(D. W. Stampe in conversation) A man is playing bridge against his boss. He wants to earn his boss's favor, and for this reason he wants his boss to win, and furthermore he wants his boss to know that he wants him to win (his boss likes that kind of self-effacement).

He does not want to do anything too blatant, however, like telling his boss by word of mouth, or in effect telling him by some action amounting to a signal, for fear the boss might be offended by his crudity. So he puts into operation the following plan: when he gets a good hand, he smiles in a certain way; the smile is very like, but not quite like, a spontaneous smile of pleasure. He intends his boss to detect the difference and to argue as follows: "That was not a genuine giveaway smile, but the simulation of such a smile. That sort of simulation might be a bluff (on a weak hand), but this is bridge, not poker, and he would not want to get the better of me, his boss, by such an impropriety. So probably he has a good hand, and, wanting me to win, he hoped I would learn that he has a good hand by taking his smile as a spontaneous giveaway. That being so, I shall not raise my partner's bid."

In such a case, I do not think one would want to say that the cm-ployee had meant, by his smile (or by smiling), that he had a good hand, nor indeed that he had meant anything at all. Yet the conditions so far listed are fulfilled. When producing the smile:

1. The employee intended that the boss should think that the employee had a good hand.
2. The employee intended that the boss should think, at least in part because of the smile, that the employee intended the boss to think that the hand was a good one.
3. The employee intended that at least part of the boss's reason for thinking that the hand was a good one should be that the employee wanted him to think just that.