Index to WoW

 Activated belief, 109, 110

Adding, 122

Adeimantus, 307, 309, 313, 314

Adjectives, 48, 130

Adverbs, 6-8, 13

Affinity, 305, 332

Affirmative categorical sentences, 130

Albritton, Rogers, 53, 248n1, 257

Ambiguity, 27, 35, 119-120, 151; and ordinary language, 177; and the analytic/ synthetic distinction, 196

Analogy, 305

Analytic/synthetic distinction, 196-213, 341, 344, 363; illusory, 197; agreement about meaning, 198; Quine's argument against, 201-202

"And," 68, 70, 201; and conditionals, 67; and "or," 69; Russellian conjuncts, 276

Antinomy of conditionals, 84-85

A-philosophers, 10-12, 14-22

Applied timeless meaning, 89, 90, 91; distinct from occasion meaning, 119; for unstructured utterance-types, 128-129; for structured utterance-types, 129-132.

See also Meaning; Occasion-meaning;

Timeless meaning

A posteriori, 340

Appropriateness, 273, 340

A prioricity, 197

Argument from illusion, 226

Aristotle, 305-308, 315, 327, 378-

380

Assertive mood. See Indicatives

Assurance-deficiency, 110

Attention-deficiency, 110

Audience, 103, 123; indefinite audiences,

113-117; possible audiences, 115

Austin, J. L., 19, 376, 377, 379; on ad-verbs, 8; on intentional actions, 12-13, 14-15; and the Playgroup, 181-182; on ordinary language, 381-385; on Moore and Wittgenstein, 381

Ayer, A. J., 342

"Backward-looking" subclauses, 99

Baker, Judith, 295, 305-307, 313, 316

Believing, 123; as an intentional concept,

137; having reasons for believing, 221

Benjamin, Cornelius, S, 11

Bennett, Jonathan, v Boyle, Robert, 343

Brevity, 27, 37

Cancelability (of implicatures), 44-46,

229; of doubt or denial condition, 230,

234; and empty definite descriptions,

270-271. See also Conversational impli-cature; Detachability; Implicature; Non-detachability

Cartesian circle, 190-191. See also Des-cartes; God

Categories. See Conversational maxims Causal Theory of Perception, 224-248, 249-268, 340, 341-344; how consti-tuted, 224-226; causal dependence as condition for perception, 238-241;Causal Theory of Perception (cont.) causal concepts involved, 241; charge that it leads to skepticism, 241-247; lack of conflict with Phenomenalism, 242-243; two ways of looking at, 244.

See also Perception; Senses

"Cause," 164-166, 215-217, 304. See also

Causal Theory of Perception

Centrality, 359, 360

Cephalus, 309

Certainty, 10, 147, 155; and proof, 157;

Descartes on, 187-192; divided into objective and subjective, 188-189; and necessary truth, 188-190. See also Des-cartes; Moore, G. E.; Skepticism

Class complement, 133

Cleitophon, 310

Coextensionality, 200

Cognitive synonymy: explained, 200, 202; and sentence synonymy, 201; related to definition, 206-207; and verification theory of meaning, 209-210; and confir-mation, 211

Color, 225; and sense data, 227, 228; as a visual property, 255; and Martians,

262-263

Common sense, 147-153, 341, 373;

Moore on, 154-159, 345, 381-386; and proof, 157; and metaphysics, 306; and perception, 344; defended, 345-349;

Thomas Reid's defense of, 345-346

Communication, 215; artificial devices for,

296

Conceptual analysis, 172-180, 181-185; characterized, 174-176; and lexicogra-phy, 175; as rational reconstruction,

182; and self-justification, 183; and Re-ality, 184

Conceptual schemes, 211

Conditionals, 58-85; material, 58, 63;

Philonian and Megarian, 62-63; natu-ral, 62-63; unitary, 74-75; conditional particle clarified, 74-76; and modus po-nendo ponens, 75, 79, 82; noncommuta-tivity of, 75, 77; conventional meaning of, 77; and nonconventional implicature, 77, 78, 375-376; and inferrability, 77,

78; negated, 78-85; subjective probability and, 79; conventional meaning of

"if," 83; Grice's antinomy, 84-85. See also "And"; Implying; "Or"

Causal Theory of Perception (cont.) causal concepts involved, 241; charge that it leads to skepticism, 241-247; lack of conflict with Phenomenalism, 242-243; two ways of looking at, 244.

See also Perception; Senses

"Cause," 164-166, 215-217, 304. See also

Causal Theory of Perception

Centrality, 359, 360

Cephalus, 309

Certainty, 10, 147, 155; and proof, 157;

Descartes on, 187-192; divided into objective and subjective, 188-189; and necessary truth, 188-190. See also Des-cartes; Moore, G. E.; Skepticism

Class complement, 133

Cleitophon, 310

Coextensionality, 200

Cognitive synonymy: explained, 200, 202; and sentence synonymy, 201; related to definition, 206-207; and verification theory of meaning, 209-210; and confir-mation, 211

Color, 225; and sense data, 227, 228; as a visual property, 255; and Martians,

262-263

Common sense, 147-153, 341, 373;

Moore on, 154-159, 345, 381-386; and proof, 157; and metaphysics, 306; and perception, 344; defended, 345-349;

Thomas Reid's defense of, 345-346

Communication, 215; artificial devices for,

296

Conceptual analysis, 172-180, 181-185; characterized, 174-176; and lexicogra-phy, 175; as rational reconstruction,

182; and self-justification, 183; and Re-ality, 184

Conceptual schemes, 211

Conditionals, 58-85; material, 58, 63;

Philonian and Megarian, 62-63; natu-ral, 62-63; unitary, 74-75; conditional particle clarified, 74-76; and modus po-nendo ponens, 75, 79, 82; noncommuta-tivity of, 75, 77; conventional meaning of, 77; and nonconventional implicature, 77, 78, 375-376; and inferrability, 77,

78; negated, 78-85; subjective probability and, 79; conventional meaning of

"if," 83; Grice's antinomy, 84-85. See also "And"; Implying; "Or"

Correlation, 103, 104; defined, 132-135; explicit, 132, 136; nonexplicit, 136; os-tensive, 134-135. See also D-correla-tion; R-correlation; Truth Correspondence theory of truth, 56-57

Crucial statements, 10, 14-15

Crucial words, 10-11

Davis, Steven, 225n1

D-correlation, 130-131

Deception, 292-293

Deeming, 302

Definite descriptions, 130, 270-282, 375; as carriers of implicature, 272-273; ne-gations of statements using, 275-276; reference contextually determined, 276-

277; and nonindicative moods, 277-279

Definition, 206-207

Descartes, René, 148, 186-195; and prop-ositions, 186-187; on clear and distinct perception, 186-188; on "simple na-tures," 187; on certainty, 187-188; and necessary connections, 188

Descriptions: Russell's theory of, 269, 272-274; descriptive representation, 358-359. See also Definite descriptions

Designation, 56

Detachability (of implicatures), 58, 229; of doubt or denial condition, 230; and empty definite descriptions, 271

Deutero-Esperanto, 298-299

Dictiveness, 360-361, 362

Disjunction. See "Or"

Doubt or denial condition (D-or-D condi-tion): introduced with respect to sense data, 227, 228-237; noncancelability of,

230; nondetachability of, 230, 232; relation to L-statements, 231, 235-237; de-tachability of, 233, 234; cancelability of,

234. See also L-statements

Dreaming, 347-348

Dummett, Michael, 79

Entailment, 3, 9

Eschatology, philosophical, 304-338;

characterized, 304; role of, 304-308;

Plato's discussion of justice as an ex-ample of, 308-338

Establishment-conditions, 193, 194

Existential generalization, 115

Existential quantification, 128

Faking. See Deception

Formality, 359, 360-361, 363

Free will, 14-17

Frowning, 219

General statements, 274-275

Gesticulation, 104

Gladstone, William, 362

Glaucon, 314

God: Descartes on, 190-192; Ontological Proof of, 191; and human beings, 305

Godel, Kurt, 188

"Good," 9

Grandy, Richard, 297, 344

Grice, H. P.: Grice's Paradox, 78-85, 382;

Gricean theses, 350-359

Hampshire, Stuart, 377

Handwaving ("HW"): as a type of utter-ance, 125-129; defined, 125-126; and timeless meaning, 126-129; and speaker's meaning, 128-129. See also Utter-ances; Utterance-types

Hardy, G. H., 345

Hart, H. L. A., 7

Hearing, 340, 342

Heidegger, Martin, 18

Herod, 218

Hinting, 368

Humor, 92

Hyperbole, 34

Idiolect, 119, 125, 129

Idiom, 90

Imperatives, 105, 112, 118, 123; and definite descriptions, 278

Implicature, 22-40, 41-57, 138-143, 268-282; defined, 24-26, 86, 229, 341; and conventional meaning, 25-26; con-ventional, 41, 46, 86; nonconventional, 41, 77, 78, 118, 375-376; and condi-tionals, 58-85; and saying, 118-138; and perceptual and subperceptual locu-tions, 140-141; and contrasters, 141; conveying, 362. See also Conversational implicature; Conversational maxims;

Implying; Indicating; Presupposition Implying, 3, 42, 86, 118, 341; Strawson on, 9; and inference elements, 104, 114; speaker's implication, 369. See also Conditionals, Implicature, Indicating

Impossibility. See Logical impossibility

Inconsistency, 202

Indicating, 25, 42, 56, 69, 86, 118; and saying 121. See also Implicature; Imply-

ing

Indicatives, 105, 108, 118, 123, 130-132.

See also Imperatives; Mood Indirectness Condition: formulation, 58,

59; generalized implicature of, 60-62

Induction, 158-159; as grounds for general statements, 274, 275

Inference. See Conditionals; Implying Inference-elements, 99, 104, 114

Intensionality: and language, 133, 137; and extensionality, 137, 348, 364-366

Intentions, 36, 91, 125, 347; intentional action, 12-13, 105; and defining mean-ing, 92-116, 221-223, 283-303; subin-tentions defined, 97; and imperatives,

105; activated intention, 110; linguistic intentions, 135; as an intentional con-cept, 137; general intention (readiness),

139; and deception, 292; and pain be-havior, 293-296. See also Meaning;

M-intending

Interrogative mood, 75-78

Interrogative subordination, 75-76

Introspection, 259-260

lota operator, 271-272

Irony, 53-54, 120

Jack, Mrs. J., 350-351

Justice, 173-174; Plato's discussion of, 307-313; as example of eschatology,

313-338

Kant, Immanuel, 187, 328, 336-337, 338 Knowledge, S, 12, 13, 97; Grice's analysis of, 52-53; Descartes's conception of, 192-195; and the causal theory of per-ception, 243-247; presuppositions of know, 279-280; restrictive account of, 301-302; and common sense, 345-349;

Aristotle on, 379. See also Certainty;

Paradigm cases; Skepticism; Truth-con-ditions

Kripke, Saul, 79

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 382

Lexicography, 175

Locke, John, 177-178, 343

Logic, 22-40, 41-57, 341, 372-376. See also "And"; Conditionals; Implicature;

Implying; "Or"

Logical Connectives, 22-23, 58-59. See also "And"; Conditionals; Implying;

"Or"

Logical Impossibility, 204-206

L-statements: defined, 230; relationship to doubt or denial condition, 231-234;

Truth-conditions for, 232-236. See also Doubt or denial condition

Malcolm, Norman: on Moore, S, 12, 13, 154-155, 346; on skepticism, 148-153; and proof, 157; on paradoxes, 160-163.

See also Moore, G. E.

"Malignant Demon," 148

Manner, 26, 28, 39, 87, 273; and perspicu-ity, 27, 32; exploitation of maxim of,

35; as a generator of implicature, 370,

372. See also Conversational maxims;

Implicature

Maxims. See Conversational maxims

Meaning, 3, 4, 22, 86, 87-116, 117-137, 283-304, 341; central meaning, 88; meaning specifications, 89, 90-91; de-fined, 121; and saying, 121-122; established meaning, 124; "means," 166-167,

291; verification theory of, 209; natural vs. nonnatural, 213-214; causal theory of, 215-217; standard meaning, 216-

217; passive meaning, 351-353; relativized vs. nonrelativized, 354-355.

Problem examples for Grice's ac-count: examinee, 52, 106, 108, 110-

111; prisoner of war, 93; tobacconist, 93-94; bridge-playing employee, 94-95; countersuggestible man, 106-107, 110, 111, 112; Salome, Herod, and St. John the Baptist, 218.

See also Conventional meaning;

Meaning in a language; Nonnatural meaning; Occasion-meaning; Saying;

Timeless meaning

Meaning in a language, 20, 119, 285; word meaning, 20, 88, 117, 283; sentence meaning, 88, 117-118, 283; related to speaker's meaning, 117-138, 340, 349-359. See also Conventional meaning; Meaning

Meiosis, 34

Memory, 192

Metaphor, 34, 54, 305

Metaphysics, two kinds of, 304

Mill, J. S., 326

M-intending, defined, 105, 123, 350; used, 106-109, 124, 125; and mood, 123; as occasion meaning, 139. See also Intending

Modes of correlation, 103

Modus ponendo ponens, 75, 79, 81-82

Molyneaux problem, 266

Mood, 130-132. See also Imperatives; Indicatives

Mood marker "*": introduced, 110; used,

111, 112, 114, 116, 118

Moore, G. E., 5, 42; on certainty and skep-ticism, 147-148, 173, 306, 380-381; on paradoxes and common sense, 154-159; on sense data, 226; on knowing, 237, 345, 380; Malcolm on, 346-347. See also Common sense; Ordinary language philosophy

Moral skepticism, 315, 319-333

Natural impossibility, 204-206

Natural meaning, 116, 213-214. See also Conventional meaning; Meaning; Non-natural meaning

Necessary truth, 188-195

Necessity, 47, 197, 202

Negation, 15, 22, 85, 271-272, 375

Neustics, 367

Nonconventional communications, 138

Nondetachability, 44-46, 58, 232-235; of indirectness condition, 60. See also Can-celability; Detachability

Nonnatural meaning (meaningnn), 88, 91, 92, 117, 352, 354; as occasion-meaning and timeless meaning, 80-91; and natural meaning, 116, 213-214, 215, 290-298, 350-351; defined, 220. See also Conventional meaning; Meaning; Meaning in a language; Natural meaning

Obscurity, 36-37

Observation, 241-243

Obsolescence, 48-49

Occam's Razor, Modified, 47-49, 51, 65 Occasion-meaning, 138; utterance-type,

90; explained, 122-124; and timeless

meaning, 124-126, 217-218; necessary conditions for, 219; and value, 298. See also Utterer's occasion-meaning

Ontological Proof, 191

"Or," 8, 10, 22, 44-47, 68-74; exclusive disjunction and conditionals, 62-66; character of disjunctive participle, 74; compared with conditional participle, 76, 78, 82-83. See also Conditionals Ordinary expression, 149, 160

Ordinary language philosophy, 171-180, 181-186, 339, 378; its tasks, 172; objections to it, 173-176, 176-178, 178-180.

See also Austin, J. L.; Conceptual analy-sis; Moore, G. E.; Playgroup

Oxford, 8, 10, 12, 171, 181, 182, 183, 184, 276-279, 339-340, 376, 378, 380

Pain, 249-250; and nonnatural meaning,

293-298

Parable, 305

Paradigm Cases, 346-347, 380, 384. See also Knowledge; Urmson, J. O.

Paradoxes, 154-170; of material objects,

154; of time, 155; of knowledge, 155; and common sense, 156-157; and in-duction, 158-159; and self-contradiction, 160-162; how supported, 163-166; strategies for overcoming,

168-170. See also Moore, G. E.

Paraphilosophy, 181-182

Paraphrase, 142

Pascal, Blaise, 205

Paul, G. A., 342

Perception, 139-140, 224-247, 248-268,

340; pillar box example, 235; outline of causal account, 238-241; recourse to specialist, 240; and the senses, 248; direct perception, 251; and detection links,

254. See also Causal Theory of Percep-tion; Perceptual locutions

Perceptual locutions, 139, 140; accented subperceptual locutions, 138; unac-cented, 139, 140

Performative form, 134

Phenomenalism, 242-245, 247

Phrastics, 367

Plato, 174, 308, 310, 315, 336, 379

Playgroup, the, 181

Polermachus  309, 310

Predication, 130, 131

Presupposition, 3, 81, 229, 269-282; and cancelability and detachability, 270-

271; of "to know," 279-280; of "to think," 279; of "to regret," 280; of quantifiers, 280. See also Cancelability;

Conversational implicature; Detachabil-ity; Implicature

Price, H. H., 225-226, 238, 242

Pritchard, H. A., 192

Promising, 19, 100

Properties, 225

Propositional attitudes, 110, 111, 123, 353

Propositions, 188, 289-290, 291

Psychophysical correspondence, 284-290; and language, 286. See also Truth Psychophysical laws, 285-290

Quality, 26, 42, 61, 370; supermaxim and first maxim of, 27; analogue in noncon-versational transaction, 28; exploitation of first and second maxims, 34-35; and information, 371-372. See also Conversational implicature; Conversational maxims

Quantifiers, 128; and iota operator, 271;

presuppositions of, 280

Quantity: introduced, 26; analogue in non-conversational transaction, 28; violation of first maxim of, 32-33; exploitation of first and second maxims of, 33-34; im-plicature and the first maxim of, 38; conditionals and the first maxim of, 61; relevance independent of, 370-372. See also Conversational implicature; Conversational maxims

Quessertion, 297

Quine, Willard Van Orman: on the ana-lytic/synthetic distinction, 196-213,

363; on synonymy, 202; on necessity,

202; and the verification theory of meaning, 209-211; and conceptual schemes, 211; and ordinary language philosophy, 378. See also Analytic/syn-thetic distinction

Ramsey, Frank, 55

R-correlation, 130-132; nonexplicit, 136

Readiness, 127, 139

Reality, 184; relationship to thought, 284-

290; and language, 286. See also Truth;

Truth-conditions

Reassurance-conditions, 193, 194

Reassurance-directives, 194

Recognizing: in definition of utterer's occasion-meaning, 92, 94, 95, 96, 110,

134; in definition of meaning, 221-223; of complex intentions, 293-295. See also Intentions; Occasion-meaning; Say-ing; Utterer's occasion-meaning

Reductionism, in Grice's account of mean-ing, 351, 354, 355, 359

Reference, 341. See also R-correlation Regresses, in Grice's account of meaning, 52-53, 95-98, 138-139, 299-301, 352

"Regret," 280-281

Reid, Thomas, 345-346

Relation, 26, 27, 32; exploitation of maxims of, 35. See also Conversational im-plicature; Conversational maxims; Rele-

vance

Relevance, 27, 31, 86-88, 222. See also Conversational maxims; Relation

Remembering, 5, 11, 12, 16-17

Reminding, 106-107, 111

Repertoire, 126-127, 128

Resemblance, 267

Responses, 103

Resultant procedure, 129, 130-132, 136 Russell, Bertrand, 81, 269n2; theory of de-scriptions, 81, 269-270, 274-282, 283; theory of types, 204-205; Russellian expansions of existential statements, 271, 272, 274, 276; Russellian conjuncts,

276; on Mathematical Logic, 372-374

Ryle, Gilbert, 4, 378, 379, 384-385

Sachs, David, 307

Saying, 25, 42, 54, 86, 112; defined, 87-

88; and implicating, 118-138; and indi-cating, 121. See also Conventional meaning; Occasion-meaning; Timeless meaning; Utterance; Utterer's occasion-meaning

Schiffer, Stephen, 299-300, 302, 364; on Grice's account of meaning, 95-98, 115

Searle, John, 10, 12, 270, 351; on A-philosophers, 13-20; on Grice's account of meaning, 100-102

Seeing: 251-252, 340, 342; seeing as, 5-6; direct seeming, 253; compared with touch, 263-268; and notion of visual characteristics, 256-269; and visual in-dicability,  257; and Martians, 260-263;

and visual resemblance, 267. See also Perception; Senses; Visual Properties Self-contradiction, 150, 153; related to skepticism, 160-164; as inconsistency,

202

Sense (meaning), 27, 35, 48-50, 88, 119,

283

Sense data, 225, 245-247; technical term explained, 226-229; Moore on, 226; dangers of a sense datum terminology, 237-238; as theoretical items, 342-344.

See also Perception; Senses; Visual properties

Senses, 248-268, 342-344; and divina-tion, 248; individuating senses, 250-

268, 343; two kinds of seeing, 260-262.

See also Perception; Visual properties Sentence, 88, 101-102, 117, 129, 130; affirmative categorical sentences, 130; sentence-significance, 201. See also Meaning in a language

Sentence meaning. See Meaning in a language

Sight. See Seeing Sign, 215, 216

Signification, 359-368; distinctions within total signification, 118-120; conven-tional, 363, 364; extensional and inten-sional, 364-366

Similarity, 305

Skepticism: and Moore, 147-153; and cer-tainty, 148; and sense data theory, 229; and Causal Theory of Perception, 241-

247; and common sense, 345-349; possible incoherence of, 348. See also Cer-tainty; Knowledge

Socrates, 307, 332, 336, 337-338, 379; debate with Thrasymachus, 309-314, 319-322

Speaker's meaning, 109, 283; and meaning in a language, 290-298, 340, 349-359; and value, 299-303; loosely defined,

302. See also Meaning; M-intending;

Occasion-meaning; Utterer's occasion-meaning

Speech acts, 19, 100, 121, 122, 362; speech act account of truth, 55-57

Square bracketing device, 81, 280-282

Stampe, D. W., 94-95, 302

Stevenson, C. L., 215-216

Strawson, Peter F., 12, 269n1, 302, 351,

377; on truth, 9, 55-57; on implication,

9; on Grice's account of meaning, 95; on Russell's theory of descriptions, 269-

270; proposal of truth-gap theory, 270-

275; and the defense of neo-traditional logic, 373-374

Stress, 50-53

Subordinating devices, 66

Suggesting, 42, 69, 86, 118. See also Impli-cature; Indicating Summa genera, 304 uperknowing, 97-9

Supermaxims, 21

Swearing, 9

Syntheticity. See Analytic/synthetic distinction

Tactual properties, 255. See also Touch;

Visual properties

Tarski, Alfred, 55

Telling, 218

Theoretical constructs, 245

"Think," as psychological verb, 279

Thrasymachus, 308; debate with Socrates,

309-314, 315-319, 337, 338

Time, 155

Timeless meaning, 89, 90, 91; defined, 119-121, 220; timeless idiolect mean-ing, 119; timeless language meaning,

119; and unstructured utterance-types, 124-125; in terms of occasion-meaning, 138-139, 217. See also Applied timeless meaning; Occasion-meaning; Utter-ances; Utterer's occasion-meaning

Tone, 54

Touch, 249, 255; compared with sight,

263-266

Translation, 201

Truth, 4, 9, 11; Strawson on, 55-57; and analyticity, 207-209; and belief, 284-

290; and conversational rationality, 369; multiple senses of, 376-377

Truth-conditions, 193; of mathematical propositions, 193-194; of L-statements,

231-237; of beliefs, 288-290

Truth-gaps, 111, 270-275

Trying, 6-7, 17-18, 43

Uninvented entities, 245

Universal quantification, 22; and existential statements, 280-281

"Uptake," 351-352

Urmson, J. O., 8n6, 93, 376, 377; and Paradigm Case arguments, 380, 384

Use, 4, S

Utterances, 4, 92, 111, 123; and saying, 87, 88, 112; audienceless utterances,

113; and nonnatural meaning, 215-216; correspondence with psychological states, 287-290. See also Audience; Say-ing; Utterance-types

Utterance-types, 88, 89, 120, 124; unstruc-tured, 124; applied timeless meaning for, 128-129; complete, 131; defined, 132

Utterer's occasion-meaning, 91, 117-118,

119; defined in terms of speaker's inten-tions, 91-92; redefined, 94, 96-97, 99-100, 103-104, 104-105, 111-112, 114-116. See also Intentions; Meaning;

Occasion-meaning; Utterances

Uttering: and saying, 87, 88; definition of extended use, 92, 118, 215-216