GRICE E TRABALZA

 We need to be able to apply some such notion as a predication of B (adjectival) on a (nominal). "Smith is tactful," "Smith, be tact-ful," "Let Smith be tactful," and "Oh, that Smith may be tactful" would be required to count, all of them, as predications of "tactful" on "Smith." It would again be the business of some linguistic theory to set up such a sentential characterization. Suppose we, for a moment, take for granted two species of cor-relation, R-correlation (referential) and D-correlation (denotational). We want to be able to speak of some particular object as an R-correlate of a (nominal), and of each member of some class as being a D-correlate of B (adjectival).  Now suppose that U has the following two procedures (P):  P1: To utter the indicative version of o if (for some A) U wants/ intends A to think that U thinks... (the blank being filled by the infinitive version of o, e.g. "Smith to be tactful"). Also, P1': obtained from P1 by substituting "imperative" "indicative" and "intend"/  "think that U thinks." (Such procedures set up correlations between moods and specifications of "ft.")P2: To utter a t-correlated (cf. P1 and P1' predication of B on a if (for some A) U wants A to d a particular R-correlate of a to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of B.  Further suppose that, for U, the following two correlations hold:  C1: Jones's dog is an R-correlate of "Fido."  C2: Any hairy-coated thing is a D-correlate of "shaggy."  Given that U has the initial procedures P1 and P2, we can infer that U has the resultant procedure (determined by P1 and P2):  RP1: to utter the indicative version of a predication of ß on a if U wants A to think U to think a particular R-correlate of a to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of B.  Given RP1 and C1, we can infer that U has:  RP2: To utter the indicative version of a predication of B on "Fido" if U wants A to think U to think Jones's dog to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of B.  Given RP2 and C2, we can infer that U has:  RP3: To utter the indicative version of a predication of "shaggy" on "Fido" if U wants A to think U to think Jones's dog is one of the set of hairy-coated things (i.e. is hairy-coated).  And given the information from the linguist that "Fido is shaggy" is the indicative version of a predication of "shaggy" on "Fido" (as-sumed), we can infer U to have:  RP4: To utter "Fido is shaggy" if U wants A to think U to think that Jones's dog is hairy-coated. And RP4 is an interpretant of "For U, 'Fido is shaggy' means 'Jones's dog is hairy-coated."  I have not yet provided an explication for statements of timeless meaning relating to noncomplete utterance-types. I am not in a position to provide a definiens for "X (noncomplete) means ... deed, I am not certain that a general form of definition can be provided for this schema; it may remain impossible to provide a definiens until the syntactical category of X has been given. I can, however, provide a definiens which may be adequate for adjectival X (e.g.  "shaggy"):  D7: "For U, X (adjectival) means'... '"=df. "U has this proce-dure: to utter a y-correlated predication of X on a if (for some A) U wants A to yet a particular R-correlate of a to be.." (where the two lacunae represented by dots are identically completed).Any specific procedure of the form mentioned in the definiens of  D7 can be shown to be a resultant procedure. For example, if U has P2 and also C2, it is inferable that he has the procedure of uttering a vt-correlated predication of "shaggy" on a if (for some A) U wants A to dt a particular R-correlate of a to be one of the set of hairy-coated things, that is, that for U "shaggy" means "hairy-coated."  I can now offer a definition of the notion of a complete utterance-type which has so far been taken for granted:  D8: "X is complete" =df. "A fully expanded definiens for "X means'...'" contains no explicit reference to correlation, other than that involved in speaking of an R-correlate of some referring expression occurring within X." (The expanded definiens for the complete utterance-type "He is shaggy" may be expected to contain the phrase  "a particular R-correlate of 'he.")  Correlation. We must now stop taking for granted the notion of correlation. What does it mean to say that, for example, Jones's dog is the/an R-correlate of "Fido"? One idea (building in as little as pos-sible) would be to think of "Fido" and Jones's dog as paired, in some system of pairing in which names and objects form ordered pairs. But in one sense of "pair," any one name and any one object form a pair (an ordered pair, the first member of which is the name, the second the object). We want a sense of "paired" in which "Fido" is paired with Jones's dog but not with Smith's cat. "Selected pair"? But what does "selected" mean? Not "selected" in the sense in which an apple and an orange may be selected from a dish: perhaps in the sense in which a dog may be selected (as something with which (to which] the selector intends to do something). But in the case of the word-thing pair, do what? And what is the process of selecting?  I suggest we consider initially the special case in which linguistic and nonlinguistic items are explicitly correlated. Let us take this to consist in performing some act as a result of which a linguistic item and a nonlinguistic item (or items) come to stand in a relation in which they did not previously stand, and in which neither stands to noncorrelates in the other realm. Since the act of correlation may be a verbal act, how can this set up a relation between items?  Suppose U produces a particular utterance (token) V, which belongs to the utterance-type "shaggy: hairy-coated things." To be able to say that U had by V correlated "shaggy" with each member of the set of hairy-coated things, we should need to be able to say that thereis some relation R such that: (a) by uttering V, U effected that  "shaggy" stood in R to each hairy-coated thing, and only to hairy-coated things; (b) uttered V in order that, by uttering V he should effect this. It is clear that condition (b), on which some will look askance because it introduces a reference to U's intention in performing his act of correlation, is required, and that condition (a) alone would be inadequate. Certainly by uttering V, regardless of his inten-tions, U has set up a situation in which a relation R holds exclusively between "shaggy" and each hairy-coated thing Z, namely the relation which consists in being an expression uttered by U on a particular occasion O in conversational juxtaposition with the name of a class to which Z belongs. But by the same act, U has also set up a situation in which another relation R' holds exclusively between "shaggy" and each non-hairy-coated thing Z', namely the relation which consists in being an expression uttered by U on occasion O in conversational juxtaposition with the name of the complement of a class to which Z' belongs. We do not, however, for our purposes, wish to think of U as having correlated "shaggy" with each non-hairy-coated thing. The only way to ensure that R' is eliminated is to add condition (b), which confines attention to a relationship which U intends to set up. It looks as if intensionality is embedded in the very foundations of the theory of language.  Let us, then, express more formally the proposed account of cor-relation. Suppose that V= utterance-token of type ""Shaggy': hairy-coated things" (written). Then, by uttering V, U has correlated  "shaggy" with (and only with) each hairy-coated thing=(R) {(U effected by V that [Vx] [R "shaggy" x=*Ey (y is a hairy-coated thing)]) and (U uttered V in order that U effect by V that [Vx]... )}.' If so understood, U will have correlated "shaggy" with hairy-  1. The definiens suggested for explicit correlation is, I think, insufficient as it stands. I would not wish to say that if A deliberately detaches B from a party, he has thereby correlated himself with B, nor that a lecturer who ensures that just one blackboard is visible to each member of his audience (and to no one else) has thereby explicitly correlated the blackboard with each member of the audience, even though in each case the analogue of the suggested definiens is satisfied. To have explicitly correlated X with each member of a set K, not only must I have intentionally effected that a particular relation R holds between X and all those (and only those) items which belong to K, but also my purpose or end in setting up this relationship must have been to perform an act as a result of which there will be some relation or other which holds between X and all those (and only those) things which belong to K. To the definiens, then, we should add, within the scope of the initial quantifier, the following clause: "& U's purpose in effecting that Vx (.....) is that (BR') (Vz) (R' "shaggy'z=zEy (y is hairy-coated))."coated things only if there is an identifiable R' for which the condition specified in the definiens holds. What is such an R'? I suggest R'xy=x is a (word) type such that V is a sequence consisting of a token of x followed by a colon followed by an expression ("hairy-coated things") the R-correlate of which is a set of which y is a member. R'xy holds between "shaggy" and each hairy-coated thing given U's utterance of V. Any utterance V' of the form exemplified by V could be uttered to set up R"xy (involving V' instead of V) between any expression and each member of any set of nonlinguistic items.  There are other ways of achieving the same effect. The purpose of  making the utterance can be specified in the utterance: V = utterance  of "To effect that, for some R, 'shaggy' has R only to each hairy-coated thing, 'shaggy': hairy-coated things." The expression of the specified R will now have "V is a sequence containing" instead of "V is a sequence consisting of ... " Or U can use the performative form:  "I correlate 'shaggy' with each hairy-coated thing." Utterance of this form will at the same time set up the required relation and label itself as being uttered with the purpose of setting up such a relation.  But by whichever form an act of explicit correlation is effected, to say of it that it is (or is intended to be) an act of correlation is always to make an indefinite reference to a relationship which the act is intended to set up, and the specification of the relation involved in turn always involves a further use of the notion of correlation (e.g. as above in speaking of a set which is the correlate [R-correlate] of a particular expression [e.g. "Hairy-coated things"]). This seems to involve a regress which might well be objectionable; though "correla-tion" is not used in definition of correlation, it is used in specification of an indefinite reference occurring in the definition of correlation. It might be considered desirable (even necessary) to find a way of stop ping this regress at some stage. (Is this a characteristically empiricist demand?) If we don't stop it, can correlation even get started (if prior correlation is presupposed)? Let us try "ostensive" correlation. In an attempted ostensive correlation of the word "shaggy" with the property of hairy-coatedness:  U will perform a number of acts in each of which he ostends an object (a,, az, ag, etc.). Simultaneously with each ostension he utters a token of the word "shaggy." It is his intention to ostend, and to be recognized as ostending,only objects which are either, in his view, plainly hairy-coated or are, in his view, plainly not hairy-coated (4) In a model sequence these intentions are fulfilled. For a model sequence to succeed in correlating the word "shaggy" with the property of being hairy-coated, it seems necessary (and perhaps also suffi-cient) that there should be some relation R which holds between the word "shaggy" and each hairy-coated thing, y, just in case y is hairy-coated. Can such a relation R be specified? Perhaps at least in a sequence of model cases, in which U's linguistic intentions are rewarded by success, it can; the relation between the word "shaggy" and each hairy-coated object y would be the relation which holds between each plainly hairy-coated object y and the word "shaggy" and which consists in the fact that y is a thing to which U does and would apply, rather than refuse to apply, the word "shaggy." In other words in a limited universe consisting of things which in Us view are either plainly hairy-coated or plainly not hairy-coated, the relation R holds only between the word "shaggy" and each object which is for U plainly hairy-coated.  This suggestion seems not without its difficulties:  It looks as if we should want to distinguish between two relations R and R'; we want U to set up a relation R which holds between the word "shaggy" and each hairy-coated object; but the preceding account seems not to distinguish between this relation and a relation R' which holds between the word "shaggy" and each object which is in U's view unmistakably hairy-coated. To put it another way, how is U to distinguish between "shaggy" (which means hairy-coated) and the word "shaggy" * (which means "in Us view unmistakably hairy-coated")? If in an attempt to evade these troubles we suppose the relation R to be one which holds between the word "shaggy" and each object to which U would in certain circumstances apply the word "shaggy," how do we specify the circumstances in question? If we suggest that the circumstances are those in which U is concerned to set up an explicit correlation between the word "shaggy" and each member of an appropriate set of objects, our proposal becomes at once unrealistic and problematic. Normally correlations seem to grow rather than to be created, and attempts to connect such growth with potentialities of creation may give rise to further threats of circularity. The situation seems to be as follows:  We need to be able to invoke such a resultant procedure as the following, which we will call RP12, namely to predicate B on "Fido," when U wants A to vt that Jones's dog is a D-correlate of B; and we want to be able to say that at least sometimes such a resultant procedure may result from among other things, a nonexplicit R-correlation of "Fido" and Jones's dog. It is tempting to suggest that a nonexplicit R-correlation of "Fido" and Jones's dog consists in the fact that U would, explicitly, correlate "Fido" and Jones's dog.  But to say that U would explicitly correlate "Fido" and Jones's dog must be understood as an elliptical way of saying something of the form "U would explicitly correlate 'Fido' and Jones's dog, if p." How is "if p" to be specified? Perhaps as "If U were asked to give an explicit correlation for 'Fido"" But if U were actually faced with a request, he might well take it that he is being asked to make a stipulation, in the making of which he would have an entirely free hand. If he is not being asked for a stipulation, then it must be imparted to him that his explicit correlation is to satisfy some nonarbitrary condition. But what condition can this be? Again it is tempting to suggest that he is to make his explicit correlation such as to match or fit existing procedures.  In application to RP12, this seems to amount to imposing on U the demand that he should make his explicit correlation such as to yield RP12. In that case, RP12 results from a nonexplicit correlation which consists in the fact that U would explicitly correlate "Fido" and Jones's dog if he wanted to make an explicit correlation which would generate relevant existing procedures, namely RP12 itself. There is an apparent circularity here. Is this tolerable? It may be tolerable inasmuch as it may be a special case of a general phenomenon which arises in connection with the explanation of linguistic practice. We can, if we are lucky, identify "linguistic rules," so called, which are such that our linguistic practice is as if we accepted these rules and consciously followed them. But we want to say that this is not just an interesting fact about our linguistic practice but also an explanation of it; and this leads us on to suppose that "in some sense," "implicitly," we do accept these rules. Now the proper interpretation of the idea that we do accept these rules becomes something of a mystery, if the "acceptance" of the rules is to be distinguished from the existence of the related practices-but it seems likea mystery which, for the time being at least, we have to swallow, while recognizing that it involves us in an as yet unsolved problem. C. Concluding Note  It will hardly have escaped notice that my account of the cluster of notions connected with the term "meaning" has been studded with expressions for such intensional concepts as those of intending and believing, and my partial excursions into symbolic notation have been made partly with the idea of revealing my commitment to the legitimacy of quantifying over such items as propositions. I shall make two highly general remarks about this aspect of my procedure. First, I am not sympathetic toward any methodological policy which would restrict one from the start to an attempt to formulate a theory of meaning in extensional terms. It seems to me that one should at least start by giving oneself a free hand to make use of any intensional notions or devices which seem to be required in order to solve one's conceptual problems, at least at a certain level, in ways which (metaphysical bias apart) reason and intuition commend. If one denies oneself this freedom, one runs a serious risk of underestimating the richness and complexity of the conceptual field which one is investigating.  Second, I said at one point that intensionality seems to be embedded in the very foundations of the theory of language. Even if this appearance corresponds with reality, one is not, I suspect, precluded from being, in at least one important sense, an extensionalist. The psychological concepts which, in my view, are needed for the formulation of an adequate theory of language may not be among the most primitive or fundamental psychological concepts (like those which apply not only to human beings but also to quite lowly animals), and it may be possible to derive (in some relevant sense of "derive") the intensional concepts which I have been using from more primitive extensional concepts. Any extensionalist has to deal with the problem of allowing for a transition from an extensional to a nonextensional language; and it is by no means obvious to me that intensionality can be explained only via the idea of concealed references to language and so presupposes the concepts in terms of which the use of language has to be understood.