By an idea-force M. Fouillée means & "process indivisibly sensory, emotional and appetitive".

He conceives the mental

life as consisting throughout in activity directed towards ends, with or without forethought as to the nature of these ends.

In

the case of psychical process finsl causes and eficient causes are coincident.

All specific contents of consciousness, the whole

variety of sensory and intellectual experiences, are specitic modes of this all-pervading and persistent nisus in which our very existence as conscious beings consists.

According as this nisus is

thwarted or furthered by the modifications which it receives in the course of experience, these modifications are agreeably or disagreeably toned.

Thus it necessarily

tends to maintain

and develop pleasing experiences and to get rid of those which are painful.

The proposition that pain consists in thwarted

striving and the proposition that we strive against pain are ditferent ways of saying the same thing.

"The force inherent in

all states of consciousness has its ultimate ground in the inseparable union of...

discernment which is the source of intelligence,

and preference which is the source of will. ... Discernment may be implicit when one term only is present to the mind so that there is no comparison...

•There exists also an implicit pre-

ference, including no comparison. I experience a pain, and I immediately endeavour after its suppression, as is shown by my reactive effort.

This requires no reflective comparison of ideas

or possible alternatives....

There is an unreasoned but active

preference in favour of pleasure, and there is at the saine time discernment of my actual state.'

Every idea or sensation is therefore, according to M. Fouillée, an endeavour thwarted or promoted.

He admits that in the

mature consciousness the conative and aflective aspects of the triple process are sometimes comparatively inconspicuous.

But

they are never altogether absent.

In attitudes of mind which

appear nost purely cognitive, there is always some kind and degree of impulse and interest, e.g., the disposition to go on

thinking about something whatever

it may be and so avoid

mental vacuity.

But even this relative obscuration of the active

and emotional consciousness is comparatively late product of mental evolution. At the outset there is no severance between practical and theoretical interest.

Cognition is, to begin with,

immediately and entirely subservient to external action for the satisfaction of organic needs. In order to live an organism must By an idea-force M. Fouillée means & "process indivisibly sensory, emotional and appetitive".

He conceives the mental

life as consisting throughout in activity directed towards ends, with or without forethought as to the nature of these ends.

In

the case of psychical process finsl causes and eficient causes are coincident.

All specific contents of consciousness, the whole

variety of sensory and intellectual experiences, are specitic modes of this all-pervading and persistent nisus in which our very existence as conscious beings consists.

According as this nisus is

thwarted or furthered by the modifications which it receives in the course of experience, these modifications are agreeably or disagreeably toned.

Thus it necessarily

tends to maintain

and develop pleasing experiences and to get rid of those which are painful.

The proposition that pain consists in thwarted

striving and the proposition that we strive against pain are ditferent ways of saying the same thing.

"The force inherent in

all states of consciousness has its ultimate ground in the inseparable union of...

discernment which is the source of intelligence,

and preference which is the source of will. ... Discernment may be implicit when one term only is present to the mind so that there is no comparison...

•There exists also an implicit pre-

ference, including no comparison. I experience a pain, and I immediately endeavour after its suppression, as is shown by my reactive effort.

This requires no reflective comparison of ideas

or possible alternatives....

There is an unreasoned but active

preference in favour of pleasure, and there is at the saine time discernment of my actual state.'

Every idea or sensation is therefore, according to M. Fouillée, an endeavour thwarted or promoted.

He admits that in the

mature consciousness the conative and aflective aspects of the triple process are sometimes comparatively inconspicuous.

But

they are never altogether absent.

In attitudes of mind which

appear nost purely cognitive, there is always some kind and degree of impulse and interest, e.g., the disposition to go on

thinking about something whatever

it may be and so avoid

mental vacuity.

But even this relative obscuration of the active

and emotional consciousness is comparatively late product of mental evolution. At the outset there is no severance between practical and theoretical interest.

Cognition is, to begin with,

immediately and entirely subservient to external action for the satisfaction of organic needs. In order to live an organism must