The defeat of Mark Antony and Cleopatra at the Battle of Actium (31 BC) was the result of specific tactical and structural dynamics, which were only partially related to the disposition of the wings and the commanders mentioned.

The presence of Marcus Lurius commanding the right wing of Octavian and Agrippa's fleet played an important role, but the collapse of Antony's formation did not stem from an intrinsic inability to control the center. Instead, it was caused by a combination of planned defections, inferior mobility, and a premeditated retreat strategy.

Here is the strategic and tactical analysis of the battle, focusing on the key points of your query.

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1. The Role of Marcus Lurius and Octavian's Chain of Command

In Octavian's fleet, supreme command was entrusted to Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, who led the left wing (the most active from an offensive standpoint). Marcus Lurius did indeed command the right wing, while the center was assigned to Lucius Arruntius.

• The stability of Octavian's wings: Agrippa’s chain of command functioned flawlessly. Octavian's ships (primarily liburnians, which were smaller and more agile) maintained their distance from Antony's massive vessels, avoiding close-quarters boarding combat.
• The containment tactic: Lurius’s right wing held its ground to block any flanking attempts by Gellius Publicola (Antony's left wing), applying constant pressure without breaking the cohesion of the line.

2. The Dislocation and Collapse of Antony's Wings

The theory that Antony's center failed to prevent the dislocation or separation of his wings is correct if viewed through the lens of betrayal and loss of morale, rather than a mere error in central maneuvering:

• The betrayal of the left wing: Before the battle, Antony’s general, Quintus Dellius, defected to Octavian and revealed the entire battle plan. During the clash, Antony’s left wing (commanded by Sosius) advanced excessively to engage Agrippa, breaking the compactness of the formation and opening a lethal gap.
• The defection of the center and right: Seeing the compromised situation, large portions of Antony's central fleet and his right wing chose not to fight wholeheartedly or surrendered directly on the field, making it impossible for Antony to coordinate any countermoves from the center.

3. Antony's True Strategy: A Retreat, Not a Total Victory

The decisive strategic factor explaining the "lack of cohesion" in Antony's center lies in the actual goals of his campaign:

• The flagship trapped: Antony was not looking for a decisive victory to destroy Octavian. Aware that he was strategically trapped and running low on supplies due to Agrippa’s previous naval blockade, his goal was to break through the blockade to salvage Cleopatra’s treasure and the army.
• The central gap: When Antony's left wing widened to pursue Agrippa, a gap opened in the center of the formation. This was exactly what Cleopatra was waiting for. The Queen of Egypt, positioned in the central rear with her 60 gold-laden ships, hoisted her sails and charged through the gap to escape toward the Peloponnese.
• Abandoning the center: Antony, seeing Cleopatra's fleet flee, abandoned his flagship (which was already engaged and unable to move), boarded a fast liburnian, and followed her. This left the center and the rest of the remaining fleet without a leader, sealing their immediate surrender or destruction.

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Strategic Summary

The loss of cohesion between Antony's center and wings was not a mere tactical accident caused by Lurius's pressure or Antony's inability as a coordinator. It was the result of a battle plan compromised from the start by desertion, combined with Antony and Cleopatra's strategic choice to prioritize escape and the preservation of resources (the treasure and land troops) over holding the battle line. The moment the commander-in-chief abandoned the center to follow the fleeing rearguard, the dislocation of the wings became irreversible.

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If you would like to explore this further, let me know if you prefer to focus on:

• The technical details of the ships (Antony's heavy quinqueremes vs. Agrippa's agile liburnians).
• The immediate geopolitical consequences of the retreat to Egypt.
• The fate of Antony's land legions left isolated after the naval battle.

would naval strategy today refer to right and left or use starboard etc or even king lat n s e w?

Modern naval strategy and tactics have completely evolved past the rigid visual formations of antiquity. Today, naval commanders would not refer to their forces as a "left wing" or "right wing" in the style of Actium, nor would they use "starboard" or "port" to describe overall fleet architecture, and "king latitude" is not a standard naval term.

Instead, modern naval warfare relies on spatial axes, grid systems, relative bearings, and functional task groups.

Here is exactly how modern naval strategy refers to positioning, direction, and spatial organization:

1. Geometric Axes and Sector Allocation (Instead of Wings)

Modern fleets (like a Carrier Strike Group) do not march in a flat line abreast. They operate in a 360-degree, multi-domain bubble (air, surface, subsurface). [1, 2]

• Threat Axes / Bearing Lines: Direction is defined relative to the threat. If an enemy anti-ship missile threat is expected from the Northeast, that becomes the Threat Axis.
• Sectors: Escort ships (destroyers, cruisers) are assigned to specific sectors or "station hours" around the high-value unit (like an aircraft carrier). For example, a cruiser might be ordered to maintain a station at "Sector 12 to 2" (using a 12-hour clock face analogy relative to the carrier’s heading) or a specific true bearing (e.g., "Station at 045 degrees True, 15 nautical miles"). [1]
• Screen Commanders: Instead of a "Right Wing Commander," a modern fleet has a Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC) or an Air Defense Commander (ADC) who owns a specific functional bubble of space, regardless of whether they are physically to the left or right.

2. Relative vs. Absolute Directions (Starboard vs. Cardinal Points)

• Starboard and Port: These terms are strictly used for shipboard directions (e.g., "Lookout reports a contact on the starboard bow") or very close-in ship maneuvers (tactical maneuvering signals between adjacent ships). They are not used for fleet-wide theater strategy. [1, 2]
• True Bearings and Cardinal Points (N, S, E, W): Tactical data links (like Link 16) and combat management systems use absolute geographic coordinates (Latitude/Longitude) and True Bearings (000° to 359°). A commander will order a ship to "interdict a contact at Bearing 270, distance 40 miles," rather than "to the West."

3. Grid Reference Systems

Instead of historical landmarks or flexible lines, modern naval strategy utilizes highly precise, digital grid systems:

• CGRS / GARS (Global Area Reference System): This standardizes the battlespace into highly structured coordinate boxes. Commanders assign ships, aircraft, and submarines to operate within specific "kill boxes" or "grid squares" to prevent friendly fire and coordinate multi-domain strikes.
• PIM (Position of Intended Movement): The strategy of a moving fleet is tracked along a pre-planned timeline grid called the PIM line, which dictates exactly where the fleet should be geographically at any given minute.

4. Functional Task Organization (The Modern Fleet)

At the strategic and operational level, navies organize by function and hierarchy rather than physical location:

• Task Forces (TF), Groups (TG), and Units (TU): A fleet is broken down into alphanumerical identifiers (e.g., Task Force 50, Task Group 50.1).
• These groups are dispersed by dozens or even hundreds of miles, communicating via satellite. Because they are over the horizon from one another, physical terms like "left" and "right" lose all meaning; they are connected instead by network architecture and shared digital maps. [1]

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If you want to dive deeper into how modern navies organize their battlespace, let me know if you would like to explore:

• How Link 16 digital networks create a shared tactical picture for all ships.
• The specific Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept used by the US Navy to delegate command.
• How submarines coordinate with surface ships without crashing into each other using water space management.

I meant lat long did they have chartsxwhere this would be usable?

No, they did not have charts with usable latitude and longitude grids. [1]

While the general geometric concepts of latitude and longitude were invented by Greek scholars long before the Battle of Actium, they were purely theoretical academic models. They were completely absent from the actual, hands-on charts used by ancient Roman and Egyptian captains. [1]

The reality of ancient naval charts and tactical coordinates reveals why they could not use this system:

1. What Ancient Sailors Used Instead (The Periplus)

Ancient Mediterranean navies did not use graphical, gridded maps to steer their ships. Instead, they relied on written piloting books called a periplus (meaning "circumnavigation"). [1]

• These were text-based manuscripts with lists of coastal landmarks, ports, watering holes, hidden reefs, and the distances between them.
• If a captain was in open water, they navigated strictly by dead reckoning (estimating speed, time, and direction by tracking wind and landmarks) and by watching the positions of the sun and stars. [1, 2, 3]

2. The Theoretical Grid vs. Navigational Reality

The famous geographer Ptolemy did create a world atlas with latitude and longitude lines around 150 AD (nearly two centuries after Actium). However, it was physically impossible for ancient Roman or Egyptian sailors to actually use a coordinate grid on the open water: [1]

• The Longitude Problem: While it is relatively easy to calculate latitude (North/South) by looking at the angle of the North Star, measuring longitude (East/West) requires an exceptionally accurate clock. Accurate ocean longitude was not solvable until the invention of the marine chronometer in the 18th century.
• Without a precise clock, any coordinate grid on an ancient chart was just a guess. [1, 2, 3]

3. Actium Was a "Sight" Battle

The Battle of Actium took place right at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf in Greece, close to the rocky shoreline.

• There was no open-ocean navigation required.
• Octavian, Agrippa, and Antony deployed their ships based entirely on what they could physically seefrom their decks and from shouting signals across nearby vessels.
• In a tight tactical space like that, commanders positioned their ships using local landmarks (like the Temple of Apollo on the Actium peninsula) and relative directions ("face the enemy," "hold the left coast," "guard the center").

Graphical sea charts with accurate compass networks (called Portolan charts) didn't emerge until the 13th century, and modern, gridded nautical charts with precise math didn't become standard naval tools until the 16th and 17th centuries. [1, 2, 3, 4]

If you are curious about the evolution of navigation, we can look into how 13th-century Portolan chartsused wind roses instead of grids, or how the 18th-century "Longitude Crisis" was finally solved by clockmaker John Harrison. Which would you prefer? [1, 2, 3]