In Marcus Tullius Cicero's De Oratore (specifically Book 1, Section 179, which falls within the larger chapter 39), the primary speaker Lucius Licinius Crassus (Licinio) рассказывает an anecdote to Marcus Antoniusand their peers regarding a legal blunder made by Marcus Bucculeius (Bucculeo). [1, 2, 3, 4]

The Direct Summary

Crassus states that Bucculeius made a careless legal mistake while selling a house to Lucius Fufius. In the deed of sale (mancipium), Bucculeius guaranteed the "window-lights" exactly as they were at the time. However, Fufius weaponized this poorly drafted guarantee. As soon as a building started going up anywhere in Rome that could be seen from his house, Fufius sued Bucculeius, claiming his light was being altered—no matter how small the obstruction or how far away the new building was. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

What is Said in Latin (and English Translation)

Crassus introduces Bucculeius with a mix of mild praise and irony: [1]

“Quo quidem in genere familiaris noster M. Bucculeius... [neque meo iudicio stultus, et suo valde sapiens]... simili in re quodam modo nuper erravit.” [1]

English: "...our friend M. Bucculeius—a man who is no fool in my opinion, very wise in his own... made a mistake lately in an affair of a somewhat similar nature." (The full, precise Latin text can be found in reference). [1, 2]

He then explains the mistake: [1]

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Attalus.org·https://www.attalus.org

Cicero, De Oratore, 1 (a) - Attalus.org

[7] Who, indeed, is there, that, if he would measure the qualifications of illustrious men, either by the usefulness or magnitude of their actions, would not ...

Internet Archive·https://archive.org

De oratore, book 1. Translated into English with an introd. by E.N.P. ...

with you, Scsevola, and thanks to his oratorical skill will i surpass even ... will say my say as I have begun, and will only beg of you not to let the ...

Wikiversity·https://en.wikiversity.org

Quotes from Cicero's DE ORATORE BOOK I - Wikiversity

The Latin quotes are selected for interest (int), language (lan), and rhetoric (bea), and are translated into English. The line numbers are from the Loeb ...

BR

 

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bra

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bracciolini – Ossia: Grice e Bracciolini e la ragione conversazionale. (Roma). Famed humanist orator and recovery agent of lost classical texts. Poggio Bracciolini. Grice e Bracciolini Poggio Bracciolini (Roma) e la ragione conversazionale.  Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains “what is meant” as something hearers rationally infer from what is said plus an assumption of cooperative, goal-directed talk (the Cooperative Principle), so that implicatures arise when a speaker’s words would otherwise seem unhelpful, oddly weak, or off-point; Poggio Bracciolini, by contrast, represents a humanist-rhetorical ecology in which meaning is cultivated through learned Latinity, social wit, and genre (letters, dialogues, invective, and the Facetiae), with communication understood less as maxim-guided inference from sparse utterances and more as a civically and institutionally situated art of address—persuasion, ridicule, moral diagnosis, and stylistic self-fashioning directed to particular audiences (curial, monastic, republican, scholarly). If Grice models conversational rationality as a set of publicly recognizable norms that make indirectness intelligible and accountable, Poggio treats the recovery and circulation of classical eloquence as itself a technology of intelligibility, where what is “meant” is often carried by allusion, exempla, and Ciceronian tone rather than by a minimal sentence designed for cooperative uptake. Still, the two converge in a useful way: Poggio’s epistolary voice and his facetious narratives rely on shared background, audience calibration, and the expectation that readers will supply what is left unsaid—an interpretive practice that can be reconstrued in Gricean terms as systematic implicature-generation—yet their difference is that Grice abstracts those expectations into a general, reason-based theory of inference in conversation, whereas Poggio embeds them in rhetorical tradition and humanist sociability, where meaning is inseparable from learned style, institutional setting, and the performative aims of praise, blame, and persuasion. Famed humanist orator and recovery agent of lost classical texts.  Grice: Poggio, cosa è più difficile—trovare un manoscritto perduto o convincere gli amici a leggere Cicerone per piacere? Bracciolini: Grice, ti assicuro che nulla è più difficile che persuadere qualcuno a godersi Cicerone. Almeno i manoscritti non protestano. Grice: Hai mai provato a spiegare l’implicatura conversazionale a un gruppo di monaci? Di solito preferiscono il silenzio a “vires imperium romanum”. Bracciolini: Il silenzio è d’oro, Grice, ma se i discorsi di Cicerone potessero essere sussurrati nello scriptorium, forse anche i monaci finirebbero a dibattere l’equità civile invece del menù del pranzo! Bracciolini, Poggio (1470). Facetie. Firenze, Bartolomeo de' Libri.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Braibanti – Ossia: Grice e Braibanti – la ragione conversazionale. Grice: “I guess B. compares to Wilde at Oxford – he wanted to be a pupil at Magdalen, because ‘it’s such a pretty college’ – Douglas had a lot to do with it!  Aldo Braibanti (Fiorenzuola d'Arda, Piacenza, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats what a speaker means as something hearers rationally infer from what is said plus the shared assumption that participants are cooperating toward an accepted purpose in a talk-exchange (the Cooperative Principle and its maxims), so that implicatures arise when an utterance would otherwise be puzzlingly weak, irrelevant, opaque, or overstrong. Braibanti, as suggested by the passage and by standard biographical accounts of his wide-ranging work (poetry, theatre, political writing, ecology/mirmecology), invites a different contrast: his “conversational reason” is less a quasi-formal model of inference and more a cross-disciplinary practice in which meaning is staged, curated, and sometimes strategically displaced across genres (dialogue, manifesto, drama, poetic free verse, even the observational “sociality” of ants as a conceptual analogue), so that the unsaid can function aesthetically, politically, or ethically rather than chiefly as a calculable implicature. Where Grice explains indirectness by rational norms internal to conversation (what a reasonable interlocutor must assume to keep the exchange intelligible), Braibanti’s intellectual persona foregrounds how meaning can be made to travel through coded forms under pressure—fascist censorship, partisan clandestinity, later public scandal—so that what is communicated is often inseparable from the risks of saying it, the medium chosen, and the audience’s willingness to read between the lines. In that sense, a Gricean can redescribe Braibanti’s obliqueness, irony, and genre-shifting as systematic implicature-generation; but the divergence is that Grice treats implicature as a rationally recoverable supplement to literal content, whereas Braibanti’s “ragione conversazionale” looks closer to an art-and-politics of communication in which form, silence, and indirection are not merely cooperative shortcuts but sometimes the very point of the act. Grice: “I guess B. compares to Wilde at Oxford – he wanted to be a pupil at Magdalen, because ‘it’s such a pretty college’ – Douglas had a lot to do with it! Wilde is said to have said before the king who abdicated that ‘only the poor learn at Oxford.’ Gilbert and Sullivan popularised the idea that at Oxford you were either a Paterian (an aesthete) or an athlete. I guess i was both: I was ‘musical’ – had played Ravel at Clifton, and always kept a piano in my rooms – and yet I played cricket, football – I captained the Corpus team for a term – and golf!” Filosofo italiano -- è stato uno scrittore, sceneggiatore e drammaturgo italiano. Intellettuale, partigiano antifascista e poeta, nella sua vita si è occupato di arte, cinema, politica, teatro e letteratura, oltre a essere un appassionato mirmecologo. Ben presto scopre la centralità del mondo naturale e sviluppa un pensiero acuto e radicale in tema di ecologia e salvaguardia dell'ambiente, rispetto della vita animale e un particolare interesse per i costumi degli insetti sociali: formiche, api e termiti. In pieno periodo fascista vive "in una famiglia illuminata e ferma nel rifiuto di ogni situazione autoritaria e clericale. Tra i sette e gli otto anni inizia a scrivere i primi testi poetici. Tra i suoi interessi scolastici vi sono Dante, Petrarca, Carducci, Pascoli e D'Annunzio, ma soprattutto Leopardi e Foscolo, ed è in quel periodo che inizia la sua attività poetica, abbandonando subito la rima e le tradizioni stilistiche per scrivere poesie in libertà. Di allora sono anche i primi tentativi teatrali (Amneris), i primi dialoghetti filosofici (Il veglio della montagna) e i primi "inni alla natura". Studia a Parma sotto Bernini. Scrive e distribuisce clandestinamente a scuola un manifesto, rivolto a tutti gli uomini, in cui invita a unirsi e organizzarsi contro la dittatura fascista. A Firenze nasce l'amore per Vinci e Bruno. Inizia a dedicarsi ai collage e agli assemblage, mentre l'osservazione delle formiche comincia a precisarsi in un interesse che mira a di casa. Evidenze e misteri dell'ideologia italiana. Grice: Braibanti, ma tra formiche e Oxford, dove è più difficile trovare qualcuno disposto a organizzare una partita di cricket? Braibanti: Grice, tra le formiche non c’è mai un arbitro, e chi perde finisce a portare briciole per settimane. A Oxford, almeno, dopo la partita si può scrivere una poesia. Grice: E tra poesia e manifesti antifascisti, dove si rischiano più morsi: tra i versi liberi o tra le formiche arrabbiate? Braibanti: Grice, i versi liberi mordono solo l’anima. Le formiche, invece, hanno un certo senso della giustizia: ti pungono, ma almeno non scrivono manifesti contro di te. Braibanti, Aldo (1949). Il veglio della montagna. Parma, Tipografia Benedettina.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Branciforte – Ossia: Grice e Branciforte: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei giochi olimpici.  Giuseppe Giovanni Luigi Enrico del Basto Lanzo di Trabia Branciforte (San Vito dei Normanni, Specchia di Mare, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei giochi olimpici. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers recover what is meant by treating talk as a rational, cooperative activity in which a speaker’s intentions are constrained by publicly recognizable norms (maxims), so that implicatures arise when literal content is too weak, oddly chosen, or strategically indirect given the shared purposes of the exchange. Branciforte (better known in accessible sources as Giuseppe Giovanni Lanza del Vasto, born Giuseppe Giovanni Luigi Enrico Lanza di Trabia-Branciforte) pushes “conversational reason” toward an ethical-spiritual and quasi-pilgrimage model of communication: the crucial unit is not the maxim-guided inference from saying to implicating, but the message as vocation addressed to another (and ultimately to love, nonviolence, and a community of practice), where dialogue is a vehicle for conversion, discipline, and moral reorientation rather than primarily a mechanism for efficiently coordinating belief. From a Gricean angle, Branciforte’s emphasis on addressee, testimony, and the retrieval of a “message” behind public acts (the Olympic games as sign, relay, or song awaiting a hearer) can be redescribed as a broadened pragmatics in which what is communicated systematically outruns what is explicitly stated; but the contrast remains that Grice grounds that outrunning in calculable rational expectations internal to conversation, whereas Branciforte grounds it in a metaphysics and ethics of address, where implicature becomes less a technical inference licensed by cooperative norms and more a hermeneutic surplus carried by symbolic action, ritual, and nonviolent witness directed at transforming the interlocutor and the shared world. Grice: “You’ve got to love B.: my favourite is his philosophy of what he calls ‘il messaggio,’ – I do use the term when I speak of a transmitter, and an addressee, etc. – the fact that he was born where Ikkos was born help, since one would need to recover Ikkos’s message! Branciforte sees philosophy as a pilgrimage of love – ‘il peregrine dell’amore’ with his ‘canzionere’ and surely the song needs an addressee!” Esponente della nobile famiglia siciliana dei Lanza di Trabia.. La sua personalità eccezionale riunisce caratteristiche disparate: filosofo con una forte vena mistica, ma anche patriarca fondatore di comunità rurali e attivista nonviolento contro la guerra d'Algeria o gli armamenti nucleari.    Sudia a Pisa sotto CARLINI .  «La guerra di Abissinia già iniziava ed il mio rifiuto a parteciparvi era la cosa più evidente. E poi questa guerra non era che l’inizio: in seguito forse sarei stato ad uccidere inglesi, tedeschi e un giorno avrei avuto dinanzi alla mia baionetta Rainer Maria Rilke. No, la mia risposta era no. “Ma che cosa è che rende la guerra inevitabile?”, mi domandavo. Capisce la puerilità delle risposte ordinarie, quelle che si rifanno alla nostra cattiveria, al nostro odio e al pregiudizio. Sa che la guerra non ha a che fare con tutto ciò. Certo, una dottrina esiste per opporsi alla guerra. Manca un metodo per difendersi senza offendere. Un modo umano di risolvere i conflitti umani. Ma li è convertito alla sua propria religione, e ha il suo da fare per meditare. E se mi si chiedeva “siete cristiano?, rispondevo: Sarebbe ben prezioso dire di sì. Tento di esserlo. L’arca aveva una vigna per vela. La non violenza,, molto contraria al suo carattere, come del resto crede sia contraria al carattere di tutti. Nessuno è NON violento per natura. Siamo violenti e non proviamo vergogna a dirlo. Ma ciò che non diciamo è che la vigliaccheria e la violenza fanno la forza delle nazioni e degli eserciti. Ikko, Crotone, Taranto. Grice: Branciforte, ogni volta che parli di giochi olimpici, penso subito al messaggio: chi è il vero destinatario, il pubblico o gli atleti in toga? Branciforte: Caro Grice, secondo me il vero destinatario è l’amore stesso, perché ogni gara olimpica è una canzone che aspetta chi la ascolti. Grice: E tra i giochi e le canzoni, preferisci la staffetta o il pellegrinaggio mistico? Io, sinceramente, mi accontenterei di una vigna per vela. Branciforte: Grice, la staffetta va bene, ma solo se il testimone è la nonviolenza! Altrimenti mi ritrovo a meditare sotto una pergola, sperando di non incontrare Rilke con una baionetta in mano. Branciforte, Giuseppe Giovanni Luigi Enrico del Vasto Lanza di Trabia (1932). Il pellegrinaggio dell’amore. Firenze, Vallecchi. 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Brandalise – Ossia: Grice e Brandalise: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del municipio di Firenze, albero fiorito, immune, comune. 

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bre

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Breccia – Ossia: Grice e Breccia: la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura conversazionale della metafisica del dialogo.  Pier Augusto Breccia (Trento, Trentino-Alto Edige): la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura conversazionale della metafisica del dialogo. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how what a speaker means regularly outruns what the sentence literally says: hearers treat talk as a cooperative, purposive activity and, assuming rational agency, infer conversational implicatures as the best explanation of an utterance’s apparent over- or under-informativeness, odd wording, or strategic indirectness. Breccia, as presented in the passage and in biographical materials, relocates “conversational reason” into a hermeneutic-metaphysical register: dialogue is not just a rule-governed exchange for efficiently transferring beliefs, but an ontological scene (ego/tu, we, and even silence) in which meaning emerges through interpretive horizons, the “metaphysics of dialogue,” and a semantics of silence that treats what is unsaid as constitutive rather than merely optional. Where Grice’s rationality is primarily inferential and methodological (a framework for deriving implicata from maxims plus intentions), Breccia’s rationality is existential and interpretive (a way the self meets another and becomes intelligible), so “implicature” shifts from a calculable add-on to a broader “hermeneutic implicature” in which omission, ambiguity, and the artwork-like openness of the dialogical space are not failures of explicitness but part of how meaning is disclosed. The upshot is that Grice offers a parsimonious, quasi-formal account of why indirectness is rational in conversation, while Breccia treats conversation itself as a metaphysical medium—one in which even the body, the painted figure, and the silent interval can function as dialogical moves, making reason less a set of conversational constraints than the interpretive practice by which a shared world is continually composed. Grice: “I like B.; he is, like Vitruvio, obsessed with the male human body – but also about the ‘metafisica del dialogo,’ so we can call him a Griceian!” --  Breccia nel suo studio a Roma.  (Trento ), filosofo. La pittura di Breccia esplora l’essere umano con un approccio ermeneutico (nel senso della filosofia ermeneutica moderna di Jaspers, Heidegger, Gadamer) e si apre su un vasto orizzonte di temi filosofici. L’opera di Breccia include oli su tela, matite e pasteli su carta, 7 libri e numerosi saggi critici. B. ha esposto in personali in Europa e USA.  D’ascendenza umbra. Studia a Roma. . Scopre ALIGHIERI che studia di sua iniziativa affascinato dalle allegorie dantesche. Subito dopo, attratto dalla filosofia e dalla mitologia, traduce l’“Antigone e il Prometeo legato e i Dialoghi accademici.  La produzione artistica dei primi due anni e il pensiero filosofico da questa ispirato confluiscno nel libro "Oltreomega".  monologo corale, forme concrete dell in-esistente', semantica del silenzio. stile ideomorfico l’eterno mrtale. animus-anima la lingua sospesa della coscienza ermeneutica ego tu Entwistle, Gardiner, ego metafisica del dialogo, noi, ovvero, la metafisica della conversazione, implicatura ermeneutica. Grice: Breccia, raccontami, quando dipingi il corpo umano, pensi più a Vitruvio o alla metafisica del dialogo? Breccia: Grice, ti dirò, ogni tanto Vitruvio mi suggerisce le proporzioni, ma poi la metafisica del dialogo mi scompiglia tutto: a quel punto mi serve un buon caffè e una tela bianca per far parlare i colori! Grice: E se il silenzio diventasse parte del dialogo? Non rischi che la tua tela inizi a filosofeggiare da sola? Breccia: Caro Grice, in studio capita spesso: una pennellata e già la tela mi risponde. A volte temo che il vero artista sia lei, io mi limito solo a conversare con le sue implicature! Breccia, Pier Augusto (1967). Tesi di laurea in Medicina e Chirurgia, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Roma).

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bressani – Ossia: Grice e Bressani: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del vo significando – Vendler: have you stopped meaning it yet? intorno alla lingua toscana. Grice: “Strawson, being boring, likes B.’s arguments Gregorio Bressani (Treviso, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del vo significando – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats “what is meant” as an inferential product of a speaker’s intentions interacting with publicly shared norms of cooperative talk: hearers assume a rational, purposive exchange and therefore calculate conversational implicatures when what is said would otherwise be inexplicably weak, off-topic, or oddly phrased given the point of the exchange. Bressani, by contrast, approaches the same space from within an eighteenth-century Italian philological and rhetorical preoccupation with the volgare and with the relation between “significato della voce” and the “relazione tra le voci” that makes expression fitting: his emphasis falls less on a general, formal account of rational cooperation and more on cultivated adequacy (convenienza), stylistic and grammatical formation, and the lived skill of adapting one’s fantasia to occasions of esprimersi, so that meaning is not only an intention-and-inference structure but a normatively guided practice of choosing forms that carry, sustain, and refine sense within a linguistic community. On a Gricean reading, Bressani’s recurrent concern with how speakers manage to be understood beyond mere dictionary “significato” can be redescribed as proto-pragmatic attention to what later becomes implicature, but the contrast remains that Grice explains the phenomenon by explicit principles of rational agency in conversation, whereas Bressani frames it as a humanistic discipline of linguistic propriety and expressive mastery, where the “vo significando” is continuous with the ethical-aesthetic education of speakers rather than a primarily analytic model of inference under cooperative constraints. Vendler: have you stopped meaning it yet? intorno alla lingua toscana. Grice: “Strawson, being boring, likes B.’s arguments – all’accademia e lizio, but mainly lizio – against what BONAIUTO has the cheek to call ‘filosofare’! But I prefer B.’s poems, the buccoliche, and especially his lovely treatise discorso in torno alla lingua, his little ethical treatise is charming especially if you are into what some, not I, certainl, call developmental conversational pragmatics!” B. BONAIUTO contro il lizio. Si laurea a Padova. Conosce Algarotti. Sostenne uno scolasticismo classico in opposizione a BONAIUTI. Modo del filosofare Comino, LINGUA ITALIANA nello ſteam dio, che affettano dell’italiana FAVELLA. Non è per tanto che ella non ha la sua verità in rispetto a que’pochi, a cui è dato d’INTENDERE non solamente il SIGNIFICATO – GRICE -- della voce, ma la relazione tra le voci meglio convenevole. Ora come io, senza più, approvo i vocabolarj, gl’avvertimenti di grammatica e l’ossersvazioni che intorno alla lingua sonosi facte dalla diligenza d;uomini valenci; poco ha che accennare de’suoi materiali, ed il suo ragionamento è spezialmente della forma quanto a lui, la di quanto fa di mestieri ula usare a voler scrivere con lode; per chè in fine, siccome non d’altri, che dal proprio sentimento si può apprendere a modificar variamente l’armonia della musica, nè dell’architectura. Così non d’altri che da sè veruno non può apprendere il vero modo d’addattare la propria fantasia a tutte l’occasioni particolari d’aver d’ESPRRIMERSI. Poco dice essere ciò, che li cadde in animo d’accennare verso il molto che un esperto dicitore sa e medita, ed ESPRIME d’attinente a così rasto argomento. lingua toscana l’implicatura di BONAIUTI, discorso intorno a nostra lingua discorso intorno al volgare Aligheri I am meaning forma logica accademia lizeo grammatica geometria grammatica profonda. Grice: Bressani, dimmi, quando discuti della lingua toscana, smetti mai di “vo significando” o continui anche mentre sorseggi il caffè? Bressani: Ah, Grice, la lingua toscana è come la moka: borbotta sempre qualcosa, e se non la ascolti bene rischi di perdere il significato – o peggio, la tazzina! Grice: E secondo te, i lessici e le grammatiche che compilano gli accademici servono davvero, oppure è meglio lasciar fare alla fantasia di chi parla? Bressani: Ma certo, Grice! Come dice Bonaiuti, filosofare è una cosa seria – però, quando la fantasia si mette a tavola, il discorso diventa più saporito. E poi, se la lingua non si adatta, chi la invita a cena? Bressani, Gregorio (1738). Discorso in torno alla lingua. Treviso: Costantini.

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bro

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Brozio – Ossia: Grice e Brozio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Brozio. The Brozzi is a family of ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned by Roman writers, but several are known from inscriptions, including at least two potters whose stamps have been found at Cora in Latium.  Gaius Brotius C. l. Geminus, a freedman buried at Rome, aged twenty-five. His fellow freedman, Gaius B. Silo, was buried in the same place.[1] Gaius B. Philocaus, a potter whose makers' mark has been found on ceramics from Cora and Ostia in Latium. Another inscription from Cora names a potter named Gaius Brotius Philotetus.[2] Gaius Brotius Philotetus, a potter whose makers' mark was found on ceramics from Cora. Other pottery stamps from Cora and elsewhere name a Gaius Brotius Philocaus.[3] Gaius Brotius C. l. Silo, a freedman buried at Rome, aged thirty. His fellow freedman, Gaius Brotius Geminus, was buried in the same place.[1] Titus Brotius Zosimus, buried in a second- or third-century tomb at Thessalonica in Macedonia, built by his wife, the freedwoman Cossutia Fausta.[4][5] See also List of Roman gentes References  CIL VI, 13643.  CIL X, 8043,040b, CIL X, 8043,041a, CIL X, 8043,041b, CIL X, 8043,041c, CIL X, 8043,040d, CIL XIV, 4089.  CIL X, 8043,040c.  CIL III, 14203,42.  IG, x. 2–1, 668. Bibliography Adolf Kirchhoff et alii, Inscriptiones Graecae (Greek Inscriptions, abbreviated IG), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1860–present). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Category: Roman gentes For this gens we can analyse and compare with Greeks. It is grice's and Speranza's undersatnding that in some pieces of instrumental Greek art, we find inscriptions like "F. did this" -- auto-referential deictic. Do we know if in Roman cases it was similar, with some stupid verb attached to the piece of pottery, not just the "B" as per Royal Doulton mark (code) -- but "B. cooked this"? Input? Feedack? Thanks. In which case, or any case, we can create a conversation with son seeing how father finished piece of pottery and now adds name -- usual conversation in latin with son inquiring: why are you spoiling that piece? I'm writing it on the base.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Brozio – Ossia: Grice e Brozio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Brozio. This is actually a very good Grice/Speranza topic, because pottery stamps sit right on the boundary between:  mere marking ("Royal Doulton") and utterance ("X made me").  And the Greeks are indeed famous for forms such as:  Ἐποίησέν με ("made me")  or  ἔγραψέν με ("painted me")  where the object almost speaks in the first person. What I can say safely from your Brotii material is that the inscriptions cited are described as makers' marks (figlina stamps, potters' stamps) associated with potters such as Gaius Brotius Philocaus and Gaius Brotius Philotetus. The passage you supplied does not specify the exact wording of the stamps, only that their makers' marks were found on ceramics. Therefore I cannot claim that the Brotii used a verb such as fecit or finxit on the surviving stamps; the text does not tell us that. What is interesting, however, is the Gricean distinction:                      TypeExamplePure index"BROTI PHILOCAI"Full utterance"BROTIVS FECIT"Object-speaking form"BROTIVS ME FECIT" The further one goes down that list, the more one approaches conversation and deixis.  A Brotius dialogue Since we do not know the exact wording of the stamp, let us make the conversation about the act of marking itself. Conversatio FILIVS (1) "Pater, cur vas iam perfectum scalpis?" (Father, why are you scratching the pot when it is already finished?) BROTIVS (2) "Non laedo; nomen addo." (I do not damage it; I add a name.) FILIVS (3) "Sed cur nomen opus sequitur?" (But why does a name follow the work?) BROTIVS (4) "Ut sciatur cuius manus hoc fecerit." (So that it may be known whose hand made this.) FILIVS (5) "Num vas ipsum loquitur?" (Does the vessel itself speak?) BROTIVS (6) "Paene; tacet lutum, nomen autem respondet." (Almost; the clay is silent, but the name answers.) +> that a maker's mark functions as a compressed speech act, supplying authorship without the craftsman being physically present.  Why Speranza would like it The stamp says very little:  BROTIVS  Yet the hearer immediately infers:  someone made this, someone takes responsibility for it, someone wishes to be remembered through it.  In Gricean terms, the stamp is almost an extreme abbreviation of an utterance:  "I made this."  The potter need not say the sentence; the audience reconstructs it. A neat Speranzian formulation might be:  Nomen fictoris est implicatura operis. ("The potter's name is the implicature of the artifact.")  The object itself becomes a silent conversational participant.

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bru

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bruni – Ossia: Grice e Bruni: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’interpretare da Romolo e Remo.  Leonardo Bruni (Arezzo, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’interpretare da Romolo e Remo. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers move from sentence meaning to speaker meaning by presuming a cooperative, rational “talk exchange” (the Cooperative Principle and maxims) and then deriving conversational implicatures when an utterance looks under-informative, oddly phrased, or apparently off-topic; the key is that what is meant is recoverable as a calculable, defeasible inference from shared purposes and intention-recognition. Leonardo Bruni (Arezzo c. 1370–Florence 1444), although not a pragmatics theorist, offers a strikingly parallel normative stance about “right interpretation” in the domain of translation and humanist philology: in De interpretatione recta (written c. 1420–1426) he argues that translating and interpreting require deep command of both languages and, crucially, sensitivity to the author’s style and intended force, attacking word-for-word “incorrect” rendering as a failure to carry over what the author is doing, not merely what the words denote. Put side by side, Grice supplies the micro-level model of how rational agents infer intended meaning in live conversation (including when the speaker relies on the audience to supply what is left unsaid), while Bruni supplies a macro-level humanist ethics of interpretive responsibility: be “retta” in conveying an author’s thought and rhetorical character, resist both wooden literalism and uncontrolled over-interpretation, and treat understanding as something governed by disciplined norms rather than free invention. In Gricean terms, Bruni’s ideal translator is a highly cooperative hearer: someone who tracks relevance, avoids distortion, and reconstructs intention and stylistic point; and Bruni’s worry about misreading or over-reading anticipates a Gricean caution that implicatures are cancellable and context-bound—so interpretive zeal that outruns evidence turns “extra meaning” into mere misinterpretation rather than rationally warranted conversational (or textual) enrichment. Grice: “B. is a philosopher – and a Griceian one at that. He reminds me when Austin and I gave joint seminars on De interpretatione -- our tutees finding it boring that we lay the blame on il lizio. Annici is possibly wrong in missing the metaphorical impicature of ‘ermeneutica, and give us a rather boring inter-pretatio, which is the thing B. uses when dealing with CICERONE, unaware if what he is doing is interpretare or volgarizare, rendering the thing into the volgare that the volgo will appreciate! B’s implicature seems to be: let the classic stay classy! But there is a little word that B. uses that is crucial: retta: l’interpretazione has to be retta, not incorretta, which leads us to implicature: is over-interpretation mis-interpretation? We think it is! But since an implicaturum is cancellable, we have to be VERY careful here, as B. is, especially when he visits I Tatti!” Umanista, studia sotto Maplaghini. Conosce Filelfo. Questione della lingua. Riscontra la corruzione del latino in Plauto coll’assimilazione, isse/ipse, colonna/columna. Il latino evolve dall’interno e diviene toscano. BIONDO s’oppone. La causa sono gl’ostrogoti e i longobardi. Sul volgare degno, SALUTATI e VALLA disprezzano il volgare, non dotato della  norma grammaticale. ALBERTI lo riconosce come lingua ricca di dignità. Conversazione tra SALUTATI e NICCOLINI, asserendo che il volgare è degno se regolato d’un assioma preciso, e dispiacendosi che ALIGHIERI non scrive la commedia nel ben più nobile latino; l’altro giudicando piu radicalmente ALIGHIERI, PETRARCA e BOCCACCIO poco più che degl’ignoranti, ma difendeli, riconoscendole sua grandezza, independentemente alla lingua che usano. ambivalenza d’interpretazione volutamente lasciata da B. contro BONAIUTI.  dove la posizione di Simplicio è quella di chi enuncia testi che devono essere confutate. interpretare, implicatura geometrica, ethica nicomachaea, Grice, Hardie, ad Petrum Paulum Histrum, i sei aquile I duodici aquile primi I sei corvi il segnato implicatura geometrica. Grice: Bruni, mi racconti, tra Romolo e Remo, quale implicatura conversazionale hai trovato più divertente nell'interpretare le storie degli antichi? Bruni: Grice, dipende da come la prendi! Se interpreti troppo, rischi che Romolo diventi Remo e viceversa... e magari la lupa si offende pure. La retta interpretazione, come dico sempre, sta nel mezzo. Grice: E allora, ti capita mai di “volgarizzare” troppo, rendendo le cose troppo popolari, come Cicerone che si trasforma in un chiacchierone da piazza? Bruni: Ma certo, Grice! A volte mi piace lasciare un po’ di ambivalenza, così anche il volgo può divertirsi a interpretare. D’altronde, una buona conversazione è come una partita di scacchi: basta non fare mosse incorrette, e il gioco continua! Bruni, Leonardo (1439). Historia Florentina. Firenze, Bartolomeo de' Libri.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bruno – Ossia: Grice e Bruno: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’opera – libretto d’Atteone.   Filippo Giordano Bruno Bruni (Nola, Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’opera – libretto d’Atteone. Grice: “It has taken naturally an Italian – Rossi – to unearth the connection between the chiave universalis and the cabbala! Italians should concentrate on the few Italian philosophical dialogues by B. in the vernacular, and leave those in ‘the learned’ for those who cannot deal with the ‘volgare’! My favourite has to be the one on Atteone – which B. describes as the ‘furor’ of a ‘heroe’ – Atteone il cacciatore – but the one on the Fiume at the Campidoglio is also very good! A genius. We see in B. some uses of Latin intendere – Italian intendere – which were also borrowed from the Anglo-Normans and turned it into ‘intend,’ which the OED recognises as ‘mean’. However, my phrase is ‘to intend one’s addressee to believe ...’ rather than a strict equivalence ‘to intend’ =def ‘to mean’.” Naturalista, amare universo infinito dei mondi materialista Bonaiuto accademia memotennnica effetto d’un divino in-figurabile. Interrogato nel processo informa. Io ho nome  Nato fronte al Vesuvio, che, pensando che oltre quella montagna non vi è più nulla nel mondo, esplora . Ne trae l'insegnamento di non basarsi esclusivamente sul giudizio dei sensi, come fa, a suo dire, il lizio, imparando soprattutto che, al di là di ogni apparente limite, vi è sempre qualche cosa d'altro. Studia su Giandomenico de Iannello ed a Aloia e Napoli. In trisbitia  hilaris Bruniana paganesimo ario, anti-catolecismo, anti-papismo, filosofia anti-religione ragione, contro la fede irrazionale ario tradizione pagano religione Roma antica irrazionale della religione antica romana metafora ermetico segno composto asino Spaventa Giudice Cacciatore Gentile, ligatura relativo infigurabile indeterminabile open Marlowe Shakespeare pene d’amore perdute Oxford. Grice: Bruno, nel tuo libretto d’Atteone l’eroe diventa cervo perché guarda troppo, ma dimmi: era una tragedia o una gigantesca implicatura cosmologica? Bruno: Caro Grice, era un modo per far capire che l’infinito non entra nei sensi senza fare rumore, e Atteone paga il prezzo del voler vedere oltre misura. Grice: E quando tu dici intendere, vuoi dire proprio “mean”, o intendi che io intenda che tu intendi che io creda qualcosa di più sottile? Bruno: Intendo tutte e tre le cose, ma se ti perdi, seguimi con il volgare: è più veloce del latino e morde meno dei cani di Atteone. Bruno, Filippo Giordano (1582). De la causa, principio et uno. Venezia,

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bruttio – Ossia: Grice e Bruttio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Bruttio. The Bruttii are an ancient Roman family during the late Republic and into imperial times. None of the gens obtained any important magistracies until the latter half of the first century AD, when Lucius B. Maximus was proconsul in Cyprus.  “B.” probably indicates that the ancestors of the gens were from Bruttium, the southernmost region of Italia. The Bruttii were an Oscan people descended from the Lucani, from whom they asserted their independence during the fourth century BC. The name of Bruttii, which they adopted for themselves, may be a pre-Sabellic name meaning "runaways". The praenomina used by the Bruttii are Lucius, Gaius, and Quintus.  No distinct families of the Bruttii appear under the Republic, during which the only cognomen is Sura. A number of surnames occur in imperial times, of which all but Balbus appear to belong to the same family. The others were Maximus, Praesens, and Crispinus. This family came from Volceii, in Lucania, and seems to have made a habit of adopting names from the female line. The combination of Quinctius or Quintius Crispinus probably asserts the family's descent from the ancient patrician house of the Quinctii Crispini.[5]  Quintus B. Sura, legate of Gaius Sentius Saturninus, governor of Macedonia in 88 BC. Gaius Bruttius C. f., proquaestor in an unspecified year, and aedile in 57 BC.[6] Bruttius, an eques, for whom Cicero wrote a letter of introduction to Manius Acilius Caninus, proconsul in Sicilia in 46 BC.[7] B., a philologer, with whom the younger Tullio Cicero studied at Athens.[8] Quintus B. Balbus, a candidate for duumvir at Pompeii, mentioned in a political graffito.[9] Lucius B. Maximus, proconsul of Cyprus in AD 80. Gaius B. L. f. Praesens Lucius Fulvius Rusticus, consul in AD 139. Lucius Fulvius Gaius B. C. f. L. n. Praesens Laberius Maximus, consul in AD 153 and 180. Bruttia C. f. C. n. Crispina, Roman empress, the wife of Commodus. Lucius B. C. f. C. n. Quinctius Crispinus, consul in AD 187. Gaius Bruttius Praesens, consul in AD 217.[10] Lucius Bruttius Quintius Crispinus, consul in AD 224, and afterwards persuaded the city of Aquileia to resist Maximinus Thrax. Gaius Bruttius Praesens, consul in AD 246.[5] Bruttius or "Brittius" Praesens, corrector of Lucania and Bruttium, and a pontifex major, around the early fourth century.[11][12] See also List of Roman gentes Brutus (disambiguation) References  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help) Jones, A. H. M.; Martindale, J. R.; Morris, John, eds. (1971–1992). Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (3 volumes). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (see PLRE)  Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca Historica, xvi. 15.  Strabo, Geographica, vi. 253 ff.  Marcus Junianus Justinus, Historiarum Philippicarum libri XLIV, xxiii. 1.  Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd Ed. (1970).  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Attilio Degrassi, Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae, Turin (1963), pp. 92, 93 (No. 608).  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, xiii. 38.  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, xvi. 21.  Walls of Pompeii Archived May 7, 2003, at the Wayback Machine  Fasti consulares.  CIL VI, 2153, CIL X, 468.  PLRE, vol. I, p. 721. Categories: BruttiiRoman gentes

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bruttio – Ossia: Grice e Bruttio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Bruttio. For this gens we can have a conversation in Latin with Cicero arriving at Athens and meeting B. Cicero was sent by his father, and Cicero thought he would be tutored almost by Plato. Instead, there was this Italian Roman B. -- and Cicero is puzzled. And B. explains: your father says your greek leaves a lot to be desired so he thought best to pay ME for your education, since "my child will understand your Latin, I hope". Input? Feedback? Thanks This is actually an excellent Bruttian vignette because it combines two of Speranza's favourite themes:  Athens as the supposed source of wisdom, and The disappointment of expectations when one arrives and finds not Plato, but a fellow Italian.  From your passage, all we know explicitly is that:  Bruttius, a philologer, with whom the younger Tullio Cicero studied at Athens. (Cicero, Ad Familiares xvi.21, as cited in your source.)  The rest may be reconstructed imaginatively.   Conversatio: Cicero Minor and Bruttius at Athens CICERO IVNIOR (1) “Salve. Ubi est philosophus Graecus ad quem pater me misit?” (Greetings. Where is the Greek philosopher to whom my father sent me?)  BRVTTIVS (2) “Adest; sed non est quem exspectas.” (He is here; but not the one you expect.)  CICERO IVNIOR (3) “Putabam me apud Academiam paene ipsum Platonem inventurum.” (I thought I should find almost Plato himself at the Academy.)  BRVTTIVS (4) “Pro Platone Bruttium invenisti.” (Instead of Plato, you have found a Bruttius.)  CICERO IVNIOR (5) “At tu Romanus es!” (But you are a Roman!)  BRVTTIVS (6) “Romanus quidem; sed Athenis disco atque doceo.” (Roman indeed; but in Athens I learn and teach.)  CICERO IVNIOR (7) “Cur pater me tibi commendavit?” (Why did my father recommend me to you?)  BRVTTIVS (8) “Quia Graeca tua emendatione egent.” (Because your Greek needs improvement.)  CICERO IVNIOR (9) “Num Graecus magister melior non esset?” (Would not a Greek teacher be better?)  BRVTTIVS (10) “Pater tuus fortasse speravit filium Latinum Latine admonitum citius intellecturum.” (Your father perhaps hoped that a Roman son, corrected by a Roman, would understand more quickly.)  +> that genuine learning often comes not from the exotic source one imagines, but from an intermediary who shares enough background to make understanding possible.   Why this is Gricean The humour lies in defeated expectation. Cicero Minor reasons:  Athens → Greeks Greeks → philosophy philosophy → Plato  Therefore:  "I shall be taught by a Greek sage."  Instead he finds:  Bruttius, a Roman philologer.  The conversational implicature attached to "study at Athens" is cancelled. Athens remains Athens, but the route to Greek culture passes through a Roman mediator.   A deeper Speranzian point Bruttius is almost the opposite of Titus Betucius Barrus. With Barrus, Rome recognizes excellence outside Rome. With Bruttius, Athens teaches Rome through a Roman. One might formulate it:  Athenae sunt locus doctrinae; doctor tamen Romanus est.  ("Athens is the place of learning; the teacher, however, is Roman.") The moral being that cultural authority does not always coincide with ethnic or geographic origin—a theme Cicero himself, an Arpinate who became Rome's greatest orator, would surely have appreciated. And the importance of the comparative -- younger Cicero studied at Athens: Tullio's son -- only ONE mention survives but we can think that Cicero Jr sent back a letter or actually met for some festivitiy -- the summer recess and then we have the conversation between Cicero Sr. and Cicero Jr. about B. The fact that only ONE mention of B. by Tullio indicates that B. did not leave much of a mark. The general gens entry mentions ANOTHER B. for whom Tullio wrote a recommendation, so his name may be dropped in the conversation. Thanks I think this is exactly the right way to read the evidence. What survives in the sources, as presented in your gens entry, is strikingly asymmetrical:  one Bruttius is merely mentioned as the philologer with whom the younger Cicero studied at Athens; another Bruttius is important enough that Cicero writes a letter of recommendation for him. (The entry cites Ad Familiares xiii.38 and xvi.21.)  From a Speranzian perspective, the scarcity itself becomes meaningful. The Gricean maxim at work is almost:  If Bruttius had greatly impressed Cicero, we should expect more to be said.  Since only a passing mention survives, one natural implicature is:  +> Bruttius performed his pedagogical function adequately, but did not become one of the memorable intellectual presences of Cicero's world.  Of course this is only an implicature, not a historical fact—many great people disappear from the record.  A reconstructed conversation Imagine Cicero Jr. returning from Athens during a recess and discussing his studies with his father. Conversatio CICERO SENIOR (1) “Quid tandem de studiis Atheniensibus? Quem audisti?” (Well then, what of your Athenian studies? Whom did you study under?)  CICERO IVNIOR (2) “Bruttium quendam philologum.” (A certain Bruttius, a philologer.)  CICERO SENIOR (3) “Bruttium? Putabam te magistros Graecos frequentare.” (Bruttius? I thought you would be attending Greek teachers.)  CICERO IVNIOR (4) “Graeca quidem docebat, sed Latine explicabat.” (He taught Greek, certainly, but explained it in Latin.)  CICERO SENIOR (5) “Fortasse id utilius fuit.” (Perhaps that was more useful.)  CICERO IVNIOR (6) “Minus gloriosum, sed facilius.” (Less glorious, but easier.)  CICERO SENIOR (7) “Num aliquid memorabile dixit?” (Did he say anything memorable?)  CICERO IVNIOR (8) “Non multa; sed multa intellexi.” (Not many things; but I understood many things.)  CICERO SENIOR (9) “Estne idem genus hominum quod ille Bruttius cui litteras commendaticias dedi?” (Is he of the same sort as that Bruttius for whom I once wrote a letter of recommendation?)  CICERO IVNIOR (10) “Fortasse. Non eminuit, sed profuit.” (Perhaps. He did not stand out, but he was useful.)  +> that the best teacher is not necessarily the most famous or memorable, but the one through whom understanding occurs.  The comparative point What I particularly like here is your emphasis on the comparative. Young Cicero likely arrives expecting:  Plato → Academy → Greek sage.  Instead he gets:  Bruttius → Roman intermediary → practical instruction.  The contrast is not:  good teacher vs bad teacher,  but:  prestigious teacher vs effective teacher.  That is very Gricean. The student initially assumes that greater prestige entails greater educational value. The conversation gradually cancels that implicature. A Speranzian tag might be:  Minus clarus, sed magis utilis. ("Less famous, but more useful.")  And perhaps that is exactly why Bruttius is mentioned only once: not because he failed, but because he succeeded in the unglamorous task of helping Cicero's son learn. The teacher disappears; the education remains. By the comparative Speranza was referring to the rather sloppy style in tehe wiki en entry for the gens: "younger Cicero studied under B." implicature: Cicero JUNIOR. Without the -er in YOUNGER, and as "Young Cicero studied under B." that would mean Cicero at the required age for study? Input? Feedback? Thanks Yes—this is a very nice Speranzian point, and it concerns not Roman history but the pragmatics of English comparatives. The entry says:  "Bruttius, a philologer, with whom the younger Tullius Cicero studied at Athens."  In classical scholarship, "the younger Cicero" is a fixed identifying expression. It means:  Cicero's son, Marcus Tullius Cicero Minor.  The comparative younger is not primarily about age at the time of study but about distinguishing two individuals with essentially the same name. Compare:  Pliny the Elder / Pliny the Younger Cato the Elder / Cato the Younger Seneca the Elder / Seneca the Younger  The comparative functions almost as part of the name.  Now suppose the sentence were rewritten:  "Young Cicero studied under Bruttius."  That is different. Here young is an adjective describing a stage of life, not identifying a person. The implicature becomes:  Cicero (whichever Cicero is under discussion) was at a youthful age when he studied under Bruttius.  A reader unfamiliar with the family could even take it to mean:  Marcus Tullius Cicero, the famous orator, when he was young.   So the contrast is:                  PhraseMeaningthe younger CiceroCicero Jr., a particular individualyoung CiceroCicero at a young age Very different.  A Gricean observation is that Wikipedia-style summaries often rely on the assumption that the reader already knows this convention. Thus:  "the younger Cicero studied under Bruttius"  carries the conversational implicature:  "there is an elder Cicero from whom he must be distinguished."  Without the comparative, that implicature vanishes. In fact, one could imagine Speranza joking that:  The younger Cicero is not necessarily young; he is merely younger than Cicero.  Just as "the Younger Pitt" can be quite old while remaining "the Younger Pitt." So I think your criticism is justified: replacing "the younger Cicero" with "young Cicero" would alter the reference substantially. The comparative here is not an age-description but an identity-marker. And Speranza was using 'sloppy' pedantically, implicating that back in the day, Cicero would not call himself maior or his son minor -- these are all post-classical considerations. Input? Yes, I think Speranza's complaint is a good pedantic one. The Romans themselves would not ordinarily have spoken of:  Cicero maior and Cicero minor,  in the way modern scholars speak of:  Cato the Elder / Cato the Younger, Seneca the Elder / Seneca the Younger, Pliny the Elder / Pliny the Younger.  Those labels are largely scholarly conveniences. The passage cited in your gens entry merely identifies:  "Bruttius, a philologer, with whom the younger Tullius Cicero studied at Athens."  The "younger" here is modern editorial language, intended to prevent confusion between father and son. It is not reproducing a self-description by Cicero. A Speranzian point would be that there are two quite different uses of "younger": Historical-scholarly use  "the younger Cicero"  Meaning:  the son, as opposed to the father.  This is referential.  Ordinary-language use  "young Cicero"  Meaning:  Cicero at an early age.  This is descriptive.  The wiki-style wording quietly slides from one to the other. A reader unfamiliar with Roman prosopography may almost hear:  "while still a youngster, Cicero studied under Bruttius."  But what is really meant is:  "Cicero's son studied under Bruttius."  Very different. In Gricean terms, the comparative "younger" generates a conversational implicature that there are two salient Ciceros requiring disambiguation. It does not primarily generate an implicature about age. Speranza's further point is that neither Cicero nor his son would likely have introduced themselves:  ego sum Cicero minor,  any more than Julius Caesar would have called himself "Julius Caesar Senior." The labels belong to the historian's filing system, not ordinarily to the participants' own conversational practice. One can almost hear Speranza formulate the principle:  "The younger Cicero" is a convenience for posterity; "my son" would have sufficed for Cicero.  That strikes me as exactly the sort of linguistic distinction that both Grice and Speranza would enjoy.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Bruzi – Ossia: Grice e Bruzi:  la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei goti.  Grice: “I like B!”  Flavio Magno Aurelio Cassiodoro Senatore Bruzi:  la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei goti. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers recover what a speaker means from what is said by presuming cooperative rationality (maxims of quantity, quality, relation, manner) and then calculating implicatures when an utterance seems oddly indirect, incomplete, or off-point; the engine is intention plus publicly accessible norms of inference in a talk exchange. Cassiodorus (Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator, c. 485–c. 585; from the Bruttium/Calabria area, later founder of Vivarium) is not a pragmatics theorist but a late antique statesman and Christian intellectual whose surviving corpus (especially the Variae and the educational program of the Institutiones) aims at preserving and reorganizing learned culture under Ostrogothic rule, and whose brief treatise traditionally titled De arte rhetorica et dialectica (often treated as an elementary handbook of the trivium) frames dialectic as a rule-governed art of reasoning and disputation. The comparison, then, is that Grice supplies a modern micro-theory of how conversational partners infer extra meaning beyond literal content in ordinary interaction, while Cassiodorus exemplifies an older macro-normative conception of rational speech as something cultivated through artes—dialectic, rhetoric, grammar—designed to discipline discourse, train inference, and stabilize civic and ecclesiastical communication across linguistic and political difference (Romans/Goths, Latin learning in a changing polity). Put Griceanly, Cassiodorus’s “dialectica” is not about implicature as such, but it provides the institutional and pedagogical background that makes reasoned exchange possible: it teaches what counts as a good step in argument, how to avoid fallacious transitions, and how to conduct disputation; Grice then explains how, within any such rule-governed practice, speakers can intentionally exploit expectations of relevance and sufficiency to communicate more than they explicitly state—so that Cassiodorus represents the education of reasoned discourse, whereas Grice explains the inferential pragmatics by which that educated discourse (and even its jokes about Goths, “Getae,” and war versus dialogue) is actually understood in context. Grice: “B. is possibly a genius; I mean, I wrote a logic, and so did he. But he is ‘consul’ on top! My favourite – and indeed, the ONLY tract by him I recommend my tutees is his Dialettica. Strawson prefers his De anima, but anima is a confused notion, for Wittgenstein and neo-Wittgensteinians alike – no souly ascription without behaviour that manifests it! whereas with ‘dialettica’ you are safe enough! I should be pointed out that of the three of the trivial arts – ‘dialettica’ is the only one that deals with my topic, conversation or dia-logue: grammatica is almost autistic, and rhetoric is for lawyers, i. e. sharks! Only dialettica represents why those in the Lit. Hum. programme choose philosophy’! Dialettica INCORPORATES all that grammatica and rettorica can teach!”. Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus. Cassiodoro, Magister officiorum del Regno Ostrogoto Atalarico Atalarico Venanzio Opilione Teodato Vitige  Fidelio. Vive sotto gl’ostrogoti. Succede Annici. Scrive le Variæ. dialettica, teodorico virtu bellica ardore guerriero pagano B. writes a story of the Goths, but he mistakes them for the Bulgarians: geti, gotti. Squillace, Catanzaro, Calabria.  Grice: Cassiodoro, tu che hai scritto una dialettica da vero consul, dimmi, è vero che i goti preferiscono la conversazione alla guerra? Bruzi: Grice, i goti si rilassano volentieri con un bel dialogo, ma quando si parla di virtù bellica, preferiscono un po’ d’ardore pagano e qualche battuta tra amici. Grice: E la tua dialettica, incorporando grammatica e rettorica, serve a far ridere gli ostrogoti o a confondere i bulgari? Bruzi: Grice, a Squillace i bulgari li confondono sempre con i geti, ma la vera dialettica si pratica meglio tra una storia e l’altra, magari davanti a un bicchiere di vino calabrese! Bruzi, Flavio Magno Aurelio Cassiodoro Senatore (537). Variae epistolae. Roma, Tipografia del Senato.