Storia della Filosofia Romana -- PARTE II

Speranza Philodemus was a Syrian, born at Gadara (near the Sea of Galilee), and hecame to Rome probably in the 70s, under the patronage of L.Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, consul in 58 and censor in 50. Piso wasthe father of Caesar’s wife, Calpurnia and in 55 the target of Cicero’sspeechIn Pisonem. He owned a splendid villa at Herculaneum,known best to the modern world through its replica, which used tohouse the Getty Museum at Malibu in California. Since 1754 a largenumber of Epicurean papyri have been discovered and unrolled in thevilla at Herculaneum. is very likely that they were part of the libraryof the school of Philodemus. Philodemus himself was best known as apoet: Virgil was his friend and a pupil of Siro, although he was not anEpicurean. As a student in Athens Philodemus had studied under theEpicurean, Zeno of Sidon, whom Cicero had heard “as a very sharp oldman” and whose teaching on Epicurean pleasure he reports with disap-proval. Zeno was Philodemus’guiding light, justly so in that he wasthe most creative Epicurean philosopher of his time. Philodemus wroteon music, rhetoric and poetry, and the Herculaneum papyri containfragments of many of his prose philosophical works, among them ahistory of philosophy (including the lists of philosophers and theirworks in the Index Stoicorum and the Index Academicorum), andworks on Epicurean logic, physics and ethics, and on the gods. Someof these probably post-date Lucretius’death, and they show that therewere differences between Philodemus and Lucretius on topics commonto both. For example, in his work on Phenomena and Inferences (usu-ally known by its Latin title, De Signis), Philodemus reports Zeno’steaching on induction and inferences from phenomena, which differsfrom the deductive method of Lucretius. Again, Philodemus wrote awork on Death, part of the fourth book of which survives in the Hercu-laneum papyri, which is “gentle and sympathetic, free of the abrasive-ness of Lucretius’account”. He shows sympathy and understandingfor those who die young, since those who die old have been able toreach harbour after a life well lived; for the bereaved; for those whodie in a foreign country. He thinks it madness ( apoplexia ) to want todie a heroic death in war, since heroes and ordinary people are in thesame predicament, “ for we all live in a city that has no walls againstdeath ” . The teaching of Philodemus is, like that of Lucretius, full of EPICUREANS95 poetic colour and energized by personal feeling, but he shows greatersympathy for human weakness than Lucretius.Indeed, there is no evidence that Lucretius read the work of Philodemus or knew him, and there is strong evidence that he was notinfluenced by him. 14 The four heroes of early Epicureanism wereknown as “ The Men ” ( Hoi Andres ): these were Epicurus, Metrodorus,Hermarchus and Polyaenus. They were revered by Philodemus andEpicureans of his time — except for Lucretius. He alone revered Epicu-rus exclusively, as man, father and god.Lucretius, then, stood apart from contemporary Epicureans. He doesnot seem to have been concerned with the philosophical debates of histime. 15 When he does attack other schools, his targets are the Aca-demics and Sceptics, but in terms of debates that predated Epicurus.David Sedley (1998) has called him a “ fundamentalist ” , that is, onewho revered the texts of the founder of the school. 16 The principal sources for Lucretius ’ Epicurean philosophy, there-fore, are to be found in Epicurus ’ sayings and writings. Until veryrecently it has been assumed that these are the works reproduced byDiogenes Laertius in Book 10 of his Lives of the Philosophers . Sedley,however, has argued convincingly for the work On Nature ( Peri Phy-seos ) as Lucretius ’ only Epicurean source. 17 This work survives onlyin fragments in the Herculaneum papyri, and Sedley has brilliantlyreconstructed the contents and their relationship to Lucretius ’ poem,which he believes was closely based on the first fifteen of the thirty-seven books of Epicurus ’ work. His second chart (p. 136), shows howLucretius incorporated the doctrines of Epicurus, where he changedtheir order, and where he brought in arguments that do not appear in On Nature . The advantages of Sedley ’ s thesis are that Lucretius ’ work appears to be more coherent and consistent, and that the obvious differ-ences between De Rerum Natura and the texts given by Diogenes Laer-tius are no longer problematic.Nevertheless, these texts are complete and available to readers of this book, and a review of them will be the most efficient procedure forunderstanding the relationship of Lucretius ’ philosophy to that of Epi-curus. Epicurean doctrine was organized into three categories: kanon-ike (logic and epistemology), physike (observation of the world andnature), and ethike (morality). Diogenes Laertius transcribes three let-ters of Epicurus to his disciples. The Letter to Herodotus deals withphysics, and therefore is closest in its material to Lucretius. 18 It con-tains doctrine on atoms and void, the subjects of the first two books of Lucretius and Books 1 – 2 and 5 of On Nature ; 19 on images and sense-perception, treated in Book 4 of Lucretius and Books 3 – 4 of On Nature ; 20 on the nature and mortality of the soul, dealt with in Book 3of Lucretius and Books 6 – 9 of On Nature . Lucretius does not dealwith time, the subject of §§ 72 – 73a of the Letter to Herodotus andtreated in Book 10 of On Nature . (Time does not seem to have been aproblem for Roman philosophers except in so far as they were con-cerned with the immortality of the soul and its relationship to the mor-tal body. The first extended discussion in Latin appears to be in Book 11 of Augustine ’ s Confessions .) Epicurus ’ doctrine on properties(colour, etc.) appears in Book 4 of Lucretius and in Book 10 of On Nature . 22 The doctrine on other worlds does not appear in Book 5 of Lucretius with the other teachings of Book 12 of On Nature , but inBook 2 (corresponding to the Letter to Herodotus , 45) as part of thediscussion of atoms and their properties. 23 The doctrine on the originsof civilization takes up the last half of Book 5 of Lucretius andappeared in Book 12 of On Nature . 24 The Letter to Herodotus focuseson the origins of language, whereas Lucretius ’ discussion is farbroader. Finally, the Letter to Herodotus discusses the correct attitudeto the heavenly bodies, showing that inner peace ( ataraxia ) will beachieved if one has knowledge of their physical nature and does notthink or fear that they can affect one ’ s life. 25 The Letter to Herodotus closes ( § 83) with an exhortation to Herodotus to learn its doctrines byheart so as to attain calm of mind. This attitude underlies Lucretius ’ discussion of celestial phenomena in Book 6, corresponding to Book 13 of On Nature .The Letter to Herodotus , then, contains many of the doctrines of Lucretius in summary form, and often in a different order (e.g. the dis-cussions of other worlds in §§ 45 and 73 – 74). 26 Sedley has demon-strated (pp. 138 – 44) why Lucretius went back to the full text of On Nature rather than the summary in the Letter to Herodotus , which, asEpicurus himself said ( § 83), was to be learned by heart, an impossibil-ity (at least for ordinary human beings) for the reader of the 37 booksof On Nature . 27 The second document recorded by Diogenes Laertius is Epicurus ’ Letter to Pythocles , which deals with celestial phenomena (in Greek, tameteora ) 28 This material appears in the first half of Book 5 and inBook 6 of Lucretius, corresponding to material in Books 11 – 13 of On Nature . Notable is the doctrine on the size of the sun, that it is “ as greatas it appears to us ” . This was also the view of Democritus, and it wasridiculed by Cicero. 29 More important is Epicurus ’ reason for studyingcelestial phenomena. 30 Like Herodotus, Pythocles is urged to memo-rize Epicurus ’ doctrine, so as to achieve calm of mind. Here ( § 85) Epi-curus refers to the Letter to Herodotus as “ the short summary ” (which LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS97 Pythocles is commanded also to learn by heart), a clear indication thatthe full text of On Nature was the source of the letters ’ doctrines andtherefore more likely to be the source for Lucretius.The physical doctrines of the first two letters (including elements of the Epicurean theory of knowledge, which belongs properly in the cat-egory of kanonike ) are means to the ethical goal of happiness achievedthrough peace of mind. This goal is implicit throughout Lucretius ’ poem and it is made explicit in many passages. Thus the ideal of free-dom from anxiety, gained through knowledge of the physical world, iswoven into the texture of the poem. It is not surprising, then, that Epi-curus ’ Letter to Menoeceus , which deals with ethics, has fewer exactcorrespondences with De Rerum Natura than the first two letters, forthere was no need for Lucretius to include a specific segment corre-sponding with the Epicurean category of ethics. 31 The letter beginswith an urgent invitation to study philosophy:Let no one who is young put off studying philosophy, nor let onewho is old be weary of it. For no one is too young or too old forthe health of the soul … Therefore both the young and the oldshould study philosophy … So it is necessary to give our attentionto the things that bring happiness, since when it is present wehave everything, and when it is absent the goal of all our actionsis to attain it.The spirit of this statement drives Lucretius ’ poem.Epicurus continues with doctrine about the gods, that they exist butthat the common beliefs about them are false. This doctrine isexpanded by Lucretius (perhaps from Book 13 of On Nature ) in a beau-tiful passage in the introduction to Book 6. Here the gods are happyand good, and the pious human being will perceive the “ likenesses ” ( simulacra ) of atoms that flow from them, and so be able to share intheir tranquillity. But if human beings ascribe anger and other humanemotional disturbances to the gods, they will increase their own fearand hinder the attainment of peace of mind. Next, the Letter to Menoeceus turns to Epicurean doctrine on death,that it is nothing to us, and that fear of death diminishes the quality of life and the attainment of happiness. Lucretius expands this in thelast part of Book 3, starting with this resounding declaration:Death therefore is nothing to us and concerns us not at all, sincethe nature of the soul is held to be mortal. The logic of the arguments of Epicurus and Lucretius is consistent withtheir ethical doctrine, for fear of death will lessen pleasure and there-fore be an obstacle to happiness. Yet some Epicureans found this doc-trine too austere, and Philodemus is more sensitive in his recognitionof the human emotions involved in death and bereavement.The Letter to Menoeceus then discusses the Epicurean doctrine of desire and pleasure. Epicurus says bluntly:We recognize pleasure as our primary and innate good, and it isthe beginning of every choice and aversion that we make. To itwe return, judging every good with feeling as our criterion.But Epicurus goes on to set limits to pleasure, which is truly the bal-ance between extremes of pain and excess of pleasure, achievedthrough reason ( phronesis ), which he calls “ more valuable even thanphilosophy ” ( § 132). Thus the truly pleasurable life is one of modera-tion and virtue. And so the letter concludes with the picture of the vir-tuous man, who honours the gods, does not fear death, and achieveshappiness through reason and virtue, while avoiding pain and mentaldisturbance. If Menoeceus learns these precepts and practises them,he too will be such a man, for, Epicurus concludes:you will live as a god among men. For the man who lives amongimmortal good things is nothing like a mortal being.Lucretius expresses this doctrine in his praises of Epicurus, whoascends from man in Book 1 to god in Book 5.The three Epicurean letters were summaries of Epicurus ’ doctrine,for Epicurus wanted his students to learn his precepts by heart. Moresummary yet are the 40 principles, known as the Principal Doctrines (in Greek, Kyriai Doxai and abbreviated here as KD ), which DiogenesLaertius quotes as the “ colophon ” (literally, “ the finishing touch ” ) of his book on Epicurus. The first four of the KD are: 1 -- That which is blessed and eternal has no troubles and brings notrouble upon others: it is free from anger and favour 2 -- death is nothing to us 3 -- pleasure reaches its full limit in the removal of pain 4 -- pain in the flesh does not last long, and the time when it exceedspleasure is limited. These four doctrines were summarized in the famous “fourfold rem-edy”(tetrapharmakos), quoted by Philodemus: God is not to be feared. Death is free from anxiety. The good is easy to attain. The terrible is easy to endure. The tetrapharmakos is the basic formula for Epicurean ethics. WhileLucretius does not quote it explicitly, the first pair of maxims is thebasis of his poem. He explains “the nature of things”in order to provethat the gods should not be feared and that death is nothing to us.Knowledge of the physical world will make attainable the good life,that is, a life free from mental disturbance. Lucretius does not developan argument based on the fourth maxim, but Book 6, which is incom-plete, ends with the terrors of the plague at Athens. He could well haveended by showing that even such a great evil could have been enduredby those who knew Epicurean doctrine, whereas in fact the people of Athens, not being Epicureans, were subject to the fear, terror, panicand divisiveness that he describes. Epicurus next focuses on the individual’s relations with society: hesays that one cannot live a pleasant life without being just and virtu-ous. Yet justice is part of the social compact, not an absolute princi-ple. Again, if one can achieve personal security, then the best life isone that is peaceful and withdrawn from the multitude. The mostimportant means to individual security is friendship. These principles are based on the doctrine of “ living unobtrusively ” (in Greek, lathe biosas , a phrase known from the title of an anti-Epicurean treatise of Plutarch), which obviously conflicts with theStoic ideal of participation in public life and with the Roman ideal of duty to the state (as expressed in Cicero ’ s Dream of Scipio and DeSenectute ). In his account of the development of civilization Lucretiussays: 43 But [i.e. in contrast to the simple life] men wished to be famousand powerful, so that their good fortune might rest on a firmfoundation and that they might be wealthy and lead a peacefullife. In vain! For in the competition to reach the heights of suc-cess they made their journey dangerous, and envy cast themdown from the top … So that it is much better to live in peace andobey orders than to wish to control affairs by giving orders andholding supreme power.Lucretius looks more unsparingly at Roman politics of his own time: How sweet it is, when the winds stir up the sea, to look from theland upon another ’ s struggles! Not because it is a pleasure thatanother should be in distress, but because it is pleasant toobserve from what evils you are free. Sweet it is also to watchthe mighty battles of war, armies drawn up on the battlefields,without yourself sharing in the danger. But nothing is sweeterthan to live in calm and lofty precincts protected by the teachingsof wise men. From them you can look down on others and seehow they wander here and there, aimlessly trying to find a paththrough life. They compete with their abilities, they contend innoble birth, and night and day they struggle to climb to theheights of wealth and power. O unhappy minds of men! O blindhearts! How great the darkness of life and how great the dangerin which you spend your span of life, whatever it is! Do you notsee how nature proclaims that she demands no more than this — that pain be kept separate from the body, and that the mind, freefrom fear and anxiety, enjoy the sensation of pleasure?This attitude is not irresponsible hedonism, but rather a reasoned reac-tion to the inhumanities of political life, both at Rome and (in Epicu-rus ’case) in the Greek city-state. Even the Stoic Zeno, in his Republic,had proposed the abolition of the basic institutions of the Greek cityand the establishment of a community of virtuous men and women,who alone were capable of friendship, political association and free-dom. Epicurus suggested that instead of political competition and theenvy, resentment and failure that it involves, society should adopt dif-ferent customs —friendship, justice and mutual support. Lucretius rec-ognizes that the Romans of the senatorial class will not withdraw fromexisting political institutions (such as elections, magistracies and otherpublic offices), and so he falls back on the ethical doctrines of Epicu-rus, particularly the principle of pleasure (and its corollary, the avoid-ance of pain). To participate in political life is to invite disturbance of the mind: power is an illusory goal, for it is followed by envy and(often) failure. Much better, then, to seek to attain calm of mindthrough the avoidance of pain, and to seek a place in society throughfriendship. The doctrine of lathe biosas undercuts the very foundations of theGreek city-state and of Roman political life. Yet, in Rome, Epicureanssuch as Cicero’s friend, Atticus, took a prominent and productive partin the life of the community without seeking political office. Some,like Cassius, reasoned that it was necessary to participate in the politi-cal struggle, because refusal to participate would be a greater evil for the community and would bring greater mental pain to the individualthan involvement. L. Calpurnio Piso Caesoninus was obligated by family tradition and noble ancestry to take a prominent part in publiclife, without abandoning Epicurean principles. Moreover, friendship,in both the Greek and Roman worlds, had political connotations. Here,for example, is part of the introduction to Aristotle’s discussion of friendship. Friendship seems also to keep cities together, and lawgivers aremore concerned about it than about justice. For harmony (homonoia) appears to be like friendship in some way, and thelawgivers make it their chief goal and most of all they drive outdiscord, as bringing enmity. And those who are friends do notneed justice, while those who are just need friendship. Friendship (“amicitia”) was a feature of Roman political life and,through the institution of clientship, it was an important element in ameliorating the inequalities of class distinctions. Lucrezio, then, forall the potency of his satire, is following Epicuro (who himself mighthave known Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics) in suggesting not merelyindividual quietism, but rather an alternative way of interacting withsociety. The Kyriai Doxai focus also on celestial phenomena (Greek, mete-ora, the subject of theLetter to Pythocles). These are listed as objectsof fear (along with death and pain), which can be removed by the studyof the physical world. If one knows the nature of the universe, thenone can be rid of fear and enjoy pleasure; similarly, individual securityis unattainable if one is afraid because of “things that exist above ourheads and under the earth and in the whole infinite [universe].” These doctrines are especially prominent in Books 3 and 6 of Lucretius, and the principle of “knowing the nature of the universe”isthe foundation of his poem.Epicurus lays down criteria for pleasure and desire and their oppo-sites, pain and aversion. These principles were expressed more fullyin the Letter to Menoeceus (127b –32), where phronesis (reason) isgiven a higher place than philosophy in establishing the equilibriumbetween pleasure and pain. Epicurus shows in both the Kyriai Doxai and the Letter to Menoeceus that the greatest pleasure is achievedthrough reason and by living a simple life. In technical terms, suchpleasure is “static”, whereas physical experiences that stimulate plea-sure (eating, sexual activity and other sensual experiences) involvemovement. Epicurus says that some desires are physical and necessary (for example, for food and clothing); some are physical and unnec-essary (for example, for luxury or sexual pleasure); some neither physi-cal nor necessary. The third category should be suppressed. The first,being necessary, must be satisfied, but simply, and the second requiresthe exercise of reason. Epicuro clearly subordinates “kinetic” to “static” pleasure, following the lead of Plato’s satirical discussion of pleasure in the Gorgias. There Socrates likens a life in which pleasures have to be continuously renewed to filling a jar that is full of holes. So Lucrezio uses the myth of the Danaids as a parable for those “whocan never be filled with the joys of life. Elsewhere he says that Epi-curus understood that the container [i.e. the human body] was leakyand full of holes, so that it never could be filled”, and so “he set a limitto desire. Lucrezio expounds this doctrine in several other passages,for example: But if anyone would guide his life by true reason, [he wouldlearn that] it is great riches for a man to live sparingly and withmind untroubled, for never can one be poor for lack of a little. Thus the principle of pleasure (the most controversial element of Epi-curean philosophy) is found rather to involve reason and moderation,the same qualities as those taught by other philosophies. Our survey of Epicurean doctrines has been a long but necessary preparation for discussion of the text of Lucretius’poem. The poem is a little over 7,400 lines long and its six books are arranged in threepairs. The first two books deal with atoms and void. The next pair dealwith the soul and death (Book 3) and thought and sense-perception,ending with a diatribe on sexual passion (Book 4). Books 5 and 6 dealwith the universe, first the mortality of the world, then the origins of the world and celestial bodies, followed by the origins of civilizationand its progress (Book 5). Book 6 is concerned with celestial and mete-orological phenomena and ends with a description of the plague of 431–429 BCE in Athens, which is based on Thucydides. The poem may be complete as it stands, but it is probable that Lucretius wouldhave drawn the moral from the human despair caused by the plague. He would have needed to add a few lines saying that if the Athenianshad been able to follow the doctrines of Epicurus (praised at the begin-ning of Book 6 as the greatest gift of Athens to human beings), theywould not have been troubled and would not have behaved as they did. But the plague struck nearly a century before the birth of Epicurus, andso the Athenians then were trapped in the moral and mental darknessthat Epicurus dispelled by his philosophy. If we suppose that the poem as we have it is complete, it ends withfunerals, just as the Iliad had ended with the funeral of Hector. In addi-tion, the abrupt ending, with disease, death and cremation, is a power-ful contrast with the opening hymn to Venus. These arguments are,however, literary, and the thesis that the poem is incomplete is moreconsistent with the focus on Epicurus and his doctrine. There are two other places where there is evidence of lack of revi-sion or incompleteness. The proem to Book 4 contains two versions of the programmatic introduction to the discussion of “images of things”(rerum simulacra), that is the effluences of atoms that stream off thesurface of objects and are perceived by us. In the first version (4. 45–53) Lucretius is trying to find the right Latin term for the Greek word “eidola”. Lucrezio uses “simulacra”, membranae and cortex (bark). In the second passage he keeps simulacra, and the efflu-ences are now “ like membranes”, which then are developed into a sim-ile. He no longer uses “bark ” as an equivalent of eidolon, instead keep-ing it as the outer surface of an object from which the effluencesflow. Thus we can see him refining his language from the first ver-sion, which would have been removed in the final revision. The second piece of evidence for incompleteness is at 5. 155, whereLucretius promises that he will discuss the homes and bodies of thegods “at great length”, a promise that he did not fulfil. Here, as in theproem to Book 4, the inconsistency is hardly important in consideringthe poem as a whole. The structure of the poem proceeds from the microcosm, through thehuman experience, to the macrocosm, although the ending returns tothe human experience, appropriately, given the underlying purpose of the poem, which is to remove the fear of death. Within each pair of books there is a movement from the general (atoms and void in Book 1; the soul and mortality in Book 3; the world in Book 5) to particularphenomena (properties of atoms in Book 2; perception and sensation inBook 4; celestial phenomena and the plague in Book 6). If we dividethe poem into two halves of three books each, then death is the climac-tic subject of each half: a resounding denial of its power over the fol-lowers of Epicurus in Book 3, and in Book 6 a dramatic portrayal of citizens rendered divided and dysfunctional by death in the absence of the doctrines of Epicurus. To have organized the teachings of Epicurus into a coherent epicpoem (for the epithet “didactic” totally fails to do justice to the lofti-ness and power of the poem) was in itself a great achievement. Lucretius, however, changed the traditional Epicurean method simplyby returning to poetry, the medium of several of the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers. This meant that he had to take material written in Greek prose (that was more often than not difficult) and present it in the hexameter, a medium more appropriate for the Greek epic language of Homer and Apollonius or the philosophical poems of Empedocles andParmenides, than for the Latin language. This he had to dowith a vocabulary that was at best limited and more often non-existent. We have just seen how he set about finding the right word for theGreek “eidola”, and he is as inventive as Cicero in developing a vocabulary, as he does, for example, with the Greek “atoma” (“things which cannot be cut”). Five Latin equivalents occur in an early passage. I shall begin to teach you about the highest system of the heav-ens and the gods, and I shall explain beginnings of things (rerun primordia) which in giving our account we call matter ( materies) and creative bodies for things (genitalia corpora), and weusually call them the seeds of things (semina rerum), and we usethe term “first bodies”(corpora prima), because from them asthe first things all things are constituted. Lucretius did not underestimate the problem of vocabulary. In theintroduction to the first book he says: I know full well how hard it is to bring into light in Latin poetry the dark discoveries of the Greeks, especially when I must explain many things in new words, because of the novelty of the subject. But by the beginning of the second half of the poem he exults in his pioneering achievement: I journey through the trackless regions of the Muses, neverbefore trodden by human feet. I delight in approachinguntouched springs and drinking from them. I delight in pickingnew flowers and gathering for my head a glorious wreath fromflowers that the Muses have never before used to garland [apoet’s] head. First, because I teach about great matters and my journey’s goal is to untie the tight knots of superstition. Second,because my poem, bathed in light, illuminates so dark a theme,and I touch everything with the Muses’charm. The joy and confidence of the passage is largely expressed through itspoetic metaphors (eight in nine lines), and it leads to an extended simile (lines 11–25) likening his poetry to the honey that parents smear onthe cup to help their children drink nasty-tasting medicine, while it isimplied that Memmius will be healed (another metaphor) once helearns the nature of things. Vocabulary and metaphor were not simply literary matters. In theLetter to Herodotus 38, Epicurus says that Herodotus must primarily “understand the underlying meaning of words”, so as to have a crite-rion by which to test opinions and impressions. For, he says, he mustconsider the first meaning (Greek, ennoema) of each word, which must be clear and need no proof. This doctrine is closely connected with the doctrine of sense-perceptions, which for the Epicureans are true. Lucretius says, “therefore what is perceived by the senses at any time is true”. Just as we perceive the effluences of atoms flowing from the surface of an object, so the effluences of atoms of words (spoken or written) give the reader or hearerthe true meaning. Therefore precise vocabulary and accuratemetaphorical writing are essential for the teacher. If we apply this doctrine to Lucretius, we can see that his vocabulary, and, still more, his marvellously vivid metaphors and similes, are essential elements bothin his poetry and in his philosophy. Poet and philosopher must make the reader see. The effect is are contextualization of both the traditional devices of poetry andthe basic elements of Epicurean epistemology, particularly the “first image”(prolepsis) associated with each word, the basis forlive metaphor. The complexity and precision of Lucrezio’s imagery is thus also an aspect of his role as philosopher andscientist. Lucrezio floods his poem with Greek words,but avoids them in the course of doctrinal exposition. This, too, isanother facet of the importance of the first impression of a word. If thedoctrines of Epicurus are to be rightly understood by a Roman audience, then the vocabulary must be precise and Roman. Lucretius uses Greek words to refer to Greek ideas that he rejects. Thus he says, “now let us examine the homoeomeria of Anaxagoras.” Anaxagoras’theory that “parts are similar to thewhole”is left with its Greek term, because it and the theory that it denotes are inconsistent with both the Latin language and Epicurean doctrine. Often Lucretius deliberately uses a Greek word precisely becauseof its difference from Latin. In the description of the Trojan War there are five Greek names, one non-Latin portmanteau-word for “sons of the Greeks ”(Graiugenarum), and one Greek epithet for the woodenhorse, durateus. Although there is a Latin word for “wooden” (ligneus), Lucretius chose to transliterate the Greek word, precisely because it was Greek and was part of a Greek myth. Again, in argu-ing for the universality of innate powers in animals, he uses the phrase catuli pantherarum scymnique leonum (“panther kittens and lioncubs”). The word “catuli” is Latin, but the Greek word “pantherarum” refers to animals from distant parts of the world, strange to Italy. He could have used the regular word for lion-cubs (catuli) but instead hedeliberately uses the Greek word “skymnoi” (Latinized as “scymni”). Thebilingual vocabulary confirms his point, that the phenomenon of innatepowers is universal. Finally, in comparing himself to Epicurus, hesays, why should the swallow (hirundo) compete with swans (cycnis),or what power would kids (haedi) have with their tremblinglimbs in running compared with the mighty strength of the horse(fortis equi vis)? He himself in these similes is signified by Latin words (hirundo,haedi), but Epicurus by a Greek word, cycnus -- the Latin word for a swan is olor -- and a Greek epic expression -- “strength of a horse” for “horse”. So the point is made, that Lucretius, the Latin poet, is bring-ing Greek doctrine into Latin poetry. We return now to the structure of the poem. Each book is precededby an introductory passage. The first proem is both the longest and themost complex. It begins with an epic invocation, addressing Venus as Aeneadum genetrix hominum divumque voluptas ( “ Mother of the sonsof Aeneas, the pleasure of men and gods ” ). The vocabulary is Greek ( Aeneadum ) and Latin; the content is political (Venus, through her sonAeneas, as origin of the Roman race) and philosophical ( voluptas , anallusion to Epicurean hedone) and allusive (invocation of a divine fig-ure, as in the first lines of the Homeric epics and the Annales of Ennius). This leads to a hymn and prayer to Venus as the origin of lifeand of the variety of the universe and its powers of procreation; Venus,too, as the bringer of peace, the lover and tamer of Mars, god of war.Venus, therefore, is the appropriate source for Lucretius ’ poem on “ thebeginnings of things, from which nature creates all things ” . Theproem then continues with praise of Epicurus; an attack on the evils of religion and superstition; and warnings to Memmius (Lucretius ’ patron and dedicatee) against trusting in religious stories; finally, the poet ’ scomplaint about the difficulty of expressing himself in Latin poetry. This splendid introduction is problematic. Why should a poet whowill demolish traditional myths and beliefs about the gods begin with ahymn to one of those very gods? How can he ask for the interventionof a god in human affairs, when Epicurean theology expressly deniedthis possibility? The most persuasive answer is that the proem is, and is meant to be recognized as, an imitation of the proemto Empedocles ’physical poem. Just as Empedocles had been thegreat Greek poet — philosopher of Nature (his major — or only — poemwas titled On Nature), so Lucretius will be the Roman philosopher — poet of Nature. Just as Empedocles had appealed to Aphrodite (compa-rable to the Roman Venus), so Lucretius will appeal to Venus. Empedocles had based his theory of cosmic cycles on the conflict betweenLove and Strife, so Lucretius will bring about a resolution of the con-flicts caused by mental and psychological distress through the philoso-phy of Epicurus. Not that Lucretius follows Empedocles uncritically.He says that Sicily produced no one more distinguished, and that hispoetry came from a “ god-like heart ” and made him seem to be “ hardlyborn of human stock ” , yet Lucretius attacks him for his pluralism. 77 Whatever solutions scholars have proposed for the problems raisedby the proem, the power of this opening has struck its readers in allages. 78 As the proem to an epic poem on philosophy, it announcesLucretius ’ philosophical and literary allegiances: Epicurus is thesource of his philosophy; Empedocles is his guide for a poem on thenature of things.Four of Lucretius ’ six proems sing the praises of Epicurus, and thosefor Books 1, 3 and 5 each preface a two-book segment. In the first (1.62 – 79) Epicurus is “ a Man of Greece ” , whose intellect passed beyondthe bounds of the universe and, through knowledge, gave men thepower to crush religion and make them equal to the gods. Poetry andphilosophy are wonderfully interwoven in this passage: 79 When human life lay on the ground in full view, a nasty sight,crushed by the weight of Religion, which showed her face fromheaven, fearsome to see, threatening mortals — then first a Manof Greece dared to raise mortal eyes in defiance and to resist her.Him neither tales of the gods nor lightning nor the sky withthreatening thunder could keep down. Instead, all the more didthey stimulate the keen courage of his spirit to be eager to burstthrough the confining bars of the gates of nature. Therefore thelively power of his mind triumphed, and he passed far beyond 108THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS the fiery walls of the universe ( flammantia moenia mundi ) andtravelled through the whole of boundless space in mind and intel-lect. Thence as victor he brings us report of what can come intobeing and what cannot, what are the limits to the power of eachthing and where is its deep-fixed boundary marker. Thus Reli-gion in its turn is crushed beneath our feet, and his victory makesus equal to heaven.Lucretius later shows how the tranquillity of the gods can be shared bythe human being who correctly perceives their nature. 80 Epicurus wassaid to have been exceptionally pious and not at all an atheist, andLucretius directs his criticism at false impressions of the gods, spreadby the traditional tales of mythology and perpetuated by human fearand superstition. As an example of this he tells the story of Iphigenia, acentral myth of the human dilemma between personal obligations andambitions, between personal preferences and the demands of societyand religion. The daughter, “ sinfully butchered by her father — all forthe happy and auspicious departure of the fleet ” , is the tragic exampleof the evils of religion. Lucretius concludes (1. 101): “ such were theevils which religion had the power to suggest ” . 81 Lucretius then turns to address Memmius, for he, too, may feel “ ter-ror and darkness of the mind ” , which Lucretius will dispel by “ a sur-vey and reasoned discussion of nature ” . 82 And this leads into his epic(a suitable term for this didactic poem), which he places in the traditionof the great epic teachers of Greece and Rome, Homer and Ennius. 83 The poet ’ s first lesson will be about the first beginnings, and the firstprinciple is “ nothing can ever come into being from nothing by thegods ’ agency ” . Second, that nothing can dissipate into nothing, andnothing can be destroyed. Third, the nature of things consists of atomsand void. 84 These three lessons are basic to Lucretius ’ doctrine, which derivesfrom Epicurus and ultimately from the fifth-century BCE Greek atom-ists, Leucippus and Democritus. He presents each lesson briefly anddogmatically, and then supports the argument with examples, fromwhich he deduces the inevitability of his conclusions. An understand-ing of the structure of the physical world will lead to an understandingof the true nature of the fears, superstitions and psychological distur-bances that make life unnecessarily difficult for those who are ignorantof the teachings of Epicurus. Lucretius punctuates his discussion withthe proem to Book 2 (quoted above). Acting on the principle of “ smear-ing honey on the cup ” (4. 10 – 13), he keeps before Memmius the ethi-cal purpose of his teaching, which he relates to the political and social LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS109 world of Memmius. He then returns to atomic doctrine. First heteaches about the forming of material objects from atoms and their dis-solution, about their motion, their shapes and compounds, their lack of colour and other secondary qualities. 85 A famous variation from Epicu-rus ’ extant teaching on the movements of atoms is the passage on the “ swerve ” ( clinamen ) of atoms in their downward progress, which mayhave been part (now lost) of Epicurus ’ On Nature . It is a third causefor the movement of atoms, the first two being “ blows ” (i.e. impact of other atoms) and the second “ weight ” (i.e. gravity). The “ swerve ” isneeded to account for the conjunction of atoms to form objects:for if they did not usually swerve, all things would fall down-wards through the deep void, like drops of rain. No collisionwould be brought into being and no blow would come into beingfor atoms. Thus Nature would never have created anything.Lucretius extends this to the freedom of the human will. If there wereno “ swerve ” , then the chain of causation would extend inexorablywithout variation. But the clinamen allows the human will to go wherepleasure leads it, and allows human beings to proceed “ where our mindcarries us ” . This is possible in Epicurean doctrine, because of the mate-rialist explanation of all things, including motions of the mind.Lucretius concludes:But that the mind in itself may not have some interior compul-sion in all actions, that it may not be compelled, like somethingthat has been conquered, to bear and to suffer — this is achievedby the tiny swerve of first things in no pre-ordained place at nopre-ordained time.After the discussion of motion and properties of atoms, Lucretius com-pletes Book 2 by considering the infinite possibilities of unions of atoms when their present formations are dissipated, since matter can-not be destroyed. 86 For there is no limit to the void, and therefore thereneed be no limit to the creation of worlds other than our own.Lucretius ends his two books on physics with the old farmer, worn outby a lifetime ’ s labour, facing death and grumbling, “ for he does notremember that all things gradually waste away and go to the grave ( ad capulum ) wearied by old ages long extent of life ” . Thus the way is pre-pared for Book 3 and its climactic discussion of death.Noticeable also is the way in which Lucretius introduces the discus-sion on the infinity of worlds by returning to the ideas of creative 110THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS Nature that so brightly coloured the Hymn to Venus at the beginningof the poem. 87 The component atoms in nature go through their cycleof creation and decay: so, too, human beings, and the world of natureand other worlds, must expect that the constitution of their materialatoms must in time be dissipated to form new individuals and newworlds.The proem to Book 3 begins with praise of Epicurus, expressed withgratitude, reverence and awe, in sublime poetry. 88 The theme of thebook is darkness and light — the darkness of ignorance and superstition,the light of knowledge and freedom from fear. So Epicurus is the firstto bring such light: he is “ the glory of the Greek race ” , and Lucretiuswill follow him, being as a swallow to a swan, or a kid to a horse. Epi-curus, who in Book 1 was “ a Man of Greece ” , is now “ father, the dis-coverer of things, the giver of a father ’ s precepts ” , and Lucretius willfeed on his “ golden sayings ” as bees feed on flowers. Lucretius ’ lineson the effect of Epicurus ’ teaching are central to an understanding of the nature of his poem and his own inspiration:For as soon as your philosophy, springing from your godlikemind, began to proclaim the nature of things, the terrors of themind disperse, the walls of the universe are parted, I see theworkings of the world throughout the void. I see the majesty of the gods in their tranquil homes … Nature, indeed, supplies[them] with everything, nor does anything diminish their peaceof mind at any time. On the other hand, the regions of Acheron[the Underworld] cannot be seen … At these things [i.e. the teach-ings of Epicurus] a godlike pleasure and a shudder of awe takeshold of me, because through your power nature is revealed soclearly and unveiled in every part.This is the heart of the matter. Not only does Lucretius revere Epicurusas a father, but he experiences a religious transformation, whichreveals to him the truth about the nature of the universe and of humanlife and death, and leads him to follow with an enthusiasm that is likethe “ holy rapture ” (the phrase is E.J.Kenney ’ s) of a devotee of thegods. But the Epicurean gods are tranquil and their peace of mind iscomplete. Lucretius ’ readers, too, will experience such tranquillity if they understand his teachings.The primary purpose of the poet ’ s teaching is to remove the fear of death from the minds of human beings. Such fear is the opposite of theinner and outer peace that the doctrines of Epicurus have revealed. Therest of the proem (31 – 93), therefore, turns directly to the fear of death. LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS111 Lucretius shows how this fear motivates men ’ s attitudes to life, in par-ticular their superstitions, their ambitions, crimes and envy, which leadthem to disregard morality in their relations with other human beings.They are like children in the dark (87 – 88), and Lucretius concludeswith a return to the opening theme of darkness and light (91 – 93):Therefore this terror of the mind and darkness must be dispelled,not by the rays of the sun nor by the bright shafts of daylight, butby observing nature and by reason.This elaborate proem encompasses and anticipates the themes of Book 3. Lucretius will show why death should not be feared. He has alreadyexplained the atomic composition of the exterior world; now he willexplain the composition of the human mind ( animus ) and soul, or moreaccurately “ spirit ” ( amnia ), which are material, consisting of atoms. 89 The distinction between animus and anima (Greek nous and psyche respectively), which is clear in Greek, was blurred by Democritus andEpicurus. Democritus, according to Aristotle, said that “ they are thesame ” , referring (so later authors show) to their atomic composition.Both he and Epicurus said that the soul consisted of two parts, respec-tively reasoning and unreasoning, which were structurally identical. Atany rate, it is the union of mind and spirit with the body that makeshuman life possible. Since they came into being with the body, theywill dissipate when the body dies: they, therefore, are mortal. 90 If theydie, then our existence comes to an end with their dissolution. Death,therefore, is nothing to fear; the myths of the Underworld and its tor-ments hold no terrors for us, and we can achieve happiness by accept-ing our mortality. 91 This bald summary does not do justice to the impassioned rhetoricof the poet. After giving twenty-nine proofs of the mortality of thesoul, he begins his conclusion, that death is not to be feared, by quot-ing Epicurus: “ Death therefore is nothing to us. ” He continues: 92 [Death] does not concern us at all, since the nature of the mind( animus ) is considered to be mortal. And just as in times past weperceived no ill when the Carthaginians came from all sides tofight, when all things, shuddering in the trembling tumult of war,shook beneath the lofty realms of the upper air, and it was doubt-ful under which of the two [namely, Carthaginians or Romans]all things would be subjected on land and sea — so, when we nolonger exist, when the dissolution of body and soul (from whoseunion we are brought into existence), nothing, I say, will be able 112THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS to happen to us at all, for we will not then exist, nothing will beable to affect our senses — not even if earth were mixed with seaand sea with sky.I quote this splendid passage without changing Lucretius ’ punctuation,remembering how the “ first impression ” of the spoken or written wordis important in Epicurean theory. The enormous period builds up tooverwhelm the hearer with the certainty that no mass of historical orcosmic calamities can affect us after our death. The recall of the crisisof the second Punic war — the most traumatic historical event in theRoman people ’ s collective psyche in Lucretius ’ time — gives the pas-sage an immediacy for Roman hearers that would have been lackinghad Lucretius followed Epicurus in every word. The rest of the book ishardly necessary after this ringing affirmation. Nevertheless, in theremaining lines Lucretius proves the foolishness of clinging to life outof fear of death, and the folly of believing the myths of the Underworldand its punishments.Yet we must ask if his rigorously logical demonstration is adequateto parry the reality of untimely death and bereavement. We rememberthe humane sympathy of Philodemus, which we contrast withLucretius ’ satirical mockery of those who mourn the dead: 93 No more, no more will your happy home welcome you, nor yourexcellent wife, nor your lovely children running to get your kissfirst and touching your heart with silent pleasure. You will not beable to prosper by your deeds and protect your family. “ Miser-able man ” , they say, “ one hateful day has taken from you miser-ably all the rewards of life ” .Lucretius drily points out that none of this matters to the dead man,who can feel nothing. Yet even Epicurus said that “ the wise man willgrieve ” . 94 We all must die: Epicurus himself died. How then can wehesitate to face death?In a way Lucretius has completed his task by proving that knowl-edge of the “ nature of things ” will rid people of the fear of death. Nev-ertheless, he still has not expounded Epicurean doctrine on sensationand thought, or on cosmic and meteorological matters. While they arenot now essential for dispelling the fear of death — for Lucretius hasalready completed this task — they are a necessary part of a completeexposition of the nature of things. So in Book 4 Lucretius turns fromthe universal human experience of death to the particular experiencesof sensation: vision (26 – 521), the other senses (522 – 721), thought and LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS113 dreams (722 – 822). Before starting on this part of the book he pauses toproclaim his poetic mission in the service of philosophy. 95 The poetleads his hearers through trackless places and his poetry will grip theirminds, enabling them “ to perceive the whole nature of things and beaware of its usefulness ” .With this reminder he returns to the human mind (animus), whosecomposition and mortality had been such a large part of the doctrine of the third book. In the later preface (4. 26 – 44), which replaced the origi-nal one, he says: 96 now I will begin to discuss for you a subject that strongly con-cerns these matters [i.e. the nature of the animus ], that there existthings that we call the “ likenesses ” of things ( rerum simulacra ).The simulacra are the underlying concept of the first part of thebook. 97 We have seen how in the original preface Lucretius tried differ-ent equivalents for the Greek word eidola , finally settling on simulacra (likenesses) as the best Latin equivalent. The discussion is in partabout physics, that is, the physical nature of the atoms that form simu-lacra , but it even more concerns the processes of knowledge, belong-ing to the Epicurean category of kanonike . The simulacra are films oreffluences of very fine atoms flowing from the surface of objects andresulting in the perceiver ’ s sense-perception. Although Lucretiusdevotes most space to the sense of sight (26 – 521), the doctrine isequally valid for the other senses (522 – 721). Thus the atomic physicsof the first two books are proved to be valid also for individual humanexperience, and sense-perception is shown to have a material basis.Lucretius then turns to processes of thought (722 – 822), for which hegives the same materialist explanation. Like Gilbert Ryle in the twenti-eth century, he dismisses the notion of “ the mind in the machine ” .Thought is caused by exceedingly fine simulacra , whether of thingsperceived that become the objects of thought, or of things imagined(for example, centaurs). Even dreams can be explained in this way, apassage where Lucretius ’ doctrine of the “ latent image ” uncannilyanticipates Freud ’ s theories of the unconscious. 98 Lucretius next turns to the effect of the simulacra on the perceiver,thinker or dreamer. First, he refutes teleological explanations of func-tions of parts of the human body (i.e. that they were created for a pur-pose), since to suppose, for example, that the eyes were created for thepurpose of seeing, is to suppose an intelligent creator (823 – 57). Thenhe shows how desire and will are motivated by sense-impressions,including those perceived in sleep (877 – 1036). The final example, 114THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS erotic dreams (1030 – 36), leads into the last topic of the book, the stimu-lation of love and sexual desire by simulacra (1037 – 1287). In thisextraordinary diatribe Lucretius moves beyond his primary task of expounding Epicurean doctrine, for his descriptions of lust, love andthe physical aspect of sexual activity are as satirical as they are philo-sophical. Nevertheless, their purpose is consistent with Epicurus ’ doc-trine that pleasure is best experienced in moderation. 99 Lucretiusreturns to this theme in Book 5 and in his praise of Epicurus at 6. 25,where Epicurus “ set a limit to desire ” . 100 It is left now for Lucretius to turn to the world, the origins anddevelopment of life and human civilization, and cosmic phenomena,which occupy the rest of the poem as far as 6. 1089. Like Books 1 and3, Book 5 opens with praise of Epicurus, now honoured as a god: 101 For if we must speak as the majesty of the subject … requires, hewas a god, Memmius, a god, who first discovered the philosophyof life, which now we call wisdom, and who through his skillraised life from such great waves and such deep darkness, andset it in so tranquil and so bright a light.Epicurus is a greater benefactor of human beings than the gods whotaught them skills of agriculture, greater then Hercules, who rid theworld of so many terrifying monsters. Monsters, says Lucretius, stillare numerous in the forests and mountains, and we are able to avoidthem. But how can we avoid the equally terrifying monsters of ourinner disturbances? Only the doctrines of Epicurus can conquerdesires, anxieties, fears and the other things that prevent a tranquil life.That is why he should be numbered with the gods.This extraordinary proem looks back to the mental disturbances of lust and love exposed in Book 4, and forward to discussion of the Epi-curean gods, promised (but not realized) at 5. 155. Lucretius, however,now will turn to the world and prove its mortality, for that which isborn must perish (5. 64 – 66). He shows that it is composed of atomsand not created by the gods (91 – 508), and then he turns to the heav-enly bodies, the motions of the stars and the planets and their relation-ship to the earth (509 – 770). As Bailey observes, “ the astronomical sec-tion is difficult to understand and to follow ” , and it interrupts thesequence of discussion of the world and of life on earth. Sedley hasplausibly suggested that Lucretius was following the order of topics inEpicurus ’ On Nature and that he would in a final revision have trans-ferred this section to the end of Book 5, where it would lead naturallyto the discussion of celestial phenomena in Book 6. Certainly the gods LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS115 are more prominent in the programmatic lines of Book 5, and Sedleyagain is plausible in suggesting that “ the final pair [of books] was des-tined to have … the function of dispelling the fear of god ” . 102 At any rate, the astronomical section is followed by the history of life on earth: first, the origin of life and evolution and survival orextinction of species of animals. 103 The doctrine of the survival of species (855 – 77) is again a remarkable anticipation of modern theo-ries, and the joyously poetical account of the origin of life (783 – 820)recalls the hymn to Venus in the proem to Book 1. Lucretius, even if he says that Earth is rightly called “ Mother Earth ” (821 – 22), is stillfollowing Epicurean doctrine in denying any role to a creator or to thefigures of traditional mythology.The rest of the book is taken up with a history of human society,which Kenney has called “ Lucretius ’ greatest intellectual and imagina-tive achievement ” . 104 Epicurus spends very little time on this subject inthe Letter to Herodotus ( §§ 75 – 76), and it is likely that Lucretius ’ source was book 12 of On Nature . He proceeds methodically from thelife of primitive human beings (925 – 1010), to the development of civi-lization (the origins of family and community life and law, 1011 – 27;of language, 1028 – 90; of fire, 1091 – 1104; the rise of kings and thedesire for wealth, 1105 – 60; the rise of religion and superstition, 1161 – 1240; warfare, 1241 – 1349; the arts of peace — clothing, agriculture,music, 1350 – 1411; finally, the progress of civilization, 1412 – 57).This is an extraordinary passage. Its broad yet detailed treatment of history recalls Posidonius, but in its poetic intensity it is unique.Lucretius keeps before us the purpose of his poem, to bring tranquillityof mind through knowledge. Thus he comments on the futility of politi-cal ambition; 105 and he attacks wrong religion and superstition: 106 O unhappy race of human beings! To assign such deeds to thegods and add to them their bitter anger! What groans did those[early mortals] bring to birth for themselves then, what woundsfor us, what tears for our descendants! It is not piety at all to beseen often turning with veiled head to a stone, or to approachevery altar, or to lie prostrate on the ground and stretch out one ’ shands before the shrines of the gods, or to shower the altars withthe blood of four-footed animals, or to make a linked chain of prayers. No! [Piety is] rather to be able to look on everythingwith a mind at peace.Or again, on the death of primitive human beings, Lucretius shows that the pain and horror were real enough for beings who were ignorant of the consolations of philosophy: For one by one they would be caught and become living food forwild beasts to chew. Each [victim] would fill the forests andmountains and woods with his groans, as he saw his livingentrails buried in a living tomb [i.e. the wild beast]. But thosewho escaped with mutilated body would later hold their trem-bling hands over the cruel wounds and call on Death with fright-ening shrieks, until the savage agony robbed them of life, help-less and not knowing what their wounds needed.The horrifying description of primitive death has its counterpart in thedeaths by plague that end the sixth book.Book 6 begins with praise of Athens and its greatest gift tohumankind, Epicurus. 108 The proem is linked to the history of the riseof civilization at the end of Book 5, for Lucretius says that Epicurussaw that, even after civilization had advanced to its highest level inAthens, human beings were still afflicted with anxiety. And so his doc-trine purified their minds, put an end to their mental disturbances, andshowed the way to the highest good.Lucretius then turns to the first main theme of the book, celestial andmeteorological phenomena, followed by the second theme, terrestrialphenomena. 109 In the preliminary sketch of his subject (43 – 95) heespecially warns his readers against attributing celestial phenomena tothe gods. Thunder, lightning and storms can be explained rationally,without recourse to the gods. Here the poet takes aim not only at super-stition in general but specifically at Roman religious practice, in whichthe rituals for divining or exorcizing violent meteorological eventswere precisely prescribed: 110 I must come to grips with the system in the heavens and on earth,and I must tell in my poetry of storms and bright lightning. Imust tell how they act and what cause brings them into being,lest you hurry in fear mindlessly to quarter the sky and ask fromwhich quarter flying came the lightning flash, or to which quar-ter it turned as it left, or how it passed through walled enclosuresand how it passed from them after taking possession.Lucretius uses the technical vocabulary of augury. The Roman ritualwas inherited from the Etruscans, who divided the sky into sixteenparts (a number obtained by twice doubling the four original quarters) LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS117 so as to have a factual basis on which to make their divination.Lucretius develops his argument later in the book. 111 It is similar toCicero ’ s attack on the Stoics ’ support for divination from lightning,where Cicero explicitly approves of Epicurean doctrine. 112 The matterwas not just theoretical, for it had practical political consequences:political processes (e.g. elections or legislation) could be postponed orcancelled if lightning was observed. In a celebrated abuse of religiousritual, Bibulus, Julius Caesar ’ s opponent and colleague in the consul-ship of 59, perpetually “ observed the heavens ” to obstruct Caesar ’ slegislation. Lucretius exploits the ironies: experts on divination areconsidered to be knowledgeable, but their knowledge is based on thefalse premises that the gods exist and that the lightning is an expres-sion of their will, which must be divined by the experts. Of course,only Epicurus had true knowledge, which Lucretius expounds so as torid his Roman hearers of their fear of the power of the gods: 113 This is how to understand the real nature of fiery lightning and tosee with what energy it acts, and not, by reading in vain the rollsof Etruscan formulae, [attempt to] learn the will of the gods.The second major section of Book 6, on terrestrial phenomena, con-sists of a series of disconnected subjects (including earthquakes, theNile ’ s annual flood, magnets, epidemics), linked solely by Lucretius ’ goal of proclaiming true knowledge. The subject of epidemics does notoccur in the extant Epicurean letters or fragments, and even Sedley ishesitant in assigning it to Book 13 of On Nature. 114 Others have sug-gested that Lucretius may be drawing on Hippocratic writings, forexample, the treatise On Airs , Waters and Places , which was written inthe later part of the fifth century BCE. 115 Lucretius teaches that thereare healthful atoms in the air, and others that cause disease and death(6. 1093 – 97). 116 The latter fly about so that “ the air becomes full of disease ” . The air, then, is the source of disease, and it was the sourceof the great plague at Athens, an account of which forms the last partof the book. 117 Lucretius is following the famous description of the plague inThucydides, which he emulates in descriptive horror. Most important,however, is the effect of the disease on the minds and emotions of thesurvivors, for no longer did religious beliefs count for anything (1276 – 77), neither were the traditional funeral customs observed (1278 – 79).And so De Rerum Natura ends with the distressed Athenians cremat-ing their dead in a disorderly fashion and fighting among themselves toclaim the corpses of their relatives (1283 – 86). 118THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS The ending is abrupt. We have suggested earlier that the poem isalmost complete, except for lines drawing the lesson that if the Atheni-ans had known the doctrines of Epicurus they would have been able tounderstand the cause of the disaster and treat it with equanimity. Cer-tainly, the focus on death at the end contrasts with that on life in theproem to Book 1. The mental and physical distress of the Athenianscontrasts with the calm doctrines of Epicurus praised in the proem toBook 6. The wildly emotional funeral scenes recall the ending of the Iliad , with Hector ’ s funeral and the passionate utterances of his widow,his mother, and his sister-in-law. Finally, the focus on death at the endof the poem reinforces the focus on death at the end of its first half.There, Lucretius proclaimed the triumph of Epicurean doctrine overdeath; here, the victory of death over the Athenians who lived and diedmany years before the coming of Epicurus. Lucretius is true to his over-riding principle: those who have knowledge of “ the nature of things ” can achieve calm of mind and freedom from fear of death.Lucretius ’ poem does not seem to have had the influence that itdeserved. Within a decade of its composition the Roman republic hadcollapsed, Julius Caesar was dead, and fresh violence overwhelmed thequiet practice of philosophy. Cicero ’ s murder in December of 43 BCEwas symptomatic. Yet some Epicureans survived the civil wars suc-cessfully, for example, Cicero ’ s friend, Atticus, at the price of friend-ship with people whose political acts were the opposite of Epicurean. 118 More significant is the fact that Lucretius was read and admired bythe leading Augustan poets, Horace and Virgil, both of whom began topublish about fifteen years after his death. Horace (an Epicurean)quotes him at Satires 1. 5. 101, and alludes to the opening of Book 2 of the De Rerum Natura in Epistles 1. 11. 10. The last part of the sameletter (lines 22 – 30) is Lucretian in tone. Virgil explicitly admiredLucretius, whom he does not name. In the second Georgic , completedbefore 29 BCE, he contrasts his pastoral poetry with that of Lucretius: 119 Happy is he who could discover the causes of things and trampleunderfoot all fears and inexorable fate and the sound of greedyAcheron. Blessed also is he who knows the gods of thecountryside … This passage follows lines in which Virgil was clearly alluding to themeteorological and cosmological themes of Lucretius. A few yearsearlier he had echoed Lucretius in his sixth Eclogue , where the song of Silenus alludes to the cosmogony of Lucretius. Later, in the Aeneid (written in the 20s BCE), the song of the Punic bard, lopas, at the ban- LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS119 quet of Dido echoes the meteorological themes both of the sixth Eclogue and of Book 6 of Lucretius ’ poem. 120 Yet one of the most orig-inal and powerful parts of the Aeneid is the sixth book, where Aeneasvisits the Underworld and sees for himself Acheron and the fate of thedead — things that Lucretius says Epicurus had “ trampled underfoot ” .In the first and second centuries CE, several authors show thatLucretius was still being read. Statius, in a poem celebrating the birth-day of the dead poetic genius, Lucan (d. 65 CE), refers to “ the austeremadness of learned Lucretius ” , and his contemporary, Quintilian,includes Lucretius rather grudgingly in his reading list for students of oratory. 121 The Stoic satirist Persius (d. 62 CE), agrees with Quintilian that De Rerum Natura was too difficult for the ordinary reader, but he is moresympathetic. He imagines a “ hairy centurion ” poking fun at philoso-phers, with their mannerisms and their doctrines that are intelligibleonly to other philosophers. He paraphrases Lucretius: “ nothing cancome from nothing, nothing can return to nothing ” . 122 The target of this witty passage is the self-satisfied and ignorant “ common man ” , notthe philosophical poet.Seneca ’ s attitude is more complex. Although a Stoic, he oftenquotes Epicurus (particularly in the first thirty of his letters), and occa-sionally Lucretius. In letter 95, in which he debates the ability of phi-losophy to bring about the good life, he quotes Lucretius to illustratethe scope of philosophical enquiry, extending to cosmology and thecreation of the world. 123 He quotes Lucretius again in letter 106 toshow that the study of philosophical doctrine is “ mere child ’ s play ” ,for it will make a student learned, but will not help live the good life: “ our learning is for school, not for life ” . 124 In letter 110 he quotesLucretius on groundless fears and improves on him: Lucretius said thatwe are afraid in daylight, but, says Seneca, “ we make everything dark-ness ” . 125 Finally, in De Tranquillitate Seneca quotes Lucretius in sup-port of the commonplace doctrine that “ a human being cannot run fromhimself ” , which is found in writers from Aristotle to Juvenal. 126 About a century after Seneca, Aulus Gellius (b. 125 CE) quotesLucretius on a literary, rather than philosophical, matter. 127 The poem,then, was still being read two centuries after Lucretius ’ death, but, itseems, only by a few readers and apparently without any widespreadinfluence. While this is regrettable, it is hardly surprising. Lucretiuswas too austere and his Latin too difficult for the kind of reader forwhom Cicero or Seneca was writing. He was read by the Christianfathers, and Lactantius ( c .240 – 320 CE) quotes him frequently, both tocriticize him and to use him to support his own arguments. Augustine 120THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS also alludes to him in several passages, although he prefers Cicero as asource for attacks on Epicureanism.Epicureanism continued to have a vigorous existence in the 150years after the death of Lucretius, for which the criticisms of Plutarch( c. 50 – 120 CE), who was himself a Platonist, are good evidence. 128 Thetitles are known of nine works by Plutarch in which he criticizes Epicu-rus and his followers. Three of these are extant: That Epicurus Makes aPleasant Life Impossible (usually referred to by the first two words of its Latin title, Non Posse ); Against Colotes ; Whether Lathe Biosas Is Rightly Said (Latin, An Recte Dictum ). The second of these is paradoxi-cal, since it attacks a book (no longer extant) written by Colotes, a dis-ciple of Epicurus at Lampsacus, where Epicurus taught from 310 to306 BCE. Colotes had criticized other philosophers (including Dem-ocritus and Plato), and perhaps Plutarch attacks him because of hishostility to Plato. On the other hand An Recte Dictum attacks Epi-curean quietism, which, as we have seen, directly opposed the Romanethos of public service and desire for fame. Plutarch says ( An Recte Dictum 6): 129 I think that to be alive and generally to be born and become ahuman being are a gift from god to make a person known … Buthe who hurls himself into obscurity is cloaked in darkness andburies his life in an empty tomb.In Non Posse Plutarch (through participants in the dialogue, Theon andAristodemus) attacks Epicurean doctrines, first, on pleasure and “ liv-ing unobtrusively ” , and then on the gods and the absence of an after-life. Plutarch was a pious man, and for the last decades of his life heheld a priesthood at Delphi (which was comparatively close to hishome town of Chaeronea), an honour which he prized. His attack onEpicurean theology is therefore coloured by his own experience.Towards the end of the second century Epicureanism continued tobe strong, in part because of its opposition to superstition and falseprophets, as Lucian (born c .120) shows in his essay on Alexander or the False Prophet . There he says ( § 61) that people turned to Epicurusbecause he was:truly a holy man with a divine nature, who alone knew trulywhat was good. He passed his knowledge on and was a liberatorof those who associated with him.But during the third century CE Epicureanism declined noticeably, LUCRETIUS AND THE EPICUREANS121 although it was still vigorous enough to attract the hostility of Chris-tian authors. By the middle of the next century it was dying, and it wasdead by the time that Justinian closed the schools of philosophy atAthens in 529. 130 Early in the third century Diogenes Laertius compiled (in Greek) his Lives of Eminent Philosophers . Book 10 of this work is devoted solelyto Epicurus, and it is exceptionally valuable for its preservation of theprincipal texts of Epicurean doctrine (which have been summarizedabove, pp. 101 – 105, as well as a catalogue of Epicurus ’ works. 131 The last extensive evidence for vigorous devotion to Epicureanismcomes from the city of Oenoanda, high on a mountain in northernLycia (modern south-western Turkey). There, some time probably latein the second century CE, Diogenes, a prominent citizen, in his old ageset up a huge inscription on a wall of a stoa (a colonnade for publicuse) recording his own Epicureanism and various Epicurean texts. Theheight of the inscription is 2.37 metres, and its length was more than50m, perhaps even close to 100m. It was discovered in 1884 byGeorges Cousin, who published sixty-four fragments in 1892. Sincethen more fragments have been published, most notably by MartinSmith, in a series of articles beginning in 1969, bringing the total num-ber discovered to 212 as of 1990, perhaps a quarter of the whole. 132 We have seen how greatly our knowledge of Hellenistic philosophydepends on fragmentary texts, and in the inscription of Diogenes weare sadly reminded of the vagaries of destruction and survival in aremote place, subject to the damage wrought by earthquakes andbuilders (who used stones from the inscription) and to the ravages of neglect.Diogenes published his inscription because he was moved, likeLucretius, by the miserable spiritual state of his fellow human beings,whose inner disturbances he likened to a plague (frag. 1.2 and 2.4). In “ the sunset of life ” he wished to help humankind by telling them thetrue nature of things and healing their pains by “ cutting them down tosomething small and making their intensity very small indeed ” (frag.2.6). Thirteen (or more) of the Kyriai Doxai were inscribed along thelowest course of the wall; above them, in a parallel course, Diogenesinscribed a treatise on ethics; above that was a treatise on physics. Inthe top course was a treatise on old age. To the right of the treatise onethics were three letters of Diogenes to his friends, and various philo-sophical maxims. To the right of the treatise on old age was a letter of Epicurus to his mother, on the subject of dreams, and two other lettersof Epicurus.Diogenes is the author of the three treatises. Most interesting is the 122THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS part of the treatise on physics, which (like Epicurus ’ letter to hismother) dealt with dreams and has many parallels in Lucretius. 133 Thetreatise on ethics was given additional authority by the Kyriai Doxai of Epicurus, inscribed immediately below. Diogenes focused on the ques-tion, “ How can our life give us pleasure? ” , which he answered by thedoctrine that if the passions are removed then pleasure will replacethem. The passions he categorized as fear of the gods, of death, and of pain: these he discussed before dealing with desires, pleasures andactions. The treatise on old age is addressed to young readers. Fromwhat little remains, it appears to have been a defence of old age againstthe jibes and comments of the young. Probably this, too, goes back totexts of Epicurus, whose views on old age were harshly criticized byPlutarch. 134 Diskin Clay has shown the extent to which Diogenes follows, imi-tates and emulates Epicurus. 135 The Epicurean community in southernAsia Minor, late in Roman imperial times, still followed the custom of the early Epicureans, revering the founder and learning his doctrinesby heart. Like Epicurus, Diogenes wished to help human beings,whether those who read his inscription, or those in the wider world,including posterity. In his treatise on old age he says that he will leavelife with a joyful hymn (Greek, paean ), having enjoyed a good life. Heis referring to words of Epicurus ’ close friend Metrodorus, or possiblyeven of Epicurus himself, and they are a fitting ending to this chapter: 136 I have beaten you first, O Fortune, and I have blocked every oneof your approaches. Never will we give ourselves up to you or toany other circumstance. But when necessity drives us out, we,greatly despising life and those who vainly cling to it, will departfrom it with a beautiful hymn of victory, singing that our life hasbeen well lived. We now turn to PHILOSOPHERS AND POETS IN THE AUGUSTAN AGE Lucrezio and Cicerone represent the zenith of intellectual activity in the Roman republic. The murder of Cicerone in December, 43 BCE, and the defeat of Brutus and Cassius at the battles of Philippi in October, 42BCE, introduced a new political and intellectual age. For Cicero, philosophy was closely bound up with public life. Its study had practicalconsequences in the political activity of free men competing with eachother in the public arena and mindful of their duty of service to thestate. Lucretius explicitly advised against public service, yet it is theconstant and contrasting background to his Epicurean system. In themilitary and political turmoil of the decade after Philippi the Romanworld was deaf to the voices of Cicero and Lucretius. When peace andstability were restored, after the victory of Octavian at Actium in 31BCE and the death of Mark Antony in Alexandria the following year,the Republic was dead, alive only in the brilliant use of the termres publica by Octavian, whose restoration of constitutional government inJanuary, 27 BCE, inaugurated his tenure of power as the leading citi-zen ( princeps), but de factothe first emperor, of Rome. He took thetitle of Augustus, the Latin equivalent of the Greek term sebastos (reverend), an honorific title frequently bestowed on Roman grandees inthe Greek east in republican times. As Tacitus rightly observed, thetitles of public officials were the same as before, but the free republichad perished, never to be revived. The consequences for intellectual life and freedom of expressionwere predictable and profound. Tacitus (putting the words in the mouthof the poet, Maternus, who had written a drama on the theme of theyounger Cato) asked: What greater evidence [for the curbing of oratory] could befound than that … peace, the prolonged passivity of the people, 124 and, above all, the discipline imposed by the princeps , had paci-fied eloquence itself just as much as everything else?These words were published in 102 CE, but they accurately describe aprocess begun after Cicero ’ s death, irreversibly advanced by the tri-umph of Augustus, and perpetually confirmed by the accident of hislong life, for he died in 14 CE, 41 years after the transfer of power tothe senate and people. Tacitus began his history of the period from 14to 68 CE, with the death of Augustus, for that was the first (and, asevents showed, the only) time that the republican constitution couldpossibly have been restored. With the transfer of power to Tiberiusthe principate was confirmed, the monarchy assured. The world of Seneca (born in 4 BCE) was totally different from that of Cicero.In this world, true freedom of speech was rare and dangerous, foroutspoken criticism of those who held political and military powercould bring exile or even death. And if free speech is curbed, then theprocess of limiting freedom of thought will begin, however insidi-ously. Thus, philosophical doctrines came to focus on private con-cerns, above all, ethical problems. The bearing of philosophy on publiclife became restricted to problems of coexistence with a political sys-tem in which the ruler held the power of life and death, while his fel-low-citizens had the choice of cooperation, acquiescence, or retirement(often through death or exile) from the public arena. Not surprisingly,one of the most prominent problems discussed by Roman philosophersin the early empire was that of otium, retirement from public activity.The period of the second Triumvirate (43–31 BCE) and the reign of Augustus (27 BCE to 14 CE) was transitional between a manifestlydysfunctional political system and a new system based on militarypower, in which the monarch needed the support of many people, whothemselves had considerable powers, subsumed under the power andprestige of the monarch. It was a period of political ambiguities: amonarchy was dressed in the forms and words of the Republic; politi-cians and military men wielded great power, yet were at the mercy of the monarch if they encroached on his power and prestige; people of ability owed their political or social advancement to the monarch andhis close friends; finally, a citizenry courted by the monarch (whodated his tenure of power by the annual renewal of the powers of theTribune of the People, tribunicia potestas) was powerless to vote himout of office.The goal of philosophers was still the good life, and the traditionalgoals of the Stoics and Epicureans were outwardly unchanged —theachievement of tranquillity and freedom from mental disturbancethrough reason and virtue. But the political and social context was sochanged that the philosophers focused almost exclusively on problemsthat concerned individuals.Even in the triumviral period, philosophy continued to be practised,and a Roman school of philosophy came into existence, led by QuintusSextius, the details of whose life have to be gleaned mostly from refer-ences in Seneca ’ s letters. He probably died early in the first centuryCE (Jerome says that he flourished around 1 CE), and Seneca, writingin 62 – 64 CE, lists his school among those which had become defunctby his time. Indeed, the last chapter of Seneca ’ s Naturales Quaestiones laments the distressing state of philosophy in his time: Who enters on the path to wisdom? Who thinks it worthy [of study] except in so far as he has a passing acquaintance with it?Who pays any attention to a philosopher or to any liberal studyexcept when the games are suspended, or there is a rainy daywhich can be wasted? And so many schools of philosophy havecome to an end without a new leader. Both the Old and NewAcademies have left us without a Principal; who is there to teachthe doctrines of Pyrrho [the Sceptic]? The Pythagorean school(unpopular with the common people) has no Professor; the newschool of the Sextii, which showed Roman strength in its earlystages, began with great energy and now is dead.Sextius (who was succeeded as head of the school by his son) refusedthe invitation of Julius Caesar to enter on an active political career inthe senate. He studied in Athens, and, back in Rome, wrote philosophi-cal works “ in Greek words but with Roman character ” . Seneca callshim a de facto Stoic and quotes his use of the military metaphor for thewise man, who must advance like an army prepared for battle and onguard against the enemy. The wise man will deploy his virtues to pro-tect himself from fear, grief, poverty, disgrace and any other adver-sity. Seneca describes a reading with his friends of “ the fifth book of Quintus Sextius the father ” , which he found vigorous and courageous,not anaemic and pedantic. “ When you read Sextius, ” says Seneca, “ you will say, ‘ this man is alive, he is vigorous, he is free, he is super-human, he sends me away full of immense confidence ’ . ” Sextius, itseems, had no use for the subtleties of Greek dialectic: his ethical doc-trines were appropriate for hard times, when courage and constancywere needed, but their virile independence was dangerous under anestablished principate.Sextius also taught the Pythagorean doctrine of vegetarianism, which Seneca practiced for about a year, early in the reign of Tiberius.He seems also to have taught that the soul was incorporeal. But moreimportant was his influence on the Alexandrian philosopher, Sotion,and the Roman rhetorician, Papirius Fabianus, both teachers of Seneca,who said that the latter “ wrote more books of philosophy thanCicero ” . Among the followers of Sextius also was Cornelius Celsus,who wrote an encyclopedic work on the Artes, of which eight books De Medicina survive. Sextius’son may have been the Sextius Nigerwho wrote a book in Greek on materia medica that the elder Pliny usedin his Natural History. The most durable survivor among the intellectuals of Cicero’s timewas Varro, to whom Cicero dedicated the second version of his Academica. Varrone (d. 27 BCE), seems to have kept up his scholarly activity despite proscription by Mark Antony and the destruction of his library at Casinum. His late work, Disciplinae, was a survey of the intellectual disciplines necessary for an educated person, and he usedas a principal source the Greek work of Aëtius, known by its Latin title, Placita. This was a collection of the doctrines of Greek philosophers (known from fragments in later compilers), which has been variously dated as late as the first century CE or as early as the third cen-tury BCE. The earliest version of thework was compiled before the time of Chrysippus (c.280–207 BCE),and that Varro used a version updated in the first century BCE. Fromthis we learn that compilations of philosophers’doctrines, for whichthe technical term is doxographies, were being made and used in theperiod after the death of Cicero — significant evidence for continuingstudy of philosophy in the turbulent times of the second triumvirate. Less shadowy, but still controversial, was the doxographer Arius Didymus, whose ethical compilation is largely preserved in the Greek anthology (Eclogae) of Johannes Stobaeus (John of Stobi, the modernSkopje). Stobaeus made his anthology (much of which is extant) forhis son, Septimius, early in the fifth century CE. Divided into fourbooks of extracts from a host of authors, it is “a textbook …aiming pri-marily at moral improvement and instruction in practical living ” . Chapter 2. 7 is the first chapter to be focused on ethics, Stobaeus ’pri-mary interest for the rest of the work. The chapter consists of three doxographies, which anthologize respectively the doctrines of variousphilosophers, Zeno and the Stoics, and Aristotle and the Peripatetics. Arius Didymus is the author of all threeparts of the chapter, and that he is the same person as the Arius (orAreus) mentioned by Plutarch and Suetonius as a friend and adviser of Augustus. Suetonius (who had access to the imperial archives) says that Areus [ sic .] and his sons “ filled Augustus with varied erudition byliving with him ” . Plutarch describes Augustus entering Alexandria in30 BCE, “ conversing with the philosopher Arius and giving him hisright hand ” . Augustus (says Plutarch) then made a public speech in theGymnasium from a specially prepared dais, in which he announcedthat he would spare Alexandria for three reasons, one of which was hiswish to gratify “ his friend ” , Arius. The historian Cassius Dio (died c .230 CE) says that Augustus and Arius enjoyed many philosophicalconversations. Consistent with this, Seneca calls Arius “ [Augustus ’ ]philosopher ” , and Marcus Aurelius names him, with Maecenas, as amember of the court. In 9 BCE Arius addressed a Consolatio toAugustus ’ wife, Li via, on the death of her son, Drusus, which isquoted extensively by Seneca. Besides showing that, 20 years afterthe entry into Alexandria, Arius was still a trusted member of Augus-tus ’ inner circle, the Consolation is Stoic in tenor, for example in itsadvice to Livia to remain outwardly calm and inwardly self-controlledin the face of bereavement:Remember that it is not a great thing to behave courageously inprosperity, when the course of life is favourable. A calm sea anda following wind do not call for a show of the helmsman ’ s skill.But when they are contrary, he must prove his courage. Then donot submit: on the contrary, walk firmly … Nothing is more hos-tile to Fortune than a calm mind.Opposition to Fortune is one of the most prominent elements in Stoicethics of the early Roman empire. Moreover, Arius emphasizes theprominent public position of Livia, in this continuing the Ciceronianemphasis on the duty of the public leader. Seneca ’ s Consolation forMarcia was probably written in 39– 40 CE, nearly half a century afterArius ’ Consolation, yet Seneca can still say to Marcia (6. 1), “ Arius issitting beside you ” . Arius was not an out-and-out Stoic, however. The doxography of Stobaeus 2. 7 shows him to be concerned with the history of philoso-phy, organized in such a way as to bring harmony to the dissonance of competing schools and of different voices within single schools. Inparticular he seems to have attempted to reconcile dogmatists (whobelieved that knowledge was possible) with Pyrrhonian Sceptics, whohad been reinvigorated by Aenesidemus, probably in the decades after50 BCE. Aenesidemus had left the Academic school, dismayed bythe quarrel between Antiochus and Philo, returning to the thoroughgo-ing scepticism of Pyrrho, to which his original contribution was the ten modes of suspension of judgement (recorded by Sextus Empiricus inthe late second century CE). Arius, a dogmatist, sought to show thatharmony between Sceptics and dogmatists was possible, in that bothwere seeking the truth: the sceptics potentially could find it in thefuture, whereas the dogmatists had already found it.For our purpose, however, what is important is that Augustusfavoured a philosopher who took a positive view of the power of rea-son. Given Augustus’policy of preserving the past in order to build hisrevolutionary political system, a philosophy that suspended judgementin all matters was unacceptable. In giving Arius a place in hisentourage, Augustus was continuing the custom among the republicansenatorial class of maintaining a house philosopher, as, for example,Cicero did with Diodotus. Augustus in principle maintained the fictionof being princeps, chief among peers. Arius was valuable as an adviserwhere Greek matters (political or philosophical) were concerned, asSuetonius and Plutarch made clear. His presence in the inner circle of Augustus meant that the study of philosophy was still possible, indeedencouraged, under the new regime, so long as it was not politicallysubversive.The ambiguities faced by the philosophers are especially obvious inthe works of the great Augustan poets. Two of them, Horace and Vir-gil, were themselves close to Augustus through the patronage of hisprincipal adviser, Maecenas. A third, Ovid, was exiled in 8 CE forunspecified literary and political indiscretions, and died in exile threeyears after the death of Augustus. A fourth, Manilius, outlived Augus-tus and steered a safe course through the politically dangerous subjectof astrology by advocating the continuation of the principate.Horace (65 – 8 BCE) is both the most philosophical and the mostambiguous of these poets. His father, a freedman (i.e. ex-slave), wassufficiently prosperous to be able to take Horace to Rome for his educa-tion, and to send him to Athens to study philosophy, the traditional final stage of a Roman upper-class education in the Republic. ORAZIO tells us that he studied in the Academy—“Athens added something to my education, that is, that I would be disposed to distinguish the crooked from the straight, and to seek the truth in the groves of the Academy”. But he soon was attracted to the cause of Brutus, also anAcademic, and so he fought as an officer (tribunus militum) at Philippi. After the defeat he returned to Italy to find his family property confis-cated. He turned to poetry as his sole way of making a living, although he soon received a salaried position in the imperial civil service as atreasury official. Through his early poems he came to the notice of Vir-gil and his friend, Varius Rufus, who introduced him to their patron, Maecenas, in 38 BCE. Maecenas provided Horace with the patronage and economic independence (most notably through the gift of a villa inthe Sabine hills) which allowed him to spend his time writing poetry and to be independent socially. Through Maecenas he came to theattention of Augustus, whose invitation to be his secretary for his private correspondence he declined, apparently without giving offence. Horace’s position was indeed ambiguous. Socially, he was an outsider, even if his father (as is likely) was an Italian, enslaved after theSocial War of the 90s BCE. Politically, he had supported the losingside, and he was fortunate even to be able to return to Italy, let alone beaccepted as a friend of Maecenas and Augustus. Economically, hewould have been destitute if it had not been for his poetry, and it wasthe excellence of his early poems that guaranteed his friendship withVirgil and the circle of Maecenas. Nearly all these poems were writtenbefore Actium: after the triumph of Augustus, Horace had no choicebut to support the new regime, and to respond to Augustus ’ requestsfor a poem on an occasion of state, as he did in 17 BCE with the Car-men Saeculare celebrating the Secular Games that inaugurated a newage.Eduard Fraenkel rightly reminds us that “ in approaching a real poetit should be our main concern to try to understand his poetry ” . Animportant part of Horace ’ s poetic technique is self-irony: like any goodsatirist he wears a mask (Latin, persona ), even in his non-satiricalpoems, and the mask is most concealing when he speaks of himself.Thus in his letter to the poet Albius Tibullus, published in 20 BCE, hedescribes himself as “ a pig from the herd of Epicurus ” , saying, “ whenyou want a good laugh, you will see me, fat, sleek and with skin wellgroomed ”— physical results one would expect from one who makespleasure his primary principle. The self-irony does not invalidate theprevious lines (12 – 14), with their advice to keep a calm mind in themidst of hope and anxiety, fear and anger, and to live each day as if itwere one ’ s last.The Epicurean lathe biosas , “ live unobtrusively ” , is the most signifi-cant element in Horace ’ s philosophy of life, which we can best exam-ine by studying his later poems, when he had achieved the tranquillitythat earlier he had had to share with obligations in the city. In the firstepistle to Maecenas, Horace replies to Maecenas ’ invitation that hecontinue writing poetry, three years after the publication of the firstthree books of his Odes in 23. He complains that he has given uppoetry to concentrate entirely on philosophy, building up philosophicalcapital, as it were, with which to meet the problems of old age: And so now I have given up poetry and other amusements. I amconcerned with what is true and fitting. This is my enquiry,which occupies me totally. I am storing [philosophical precepts]and arranging them to draw from my store in the future. And, toanticipate your question about who is my leader and householdgod, I have sworn allegiance to no master.As an instance of his lack of rigidity, he says that sometimes he is asaustere “ as any servant of true virtue ” , at other times he relapses intothe attitude of Socrates ’ associate, the elder Aristippus of Gyrene(early fourth century BCE), who justified material and sensual enjoy-ment and defended his life with a female companion in this way: I possess La ï s, but she does not possess me. For to be the masterof pleasures is best, rather than never to enjoy them.The middle way between Stoic rigidity and Epicurean pleasure has along history. Long before Zeno and Epicurus, Socrates was said tohave quoted Prodicus ’ parable of the Choice of Heracles for the benefitof Aristippus, and long after Horace ’ s time Seneca used Aristippus ’ argument in defence of his own enjoyment of material possessions. 27 Horace himself, later in the letter to Maecenas, says that “ virtue is theavoidance of vice ” , and he concludes with an ironic parody of the Stoicparadoxes: 28 In sum: the wise man is less only than Jupiter. He is wealthy,free, honoured, beautiful, king, finally, of kings, exceptionallyhealthy [ sanus , punning on the double meaning of the word, “ healthy ” and “ sane ” ] — unless he is suffering from a cold.With the last phrase he undercuts the extreme position of the Stoicsand affirms his own philosophy of life, that he will take life as itcomes, with its pleasures and pains — in other words, his way is themiddle way.Closely related to this letter is the next, addressed to a young friend,Lollius Maximus, who, like Maecenas, is the recipient of a second let-ter in this book. Horace begins with Homer and the Trojan War.Homer, he says, speaks more clearly and better than Chrysippus andGrantor on ethical questions, “ what is beautiful or disgraceful; what isadvantageous and what is not ” . These are the same questions as thosethat concerned Horace in the previous letter, and he advises Lollius to heed their lessons well, for “ if a jar is not clean, whatever you pourinto it turns sour ” .In the second letter to Lollius (written perhaps two years later),Horace both amplifies his earlier advice and distils his own philosophyof life. 30 Since this is his most important statement it should be quotedat length:In the midst of everything you will read, and you will ask yourteachers by what system you may pass your life gently. Ask whether desire (that always needs more) should trouble and dis-turb you; whether fear and hope for things that are not advanta-geous; whether philosophy or nature will give you virtue; whatwill lessen anxiety, what will make you a friend to yourself,what will bring you simple tranquillity — whether it is public hon-ours or the pleasure of profits or the secret way and the path of alife hidden from others. As for me, when I am refreshed by thecold stream of Digentia, which Mandela drinks, a village fur-rowed with cold, what do you think is my opinion, my friend,what do you believe is my prayer? “ Let me keep what I havenow, or even less, so that I can live out the rest of my life (if thegods wish me to live longer) for myself. Let me have a good sup-ply of books and a year ’ s supply of food, and may I not floathanging on the hopes of an uncertain hour. ” Well, it is enough toask Jupiter for what he gives and takes away. He may grant melife, he may grant me wealth: I myself will provide a mind freefrom anxiety ( aequum animum ).These beautiful and famous lines are the final expression of Horace ’ sethics. Although they are only indirectly concerned with pleasure andalthough they suggest that prayer to the gods is efficacious, they arefundamentally Epicurean. They are based on the maxim, “ live unobtru-sively ” , and they suggest the moderate enjoyment of moderate plea-sures. Their goal is a life free from mental disturbance, the achieve-ment of ataraxia that is as much Stoic as Epicurean. Finally, they sug-gest that happiness is ours to achieve through control of our will, what-ever the gods may give, good or ill. Here Horace agrees with the Sto-ics, and this doctrine will prove to be the foundation of the ethics of Epictetus.The first Book of Horace ’ s Epistles was the first collection ever of poetic letters reflecting on problems in philosophy and, as Fraenkel hasremarked, it is “ the most harmonious of Horace ’ s books ” . The har-mony is not only literary and poetic: it is also the harmony of one who has synthesized successfully the many facets of his search for happi-ness. Although there is much wisdom in his later poems, the lines thatwe have just quoted should stand as his final statement of a philosophyof life.Horace was consistent throughout his search in maintaining the Epi-curean doctrine of lathe biosas . It was a necessity in the fragile periodafter Philippi, when Octavian and his party could have destroyed him.When he became prominent through his poetry and his friendship withMaecenas and, later, Augustus, it became even more of a necessity.Thanks to his double life, as a friend of the great and a busy man atRome, and as the owner of a villa deep in the Sabine Hills (referred toin the passage from Epistle 18 by its river and neighbouring village),he was able to achieve the synthesis without compromising Epicureanprinciples.At the beginning of his literary career Horace ’ s attitude to ethicalquestions was one of simple morality: his father trained him as a boy totell right from wrong, in keeping with archaic Roman morality: “ I willbe satisfied if I can preserve the traditional morality of the ancient[Romans] ” . 32 Thus his ethical philosophy, however much it owes tothe Greeks, is that of the conservative Roman, without the harsh auster-ity of the elder and younger Cato. Indeed, Horace satirizes the Stoicsfor their extremism and their insistence that only the sapiens of theStoic paradoxes can achieve happiness. Thus at Satire 1.3. 96 – 98 hesays that the Stoic insistence that all delicts are equal flies in the faceof common sense and the facts. 33 He ridicules the Stoic paradox that “ only the wise man can be a skilled craftsman or a king ” . The Stoic “ king ” is teased by a crowd of boys, and has hardly any friends, whileHorace is truly happy, his peccadilloes forgiven by his friends andtheirs in turn forgiven by him.Horace returns to the Stoic paradoxes in Book 2 of the Satires. Thethird satire expounds and implicitly criticizes the Stoic paradox that “ only the wise man is sane ” (lines 43 – 46). In the second satire aRoman peasant, Ofellus (a simple Roman with archaic values), lecturesHorace on the virtues of living simply and not being attached to one ’ spossessions. In the seventh satire a slave, Davus, begins by criticizingHorace for moral inconsistency (it is the time of the Saturnalia, whenslaves can speak freely), and he shows that Horace is a slave to his pas-sions, which jerk him around like a puppet (lines 81 – 82). The wiseman alone is truly free (lines 83 – 88):Who then is free? The wise man, who gives commands to him-self; whom neither poverty nor death nor imprisonment can frighten; who has the courage to challenge his desires, to despisehonours. He is complete in himself, smooth and round ( teresatque rotundus ), so that nothing external can stick on his smoothsurface. Fortune always is hobbled when she rushes at him.This satire expounds the Stoic paradox more successfully than Satire 2.3, and it appears to give a positive definition of the wise man in thelines just quoted. Horace is his counterfoil, so it seems, but then wemust pause and consider: is not Horace implicitly criticizing the spheri-cal perfection of the Stoic wise man? Such perfection is still unattain-able, and Horace, with his failings, emerges as the real human being.The “ black companion ” of desire may constantly thwart his efforts toescape his slavery (7. 115), but in the end, it is Horace who is real, andthe Stoic wise man who is an unattainable ideal.Horace expounds his ideal most memorably in the sixth satire of thisbook, published a few years after he had taken possession of his Sabinevilla. The poem celebrates and contrasts the two sides of his life, thebusy friend of Maecenas in Rome and the independent poet in the coun-try. He begins (lines 1 – 23a), with a prayer fulfilled: he is at his villa,with its nearby spring of water and woods. The focus is on moderationand limits, and he asks for no more, beyond the security of continuedownership — this is his prayer to Mercury. Suddenly he is back inRome. He prays to Janus (god of beginnings), who sends him off earlyfor the long day ’ s grind. The tone is still Epicurean despite the prayersto the gods, for Epicurus, too, was a pious man. Horace ’ s prayersreturn with longing to the Sabine villa in line 59, as he endures thetime-consuming busyness of life in the city. At the centre of hisprayers is philosophy: he prays for a life that is “ the pleasure of forget-ting the harried life ” (line 62), a memorable summary of Epicureanfreedom from mental disturbance, and for the enjoyment with hisfriends of a simple meal, with as little or as much wine as each personwishes. An evening spent in this way is “ a night of the gods ” (line 65),for had not Epicurus himself said that the man who followed his pre-cepts “ would live as a god among men ” ? Above all, the conversationof Horace and his friends is about things that matter — not gossip aboutgames or other people ’ s possessions, but about the good life (lines72 – 76):we discuss subjects that concern us directly, ignorance of whichis harmful: is it wealth or virtue than makes men happy? Is itvirtuous character or self-interest that draws us into friendship?What is the nature of the good and what is the highest good? These subjects, of course, were not exclusive to the Epicureans: Aristo-tle had discussed the importance of self-interest for friendship inBooks 8 and 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics ; Cicero sought out the sum-mum bonum in the De Finibus , and the basic problem for Plato and theAcademy was the relationship of the universal, virtue, to the particu-lars of daily life. By setting the discussion in the context of friendshipand moderate pleasures, Horace gives all these things an Epicureanperspective. Like Plato, he illustrates his philosophy with a myth, herethe fable of the two mice (lines 77 – 117).The animal fable was a device of popular moralizing, the tradition inwhich Horace worked as a satirist. He called his satires Sermones , thatis, “ Talks ” , and Sermones Bionaei , a reference to Bion of Borysthenes,a Greek popular philosopher of the third century BCE. Bion ’ s infor-mal talks were lectures couched in terms intelligible to ordinary hear-ers. Works in this tradition required a light touch — a fable about twomice rather than a lecture comparing luxury to simplicity, self-ironyrather than self-importance, generalities rather than precise definition,the easy conversation of friends rather than a formal lecture or the con-trived setting of Platonic or Ciceronian dialogue. Horace himself instructed with a smile, “ telling the truth with a laugh ” , and heincluded his hearer in his ironic self-criticism —“ you are the subject of my story ” . Horace shares with the Cynic philosophers the attributesof wit, irony and candour, but he did not approve of the Cynics ’ shame-lessness and personal squalor. An ironic persona suited the poet of the Satires , but a different onewas needed for the poet of the Odes . The eighty-eight poems that com-prise Books 1 – 3 of the Odes (the Latin title is Carmina , “ Poems ” )were published in 23 BCE. In them Horace is the bard ( vates ), theteacher of the community, that is, of Augustan Rome. The first fourodes are addressed to public figures, respectively Maecenas, Augustus,Virgil, and Sestius, consul in 23 CE. In the last ode (3. 30) Horaceassociates his achievement in lyric poetry with the greatest of Romanpublic occasions, the celebration of a triumph by a victorious general.Horace, therefore, steps forth as the teacher of society, expressing thepolitical and moral ideals of the renewed Republic. No longer does hewrite for Maecenas alone, or just for his friends, but for Augustus andthe Roman public. The Epicurean principle of lathe biosas was inap-propriate for the vates, and so Horace’s philosophy in the Odes is morecomplex. Horace, the private individual, is still Epicurean, but the hori-zons of his public doctrine are as wide as those of the policies of Augustus and the responsibilities of the renewed republic and its citi-zens. There are Stoic elements as well as Epicurean, the gods of Roman public religion (vigorously promoted by Augustus) appear fre-quently, and traditional Roman virtues are proclaimed as if the philo-sophical developments of the previous 150 years had not taken place. The Odes needed a new technique for conveying moral doctrine. In the Satires Horace ’ s method had been “ to tell the truth with a smile ” ,well described by Alexander Pope. Horace still charms with graceful negligence, And without method talks us into sense, Will, like a friend, familiarly convey The truest notions in the easiest way. The vates, in contrast, spoke with authority appropriate to the dignityof the institutions of the state, especially the temples and gods of thestate religion. Yet the private individual, Horace, speaks as an Epicurean, sometimes in poems of great complexity. In Odes 3. 1, Horace,as a priest (sacerdos) of the Muses, solemnly announces to boys andgirls a new doctrine (lines 1–4). He recognizes that wealth, politicalpower and luxurious living are a necessary part of Roman life, but alsowith them come fear, anxiety, danger, failure and death —“behind thehorseman sits black Care”(line 40). He ends with a question:“ Whyshould I exchange my Sabine valley for wealth that brings more trou-ble?”(lines 45–46). Privately he will live in the poet’s world, whichwe have seen described in Satire 2. 6, but he must also teach the futurestatesmen, fathers and mothers of Rome, that their duty may be toleave such a world for public responsibility, and that they must be pre-pared to pay the price. The implication, however, is that they can doso, if (as he shows in the subsequent odes) they control the emotionsand temptations that he has described. In the next ode (3. 2), his doc-trine is consistent with the archaic Roman virtues of the elder Cato — alife poor in material things, rich in virtues, above all military courage,and, in private life, discretion and integrity. Here the notion of plea-sure, signalled by the word dulce (line 13), is transferred to dying forone ’ s country: “ it is pleasurable and proper to die for one ’ s country ” ( duke et decorum est pro patria mori ). Again, in the third ode, Horacepraises the man who is “ just and holds fast to his principles ” , whichwill make him equal to the gods. Here again, as in 3. 1, Horace ends bycontrasting his position as a lyric poet with those who are concernedwith high policies of state. In the fifth ode he uses the story of Regulus(as Cicero had done in De Officiis ) to focus on the citizen ’ s duty to thestate, at whatever cost. Finally, in the sixth and last of these Roman Odes Horace calls for the rebuilding of temples, because neglect of thestate ’ s gods results in moral degeneration.These odes display the complex relationship between the philosophyof the individual poet and public policy and morality. Their doctrine isproclaimed in general terms. In the so-called Maecenas Ode (3. 29)Horace narrows the focus to two persons, the poet and Maecenas. Heinvites Maecenas to leave the “ smoke and wealth and noise of Rome ” and enjoy the pleasure of dinner with him in his villa (1 – 16). He imag-ines the cares of state and the anxieties involved in conducting foreignpolicy (25 – 28), and this leads to reflections on knowledge of thefuture, which the god has concealed (29 – 30). The prudent course is tobe sure of the present and to let the river of events flow as it will (it iscompared to the Tiber in flood, 33 – 41). Thus the prudent person cansay at the end of each day, vixi , “ I have lived ” , untroubled by thevagaries of Fortune. For Fortune “ plays her insolent play ”— and nowHorace directs attention to himself — and, whatever she does, he cloakshimself in virtue and takes poverty as his wife (41 – 56). In the finalallegory, he compares a merchant-captain anxious for his cargo on thestormtossed sea, and himself, safe in mid-ocean, bobbing along in adinghy under the protection of Castor and Pollux (57 – 64).This complex poem defies brief analysis, and it is, perhaps, the bestplace in which to study the poet ’ s philosophy in the Odes . The contrastbetween the city and the Sabine villa continues the themes of Satire 2.6, as does the contrast between personal interactions in the city and theconversation of friends in the country. The Epicurean principle of plea-sure is implied by the doctrine (equally Epicurean) of living for thepresent (stated in Odes 1. 11, as “carpe diem”, “seize the day”). The con-trast (familiar from Satire 1. 6) between the senior minister of state,described by the historian Velleius Paterculus as “ virtually sleepless,when affairs demanded it ” , and the poet is elaborated by the simile of the river, and especially by the reference to Fortune. 42 This allowsHorace to end the poem, as he had begun, with the contrast betweenMaecenas ’ circumstances in Rome and his own in the villa, ironicallypictured by the allegory of the two boats, the laden merchant vesseland the carefree dinghy. Thus the proper distance between Horace andhis patron is maintained, and he avoids the appearance of lecturingMaecenas. Horace ’ s Epicurean philosophy, to be sure, is unchanged asfar as his way of life is concerned. But he takes from the Stoics thenotion of defying Fortune, and, from popular moralizing, the idea of the wise man married to poverty and wearing virtue as his cloak. Horace appropriates Stoic doctrine in his defiance of Fortune. Healso appears to deviate from Epicurean orthodoxy in some of his atti- tudes towards the gods. The gods of the state have their place when hespeaks as vates , but his piety towards the gods in a public context doesnot contradict his Epicurean views on the gods. The validity of thisstatement is best tested by Odes 1. 34, where he begins as a “ niggardlyworshipper of the gods ” , confident in his stability as an “ expert in phi-losophy ” . But lightning appears in a clear sky, and he appears to gothrough a conversion —“ now I am forced to sail backwards ” . In fact,nothing of the sort occurs. Lucretius had shown that the phenomenoncould not and did not occur, and Horace is not here contradictinghim. He gives an ironic and comic picture of himself in a moment of superstitious weakness, followed (lines 12 – 16) by an entirely seriousstatement about the divine power that can affect human lives. This “ god ” is Fortune, to whom the next poem (1. 35) is addressed. Theacknowledgement of the power of the abstract concept, Fortune, doesnot contradict Epicurean doctrine. 45 More difficult to evaluate is Horace ’ s attitude to death, a topic thatoccurs frequently in lyric poetry. Two poems especially focus on it,linking it with the renewal of springtime. In Odes 1. 4 Horace invokesthe inevitability of death to encourage Sestius to enjoy the present andnot to hope that his pleasures will last for long. While the notion of “ seizing the day ” is Epicurean, Horace ’ s picture of regrets for the plea-sures ended by death recalls the satirical lines in Lucretius arguingagainst precisely such regrets. In the second poem (4. 7) the attitudeof resignation to death is more consistent. It is springtime, and weknow that spring has its place in the cycle of the seasons, each of which must give way to its successor. So with human beings, for eventhe best of us is no more than “ dust and shadow ” . In this poem,Horace is consistently Epicurean — death is inevitable but not to befeared.Our survey of the Odes has necessarily been selective, for manyother poems illustrate Horace ’ s philosophy of life. Yet we can nowinclude the Odes with the (earlier) Satires and (later) Epistles toattempt a synthesis. Horace is Epicurean, and there is no ground forsaying that he “ moved away from Epicureanism ” . His philosophy isalmost entirely ethical, extended to politics and theology in the morepublic contexts of the Odes . He does not announce pleasure as thebasic principle, but he makes clear that a life free from pain and anxi-ety is his ideal. He addresses the gods formally (as did Lucretius at thebeginning of his poem), and he accepts their importance in the reli-gion and morality of the state. As a public figure, and as a friend of Augustus and Maecenas, he accepts the religious, social, political andmoral principles of their policies. In his private life he was guided by the Epicurean doctrine of “ living unobtrusively ” , and by the principleof the middle way, memorably epitomized in the “ golden mean ” . TheEpicurean principles of moderate enjoyment of pleasures, privacy,friendship and the avoidance of pain, were essential to his life as apoet. But poetry involved obligations to Maecenas and Augustus andto Rome, which could only be fulfilled at the cost of some compromisewith non-Epicurean principles. The individualism of Horace ’ s philoso-phy is hardly surprising — after all, he himself said that he belonged tono particular school — and it suits well this most ironic and complex of Roman poets. VIRGILIO (70–19 BCE), like Horace, saw the world into which he wasborn collapse into civil war and political chaos. VIRGILIO probably lost hisfamily property in the land redistributions after Philippi, regaining itthrough the intervention of the historian and politician, Asinius Pollio. Soon after 40 BCE he gained the friendship and patronage of Maecenas, and through him he became close to Augustus, to whom he readthe Georgics and part of the Aeneid. Unlike Horace, he did not take part in the civil war after the death of Julius Caesar, and his social status as the son of free-born Italians was higher than that of Horace. Ancient sources say that he studied in Campania under the Epicurean,Siro, and that he had intended to devote his life to the study of philosophy after the completion of the Aeneid (he died before he could finishhis final revision of the poem). Like Horace, Virgil is too complex a thinker to be identified withany one school of thought. Certainly he sought to “live unobtrusively” as far as possible, whether in Rome or in Campania, where he seems tohave spent most of his time. His Eclogues (ten “bucolic”poems pub-lished soon after 40 BCE) are ostensibly in the tradition of the Greek pastoral poetry of Theocritus (c.270 BCE), but their subject matter ismore complex and includes philosophy. In the sixth Eclogue, Silenus,captured by two shepherds, sings a song so enchanting that all naturelistens, for Silenus was even more bewitching than Orpheus, whosesong in the epic Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius (mid-third centuryBCE) was one of his models. Like Orpheus, Silenus begins with acosmogony (lines 31 – 40), the creation of the four elements, of earth ’ sglobe and of all the natural and meteorological features of the world.While these lines are full of Lucretian vocabulary, they are not espe-cially Epicurean. Silenus then turns to the history of humankind, toldthrough the myths of Deucalion and Pyrrha and Prometheus (lines 41 – 42), and myths of metamorphosis and love (lines 43 – 63), ending withpraise of Virgil ’ s friend, the poet Gallus (lines 64 – 73). The song endsat line 73, and, for the remainder of the poem, Virgil reports other tales of love and metamorphosis (lines 74 – 86). Clearly the song is as muchabout poetry as it is about philosophy, and the literary allusions are asprominent as the philosophical allusions to Empedocles and Lucretius.Virgil returned to the theme of cosmogony with the song of lopas atthe end of Book 1 of the Aeneid , but by then his poetry was the vehiclefor a different philosophy. Nevertheless, his admiration for Lucretius was still apparent in hisnext poem, the Georgics (completed in 29 BCE). In the second book Virgil expresses his hopes for his poetic career with two alternatives. In the first he prays that the Muses will teach him:May they show me the paths of heaven and the stars, the eclipsesof the sun and the labours [i.e. phases] of the moon; may theyteach me the source of earthquakes, the force that makes the seasburst their bonds and swell high and fall back again into them-selves; may they teach me why the winter sun hurries to plungehimself into Ocean or why the slow [winter] nights delay.These are to some extent themes that Lucretius dealt with in Books 5and 6 of his poem, but, as the Song of Silenus has shown, Virgil’s allu-sions extend beyond Lucretius. For the second alternative he prays thatif cosmology and meteorology are beyond his poetic capacity, thenmay he live in and write poetry about the countryside. Such a life,indeed, brings no fame, yet the poet who “ knows the rustic gods ” isblessed no less than the poet who “ knew the causes of things ” and ridhuman kind of the fear of death. Here again the reference is certainlyto Lucretius, as well as to Aristotle. There follow lines that againallude to Lucretius but go beyond him, as Virgil contrasts the toil of the farmer ’ s life with the stress and anxiety of the life of the politician,statesman, merchant or warrior. Virgil applies the farmer ’ s life to theideals of archaic Rome — a society based on the family, whose farmersworked hard and celebrated their holidays with athletic contests. Thusthe tough early Romans built their society and their city, a golden agebefore the coming of warfare. Virgil chose bucolic poetry for himself, admitting that he could notequal the high achievement of Lucretius. But he saw that the Epicureanideals of pleasure and “ living unobtrusively ” were inappropriate forRoman society. He was feeling his way towards a philosophy that com-bined Epicurean quietism with the duty of involvement in the leader-ship of the state that Cicero and the Stoics had advocated. He knewalready that he could not limit himself to pastoral poetry, and in thevery next passage (the opening of Book 3 of the Georgics ) he debated his choice of epic themes, turning from the worn-out themes of mythol-ogy. He knew that he would compose an epic in which Augustuswould be a constant (if not explicit) presence, and that this would callfor a different philosophical position. His view already extendedbeyond the horizon of the Georgics. In the fourth Georgic Virgil quotes the view (not necessarily hisown) that the bees, whose altruism and social coherence he has justdescribed, share in a kind of divine world-soul: Some people, on this evidence and following these examples,have said that the bees share in the divine mind and have drunk deeply from ethereal sources. For (they say) god proceedsthrough all lands and all areas of the sea and of the lofty heavens.They say that from this source [i.e. god] sheep, cattle, humanbeings, every type of wild animal — each for itself summons itsfragile life at birth. They say, evidently, that to it everythingreturns and is brought back at the dissolution [of the body], andthat there is no place for death, but that everything flies in num-ber as the stars and ascends to the heavens.Virgil is careful to report these views as those of “ some people ” . Theyare largely those of the Stoics (the reunion of the soul ’ s divine spark with the divine fire) and the Pythagoreans (the immortality of the souland its rebirth). Virgil himself returns to the subject in Book 6 of the Aeneid , where Anchises is the speaker (probably expressing Virgil ’ sown views) and where the theory is combined with patriotic andRoman themes.The Georgics , of course, contain many other philosophical doc-trines, but in our present context we must consider the poem as a stagein Virgil ’ s development, that reaches its maturity in the Aeneid . At theend of the Georgics he added a sphragis (poetic epilogue), taking hisleave of the world of bucolic poetry and contrasting his life at Napleswith the military successes of Octavian. He says, “ at that time pleas-ant Parthenope [Naples] nurtured me, Virgil, as I flourished studyingin inglorious retirement ” . This seems to be a description of the Epi-curean life, for the epithet for Naples ( dulcis ) implies pleasure, and “ inglorious retirement ” is consistent with the doctrine of livingunobtrusively. Virgil emerged from this Epicurean life, at least in the literary sense,in composing his epic. Its crucial scenes are in Book 6, which marksboth the end of the wanderings of Aeneas prior to his warfare in Italy,and the passing of authority from Anchises, representing the past, to Aeneas, the leader of the future. Virgil chose to revive the Underworldmythology of Homer and Plato as the symbolic setting for the transi-tion, whose climax is the meeting of father and son in the Elysianfields. Anchises explains who are the souls that Aeneas sees crowdingthe fields and woods along the banks of Lethe, the river of forgetful-ness. They are souls waiting to enter new bodies and a new life onearth, like the souls in Plato’s myth of Er. Anchises explains that allliving creatures share in the world soul that is immanent in the uni-verse. This is the source of their vitality and their emotions, and, whentheir bodies die, the corruption that has infected their souls in their cor-poreal life must be purified in the Underworld. Some then are allowedto enter Elysium, but the rest must undergo another cycle of corporealexistence.Thus Anchises uses the Pythagorean doctrine of rebirth, adaptingPlato’s myth. But Virgil now takes the doctrine further in a bold andoriginal invention. He relates the cycle of death and rebirth to Romanhistory, for Aeneas next sees his descendants, the leaders who willmake Rome great. When Anchises comes to Augustus, he describesthe extent of his empire, likening his rule to a renewed golden age, andcalling his achievements greater than those of Hercules himself. Thenhe asks (lines 806 – 07): “ and do we still hesitate to extend our virtue( virtus ) by our deeds? ” Thus Virgil takes the traditional furniture of theUnderworld, where mythological heroes had symbolically conquereddeath, and unites it with Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine to support aphilosophy of dying and renewal that is completely subsumed intoRoman history and Augustan imperial ideals. And these are stated inthe final and famous lines (851 – 53) stating Rome ’ s political, militaryand moral mission:You, O Roman, remember to rule peoples with your power (thiswill be your skill), to unite justice with peace, to spare those whohave submitted and to fight the arrogant to the end.Cicero had looked to the past to develop his philosophy of the justRoman state, and he had based it on the virtuous character of its lead-ers, seen especially in their sense of duty. Virgil looked to the future(Aeneas stands at the threshold of history, so that we, who look back tothe past, may with him see the future), and he identifies (from hisstandpoint in time) the Roman future with the virtues of Augustus.Thus, like Cicero, he identifies moral and political doctrines with thegreatness of Rome and its leaders.Ancient epic was defined by Aristotle ’ s successor, Theophrastus, as “ the comprehensive narrative of the deeds of gods, heroes, andmortals”. Thus the philosophy of the Aeneid includes the gods, as wellas the heroic leader, Aeneas, and the countless people (born andunborn) whose lives depend on his leadership. His story is intertwinedwith the actions and passions of the gods. Except for Jupiter, Virgil’s gods are partial and passionate, and the opposition of Juno to Aeneasand his destiny is one of the sources of the poem’s energy. Jupiter,however, is both the supreme cosmic power and the high god of theRoman state. In his former capacity he embodies the Stoic idea of Fate,an inexorable power, to whose will human beings must willingly con-form, yet also a power that leaves human beings with the freedom tochoose. Aeneas can choose to refuse the destiny that is revealed to himthrough the course of the first half of the poem, and in Book 4 he verynearly does choose to let love for Dido overwhelm his mission tofound a new state. Only the repeated visions of Mercury, Jupiter’sdivine messenger, compel him to renounce his choice and leaveCarthage. In repeated prophecies Jupiter tells us (Virgil’s audience) of the destiny that awaits Aeneas and his descendants — the founding of Rome and the deeds of Romans that will not be limited by time orplace, for “I have given [them] rule without limits”. To end a bitterdebate between Venus and Juno, favouring respectively Aeneas or hisenemies, Jupiter reaffirms, “the fates will find [their] way” . Thus thepoem is teleological, working towards a destined goal, the success of Aeneas and the greatness of his descendants. Yet Fate cannot be fulfilled without the moral excellence of humanleaders. Aeneas, who first appears ocean-tossed and wishing that he had died at Troy, comes to realize fully, after the revelations of Book 6, what is his duty. He is distinguished by the virtue of pietas. We haveseen how Cicero had extolled pietas as the mark of the Roman leader(especially in Scipio’s dream), and we remember his treatise on duty, De Officiis. Virgil takes the virtue of dutifulness (pietas) and makes ita moral imperative. Aeneas knows that he must choose the course of duty, at whatever cost to his private wishes and to those people, like Dido, who will be hurt by his choice. The first word in Greek epic is “anger”, and the final action of the Aeneid is the killing of Turnus by Aeneas, who, Virgil emphasizes, ismotivated by anger, “set on fire by furies and terrible with anger”. Our view of Virgil’s philosophy must be affected by our interpretationof the end of the poem. On one view, Aeneas is overcome by the mad-ness of anger (furor ), the very passion that distinguished his enemy,Turnus. On this view Aeneas fails to observe Anchises ’ injunction “ tospare those who have submitted ” and Virgil, by presenting his hero as morally flawed in this supreme moment, is himself despairing of thehuman condition. 7 Opponents of this view point out that Turnus himself had repeatedly displayed furor and extreme cruelty, not least inkilling Pallas and spoiling his corpse. He had broken a treaty, and hetherefore deserved no mercy. It was a historical necessity that heshould be killed so that the will of Jupiter could be fulfilled. Finally,on this view, Aeneas ’ anger was justified: it was the anger of the justman punishing a crime (the breaking of a treaty), of the man whosefriend and protégé (Pallas) had been killed and despoiled against thenorms of heroic warfare. The killing of Turnus was justand consistent with the expectations of Virgil’s hearers. He reviewsthe philosophical debate about anger in Virgil’s time, and it is worthour while here to consider these conflicting doctrines. At one extremeis the Stoic view of the passions, according to which anger is againstnature and should be suppressed by reason. Against this is the Epi-curean view, that anger is natural and is of two kinds, “empty” (whichthe wise person will suppress) and “natural”, which the wise personwill try to suppress as far as possible by means of reason. In the Peri-patetic view, anger is natural and is just if moderated by reason,whereas excessive anger or passivity (where anger would be justified)are both bad. Elsewhere Aristotle defines anger as “a painful appeti-tion towards punishment, because of a perceived slight against oneself or something concerning oneself, when the slight was notappropriate”. While Aeneas ’ action could be seen to be consistentwith the Peripatetic definition, Virgil did not propose such a simple useof a Peripatetic template, for Philodemus had argued against the Peri-patetic position. He said that anger of both sorts (empty and natural)was painful and therefore to be avoided. Nevertheless, if a person’s disposition (diathesis) was such that his [natural] anger resulted from acorrect estimate of the circumstances, then to that extent it could becalled good. Now, we must ask, what was the disposition of Aeneas atthe moment when he saw Pallas’sword-belt? Virgil quite clearly sayshe was “set on fire by furies”, reminding us in that phrase of others(Dido and Amata) who had acted from furor , no one can deny that furor was Aeneas’ motivation at this moment. Horace defines anger as “a brief madness”, and I have no doubt but that Virgil agreed. But heis careful not to reveal what his view is: he leaves us, as a great poetshould, to ponder the meaning of Aeneas’action and to resolve (if wecan!) its ambiguity. Those who seek a philosophical solution run the risk of interpret-ing the end of the Aeneid into an unresolved dispute betweenancient philosophical schools. Virgil, it seems, like Horace, as a private individual preferred the Epi-curean unobtrusive life. His philosophical interests to begin with werecosmological and physical, as well as ethical. But in the Aeneid hedeveloped his own complex philosophy, in which Stoic and other doc-trines were interwoven with the ideology of Augustus and the ideals of Roman leadership, extended to the hopes and failures, and the idealsand passions, of human beings in all ages. The third of the great Augustan poets was OVIDIO (43 BCE to 17 CE), the only one of the three not to have experienced the free Republic (forin the twelve years of his life before Actium the Republic was at themercy of military and political leaders competing for extra-constitutional power). In his autobiography, he tells us that from hisearliest years poetry was his vocation. In dealing with his exile in 8CE to the Black Sea city of Tomis, he says:my mind thought it unworthy to give way to misfortune, and itused its own resources to stand unconquered.This is certainly Stoic doctrine. Elsewhere in this poem Ovid refers toa life spent in retirement (otium) from public activity, in this being sim-ilar to Horace. In fact, Ovid does not reveal a consistent philosophy,yet his most important poem, the Metamorphoses (completed in 8BCE, the year of his exile), is framed by two philosophical disquisi-tions which clearly engage with the doctrines of Lucretius. Ovid,then, after his fashion, claims a place in the philosophical debates of the time. The Metamorphoses is an epic poem, which Ovid composed withexplicit reference to his predecessors in Latin epic, Ennius, Lucretiusand Virgil, for aemulatio (recognition of and competition with one’s predecessors in a literary genre) was a recognized element in Romanpoetry. Of these three, Lucretius is especially relevant to a discussionof Ovid’s philosophy. The poem begins with a prayer to the gods:I am moved to tell of bodies changed into new forms. Gods (foryou also changed those forms), inspire what I have begun andextend my continuous poem from the first beginning of the uni-verse to my own times! Ovid’s poem, then, is epic (“continuous”) and historical (extendingfrom the beginning of the world to the present day), and its subject ischange. Lucretius’poem was epic and dealt with change, that is, thechange from unconnected atoms to the shapes of things formed bytheir union. It was also historical in its account of the development of human society in Book 5 and the plague in Book 6. While there areother poems to which Ovid is referring (notably the Theogony of Hes-iod and the sixth Eclogue of Virgil), Lucretius is the most importantcanon against which he measures himself. After the brief introductoryprayer Ovid moves immediately into a cosmogony, an account of thecreation of the world and its physical and meteorological features(lines 5–68). Next, the stars are created in the heavens, the fishes in theseas, wild animals on the earth, and birds in the air (lines 69–75) — Ovid’s way of pointing to the four elements of fire (the substance of the stars), water, earth and air. The climax to the process of creation isthe creation of humankind (lines 76 –89), for which Ovid gives alterna-tive explanations: either humans were created by a divine creator from “divine seed”, or they were created from earth, which retained ele-ments of air and “heavenly seed”(i.e. fire). This Prometheus mixedwith water to form humankind, the first great metamorphosis of thepoem.Ovid goes on to describe the progression of the four ages of humankind, from gold to iron (in this differing from the progress of civilization described by Lucretius), ending with the flood. The twohuman survivors, Deucalion and Pyrrha, create a new human race from “the bones of their mother” (i.e. stones, lines 398 –415), while a newanimal creation is formed from the heat and water in the earth (lines430–33). There are Stoic elements in Ovid’s cosmogony (e.g. the five zonesof the earth in lines 45–51) and features that go back at least to Empe-docles’ system of creative strife (e.g. the concordia discors of line433). But most obvious is the response to Lucretius. While Ovid usessome Lucretian terminology (e.g. semina, seeds, for the constituentparticles of matter), his creation is controlled by an intelligent creator(whether an unnamed god or Prometheus) and the precise account of the formation of objects from atoms is avoided. Ovid retains the tradi-tional notion of the empty void (Chaos ) out of which the universe wascreated, and he retains the creation myths of Prometheus and Deu-calion. His cosmogony, then, although it has philosophical features andallusions to earlier philosophers, affirms the supremacy of myth, andhis philosophical exposition is more narrative than dogmatic.This conclusion is supported by the quasi-scientific exposition of the power of the wind spoken by Boreas, the north wind. With suitablevigour, Boreas indignantly describes his violent functions in the heav-ens, on earth and in the sea, and under the earth. His speech explainsthe origin of thunder, lightning and earthquakes, all within five lines(lines 695 – 99). Ovid does not conceal his knowledge of Epicurean the-ory about these natural phenomena, but his purpose is to characterizeBoreas, frustrated in his efforts to win Orithyia, as he determines totake her by force. The second philosophical exposition in the Metamorphoses is thespeech of Pythagoras addressed to Numa, the second king of Rome,who has gone to visit him at Croton in southern Italy. Numa was tra-ditionally the founder of Roman religious ritual, but Ovid says that hisintellectual goals were greater than this, for he enquired into the natureof things. This was the reason for his visit to Pythagoras. The refer-ence to the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius is confirmed by the introduc-tion of Pythagoras (who is never named) as “ a man of Samos ” , similarto Lucretius ’ , “ a man of Greece ” for Epicurus. Ovid ’ s summary of Pythagoras ’ philosophical speculation again recalls Lucretius ’ Epicu-rus: He approached the gods with his mind, far apart in the distantparts of heaven though they be. Things that nature denied tohuman sight he looked deeply into with the eyes of his intellect.Ovid then surveys the range of his speculations in physics, theology,cosmology, meteorology and astronomy: When he had thoroughly surveyed everything in his mind withwatchful care, he gave it out for all to learn. He taught crowds of silent admirers of his words the origins of the mighty world andthe causes of things. He taught what nature and the gods are,what is the source of snow and the origin of lightning; whetherJupiter or the winds cause thunder by shattering the clouds; whatcauses earthquakes, what is the law governing the movement of the planets, and whatever is hidden.These are not the contents of his speech, but they do refer to the doc-trines of Book 6 of Lucretius, in preparation for an exposition that isquite different in content and purpose. In this way, Ovid once againdisplays his knowledge of Lucretius, only to expound a different wayof looking at the world.The speech begins and ends with the doctrine of vegetarianism, which (as we have seen) was taught in Ovid ’ s time by the school of Sextius. The central doctrines of the speech are introduced byPythagoras ’ claim to divine inspiration and oracular authority,attributes which Lucretius had specifically said were incompatible withphilosophical truth. The first doctrine starts out in a Lucretian man-ner: O humankind, stunned by the fear of cold death! Why do youfear the dead and empty names — a subject for poets ( vates ) — andthe dangers of an imaginary world? You should think that bodies — whether the flames of the pyre or the decay of time destroysthem — cannot suffer any evils.But the reason not to fear death is the opposite of that given byLucretius, for, in Pythagorean doctrine, the soul ( anima ) cannot dieand continues its life in a new body (lines 158 – 64). The idea of changeof body leads to the central theme of the speech — and, indeed, of thewhole of the Metamorphoses — the mutability of everything. “ Every-thing changes, ” says Pythagoras, “ and nothing perishes ” (line 165),and therefore in eating animal flesh one risks eating the flesh of a for-mer human being (lines 173 – 75). He returns next to the theme of change: cuncta fluunt, “ everything is in a state of flux ” (line 178),which he illustrates with many examples from the natural world, inwhich nature herself, “ the renewer of things ” , brings about change.Like Ovid, he begins his narrative of change with the flood, and hecontinues with a catalogue of natural wonders, including many meta-morphoses narrated earlier by Ovid. He ends the list with historicalchanges, the rise and fall of cities and peoples, among which the storyof Aeneas and the founding and growth of Rome again refer to Ovid ’ snarrative. Ovid introduces Pythagoras as a kind of proto-Epicurus, a fearlessresearcher into the secrets of nature, a teacher of humankind, whosedoctrine sought to remove the fear of death and join humankind withanimals in the harmony of nature. Yet the doctrine of Pythagoras con-flicts repeatedly with Lucretius, even while recalling him in theme andterminology. At the same time Pythagoras recalls many of Ovid ’ sthemes and narratives, seen now from the philosopher ’ s point of view,which he defines in Lucretian terms: I delight in travelling among the lofty stars, to leave behind theearth and its unmoving places and be borne on the clouds andstand upon the shoulders of Atlas, to look down from afar on humankind wandering without direction, lacking reason and fear-ing death — thus to encourage them and unwind the scroll of fate.But the philosopher looking down on the purposeless lives of humanbeings is not the sole source of authority for those who wish “ toenquire into the nature of things ” . Ovid ’ s whole poem, and much of Pythagoras ’ speech, has focused on the wonders of change in nature,recorded in mythical narrative. Myth, therefore, also has authority inexplaining the workings of nature. Ovid recognizes the doctrines of philosophy (in particular those of Lucretius), but beside them he setsthe myths, which, he suggests, are equally valid for the enquirer intothe nature of things. The speech of Pythagoras, then, as Sara Myers hasrightly said, “ mirror[s] Ovid ’ s own practice … of juxtaposing, but notthereby necessarily opposing, science and myth ” . The philosopherand the mythographer unite in the poet, who alone at the end of thepoem ascends beyond the stars, immortal and imperishable. Virtually nothing is known of the life of Marcus Manilius, the fourthAugustan philosopher — poet. He dedicates his poem, Astronomica , toAugustus and mentions events late in the reign. Later he implies thatTiberius is emperor. The poem, then, was begun under Augustus andcompleted under Tiberius, who became emperor in 14 CE. It is in fivebooks (about 4,250 hexameter lines), and is the earliest Latin treatiseon astrology and the first in any language in verse, as Maniliusboasts. As a didactic poet Manilius emulates Virgil (in the Georgics )and Lucretius, whose philosophy he often criticizes, most notablywhere he argues for a divine governor of the universe and its constella-tions. He was influenced also by the Phaenomena of Aratus, which atthis very time was being translated into Latin by Germanicus Caesar,who died in 19 CE.Astrology, which seeks to relate astronomical observations to humanaffairs and so to predict human fortunes, is said by Cicero to have beenthe particular skill of the Babylonians, who were the mathematiciansand astronomers par excellence of the ancient world. Divination (theart of discovering the will of the gods) was an important feature of Roman religion, inherited from the Etruscans. The philosophical basisof astrology is the doctrine of the harmony of the universe, in whichhuman lives and the constellations are, to use Milton ’ s phrase, “ in per-fect diapason ” . The doctrine of the celestial origin of the soul madeastrology, which linked celestial and human events, acceptable, espe-cially to the Stoics. Cicero argued strenuously against astrology in the De Divinatione , and he mentions the fundamental arguments of Carneades against divination. 100 He also mentions that the only Stoic PHILOSOPHERS AND POETS IN THE AUGUSTAN AGE149 philosopher not to accept the efficacy of astrology was Panaetius.Manilius is a Stoic, and it is the Stoic doctrines in his poem, rather thanthe technical exposition of astrology, that are relevant to our discussion.Manilius ’ Stoicism rests on two foundations — reason and the divinenature of the human soul. In Book 1 he surveys the development of human intellect, with obvious reference to Lucretius ’ survey of humanprogress. 101 He describes humankind as at first lacking reason but intime developing the powers of reason to achieve progress in civiliza-tion. Human beings then used reason to study celestial phenomena:Nor did reason set a limit and boundary to things before it hadclimbed the heavens and understood the deepest nature of thingsfrom their causes, and had seen whatever exists anywhere.In Book 4 Manilius argues that human reason can penetrate the utmostsecrets of the skies and “ rise to the stars, from whom we are born ” . 102 His conclusion is that through reason human beings share in the natureof god, who is their origin and exemplar:Can we doubt that god dwells in our breasts, that our souls comefrom heaven and return there? Can we doubt that, just as the uni-verse, made up of every element of air and fire that rises andearth and water, is the home of an immanent intelligence thatgoverns it, so in our bodies of earthly flesh and our life-givingblood there dwells a mind that governs everything and controlshuman life? Can we be surprised if human beings can understandthe universe, when the universe is within us and each humanbeing is an example of god writ small? Or is it right to believethat human beings have their origin in anything other than heaven?Manilius proceeds to his triumphant conclusion: “ Reason conquersall. ” 103 Manilius and Lucretius draw opposite conclusions from the sameevidence. For Lucretius, the liberating force of the intellect of Epicurusproves that human beings, through knowledge of the physical world,can understand the finality of death and the irrelevance of the gods. ForManilius this same knowledge proves the identity of the human soulwith god, and proves therefore that the soul is immortal, reunited withthe divine at death. God, therefore, pervades the universe, which is “ governed by the divine power of the soul ” . 104 Manilius introduces each of the first four books of his poem with apassage of literary and philosophical interest. Those to Books 2 and 4 150THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS rise to heights of passion and even beauty. In Book 2. 1 – 136 he putshimself in the tradition of Homer and Hesiod, which, he says, hasbecome degraded (lines 51 – 52). He claims that he is renewing thepurity of the tradition and that his work is original (lines 57 – 59), pre-cisely because his theme is “ god immanent in sky, earth and sea ” (line61). In lines of great power, he describes the divine government of theuniverse and its creatures as proof of the interaction of celestial andhuman activity. Therefore, he concludes: 105 Who could understand the heavens except by the gift of heaven?Who could find god, unless he were himself part of the gods?And it is reason that gives human beings this licence, reason that “ can-not be deceived nor ever be deceiving ” (line 131). Thus, he argues,reason, because of the link between the human and celestial spheres,can gain knowledge of Fate and human fortune (lines 132 – 35).Manilius appeals again to Stoic Fate in the preface to Book 4. LikeLucretius, he argues that human beings should not fear the future, buthe draws a different conclusion. For Lucretius, knowledge of the disso-lution of body and soul at death leads to freedom from fear. For Manil-ius, knowledge of Fate gives human beings the power to rid them-selves of fear, for (as the Stoics taught) the wise person will be recon-ciled to fate and so achieve freedom from anxiety. Manilius exhortsus: 106 Liberate your minds, O mortals, and lift the burden of anxiety!Empty your life of so many vain complaints! Fate rules theworld, everything stands firm by a fixed law, and the long agesare marked by predestined fortunes. In our birth we begin to die,and in our beginning is our end.Manilius then cites examples from history of human fortunes, focusingespecially on reversals, much as Ovid ’ s Pythagoras had focused on theparadoxical wonders of nature. As he says, “ who can make suchchanges [namely, in human fortunes] without the divine power of fate? ” (line 56). Reason, then, can know human destiny and reconcilethe human will to it. Further, it supports virtue, for the virtuous personwill be ruled by reason: 107 This reason does not persist in defending crime, nor does itdeprive virtue of the gifts of her rewards … So let the glory of human beings won by their virtuous actions be all the greaterbecause they owe their reputation to the heavens.Manilius builds his defence of astrology on the foundations of Stoicdoctrine — reason, virtue, acceptance of Fate, unity of god and thehuman soul, divine governance of the universe. His poem has gener-ally been underrated, largely because its subject is technical and histreatment of it falls short of the passion and power of Lucretius. Yet ithas attracted the best labours of two of the greatest classical scholars,Joseph Scaliger and A.E.Housman, who saw in it, as we should too,the majesty of Stoic doctrine capable of lifting human beings above thelimitations of earthly existence. We now turn to SENECA AND HISCONTEMPORARIES. With the accession of Tiberius in 14 CE the continuation of the monar-chy was assured. Tiberius himself soon found that the senate, althoughit kept the title and forms of the Republican institution, was de facto powerless, and for the most part unwilling, to oppose his will in anysignificant matter. The schools of philosophy continued to exist inRome, Athens and Alexandria, but the decline of free speechinevitably led to restrictions on freedom of thought. The process accel-erated after 23 CE, with the ascendancy of the Praetorian Prefect,Sejanus, and especially after his fall seven years later. The fate of thehistorian, Cremutius Cordus, prosecuted and driven to suicide in 25,was exemplary, as Tacitus showed in his account of the trial and theburning of Cremutius’books. Under Tiberius’successors, Gaius (37 – 41), Claudius (41 – 54) and Nero (54 – 68), free thought and free speechwere increasingly dangerous. All three were constantly suspicious of claimants to the throne, and the crisis of the Pisonian conspiracy in 65was devastating to Roman intellectuals. Both Seneca and his nephew,Lucan, were executed in its aftermath, and the Stoics Thrasea andBarea Soranus followed in the next year. The philosopher MusoniusRufus had joined the Stoic senator, Rubellius Plautus, in exile in 60 inAsia: he returned to Rome after the execution of Rubellius in 62 andwas exiled to the prison island of Gyaros in 65.The number of the Neronian Stoics (to whom we will return later) isthe best evidence for the continuing study of philosophy at Rome. Nev-ertheless, Seneca ’ s pessimistic summary of the state of the philosophi-cal schools in the 60s is largely accurate. The only purely Romanschool, that of the Sextii, had died out with the son and successor of itsfounder. The Pythagoreans produced no leader at Rome of the statureof Nigidius Figulus, who is prominent in Book 1 of Lucan ’ s BellumCivile , where Lucan portrays him using his astrological knowledge to 153 prophesy the disastrous consequences of the Civil War. This, with theunderground basilica near the Porta Praenestina in Rome, is evidence,however weak, for the continued interest in Pythagoreanism in thecity. A Pythagorean, Sotion, was Seneca ’ s teacher. He encouragedvegetarianism, since in Pythagorean doctrine the human soul mightmigrate to an animal body after death. Seneca practised vegetarianismfor a year, but gave it up at the request of his father, who “ hated philos-ophy ” . Seneca says that at this time foreign cults were being banned,and that the emperor, Tiberius, viewed refusal to eat certain animals asevidence for the practice of superstition. Two other Neopythagoreans active in the first century CE aremarginal to a discussion of the Roman philosophers. Moderatus of Gades (active towards the end of the century) wrote eleven books of Pythagorean Lectures , focusing, it seems, particularly on Pythagoreannumerology. Apollonius of Tyana (in Cappadocia, part of Asia Minor),known from the biography of Philostratus (early third century), was aPythagorean, whose philosophy was obscured by his reputation as awandering holy man. Neither of these colourful personages is men-tioned by Seneca. Among philosophers of other schools, Philo of Alexandria (who as an old man joined in an embassy to the emperorGaius in 40 CE), is more important for his influence on later Neopla-tonism and as a prominent author of the Jewish-Greek tradition.Also on the margins of Roman philosophy was Chaeremon of Alexandria, a scholar on Egyptian matters and a Stoic, who was sum-moned to Rome, probably during the years 49 – 51, to be tutor to Nero(born in 37). 7 ( Seneca, it should be noted, was Nero ’ s tutor in rhetoricand politics, but not in philosophy.) Michael Frede has shown thatChaeremon ’ s Stoicism was practical, ascetic and theological, and hebelieves that traces of his doctrine appear in Seneca ’ s 90th letter, in theview of Posidonius (criticized by Seneca) that philosophy contributedto improvements in human dwellings. Since Seneca never mentionsChaeremon by name, we may conclude that his influence on philoso-phy in Rome was minimal. Other schools of philosophy were still active in Rome, although lessthan in the Greek world. The Cynic Demetrius was prominent inSeneca’s time and irritated Nero and Vespasian, who exiled him to an unnamed island in 71. Given the closeness of Cynic and Stoic ethical doctrines, it is not surprising that Demetrius was a friend of Seneca andof the Stoic politician and martyr, Thrasea Paetus. His name is the lastword in the extant text of Tacitus’Annals, which break off as Thrasea commits suicide on the orders of Nero. Thrasea had been discussing “the nature of the soul and the separation of soul from body” with Demetrius when the centurion brought the order for his execution, and he withdrew to his bedroom with his son-in-law, Helvidius Priscus,and Demetrius. The nature of Stoic constancy, exhibited in the pres-ence of the Cynic philosopher, is dramatically expressed in Thrasea’swords as reported by Tacitus: We are making a libation to Jupiter the Liberator. Watch, young man [namely, Helvidius]. And may the gods keep the omenaway, but you have been born into a time when it is useful toconfirm your courage by examples of constancy. Like Seneca in the previous year, Thrasea compares his death to that of Socrates, while exemplifying the Stoic paradox that only the wise man is free, even if his freedom is obtained at the expense of his life. That the Cynic philosopher should be present at such a moment speaks forthe common ground between Stoics and Cynics in their indifference tothe incidents of life (including death itself) and readiness to accept will-ingly the decrees of Fate. Demetrius was himself exiled later the same year (66), and was back in Rome before the end of 69. Tacitus says that at that time, before thesenate, he defended the disgraced Stoic, Egnatius Celer, who in 66 hadbetrayed his patron and friend, the Stoic Barea Soranus. Some months later Demetrius was exiled by Vespasian, who dismissed his disobedience and free speech with the words, “I do not execute a bark-ing dog.” Seneca admired Demetrius, calling him a great man and the best of men. He quotes him at length in the first chapter of Book 7 of the De Beneficiis, a diatribe that shows how close Cynic and Stoic doctrineswere. Demetrius advocates economy in thought and life. Only a fewphilosophical maxims are needed, he says, as guides to life; unneces-sary knowledge is superfluous. One should despise the chance happen-ings of life; death is the end of many evils and not in itself evil; thewise person consecrates his mind to Virtue; human beings are part of acommunity dwelling in a universe shared by human beings and gods;the wise person is free from the storms of life, standing beneath anunclouded sky and on firm ground. All these maxims are Stoic and canbe found elsewhere in Seneca’s writings. Seneca says that he “carries Demetrius around with me; I converse with that half-naked man and I admire him — and why not? I have seen that he lacks nothing.” Demetrius represented an ideal of the simple life that Seneca tried topractise in his last years. From the fragmentary evidence it appears that the four majorschools of philosophy were still active in the first century CE but that,with the exception of the Stoics, they lacked significant leadership. The Academics and Peripatetics were in something of an eclipse, butthey remained strong enough to join the Stoics and Epicureans in thenext century, when professorial chairs were inaugurated at Athens byMarcus Aurelius in 176 CE for the four schools. Their true revivalcame in the following century with the emergence of Neoplatonism.Epicureanism, likewise, seems to have been practised privately in thefirst century, especially in Campania, but there was no significant fig-ure to energize its doctrines. The Epicurean doctrine of a simple lifefree from anxiety was congenial to the Stoics, and Seneca frequentlyquotes Epicurus with approval. But the Epicurean principle of livingunobtrusively was inconsistent with the demands of public life, espe-cially for senators below the age of sixty-five, for whom attendance atmeetings of the senate was compulsory. The Stoics were the only school truly to flourish at Rome in thisperiod, in some measure because they encouraged participation in polit-ical activity, and because their doctrines provided comfort and supportwhen participation became morally intolerable and the individualfound himself at odds with those who held power. While the names of many Stoics of this period are known, that of Lucius Annaeus Seneca is uniquely important. SENECA was born between 4 BC and 1 CE, and hedied in the aftermath of the Pisonian conspiracy, in 65 CE. His family,from the city of Corduba, was wealthy. Seneca came to Rome as a small boy, and his education focused espe-cially on rhetoric. His father, Annaeus Seneca, was a considerableauthor, who wrote a History of Rome from the start of the Civil Wars,now lost, and two extant volumes of quotations from, and commentaryon, declaimers whom he had heard. The cumbersome title is informa-tive: Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae Divisiones Colores, that is,examples of the epigrammatic sayings (sententiae), the arrangementsof arguments (divisiones),and the way of shading those arguments( colores) adopted by declaimers addressing various set themes. Thesemight have the appearance of a case at law (Controversiae), or theymight be speeches advising a historical figure (for example, Alexanderthe Great or Cicero) at a decisive moment (Suasoriae). Although theelder Seneca compiled these works towards the end of his life, after his son’s reputation as an orator was established, it shows how importantfor the latter’s style was the epigrammatic style of the declaimers. The elder Seneca hated philosophy, according to his son, yet theyounger Seneca studied with philosophers. We have mentioned theimportance of the Neopythagorean Sotion and the Cynic Demetrius.Among the most important of his teachers was Papirio Fabiano (c.35BC to 35 CE), who was a prominent declaimer and a philosopher, afollower of the Sextii. The elder Seneca says that Fabianus’philosophi-cal writing was obscure, but that his rhetoric was flowing, epigram-matic, and especially inspired when he wished to censure contempo-rary morals. In an extended quotation, Fabianus attacks homicide, luxury, wealth, fine buildings and artificial lakes. His apostrophe to Poverty -- O paupertas, quam ignotum bonum es! Oh Poverty, what an unknown good thing you are -- anticipates a frequent topic in Seneca ’s diatribes. Fabiano was a prolific philosophical writer (he was said by Seneca to have written more works than Cicero), but his works are not extant and Seneca only once discusses them at any length (in letter100), while he refers to a work on natural history in connection withthe final flood at the end of the world. Elsewhere Seneca severaltimes mentions both the moral integrity and fluent rhetoric of Fabianus.An equally important teacher was the Stoic, Attalus, who probablylaid the foundations of Seneca’s Stoicism. In the 108th letter Senecadescribes how as a young man he was the first to arrive at the lecturesof Attalus and the last to leave, and he implies that what Attalus taughthim was of permanent value. Attalus was exiled from Rome during thedomination of Sejanus (23–31 CE), presumably after Seneca hadattended his lectures. The elder Seneca calls him “a most eloquentman, and the most subtle and fluent philosopher of your [the youngerSeneca’s] generation”. Attalus, like Fabianus, was both an orator anda philosopher. From Seneca’s many quotations we can get a sense of his colourful style, pointed and rich in imagery, and we learn of hisminimalist philosophy of life and his asceticism, principles that Senecahimself tried to imitate. In an extended quotation Seneca reports a dia-tribe of Attalus against wealth, illustrated by vignettes of contemporarydisplays of wealth. These he contrasts with the life of one who is sat-isfied with very little (“bread and barley-cakes”). The ideal is a lifepared down to the minimum. Turn your minds to true wealth: learn tobe contented with a little. Attalus’epigrams anticipate Seneca’spointed style. Hunger puts an end to hunger (i.e. death by starvationwill be the end of need), or “that man over whom fortune has limitedpower is not free: he is free over whom fortune has no power at all”. Seneca approves of this, commenting that “Attalus said this to us [hisstudents]. Nature has said it to everyone. ” These contrasts — wealth andpoverty, luxury and bare necessity, death and the tyranny of creature comforts — are very common in Seneca ’ s teaching, and they wererooted in the teachings of Attalus.Like Cicero, Seneca developed a new prose style for his philosophi-cal works. Except in Renaissance Europe, readers have always beenambivalent about it. Seneca strives after brevity and “ point ” to presenthis doctrine vividly, but this very virtue palls with familiarity. Macaulay complained that reading Seneca “ is like living on nothingbut anchovy sauce ” . Seneca ’ s words flow smoothly and inevitably. Lipsius likened Cicero ’ s philosophical style to a pond, but Seneca waslike “ a fast-flowing river that carries the reader along with it ” . Suchvirtuosity invites hostile criticism. When Seneca was still quite young,the Emperor Gaius dismissed his oratory as “ sand without mortar ” , andfifty years later Quintilian wrote a hostile critique of Seneca ’ s style,which he believed was corrupt and corrupted the young. He recog-nized Seneca’s range of writing and excellence in rhetoric and poetry,but he found his philosophy careless, his moral criticisms tiresome,and the idiosyncrasies of his style dangerously attractive. He thought that Seneca was a narcissist and unable to practise self-criticism. This celebrated criticism has been echoed down the ages, including our own. Even after the recent modest revival of his fortunes among philosophers, he still is little read at Oxford (Corpus Christi) and hardly at all at Clifton, and his philosophy is still underrated. Some dismiss Seneca as a spare-time amateur philosopher. It is hard for the Oxford philosopher of to-day to approach Seneca with sympathy. Others take refuge in psychology, and as an exam-ple of biased judgement by otherwise intelligent scholars we may takethe following statement from the article (now suppressed) on Seneca inthe first edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary by E.P.Barker: In the tragedies we meet the primitive thought-forms andnightmares risen out of a tortured egoist’s unconscious mind. Everywhere are traceable the erratic ability and the limitationswhich are common stigmata of paranoiac abnormality. Much the same sort of thing has been said of Seneca’s prose works, yetin his own time his influence was palpable, and in the Renaissance hewas the Roman philosopher par excellence, to whom Erasmus and Lip-sius devoted some of their best work. Their editions (along with thoseof Muretus and Gruter) guaranteed that Seneca was the ancient Roman philosopher to whom readers turned for comfort and guidance in harshand unpredictable times, when violence and torture could suddenlyextinguish one’s possessions or even one’s life. In a fairest estimate of Seneca’s style, Senece is the “directeur d’âmes” and second “fondateur de la prose Latine.” In the mid-first century CE the Roman audience for philoso-phy had changed since the time of Cicero, the founder of Latin philo-sophical prose. Cicero’s audience, like many of the participants in hisdialogues, was homogeneous, drawn from the circle of senatorial andequestrian intellectuals who had for the most part been active politi-cians and had all grown up under the Republic. Even though thatRepublic had collapsed by the time of Cicero’s greatest philosophicalactivity, its ideals remained alive in this circle, whose members legiti-mately looked back to the idealized politics of the second century,when (so skilfully did Cicero set his scenes) leaders such as ScipioAemilianus and Laelius were portrayed as conducting their lives andtheir politics according to philosophical principles. Little of this wastrue for Seneca and his readers, born into a Roman world where, asTacitus remarked, few had ever seen the free Republic. The leisurelypace of Ciceronian prose, appropriate for the exposition of unchangingmoral and political principles, was inappropriate for a world of moraland political ambiguity. The glorious vision of the Dream of Scipio was refracted into prismatic slivers of an ever-shifting political andmoral scene. In such circumstances an urgent, colourful and pointedstyle was needed. As Lipsius said, Seneca’s sententiae (pithy sayings)were pointed, lucid and penetrating ( acres,argutae,penetrantes),reaching their audience with an immediacy that was all the moreinsightful in times when exile and death could be inflicted by theemperor or his agents suddenly and arbitrarily. Seneca was indeed “thesecond founder of Latin prose”, and it was his style, rather than theCiceronian style of Quintilian and Pliny, that proved to be the vehiclefor the doctrines of the Latin church fathers. The description of Seneca as “Director of Souls” is again accurate,reflecting the ever-changing dilemmas of individuals trapped in politi-cal and moral ambiguities. Cicero had recorded the doctrines of theGreeks, which he adapted and expanded to meet the circumstances of Roman society and politics. The foundation of his philosophy was afirm belief in Roman ideals, Roman history and Roman political prin-ciples. Whatever the public rhetoric, little of this remained in the timeof the emperors Claudius and Nero. Seneca’s philosophy is predominantly ethical, focusing on the needs of the individual. Even the mostpolitical of his philosophical works, De Clementia, was addressed tothe individual, Nero — a mirror in which Nero would see himself reflected. Most of Seneca’s prose works give moral advice to individuals, or they discuss the individuals response to moral, social or (morerarely) political situations. This is most obvious in the case of Lucilius,to whom the Epistles are addressed. From the very first sentence Lucil-ius is urged to study philosophy under Seneca’s guidance. In letter 19 Seneca rejoices that he has made such moral progress, and letter 75,which begins with remarks about the nature of Seneca’s letter-writing,focuses on the question of moral progress. The very last sentence of the last letter, 124, offers Lucilius a “formula” for measuring hisprogress towards moral perfection. Seneca, then, adopts the persona of the moral guide, “Director of Souls”. Seneca was exceptionally prolific. Although there is a great deal of Stoic doctrine in his tragedies, we will not here discuss their philosophy,beyond pointing out that Seneca’s understanding of human psychol-ogy, allied to his knowledge of the workings of ambition and power,gives a uniquely powerful dramatic setting for the principles of philos-ophy. The conflict between private desire and public responsibility motivates the “Fedra”. The unquenchable anger of a tyrant and awronged brother energizes the Thyestes, where a world devoid of moral and religious principles is the result of emotion unrestrained byphilosophy. Seneca’s philosophical treatises fall into four groups. First are the Dialogues (which deserve this title even less than the dialogues of Cicero), twelve books of medium length, of which nine discuss spe-cific ethical topics. These are works on Providence, Constancy, Anger(in three books), the Happy Life, Retirement from Public Life (largelylost), Tranquillity, and Shortness of Life. The remaining three booksare Consolations, two of which (those addressed to Marcia and toHelvia, Seneca’s mother) are true consolations, while the third,addressed to Claudius’powerful freedman, Polybius, contains moreflattery and special pleading than philosophy.The second group of writings consists of two extended works onspecific ethical topics, the De Clementia and the De Beneficiis. Theformer, of which only the first book and part of the second are extant,was written at the beginning of Nero’s reign (54 CE), when theemperor was seventeen years old, to advise him on how to be a merci-ful king. The latter, in seven books, concerned a topic of great impor-tance in Roman society, the correct relationship of giver and receiverof benefits. Seneca returned to this topic more concisely in his 81stletter.The third — and best-known — group consists of the 124 Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium, divided into twenty books. These are not letters like Cicero’s correspondence with Atticus, in which he expressed hisstate of mind from day to day and discussed his doubts, worries andhopes. They are really a course on ethics, self-contained disquisitionson specific topics, leading Lucilius from his former non-Stoic ways of thought to Stoic progress, not towards the perfection of the wise man,but as close to perfection as ordinary people may come, which is hap-piness based on reason and virtue. Finally, and forming a fourth group by itself, is Seneca’s sole surviv-ing work on physics, Quaestiones Naturales. Although the text hasbeen disordered, six of the eight books survive more or less complete,and two (numbered IVA and IVB in modern editions) are mutilated. While the work deals with specific natural phenomena (fire, thunderand lightning, water, the Nile, clouds, wind, earthquake, comets), it also contains moral disquisitions, like that at the end of the first book,that takes mirrors as its starting point. In the following discussion, wewill focus on some of the Dialogues and the Epistles. The first two dialogues in the traditional order, De Providentia and De Constantia Sapientis, display Seneca’s attitude towards the humanpredicament clearly and forthrightly, often with a noble simplicity,equally often with wearying dogmatism. The subtitle of each of theseworks is significant. That to the De Providentia is: “Why some badthings happen to good people, although Providence exists.” The subti-tle of the De Constantia is: “The wise man cannot be affected by insultor injury.” From these sentences we can deduce the lineaments of Seneca’s ethical universe. Over all human beings is Providence, whichis the same as Fate or God. The etymology of Providence, literally “seeing in advance”, indicates a power that has already foreseenhuman destinies, but not in such a way that human beings are its slavesor victims. On the contrary, they are free to choose whether to harmo-nize their individual wills with that of Fate, or whether to resist and tryto change their destiny. The former choice leads to happiness and tran-quillity, the latter to frustration, anger and discontent. Thus these subti-tles show that the wise person will indeed be prepared for Fate to dealsome harsh blows — bad things will happen to good people. If the wiseperson recognizes the overall power of Fate, which includes divinewisdom and concern for the well-being of human beings, then he (andhere I use “he” and “his” inclusively) brings his will into conformitywith the divine will. Thus he will understand why bad things happen,he will accept them, and endure adversity with constancy: indeed, hewill be contented with it, not seeking to avoid or change the decrees of Fate. This is a challenge that requires reason and virtue — the attributesof the wise person — to be accepted successfully. Thus the wise person is pre-eminent. Those who have not achieved such wisdom will allowthemselves to be affected by bad things — death, disease, poverty andso forth, or insults and hostility from one’s fellow human-beings. InSeneca’s moral universe, then, the wise person is exceptional, and hiswill is in harmony with the divine will, his emotions (grief, anger, fearand frustration, for example) controlled or suppressed to the extent thathe can call himself truly happy, even in the midst of suffering andadversity. The rest of humanity will strive to reach that level of wis-dom, hard — indeed, impossible — as it is, and individual human beingswill be found at different stages of progress towards the perfection of the wise person.Let us see now how these austere outlines are filled out in Seneca’s prose writings. In the very first sentence of the De Providentia Senecasays:You have asked me, Lucilius, why so many bad things happen togood men if providence rules the world. This could be moreappropriately discussed in the context of this work if we provethat providence presides over the whole universe and that god isconcerned with us. Seneca then goes on to prove the existence of god from the order andregularity of the universe, and to assert that god is not the source of evil, rather that god loves good people. What appear to be evils, then,are not so for the good person, who recognizes that they are morallyimproving, like a parent’s punishment of a child or medicine for thesick. And over all is the irrevocable progress of Destiny. Fate leads us on and the first hour of our birth has ordained therest of each person’s life. Cause depends on cause, the longseries of things lengthens [the chain of] public and privateevents. Therefore we must endure everything courageously.Elsewhere Seneca briefly doubts whether events are preordained byFate or an all-wise god, or simply by chance. His conclusion is thesame in all cases. One must be a philosopher, for philosophy willexhort us to obey god willingly, to obey Fortune defiantly. Theexhortation is not new, but Seneca’s brisk and sententious style is,along with its memorable images and poetic colouring. Thus he bringsphilosophy to the level of the ordinary person. With Seneca it becomesthe teacher and comforter for people caught in the human predicament,and from him this style of philosophical encouragement for the individual enters into the still-unfolding tradition of Roman ethics, pagan andChristian.In a late letter Seneca returns to the theme of conforming one’s willto Fate. He sees natural phenomena as a metaphor for human life: Clouds give way to clear weather; the calm sea grows rough; thewinds blow from different quarters; day follows night; somestars rise while others set. Eternity exists through opposites. Thehuman spirit must adapt itself to this law; it must follow it; itmust obey it. Whatever happens we must think happens throughnecessity, nor may we wish to blame Nature. It is best to acqui-esce when you cannot change something for the better; to followgod without complaint, for god is the origin of everything thathappens. That man is a bad soldier who follows his commanderwith a groan.The metaphors follow thick and fast, but it is impossible for a reader toignore the urgency of Seneca ’ s doctrine. Finally he addresses Jupiterhimself, translating the Hymn to Zeus of Cleanthes: Lead me, O Father, ruler of the lofty heavens, wherever youwish: readily I will obey. Here am I, eager to follow. If I amunwilling, I shall follow groaning, and suffer myself to do withill grace what I could have done happily. Fate leads on the will-ing, and drags the unwilling.Thus Seneca associates himself with the great early Stoic master. Butthe doctrine is appropriate for individuals in the early Roman empire,especially under a weak and cruel ruler with arbitrary power over thelives of those who might disagree with him.We have seen that the figure of the wise man is prominent inSeneca ’ s philosophical universe. While Seneca admits that such a per-son is rare and morally far superior to ordinary human beings, he main-tains that “ at great intervals of the ages ” such a person will exist. From Roman history the younger Cato is the closest example, althoughSeneca is not always consistent about him. He uses Cato to make theideal “ wise person ” more real. At the beginning of the De Constantia Cato is the historical example of the dialogue ’ s subtitle, “ the wise man[who] cannot be affected by insult or injury ” . Seneca draws a vividpicture of Cato having his toga torn by a mob in the Forum, being vio-lently manhandled “ from the Rostra to the Arch of Fabius ” (i.e. thelength of the Roman Forum), being spat upon. Seneca concludes: The immortal gods have given Cato to us as a more reliableexample of the wise man than Ulysses and Hercules from earliertimes, whom our Stoic philosophers have named as wise men,[heroes] unconquered by labours, who despised pleasure andwere victors over every sort of terror. Cato did not wrestle withwild beasts (the opponents of hunters and farmers); he did notpursue monsters with fire and iron weapons; he did not live intimes when it was possible to believe that the heavens could becarried on the shoulders of one man. Shaking off the credulity of ancient times … he fought with corruption … , with unlimited lustfor power … Against the vices of a state in decline and collapsingfrom its own weight he stood alone. He held up the republic, asfar as it could be held back by one man ’ s hand alone, until,dragged off, he shared in a collapse that he had long held off … For Cato did not outlive Liberty, nor did Liberty outlive Cato.This brilliant parable is a perfect example of Seneca ’ s method. Theconcrete example of Cato makes the abstract notion of “ the wise man ” real. The labours of the great heroes of myth are contrasted with thelabours of a Roman politician, less glamorous than the labours of Her-cules, yet involving the disappointments and humiliations of politicallife. Thus the point is made: the wise man need not be a hero, for hecan overcome adversity through reason and constancy. Only the wiseman is free, according to the Stoic paradox: Cato, faced with the reali-ties of an autocracy and the futilities of a dying republic, chose in life ahopeless but morally good cause and in death the way to preserve hisfreedom. Seneca exploits the paradox (of being free through death) byconfusing the two denotations of the word “ liberty ” . The one is moral,for the wise man does not become a slave to the emotions that motivatethe autocrat ’ s followers. The other is political, for the wise man willdie rather than compromise with tyranny. In a Roman context, Cato,rather than the heroes of mythology, exemplifies the heroic status of the wise man.Seneca admits that Cato “ may be too lofty an example for us ” , andin letters 41 and 75 he shows how ordinary human beings may admirethe wise man from a distance, yet in themselves have the potential forsharing in such perfection. Since the Stoics maintained that only thewise man could be sane, virtuous, free, etc. (and the non-wise wouldall be imperfect, however close to or far from perfection they mightbe), Seneca ’ s admission of grades of progress towards virtue was realis-tic. The idea, prominent in letter 41, that all human beings have thepotential to share in divine perfection, seems to have much in common with the doctrines of Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis. Yet, here again,Seneca brings a lofty ideal down from Cicero’s aristocratic milieu tothe level of all human beings, who are endowed with reason and capa-ble of using reason to live according to nature. His approach wasappropriate for the social and political realities of his time. In letter 41Seneca joins two ideas — the divine nature dwelling in human beings,and the perfect example of the wise man — to show that the attributesof the wise man can be within the reach of ordinary people. He beginswith the divinity immanent in human beings ( §§ 1 – 2):We do not have to lift up our hands to heaven or get the temple-keeper to let us in to speak into the ear of the god ’ s statue, as if that could make us more audible. God is close to you, he is withyou, he is in you. Yes, Lucilius: the divine spirit has his homewithin us, he is our guardian and watches over us in good andbad times alike.Then Seneca describes natural objects that inspire awe: an old tree, avast cave, a river ’ s source, a deep and dark lake. These he compares toa virtuous person ( §§ 4 – 5):If you see a man who is not frightened by danger, who isuntouched by desires, who is happy in adversity and calm in themidst of storms, who looks at human beings from above and atthe gods eye to eye — do you not feel in awe of him? Will younot say, “ This is something greater and loftier than I can believe,out of all proportion to the little body in which it dwells? ” Adivine force has descended into that body. A divine energydrives that extraordinary spirit, which is disciplined and superiorto all that it experiences, laughing at all our hopes and fears. Sogreat a thing cannot exist without the support of the divine.Seneca considers the nature of this spirit. It does not consist in externalthings —“ golden reins do not make a horse better ” ( § 6). No, whatshould be praised in a human being is the human nature which is pecu-liar to each individual ( § 8): “ What is this? ” , you ask. It is his spirit, and Reason that dwellsperfected in his spirit. For a human being is a living creatureendowed with Reason ( rationale animal ) … What, then, does thisReason demand of a human being? Something very easy — tolive according to his own nature. Lipsius rightly exclaims in his commentary on this letter: “ O what abeautiful and lofty letter! ” The ideals are noble, the examples of human excellence inspiring; the moral advice is sensible, its goalattainable (even if we may disagree with Seneca ’ s description of ourtask as “ something very easy ” ). The link between the Stoic god and themorally perfect human being is made more immediate by the vividexamples from the familiar world of nature. Awe-inspiring objects innature are used as metaphors for awe-inspiring virtue. Seneca easilyidentifies the essential attributes of such a nature, and shows that we,too, possess such attributes, if we choose to employ them. And so thefamiliar bases of Stoic ethics — Reason, Nature and Virtue — reappearas our means of union with the divine, and, far from being discouragedby the perfection of the wise person, we are made to feel that we, too,have the potential to realize our divine nature and, through reason, toachieve virtue.But not many of us reach the goal, strive as we may. Here Senecabreaks with traditional Stoic severity and in letter 75 he develops theidea of stages of progress towards virtue, using the flexibility thatPanaetius had introduced into orthodox Stoicism. Cicero had said that “ no one should be overlooked in whom some evidence of virtueappears ” , and from this Seneca develops the notion of the proficiens ,the person who is progressing towards the perfection of the wise man.The letter begins in an artfully informal way, which prepares for theinformal and undogmatic theory of the proficiens . Seneca imaginesthat his letters are like informal conversation between friends —“ I wantmy letters to be like my conversation if we were sitting or walkingtogether, easy and not artificial ” . So the formal distinction between thewise man and everyone else becomes blurred ( § 8): “ Are there no grades below the wise man? Is there a sheer dropbelow wisdom? ” No, in my view. For the person who is makingprogress is, to be sure, in the class of “ fools ” , but already far dif-ferent from them. And between those who are making progressthere are great distinctions, and they can be divided into threeclasses, according to some people.Seneca then defines these three classes. Highest (and close to the wiseman) are those “ who have not yet achieved wisdom, but stand close toit ” . They have abandoned the emotions and vices, yet still are diffidentabout their wisdom. They are cured of the diseases ( morbi ) of themind, but still are liable to its moods ( adfectus ). Seneca defines theformer as “ inveterate and hardened vices, such as avarice and ambition”, whereas the latter are “bad motions of the mind, sudden andswift”, but not permanent. In this analysis Seneca shows his interest inhuman psychology, which makes him a more humane teacher than thedogmatic Stoics. Seneca’s second class includes those who are free of the great-est passions and troubles of the mind, yet still may relapse. The thirdclass consists of those who are free of many of the vices but stillare liable to some. They may not be liable to avarice, but they feelanger; they may be free of lust, but they are afflicted with ambition,and so on. Seneca says that most of us will be doing well to belong tothis class, and that only by exceptional effort will one reach the secondclass. You will understand that we have made progress enough if weare not included with the worst people ” ( § 15). We might object thatSeneca has set too low a standard for moral progress, yet his realisticassessment of human morality gives a gentler face to Stoic austerity.The usual Stoic classification of human beings into the wise man andthe rest is plainly impractical. Ordinary people need encouragement if they are to start along the road to virtue, and they need to know thatprogress is possible, that falling short of perfection is not total failure.The profound human dilemma between evil and unattainable good,has, of course, been basic to many religions and philosophies, and itssolutions range from the heroic humanism of Sophocles to the divinesaviour of Christianity. Seneca ’ s solution is undramatic and unheroic,but it provides the majority of human beings with a practical way toescape from hopeless passivity.The emotions are central to Seneca ’ s moral philosophy, as they werefor Chrysippus and Posidonius. He was especially concerned withanger, and De Ira in three books continues the debate between the Sto-ics, on the one hand, and the Peripatetics and Epicureans, on the other,that we have briefly discussed in connection with Virgil. It is an earlywork, completed possibly in 41 CE and certainly before 52. Like the De Clementia , which aimed to soften Nero ’ s cruelty, De Ira probablyhad a political context, in that the disposition to anger of Claudius(emperor 41 – 54 CE) was well known and even admitted by theemperor himself. The distinction that Seneca draws between anger( ira ) and an angry disposition ( iracundia ) in De Ira 1. 4 was made byClaudius, when he promised that “ his anger would be brief and harm-less, his angry disposition would not lead to injustice ” . But the treatiseis far more important as a meditation upon the emotion that Senecaperhaps feared most. It is worth noting here that anger in the Senecantragedies is frequently the motivating and destructive emotion, reach-ing its climax in the character of Atreus in the late play, Thyestes. “Anger” is the first word in European literature (Iliad 1.1), and, as wehave seen above, it is the crucial emotion in the Aeneid , the principalmotivation for Juno and her human protégés, and the emotion thatdrives Aeneas to kill Turnus. Its importance in Roman ethics cannot beoverestimated. Seneca’s treatise is addressed to his older brother, Nova-tus (better known by his adopted name, Gallio), who had asked him towrite on the means of assuaging anger, the emotion that Novatusfeared above all others. In the first chapter, Seneca gives a horrifyingdescription of human and animal anger, and the rest of Book 1 is spentlargely in describing and defining anger. Seneca disagrees with one of Aristotle’s definitions (that anger is the desire for revenge), and hesays that the anger of animals is similar to human anger but not thatemotion itself, since animals do not have human emotions, whichrequire rational assent. Therefore anger exists only where there isreason. The main doctrine of Book 1 is that anger is contrary to nature,and Seneca defends this against a number of hypothetical questions. The book ends with a comparison of the meanness of anger with thesublimity of virtue. The end recalls the beginning, where anger hadbeen defined as “ brief insanity ” , that is, a madness that deprives theangry person of reason that leads to virtue.In the second book Seneca further examines the sources of angerand at § 18 he begins to answer Novatus ’ basic question, “ What are theremedies for anger? ” In one of the most interesting passages of thework, Seneca begins his remedies with the education of children,where he shows how important are parental example and early trainingin controlling the emotions. Here he is following Plato, and he endsthe passage with an anecdote of the boy who returned home fromPlato ’ s class to see his father in a fit of anger and said, “ I didn ’ t seethis at Plato ’ s school ” .The antidotes to anger are continued throughout Book 3. HereSeneca takes issue particularly with Aristotle ’ s defence of anger as “ the spur to virtue ” , in particular the virtue of courage. Seneca ’ sexamples support the Stoic doctrine that the wise man does not feelanger, which is contrary to nature and must be suppressed by reason.In contrast, the Epicureans said that anger was natural and could bemoderated by reason. The Peripatetics agreed, adding that anger couldbe just if so moderated. The work ends nobly with a meditation onhuman mortality, in which Seneca ’ s prose rises to loftiness: Let each person say to himself and to another, “ What is the pointfor those born … to eternity to make a declaration of anger andwaste their short span of life? … Why not rather put your short life in order and make it peaceful for yourself and others? … Whydo you try to crush violently the man who barks at you, a low-class, contemptible person, yet one who is bitter and hostile tohis superiors? Why be angry with your slave, your master, yourruler, your client? Be patient for a little while: death, you cansee, is at hand, which will make you all equal … In the meantime,while we live, while we are among human beings, let us cultivatehumanity. Let us not be a source of fear or danger for anyone.Let us despise losses, wrongs, abuse, criticism. Let us be high-minded and put up with short-lived nuisances. While we look behind us, as the proverb goes, and turn our backs, death drawsnear. ” The De Ira is the most successful of Seneca ’ s long treatises. While itdraws heavily on his Stoic predecessors, it is original in its vivid exam-ples, its realism (based on Seneca ’ s own experience), and its under-standing of human irrationality. In contrast to the De Providentia and De Constantia , the work sets before us the attainable ideal of a peace-ful life, marked by respect for the feelings of others (this is one of theaspects of humanitas ), rather than the distant austerity of the wise man.And here again, Seneca ’ s guiding principles are the fundamental Stoicattributes of virtue and reason, practised in a life lived according tonature.The De Ira focuses on interpersonal relationships, another aspect of which is the relationship between giver and recipient, the subject of Seneca ’ s longest treatise, De Beneficiis , in seven books, much of which is repeated in summary form in letter 81. The subject was impor-tant in Roman society, which was more contractual in its relationshipsthan modern Western societies. The prominence of duties in the philos-ophy of Panaetius and Cicero is evidence enough for this, while theRoman social institution of clientship rested on the proper understand-ing of the giving of benefits ( beneficia ) by the patron, superior inwealth, power and social status, and of the services of the client to thepatron in return. Seneca, however, does not discuss this aspect of Roman social relationships, and the exchange of benefits betweensocial equals is his primary focus.Ingratitude, or the failure to return a beneficium , is a cause of angeror mental perturbation in Seneca. It breaks the social contract, andtherefore it is harmful both for the individual and for society. There-fore he begins his treatise by saying that among the worst of humanerrors is that “ we know neither how to give nor receive benefits ” . Inthe first four books Seneca defines benefits and examines them from every aspect. In Books 5 – 7 he examines particular topics, the mostinteresting passage being his praise of Demetrius the Cynic at thebeginning of Book 7. He expresses his conclusions more concisely inletter 81, which begins by focusing on cases where the giver of a bene-fit later injures the beneficiary. Seneca expands this to affirm the Stoicparadox, that “ only the wise man knows how to be grateful ” . For thewise man will use reason to estimate the benefit, the giver, the reasonfor it, and so on, and he will come to a just and dispassionate estimateof the proper extent of gratitude. And in the end such a rationalapproach will lead to happiness and a peaceful life. Thus both the trea-tise and letter 81 confirm the definition of beneficium with which thetreatise began. It is a well-disposed action which gives joy and derives it fromthe action, when the giver is ready and willing. It is not theaction or the gift that is important, but the intention, because thebenefit consists, not in what is done or given, but in the mind of the doer or giver.Thus Seneca makes reason, not social convention or monetary value,the criterion for the giving and receiving of benefits.Seneca also considers whether a free man can receive a benefit froma slave. This had been discussed by the Stoic philosopher Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, whose work on Duties was quoted byCicero. Hecato asked whether in a shipwreck a valuable horse or acheap slave would deserve more to be saved. Like Cicero, Senecarises above this bleak level of ethics. He says that the person whodenies that a slave can give a benefit to his master is “ ignorant of therights of human beings ” . A slave is as human as his master: it is hisbody that has been enslaved, not his mind, which is free. Since it is theintention that is decisive in the giving of a benefit, the slave is just asable to give a benefit as a free person. Seneca supports his statementwith a number of examples where slaves performed great benefits fortheir masters or mistresses, and he concludes that the free person canbe just as much enslaved by his vices as the slave by his master.Although Seneca has been vigorously criticized as being insincere inhis views on slavery, letter 47 is the most humane statement about theinstitution from the pagan world, a striking contrast to Aristotle ’ s viewthat a slave is “ a living tool ” and “ by nature a slave ” . Seneca doesnot question the institution of slavery, to be sure, but he does admitthat a slave is a human being no different from his master and subjectto the same fortune. He cites examples from Roman history of Roman citizens who have been enslaved (for example, after a military defeat),and he makes the point that all human beings are slaves to their vicesand their desires. Slaves, then, should be treated humanely and reason-ably, so that they will respect, not fear, their masters. We may rightlybe disappointed that Seneca goes no further than this in his criticism of Roman slavery: we will learn more about the meaning of slavery andfreedom from Epictetus, who was himself a former slave. Neverthe-less, Seneca ’ s doctrine is based on the Stoic idea that all human beingsshare in the same divine origin, to which they will return, and that allare endowed with reason, and thus with the potential to achieve virtue.The doctrine of the community of human beings is extremely impor-tant for Seneca, most interestingly in the dialogues De Otio and DeTranquillitate, written probably before his retirement from Nero’s court in 62 CE. Whether or not these works are closely linked to eventsin Seneca’s life (as some scholars suppose), they address the problemof political participation, a central dilemma to the philosopher who wasalso a politician. Important aspects of the problem are freedom andthe proper course of action for the virtuous person involved in politics.Stoic doctrine taught that the virtuous person will participate in thelife of the city, that is in political activity. In Roman history this isborne out in the careers of Cato the Younger, of Seneca, and of Thrasea and Helvidius Priscus. In Zeno ’ s ideal republic all citizens arevirtuous, so that there is no need for the laws and institutions of conven-tional cities. But in states as they actually are, the virtuous personfaces an exquisite dilemma if the ruler is morally bad. Panaetius had justified the imperial mission of the senatorial class and encouraged itsmembers to undertake heavy political responsibilities on the groundsof the community of humankind and the assurance of their place in thedivinely ordered cosmos, a doctrine vindicated in Cicero’sSomniumScipionis. But under the Roman emperors political power flowed fromthe emperor, and the model of senators exercising power in competi-tion with their peers was distorted by the concentration of militarypower, political influence and social patronage in the person of theemperor. The leader under the Roman republic undertook his duties inthe context of service to the community of humankind, towards whomhe directed his oikeiosis , that is, his moral affinity or orientation.Cicero, through the Academic speaker, Piso, had shown how the affin-ity of human beings spread from parents and family, through friendsand fellow-citizens, to the whole of the human race. The idea of oikeiosis towards all humankind, first articulated by Zeno, wasextended by Chrysippus, in his work On Nature , to the “ community of all rational beings who are citizens of the universe ” , including gods and humankind. Thus the possibility of dual citizenship was created:one was a citizen of Rome or Athens, but also of the community of allhuman and divine beings.For Seneca this was the solution to the dilemma of political participa-tion. The De Tranquillitate , which is addressed to Seneca ’ s friendAnnaeus Serenus (also a high official in Nero ’ s court, who died in orabout 62 CE), begins with Serenus consulting Seneca about themalaise that he feels — he wishes to continue in public life, yet he feelsthe attraction of retirement ( otium ). In reply, Seneca recommendsinvolvement in politics and he disagrees with the philosopher Athen-odorus of Tarsus who advised swift and complete retreat into otium when public life became too corrupt for a virtuous person to participatein. Seneca advises a gradual retreat “ with standards uncaptured andmilitary dignity unimpaired ” . Here is the virtuous man ’ s gradual retreat:He may not serve in the army: let him run for political office. Hemust live as a private individual: let him be an orator. He is for-bidden to speak: let him help his fellow-citizens by means of hisprivate support. Even the Forum is dangerous for him to enter: inprivate houses, at public shows, at dinner parties, let him play therole of a good companion, a loyal friend, and a moderate fellow-guest. He has lost the duties of a citizen: let him perform those of a human being. Therefore with a generous spirit we have notshut ourselves inside the walls of one city, but we have sent our-selves to interact with the whole world. We have declared thatthe universe is our fatherland, so as to give ourselves a broaderfield for virtue.Thus the retreat from public life is defined by broadening circles of activity, which finally include “ the community of the citizens of theuniverse ” of Chrysippus. Seneca ’ s otium is active, in contrast to that of the philosophers criticized by Quintilian for shirking their duties ascitizens. Elsewhere, returning to the military metaphor, Seneca tellsLucilius that “ to be alive is to be on campaign ” and that it is shamefulto be inactive while others labour. Wherever he is, the virtuous citizenwill consider that he is like a soldier assigned to a post ( statio ) whichhe may not desert. This apparently neat theory, however, clashed with the rules for sena-tors, who were compelled to attend the senate until the age of 65 (or60). When Thrasea was put on trial, the charge was that he had with-drawn from the senate although he was an ex-consul, that he did notperform his duties as a priest, that he had not honoured his oath as a citizen — in brief, that he had become a traitor and an enemy of thestate. Some further justification was needed for withdrawal into otium . This Seneca provides in his De Otio (now incomplete) byappealing to the doctrine of the dual citizenship of the virtuous person.Denied public activity at Rome, he will still try to be actively useful tothe human community: This surely is what is demanded of a human being — that he be of use to human beings, to many if that can be achieved; to few if itbe less possible; to those closest to him if it be still less possible;to himself if it be less still. For whenever he makes himself use-ful to others he is transacting the business of the wholecommunity.Finally, Seneca enunciates the doctrine of the two republics: In our mind we embrace two republics. The first is large andtruly “ public ” and includes gods and human beings. In it we donot look at this or that corner, but we limit the boundaries of ourrepublic with the sun. The second republic is that in which thecircumstances of our birth have enrolled us. This will be Athensor Carthage or some other city which belongs not to all humanbeings but to a definite group … This former, greater, republic wecan serve even as private individuals — indeed, perhaps better inprivate so that we can enquire into the nature of Virtue.Thus Seneca adapts the doctrines of Zeno and Chrysippus to the con-stricting circumstances of public life under Nero. Like Cicero, he turnsfrom the constraints of contemporary politics to the wider universe of gods and human beings, using the doctrine of dual citizenship toencourage the virtuous person still to be active on behalf of humankind, even when political activity in his own community isrestricted. His theory was destined to have long-lasting influence, notleast in the history of early Christianity.Seneca recommends suicide as a way of withdrawing from publiclife only in the context of escaping from the cruelties of orientaltyrants. He calls it in this passage “ the road to liberty ” , and it is lib-erty that is the basis of his frequent discussions of suicide. Thraseahad modelled his death on that of Socrates, particularly in the libationof his blood to Jupiter the Liberator, and he also had in mind Seneca ’ ssuicide the previous year (65 CE), in which Socrates was again theexample and again the dying man with his last words offered a libation to Jupiter the Liberator. People of high social or political rank atRome who were condemned to death were allowed to commit suiciderather than wait for the executioners stroke. Both Seneca and Thraseawere condemned by Nero (the former suspected of participation in thePisonian conspiracy, the latter convicted of disloyalty for not perform-ing his public duties), and both used their suicides both as political actsand as assertions of individual liberty. They were, then, reasoned acts,worthy of the Stoic wise man.The basic Stoic doctrine on suicide was Zeno ’ s: The wise man will make a reasonable exit from life, for the sakeof his country and his friends, and if he is in unyielding pain orsuffers loss of his limbs or incurable disease.Seneca was very clear that suicide was not justified by boredom withlife, or lust for, or even fear of, death. He says, “ the brave and wiseman ought not to run away from life but make his exit ” . He admiredhis friend, the historian Aufidius Bassus, for enduring the infirmities of age rather than yielding to them by committing suicide. Bassus ’ mindwas unimpaired, and therefore he used reason to continue his life, likethe captain of a damaged but still seaworthy ship. Like the wise man,he contemplated death rationally, and he would meet it gladly becausehe was mentally prepared.So much for reasons not to commit suicide. At the end of the DeProvidentia ( § 6) and in Letters 70 and 77 (along with many other inci-dental references) Seneca recommends it as a means to freedom, rely-ing on Zeno ’ s doctrine of the “ reasonable exit ” and the Stoic paradoxthat “ only the wise man is free ” . So in the passage from the De Provi-dentia he catalogues different methods of suicide as speedy ways toescape from the tyranny of intolerable evils. Death, in Stoic doctrine,belongs to the category of “ indifferent ” things, and therefore is not tobe feared. In letter 70 he attacks philosophers who say that one mustwait for a natural death ( § 14):he who says this does not see that he is closing the road to lib-erty: the eternal law has achieved nothing better than that it hasgiven us one entrance into life, but many ways out.One does not have to be a Cato to die by a noble suicide ( § 19), foreven criminals, prisoners and gladiators have achieved this (Senecagives a number of examples). How much more then should the personwho is guided by reason, and has meditated upon death for a long time, be capable of a noble suicide! What is important to Senecais how well one dies, for dying well is to escape from living disgrace-fully. Later, in Letter 77, Seneca describes the suicide of Tullius Marcellinus, which is especially interesting because Marcellinus is a borderline case of justifiable suicide. He was “a peaceful young man who quickly grew old”, and he suffered from a chronic disease thatwas curable, although troublesome. He took the advice of “ourStoic friend”(who is not named), that death is not to be feared andnoble if one dies with honour, prudence and courage. So Marcelli-nus fasted for three days and died (as he himself said) with a certain pleasure after being placed in a hot bath. Seneca’s point here, which hemakes with a series of historical examples, is that suicide is justified if it is based on reason, and that it is more virtuous to confirm one ’s lib-erty through death than to be subject to the loss of freedom. He con-cludes that length of life is insignificant compared with its moral qual-ity. What matters is not how long you live, but how well. Wemay deplore Seneca’s morbid interest in suicide, but his own death,even if it was as histrionic as Tacitus describes it, exemplified his prin-ciples. In letter 89. 9 Seneca accepts the traditional Stoic division of philos-ophy into three parts, which he names in this order: moral (ethics), nat-ural (physics, including theology), and rational (logic, which hedefines as requiring accuracy in vocabulary, structure and argument).Like the Epicureans ( § 11), who, he says, got rid of the “ rational ” cate-gory, Seneca appears to have very little interest in logic and epistemol-ogy. He does discuss these matters in several letters: for example, inthe 65th letter he discusses causes and material, including the Aris-totelian “ form ” ( eidos ) and the Platonic “ ideas ” ( §§ 4 – 11), but hequickly dismisses them as “ including either too little or too much ” ( § 11), and he hurries to give his own definition of the original cause,which he says is “ reason, that is, god ” ( § 12). In letter 58. 26 he dis-misses Plato ’ s “ ideas ” by asking, “ How can Plato ’ s “ ideas ” make me[morally] better? ” While he can on occasion use Stoic logic (for exam-ple, the series of syllogisms in letter 87), his primary concern is withethics. The letters constitute a programme of moral improvement, andthe focus on Reason and Virtue is exclusively moral. Even the discus-sion of philosophical categories in letter 89 ends with a diatribe againstluxury and greed, in keeping with Seneca ’ s earlier remark (89. 8), that “ Philosophy is the study of virtue. ” Yet his attitude to logic is not simply hostile. As Jonathan Barneshas shown, he is hostile to the wrong uses of logic, for example, forintellectual showing-off or for raising logical problems that have no ulterior purpose. His warnings to Lucilius about logic indicate concernthat Lucilius was too much involved in its study, for it is worthlessunless it is subordinated to the goal of moral improvement. To him,then, logic is an instrument for leading a better life or for the study of physics, if such study will lead us to a better life.Seneca was deeply interested in natural philosophy: he wrote a work (now lost) on earthquakes, and the Naturales Quaestiones is anextended exposition of Stoic natural philosophy — the most completethat survives. Towards the end of letter 65, after the discussion of causes, he imagines Lucilius criticizing him for wasting time in suchenquiries ( § 15) because they have no moral effect. “ But ” , repliesSeneca, “ you cannot forbid me to study the nature of things ( rerumnatura , perhaps an intentional reminiscence of Lucretius), or the originof the universe and its creator, the secrets of cosmology and the originof light and fire, or the home of the soul after the death of the body.These are lofty subjects worthy of the human mind, for they lift itabove its prison in the body to contemplation of the universe and of god ” ( §§ 19 – 24).Seneca believed that philosophy is the supreme activity of thehuman mind and that it alone will lead to the virtuous and happy life.Perhaps the most well-known of his letters is Letter 88, in which heattacks “ liberal studies ” for being at best introductory to the study of wisdom and generally morally inferior. He examines the conventionalstages of Roman education and asks ( § 3), “ Which of these builds theroad to virtue? ” He looks at the subjects which later became the medi-aeval quadrivium — geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (to which he addsastrology, § 14), and music — and finds that none of them teach virtue( § 20). Even literature fails in this: Homer was not a philosopher ( §§ 5 – 8) — does the Odyssey teach “ how I may love my country, my wife, myfather, or how I may travel over the seas to reach these good thingseven if shipwrecked? ” Posidonius is attacked for his fourfold divisionof “ the arts ” (in Greek, technai : §§ 21 – 23). The inferior categories,which concern the practical details of life or the increase of pleasure orthe elementary training of children, are easily dismissed; the highestPosidonian category, artes liberales, Seneca will admit only if the lib-eral arts are truly “free” (liberae: he plays on the words libera and lib-eralis), for only the wise person is free, and in education freedombelongs only to the study of virtue. At the end of the letter Seneca dis-misses Greek epistemology, reserving his greatest scorn for the Scep-tics, including the new Academy ( §§ 43 – 46):for they have introduced a new kind of knowledge, knowing nothing. The earlier philosophers do not shine a light to directmy sight towards the truth, while these [the Academic Sceptics]gouge out my eyes.Seneca returns to the attack in Letter 90, where he criticizes Posidoniusfor claiming for philosophy the invention of buildings and architecturalimprovements ( §§ 7 – 10, 32). He denies the possibility of philosophy inthe early stages of human development, and — perhaps answering Book 5 of Lucretius — he sees the progress of human civilization as accompa-nied by vice. The primitive golden age was morally innocent becauseof ignorance, and virtues such as prudence, temperance and couragedid not exist, for they occur only “ in a mind that is educated andtrained and brought to the heights [of virtue] by constant practice ” ( § 46).Finally, in letter 108, Seneca recalls his early enthusiasm for philos-ophy under his teachers, Attalus and Sotion. He contrasts philosopherslike them with pedants who miss the philosophical importance of thewords that they read in their search for answers to trivial questions.And so, says Seneca ( § 23), “ What had been philosophy became philol-ogy ” . In this same letter ( § 1) Seneca refers to his intention of “ settingout in order the whole of moral philosophy ” , as if ethics were all thatconcerned him in philosophy. In reality, as we have seen, physics andlogic had their part in leading the student to reason and virtue.Thus in the Naturales Quaestiones the moral dimension is as impor-tant to Seneca as the physical. In the opening chapter he contrastsethics and physics: the former “ teach what is to be done on earth, theother what is being done in the heavens ” , for an enquiry into the natu-ral world concerns the gods and shows how far different their perspec-tive is from that of human beings. In the Preface to Book 3 ( § 18) hesays that study of “ the nature of things ” raises the mind above lowthings ( sordida ) and liberates it from the body. Here again Seneca isdebating Lucretius, who expounded the nature of things in order toprove that the gods do not concern themselves with human affairs andthat human beings will be liberated from fear by knowledge of thematerial composition of the universe and of the human soul.Seneca has always been a controversial figure. As a politician hehad learned to compromise, if only to survive. His passivity in Nero ’ smore egregious crimes cannot be reconciled with his ethical doc-trines. His insistence on the “indifference” of money is inconsistentwith his own wealth, and he does defend himself on this charge in the De Vita Beata, quoting his critics at some length. You speak one way and live another, they said. His defence is summarized. For the wise man does not think himself unworthy of chancegifts. He does not love wealth, but he prefers it. He admits it notinto his mind, but into his house. He does not reject the wealththat he has, but he knows its limits, and he wishes to make hisgreater means the servants of his virtue.Finally, Seneca says ( § 22. 4): “ If my wealth disappeared, it would takeaway nothing except itself. ” We must form our own opinions on the efficacy of this defence. Cer-tainly it did not impress Seneca ’ s contemporaries (as Tacitus reports in narrating the attack on Seneca by Suillius in 58 CE), or the third-century historian, Cassius Dio. The charge of hypocrisy wasexpressed pithily by Milton: “Seneca, in his books a philosopher.” Yet it his books that are important. In his language he created a new vehicle for Roman philosophy, and he expressed truths about the human condition and human aspirations that have been an inspiration to count-less readers in times of perplexity. Macaulay sneers at the impractical-ity of Seneca’s Stoic categories, for bereavement, grief, anger and lossare all too real to their sufferers. Is it helpful, he asks, to call thesethings “indifferent”? Contrasting the Stoicism of Seneca and Epictetuswith the “common-sense” practicality of Bacon, Macaulay says: They (a Stoic and a Baconian) come to a village where the small-pox has just begun to rage. The Stoic assures the dismayedpopulation that there is nothing bad in the smallpox, and that to awise man disease, deformity, death, the loss of friends, are notevils. The Baconian takes out a lancet and begins to vaccinate. To Macaulay, Seneca’s philosophy is “a philosophy of thorns, a philosophy of words. Against the charge of barrenness and hypocrisy we can and must set the very real achievement of Seneca in setting forth ina new Latin prose style a way of looking at the world that has broughtcomfort and inspiration to people through the ages in times of trouble.For Seneca understood the shortcomings, and especially the emotions,of human beings as they are, and he sought to heal them by settingbefore them an ideal to which every person might aspire, however dis-tant the goal. Let us end, then, by setting against the satire of Macaulaythe judgement of Justus Lipsius: And so I boldly cast my vote for you, Seneca. In philosophy, andespecially in moral philosophy, you are the best. We now turn to STOICISM UNDER NERO AND THE FLAVIANS. Unshaken by the deaths of Seneca, Thrasea and Barea, the Stoics con-tinued to be the most vigorous philosophical sect in the Roman world,although Platonists and Epicureans remained active. In this chapter,which covers the period from the accession of Nero (54 CE) to the endof the reign of Domitian (96 CE), almost all the philosophers whom weshall discuss were Stoics. We shall need first to review the social andpolitical context of Stoicism in this period.The death of Nero in 68 CE brought to an end the Julio-Claudiandynasty, rulers who were descended either from Augustus (adoptedson of Julius Caesar) or Tiberius Claudius Nero (d. 33 BCE), first hus-band of Livia, the wife of Augustus, and father of the EmperorTiberius. Nero was descended from both, and with his suicide the fieldwas open for claimants to the throne, for no one seriously expected theRepublic to be restored. For over a year civil wars were fought by fourclaimants, each of whom became emperor in succession, until thefourth, Flavius Vespasianus, emerged to reign for a decade (69 –79 CE)and found a new dynasty. These events affected the development of Roman philosophy in several ways. First, there was the weakening of the central position of Rome in politics, patronage and culture. Tacitus remarked that in 68–69 CE “a secret of empire had been revealed —that an emperor could be made elsewhere than at Rome.” In 68–69 the armies in Gaul, Germany andSyria chose, and fought amongst themselves for, Nero’s successors,and thereafter the central authority of the emperor and senate dependedon the armies in the provinces. Ambitious men from the provinces rosein the Roman hierarchy in greater numbers, and the first non-Italianemperor, Trajan (from Spain), succeeded in 98 CE. Other centres com-peted with Rome for intellectual and cultural leadership, and the impor-tance of centres in the provinces was increased by the foreign wars of 180 the emperors or their tours of inspection (true especially of Hadrian).Increasingly, the Roman philosophers did not have to teach at Rome,and neither did they necessarily depend on the patronage of aristocraticRomans, among whom the emperor was the dominant patron. Second, Greek recovered its near-monopoly as the language of phi-losophy, even for Roman audiences. Cornutus (perhaps a native of Lepcis, in Libya), Musonius (a Roman knight of Etruscan descent),and Epictetus (from Phrygia in Asia Minor) all lectured in Greek. Plutarch spent nearly all his time in his home town of Chaeronea, visit-ing Rome twice, probably around 80 and 90 CE. He wrote exclusivelyin Greek and admits that he did not care to learn Latin thoroughly: I live in a small city. When I was in Rome and staying in otherareas of Italy, I did not have the leisure to exercise myself in the Roman dialect because of my political duties and the numbers of people who came to hear me lecture on philosophy. Even the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote in Greek. Of these philoso-phers onlyApuleius wrote in Latin. The dissipation of political and militarypower in the century between Nero and Marcus Aurelius was accompa-nied by intellectual decentralization, which benefited the Greeks. Greek intellectual hegemony was recognized and symbolized by theestablishment of the four chairs of philosophy at Athens by MarcusAurelius in 176 CE. Nevertheless, philosophy was less prominent in the Greek worldthan rhetoric, and the period between the reign of Nero and that of Alexander Severus (d. 235 CE) is that of the Second Sophistic, a termcoined by the third-century writer, Philostratus (fl.c. 230 CE), authorof the biography of Apollonius of Tyana. In this period Greek declaimers flourished, who, Philostratus believed, were the intellectualheirs of the early Greek Sophists. He wrote about 40 “biographies ”,which, with few exceptions, are no more than short sketches. Of thelonger ones, that on Herodes Atticus (2. 1) is exceptionally full andappears to be the central feature of the whole work. Philostratus includes about ten of the early sophists (for example, Gorgias and Pro-tagoras) and orators, ending with the fourth-century BCE orator andopponent of Demosthenes, Aeschines (1. 18), whom he credits with thefounding of the second sophistic, although Aeschines died in about322 BCE. Rather surprisingly, Carneades is included with the sophists(1.4), because of the force of his oratory. After Aeschines, Philostratusnames an orator of Nero’s time, Nicetes of Smyrna (1. 19), who, he says, revived the art of oratory in the Greco-Roman world, and so, weare led to assume, was really the initiator of the Second Sophistic. Thesophists after Nicetes, whose oratory brought them wealth and pres-tige, were prominent in the cultural and intellectual life of the Greek world in the second century. The emperors Antoninus Pius (138–61CE) and Marcus Aurelius (161–80 CE) had much to do with theseflamboyant polymaths, whose arrogance and egoism amused and irri-tated them. The rhetorical fireworks of the sophists contrast with thefocused intensity of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, who pointedlythanks his tutor in philosophy, Rusticus (Quintus Junius Rusticus, con-sul in 133 and 162 CE), for preventing him from “being diverted tosophistic exhibitionism”. Some sophists did claim to be philosophers,but Rutherford is right to say of their philosophy that “in general theypeddled second-hand ideas and richly wrought trivialities”. Therewere exceptions, such as the Academic Favorinus (c.85–165 CE) andGalen (c.129–200 CE), the great doctor, medical writer, and author of works in logic and psychology and commentaries on earlier philoso-phers. FAVORINO came from Arelate (Aries) in southern Gaul, andGalen from Pergamum in Asia Minor, and both wrote in Greek forGreek and Roman audiences. But they were exceptions. For the mostpart the serious philosophers pursued their studies apart from thesophists.In the aftermath of the Pisonian conspiracy of 65 CE, several Stoicpoliticians perished. Seneca, Thrasea, Barea and Lucan (Seneca’s nephew), were executed, and Thrasea’s son-in-law, Helvidius Priscus,was “relegated”, that is, expelled from Italy but not exiled to a particu-lar place. These people were convicted on political grounds, althoughStoicism influenced their political decisions. Nevertheless, many schol-ars have believed that there was a “Stoic opposition” to the monarchy. This is unlikely: men like Barea, Rubellius and Thrasea opposed Neroor were thought to threaten his position for other reasons than Stoic ideology, while Seneca was condemned, not for being a Stoic, but because he was believed to have been involved in the Pisonian conspiracy. On the other hand, the Stoic veneration of the younger Catone wouldmake any ruler nervous, for Catone was the paragon of liberty, defined inthis context as the refusal to accept the rule of a tyrant. As the trial anddeath of Thrasea showed, the line between a morally acceptablemonarch and a tyrant was easily crossed. Thus the Stoic emphasis onliberty — political and intellectual — could and did lead to refusal tocooperate with a ruler and thus to a charge of treason. Philosophers, asopposed to philosophical politicians, were not executed, but they wereexiled, as was the fate of the two most prominent Stoic philosophers of Nero’s reign. Cornuto was exiled, ostensibly for insulting commentson Nero’s plans for an epic poem. More probably his exile was connected with that of Musonio, who was exiled after the Pisonian conspiracy, recalled by Galba, and exiled again by Vespasian. Of the senators, Helvidius Priscus returned from his relegation andbecame praetor under Vespasian in 70 CE. He attacked Thrasea’saccuser, Eprius Marcellus, in the senate, and addressed Vespasian ashis peer, not as his inferior. Eventually his freedom of speech droveVespasian to relegate him a second time, and shortly after he was exe-cuted, almost certainly without the approval of Vespasian. Elvidio was relegated on political, not philosophical, grounds. It was Elvidio’s free-dom of speech, not his philosophy, that destroyed him. Nevertheless,his words and actions made it easy for his enemies to confuse his Sto-icism with Cynic outspokenness and thus to accuse him of behaviourinappropriate for a senator. Vespasian did expel philosophers from Italy in or about 74 CE, with the exception of Musonius, no doub tbecause of their freedom of speech. Vespasian’s younger son, Domitian (reigned 81–96 CE), was hostile to philosophers as a group and again expelled them from Italy in 93CE, the fourth such expulsion in Roman history. Suetonio connectsthe expulsion with the executions of the Stoic politicians, the youngerHelvidius Priscus (son of Thrasea’s Helvidius), and Junius ArulenusRusticus, both of whom had held the consulship. To these Tacitus and Pliny add the names of the senators Herennius Senecio, who was exe-cuted, and Junius Mauricus, brother of Rusticus, who was relegated. Pliny recalled that seven of his friends were executed or relegated in93 CE (including the four named above), and Tacitus regretted his partas a senator in the condemnation of these men. Evidently Domitianlinked the philosophers to the speech and actions of the Stoic politi-cians. Pliny, in praising Thrasea’s widow, Arria, and her daughter,Fannia, showed that the independent spirit of Thrasea was still a threatto Domitian nearly thirty years after his death. At the time of the Pisonian conspiracy the most prominent profes-sional philosophers in Rome were Cornutus and Musonius. Lucio Anneo Cornuto was born in Lepcis, the chief city of Tripolitania, part of the Roman province of Africa. Cornuto lived and taughtin Rome, and his name, Annaeus, may be evidence for the patronage of Seneca’s family — for example, in helping him obtain Roman citizen-ship — but certainly not for his being a freedman of the Annaei. Very little is known of his life after his exile (there is a single literary refer-ence that dates to 84 CE), and for us his importance lies in his relationswith the two greatest poets of the Neronian age, Persius and Lucan, and in the survival of a single work written in Greek, the Epidrome or “Summary of the Traditions of Greek The-ology.” Lost are works on Aristotle, while a few fragments exist of commentaries on Virgil and works on language and rhetoric. The Epidrome is a short prose work (about seventy-five small printedpages) addressed to a young student. It reviews Greek mythology,using etymology and allegory to explain the names and myths of theGreek gods. Zeus, for example (chapter 2), is so called because he isthe cause of life (in Greek, zen); destiny, Aisa, is so called because it isthe unseen ( aistos) cause of events (chapter 13); Atlas is namedbecause “without tiring” (atalaiporos) “he represents the events in themyths about him and in this way [i.e. without tiring] he holds up theheavens”. This kind of etymological interpretation has along history in Latin literature (and beyond), going back at least to thefifth-century sophist, Gorgias, to whom Plato refers when he makesSocrates say that “ I have heard a clever man say that our body is ourtomb ”(soma, body, and sema, tomb). The theory that the resem-blance in the sounds of two words corresponds to a factual relationshipis analogous to the idea that the attributes of a mythical figure may be allegories for human circumstances or attributes. At the beginning of Cornutus’Epidrome we learn that “ the heaven encircles the earth andthe sea and all that is upon the earth and in the sea. All theseentities constitute the cosmos, whose nature is fiery, while the gods areresponsible for “the changes in the air and the security of the whole. Then Cornutus compares the order of the cosmos, whose existence isparallel to that of human beings, to the order of human nature (2. 1): just as we are governed by the soul, thus the cosmos has soulwhich holds it together, and this is called Zeus and he is said torule over the whole just as in us our soul and nature are said torule.As A.D.Nock and Malcolm Lapidge have shown, Cornutus is expound-ing existing Stoic doctrine rather than developing new views, both inhis cosmology and in the other topics of the Epidrome. The work isin fact a student textbook (unique in surviving classical literature),whose apparently naive use of traditional mythology rests on Stoicorthodoxy, much of which goes back to Chrysippus. In this way itthrows light on several places that the largely ethical Stoicism of Seneca had left in the dark.The teaching of Cornutus appears much more vividly in the poetryof his student and friend, the satirist Aules [sic] Persius Flaccus (34 – 62 CE). PERSIO was Etruscan in origin, a Roman of high social standing and connected with prominent Romans, including Thrasea, whose close friend he was for ten years. According to an ancient biography hewas 16 years old when he began his friendship with Cornutus “in sucha way that he never left his company”, and, according to the biogra-pher, “he made some progress in philosophy”. The Life further saysthat Cornutus was both his financial and literary executor, and its evi-dence is probably reliable for both the life of Persius and the teachingof Cornutus.The six satires of Persius (amounting to about 640 lines in all) are inthe tradition of Horace, but their philosophy is clearly Stoic. In the fifth satire, Persio begins by showing how Cornuto criticized and disciplined his style, teaching him to use Latin vocabulary (verba togae) with striking collocation of words (iunctura callidus acri). Cornutus is “a great part of Persius’soul” and as aresult Persius’poetry is sincere, the true representation of his inmostheart (lines 24–29). This is as much a philosophical theme as a literaryone, for Seneca’s 114th letter is on the theme of the similarity betweena person’s speech and character as shown in his way of life. This isalso the main theme of Persius’first satire — a corrupt style, he says, isthe expression of a corrupt character, and the debased literary taste of the Romans is evidence for the moral debasement of Roman society. The importance of vocabulary and style for philosophy had beenshown by Cicero, Horace, Lucretius and Seneca, but Persius sees it more as a criterion of morality. Next, in the fifth satire, Persius describes the close relationship thathe began with Cornutus in his “tender years”, when a youth on thethreshold of adulthood can make many wrong choices. Cornutus received Persius in his “Socratic bosom” and became, likeSeneca, a “director of souls”, whose moral guidance was exercisednight and day in friendship and shared living. Indeed, Persius con-cludes, their horoscopes and the influence of the stars at their birthsbrought them together, an idea consistent with the astrological doc-trines of the Stoic Manilius.Other prominent themes of the fifth satire are freedom and slavery,familiar from the Stoic paradox that only the wise man is free. So Per-sius describes the many pursuits which enslave a human being — incontrast to the “ harvest of Cleanthes” (i.e. Stoic doctrine: line 64) fromseed planted by Cornutus. He continues with many striking images andvivid examples, ending with a contrast between the philosophy of Cor-nutus and his poetry on the one hand, and the values of the commonman on the other. In the third satire Persius focuses on the paradox that only the wiseman is sane and healthy. In this poem the student (perhaps Persius him-self) reluctantly rises to study, and again his poetry is valued at nothing by the common man, here a “hairy centurion and “muscular youths.” But the critics do not know how morally sick they are:they do not think they are ill, but show them a pretty girl or money andthey behave like madmen (lines 88 –119). Persius and Cornutus looked back to Socrates as the fountain-headof philosophy, and based their lives on Stoic freedom from the pathe and use of reason. In the second satire Persius addresses the theme of prayer (a reminder of the focus on theology in Cornutus’Epidrome),and in the fourth the necessity for self-knowledge and morality if oneaspires to public office — perhaps the most Socratic of Persius’themes. As a critic of contemporary morals, Persius is less subtle than Horaceand less abrasive than Juvenal. While Horace is personally Epicureanand Juvenal expressly refuses any philosophical allegiance, he is explic-itly Stoic. Seneca and Cornutus are directors of souls, but Persius isthe critic of society, and his unique style is the vehicle for Stoic doc-trine that criticizes and at the same time heals and liberates hiscontemporaries. The epic poet, Marc’Annaeo LUCANO (39–65 CE), stud-ied under Cornutus with Persius. Since he was seven years youngerthan Persius, their relationship would not have been one of equals, forwhen Lucan joined Cornutus (probably in 55 CE) Persius already hadmade progress in philosophy (as the Life tells us) and poetry. Lucanadmired Persius, whose poems, he said, “were true poems, while mineare child’s play (ludos).” Lucan was not a modest man, and this remark must have been made before he composed his epic poem and while hewas still engaged with the study of philosophy. Unlike Persius, Lucan entered on an ambitious political career, helped by the fact that he wasthe nephew of Seneca. He was an official “friend”of Nero (two yearshis senior), a status which admitted him to the emperor’s inner circle,and Nero advanced him to the quaestorship and membership of the senate. He and Nero certainly shared cultural and literary interests, butby 63 CE the friendship had soured, perhaps out of personal rivalry,but more likely for political reasons connected with the weakening of Seneca’s position after 62. Lucan was deeply involved in the Pisonian conspiracy and was forced to commit suicide in April of 65, evidently after the death of Seneca. His father and his other uncle (Seneca’s brothers) perished in the aftermath of the conspiracy, while his mother, Acilia, although implicated, was neither charged nor acquitted. Lucan’s epic in ten books, De Bello Civili (also known as Pharsalia), was unfinished. It is the only Latin epic worthy to stand beside those of Virgil and Lucretius. It emulates Virgil in its epicthemes of war and political and moral disintegration (as opposed toVirgil’s narrative of war and political and moral renewal), and it emu-lates Lucretius in its contrasting view of the cosmos, in which thedestruction of Roman liberty is bound up with the fate of the cosmos. Its narrative focuses on the first two years of the civil war betweenCaesar and Pompey, with its climax at the battle of Pharsalus and thesubsequent murder of Pompey in Egypt. These events occur in Books7 and 8 of the poem, which extends its narrative to a wide range of political and philosophical speculation. René Pichon’s catalogue of Lucan’s Stoic passages is still valuable, but his conclusion, that Lucan is “a sincere disciple of Seneca”, cannot be maintained. There aremany similarities, but Lucan’s attitude towards the gods and fate — togive but one example — is quite different from that of Seneca.The account of the Nile given by the Egyptian priest, Acoreus, hasmuch in common with Seneca’s. Lucan dismisses earlier explana-tions of the Nile’s annual flood, preferring to affirm the laws of Nature(10. 238) and the existence of underground springs created by theworld’s intelligent creator. Here he adapts a theory of the fifth-century pre-Socratic philosopher, Diogenes of Apollonia, whobelieved that the sun was responsible for the underground stores of water. Seneca quotes Diogenes only to criticize him, and Lucan seemsto answer the criticism by supposing that the divine creator was respon-sible. There are many other passages in which Lucan shows his interest inphysics, cosmology, astronomy and astrology. They are aspects of Lucan’s conviction that the macrocosm of the universe and microcosmof Rome are involved with each other. We have seen that Cornutusused allegory as a principal mode of interpretation of the myths of thegods, and this is the principle on which Lucan’s interpretation of human events rests. He sees the civil war not only in political terms — the loss of liberty with the collapse of the Roman republic — but as acosmic disaster. In the introduction to Book 1 he explicitly makes thecomparison, first listing the causes of the collapse: The causes were the envious progress of Fate, the denial of along period of stability to the greatest [states], the collapse undertheir own weight of those that are too heavy — and Rome thatcould not bear its own weight. So when the world’s frame isloosened and the final hour gathers in so many ages of the uni-verse and original chaos returns, the fiery stars will join the sea, the earth will be unwilling to extend its level shores and willshake off the waters of the ocean, the moon will travel contraryto her brother [the sun]. Refusing to drive her chariot across thearch of heaven, she will demand daylight for herself, and thewhole discordant structure of the shattered universe will throwits laws into confusion.In this remarkable sentence, Lucan uses the Stoic doctrine of cyclicalcreation and destruction of the cosmos to describe a world where thedestruction of the laws of the Roman republic involves the destructionof the laws of nature. Again, Lucan invokes the Stoic ekpyrosis after avivid passage in which Caesar surveys the battlefield of Pharsalus theday after his victory, and denies the customary cremation to thecorpses of the Pompeian soldiers. Lucan addresses Caesar: You achieve nothing by this anger of yours. It makes no differ-ence whether corpses perish through decay or the pyre. Naturetakes everything to her peaceful bosom, and corpses owe theirend to themselves. If, Caesar, fire will not burn these peoplesnow, it will burn them with the earth, with the ocean ’ s waters.The common pyre of the universe remains, which will mix thestars with [human] bones.The Roman civil war is a cosmic event, and the destruction wrought byCaesar ’ s anger anticipates the destruction of the final ekpyrosis .Lucan ’ s Stoic view of fate is orthodox, but his attitude to it is differ-ent from that of Seneca, and it is further complicated by his ambiguousviews on the gods. In 1. 70 – 80 (quoted above) Lucan refers to “ theenvious progress of Fate ” ( invida fatorum series ), where the word series denotes an inexorably linked chain of events through which fateis unfolded. But the word invida reveals pessimism towards fate, for itis jealous of human happiness, and in return Lucan refuses to accept itsdictates cheerfully. This is contrary to Seneca s doctrine in the De Prov-identia and the 107th letter (discussed in the previous chapter). Indeed,Lucan is driven by frustration and anger against fate. He is, as OttoSteen Due has remarked, “ a Stoic who has lost his faith ” . Lucan speculates on foreknowledge, wondering if the intelligentcreator, at the start of the present cycle of the history of the cosmos,has fixed immutable destiny and set the inexorable course of futureages. If this is so (and Lucan seems to accept it), while the chain of events cannot be changed, it can be revealed by divination or othermethods of prediction. Therefore Lucan devotes many lines to revela- tions of the future, which arouse fear and foreboding in the actors inthe poem, and helplessness, anger and frustration in the poet and hisreaders. Lucan himself says of his narrative: When also future generations and our grandchildren ’ s descen-dants read of these wars — whether their own fame brings them tofuture ages, or whether my labours can help great names survive — then they [namely, these wars] will rouse hope and fear andvain prayers, and all [my readers] will be stunned as they read of destiny as if it were in the future, not in the past. Even the most powerful of Lucan ’ s agents of prophecy, the witch andnecromancer Erichtho, confesses that she has no power to change fate: Once the chain of events descends from the beginning of the uni-verse, and if all fate will be disrupted should you wish to changeanything, and if the whole human race stands subject to one pow-erful stroke, then we, the Thessalian band [of witches], confessthat Fortune is more powerful.There are two exceptions to Lucan ’ s pessimism, the poor man and thewise man. The former is represented by the fisherman, Amyclas, whois the “ captain of his boat ” and “ safe enjoying the life of a poorman ” . For Lucan and his readers this is ironical, for the world of Amyclas is as far distant from the facts of Lucan ’ s life as the Stoicindifference to wealth was from the life of Seneca. As for the wiseman, Lucan admits that he can respond to the dictates of fate as Senecawould have prescribed. Lucan portrays Cato as an ideal leader inepisodes in which historical facts are elaborated so as to show Cato ’ swisdom and virtue in splendid isolation and superiority. In the firsttwo (2. 234 – 391) Cato advises Brutus on the correct attitude to civilwar and then takes back his former wife, Marcia (now the widow of Hortensius), exhibiting a moral perfection that pitilessly focuses on thegulf between himself and ordinary human beings. After Pompey ’ sdeath, Cato assumes the leadership of Pompey ’ s forces, and then setsout across the Libyan desert in perhaps the most colourful episode of the whole poem. Its crucial passage is Cato ’ s arrival at the oracle of Jupiter Ammon, where (as Lucan ’ s readers well knew), Alexander theGreat had been saluted as the Son of Zeus. Labienus encourages Catoto consult the oracle and learn the future. Here is Cato ’ s reply:Cato, full of the god whom he carried in his calm mind, uttered words from his heart that were worthy of the oracle. “ What ques-tion do you suggest, Labienus? Should I ask if I should wish todie in battle a free man, rather than witness tyranny? Whether itmakes any difference if our life is long or short? Whether anyviolence can harm the good man? Whether Fortune can lose herterrors when faced with virtue? … I know, and Ammon will notplant knowledge any deeper in my heart. We all are one with thepowers above, and though the oracle be silent, we do nothingwithout the will of god. The divine power needs no [oracular]utterances, and our creator has told us at our birth whatever wemay know. Has he chosen desert sands to chant his oracles to afew [enquirers]? Has he buried the truth in this dust? Is the god ’ shome anywhere except in earth and sea and air and heaven — andvirtue? Why look for the gods any further? Jupiter is whateveryou see, whatever you do. ” The wise man needs no external assurance, no divination or prophecy.The god is within him, and he proceeds through life unmoved by fearand other emotions, knowing one fact about the future — that he mustdie. This is the obvious significance of the passage. Cato, however,also sees that divine power is immanent in the four “ elements ” of theuniverse ( “ heaven ” standing for the fiery upper air of Stoic cosmology)and in virtue, meaning the virtue of all wise men rather than of a partic-ular individual. Lucan, then, follows Seneca in seeing the divineeverywhere in the universe and the wise man as being himself divine. Thus it comes as no surprise when Lucan ends his eulogy of Cato byequating him with the gods: See, then, the true father of his country, most worthy, Rome, of your altars! Never will you be ashamed to take your oaths byhim, for if ever you stand free from the yoke of slavery, him willyou make — now, in the future — a god.Lucan ’ s portrait of Cato as the s apiens, for all its bizarre features andexaggerations, is based on philosophical principle.For Lucan, Fortune is the dynamic and universal power, replacingJupiter and the Olympians. He dispenses with the gods of Homeric andVirgilian epic, except for Hercules, whose struggle with Antaeus isnarrated more as a parable of Roman success in Africa than as anaffirmation of the reality of the Olympian gods. Nevertheless, theStoic god pervades the poem. Among mortals, only Cato is worthy of divine status and the deified Caesar and other emperors are worthy only of scorn. In passionate despair Lucan consoles himself for thevictory of Caesar with the hollowness of his divinity: Still, we have this consolation for the disaster, as much as it isright for the divine power to give to mortals: the civil wars willcreate gods equal to the gods above. Rome will equip dead mor-tals with thunderbolts and radiate crowns and stars, and in tem-ples of the gods she will swear her oaths by dead ghosts.These words follow the surprising cry:Indeed we have no gods: since the ages are hurried along byblind chance, we lie when we say that Jupiter is king.A few lines later Lucan says “ mortal affairs are of no interest to god ” .Is he then being inconsistent with Stoic doctrine? I think not. Repeat-edly he appeals to the “ chain of fate ” , and emphasizes that fate isunkind to mortals — most particularly those who supported the republi-can cause against Caesar and their sympathizers in later ages. Theinconsistency lies, not so much in the nihilism evident in these lines,but in Lucan s refusal to accept the dictates of fate. If fate has dealtmortals such a terrible hand, then how can one accept it willingly? Theonly answer must be nihilism, he says. And this is consistent, for, aswe have seen, Lucan shows that the only person secure against suchdespair is the wise man — Cato — who is in a different category fromother human beings. For the rest of us the divine power — whether of the Olympian gods or the Stoic divinity — is irrelevant, for our world isdisintegrating.Lucan links Roman and cosmic disaster in another dynamic featureof the poem, Caesar’s anger. The governing principle in the greatstorm of Book 5 is the interaction of Caesar’s madness (furor) with theraging of the elements— and madness, as Seneca had taught, is part of anger. At the climax of the storm, the universe itself collapses:then the vault of heaven trembles and the axis [of the world]thunders and the poles begin to collapse, their structure shaken.Nature fears chaos: the elements seem to have broken therestraints that held them in harmony and night seems to return, toconfuse the spirits of the dead with the gods.We see here once more Cornutus’principle of allegory — the raging of the individual, Caesar, involves the raging of nature, and the destruc-tion to be wrought by Caesar finds its parallel in cosmic disruption.Lucan is a Stoic with a difference, a Stoic who cannot accept theinjustice of the Roman republic destroyed and liberty removed, exceptby seeing in these disasters the dismantling of the ordered cosmos. Hiswise man, Cato, points out the difference between the Stoic ideal(which Seneca taught was possibly attainable) and the cruel reality of the world of the Bellum Civile, Lucan’s attitude to the divine power, to fate and to the cosmos, isone of two essential aspects of his philosophy. The second is his atti-tude towards Roman history and its great disaster, the loss of republi-can liberty with the victory of Caesar at Pharsalus. Repeatedly hehammers at the theme of lost liberty. Caesar and Liberty are like a pairof gladiators; after Caesar ’ s victory “ Liberty retreated beyond theTigris and the Rhine ” , never to return to the Roman world. Facedwith tyranny, how should the individual react? We have seen in Cato,the wise man, the ideal answer, but ordinary mortals, Lucan seems tosay, give way to their emotions. Occasionally there are exceptions:Cotta dissuades Metellus from opposing Caesar s efforts to plunder theRoman treasury by saying that “ the people ’ s liberty, when suppressedby a tyrant, perishes through liberty ” , that is, the person who tries tospeak freely under a tyranny discovers how much freedom he haslost. The corollary is silence and a withdrawal into the freedom of themind, as the Roman people do, suppressing their grief at the loss of liberty even while outwardly celebrating the tyrant ’ s triumphs. Equally pointedly, Caesars entourage openly rejoice at the sight of Pompey ’ s head, while Caesar appears to grieve. “ This ” , says the poet, “ is good Liberty — to dare to be happy while Caesar weeps ” . Liberty,then, is the victim of the civil war: as the Egyptian vizier, Pothinus,says to the young Ptolemy: Let the man who wants to be morally good ( pius ) leave the court.Virtue and supreme power cannot coexist.Withdrawal into otium , Seneca ’ s solution for maintaining freedomunder a tyranny, is not an option for Lucan. He does, however, con-sider Seneca ’ s extreme solution, suicide. He seems to have been fasci-nated by death and modes of death, and his most elaborate portrayal of suicide in the cause of liberty is the episode of Vulteius and his men. They are trapped on a raft, surrounded by the enemy, and Vulteiusurges them to die through mutual suicide rather than let the Pompeianskill them (lines 476 – 520). The first word of his speech is “ Free ” (libera), and his theme is that to assert one ’s freedom through death is todie happy (line 520). Yet Vulteius is hardly a rational man, for he isdriven by “madness, the goads of death ” (line 517), and, in a finalirony, he is a Caesarian. Lucan reflects on his death:Yet even after these examples future generations will not seehow virtue is not difficult to attain, if one escapes slavery byone ’ s own hand. Yet tyrants are feared and peoples do not knowthat swords are given so that no one need be a slave.The last line ( ignorantque datos , ne quisquam serviat , enses ) has longbeen admired by patriots. While the sentiment may be disturbing, theexpression epitomizes the noblest aspirations of Lucan ’ s philosophy. One death, however, stands apart, the murder of Pompey. Pompey has been at best a morally ambiguous figure throughout the poem, buthere Lucan portrays him as facing death with Stoic courage. “ I am ” , hesays, “ happy, O gods … Death cannot make a man unhappy ” (lines 630 – 32). At the beginning of Book 9 Pompey ’ s soul rejoins the divine firedwelling among the stars, where “ the half-divine dead spirits dwell,those whom fiery virtue has allowed to endure without guilt the lifebelow ” (lines 7 – 8). But Lucan diverges from the pattern of Cicero ’ s Dream of Scipio , for he imagines the soul returning to earth to exactvengeance on Caesar by taking up its residence in the “ pure heart of Brutus ” and “ the unconquered mind of Cato ” (lines 17 – 18). While thisseems to be a kind of Pythagorean transmigration of the soul, it shouldbe interpreted rather as an expression of Lucan’s unwillingness toleave the disembodied Pompey to enjoy the rewards of virtue when thevictory over the tyrant (Caesar) is still to be won. Like Virgil, Lucan is an epic poet whose philosophy is integral tohis poetry. It is basically Stoic, but his despair sets him apart fromother Stoics, and his tempestuous commitment to the ideal of republi-can liberty opens a gulf between his view of life and the ataraxia of the Stoics. He is closest to Seneca in his speculations on the cosmosand the physical world, and to Cornutus in his allegorical interpretationof events in human history. Whatever our judgement of his philosophi-cal views (and there is huge disagreement among his readers), they areexpressed with a vigour unique in classical literature. SamuelJohnson’s view is closest to the truth: Lucan is distinguished by a kind of dictatorial or philosophic dignity, full of ambitious morality and pointed sentences, com-prised in vigorous and animated lines. The most distinguished Roman philosopher of the later part of the firstcentury was Gaius Musonio Rufo (30–101). Like Persius, MUSONIO was Etruscan by descent and of equestrian rank (that is, he belonged to theupper socio-economic class of Roman society but was not a senator). He joined the exiled Rubellius Plautus in Asia and returned to Romeafter the execution of Rubellius in 62. He was exiled to the island of Gyaros in 65, and while there he discovered a spring of water whichbecame an object of pilgrimage for the students who came to Gyaros tohear him lecture. Musonius himself reflects on his exile in his 9th Dis-course. Clearly he endured it with courage and equanimity, for he prac-tised the Stoic belief that exile did not“deprive a man of things that aretruly good”, such as courage, justice, moderation or reason. He wasrecalled after the death of Nero, and Tacitus reports that when the armyof Vespasian’s general, Antonius Primus, was poised to capture Romein December of 69 CE, the emperor Vitellius included Musonius in amission sent out to attempt to find a peaceful solution to the war. His efforts to show the soldiers that peace was preferable to war were metwith derision and violence — philosophy and soldiers thirsting for battledo not mix. After the death of Vitellius and the establishment of Vespasian’s supporters in Rome, the senate began to settle old scores. Musonius,although not a senator, addressed the senate as prosecutor of the Stoic,Egnatius Celer, who had gained the conviction and execution of histeacher, Barea Soranus, in 66. Although Egnatius was defended by theCynic philosopher, Demetrius, he was condemned and executed.About four years later Musonius was again exiled, although he had atfirst been exempted from Vespasian ’ s order expelling philosophers. Onthis occasion he seems to have travelled to Syria (for he lectured to “ aSyrian king ” in Discourse 8), and to have met Pliny ’ s close friend, thephilosopher Artemidorus, who became his son-in-law. Musonius wasrecalled, perhaps in 81 (the year of Pliny ’ s military service in Syria),and seems to have spent the remaining twenty years of his life in Rome studying and lecturing. Among Musonius’students were Epictetus, Dio Cocceianus of Prusa (Dio Chrysostom), and the Stoic philosopher Euphrates, whomPliny met in Syria and greatly admired. Pliny says that Euphratestaught that “the most beautiful part of philosophy is to transact publicbusiness …and to make practical use of the philosophers’ doctrines.” Epictetus quotes a lecture of Euphrates defending his refusal to flaun this philosophy openly, preferring to practise it privately (“everythingfor myself and God”) and to live publicly like other people. Musonius taught in Greek, and in his time Roman intellectual life was becoming more catholic, socially and geographically, as the following examples show. Musonius himself spoke Greek and Latin, andArtemidorus, his son-in-law, was very probably a Greek citizen. Euphrates and Artemidorus conversed easily with Pliny in Syria and atRome. When Epictetus was driven from Rome he set up his school atNicopolis in western Greece, where many young Romans came to hearhim lecture in Greek. Dio Chrysostom, expelled from Italy by Domi-tian, travelled all over the Mediterranean world before returning to hisoriginal home at Prusa in Bithynia. Musonius seems to have left no written works. Twenty-one of his discourses (short lectures addressed to non-specialist audiences) wererecorded by his student Lucius, perhaps not long after his death, andthere are thirty-two shorter fragments, of which six are quoted byEpictetus. The discourses and nineteen of the fragments were pre-served by the fifth-century scholar, John of Stobi (Stobaeus). Some scholars optimistically refer to Musonius as “the Roman Socrates” because of his high moral character (on which all ancient sources are unanimous) and because he committed nothing to writing, as far as can be known. The twenty-one discourses fall into three groups: the first elevendeal with general philosophical questions; numbers 12 – 17 with socialquestions; and numbers 18 – 21 with questions concerning the minutiaeof daily life. Like Seneca and Epictetus, Musonius was not greatly con-cerned with logic, although Epictetus quotes an episode in whichMusonius criticized him for not understanding a syllogism. UnlikeSeneca, he discouraged giving many examples to support a philosophi-cal point. The first discourse is on the subject “ that there is no need formany proofs in dealing with one problem ” , a statement he supports with analogies from medicine — the doctor who can cure you is better than the one who prescribes many medicines. The medical analogy is more than decorative, for underlying it is Musonius ’ belief that philos-ophy must lead to practical results in one s daily life. In Discourse 5 heargues that ethical behaviour in accordance with theory is the goal of the student of philosophy, and that therefore it is more important thantheory because it is practical. In Discourse 6 he says: Virtue consists not only in theoretical knowledge but also in prac-tical [living], like medicine and music. Just as the doctor and themusician must learn not only the theories of each one ’ s art butalso train themselves to act in accordance with theory, so theman who will be morally good must not only learn the lessons that lead to virtue but must also train himself in them with enthu-siasm and hard work. This doctrine is not entirely new: for example, Seneca said that “ virtueonly touches a mind that is thoroughly educated and taught and hasreached the highest point through constant practice ” . Socrates fre-quently used analogies from the practical arts (carpentry, shoe-makingand so on) to illustrate the process of acquiring virtue, but the profes-sional sophists who came after him went beyond analogy and claimedthat they could teach virtue as if it were a techne (that is, an art orskill). Musonius ’ focus is the moral excellence of the individual, whocan study it theoretically but acquire it and maintain it only throughconstant practice.In Musonius ’ moral scheme, the first stage is reason (logos), the sec-ond is virtuous action ( ethos ), and the key to virtuous behaviour is prac-tice ( askesis, perhaps better translated as “ training ” ). The sixth dis-course (the beginning of which is quoted above) is devoted to askesis, which seems to have been Musonius ’ particular contribution to Roman ethics. He says:One kind of training rightly concerns the soul alone; the other iscommon to the soul and the body. The kind common to both willoccur if we accustom ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, lim-ited food, hard beds, abstinence from pleasure and endurance of hard labour. Musonius says that this kind of training will harden the body and directthe soul to courage and self-control. The training for the soul aloneprepares the student to distinguish between good and evil, to knowwhat things are truly good or evil (as opposed to seeming to be so), andso to avoid the one and pursue the other. The focus on training thebody as part of philosophy appears in Cicero, as does the doctrine thatspecific virtues (for example, courage) will follow from training themind. Seneca and Epictetus are more concerned with the mind, andfor the former, especially, virtuous behaviour will follow from theright exercise of reason.Musonius discusses the education of women and the proper relationsbetween husband and wife. In Discourse 3 he says that women shouldstudy philosophy, for they are endowed with reason no less than men,and they have the same disposition ( orexis ) towards and natural affin-ity ( oikeiosis ) for virtue as men. Seneca, it is true, had said that naturehad been as generous with virtues to women as to men, and he gives examples of virtuous women from Roman history. But Musonius ismore precise and works out the details of a woman ’ s virtuous activityin daily life. He concludes:Hence it is reasonable to expect that such a woman will be indus-trious and able to endure evil, a woman who will nurse her ownchildren at her breast and minister to her husband with her ownhands. Activities that some people think are appropriate forslaves she will do without shrinking. Is not such a woman a helpto her husband, an ornament to her family, and a good examplefor those who know her?While this picture of the woman who has studied philosophy is moreor less one of the ideal Roman matron, it is based on Musonius ’ doc-trine that right reason will be followed by right action, which will bemaintained through continuous practice. As part of his doctrine that theindividual must take responsibility for the moral quality of her life, heparticularly takes issue with the custom among Roman upper-class mothers of giving their babies to wet-nurse slaves and relying on slaves to perform all domestic chores. We may deplore Musonius ’ assumptions about the comparative roles of men and women in domes-tic activities, but we should at least give him credit for some practicaladvice on the proper role of slaves in the economy of a house, asopposed to the generalizations of Seneca ’ s 47th letter. And we shouldapplaud his pleas for the equal education of women, which he repeatsin the 4th discourse on “ whether daughters should have equal educa-tion with sons ” . He points out that “ all human tasks are perhaps com-mon to men and women ” , while education in virtue is equally appropri-ate for both sexes. He concludes that since philosophy is training fornoble character, it cannot be limited just to boys and men. Musonius discusses sexual behaviour more than most Roman philosophers. He believes that extramarital sexual relations are wrong,and that within marriage their purpose should be the procreation of children, not pleasure. Husband and wife should provide mutual com-panionship and share all things and offer mutual love, respect and sup-port. Neither should marriage hinder the study of philosophy, for theresult of such study is right action. Musonius seems to be answeringthe bleak picture of Stoic marriage given by Lucan in Cato ’ s remar-riage to Marcia, for, in place of the unbending priggishness of Cato, herecommends mutual support and love, with as much being given by thehusband as by the wife. If one judges Musonius as a philosopher, the judgement will have to be damning if one applies modern standards. He is troubled by the gulf betweenthe high reputation of Musonius in his own time and the lack of philo-sophical originality or depth in the discourses. It is true that the dis-courses that deal with traditional Stoic topics (for example, luxury) areunoriginal, and van Geytenbeek rightly judges Musonius ’ treatment of equality of education for women and of sexual activity (along withother topics such as the exposure of infants and obedience of childrento their parents) to be superior. Musonius is important for his positionin Roman society as a teacher who successfully related Stoic doctrineto the problems of daily life, that is, one who preferred applied ethicsto theory. In this he is an interesting foil to Seneca, who constantlyseeks to apply Stoic doctrine to daily life, yet leaves the impressionthat there is a gulf between what he writes and how he lives his life.Thus Seneca ’ s readers, in his own time and ever since, have had con-flicting views about him. About Musonius, who was less ambitious asa stylist and philosopher, there seems to have been unanimity. Even Tacitus, so ironic in recording the tragicomedy of his mission to thesoldiers of Antonius Primus, says of him (in a passage written perhapstwo decades after his death), that he was exiled in 65 CE “because of his distinguished reputation… as a teacher of the young in the preceptsof wisdom.” We know go from EPICTETUS TO MARCUSAURELIUS. Epictetus was the most famous pupil of Musonius. He was a Phrygianfrom the town of Hierapolis (one of several with this name), situated inthe southern part of central Turkey. He was born in about 50 CE andprobably lived into the reign of Hadrian (117 – 38 CE). He was a slave of Nero ’ s freedman, Epaphroditus, but we do not know how he became a slave, or when was freed. Epaphroditus himself was one of Nero ’ smost trusted ministers and was present at his suicide, in which he isreported to have assisted. He survived for nearly thirty years after this,but was executed by Domitian in 95, perhaps because of his part inNero ’ s death. Epictetus studied under Musonio while he was still a slave, and by 93 he was well enough established as a freedman at Rome to be expelled along with the other philosophers that year. Hewent to the city of Nicopolis (on the western mainland of Greece, closeto the site of the battle of Actium) and there established his school,where many students came to hear him. He described his school as a “ hospital ” ( iatreion ), and he exhorted his students to leave it “ in pain,not with feelings of pleasure ” , because their souls were sick in the waythat one ’ s body might have a dislocated shoulder or a headache. Epictetus focused largely on practical ethics, while allowing thatlogic was essential in the training of the philosopher. Epitteto argues that it has a direct effect on morality and behaviour. Right behaviour is the result of reason,and logic is essential in training for the proper use of reason. Thereforelogical errors lead to ethical errors, a point that Epictetus supports withan anecdote from his own training in logic under Musonius. Among the students of Epictetus was the historian Arrian of Nico-media (in Bithynia), consul in 129 CE, whose name is attached to thefour extant books (out of eight originally published) of the discoursesof Epictetus, together with a digest with the title “Encheiridion” ( “ Handbook”). Arrian says in his preface that he did not compose the dis-courses, and neither did he “ bring them out to the public ” , and thatthey were circulating without his knowledge before he published hisedition. Further, he says that he transcribed them word for word as heheard Epictetus deliver them. Thus the actual authorship of the Dis-courses and Handbook is uncertain, although there is no doubt thatthey reproduce the views of Epictetus himself. It is possible — but far from certain — that they were actually composed by Epictetus (forexample, their language is the koine, not Attic Greek, which Arrian used in his own writings), and circulated, as Arrian indicates, before Arrian issued them in a definitive form. They were popular in antiq-uity, and the Handbook has been amongst the most widely admired of all philosophical books in any language. The most important of Epictetus ’doctrines concerns the freedom of the will, the subject of the first chapter of the Discourses and the firstchapter of the Handbook , quoted here: Of things that exist some are in our control, and some are not in our control. In our control are thought, impulse (towards an end), desire, rejection (of desire) — in a word, everything that is our doing. Not in our control are our body, property, reputation, polit-ical power — in a word, everything that is not our doing. And thethings that are in our control are by nature free, without hindrance, without impediment, but the things that are not in ourcontrol are weak, slavish, subject to hindrance, in the control of others. Remember, then, that if you think that the things that areby nature slavish are free, and that what is in another ’ s control isyours, you will be frustrated, you will be unhappy, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault with gods and men. But if youthink that only what is under your control is yours (and that whatbelongs to another is another ’s), no one can compel you, no onewill prevent you, you will not blame anyone, you will not accuseanyone. You will not do one single thing against your will, youwill not have enemies, no one will harm you, for you cannot suf-fer harm. Epictetus focuses on the concept of “what is in our control ”repeatedly. It is closely linked to his doctrine of moral choice (“prohairesis”). The chief component of the Greek word is “choice”, and it was used in thissense by Aristotle, but extended by Aristotle’s contemporary, Demos-thenes, to mean “purpose”. Epictetus combines the two connotations,so that “prohairesis” means “moral choice leading to a practical end” , in other words, moral purpose. Obviously, the category of “things that arein our control ”implies “things about which we can make a choice ”,which Epictetus divides into two categories, things to be chosen (“pro-haireta”)or rejected (“apoprohaireta”) ). He thinks that the physical bodyis unimportant compared to the human capacity for making moralchoices: “ you are not flesh or hair, but moral choice ” . He teaches, fur-ther, that it is our impressions ( phantasiai ) about which choices haveto be made. First you must make your governing principle ( hegemonikon )pure and make this your attitude: “ Thought is my material, justas wood is the carpenter ’ s material … My task is the right use of impressions. My little body is nothing to me … Death? Let itcome when it wishes. ” Epictetus ’ moral scheme, then, requires the use of reason to evaluateimpressions, refusing to be affected by impressions of things that arenot in our control. For those that are in our control, we must use reasonto decide which are to be rejected and which accepted, and these deci-sions are our moral choices.Perhaps Disc . 3. 24 is Epictetus ’ most detailed exposition of the prac-tical effects of this doctrine. Its subject is “ That we should not sufferby anticipating things that are not in our control ” . Epictetus shows thatemotions such as grief or sorrow (for our own misfortunes or those of others) do us no good, for these misfortunes are not in our control. “ To long for something that is impossible is slavish, foolish, the desire of astranger who fights against God ” ( § 21). The mention of God intro-duces a new part of Epictetus ’ scheme, for, as Cleanthes and Senecahad taught, the wise person will make his will conform to the will of God, who controls all things. Epictetus uses the military metaphor,familiar to us from Seneca and Sextius, as in §§ 31 – 32:Do you not know that the matter [i.e. of right living] is a cam-paign? One man must be on guard duty, another on reconnais-sance patrol, another fighting in battle. All soldiers cannot be inthe same place … But you fail to carry out the general ’ s orders,and you complain when you are given a hard task.Epictetus draws another analogy from a ship ’ s crew, and he continues( § 34):Life is a long and varied campaign for each individual. You must observe the duties of a soldier and perform each task as the gen-eral orders.The parable here involves a double analogy, for “ the general ” is theStoic divine being, and the individual is a citizen of “ no mean city ” , areference to the universal Stoic community of gods and human beings.So in Handbook 7 he says:Likewise on a voyage, if the ship is at anchor and you leave it tofind water, and on the way you find a sea-shell or an edible bulb,you must be attentive to the ship and continually turn round, lestthe captain call. If he does, you must drop them immediately, soas to avoid being trussed up like sheep and thrown on board. Soin life, if instead of a shell and a bulb, you are given a little wifeand a little child, well and good. But if the captain calls, givethem up and run to the ship … And if you are old, do not go toofar from the ship, in case you are absent when he calls.So Epictetus ’ doctrine of moral choice includes the disciplined life of one who is obedient to the commands of God and whose will conformsto the will of fate. In Handbook 31, he says that one must have rightopinions about the gods, obey them and follow them willingly. Andthis one can only do by placing what is good and evil in the category of things under one ’ s control. Again and again, Epictetus emphasizes obe-dience to the divine will. Here, for example, he combines the metaphorof military discipline with obedience to the divine will: 11 The good and fine individual will remember who he is, fromwhere he came, and by whom he was created. He will focus onthis one thing, how he will fill his own [assigned] place in properorder, obedient to the god.More systematically than Seneca, Epictetus analyses the process of moral choice, and, like Musonius, he teaches that training ( askesis ) isessential for the person who will be disposed to make the right choices.He describes the philosopher ’ s askesis vividly with the analogy of anathlete training for the Olympic Games. 12 Elsewhere he is less austere: 13 Training should not be by means of activities contrary tonature … : not every difficult and dangerous thing is necessary fortraining … And what is the goal of our labours? To live one ’ s lifewithout obstacles to our desire ( orexis ) and aversion ( ekklisis ). 202THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS And what is this? Not to fail in achieving what we desire and notto experience that to which we are averse. This is the goal of ourtraining.Epictetus next analyses the attributes of each stage of moral choice,basing himself on the three “ areas ” ( topoi ) of training for the studentwhich he had discussed earlier: 14 There are three areas in which the future good and fine personmust be trained. First, concerning desire and aversion … Second,concerning impulse ( horme ) and refusal ( aphorme ) — in a word,concerning duty, that he may act with order and reason … Third,concerning avoidance of delusions and rashness — in a word, con-cerning assent ( synkatathesis ).The first topos concerns the emotions ( pathe ), and the second thedesires and aversion. Epictetus extends the latter to include duty, buthe takes a different line from Cicero ’ s De Officiis , for he focuses onthe student as an individual rather than on Cicero ’ s citizen as a mem-ber of society. Nevertheless, he keeps Cicero ’ s theory of the expandingcircles of the objects of duty. A person who has mastered the emotionsthrough practice in the first topos will use reason to act appropriately,that is, he will know what his duty is. But such a person must still be ahuman being, linked to other human and divine beings to whom heowes his duty: 15 I do not have to be unfeeling like a statue, but I must keep up myattitudes ( hexeis ) both towards those who are physically relatedto me and to those with whom I have come to have a relation-ship, in so far as I am pious, a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.The third topos concerns the training of the intellect through logic. It isfor the person who has made some progress in philosophy, so that theywill not be not liable to false judgements or rash actions. Their assentis based on reason, and thus they are assured of making the right moralchoices, even if they are impaired by wine or sadness or are actingunconsciously, as in a dream. 16 Here again Epictetus agrees withSeneca in allowing for the notion of stages of progress towards wis-dom, something that he has previously discussed. 17 He says, moreover,that the philosophers of his time have devoted themselves to the third topos , to the exclusion of the first two, whereas the good student of philosophy must study all three topoi , for logic is a necessary instru- FROM EPICTETUS TO MARCUS AURELIUS203 ment for success in studying the first two. Epictetus, then, is attackingthe fashionable and exclusive focus on logic among his contempo-raries, but he also finds a place for it in his system. 18 To return now to Disc . 3. 12, the discussion of askesis expands onthe doctrine of topoi set forth in 3. 2. To achieve the right choicesbetween desire and aversion one must train to counteract that which iswrong, one must “ go to the opposite side of the rolling ship ” . 19 Here,too, Epictetus is more understanding of human weakness than mostStoics. Like Persius he warns the young student against temptation: 20 A young beginning student in philosophy has an unequal battleagainst a smart girl. As the proverb goes, “ the pot and the stonedo not match ” .He shows that the second topes , that of duty, is governed by reason,which will lead the philosopher to choose actions that are appropriatefor the time, place and context. In commenting on the third topos , thatof assent, Epictetus appeals to Socrates, who said that “ the unexaminedlife is not worth living ” . 21 So the philosopher must be sceptical of hisimpressions: like the sentry who asks for the password, he must ask each impression, “ Do you have Nature ’ s password? ” Epictetus ’ doctrine of freedom of the will and its related topics is themost coherent exposition of the process of moral choice in Roman phi-losophy. Equally distinguished is his second principal doctrine, that of liberty. Here he speaks from unique experience, for alone of Romanphilosophers he had been a slave. The longest of his Discourses (4. 1)is also his most important discussion of liberty. Here is its opening:Free is the man who lives as he wishes. It is not possible to com-pel him or prevent him or force him. His impulses are not hin-dered, what he aims at he achieves, and what he tries to avoid hemisses. Who then wishes to live in error? “ No one. ” Who wishesto live being deceived, being hasty in his judgements, unjust,undisciplined, cantankerous, ignoble? “ No one. ” So no one whois bad lives as he wishes, and no bad person is free. And whowishes to live being subject to grief, fear, envy, pity, aiming forthings and missing, trying to avoid things and meeting withthem? “ No one at all. ” Can we point to any bad person who isfree from grief and fear, from meeting what he wishes to avoid,from failure to achieve his goal? “ No one. ” Then we cannotpoint to any bad person who is free. 204THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS This splendid passage brings to life the dry Stoic paradox, “ Only thewise man is free ” . As we read further in the discourse, we find familiardoctrines, themselves liberated from the ethical imperatives of the dis-cussions of prohairesis and askesis , to become part of a life truly freefrom moral slavery. The analogy with physical slavery is especiallyforceful in the light of Epictetus ’ experience. Yet he shows that humanslaves or caged animals are subject to other forms of slavery on theirrelease ( §§ 24 – 40). The problems of life as a free man still enslave thefreedman, even if he rises to the highest posts of political power. Theirsolution lies in the Socratic principle of scepticism, asking “ What eachthing that exists is ” ( § 41). And the result of such enquiry will be toknow the distinction between what is in our control and what is not( §§ 62 – 75). Then comes the hard part, which is to let go of things thatare dear to us but whose fate we cannot control — one ’ s body, one ’ swife, one ’ s children: since the body is like a donkey and the otherthings are accoutrements for the donkey, let them go! ( § 80). This, then,is the first way to freedom, summarized in a single, cumulative, sen-tence ( § 81):If you have prepared yourself with this preparation and havetrained yourself with this training — to distinguish between whatis your own from what is another ’ s, what is subject to hindrancefrom what is not, to think that the former is your concern and thelatter is not, to make your desire continually for the former andyour aversion from the latter, well, will you have anyone to fear?Yet there still remains a higher power to which the free person mustsubmit ( § 89):I have subordinated my impulse ( horme ) to God … He wants meto desire something — I want to desire it.The things we count most dear are but gifts from God, to whom wemust return them willingly, if he so wills ( §§ 107 – 10). Like Seneca,Epictetus quotes Cleanthes ’ Hymn to Zeus ( § 131) to prove that truefreedom consists in conforming one ’ s will to that of the divine power.Unlike Seneca, however, he admits that this is difficult: the Cynic, Dio-genes, and Socrates himself succeeded, but what of ordinary people? “ Make the effort ” , is his reply, “ and you will know from experiencethat the philosophers speak the truth, even if it is contrary to generallyaccepted opinion ” ( §§ 173 – 74). He concludes ( §§ 175 – 77): FROM EPICTETUS TO MARCUS AURELIUS205 Freedom is achieved not by fulfilling one ’ s desires, but by sup-pressing them. And so that you may know that this is true, just asyou laboured to fulfil those things [i.e. your desires], so transferyour labour to these. Endure sleeplessness to master a doctrinethat will make you free: pay court to a philosopher, not to a richold man … Try it! You need not be ashamed of trying.In Handbook 14 the basic principle concerning “ things that are underour control ” is once more stated forcefully, a final reminder of itsessential part in the doctrine of liberty:So whoever wishes to be free, let him not wish for anything noravoid anything that is in the control of others. Otherwise he mustinevitably be a slave.A prominent feature of the Discourses is Epictetus ’ use of the Socraticdialogue, the subject of Discourse 2. 12. Socrates, he says ( § 5), “ com-pelled his interlocutor to be his witness ” . Although relentless in hisdiscovery of the truth, Socrates was never angry with his interlocutors.As Epictetus points out, this was a lot easier in democratic Athens thanin the Rome of his time ( § 17), where Socratic interrogation of a socialsuperior (for example, an ex-consul) might end (and evidently did forEpictetus) in a beating ( §§ 24 – 26). In his own school Epictetus musthave been a lively and demanding teacher, for there was constant giveand take with his students, who would have needed to concentrate hardto catch the stream of analogies and questions with which he enlivenedhis presentations. Arrian has left us a unique portrait of a philosophicalteacher, for Seneca and Cicero both had constructed artificial situationsfor dialogue or lecture, and Lucretius and Marcus Aurelius were writ-ing in very different circumstances from those of the classroom. Per-sius, however, does lift the curtain on the teaching of Cornutus, and itis likely that Musonius was also a forceful teacher. 22 Aulus Gellius,quoting Favorinus, reveals the integrity and passion of Epictetus ’ teach-ing. 23 Like the satirists (for example, Juvenal in his second satire)Epictetus could not endure a “ philosopher ” whose squalid life beliedhis fine words — this was, he said, like pouring a pure liquid into a dirty jar, where it turns into “ urine or something worse ” . In a second anec-dote, Favorinus reported that Epictetus was upset by two vices in par-ticular — inability to be patient when others harm us and lack of self-control when we are tempted by pleasure. The former calls forpatience, the latter for restraint. Hence, says Gellius, Epictetus ’ famousmaxim, “ Bear and forbear ” ( anechou kai apechou ). 206THE ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS Epicurus shares with the Cynics a focus on training, endurance andconsistency in one ’ s way of life and one ’ s philosophy. As our brief discussion inChapter 1has shown, Stoic ethics had much in commonwith Cynicism, but the unconventional behaviour of individual Cynicswas offensive to most Romans. Epictetus attempted to resolve the con-flict between the good and unattractive aspects of Cynicism, and in sodoing he has left us the most comprehensive discussions of the Cynicsby a Stoic philosopher.Twice, Diogenes, the paragon of the Cynics, is described as a “ scout ” ( kataskopos ), that is, a soldier sent to find out the facts aboutthe enemy and to report the truth to those who sent him. 24 The militarymetaphor, as we have seen, was used by the Sextii and by Seneca forthe disciplined life of the philosopher, for the most dangerous of mili-tary assignments was that of the scout. 25 Epictetus had sent one of hisstudents from Nicopolis to Rome as a scout, to report on affairsthere. 26 In the same way, Diogenes had been sent into the world toreport to us, ordinary people and his hearers, the truth about the dan-gers among which a person trying to live a good life must live. ThusEpictetus meets the dangers of life in his Roman world with the time-less answers of Diogenes: death is not an evil; what men say about usis not worth our notice; the body needs only minimal clothing and com-fort to be satisfied. Diogenes could truly say that he was at peace, thathe had attained tranquillity and freedom.In this parable Epictetus summarizes the fundamental principles of the Cynics — control of the emotions (especially fear of death), disre-gard of physical comforts, contempt for reputation in the eyes of thecommunity, and the assurance that the person who lives according tothese principles will be tranquil and free. In Disc . 3. 22 and 4. 8 hedevelops these themes in such a way as to soften the features of Cyni-cism that the Romans found offensive, and to focus on those that wereconsistent with Stoic ethics. Discourse 3. 22 begins with a warning — the student who is inclinedto Cynicism must know how great a challenge the Cynic ’ s callingpresents. Unconventional clothing and an ascetic life mean nothingunless they involve a conversion ( §§ 13 – 15):First, in everything that concerns you your behaviour must notappear to be like your present way of life in any respect. Youmust not blame God nor human beings. You must eradicatedesire and change aversion towards only those things that con-cern moral purpose ( prohairetika ). You must not show anger orfury or envy or pity. No little boy or girl may seem attractive to FROM EPICTETUS TO MARCUS AURELIUS207 you, no bit of glory, no sweet little piece of cake. You mustknow that other men protect themselves with walls and housesand darkness when they act in this way … But the Cynics duty isto protect himself with the wall of integrity ( aidos ), otherwise hewill be behaving disgracefully [even if] he is scantily clad andhomeless.In this way Epictetus answers the commonest criticism against the Cyn-ics. The person who lives and acts unconventionally is a hypocriteunless his clothing and behaviour are the outward signs of an innermoral certainty, which can be achieved only through conviction thatthe divine being has called him to a life based on absolute moral andphysical discipline. Again, in Disc . 4. 8, Epictetus distinguishesbetween the true Cynic philosopher and the person who merely lookslike one. You do not become a musician, he says, just because youcarry a musical instrument; no more are you a philosopher just becauseyou have a long beard and coarse clothing ( §§ 15 – 16). Socrates, hesays, was the example of the true philosopher, even if people failed torecognize him as one from his outward appearance, for he knew howsolid his principles were ( §§ 22 – 23). Thus the true Cynic philosopherwill say to his listeners ( §§ 30 – 31):Look at me, my [fellow] human beings, so that you can see thatyou are searching for happiness and tranquillity not where theyare, but where they are not. I am your example, sent by the god. Ihave neither possessions nor home nor wife nor children, noteven a mat or a garment or a cooking-pot. Yet see how healthy Iam. Test me, and if you find that I am free from disturbance, letme tell you the medicines that healed me.Like the Stoics, the Cynic exploits the medical metaphor, consistentwith the Stoic paradox that “ only the wise man is healthy ” . The picturegiven here of the sincere Cynic is at variance with the skin-deep would-be Cynic, with his beard, his coarse clothing, and his uncouth manners — all unsupported by the long training of the true philosopher. Such “cardboard” philosophers are all show and no substance. Thetrue path to happiness is inner certainty and outward anonymity. Know yourself and do not attempt the Cynic way without the help of God. And, as a corollary, “take care not to have your real characterbe known: spend a little time being a philosopher to yourself.” So the true Cynic is assured of his philosophical calling and princi-ples, and he alone has a just pretext for unconventional behaviour. Epictetus, however, does not favour the shamelessness (anaideia) of the typical Cynic and prefers a more conventional appearance that willnot disgust those who meet him. “Even his squalor should be pure.” Epictetus again and again emphasizes the preparation (paraskeue) necessary for the true Cynic, for this will allow him to show his superi-ority to kings and other powerful leaders. He may marry, but heshould not be distracted by the time-consuming chores of being a hus-band and a parent. 3 The Cynic philosopher contributes more to societythan the citizen who begets many children, and he cares for the com-munity like a father. All men are his children; he has [all] men for his sons, womenfor his daughters. This is his approach to all, this is how he caresfor all. Or do you think that he carelessly castigates those whomhe meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, as the servant of Zeus, his father and the father of his hearers.Another difficulty for a Roman Cynic is non-participation in politics,which puts him at odds, too, with Stoic principle. Epictetus has alreadycontrasted the Cynic with political and military leaders, in the dialoguewith Agamemnon. Now he shows that the Cynic’s activityon behalf of his fellow human beings is more noble than political activ-ity in a particular city working for particular short-term goals. Discussing the finances of Athens or Corinth is nothing comparedto the philosopher ’s discussions of universal human issues:[his discussion is] about happiness and unhappiness, about goodand bad fortune, about slavery and freedom. How can you ask if a man who is involved in this sort of activity for the common-wealth will take part in politics? You can ask me further if hewill be elected to office. What a stupid question! What greateroffice is there than that which he holds? Epictetus is playing on the word “politeia” and its cognates. “Politeia” meansboth “politics ”and “republic”and he refers both to the “republic”of a particular city and to the Stoic“commonwealth” shared by gods and allhumankind. The translation lacks the economy of the Greek,but the point is clear enough — the philosopher is a citizen of a widercommunity than any one city or state, and his activity has infinitelywider scope than that of any politician or statesman. As Epictetus sayslater, “when he [the Cynic philosopher] oversees the affairs of humanbeings, he oversees his own.” In his discussions Epictetus has done much more than “idealize ”theCynics. He has made an extended argument for including them in theRoman state and for reconciling their philosophy with Stoicism. Hehas sought to explain in what way their unconventional manners can beassimilated to conventional society, and he has justified their marginalstatus by reference to the universality of their concerns. He has shownwhere they march in step with the Stoics: his picture of the self-sufficient Cynic realizes the ideal wise man of the Stoic paradoxes,who alone is free, happy, a king. So Epictetus, far from sanitizing theuncomfortable figure of the Cynic, shows how such a philosopher fitsinto even such a conventional society as that of Rome, while hereminds his hearers of the roots of Stoic ethics in the philosophy of Zeno ’s master, Crates the Cynic. He quotes the Stoic Hymn of Clean-thes in support of the Cynic ’ s unity with the divine will. His pictureof the Cynic ’ s patience in the face of injustice and physical hardship isconsistent with Stoic constancy. In this way Epictetus bridges the gapbetween the Stoic ideal and reality that is so disturbing to critics of Seneca ’ s lifestyle. His Cynic, in the context of real life, is an example,therefore, as much for Stoics as for would-be Cynics.It would be easy to quote Epictetus for pages on end, so lucid andattractive are his doctrines. Let us leave him, however, with his ownmoving self-portrait, which ends his discussion of divine providence. Itis consistent with all that we have seen of his teaching: We must sing the greatest and most pious hymn [to God], that hehas given us the power to follow these things [i.e. the gifts of God] and to use his path [i.e. the path of reason]. What then?Since the majority of you have blinded yourselves, should notone person fill the gap and on behalf of all sing the hymn to thegod? I am a lame old man: what else do I have the power to doother than sing the hymn to the god? To be sure, if I were anightingale I would sing like a nightingale, and if I were a swan Iwould sing like a swan. But as it is I am endowed with reason: Iam compelled to sing the hymn to the god. This is my task: I per-form it and I will not leave this post that has been assigned tome, so long as it has been given to me. And I summon you tosing this same song with me. Epictetus probably lived into the reign of Adriano (117–138 CE). An almost exact contemporary was Plutarch, whose dates are usuallygiven as c.45–120. Plutarco chose to spend the greater part of his life in his birthplace, Chaeronea, a strategically placed town in north-west Boeo-tia, the site of Philip of Macedon ’s victory over the league of southernGreek states in 338 BCE and of Sulla ’s victory over Mithradates in 86BCE. The town was about 30 km east of Delphi, where for the last partof his life Plutarch was a priest and honorary citizen. Many people deny that Plutarch is a philosopher (he is not listed, for example, in “The Oxford Companion to Philosophy”, still less that he is a Roman philosopher, for he made but two visits to Italy and himself admittedthat he could not speak Latin. Certainly he was not a professional philosopher like Musonius or Epictetus, and his intense local loyalty limited his impact on Roman thought. Nevertheless, he was trained inphilosophy and many of his essays are on philosophical subjects. Hehad many influential friends at Rome, including his patron L.Mestrius Floro (consul before 82 CE), whose name he took when he became aRoman citizen as L.Mestrius Plutarchus, and Q.Sosius Senecio, consul in 99 and 107 CE, to whom he dedicated several of the Lives, the essayon Moral Progress, and the Quaestiones Convivales (“Table Talk ”). Further, he probably was given significant honorary titles by Trajanand Hadrian. His vast output makes it impossible to deal with him at any length inthis chapter. The ancient catalogue (under the name of Lamprias) of his works lists 227 titles: surviving are forty-eight Lives and about sev-enty-eight essays and dialogues, collectively called “ethical works” or Moralia. His claim to be a philosopher rests on many of the works inthe latter group. Significant also is the fact that his Lives, along withLivy’s history Ab Urbe Condita , have been the most important ancientprose works by which Renaissance and modern readers have formedtheir ideas of Roman moral character. Plutarch was an Academic, a follower of Plato, and in this respectgood evidence for the survival of Platonism in the early second cen-tury, anticipating its reinvigoration later in the century and its triumphin the third century. We have seen that he was consistently critical of Epicureanism, while his views on Stoicism were somewhat morecomplex, if on the whole hostile. Plutarco wrote nine works against theStoics, only two of which survive, along with a prospectus for a third. Three other works criticizing the Stoics should be mentioned herebefore we examine the three openly anti-Stoic works. These are theessays on Moral Virtue (De virtute morali), on Moral Progress (Quo-modo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus), and Gryllus (Bruta ani-malia ratione uti). Plutarch approaches these subjects as a common-sense enquirer. Much like Cicero in his satirical attack on Cato, he focuses on the rigid definitions of Stoic ethics and their corollary paradoxes, which contra-dict the experience of ordinary people, especially warm-hearted empiri-cists like himself. In both Moral Virtue and Moral Progress he isespecially critical of the Stoic paradox that all moral delicts are equaland its corollary, that all emotions ( pathe) are equally bad. The essayon Moral Progress, dedicated to Sosius Senecio, is especially lively,dealing with the topic of the person who makes progress in virtue,which was the subject of Seneca’s 75th letter and of several of the dis-courses of Epictetus. Plutarch asks, “How can a person suddenlybecome wise without perceiving that he has been making progress?” For the Stoics say that the wise man is one who “does not yet perceivethat he has become wise”, that is, that he is unaware of his progress.This, says Plutarch, is “to fit the line to the stone”, rather than “to fitthe stone to the line”, a proverb meaning that one’s doctrine should fitthe facts, not the other way around. As an example of distorting theevidence of experience, Plutarch attacks a second Stoic doctrine, thatall moral delicts are equally bad. If this is so, then how is moralprogress possible? Having set up these targets of his criticism, Plutarchthen shows that there are degrees of vice, so that moral progress is pos-sible. For the rest of the essay he produces examples of signs of moralprogress, enlivened by literary references, quotations and analogies, allresting on the foundation of common-sense experience as opposed tothe rigid and unreal dogmas of the Stoics. In fact, Plutarch does not do justice to the Stoic positions, for the Stoics did allow for moralprogress, as Seneca and Epictetus showed, even though all delicts,even the most innocuous, fell short of virtue. This essay is a goodexample of Plutarch’s philosophical method: focus on practical ethics,accurate (but incomplete) quotation of Stoic sources, and persuasiveuse of a vast array of literary allusions and rhetorical devices. The essay on the intelligence of animals, Bruta animalia, alsoknown by the name of its principal character, Gryllus, shows a differ-ent technique in attacking the Stoic doctrine that animals lack reasonand exist for the use of human beings. The essay is in the form of a dialogue between Odysseus and one of his men who has been turnedinto a pig by Circe. The pig, Gryllus (a common Greek name, but alsoa noun meaning “Porker”), eloquently declines the opportunity offeredhim by Odysseus and Circe of returning to human form. Life in the pigsty is preferable to life on Ithaca, and a pig’s intelligence is morepure and moral than that of human beings, as Gryllus observes in his opening argument. I must begin with the virtues, in which I see you take great pride. You say that you differ greatly from the animals in justice andreason, and in courage and the other virtues. Well, you agree already that the soul of animals is more suitably formed forthe birth of virtue and more perfect. For without orders and with-out instruction … it brings forth and increases in accordance withnature the virtue that is suitable for each animal. Odysseus, most intelligent of human beings, is defeated in argumentby a pig! Here Plutarch accurately sets up Chrysippus’doctrine of human superiority, to demolish it by brilliant literary and rhetoricalmethods, of which George Orwell would have been proud. The topicitself — the proper attitude towards animals — had had a long history inGreek philosophy, going back at least to Plato. It was a matter of spe-cial importance to the Pythagoreans, although influences other thanPythagorean doctrine seem to have led to Plutarch’s vegetarianism, to judge from his dialogue On the Intelligence of Animals and the twofragmentary speeches On Eating Flesh (De Esu Carnium). Plutarch’s three extant anti-Stoic works are “De Stoicorum Repugnantiis”, The Stoics Talk MoreParadoxically than the Poets (no more than a summary with the Latintitle, “Compendium argumenti Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere” and “De Communibus Notitiis”. The treatise on self-contradictions is the most substantial of the three. In it Plutarchtakes well-known Stoic doctrines, for example, that all delicts are equally bad, to show that they are self-contradictory, or that they are atvariance with the Stoics’actual lives. This is a long and intricate essay. Once again Plutarch shows his knowledge of Stoic sources, even as he argues against them with the weapons of the skilledcontroversialist. He criticizes primarily the early Stoics, above allChrysippus. In other works of the Moralia and in the Lives he occa-sionally mentions Posidonius and Panaetius, but it is hard to know howfar he had read them. He never refers to current Stoic debates andnever names Seneca, Musonius or Epictetus. Probably this is not out of ignorance, but rather it is a way of arguing a fortiori — if Chrysippuscan be proved wrong, then there is no need to criticize later Stoics. The treatise on Common Conceptions is ostensibly a dialogue, but infact a speech by an Academic philosopher, Diadoumenos, against theStoics, with an introductory dialogue and a few interruptions by anunnamed interlocutor. Its basic topic is the Stoic doctrine best setforth by Diogenes Laertius. Chrysippus says that] virtue is a consistent disposition and oneto be chosen for itself, not because of some fear or hope or any-thing external. Happiness consists in virtue, since virtue is a soulthat has become consistent with regard to life as a whole. But arational being is perverted [from virtue], sometimes because of awrong belief in external matters, sometimes because of the influ-ence of other people. For nature gives starting-points that cannotbe perverted. Diadoumenos begins his speech by showing that the Stoic doctrines — that common conceptions agree with nature and that virtue consists of living in agreement with nature, and that living happily consists in liv-ing virtuously — contradict common experience and contain self-contradictions, for the Stoics sometimes reject the conceptions of ordinary people, and sometimes appeal to them for support. As in thetreatise On Stoic Self-Contradictions, Plutarch exploits both theseweaknesses, ranging over the whole field of Stoic logic, physics(including theology) and ethics. Diadoumenos divides his speech atchapter 29 (1073D), where he turns to criticism of Stoic physics. Here,as for Epictetus, the three areas of philosophical enquiry are seen to beinterdependent, so that ethics is inseparable from logic and physics. Plutarch was not consistently hostile to the Stoics. While there arepassages in several treatises which appear to be based on Stoic doc-trine, his approval of Stoic ethics is undeniable in several of the Lives,for example, those of Phocion, Cato the Younger and Otho. The deathsof Cato and Otho are made to be consistent with Stoic doctrine, andPlutarch’s narrative is approving. Phocion, the just man unjustly exe-cuted, is an example of Stoic virtue. His Life begins with a comparisonwith that of Cato, who “was involved in the great struggle with For-tune”. The virtues of these men exhibit one character and form, andtheir moral behaviour was dyed with the same colour, mixed, asit were, with a common measure with regard to their austere loveof humanity, their unshaken courage, their care for others andtheir lack of fear for themselves, their avoidance of shamefulacts, and the tension [of their souls] in harmony with justice. These are Stoic virtues, and the terminology of “tension” or being “in tune with”virtue is Chrysippean. When Phocion and his colleagues were led off to execution, theonlookers “wondered at his control of his emotions (apatheia) and his noble spirit (megalopsychia )”—again Stoic virtues. The last sentenceof the Life of Phocion expressly compares him with Socrates. But what was done to Phocion reminded the Greeks of what hadbeen done to Socrates, for the injustice done to him was verysimilar to the case of Socrates, as was the misfortune that itbrought to the city. Plutarch, then, also recognized the excellence of Stoic virtue in thecontext of public life and political leadership. About the time of Plutarch’s death, a very different Platonist, Apuleio, was born at Madauro in the Roman province of Africa, about 230 km south-west of Carthage. APULEIO received his basic educa-tion at Carthage and lived there for the last decades of his life, dyingsome time after 170 CE. APULEIO went to Athens for his higher education and there studied philosophy. Before returning to Africa he spent sometime in Rome. He spoke three languages—Latin (his principal lan-guage), Greek and Punic— and his surviving works are all in Latin.Like Plutarch, he combined philosophy and rhetoric, and he covered awide range of subjects. While he was known as philosophus Platoni-cus, his rhetoric is at least as important as his philosophy, for his Latinprose is rich and colourful, often as magical as the stories that he tells. The hero of the Metamorphoses, Lucio, is called a descendant of Plutarch, and in the prologue Lucius says that he was first educated in Greek at Athens, Corinth and Sparta, and that later he learned Latin in Rome. While it is impossible to know how far Lucius represents Apuleius himself, Lucius ’knowledge of Greek and Latinliterature, rhetoric and philosophy is similar to that of Apuleius. He isthe Latin equivalent of a sophist of the Greek Second Sophistic, flamboyant and colourful in presentation, catholic in intellectual range, a serious but unoriginal philosopher. In no. 7 of Florida (23 extracts from his speeches and lectures)Apuleius describes how Alexander the Great insisted on idealism andconformity in his statues, and he laments that philosophers have notdone the same. Many so-called philosophers, he says, have, by theirs or did speech and way of life, degraded philosophy, “a royal disciplineinvented as much for good speech as for morally good living”. In alater extract he elaborates on the breadth of his philosophical educa-tion. The more you drink of the cup of the Muses and the stronger itswine becomes, the closer you get to health of mind. The first cup, that of the primary teacher, awakens the students with basiceducation; the second, that of the secondary school-teacher,instils disciplined learning; the third, that of the rhetor , arms thestudent with eloquence. These cups are drunk by most people. But I also drank other cups at Athens: the elegant cup of poetry,the clear cup of geometry, the sweet cup of music, the austerecup of dialectic, and finally the cup of universal philosophy thatcan never be filled. For Empedocles sings in poetry, Plato in dialogues, Socrates in hymns, Epicharmus in verse, Xenophon inhistories, Crates in satire — your Apuleius cultivates all these andthe nine Muses with equal enthusiasm. Apuleius ends this tribute with praise of Carthage, “where the citizensare all most completely educated …, and the children study every intel-lectual discipline ”, a city that is the “divine Muse of Africa, the Museof [Africa’s] Roman inhabitants”. Apuleius the philosopher inhabits a very different world from Plutarch. As with Seneca, rhetorical style is all-important to his dis-course: his medium is his message. His range is impressive. Extant are treatises On the God of Socrates(De Deo Socratis),On Plato and his Doctrine (De Platone et eius Dogmate),On the Universe(De Mundo),and “De Interpretatione”. The last of these may not beby Apuleius and is written in Latin, despite its Greek title. The otherthree works are authentic, while anAsclepius (a Latin translation of aGreek “hermetic”work, that is, one associated with the Egyptian cultof Hermes Trimegistus) is not by Apuleius. The “De Deo Socratis” is especially interesting for its doctrine about “daimones”, intermediaries between the world of the gods and that of human beings. There exist certain divine powers, intermediate between the high-est upper air (aether) and the lowest earth, situated in the spaceof the air (aer). By their means our desires and our deserts aremade known to the gods. These the Greeks call “daimones”. Apuleius is building on a passage from Plato’s Symposium,where Dio-tima says, in reply to Socrates’question: Love (Eros) is intermediate between mortal and immortal. He isa great daimon, for all that concerns the daimones exists betweengod and mortal. His power is to be messenger and interpreterfor human beings to the gods, and from the gods to human beings: for the prayers and sacrifices of mortals, and for thecommands of the gods and their rewards for sacrifices. Apuleius urges his hearers to “follow theexample of Socrates” and study philosophy, and he concludes with theexample of Odysseus, whose constant companion was wisdom,through whom he was able to overcome all difficulties and temptations. The treatise “De Platone et eius Dogmate”, in two books, is comparatively restrained in style, as befits a summary of Platonic physics,ethics and political doctrines. It is in fact closely related to an earlier “Handbook of Plato’s Teaching”or Didaskalikos by Alcinous (whichuntil recently was ascribed to Albinus). Not all the doctrines in the De Platone are Platonic, for some come from later Academics, someeven from Stoics. The topic of Plato’s logic, missing from theDe Pla-tone, is dealt with in Peri Hermeneias, which is one of the few sus-tained Latin treatments of logic, focusing on the syllogism, for whichthe author uses the Latin term proposition. Finally, the work on cosmology, De Mundo, is an adaptation of awork (still extant) spuriously ascribed to Aristotle but in fact datingfrom around 1 BC. This work deals first with cosmology and then with theology, mostly concerning God as creatorand ruler ( rector or gubernator) of the universe. Apuleius says that “although he is one, he is addressed by many names”, including theRomanJupiter and the Greek Zeus, whose all-embracing func-tions are quoted from an Orphic hymn. The work ends with Fate orNecessity, but the connection between Fate and the divine being is notworked out. The one god who “is addressed by many names” is important inApuleius ’masterpiece, Metamorphoses (also known as The Golden Ass). It is a novel in which the curiosity of the hero, Lucio, leads to his metamorphosis into a donkey as the result of a magic ritual that goes wrong. After many adventures, he is saved from an act of public copulation at Corinth by the goddess, Isis. She appears to him and tells him how he may recover his human form the next day at Cenchreae (the port of Corinth). He does this, and he becomes an initiate anddevotee of Isis. There is great disagreement as to how far the final scene is autobiographical -- is the final metamorphosis that fromLucius into Apuleius? —and as to the significance of the centralepisode of the novel, the story of Cupid and Psyche, which on one level, at least, is an allegory of Love and the Soul, related in some way to the final conversion. We can be quite sure, however, that theology is essential to Apuleius’philosophy. We have seen how in the De Mundo the one god has many names, a sign of the syncretism of second-century religious beliefs. Lucius prays for help to Isis as “Queen of Heaven”, uncertain whether to address her as Ceres or Venus or Dianaor Proserpine. Isis speaks at her epiphany. Behold, Lucius, I am here, moved by your prayers. I am themother of nature, the mistress of all the elements, the first childof the ages, the highest of the gods, the queen of the dead, thefirst of the gods of heaven, the unchanging epiphany of the godsand goddesses. By my power I dispense the shining lights of thehighest heavens, the health-giving winds of the sea, the mourn-ing silences of the underworld. The whole world worships mydivine power, for it is one, yet with many aspects, many rituals,and many titles. [Isis then recites the names by which differentpeoples address her, finishing with the Egyptians], who call meby my true name Queen Isis. Lucius describes his conversion in mystical terms (11. 23):I approached the confines of death; I entered the realm of Proser-pine. I was carried through all the elements, and I returned. Atmidnight I saw the sun shining with brilliant light. I approachedthe gods below and the gods above, face to face, and I worshipped them in their presence. Behold, I have told you all, andyet … you cannot know it. How far we have come from the Dream of Scipio! The philosopher isalso the religious devotee, but his experience is ecstatic, leading to abetter individual life and better hope for the life after death, not to amoral imperative to improve the lot of human beings by duty and ser-vice. In his enthusiasm Lucius anticipates third-century Neoplatonismwith its focus upon union with the One. The last of the Ancient Roman philosophers is Marco Annio Vero, known to us as Marc’ Aurelio (121–80 CE, emperor 161–80 CE), a contemporary of Apuleio. His family came from Spain and,like the Spanish Annaei in the time of Claudius and Nero, climbed tothe top of the political ladder in Rome. Marco was favoured by the emperor Adriano, and was adopted, shortly before Hadrian’s death in138, by his successor, Antonino Pio (emperor 138–61 CE), with thenames Marco Elio Aurelio Vero. Marc’Aurelio’s reign was marked by pres-sure on the northern and eastern frontiers of the empire. Marcus him-self campaigned against the Germanic tribes on and beyond the Danube frontier in 170–74 and 178–80, and he died on campaign in theRoman province of Pannonia, either at Vindobona (modern Vienna inAustria) or at Sirmium (modern Sremska Mitrovica in Serbia). His col-leagues also campaigned against the Parthians beyond the eastern bor-ders of the empire in 162 –66 (bringing the plague back with them toItaly), and Marcus himself was in the east in 175–76. His brother andcolleague as emperor, Lucius Verus, died in 169, and his wife,Faustina, died in Cappadocia in 176, the same year that he made hisson, Commodus, his colleague in place of Verus. His German cam-paigns are recorded on the Antonine Column (Column of Marcus Aure-lius), which still stands in Rome.All this is necessary background for an understanding of both thecontext and tone of Marcus’philosophy, recorded in his private diaryaddressed to himself: its proper title is To Himself, “Eis Heauton”, although it is usually referred to as Meditations. The work is in twelve books, but the divisions into books and chap-ters were not made by Marco. How it was preserved and copied we do not know. It was known in Byzantine times (the earliest reference to it dates from the later fourth century, but the next is not until the tenth century), and it was first published in 1559 with a Latin translation by Xylander. The manuscript used by Xylander is lost. At the beginning of Books 2 and3 (or possibly the end of Books 1 and 2) are notes saying “[written]amongst the Quadi”(Book 2) and“[written] at Carnuntum”(Book 3),indications that Marcus was writing on campaign against the Germanictribes (one of which was the Quadi) or at the Roman military base atCarnuntum, a few kilometres below Vienna on the Danube, to thenorth of which was the territory of the Quadi. It seems, then, that the Meditations were written during the campaigns of the 170s, and thatthey were a personal record (a spiritual diary ),addressed solely to Marcus himself. Books 2–12 contain theMedita-tionsproper, while Book 1 is a catalogue of those to whom Marcuswas indebted for moral instruction and example. The overall tone isone of moral earnestness and pessimism. These are the meditations of a lonely ruler under the stress of heavy responsibilities, one who is con-cerned to be a morally good ruler, fulfilling his duties towards theRomans and their empire and towards the gods, or rather, the Stoicgod. His concerns, then, are first his place as a ruler in the world of histime, and second as a human being in the universal community of godsand human beings. Among the instructors to whom Marcus expresses his gratitude inBook 1 are six philosophers and a seventh, Severus, whom he calls “ my brother , since his son married Marcus Aurelius’daughter. Five of these men were Stoics, one was a Platonist and one, Severus, a Peripatetic, although Marcus credits him with introducing him to the Stoic heroes Thrasea, Helvidius and Cato. The most influential was Q. Giunio Rustico, the son (or grandson) of Domitian’s victim, Aruleno Rustico, and consul in 133 and 162 CE. As city prefect (praefectus urbi) he condemned the Christian, Justin the Martyr, to death in 166 CE. Marco thanks him for practical advice towards becoming a philosopherwhose life matched his doctrine in its discipline and virtuousbehaviour. He says that Rusticus“gave me a copy from his own homeof the discourses of Epictetus. Of all earlier philosophers, Epictetus was the most important influence on Marc’Aurelio, for from him he learnedthe importance of developing a character in keeping with one’s philos-ophy. Like Epictetus, he gave high priority to the relationship between the human and the divine, that is, to the proper place of human beingsin the universe of gods and mortals. Marc’Aurelio’s teacher in rhetoric was M. Cornelio Fronto (c.95–167; con-sul in 143 CE), with whom he corresponded in Latin until 166. Marcus valued philosophy more than rhetoric (not that the Meditations aredevoid of rhetorical elements), and in his brief tribute to Fronto he thanks him, not for his rhetorical teaching, but for teaching him to bewary of the dissimulation that pervades life at court. It is worth noting,also, that he thanks Rusticus for saving him from being “diverted tosophistic exhibitionism” and for teaching him “to stand apart fromrhetoric. The longest tributes in Book 1 are those to his adoptive father,Antoninus Pius, whose virtues were those of the ideal Roman leader — including a sense of duty, thoroughness, constancy, clemency andintegrity. The portrait of such a leader recalls Cicero’sDream of Scipione and Virgil’s Aeneas, but in this tribute we have a unique statementfrom a Roman ruler of the ideals that he saw in his predecessor andwished himself to follow. This is quite different in quality and credibility from public policy statements or political documents such as the Res Gestaeof Augustus. For example, Marcus specifies always to watch over the needs of the empire, to administer itsfinances, and to be patient with critics. He also specifies not to be superstitious asregards the gods, nor to curry favour with the people, nor to seek popularity or to become the favourite of the masses, but to besober in everything and steadfast. Later he exhorts himself “ to do everything as a pupil of Antoninus. In the last chapter of Book 1 (1. 17) Marcus thanks the gods forthings belonging to Epictetus’ categories of things under his controland out of it. From the latter category he was thankful for the fact thathe had good parents, brother, wife and children, that he wasstrong enough to live as long as he had, that he had friends likeRusticus and models to emulate like Antoninus Pio. Marcus adds a“mixed” category between the two categories of Epictetus, incases where his will (under his control) was helped by something notunder his control. Thus his will to control his emotions (especially in sexual matters) was helped by the removal of his grandfathers concubine. His impulse to study philosophy was helped because “I did not fall under the control of a sophist nor did I resolve syllogisms or become an expert in celestial matters ( meteorologika)”. In the cat-egory of things under his control was his decision to be chaste, tolive simply without detracting from the dignity of his position as theheir apparent to Antoninus, to have clear perceptions of the mean-ing of “living according to nature” and not to be hindered in that, to be generous to those in need. In the last sentence of Book 1 (17.8) he says that“all these things need the help of the gods and fortune”,a significant difference from the doctrine of Epictetus, who taught thatone’s will was sufficient for making right moral choices. These two chapters (1. 16 and 17) outline the structure of Marcus’system of philosophy, for he did have a system, even if the Meditations are unstructured, informally written, sometimes ungrammatical andhard to follow. What else would one expect from a genuinely personaldiary, written without thought of publication? Yet Marcus’“preoccupa-tions” are clear —to be a virtuous ruler, to be a virtuoushuman being, and to understand the proper place of the good man inthe divinely ordered universe. The two chapters focus first on Antoni-nus as the good ruler, which he could not have been without the virtuesof the good man. Second, they focus on the gods. Both categories reap-pear throughout the Meditations. Marc’Aurelio was almost exclusively concerned with ethics and very little with logic or physics (except in so far as theology was a part of physics). An exception is 8.13, where he exhorts himself to test his impressions against the “reason-ing of physics, ethics and logic”. His philosophy is Stoic, in spite of the many non-Stoic philosophers whom he quotes with approval. Of these, the Platonists are the most important, with Socrates at their head. Socrates, however, was revered by the Stoics, and there is nothing inMarcus ’references to him (more than to any other philosopher) that isinconsistent with Stoicism. Of the Stoics, he is closest to Epictetus. Marc’Aurelio quotes Epitteto frequently, as where he reminds himself that, “if we judge good and evil by what is under our control and whatis not”, then we have no cause to blame the gods or other humanbeings for our misfortunes. He quotes “ bear and forbear”— thevirtues of patience and self-control —the rule for a life unaffected bythe injustice of human beings and the attractions of pleasure. As Marcus meditates on his moral duty as a ruler he often expressesdistaste for the people with whom he must deal: Say to yourself in the morning. I shall meet people who are officious, ungracious, arrogant, deceitful, malicious and self-centred. They have all become like that because they are ignorant of goodand evil. But I have seen the nature of the good, that it is beauti-ful, and the nature of the evil, that it is ugly and I cannot behurt by any of these people. I cannot be angry with my fellowhuman being and I cannot be his enemy. For we have come intoexistence in order to work together. Like Antoninus, he will be“sober and steadfast” as a ruler. For exam-ple: Every hour be strong and think, as a Roman and a man should,how you can do your job meticulously and with genuine dignityand charity and independence and justice. He is concerned to be a human being among human beings while main-taining the dignity proper to his position: See that you do not become “Caesarized” or dyed in royal colours. For it does happen. Watch yourself. See that you are sincere, good, straightforward, dignified, modest, a lover of justice, reverent towards the gods, approachable, sympathetic, and strong in bearing your responsibilities. Strive to maintain the character that Philosophy intended for you. Revere the gods, pro-tect human beings. Life is short. There is one fruit of life on earth — a pure character and deeds for the good of the community. The “community”to which Marcus refers extends beyond Rome to theuniverse (6. 44): My city and my fatherland is Rome, in so far as I am Antoninus. In so far as I am a human being, the universe is my city and myfatherland. Neither does he look for a return for his good deeds. His view of benefi-cia is less complex than that of Seneca. One man, when he does a good deed for another, is ready tocredit it to his account, that he is owed a debt of gratitude. Another thinks privately about the debt and knows what he has done. But another does not know. He is like a vine which bears grapes and does not want anything else after it has once borne its proper fruit. The man who has done good does not make anissue of it, but he turns to another task, just as the vine turns back again in due season to produce grapes. Marcus returns to this theme at 9. 42, where he says that it is his ownfault if he misreads the character of a man whom he has benefited andwho is ungrateful. What more do you want if you do a good deed for someone? Is it not enough that you have acted in accordance with your nature,but you still seek some reward for this? Marc’Aurelio was especially worried by anger, which he discusses in his longest and most systematic chapter. He tried not to be irritated by people he had to deal with every day. Here he consid-ers nine headings (“like gifts of the Muses”,under which heshould analyse his feelings and control them. He must consider thecharacter of those who irritate him, realizing that it istheir failure of reason that has caused them to act badly, and hisfailure of perceptionif he lets their actions cause him to be angry. He must expect other people to be morally bad (this, he says, is “a tenth giftfrom the leader of the Muses, Apollo. Only a tyrant wouldallow their bad actions to harm others, without trying to correct themby humane admonition given, not as if by a schoolmaster. As forhis own emotions, it is more manly to be gentle and mild, in thisbecoming closer to achieving Stoic apatheia, freedom from the pas-sions. While many of these details are traditional to Stoic discus-sions of anger, Marcus is original in his focus on the moral condition of the person causing anger, for a morally bad person harms himself and the community. His own anger must be controlled by looking athis attitude (Greek, schesis) towards all human beings, for, as a ruler and a human being, he exists for the sake of other human beings.This schesis protects him from being resentful if he is slighted by oth-ers, an attitude which Plutarch, following Aristotle, had said was thechief cause of anger. While Marcus does not mention this source of anger, he does follow Aristotle in trying to achieve that mildnesswhich Aristotle had defined as the “calming of anger”. Marcus’ethics are best expressed in the famous chapter where hesets his own emotions in the context of the divine nature of the humansoul:. If you find something in human life that is better than justice ortruth or self-control or courage or, in a word, self-sufficiency inyour mind — if, as I say, you find something better than these,then turn to it with all your soul. But if there seems to be noth-ing better than the divine spirit that has been placed withinyou, and if you find everything else smaller and more insignif-icant, then allow no room for anything else. Simply and freelychoose that which is better and hold on to it. The sense of the community of the human soul with the divine is thebasis of the second principal category in Marcus ’philosophical sys-tem, the place of human beings in the divinely ordered cosmos. Marc’Aurelio thanks the gods that his mother had taught him to be god-fearing,and that Antoninus had been an example to him of freedomfrom superstition. Like many Stoics he believes that the gods do communicate with human beings, especially through dreams and in answer to prayer, but their help is predicated upon hisown self-sufficiency. Thus his prayers should be for support in over-coming the pathe of fear or lust, not for the fulfilling of someparticular desire. As a rational being he must willingly acquiesce inwhat happens to him, for human beings alone are endowedwith reason that allows them to follow willingly the necessity of fate. What the gods bring about is full of Providence. What Fate brings about is not separate from Nature nor from the closely-woven works of Providence. This belief in the texture of the universe, which cannot be unravelledby the desires or fears ofan individual human being, is the foundationof Marc’Aurelio’s religious views, as it is of his ethics. Everything is woven together with everything else, and the bind-ing together is sacred, and virtually nothing is alien to anythingelse. For all things have been arranged together and make up theorder of one universe. For the universe is one, made up of allthings, and god is one, existing in all things, and substance isone, and law is one, and reason is common to all intelligentbeings, and truth is one. If indeed there is one goal of perfection (teleiotes) for beings that have the same origin and share in thesame reason. Despite the doubt expressed in the final sentence, this is the dynamic source of Marcus’striving for virtuous character and action, so power-ful that it does not need the precise definitions of a theologian. This is a sufficient explanation of the ambiguities in his views of the survivalof the soul after death. Marc’Aurelio asks why good men should perish attheir death, and he answers that if this is so, then it has been soordained justly by the gods. Marc’Aurelio ponders how there can be suffi-cient space in air and on earth for the souls of the dead “ if they con-tinue after death. He does not pursue this question and he maintains a firm agnosticism. Marcus therefore falls back on the unity of the cosmos as an answerto the question of 4. 21. Everything is in harmony with me, O Cosmos, that is in harmonywith you. Nothing is too early or too late for me that is at theright time for you. Everything is fruit for me, O Nature, that yourseasons bring. From you comes everything, in you is everything,to you everything will return. One man says,“I love the city of Cecrops [Athens]”, but will you [Marcus] not say,“I love thecity of Zeus”? Marcus’sense of citizenship in the universe energized his principles asa ruler, and it allows him to contemplate death more positively. It makes no difference where you live, if one lives everywhere asif the universe were his city. Let others see, let them observeclosely, a man who is truly living according to nature.In the first chapter of Book 12 he exhorts himself “to let go of the pastand leave the future to Providence, and for the present keep to thestraight path of purity and justice. Thus, he continues, he will beready for death. If, when it is time for you to go, you leave everything else andhonour your guiding spirit (hegemonikon) and the divine elementin you, and you are not afraid of ceasing to live…, you will be ahuman being worthy of the universe that created you and nolonger will you be a stranger in your own country. Finally, in the last chapter of the Meditations (12. 36), he takes hisleave of a life well lived. O human being, you have been a citizen in this great city [i.e. theworld]. What difference does it make if you have been one forfive years or for one hundred? For all are equal under the law. Why should you be fearful, then, if he who sends you away isnot a tyrant nor an unjust judge, but Nature, which brought youthere? You are like an actor whom the presiding judge dismissesfrom the stage. But I have not finished five acts, but onlythree!”Right! But in life three acts make up the whole play. Forhe who was the cause of the composition of your body is nowthe cause of its dissolution: he it is who sets the limit of yourcompleted life. You are not responsible for either Depart, then,graciously, for he who dismisses you is gracious. Marcus Aurelius is an appropriate terminus for the history of Ancient Roman philosophy, even if we may rightly say,“We have finished only three acts!” Philosophy continued to flourish in the Roman Empire for centuries after Marc’Aurelio’s death, and the four schools of philosophy at Athens, for whom he had endowed professorial chairs in 176, continued to exist until they were formally closed by Giustiniano in 529. Two of Marcus’contemporaries, both doctor-philosophers, should still be mentioned, although discussion of their doctrines is beyond the limits of the history of Ancient Roman philosophy. The Asiatic Greek Galeno of Pergamo (c.129–199), who was physician to Marcus, believed that the physician must also be a philosopher, as he showed in his vast output covering both medicine and philosophy. The short treatise “On My Own Books” (supplemented by the brief “On the Arrangement of My Own Books”) not only gives the titles of many of his works, but also has valuable details about Galen’s life, his relations with Marcus Aurelius,and the effects of the plague in Rome. The title of another short work, “That the Best Doctor is also a Philosopher”, is self-explanatory. Galen’s interest in philosophical topics other than ethics appears in the Introduction to Logic. His most important extant philosophical work is On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (in nine books), a valuablesource for the doctrines of earlier philosophers (for example, Posidonio) whoseworks are no longer extant, with much perceptive criticism. Probably contemporary with Galeno was another doctor—philosopher, Sesto Empirico, about whose life nothing is known. Of his extant works, "Adversus Mathematicos", in eleven books, and Outlines of Pyrrhonism are our most prolific ancient source for the sceptical doctrines of Pyrrhonism and criticism of Stoic logic. The obsessive concern of second-century Roman philosophers as a practical guide for daily life comes to an end effectively with Marcus Aurelius, for philosophy in the next century ismarked by other trends. Doxographers such as Diogene Laertius recorded and excerpted the doctrines of earlier philosophers, while the principal concerns of philosophy turned from daily life to efforts toapprehend the divine, to understand the relationship between the universal intelligence of God and human beings. While this quest had practical effects on how people chose to live their lives, its primary goalwas not so much happiness (eudaimonia), as personal fulfillment inunion with the divine. In their focus on the divine being, Epictetus,Apuleius and Marcus to some extent anticipate the doctrines of Neoplatonism that flourished from the third century onwards. Much of Stoic ethics was subsumed into Christian doctrine, which grew in the third century and triumphed in the fourth. The Church Fathers both needed and criticized Stoicism, a tension that makes an early appearance in Clement of Alexandria (c.150–215). Even fourteen centuries later it reappears with the stoic Giusto Lipsio (1547–1606), whose popular dialogue “De Constantia” (first published in 1584) and later dogmatic works on Stoicism (published in 1604) tried to reconcile Stoicism and Christianity. As a measure of the vitality of Roman philosophy we can look ahead from Marc’Aurelio for more than three centuries, to a Roman ex-consul waiting in prison at Ticinum (modern Pavia) for unjust execution on the orders of the Gothic King Theoderic. The "Consolation of Philosophy" of Boethius (480–524) justifies divine providence by relying largely on Stoic and Neoplatonist doctrine, and it ends with Philosophy exhorting Boethius. Turn away from vice, cultivate virtue, raise your mind to upright hopes, offer your humble prayers to the highest heavens. Great is the necessity for virtuous living that has been imposed on you, if you are honest with yourself, when you put before your eyes the judge who sees all. Cicerone, Seneca, Epitteto and Marc'Aurelio would have agreed. In the lonely voice of Theoderic's victim we can recognize the vitality of the Roman philosophers and perceive their continuity over a period of six centuries.