Saturday, July 18, 2026
In his Epitome of Roman History, Florus uses the Latin perfect passive participle destricta (from the verb destringo, meaning "to unsheathe" or "to draw" a weapon). [1, 2]
- The Latin Passage:
"...insuper augente Nautio tribuno metum, in quem, nisi paruisset, securi destrictaimperator metu mortis navigandi fecit audaciam."
[1] - The English Translation (Loeb Classical Library):
"...their alarm being further increased by the tribune Nautius; but the general, by threatening him with the axe if he refused to obey, inspired them with courage..."
[1, 2]
Nasidienus Rufus gives us: social signaling, hospitality, reputation, pretension, conversational failure, unintended implicature. That is practically a Grice seminar disguised as a Roman banquet. Speranzian Epigram NASIDIENVS CENAM DEDIT; HORATIVS INTERPRETATIONEM. Nasidienus supplied the dinner; Horace supplied the interpretation. Or, even more Gricean: Quod Nasidienus significare voluit splendorem fuit; quod significavit ridiculum fuit. What Nasidienus meant to convey was splendour; what he conveyed was absurdity.
The document you are referring to is a letter of recommendation written by Cicero to Marcus Junius Brutus around June 43 BC. In modern scholarly editions of Cicero's letters, it is classified as Epistulae ad Brutum, 1.8 (specifically paragraph 2). Note that the individual's name is classically spelled with a double 'n' as Gaius Nasennius. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
“...C. autem Nasennius ex municipio Suessano commendatissimus tibi sit illo vel maxime. Cretensi bello Metello imperatore octavus princeps duxit. Postea res familiares curavit. Hoc tempore partium studio et tua praestantissima dignitate commotus voluit aliquid per te publicae auctoritatis assequi. Virum fortem commendo tibi, Brute, et hominem frugi et, si quid ad rem pertineat, locupletem. Mihi gratissimum feceris, si eum ita tractaris ut ipse mihi tuo beneficio gratias agere iure possit.” [1, 2, 3]
“...But C. Nasennius, from the borough of Suessa, I recommend to you with special earnestness. In the Cretan war, under the command of Metellus, he was first centurion of the eighth cohort. In the years to follow he attended to his family affairs. At the present time, under the compelling influence of party loyalty and of your pre-eminent high rank, he wants to obtain through you some position of authority. I recommend him to you, Brutus, as a gallant man, a man of distinction and, if this is relevant to the case, of ample means. I shall be deeply obliged, if you give him such treatment that he may be able to thank me on the strength of your good deed.” [1]
- The Aftermath of Caesar's Death: This letter was written roughly a year after the assassination of Julius Caesar. [1, 2]
- The Looming Civil War: Rome was fracturing into a three-way ideological and military split between the Senate (led rhetorically by Cicero), the remaining Caesarians (Mark Antony), and the young Octavian. [1, 2, 3]
- Brutus in the East: Brutus was mobilizing a Republican army in Macedonia and Greece. Cicero wrote this to vet and send capable men to serve under Brutus' banner. [, 2, 3, 4, 5]
- Military Credentials: Nasennius was a battle-tested veteran. He served as a princeps (chief centurion) under Quintus Caecilius Metellus Creticus during the grueling conquest of Crete (68–67 BC). [1, 2]
- Socioeconomic Status: He is from the municipium of Suessa Aurunca (modern Sessa Aurunca in Campania). Cicero notes that he has locupletem (ample means/wealth), likely accumulated via war booty or land investments following his retirement. [1, 2, 3]
- Political Alignment: Despite years in private life, Nasennius was motivated by partium studio ("party loyalty" or devotion to the Republican cause) to take up arms once again under Brutus. [1, 2]
- The Specific Connection (Commendatissimus): Establishes urgency and a high level of personal endorsement.
- The Military Record (Res Gestae): Highlights operational capability, ensuring Brutus knows Nasennius is a disciplined leader, not just a political placeholder.
- The Virtue Axiom (Virum Fortem et Frugi): Validates moral reliability. Calling a soldier frugi (honest, temperate, or of good character) meant he wouldn't stir up mutiny or mismanage resources.
- The Wealth Clause (Locupletum): "If it is at all relevant, he is rich." In ancient Rome, personal wealth was viewed as a marker of civic stability; a rich man had a financial stake in maintaining the Republic and was less susceptible to bribery.
- The Reciprocal Social Contract: Cicero concludes by framing the favor as a loop of gratitude (beneficio). If Brutus elevates Nasennius, Nasennius owes Cicero gratitude, and Cicero owes Brutus a favor in return. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
- Look into the broader correspondence between Cicero and Brutus regarding military mobilization.
- Draft an outline mapping out how to structure this analysis into a formal essay.
- Explain how Roman centurions transitioned into local political elites (municipia).
Friday, July 17, 2026
MU
Catalogue Raisonné of J. L.
Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I
Verbali: Mum
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mummio – Ossia: Grice e
Mummio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Mummio. The Mummii are a family at Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned after the Second Punic War, and
within a generation, Lucius Mummius Achaicus became the first of the family to
obtain the consulship. Although they were never numerous, Mummii continued to
fill the highest offices of the state through the third century AD. Praenomina The praenomina associated with the
Mummii include Lucius, Quintus, Spurius, and Marcus. Branches and cognomina As the Mummii were
neither a large nor an old family, few of them are found with any surname in
the time of the Republic. The chief exception was Achaicus, an agnomen won by
Lucius Mummius, the consul of 146 BC, for his conquest of Greece, and he is
said to have been the first novus homo to have earned such a distinction
through his military achievements.[1] Members of this gens are frequently found
with cognomina in imperial times.
Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of
this practice, see filiation. Lucius Mummius, the father of the tribunes Lucius
and Quintus.[1] Lucius Mummius L. f., tribune of the plebs in 187 BC, opposed
the attempt of Marcus Porcius Cato to place under scrutiny the payments made by
Antiochus to Scipio Africanus and Scipio Asiaticus, but withdrew his opposition
under intimidation. He was praetor in 177, obtaining the province of
Sardinia.[2][3] Quintus Mummius L. f., tribune of the plebs, and a colleague of
his brother Lucius in 187 BC.[4][5] Lucius Mummius L. f. L. n. Achaicus, consul
in 146 BC, was a novus homo, but earned his surname by defeating the Achaean
League, and bringing all of Greece under Roman control. Despite his burning of
Corinth, Mummius gradually won the trust of the Greeks by establishing good
government and embracing Hellenic culture.[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]
Spurius Mummius L. f. L. n., the brother of Achaicus, to whom he was
philosophically opposed. Spurius served as his brother's legate at Corinth in
146 and 145 BC. He opposed the establishment of rhetorical academies at Rome, and
wrote letters on ethics and satire.[24][25] Spurius Mummius S. n., was a friend
of Cicero, to whom he would read his grandfather's letters. In 46 BC, Cicero
wrote that Mummius had died not long before.[26] Mummius, a legate of Marcus
Licinius Crassus in 72 BC, during the Servile War. He was defeated by
Spartacus.[27][28] Marcus Mummius, while praetor in 70 BC, presided over the
trial of Verres.[29][30] Mummius,[i] a comic playwright, active after 90 BC,
mentioned by Charisius, Priscian, Macrobius, and Aulus Gellius.[31][32][33][34]
Mummia Achaica, great-granddaughter of Lucius Mummius Achaicus, and mother of
the emperor Galba.[35] Mummius Lupercus, sent by the consul Marcus Hordeonius
Flaccus with two legions to fight Gaius Julius Civilis, leader of the Batavi,
in AD 69. After being defeated, Mummius found his forces besieged; faced with
starvation, his men eventually surrendered, and Mummius was slain by his
captors.[36] Lucius Mummius Niger Quintus Valerius Vegetus, consul suffectus in
AD 112. Publius Mummius Sisenna, consul in AD 133.[37] Publius Mummius Sisenna
Rutilianus, consul suffectus in AD 146.[38] Lucius Mummius Felix Cornelianus,
consul in AD 237.[39] Mummius Bassus, consul in AD 258. See also List of Roman
gentes Footnotes Macrobius and Gellius
refer to him as Memmius. References
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1119
("Mummius"). Livy, xxxvii. 54,
xli. 8. Broughton, vol. I, pp. 369,
398. Livy, xxxvii.
54. Broughton, vol. I, p. 369. Appian, Hispanica, 56–57, Punica, 135. Eutropius, iv. 9, 14. Fasti Capitolini. Polybius, iii. 32, xl. 7, 8, 11. Livy, Epitome, 52. Cassius Dio, 81. Florus, ii. 16. Valerius Maximus, vi. 4. § 2, vii. 5. §
4. Cicero, In Verrem, i. 21, iii. 4, iv.
2, Pro Murena, 14, De Lege Agraria, i. 2, De Oratore, ii. 6, Orator ad M.
Brutum, 70, Brutus, 22, De Officiis, ii. 22, Epistulae ad Atticum, xiii. 4, 5,
6, 30, 32, 33, Paradoxa Stoicorum, v. 2, Pro Cornelio, ii. fragmentum 8. Pliny the Elder, xxxiv. 2, xxxv. 4, 10. Diodorus Siculus, xxxi. 5, fragmentum. Orosius, v. 3. Velleius Paterculus, i. 12, 13, ii. 128. Tacitus, Annales, xiv. 21. Pausanias, vii. 12. Strabo, viii. p. 381. Zonaras, ix. 20–23. Broughton, vol. I, pp. 465, 470. Cicero, De Republica, i. 12, iii. 35, v. 9,
Laelius de Amicitia, 19, 27, Epistulae ad Atticum, xiii. 5, 6, 30. Broughton, vol. I, pp. 468, 470. Cicero, Epistulae
ad Atticum, xiii. 6. Plutarch, "The
Life of Crassus", 10. Broughton,
vol. II, p. 119. Cicero, In Verrem, iii.
52. Broughton, vol. II, p. 127. Charisius, p. 118. Priscian, x. 9, p. 514 (ed. Krehle). Macrobius, i. 10. Gellius, xix. 9. Suetonius, "The Life of
Galba". Tacitus, Historiae, iv. 18,
22, 23, 61. PIR, vol. I, p.
388. PIR, vol. I, pp. 388, 389. PIR, vol. I, p. 387. Bibliography Polybius,
Historiae (The Histories). Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, De Lege Agraria
contra Rullum, De Officiis, De Oratore, De Republica, Epistulae ad Atticum, In
Verrem, Laelius de Amicitia, Orator ad M. Brutum, Paradoxa Stoicorum, Pro Gaio
Cornelio, Pro Murena. Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica (Library of
History). Titus Livius (Livy), Ab Urbe Condita (History of Rome). Strabo,
Geographica. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Valerius
Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Gaius
Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Naturalis Historia (Natural History).
Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Plutarchus, Lives of the Noble
Greeks and Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the
Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Lucius Annaeus Florus, Epitome de T. Livio
Bellorum Omnium Annorum DCC (Epitome of Livy: All the Wars of Seven Hundred
Years). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Hispanica (The Spanish Wars), Punica
(The Punic Wars). Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights). Pausanias,
Description of Greece. Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman
History. Eutropius, Breviarium Historiae Romanae (Abridgement of the History of
Rome). Paulus Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Paganos (History Against the
Pagans). Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius, Saturnalia. Priscianus Caesariensis
(Priscian), Institutiones Grammaticae (Institutes of Grammar). Joannes Zonaras,
Epitome Historiarum (Epitome of History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography
and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849).
Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii
Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898).
T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American
Philological Association (1952). Categories: Roman gentesMummii Here is M. gens
-- general entry and two Mummii -- which one would be your third-best choice
for a Grice/Speranza vignette? Thanks
Speranza, J. L.
(n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mummio –
Ossia: Grice e Mummio – GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: Mummio -- Gens Mummia Mummio
Achaico, L. (A.U.C. DCHNDII Move 1 Ship
Captain: "Hae statuae Corinthiae antiquae et fragiles sunt,
imperator." Move 2 Mummio [cum gravitate]: "Si eas frangetis, novas
et similes Romae reddetis." Abbott-Style Translation: Captain: "These
stolen Greek masterpieces are incredibly ancient and fragile, General."
Mummio: "If your sailors smash any of them, I shall expect your crew to
sit down and carve exact replacements by Tuesday." +> IMPLICATURA: That
Mummius possesses a delightfully uncultured, utilitarian mind that views
irreplaceable high art as simple mass-produced furniture. If this passage below
has historical attestation, this is -- and Mummio represents) what Grice and
Speranza call Roman wit. So please supply historical attestation. Wit can be
unintended, though. Input? Feedback? Thanks. Passage: Yes—this anecdote is
genuinely attested in the ancient tradition, and your reconstruction is very
close to the reported content, though (as often) not to an exact preserved
Latin sentence. Let me set it out carefully.
1. The historical anecdote (attested) Ancient sources (not Livy, but
later writers drawing on earlier historians) report that: Lucius Mummius told those transporting the
artworks from Corinth that if they lost or damaged them, they would have to
replace them. [en-academic.com], [Lucius Mum...-index.com] This is the kernel of the story. It is cited (via tradition) by authors such
as Cicero and later compilers. It becomes a standard exemplum of Mummius’
supposed lack of artistic sensibility.
2. Your Latin vs. the tradition Your version: Si eas frangetis, novas et similes Romae
reddetis. This is not a verbatim ancient
quotation, but it is: structurally right
semantically faithful The transmitted
version (in paraphrase): “if they were lost
or damaged, you must replace them” So
your Latin is best seen as a pedagogical or rhetorical reconstruction of a
well-attested anecdote. 3. Context: the
sack of Corinth (146 BC) This matters a lot.
Mummius destroys Corinth and exports enormous quantities of Greek art to
Rome. [en.wikipedia.org] For Romans, this is a new phenomenon: mass import of
Greek masterpieces. The anecdote is
built to contrast: Greek valuation of
art → unique, irreplaceable Roman (Mummian) attitude → fungible goods 4. What kind of “wit” is this? You rightly
connect this to “Roman wit”—but it is a special kind. (A) Is it deliberate
irony? Probably not in origin. The tradition presents it as: naïve literalism practical military thinking
applied to art (B) But it becomes
ironic in reception Ancient (and modern) readers hear: “replace a masterpiece” and react: → that is impossible So the
utterance acquires: unintended irony a
mismatch between speaker’s intention and objective reality (C) Gricean reading This is a textbook case
of: failure of shared background
assumptions Mummius assumes: statues = objects like furniture replaceable
under contract Audience (Greek, later
Roman elite) assumes: statues = unique
works of genius So the utterance
generates implicature: Mummius does not
grasp the non-replicability of art 5.
Is the anecdote fair to Mummius? Important nuance: Some modern historians think the story is
hostile propaganda against a novus homo (social outsider). Others point out he
later behaved sensibly and even respectfully in administration. So:
the anecdote may exaggerate or stylize his “uncultured” persona 6. Your formulation: why it works so well
Your two-move dialogue captures perfectly:
the Greek perception of fragility and uniqueness the Roman
administrative mindset The captain
warns: → fragility + antiquity Mummius replies: → liability + replacement This
mismatch is exactly where the “wit” (intentional or not) lies. 7. Final synthesis Yes—there is solid
historical attestation for the core remark: that Mummius instructed those
transporting Corinthian artworks that they would have to replace any that were
lost or damaged. [en-academic.com], [Lucius Mum...-index.com] Your Latin
formulation is not preserved verbatim but accurately reconstructs the sense.
The anecdote functions in ancient tradition as an example of Mummius’ supposed
indifference to art, and its wit lies in the gap between his practical,
contractual mindset and the irreducible uniqueness of the objects. In Gricean
terms, it produces an implicature not because of subtle intention, but because
of a mismatch in presuppositions between speaker and audience. If you like, we could compare this with
Cicero’s use of the story—he explicitly leverages it to mark the transition
from Roman austerity to Greek cultural sophistication. Can you parse his
utterance "Romae, etc" carefully? Grice and Speranza are thinking
Apollo Belvedere and Laoconote. This was a big surprise in Rome when Laoconte
was unburied, more so than Apollo -- it was a replica, so what gives? The thing
was a realistic replica, and it was found AT ROME -- not transpoted by ship.
Where would CICERO report this, he being the homo novissimus if ever there was
one. But if you help with the parsing of the reconstructed utterance we may see
the gist -- and are the sources specific about what gems were being transported
and whther the conditional by Mummio proved to be tested p --> q, p;
therefore q? Input? Feedback? Thanks. Let’s do this carefully on three fronts:
(1) parsing your reconstructed Latin, (2) what the sources actually imply (and
don’t), and (3) your Laocoön/Apollo question, which is really about replication
vs. originality. 1. Parsing the
reconstructed Latin Your sentence: Si
eas frangetis, novas et similes Romae reddetis
Let’s go word by word. (A) Condition
clause Si eas frangetis Si = “if” eas =
accusative plural feminine (“them”) → the statues (statuae) frangetis = 2nd
person plural future (frango) → “you will break” So:
“If you (plural) break them” (B)
Main clause novas et similes Romae reddetis
novas = accusative plural (“new ones”) et similes = “and similar (ones)”
→ two predicates modifying an understood statuae Romae = locative (“at Rome”) →
very important nuance reddetis = 2nd person plural future (reddere) → “you will
return / provide / restore” (C) Crucial
nuance: Romae This is where the philosophical bite lies. Romae can mean: “in Rome” (locative) “to Rome” (effectively
dative-like in sense, but formally locative here) In context, best read as: “you will provide them in Rome (i.e. for
Rome’s benefit / into Roman possession)”
So: Romae reddetis = “you will
make them good in Rome / for Rome” This
is almost contractual: loss →
compensation owed → delivery in Rome
(D) Full translation (precise)
“If you damage them, you will replace them with new and similar ones in
Rome.” Notably: no mention of “exact copies” just novas et
similes → “new and comparable” That
matters a lot. 2. What the sources
actually say (limits) The sources (Cicero, later tradition) give
essentially: “if they were lost or
damaged, you must replace them.” But
crucially: They do NOT specify: which statues (no Apollo Belvedere, no
Laocoön) any test case (no example of loss → replacement) any actual
replication being performed So: the anecdote is illustrative, not contractual
reportage 3. Why your parsing matters
philosophically Your phrase: novas et
similes already softens the supposed
“absurdity.” Mummius is not saying:
“identical copies” He is
saying: “adequate substitutes” This is:
functional equivalence, not artistic identity So his “error” is: not stupidity but applying Roman
administrative equivalence to Greek uniqueness
4. Your Laocoön / Apollo insight (excellent) You are pointing to
something subtle: The Laocoön group was
found in Rome (1506) likely itself a Roman copy of a Greek original yet it
stunned Renaissance viewers as a masterpiece
So: Rome already lived in a world
of copies mistaken for originals This
actually supports Mummius’ mindset:
Roman elite culture was full of:
reproductions imports workshop copies
So his position is not absurd in his own context: statues are reproducible objects → therefore
replaceable 5. Cicero and the ideological
use You asked about Cicero. Cicero (especially in aesthetic passages like
Tusculanae Quaestiones or elsewhere) uses examples like this to mark: older Roman simplicity vs. later cultivated
taste But (important): Cicero does not treat Mummius as a fool →
more as a figure from an earlier habitus
So: Mummius = morally upright,
aesthetically unrefined later Romans = culturally enriched but morally
ambiguous 6. Your logical point (p → q)
You ask: was the conditional ever
tested? No evidence. So: we have only:
the conditional utterance no instance of “p; therefore q” So the statement functions as: a normative threat / instruction, not a
record of enforcement 7. Final
synthesis Grammatically, Romae reddetis
novas et similes expresses not exact duplication but replacement by acceptable
equivalents delivered at Rome. Historically, the anecdote is attested but
unspecified in detail: no particular statues are named, and no case of
enforcement is recorded. Conceptually, Mummius’ stance is not sheer ignorance
but a mismatch between Roman administrative thinking (objects as replaceable
goods) and Greek aesthetic valuation (objects as unique works). Your Laocoön
example actually strengthens the point: Roman culture already operated with copies
that could function as originals, making Mummius’ assumption less absurd in
context. If you want, we can push this
further into a Gricean direction: is Mummius failing a presupposition, or is he
exploiting a different conversational background where uniqueness is simply not
a relevant parameter? Roman ingenuity indeed. Indeed, antiquarians detest restoration. Isn't
the apollo belvedere supposed to lack an arm and the bow and the string but the
Vatican Ottogono will have nothing of that? And Venus of Milo? "What are
you doing," The Roman matron asks. "Mummio said I had to restore what
I break -- I broke Venus's both arms -- and I'm de-amputating it". Were
examples of broken pieces in evidence then? I would think so? I suppose the
underlying moral is the steal. Suppose (whoever brought the Parthenon to
British Museum by ship). "This are heavey and delicate, sir."
"Yes, and striaght to London they go. If you break them you own
them." Input? Feedback? Thanks. You’re putting your finger on a very real
tension between Roman practice and later antiquarian sensibility, and the
Mummius anecdote sits right at that fault line. Let me answer in layers: (1)
what Romans actually dealt with materially, (2) what “restoration” meant to
them, and (3) why your modern parallels (Apollo, Venus, Elgin) illuminate—but
also distort—the case. 1. Were broken
works already a thing for Romans? Yes—very much so. Even before Mummius: Greek statues circulating in the
Mediterranean were often old, damaged, repaired, or copied Bronze statues in
particular were: melted down recast
replaced by marble copies So Romans
inherited not a pristine world of originals, but a recycling economy of art.
That means: seeing a statue missing an
arm or restored in parts was not shocking
2. Restoration vs replacement (the key distinction) Your imagined Roman
matron (“I broke Venus’ arms, so I’ll reattach them”) is very witty—but
slightly anachronistic. Romans did do restoration, but: (A) Restoration (Roman
practice) attaching new limbs recarving
missing parts adapting older statues (B)
Replacement (Mummius’ logic) novas et
similes not “repair this object” but “supply another adequate one” So Mummius’ framework is: not conservation of identity but substitution
of value This is closer to commerce than
to aesthetics. 3. Apollo Belvedere and
Venus de Milo (why they mislead) You’re right that: Apollo Belvedere (in its Renaissance
reception) Venus de Milo raise the
question: why not restore the missing
parts? But: modern museums deliberately avoid restoration
to preserve “authenticity” Romans did not share that principle In antiquity:
a restored statue was still perfectly acceptable as “the statue” So:
your “de-amputating Venus” joke would not be absurd in Roman terms at
all 4. Laocoön: your key example You
are absolutely right here. Laocoön group
found in Rome (1506) likely a Roman-period work (or copy of Greek original) yet
treated as a masterpiece This
shows: Rome was already a culture of
reproduction without anxiety So Mummius’
assumption— “replace damaged works” fits a world where: replication is normal originality is less
sharply defined 5. Was anything
actually broken in transit? The sources do not specify any case of: statues broken replacements demanded So: we
have the rule, but no recorded test-case
That is why the anecdote reads more like: a character sketch than a logistical
report 6. Your Elgin/Parthenon analogy
(very apt) You write: “If you break
them, you own them.” That is exactly the
right modern analogue. The underlying principle in Mummius’ remark is: liability of the transporter i.e.:
you are responsible for delivering the goods intact otherwise you
compensate the owner (Rome) So this
is: not aesthetic stupidity but proto-contractual
thinking 7. The “moral”: not
restoration but appropriation Your final hint is the deepest: “the underlying moral is the steal” Yes—this is crucial. The whole system
presupposes: the art is now Roman
property its value lies in: possession
display political prestige So: once appropriated, it becomes fungible Roman
capital 8. Final synthesis Romans did encounter and tolerate damaged or
restored artworks, so the idea of replacement was not absurd in their material
culture. Mummius’ remark (novas et similes Romae reddetis) implies replacement,
not careful restoration, reflecting a commercial or administrative mindset
rather than an aesthetic one. The anecdote’s wit (whether intended or not)
arises from the mismatch between that mindset and the later concept of the
artwork as unique and irreplaceable. Your modern parallels (Venus de Milo,
Laocoön, Elgin marbles) highlight how radically our notion of originality
diverges from the Roman one—where copies, restorations, and substitutions were
a normal part of artistic life. If you
want, we can go one step further and look at how Roman patrons like Cicero or
Verres handled Greek art—they often oscillate between Mummian pragmatism and emerging
connoisseurship.Mummio Acaico (DCHNDII). Si eas
frangetis, novas et similes Romae reddetis
Speranza, J. L.
(n. d.). ‘H.
P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mummio – Ossia: Grice
e Mummio: la ragione conversazionale della lettera da Corinto –epistle. Spurio
Mummio. Grice e Mummio: il portico romano Roma antica. Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo
di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Mummio Spurio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione
conversazionale delle lettere da Corinto. A comparison
between Grice and Spurio Mummio brings into focus two historically distant but
conceptually resonant ways of understanding reason as it governs communicative
practice. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats
communication as a cooperative rational enterprise: speakers are accountable
for what they say, hearers are entitled to draw inferences, and meaning emerges
through shared expectations articulated by conversational maxims and calculable
implicatures. Rationality here is regulative and stabilizing, oriented toward
mutual understanding even when disagreement or irony arises. Spurio Mummio’s
poetic and philosophical epistles from Corinth, by contrast, exemplify an earlier,
Stoic‑inflected mode of conversational reason in which writing substitutes for
face‑to‑face exchange, and rationality operates through ethical stance,
restraint, and wit rather than explicit coordination. His letters, shaped by
the austere ethos of the Porch and addressed to friends within the Scipionic
circle, rely heavily on what is left unsaid, presupposed, or humorously
displaced; they presuppose a community capable of reconstructing intention from
tone, allusion, and shared moral background. Where Grice theorizes the norms
that make such reconstruction rationally intelligible, Mummio practices those
norms without theorizing them, using the epistolary form to test how far
meaning can travel when voice, immediacy, and corrective feedback are absent.
The comparison thus shows Grice as offering an explicit pragmatics of
conversational reason, while Mummio provides a paradigmatic ancient instance of
that reason at work under the constraints of distance, genre, and Stoic
discipline. Fratello
di Lucio Mummio, vincitore di Corinto, partecipa con
SCIPIONE Emiliano e con Lucio Metello CALVO a
un’ambasciata politica in Oriente e così puo stringere più stretti rapporti con
Panezio di Rodi. Scrive lettere in versi e orazioni. CICERONE lo pone tra i IV
interlocutori del "De republica." Oratore. I suoi discorsi hanno, per
la loro aridità, impronta del Portico. Coltiva gli studi
giuridici. A Roman soldier and writer. A legatus of his brother, and a
close friend of SCIPIONE EMILIANO. This friendship garners his entrance into
the Scipionic Circle. Politically, he is an aristocrat. He writes satirical and
ethical epistles, describing his experiences in Corinto in humorous verse.
According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, these letters, are the first examples
of a distinct class of Roman poetry, the poetic epistle. "Mummii".
Mek.niif. hu. Mummius M, Mortgage, ed. Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical
Antiquities. Perseus tufts, Chisholm, ed. "Mummius,
Lucius" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Cambridge. Stub icon This article about
an Ancient Roman writer. Categories: Ancient Roman writersm Romans, writers
Mummii Ancient Roman people stubs European writer stubs When we turn to Rome we
find that letter writing becomes a Roman literary art under Greek influence and
is speedily nationalised as is the dialogue. We know that the epistolary form
is used by S., who appears in CICERONE’s de republica as an intimate friend of
SCIPIONE the younger. He receives a education in the Porch, and
accompanied his more famous brother to Corinto as a legatus. From Corinto he
sends a number of poetic epistles to his friends. These do not receive general
publicity, but are preserved in the archives of the family where they are read
by CICERONE, who praises their wit. Keyword: philosophical epistle.
Spurio Mummio. Grice e Mummio: il portico romano – lettera da Corinto – Roma
antica -- Roma – filosofia italiana.
GRICEVS: Salvē, Spurī Mummi. Audīvī tē ex Corinthō epistulās versibus
mittere—tam lepidas ut Cicero ipsās in archivīs quasi vinum vetus servet.
SPVRIVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita facio: nam quod in contiōne aridum est, in epistulā
saepe fluit. Sed quid tu, qui de ratione conversandi tam subtiliter
iudicās, de litterīs sentīs? GRICEVS: Litterae… pulchrae sunt, fateor: sed
saepe mihi videntur quasi una littera (velut punctum aut apex) totum saporem
colloquiī frangat; quod inter amīcōs in ipsā voce suaviter relinquerēs, in
chartā nimis fixum fit—et, dum scribimus, minus relinquimus quod amīcus ex ipsā
benevolentia colligat. SPVRIVS: Implicatūram secundī gradūs efficācissimam,
cārissime Grice! Nam intellegō: epistula, dum “explicat,” saepe illud quod
inter duo pectora sponte nascitur interficit. Ego tamen meminī Corinthiōs etiam
in porticibus pictis (Graecē Στοὰ Ποικίλη) multa ostendere, pauca sentire: id genus pictūrae Damasippō meō prorsus
super caput fuit—ille enim nihil nisi de togā suā novā cogitābat, utrum satis
virīlis foret! Spurio Mummio -- gens Mummia, but then a spurious
member of that gens? Other members of that gens, less spurious? Grice can't
think of a gens named Spuria. No: Spurius is not “spurious” here. Spurius is an
old Roman praenomen. So Spurius Mummius means, in ordinary Roman terms, a man
of the gens Mummia whose praenomen happens to be Spurius. There is no need to
invent a gens Spuria, and no need to hear “spurious” in the English sense. That
is only a later and tempting false friend. So the naming analysis is straightforward.
Mummius is the gentilicium and points to the gens Mummia. Spurius is the
praenomen. It does not mean he was a doubtful or illegitimate member of the
family. Roman onomastics is innocent here, however mischievously English may
now hear it. As for other members of the gens Mummia, yes, there are very real
and much less misleadingly named ones. The most famous by far is Lucius
Mummius, later Lucius Mummius Achaicus, the conqueror of Corinth. He is the
great canonical Mummius and the obvious anchor for the family. Your Spurius
Mummius is usually presented as his brother, and precisely through that
brotherly relation the gens becomes visible in literary memory. The Mummii are
not among the largest and most endlessly glittering Roman gentes, but they are
solidly there. Lucius Mummius Achaicus is enough to make the family
historically memorable, and Spurius Mummius shares in that standing through
kinship, diplomacy, literary interest, and the Scipionic circle. So one should
think of gens Mummia as a real Roman family of some consequence, though not one
of the colossal marquee houses. And yes, Grice is right that there is no
well-known gens Spuria to be dragged in here. The temptation comes only from
the English adjective spurious, which is etymologically a different and
treacherous route for the modern ear. In Roman naming, Spurius is simply a
praenomen, old-fashioned but perfectly proper. If you want the driest
formulation, it is this. Spurius Mummius is a member of gens Mummia. Spurius is
his praenomen, not a sign of doubtful legitimacy. Other members include above
all Lucius Mummius Achaicus, the conqueror of Corinth, and through him the gens
Mummia enters the better-lit portion of Roman history. And there is a small
comic bonus. The very fact that modern English hears “Spurius” as if Rome had
named the poor man “Mr Dubious” is exactly the sort of false philological joke
Grice would enjoy for ten seconds and then insist on correcting. If you like, I
can now do one of two things in chat only. I can give you a compact note on the
Roman praenomen Spurius and why modern readers so often mistrust it. Or I can
give you a short family note on the Mummii, with Lucius Mummius, Spurius
Mummius, and the Corinth connection. And when you say 'false friend' do we have
the etyma for both 'spurious' in English (ultimately from Latin) and the
prae-nomen Spurius? thanks Yes, and the two etyma are not the same. English
spurious comes from Latin spurius in the adjective sense “false, illegitimate,
not genuine.” That Latin adjective is old, but its deeper origin is uncertain.
Ancient and later scholars have often tried to connect it with ideas of
illegitimacy or non-paternal descent, but the etymology is not securely
settled. The important point is that English spurious comes through that
adjectival line: Latin spurius meaning something like illegitimate or false,
then later “not genuine.” The Roman praenomen Spurius is a different matter. It
is not simply the adjective reused as a first name in any transparent way, and
Roman antiquarians themselves already worried over it. There is an old
antiquarian tradition that tried to explain the praenomen by linking it to sine
patre, as though a child of uncertain paternity might be called Spurius. But
that explanation is usually treated as folk etymology rather than sound
philology. In other words, the Romans themselves suspected the joke that modern
English readers also make, but suspicion is not proof. So the dry answer is
this. The resemblance is real in form, but the neat derivation “Spurius the
praenomen means spurious in the English sense” is not something one should
confidently assert. The adjective spurius unquestionably lies behind English
spurious. The praenomen Spurius is ancient Roman onomastic material whose exact
origin is obscure, and the old sine patre explanation is probably a later
rationalisation rather than a secure etymon. If one wants the neatest scholarly
formula, I would put it this way. English spurious descends from Latin spurius
adjective, “false, illegitimate, not genuine.” The Roman praenomen Spurius may
be historically related at some remote stage, but the commonly cited derivation
from sine patre is generally regarded as doubtful or merely antiquarian folk
etymology. So the modern false-friend effect is genuine enough for the ear, but
philologically one should keep the two tracks distinct. And that is why Spurius
Mummius should not be translated in one’s head as “Dubious Mummius.” That would
be good undergraduate wit and bad Roman philology. If you like, I can now do
one of two things in chat only. I can give you the ancient Roman antiquarian
testimonia about Spurius and sine patre. Or I can give you a short note on a
few other Roman praenomina whose meanings became opaque even to the Romans
themselves.Mummio, Spurio (a. u. c. DCVIII). Dicta. Roma.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mummio – Ossia: Grice e
Mummio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Mummio. For the
Mummii, my third-best Grice/Speranza vignette would actually be Spurius
Mummius, not the famous Achaicus himself. My ranking would be: Lucius Mummius Achaicus — the Corinth story,
the statue anecdote, replaceability versus uniqueness of art. Lucius Minucius
Augurinus-type "implicature" figures in other gentes. Spurius Mummius
— because he gives you something much rarer: an ancient practitioner of
conversational reason. The material
you've collected is especially suggestive because Cicero presents Spurius
as: brother of the conqueror of Corinth,
member of the Scipionic circle, interested in ethics, writer of letters,
opponent of fashionable rhetoric, a man whose correspondence survived in a
family archive and was later read. The gens entry explicitly notes that a later
Spurius Mummius used to read his grandfather's letters, and Cicero refers to
them. citeNo tool citation available for user-provided text That is almost tailor-made for
Grice. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: What are you
reading? GRICE: Mummius.
SHROPSHIRE: The destroyer of
Corinth? GRICE: No. The correspondent. SHROPSHIRE:
More interesting? GRICE: Infinitely.
SHROPSHIRE: Why? GRICE:
One transported statues. The other transported meaning. What fascinates me is that Achaicus
represents: Roman administration. Whereas Spurius represents: Roman communication. The reported letters from Corinth fit
remarkably well with a Gricean framework:
writer absent, reader distant, intention reconstructed, irony and wit
conveyed without voice, meaning preserved across time. That is practically a case study in what
Grice later analyzes explicitly. The Corinth Letter Your reconstructed dialogue
is actually very plausible as a Grice/Speranza exercise: GRICE: Conversation permits correction. SPVRIVS:
Epistolary conversation does not.
GRICE: Therefore the writer must
rely on shared assumptions.
SPVRIVS: Precisely. That's almost a definition of
implicature. Why not Achaicus? Achaicus
gives us one magnificent joke: "If
you break them, replace them." But
once you've exhausted the joke, you're left with administrative mentality
versus artistic uniqueness. Spurius gives:
friendship, correspondence, Stoic restraint, family archives,
interpretation, literary transmission,
which are much closer to Grice's lifelong concerns. So my third-best
choice would be: Spurius Mummius, the
Corinthian letter-writer. Achaicus gives
the famous dictum. Spurius gives the pragmatics. And what was the connection
with the Scipionic circle -- mainly sponsored by Emiliano Scipio, right? Yes,
essentially. But the interesting thing is that the Scipionic Circle was
probably less a formal "club" than a network centered on Scipio
Aemilianus (Scipio Africanus Minor). For Spurius Mummius, the connection is
particularly natural: his brother Lucius
Mummius Achaicus conquered Corinth; Spurius served with him as a legate in
Greece; the sources associate Spurius with ethical and literary interests;
later tradition links him with Scipio Aemilianus and the intellectual milieu
around him (including figures such as Panaetius of Rhodes). The material you
provided explicitly places him among the friends of Scipio and gives him a
Stoic coloration. From a Grice/Speranza
perspective, what matters is that the Scipionic Circle is often described as
the moment when Roman aristocratic seriousness meets Greek intellectual
culture: Roman
sideGreek sidepublic servicephilosophystatesmanshiprhetoriclawethicsmilitary
commandliterary cultivation Spurius Mummius fits that conjunction much better than
his victorious brother. Corpus SHROPSHIRE:
What was the Scipionic Circle?
GRICE: A collection of Romans who
had discovered that victory over Greece was less consequential than
conversation with Greeks.
SHROPSHIRE: Sponsored by
Scipio? GRICE: Gathered around him, certainly. SHROPSHIRE:
And Mummius? GRICE: The wrong Mummius conquered Corinth. The
interesting Mummius wrote letters from it.
That's perhaps unfair to Achaicus, but it's exactly the sort of thing
Grice might say. The really Gricean feature of Spurius is that he sits at the
intersection of: Corinth → Greece →
Panaetius → Scipio → letters → friendship.
In other words, not empire but communication. The conqueror acquires
Corinth; the correspondent acquires the conversation. And when we say Stoic
(Portico) coloration, what do we mean? I realise Cicero was involved with
Hortus (Epicureo). But as for the Painted Porch, was there anything active by
then in this Mummio's time, or a thing of the past? Thanks -- as far as an
actual circle in Athens, I mean -- the Stoa poitike or whatever you said
'painted'? Thanks Yes — and this is exactly the right question to ask, because
"Stoic" can mean two rather different things. 1. The actual Painted
Porch (Stoa Poikile) Originally, Stoicism gets its name from the: Στοὰ Ποικίλη (Stoa Poikile) the "Painted Porch" at Athens, where Zeno taught. By the time of
Scipio Aemilianus and Spurius Mummius (mid-second century BC), the Porch was
not merely an archaeological memory. Stoicism was still very much a living
school. It had evolved beyond Zeno and Cleanthes to figures such as: Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, and
especially Panaetius of Rhodes.
Panaetius is the crucial figure for your question. 2. The Scipionic
version of Stoicism When people speak of the Scipionic Circle's Stoic
coloration, they usually do not mean that the Romans were sitting in the
Painted Porch itself listening to lectures. They mean that the circle
around: Scipio Aemilianus had close connections with Greek
intellectuals, above all: Panaetius of
Rhodes who became one of Scipio's
companions and helped adapt Stoicism to Roman aristocratic life. So the
Romanized Stoic package becomes: duty,
public service, self-control, moderation, friendship, statesmanship. This is much less doctrinaire than early
Greek Stoicism. 3. Why Spurius Mummius fits The fragments and testimonia make
Spurius look almost like a prototype of the Roman gentleman-philosopher: friend of Scipio, interested in ethics,
writer of letters, suspicious of rhetorical excess, legally minded, associated
with Panaetius. That is what people mean
by a Stoic "coloration." Corpus SHROPSHIRE: Was Mummius a Stoic? GRICE:
Not necessarily. SHROPSHIRE: Then why call him Stoic? GRICE:
Because he moved among Stoics.
SHROPSHIRE: In the Painted
Porch? GRICE: More likely at dinner. SHROPSHIRE:
Ah. GRICE: Philosophy had become more comfortable by
then. Grice's likely interest What would
attract Grice is not Stoic physics or cosmology, but the Stoic concern
with: rational conversation among
friends. That is one reason the image of
Spurius Mummius writing witty, restrained letters from Corinth to members of
the Scipionic circle feels so Gricean. The conqueror of Corinth (Lucius)
acquires Greece politically. The correspondent of Corinth (Spurius) acquires
Greece intellectually. And in the second century BC, thanks largely to
Panaetius and the Scipionic circle, the latter enterprise was probably the more
lasting one. THe 'suspicious of rhetoric excess' would make him the anti-Grice
-- the first lesson for Griceians (and some stop at that): rational model of
converation: economy, etc. -- second lesson: blatantly flout all that through
rhetorical excess ("He has beautiful handwriting," "She is the
cream in my cofee", "He is spendid fellow" (+> irony: he's a
scoundrel); "He was a little intoxicated" (meiosis-> of a man said
to have broken furniture") etc. why couldn't the stoic philosophers FIND
another sobriquet and kept referring to the painted porch that perhaps they
never saw -- what kind of -ism can we think for it? Because for Epicureanism
and the Hortus, usually hedonism works? Thanks Interestingly in the Spanish
Royal Academy dictionary: filosofo--stoico -- just because Quixote tells
Sancho: "You're quite a philosopher" +> stoic, general apathetic
considerations and reflections on life? Thanks Yes — and this is exactly where
Grice is much less "Stoic" than people sometimes suppose. Many
beginners stop at the first lesson: Be
rational. Be economical. Be orderly. Avoid unnecessary complexity. That sounds almost Stoic. But Grice's second
lesson is much more subversive: Rational
speakers systematically exploit departures from economy. Hence:
irony, meiosis, hyperbole, metaphor, banter, rhetorical flourish. The point of the maxims is not that they are
always obeyed, but that their flouting is intelligible. Thus: "He has beautiful handwriting." may implicate: "I can think of nothing else good to say
about him." And: "He was a little intoxicated" said of a man who has smashed the furniture
is intelligible precisely because everyone recognizes the understatement. A
strict Stoic interested only in economy might find this suspicious. A Griceian
revels in it. Why did the Stoics keep the Porch? An excellent question. By the
time of Panaetius and the Scipionic circle, Stoicism was no longer tied physically
to the Painted Porch. Yet the name remained. In a sense it's no odder
than: "the Academy" after
Plato, "the Lyceum" after Aristotle, "the Garden" after
Epicurus. The place becomes a badge of
lineage. A Griceian might say: Stoic no
longer denotes occupancy of the Porch. It connotes descent from a
tradition. A conversational implicature
has become lexical meaning. Why not call them "Rationalists"? Because
they weren't merely concerned with reasoning. Stoicism carried: ethics, self-command, duty, cosmopolitanism,
emotional discipline. The word most
Europeans eventually associated with a Stoic was not: logical,
but: steadfast. Which leads neatly to your Spanish example.
Quixote and "philosopher" In everyday Romance usage, to call
someone: filósofo often means something closer to: resigned, reflective, accepting adversity
calmly. Hence Don Quixote's praise of
Sancho. The implication is not:
"You have mastered Chrysippus." Rather:
"You are taking life's blows with composure." And that is very close to what ordinary
people came to mean by: a Stoic. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: Was Mummius a Stoic? GRICE:
Perhaps. SHROPSHIRE: Then he disliked rhetoric? GRICE:
Excessive rhetoric.
SHROPSHIRE: Unlike you? GRICE:
Entirely unlike me. SHROPSHIRE: Yet you preach economy. GRICE:
So that extravagance may occasionally become meaningful. That's the wonderfully un-Stoic side of
Grice. The Stoic says: "Use only
what you need." Grice says: "Use only what you need—unless using
more, less, or something else altogether will convey even more." And what
would be a Latin thesaurus note for steadfast, and where the etymology and use
of steadfast originate? Thanks A lovely question. Steadfast is actually a very
Germanic word, and its history is almost the opposite of the Greek-derived
philosophical labels we've been discussing. Etymology of steadfast It is formed
from: stead = place, position, standing,
station (Old English stede) fast = firm, fixed, secure (Old English fæst) So originally: steadfast = fixed in one's place. The primary image is not emotional restraint
but not moving from where one stands. From the physical sense comes the moral
sense: firm, constant, unwavering,
loyal, resolute. A Stoic became
"steadfast" because he metaphorically remained at his post. Latin thesaurus note There is no single
perfect Latin equivalent, but a Roman moralist might choose:
LatinNuanceconstansconstant, unwaveringfirmusfirm, solidstabilisstable,
not easily shakenperseveransperseveringtenaxholding fast, tenaciousimmotusunmovedinconcussusunshakenconstantiathe
Stoic virtue corresponding to steadfastness If Cicero or Seneca were praising a
Stoic sage, the favorite word would probably be: constans
or the noun constantia. For example:
vir constans "a steadfast man." Why "Stoic" came to mean
"steadfast" This is a fascinating semantic development. Originally: Stoic = member of the school founded in the
Stoa Poikile. Later people forgot the
geography but remembered the behavior. Thus:
Stoic philosopher became man who endures misfortune calmly. Much as:
Epicurean ceased to mean follower of Epicurus and came to mean lover of pleasure or fine living. The school name became a character type. A Griceian vignette SHROPSHIRE: Why does "Stoic" mean steadfast? GRICE:
It doesn't. SHROPSHIRE: It doesn't?
GRICE: Strictly speaking, it
means a man from a porch.
SHROPSHIRE: Then what
happened? GRICE: People ceased noticing the porch and began
noticing the men. SHROPSHIRE: And the men were steadfast? GRICE:
Or wished to be thought so.
That's almost a textbook case of meaning drifting from a place to a
characteristic associated with the people who frequent the place. If Cicero
were making a thesaurus entry, I suspect he would gloss "steadfast"
most naturally as constans, with constantia as the corresponding virtue.
MUN
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Munazio – Ossia: Grice e
Munazio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Munazio. Statue of
Lucius M. Plancus, in the Rathaus of Basel. Plancus founded the colony of
Raurica, now Basel, in 43 BC.[1][2] The statue, depicting Plancus in the
Renaissance version of Roman armor, is dated 1580. The gens Munatia was a
plebeian family at Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned during the second
century BC, but they did not obtain any of the higher offices of the Roman
state until imperial times.[3] Branches
and cognomina The chief surnames of the Munatii under the Republic were
Flaccus, Gratus, Plancus, and Rufus.[3] Plancus, often written Plancius,
denotes a person with flat feet.[4][5] It was the cognomen of the most
important family of the Munatii.[6] Some of the Munatii do not appear to have
borne cognomina.[3] Members This list
includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see
filiation. Munatii of the Republic Gaius Munatius, appointed commissioner in
173 BC, to allot land in Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul.[7][8] Publius Munatius,
imprisoned by the triumviri capitales in an uncertain year. Munatius was said
to have taken the crown from the statue of Marsyas that stood in the Roman
Forum, and placed it on his own head. He appealed his sentence to the tribunes
of the plebs, but was ignored.[9] Munatius, a man of no consequence, who having
squandered his fortune, joined the conspiracy of Catiline.[10] Munatius Rufus,
a close friend of Cato the Younger, with whom he quarreled. Cato's wife,
Marcia, succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between the men.[11][12]
Gaius Munatius C. f., a provincial official to whom Cicero recommended Lucius
Livinius Trypho, a freedman.[13] Lucius Munatius Flaccus, joined a conspiracy
against Quintus Cassius Longinus, praetor in Hispania Ulterior, in 48 BC.
Flaccus slew one of the praetor's lictors, and wounded Cassius, but failed to
complete his mission.[14][15][16][17][18][19][20] Titus Munatius, a relative of
Lucius Munatius Plancus, proconsul of Gallia Narbonensis in 44 BC. Munatius
received valuable intelligence from his kinsman, which he relayed to Cicero and
the Roman Senate. He later joined the party of Marcus Antonius.[21] Munatii
Planci Denarius of Lucius Plautius
Plancus, 47 BC. The obverse depicts a facing head of Medusa. The reverse is a
reproduction of Nicomachus of Thebes' Victory in a Quadriga, which was placed
in the Temple of Jupiter by Lucius Munatius Plancus, consul in 43 BC and
Plautius' natural brother.[22][23] Gnaeus Munatius Plancus, was accused by
Marcus Junius Brutus about 106 BC, and defended by Lucius Licinius Crassus, the
famed orator.[24][25] Lucius Munatius L. f. L. n. Plancus, one of Caesar's most
loyal lieutenants, became consul in 42 BC, after the dictator's death. On
another occasion he was consul suffectus, but the year is not certain. He
befriended Marcus Antonius, then Octavian, proposed the title of Augustus for
him in 27 BC, and was Roman censor in
42.[26][27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][excessive
citations] Titus Munatius L. f. L. n. Plancus Bursa, a partisan of Gnaeus
Pompeius Magnus, stoked the unease which led to Pompeius being appointed consul
sine collega. He was condemned for joining in the burning of the Curia
Hostilia, and went into exile, but later returned. After Caesar's murder, he
joined the party of Antonius.[40][41][42][43][44] Gnaeus Munatius L. f. L. n.
Plancus, praetor in 43 BC.[45] Gaius Munatius L. f. L. n. Plancus,[i] afterward
Lucius Plautius Plancus, was adopted by Lucius Plautius, whose name he assumed.
He was proscribed by the Second Triumvirate, and hid near Salernum, but
voluntarily gave himself up to save his slaves from being tortured to death to
reveal him.[46][47][48][49] Munatia L. f. L. n., sister of Lucius, Titus,
Gnaeus, and Gaius, married Marcus Titius. He was proscribed by the triumvirs in
43 BC, but escaped to Sicily.[50][51] Munatia (L. f. L. n.) Plancina, probably
daughter of the consul Lucius, married Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, governor of
Syria under Tiberius. She and her husband were suspected of poisoning Germanicus,
but Plancina was protected by the empress Livia. Accused again in AD 33, she
took her own life.[52][53][54] Lucius Munatius L. f. L. n. Plancus, consul in
AD 13. After the death of Augustus, the senate dispatched him to deal with the
legions that had revolted against Germanicus, but on his arrival he was nearly
slain by the soldiers.[55][56][57][54]
Aureus of Gaius Julius Caesar and Lucius Munatius Plancus, 45 BC. A bust
of Victory is depicted on the obverse, while there is a jug on the reverse. The
legends tell that Caesar is dictator for the third time, and Plancus has been
appointed urban prefect.[58][59] Munatii of the Empire Munatius Gratus, a
participant in the Pisonian conspiracy of AD 65.[60][38] Lucius Munatius
Gallus, legatus pro praetore commanding the army in Africa, AD 100.[38] Marcus
Munatius Popilianus, the husband of Cocceia Bassula Numisia Procula.[54]
Munatia M. f. Procula, mentioned in an inscription from Rome.[54] Lucius
Munatius Felix, governor of Egypt under Antoninus Pius.[61] Gnaeus Munatius M.
f. Aurelius Bassus, a soldier stationed at Colonia Claudia Victricensis in
Britain.[62] Gnaeus Munatius Cn. f. Bassus, perhaps the son of Aurelius
Bassus.[62] Quintus Munatius Celsus, governor of Mauretania Caesariensis under
Caracalla.[62] Marcus Munatius Sulla Cerialis, consul in AD 215.[54] Marcus
Munatius Sulla Urbanus, consul in AD 234, with Marcus Claudius Pupienus
Maximus, the future emperor.[63] Footnotes
The Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, followed by
Broughton, makes Gaius Munatius Plancus the same as Gnaeus Munatius Plancus,
praetor in 43 BC, who would otherwise be his brother. However, this
identification is very uncertain, as the only sources that name the praetor
call him Gnaeus, while the only sources that name the proscribed Plancus call
him Gaius or Lucius. See also List of Roman gentes References Seneca the Younger, Epistulae, 91. Strabo, iv. pp. 186, 192. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and
Mythology, vol. II, p. 1120 ("Munatia Gens"). Pliny the Elder, xi. 45. s. 105. Festus, s. v. Plancae. Drumann, Geschichte Roms, vol. iv., p. 205
ff. Livy, xlii. 4. Broughton, vol. I, p. 410. Pliny the Elder, xxi. 6. Cicero, In Catilinam, ii. 2. Plutarch, "The Life of Cato Minor",
9, 30, 36, 37. Valerius Maximus, iv. 3.
§ 2. Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares,
xiii. 60. Hirtius, De
Bello Alexandrino, 52. Caesar, De Bello
Hispaniensis, 19. Valerius Maximus, ix.
2. § 4. Frontinus, Strategemata, iii.
14. Cassius Dio, xliii. 33, 34. Broughton, vol. II, p. 313. PW, vol. XVI, part 1, col.
538 ("Munatius", No. 19).
Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, x. 12.
Pliny. Historia Naturalis, xxxv. 108.
Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 468. Cicero, De Oratore, ii. 54, Pro Cluentio,
51. Quintilian, v. 3. § 44. Caesar, De Bello Gallico, v.
24 ff., De Bello Civili, i. 40. Hirtius, De Bello Africo, 4.
Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, x. 1–24, xi. 9, 11, 13–15, xii. 8,
Philippicae, iii. 15, xiii. 19.
Plutarch, "The Life of Brutus", 19, "The Life of
Antonius", 56, 58. Appian,
Bellum Civile, iii. 46, 74, 81, 97, iv. 12, 37, 45, v. 33, 35, 50, 55, 61,
144. Cassius Dio, xlvi. 29, 50, 53,
xlvii. 16, xlviii. 24, l. 3. Velleius
Paterculus, ii. 63, 74, 83. Macrobius,
ii. 2. Suetonius, De Claris Rhetoribus,
6. Pliny the Elder,
vii. 10, s. 12, xiii. 3. s. 5. Solinus,
i. 75. Horace, Odes, Carmina i. 7. PIR, vol. I, p. 390. Broughton, vol. II, pp. 307, 329, 347,
357. Cassius Dio, xl. 49, 55, xlvi.
38. Plutarch, "The Life of
Pompeius", 55, "The Life of Catiline", 48. Asconius Pedianus, In Ciceronis Pro
Milone, p. 32 ff. (ed. Orelli). Cicero,
Epistulae ad Atticum, vi. 1. § 10, Epistulae ad Familiares, vii. 12, xii. 18,
Philippicae vi. 4., x. 10, xi. 6, xii. 8, xiii. 12. Broughton, vol. II, p. 354. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xvi. 16,
Epistulae ad Familiares, x. 6, 11, 15, 17, 21.
Pliny the Elder, xii. 3. s. 5.
Valerius Maximus, vi. 8. § 5.
Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 12.
Velleius Paterculus, ii. 67.
Cassius Dio, xlviii. 30. Velleius
Paterculus, ii. 83. Tacitus, Annales,
ii. 43, 55, 75, iii. 9, 15, 17, vi. 26.
Cassius Dio, lvii. 18, lviii. 22.
PIR, vol. I, p. 392. Cassius Dio,
lvi. 28. Suetonius,
"The Life of Augustus", p. 102.
Tacitus, Annales, i. 28.
Broughton, vol. II, p. 313. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p.
485. Tacitus, Annales, 15, 50. PIR, vol. I, pp. 389,
390. PIR, vol. I, p. 389. CIL XIV, 4562, AE 2006, 77, AE 2009, 1799. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Oratore, Epistulae ad Atticum,
Epistulae ad Familiares, In Catilinam, Philippicae, Pro Cluentio. Gaius Julius
Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico (Commentaries on the Gallic War),
Commentarii de Bello Civili (Commentaries on the Civil War), De Bello
Hispaniensis (On the War in Spain, attributed). Aulus Hirtius, De Bello
Alexandrino, De Bello Africo (On the African War, attributed). Quintus Horatius
Flaccus (Horace), Odes. Titus Livius (Livy), Ab Urbe Condita (History of Rome).
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia. Strabo, Geographica. Marcus
Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac
Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Lucius Annaeus Seneca
(Seneca the Younger), Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium (Moral Letters to
Lucilius). Quintus
Asconius Pedianus, Commentarius in Oratio Ciceronis Pro Milone (Commentary on
Cicero's Oration Pro Milone). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny
the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Marcus Fabius Quintilianus
(Quintilian), Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory). Sextus Julius
Frontinus, Strategemata (Stratagems). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Gaius
Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve
Caesars), De Claris Rhetoribus (On the Eminent Orators). Plutarchus, Lives of
the Noble Greeks and Romans. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The
Civil War). Sextus Pompeius Festus, Epitome de M. Verrio Flacco de Verborum
Significatu (Epitome of Marcus Verrius Flaccus: On the Meaning of Words).
Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Gaius Julius
Solinus, De Mirabilis Mundi (On the Wonders of the World). Wilhelm Drumann,
Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergang von der republikanischen zur monarchischen
Verfassung, oder: Pompeius, Caesar, Cicero und ihre Zeitgenossen, Königsberg
(1834–1844). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William
Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii,
Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated
CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy,
abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen
Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical
Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). Paul
von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani
(The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T.
Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American
Philological Association (1952). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage,
Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). Categories: MunatiiRoman gentes And
what would be your first choice for a Grice/Speranza vignate for THIS gens
below? Thanks
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Munazio – Ossia: Grice e
Munazio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Munazio. For the
Munatii, my first choice would be Lucius Munatius Plancus by a wide margin. Not
because he founded Basel (Raurica), nor because of his military career, but
because he is almost a walking embodiment of what Grice would call political
conversational rationality. Look at the sequence: loyal lieutenant of Caesar, then close to
Antony, then ultimately aligned with Octavian, and finally the man credited
with proposing the title Augustus for Octavian in 27 BC. [books.google.com] That is a life conducted through: advice, recommendation, allegiance, letters,
negotiation, political signaling. Corpus
SHROPSHIRE: What are you reading? GRICE:
Plancus. SHROPSHIRE: Caesar's man?
GRICE: Among others. SHROPSHIRE:
Antony's man? GRICE: For a while.
SHROPSHIRE: Augustus' man? GRICE:
Eventually. SHROPSHIRE: Was he constant? GRICE:
Politically? No. SHROPSHIRE: Then what was constant? GRICE:
Plancus. The Griceian joke is
that Plancus survives every conversational context. Where a Stoic hero remains
steadfast, Plancus remains relevant. The title "Augustus" For a
philosopher of language, the irresistible moment is: Plancus proposes the title Augustus.
[books.google.com] This is almost a
speech-act. Octavian does not merely receive a new label. The naming helps
constitute a new political reality. A Griceian vignette nearly writes itself:
SHROPSHIRE: What did Plancus
conquer? GRICE: A word.
SHROPSHIRE: A word? GRICE:
Augustus. SHROPSHIRE: Hardly a military achievement. GRICE:
On the contrary. Most empires begin with vocabulary. But for a full
Grice e Munazio piece, Plancus is ideal because his life revolves around: meaning, allegiance, recommendation,
political wording, and the naming of Augustus.
A philosopher could hardly ask for more. And Grice could claim that the master of the
kindergarten at Oxford -- J. L. Austin -- owed his surname to ultimately a
fashion? AUSTIN<AVGVSTINVS. Could it be that all the Augustines -- the st.
who went to Canterbury, the writer of Civitas Dei, all got that name because
the fashion instituted by this Munazio, that almost rivalled the use of
'caesar' generalised? Or was NOT 'august' generalised to later generations, as
'Caesar' was for 'any ruler, afterwards -- hence kaiser, czar. Interstingly
JULY, AUGUST -- the dog days of summer? Thanks Yes, and this is a wonderfully
Gricean line of thought. The short answer is:
Austin does ultimately come from Augustine / Augustinus, and Augustinus
is derived from Augustus. [en.wikipedia.org], [etymonline.com] So one could jokingly say: J. L. Austin owes his surname to a political
branding exercise ultimately traceable to Octavian's assumption of the title
Augustus, a title whose proposal ancient tradition associates with Lucius
Munatius Plancus. [en.wikipedia.org], [wisdomlib.org] That is the sort of genealogical joke
Speranza and Grice would enjoy. The chain Roughly: Augustus (title) ↓
Augustinus ("belonging to Augustus," "August-like")
[etymonline.com], [goong.com] ↓ Augustine / Augustin / Agostino etc.
[en.wikipedia.org], [wisdomlib.org] ↓ Old French Aoustin ↓
English Austin. [en.wikipedia.org], [etymonline.com] So: GRICE:
Austin derives from Augustine.
SHROPSHIRE: Augustine derives
from Augustus. GRICE: Therefore Austin is indirectly an imperial
title. Did Augustus become like Caesar?
Not quite. This is the key distinction. Caesar became a generic imperial
title: Caesar → Kaiser → Tsar/Czar. The word escaped its family origin and became
a label for rulers. That development is enormous. Augustus had a different
fate. It remained an imperial title, but it also generated personal names: Augustus, Augustinus, Augustine, Agostino,
Augustin, Austin. [en.wikipedia.org], [wisdomlib.org] So its triumph was onomastic rather than
political. In other words: Caesar became
a common title for emperors. Augustus became a common source of names. Augustine of Hippo and Augustine of
Canterbury Both bear names descending from Augustinus. [en.wikipedia.org],
[en.wikipedia.org] One may therefore say, with some exaggeration: Had there been no Augustus, there would have
been no Augustine; had there been no Augustine, there might have been no
Austin. That is a rather pleasing chain
linking: Octavian → Plancus → Augustine
of Hippo → Augustine of Canterbury → J. L. Austin. July and August Another related triumph of
nomenclature: July from Julius Caesar.
August from Augustus. [wisdomlib.org] So
every summer we commemorate both: Caesar
in July, Augustus in August. A Corpus
ending: SHROPSHIRE: Then Austin is
really Augustus? GRICE: Via Augustine. SHROPSHIRE:
And August? GRICE: Plancus helped name an emperor. SHROPSHIRE:
Who indirectly named Austin?
GRICE: Quite. SHROPSHIRE:
Oxford never escapes Rome.
GRICE: Nor, apparently, does
ordinary-language philosophy. But are we saying that successors of Augustus as
emperor did 'take' AVGVSTVS formally as sobriquet. And Munazio knew the
etymology and use of augustus, already, right? What was the common use of the
word by then, and what the occasion where Munazio had the idea? Thanks Yes. Two
distinct things are going on. 1. Did later emperors formally take Augustus?
Yes. After Octavian received the title Augustus in 27 BC, it became a regular
imperial title. It did not remain his personal nickname. Later emperors
incorporated Augustus into their official titulature. [en.wiktionary.org],
[oed.com] This is where Augustus resembles Caesar. But the careers of the two
words diverged: Caesar became the title
that eventually yielded Kaiser and Tsar/Czar. Augustus remained an imperial
title, but also became productive as a personal name and name-element
(Augustinus, Augustine, Agostino, Austin, etc.). [etymonline.com],
[en.wiktionary.org] 2. What did augustus
mean before Octavian? This is the more interesting Gricean question. The word
already existed in Latin before it became Octavian's title. Ancient writers
understood it as a venerable, majestic, reverential word. Modern etymological
discussions connect it either with religious notions of auspiciousness/augury
or with the root seen in augere ("increase"). [en.wiktionary.org],
[oed.com] So when Plancus proposed Augustus, he was not inventing a new word.
Rather, he was taking an old, prestigious word and applying it to a new
political situation. Why not "Romulus"? This is where the naming
becomes genuinely clever. The sources associated with the settlement of 27 BC
indicate that Octavian received the title Augustus. [oed.com],
[en.wiktionary.org] A term such as:
Romulus would have sounded like
the founder and king of Rome. By contrast:
Augustus had religious dignity
without explicitly proclaiming monarchy. A Griceian analysis would be: What is
said? Octavian is Augustus. What is implicated? He possesses exceptional dignity and
authority. What is carefully
avoided? He is king. The title performs political work by means of
its connotations. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: Did
Munatius Plancus know what augustus meant?
GRICE: Certainly. SHROPSHIRE:
Then he was not merely naming a man?
GRICE: He was naming a regime. SHROPSHIRE:
How? GRICE: By choosing a word that suggested majesty
without saying monarchy. That's why
Plancus is such a Gricean figure. His most enduring achievement may not be
military or administrative at all, but lexical: helping attach an ancient
religious word to a new constitutional reality. That word then survived not
only in the Roman Empire, but in names such as Augustinus, Augustine, and
ultimately Austin. [etymonline.com], [en.wiktionary.org] Grice (seminar):
"But seeing that the Romans neve used lower-case letters, note that
OCTAVIANVS EST AVGUSTVS -- does not change the implicature nor the sense of
'Octiavianus is august.' – thanks Grice: "Now lost in English, which has
'august' -- as she is august -- Roman: AVGVSTA ESTA." Thanks Yes, that's a
delightful Gricean point about capitalization as a modern semantic crutch.
Corpus Seminar GRICE: Modern editors
comfort themselves with capitals. They write: Octavian is Augustus, but Livia
is august. POTTS: The Romans?
GRICE: The Romans wrote:
OCTAVIANVS EST AVGVSTVS and LIVIA AVGVSTA EST.
POTTS: No distinction? GRICE:
Not in the lettering. The joke is
that English allows us to separate:
Augustus = title or proper name, august = adjective
("venerable", "majestic").
But Roman inscriptions generally did not signal that distinction
typographically. So: LIVIA AVGVSTA
EST could literally mean: "Livia is august." Yet, once Augusta became an imperial title,
it could simultaneously suggest:
"Livia is Augusta." A
marvelous example of political language working through an ambiguity that
nobody wished to dispel. The Griceian moral SHROPSHIRE: Did the title come from the adjective? GRICE:
Yes. SHROPSHIRE: And how did one become the other? GRICE:
Repeated implicature.
SHROPSHIRE: Meaning? GRICE:
Call a man "venerable" often enough and posterity begins to
think it is his office. One can imagine
Grice adding: "The Principate began
when an adjective acquired constitutional significance." Which is a rather elegant description of what
happened to Augustus. Is the distinction still existant in French -- because in
italian it is: augusto, augusta, right? Thanks Yes, much more than in English.
In English, the distinction is very clear:
Augustus = the emperor/title. august = the adjective
("venerable", "majestic").
Modern readers immediately see the difference. In Italian, one likewise
has: Augusto (name/title), augusto /
augusta (adjective, though now rather literary or elevated). So your example works perfectly: Livia è augusta. Livia Augusta est. The adjective and the title remain visibly
close. In French, the situation is even more interesting because: Auguste is a proper name (Auguste Comte,
Auguste Rodin, etc.). [babynames.help], [nameberry.com] auguste is still an
adjective meaning "imposing, respectable, worthy of veneration."
[fr.wiktionary.org] So French preserves
almost exactly the ambiguity that would delight Grice: Il est auguste. "He is
august/venerable." versus Il est Auguste. "He is
Auguste." Modern capitalization
distinguishes them, but historically the words are transparently related.
[fr.wiktionary.org], [venere.it] Hence a Grice seminar: GRICE: In English the game has largely been
ruined. POTTS: Why, sir?
GRICE: Because Augustus and
august are now separate lexical items.
POTTS: And in French? GRICE:
One may still hear the echo.
POTTS: The Roman echo? GRICE:
Precisely. The Romans had only: AVGVSTVS. And that is the philosophical point: the
Romans did not have typography to rescue them. Much of the political success of
the title Augustus depended on the fact that the same word could be heard both
as a description ("venerable") and as a designation (the ruler's
title). Plancus' choice exploited that ambiguity rather brilliantly. BUt in
French, the auguste form is used both for masc. and fem. or can we still
distinguish gender through plural, etc? Thanks Yes. In modern French auguste is
one of those adjectives whose form is the same for masculine and feminine: un homme auguste une femme auguste No spelling change occurs. [etymology....ademic.com]
The plural, however, is marked in writing:
un homme auguste des hommes augustes une femme auguste des femmes
augustes [etymology....ademic.com] So
French has:
GenderSingularPluralMasculineaugusteaugustesFeminineaugusteaugustes
Unlike Italian:
GenderSingularMasculineaugustoFeminineaugusta Italian preserves the
Latin-style gender distinction much more visibly. A Griceian might remark:
GRICE: French has levelled the
distinction. POTTS: Between augustus and augusta? GRICE:
Between masculine and feminine forms.
POTTS: Then how do the French
distinguish them? GRICE: By the noun, not the adjective. Which is indeed what happens: cet auguste personnage cette auguste
dame The adjective itself stays
unchanged; gender is recovered from the surrounding grammar.
[etymology....ademic.com] And in that respect French is actually a little closer
than Italian to the Roman inscriptional situation, where AVGVSTVS / AVGVSTA
were visible distinctions, but capitalization was not available to separate
title from adjective. Because in other non o/a nouns, the distinction is in
French: etudiant/etudiants (masc) etudiante/etudiantes (fem) -- do French
grammars call these things differently -- as per classes? Thanks -- and cfr.
English blond/blonde, blonds/blondes? thanks or ne/nee Yes. French grammars do
in fact distinguish between different classes of adjectives according to how
(or whether) they mark gender. Your example:
étudiant / étudiante blond / blonde né / née belongs to the class where the feminine is
morphologically marked, usually by adding a written -e.
MasculineFeminineétudiantétudianteblondblondenénée and then the
plurals:
MasculineFeminineétudiantsétudiantesblondsblondesnésnées French school
grammars often speak of adjectives with a forme féminine marquée ("marked
feminine form"). By contrast, auguste belongs to the large class of
adjectives whose masculine and feminine forms are identical: MasculineFeminineaugusteaugustetristetristejeunejeunepauvrepauvre
Only the plural changes:
SingularPluralaugusteaugustes Hence:
un homme auguste une femme auguste des hommes augustes des femmes
augustes The adjective itself does not
reveal gender; the noun or article does.
Your English comparison with blond/blonde is particularly apt. English
borrowed the French distinction:
MasculineFeminineblondblonde though many English speakers today simply
write blond for both sexes. Similarly: MasculineFemininenénée survives
in English genealogical and biographical writing: Jane Smith, née Brown where the feminine form remains visible. A Gricean philological aside: GRICE: French preserves the distinction in
blond/blonde and né/née, but not in auguste.
SHROPSHIRE: Why? GRICE:
Historical accident.
SHROPSHIRE: Philosophically
unsatisfactory. GRICE: Most languages are. And from a Latin perspective, the contrast is
striking:
LatinFrenchaugustusaugusteaugustaauguste French has collapsed the Latin
masculine/feminine distinction, whereas Italian has largely preserved it: Italianaugustoaugusta which is
one reason Italian readers can still "see" the old Roman gender
contrast more readily than French readers.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Munazio – Ossia: Grice e
Munazio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Munazio. My
second-best choice would actually be the absurd fellow who took the crown from
the statue of Marsyas and put it on his own head, thereby finding himself in
trouble with the authorities. That is pure Roman pragmatics: the act means more
than the actor intends. [books.google.com] and the own with the crown of
Maryas, what was big deal? The big deal was not really the crown, but what
putting the crown on your own head symbolized. The entry says: Publius Munatius was imprisoned because he
took the crown from the statue of Marsyas in the Forum and placed it on his own
head. Pliny preserves the anecdote. [etymology....ademic.com] To a modern reader that sounds like drunken
horseplay. To a Roman, it could carry political overtones. Marsyas was not just
any statue. The statue of Marsyas in the Forum had become associated with: liberty of speech, the common people, popular
political symbolism. So when someone
removed a crown from a public statue and crowned himself, observers could
easily read the gesture as a political statement rather than a joke. A very
Gricean case: What was done? Munatius
put a crown on his head. What was
inferred? Possibly: "Munatius is
claiming special status." "Munatius is mocking public
authority." "Munatius is making a political demonstration." The Gricean point The physical act is
trivial. The implicatures are not. One is reminded of your earlier discussion
of Augustus. A crown is never merely a piece of metal. In a republic
especially, it says things. Corpus SHROPSHIRE:
What did Munatius do? GRICE: He borrowed a crown. SHROPSHIRE:
From whom? GRICE: From a statue. SHROPSHIRE:
And for that he was imprisoned?
GRICE: Not for the
borrowing. SHROPSHIRE: For the implication? GRICE:
Precisely. That's why the
anecdote belongs in Roman political folklore. Like many Roman scandals, the
deed itself was small; the meanings attached to it were enormous. and who is
Marsyas? Marsyas is a fascinating figure because there are really two Marsyases
in play: 1. The Greek mythical Marsyas Marsyas was a satyr (or Silenus-like
figure) from Phrygia. In the famous myth:
Athena discarded the aulos (double flute). Marsyas picked it up and
became a master musician. He challenged Apollo to a musical contest. Apollo won
and punished Marsyas horribly by flaying him alive. [en.wikipedia.org],
[uffizi.it] The standard Greek moral is: Don't challenge a god. That is, Marsyas becomes an example of
hubris. [en.wikipedia.org] 2. The Roman
Forum Marsyas The statue in the Roman Forum was something rather different. The
Roman Marsyas was a famous public statue near the Forum and Rostra. Ancient and
modern discussions associate it with:
libertas (freedom), the plebs, public speech, legal and civic rights.
[classicalstudies.org], [cambridge.org], [grokipedia.com] So when Publius Munatius took the crown from
the statue and put it on his own head, Romans were not seeing merely: "a man fooling around with a
statue." They were seeing someone
tampering with an extremely charged civic symbol. A Griceian reading GRICE: Who was Marsyas? SHROPSHIRE:
A satyr flayed by Apollo. GRICE: In Greece.
SHROPSHIRE: And at Rome? GRICE:
A public symbol of liberty.
SHROPSHIRE: Ah. GRICE:
Which explains why borrowing his crown was not interpreted as millinery. Exactly. The act: takes crown from statue → places crown on own
head carries possible implicatures such
as: "I appropriate public
honor." "I mock authority." "I claim
distinction." Whether Munatius
intended any of this is almost secondary. The Romans cared about what the
gesture meant. That's why the anecdote is so Gricean: a trivial physical act
generated a politically explosive interpretation. And are the two Marsia
related? And was it bronze? or stone? How can you take a crown from a statue?
Thanks -- and why was Marsia wearing a crown? Thanks Excellent questions. We
have to distinguish carefully between the mythical Marsyas and the Forum
Marsyas. Are they the same Marsyas? Yes and no. The Roman Forum statue
represented the same mythological Marsyas, the satyr associated with Apollo and
the flute. But the Romans gave the figure a new civic meaning. In Greek myth he
is primarily: the satyr who challenged
Apollo and was punished for hubris. [oed.com], [goodreads.com] In Rome, the statue became associated
with: libertas, public life, the Forum,
and civic symbolism. [etymology....ademic.com], [oed.com],
[en.wiktionary.org] So the mythological
identity stayed the same, while the political meaning changed. Was the Forum Marsyas bronze or stone? The
surviving ancient statue is lost. One source describes the Forum Marsyas as a
famous bronze sculpture that stood in the Forum throughout the Republic and
Empire. [en.wiktionary.org] We have later copies and images on coins and
reliefs, but not the original statue itself. [oed.com], [etymology....ademic.com] How can one "take a crown from a
statue"? The sources do not specify the exact mechanics. What we know is
that Pliny reports that Publius Munatius took a crown from the statue of
Marsyas and put it on his own head. Your gens entry cites Naturalis Historia
21.6. [etymology....ademic.com] I found references to the anecdote, but not a
description of the crown's construction or attachment. It may have been: a removable wreath, a garland, a ceremonial
decoration temporarily placed on the statue,
but the sources I found do not specify which. So we should resist
guessing. Why was Marsyas wearing a
crown? This is perhaps the most interesting question. Ancient authors record
that the statue was decorated and garlanded during festivities and revelry.
[etymology....ademic.com] So the "crown" was probably not part of the
original sculptural design in the way a king's crown might be. The sources I
found indicate a tradition of adorning the statue with garlands or wreaths.
[etymology....ademic.com] Thus the scandal may not have been: "Munatius stole Marsyas' permanent
crown," but rather: "Munatius appropriated for himself an
honor publicly attached to a revered civic symbol." The Griceian version SHROPSHIRE: Why was Marsyas crowned? GRICE:
The Romans decorated him.
SHROPSHIRE: Why? GRICE:
Civic custom. SHROPSHIRE: And Munatius?
GRICE: He transferred the
decoration. SHROPSHIRE: From the statue to himself? GRICE:
Precisely. SHROPSHIRE: The same crown? GRICE:
The same crown. SHROPSHIRE: Then the crime was theft? GRICE:
No. The crime was the implicature.
That's probably very close to how a Roman moralist would have wanted the
story understood. And is pliny who reports the Munazio? And what punishment did
he receive? Yes. The Munatius anecdote ultimately comes from Pliny the Elder,
whom your gens entry cites (Naturalis Historia 21.6). The story is that Publius
Munatius took the crown (or wreath) from the statue of Marsyas in the Forum and
placed it on his own head. [academia.edu], [cambridge.org] As for the
punishment, your gens entry is actually more specific than the web sources I
found: Publius Munatius was imprisoned
by the triumviri capitales. He appealed to the tribunes of the plebs, but they
ignored him. I was able to confirm the
broader Marsyas symbolism, but I did not find a source in my search results
giving further details of the sentence or what happened after the appeal. So I
should not speculate beyond what your cited entry states. [cambridge.org],
[academia.edu] What makes the episode interesting is its symbolic setting: The Forum Marsyas had associations with
libertas (civic freedom and plebeian rights). [etymology....ademic.com],
[oed.com] Public crowning of Marsyas seems to have been a meaningful political
gesture. Pliny also records a later episode involving Augustus' daughter Julia
and a crown placed on the Marsyas statue. [academia.edu],
[etymology....ademic.com] So the
Griceian reconstruction almost writes itself: SHROPSHIRE: What was his crime? GRICE:
Taking a wreath from a statue.
SHROPSHIRE: Hardly a capital
offence. GRICE: The Romans were not prosecuting the act. SHROPSHIRE:
Then what? GRICE: Its interpretation. A very Roman lesson: the physical gesture was
small; the public meaning attached to it was not. So for Grice, it is not the
case that Munazio means that he is to be considered worth a wreath (he was
drunk) --. And it is not the case that he meant SOME addressee to get to know
that he was wearing a wreath. So imprisoned just for drunkeness? Thanks I think
a Griceian would be very careful here. What we know from the tradition is
roughly: Munatius took the crown/wreath
from the statue of Marsyas and put it on his own head. He was imprisoned by the
triumviri capitales. His appeal to the tribunes was unsuccessful (according to
the summary in your gens entry). What we
do not know is: that he was drunk; that
he intended to proclaim himself worthy of a crown; that he intended to
communicate a political message; that the punishment was merely for drunkenness. The surviving evidence, at least from what
we've looked at, does not specify his intention. It records the act and the
reaction. This is exactly the sort of case Grice liked: Meaning for the agent ≠ meaning for the
audience. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: Perhaps he was merely drunk. GRICE:
Possibly. SHROPSHIRE: Then he meant nothing by it? GRICE:
That does not follow.
SHROPSHIRE: Why not? GRICE:
Because public gestures acquire interpretations independently of the
actor's intentions. That is a very un-Romantic
and very Griceian observation. Even if Munatius had no communicative intention
whatsoever—suppose he was simply intoxicated and behaving foolishly—the Roman
authorities might still have regarded the act as objectively significant
because: it involved a famous public
statue; Marsyas had political associations; a crown placed on one's own head in
a public setting could be read symbolically.
The Romans were often interested not merely in: quid voluit? ("what did he
intend?") but also in: quid significavit? ("what did it
signify?") So I would not say: "Munatius was imprisoned for
drunkenness." Nor would I confidently
say: "Munatius was imprisoned
because he claimed royal honours."
Rather: The sources report a
symbolic public act followed by punishment, but they do not clearly tell us
what Munatius intended or precisely which interpretation led to the
punishment. And that uncertainty is
precisely what would attract Grice. The gap between speaker's meaning and
public meaning is where the philosophy begins. The implicature stealth: dempta.
Major Pliny implicature: laws are too strict! thanks Publius Munatius was
imprisoned in ancient Rome because he stole a laurel crown from the statue of
Marsyas in the Roman Forum and placed it on his own head. [1] Key Details of
the Incident The Crime: Pliny the Elder records that Munatius removed a chaplet
or garland from the statue of Marsyas. This statue stood as a powerful symbol
of liberty and civic pride in the heart of Rome's political center. [1, 2] The
Punishment: The triumviri capitales—the Roman magistrates in charge of prisons,
public safety, and minor executions—ordered Munatius to be thrown into chains
and imprisoned for the offense. [1, 2] The Appeal: Munatius attempted to appeal
his harsh sentence to the tribunes of the plebs. However, the tribunes chose to
ignore his pleas and refused to intervene on his behalf. [1, 2] If you are
researching a different member of the famous Munatia gens, please let me know!
I can also provide more context on the symbolic importance of the Marsyas
statue or how the Roman prison systemoperated. L'AI può commettere
errori, quindi verifica le risposte so the charge was stealth? Pliny lat eng? 5 siti Yes, you have hit on the exact nuance. The core
legal concept behind his arrest is directly tied to theft and public
licentiousness, rather than a grand political crime like treason. [1] Pliny
uses this story as a cautionary moral tale about how strictly the Roman
Republic guarded public decency and public property, contrasting it against the
moral decay of later generations. [1] Pliny’s Text: Latin vs. English The
passage is found in Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia, Book 21, Chapter 3
(or Section 8 depending on the edition). [1, 2] The Original Latin:
"...legitur, P. Munatium, cum demptam Marsyae coronam e floribus capiti
suo imposuisset, ob id in vincula coniectum fuisse. De Marsya..." [1] The
English Translation: "...we read that P. Munatius, having placed upon his
head a chaplet of flowers taken from the statue of Marsyas, was condemned by
the Triumviri to be put in chains." [1] Was the charge "stealth"
(Theft / Furtum)? Legally speaking, taking something that belongs to a deity or
stands on public/sacred grounds fell under property violations or public
disorder: Theft (Furtum): Munatius essentially committed a theft of
public/sacred property by physically removing (demptam) the crown. Public
Licentiousness (Lascia/Licentia): Pliny explicitly frames the punishment as a
response to severe "licentiousness" (licentia). In the Republic,
performing a drunken prank, treating a civic monument like a party prop, and
parading around the Forum with stolen public adornments was handled directly as
a criminal disturbance by the triumviri capitales. [1, 2, 3] Pliny uses this to
complain that in the old days, a young man was thrown in chains just for
playing a prank with a statue's crown. Yet, by his own time, the Emperor
Augustus's daughter Julia could openly throw wild, nightly drunken revels right
on the exact same spot in the Forum without immediate arrest. [1] Would you
like to explore the history of the Triumviri Capitales who arrested him, or
look closer at how Roman theft law (actio furti) worked? [1, 2] L'AI può
commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte where Is implication of steal in
Pliny “taken” in lat — parse 2 siti In Pliny's sentence, the structural
implication of "theft" does not rely on a standalone, aggressive word
for stealing (like furari or rapere). Instead, the legal nuance of unlawful
removal is carried entirely by the word demptam, combined with the grammar of
the sentence. [1] The breakdown of how the Latin word functions grammatically
and contextually implies the crime: 1. Grammatical Parsing of Demptam Word
(Lemma): Demptus, -a, -um Verb Origin: Perfect passive participle of the
third-conjugation verb demo, demere, dempsi, demptum. Literal Meaning:
"Taken away," "removed," "subtracted," or
"withdrawn." Morphology: Gender: Feminine Number: Singular Case:
Accusative Agreement: It directly modifies the feminine accusative noun coronam
(the crown/garland). [1] 2. The Contextual Implication of "Theft" In
isolation, demere simply means "to take down" or "to
remove." However, Pliny’s specific syntax creates the criminal implication
of an illegal act through two distinct features: A. The Ablative of Separation
(Implied Source) The phrase reads: ...cum demptam Marsyae coronam... [1]
Marsyae is the dative of disadvantage or a genitive of possession ("from
Marsyas" / "Marsyas's"). In Roman law, taking an item off a
public/sacred monument (Marsyae) without proper religious or political
authorization transforms a neutral act of "taking down" (demere) into
an act of asportation—the physical removal of property required to prove the
charge of theft (furtum). [1] B. The Circumstantial Cum Clause The participle
demptam is embedded inside a temporal/circumstantial clause: cum... imposuisset
("when he had placed..."). [1] The literal flow: "...when he had
placed on his own head the crown, which had been taken away from
Marsyas..." [1] By positioning demptam as an action performed on the
statue prior to putting it on his own head, Pliny legally separates the act
into two criminal components: The physical removal of public/sacred property
(demptam). The re-purposing for personal use (capiti suo imposuisset), which
fulfills the Roman legal definition of contrectatio (the dishonest handling of
property for personal gain). [1] Summary of Pliny's Legal Nuance Pliny chose
demere ("to take down/remove") rather than furari ("to
steal") because it emphasizes the physical violation of the monument. In
Roman society, the act of taking it down from a public monument was the crime
itself; the fact that it was stolen is automatically understood because
Munatius had no legal right to alter a public statue. [1] Would you like to
analyze the grammatical parsing of in vincula coniectum fuisse to see how Pliny
structures the punishment phase of the text? [1] Yes — and this is exactly the
sort of place where a Griceian distinction between what is said and what is
implicated becomes useful. The crucial word is:
demptam from: demo, demere, dempsi, demptum meaning:
"taken down", "removed", "taken away".
[en.wiktionary.org] In the passage as
you quote it: cum demptam Marsyae
coronam e floribus capiti suo imposuisset ... "...having placed upon his
own head a floral crown taken from Marsyas..." [en.wiktionary.org] Pliny does not use: furatus est ("he stole"), surripuit
("he filched"), rapuit ("he snatched"). Instead he uses the milder demptam.
[en.wiktionary.org] A Grice seminar might proceed: POTTS: Does Pliny say he stole it? GRICE:
No. POTTS: Then why was he imprisoned? GRICE:
Because the removal itself was enough.
POTTS: Theft is implicated? GRICE:
Precisely. The Roman reader
supplies: This was a public monument.
The crown belonged on the monument. Munatius had no authority to remove it.
Therefore the removal was improper. The
implication of theft or misappropriation arises from the circumstances rather
than from an explicit accusation of furtum. And I rather like your further
suggestion: Major Plinian implicature:
the old laws were severe. That is very
plausible as a literary point. Pliny is fond of contrasting earlier Roman
discipline with later laxity. The anecdote's force is almost: "Look how strict our ancestors were: a
man was put in chains merely for taking a garland from Marsyas and putting it
on his own head." The moral is not
necessarily: "Munatius was a
dangerous criminal." It may instead
be: "The old Republic treated even
such misconduct with remarkable severity." [en.wiktionary.org] A final Gricean formulation: Explicature: Munatius removed the crown from
Marsyas and wore it. First implicature: the crown was not his to take. Second
implicature (Pliny's): ancient Roman discipline was extraordinarily
strict. That second implicature, to my
mind, is the more interesting one. Very strict -- and lots of social control.
He was parading a circumstantial ornmanet -- and perhaps had walked one block
-- is detained -- and CHAINED -- and his appeal to both TRIBUNES OF THE PLEB --
ignored. M.: "You call yourself tribunes of the pleb -- INVOCO each of
you!" Thanks Pliny furhter implicature: a mythology of LIBERTAS becomes a
mythology of REPRESESSION -- the statue of freedom of speech proodes an
anulment of it in a real Roman citizen Thanks Yes, and that is a very sharp
Grice/Speranza reading of the anecdote. If we stick closely to what Pliny's
story gives us, the sequence is striking:
Munatius removes a floral crown from the statue of Marsyas. He puts it
on his own head. He is put in chains. He appeals to the tribunes of the plebs.
They do not intervene. The sheer
disparity between act and response is what gives the anecdote its force. The
act, as Pliny describes it, is not narrated as armed rebellion or sacrilege on
the grand scale. It is the removal (demptam) of a crown from Marsyas and its
transfer to his own head. [en.wiktionary.org] A Griceian might say: The explicit content is trivial. The
institutional reaction is not. Your
observation about libertas is especially interesting. The Forum Marsyas was
associated in Roman culture with ideas of civic freedom and libertas.
[oed.com], [etymology....ademic.com] So the irony becomes: Statue of libertas → act involving the statue
→ imprisonment. Corpus MUNATIUS: Tribunes of the plebs! I invoke you! TRIBUNE:
On what grounds? MUNATIUS: Liberty.
TRIBUNE: Which liberty? MUNATIUS:
The one represented by that statue.
TRIBUNE: The statue from which
you removed the crown? MUNATIUS: Precisely.
A Speranzian moral might be: The
symbol of liberty protected itself by suspending liberty. Or, more Gricean still: The meaning of Marsyas exceeded the
intentions of Munatius. Whether Munatius
intended political symbolism, drunken jest, self-decoration, or mere
foolishness, the state reacted not to the psychology of the actor but to the
public significance of the gesture. Hence a possible Plinian implicature: "Look how severe the old Republic was:
even a symbolic impropriety against a civic emblem drew chains rather than
tolerance." [en.wiktionary.org] And
the deeper paradox—which I think would have delighted both Grice and
Speranza—is that a monument associated with libertas becomes the occasion for a
conspicuous display of social control. The emblem of freedom generates a case
study in authority. And we can have THAT dialogue in latin, thanks. Also: Mrs. M. Darling, I
missed you -- yes, you were imprisoned for three weeks. M: Libertas, honey --
libertas. Thanks Delightful. One can make the irony very Roman indeed: the
statue of Marsyas libertatis testis becomes the occasion for chains. Dialogus Primus: Ad Tribunos Plebis MVNATIVS (in vinculis): Tribuni plebis! Tribuni plebis! Auxilium
imploro! TRIBVNVS I: Quid accidit?
MVNATIVS: Coronam tantum dempsi
atque capiti imposui. TRIBVNVS II: E statua Marsyae? MVNATIVS:
E statua Marsyae. TRIBVNVS
I: Itaque nunc in vinculis es. MVNATIVS: Quod maxime miror. TRIBVNVS II:
Marsyas libertatis signum est. MVNATIVS: Ego quoque liber esse cupio. TRIBVNVS I:
Causa finita est. MVNATIVS: Quid? Nonne vos estis
tribuni plebis? TRIBVNVS II: Sumus.
MVNATIVS: Et ego plebeius
sum. TRIBVNVS I: Miserum quidem. MVNATIVS:
Provoco! Invoco vos singulos!
TRIBVNVS II: Frustra. MVNATIVS:
Marsyas libertatem repraesentat! TRIBVNVS I: Recte. MVNATIVS:
Ego autem in vinculis sum!
TRIBVNVS II: Etiam rectius. Dialogus Secundus: Domi Post Vincula VXOR
MVNATII: Carissime! Tandem
rediisti! MVNATIVS: Redii.
VXOR: Tres hebdomadas
afuisti! MVNATIVS: Scio.
VXOR: Quid egisti? MVNATIVS:
Libertatem didici. VXOR: In carcere?
MVNATIVS: Precisely. (praecise,
ut diceret Grice.) VXOR: Sed ob quid inclusus es? MVNATIVS:
Ob coronam. VXOR: Auream?
MVNATIVS: Floribus factam. VXOR:
Tantumne? MVNATIVS: Tantum.
VXOR: Miser vir! MVNATIVS:
Libertas, mea. VXOR: Quae libertas? MVNATIVS:
Romana. A Speranza-style moral
might be: MARSYAS LIBERTATEM
SIGNIFICABAT; MVNATIVS VINCVLA DIDICIT.
("Marsyas signified liberty; Munatius learned about chains.")
And the Griceian twist is that the implicature of the episode may be larger
than the act itself: a symbol of libertas generates an instance of repression.
The crown travels one foot—from statue to citizen—and the full weight of Roman
social control descends upon him. and now we can have the conversations as they
are in Latin with Engl. translation immediately in bracket after each move --
and perhaps a '+>' implicature in English only for M.'s utterance (one or
two). Mrs. M. Darling, what did YOU Mean by putting that garland. M: I'm not
sure. I did many things. I took the garland -- it wasn't mine, but I took it --
it was a circumstantial 'garland' -- Marsia represents libertas, you know. Mrs.
M. Yes. M.: I put in on my head -- surely I'm worth MORE than a bit of meltable
bronze. Mrs. M: But this is Rome -- maiorum mos! And you told me you were going
to the baths! They enchained you for FOUR long days! M. Blame it on Marsia. Thanks
Delightful. One can make the irony very Roman indeed: the statue of Marsyas
libertatis testis becomes the occasion for chains. Dialogus Primus: Ad Tribunos Plebis MVNATIVS (in vinculis): Tribuni plebis! Tribuni plebis! Auxilium
imploro! TRIBVNVS I: Quid accidit?
MVNATIVS: Coronam tantum dempsi
atque capiti imposui. TRIBVNVS II: E statua Marsyae? MVNATIVS:
E statua Marsyae. TRIBVNVS
I: Itaque nunc in vinculis es. MVNATIVS: Quod maxime miror. TRIBVNVS II:
Marsyas libertatis signum est. MVNATIVS: Ego quoque liber esse cupio. TRIBVNVS I:
Causa finita est. MVNATIVS: Quid? Nonne vos estis
tribuni plebis? TRIBVNVS II: Sumus.
MVNATIVS: Et ego plebeius
sum. TRIBVNVS I: Miserum quidem. MVNATIVS:
Provoco! Invoco vos singulos!
TRIBVNVS II: Frustra. MVNATIVS:
Marsyas libertatem repraesentat! TRIBVNVS I: Recte. MVNATIVS:
Ego autem in vinculis sum!
TRIBVNVS II: Etiam rectius. Dialogus Secundus: Domi Post Vincula VXOR
MVNATII: Carissime! Tandem
rediisti! MVNATIVS: Redii.
VXOR: Tres hebdomadas
afuisti! MVNATIVS: Scio.
VXOR: Quid egisti? MVNATIVS:
Libertatem didici. VXOR: In carcere?
MVNATIVS: Precisely. (praecise,
ut diceret Grice.) VXOR: Sed ob quid inclusus es? MVNATIVS:
Ob coronam. VXOR: Auream?
MVNATIVS: Floribus factam. VXOR:
Tantumne? MVNATIVS: Tantum.
VXOR: Miser vir! MVNATIVS:
Libertas, mea. VXOR: Quae libertas? MVNATIVS:
Romana. A Speranza-style moral
might be: MARSYAS LIBERTATEM
SIGNIFICABAT; MVNATIVS VINCVLA DIDICIT.
("Marsyas signified liberty; Munatius learned about chains.")
And the Griceian twist is that the implicature of the episode may be larger
than the act itself: a symbol of libertas generates an instance of repression.
The crown travels one foot—from statue to citizen—and the full weight of Roman
social control descends upon him. Provide your feedback on BizChatYou said: and
now we can have the conversations as they are in Latin with Engl. translation
immediately in bracket after each move -- and perhaps a '+>' implicature in
English only for M.'s utterance (one or two). Mrs. M. Darling, what did YOU
Mean by putting that garland. M: I'm not sure. I did many things. I took the
garland -- it wasn't mine, but I took it -- it was a circumstantial 'garland'
-- Marsia represents libertas, you know. Mrs. M. Yes. M.: I put in on my head
-- surely I'm worth MORE than a bit of meltable bronze. Mrs. M: But this is
Rome -- maiorum mos! And you told me you were going to the baths! They
enchained you for FOUR long days! M. Blame it on Marsia. THanks Copilot said:
CopilotDelightful. Here's a Grice/Speranza version, with Latin first, English
immediately after, and a few Gricean implicatures attached to Munatius'
remarks. MVNATIVS DOMVM REDIIT VXOR
MVNATII: Carissime, desideravi te! Quid
tandem accidit? (Darling, I missed you! What on earth happened?) MVNATIVS:
In vincula coniectus sum. (I was thrown into chains.) VXOR:
Scio. Per quattuor dies! (I know. For four whole days!) MVNATIVS:
Libertas, mea. (Liberty, my dear.)
+> The Romans have a curious way of celebrating liberty. VXOR:
Sed quid significare voluisti, cum coronam illam capiti imposuisti? (But
what did you mean when you put that garland on your head?) MVNATIVS:
Nescio. (I'm not sure.)
MVNATIVS: Multa feci; unum tantum
non feci: de philosophia non cogitavi. (I did many
things; one thing I did not do: think about philosophy.) +> Whatever meaning was found in the act
was found by others. MVNATIVS: Coronam dempsi. (I took the garland
down.) VXOR: Quae tua non erat. (Which was not
yours.) MVNATIVS: Quae mea non erat. (Which was not mine.) +> I concede the fact before anyone can
accuse me of it. MVNATIVS: Sed corona tantum erat, ex floribus facta.
(But it was only a garland, made of flowers.)
VXOR: Corona publica erat. (It
was a public garland.) MVNATIVS: Marsyas libertatem repraesentat, ut scis.
(Marsyas represents liberty, as you know.)
VXOR: Scio. (I know.) MVNATIVS:
Deinde coronam capiti meo imposui. (Then I put the garland on my own
head.) VXOR: Quod error fuit. (Which was a mistake.) MVNATIVS:
Certe plus valeo quam aes quoddam liquescens. (Surely I am worth more
than a bit of meltable bronze.) +>
If Marsyas deserves a garland, why not a living Roman citizen? VXOR:
At haec Roma est. (But this is Rome.)
VXOR: Mos maiorum! (The custom of
the ancestors!) VXOR: Mihi autem dixeras te ad balneas iturum esse.
(And you told me you were going to the baths!)
MVNATIVS: Ad Forum diverti. (I
made a detour to the Forum.) VXOR: Et e Foro ad carcerem. (And from the Forum to
prison.) VXOR: Tribunosne appellasti? (Did you appeal to the
tribunes?) MVNATIVS: Appellavi. (I did.) VXOR:
Et? (And?) MVNATIVS: Nihil. (Nothing.) VXOR:
Tribuni plebis plebeio non subvenerunt? (The tribunes of the plebs did
not help a plebeian?) MVNATIVS: Marsyas fortasse libertatem habebat; ego non
habui. (Marsyas perhaps had liberty; I did not.) +> The symbol enjoyed more freedom than
the citizen. VXOR: Quem ergo culpas? (Whom do you blame,
then?) MVNATIVS: Marsyam. (Marsyas.) VXOR:
Marsyam? (Marsyas?)
MVNATIVS: Immo libertatem
Romanam. (Rather, Roman liberty.) +>
The punishment revealed more about Rome than about the garland. A suitably Speranzian epigram at the
end: MARSYAS LIBERTATEM SIGNIFICABAT;
MVNATIVS VINCVLA EXPERTVS EST. (Marsyas signified liberty; Munatius
experienced chains.)
MUS
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Musonio – Ossia: Grice e
Musonio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del Musonio
di Gentile -- lingua lazia Tito Gaio Musonio Rufo (Bolsena, Viterbo, Lazio): la
ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del Musonio di Gentile
-- lingua lazia -- Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning
finds an unusually apt foil in Musonius Rufus, whose authority, as your passage
notes, was exerted largely through oral teaching and whose surviving “texts”
are in effect the afterlife of uptake: apophthegms and lecture-fragments
preserved by hearers (via Stobaeus, Aulus Gellius, Plutarch, and through Epictetus/Arrian).
Where Grice theorizes how hearers rationally recover
speaker-meaning by assuming a cooperative orientation and then calculating
implicatures from what is said, Musonius exemplifies a pedagogy that forces
precisely that calculative work: by refusing the security of a written
treatise, he makes doctrine travel as an inferential practice, not as a fixed
inscription, so that “what he meant” is inseparable from what competent
auditors could responsibly reconstruct. The exile motif (Rome/Gyaros and back)
sharpens the parallel: both at Nero’s court and in post-war Oxford’s “no-no”
climate for Roman philosophy, institutions manage what counts as sayable; yet
the Gricean point is that meaning survives censorship and fashion because it is
not exhausted by the official dictum—an audience can still retrieve a
standpoint from sparse prompts, silences, and pointed brevity. Your dialogue’s
line “if I keep silent, you are compelled to understand” is Gricean to the
core: silence and under-specification become communicative moves only against a
background of shared norms, shared purposes, and the expectation that a
rational agent is not wasting the interlocutor’s time. Finally, Musonius’
“lingua lazia” and Stoic plainness function like an ethics of maxim-following:
speak with measured quantity and relevance, let the hearer do the rest, and
treat the residue—what is not stated but becomes jointly recoverable—as the
real vehicle of philosophical transmission, i.e., implicature as moral practice
rather than mere semantic decoration. Grice: “I don’t know if it was Ryle, but
for years, Roman philosophy was a no-no at Oxford. Gone were the days of Walter
Pater and his Marius The Epicurean!” Esercita un forte influsso sui
contemporanei. Di famiglia equestre dell’etrusca Volsini suscita per la
sua fama di filosofo l’invidia di Nerone. Segue Rubellio Plauto
nell'Asia Minore e lo incoraggia a togliersi la vita quando Nerone lo condanna
a morte. Ritorna a Roma, dove e bandito insieme con Cornuto in
occasione della congiura di Pisone e confinato nell’isola di Gyaros
nelle Cicladi, ove per la sua rinomanza attira uditori da ogni
parte.Verosimilmente richiamato a Roma da GALBA, negli ultimi giorni di Vitellio
si une ad una ambasceria del Senato presso Antonio Primo per perorare la causa
della pace fra i suoi soldati, ma senza successo.Quando Vespasiano assunse il
potere, M. accusa davanti al Senato P. Egnazio Celere, quale delatore e falso
testimonio nel processo di Borea Sorano. Vespasiano lo escluse dalla prima
espulsione dei filosofi da Roma, ma poi lo esiliò per la seconda volta ;
però Tito, che già lo aveva conosciuto, lo richiamò dopo la sua assunzione al
trono. In seguito mancano notizie su di lui, ma da una lettera di Plinio il
Giovane sembra che non fosse più in vita. Non risulta che abbia composto e
pubblicato scritti, anzi sembra che si sia servito soltanto dell’insegnamento
orale, del quale, però, rimangono frammenti abbastanza numerosi. Essi
comprendono 19 brevi apoftegmi conservati da Plutarco, da Aulo Gellio e dallo
Stobeo ; altri apoftegmi e trattazioni filosofiche relativamente ampie raccolti
da Epitteto nel suo insegnamento-È e trasmessi i primi da Arriano, le seconde
dallo Stobeo ; esposizioni o lezioni che si trovano nello Stobeo o
costituiscono la parte più estesa dei frammenti. Etruria. Tito Gaio Musonio
Rufo. GRICEVS: Nescio an Ryle fuerit; sed per annos philosophia Romana Oxonii
quasi “nefas” habebatur—abiērunt dies Walteri Pater et Marii Epicurei! MVSONIVS: Miror vos: Oxonii “nefas” dicitis quod Nero “invidia” vocabat.
Ille me Gyarum misit; vos tantum ad bibliothecam—quae, fateor, etiam carcer
esse potest. GRICEVS: At tu—philosophus Bolsenae—tam multos auditores traxisti,
et tamen nihil scripsisti. Id est implicatura maxima: “si taceo, vos cogimini
intellegere.” MVSONIVS: Ita est: scripta saepe sunt longiora quam res; ego
breviter doceo et diu exulō. Si ex XIX
apophthegmatibus totam doctrinam colligitis, cooperative agite—et parcite mihi
chartis, quas Vespasianus iterum exulare iuberet. Grice and Speranza have only one Musonio -- in their philosophers' list
-- by which Grice "implicates" "they were hardly a patrician
gens" -- Other members of the gens: Grice is somewhat puzzled that this
one had TWO prae-nomina: Tito Gaio -- and then the cognomen was more like an
agnomen: the ginger one? What you have staged with “Tito Gaio Musonio Rufo” is
in fact a neat test case for everything that was troubling Grice in the
Catones, but now pushed into the Imperial period where the system has already
begun to loosen and hybridize. Let me separate the pieces carefully. First,
about the two praenomina. A Roman citizen, strictly speaking, does not have
“two praenomina” in the classical Republican sense. The standard structure is
still one praenomen plus nomen plus cognomen. What happens in the Imperial period
is that additional names begin to accumulate (inheritance, adoption, social
display), and what were once rigid categories start to blur. So in “Titus Gaius
Musonius Rufus” one should not think of two independent praenomina in a strict
Varronian sense. Rather, one of two things is happening: either we are seeing a
later, expanded name sequence in which more than one element that looks like a
praenomen is retained, or we are seeing transmission variation in our sources
(Greek writers, epitomators, or modern reconstructions), who are less strict
than Republican practice would require. The hard evidence you would want
here—an inscription fixing the exact Latin form—is thin, and the sources that
preserve Musonius are not primarily epigraphic but literary and secondary. So
one must be cautious. What is clear is that by the first century CE, the system
is no longer as tightly constrained as in the age of Cato. Second, about the
gens. Your Gricean implicature is well formed. Musonius is not a name that
multiplies across a large, politically dominant gens in the way that Cornelius
or Porcius does. That alone explains why there is no pressure to create
internal differentiation such as “maior/minor.” The scarcity of the nomen
carries most of the identifying weight. One Musonius is enough. Third, the
cognomen Rufus. Here you are exactly right. Rufus is a typical Roman cognomen
derived from a physical trait, in this case red hair. In origin such a cognomen
behaves like what you call an agnomen: it distinguishes an individual within a
group by a contingent feature. Over time, however, such nicknames tend to
stabilize and become hereditary cognomina. So Rufus sits in between your
categories. Historically it is descriptive and ad hoc; structurally, by
Musonius’ time, it functions as a regular cognomen. Fourth, the comparison with
the Catones. Now the contrast becomes philosophically interesting. The Catones
show maximal repetition with minimal lexical differentiation: Marcus Porcius
Cato repeated across generations distinction deferred to filiation or later
agnomina Musonius shows the opposite tendency: a rarer nomen a more
individualized cognomen less need for genealogical disambiguation So in Gricean
terms, the informational burden is distributed differently. In the Catones: the
system relies on background knowledge and contextual supplementation in
Musonius: the system relies more on lexical distinctiveness at the surface
Fifth, your very attractive Gricean reading of Musonius’ orality. This is, if I
may say so, one of the sharper analogies you have drawn. The fact that Musonius
leaves no treatise but survives as apophthegms preserved by others makes him a
kind of empirical case of conversational meaning detached from fixed text. What
our sources give us are not his words in the sense of a canonical utterance,
but reconstructions by cooperative hearers. That aligns neatly with Grice’s
idea that meaning is not identical with what is explicitly said, but with what
a rational audience can recover given the assumption of communicative intent.
So your line “si taceo, vos cogimini intellegere” is not merely a witty gloss,
but structurally apt. Silence and brevity force the audience into the work of
inference. Musonius is not merely transmitting content, but training
inferential competence. Finally, one small corrective in the spirit of your
earlier concerns. Whereas with Cato we can confidently say that the birth name
Marcus Porcius Cato is repeated across generations and that “the Elder / the
Younger” is a later imposition, with Musonius we cannot, from the available
sources, reconstruct an equally tight “birth-name logic.” The sources show the
full designation (with Rufus and the double first element), but they do not
specify how these elements functioned at naming, as opposed to later usage. So
here the Gricean maxim of caution would be: do not infer a Republican purity of
structure in a first‑century naming environment. But your larger philosophical
point survives intact. In Musonius, as in Grice, the real work is not done by the
explicit string of words, but by what competent participants can responsibly
take from it.Musonio Rufo, Tito Gaio (a. u. c. DCCLXXVIII). Dicta. Roma.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mussidio – Ossia: Grice e
Mussidio -- Grex griceiana – Mussidio. The gens Mussidia
was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few of the Mussidii attained the
higher offices of the Roman state, although Titus Mussidius Pollianus obtained
the consulship in the time of Caligula. Other members of this gens are known
from inscriptions.[1] Origin The
Mussidii appear to be of Paelignian origin, and may have been natives of Sulmo,
which besides Rome is the only location in Italy where the name is found.[2]
The nomen Mussidius belongs to a large class of gentilicia formed using the
suffix -idius. Most of these names were originally derived from cognomina
ending in -idus, but such names were so numerous that -idius must have come to
be regarded as a regular gentile-forming suffix, and was used to form nomina
from names or words other than those ending in -idus.[3] Praenomina The only praenomina known from the
senatorial Mussidii are Titus and Lucius. Gaius and Decimus are found in
inscriptions. All but Decimus were very common throughout Roman history, while
Decimus was favoured by a small number of families, mostly of plebeian
origin. Branches and cognomina The only
cognomen associated with the main branch of the Mussidii is Longus, normally
given to someone who was particularly tall.[1][4] Pollianus, borne by two of
the Mussidii, probably in the same branch as Longus, probably indicates descent
from the Pollii through the female line. Optatus, found among a family of
Mussidii in Spain, means "welcome" or "desired",[5] while
Proculus is an old praenomen that became a common surname.[6] Members This list includes abbreviated
praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Mussidii Longi
Titus Mussidius, the father of Lucius Mussidius Longus.[7] Lucius Mussidius T.
f. Longus, a triumvir monetalis, known from numerous coins depicting Caesar and
the triumvirs.[8][7] He may have been killed in the Battle of Philippi.[2]
Lucius Mussidius, proconsul of Sicily under Augustus, perhaps the same man as
the moneyer Longus.[7] Titus Mussidius L. f., the father of Pollianus, and
perhaps the son of Longus.[9] Titus Mussidius T. f. L. n. Pollianus,[i]
governor of Gallia Narbonensis from AD 34 to 37, at the end of the reign of
Tiberius. He was consul suffectus under Caligula, but the year is
uncertain.[10][7][11] Titus Mussidius T. f. T. n. Pollianus,[ii] quaestor
during the reign of Nero.[9] Mussidii from inscriptions Gaius Mussidius T. f.,
named in an inscription from Sulmo in Samnium.[12] Mussidia Salvia, named in an
inscription from Sulmo, together with Gaius Mussidius Diogenes.[13] Gaius
Mussidius Diogenes, named in an inscription from Sulmo, together with Mussidia
Salvia.[13] Lucius Mussidius, named in an inscription from Sulmo. Gaius
Mussidius Optatus, perhaps the father of Lucius and Gaius, named in an
inscription from Gemella in Hispania Baetica.[14] Lucius Mussidius C. f., named
along with several family members in an inscription from Gemella in Hispania
Baetica.[14] Gaius Mussidius C. f., named along with several family members in
an inscription from Gemella in Hispania Baetica.[14] Decimus Mussidius
Proculus, a centurion with the fifth legion, named in a votive inscription from
Sirakovo in Moesia Inferior.[15] Decimus Mussidius, the former master of
Decimus Mussidius Ariates and Decimus Mussidius Salvius.[16] Decimus Mussidius
D. l. Ariates, a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Rome.[16] Decimus
Mussidius D. l. Salvius, a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Rome.[16]
See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes
Lucius in some sources, but Titus appears to be the correct praenomen. His filiation names not only his father and grandfather,
but his proavus as well, indicating that the consul Pollianus was probably the
son of the proconsul Lucius. References
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1127
("Mussidia Gens"). Wiseman,
"Some Republican Senators and Their Tribes", p. 127. Chase, pp. 121, 122. Chase, p. 110. The New College Latin & English
Dictionary, s. v. Optatus. Chase, p.
145. PIR, vol. I, p. 394. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and
Mythology, vol. II,
p. 806 ("Lucius Mussidius Longus").
CIL VI, 40173. Rivet, Gallia
Narbonensis, pp. 79, 86 ff. CIL VI,
41072. CIL IX, 3114. AE 1989, 252.
CIL II, 901. CIL III, 12386, AE
1895, 100. CIL VI, 22750, CIL VI, 22752.
Bibliography Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography
and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849).
Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin
Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der
Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii,
L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses
Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis
Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, &
Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman
Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). A. L. F. Rivet, Gallia Narbonensis,
Batsford, London (1988). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English
Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). T.P. Wiseman, "Some Republican
Senators and Their Tribes", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 14, pp. 122–133
(1964). Categories: MussidiiRoman gentes What wouldbe your choice for a
Grice/Speranza vignette from this gens? Thanks
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mussidio – Ossia: Grice e
Mussidio -- Grex griceiana – Mussidio. For the Mussidii,
my first choice would be Lucius Mussidius Longus, the moneyer. Not because he
held the highest office, but because he issued coins depicting: Caesar and the triumvirs. citeturn297search172? No source available from provided text (Here I must be careful: your gens entry
explicitly says he is known from numerous coins depicting Caesar and the
triumvirs; I'm relying on the text you supplied.) For a Grice/Speranza
vignette, coinage is irresistible because it sits exactly at the intersection
of: communication, authority, symbolism,
public meaning. A coin is a
state-sponsored utterance. Corpus
SHROPSHIRE: What are you reading? GRICE:
Mussidius Longus.
SHROPSHIRE: The senator? GRICE:
The moneyer. SHROPSHIRE: A banker?
GRICE: Better. A publisher. SHROPSHIRE:
Publisher? GRICE: Every coin is an argument. Why Longus is Gricean A Roman coin literally
says: "This is worth a
denarius." The metal alone does not
fully explain the value. The citizen draws inferences from: the images, the legends, the issuing
authority. In Gricean terms, the coin
operates through a vast background of accepted conventions. GRICE: Why does this silver disk purchase bread? SHROPSHIRE:
Because it is silver. GRICE: Not enough.
SHROPSHIRE: Because Rome says
so? GRICE: Better.
The triumviral angle Longus' coinage appears during one of the most
linguistically fascinating moments in Roman history: Caesar dead, the triumvirs competing,
legitimacy uncertain. The imagery on
coins is then doing political work. A coin becomes a miniature speech-act. Longus
gives you something richer: How does
authority travel? Answer: On little pieces of metal. Speranzian epigram SHROPSHIRE: What did Mussidius Longus write? GRICE:
Nothing. SHROPSHIRE: Then why remember him? GRICE:
Because he published in silver.
SHROPSHIRE: And his readers? GRICE:
The Roman Empire. That, to me, is
the best Grice/Speranza vignette in the gens Mussidia. And for the
banker, the practice seems anti-british. I think you can coin coins with
Elizabeth II while she is alive -- not when dead. So the implicature double
downs? Thanks Yes, and I think a Griceian would say the Roman coin
"speaks" in two voices at once. With modern British coinage, if a
coin bears: ELIZABETH II while Elizabeth is alive, the primary message
is fairly straightforward: "This is
the lawful coinage of the present sovereign." The portrait identifies the current
constitutional authority. But in the late Republic, especially with moneyers
such as Lucius Mussidius Longus issuing coins with Caesar and the triumviral
regime, the situation is more unstable. The images are not merely identifying
authority; they are helping construct it. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: Why place Caesar on the coin? GRICE:
To identify the government.
SHROPSHIRE: Is that all? GRICE:
Never all. First implicature "This is legitimate money." Second implicature "The person depicted possesses
legitimate authority." Third
implicature "The issuer wishes you
to accept that authority." In a
period of civil war or constitutional transition, that third level becomes
especially important. A Gricean might call it an iterated implicature: Caesar's image ⇒ the state endorses Caesar ⇒ the citizen
should endorse the state that endorses Caesar.
The coin is therefore not merely economic but rhetorical. Why it feels
"anti-British" Partly because modern Britons are accustomed to a
settled monarchy. The portrait of Elizabeth II does not usually invite the
thought: "Should Elizabeth be
Queen?" The issue is already
settled. But the Roman late Republic is full of moments where the
constitutional position is precisely what is at stake. Hence the coin becomes a
political argument. Grice's joke SHROPSHIRE:
What is a coin? GRICE: A metallic conversational contribution. SHROPSHIRE:
With Caesar's head on it?
GRICE: Then it becomes a
political conversational contribution.
SHROPSHIRE: Meaning? GRICE:
Rome pays its debts in silver. It pays its constitutional arguments in
imagery. That is why a Mussidius moneyer
is more Gricean than he may first appear: he is engaged in mass communication,
one denarius at a time. and can you check if this would be against the law in
england. Elizabeth II DEAD -- King Charles II cannot order the minting of coins
with Elizabeth II on them? Thanks -- wasn't this a policy? Thanks No, there is
not a rule of English or UK law that forbids coins depicting a deceased
monarch. In fact, after Queen Elizabeth II's death, the Royal Mint issued
memorial coins honoring her, while also introducing coins bearing the effigy of
King Charles III. [royalmint.com], [royalmint.com] The important distinction is
between: The current sovereign's
portrait on ordinary circulating coinage. Commemorative or memorial coinage
depicting deceased figures. The latter
is perfectly normal. The Royal Mint explicitly produced memorial issues for
Elizabeth II after her death. [royalmint.com], [royalmint.com] In fact, during
the transition, coins associated with both monarchs circulated: Elizabeth II
coins remained legal tender, while Charles III coins were introduced.
[telegraph.co.uk], [mycoinage.co.uk] So the policy is not: "You may never mint a dead
monarch." Rather, something more
like: "The ordinary state coinage
bears the reigning monarch, but memorial and commemorative issues may honor
former monarchs." A Griceian
comparison with Rome is amusing. Britain A coin with Elizabeth II after 2022
may implicate: "We remember
her." Rome A coin with Caesar
during the triumviral period may additionally implicate: "You should recognize the authority
whose memory or legacy legitimates the present regime." The Roman coin is often more argumentative.
The British memorial coin is more commemorative. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: Could Charles III strike a coin with
Elizabeth II on it? GRICE: Evidently yes. SHROPSHIRE:
Then what does it mean?
GRICE: In Britain,
remembrance. SHROPSHIRE: And in Rome?
GRICE: Frequently,
legitimacy. SHROPSHIRE: A deeper implicature? GRICE:
As Romans generally preferred.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mussidio – Ossia: Grice e
Mussidio -- Grex griceiana – Mussidio. Alternative
choice: Titus Munatius-style intelligence The only rival candidate for me would
be Titus Mussidius Pollianus, governor and consul, but he is mostly an
administrative figure in the surviving evidence.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mussolini – Ossia: Grice
e Mussolini: Ryle e la ragione conversazionale ad Oxford Arnaldo Mussolini
(Dovia di Predapio, Forli-Cesena, Emilia-Romagna): Ryle e la ragione
conversazionale ad Oxford. Grice’s picture of
reason-governed conversational meaning helps read your Oxford vignette not as a
biographical aside about an Italian public figure’s brother, but as a case
study in how institutional climates reshape what can be said and, crucially,
what must be left to implicature. On a Gricean view, hearers routinely assume
cooperative rationality and so infer speaker-meaning from not only what is
asserted but from choices of topic, tone, and omission; in the passage, the
“Ryle knew” motif and the post-war hardening of attitudes toward continental
philosophy can be described as a systematic management of conversational
presuppositions (what counts as “live,” “serious,” or “respectable” philosophy)
and of salience (what gets framed as relevant or treated with derision). The
move from pre-war respectful engagement to post-war dismissal functions
pragmatically like a standing implicature: that certain traditions are not
merely false but not worth pursuing, so that a philosopher can communicate
exclusion without having to argue for it in the open. The label “unwanted
course” is likewise Gricean: it is an overtly thin description that invites the
audience to supply the deeper institutional message (this material is being
taught under constraint, as an obligation rather than as a shared project), and
it does so by relying on shared background norms about what Oxford expects to
be worth teaching. In that way, your scene ties Ryle-style gatekeeping to
Grice’s central insight: conversational meaning is rationally recoverable only
against a backdrop of common assumptions, and when those assumptions become
politically and culturally charged, the same inferential machinery that
ordinarily supports cooperation can also support exclusion—by making silence,
ridicule, and curricular sidelining do the work that explicit argument used to
do. Grice: “As a scholarship boy from Clifton arriving at Oxford in 1934,
little did I know that Mussolini’s brother was dead – but RYLE knew! Evidence
from Rowe's biography of Austin and related academic reviews suggests that when
Ryle eventually did become the dominant figure of philosophy at Oxford after
World War II, he deliberately suppresses praise for German philosophy and
continental european thought generally, often using derision in place of his
pre-war respect for it. Evidence of Suppression Shift from Respect to
Hostility: Before the war, Ryle is sympathetic to continental philosophy,
reviewing Heidegger's “Sein und Zeit” with respect and delivering a measured
account of Husserl's work. However, after the war, this dissent "hardens
into hostility," and he replaces his former respect with derision.
"Unwanted Course": Ryle himself refers to a course of lectures he
gives at Oxford – when Grice was a scholar at Corpus, and then a Harmsworth
Schoalr at Merton, to eventually become a Fellow, and Tutorial Fellow in
Philosophy at St. John’s, and eventually University Lecturer -- on the work of
Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, and Meinong [from whose ‘jungle’ – ontological
jungle – Grice wants to get away as late as ‘Vacuous names’ -- as an
"unwanted course," reflecting the prevailing shift in the Oxford
philosophical climate away from such philosophers. Cultural Atmosphere: Rowe's
biography and related analyses tie this shift to the general "political
and cultural climate" in post-war Oxford, which influences dons and
graduates. This atmosphere contributed to the rise of the insular Oxford
"ordinary-language philosophy" led by Ryle and Austin, which largely
ignores or dismisses non-anglophone traditions. Focus on British
Pragmatist empiricism: Grice: Ah,
Mussolini! Sa, anche io ho un fratello—‘ne ho solo uno, proprio come lei’—ma
sembra che sia il suo ad essere la vera celebrità a Vadum Boum. Eppure, mentre
molti preferiscono Mussolini, Mussolini è il mio uomo. La filosofia, mi creda,
finisce spesso per essere dettata dalla dittatura della storia!" Mussolini: Caro Grice, la sua osservazione è davvero
spassosa. L’ombra della storia pesa su tutti, persino sui pensieri—ma forse la
filosofia, come il linguaggio, può liberarci dal suo fardello. La fama di mio
fratello è un macigno, ma spero che anche la mia voce filosofica possa trovare
spazio."
Grice: "Ha centrato il punto,
Arnaldo. La tirannia della storia è una realtà, ma c’è sempre spazio per un
dialogo nuovo. Il filosofo, insomma, deve conversare—con eleganza, ovvio—anche
col passato e proporre nuove implicature per il presente." Mussolini: "Esattamente, Professor Grice. Continuiamo
allora a costruire la nostra filosofia con ragionamento e conversazione—senza
mai dimenticare la storia, ma senza farci chiudere in gabbia. Grazie per la sua
franchezza e questo scambio così ricco. Mussolini, Arnaldo (1902). La
riforma sociale in Italia. Milano: Tipografia Editrice Sociale.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Mussolini – Ossia: Grice
e Mussolini: la ragione conversazionale e la storia della filosofia di Lamanna
– la scuola di Dovia di Predapio -- filosofia emiliana -- filosofia
italiana Benito Amilcare Andrea
Mussolini (Dovia di Predapio, Forli-Cesena, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione
conversazionale e la storia della filosofia di Lamanna. Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning can be used,
in your passage, to diagnose how political rhetoric works precisely by
recruiting an audience’s practical rationality to supply what is not said: the
speaker banks on the hearer’s assumption that utterances are produced with some
cooperative point, so hearers infer additional content (implicatures) from
selective emphasis, strategic vagueness, and the staging of “acts” as if they
were arguments. Read that way, “the Duce” becomes less a partner in
philosophical exchange than a case study in how public speech can exploit the
very norms Grice theorizes: slogans and set-pieces invite maximal uptake with
minimal propositional commitment; appeals to authority and destiny trade on the
maxim of Relation by making personal action “relevant” evidence for historical
necessity; and the claim that a “philosophy” is to be “desumed from acts”
shifts evaluation from truth-conditions to performative display, encouraging
the audience to treat power as a reason. The institutional framing you cite
(culture journals, curated editions, “discorsi di circostanza”) also fits
Grice’s emphasis on audience design: by controlling context, genre, and what
counts as admissible background, the propagandistic speaker narrows the range
of reasonable inferences until the preferred implicature feels like the only
rational one. In short, your comparison can present Grice as explaining not
only how cooperative conversation succeeds, but also how the appearance of
rational cooperation can be engineered so that hearers do the inferential
work—filling in conclusions, excusing gaps, and treating spectacle as
meaning—thereby turning reason-governed interpretation into a tool that can be
manipulated rather than a neutral route to understanding. Grice: “We do not
study history as philosophers at Oxford – we FOUGHT it!” -- Grice: “I was
thinking of Hitler, when I was callled to the arms. It was only later that I
added M. to my thoughts!”—Grice: “I heard one Italian say, ‘Some like Mussolini,
but Mussolin’s MY man’ – by the first, he referred to the Duce, by the second,
to the Duce’s broher, the philosopher!” QUADERNI DELL'ISTITUTO NAZIONALE
FASCISTA DI CULTURA. CARLINI, LA FILOSOFIA DI M. ISTITUTO NAZIONALE FASCISTA DI
CULTURA, ROMA, tipografia del Senato di Bardi Ci proponiamo di mettere in
rilievo, in rapidi cenni, un aspetto non ancora studiato della personalità del
nostro duce: il sua ‘filosofia,’ quale si può desumere da’ suoi atti. In
verità, i biografi di lui, indagando il periodo della formazione della sua
personalità, non hanno trascurato questo lato. Discepolo di Nietzsche è
definito anche recentemente. Egli stesso riconosce in Pareto un altro suo
maestro; e tutti [Il presente studio vuol essere soltanto un saggio, anzi una
semplice indicazione di un aspetto della personalità del duce: aspetto
implicante svariati e importanti problemi del pensiero fascista. Per uno studio
più ampio giover moltissimo la nuova, accurata, edizione de’ suoi scritti a cui
s’è accinto l’editore Hoepli. M. ricorda il periodo della sua vita e della
storia italiana da lui vissuta vertiginosamente, e aggiunge. Molti discorsi e
scritti sono legati al movente che li provocò : sono di circostanza ».
L’editore, anch’egli, dice che l’edizione « conterrà tutto ciò ch’è destinato a
lassare alla storia, nella forma originaria più ampia: eliminati, quindi, i
discorsi dei quali esiste solamente il riassunto ». tea with Mussolini. The Oxford University Fascist Association held its first annual dinner
at the Clarendon Hotel, Cornmarket, Oxford, on Tuesday, 20 November 1934.
Surviving descriptions of the printed menu record that Oswald Mosley was
present and that the menu bears signatures including Mosley’s and William
Joyce’s. The association is usually abbreviated OUFA. The Clarendon was a
central Oxford hotel on Cornmarket Street, on the site of the old Clarendon
Hotel later demolished in the 1950s. So the event was not in a college or
university hall but in a commercial hotel in the middle of Oxford. The Joyce in
question was William Joyce, not James Joyce. In 1934 he was a leading British
fascist propagandist closely associated with Mosley and the British Union of
Fascists. He later became notorious in wartime Germany as the broadcaster known
as “Lord Haw-Haw,” and after the war he was tried and executed for treason. So
his signature on the surviving Clarendon menu gives the dinner a significance
beyond student politics: it places the occasion squarely within the wider
fascist political network of the 1930s. The menu itself survives as an
artefact, and the date, venue, and named attendees can be verified from sale
and reproduction records, though those public traces do not by themselves yield
a full transcription of the courses served. Grice: Ah, Mussolini, si dice che la filosofia non sia mai
stata la sola guida dei destini d’Italia, ma mi incuriosisce il modo in cui la
storia, da Dovia di Predappio, si intreccia con la ragione conversazionale. Lei
ha mai pensato che il filosofo, più che studiare la storia, debba combatterla,
come suggeriamo spesso ad Oxford?" Mussolini:
"Caro Grice, le sue parole colpiscono nel segno. In Italia, la storia è
sempre stata una maestra severa. Io stesso, da giovane, l’ho vissuta
vertiginosamente, imparando che la filosofia deve essere implicita negli atti,
non solo nei libri. È così che la mia 'filosofia' si è forgiata, a volte tra
Nietzsche e Pareto, a volte tra circostanze che richiedono risposte
immediate." Grice:
Interessante, Mussolini. Da noi ad Oxford si ride spesso della filosofia messa
sullo sfondo della storia, ma il suo modo di intendere il pensiero, come
qualcosa che si desume dagli atti, mi ricorda la forza del pragmatismo. Forse
il filosofo italiano è più vicino a quell’idea che la parola deve sempre farsi
azione?" Mussolini:
"Direi proprio di sì, Grice. La filosofia italiana, soprattutto quella
emiliana, non si accontenta di stare sulle pagine: vuole incidere nella realtà,
lasciare traccia nella storia. E anche se i discorsi talvolta sono 'di
circostanza', come diceva il mio editore, penso che la vera implicatura sia
sempre quella di costruire—anche conversando—un destino più grande. Grazie per
il suo sguardo acuto e per questa conversazione, che illumina il cuore della
nostra tradizione. Mussolini, Benito Amilcare Andrea (1909). La filosofia
della forza. Milano: Società Editrice Avanti.
Grice e Mustio
Grex Mustio The gens Mustia was a minor plebeian family at Rome. Members of
this gens are first mentioned in the final decades of the Republic, and at
least some were of equestrian rank. However, few of the family are recorded
outside of inscriptions.[1] Members This
list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see
filiation. Mustius, an eques and publican, whose stepson and ward, Marcus
Junius, was defrauded by Verres during the latter's praetorship in 75 BC. On
another occasion, the circumstances of which have been forgotten, Cicero spoke
in Mustius' defense, but his speech has been lost.[2][3] Mustius, an architect,
and a friend of Pliny the Younger.[4][5] Titus Mustius C. f. Hostilius
Fabricius Medulla Augurinus, praetor during the reign of Trajan.[5] Quintus
Mustius Priscus, consul suffectus in AD 145.[5] See also List of Roman gentes
References Dictionary of Greek and Roman
Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1127 ("Mustius"). Cicero, In Verrem, i. 51, 52. Pseudo-Asconius, In Verrem, I, p. 195. Pliny the Younger,
Epistulae, ix. 39. PIR, vol. I, p. 395.
Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Verrem. Pseudo-Asconius,
Commentarius in Oratorio Ciceronis in Verrem (Commentary on Cicero's In
Verrem), ed. Orelli. Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the
Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and
Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Paul
von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani
(The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898).
Category: Roman gentes
MUZ
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio -- Grex giceiana – Muzio. Gaius Mucius Scaevola in the
Presence of Lars Porsena (early 1640s), oil painting by Matthias Stom (Art
Gallery of New South Wales) The gens Mucia was an ancient and noble plebeian
house at ancient Rome. Members of this gens appear during the earliest period
of the Republic, but the family only attained prominence from the time of the
Second Punic War.[1] Origin The first of
the Mucii to appear in history is Gaius Mucius Scaevola, a young man at the
inception of the Roman Republic. According to legend, he volunteered to
infiltrate the camp of Lars Porsena, the king of Clusium, who besieged Rome
c. 508 BC, and who may in fact have captured and held the city for some time.
Mucius, armed with a dagger, attempted to assassinate Porsena, but unfamiliar
with Etruscan dress, he mistook the king's secretary for the king, and was
captured. Brought before the king,
Mucius declared that he was but one of three hundred Roman men who had sworn to
carry out this mission, or die in the attempt. As a show of bravery, it was
said that he thrust his right hand into a brazier, and stood silently as it
burned. Porsena was so impressed by his courage and endurance that Mucius was
freed, and some traditions held that Porsena withdrew his army in fear of the
threat of assassination invented by the young Roman.[2] At one time it was supposed that any Roman of
consequence during this period must have been a patrician, and that the Mucii
must therefore have been a patrician gens that was later supplanted by its
plebeian descendants.[1] But assuming that the would-be assassin was a real
person, all of the other Mucii known to history seem to have been plebeians,
suggesting that there may never have been a patrician family of this name. Praenomina The only praenomina used by the
Mucii mentioned during the Republic were Publius, Quintus, and Gaius, each of
which were among the most common names at all periods of Roman history. Marcus
is also found among the Mucii of imperial times.[3] Branches and cognomina The only major family
of the Mucii bore the cognomen Scaevola. This surname is said to have been
acquired by Gaius Mucius, who lost the use of his right hand following his
attempt on the life of Lars Porsena, and was subsequently called Scaevola
because only his left hand remained. The similar cognomen, Scaeva, which occurs
in other gentes, including among the Junii, is generally assumed to mean
"left handed",[i] and Scaevola could be a diminutive form; but in
ordinary usage, scaevola referred to an amulet.[4] The only other important cognomen of the
Mucii was Cordus, borne by some of the Scaevolae. According to some traditions,
Gaius Mucius was originally surnamed Cordus, and assumed the surname Scaevola
on account of his deed before Porsena. However, it may be that the tradition concerning
his right hand was a later addition to the story, intended to explain the
descent of the Mucii Scaevolae from one of the heroes of the Republic. Although
Gaius Mucius was a patrician, the later Mucii Scaevolae were plebeians.[5][6] Members This list includes abbreviated
praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Gaius Mucius
Scaevola, attempted the life of Lars Porsena, c. 508 BC.[7][8] Publius Mucius
Scaevola, tribune of the plebs in 486 BC, supposedly burned nine of his colleagues
for conspiring with the consul Spurius Cassius Vecellinus.[9][10][11] Publius
Mucius Scaevola, father of the praetor of 215 BC.[12] Quintus Mucius P. f.
Scaevola, praetor in 215 BC, received Sardinia as his province. His command
there was prolonged for three years. He may have been consul in 220.[13][14]
Publius Mucius Q. f. P. n. Scaevola, praetor in 179 BC, and consul in 175,
triumphed over the Ligures.[15][16][17] Quintus Mucius Q. f. P. n. Scaevola,
praetor in 179 BC, and consul in 174.[18][19] Publius Mucius (P. f. Q. n.)
Scaevola, consul in 133 BC; two years later he succeeded his brother, Publius
Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, as Pontifex Maximus. He was regarded as one of
the founders of the jus civile.[20][21][22][23][24][25][26] Publius Licinius
Crassus Dives Mucianus, Pontifex Maximus, and consul in 131 BC; he was defeated
and killed by Aristonicus.[27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34] Quintus Mucius Q. f.
Q. n. Scaevola, called the augur, consul in 117 BC.[35][36][37] Mucia Q. f. Q.
n., the elder daughter of Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the augur, married Lucius
Licinius Crassus, the orator, who was consul in 95 BC, and the colleague of
Mucia's cousin, Quintus Mucius Scaevola.[38][39][40] Tertia Mucia Q. f. Q. n.,
better known as Mucia Tertia, the younger daughter of the augur, married Gnaeus
Pompeius, the triumvir.[41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48] Quintus Mucius P. f.
(P. n.) Scaevola, consul in 95 BC and Pontifex Maximus, was murdered at the
temple of Vesta by order of the younger
Marius.[49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57] Publius Mucius Scaevola, triumvir
monetalis in 70 BC, then pontifex from 69. He used the cognomen Cordus on his
coins, in order to highlight his descent from the mythical Scaevola.[58] Gaius
Mucius Scaevola, one of the quindecimviri sacris faciundis in 17 BC.[59] Gaius
Licinius Mucianus, consul in AD 52, 70, and 75; a general, statesman, orator,
and historian praised by Tacitus, he was a strong supporter of
Vespasian.[60][61][62][63][64][65][66] See also List of Roman gentes
Footnotes Scaeva could also refer to a
favourable omen. References Citations
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1117
("Mucia Gens"). Livy, ii. 12,
13. PW, "Mucius", No. 11. The New College Latin & English
Dictionary, s. v. scaeva, scaevola.
Livy, ii. 13. Varro, De Lingua
Latina, vi. 5. Livy, ii. 13. Niebuhr, History of Rome, vol. i, "The
War with Porsenna". Valerius
Maximus, vi. 3. § 2. Festus, 180 L. Broughton, vol. I, p. 21. Broughton, vol. I, p. 235. Livy, xxiii. 24, 30, 34, 40, xxiv. 9, 44,
xxv. 3, xxvii. 8. Broughton, vol. I, pp.
235, 236 (note 1), 255. Livy, xl. 44,
xli. 19. Fasti Triumphales. Broughton, vol. I, pp. 401, 403 (note
1). Livy, xl. 44, xlii. 49, 67. Broughton, vol. I, p. 403. Plutarch, "The Life of Tiberius
Gracchus", c. 9. Cicero, Pro
Plancio, c. 36, De Domo Sua, c. 34, De Oratore, i. 50, Brutus, c. 28. Digesta, 1. tit. 2.
s. 2. § 9; 24. tit. 3. s. 66; 50. tit. 7. s. 17; 49. tit. 15. s. 4. Valerius Maximus, viii. 8, 2. Quintilian, xi. 2. Zimmern, Geschichte des Römischen
Privatrechts, vol. i, p. 277. Broughton,
vol. I, p. 492. Plutarch, "The Life
of Tiberius Gracchus", 9, 21.
Cicero, "De Oratore", i. 37, 56, Brutus, 26, 33. Livy, Epitome, 59. Gellius, i. 13. Valerius Maximus, viii. 7. § 6. Digesta, 1. tit. 2. s. 2. § 40, ff. Drumann, Geschichte Roms, "Licinii
Crassi", No. 21. Broughton, vol. I,
pp. 499, 500. Cicero, Laelius de
Amicitia, 8, c. 1, Brutus, c. 26, 35, De Finibus, i. 3, De Oratore, i. 17, ii.
70, Philippicae, viii. 10, Pro Balbo, c. 20.
Valerius Maximus, iii. 8, iv. 1. § 11, iv. 5. § 4, viii. 12. § 1. Broughton, vol. I, pp. 523, 524, 529, 530
(note 1). Cicero, Brutus, 58. § 211, De
Oratore, iii. 12. Valerius Maximus,
viii. 8. § 1. Quintilian, i. 1. §
6. Asconius Pedianus, In Ciceronis Pro
Scauro, p. 19 (ed. Orelli). Cicero,
Epistulae ad Familiares, v. 2, Epistulae ad Atticum, i. 12. Cassius Dio, xxxvii. 49, xlviii. 16, li. 2,
lvi. 38. Appian, Bellum Civile, v. 69,
72. Suetonius,
"The Life of Caesar", 50.
Plutarch, "The Life of Pompeius", 42. Zonaras, x. 5. St. Jerome, Adversus Jovinianum, i. 48. Cicero, De Officiis, i. 32, iii. 11, 15, De
Oratore, i. 39, iii. 3, Pro Roscio Amerino, 12, Brutus, 39, 52, 89, De Legibus,
ii. 20. Velleius Paterculus, ii. 26. Florus, iii. 21. Lucan, ii. 126. Appian, Bellum Civile, i. 88. Valerius Maximus, ix. 11. Plutarch, "The Life of Sulla", c.
25. Digesta, 41. tit. 1. s. 64; 43 tit.
20. s. 8; 50 tit. 16. s. 241; tit. 17. s. 73; 35. tit. 1. s. 7, 77, 79,
ff. Broughton, vol. II, pp. 11, 37. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p.
413. PIR, vol. I, p. 387. Tacitus, Historiae, i. 10, 76, ii. 4, 5,
76–84, iii. 8, 46, 53, 78, iv. 4, 11, 39, 80, 85. Suetonius, "The Life of Vespasian",
6, 13. Cassius Dio, lxv. 8, 9, 22, lxvi.
2, 9, 13. Josephus, Bellum Judaïcum, iv.
10, 11. Pliny the Elder, xii. 1. s. 5,
xxviii. 2. § 5, xxxiv. 7. s. 17 ff.
Vossius, De Historicis Latinis, i. 27, p. 140. Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit, § 82,
n. 19. Bibliography Marcus Terentius Varro, De Lingua Latina (On the Latin
Language). Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, De Domo Sua, De Finibus Bonorum et
Malorum, De Legibus, De Officiis, De Oratore, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae
ad Familiares, Laelius de Amicitia, Philippicae, Pro Balbo, Pro Plancio, Pro
Sexto Roscio Amerino, Topica. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Marcus
Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac
Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Marcus Annaeus
Lucanus (Lucan), Pharsalia. Quintus Asconius Pedianus, Commentarius in Oratio
Ciceronis Pro Scauro (Commentary on Cicero's Oration Pro Scauro). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Naturalis Historia (Natural
History). Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (Quintilian), Institutio Oratoria
(Institutes of Oratory). Flavius Josephus, Bellum Judaïcum (The Jewish War).
Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Historiae. Plutarchus, Lives of the Noble Greeks and
Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or
The Twelve Caesars). Lucius Annaeus Florus, Epitome de T. Livio Bellorum Omnium
Annorum DCC (Epitome of Livy: All the Wars of Seven Hundred Years). Appianus
Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Aulus Gellius, Noctes
Atticae (Attic Nights). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman
History. Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus (St. Jerome), Adversus Jovinianum
(Against Jovinianus). Digesta seu Pandectae (The Digest). Joannes Zonaras,
Epitome Historiarum (Epitome of History). Gerardus Vossius, De Historicis
Latinis (The Latin Historians), Jan Maire, Brittenburg (1627). Sigmund Wilhelm
Zimmern, Geschichte des Römischen Privatrechts bis Justinian (History of Roman
Private Law to Justinian), J. C. B. Mohr, Heidelberg (1826). Barthold Georg
Niebuhr, The History of Rome, Julius Charles Hare and Connop Thirlwall, trans.,
John Smith, Cambridge (1828). Wilhelm Drumann, Geschichte Roms in seinem
Übergang von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung, oder: Pompeius,
Caesar, Cicero und ihre Zeitgenossen, Königsberg (1834–1844). Anton Westermann,
Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit in Greichenland und Rom (History of Rhetoric in
Greece and Rome), Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig (1835). Dictionary of Greek
and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and
Company, Boston (1849). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau,
Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire,
abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the
Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). John C. Traupman, The
New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995).
Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974,
2001). Categories: MuciiRoman gentes and your choice of a Grice/Speranza
vignette from THIS gens? Thanks
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio -- Grex giceiana – Muzio. For the Mucii, I would choose
Gaius Mucius Scaevola without hesitation. Not because he is the most historical
member of the gens—indeed, the story is partly legendary—but because he is
almost a ready-made Gricean thought experiment about intention, failure,
communication, and reputation. The sequence is superb: He intends to kill Porsena. He kills the
wrong man. The action fails. He is captured. He gives an explanation of his
intention. He burns his hand. The failed assassin becomes a Roman hero.
(According to the tradition summarized by Livy and others.) A Griceian immediately notices: The physical act failed. The communicative
act succeeded. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: What did Scaevola accomplish? GRICE:
Assassination. SHROPSHIRE: But he killed the wrong man. GRICE:
Precisely. SHROPSHIRE: Then he failed. GRICE:
Physically. SHROPSHIRE: Yet history calls him a hero. GRICE:
Because his intention survived the failure. The deepest Griceian moment is not the
stabbing. It is the speech before Porsena:
"I am one of three hundred."
Whether historically true or not, the story turns on the transmission of
information. Scaevola cannot kill Porsena. So he successfully communicates
something more terrifying: "There
are many more like me." The dagger
fails. The message succeeds. The hand in
the fire The famous burning of the hand is even more Griceian. PORSENA: You fear torture. MUCIUS:
Watch. (Hand enters brazier.) The
act says: "Your threats have no
force." No words are strictly
necessary. A paradigmatic non-verbal implicature. Corpus PORSENA: Why are you smiling? MUCIUS:
Because you think you have captured me.
PORSENA: Have I not? MUCIUS:
You have captured my body.
PORSENA: And? MUCIUS:
The message has already been delivered.
+> Rome cannot be intimidated.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio -- Grex giceiana – Muzio. The alternative choice My
second choice would be Quintus Mucius Scaevola the jurist and Pontifex Maximus,
whom Cicero admired and who helped shape the ius civile. A Grice/Speranza
dialogue on legal interpretation would be wonderful. But if one wants a single
iconic vignette for the gens, nothing beats Scaevola before Porsena. Speranzian
epigram Dextram amisit; famam invenit.
He lost his right hand; he found his reputation. Or, in more Gricean terms: Mucius failed to kill a king, but succeeded
in conveying an intention.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Muzio The Lapide dei Quattuorviri, now in
the wall of a church at Gottolengo, near the ancient city of Brixia. The stone dates to the first century, and commemorates the construction
of a defensive tower by the quattuorviri of Brixia, Gaius Mutius, Publius
Popillius, Quintus Mucius, and Marcus Cornelius. The gens Mutia was an obscure
plebeian family at Rome. None of its members is known to have held any
magistracy, but many are known from inscriptions, including a large number of
freedmen. Members This list includes
abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation.
Gaius Mutius Sex. f., one of the quattuorviri[i] at Brixia, who erected a
defensive tower on the site of the present village of Gottolengo, dated to the
first century.[1] Gaius Mutius Eutychus, named in a large inscription from
Rome, from the time of the emperor Vespasian.[2] Lucius Mutius Fortunatus,
named in an inscription from Rome, recording a gift to Diana, dated to AD
86.[3] Lucius Mutius Trophimus, named in an inscription from Rome, recording a
gift to Diana, dated to AD 86.[3] Lucius Mutius L. l. Pamphilus, a freedman,
named in an inscription from Rome.[4] Lucius Mutius L. f. Faustus, buried at
Rome, aged eight years.[5] Quintus Mutius, the former master of Antiochus,
Adrastus, Philargurus, and Mutia Philete.[6] Quintus Mutius Q. l. Antiochus, a
freedman named in an inscription from Rome.[6] Mutia Q. l. Philete, a
freedwoman named in an inscription from Rome.[6] Quintus Mutius Q. l. Adrastus,
a freedman named in an inscription from Rome.[6] Quintus Mutius Q. l.
Philargurus, a freedman named in an inscription from Rome.[6] Marcus Mutius,
the former master of Marcus Mutius Salvius.[7] Marcus Mutius M. l. Salvius, a
freedman buried at Rome.[7] Lucius Mutius, the former master of Bithus and
Mutia Hilara.[8] Lucius Mutius L. l. Bithus, a freedman named in an inscription
from Rome.[8] Mutia L. l. Hilara, a freedwoman named in an inscription from
Rome.[8] Titus Mutius, the former master of Moschus, Carito, and Mutia
Philematia.[9] Titus Mutius T. l. Moschus, a freedman buried at Rome.[9] Mutia
T. l. Philematia, a freedwoman buried at Rome.[9] Titus Mutius T. l. Carito, a
freedman buried at Rome.[9] Lucius Mutius L. f. Faustinus, buried at Bulla
Regia in Africa Proconsularis, aged seventy-four.[10] Gaius Mutius Sabinianus,
erected a monument to his late wife, Neria Aetia, at Beneventum.[11] Gaius
Mutius, named in a libationary inscription dedicated to Hercules, found at
Poggi Alti in Etruria.[12] Marcus Mutius, named in a libationary inscription
dedicated to Hercules, found at Poggi Alti in Etruria.[12] Lucius Mutius
Gentilis, mentioned in an inscription found at Venterol, formerly part of
Gallia Narbonensis.[13] Sextus Mutius, the former master of Sextus Mutius
Numenius, Mutia Eleutheris, and Mutia Vitalis.[14] Sextus Mutius Sex. l.
Numenius, a freedman, named in a funerary inscription from Rome.[14] Mutia Sex.
l. Eleutheris, a freedwoman, named in a funerary inscription from Rome.[14]
Mutia Sex. l. Vitalis, a freedwoman, named in a funerary inscription from
Rome.[14] Gaius Mutius C. l., named in an inscription from Samothrace.[15] Footnotes A board of four municipal officials. See also
List of Roman gentes References CIL V,
4131. CIL VI, 200, AE 1999, 193. CIL VI, 127. CIL VI, 5880.
CIL VI, 22782. CIL VI,
33608. CIL VI, 35896. CIL VI, 38647. CIL VI, 38648. CIL VIII, 25626. CIL IX, 1902.
CIL XI, 2644. AE 1969, 372. AE 2001, 401. CIL I, 2941. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et
alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions,
abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften
(1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in
Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Category: Roman gentes and what is your choice for Grice/Speranza
vignette from THIS gens? Thanks But for a Grice e Muzio vignette I would choose
the quattuorviri tower inscription. Speranzian dialogue SHROPSHIRE: What are you reading? GRICE:
An inscription. SHROPSHIRE: About a tower? GRICE:
About four men. SHROPSHIRE: Who built it?
GRICE: The inscription does not
say. SHROPSHIRE: Then what does it say? GRICE:
Who wished posterity to know that it had been built. SHROPSHIRE:
Ah. GRICE: Municipal implicature. The tower itself performs the deixis; the inscription
supplies the civic metadata. That's a very Speranza-like theme, and it connects
beautifully to your earlier discussions of the Mimesii and Roman public
inscriptions. and does the inscription in latin reads 'defensive' and was it
built on the city walls? Thanks Good question. Based on the material we have, I
would be cautious. The gens article says:
the inscription commemorates the erection of a defensive tower by the
quattuorviri of Brixia. But that does
not necessarily mean the Latin inscription itself contains an adjective
equivalent to "defensive." That may be a modern historian's
description of the structure rather than a word occurring in the text. I have
not found the text of CIL V 4131 itself, so I cannot verify the exact Latin
wording. [cil.bbaw.de], [cil.bbaw.de] Likewise, I have not found evidence that
the tower stood on the city walls. The article states only that the
quattuorviri erected a tower at the site of modern Gottolengo near ancient
Brixia. The search results I found do not specify: the exact Latin text, whether the tower
formed part of a wall, whether it was a watchtower, whether it was a
gate-tower, or whether it was an isolated fortified structure. [cil.bbaw.de],
[cil.bbaw.de] So, philologically, the
safest Griceian exchange would actually be: VIATOR: Quid est?
(What is it?) MVTIVS:
Turris. (A tower.) VIATOR: Defensiva?
(Defensive?) MVTIVS: Ita
speramus. (We certainly hope so.) The
joke works even better if the inscription merely says turris (or records the
construction) and the modern archaeologist supplies "defensive." A
very Gricean moral:
"Defensive" may be an implicature of the tower rather than a
word in the inscription. And that's
exactly the sort of distinction Grice would enjoy making. does this below help.
Grand tour. TOUR GUIDE: Grice, hurry up -- we're leaving. (Grice inspecting
inscriptions and rambling about). G: No tower -- TOUR GUIDE: We're leaving!
Grice: No tower but sign of a tower. Tour guide: It was a defensive tower --
what do you expect? Peirce cannot stop offensives! Thanks The Latin inscription
associated with "Mutius tower" (properly known as the Lapide dei
Quattuorviri, embedded in the wall of the parish church apse in Gottolengo)
reads: Q(uintus) MVCIVS P(ubli) F(ilius) M(arcus) CORNELIVS P(ubli) F(ilius)
C(aius) MVTIVS SEX(ti) F(ilius) P(ublius) POPILLIVS M(arci) F(ilius) IIIIVIR(i)
TVRREM EX D(ecreto) D(ecurionum) AD AVGENDAS LOCAVER(e) IDEMQVE PROBAVERE [1,
2] 📜 English
Translation "Quintus Mucius, son of Publius; Marcus Cornelius, son of
Publius; Gaius Mutius, son of Sextus; Publius Popillius, son of Marcus;
Quattuorviri (the four municipal magistrates), by decree of the decurions (town
council), contracted out the construction of this tower to expand [the
fortifications], and they themselves approved and tested it." [1, 2, 3] 🏛️ Historical
Context Origin: Dating back to the 1st century BCE (late Roman Republic /
pre-Augustan era), this stone commemorates the expansion of defensive
fortifications. [1, 2] The "Tower": No physical traces of the
original defensive tower remain. [1] Current Location: The ancient stone slab
was discovered in the pavement of an old medieval church. It was salvaged and
later built directly into the exterior apse wall of the current 18th-century
parish church in Gottolengo, Italy. [1, 2, 3] If you are researching a specific
historical figure or looking for more details on this region, let me know if
you would like to explore the archaeological history of Brescia (Brixia) or
look into other epigraphs from the Roman Republic. [1, 2, 3] Yes — that helps
enormously, because now we actually have the wording. What leaps out is not
"defensive" but: TVRREM ... AD
AVGENDAS ... LOCAVERE IDEMQVE PROBAVERE
and especially: locavere
"they contracted (it) out"
and probavere "they
approved/inspected/certified (it)."
This is exactly the same civic-magisterial language that delighted us in
the Mimesii inscription. The quattuorviri are not claiming: "We built the tower." They are claiming: "By decree of the town council, we
tendered the project and then approved the completed work." In modern terms, they are closer to a
building committee than to masons. And this improves the Grice vignette
wonderfully. Grand Tour at Gottolengo
DVX ITINERIS: Grice, festina!
Discedimus. (Grice, hurry up! We're leaving.)
GRICEVS: Nondum. (Not yet.) DVX:
Quid spectas? (What are you looking at?)
GRICEVS: Nulla turris. (No
tower.) DVX: Quid ais? Inscriptio de turre est. (What are
you talking about? The inscription concerns a tower.) GRICEVS:
Immo. (Indeed.) DVX: Ergo ubi est turris? (Then where is the
tower?) GRICEVS: Non turris; signum turris. (Not the tower; a
sign of the tower.) DVX: Turris defensiva fuit. (It was a defensive
tower.) GRICEVS: Quod Peirce approbaret. (Which Peirce would
approve.) DVX: Cur? (Why?)
GRICEVS: Signa offensiones sistere
non possunt. (Signs cannot stop invasions.)
DVX: At turres possunt. (But
towers can.) GRICEVS: Nisi deletae sint. (Unless they've
disappeared.) Even more Gricean
DVX: Quattuorviri turrim fecerunt. (The
quattuorviri built the tower.)
GRICEVS: Minime. (Not at
all.) DVX: Nonne hoc dicit inscriptio? (Doesn't the
inscription say that?) GRICEVS: Non dicit fecerunt. (It doesn't say
"they built it".) DVX: Quid dicit? (What does it say?) GRICEVS:
Locavere. (They contracted it out.)
DVX: Et? (And?) GRICEVS:
Probavere. (They approved it.)
DVX: Ergo quis aedificavit? (Then
who built it?) GRICEVS: Ut semper, ii quorum nomina periērunt. (As
always, those whose names have perished.)
A very Speranzian epigram would be:
TVRRIS PERIIT; INSCRIPTIO MANSIT. The tower perished; the inscription
remained. Or, more Gricean: Turris hostes prohibebat; inscriptio
oblivionem. The tower kept out enemies; the inscription keeps out oblivion. And
no mention in the inscription about 'use' or 'point' of tower. Where would this
be located today? Perhaps they wanted a better view of the landscape and a
tower was the only way to get it? Thanks Exactly. The inscription, as you've
quoted it, says essentially: TVRREM ...
LOCAVERE IDEMQVE PROBAVERE "They contracted out the tower and approved
it." It does not say: why the tower was built, whom it was supposed
to defend against, whether it stood on a wall, whether it was a watchtower,
whether it guarded a gate, whether it had any military use at all. The modern description "defensive
tower" is an archaeological interpretation, not a purpose clause found in
the text itself (at least not in the wording you've supplied). The inscription
is remarkably bureaucratic: "By
decree of the decurions, we commissioned the tower and certified the completed
work." One almost hears the
municipal paperwork. As for location,
the information you quoted says that: the
stone survives today in the wall of the parish church at Gottolengo, near
ancient Brixia (modern Brescia); no physical remains of the tower itself
survive. So we have the inscription but not the structure. The tower's precise
appearance and function are therefore uncertain. And your Griceian speculation is delightful:
DVX ITINERIS: It was a defensive
tower. (It was a defensive tower.)
GRICEVS: Unde scis? (How do you know?) DVX: Quia archaeologi ita dicunt. (Because archaeologists say so.) GRICEVS: Fortasse prospectum meliorem cupiebant. (Perhaps they merely wanted a better view.)
DVX: Quattuorviri? (The city magistrates?) GRICEVS: Etiam magistratus interdum prospectus
amant. (Even magistrates sometimes enjoy
a view.) The strictly historical answer is:
We know there was a tower. We know the magistrates commissioned and
approved it. We do not know from the inscription itself what its purpose
was. Which leads to a very Gricean
motto: Turris adest in inscriptione;
ratio turris abest. The tower is present in the inscription; the reason for the
tower is absent. If it was defensive, it didn't defend itself -- from stuff. Do
Roman towers subsist? What year was this? Your first remark is wonderfully
Speranzian: If the tower was defensive,
it failed to defend itself. Or in
mock-Latin: Turris defensiva se ipsam
non defendit. (The defensive tower did not defend itself.) That is exactly the irony. The tower
disappears; the inscription remains. As for the date, I would be cautious. The
gens entry says: Gaius Mutius Sex. f.,
one of the quattuorviri at Brixia, erected a defensive tower ... dated to the
first century. The additional text you
provided says: the stone dates to the
first century BCE (late Republic / pre-Augustan period). I have not independently verified the exact
century, so I can only report that the material you've supplied places it
somewhere around the late Republic or early Imperial period. I cannot narrow it
down further from the evidence before us. As for Roman towers generally: yes,
many Roman towers survive, although often in altered form. Watchtowers, gate
towers, and stretches of fortification survive in various parts of the former
Empire. But for this particular tower, the information you've supplied
explicitly says: No physical traces of
the original tower remain. The
inscription survives today at Gottolengo, built into the wall of the parish
church, but not the tower itself. A Grice/Speranza dialogue practically writes
itself: VIATOR: Ubi est turris? (Where is the tower?) GRICEVS: Nusquam.
(Nowhere.) VIATOR: Quid
superest? (What remains?) GRICEVS: Inscriptio.
(The inscription.) VIATOR: Ergo
turris periit. (Then the tower
perished.) GRICEVS: Ita. (Indeed.) VIATOR: Quid ergo defendit? (Then what does it defend?) GRICEVS: Memoriam quattuorvirorum. (The memory of the four magistrates.) +> The practical function vanished; the
commemorative function prevailed. That,
in fact, is often the fate of Roman public works: the utility disappears, while
the inscription continues its conversation with posterity.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Muzio For the Mutii, I would go in exactly
the opposite direction from the grand heroic Scaevola. The Mutii are interesting because they are so unheroic. My choice would
be: Gaius Mutius Sex. f., one of the
quattuorviri of Brixia who helped erect a defensive tower. The inscription
commemorates the work along with three colleagues. citeCIL V, 4131 (user-provided text) Why? Because this is the municipal version of
the Mimesii cistern inscription you were discussing earlier. No assassination.
No burned hand. No Augustus. No conspiracy. Just: four magistrates, one tower, one
inscription. A very Gricean theme
emerges: collective agency. Corpus SHROPSHIRE: What did Mutius do? GRICE:
Built a tower. SHROPSHIRE: Alone?
GRICE: Certainly not. SHROPSHIRE:
Then why is his name there?
GRICE: Because inscriptions
commemorate responsibility more readily than labour. SHROPSHIRE:
Who carried the stones?
GRICE: History declines to
say. The contrast with Mucius Scaevola
is wonderful.
Mucius ScaevolaGaius Mutiusone herofour magistratesone dramatic actone
municipal projectintention highlightedadministration
highlightedlegendinscription M.
Finished! -- Viewer: What is it? M: A defensive tower. Viewer: You mean a
tower. M: Defensive. Thanks Perfect. It captures the Roman municipal mind
exactly. Turris Defensiva MVTIVS:
Perfectum est! (It's finished!)
VIATOR: Quid est? (What is
it?) MVTIVS: Turris defensiva. (A defensive tower.) VIATOR:
Vis dicere turrim. (You mean a tower.)
MVTIVS: Defensivam.
(Defensive.) VIATOR: Num est aliqua turris offensiva? (Is there
such a thing as an offensive tower?)
MVTIVS: Spero non apud nos. (I
hope not in our municipality.) Gricean
version VIATOR: Quid fecisti hodie?
(What did you do today?) MVTIVS: Turrim defensivam aedificavimus. (We built a
defensive tower.) VIATOR: Ergo hostes adsunt? (So there are enemies
nearby?) MVTIVS: Nondum. (Not yet.) +> There may be some reason to expect
them. Or perhaps even more Griceian:
VIATOR: Quid est? (What is it?) MVTIVS:
Turris defensiva. (A defensive tower.)
VIATOR: Cur addis "defensiva"?
(Why add "defensive"?)
MVTIVS: Quia
"sumptuosa" populum minus delectat. (Because "expensive
tower" pleases the public less.)
+> Public works are easier to justify when one invokes danger. A Speranzian moral: "TURRIS" DESCRIBIT AEDIFICIUM;
"DEFENSIVA" DESCRIBIT BUDGETUM. "'Tower' describes the building;
'defensive' describes the budget." That's very
Roman—and very Gricean.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Muzio A second possibility would be one of
the freedmen groups: Quintus Mutius and
Antiochus, Adrastus, Philargurus, Philete.
The names themselves are philosophically
attractive: Antiochus Adrastus
Philargurus ("lover of silver") Philete because they reveal a whole social world of
masters, freedmen, naming, and identity.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio – GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: Muzio -- Gens Mucia Mucio Scaevola, C.
A.U.C. CCLXVI Move 1 Lars Porsena: "Nisi mihi coniurationem aperis, te
vivum cremabo!" Move 2 Mucio [cum gravitate]: "Vide quam barbare
corpus contemnant qui magnam gloriam quaerunt." Abbott-Style Translation:
Porsena: "Tell me who else is plotting against me, or I will roast you
alive right now!" Mucio: "Do watch closely; we Romans treat physical
comfort as a rather tedious afterthought when there is glory to be won."
+> IMPLICATURA: That burning one hand is a minor party trick compared to
what the other three hundred hidden Roman assassins will do to Porsena. Muzio
MUST have said something or screamed? Historical evidence for Latin utterance
by Muzio below? Historical contextualisation? Best in Livy? I know,
reconstruction, not actual utterance, but Livy does say Muzio does say
something -- and contextualisation -- why so preice about the three hundred?
Input? Feedback? Thanks. Passage: Excellent case—because here, unlike your more
freely constructed sententiae, Livy really does give you words in Mucius’
mouth, and they are very close to what you’re aiming at. 1. What Livy actually has Mucius say (crucial
evidence) From Livy (2.12), once Mucius is captured and brought before
Porsenna, he speaks at length. The key parts (in substance, with Latin anchor):
(a) Declaration of identity and ethos
Romanus sum civis… nec minus agere quam pati fortia possum. → “I am a
Roman citizen… I can endure suffering as bravely as I act.”
[anastrophe...hicago.edu] (b) The
famous “300” claim trecenti
coniuravimus… → “We, three hundred, the foremost youths of Rome, have
conspired…” [loebclassics.com] and: mea prima sors fuit; ceteri… suo quisque
tempore aderunt → “Mine was the first lot; the others will come, each in turn…”
[loebclassics.com] (c) The body–glory
contrast (your key line!) Livy (as paraphrased very closely in tradition): vide… quam parvi corpus sit iis qui magnam
gloriam spectant Your version: Vide quam… corpus contemnant qui magnam
gloriam quaerunt This is not verbatim
Livy, but it is remarkably faithful to the sense. In fact, later summaries
preserve almost exactly your idea:
“Watch… how cheap the body is to men who seek great glory.”
[en.wikipedia.org] So: yes: Mucius does utter something very close
to this your sentence = a faithful rhetorical reconstruction, not invention ex
nihilo 2. The three hundred: why so
precise? This is not a random number—it is doing heavy work. (A) Within the
narrative Mucius says: there are 300
Roman youths, each ready to attempt assassination → effect on Porsenna: not one fanatic but a serial threat This is exactly why Livy says Porsenna is
shaken: he fears having to undergo
danger “as many times as there are conspirators” [loebclassics.com] (B) Cultural background “300” resonates
deeply in Roman and Greek tradition:
compact elite band quasi-heroic unit (cf. Thermopylae) So it signals: → organized, aristocratic
courage, not mob action (C) Rhetorical
function (Gricean) The number creates an implicature: even if you defeat me → more will come →
indefinitely So: literal content: “there are 300” implicature:
you cannot escape this threat 3. Does
Mucius “scream”? What is the tone? Livy’s presentation is very clear: calm, controlled, declarative not screaming,
but self-authorizing rhetoric Even when
threatened with torture: he speaks then
performs (burns his hand) So the
sequence: speech → demonstration → further speech This is very similar to your
earlier patterns: words insufficient
action confirms them 4. The famous
“hand in fire” Livy’s structure: threat
of torture Mucius responds by burning his own hand then continues the
speech The deed is: not punishment but self-chosen demonstration
of indifference to pain Which matches
exactly your line’s philosophy: body =
negligible glory = ultimate 5. What
kind of figure is this? Your sentence: Vide
quam… corpus contemnant qui magnam gloriam quaerunt This involves: (a) Imperative + demonstratio
vide = “look!” → deictic invitation to witness (b) Generalization “those who
seek glory” → from individual → type (Roman youth, even humanity) (c)
Stoicizing paradox (avant la lettre) body ≪ glory Not
irony Nothing hidden: it is hyper-explicit Not hyperbole alone Because the
demonstration (burning hand) makes it literal Best classification: →
performative exemplum He says it, then enacts it. 6. Your implicature reading (spot-on) You
wrote: that burning one hand is minor
compared to what the other 300 will do
Yes—this is exactly Livy’s logic. Mucius’ speech has two layers: explicit: → “I despise bodily pain”
implicature: → “you face a whole class of such men” So Porsenna infers: → the threat is systemic,
not individual 7. Final synthesis Livy does give Mucius a speech, including the
famous claim about the contempt for the body and the existence of three hundred
conspirators. [loebclassics.com], [en.wikipedia.org] Your sentence is not
verbatim but is a very accurate condensation of Livy’s language and concept.
The number “three hundred” functions rhetorically to convert a single failed
assassin into a collective, repeated threat, which is precisely what induces
Porsenna to negotiate. The figure is best understood as a performative
exemplum: the utterance about despising the body is immediately enacted by
Mucius’ self-mutilation, collapsing the distinction between saying and
doing. If you like, we could now
compare Mucius’ line (“body is cheap”) with Stoic formulations (Seneca etc.),
where the same idea becomes fully philosophical rather than heroic-narrative. And why this thing
against Lars Porsenna? Grice and Speranza are reminded of Tristan and Isolde
where the hand over fire is superstitiously related to godly protection. Not
here -- So please supply reason of Muzio's animosity against Lars and whether
the 300 eventually did get rid of Lars? How is this read ethnically? Was a fire
just there, and he made the best of the occasion? What kind of torture was
intended or threatened by Lars? Because the Druids ( cf. Norma by Bellini) set
culprits on fire -- cf. witches of Salem. Input? Feedback? Thanks. You are
asking the right cluster of questions here, because the Mucius episode only
really makes sense once we separate three layers: historical-political situation (why Porsenna
/ why hatred) dramatic staging in Livy (why fire, why threat)
semiotic/rhetorical function (why it “works”)
Let me go step by step. 1. Why
hostility toward Lars Porsenna? This is not personal animosity; it is structural,
political, almost constitutional hatred.
Rome has just expelled its king (Tarquinius Superbus). Tarquin seeks
restoration and calls in Lars Porsenna, king of Clusium. Porsenna invades Italy
and besieges Rome. [en.wikipedia.org]
So: from the Roman perspective,
Porsenna is the external instrument of monarchy trying to return That is crucial: Mucius is not acting as a private assassin he
is acting as a citizen-agent of the new Republic Livy even frames it this way: → it is a
disgrace that free Rome is besieged → therefore a magnus facinus is needed (a
great deed) So the “hatred” is really:
res publica vs regnum 2. Why did
Mucius try to kill him? Very simple and very Roman: eliminate the person → end the siege Livy’s own structure makes this explicit: there is no army engagement possible so
Mucius proposes targeted killing This is
early “asymmetric warfare”: not battle
(acies) but individual lethal initiative
3. What happened after? Did the “300” succeed? No—and this is
essential. Mucius claims: trecenti
coniuravimus (“300 of us have sworn”) [Cloelia (L...1) - VROMA] but no further
assassins appear Instead: Porsenna is terrified by the prospect and
negotiates peace He withdraws → no
restoration of Tarquin → Rome survives. [en.wikipedia.org] So the “300”
function is: deterrence, not
execution It is almost certainly: rhetorical exaggeration possibly outright
bluff But a successful bluff. 4. The fire: was it just “there”? Yes—and
here Livy is very concrete. Sources consistently say: the fire was already burning for sacrifice
(altar fire) [en.wikipedia.org] So: this is not ordeal, not ritual trial not
“Tristan hand-in-fire proving innocence”
Instead: Mucius opportunistically
uses what is present → transforms a threatened instrument of torture into a
self-imposed demonstration 5. What
torture did Porsenna threaten? Livy (and the tradition) clearly imply: burning alive or burning as torture Standard summary: Porsenna threatens to have him burned alive
if he does not confess [pantheon.org] So
the sequence is: threat: you will burn
unless you speak Mucius: preempts → burns his own hand This is rhetorically brilliant: you threaten me with fire → I show I do not
care about fire 6. Why burning the
right hand? This is a point often missed—and historically interesting: the right hand = agent of action, oath,
identity in some traditions, burning the right hand was a penalty for
oath-breaking or treason [livius.org] So
the act has a double resonance:
physically: demonstration of endurance culturally: symbolic
self-sacrifice of the agent of action
Hence the name Scaevola (“left-handed”).
7. Is there anything “religious / ordeal-like”? Not really in Livy’s
framing. Compare your Tristan parallel:
Tristan: fire proves innocence (divine judgment) Mucius:
does not appeal to divine truth does not “prove” innocence instead
demonstrates virtus So:
TristanMuciusordealdemonstrationdivine validationhuman
enduranceinnocencecourage 8. Ethnic
dimension: Roman vs Etruscan? Yes, but subtly.
Porsenna = Etruscan king (and powerful one) Rome = emerging
Republic Roman narrative
emphasizes: Etruscan sophistication and
power but Roman moral superiority (virtus)
Thus Mucius’ act says: you may be
stronger materially but we surpass you in contempt of pain and devotion to
glory 9. Why the whole episode “works”
(deep structure) This episode is constructed exactly like a Gricean escalation:
Stage 1: speech Mucius: “we are 300” Porsenna:
“I’ll torture you” Stage 2:
breakdown of words Threat of torture → words insufficient Stage 3: action Mucius burns hand Stage 4: inference Porsenna concludes: if one man does this → 300 like him are
intolerable Result: → peace So: action replaces argument → produces belief →
changes policy 10. Final synthesis Mucius’ hostility toward Porsenna arises from
the political situation: Porsenna is besieging Rome in order to restore the
monarchy, so he is the embodiment of anti‑republican force. The threat of
burning is genuine: Porsenna intends torture (likely burning alive), and Mucius
preempts it by voluntarily placing his hand into a sacrificial fire already
present in the camp. The “three hundred” are not historically operative
assassins; they function rhetorically as a deterrent, probably exaggerated or
fictive, but psychologically effective. The act is not a religious ordeal but a
performative demonstration of Roman virtus: contempt for bodily pain in pursuit
of glory. Its success lies precisely in this inversion: what was meant as
punishment (fire) is converted by Mucius into a communicative act that compels
Porsenna to make peace. If you want, we
could compare this to later Roman uses of endurance displays (e.g. Stoic
self-control, Spartan parallels) and see how this episode becomes paradigmatic
of Roman identity. Grice was once approached by Neil Wilson ("Grice's Ultimate
Counterexaple", Nous): "You conflate illocutionary force with
perlocutionary effect." Grice: "I may be mistaken but I am not
confused." Muzio is naive in his 'utterance' -- the burning of his hand --
and proto-Stoic maxim: little does the body do to those who seek glory --
DICTUM post FACTVM -- for Porsenna could have remained UNCONVINCED, so this is
Livy ex post facto moralising. "He was terrorised. If one does do, the 300
other -- (so it's strictly 301) -- what can THEY do!? So Lars terminates siege.
On a counterfactual scenario: "If one of the 301 does this, what can the
other 300 do? Perhaps each will burn his own right hand?" (Bad uptake --
but what is the causal connection? there is no necessity for the burning of
one's right hand to ENSURE that the siege will cease. So the underlying force
is in "Porsenna intends to TORTURE Muzio; Muzio rather self-tortures,
pre-emptying Porsenna's threat. Input? Feedback? Thanks. This is a very sharp
Gricean diagnosis, and you’re absolutely right to press on the gap between
illocutionary force (“look how little we value the body”) and the
perlocutionary effect (Porsenna actually ends the siege). Let me tighten the
analysis around your points. 1. Mucius’
act: illocution vs. perlocution What Mucius does is not logically sufficient to
produce what happens. Illocutionary complex He produces a compound “utterance”: verbal: “trecenti coniuravimus …”
demonstrative: burning his hand ethical maxim: contempt for the body This amounts to: “We Romans are the kind of agents for whom
pain is irrelevant.” Perlocutionary
result (what actually happens) Porsenna:
becomes alarmed infers repeated risk opens negotiations But, as you stress: there is no necessity here Nothing entails: from “this man burns his hand” to “300
assassins will succeed” to “I must end the siege” So the causal link is psychological, not
logical. 2. Your counterfactual is
decisive You write: perhaps each of the
300 would burn his own right hand?
Exactly—this shows the non-sequitur. The inference could go wrong: Porsenna might think: “these are fanatics but ineffective” “they
harm themselves more than me” (and indeed Livy has him say something close to
this) So the success of the act
depends on: a particular uptake (to use Grice’s
language) 3. What makes the uptake
work? Here is the real hinge. Porsenna does not infer: “they can burn themselves” He infers:
“they are indifferent to death and pain”
From that he infers further:
“they will keep attempting assassination” “my exposure is
continuous” So the structure is: Exemplum: one man shows indifference
Generalization: there are many like him Projection: repeated lethal attempts
Decision: risk is unacceptable This is
not logical entailment—it is practical reasoning under uncertainty. 4. Pre-emption of torture (your key point)
This is the most important move, and you are exactly right. Porsenna’s implicit
threat: “If you don’t speak, I will
subject you to fire.” Mucius’
response: “Fire does not function as a
threat for me.” By self-burning he
achieves: removal of coercive leverage
collapse of torture as an instrument So
even before the “300” claim: he has
already neutralized the threat This is
structurally very close to a Gricean move:
the expected conversational pressure (threat → compliance) fails because
the hearer refuses the relevance condition (“this will hurt you”) 5. Livy’s ex post facto moralisation (you
are right) You note: this is Livy writing
after the fact Exactly. Livy arranges
the episode so that: action displays
Roman virtus virtus produces fear in the enemy fear produces political success But historically this is: almost certainly stylized or legendary shaped
to express a Roman moral thesis:
victory comes from character, not just force So:
the causal chain is narratively tightened after the fact 6. What the episode really shows
(philosophically) Your reading leads to a deeper conclusion: The act does not
cause the outcome by necessity. It works because: it reshapes the opponent’s expectations In modern terms: Mucius is changing the opponent’s model of
the adversary Before: “one captured assassin” After:
“an unlimited sequence of fearless attackers” That shift—not the burning itself—is what
ends the siege. 7. Final synthesis You
are entirely right: there is no necessary connection between Mucius burning his
hand and the lifting of the siege. The act is a pre-emptive neutralization of
Porsenna’s threatened torture and functions as a demonstrative sign of Roman
indifference to pain. Its success depends entirely on Porsenna’s uptake: he
interprets the act not as pointless self-harm but as evidence that many
similarly motivated assassins exist, making his position untenable. Livy’s
narrative retrospectively presents this as a morally coherent causal chain, but
in analytic terms the link is contingent, psychological, and inferential rather
than logically binding. If you like, we
could compare this with modern deterrence theory—Mucius as a one-man
demonstration of “credible commitment.” MUZIO disguises himself in an Etrurian helmet — a sort of Tuscan bonnet
— and with a sword concealed under the folds of his ample Roman wrap-rascal, he
arrives at Porsenna's camp, just as the salaries are being paid to the
soldiers. While the troops are intent on drawing their pay, MUZIO slily draws
his sword, and seeing an individual rather handsomely dressed, rushed upon him
to administer to him, with the weapon, a most unhandsome dressing. The
individual thus assailed is rapidly despatched, but it turned out that the
victim, instead of being the king, is an unfortunate scribe, or writer, who
could have been by no means prepared for this unusual fate of genius. Had the
critics unmercifully cut him up, the scribe would have felt that his death is,
to a certain extent, in the way of business; but to be murdered by mistake for
a king, is a result that any member of the republic of letters might fairly
have objected to. It may appear at first sight startling that a literary man
should have been well-dressed, and in the company of a king, but it must be
remembered that the scribe is not necessarily a man of remarkable ability. His
art is that of a mere copyist, which, even in these days, frequently gains a
reputation for the imitator, who is often confounded with, instead of being
confounded by the man of original genius. The scribes of antiquity, like many
modern writers, do no more than set down the thoughts of others, and, as their
style is extremely hard, consisting of a piece of iron, with which they write
upon wax, their works are not likely to make a very deep or lasting impression.
Our pity for the unfortunate literary character is considerably lessened by the
fact, that being in the camp he has no doubt been dining with the guards; and
we know he was wearing a showy dress — two circumstances indicating an
affectation of the manners of the fast man, which are always unbecoming to the
man of letters. MUZIO is about to retire after the execution of the deed, but
he is seized by the attendants, and then seized by remorse when he is
informed that he had despatched a harmless literary man instead of Porsenna.
Being taken to the king, MUZIO finds him sitting before the fire of a large
altar. The Etruscan chief, on hearing the charge, pointed out the penalty that
had been incurred, when the prisoner, thrusting his right hand into the fire,
allows it to remain, with extraordinary coolness, or, rather, with most intense
heat, until it is consumed as far as the wrist; and he concludes the act of
self incendiarism, by declaring there are three hundred others who are just as
ready as himself to take up arms and burn off a hand, in defiance of their
oppressor. Porsenna, who had watched the painful process with extreme interest,
is so delighted at the fortitude displayed, that he jumps from his seat, and
mentally remarking that "the fellow is a wonderfully cool hand at an
operation of the kind," orders some guards to conduct him in safety to
Rome; at the same time advising MUZIO to conduct himself more wisely for the
future. MUZIO returns to Rome, where he obtains the name of Scævola (from
Scærus) in consequence of his being left-handed, or it might have been because
of his having evinced such an utter want of dexterity in the business he had
undertaken. Back to MUZIO -- Abbott has this pun on SCEVOLA -- but the idea
makes sense -- was this recorded? For had he not MISIDENTIFIED that scribe for
the king, he had not been taken prisoner and not lose his right hand -- Abbot
also puns on the factt that his thread could comically be udnerstood as
figuratively that the 300 were ready to lose their right hand for the glory of
ROme. Input? Feedback? Thanks. Passage: This is a splendid case where Abbott’s
comic exaggeration actually tracks very closely a real feature of the Livian
story—but then twists it. Let me separate the three key elements you’ve
identified: 1. Was the “mistaken killing of the scribe”
really in Livy? Yes — absolutely essential to the story. Livy (and the
tradition) explicitly says: Mucius
enters the camp to kill the king sees two similarly dressed figures and: kills the king’s scribe by mistake
[en.wikipedia.org], [grokipedia.com]
Why this matters You are exactly right:
If he had killed the king → no capture no capture → no speech no speech
→ no Scaevola So: the failure is structurally necessary Roman logic: error produces exemplum 2.
The “300 youths” — is this real? Yes—this is not Abbott’s invention. In
Livy’s scene before Porsenna, Mucius declares:
he is only the first of three hundred Roman youths sworn to attempt the
king’s life [en.wikipedia.org]
Function of this claim intimidate
the king suggest: continuous threat turn individual act into: collective Roman resolve Your reading is perfectly sharp: Abbott literalizes it into a “300 hands”
motif But in Livy it is: not literal mutilation but: multiplicity of
agents 3. The hand-burning and “Scaevola” This is also
fully traditional: Mucius thrusts his
right hand into the fire holds it there loses its use Hence:
Scaevola = “left-handed” (from Latin scaevus) [behindthename.com] Key point The name is: not about clumsiness (Abbott joke) but: physical consequence + moral sign 4. Your core insight: the mistake as
condition of meaning You put it superbly:
the whole episode depends on misidentification Yes—and we can formalize it: Chain:
intention: → kill the king error: → kill scribe capture: → brought
before king speech: → declares Roman ethos act: → burns hand result: → earns
name + fame So: τυχὴ (fortune) + error
→ exemplum Livy often does this: failure at level of action success at level
of narrative/moral 5. Grice/Speranza reading
(very strong here) You are right to frame this in communicative terms. The killing:
intended as: practical act
(assassination) The failure
transforms it into: communicative
act Now Mucius: speaks demonstrates signifies So:
the event becomes a performance for an audience (Porsenna) 6. Is Abbott’s pun justified? Abbott
suggests (humorously): “losing the right
hand” “300 ready to do the same”
Verdict: not literal in
Livy captures something real: Roman willingness to sacrifice the body for
gloria Final synthesis Livy explicitly includes Mucius’
misidentification of the king’s scribe, showing that the hero’s later fame
depends paradoxically on his initial failure. [en.wikipedia.org],
[grokipedia.com] Mucius’ claim that he is the first of 300 youths sworn to the
same mission is also authentic to the tradition, functioning as a psychological
threat rather than a literal program of self-mutilation. [en.wikipedia.org] His
cognomen Scaevola (“left-handed”) derives from the loss of his right hand in
the fire, turning a bodily injury into a marker of virtue and identity.
[behindthename.com] One-line conclusion
(your idiom): Mucius fails to kill the
king, but succeeds in becoming a sign: his mistake produces the speech, the
speech produces the fire, and the fire produces the name that Rome
remembers. If you like, we can
reconstruct his full Livian speech in Latin—it’s one of the clearest cases of
Roman self-definition through oratio recta.Muzio Scaevola (CCLXVI). Vide quam
barbare corpus contemnant qui magnam gloriam quaerunt.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio: la ragione conversazionale del pontefice – divisione – dal portico? --
la nascita della giurisprudenza come rama della filosofia politca. Note su De
iure civile. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice.
Quinto Muzio Scevola Maggiore (Roma, Lazio): la
ragione conversazionale del pontefice – Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Elder, the
Pontifex, represents an early paradigm of reason-governed public meaning that
closely aligns with Grice’s later theory of conversational rationality: in
Scaevola’s career as consul, jurist, and pontifex maximus, law emerges not as a
merely technical craft or an instrument of power but as a disciplined form of
public reasoning rooted in shared standards of judgment and mutual intelligibility,
a view reinforced by his systematic works, the Libri XVIII iuris civilis and
the Horoi, where definition, distinction, and dialectical division—drawn from
Stoic philosophy and ultimately from the Portico—are used to make legal norms
publicly articulable and contestable; just as Grice argues that meaning in
conversation is governed by rational principles rather than by authority,
force, or convention alone, Scaevola treats jurisprudence as a branch of
political philosophy whose authority depends on its capacity to give reasons
that others may recognize as reasons, whether in the forum, the senate, or the
school; his famous insistence, reported by Cicero, that law without letters is
mute and letters without law wander, mirrors Grice’s insistence that linguistic
acts derive their significance from cooperative expectations about relevance,
justification, and responsibility, not from institutional costume or procedural
ritual; in both figures, normativity is conversational rather than coercive, so
that the toga does not itself generate wisdom, just as an utterance does not
generate meaning by fiat, and the integrity of judgment—whether legal or
linguistic—rests on disciplined participation in shared practices of reason
that bind speakers and jurists alike more securely than power, fear, or mere
technical expertise. -- divisione – dal portico? -- la nascita della
giurisprudenza come rama della filosofia politca. Grice: Questore,
tribuno della plebe, pretore, console, proconsole d’Asia e si attira, per la
sua giustizia e il suo disinteresse, l'affetto dei provinciali e l’odio dei
cavalieri romani, che accusarono il suo legato Rutilio Rufo, che egli
difese. Pontefice massimo. Cadde vittima delle lotte civili. Giurista insigne.
Compose libri XVIII juris civilis, in cui per la prima volta tenta una
trattazione sistematica dell’argomento, e un’opera intitolata
"Horoi," che contiene definizioni di concetti e di rapporti giuridici. E
molto ricercato il suo insegnamento di diritto. Insegna, derivandola, pare, da
Panezio di Rodi, la distinzione di tre teologie, ripresa da Varrone: teologia
poetica (falsa), teologia ufficiale (falsa) e teologia naturale (vera). Console.
Giuristi romani e politici romani. Console della Repubblica romana. Gens:
Mucia. Tribuno della plebe, pretore, consolae Pontificato max. Filosofo del
portico, giurista e politico romano. Me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem
unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere.”
Mi sono recato da Scevola pontefice, che oso dire superiore per ingegno e
rettitudine a tutti i nostri concittadini. -- CICERONE, Laelius de amicitia.
Appartenente alla gens Mucia, è considerato uno dei più grandi giuristi della
storia del diritto romano e in parte l'artefice dell'introduzione, nella
giurisprudenza romana, del metodo dialettico e diairetico, mutuato dalla
filosofia. Questore, tribuno della plebe, pretore, console - insieme a Lucio
Licinio Crasso, pro-console e pontefice massimo. Durante il consolato promulga
la “lex Licinia Mucia”, che fissa dei rigidi limiti al conseguimento della
cittadinanza da parte degl’italici. Fra le sue opere letterarie si ricordano
gl’ “Horoi,” titolo in greco che corrisponde al latino definitiones, e i Libri
XVIII iuris civilis. sistema muziano.
GRICEVS: Salvē, Scaevola pontifex. Apud Vadum Boum noster
quidam—Hart—Facultātem LITTERĀRVM HVMANIŌRVM reliquit et ad paene opificinam FACVLTĀTEM
IVRISPRVDENTIAE transiit: ego fateor, inde eum minus “tragicē” sumere coepī.
SCEVOLA: Salvē, Grice. Nōn est opificina, sed officina reī pūblicae. Nam sine iūre, litterae ipsae vagantur; et sine litterīs, iūs fit mutus. GRICEVS:
Fortasse; sed miror quanta fidūciā quis se dicat “doctum” statim atque ad iūs
accessit—quasi toga statim sapientiam pariat. Et, ut vērē dīcam, apud Vadum
Boum interdum vidētur quasi iūs sibi velit ipsam scholam esse, nōn tantum
scholārum hospes. SCEVOLA: Audāx inplicātūra tua, illic, Grice; sed moneō:
iūdex, etiamsi minus otiosus est quam philosophus tuus vulgāris hortulānus,
tamen sedēre sinendus est—in vīcō (vel “TOWN,” ut barbarī vocant) sī nōn in
togā (vel “GOWN,” ut barbarī vocant); an e conversō? Disciplina enim locum suum
habet, et potestas suum: neque forum scholam devoret, neque schola forum
contemnat. Grice's weekly essay assignment: Quinto Muzio Scevola
Maggiore. There are, to the great inconvenience of the hurried, two Scevolae
and both are Quintus Mucius. Write on the elder and pontifical [Quintus Mucius
Scaevola] under the condition that you may not use the word “jurist” until the
second paragraph. Explain whether his true claim to importance lies in (a)
wearing the toga, (b) dividing things properly, or (c) making Roman law look,
alarmingly, like a branch of political philosophy imported from the Portico;
and determine whether a man called Scevola is already too oddly named to be
trusted with definitions, or exactly odd enough to deserve them. Typewriting
disallowed. Handwriting counts. Grice has these two under "M" --
Muzio -- and Grice makes the point of using the a. u. c. -- to avoid 'the
stupidity of "1066 and all that" in pointing out that Julius Caesar
invaded England twice -- in 56 B. C. and then in 55 B. C. "due to this
unusual numbering method by the Romans" -- Sellars and Yeats add --. Here we
do see the Muzio Maggiore with an A. U. C. minor than that for Muzio Minore --
"without expecting a birth of Christ, no disrispect meant" -- Grice
says. Yes, that is perfectly sensible, and in fact more sensible than the
modern habit of pretending that B.C. and A.D. are somehow neutral. If Grice
files the two Quintus Mucius Scaevolae under M for Muzio, and then keeps the
a.u.c. dates visible, he is doing two useful things at once. First, he avoids
the childishness of what he calls the “1066 and all that” mentality, where all
chronology is silently bent toward England, Christianity, or schoolroom
mnemonics. Ab urbe condita restores the Roman point of view. It asks the reader
to think from Rome outward, not from later Europe backward. That is not
pedantry. It is perspective. Second, in the case of the two Scaevolae it helps
with exactly the confusion that their names invite. Since both are Quintus
Mucius Scaevola, and since “Maggiore” and “Minore” are later classificatory
conveniences rather than original Roman labels, the a.u.c. date quietly does
the work of historical separation without forcing Christian time backward into
a world that did not yet know it. So yes: the one with the smaller a.u.c.
number is the earlier man, and Grice can let that stand without waiting for the
birth of Christ “no disrespect meant,” as he says. There is also a third
advantage. In Roman history, the usual modern B.C. numbering is genuinely
awkward, because it runs backward and invites error. Grice’s Caesar example is
exactly right as a joke against that awkwardness. If one says Caesar invaded
Britain in 55 and 54 B.C., the later invasion carries the smaller number, which
is arithmetically unnatural even if historically familiar. A.u.c. removes that
irritation. Time moves forward again in the same visual direction as the
numbers. So the dry answer is this. Yes, Grice is right to keep the two
Scaevolae under Muzio and to use a.u.c. for distinction. It is both more Roman
in perspective and more rational in sequence. The elder Scaevola simply bears
the smaller Roman year-number because he really is earlier, and that spares one
the comic backwardness of B.C. reckoning. And there is a nice Gricean point
hiding here too. A dating system is not innocent. It carries an implicature
about what counts as the centre from which one measures time. A.u.c. says Rome.
Anno Domini says Christendom. “1066 and all that” says the English
schoolmaster. Grice’s preference, in a Roman context, is therefore not just
antiquarian but philosophical: it lets the civilisation under discussion keep
its own clock. It pains Grice and Speranza a little that Quinto Muzio Scevola Maggiore
gets the second cognmen, while in mere percentual terms, Quinto Muzio Scevola
(Minore) does not -- Why? And talking of which, what was Plinio's gens? yes,
Grice and Speranza know that Plinio the younger was adopted and not the son,
but still -- it's one case where every classicist teaches his tutee to add 'the
elder' and 'the younger' -- what other cases do we have, and where is it
necessary to add -- "not the son, or not the BIOLOGICAL son, not even the
non-biological son -- etc -- if Plinio the minore was the nephew -- would
legally count as Plinio Maggiore's SON? -- You are circling three distinct but
beautifully entangled Roman problems:
why “maior/minor” is unevenly applied (your Scaevola irritation), what
adoption really does to Roman identity (your Pliny puzzle), and when classicists
feel compelled to add “the Elder / Younger” at all. Let me disentangle them in a Gricean way:
what is said, what is needed, and what is implied. 1. Why does one Scaevola get “Maggiore” and
the other not (symmetrically)? Your annoyance is justified. The asymmetry is
not Roman—it is ours. Key point: Romans
did not systematically call them “maior” and “minor.” Those labels are later
scholarly disambiguations, applied ad hoc.
The rule is pragmatic: You add
maior/minor only when confusion becomes intolerable. In the case of Quintus Mucius Scaevola: There are multiple famous bearers with
identical tria nomina But: the pontifex
(d. 82 BC) became canonical as the Scaevola the others are marked relative to
him So: Scaevola maior = “the earlier one (in this
historiographical tradition)” Scaevola minor = “the later / derivative
one” But the labels are: retrospective non-systematic asymmetric
because usage settled that way This is
pure conversational economy: add only
enough to avoid ambiguity — no more symmetry than needed. Very Gricean indeed. 2. Pliny: gens, identity, and legal sonship
(a) The gens of Pliny Both Pliny the
Elder and Younger belong (finally) to the gens Plinia, a plebeian family.
[en.wikipedia.org] But here comes your
delicious complication. (b) The Younger:
nephew → son (legally) Born: Gaius
Caecilius Cilo Adopted by his uncle in his will After adoption: Gaius Plinius
Caecilius Secundus [en.wikipedia.org]
And crucially: Adoption in Rome =
full legal filiation He becomes: legally the son (filius) of Pliny member of
the gens Plinia heir, name-bearer, and continuer of the line Indeed, this is typical: adoption was used precisely to create sons
where none existed And the sources are
explicit: the Elder “adopted his
sister’s son” in his will [en.wikipedia.org]
So your question: Would the
nephew “count as a son”? Answer: Yes—completely, in law and nomenclature. Biologically no; socially and juridically:
absolutely. (c) But the name remembers
the past Notice the compromise: Plinius
(new gens) Caecilius (old gens retained as memory) So his name encodes: “I am Plinius — but I was Caecilius.” A perfect Roman implicature. 3. Why do we always say “Pliny the Elder /
Younger”? Because here the ambiguity is maximal: Same nomen (Plinius) Same cognomen (Secundus,
effectively) Direct familial relation Both intellectually famous So:
the conversational risk of confusion = extreme → disambiguation becomes
obligatory Hence the pedagogical
reflex: “Pliny the Elder” “Pliny the
Younger” 4. Other cases where this is
necessary The pattern appears wherever:
same name same family both historically prominent Classic examples: Cato Maior / Cato Minor (Uticensis) Pliny
Maior / Minor Scipio Africanus (major tradition) vs. later Scipiones (less
tidy) And even for women: Octavia Major / Minor (Augustus’
sisters) So: maior/minor = a kind of emergency
cognomen —not inherited, but
conversationally imposed. 5. When is it
not used? When other devices suffice:
different cognomina different agnomina different offices (e.g.,
“Scaevola Pontifex”) So: the system minimizes redundancy Again: Grice’s maxim of quantity. 6. Final Gricean synthesis You can put the
whole Roman naming system like this: Literal content: tria nomina identify the man Problem:
recycling of names creates ambiguity
Conversational repair strategies:
filiation (son of X) cognomen (branch name) agnomen (honorific)
maior/minor (last resort) So: “Pliny the Younger” is not part of his name
it is a pragmatic disambiguation device
And the deepest point (which you are already pressing): Roman identity is not biological but
juridical and conversational — adoption, naming, and reference all track
recognition within a rational social system, not mere origin. If you like, we could compare Pliny’s
adoption with Augustus (Octavian → Julius Caesar) to see the system working at
maximum political power. And Grice and Speranza would add Bruto (the founder of the republic) and
the one who defended it ("Tu quote, Brute," as uttered by Caesar).
And do we know by what year this practice appeared, 'maior' 'minor' -- never in
epigraphy as such? Because it became very customary in mediaeval times with
say, who was the first king of France, suppose someone with a Roman name, --
there are few -- and then NAME I, NAME II, NAME III -- not to mention the
pontifices which possibly took that from emperors (themselves bridge-makers --
are there emperors who are distinguished by what would be 'minor' or maior' --
and what would a big king of Italy who led successors named in ordinal way, as
X I, X II, X III, etc. -- thanks. This is a superb cluster of questions,
because it lets you see three distinct historical layers that later get
confused: Roman practice (maior/minor,
epithets, filiation) late antique / medieval reinterpretation fully developed
regnal numbering (I, II, III) Let me go
through them in order, with your Brutus and papal examples in view. 1. Did the Romans themselves “systematically”
use maior / minor? Short answer: Yes—but only informally, and only when needed.
Not as a system. You do see: Laelia
Maior / Laelia Minor (two sisters) [en.wikipedia.org] Cato Maior / Minor
Plinius Maior / Minor But this use
is: occasional context-driven not
standardized in official naming The key
negative point: It is not a fixed part
of the Roman name system (tria nomina)
And very importantly for your epigraphic suspicion: Inscriptions tend instead to use: filiation (X f. = “son of …”) ancestry chains
cognomina The sources here don’t
explicitly say “never,” but the positive evidence shows: epigraphy prefers genealogy over
adjectives —because genealogy is legally
precise. So your instinct is essentially right:
“maior/minor” lives more in literary and conversational space than in
formal stone. 2. Why not just number
them (I, II, III) like kings? Because Romans did not identify individuals by
regnal role. Key difference: RomeMedieval monarchyPerson within
gensOffice-holder with same regnal nameIdentity = family + ancestryIdentity =
office sequenceDistinction = lineageDistinction = ordinal So Rome says: “Marcus Tullius, son of Marcus, grandson of
Marcus…” The Middle Ages say: “Henry II”
These are different ontologies of identity. 3. When do regnal numbers (I, II, III)
appear? Properly: Medieval and later
European development They are: ordinal numbers used to distinguish rulers
with the same name [en.wikipedia.org]
And historically: the practice
becomes visible at least by the later Middle Ages some early coinage examples
(e.g. France) already use “I” self-consciously [academickids.com] So:
Roman numerals existed in Rome but regnal numbering did not exist in
Roman political identity That is the
crucial break. 4. Emperors: did they use
“maior/minor” or numbers? Neither, in the medieval sense. Roman emperors: used names, titles, adoptive filiation added
honorifics (Augustus, Germanicus, etc.)
Example pattern: Imperator Caesar
Divi Filius Augustus No: “Augustus I, Augustus II” no systematic
“maior/minor” Instead: succession is marked by adoption +
titulature, not numbering 5. Popes: the
bridge between Rome and kings You spotted something important: Popes adopt regnal-style numbering: John XXIII, Benedict XVI, etc. This is exactly where: Roman naming + medieval office → regnal
numbering And indeed: Papal numbering is part of the same system as
monarchs [en.wikipedia.org] So: the papacy is one of the key transmitters of
ordinal naming into Europe 6. Your
Italian king example Perfect: Umberto I,
Umberto II of Italy [en.wikipedia.org]
This is pure regnal numbering:
tied to the office (king) not the family
Even if the dynasty changes, numbering may continue for legitimacy. 7. Brutus: why he needs no “Brutus I / II”
Your Bruti illustrate the Roman method perfectly. Lucius Junius Brutus (founder of the
Republic) Marcus Junius Brutus (assassin of Caesar) No need for:
“Brutus I / Brutus II” Because
they differ in: praenomen (Lucius vs
Marcus) historical role So Rome resolves
it by: name + context, not
numbering 8. Final conceptual map (very
Gricean) Think of three systems as three different answers to the same
conversational problem: Problem: How do I distinguish X from X? Roman system:
Use more description (“son of…”, “the pontifex”, etc.) → maxim of quantity (add structure) Late Roman / literary shortcut: Use maior / minor → minimal pragmatic repair Medieval system: Use numbers
→ replace description with ordinal position Final dry punchline Maior/minor is Roman but unsystematic regnal
numbers are systematic but not Roman epigraphy prefers ancestry over
adjectives And Grice would say: numbering is a later civilization’s attempt
to turn a conversational implicature into a formal semantic device. If you want, we can track one name (say
“Henry”) from Roman-style identity through Merovingians to full ordinal
monarchy—it’s a neat evolution of how Europe changed what a “name” is. But Grice
suspects, classicists are not as Griceian as they should be, because Plinio the
minor already had a full name that did not COINCIDE wth his adoptive uncle. And
do we have some sloppy historian -- Italian, most naturally -- who does refer
to Bruto maggiore, or worse, minore, when no such need is felt if the
praenomina are KNOWN to be different? Still, the irony of the Scevola Maggiore,
so called because he was not as famous as his descendant who could go by
Scevola SIMPLICITER! Cheers! Grice’s irritation is, in fact, exquisitely well‑placed—because it
exposes a tension between Roman onomastic rationality and modern scholarly
convenience. Let me sharpen your points.
1. The Pliny “problem”: classicists are indeed being slightly un‑Gricean
You are exactly right: Pliny the Elder =
Gaius Plinius Secundus Pliny the Younger = Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus
(after adoption) [articles.n...istpro.com]
So: the names do not coincide
fully There is a built‑in
disambiguation: Caecilius marks the
original gens The Elder lacks it From a
strictly Roman, even quasi-Gricean point of view: the maxim of quantity is already satisfied →
no need for “elder / younger.” And yet
we add them. Why? Because modern classicists suppress internal Roman
distinctions in favor of: a simplified
reference term: “Pliny” Once you
collapse the name to “Pliny,” you must repair the ambiguity externally. So the
sequence is: Information loss (drop
Caecilius) Artificial ambiguity Repair via “Elder/Younger” That is exactly the kind of self-inflicted
conversational crisis Grice enjoyed diagnosing.
2. Your suspicion about “Brutus maggiore/minore” Here the situation is
even more telling. Lucius Junius Brutus
(founder) Marcus Junius Brutus (Caesar’s assassin) Roman system:
perfectly disambiguated by praenomina
So: “Brutus maior/minor” would be
superfluous And indeed: the standard scholarly tradition does not use
maior/minor here Do sloppy uses exist?
They do—especially in: looser
historiography pedagogical or popular writing occasionally in modern vernacular
traditions (including Italian) But here
I must be precise: I did not find a
canonical, established scholarly practice of “Bruto Maggiore / Minore” for
these two. So if it occurs, it is: idiosyncratic or stylistic, not
institutionalized Which makes your
irritation sharper: it is not even a
necessary or stable convention—just a lapse into convenience. 3. The Scaevola irony (your best point) This
is genuinely delightful and quite deep. You observed: the “Scaevola Maggiore” is called that
because another Scaevola is more famous
Exactly. So: the greater (maior)
is historically less dominant in reception the “unmarked” (Scaevola simpliciter)
is actually the one scholars default to
This produces a reversal: TermLogical
meaningPractical usemaiorolder / greaterthe one needing specificationsimpliciter—the
canonical / dominant figure That is almost a textbook case of: marked vs unmarked terms reversing semantic
weight —something Grice would absolutely
relish. 4. Why classicists do this
(defence, if any) They are following a different maxim—not Grice’s, but a
historian’s version: minimize friction
for the reader So: “Pliny the Younger” is faster than “Gaius
Plinius Caecilius Secundus” “Scaevola Pontifex” is less stable than “Scaevola
Maior” In other words: they optimize for recognition, not logical
sufficiency 5. Final Gricean diagnosis
You can state the whole situation like this: Roman system: Names encode maximum discriminating information
No need for external devices Modern
scholarship: Compress names (Pliny,
Brutus, Scaevola) Create ambiguity Add maior/minor as a conversational patch So:
maior/minor is often not a Roman necessity, but a modern repair for
modern abbreviation. Final punchline
(worthy of Grice) If one were being mischievous in an Oxford tutorial, one
might say: “Pliny the Younger is younger
only because we have first made him indistinguishable from his uncle.” —and that, indeed, is a perfectly Gricean
implicature. If you’d like, we could map
other famous “collisions” (e.g. the multiple Scipiones or Metelli) to see when
Roman internal naming succeeds without any need for “elder/younger.” please do notuse
bold, italic, or bulleting -- and can you do a second run in Italian
historiography to see if Bruto minore was ever used? as per your "Cato
Maior / Cato Minor (Uticensis) Pliny Maior / Minor Scipio Africanus (major
tradition) vs. later Scipiones (less tidy)" I suppose in the Porzio case,
the tria nomina WERE identical -- yes with later cognomina like censor versus
uticensis -- the plinis we've discussed and it is a pity that Caecilius is
often dropped -- seeing it was a nice gens, too -- as for the Publio Cornelio
Scipione that seems tria nomina enough -- Africanus cognomen, but hereditary
and maior later addition in terms in this case of prominence, unlike the
scevola case where it is a disambiguating device? Input? Thanks. I notice the Scipione
used Emiliano also for decoration -- in which case a full one may have SIX
rather than tria nomina? What's the maximum we've seen epigraphically? Thanks. Your
instinct about classicists being a little un‑Gricean is, I think, exactly
right, and the cases you bring together make that visible with unusual clarity.
Let me begin with the Italian side, since you explicitly asked for that “second
run”. On the question whether one finds Bruto minore in Italian usage, the
answer is yes, but with a very telling limitation. It is not, so far as I can
see, part of strict scholarly historiography in the way that “Catone il
Censore” or “Scipione Africano” are. Rather, it lives in literary and cultural
usage. The most famous instance is Leopardi’s poem Bruto minore, which takes
Marcus Junius Brutus as its subject. In pedagogical or informal materials one
also finds formulations like “Marco Giunio Bruto, o Bruto minore”. That is
already enough to show that the label circulates. [it.wikipedia.org]
[slideshare.net] But the important point is negative: this does not correspond
to a stabilized scholarly convention. It is not like Plinio il giovane or
Catone il minore. It is sporadic, stylistic, often literary, and sometimes
didactic. Which fits your suspicion nicely: where the Roman system already
distinguishes perfectly (Lucius vs Marcus), the use of maggiore/minore in
Italian is a kind of over‑marking produced by later habits, not by necessity.
Now to your central cluster: Cato, Pliny, Scipio. In the case of the Porcii
Catones, you are quite right that we are very close to a situation of real
identity collision. The tria nomina are essentially the same, and
differentiation is achieved by: Catone il Censore (office-based, effectively an
agnomen of function) Catone Uticense (place/death-based, a later agnomen) The
additional labels maior/minor sit on top of already sufficient Roman
distinctions. So again, the same pattern: modern compression to “Cato” produces
the need for an external differentiator. The Romans themselves did not need it.
With the Plinii you have already noted the crucial fact: the younger man’s
official name contains Caecilius, which is enough in strict Roman terms. The
habit of saying “Pliny the Younger” arises because modern usage truncates the
name to “Pliny”. That is a textbook Gricean case of information being dropped
and then re‑introduced as a repair device. Now the Scipiones, which are really
the most instructive of all. Take the elder Africanus: Publius Cornelius Scipio
Africanus. Here Africanus is an agnomen, originally honorific, then becoming
quasi-hereditary. There is no need for maior in Roman usage, because the man is
already uniquely identified by the combination of nomen, cognomen, and agnomen.
Then comes Scipio Aemilianus. His full name, in its most expanded form, is
something like Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, often further extended to
Africanus Numantinus. That already gives you four or five elements of
identification. “Aemilianus” is the adoption-marker, preserving his original
gens; “Africanus” and “Numantinus” are achievement-based agnomina.
[britannica.com] So yes, here you effectively get what you called “six names”,
if you include: praenomen: Publius nomen: Cornelius cognomen: Scipio
adoptive/derivative cognomen: Aemilianus agnomina: Africanus, Numantinus And
that is not exceptional. Roman naming, especially in the late Republic and
early Empire, becomes cumulatively additive. The system is open-ended. After
the tria nomina, further elements can be appended: agnomina, adoptive markers,
filiation, tribal affiliation. The sources explicitly note that additional
surnames and designations could be added to the core structure. [en.wikipedia.org]
Epigraphically, then, there is no strict upper bound in principle. In practice,
inscriptions often include long chains: name plus filiation (son of, grandson
of), plus tribe, plus one or more cognomina. Cicero’s son, for example, is
recorded with multiple generations in abbreviated form. So the “maximum” is not
a fixed number but the space available on stone and the social need to display
lineage. Returning to your interpretive point about Africanus maior vs
Africanus minor. Here the dynamic is slightly different from Scaevola.
Africanus maior is not needed because the elder man is less prominent; rather,
the younger acquires the label minor by reference to the already established
prestige of the first. In other words, minor here is genuinely relational to a
prior bearer of the same honorific. It is classificatory, not corrective. In
the Scaevola case, by contrast, maior/minor functions more as an editorial
device imposed from outside the Roman system. So one could put it this way. In
Scaevola, maior/minor comes from later historiographical need. In Africanus,
minor comes from internal Roman practice of distinguishing two bearers of the
same agnomen. In Pliny, maior/minor comes from modern abbreviation. In Brutus,
maior/minor is unnecessary and therefore mostly non-standard. And that leads to
your final ironic observation, which is quite sound. The so-called Scaevola
maior ends up being “the one who requires qualification”, whereas the later,
more prominent figure is the unmarked Scaevola. That is a classic case of how
frequency and prominence override literal semantics. Greater and lesser cease
to mean “more important” and instead mean “the one we have had to mark” and
“the default reference”. If you want to push the Gricean moral to its limit, it
would be this. Roman naming tries to encode identity inside the name itself;
later scholarship strips that encoding down for convenience and then has to
reconstruct distinctions externally. The more we abbreviate, the more we need
ad hoc devices like maior and minor to repair the loss we have created. And back to the
Catos -- were they 'essentially identical' as you put it -- can Grice and
Speranza have birth names for both? The cognome /agnome distinction is Griceian
and Grice and Speranza wonder if this was studied under grammar because that
was taught by Greeks in Rome, and what would THEY know? but the whole
terminology is what Grice calls 'Terencian' (i. e. Varronian), prae-, nomen
simpliciter, co-(g)-nomen, a-(g) nomen as ad-junct. Now if the Catos shared
essential names, and the minor was the great grandson -- I can imagine Cato the
Elder's father: "My son will be called ... [thus]." and later, his
descendant, Cato minor's father saying: "My son will be called 'thus' --
essentially the same as his great grandfather -- and I would not be surprised
if the same names got repeated in the generations in between? Input? Thanks. This
is one of those cases where Roman practice turns out to be even more “Gricean”
than the modern labels suggest, and your intuition about repetition across
generations is entirely correct. First, the bare fact. Cato the Elder is Marcus
Porcius Cato. Cato the Younger is also
Marcus Porcius Cato (with the later addition Uticensis). [en.wikipedia.org]
[en.wikipedia.org] So yes: in the strict tria nomina sense, they are identical.
The “Elder / Younger” is not Roman naming; it is a later device to distinguish
two historically prominent bearers of exactly the same inherited name. Now to
the deeper point you raise: could a Roman father deliberately name a son
identically to an ancestor, and would that repetition propagate? The evidence
says: not only could he, but this was in fact normal. Roman naming rules
include two very strong constraints: there were very few praenomina in
circulation families often restricted themselves to a very small subset and the
eldest son was very frequently given the father’s praenomen [vroma.org] In the
Porcii in particular, the dominant praenomen is Marcus. [en.wikipedia.org] So
the pattern becomes almost mechanical: Marcus Porcius (generation 1) Marcus
Porcius (generation 2) Marcus Porcius (generation 3) and so on What distinguishes
them is not the core name, but: filiation (M. f., M. n., etc.) occasional
cognomina or agnomina context of action and office That is why inscriptions go
to lengths like “Marcus Tullius, son of Marcus, grandson of Marcus,
great‑grandson of Marcus” as a normal identifying string. [vroma.org] So your
imagined scene is not fanciful at all; it is structurally accurate. A Roman
father might indeed say, in effect, “he will be Marcus Porcius Cato,” meaning:
he will carry the same identity-token as his lineage. Now, in the specific case
of the Catones, we can confirm a bit of the internal repetition. Cato the Elder
had sons who were themselves both called Marcus Porcius Cato, distinguished
secondarily as Licinianus and Salonianus. [en.wikipedia.org] Cato the Younger
is descended from that line, and is again Marcus Porcius Cato. So you really do
have a chain of repeated identical names across generations, precisely as you
suspected. At this point the Gricean observation becomes almost irresistible.
From a Roman perspective, the naming system does not aim to maximize surface
differentiation; it aims to encode: membership in a gens (Porcius) continuity
of lineage (repeated Marcus) branch identity (Cato) Individual disambiguation
is then handled pragmatically, by additional context (filiation, office, biography).
From a modern perspective, we collapse all of that into “Cato,” thereby
destroying the very distinctions the Romans were encoding, and then we patch
things with “the Elder” and “the Younger.” So the apparent paradox is this: the
Romans tolerated identical names because their system carries hidden
differentiators modern scholars create the need for maior/minor by stripping
those differentiators away Finally, on your remark about Varronian or
“Terentian” terminology. You are quite right that the technical vocabulary
praenomen, nomen, cognomen, agnomen is itself a Latin scholarly
systematization, not a natural folk taxonomy. It is retrospective, analytic,
and to some extent grammaticalized. But the practices it describes were very
real, and what emerges from cases like the Catones is that the Romans relied
less on lexical differentiation and more on structural embedding within family
and memory. So if Grice is looking for a maxim here, it might be this: the
Romans satisfied the maxim of quantity not by diversifying names, but by
embedding them in a network of inherited reference. Which is why four different
Marcus Porcius Cato can coexist without confusion—until a modern historian
abbreviates them all to “Cato” and needs rescuing by “Elder” and “Younger.”Muzio
Scevola Maggiore, Quinto (a. u. c. DCLX). De iure
civile. Roma.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio. Scevola: la ragione conversazionale dell’augure -- MIHI
AGMINA MILITVM QVIBVS CVRIAM CIRCVMSEDISTI LICET MORTEM IDENTIDEM MINITERIS
NVMQVAM TAMEN EFFICIES VT PROPTER EXIGVVM SENILEMQVE SANGVINEM MEVM MARIVM A
QVO VRBS ET ITALIA CONSERVATA EST HOSTEM IVDICEM. Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo di
Gioco di H. P. Grice. Quinto Muzio Scevola (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale
dell’augure -- Quintus Mucius Scaevola’s stance in defense of Gaius Marius,
articulated in the senate under armed threat, exemplifies a form of
reason-governed conversational agency that strikingly anticipates Grice’s
account of meaning as constrained by rational norms rather than by force, fear,
or mere causal pressure: Scaevola’s utterance does not function as rhetoric,
augury, or intimidation, but as a public act whose authority derives from shared
expectations about what counts as a justified judgment within a political and
legal conversation, namely that one does not call an enemy a man who saved the
city, regardless of surrounding coercion; in Gricean terms, Scaevola exploits
the cooperative framework of civic discourse, making explicit that no amount of
external threat can cancel the standing reasons that license a verdict, and
thereby generates an implicature about the limits of power itself, since the
soldiers “surrounding the Curia” are shown to be conversationally irrelevant to
the validity of the judgment; just as Grice insists that meaning and reason
operate through norms that speakers mutually recognize and uphold, Scaevola’s
remark demonstrates that rational authority in conversation can defeat
intimidation precisely because it is answerable to public criteria of judgment
rather than to outcomes, revealing a shared insight across centuries that
logos, when properly enacted, binds speakers more strongly than fear and
secures the possibility of law, conversation, and δημόσια κρίσις alike. MIHI AGMINA MILITVM QVIBVS CVRIAM CIRCVMSEDISTI LICET MORTEM
IDENTIDEM MINITERIS NVMQVAM TAMEN EFFICIES VT PROPTER EXIGVVM SENILEMQVE
SANGVINEM MEVM MARIVM A QVO VRBS ET ITALIA CONSERVATA EST HOSTEM IVDICEM. Console
della repubblica romana. Augure. Gens: Mucia. Edile, tribuno della plebe,
pretore, console. Politico romano vissuto durante il periodo della repubblica
ed un esperto di diritto romano. Da non confondere col pontifice, autore degl’
“Annales Maximi.” Venne educato in legge dal padre e in filosofia da Panezio di
Rodi, filosofo del portico. Venne eletto tribune, edile, e pretore. Inviato
come governatore nelle province dell'Asia,inore. Tornato a Roma, dove
difendersi da un'accusa di estorsione rivoltagli da Tito Albucio da cui riusce
a difendersi. Venne eletto console. S. ha grande interesse per la legge e
gl’affari all'interno di Roma. Trasmitte la sua conoscenza del diritto romano
ad alcuni dei più famosi oratori di quei tempi, tra cui Cicerone e Attico.
Difende Gaio Mario dalla mozione di Silla che lo vuole rendere nemico del
popolo, asserendo che mai avrebbe approvato un tale disonore per un uomo che
aveva salvato Roma. Cicerone utilizza la figura del suo maestro come
interlocutore in tre opere: “De oratore”, “De amicitia”, e “De re
publica”. S., su sapere.it, De Agostini. S. su Enciclopedia Britannica,
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Predecessore Console romano Successore Marco
Porcio Catone e Quinto Marcio Re con Lucio Cecilio Metello Diademato Quinto
Fabio Massimo Eburno e Gaio Licinio Geta. Portale Antica Roma
Portale Biografie Categorie: Politici romani Consoli repubblicani romani
Mucii Auguri Governatori romani dell'Asia. Gaio Mario. Se stai
cercando il figlio di Gaio Mario, vedi Gaio Mario il Giovane. GRICEVS: Salvē, Scaevola augur. Audīvī tē in
contiōne tam constanter stetisse pro Mariō, ut Sulla ipse pallēsceret—nōn
propter aves, sed propter verba. SCEVOLA: Salvē, Grice. Verba quoque auguria
sunt, sī recte audiās. Sed quid tibi vidētur de illīs quī, glādiō cinctī, iūs
perterrēre volunt? GRICEVS: MIHI AGMINA MILITVM QVIBVS CVRIAM CIRCVMSEDISTI
LICET MORTEM IDENTIDEM MINITERIS NVMQVAM TAMEN EFFICIES VT PROPTER EXIGVVM
SENILEMQVE SANGVINEM MEVM MARIVM A QVO VRBS ET ITALIA CONSERVATA EST HOSTEM IVDICEM.
SCEVOLA: Sapiens inplicātūra tua, Grice—sed quid aliud ex sapientulō talī
exspectāre possumus? Nam dum Mariō favēre videris, simul ostendis istōs
“agmina” nihil posse efficere nisi strepitum: senex enim, si iūdicium tenet,
hostem hostem appellāre recusat—et iūs ipsō metu fortius est. Grice's weekly essay assignment: Quinto Muzio Scevola. Now take the
other [Quintus Mucius Scaevola], the augur, and assume for the week that an
armed cordon round the Curia is not, in itself, a good argument. Discuss why
his refusal to call [Gaius Marius] hostis under threat counts as an instance of
rational public speech rather than theatrical obstinacy, and state whether an
augur named Scevola sees more clearly in birds, in law, or in the noise made by
soldiers who imagine themselves relevant to judgment. Typewriting disallowed.
Handwriting counts. Muzio Scevola, Quinto (a. u. c. DCXXXVII). Dicta. Roma.
Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P.
Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Muzio – Ossia: Grice e
Muzio: la ragione conversazionale nella vernacola Girolamo Muzio (Padova, Veneto): la ragione
conversazionale nella vernacola. Grice’s reason-governed picture of conversational meaning fits Muzio
almost too well: Muzio’s “battle” for the vernacular is not merely a patriotic
preference for Italian over Latin, but a thesis about what makes speech
intelligible and socially efficacious in the first place—namely, that speakers
and hearers share practical norms of inference that let them move from what is
said to what is meant without needing an elite code. In Gricean terms, Latin at
Oxford functions as a gatekeeping register that can disguise a failure of
communicative cooperation (one can sound learned while flouting relevance,
perspicuity, or audience-design), whereas Muzio’s vernacularism implicitly
backs the Cooperative Principle by insisting that philosophical teaching remain
calculable by ordinary reasoners within a living linguistic community. The
Padua-to-Oxford contrast in your dialogue sharpens this: Muzio treats dialect,
proverb, and “osteria” wit as sites where implicature is most naturally at
home, because shared form-of-life knowledge makes indirectness interpretable;
Grice, though formed by the Latin-heavy Literae Humaniores regime, ultimately
gives a theory that vindicates Muzio’s point by explaining how meaning
routinely outruns literal sentence-meaning through rational expectations. Even
the comic opposition between “toga latina” and “lingua del popolo” can be cast
as a pragmatics claim: when the language is socially marked as elite, the
hearer must spend effort distinguishing genuine informative intent from mere
status display, while vernacular talk—precisely because it is accountable to
common uptake—makes conversational rationality visible in the open, where a
well-timed proverb or joke does the philosophical work by implicature rather
than by scholastic formality. Grice: “It can be said, to echo M., that there is
an even less natural – than in his native Italy, long, largely figurative
"battle" at Oxford over the use of Latin versus the vernacular in the
teaching of philosophy. This is not a single, sudden conflict but a gradual
cultural and institutional shift that occurs over centuries, as the role of the
Latin language as the universal language of philosophy diminished. This
transition is driven by social and intellectual changes. The Latin language,
unlike the vernacular, is a marker of ELITE status. Proficiency in the Latin
language is a hall-mark of a gentleman's education and an upper-class trait,
zealously guarded to maintain social distinctions. The vernacular is a
"commoner's tongue". The vernacular is long considered too unrefined
for serious philosophical discourse by many philosophers. Rise of the
vernacular: A wider movement across Europe in the late Middle Ages and early
modern period legitimised the nationa language, though this is slower in
English at Oxford. Practicality vs. Tradition: While the Latin language allows
philosophers across Europe to communicate, it becomes a barrier to wider
education and the integration of ideas, not so much in philosophy, but
especially in science and modern subjects. Key Dates and Periods
Period/Date Event/Significance Pre-17th Century. Every scholarship and
examination at Oxford is conducted in the Latin language. Late 17th - Mid-18th
Century. A gradual shift begins. While the Latin language remains the formal
language of tutorials, seminars, lectures, official documents, and to this day,
degrees: Grice, B. A. Lit. Hum. Oxon -- the use of the vernacular in INFORMAL
discussion and SOME written work starts to increase. 1750s Prominent
intellectuals and philosophers, like Johnson, regard the Latin language as
superior for formal philosophical discourse, highlighting ongoing cultural
resistance to the vernacular in academia. E. Muzio. Grice: Caro Muzio, dicono che a Oxford la
battaglia tra latino e vernacolo sia stata lunga e figurativa. Ma lei, da
Padova, si trova più a suo agio a filosofeggiare nella lingua del popolo o
preferisce indossare la toga latina? Muzio: Grice, le confesso che il vernacolo
ha una musicalità che il latino non riesce a imitare. Certo, il latino fa
sentire tutti un po’ aristocratici, ma provi a dire “filosofia” tra amici in
dialetto veneto: è più facile trovare un buon vino che un confine tra pensiero e
risata! Grice: Ah, allora forse dovremmo istituire un simposio filosofico in
osteria! Chissà che, tra un proverbio e una battuta, la ragione conversazionale
non si riveli più profonda che tra i marmi di Oxford. Muzio: Ottima idea,
Grice! A Padova si dice che la filosofia nasce dove si brinda. E se qualcuno
osa correggere la nostra lingua, lo mandiamo a declinare “buon senso” in
latino, così impara che la saggezza va servita sempre col sorriso! Muzio,
Girolamo (1518). Isagogicon ad Libellum (introduzione a un libretto in lode di
Biagio Elcelio). Augusta.

