Activated belief, 109, 110
Adding, 122
Adeimantus, 307, 309, 313, 314
Adjectives, 48, 130
Adverbs, 6-8, 13
Affinity, 305, 332
Affirmative categorical sentences, 130
Albritton, Rogers, 53, 248n1, 257
Ambiguity, 27, 35, 119-120, 151; and ordinary language, 177; and the analytic/ synthetic distinction, 196
Analogy, 305
Analytic/synthetic distinction, 196-213, 341, 344, 363; illusory, 197; agreement about meaning, 198; Quine's argument against, 201-202
"And," 68, 70, 201; and conditionals, 67; and "or," 69; Russellian conjuncts, 276
Antinomy of conditionals, 84-85
A-philosophers, 10-12, 14-22
Applied timeless meaning, 89, 90, 91; distinct from occasion meaning, 119; for unstructured utterance-types, 128-129; for structured utterance-types, 129-132.
See also Meaning; Occasion-meaning;
Timeless meaning
A posteriori, 340
Appropriateness, 273, 340
A prioricity, 197
Argument from illusion, 226
Aristotle, 305-308, 315, 327, 378-
380
Assertive mood. See Indicatives
Assurance-deficiency, 110
Attention-deficiency, 110
Audience, 103, 123; indefinite audiences,
113-117; possible audiences, 115
Austin, J. L., 19, 376, 377, 379; on ad-verbs, 8; on intentional actions, 12-13, 14-15; and the Playgroup, 181-182; on ordinary language, 381-385; on Moore and Wittgenstein, 381
Ayer, A. J., 342
"Backward-looking" subclauses, 99
Baker, Judith, 295, 305-307, 313, 316
Believing, 123; as an intentional concept,
137; having reasons for believing, 221
Benjamin, Cornelius, S, 11
Bennett, Jonathan, v Boyle, Robert, 343
Brevity, 27, 37
Cancelability (of implicatures), 44-46,
229; of doubt or denial condition, 230,
234; and empty definite descriptions,
270-271. See also Conversational impli-cature; Detachability; Implicature; Non-detachability
Cartesian circle, 190-191. See also Des-cartes; God
Categories. See Conversational maxims Causal Theory of Perception, 224-248, 249-268, 340, 341-344; how consti-tuted, 224-226; causal dependence as condition for perception, 238-241;Causal Theory of Perception (cont.) causal concepts involved, 241; charge that it leads to skepticism, 241-247; lack of conflict with Phenomenalism, 242-243; two ways of looking at, 244.
See also Perception; Senses
"Cause," 164-166, 215-217, 304. See also
Causal Theory of Perception
Centrality, 359, 360
Cephalus, 309
Certainty, 10, 147, 155; and proof, 157;
Descartes on, 187-192; divided into objective and subjective, 188-189; and necessary truth, 188-190. See also Des-cartes; Moore, G. E.; Skepticism
Class complement, 133
Cleitophon, 310
Coextensionality, 200
Cognitive synonymy: explained, 200, 202; and sentence synonymy, 201; related to definition, 206-207; and verification theory of meaning, 209-210; and confir-mation, 211
Color, 225; and sense data, 227, 228; as a visual property, 255; and Martians,
262-263
Common sense, 147-153, 341, 373;
Moore on, 154-159, 345, 381-386; and proof, 157; and metaphysics, 306; and perception, 344; defended, 345-349;
Thomas Reid's defense of, 345-346
Communication, 215; artificial devices for,
296
Conceptual analysis, 172-180, 181-185; characterized, 174-176; and lexicogra-phy, 175; as rational reconstruction,
182; and self-justification, 183; and Re-ality, 184
Conceptual schemes, 211
Conditionals, 58-85; material, 58, 63;
Philonian and Megarian, 62-63; natu-ral, 62-63; unitary, 74-75; conditional particle clarified, 74-76; and modus po-nendo ponens, 75, 79, 82; noncommuta-tivity of, 75, 77; conventional meaning of, 77; and nonconventional implicature, 77, 78, 375-376; and inferrability, 77,
78; negated, 78-85; subjective probability and, 79; conventional meaning of
"if," 83; Grice's antinomy, 84-85. See also "And"; Implying; "Or"
Causal Theory of Perception (cont.) causal concepts involved, 241; charge that it leads to skepticism, 241-247; lack of conflict with Phenomenalism, 242-243; two ways of looking at, 244.
See also Perception; Senses
"Cause," 164-166, 215-217, 304. See also
Causal Theory of Perception
Centrality, 359, 360
Cephalus, 309
Certainty, 10, 147, 155; and proof, 157;
Descartes on, 187-192; divided into objective and subjective, 188-189; and necessary truth, 188-190. See also Des-cartes; Moore, G. E.; Skepticism
Class complement, 133
Cleitophon, 310
Coextensionality, 200
Cognitive synonymy: explained, 200, 202; and sentence synonymy, 201; related to definition, 206-207; and verification theory of meaning, 209-210; and confir-mation, 211
Color, 225; and sense data, 227, 228; as a visual property, 255; and Martians,
262-263
Common sense, 147-153, 341, 373;
Moore on, 154-159, 345, 381-386; and proof, 157; and metaphysics, 306; and perception, 344; defended, 345-349;
Thomas Reid's defense of, 345-346
Communication, 215; artificial devices for,
296
Conceptual analysis, 172-180, 181-185; characterized, 174-176; and lexicogra-phy, 175; as rational reconstruction,
182; and self-justification, 183; and Re-ality, 184
Conceptual schemes, 211
Conditionals, 58-85; material, 58, 63;
Philonian and Megarian, 62-63; natu-ral, 62-63; unitary, 74-75; conditional particle clarified, 74-76; and modus po-nendo ponens, 75, 79, 82; noncommuta-tivity of, 75, 77; conventional meaning of, 77; and nonconventional implicature, 77, 78, 375-376; and inferrability, 77,
78; negated, 78-85; subjective probability and, 79; conventional meaning of
"if," 83; Grice's antinomy, 84-85. See also "And"; Implying; "Or"
Correlation, 103, 104; defined, 132-135; explicit, 132, 136; nonexplicit, 136; os-tensive, 134-135. See also D-correla-tion; R-correlation; Truth Correspondence theory of truth, 56-57
Crucial statements, 10, 14-15
Crucial words, 10-11
Davis, Steven, 225n1
D-correlation, 130-131
Deception, 292-293
Deeming, 302
Definite descriptions, 130, 270-282, 375; as carriers of implicature, 272-273; ne-gations of statements using, 275-276; reference contextually determined, 276-
277; and nonindicative moods, 277-279
Definition, 206-207
Descartes, René, 148, 186-195; and prop-ositions, 186-187; on clear and distinct perception, 186-188; on "simple na-tures," 187; on certainty, 187-188; and necessary connections, 188
Descriptions: Russell's theory of, 269, 272-274; descriptive representation, 358-359. See also Definite descriptions
Designation, 56
Detachability (of implicatures), 58, 229; of doubt or denial condition, 230; and empty definite descriptions, 271
Deutero-Esperanto, 298-299
Dictiveness, 360-361, 362
Disjunction. See "Or"
Doubt or denial condition (D-or-D condi-tion): introduced with respect to sense data, 227, 228-237; noncancelability of,
230; nondetachability of, 230, 232; relation to L-statements, 231, 235-237; de-tachability of, 233, 234; cancelability of,
234. See also L-statements
Dreaming, 347-348
Dummett, Michael, 79
Entailment, 3, 9
Eschatology, philosophical, 304-338;
characterized, 304; role of, 304-308;
Plato's discussion of justice as an ex-ample of, 308-338
Establishment-conditions, 193, 194
Existential generalization, 115
Existential quantification, 128
Faking. See Deception
Formality, 359, 360-361, 363
Free will, 14-17
Frowning, 219
General statements, 274-275
Gesticulation, 104
Gladstone, William, 362
Glaucon, 314
God: Descartes on, 190-192; Ontological Proof of, 191; and human beings, 305
Godel, Kurt, 188
"Good," 9
Grandy, Richard, 297, 344
Grice, H. P.: Grice's Paradox, 78-85, 382;
Gricean theses, 350-359
Hampshire, Stuart, 377
Handwaving ("HW"): as a type of utter-ance, 125-129; defined, 125-126; and timeless meaning, 126-129; and speaker's meaning, 128-129. See also Utter-ances; Utterance-types
Hardy, G. H., 345
Hart, H. L. A., 7
Hearing, 340, 342
Heidegger, Martin, 18
Herod, 218
Hinting, 368
Humor, 92
Hyperbole, 34
Idiolect, 119, 125, 129
Idiom, 90
Imperatives, 105, 112, 118, 123; and definite descriptions, 278
Implicature, 22-40, 41-57, 138-143, 268-282; defined, 24-26, 86, 229, 341; and conventional meaning, 25-26; con-ventional, 41, 46, 86; nonconventional, 41, 77, 78, 118, 375-376; and condi-tionals, 58-85; and saying, 118-138; and perceptual and subperceptual locu-tions, 140-141; and contrasters, 141; conveying, 362. See also Conversational implicature; Conversational maxims;
Implying; Indicating; Presupposition Implying, 3, 42, 86, 118, 341; Strawson on, 9; and inference elements, 104, 114; speaker's implication, 369. See also Conditionals, Implicature, Indicating
Impossibility. See Logical impossibility
Inconsistency, 202
Indicating, 25, 42, 56, 69, 86, 118; and saying 121. See also Implicature; Imply-
ing
Indicatives, 105, 108, 118, 123, 130-132.
See also Imperatives; Mood Indirectness Condition: formulation, 58,
59; generalized implicature of, 60-62
Induction, 158-159; as grounds for general statements, 274, 275
Inference. See Conditionals; Implying Inference-elements, 99, 104, 114
Intensionality: and language, 133, 137; and extensionality, 137, 348, 364-366
Intentions, 36, 91, 125, 347; intentional action, 12-13, 105; and defining mean-ing, 92-116, 221-223, 283-303; subin-tentions defined, 97; and imperatives,
105; activated intention, 110; linguistic intentions, 135; as an intentional con-cept, 137; general intention (readiness),
139; and deception, 292; and pain be-havior, 293-296. See also Meaning;
M-intending
Interrogative mood, 75-78
Interrogative subordination, 75-76
Introspection, 259-260
lota operator, 271-272
Irony, 53-54, 120
Jack, Mrs. J., 350-351
Justice, 173-174; Plato's discussion of, 307-313; as example of eschatology,
313-338
Kant, Immanuel, 187, 328, 336-337, 338 Knowledge, S, 12, 13, 97; Grice's analysis of, 52-53; Descartes's conception of, 192-195; and the causal theory of per-ception, 243-247; presuppositions of know, 279-280; restrictive account of, 301-302; and common sense, 345-349;
Aristotle on, 379. See also Certainty;
Paradigm cases; Skepticism; Truth-con-ditions
Kripke, Saul, 79
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 382
Lexicography, 175
Locke, John, 177-178, 343
Logic, 22-40, 41-57, 341, 372-376. See also "And"; Conditionals; Implicature;
Implying; "Or"
Logical Connectives, 22-23, 58-59. See also "And"; Conditionals; Implying;
"Or"
Logical Impossibility, 204-206
L-statements: defined, 230; relationship to doubt or denial condition, 231-234;
Truth-conditions for, 232-236. See also Doubt or denial condition
Malcolm, Norman: on Moore, S, 12, 13, 154-155, 346; on skepticism, 148-153; and proof, 157; on paradoxes, 160-163.
See also Moore, G. E.
"Malignant Demon," 148
Manner, 26, 28, 39, 87, 273; and perspicu-ity, 27, 32; exploitation of maxim of,
35; as a generator of implicature, 370,
372. See also Conversational maxims;
Implicature
Maxims. See Conversational maxims
Meaning, 3, 4, 22, 86, 87-116, 117-137, 283-304, 341; central meaning, 88; meaning specifications, 89, 90-91; de-fined, 121; and saying, 121-122; established meaning, 124; "means," 166-167,
291; verification theory of, 209; natural vs. nonnatural, 213-214; causal theory of, 215-217; standard meaning, 216-
217; passive meaning, 351-353; relativized vs. nonrelativized, 354-355.
Problem examples for Grice's ac-count: examinee, 52, 106, 108, 110-
111; prisoner of war, 93; tobacconist, 93-94; bridge-playing employee, 94-95; countersuggestible man, 106-107, 110, 111, 112; Salome, Herod, and St. John the Baptist, 218.
See also Conventional meaning;
Meaning in a language; Nonnatural meaning; Occasion-meaning; Saying;
Timeless meaning
Meaning in a language, 20, 119, 285; word meaning, 20, 88, 117, 283; sentence meaning, 88, 117-118, 283; related to speaker's meaning, 117-138, 340, 349-359. See also Conventional meaning; Meaning
Meiosis, 34
Memory, 192
Metaphor, 34, 54, 305
Metaphysics, two kinds of, 304
Mill, J. S., 326
M-intending, defined, 105, 123, 350; used, 106-109, 124, 125; and mood, 123; as occasion meaning, 139. See also Intending
Modes of correlation, 103
Modus ponendo ponens, 75, 79, 81-82
Molyneaux problem, 266
Mood, 130-132. See also Imperatives; Indicatives
Mood marker "*": introduced, 110; used,
111, 112, 114, 116, 118
Moore, G. E., 5, 42; on certainty and skep-ticism, 147-148, 173, 306, 380-381; on paradoxes and common sense, 154-159; on sense data, 226; on knowing, 237, 345, 380; Malcolm on, 346-347. See also Common sense; Ordinary language philosophy
Moral skepticism, 315, 319-333
Natural impossibility, 204-206
Natural meaning, 116, 213-214. See also Conventional meaning; Meaning; Non-natural meaning
Necessary truth, 188-195
Necessity, 47, 197, 202
Negation, 15, 22, 85, 271-272, 375
Neustics, 367
Nonconventional communications, 138
Nondetachability, 44-46, 58, 232-235; of indirectness condition, 60. See also Can-celability; Detachability
Nonnatural meaning (meaningnn), 88, 91, 92, 117, 352, 354; as occasion-meaning and timeless meaning, 80-91; and natural meaning, 116, 213-214, 215, 290-298, 350-351; defined, 220. See also Conventional meaning; Meaning; Meaning in a language; Natural meaning
Obscurity, 36-37
Observation, 241-243
Obsolescence, 48-49
Occam's Razor, Modified, 47-49, 51, 65 Occasion-meaning, 138; utterance-type,
90; explained, 122-124; and timeless
meaning, 124-126, 217-218; necessary conditions for, 219; and value, 298. See also Utterer's occasion-meaning
Ontological Proof, 191
"Or," 8, 10, 22, 44-47, 68-74; exclusive disjunction and conditionals, 62-66; character of disjunctive participle, 74; compared with conditional participle, 76, 78, 82-83. See also Conditionals Ordinary expression, 149, 160
Ordinary language philosophy, 171-180, 181-186, 339, 378; its tasks, 172; objections to it, 173-176, 176-178, 178-180.
See also Austin, J. L.; Conceptual analy-sis; Moore, G. E.; Playgroup
Oxford, 8, 10, 12, 171, 181, 182, 183, 184, 276-279, 339-340, 376, 378, 380
Pain, 249-250; and nonnatural meaning,
293-298
Parable, 305
Paradigm Cases, 346-347, 380, 384. See also Knowledge; Urmson, J. O.
Paradoxes, 154-170; of material objects,
154; of time, 155; of knowledge, 155; and common sense, 156-157; and in-duction, 158-159; and self-contradiction, 160-162; how supported, 163-166; strategies for overcoming,
168-170. See also Moore, G. E.
Paraphilosophy, 181-182
Paraphrase, 142
Pascal, Blaise, 205
Paul, G. A., 342
Perception, 139-140, 224-247, 248-268,
340; pillar box example, 235; outline of causal account, 238-241; recourse to specialist, 240; and the senses, 248; direct perception, 251; and detection links,
254. See also Causal Theory of Percep-tion; Perceptual locutions
Perceptual locutions, 139, 140; accented subperceptual locutions, 138; unac-cented, 139, 140
Performative form, 134
Phenomenalism, 242-245, 247
Phrastics, 367
Plato, 174, 308, 310, 315, 336, 379
Playgroup, the, 181
Polermachus 309, 310
Predication, 130, 131
Presupposition, 3, 81, 229, 269-282; and cancelability and detachability, 270-
271; of "to know," 279-280; of "to think," 279; of "to regret," 280; of quantifiers, 280. See also Cancelability;
Conversational implicature; Detachabil-ity; Implicature
Price, H. H., 225-226, 238, 242
Pritchard, H. A., 192
Promising, 19, 100
Properties, 225
Propositional attitudes, 110, 111, 123, 353
Propositions, 188, 289-290, 291
Psychophysical correspondence, 284-290; and language, 286. See also Truth Psychophysical laws, 285-290
Quality, 26, 42, 61, 370; supermaxim and first maxim of, 27; analogue in noncon-versational transaction, 28; exploitation of first and second maxims, 34-35; and information, 371-372. See also Conversational implicature; Conversational maxims
Quantifiers, 128; and iota operator, 271;
presuppositions of, 280
Quantity: introduced, 26; analogue in non-conversational transaction, 28; violation of first maxim of, 32-33; exploitation of first and second maxims of, 33-34; im-plicature and the first maxim of, 38; conditionals and the first maxim of, 61; relevance independent of, 370-372. See also Conversational implicature; Conversational maxims
Quessertion, 297
Quine, Willard Van Orman: on the ana-lytic/synthetic distinction, 196-213,
363; on synonymy, 202; on necessity,
202; and the verification theory of meaning, 209-211; and conceptual schemes, 211; and ordinary language philosophy, 378. See also Analytic/syn-thetic distinction
Ramsey, Frank, 55
R-correlation, 130-132; nonexplicit, 136
Readiness, 127, 139
Reality, 184; relationship to thought, 284-
290; and language, 286. See also Truth;
Truth-conditions
Reassurance-conditions, 193, 194
Reassurance-directives, 194
Recognizing: in definition of utterer's occasion-meaning, 92, 94, 95, 96, 110,
134; in definition of meaning, 221-223; of complex intentions, 293-295. See also Intentions; Occasion-meaning; Say-ing; Utterer's occasion-meaning
Reductionism, in Grice's account of mean-ing, 351, 354, 355, 359
Reference, 341. See also R-correlation Regresses, in Grice's account of meaning, 52-53, 95-98, 138-139, 299-301, 352
"Regret," 280-281
Reid, Thomas, 345-346
Relation, 26, 27, 32; exploitation of maxims of, 35. See also Conversational im-plicature; Conversational maxims; Rele-
vance
Relevance, 27, 31, 86-88, 222. See also Conversational maxims; Relation
Remembering, 5, 11, 12, 16-17
Reminding, 106-107, 111
Repertoire, 126-127, 128
Resemblance, 267
Responses, 103
Resultant procedure, 129, 130-132, 136 Russell, Bertrand, 81, 269n2; theory of de-scriptions, 81, 269-270, 274-282, 283; theory of types, 204-205; Russellian expansions of existential statements, 271, 272, 274, 276; Russellian conjuncts,
276; on Mathematical Logic, 372-374
Ryle, Gilbert, 4, 378, 379, 384-385
Sachs, David, 307
Saying, 25, 42, 54, 86, 112; defined, 87-
88; and implicating, 118-138; and indi-cating, 121. See also Conventional meaning; Occasion-meaning; Timeless meaning; Utterance; Utterer's occasion-meaning
Schiffer, Stephen, 299-300, 302, 364; on Grice's account of meaning, 95-98, 115
Searle, John, 10, 12, 270, 351; on A-philosophers, 13-20; on Grice's account of meaning, 100-102
Seeing: 251-252, 340, 342; seeing as, 5-6; direct seeming, 253; compared with touch, 263-268; and notion of visual characteristics, 256-269; and visual in-dicability, 257; and Martians, 260-263;
and visual resemblance, 267. See also Perception; Senses; Visual Properties Self-contradiction, 150, 153; related to skepticism, 160-164; as inconsistency,
202
Sense (meaning), 27, 35, 48-50, 88, 119,
283
Sense data, 225, 245-247; technical term explained, 226-229; Moore on, 226; dangers of a sense datum terminology, 237-238; as theoretical items, 342-344.
See also Perception; Senses; Visual properties
Senses, 248-268, 342-344; and divina-tion, 248; individuating senses, 250-
268, 343; two kinds of seeing, 260-262.
See also Perception; Visual properties Sentence, 88, 101-102, 117, 129, 130; affirmative categorical sentences, 130; sentence-significance, 201. See also Meaning in a language
Sentence meaning. See Meaning in a language
Sight. See Seeing Sign, 215, 216
Signification, 359-368; distinctions within total signification, 118-120; conven-tional, 363, 364; extensional and inten-sional, 364-366
Similarity, 305
Skepticism: and Moore, 147-153; and cer-tainty, 148; and sense data theory, 229; and Causal Theory of Perception, 241-
247; and common sense, 345-349; possible incoherence of, 348. See also Cer-tainty; Knowledge
Socrates, 307, 332, 336, 337-338, 379; debate with Thrasymachus, 309-314, 319-322
Speaker's meaning, 109, 283; and meaning in a language, 290-298, 340, 349-359; and value, 299-303; loosely defined,
302. See also Meaning; M-intending;
Occasion-meaning; Utterer's occasion-meaning
Speech acts, 19, 100, 121, 122, 362; speech act account of truth, 55-57
Square bracketing device, 81, 280-282
Stampe, D. W., 94-95, 302
Stevenson, C. L., 215-216
Strawson, Peter F., 12, 269n1, 302, 351,
377; on truth, 9, 55-57; on implication,
9; on Grice's account of meaning, 95; on Russell's theory of descriptions, 269-
270; proposal of truth-gap theory, 270-
275; and the defense of neo-traditional logic, 373-374
Stress, 50-53
Subordinating devices, 66
Suggesting, 42, 69, 86, 118. See also Impli-cature; Indicating Summa genera, 304 uperknowing, 97-9
Supermaxims, 21
Swearing, 9
Syntheticity. See Analytic/synthetic distinction
Tactual properties, 255. See also Touch;
Visual properties
Tarski, Alfred, 55
Telling, 218
Theoretical constructs, 245
"Think," as psychological verb, 279
Thrasymachus, 308; debate with Socrates,
309-314, 315-319, 337, 338
Time, 155
Timeless meaning, 89, 90, 91; defined, 119-121, 220; timeless idiolect mean-ing, 119; timeless language meaning,
119; and unstructured utterance-types, 124-125; in terms of occasion-meaning, 138-139, 217. See also Applied timeless meaning; Occasion-meaning; Utter-ances; Utterer's occasion-meaning
Tone, 54
Touch, 249, 255; compared with sight,
263-266
Translation, 201
Truth, 4, 9, 11; Strawson on, 55-57; and analyticity, 207-209; and belief, 284-
290; and conversational rationality, 369; multiple senses of, 376-377
Truth-conditions, 193; of mathematical propositions, 193-194; of L-statements,
231-237; of beliefs, 288-290
Truth-gaps, 111, 270-275
Trying, 6-7, 17-18, 43
Uninvented entities, 245
Universal quantification, 22; and existential statements, 280-281
"Uptake," 351-352
Urmson, J. O., 8n6, 93, 376, 377; and Paradigm Case arguments, 380, 384
Use, 4, S
Utterances, 4, 92, 111, 123; and saying, 87, 88, 112; audienceless utterances,
113; and nonnatural meaning, 215-216; correspondence with psychological states, 287-290. See also Audience; Say-ing; Utterance-types
Utterance-types, 88, 89, 120, 124; unstruc-tured, 124; applied timeless meaning for, 128-129; complete, 131; defined, 132
Utterer's occasion-meaning, 91, 117-118,
119; defined in terms of speaker's inten-tions, 91-92; redefined, 94, 96-97, 99-100, 103-104, 104-105, 111-112, 114-116. See also Intentions; Meaning;
Occasion-meaning; Utterances
Uttering: and saying, 87, 88; definition of extended use, 92, 118, 215-216
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