In fact, there seem to me to be quite a number of different forms of statement each of which has a good right to the title of conditional, and a number of which are quite ordinary or humdrum, such as "if P, q," "if p then q," "unless p, 9," and "supposing p, (then) q," together with an indefinite multitude of further forms. The two forms which the strong theorist most signally fails to distinguish are "if p, q" and "if p then q"; and the strong theorist, therefore, also fails to differentiate between two distinct philosophical theses: (1) that the sense of "if p, q" is given by the material conditional, and (2) that the sense of "if p then q" is given by the material conditional. Thesis (1) seems to have a good chance of being correct, whereas thesis (2) seems to be plainly incorrect, since the meaning of "if p, then q" is little different from that of "if p, in that case q," a linguistic form which has a much closer connection with argument than would attach to the linguistic form in which the word "then" does nor appear.

We should be careful, therefore, not to allow ourselves to be convinced that the meaning of "if p, q" diverges from that of the corresponding material conditional by an argument which relies on a genuine but irrelevant difference between "if p then q" and the material conditional "p > q."