BASSON, A. H. and O'CONNER, D. J. -Introduction to Symbolic Logic [Book Review]

O. P. Wood

Mind 65:107 (1956)   Copy   BIBTEX

 I am here considering what is (or may be) only an ideal case, one which is artificially simplified by abstracting from all considerations other than those involved in the pursuance of a certain sort of conversational cooperation. I do not claim that there actually occur any conversations of this artificially simplified kind; it might even be that these could not be (cf frictionless pulleys). My question is on the (artificial) assumption that their only concern is cooperation in the business of giving and receiving information, what subordinate maxims or rules would it be reasonable or even mandatory that participants should accept as governing their conversational practice? Since the object of this exercise is to provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of cases, why it is that a particular implicature is present, I would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this model should be a) can it be used to construct explanations of the presence of such implicatures, and is it more comprehensive and more economical than any rival [I have tried to make a start on the first part of a)] b) Are the no doubt crude, preteoretical explanations which one would be prompted to give of such implicatures consistent with, or better still favourable pointers towards, the requirements involved in the model.

 we want to allow for the construction of a (possibly later) type, a talking piror, which can express that it judges that p; and (b) to maintain as a general (though probably derivative) law that celeris paribus if x expresses that & then x judges that. ф. The substitution of x judges that p" for *or will force the admissibility of "* judges" that p". So we shall have to adopt as a law thar a judges' that piff x judges that p. Exactly parallel reasoning will force the adoption of the law that a judges* that p if x judges? that p.