it has been claimed that Grice's theory of meaning cannot cope with meaningful utterance occurring in the absence of an audience in cases where the utterer thinks that there is no audience, does not want an audience and/or wants there not to be an audience. Green considered the problem and canvassed two solutions, the first of which, that the utterer is talking to himself, he instantly dismissed—as Ziff" did. The second was that the intention was to inform a hearer if a hearer were present (unbeknownst to the utterer). This was dismissed, since there are many occasions when we would not want to inform a hearer if a hearer were present.

Grice's later formulation, the outcome of his discussion of utterer's occasion-meaning in the absence of an audience, seems designed to cope with this problem. The relevant essential element can be rendered: the utterer utters x intending x to be such that (say) an English speaker would etc. etc. This is compatible with his not intending to inform any English speaker and, indeed, with his intending not to inform any English speaker. However, since he spoke in English he did intend his utterance to be such that an English speaker would be informed if an English speaker were present.

However, Schiffer* has considered unfavourably what is in effect this suggestion. His formulation is that the utterer intends to utter something which would inform an English speaker if an English speaker were present. Schiffer thinks this might do for certain cases of solitary meaningful utterance, but it allows as meaningful certain cases of solitary utterance which are not meaningful cases. These latter are such cases as saying things when alone, perhaps to test our voice, or typing out things to test a typewriter. Schiffer's remarks suggest that his view is that the

* O. H. Green, "Intentions and speech acts", Analysis, 2(1968/9), 100-12.

• P. Zi,"On H, P. Grice's account of meaning" Analysis 28(1967/8), 1-8.
• H. P. Grice, "Ueterer's meaning and intentions", Philasophical Review, 78 (1969), 147-77.

+ S. Schiffer, Meaning (O.U.P., 1972), PP. 73-80.

 A CESARE LOSANA.

Mon so, cuico, se questo posero saggio sia per aquistari, presso i pochi che lo leggerano, piro oompatimento coe bionino: saréi contento se tu lo accel-torsi come prova del desiderio du meritarmi, operaudo, la tux armaria.

Ladova, 5 шаддіо 187л.

Je treo

B. L. Varisco.

 4) La vera origine del diritto divinata dal Vico (Scienza Nuova) fa scientificamente dimostrala dalla scuola storica di Germania e dall'illustre sue capo F. C. De SavigNy (Trailé de Droit Romain Liv. L. ch. s S 7 e segg. - Vocazione del nostro secolo per la Legistazione e la Giurispru-

denza cap. 4. ) Vedi pure G. F. PucHrA, Istiluzioni, lutrod. — STAHL, Storia della Filosofia del Diritto, Lib. VI. Sez. 2. — ContE, Traité de Legislat. Liv. II. — S. ScoLArI, Il Dirilto e la Storia, Torino 1860. — SABEDO, Tralt. delle Leggi, lotr. — CAVAGNABI A. Saggio di Filosopa giu-ridica secondo i canoni della Scuola storiea (Bologna 1965 ) — PEPERE,

Enciclopedia del Diritto, cap. VI, VII.

 Ricercare in via teoretica e provare storicamente quale sia stata l' influenza della consuetudine nel processo formativo del diritto e nelle legislazioni dei po-poli, stabilire qual conto debba farsi di essa nella compilazione delle leggi, qual valore le resti dopo che la legge è scritta ed un Codice è promulgato; ecco i tre punti fondamentali su cui per la sua stessa natura deve aggirarsi il mio tema. Tema del quale io non dissimulai certo a me stesso la gravita e la difficolta imprendendo a trattarlo, mentre ad esso fanno capo questioni e problemi che formano, direi quasi, il punto principale di divergenza delle diverse scuole e dei vari sistemi della scienza giuridica. Si aggiunga che le vere e giuste teoriche formulate sull' argomento vennero spesso per spirito di sistema confuse colle esagerazioni e cogli errori della scuola che le avea originate, e colle altre teoriche di essa repudiate ad un fascio.

Onde sconoscendosi quello che fu progresso reale ed effettivo per la scienza, si torna anche oggi da molti ai vecchi errori, che si avea tutta ragione di credere fossero dileguati e per sempre.

 ALLA SANTA E VENERATA MEMORIA

DI CAMILLO MIO PADRE

CONSACRO QUESTO PRIMO LAVORO

AUGURANDOMI DI POTER QUANDOCHESIA AFFIDARE

A PIU DEGNO MONUMENTO

IL RICORDO

DI TANTO AFFETTO E DI TANTE VIRTU

 La Facoltà di Ciarispradensa riunita in Commissione esaminatrice a forma dell art. 94 dello Statuto di questa

Università e coerentemente all art. 5g al. 4.* del Regolamento generale Universitario del 6 Ottobre 1868, ordind la pubblicazione per le stampe della presente dissertasione liberamente scelta e letta dall Autore nella sessione estiva

dell' anno 1873-76.

Dall' officio retterale dell' Università di Perugia

li 2o Ottere 1876.

# Rettare

GIOVANNI PERMAGCRI

L

in what is one of the shorter orations, To- mai elaborates on the virtues of Doge Tron, his justice, fortitude and temperance, draws attention to his cursus honorum and highlights the nobility of his family.7 He then turns his attention to the city of Venice : quae (sc. urbs Venetiarum) sicut vera religione, iustitia, quiete, libertate, optimis artibus, sanc- tissimis institutis facile Italiae caput est, ita virtute, fortuna, potentia, rebus gestis terra mari- que late dominatur. Et incredibile dictu est, Princeps foelicissime, quanta de tua hac praestanti civitate, quae tanquam regina caeteras claras urbes superat et excellit, et de vobis apud omnes exteras nationes opinio sit, quanta observantia, quantum nomen. Noverunt enim bonam civi- tatem non moenibus neque parietibus, sed his teneri et conservari civibus, qui unum in locum, uno consilio, una mente, una voluntate congregati, hisdem moribus, hisdem institutis, hisdem inter se legibus uterentur. Noveruntque pace et concordia nihil melius, nihil utilius, nihil di- vinius ab immortali Deo hominibus datum esse.8 you of its own free will’.  10 Peppered with occasional classical references, and completely centred on its objects of praise, Tomai’s oration stands as an ideal example for studying how Venetian power was articulated in the halls of the Ducal Palace  6 To be more specifc, in what is one of the shorter orations, To- mai elaborates on the virtues of Doge Tron, his justice, fortitude and temperance, draws attention to his cursus honorum and highlights the nobility of his family.7 He then turns his attention to the city of Venice : quae (sc. urbs Venetiarum) sicut vera religione, iustitia, quiete, libertate, optimis artibus, sanc- tissimis institutis facile Italiae caput est, ita virtute, fortuna, potentia, rebus gestis terra mari- que late dominatur. Et incredibile dictu est, Princeps foelicissime, quanta de tua hac praestanti civitate, quae tanquam regina caeteras claras urbes superat et excellit, et de vobis apud omnes exteras nationes opinio sit, quanta observantia, quantum nomen. Noverunt enim bonam civi- tatem non moenibus neque parietibus, sed his teneri et conservari civibus, qui unum in locum, uno consilio, una mente, una voluntate congregati, hisdem moribus, hisdem institutis, hisdem inter se legibus uterentur. Noveruntque pace et concordia nihil melius, nihil utilius, nihil di- vinius ab immortali Deo hominibus datum esse.8

What Tomai, as well as other envoys, thus elaborates in his oration was the myth of Venice : the idea – promoted, frst and foremost, by the Venetian patriciate, both indi- vidually and institutionally – that the Venetian state, on account of its political stability, divine sanction and never-tarnished freedom, stood superior to all others, which made it its right and duty to rule people that were incapable of ruling themselves.9 Te whole ritual, in other words, functioned as an instrument of Venetian imperialism that served to strengthen the idea of its benevolent rule among provincial elites. Even when Tomai commends his city as Venice’s ‘most loyal and obedient daughter, servant and ward’, he gives but a mere glimpse of local patriotic pride, mentioning that Ravenna ‘was not con- quered in war but joined you of its own free will’.10 Peppered with occasional classical references, and completely centred on its objects of praise, Tomai’s oration stands as an ideal example for studying how Venetian power was articulated in the halls of the Ducal Palace. St     you of its own free will’.10 Peppered with occasional classical references, and completely centred on its objects of praise, Tomai’s oration stands as an ideal example for studying how Venetian power was articulated in the halls of the Ducal Palace  

 Latin.

What Tomai, as well as other envoys, thus elaborates in his oration was the myth of Venice : the idea – promoted, frst and foremost, by the Venetian patriciate, both indi- vidually and institutionally – that the Venetian state, on account of its political stability, divine sanction and never-tarnished freedom, stood superior to all others, which made it its right and duty to rule people that were incapable of ruling themselves.9 Te whole ritual, in other words, functioned as an instrument of Venetian imperialism that served to strengthen the idea of its benevolent rule among provincial elites. Even when Tomai commends his city as Venice’s ‘most loyal and obedient daughter, servant and ward’, he gives but a mere glimpse of local patriotic pride, mentioning that Ravenna ‘was not con- quered in war but joined you of its own free will’.10 Peppered with occasional classical references, and completely centred on its objects of praise, Tomai’s oration stands as an ideal example for studying how Venetian power was articulated in the halls of the Ducal Palace. St

What Tomai, as well as other envoys, thus elaborates in his oration was the myth of Venice : the idea – promoted, frst and foremost, by the Venetian patriciate, both indi- vidually and institutionally – that the Venetian state, on account of its political stability, divine sanction and never-tarnished freedom, stood superior to all others, which made it its right and duty to rule people that were incapable of ruling themselves.9 Te whole ritual, in other words, functioned as an instrument of Venetian imperialism that served to strengthen the idea of its benevolent rule among provincial elites. Even when Tomai commends his city as Venice’s ‘most loyal and obedient daughter, servant and ward’, he gives but a mere glimpse of local patriotic pride, mentioning that Ravenna ‘was not con- quered in war but joined you of its own free will’.10 Peppered with occasional classical references, and completely centred on its objects of praise, Tomai’s oration stands as an ideal example for studying how Venetian power was articulated in the halls of the Ducal Palace

6 To be more specifc, in what is one of the shorter orations, To- mai elaborates on the virtues of Doge Tron, his justice, fortitude and temperance, draws attention to his cursus honorum and highlights the nobility of his family.7 He then turns his attention to the city of Venice : quae (sc. urbs Venetiarum) sicut vera religione, iustitia, quiete, libertate, optimis artibus, sanc- tissimis institutis facile Italiae caput est, ita virtute, fortuna, potentia, rebus gestis terra mari- que late dominatur. Et incredibile dictu est, Princeps foelicissime, quanta de tua hac praestanti civitate, quae tanquam regina caeteras claras urbes superat et excellit, et de vobis apud omnes exteras nationes opinio sit, quanta observantia, quantum nomen. Noverunt enim bonam civi- tatem non moenibus neque parietibus, sed his teneri et conservari civibus, qui unum in locum, uno consilio, una mente, una voluntate congregati, hisdem moribus, hisdem institutis, hisdem inter se legibus uterentur. Noveruntque pace et concordia nihil melius, nihil utilius, nihil di- vinius ab immortali Deo hominibus datum esse.8

 Among the A-philosophical theses which 1 considered in Essay 1 was the original version of a "speech-act" account of truth, proposed by Strawson many years ago' though extensively modified by him since then. He was influenced, I think, by four main considerations:

(1) that the word true is properly, or at least primarily, to be applied to statements (what is stated), in view of the difficulties which he thought he saw in the thesis that it should be understood as applying to utterances; (2) that given the correctness of the previous supposi-tion, no theory which treats truth as consisting in a relation (or cor-relation) between statements and facts is satisfactory, since statements and facts cannot be allowed to be distinct items in the real world; (3) that Ramsey's account of truth —namely, that to assert that a proposition is true is to assert that proposition—is correct so far as it goes; and (4) that it does not go far enough, since it omits to take seriously the fact that we should not always be willing to tolerate the substitution of, for example, It is true that it is raining for It is raining. So he propounded the thesis that to say of a statement that it is true is (1) insofar as it is to assert anything, to assert that statement and (2) not merely to assert it but to endorse, confirm, concede, or reassert it (the list is not, of course, intended to be complete).

Such a theory seems to me to have at least two unattractive fea-tures, on the assumption that it was intended to give an account of the meaning (conventional significance) of the word true. (1) (A familiar type of objection) it gives no account, or no satisfactory ac-count, of the meaning of the word true when it occurs in unasserted subsentences (e.g. He thinks that it is true that... or If it is true that ... ). (2) It is open to an objection which I am inclined to think holds against Ramsey's view (of which the speech-act theory is an offshoot).

A theory of truth has (as Tarski noted) to provide not only for occurrences of true in sentences in which what is being spoken of as true is specified, but also for occurrences in sentences in which no specification is given (eg. The policeman's statement was true). According both to the speech-act theory, I presume, and to Ramsey's theory, at least part of what the utterer of such a sentence is doing is to assert whatever it was that the policeman stated. But the utterer may not

1. P. F. Strawson, "Trutb," Analysis 9, no. 6 (1949).
2. Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 142-143.

know what that statement was; he may think that the policeman's statement was true because policemen always speak the truth, or that that policeman always speaks the truth, or that policeman in those circumstances could not but have spoken the truth. Now assertion presumably involves committing oneself, and while it is possible to commit oneself to a statement which one has not identified (I could commit myself to the contents of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, without knowing what they say), I do not think I should be properly regarded as having committed myself to the content of the policeman's statement, merely in virtue of having said that it was true. When to my surprise I learn that the policeman actually said, Monkeys can talk, I say (perhaps), Well, I was wrong, not I withdraw that, or I withdraw my commitment to that. I never was committed to it.

 The interpretation which I propose for the traditional forms has, then, the following merits: (a) it enables the whole body of the laws of the system to be accepted without inconsistency;

(b) with the reservation noted above, it gives the constants of the system just the sense which they have in a vast group of statements of ordinary speech; (c) it emphasizes an important general feature of statements of that group, viz., that while the existence of members of their subject-classes is not a part of what is asserted in such statement, it is, in the sense we have examined, presupposed by them.

It is this last feature which

makes it unplausible to regard assertions of existence as either the whole, or conjunctive or disjunctive parts, of the sense of such ordinary statements as ' All the men at work on the scaffolding have gone home' or 'Some of the men are still at work'.

This was the reason why we were unhappy about regarding such expressions as '(x)(fx>g) as giving the form of these sentences; and why our uneasiness was not to be removed by the simple addition of positively or negatively existential for mulae.

Even the resemblance between 'There is not a single book in his room which is not by an English author' and the negatively existential form '~(Ix)(fx. ~gx) was deceptive.

The former, as normally used, carries the presupposition ' books-in-his-room ' and is far from being entailed by ' not-a-book-in. his-room'; whereas the latter is entailed by ~(J)(fx)'.

So

it is that if someone, with a solemn face, says ' There is not a single foreign book in his roora 'and then later reveals that there are no books in the room at all, we have the sense, not of having been lied to, but of having been made the victim of a sort of linguistic outrage. Of course he did not say there were any books in the room, so he has not said anything false.

Yet what

he said gave us the right to assume that there were, so he has misled us.

For what he said to be true (or false) it is necessary

(though not sufficient) that there should be books in the room.

Of this subtle sort is the relation between ' There is not a book in his room which is not by an English author ' and ' There are books in his room'. Some will say these points are irrelevaat to logic (are ' merely pragmatic '). If to call them 'irrelevant to logic' is to say that they are not considered in formal systems, then this is a point I should wish not to dispute, but to emphasize. But to logic as concerned with the relations between general classes of statements occurring in ordinary use, with the general conditions under which such statements are correctly called 'true ' or 'false', these points are not irrelevant.

Certainly a 'pragmatic con-aideration, a general rule of linguistic conduct, may perhapa be geen te underile these points: the rule, namely, that one does not make the (logically) lesser, when one could truthfully (and with equal or greater linguistic economy) make the greater, claim. Assume for a moment that the form 'There is not a single . . . which 18 not • ..'were introduced

into ordinary speech with the same sense as '~(Jx)(fx.~gx). Then the operation of this general rule would inhibit the use of this form where one could truly say simply 'There is not a single... or the introduced

orm just those logical presuppositions which 1 have describea; the Iort would tend, if it did not remain otiose, to develop just those ditterences I have emphasized from the logic of the symbolio form it was introduced operation of this .was first pointed

out to me, in a different connexion, by Mr. h. P.. Grice.

 CAPITOLO I.

Funzione sociale della letterntura. •

CAPITOLO TI.

Orgouiamo della letteratura.

CAPITOLO I1I.

Origine e sviluppo delle forme letterarie

CAPITOLO IV.

Vuriabilità delle forme letterarie - Ibridismo - Cor-

relnzione di sviluppo

25

34

5

69

CAPITOLO V

Lotta per la vita - Parassitino

CAPITOLO VI

107

Elezione naturale

139

CAPITOLO VII.

Adattamento all'ambiente

160

CAPITOLO VILL.

Ereditarietà dei caratteri letterari - Atavismo.

CAPITOLO IX.

Estinzione delle forme letterarie -

•

CAPITOLO X.

Interpretazione scientifica dei periodi d'intermittenza

 One view might be, the past experience, which is remembered, together with a stimulus which immediately preceded the remembering. But this involves the possibility of causation at a distance, which (it will be said) is very difficult to maintain. Another view might involve a persistent mental trace (the formation of which was caused by the past experience which is remembered) together with the present stimulus. But again, it will be said, the notion of a "mental trace" is a very difficult one. We are left then with the possibility that it is a persistent physical trace, caused by the past experience, in the body of the person who remembers, together with the present stimulus. Since this trace is usually supposed to be in the brain, I shall refer to it as a "brain-trace". For lack of an alternative, then, we must accept the view that the knowing is caused by existence of the brain-trace plus the occurrence of the stimulus.

Now it is possible that the formation of the brain-trace might be caused, not by the past experience, but by, say, an operation by a clever surgeon.

If this is so, it is possible that a brain-trace,

exactly like that which would be produced by a past experience 348

H. P. GRICE :

of such and such a kind, might exist without any such experience having occurred.

It will further be possible that both the brain-

trace might exist and the stimulus might occur, without the past experience having occurred. But if both the brain-trace existed and the stimulus occurred, the memory-knowing would occur.

Therefore the memory-knowing might occur without the remembered experience having occurred. But that is logically impossible.

Therefore unless the argument is unsound one of

the premisses must be rejected; and the easiest premiss to reject is that memory-knowledge occurs.

Now I think the argument is unsound; but in order to show that it is I must distinguish more closely what the argument asserts, for I think there is an ambiguity in it, due to an ambiguity in the word "possible" which may mean either

"logically

possible "

"causally possible

Suppose, first, that

sible " means logically possible. Then the bare bones of ta

argument will be:

1. The existence of a brain-trace of kind A plus the occurrence of a stimulus of kind B is logically compatible with the non-occurrence of any experience of kind E
2. The existence of a brain-trace of kind A plus the occurrence of a stimulus of kind B causally involves the occurrence of a memory-knowing of an experience of kind E.

Therefore the occurrence of a memory-knowing of an experience of kind E is logically compatible with the non-occurrence of any experience of kind E.

But this is absurd; therefore either (1) is false, which is very, very improbable; or (2) is false, and the falsity of (2) will involve the falsity of the proposition that if these memory-knowings occur they are caused by the existence of a brain-trace plus the occurrence of a stimulus; or there are no memory-knowings, which seems the easiest alternative to accept.

But there is a suppressed premiss in the argument which is false. (Perhaps it is rather a principle than a premiss.) The argument should run:

1. The existence of a brain-trace of kind A plus the occurrence of a stimulus of kind B is logically compatible with the non-occurrence of any experience of kind E.
2. The existence of a brain-trace of kind A plus the occurrence of a stimulus of kind B causally involves the occurrence of a memory-knowing of an experience of kind E
3. For any propositions p, q, r, if p is logically compatible with q, and p causally implies r, then r is logically compatible with q. Therefore the occurrence of a memory-knowing of an experience of kind E is logically compatible with the non-occurrence of any experience of kind E.

   But (3) only has to be considered to be seen to be false. Let

   p = it has been raining, 9 = the ground is not wet, y = the

   ground is wet. Then p will be logically compatible with q, for it is logically possible that it should have been raining without the ground being wet; and p will causally imply r, for whenever it rains the ground does get wet; but q is clearly not logically compatible with r; for it cannot be true both that the ground is wet and that it is not wet.

   I conclude then that the argument in this form is unsound ; but before I pass on to the second form the argument might take, I ought to remark that it must not be supposed that I accept the views about the causes of memory-knowledge involved by the argument.

   Suppose now that "possible" means. " causally possible".

   The argument (including the suppressed premiss or principle will now run :

   1. The existence of a brain-trace of kind A plus the occurrence of a stimulus of kind B is causally compatible with the non-occurrence of any experience of kind E.
   2. The existence of a brain-trace of kind A plus the occurrence of a stimulus of kind B causally involves the occurrence of a memory-knowing of an experience of kind E.
   3. For any p, q, r, if p is causally compatible with q, and 1 causally implies r, then r is logically compatible with q-
   4. Therefore the occurrence of a memory-knowing of an experience of kind E is logically compatible with the non-occurrence of any experience of kind E.

   But this is absurd; therefore (as before) we must reject memory-knowledge.

   (3) is now, I think, true; but its gain is (1)'s loss.

   For

   the supporter of the argument is now committed to maintaining not that it is logically possible that a brain-trace of kind A should exist without the occurrence of an experience of kind E, but that it is causally possible that it should so exist. That means, I think, that he has got to maintain that there are conditions given which there would be a brain-trace of kind E without any experience of kind E having occurred; and in order to support this contention he must maintain, for example, that if a surgeon operated in a certain way he would produce the brain-trace, or give some other explanation how the brain-trace could be produced. But to maintain any such thing as this is something, I should have thought, that no reasonable man would be prepared to do. For I cannot see what evidence in favour of it he could possibly have.

   I do not then think that any real doubt has been cast on the occurrence of memory-knowledge; and it seems to me, therefore, that my theory is untouched by objections of the kind I have just discussed.