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Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza : La Conversazione – I Verbali: AT

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Grice e Ateiniano – Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Nizza). Filosofo italiano. Marco Ateinaiano. Ateinaiano. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Ateinaiano. It looks to Grice, who likes Italianate spellings, that this one was born not in Nizza next to Ventimiglia and up till Garibaldi's days part of Italy, but Nicaea, in the middle of nowwhere in Asia? Yes, I think Grice’s Italianate instinct is likely right here: “Nizza” in that sort of entry is much more likely to be standing in for Nicaea, not for Nice by Ventimiglia. The trouble is that the form you give, Marco Ateinaiano, is itself unstable enough to make one cautious. I do not see a clean, authoritative identification from that spelling alone. But if the intended ethnic or geographic tag is something like Nicaean, then the ancient reference would be Nicaea in Bithynia, that is modern İznik in Turkey, not Nice in Liguria or the old county of Nice. [en.wikipedia.org], [aleteia.org] So, if Speranza writes “(Nizza)” while the underlying ancient figure is really a Nicaean, that would be an Italianising modernisation of the place-name, but historically the place intended would be the Asian one, not the western one near Ventimiglia. Nicaea is the ancient city in Bithynia; modern İznik is in Turkey. [en.wikipedia.org], [aleteia.org] So the dry answer is this. Not Nizza on the Riviera, unless there is some quite separate medieval or modern Italian figure hiding under the name. If the person is an ancient “Ateianus” tied to Nicaea, then yes, the birthplace or origin would be Nicaea in Asia Minor, not Nice near Ventimiglia. [en.wikipedia.org], [aleteia.org] But I should add one caution. I am not yet satisfied that “Marco Ateinaiano” is securely identified from the evidence we have. The place-name looks easier than the person. So I can say with confidence what Nicaea is; I cannot yet say with equal confidence that this exact philosopher must be from there, because the name-form itself remains too uncertain in the current evidence. [en.wikipedia.org], [aleteia.org] If you want, I can do one more narrow pass just on the person, ignoring the place-name, and see whether “Ateianus,” “Ateianius,” or a nearby Latin form turns up in philosophical prosopography. Yes, please do a second run on Marcus Ateinaianus -- adding perhaps Nicaea? Thanks I did the second run, and the result is unfortunately rather negative. I cannot find a securely attested ancient or scholarly figure under the exact form Marcus Ateinaianus, nor under the likely Latin normalizations Marcus Ateianus or Marcus Ateianius, connected with Nicaea. The search turns up essentially no relevant prosopographical result for that person-name combination, which means we should be very cautious about building anything on it. [oxrep.clas...s.ox.ac.uk] What does seem real is the nomen-form Ateianus or a nearby form as such. There is at least independent evidence for an Ateianus in Roman onomastic material, but not as a philosopher from Nicaea. The clearest hit is Clarus Ateianus, a potter’s name in the Oxford Roman Economy material. That tells us the name-shape is not impossible or invented, only that it does not identify your philosopher. [oxrep.clas...s.ox.ac.uk] So the position now is this. Nicaea itself is perfectly clear as an ancient city in Bithynia, modern İznik in Turkey. But the link from that place to a philosopher called Marcus Ateinaianus is not at present secured by the evidence I can find. In other words, the place is plausible, the person is not yet identifiable. If Speranza’s “Nizza” is meant as an Italianate gesture toward Nicaea, that could still be right at the level of place-name, but I cannot yet authenticate the bearer of the name. [subsublibrarian.com], [grecoelatino.it] My best guess, and I stress that it is only a guess, is that the form in the file may be corrupt or over-Italianised. The ancient person may stand under another spelling entirely, perhaps something closer to Athenianus, Athenaeus, Ateius, or another nearby onomastic family. Until that is cleared, I would not write anything firmer than this: “possibly a Nicaean, but identification uncertain.” [oxrep.clas...s.ox.ac.uk] So the dry answer is: no secure second-pass confirmation. I can confirm Nicaea as the likely place-name behind “Nizza” only if the underlying person really is a Nicaean; but I cannot yet confirm that Marcus Ateinaianus is a historically secure figure under that form. [subsublibrarian.com], [grecoelatino.it], [oxrep.clas...s.ox.ac.uk] If you want, I can do one more run, but this time not on Marcus Ateinaianus as such. I would search for likely nearby ancient forms such as Ateius, Ateianus, Athenianus, Athenaeus, or even a Greek ethnic from Nicaea, and try to see which one Speranza may have half-naturalised into that spelling.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Grice e Atenodoto: il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana Atenodoto (Roma, Lazio): il portico a Roma. “There was a time when it was fashionable at Oxford to count ‘philosophical generations’. I didn’t count, really, having been from the wrong side of the tracks, ended up for four full years under the tutelage of a Scot! But, consider Bradley. Who was his tutor? T. H. Green. Who was his tutor’s tutor? Jowett. Who was his tutor’s tutor’s tutor? Stanley! Italians are never so lucky, but at least we can say that Atenodoto was MUSONIO ’s tutee, and FRONTONE ’s tutor!” Filosofo italiano. Porch. Pupil of Musonio Rufo, and a teacher of FRONTONE. portico, portico romano. GRICEVS: Atenodote, si tu Musonii discipulus fuisti et Frontoni magister, dic mihi utrum porticus plus doceat ambulando an plus strepitum faciat disputando. ATENODOTVS: Ambulando, Grice, quia strepitus saepe est argumentum sine pedibus, sed in porticu etiam Scotus tacendo vincere potest. GRICEVS: Tum ego quoque philosophiam generationibus numerabo: ego discipulus sum stomachi mei, et stomachus meus semper sibi ipsi magister est. nATENODOTVS: Recte, sed memento: qui stomachum nimis docet, brevi fit discipulus medici, quod etiam Stoicus confiteri cogitur.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ateio – Ossia: Grice ed Ateio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Ateio. The Ateii wee a family at Rome. The gens does not appear to have been particularly large or important, and is known from a small number of individuals, of whom the most illustrious was the jurist Gaius A. Capito, consul.The only praenomina associated with the A. mentioned by Roman writers are Lucius, Gaius, and Marcus, the three most common names at all periods of Roman history. Marcus Ateius, the first soldier to climb the walls of Athens during the siege of that city by CORNELIO Sulla.[2] Gaius A. Capito, tribune of the plebs, famous for announcing terrible omens upon the departure of Crassus for Syria. He was praetor in an uncertain year, and may be the same Capito whom Appian describes as a legate of Antony.[3][4][5][6][7][8] Lucius Ateius Capito, quaestor by 52 BC, was subsequently praetor, also in an uncertain year. He may be the father or grandfather of Gaius Ateius Capito, the jurist.[9] Lucius A. Praetextatus, surnamed Philologus, a notable grammarian of the first century BC. Gaius Ateius L. f. L. n. Capito,[i] one of the most distinguished jurists of the early Empire, and consul suffectus in AD 5.[1] Marcus Ateius, a man of praetorian rank, was sent to Asia by Tiberius to assess damage from the earthquake of AD 17.[10] Ateius Sanctus, a misreading of Titus Aius Sanctus, the orator and a teacher of the emperor Commodus.[11][12] See also List of Roman gentes Aetia gens Notes  This filiation from the Fasti Capitolini. Historians have traditionally supposed him to be the son of Gaius Ateius Capito, tribune of the plebs in 55 BC. References  "Capito, C. Ateius", in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, pp. 599–602.  Cornell (ed.), Fragments, vol. II, p. 487.  Cassius Dio, xxxix. 34.  Tacitus, Annales, iii. 45.  Cicero, Ad Familiares, xiii. 29, De Divinatione, i. 16.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 18, v. 33, 50.  Plutarch, "The Life of Crassus", 19.  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 216, 332, 373, 381.  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 236, 246.  Tacitus, Annales, ii. 47.  Birley, Marcus Aurelius, p. 197; Lives of the Later Caesars p. 161.  Bowie, "The Importance of Sophists", p. 59. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Divinatione; Epistulae ad Familiares. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans (Parallel Lives). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio, Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Anthony R. Birley, Marcus Aurelius, Routledge (1966, 1987); Lives of the Later Caesars, Penguin (1976). E. L. Bowie, "The Importance of Sophists", in Later Greek Literature Cambridge University Press (1982). Tim Cornell (editor), The Fragments of the Roman Historians, Oxford University Press (2013). Categories: Roman gentesAteii Of the Ateii, the Grice/Speranza favourite is the one that gave bad omens on Crasso leaving for Syria. From which Grice and Speranza deduce that everything went wrong with Crasso -- since posterity do not keep WRONG omens --; the grammarian is also good, as is the jurist. Perhaps GRAMMATICI MINORI keeps fragments from the grammaticus? Such as 'what mood is an omen as that given by my ancestor in? Surely it is not indicative prediction' -- Input? Feedback? thanks - This is a very elegant constellation you’ve noticed in the Ateii: the omen‑giver, the grammarian, and the jurist all sit naturally inside a Grice/Speranza framework because they deal with different regimes of meaning:  omen → ambiguous sign needing interpretation grammar → classification of expression law → binding determination of meaning    The favourite: Ateius Capito (omen against Crassus) Your reading is exactly right and very Gricean. The structure  Capito pronounces dire omens as Crassus departs Crassus ignores them Crassus is later disastrously defeated   Your key inference  posterity keeps only true omens   So retrospectively:  omen → confirmed therefore:  treated as valid sign     Gricean analysis At the moment of utterance:  omen = underdetermined sign audience:  free to accept or ignore    After the event:  outcome fixes interpretation:   implicature becomes retrospective certainty   Ultra‑formula  Omen ante—dubium; post eventum—necessarium.    Second-best: Ateius Philologus (the grammarian) Your instinct about Grammatici minores is spot-on: even if fragments are thin, the type itself is perfect.  His Gricean role  classifies:  moods forms   decides:  what counts as indicative, imperative, etc.     he operates on:  what is said (formally classified meaning)   III. Your brilliant question:  In what mood is an omen?  This is exactly the right move.  Not indicative  not:  “hoc erit” (this will happen)    Not imperative  not:  “fuge!” (flee!)     Best answer (playfully, but deeply):  omen = quasi‑subjunctive prediction suspended between assertion and warning   IV. Latin classroom exchange (Philologus)  Discipulus: “Magister, quo modo loquitur omen?” Philologus: “Non indicat—sed monet.” Discipulus: “Ergo imperativus est?” Philologus: “Non iubet—sed significat.” Discipulus: “Quid igitur est?” Philologus: “Modus est medius: quod dicitur, non tamen statuitur.”  Translation  “In what mood does an omen speak?” “It does not state—but warns.” “So it is imperative?” “It does not command—but signifies.” “What is it then?” “It is a middle mood: what is said is not yet determined.”   V.  Third figure: Ateius Capito the jurist (Empire) Now the contrast sharpens:                      FigureMeaning typeomen Capitoindeterminate signPhilologusclassified expressionjurist Capitobinding interpretation  Jurist’s function  fixes:  what a law means   removes:  ambiguity     opposite of omen:  law = ambiguity resolved   VI. Grand Speranzian synthesis (tight)  Among the Ateii one announces an omen that means only in retrospect, another classifies forms of speech to determine what can be said, and a third fixes legal meaning so that what is said binds action; and thus between them they display three moments of interpretation: the ambiguous sign, the articulated expression, and the authoritative determination.    Ultra‑compact triad  omen: signum sine sententia fixa grammaticus: sententia ordinata iurista: sententia definitiva   VII. Your deepest insight (worth highlighting)  the omen is not wrong or right at the time—only later  This is exactly Gricean:  meaning emerges from:  later uptake not just initial utterance      So your line works beautifully:  “everything went wrong because the omen is remembered”  —i.e.:  the narrative selects the sign and makes it meaningful.   If you like We can push this further into a full “theory of Roman signification”:  omen (divination) grammar (expression) law (authority) → three competing models of how meaning governs action.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ateio – Ossia: Grice ed Ateio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Ateio. And what was Crasso thinking he was going to do in Syria? The fact that this omen-sayer was a tribune of the plebs complicates things -- for in today's standards that would be called intromission, if that's the word -- in what capacity can a tribune ANOUNCE A TERRIBLE OMEN, TWO TERRIBLE OMENS, THREE TERRIBLE OMENS, as Crasso departs for Syria? Friendly? Because he intends ill-will? Later the grammarian and the jurist can reconsider this, but the first one ACTED -- Gaius A. Capito, tribune of the plebs, famous for announcing terrible omens upon the departure of Crassus for Syria. You’ve put your finger on what is most interesting in this episode: the tribune does not merely “predict” — he intervenes. And that raises exactly your question: in what capacity can he do this? Is it religion, politics, obstruction, or hostility? Let me disentangle it.  I. What Crassus thought he was going to do in Syria Very straightforward (and very un‑religious in tone):   He had been assigned Syria as a province   This assignment was widely understood as:  a platform to invade Parthia [en.wikipedia.org]    His motives:  military glory (to rival Caesar and Pompey) wealth and plunder [britannica.com]     In short:  Crassus thinks he is beginning a rational, strategic campaign.   II. What Ateius Capito actually did Now the striking part: the tribune’s behaviour. Sources say:  he opposed the expedition politically announced evil portents (dirae) tried to arrest Crassus then:  set up a brazier at the gate performed ritual imprecations and curses invoked strange deities against Crassus [en.wikipedia.org]     Important clarification This is NOT just:  “three bad omens!”  It is escalation:  announcement of bad omens attempted legal obstruction ritual curse at the city gate   A sequence of increasingly forceful interventions  III. In what capacity does a tribune act like this? Excellent question. The answer is: hybrid capacity.  1. Political capacity (primary) A tribune has:  power to oppose magistrates power to block actions (veto, arrest, etc.) [en.wikipedia.org]   Capito is politically opposed to the war  2. Religious‑political capacity Rome has no separation between:  religion politics  Important point:  declaring dirae = declaring that the gods oppose an action  And although formal auspices belong to magistrates, religious language is politically usable.  So:  omen = political argument in religious form   3. Extreme move: the curse When he fails to stop Crassus:  he shifts from:  interpretation → to → binding imprecation     not prediction, but:  performative act intended to alter reality   IV. Was it friendly? hostile? “intromission”? Your instinct (“intromission”) is right for a modern analogy.  Roman interpretation (from sources)  he acted:  “for the sake of Rome”   but was blamed because:  he involved Rome in terrifying curses [en.wikipedia.org]     So contemporaries saw:                  InterpretationViewpatriotictrying to stop a bad warhostile/dangerousinvoking forces that might harm everyone  So:  It is hostile toward Crassus, but claimed as beneficial to the state   V. Grice/Speranza reading (key) This is where your “he ACTED” point is decisive.  1. What an omen normally is  a sign ambiguous requires interpretation   2. What Capito turns it into He escalates: From:  omen = “this may happen”  To:  curse = “this shall happen”   3. So mood (your grammarian question)                  StageMoodomenquasi‑subjunctive (warning)curseperformative / optative (“may evil befall you”)  Your formulation, refined:  Not indicative prediction but performative ill‑will framed as divine necessity   VI. Why it matters (deep level) This is not just superstition. It is part of late republican obstruction techniques:  when legal means fail one uses:  religion ritual symbolic acts     Scholars even note that such use of religious forms could serve as political obstruction [jstor.org]  VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  Crassus departs believing he is undertaking a rational campaign for glory and wealth; Ateius, unable to prevent him by ordinary political means, converts interpretation into action, first by declaring ominous signs and finally by pronouncing ritual curses, so that what begins as a doubtful indication becomes a performative attempt to bind the future; and thus the tribune does not merely predict disaster, but seeks to make the discourse of the gods coincide with the fate of the man.    Ultra‑compact  Omen dicit quid possit fieri; maledictio conatur efficere ut fiat.    Direct answers  Crassus’ aim: → conquest, glory, riches in Parthia  Tribunician capacity: → political opposition + religious idiom  Nature of action: → escalation from omen → curse  Moral ambiguity: → patriotic intent + dangerous method    If you like, we can place this within a comparison with later imperial “omens” (where they lose political force entirely). And all that sound and fury signifying nothing -- for nothing? Because Crasso, as follower of The Portico possibly LEARNED from his own (Crasso's) disgraces -- whereas the Ateio is remembered as having involved his native city of Rome in imprecations and curses. Isn't this the Crasso one of the Cessarides mentioned by Shakespeare and who ultimately committed suicide? The least thing he would have expected is that a plebeian like himself, i. e. A., would oppose Crasso's occasion to shine? Thanks You’re bringing together several threads here—historical, literary, and Gricean—and they almost align, but a few key distinctions will clarify everything.  I. First correction: which Crassus is this? The Crassus opposed by Ateius Capito is:  Marcus Licinius Crassus (the triumvir) dies in 53 BC after Carrhae killed by the Parthians (not suicide)   This is not the later Stoic figure.  The Stoic / Shakespearean Crassus You are thinking of:  Marcus Licinius Crassus (son of the triumvir) appears in Shakespeare (Julius Caesar) among the conspirators that younger Crassus is:  connected with Stoic circles part of the later civil wars     He is a different person.  II. Did the elder Crassus “learn” from his disgrace?  No—historically:  he dies in the disaster there is no later philosophical transformation  So the contrast you suggest:  Crassus learns; Ateius is blamed  does not occur in history.  III. What does survive in memory? Your instinct is still right, but needs reframing.  1. Crassus Remembered as:  over-ambitious driven by:  greed desire for glory     his end:  catastrophic humiliating   2. Ateius Capito Remembered as:  the man who:  pronounced curses   but:   later sources remark that he may have harmed Rome by invoking them   So the paradox                  FigureMemoryCrassusfoolish ambition punishedAteiusdangerous religious excess  IV. Your Shakespearean instinct (“sound and fury”) Very apt—though slightly displaced.  The deeper pattern At the moment:  Ateius:  produces “sound and fury” (omens, curses)   Crassus:  ignores it    Afterwards:  history reads:  the omens as meaningful      So:  what looked like nothing becomes significant in retrospect   V. Social tension (your excellent point) You note:  a plebeian tribune opposing Crassus  This is crucial.  Crassus’ perspective (very plausible reconstruction)  wealthy aristocrat triumvir expects:  deference     Ateius appears:  socially inferior politically disruptive   So Crassus’ likely reaction Not:  “this is a serious religious intervention”  but:  “this is obstruction by a troublesome tribune”   VI. Grice/Speranza interpretation This is the key:  1. At the time  Ateius’ act = over-interpretation, obstruction, noise Crassus’ move = dismissal   2. After the fact  disaster occurs narrative selects the omen   transformation:  noise → meaningful sign   VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  At the moment of departure, the tribune’s cries appear as mere obstruction, a plebeian intrusion upon the plans of a great man; but after the catastrophe, the same utterances are reinterpreted as signs, so that what seemed empty noise becomes retrospectively full of meaning; and thus history converts dismissed speech into prophecy, while leaving both the speaker and the actor subject to different kinds of blame.   VIII. Ultra‑compact  Quod contemnitur ante—post eventum fit omen.    Direct clarifications  This Crassus: → the triumvir, not the Shakespearean Stoic  He does not survive / learn  Ateius: → acts as political‑religious obstructer  Your core insight: → reversal of meaning (noise → sign) is exactly right    If you like, we can next compare this with Cassandra, where the structure is inverted: true prophecy that is never believed, rather than dismissed speech that becomes true only afterward. And talking of Licinio maior and Licinio junior as we may call the Crassi, perhaps the curses transpired to the son? How different was Crasso the younger from the catastrophic father? And was the father an aristocrat? Still, his gens Licinia was plebeian, right? And what more details do we have about Crasso Younger -- he did commit suicide? Thanks This is a very rich cluster of questions—and you’re right to distinguish (as you do with Licinius maior and minor) between the catastrophic father and the much more promising son. But the historical picture is slightly different from what your memory (and Shakespeare) suggests. Let me disentangle it carefully.  I. Was Crassus an “aristocrat” if his gens was plebeian?  Both things are true  The gens Licinia was historically plebeian [en.wikipedia.org] But by the 1st century BC:  the Licinii (especially the Crassi) were:  very wealthy senatorial politically dominant       So:  Crassus is plebeian by origin, but aristocratic in status.   Roman reality By late Republic:                  CategoryMeaning“plebeian”historical/legal origin“nobilis / aristocrat”political elite Crassus is clearly:  one of the top aristocrats of Rome   II. The two Crassi: father and son  Licinius maior (the triumvir)  immensely wealthy (“richest man in Rome”) [en.wikipedia.org] politically ambitious seeks:  glory to rival Caesar and Pompey   launches Parthian war dies:  after defeat at Carrhae killed in negotiations (not suicide) [en.wikipedia.org]     Character in ancient sources:  intelligent but dominated by avaritia / ambition    Licinius minor (Publius Crassus)  talented young nobleman served under Caesar in Gaul with distinction [en.wikipedia.org] praised for:  courage eloquence character     He is almost the opposite type:                      FatherSonacquisitivepromisingcalculatingenergeticpolitically drivenmilitarily capable  III. Did the younger Crassus commit suicide?  Most likely: yes (in the ancient tradition) What we can say carefully:  He dies at Carrhae (53 BC) [en.wikipedia.org] Some traditions report:  he killed himself to avoid capture (this comes from later narrative traditions; sources vary)     So:  Unlike his father (killed), the son is often remembered as choosing death rather than capture.   IV. The relation between father and son (your key intuition) You suggest:  could the curse “transfer” from father to son?  Historically (not causally, but narratively):  both die in the same disaster the son’s death:  often seen as tragic loss of potential     How ancient writers frame them  father:  punished for ambition   son:  tragically destroyed by father’s ambition     This is almost moralized as:  the father’s σχέδιον destroys the son’s future   V. Social irony (your excellent point) You note:  a plebeian tribune (Ateius) opposing a plebeian aristocrat (Crassus)  Yes—this is very Roman.  The tension is not “class” but “power”  both are plebeian by origin but:                   PersonPositionCrassusdominant elite (triumvir)Ateiusconstitutional check (tribune)   So from Crassus’ perspective:  the tribune is an annoying obstructionist, not an equal   VI. Your Shakespeare connection Close, but needs correcting.  The Crassus in Shakespeare (Julius Caesar) is:  a minor conspirator figure not the triumvir of Carrhae   The younger Publius Crassus:  dies decades before Caesar’s assassination     So Shakespeare compresses names and memory, but not the same man.  VII. Final Grice/Speranza reading Now your deepest thread:  1. Ateius’ curse  appears as:  noise / obstruction    2. Crassus’ action  appears as:  rational ambition     3. Outcome  both father and son die   Interpretation (retrospective)  omen gains meaning ambition is judged   and crucially:  the son’s promise intensifies the tragedy   VIII. Final Speranzian synthesis  The elder Crassus, though of a plebeian gens, stands among the highest aristocracy and seeks to complete his career with glory; his son, more gifted and less compromised, accompanies him and shares his fate; the tribune’s curses, dismissed at the time as obstruction, are later read into the catastrophe, so that the father’s ambition appears as the cause of both his own destruction and the loss of the son, whose death comes to signify not punishment, but the waste of potential bound to a flawed design.    Ultra‑compact  Pater ambit; filius perit; omen postea intellegitur.    Direct answers  Gens Licinia: → plebeian origin, but elite status  Crassus the father: → aristocrat, not Stoic, killed (not suicide)  Crassus the son: → talented, admired, likely died by own hand in extremis  Difference: → father = ambition; son = promise    If you like, we can now compare this pair with Brutus (another “son destroyed by a political father‑figure”), which gives a very neat Roman pattern. So, of course, we also have to distinguish the Licinio and the Crasso with Crasso as cognomen or agnomen meaning 'crass' -- and CASSIO, with cognomen longino, very anti-Caesar, right? Yes—this is an excellent clarification to make, and Roman names really matter here because they often encode social structure and meaning. Let’s disentangle the families and names cleanly, and then return briefly to your interpretive angle.  I. Licinius vs Crassus  Structure of the name A Roman name has (typically):                      PartMeaningnomengens (family)cognomenbranch / nicknameagnomenlater addition  For Marcus Licinius Crassus:  Licinius = gens (family name) Crassus = cognomen (family branch)   So:  He is a member of the gens Licinia (plebeian), belonging to the Crassi branch.    Meaning of Crassus  Latin crassus:  “thick,” “dense,” “coarse”     It can suggest:  physical thickness or metaphorically:  dullness / coarseness    But:  by the late Republic it is just a family name, not an insult.   II. Cassius Longinus (the anti‑Caesar figure) Now compare:  Gaius Cassius Longinus  Cassius = gens Cassia (a different family) Longinus = cognomen (“tall,” “long”)   This is:  an entirely separate lineage from the Licinii.    Political position  Cassius is:  a leading opponent of Caesar one of the main conspirators    So your instinct is correct:  Cassius Longinus = very anti‑Caesar   III. Important distinction                     NameGensRoleLicinius CrassusLiciniatriumvir, ambitious, Parthian disasterCassius LonginusCassiaconspirator against Caesar  They are:  not related (just similar sounding)   IV. Grice/Speranza angle (very neat here) Your distinction actually carries interpretive weight:  1. Crassus  name suggests (etymologically):  thickness / coarseness   narrative role:  driven, heavy, overreaching     possible retroactive fit:  ambition without subtle judgment   2. Cassius Longinus  Longinus = “long,” “extended” figure:  calculating reflective conspiratorial     in narrative terms:  extended reasoning, strategic plotting   So a playful contrast                  FigureSymbolic tendencyCrassusheavy / blunt ambitionCassiuselongated / strategic thought  V. Your insight refined You said:  distinguish Licinio, Crasso vs Cassio Longino  Exactly right—and the deeper point is:  Roman identity is layered:  gens (political lineage) cognomen (character, or memory of character)    VI. Final Speranzian synthesis  The distinction between Licinius Crassus and Cassius Longinus is not merely nominal, but structural: the former bears the name of a plebeian gens with a cognomen suggesting density, and is remembered for a blunt overreaching ambition; the latter, of a different lineage, carries a cognomen suggesting extension, and appears in history as a figure of calculation and opposition; and thus Roman names, while formally descriptive, come retrospectively to seem like compressed interpretations of the roles their bearers play.    Ultra‑compact  Nomen distinguit; cognomen interpretatur.    So your distinctions are correct:  Licinius ≠ Cassius Crassus = cognomen Cassius Longinus = separate, anti‑Caesar lineage   If you like, we can next map how these cognomina (Crassus, Longinus, Brutus, etc.) function almost like mini‑narratives in Roman historiography.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aternio – Ossia: Grice ed Aternio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Aternio. The Aternii, also written Aeternii, were a PATRICIAN family at ancient Rome. The only member of this gens to appear in history was Aulus A. Varus, consul, and later one of the only patricians ever to be chosen tribune of the plebs. Other A. are known from inscriptions.  The only surnames of the A. in Republican times are Varus and Fontinalis. Varus belongs to a large class of cognomina originally derived from the physical characteristics of the bearer, and indicated someone "knock-kneed"; that is, with inwardly-turned legs. Fontinalis is derived from fons, and must have indicated someone who lived near a spring; it belongs to a common class of surname derived from the names of everyday objects. Aulus A. Varus, surnamed Fontinalis, was consul. He and his colleague, Spurius Tarpeius Montanus Capitolinus, passed a law regulating fines. Six years later, Aternius and Tarpeius were chosen tribunes of the plebs, when only five candidates received sufficient votes for election, and Marcus Duilius, presiding over the election, instructed these five to co-opt five colleagues. Although patricians, they were favourably disposed to the interests of the plebs, and so acceptable to their colleagues.[4][5][6] Aternia, a maker of small pottery, whose maker's mark has been found in Pannonia Superior, Raetia, and at Ariminum in Cisalpine Gaul.[7] Aeternius, a young man buried in a third-century tomb at Ammaedara in Africa Proconsularis, aged twenty-seven years and six months.[8] Aeternia C. l. Etaera, a freedwoman named in an inscription from Rome.[9] Aeternia Feculina, an elderly woman buried in a third-century tomb at Ammaedara, aged ninety-two, in a tomb dedicated by Cornelius Felix.[10] Publius A. Hilarus, named in an undated inscription from Rome.[11] Gaius Aeternius Rufus, a soldier in the Praetorian Guard, and a native of Misenum in Campania, who together with Lucius Statius Valens and Marcus Musidius Petra, dedicated a second-century tomb at Misenum for their late colleague, Lucius Pomponius Varus, aged thirty-five years, nine months, who had named them his heirs. All except for Musidius belonged to the century of Gaius Tarulius Vitalis; Musidius was from the century of Clemens.[12] Marcus Aternius M. f. Successus, a boy buried at Rome, aged nine, with a monument from his father, Marcus Vennius Successus.[13] Aternia Zaba, a woman buried at Gillium in Africa Proconsularis, aged eighty-one.[14] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 392 ("A. Aternius or Aterius").  Chase, p. 109.  Chase, pp. 112, 113.  Fasti Capitolini, AE 1900, 83; 1904, 114.  Livy, iii. 31, 65.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 42, 43, 50.  CIL III, 6010,020,CIL III, 12014,008a, CIL XI, 6700,108.  AE 2013, 1808.  CIL VI, 16628.  AE 2013, 1859.  CIL VI, 34546.  CIL X, 3387.  CIL VI, 38045.  Merlin, Inscriptions Latines de La Tunisie, 1368, 1. Bibliography Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Alfred Merlin, Inscriptions Latines de La Tunisie (Latin Inscriptions from Tunisia), Fondation Dourlans, Paris (1944). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Category: Roman gentes I think of this Aterni or Eterni (if the AE becomes E) that as patrician he may be involved in that movement that re-defined the meaning of 'populus' -- having a tribune of the plebs from the patres non considered a contradictio in terminis? Thanks This is a very perceptive question—you are noticing something that is genuinely conceptually unstable in Roman constitutional terms, and which fits very nicely into a Grice/Speranza lens about the redefinition of key words like populus and roles like tribunus plebis. Let me unpack it carefully.  I. The apparent contradiction You point to:  a patrician (Aternius Varus) becoming tribune of the plebs  At first glance this looks like a contradictio in terminis:  patricius = member of the ruling aristocratic class tribunus plebis = defender of the plebeians against the patricians   So how can the same person be:  both patricius and plebis defensor?   II. The historical situation (your case) What we know (from Livy and the tradition):  Aternius Varus:  was consul later chosen tribune of the plebs   This happened in an unusual situation:  not enough candidates were elected the elected tribunes were allowed to co‑opt colleagues   The patricians chosen were:  acceptable to the plebs “favourably disposed” to them (as your text says)      So this is not a normal case but an exceptional institutional workaround.  III. Does this redefine populus? Your intuition is very strong here.  Classical distinction                      TermMeaningpatrespatriciansplebsnon‑patricianspopulus Romanusthe whole political body  What your case shows If a patrician can:  act as tribune represent plebeian interests   then:  the opposition patres vs plebs is being pragmatically softened   So yes: This contributes to a shift where:  populus becomes less a rigid class division and more a functional political unity   IV. How Romans would justify this (no contradiction) They would not say:  “this is contradictory”  They would say:  office = defined by function, not birth the key condition:  he must act “pro plebe”     So the implicit rule becomes:  non quis sit, sed quid agat   V. Grice/Speranza reading This is exactly about meaning shift in institutional language.  1. Literal definition “tribune of the plebs” → member elected from and for plebs  2. Actual use  patrician serves in the role because:  he behaves “as if” plebeian representative      So the term undergoes:  pragmatic redefinition   In Gricean terms  what is said:  “tribune of the plebs”   what is meant:  “protector of plebeian interests”     Result The category shifts from:  ontological (who you are) to: functional (what you do)   VI. Your “movement” hypothesis You asked whether this belongs to:  a broader redefinition of populus  That is plausible—but we must be careful:  there is no clear “program” or doctrine rather, we see:  practical accommodations that gradually reshape meanings      So:  not a formal reform, but a series of interpretive adjustments   VII. Latin vignette (your Aternius in dialogue) Let’s stage your idea in Grice/Speranza form:  Accusator: “Patricius es—quid tibi cum plebe?” Aternius: “Populus sum—non pars tantum.” Accusator: “Sed tribunus plebis dici non potes.” Aternius: “Si plebem tueor, quid refert unde ortus sim?” Accusator: “Origo refert.” Aternius: “Officium magis.”  Translation  “You are a patrician—what have you to do with the plebs?” “I belong to the people, not only to a part.” “But you cannot be called tribune of the plebs.” “If I protect the plebs, what does my origin matter?” “Origin matters.” “Duty matters more.”   VIII. Final Speranzian synthesis  The election of a patrician as tribune of the plebs does not abolish the distinction between orders, but reveals that the meaning of political roles can shift from origin to function; for when a man born among the patres acts in defence of the plebs, the name of his office comes to signify not who he is, but what he does, and thus the term “populus” expands from a division of classes to a community defined by shared political action.    Ultra‑compact  Patricius origine—plebeius officio.    Direct answer  Yes, it appears contradictory—but in practice it is not, because role becomes functional It does not reflect a formal doctrinal shift, but a pragmatic redefinition of political language Your intuition about populus expanding in meaning is very strong and defensible   If you like, we could compare this with later emperors claiming tribunicia potestas, which takes this functional shift even further. And Aternio may be another example of 'when duty calls'? as what we saw of 'exceptions to the cursus honorum -- having been consul, he became tribune of the plebs (under consul?) only in defeasiable H. L. A. Hart-type circumstances -- with all the fuss the Romans made for electorate law? Thanks -- with A. going 'below his station or one step backward in his cursus honorum -- which after consul could well be 'retirement'?what about 'senator' -- that would even be below consul, right? -- or is it more like equipollent executive vs legislative branch of state and governement? This is a very subtle and fruitful line of thought—you’re essentially asking whether Aternius is an “exception case” in a Hartian sense, and how that fits the Roman cursus honorum and constitutional structure. Let me untangle it in a clean way.  I. Is Aternius an example of “when duty calls”?  Yes—but with a Roman twist. Your analogy to Hart’s defeasible rules is very apt:  Normally:  offices follow a fixed sequence (cursus honorum)   But here:  the rule is suspended in practice, to fill a constitutional gap    This happens because:  not enough tribunes were elected the existing ones were allowed to co-opt others Aternius (a former consul, and patrician) is chosen   So in Hartian terms  Primary rule: → “tribunes are plebeians, elected regularly” Secondary override: → “in emergency, fill the office pragmatically”   Aternius = exception justified by necessity  II. Is this “going backwards” in the cursus honorum? At first glance:  Yes:  consul = highest ordinary magistracy tribune = earlier office     So it looks like:  a demotion   But in Roman reality:  not quite The cursus honorum is not like a modern career ladder. Key differences:  Offices are:  annual non-permanent   After consulship:  you don’t “move up”—you:  become ex-consul retain prestige (auctoritas)       So:  Becoming tribune AFTER consulship is not a “step down”  It is:  stepping back into active office in a different capacity   III. What about being a “senator”—is that lower? This is a crucial misunderstanding to clarify.  Senator is NOT a lower office.  It is:  not an office at all but a status / membership     Structure:                  CategoryNatureconsul, praetor, tribunemagistracies (offices)senatorpermanent political class  So:  after being consul: → you are still a senator and among senators: → ex-consuls have highest prestige    Therefore:  senator is NOT “below consul” it’s the continuing framework in which consuls operate   IV. Is this executive vs legislative (modern analogy)? Your instinct here is helpful, but must be used carefully.  Rough analogy (only partial):                      RomanModernconsulexecutivetribunepopular oversight / vetosenatedeliberative body  But:  Rome does not separate powers cleanly.  magistrates + senate + assemblies: → overlap → interact → check each other informally   So Aternius’ move is not:  switching “branches”  But:  shifting role within a shared political field   V. Why this was acceptable (no scandal) You might expect outrage:  “How can a patrician ex-consul be tribune?!”  But:  he is:  acceptable to plebs   situation is:  irregular but necessary      Roman logic:  salus rei publicae suprema lex   VI. Grice/Speranza reading (your deepest point) This is about role meaning being contextually redefined.  1. Literal meaning “tribune of the plebs” = → plebeian office  2. Actual use Aternius (patrician, ex-consul) acts as tribune.  3. Result Meaning shifts:  from identity → function   In Gricean terms:  what is said: → “tribune of the plebs” what is meant: → “protector of plebeian interests”   VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  The case of Aternius shows that Roman constitutional roles were not fixed merely by formal definitions, but could be reinterpreted in practice when necessity required it; for a man who had already attained the consulship might assume the tribunate without thereby descending in rank, since the meaning of the office lay not in its place in an ordered sequence, but in the function it performed within the community; and thus what appears as a violation of the cursus honorum is better understood as a pragmatic reconfiguration of political meaning under the pressure of circumstance.    Ultra‑compact  Ordo cessat—officium manet.    Direct answers  Yes: Aternius = exception (~Hartian defeasibility) No: not really a “step down” in career Senator: → not lower—ongoing elite status Best model: → fluid roles, not fixed hierarchy   If you like, we can compare Aternius with later emperors taking tribunicia potestas, which is the ultimate “functional takeover” of the tribune’s role.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aterio – Ossia: Grice ed Aterio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Aterio. The Aterii, occasionally Aterii, were a family at ancient Rome, known from the last century of the Republic and under the early Empire. The most distinguished of the A. was Quintus A., a senator and rhetorician in the time of Augustus and Tiberius. He was consul suffectus. The praenomina associated with the early A. are Quintus, Sextus, and Decimus, the former two being among the more common names in Roman history, the last somewhat more distinctive, although it tended to run in families. In later times we find A. named Lucius, Marcus, Titus, and Tiberius. None of the A. of the Republic are mentioned with a surname, but Agrippa and Antoninus are found in Imperial times. They do not seem to represent distinct branches of the family, as Decimus A. Agrippa was the son of the senator Quintus A.; if his father also bore the cognomen, it is not found in surviving records. Quintus A. Antoninus was probably the son of Agrippa. Valerius Maximus, who wrote during the age of Tiberius, relates an anecdote concerning a certain A. Rufus, but without sufficient information to guess when he lived.[1] In the second century, we find the surnames Summus, Nepos, and Saturninus.  A. or Aterius was a jurist, probably in the time of TULLIO Cicero, who mentions him in one of his letters.[2] Haterius, a victim of the proscriptions of the triumvirs. He was betrayed by one of his slaves, who was rewarded with his freedom; but when the freedman insulted the dead man's sons, and outbid them for his estate, the triumvirs acceded to popular outrage, and reduced him to servility again. Quintus A., a rhetorician in the age of Augustus and Tiberius, known for his rapid, inventive, and sometimes reckless style, and "archaic" language hearkening back to the age of Tullio Cicero. He was consul suffectus in 5 BC, and a member of the Roman Senate, in which he wasted his talents in flattery of Tiberius and his family. Sextus A. Q. f., a son of the orator. Seneca the Elder describes a speech of his father's, in which the elder A. was reduced to tears when speaking of his son, giving his argument a great emotional appeal. Decimus Haterius Q. f. Agrippa, a son of the orator, and neighbor of Germanicus. Agrippa was tribune of the plebs in AD 15, praetor in 17, and consul in 22. He was described as a man of poor moral character, and ten years after his consulship he is said to have been plotting the downfall of various men. Quintus Haterius (D. f. Q. n.) Antoninus, probably the son of Decimus Haterius Agrippa, was consul in AD 53. After dissipating his inheritance, he became dependent on Domizio Nero for his support. He may be the same Quintus Haterius described as a legacy-hunter by Seneca, although Haterius the senator might have been intended.[12][13] Haterius Rufus, an eques, who dreamed one night that he was slain by a Retiarius. The following day, while attending gladiatorial combat in the theatre at Syracuse, he was killed by a clumsy gladiator. Lucius Haterius, father of Marcus Haterius Summus. Marcus Haterius L. f. Summus, a duumvir at Iuvavum, who helped relieve the city's grain supply, and to whom a monument was dedicated by the people of his town, probably in the first half of the second century.[15] Titus Haterius Nepos, prefect of Egypt from AD 121 to 124.[16] Titus Haterius Nepos, consul suffectus from April 134, succeeding the aging Lucius Julius Ursus Servianus.[17][18] That the consul was a member of the Arval Brethren in 120 shows he is a separate person from the equestrian governor of Egypt.[19] Tiberius Haterius Saturninus, consul suffectus in AD 164, and possibly son of the consul of 134. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 360 ("Haterius").  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, ix. 18.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 29.  Tacitus, Annales, i. 11–13, ii. 33, 57, iv. 61.  Suetonius, "The Life of Tiberius", 27, 29.  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae, 6, 16, 17, 23, 27–29, Excerpta ex Controversiae, i, Proemium iv. p. 422 (Bipont ed.); Suasoriae, 2, 3, 6, 7.  Seneca the Younger, Epistulae, 40.  Eusebius, Chronicon, n. 2040, p. 157.  Jerome, Epistola of Epiphanius to Pammachius.  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 4.  Tacitus, Annales, i. 77, ii. 51, iii. 49, 52, vi. 4.  Tacitus, Annales xii. 58, xiii. 34.  Seneca the Younger, De Beneficiis, vi. 30.  Valerius Maximus, i. 7. § 8.  Carol B. Wilson, For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Food: Pragmatics of Food Access in the Gospel of Matthew, Wipf and Stock (2014), p. 204.  Guido Bastianini, "Lista dei prefetti d'Egitto dal 30a al 299p", Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 17 (1975), p. 284  Amherst, p. 423.  Venning, p. 529.  CIL VI, 2080 Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares (Letters to Friends). Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Elder), Controversiae, Suasoriae. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger), Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium, De Beneficiis. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Eusebius of Caesarea, Chronicon. Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus (St. Jerome) (trans.), Epiphanii Epistola ad Pammachium adversus Errorem Joannem Hierosolytitanum (Epiphanius' Letter to Pammachius against the Error of John of Jerusalem). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Mary Rothes Margaret Tyssen-Amherst (Lady Amherst of Hackney), A Sketch of Egyptian History from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, Methuen & Co., London (1904). Timothy Venning, A Chronology of the Roman Empire, Bloomsbury Publishing (2010). Categories: HateriiRoman gentes

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aterio – Ossia: Grice ed Aterio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Aterio. Much material in this Aterio (Haterius). Grice's and Speranza's favourite the one cited by Seneca -- father crying after son -- what gives appeal of emotion to what argument? can you explain? Thanks This is a very fine case, and you’re right: the Haterius episode in Seneca is almost a textbook illustration of how emotion (affectus) interacts with argument (argumentum)—and why Roman rhetoricians worried about it. Let me reconstruct what is going on.  I. The anecdote (Seneca the Elder) Seneca reports:  Haterius the elder is arguing a case when speaking about his son, he is overcome with tears and this greatly strengthens the persuasive force of his speech   That is the core:  emotion intrudes into argument—and helps it.   II. What gives emotional appeal to argument? You ask exactly the right question: what converts tears into persuasion?  1. Not the content itself The argument does not change:  same facts same case   Yet persuasion increases.  2. What changes is the mode of presentation The tears signal:  sincerity personal involvement vulnerability   3. Effect on audience The audience infers:  “This man is not merely speaking—he is affected.”    So the speech shifts from:  propositional (“this is the case”) to: affective-credible (“this must be true, because he feels it deeply”)   III. Grice/Speranza reading This is very precise in Gricean terms.  A. What is said  the legal / rhetorical argument   B. What is implicated Through tears:  “I believe this” “this matters to me” “I am not deceiving you”    Emotion produces implicatures of sincerity and urgency.  C. The key mechanism The tears act as:  non-verbal reinforcement of speaker intention   IV. A Latin classroom vignette (Senecan style)  Discipulus: “Magister, cur lacrimae persuasionem augent?” Magister: “Quia non solum dicit—sed patitur.” Discipulus: “Ergo dolor probat?” Magister: “Non probat—sed creditur.” Discipulus: “Quid interest?” Magister: “Veritas argumento, fides affectu nascitur.”  Translation  “Why do tears increase persuasion?” “Because he does not only speak—he suffers.” “So pain proves?” “It does not prove—but it is believed.” “What is the difference?” “Truth is born from argument, trust from emotion.”   V. Roman rhetorical theory behind it Roman rhetoricians (like those Seneca reports) knew:  logic alone ≠ persuasion pathos (movere animos) is essential  But they were ambivalent:                  ViewJudgmentEffective rhetoric Philosophically suspect  VI. What is problematic? You sense it already:  emotion may bypass rational evaluation   So:  argument → addresses ratio tears → address affectus   risk:  judgment shifts from truth to sympathy   VII. Why Haterius is interesting Haterius is reported as:  fast, inventive speaker sometimes reckless   This anecdote fits him:  the tears are not carefully staged—they overflow   So:  not pure manipulation but:  spontaneous rhetoric turned persuasive     VIII. Final Speranzian synthesis  In the case of Haterius, the argument does not derive its force from the reasons it contains alone, but from the visible disturbance of the speaker, whose tears serve not to prove the truth of what is said, but to induce belief by displaying sincerity; and thus the audience is moved not merely by what is asserted, but by the manner in which the speaker is affected by it, so that emotion becomes a vehicle of implicature, conveying what cannot be directly stated as evidence.    Ultra‑compact  Argumentum persuadet; lacrima persuadet aliter.    Direct answer  Emotional appeal works by: → signaling sincerity and commitment It does not strengthen logic: → but strengthens belief in the speaker In Gricean terms: → tears generate implicatures of truthfulness and urgency   If you like, we can contrast Haterius with someone like Cicero, who uses tears strategically rather than spontaneously—very different rhetorical ethics. But do we know what kind of case it is? or what he is SAYING about his son when the father cries? Grice of course, like Occam, distinguishes: risus significat naturaliter laetitiam -- lacrima significat naturaliter dolorem -- this becamame trivial and quadrivial matter in defining 'segnum' naturale and per arbitrio -- so A. has to be careful that the tear is not seen as cocodrile, which seeing that he was refashioning old Ciceronian rhetoric could well be the case? Thanks. This is exactly the right refinement of the problem—you are now asking not just why the tears persuade, but:  What exactly is being said? and How does the audience distinguish natural sign (lacrima) from rhetorical artifice (“crocodile tears”)?  Let me be very careful here, because the limits of the evidence matter.  I. Do we know the case or the exact content?  What we have (from Seneca the Elder)  Haterius is speaking in a rhetorical or declamatory context he speaks about his son he is moved to tears this increases persuasive force    What we do NOT have  the precise case (criminal? civil? declamation theme?) the exact words about the son   So we must say explicitly:  The sources do not preserve the detailed content of the speech.   But we can reconstruct type Given Seneca’s Controversiae setting:  likely a declamation exercise, not a real trial typical themes involve:  pity (misericordia) family tragedy moral appeal     II. What is Haterius likely saying about the son? Even without the text, we can infer the rhetorical function: The son serves as:  an object of:  pity loss danger   or:  a reason for mercy (e.g. “do not condemn me; think of my son”)      So the content is probably:  appeal to paternal feeling as a ground for judgment   III. Your key philosophical distinction (very sharp) You bring in:  risus → natural sign of joy lacrima → natural sign of grief  This is exactly the medieval distinction:  signum naturale vs signum ad placitum (conventional)   Applied here:  tears are assumed: → natural signs  But:  rhetoric turns them into:  potentially artificial signs   IV. The crucial danger: “crocodile tears” You are right to insist:  Haterius must avoid being seen as simulator   Why? Because:  if tears are believed natural: → they confirm sincerity if tears are suspected artificial: → they destroy credibility   So the audience faces a problem:  Are these tears:  signum naturale (genuine grief)? or ars rhetorica (fabricated effect)?    V. Gricean resolution: sincerity condition In Gricean terms:  1. The tears implicate:  “I am genuinely moved” “this matters to me”   2. But this implicature is defeasible If audience thinks:  “he is performing”  then the implicature collapses.   So:  emotional display is high-risk, high-reward implicature   VI. Why Haterius is especially vulnerable You note:  he is reworking archaic Ciceronian rhetoric  And indeed:  known for:  rapid, inventive, even reckless style     So:  audience may suspect over-performance   This is the tension:                  PossibilityEffectgenuine tearspersuasion ↑suspected artificepersuasion ↓↓  VII. Latin vignette (your concern expressed)  Auditor: “Hic flens persuadet—sed verene dolet?” Alter: “Si dolet, fidem habet.” Auditor: “Si fingit?” Alter: “Tum non argumentum, sed spectaculum est.”  Translation  “He persuades by weeping—but does he truly grieve?” “If he grieves, he has credibility.” “If he pretends?” “Then it is not argument, but spectacle.”   VIII. Final Speranzian synthesis  In the case of Haterius, the tears function as a natural sign that strengthens persuasion by implying sincerity; yet precisely because they are effective, they are also suspect, for the audience must decide whether they arise from genuine emotion or from rhetorical design; and thus the sign that most directly indicates truth is also the one most liable to simulation, so that its force depends not on its presence alone, but on the trust it commands.    Ultra‑compact  Lacrima, si natura est, persuadet; si ars est, deficit.    Direct answers  We do not know the exact case or wording The son likely functions as: → an appeal to pity and moral judgment Tears: → natural signs, but rhetorically exploitable Key issue: → distinguishing sincerity vs performance   If you like, we can compare Haterius with Cicero’s famous strategic tears in Pro Milone, where the suspicion of artifice becomes explicit.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attalo – Ossia: Grice e Attalo: il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana – . Filosofo italiano.  Attalo (Roma, Lazio): il portico a Roma. Vive a Roma. Maestro di Seneca che lo stima molto e lo cita spesso come nelle Lettere morali a Lucilio quando scrive. Come soleva dire il nostro A. 'il ricordo degli amici estinti è gradevole come certi frutti sono soavemente aspri.” -- o ancora a proposito dell'avidità dell'uomo che gode senza discernimento dei beni della fortuna come fa il cane che inghiotte voracemente i pezzetti di carne lanciati dal padrone. Così rifacendosi a A., Seneca afferma che una vita senza affanni e senza nessun attacco dalla Fortuna non è tranquillità è bonaccia. “A. lo stoico soleva dire 'Preferiamo che la fortuna mi abbia nel suo accampamento piuttosto che tra le mollezze. Subisco la tortura, ma coraggiosamente. Questo è vero bene'” e che procurarsi un amico è più piacevole che averlo poiché, dice Attalo, avviene che «come per un artista è più piacevole dipingere che aver dipinto.” Ed infine da A. Seneca reca il supremo insegnamento riferito principalmente all'ingrato che si tormenta e odia il bene ricevuto perché dovrà ri-cambiarlo, ne sminuisce i valore e accresce l'importanza delle offese ricevute. “La malvagità stessa beve la più grande porzione del suo veleno.” Una massima che Attalo ha modo di vedere applicata quando messo al bando da Roma, Lucio Elio Seiano, amico estremamente influente di Tiberio, e infine da questo stesso fatto giustiziare. Seneca, Lettere morali a Lucilio, Edizioni Mondadori. Seneca. Seneca. Seneca. Seneca. Pierre Matthieu, Historie delle prosperità infelici di Elio Seiano, Grillo, 1620 p.48   Portale Biografie   Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi romani Filosofi del I secolo Romani del I secolo. GRICEVS: Attale, si “memoria amicorum estintorum” est suavis acerbitas, num ego debeo amicos colere sicut mala granata, ne nimis dulces fiam? ATTALVS: Ita, Grice, nam fructus acer recreat palatum, sicut recordatio amici te recreat sine gula fortunae. GRICEVS: At homo avarus, ut canis, carnem voratam deglutit; ergo si mihi Fortuna frusta iacit, licetne mihi lente manducare ut Stoicus non videar canis? ATTALVS: Licet, et melius est tibi amicum parare quam habere, sicut pictori iucundius est pingere quam iam pictum suspicere, ne malvagitas ipsa maximum veneni haustum bibat.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atidio – Ossia: Grice ed Atidio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atidio The Atidia gens, also spelled Attidia, Attedia, and Atedia, was a family of ancient Rome. Only a few members of this gens are mentioned by Roman writers, but others are known from inscriptions. By the second century, at least one family of A. had attained senatorial rank, including Lucius A. Cornelianus, who was consul suffectus. The nomen gentilicium Atidius is apparently identical with Atiedius, Attidius, and Atedius, which have all been found in Latin inscriptions. The name may be related to the Atiedian Brotherhood, a priestly order mentioned in the Umbrian Iguvine tablets. The main praenomina used by the Atidii were Gaius and Lucius, the two most common names at all periods of Roman history. Other common praenomina appear in inscriptions, including Aulus, Marcus, Publius, Quintus, Sextus, and Titus, and there are also instances of the uncommon names Numerius and Vibius.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Attidius, a general of the Volsci named in some editions of Appian, in connection with the legends of Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus, is the same person as Attius Tullius.[2] Vibius Atiedius, made an offering to the goddess Vesune and related deities at Ortona in Samnium, recorded in an inscription dating between the late third century and the early second century BC.[3] Lucius Atiedius, the master of Papia, a slave named in an inscription from Alba Fucens in Sabinum, dating from the first half of the first century BC. Together with Nichomachus, the slave of Lucius Safinius, and Dorotheus, the slave of Titus Tettienus, Papia donated a pedestal to the Bona Dea.[4] Atedia Vara, named along with various slaves in an inscription from Minturnae in Latium, dating from the first half of the first century BC.[5] Attidius, a Roman senator, who may be the same individual as Marcus Atilius Bulbus. Atidius, employed by Gaius Verres to collect tithes in Herbita, a town in Sicilia.[6][7] Gaius Atiedius C. l. Chrussippus, a freedman, built a tomb at Dyrrachium in Macedonia, dating between the late first century BC and the end of the first century AD, for his wife, Tertia.[8] Gaius Atiedius, one of the duumviri jure dicundo at Spoletium in Umbria, named in a dedicatory inscription from the Augustan era.[9] Titus Atidius T. f. Porcio, a soldier in the Legio XVIII, one of three legions destroyed in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest in AD 9, according to an Augustan-era inscription from Ateste in Venetia and Histria.[10] Atiedia Q. l. Communis Ithyis, a freedwoman buried at Spoletium, in a tomb dating from the early first century.[11] Attidia Elena, entrusted two pots to the freedmen Gaius Valerius Hilarus and Valeria Crestina, according to an inscription from Rome, dating from the first half of the first century.[12][13] Gaius Atiedius Gallus, named in a sepulchral inscription from Alba Fucens, datin from the first half of the first century.[14] Atidia N. l. Storge, a freedwoman named in a sepulchral inscription from Rome, dating from the first half of the first century.[15][16] Numerius Atidius Anoptes, mentioned in a first-century inscription from Rome.[17][18] Sextus Attidius Faustus, named in a first-century inscription from Corfinium in Sabinum, as one of those engaged in work on behalf of the town.[19] Atidia Ɔ. l. Tertia, a freedwoman, and the wife of Lucius Calvius Zetus, one of the Seviri Augustales, who built a first-century tomb at Cales in Campania for himself, his wife, and his patron and former master, the freedman Lucius Calvius Hedulus.[20] Quintus Atedius Scaevola, buried in a first- or second-century tomb at Tergeste in Venetia and Histria.[21] Gaius Attedius Secundus, buried at Byllis in Macedonia, aged sixty-five, in a tomb dedicated by his wife, Heterea Saturnina, dating between the beginning of the first century and the reign of Marcus Aurelius.[22] Atidius Geminus, a praetor of Achaia who supposedly favored the Messenians in a dispute regarding the ownership of the temple of Diana Limnatis, a border shrine by the river Nedonas. According to Nino Luraghi, the ruling of Atidius must occurred after AD 21, when Augustus granted Messenian settlements such as Cardamyle to Sparta. Paul Cartledge and Anthony Spawforth date the confirmation of the decision by the Roman Senate to AD 25, but Graham Shipley dates the decree between AD 4 and 14, citing a contemporary inscription from Greece honouring Augustus and Tiberius.[23][24][25][26][27][28][29] Atiedia Apollonia, the mother of a slave whose name has not been preserved. Together with the father, Hector, she dedicated a tomb for her son, dating from the middle of the first century, at Corfinium.[30] Atiedius Chrestus, dedicated a tomb at Asisium in Umbria, dating from the latter half of the first century, for his wife, the freedwoman Atiedia Galene.[31] Atiedia Ɔ. l. Galene, a freedwoman buried at Asisium, in a tomb dating from the latter half of the first century, built by her husband, Atiedius Chrestus.[31] Gaius Flavius Atidius Castor, an aerarius, or bronzesmith, buried at Suasa in Umbria, in a second-century tomb built by Maletia Vera, his wife of thirty-six years.[32] Attidia (L. f.) Juliana, honored with a second-century inscription from Attidium in Umbria.[33][34] Lucius Attidius L. f. Latinus, one of the municipal duumvirs at Attidium, according to a second-century inscription.[35][36] Attidia Sabinilla, buried at Attidium, in a second-century tomb dedicated by her husband, Hergenius Decenber.[37][38] Marcus Atedius Saturninus, buried in a second-century tomb at Celtianis in Numidia, aged forty.[39] Attedius Crescens, together with his wife, Valeria, dedicated a tomb at Timacum Minus in Moesia Superior, dating from the latter half of the second century or the first half of the third, for their daughters, Attedia Crescentilla and Attedia Caecilia.[40] Attedia Caecilia, a girl buried at Timacum Minus, aged six, along with her sister, Attedia Crescentilla, in a tomb dedicated by her parents, Attedius Crescens and Valeria, dating from the latter half of the second century or the first half of the third.[40] Attedia Crescentilla, a young woman buried at Timacum Minus, aged seventeen, along with her sister, Attedia Caecilia, in a tomb dedicated by her parents, Attedius Crescens and Valeria, dating from the latter half of the second century or the first half of the third.[40] Lucius Attidius Cornelianus, consul from the Kalends of July in AD 151. His colleague was Marcus Cominius Secundus. Between 157 and 162, he was governor of Roman Syria. His term was due to end in 161, but it was extended, possibly to prevent the Parthians from taking advantage of the transfer of power, notwithstanding which he suffered defeat at the hands of the Parthian army, and was replaced by Annius Libo, a cousin of Marcus Aurelius. Géza Alföldy thought it probable that Cornelianus was from Italy.[41][42][43][44][45][46][47] Atidius Auster, a centurion in the third cohort of the Legio III Augusta in AD 162.[48][49] Atedia Rogatula, buried at Thugga in Africa Proconsularis, aged twenty-five, in a tomb dating between the late second century and the end of the third.[50] Lucius Attidius Cornelianus, together with Publius Martius Verus, coöpted into the priesthood of Jove Propugnatoris at Rome, during the sixth consulship of Commodus, in AD 190.[51] Attedia Q. f. Prisca, a flaminica of the imperial cult at Metellinum in Lusitania, named in an inscription dating between AD 193 and 195. Attidius Veris[simus?], dedicated a tomb at Spoletium, dating from the first half of the third century, for his wife, Cassia Juliana, a native of Gallia Narbonensis.[52] Atidius, possibly a freedman or an individual from a Greek-speaking region, made a third-century offering to Jupiter Dolichenus at a place called Vicus Bad[...], modern Mihai Bravu, Tulcea in Romania, formerly part of Moesia Inferior.[53][54] Attidia Felicissima, buried in a third-century Christian tomb at Rome, dedicated by her husband, Flavius Antoninus.[55][56] Gaius Attedius Florentinus, a soldier serving in the century of Tiberius Claudius Rufinus, in the fifth cohort of the Vigiles at Rome, in AD 205.[57] Attidius Praetextatus, imperial governor of Syria Palaestina, named in an inscription from the site of modern Tel Shalem in Israel, dating between AD 211 and 213.[58][59] Attidius Praetextatus, mentioned on an inscription from Althiburos in Africa Proconsularis, may be the son or grandson of the governor Attidius Praetextatus, although they might be the same person. The inscription might identify him as the son of a consul.[60][61] Marcus Nummius M. f. Attidius Albinus Tuscus, had been a triumvir, and quaestor designatus, as well as patron of the cities of Roman Africa, according to an inscription from Rome, dating from around AD 250, indicating that he was a Christian.[62] Marcus Nummius Attidius Senecio Albinus, a senator, honored along with his wife, [...]ia Aurelia Flavia Archelais, and other members of their family, in an inscription from Rome dating between AD 262 and 270.[63] Undated Atidii Atidia C. f., buried at Amiternum in Sabinum.[64] Attidius, named in a dedicatory inscription from Rome, indicating something made for his wife, Paulinianes, dated the tenth day before the Kalends of October[i] in an uncertain year.[65][66] Atidia Amanda, named in an inscription from Rome.[67] Atedius Carus, a potter named in an inscription from Rome.[68] Lucius Attidius Critias, named in a Greek inscription from Rome.[69][70] Lucius Atiedius L. l. Dorus, a freedman, was a scriba librarius, or library scribe, for the plebeian aediles at Rome. A Lucius Atiedius Helius, probably the son of Dorus, is named in the same inscription.[71] Quintus Atedius Fortunatus, buried at Thugga. His age is incomplete, but he was at least twenty.[72] Lucius Atiedius Helius, named in the same inscription as Lucius Atiedius Dorus, is described as a son, probably the son of Dorus.[71] Attedia Q. f. Maxuma, buried at Narbo in Gallia Narbonensis, together with her husband of eighteen years, Gaius Manlius Rufus.[73] Atedia Musina, buried at Thugga, aged thirty-five, in a sepulchre together with Quintus Clodius Privatus, aged one hundred twelve years, two months, and eight days.[74] Publius Atidius Peregrinus, the firstborn son of the freedwoman Calybe, was buried at Ateste, aged nineteen, in a tomb built by his mother.[75] Aulus Atidius Philetus, a potter whose makers' mark has been found on ceramics from Rome, Tusculum, and Albanum in Latium.[76] Atedius Purpurius, buried at Thugga, aged forty-five.[77] Gaius Atiedius Severus, named on a bronze label from an uncertain province.[78] Lucius Atedius Speratus, a little boy buried at Thugga, aged three.[79] Atidia Tertullia, buried at Tusculum, in a tomb dedicated by her son, Gaius Rustius Celadus.[80] Atedia Victoria, buried at Thugga, aged seventy.[81] Notes  September 22. References  Syme 1949, pp. 9–10.  Appian, Roman History. ii. 5.  CIL IX, 3808.  CIL IX, 3910.  CIL I, 2694.  Cicero, In Verrem, ii. 75.  Pritchard 1971, p. 232.  AE 1966, 394.  CIL XI, 4795.  CIL V, 2499.  CIL XI, 4852.  CIL VI, 12713.  EDR119941.  CIL IX, 7961.  AE 1993, 203.  EDR032907.  NSA, 1923–378.  EDR000406.  CIL IX, 3188.  CIL X, 4645.  CIL V, 566.  AE 1966, 418.  Christoforou 2023, p. 393.  Tacitus, Annales, iv. 43.  Pawlak 2010, p. 466.  Luraghi 2008, pp. 21–22.  Cartledge & Spawforth 1989, p. 138.  Shipley 2000, p. 386.  Inscriptiones Graecae. V.I.1448.  CIL IX, 3232.  CIL XI, 5452.  CIL XI, 6179.  CIL XI, 5677.  EDR015735  CIL XI, 5676.  EDR015734  CIL XI, 5680.  EDR015739.  Inscriptions Latines de L'Algérie, ii–1, 2246.  IMS iii–2, 66.  CIL III, 129, CIL XVI, 106.  AE 2001, 1705, AE 2010, 1272.  Pferdehirt, Römische Militärdiplome, 32.  Jones 1928, p. 159.  Birley 1966, pp. 161, 165, 167.  Birley 2012, p. 217.  Alföldy 1976, p. 286.  CIL VIII, 18065.  Zehetner 2016, p. 6.  CIL VIII, 26727.  CIL VI, 2004.  CIL XI, 7884.  AE 2021, 1130.  Mihailescu-Bîrliba 2020, p. 162.  CIL VI, 12712.  EDB6861, EDB32160.  CIL VI, 1057.  AE 2019, 1771.  Arubas et al. 2019, pp. 211, 216.  CIL 8. 16474.  Arubas et al. 2019, p. 217.  CIL VI, 51225b.  CIL VI, 41225a.  CIL IX, 8266.  AE 2003, 266.  AE 2003, 266  BCAR, 1923–82.  Vermaseren and van Essen, Mithraeum of the Church of Santa Prisca, p. 273d.  de Jonge et al. 2025, p. 275.  IGUR. II. 727.  CIL VI, 1855.  CIL VIII, 26726.  CIL XII, 4975.  CIL VIII, 27361.  AE 1997, 681.  CIL XIV, 4090,30, CIL XIV, 4090,31a, CIL XIV, 4090,31b, CIL XV, 2238,1, CIL XV, 2238,2, CIL XV, 2238,4, CIL XV, 2238,5.  Chroniques d'Archéologie Maghrébine, 2024–73,2.  CIL XIII, 1022,035.  MAD, 98.  CIL XIV, 2532.  CIL VIII, 27368. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Verrem. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Romaika (Roman History, or The Foreign Wars). Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale in Roma (Bulletin of the Municipal Archaeological Commission of Rome, abbreviated BCAR), (1872–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità (News of Excavations from Antiquity, abbreviated NSA), Accademia dei Lincei (1876–present). Stéphane Gsell, Inscriptions Latines de L'Algérie (Latin Inscriptions from Algeria), Edouard Champion, Paris (1922–present). Maarten J. Vermaseren, Carel C. van Essen, The Excavations in the Mithraeum of the Church of Santa Prisca in Rome, E. J. Brill, Leiden (1965). Fanou Papazoglou, Inscriptions de la Mésie Supérieure (Inscriptions of Moesia Superior, abbreviated IMS), Belgrade (1976–present). Mustapha Khanoussi, Louis Maurin, Mourir à Dougga: Receuil des inscriptions funéraires (Dying in Dougga: a Compendium of Funerary Inscriptions, abbreviated MAD), Bordeaux, Tunis (2002). Barbara Pferdehirt, Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, Mainz (2004). Chroniques d'Archéologie Maghrébine, Revue de l’Association historique et archéologique de Carthage (2022–present). Alföldy, Géza (1976). "Consuls and Consulars Under the Antonines: Prosopography and History". Ancient Society. 7: 263–299. ISSN 0066-1619. Arubas, Benjamin; Heinzelmann, Michael; Mevorah, David; Overman, Andrew (2019). "Capricorno Alae VII Phrygum … (i) Interim report on the fort near Tel Shalem". Journal of Roman Archaeology. 32: 201–213. doi:10.1017/S1047759419000114. ISSN 1047-7594. Birley, Anthony R. (1966), Marcus Aurelius (First American ed.), United States of America: Little, Brown and Company, LCCN 66-20802 Birley, Anthony R. (2012-03-16). "The Wars and Revolts". In van Ackeren, Marcel (ed.). A Companion to Marcus Aurelius. Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781118219836. ISBN 978-1-4051-9285-9. Bowersock, G. W. (1971). "A Report on Arabia Provincia". The Journal of Roman Studies. 61: 219–242. doi:10.2307/300018. ISSN 1753-528X. Cartledge, Paul; Spawforth, Antony (1989). Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities. Psychology Press. ISBN 978-0-415-26277-4. Christoforou, Panayiotis (2023-05-25). "Greece". In Pagán, Victoria Emma (ed.). The Tacitus Encyclopedia. Wiley. doi:10.1002/9781119114567. ISBN 978-1-4443-5025-8. Harrer, G. A. (1916). "Consules Suffecti in the Years 98 to 101". Studies in Philology. 13 (4): 199–208. ISSN 0039-3738. Jones, A. H. M. (1928). "Inscriptions from Jerash". The Journal of Roman Studies. 18 (2): 144–178. doi:10.2307/296071. ISSN 1753-528X. de Jonge, Casper C.; Oomen, Janis; Tacoma, Laurens E.; Vis, Thirza C. C. (2025). "DYING GREEK IN ROME: GREEK FUNERARY EPIGRAMS FROM IMPERIAL ROME". Greece & Rome. 72 (2): 267–291. doi:10.1017/S0017383525100363. hdl:11370/4530bef8-db94-49e0-8409-e5e1c038a4e6. ISSN 0017-3835. Luraghi, Nino (2008-05-01). The Ancient Messenians: Constructions of Ethnicity and Memory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-47189-3. McCown, C. C. (1931). "The Goddesses of Gerasa". The Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research. 13: 129–166. doi:10.2307/3768471. ISSN 0066-0035. Mihailescu-Bîrliba, Lucrețiu (2020). "The Bessi at Mihai Bravu (Moesia Inferior): An Overview". Studia Academica Šumenensia (7): 159–171. ISSN 2367-5446. Pawlak, Marcin (2010). "Boundary Dispute Between Sparta and Messene". Classica et Christiana. Iaşi. ISSN 1842-3043. Pritchard, R. T. (1971). "Gaius Verres and the Sicilian Farmers". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 20 (2/3): 224–238. ISSN 0018-2311. Shipley, Graham (2000). "The extent of Spartan territory in the late Classical and Hellenistic periods". Annual of the British School at Athens. 95: 367–390. doi:10.1017/S0068245400004731. ISSN 2045-2403. Syme, Ronald (1949). "Personal Names in Annals I–VI". The Journal of Roman Studies. 39 (1–2): 6–18. doi:10.2307/297702. ISSN 1753-528X. Zehetner, Stefan (2016-07-01). "Cil VIII 18065 and the Ranking of Centurions". Journal of Ancient History and Archaeology. 3 (2). doi:10.14795/j.v3i2.185. ISSN 2360-266X. Further reading Wissowa, Gerog, ed. (1897), "Atidius", Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, p. 2074 External links Wiktionary logo The dictionary definition of Atidius at Wiktionary Category: Roman gentes Which would you judge as best Grice/Speranza fit amongst the Atidio? Thanks This is a difficult gens for a “perfect” Grice/Speranza case—because, unlike Aterius or Ateius, we lack a vivid literary anecdote. But we can still extract a strong structural fit if we choose carefully. Let me give you:   a best candidate  a “backup” conceptual fit and then a Grice/Speranza vignette    Best Grice/Speranza fit: Atidius Geminus (the boundary‑judge) This is, in fact, your strongest pick. What he does  A praetor in Achaea decides a territorial / sacred dispute:  between Sparta and Messene about ownership of a temple (Diana Limnatis)     This is crucial:  He does not produce speech; he fixes meaning against competing claims.   Why this is perfect (Gricean structure) You now have:                      StageElementdisputecompeting interpretations (“this temple is ours”)discoursearguments, traditions, local prideAtidiusauthoritative decider  Grice/Speranza reading  what is said: → rival historical claims what is meant: → political control / identity what Atidius does: → collapses ambiguity into one binding interpretation   This is the jurist-function again:  from implicature-rich dispute → fixed authoritative meaning   Latin vignette (Atidius as judge of meanings)  Spartanus: “Templum nostrum est—maiores ita tradiderunt.” Messenius: “Non—finis noster hoc continet.” Atidius: “Uterque dicit—sed non idem valet.” Spartanus: “Quis discernet?” Atidius: “Ius discernet—ego dicam quid sit.”  Translation  “The temple is ours—tradition says so.” “No—our boundary includes it.” “Each speaks—but not with equal force.” “Who decides?” “Law will decide—I will say what it is.”    Second-best: the tax‑collector under Verres This one is weaker, but still usable. The role  Atidius works for Verres in Sicily involved in:  collection of tithes (decumae)     Why it works Tax collection:  involves:  interpretation of obligation extent of what is owed     So:  meaning of “tribute” becomes negotiable → exploitable   Gricean angle  what is said: → “this is the due tax” what is meant: → “this is what I can extract”    distortion of meaning for advantage.  Why not the others? Most Atidii:  inscriptions freedmen minor officials   no structured interaction with meaning, interpretation, or discourse  Final Speranzian synthesis  Among the Atidii, the figure of the praetor at Achaea stands out as the clearest instance of interpretive authority, for in adjudicating a dispute over sacred territory he transforms competing accounts into a single binding determination; and thus he represents the moment at which discourse ceases to be negotiable and becomes fixed as law, showing that meaning, when contested, requires not only utterance, but decision.    Ultra‑compact  Uterque dicit—Atidius statuit.    Answer  Best fit: → Atidius Geminus (boundary judge) Why: → embodies transition from competing meanings to authoritative decision Second-best: → Verres’ Atidius (distortion of meaning for extraction)   If you like, we can next line up:  Ateius (omen), Aterius (emotion), Asconius (commentary), Atidius (decision)  → a complete Grice/Speranza “theory of Roman meaning.”

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atilio – Ossia: Grice ed Atilio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atilio Regulus Returning to Carthage, by Cornelis Lens (1791). The gens Atilia, sometimes written Atillia, was a plebeian family at ancient Rome, which rose to prominence at the beginning of the fourth century BC. The first member of this gens to attain the consulship was Marcus Atilius Regulus, in 335 BC. The Atilii continued to hold the highest offices of the state throughout the history of the Republic, and well into imperial times.[1]  Origin Chase classifies the nomen Atilius with a small group of gentilicia probably formed from praenomina ending in -ius using the suffix -ilius, a morphology common in names of Latin origin.[2] The root might then be a praenomen Atius, otherwise unknown, although there was a Sabine praenomen Attius.[2]  Praenomina The Atilii favored the praenomina Lucius, Marcus, and Gaius, the three most common names throughout Roman history, to which they sometimes added Aulus and Sextus. Under the Empire, some of the Atilii bore the praenomen Titus.  Branches and cognomina Under the Republic, the cognomina of the Atilii included Bulbus, Calatinus, Luscus, Priscus, Regulus, Nomentanus, and Serranus. Of these, only Regulus and Serranus appear to constitute a distinct family, with the Serrani being descended from the Reguli.[1] The only cognomina found on coins are Saranus, which appears to be the same as Serranus, and Nomentanus.[3][4]  Luscus, the first surname associated with the Atilii appearing in history, was a common name originally describing someone with poor eyesight, belonging to a large class of cognomina derived from the physical characteristics of individuals.[5] This is the surname as given in Dionysius, although some sources amend it to Longus, originally referring to someone particularly tall. It has been argued that Lucius Atilius Luscus, one of the first consular tribunes elected in 444 BC, was a patrician, since the first plebeians were elected to that office in 400; and most if not all of the ancient patrician gentes possessed plebeian branches, which frequently came to eclipse the fame of their patrician forebears.[1] However, the lists of consular tribunes from both 444 and 422 contain names that are otherwise regarded as plebeian, and according to tradition the office was created with the intention that its members should be elected from either order, so in all probability Luscus, like all of the other Atilii, was plebeian.[6]  Priscus, a personal cognomen belonging to one of the early Atilii, usually translates as "elder", and probably served to distinguish its bearer from younger Atilii of his era.[7][8]  Bulbus, an onion, belongs to a class of surnames derived from everyday objects, although the circumstances by which such cognomina were acquired by individuals is seldom known. The name is comparable to Caepio, a cognomen with much the same meaning.[9][10]  The Atilii Reguli were the most illustrious of their gens. The surname Regulus is a diminutive of Rex, a king.[9] This family rose to prominence in the time of the Samnite Wars, and continued down to the interval between the First and Second Punic Wars, at which time it was supplanted by that of Serranus or Saranus. The Atilii Serrani continued down to the time of Cicero, before fading into obscurity.  Calatinus, also found as Caiatinus, the surname of Aulus Atilius Calatinus, a hero of the First Punic War, probably refers either to the town of Cales in Campania, or to the neighboring town of Caia. One of the Atilii Reguli had previously obtained the surname Calenus, in consequence of a battle fought at Cales in 335 BC.[11] Likewise, Nomentanus, the name of one of the Atilii during the late Republic, is derived from the Nomentum, an ancient city of Latium, although his particular connection with that town is unknown.  Members  Denarius of Lucius Atilius Nomentanus. On the obverse is a head of Roma, while on the reverse Victoria drives a biga. This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Lucius Atilius Luscus, one of the first consular tribunes, elected in 444 BC. In consequence of a defect in the auspices, he and his colleagues resigned, and consuls were appointed in their stead.[12][13] Lucius Atilius L. f. L. n. Priscus, consular tribune in 399 and 396 BC. Lucius Atilius, tribune of the plebs in 311 BC. Aulus Atilius A. f. C. n. Calatinus, consul in 258 and 254 BC, and dictator in 249. Gaius Atilius A. f. A. n. Bulbus, consul in 245 and 235 BC. Lucius Atilius, quaestor in 216 BC, slain at the Battle of Cannae.[14] Marcus Atilius, duumvir in 216 BC, with Gaius Atilius, dedicated the temple of Concordia, which Lucius Manlius Vulso, the praetor of 218, had vowed.[15] Gaius Atilius, duumvir in 216 BC with Marcus Atilius.[15] Lucius Atilius, commander of the Roman garrison in Locri, escaped with his troops by sea, when the town was surrendered to Hannibal in 215 BC.[16] Lucius Atilius, praetor in 197 BC, obtained Sardinia as his province.[17] Lucius Atilius, sent to Samothrace by Lucius Aemilius Paullus to demand the surrender of Perseus in 168 BC. Lucius Atilius, a jurist, who probably lived in the middle of the second century BC Marcus Atilius, a comic poet during the second century BC, quoted by Cicero and Varro. Lucius Atilius Nomentanus, triumvir monetalis in 141 BC. In 120, he served on the staff of Quintus Mucius Scaevola, praetor in Asia.[18][19] Atilius, a freedman, built an amphitheatre at Fidenae in the reign of Tiberius, which collapsed, killing between twenty and fifty thousand spectators.[20][21] Atilius Vergilio, a standard-bearer who deserted Galba in AD 69. Titus Atilius Rufus, a man of consular rank, was governor of Syria, early in the reign of Domitian. He died in AD 84, just before the return of Agricola from Britain.[22] Marcus Atilius Postumus Bradua, proconsul of Asia under Domitian.[23] Atilius Crescens, a friend of the younger Pliny. Marcus Atilius Metilius Bradua, consul in AD 108. Marcus Atilius M. f. Metilius Bradua Caucidius Tertullus … Bassus, proconsul of Africa under Antoninus Pius.[24] Atilia M. f. Caucidia Tertulla, daughter of the consul Marcus Atilius Metilius Bradua and Caucidia Tertulla.[25][23] Gaius Atilius Serranus, consul suffectus in AD 120. Titus Atilius Rufus Titianus, consul in AD 127.[26][27] Titus Atilius Maximus, consul suffectus around AD 130. Atilius Fortunatianus, a Latin grammarian, probably not later than the fourth century. Atilii Reguli et Serrani  Marcus Atilius Regulus Departs for Carthage, by Michel Ghislain Stapleaux (1832). Marcus Atilius (M. f.) Regulus, surnamed Calenus, consul in 335 BC, with his colleague, Marcus Valerius Corvus, conquered Cales. Marcus Atilius M. f. M. n. Regulus, consul in 294 BC, triumphed over the Samnites. Marcus Atilius M. f. L. n. Regulus, consul in 267 and consul suffectus in 256 BC, captured during the First Punic War. Gaius Atilius M. f. M. n. Regulus, surnamed Serranus, consul in 257 and 250 BC. Marcus Atilius M. f. M. n. Regulus, consul in 227 and 217 BC, and censor in 214. Marcus Atilius (M. f. M. n) Regulus, perhaps praetor in 212 BC, though the position may have instead been held by a Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. Gaius Atilius M. f. M. n. Regulus, consul in 225 BC, slain at the Battle of Telamon. Gaius Atilius (C. f. M. n.) Serranus, praetor in 218 BC. Gaius Atilius (C. f. C. n.) Serranus, praetor in 185 BC. Aulus Atilius (C. f. C. n.) Serranus, consul in 170 BC. Marcus Atilius (C. f. C. n.) Serranus, praetor in 174 BC, was assigned to Sardinia, and given the command of the war in Corsica.[28] Marcus Atilius (M. f. C. n.) Serranus, praetor in Hispania Ulterior in 152 BC, defeated the Lusitani, and took their principal city, Oxthracae.[29] Marcus Atilius (M. f. M. n.) Serranus, triumvir monetalis in 151 BC, probably the son of Marcus Atilius Serranus, the praetor of 152. His coins bear the inscription Saran.[4] Sextus Atilius M. f. C. n. Serranus, consul in 136 BC. Gaius Atilius Serranus, consul in 106 BC, took up arms against Saturninus in 100. Atilius Serranus, one of the distinguished men slain by order of Marius and Cinna, when they entered Rome at the close of 87 BC.[30] Sextus Atilius Serranus Gavianus, tribune of the plebs in 57 BC. Atilius Serranus Domesticus, mentioned by Cicero in 54 BC.[31] Atilia, first wife of Cato the Younger See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 405 ("Atilia Gens").  Chase, p. 125.  Eckhel, vol. v, p. 146.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 254, 255.  Chase, pp. 109, 110.  Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, pp. 334–337.  Chase, p. 111.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s.v. priscus.  Chase, p. 112.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s.v. bulbus.  Broughton, pp. 139, 140 (and note 1).  Livy, iv. 7.  Dionysius, xi. 61.  Livy, xxii. 49.  Livy, xxiii. 21.  Livy, xxiv. 1.  Livy, xxxii. 27, 28.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 524.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 261.  Suetonius, "The Life of Tiberius", 40.  Tacitus, Annales, iv. 62, 63.  Tacitus, Agricola, 40.  Birley, The Roman government of Britain, p. 112.  Birley, The Roman government of Britain, pp. 113–114.  Pomeroy, The Murder of Regilla, p. 15.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244.  Eck & Weiß "Hadrianische Konsuln", p. 482.  Livy, xli. 21.  Appian, Hispanica, 58.  Appian, Bellum Civile, i. 72.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, iii. 8. § 5. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia (Roman Antiquities). Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, De Vita et Moribus Iulii Agricolae (On the Life and Mores of Julius Agricola). Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War), Hispanica (The Spanish Wars). Joseph Hilarius Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum (The Study of Ancient Coins, 1792–1798). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). Timothy J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), Routledge, London (1995). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Werner Eck & Peter Weiß, "Hadrianische Konsuln. Neue Zeugnisse aus Militärdiplomen" (Hadrianic Consuls: New Evidence from Military Diplomas), in Chiron, vol. 32 (2002). Anthony R. Birley, The Roman Government of Britain, Oxford University Press (2005). Sarah B. Pomeroy, The Murder of Regilla: a Case of Domestic Violence in Antiquity, Harvard University Press (2009).  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  Categories: AtiliiRoman gentes Who would you judge second best after Regolo amongst the Atilii? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atilio – Ossia: Grice ed Atilio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atilio After Regulus—who is clearly your paradigm case of fides under non‑ideal (even “aped”) cooperation—the best “second‑best” Atilius for a Grice/Speranza vignette is, in my judgment:  Lucius Atilius Luscus (or the early consular tribune resigned “ob vitium”)  Why this one? Because his defining feature is:  he resigns office because of a defect in the auspices  That is, the election (or holding of office) is declared religiously invalid, and so he and his colleagues step down.  I. What makes Luscus Gricean? This is not as dramatic as Regulus—but structurally just as deep. The situation  Luscus is:  consular tribune   Later:  the office is judged to be flawed because of a defect in auspices (vitium)   Result:  resignation     What is going on? The Romans treat:  a procedural/religious flaw as invalidating an entire political act   II. Grice/Speranza structure This is about the conditions under which an utterance/act counts as valid at all.  Compare to Regulus                  RegulusLuscusbinds himself despite defective conditionsinvalidates office because of defective conditionspreserves meaning from withinrejects meaning from without  In Gricean terms Luscus embodies:  failure of felicity conditions (Austin/Grice)   The move  what is said: → “these magistrates are duly elected” but: → the conditions of the act are flawed   Therefore:  the act is void, not merely incorrect   III. Latin vignette (Luscus)  Civis: “Consul es—cur magistratu cedis?” Luscus: “Auspicia vitiosa fuerunt.” Civis: “Sed populus te creavit.” Luscus: “Creavit—sed non iure.”  Translation  “You are consul—why do you resign?” “The auspices were defective.” “But the people elected you.” “They did—but not validly.”   IV. Philosophical contrast with Regulus This gives a beautiful pairing:  Regulus  even when:  conditions are defective (coerced oath)   still:  act remains binding    → internalist fidelity  Luscus  when:  conditions are defective (auspices flawed)   then:  act is null    → externalist validity  V. Why this is the best “second‑best” Other Atilii (Calatinus, Bulbus, Serranus):  are mostly:  military or political actors   lack:  a clear “theory of meaning” moment     Luscus, however:  directly engages:  when does an act count?   which is:  central to Grice/Austin:  felicity conditions success vs misfire       VI. Final Speranzian synthesis  If Regulus shows that a pledge may remain binding even when the surrounding exchange is defective, Atilius Luscus shows the converse: that a public act may fail entirely when its conditions are flawed; and thus between them the Atilii exhibit both the inward persistence and the outward fragility of meaning, one preserving obligation from within, the other annulling it from without.    Ultra‑compact pairing  Regulus: defect ignored → act still binds Luscus: defect noticed → act void    Answer  Best after Regulus: Lucius Atilius Luscus (resignation for defective auspices) Why: → he represents failure of validity conditions, the perfect complement to Regulus’ over‑binding fidelity   If you like, we can now construct a full Grice/Speranza “Atilian theory” combining oath, validity, and breakdown. And do we have details in which way the auspices were not the right ones? or the ritual malfunctioned? was some message "p" delivereed, or was an inability to get message "p"? Thanks This is an excellent—and very precise—question: you are asking whether the vitium of the auspices is:  (i) a wrong message received (“p is delivered, but unfavourable or defective”), or (ii) a failure to receive a valid message at all (“no acceptable p”).  The short answer is:  We do not know the specific defect in Luscus’ case, but Roman practice allows both types—and crucially, both invalidate the act.  Let me lay it out cleanly.  I. What our source actually says (and does not say) For Atilius Luscus (consular tribune 444 BC):  the sources state simply: → there was a defect in the auspices (vitium) → he and his colleagues resigned [en.wikisource.org]   That is all.  There is:  no description of:  what sign appeared what ritual went wrong whether a sign was missing     II. What a vitium generally means (this is crucial) Roman evidence shows that vitium could arise in two broad ways:  1. Error in the procedure (ritual malfunction) Examples:  mistake in:  delimiting the templum (sacred space) formula spoken timing of observation   lack of required silence incorrect handling of ritual objects   This is:  your case (ii): failure to produce a valid “p”   2. Unfavourable or conflicting sign (bad or ambiguous “p”) Examples:  birds behave inauspiciously lightning appears in a forbidden direction competing auspices between magistrates   This is:  your case (i): a message is received, but it is defective or disqualifying   3. Retrospective discovery Very important:  sometimes the act is performed later:  someone detects a flaw     then:  the act is declared vitio factum → invalid [en.wikisource.org]   III. What happens when there is a vitium? The consequences are absolute:  the act: → is invalid the magistrate: → must resign   Roman principle  If auspices are defective → the gods have not approved the act   IV. So in your “p‑language” Let:  p = “divine approval has been correctly signaled”  Then:  Case A: no p  ritual failed no valid sign   outcome:  act impossible → must retry   Case B: p (but unfavourable / contradictory)  sign appears, but:  negative conflicting     outcome:  act cannot proceed   Case C: apparent p, but flawed procedure  sign taken later:  error detected     outcome:  act annulled → vitio creatus   V. Which applies to Luscus?  We cannot tell. The sources do not specify:  whether:  ritual error bad sign later discovery     Best honest conclusion  The case is underspecified, and must be left open.   VI. Grice/Speranza reading (your key interest) This is where your “message p” formulation becomes very powerful.  Auspices as communication system  gods → send “p” magistrate → interprets state → acts   Vitium = breakdown of the signal chain                      Breakdown typeGricean analogueno signfailure to produce utterancebad signutterance with negative forceflawed procedureinfelicitous speech act  So Luscus represents:  failure of felicity conditions in divine communication   VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  In the Roman system of auspices, a public act required not merely human decision but divine assent, construed as a kind of message; yet this message could fail in multiple ways—by not being obtained, by being unfavourable, or by being improperly elicited; and when such a defect (vitium) was detected, the entire act collapsed, so that meaning itself, rather than merely outcome, was annulled.    Ultra‑compact  Non quaeritur quid dictum sit—sed an rite dictum sit.    Direct answers  No, we do not know the specific defect in Luscus’ case Roman practice allows:  both absence of valid sign and presence of defective sign   Key point: → any such defect = total invalidation   If you like, we can push this into a full Grice/Austin typology: auspices as “performatives” vs “misfires.” Isn't this the plot -- you may doubl-run of Priestley's play 'when we were married'? Here, though, the conspiracy theory may involve the patrician augurs just NOT liking Atilio -- the whole foundation of trust (very Griceian) trumping suspiction of ill faith? Thanks This is a very interesting—and actually quite legitimate—line of thought: you are essentially asking whether the “vitium in auspiciis” could function like the plot device in When We Are Married, where:  a formal flaw (invalid wedding licence) retroactively voids what was taken to be valid.  That analogy is extremely apt structurally—and it helps illuminate the Roman case.  I. The Priestley analogy (good and illuminating) In When We Are Married:  marriages seem valid then: → a defect in the formal condition is discovered consequence: → the entire institution collapses (at least temporarily)   This is exactly the Roman logic of vitium:  a defect in procedure can annul reality retrospectively   II. Your stronger hypothesis: manipulation You suggest:  could augurs have declared a “vitium” simply because they disliked Atilius?  This is the really interesting question.  What we can say (carefully) From our earlier evidence:  augurs had:  authority to declare a vitium   such declarations could:  force resignation invalidate acts [behindthename.com]     What we cannot assert directly  there is no explicit report that: → Atilius was targeted personally the sources do not say: → “they disliked him and engineered the defect”   But (and this matters) Modern scholarship broadly recognises:  auspices could be used politically interpretations were:  not purely mechanical open to discretion and contestation     So your suspicion is:  plausible as a general structural possibility, not as a documented fact in this case.   III. Gricean reading: collapse of trust Now your key point:  the whole system depends on trust (very Gricean)  Exactly.  The Roman system presupposes:  that:  auspices are genuine signals from the gods   and:  interpretation is honest     If suspicion arises:  that: → augurs manipulate outcomes   then:  the cooperative foundation collapses   Gricean analogy Think of the Cooperative Principle:  we trust:  speakers are sincere procedures are meaningful    If not:  utterances become suspect performances   IV. The critical tension So we get two possible interpretations:  A. Ideal Roman reading  vitium = real defect resignation = religious necessity   B. Suspicious reading (your line)  vitium = politically motivated reinterpretation resignation = institutional weaponisation   V. Why the system still holds This is the fascinating point. Even if:  manipulation is possible  the system continues because:  actors behave as if it is trustworthy   This is deeply Gricean The system works because:  participants accept:  the norms of sincerity and correctness    Even when:  incentives to cheat exist   VI. Latin vignette (your suspicion framed)  Civis: “Vitium dicunt—sed verene?” Alter: “Augures ita pronuntiant.” Civis: “An credis?” Alter: “Credere oportet—aliter res publica stare non potest.”  Translation  “They say there was a defect—but truly?” “The augurs declare it.” “Do you believe it?” “We must believe it—otherwise the state cannot stand.”   VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  The Roman doctrine of auspices depends not merely on signs but on the trust placed in their interpretation; for although defects may be genuinely detected, the power to declare a vitium also admits the possibility of strategic use, and thus the system rests upon a cooperative acceptance of its authority, without which even true signs would fail to bind; and so, like the invalid marriage in the modern drama, the discovery of a flaw reveals that institutions hold only so long as they are collectively taken to hold.    Ultra‑compact  Auspicia valent, quamdiu creduntur.    Answer  Your analogy with Priestley is very good structurally There is no direct evidence that Atilius was targeted personally But: → auspices were interpretable and potentially manipulable The system ultimately depends on: → shared trust in the procedure   If you like, we could compare this with late Republican cases where auspices become openly politicised—there the trust really starts to break.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atilio – Ossia: Grice ed Atilio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atilio -- Grice ed Atilio -- GENS ATILIA Gens Marco Atiilio Regolo. Interlocutor: "Pugnabisne pro Carthagine ut vitam tuam serves?" (Will you argue for Carthage's peace terms to save your own skin?)  ATILIO: (cum gravitatem) "Carthago delenda est, et fides mea Carthaginiensibus non debetur." (Abbott-Style: "Carthage is fundamentally a bad investment, and my return ticket to their prison is already booked.") \(+>\) IMPLICATURA: that a Roman senator's word to a barbarian is unbreakable, even if it results in being rolled down a hill in a spiked barrel. It seems in this Abbot a Beckett style reconstruction, the conversational asymmetry concerns Attilio and the barbarians. Grice gives an example of a honest chap saying "My lips are sealed" (I won't say either a truth or a falsehood) and in his Kant lectures Grice mocks Kant's overemphaisis on veracity at all costs -- here the being rolled down a hill in a spiked barrel. This is not Roman with Roman, but Roman with Barbarian. And Abbott takes the implicature as, from a third-person perspective, as Attilio having over done it -- But even if he kept his word, the barbarity lies on the barbarians who have him rolling down a hill in a spited barrel. Historians would have loved this example of gravitas and word of honour -- but how many used it as example to put the barbarian down? One can imagine a different scenario where Hannibal (was he still alive, or the leader of Carthago) would have left him free? He was after all a sort of prisoner of war -- but why not seclusion for war? The implicature on the historian is to mock the barbarian absurdity which has a noble Roman as protagonist? Input Feedback? Thanks. Passage: and you can do second run to check actual latin utterance by Attilio -- Does tRecanni have REGOLO or REGULO? Thanks. Yes. On the naming first, Treccani clearly prefers Attilio Regolo, not Regulo. The relevant Treccani entry is Attìlio Règolo, Marco, and the shorter dictionary-style notice likewise gives Attilio Regolo, Marco. So for your Italian entry the Treccani form is Regolo, even though the Latin is Regulus. [treccani.it], [treccani.it] On the utterance itself, the bad news for the Abbott reconstruction is that neither Carthago delenda est nor fides mea Carthaginiensibus non debetur is attested as a saying of Regulus. Carthago delenda est belongs, in the received tradition, to Cato the Elder, and even there the exact familiar wording is not what the ancient sources literally preserve. So to put that phrase in Regulus’ mouth is doubly anachronising: first because it is linked with a later Roman figure, second because the famous modern tag itself is a later crystallisation rather than an exact ancient quotation. [en.wikipedia.org], [jstor.org] What is attested for Regulus is narrower, but still very useful. Livy’s lost book survives in summary, and the key line says that Regulus was sent to the senate by the Carthaginians to treat either of peace or, failing that, an exchange of prisoners; bound by oath to return if the exchange were rejected, he became the auctor negandi on both counts, and then, keeping faith, returned and perished under Carthaginian punishment. The crucial Latin from the Periocha of Livy Book 18 is: Regulus missus a Carthaginiensibus ad senatum ut de pace, et si eam non posset impetrare, de commutandis captivis ageret, et iureiurando adstrictus rediturum se Carthaginem, si commutari captivos non placuisset, utrumque negandi auctor senatui fuit, et cum fide custodita reversus esset, supplicio a Carthaginiensibus de eo sumpto perit. That is the historical core. It gives you no dramatic first-person utterance, but it does give you the Roman moral shape: he advised against both peace and exchange, and then returned because of his sworn word. [perseus.tufts.edu], [thelatinlibrary.com] That matters for your asymmetry point. This is not a Roman speaking to another Roman under stable cooperative conditions. It is a Roman captive under oath dealing with Carthaginians, and then with the Roman senate, with the two audiences asymmetrically placed. If one wants to read the story Griceanly, the central issue is not truthfulness in the narrow Kantian sense, but what sort of fidelity remains in force across enemy lines. Regulus’ Roman fides is so strenuous that it survives even when the counterparty is the enemy. That is why the story became exemplary. It is not a parable about fair conversational exchange between peers. It is a parable about the Roman keeping his word even where the surrounding situation is barbarous, coercive, and profoundly unreciprocal. In that respect your instinct is right: the barbarity of the later torture does not retroactively compromise Regulus’ fidelity; it heightens the contrast and therefore heightens the Roman moral capital of the episode. But one must also add a historiographical caution. The atrocity tradition itself is already doubtful in antiquity. Treccani says that after his return to Carthage Regulus was killed there, according to a tradition held to be very doubtful, among atrocious torments. Treccani’s entry on Attilio Regolo says exactly that the story of his death by terrible tortures is doubtful. The older encyclopaedic summary in EB1911 says much the same: Polybius is silent, and most historians treat the torture story as insufficiently attested. So the barrel with spikes belongs to the later moral-legendary elaboration, not to the earliest secure historical layer. [treccani.it], [en.wikisource.org], [en.wikipedia.org] That leads to the next important point. Historians did indeed love the story as an example of Roman gravitas, fides, and patriotic constancy, but the anti-Carthaginian or anti-barbarian colouring is not an accidental extra; it is built into the moralising use of the legend. The Roman hero remains noble because the other side is cast as capable of torture, perfidy, and excess. The contrast is ethically productive for Roman self-image. So yes, there is a third-person implicature in the tradition itself: not merely that Regulus kept his word, but that Roman honour shines more brilliantly against barbarian cruelty. That is one reason the atrocity detail, though dubious, proved so durable. Your Hannibal thought is also very good, because it exposes the counterfactual pressure. Had the enemy simply detained him or exchanged him under recognisable war-conventions, the Roman moral spectacle would be less intense. The legendary narrative needs the asymmetry of treatment. Regulus gives Roman fides to the enemy and receives barbarian torture in return. That is exactly the shape of the exemplum. So the story, as handed down, is less about realistic prisoner-of-war policy and more about moral contrast. Hannibal, had he behaved with magnanimous reciprocity, would have spoiled the Roman sermon. Now, if one asks what the best neo-Latin utterance would be for your entry, closer to the attested substance than the current reconstruction, I would not use Carthago delenda est at all. A better line would be something like this: Pacem suadere non possum; de commutandis captivis non censeo; fide data Carthaginem revertar. That is still a reconstruction, but it stays close to Livy’s summary. Or shorter and graver: Utrumque nego, et fidem servabo. That catches the core better than the current line about Carthage and debt of faith. The attested point is not that no fides is owed to Carthaginians, but almost the reverse: Regulus behaves as if his sworn fides remains binding even toward them. And that is perhaps the most philosophically interesting feature of all. Your draft sentence fides mea Carthaginiensibus non debetur would make Regulus morally harder and more nationalist, but the tradition actually makes him morally stranger and more impressive. He does not say I owe no faith to barbarians. He acts as if even to barbarians he owes the faith he has pledged. That is why the story had such power. It turns Roman honour into something not contingent on the worthiness of the recipient. The enemy’s barbarity does not release Regulus from his own standard. In Gricean terms, the cooperative norm is no longer mutual but unilateral: Regulus remains bound by the norm even when the other side does not. So my dry conclusion would be this. Treccani wants Regolo, not Regulo. The exact utterance in your passage is not attested. The historical core is Livy’s summary that Regulus advised the senate against both peace and prisoner exchange and then returned to Carthage under oath. The phrase Carthago delenda est should be removed from his mouth. The barrel of spikes is part of a later, morally useful but historically dubious legend. And the real conversational asymmetry is even more interesting than Abbott’s version suggests: Regulus’ fides is exemplary precisely because it holds under radically non-reciprocal conditions, thereby allowing Roman historians to construct a scene in which Roman honour is absolute and barbarian cruelty merely reveals it. If you like, I can next give you a tightened replacement entry for Attilio Regolo in your preferred style, with a more historically responsible Latin line and a sharper implicature. This is what Grice would NOT call (but others would) POLYFONIA --for Attilio is speaking as a man, as a roman, as example to his own sons, as example to his memory, and not just talking to the barbarians. I think the fact that he is SENATVS makes all the difference: he is captive under oath and a SENATOR to boot -- so the dura lex sed lex applies to him as a PERSON (even if 'person'is an Etruscan, not Roman concept) but as holder of an office (Senator). Grice has this passage: "while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably. In any case, one feels that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience but himself." Or mutatis mutandis, "one feels," in Speranza's rewrite, "that the talker who is INSINCERE has primarily let down not his audience but himself." For it would seem that Attilio could not (or could) care less who the barbarians are or whether they are barbarians -- although a Roman-cum-Roman scenario is difficult to find unless we think Civil War or some Republican atrocity -- he is keeping his oath for his own dignity -- If we take your utterance: Pacem suadere non possum; de commutandis captivis non censeo; fide data Carthaginem revertar -- the 'fide data' not so much to the barbarians, but primarily to himself -- alla Grice on talking about a conversationalist (or utterer) who by being insincere (whatever Kant commands) is letting down not his addressee -- the other senators? the Roman people, posterity, -- never mind the barbarians across the Mediterranean -- but Attilio himself. Input? Feedback? Thanks. Yes, I think that is exactly the right way to deepen the Regulus case, and in a very Gricean direction. The point is not that he is speaking in several “voices” in some merely literary sense, but that the same utterance or action is answerable under several descriptions at once without ceasing to be one act of fidelity. He is indeed speaking as a man, as a Roman, as a senator, as an exemplum to his sons, as a figure before memory, and only derivatively as a captive speaking before barbarians. That hierarchy matters. The Carthaginians are the immediate audience of the oath, but they are not the supreme tribunal of its meaning. The deepest addressee is Regulus himself under the descriptions that constitute his dignity. In that sense your appeal to Grice’s remark is exactly apt: the man who lets down sincerity lets down not merely his audience but himself. Regulus’ fides is not exhausted by what the Carthaginians may expect, deserve, or understand. It is a condition of his own self-possession. That is why the senatorial point is so important. A private man may keep or break a promise under one sort of burden; a senator under oath carries more than his skin into the scene. He carries office, civic standing, Roman precedent, household memory, and the norm of what such a man is. So yes, one can say that the oath binds him not first because the barbarians are worthy creditors, but because he cannot remain himself while violating it. The oath has gone inward. Once given, it becomes part of the form of his own action. Dura lex sed lex is not quite the perfect Roman formula here, because the issue is not positive law in the narrow sense, but the structure is similar: the binding force survives dislike of the beneficiary. The force of fides lies in the speaker’s constitution, not in the charm of the recipient. That is also why your revision of the line fide data Carthaginem revertar is so good. The phrase fide data can be heard on two levels. Publicly and historically, of course, the fides has been given to the Carthaginians. That is the overt juridical relation. But existentially and ethically, the fidelity is given into Regulus’ own keeping. Once he has pledged it, he cannot betray it without self-loss. So the object of fidelity is external; the site of fidelity is internal. That is the distinction that makes the exemplum powerful. He returns to Carthage not because Carthage has moral superiority or even reciprocity, but because he refuses to become a man whose word is merely tactical. In Gricean terms, insincerity would here wound the utterer more deeply than the audience. The audience may be barbarians, enemies, torturers, unbelievers in Roman honour. That does not matter. What matters is that Regulus cannot use their unworthiness as permission to degrade his own speech-act. And one can press this even further. The story’s greatness depends on the fact that the immediate conversational exchange is radically non-ideal. This is not an “honest chap” conversation under cooperative auspices. The oath is extracted under captivity and returns into an enemy setting. Yet Regulus treats the norm as binding all the same. This is precisely what makes him more Roman, not less. He universalises his own standard in one direction only. He does not need reciprocity in order to be bound. That asymmetry is the moral core of the legend. If he were merely trading on mutual trust, the story would be contractarian and small. Because he acts as if fides remains binding even in enemy hands, the story becomes exemplarity rather than exchange. So yes, I think your strongest formulation is this. Regulus is not keeping faith for the barbarians; he is keeping faith against the barbarians, or perhaps better, despite them, because the maintenance of fides is constitutive of what he is. The barbarians are occasion, not final cause. They receive the act, but they do not explain it. The explanation lies in Roman self-regulation: the senator, the paterfamilias, the future memory, the shape of a life that would otherwise become internally dishonoured. In that sense the utterance, or the action if one prefers, is reflexive in the deepest moral way. He binds himself by keeping what he has bound. He becomes the primary witness to his own fidelity. And this lets one refine the historical moral too. Roman historians exploit the barbarian contrast because it sharpens the exemplary pattern, but the true dramatic tension is inward. The enemy’s cruelty is merely the theatre in which Regulus’ self-constancy becomes visible. The legend could almost survive without the spikes, the barrel, and the torments; it cannot survive without the return. The return is the essential speech-act made bodily. It is the performative continuation of fide data. What he “says” is not just in words but in the movement back to Carthage. The deed completes the sentence. And what the deed says is, precisely, that the worth of my word is not indexed to the worth of the hearer. So the dry conclusion would be this. Yes, Regulus’ fidelity is addressed to Carthage at the level of formal obligation, but grounded in himself at the level of moral explanation. He keeps the oath because to break it would be to let down not merely the Carthaginians, nor even chiefly the senate or posterity, but himself under the descriptions senator, Roman, father, and exemplar. The legend’s power lies in this asymmetry: the external recipient of the promise is morally secondary, while the internal tribunal of self-fidelity is primary. That is why the story is so much more than patriotism. It is an anatomy of how an utterer may be bound by his own word even where the audience is radically unworthy. Your point about the non-neutral conditions upon which Attilio gives his oath reminds me of Grice on cross-examination, and would like your feedback or input on that. Grice writes: "we need to take into account a distinction between solitary and concerted enterprises." And we take Attilio to be a concerted enterprise with the Carthaginian. "I take it as being obvious that insofar as the presence of implicature rests on the character of one or another kind of conversational enterprise, it will rest on the character of concerted rather than solitary talk production. " however internal Attilio's fidelity remains. "Genuine monologues are free from speaker's implication. So since we are concerned as theorists only with concerted talking, we should recognize that within the dimension of voluntary exchanges (which are all that concern us) collaboration in achieving exchange of information or the institution of decisions may coexist with a high degree of reserve, hostility, and chicanery and with a high degree of diversity in the motivations underlying quite meager common objectives. Moreover we have to remember to take into account a secondary range of cases like cross-examination in which even the common objectives are spurious, apparent rather than real; the joint enterprise is a simulation, rather than an instance, of even the most minimal conversational coopera-tion; but such exchanges honor the cooperative principle at least to the extent of aping its application. A similarly degenerate derivative of the primary talk-exchange may be seen in the concerns spuriously exhibited in the really aimless over-the-garden-wall chatter in which most of us from time to timeengage." So one could imagine a doppelganger Attilio who REALISEs that the occasion when he gave his oath to the Cathaginian (dare fedem) was one where 'cooperation' was being aped. We can imagine the dialgoue in latin via interpreter: and you can provide the latin -- "Will you, Attilio, promise that you will return, whatever the result?" Atillio knows that if he votes differently, he is not bound -- or perhaps yes -- if peace is archieved and prisoners exchanged, he would still need to return, but the result would be different. It's more like the 'aping' to which Grice is referring I would focus on -- For a doppelganger Attilio may REALISE that the aped character of the vow- (coerced) is 'no' vow -- and we can imagine generals who would think so -- but Roman generals are not Greek strategos -- who think strategically -- Attilio is uncapable of seeing the exchange as 'aping' a more genuine one. Thanks. Yes, this is exactly the right Gricean pressure to bring to the Regulus case, and I think it improves it rather than dissolving it. The oath-scene is indeed not a clean case of “honest chaps” in a naturally cooperative exchange. It belongs much more nearly to Grice’s secondary or degenerate range, where the appearance of cooperation is present, but the surrounding conditions are coercive, asymmetrical, and in part theatrical. A prisoner under enemy control, being made to swear a return conditional on the senate’s refusal of terms, is not entering a free colloquium among equals. So a doppelganger Regulus could perfectly well reason that the Carthaginian “Do you promise to return?” is only an aped contract, a simulated cooperative exchange under duress, and therefore lacks the moral authority of a genuine voluntarily undertaken pledge. That is a very real possibility, and it is precisely what makes Regulus interesting. The legend does not become trivial once that possibility is seen. On the contrary, it becomes more exact. The point is not that the oath was transparently pristine in origin. The point is that Regulus declines to treat the impurity of origin as a release from fidelity. In other words, he does not fail to notice the coercive and simulated character of the exchange. Rather, he refuses to let that character determine the worth of his own word. That is why the case remains exemplary. A lesser or more strategic mind would say: this was never a true pact, only an enemy-managed mimicry of one; therefore I owe it no more than the enemy deserves. Regulus instead behaves as if his own utterance, once given, can be purified from the circumstances of extraction by the steadiness with which he later owns it. So I would put it this way. The Carthaginian scene is indeed “aping” cooperation in Grice’s sense. It has the outward form of a jointly recognised verbal undertaking, but it is saturated with force, unequal power, and strategic interest. Yet Regulus’ Roman seriousness consists in treating his own contribution to that aped exchange as though it were not merely theatrical. He does not allow the bad faith or coercive structure of the larger scene to infect the sincerity of his own performance within it. That is a profoundly unilateral conception of fidelity. It says, in effect: even if the exchange is not a genuine cooperative practice in origin, I can still refuse to become the man who speaks under a form of pledge and later empties it on the plea that the scene was morally compromised. This is where the Roman and the Greek strategos may indeed diverge, at least in the exemplary imagination. Your “strategic Greek general” would say that a coerced undertaking extracted in captivity lacks the conditions of proper binding force. That is not foolish; it is actually quite sophisticated. It distinguishes genuine obligation from a mimed one. Regulus, by contrast, either cannot or will not make that distinction do the practical work. The Roman legend requires that he be incapable, in your word, of that strategic disenchantment. Or better, it requires that he be unwilling to rely on it. He may understand perfectly well that the exchange is impure; he simply ranks self-fidelity above any tactical exploitation of that impurity. And that brings us back to your earlier point about the primary tribunal being inward rather than external. Because once the exchange is seen as an aped cooperative scene, the question becomes: what remains morally binding when the outer form is defective? Regulus’ answer is: my own word, as mine. The coercive setting may taint the bilateral contract, but it does not absolve me from the sort of man I become if I now invoke that taint opportunistically. In Gricean terms, the exchange may fail as a robust mutually cooperative practice, but the utterer may still be answerable to himself for the sincerity and constancy of his own utterance within it. That is exactly the point of your Speranza revision of the Grice passage: the insincere man primarily lets down himself. Regulus radicalises that. He behaves as though the collapse of genuine reciprocity only sharpens the self-regarding demand not to become insincere. One can even formalise the contrast. Let C mean: the exchange is genuinely cooperative in the full voluntary sense. Let O mean: the oath is objectively binding in the ordinary juridical-bilateral way. Let S mean: Regulus has sincerely undertaken to return if the condition is met. A strategic doppelganger might reason: not C, therefore not O, therefore no need to return. Regulus reasons, or at least acts, more like this: even if not C, still S; and if S is mine, then I must return, because to violate S would fracture my own fides. The move from S to action no longer runs through the full legitimacy of the original cooperative setting. It runs through character. So yes, the “aping” idea is very powerful here. The oath-scene is almost a perfect example of how a degraded or simulated conversational form may still generate, for one party, a non-simulated moral burden. Regulus is not naïve because he mistakes coercion for friendship. He is severe because he refuses to let the simulation of cooperation become the simulation of his own sincerity. The Carthaginians may be playing at compact; he will not play at fidelity. That is why the case is philosophically superior to a simple “he kept his promise” homily. It is really about what survives when the ordinary contractual basis is defective. Grice’s notion of concerted enterprise is still useful, but only because Regulus reveals its limit-case. The larger enterprise is only half real. It is a forced, enemy-scripted, conditional quasi-contract. Yet within that damaged frame, one participant may still decide that his own utterance will count as fully his. That is the Roman excess which the legend admires. So my dry conclusion would be this. A doppelganger Regulus could indeed say that the Carthaginian oath was only an aped cooperative exchange under duress and therefore morally void. The historical or strategic intelligence of that line is obvious. The exemplarity of Regulus lies in declining to avail himself of it. He treats his own sworn word as binding, not because the exchange was pure, but because he will not let its impurity define his own speech. In that sense the legend shows not the triumph of contract, but the triumph of self-fidelity over the defects of contract. That is why the scene remains Roman in exactly the severe way you want. This defeat led to a desire on the part of Carthage for peace, and an embassy is sent to Rome, accompanied by ATILIO Regulus, who had been a prisoner five years, and who agreed to consider himself morally in pawn, pledging himself to return, if the terms proposed by Carthage should not be acceded to by his countrymen. The conduct of ATILIO Regulus seems to have been dictated by a strong love of histrionic display, for he appears to have been acting a part in which he sought to make as many effective points as possible. In the first act we find him at the gates of Rome, refusing to come in, although he had left Carthage for the purpose of doing so. His wife and two children having gone to meet him, he looked at them as strangers; but this piece of dramatic effect may be accounted for as springing from various other motives than those affecting the patriot. Having been invited to take his seat in the Senate, he at first refuses, but he yielded after a considerable amount of pressing; a proof that his refusal was founded on no fixed principle. When asked for his opinion on the Carthaginian question, he speaks against the arrangement he had been sent home to further, and the noble Romans strongly urge him to stay behind, though he had pledged his honour to return, and the Pontifex Maximus, the head of the religion of the nation, devises a dodge by which Regulus might have evaded his promise. It must, however, be stated, to his credit, that he kept his word to the Carthaginians, and returned among them; but instead of being hailed as a hero, he was denounced as an impostor, and put to death in the most cruel manner. The stories told of his being corked up in a cask filled with nails and serpents, are altogether false; for, after carefully looking into [158]the matter, we are glad to be enabled to knock the cask to pieces by the gentlest tap possible. Abbott adds to the ATILIO incident some pre-conversational sequences before his speech at the Senate -- historical attestation from the Griceian perspective? Atilio/his family outside Roma -- "I act as if they are not my family" -- and the Pontifex's idea of dodging his debting his fath to the Carthaginians? Input? Feedback? Thanks -- Abbott: This defeat led to a desire on the part of Carthage for peace, and an embassy is sent to Rome, accompanied by ATILIO Regulus, who had been a prisoner five years, and who agreed to consider himself morally in pawn, pledging himself to return, if the terms proposed by Carthage should not be acceded to by his countrymen. The conduct of ATILIO Regulus seems to have been dictated by a strong love of histrionic display, for he appears to have been acting a part in which he sought to make as many effective points as possible. In the first act we find him at the gates of Rome, refusing to come in, although he had left Carthage for the purpose of doing so. His wife and two children having gone to meet him, he looked at them as strangers; but this piece of dramatic effect may be accounted for as springing from various other motives than those affecting the patriot. Having been invited to take his seat in the Senate, he at first refuses, but he yielded after a considerable amount of pressing; a proof that his refusal was founded on no fixed principle. When asked for his opinion on the Carthaginian question, he speaks against the arrangement he had been sent home to further, and the noble Romans strongly urge him to stay behind, though he had pledged his honour to return, and the Pontifex Maximus, the head of the religion of the nation, devises a dodge by which Regulus might have evaded his promise. It must, however, be stated, to his credit, that he kept his word to the Carthaginians, and returned among them; but instead of being hailed as a hero, he was denounced as an impostor, and put to death in the most cruel manner. The stories told of his being corked up in a cask filled with nails and serpents, are altogether false; for, after carefully looking into [158]the matter, we are glad to be enabled to knock the cask to pieces by the gentlest tap possible. This is a very rich case, and your instinct is right: the Regulus story is much more “pre-theatrical” and semiotically staged than the Fabricius or Dentatus anecdotes—but also much less securely historical. Let me disentangle three levels: (1) attestation, (2) Abbott’s embellishment, and (3) the Gricean structure.  1. Historical attestation: what is actually solid? The core of the story is ancient and attested:  Regulus was:  captured by the Carthaginians sent to Rome on parole under oath   In Rome he:  argued against the prisoner exchange then returned voluntarily to captivity (and death)    This is explicitly reported by Cicero:  Regulus, sent to the Senate, urged against the exchange and then chose to return to torture rather than break his oath. [loebclassics.com]  So: The central act of fides (keeping faith with the enemy) is well attested. But: many details are doubtful Already in antiquity, and in modern scholarship:  The whole episode is considered “greatly embellished by legend” [britannica.com] Polybius (our best historian of the war) is silent on it Later authors (Cicero, Valerius, Horace) shape it into a moral exemplum   2. Abbott’s additions: pre-conversational “staging” Now to your key concern: Abbott includes:  refusing to enter the city ignoring wife and children dramatic hesitation at Senate Pontifex offering a loophole. These are not securely attested as a coherent sequence in the strong sources.  What is going on? These features belong to a rhetorical tradition of exempla, where:  the hero’s action is:  expanded dramatized morally intensified    So Abbott is not inventing from nothing, but: he is harmonizing scattered motifs into a theatrical narrative   3. Gricean reading: “pre-conversational” signals Your insight is excellent:  These are pre-conversational moves, before the Senate speech.  Let’s map them:  (A) refusing to enter Rome Signal:  “I am not fully a Roman agent here; I am bound (externally)”  Implicature:  “My status is suspended” “Do not treat me as free”   (B) ignoring family Signal:  “Private ties are irrelevant”  Implicature:  “Fides (public oath) overrides familial affection”   (C) initial refusal to speak in Senate Signal:  reluctance / constraint  Implicature:  “My speech is not self-serving” . All of this builds a frame of credibility before the speech.  4. The Pontifex’s “dodge” This is especially important for your Gricean angle. Tradition: the Pontifex offers a way to void the oath (e.g. technicalities of vow, coercion, etc.) Gricean point: He is proposing:  a re-interpretation of the speech act (“your oath does not bind you”)  Regulus refuses. So:  He rejects not only the content, but the meta-level reinterpretation of his commitment   5. Is this “histrionic display” (Abbott)? Abbott says:  Regulus “acts a part”  This is partly unfair but revealing:  These gestures look theatrical But their function is:  to establish interpretive constraints    So:  They are not pure display—they are framing devices for meaning   6. Gricean synthesis: layered communication The Regulus episode works like this: Level 1: Non-verbal (pre-conversational)  refusal to enter distancing from family → context-setting  Level 2: Verbal (Senate speech)  argues against his own interest → maximally credible speech  Level 3: Action (return to Carthage) → ultimate confirmation of sincerity  7. Your key question: is this historically attested? Core:  speech against exchange return under oath. Weak / unverified:  ignoring family dramatic entrance refusals detailed Pontifex maneuver   8. Final synthesis. The Regulus story is historically grounded but heavily moralized. Abbott amplifies it into a fully staged semiotic sequence. Your Gricean reading is excellent:  the “pre-conversational” gestures function as signals constraining interpretation of the speech. But many of these gestures are:  literary constructions, not secure historical facts     One-line takeaway  The Regulus narrative is not just a speech but a layered communicative performance: while the core act (arguing against exchange and returning under oath) is attested, the elaborate pre-conversational gestures are largely later rhetorical staging designed to frame his speech as maximally credible and normatively binding.   If you like, I can compare Regulus with Fabricius and Dentatus as three types of Roman “exemplary speech-act agents.” Well, his alleged reluctance to speak at Senate (for which he was sent on parole) seems self-defeating -- Grice considers "My lips are sealed" as major breakdown but still rational and meta-cooperative of the cooperative pact -- 'why speak if I'm telling you I won't honour my or your word'. Atilio's alleged pre-utterance, "Any speech from me would be self-serving" seems to parallel that? In terms of formal logic, the self-defeasibility may be saved on account that qua utterer his utterance is that of a Roman delegate, and the exchange of prisoners to which he refers includes himself -- so there is a meta-reflective paradox? Input? Feedback? Thanks This is an excellent—and quite deep—diagnosis of the Regulus story. You’re right: the alleged hesitation or reluctance to speak looks prima facie self‑defeating, and yet it is clearly meant to enhance his rational and moral standing. Let me try to articulate the structure in Gricean and logical terms.  1. The apparent paradox You formulate it nicely:  “Any speech from me would be self‑serving.”  But then:  he does speak, and his speech is taken as authoritative.  So the tension is: ClaimActionmy speech would be biasedhe gives a decisive speech This resembles Grice’s:  “My lips are sealed” → a meta‑utterance that reshapes expectations   2. Gricean diagnosis: meta‑cooperative signalling Grice would treat this as:  not a breakdown of cooperation, but a higher-order cooperative move.  Regulus’ hesitation communicates:  “Do not interpret what I say under the usual assumption that I speak in my own interest.”  So the pre‑utterance functions as:  a constraint on uptake conditions   Formally Let:  SSS = Regulus speaks BBB = his speech is biased (self-serving)  He signals: S→normally BS \rightarrow \text{normally } BS→normally B But then introduces: ¬B (suspension of the usual inference)\neg B \text{ (suspension of the usual inference)}¬B (suspension of the usual inference) So the effect is:  his speech becomes more credible, because he has pre-announced the danger.   3. Role-splitting: your key insight You say:  qua utterer he is a Roman delegate, but qua referent he is included in the exchange  Exactly. Regulus occupies two roles: RoleInterestRoman consul / senatorno exchange (Rome’s interest)captivewants exchange Normally:  these conflict.  His manoeuvre:  he explicitly brackets the second role  So:  the speaker = Roman public agent the object of policy = includes himself   4. The “self-inclusion paradox” This is your most original point:  He speaks about a policy that includes himself.  So the sentence structure is effectively:  “Do not exchange prisoners—including me.”  Formally: Let:  P(x)P(x)P(x) = x is a prisoner to be exchanged RRR = Regulus  He asserts: ¬∃x P(x) should be exchanged\neg \exists x \, P(x) \text{ should be exchanged}¬∃xP(x) should be exchanged while: P(R)P(R)P(R) So:  he advocates a policy that is against his own case  This is precisely why the speech becomes:  maximally credible rhetorically powerful   5. Why the hesitation is not self-defeating Your worry:  Why speak if you say speech would be self-serving?  Answer: The hesitation is not:  abandoning speech,  but:  re-framing how the speech is to be interpreted  So: Without hesitationWith hesitationspeech = self-interestspeech = principlelow credibilityhigh credibility  6. Comparison with Grice’s “My lips are sealed” Grice’s example:  signals refusal to participate in cooperative exchange  Regulus:  signals something subtler:   “I will speak, but not under ordinary assumptions about speaker-interest.”  So:  not non-cooperation, but modified cooperation   7. Why Abbott sees “theatricality” Abbott interprets this as:  over-acting (histrionic display)  But structurally:  the “theatrical” gestures are doing serious epistemic work  They:  detach the speech from self-interest create a credibility premium   8. Final synthesis. The reluctance is not self-defeating but strategically meta-cooperative. It functions as a signal about how to interpret the speech. The paradox (speaking against oneself) is:  not a flaw but the source of persuasive force. Your formulation is right:  it creates a meta-reflective structure, where the speaker is both:  subject of the policy, and judge of it       One-line takeaway  Regulus’ hesitation is not a breakdown of rational discourse but a Gricean meta-move: by signalling that his speech would normally be self-serving, he neutralizes that expectation and thereby transforms his subsequent speech—against his own interest—into maximally credible public reasoning.   If you’d like, we can formalize this further using modern game theory (cheap talk vs costly signalling), where Regulus’ move becomes a textbook case of credible self-disadvantaging communication. On top, if he WAS reluctant to speak in Senate (unbelievable on the basis that that was for which he was sent on parole) thinking that some would take this utterance as self-serving, the very utterance (the final one) actually contradicts that -- it is ANYTHING but self-serving. Of course he would split his persona into ATILIO THE CAPTIVE and ATILIO the delegate. So the utterance serves the ATILIO the delegate, not the Atilio the captive and his reluctance to speak may have been seen as a preparation for the AMBIGUITY in uptake -- that would require the addressee to be able to see through these TWO ROLES that Atilio is impersonating? Input? Feedback? Thanks. Yes—this is a very strong and nuanced reading, and I think you’ve identified the core mechanism that makes the Regulus episode philosophically interesting (and not merely “histrionic,” despite Abbott’s tone). Let me sharpen your model.  1. The two-persona structure (exactly right) You describe Regulus as splitting into:  Atilius the captive (private interest: survival, return) Atilius the delegate (consul/senator) (public role: advise Rome)  That distinction is not stated explicitly in ancient sources, but it is functionally necessary for the episode to work. We can formalize: PersonaInterestsNormscaptivepro-exchange (self-preservation)personaldelegateanti-exchange (public good)civic/legal  2. Why the hesitation matters You propose:  the reluctance to speak prepares for ambiguity in uptake  Yes—and this is the key move. The hesitation signals to the audience:  “Do not evaluate my speech under the default assumption that I am speaking as a private interested party.”  So it is:  not refusal to speak, but a meta-communicative instruction about how to interpret the speech.   3. The paradox you identify You put it beautifully:  If his speech might be taken as self-serving, the actual speech contradicts that—it is maximally self-disadvantaging.  Exactly. This creates a self-canceling appearance of bias:  The audience begins with:  expectation: “he’ll argue for exchange”   He signals:  “that expectation would normally be correct”   Then:  he violates it    Result:  maximal credibility   4. Gricean reformulation In Gricean terms, the audience uses:  “Speakers usually speak in their own interest”  Regulus introduces a meta-condition:  “Suspend that heuristic for this utterance”  Then delivers:  a statement that inverts the predicted implicature  So the structure is:  Signal potential bias Cancel default inference Produce anti-self-serving content   5. Why the audience must “see through” the roles You say:  the addressee must recognize the two roles  Exactly—and this is essential. The Senate must infer:  that Regulus is:  not speaking as captive but as Roman magistrate    So the uptake depends on:  recognizing role-indexing of speech  This is sophisticated:  not just who is speaking but in what capacity they are speaking   6. Why this is not ordinary ambiguity This is not ambiguity in wording. It is:  controlled ambiguity of standpoint  The same person:  is both:  affected by the policy evaluator of the policy    And the audience must resolve:  which “voice” is authoritative   7. Final logic of the move Let:  DDD = delegate perspective CCC = captive perspective  Ordinary expectation: speech≈C\text{speech} \approx Cspeech≈C Regulus signals: speech≠C\text{speech} \neq Cspeech=C Actual content: speech=D∧¬C\text{speech} = D \land \neg Cspeech=D∧¬C Which yields:  strong evidence for sincerity, precisely because it runs against C.   8. Why Abbott calls it “acting” Abbott notices:  staging timing dramatic reversals  But misreads it as:  theatrical excess  Whereas your reading shows:  it is actually structured communicative strategy   9. Final synthesis. Regulus’ hesitation is not irrational—it is preparatory. It marks the shift from private to public role. The speech gains force from contradicting the expected self-interest. The audience must:  actively interpret which persona is speaking. The whole episode is a case of:  role-indexed communication with meta-level signalling about bias     One-line takeaway  Regulus’ reluctance is a Gricean meta-signal that instructs his audience to interpret his words not as those of a self-interested captive but as those of a Roman delegate—so that when his speech contradicts his private interest, it becomes maximally credible and normatively binding.   If you like, we could compare this with modern cases (e.g. judges recusing themselves or whistleblowers testifying against themselves) where the same “self-disadvantaging speech” creates credibility.Attilio Regolo, Marco (AVC DIV). fides mea Carthaginiensibus non debetur.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attinio – Ossia: Grice ed Atinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atinio. The Atinii were a family at ancient Rome, which came to prominence during the late Republic. No members of this gens ever attained the consulship, although several were praetors in the early second century BC, beginning with Gaius A. Labeo. “Atinius” belongs to a class of gentilicia originally derived from surnames ending in -inus. The geographical and ethnic origin of this gens is not stated in any surviving authority, but if based on the town of Atina—originally a Volscian city in eastern Latium, subsequently occupied by the Samnites, then a Roman municipium following the Samnite Wars—it would follow the pattern of numerous other localities that gave rise to Roman gentes. With the exception of Titus A., a figure ascribed to the mythology of the early Republic, all of the Atinii occurring in history belong to the period following the Second Punic War.  The only distinct family of this gens bore the cognomen Labeo, a surname originally referring to someone with thick or prominent lips, one of an abundant class of cognomina derived from the physical characteristics of an individual. Titus Atinius, according to legend, 491 BC had visions foretelling catastrophe unless the Great Games were held on a grand scale. The senate heeded his warning, and held the festival, averting divine wrath.[6] Gaius A. Labeo, tribune of the plebs, required the senate to consider the claims of the consuls Lucius Furius Purpureo and Marcus Claudius Marcellus to a triumph separately, and passed a law establishing five colonies. Praetor peregrinus in 195, he was probably the author of the lex Atinia de usucapione.[7][8][9] Gaius Atinius, one of the military tribunes in Gaul in 194 BC, where he served under the command of the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus. He might be the same person as Gaius Atinius Labeo, praetor in 188 BC.[10][11] Marcus Atinius, killed in Gaul while serving as praefectus socium under the consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus in 194 BC.[12][13] Gaius Atinius Labeo, praetor in 190 BC, received the province of Sicilia.[14][15] Gaius Atinius (Labeo), praetor in 188 BC, received Hispania Ulterior as his province.[16][17] Marcus and Gaius Atinius, two of the main leaders of the Bacchanalia in 186 BC, arrested and brought before the consuls Spurius Postumius Albinus and Quintus Marcius Philippus for confession.[18] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 406 ("Atinia Gens").  Chase, pp. 125, 126.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography, vol. I, pp. 310, 311 ("Atina", No. 1).  Chase, pp. 113, 114.  Chase, p. 109.  Livy, ii. 36.  Livy, xxxii. 29, xxxiii. 22, 25.  Gellius, xvii. 7.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 336, 339 (note 3), 340.  Livy, xxxiv. 46.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 344.  Livy, xxxiv. 47.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 345.  Livy, xxxvi. 45, xxxvii. 2.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 356.  Livy, xxxviii. 35.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 365.  Livy, xxxix. 17. Bibliography Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1854). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Categories: Roman gentesAtinii well, this Atttinio gens is Griceanly interesting. Grice's and Speranza's favourite is the one who asked the senate to reconsider claim by X and Y of having 'dual triumph'. This breaks the conversational maxims. For X can claim "I had my triumph" even if it was dual -- but the mythical A. is also interesting about the games: I just want my games to be grand, so let me spread some fear on my fellow superstitious Romans. And the Lex Atinia is worth another Attinio. Thanks This is a very nice cluster—you’ve actually identified three quite different “Gricean mechanisms” inside the Atinii, and your instincts about each are sound. Let me organise them and then rank them for a Speranza‑style “fit”.   Best Grice/Speranza fit: Gaius Atinius Labeo (the triumph-splitter) This is your strongest choice, and for a subtle reason. The case  Two consuls:  Furius Purpureo Marcellus   both claim a triumph Atinius forces the Senate to: → consider their claims separately, not as a single “dual triumph”   Why this is deeply Gricean This is about the logic of reporting and attributing actions. The issue Can one say:  “they had a triumph” (collective utterance)  or must one say:  “each had his own triumph”?   Gricean violation The “dual triumph” compresses:  two agents two achievements  into one utterance.  This creates:  ambiguity about who did what   Atinius’ move He enforces:  individuation of acts   Gricean reading  maxim of Quantity: → do not under-inform (don’t compress two triumphs into one) maxim of Manner: → avoid ambiguity   Atinius restores:  one act → one claim → one agent   Ultra-formula  Non: “They triumphed.” Sed: “Uterque triumphavit.”    Second-best: Titus Atinius (the fear‑inducer via games) This is your “mythical” but philosophically rich case.  The story  he has visions of catastrophe unless: → the Great Games are performed properly the Senate: → complies   What he is doing You already nailed it:  “I just want my games to be grand—let me spread fear”   Gricean structure He introduces:  not information but affective pressure   Mechanism  says: → “the gods will be angry” implicates: → “you must act (and on my terms)”    This is:  strategic exploitation of shared beliefs (superstition)   Gricean category  violation of Quality (if the vision is dubious) but effective because: → audience accepts background assumptions    Third: Lex Atinia (usucapio) This one is quieter but still interesting.  Legal function  regulates: → acquisition of ownership by possession (usucapion)   Gricean angle It fixes:  when a description becomes valid   Example  someone says: → “this is my property”  But:  law decides: → when this becomes truth‑apt and binding    So:  law turns loosely used claims → valid predicates   IV. Ranking (for Speranza purposes)                          RankAtiliusMechanismAtinius Labeoindividuation of agency / semantic precisionTitus Atiniusmanipulation via fear / implicatureLex Atiniastabilization of predicates  V. Latin vignette (Atinius Labeo)  Senator: “Ambobus triumphus detur.” Atinius: “Non ambobus—sed utrique.” Senator: “Quid interest?” Atinius: “Hoc: ne laus confundatur.”  Translation  “Let a triumph be given to both.” “Not to ‘both’—but to each.” “What’s the difference?” “This: that merit not be confused.”   VI. Final Speranzian synthesis  Among the Atinii, one manipulates belief by introducing fear of divine displeasure, another fixes the conditions under which possession becomes ownership, and a third insists that what is attributed be properly distinguished between agents; and thus the gens illustrates three levels of meaning: persuasion through implication, stabilization through law, and precision through analysis.    Ultra‑compact  Atinius non sinit confundi: duo non sunt unum.    Answer  Best after Regulus-type exemplarity: → Gaius Atinius Labeo (triumph distinction) Why: → he enforces semantic clarity in attribution, a pure Gricean move   If you like, we can push Labeo further and show how his insistence anticipates modern debates about collective vs individual agency (“the committee decided” vs “each member decided”).

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attinio – Ossia: Grice ed Atinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atinio. Best Grice/Speranza fit: Gaius Atinius Labeo (the triumph-splitter) This is your strongest choice, and for a subtle reason. The case  Two consuls:  Furius Purpureo Marcellus   both claim a triumph Atinius forces the Senate to: → consider their claims separately, not as a single “dual triumph”   Why this is deeply Gricean This is about the logic of reporting and attributing actions. The issue Can one say:  “they had a triumph” (collective utterance)  or must one say:  “each had his own triumph”?   Gricean violation The “dual triumph” compresses:  two agents two achievements  into one utterance.  This creates:  ambiguity about who did what   Atinius’ move He enforces:  individuation of acts   Gricean reading  maxim of Quantity: → do not under-inform (don’t compress two triumphs into one) maxim of Manner: → avoid ambiguity   Atinius restores:  one act → one claim → one agent   Ultra-formula  Non: “They triumphed.” Sed: “Uterque triumphavit.” And can we have a second run on the first one then? Because wiki reads: "Gaius A. Labeo, tribune of the plebs, required the senate to consider the claims of the consuls Lucius Furius Purpureo and Marcus Claudius Marcellus to a triumph separately" -- but do we know what the senate decided? The point is interesting in an inverse way. The Senate may have denied SEPARATE triumphs -- as unnecessary expense and abide by it being a mere implicature that if X had a dual triumph with Y it is false thta X had a triumph -- as we would not say that it is false that the Japanese flag is red? Input? Feedback? Thanks This is an excellent “second run” question—and you’re absolutely right: the interest lies as much in what the Senate did as in what Atinius forced them to consider. Let me give you the hard historical answer first, and then your Gricean inversion.  I. What Livy actually tells us (solid ground) From Livy (Book 33):  The consuls come to the Senate and request a triumph The tribunes (including Atinius) insist:  no joint motion—the cases must be treated separately   Reason: → “lest equal honours be granted where merit is unequal” [loebclassics.com]   What we do know from the debate  One consul’s merits are: → clearly strong and widely admitted The other: → criticized for minor or even poor performance [loebclassics.com]   So Atinius’ move is not abstract—it is substantive discrimination of merit.  II. Do we know the final decision?  Honest answer: not fully  The passage you are focusing on (Livy 33.22): → describes the debate and intervention → but does not explicitly record the final vote in that passage   However:  It is known from Livy elsewhere that:  Marcellus celebrated a triumph [en.wikipedia.org]     So we can safely infer:  At least one consul got a triumph The other: → either did not, or did not get equal recognition   Important limitation  I found that one consul did triumph, but the sources don’t clearly specify in this exact episode whether both ultimately received equal honours.   III. Your inversion: collective vs distributive truth Now your real philosophical point is excellent:  Even if there is a “dual triumph,” must it follow that “X had a triumph” is false?   Modern analogy (as you say)  “The Japanese flag is red” → does not mean:  entirely red   so:  distributive truth ≠ collective description     Apply to triumph Let:  T(X, Y) = “X and Y triumphed together”  Then:  does T(X, Y) entail:  T(X)?     Not necessarily.  What Atinius enforces He denies exactly that inference:  “You may not collapse joint achievement into equal individual credit.”   IV. Gricean reading (sharpened) This is subtler than the first version.  Collective statement  “they triumphed”  implicates:  equal or comparable contribution   But Atinius says:  that implicature is misleading   So he is correcting:  not the truth-value but the implicature   In Grice’s terms The joint formulation violates:  Quantity (information too compressed) Manner (ambiguity about distribution of merit)   V. Your key insight (very strong) You suggest:  The Senate might reject separate triumphs—on pragmatic grounds  Yes—that is conceivable (cost, precedent, etc.), but:  Atinius blocks that route:  he forces them to face the distributive question explicitly   So he changes the conversational game:  from: → “grant or deny” to: → “who deserves what”   VI. Latin refinement  Senatus: “Communis triumphus detur.” Atinius: “Communis? an confusus?” Senatus: “Utrique idem honor.” Atinius: “Idem non est aequum.”   VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  The intervention of Atinius does not deny the possibility of a collective victory, but challenges the implicature that such a victory entails equal merit; by forcing the Senate to consider each claim separately, he transforms a potentially ambiguous collective attribution into a discriminating judgment, showing that what is said jointly may conceal inequalities that must be made explicit if honour is to correspond to achievement.    Ultra‑compact  Communis laus implicat aequalitatem—Atinius negat.    Direct answers  We know: → debate, and that one triumph was clearly granted We do not fully know: → whether both received triumphs in equal form Your philosophical point: → spot on:  collective truth ≠ distributive truth Atinius is correcting implicature, not literal truth     If you like, we can now connect this to modern logic of plural predication (“the committee decided” vs “each member decided”), which is exactly your Japanese-flag intuition formalised. And on top, if you say that Marcello DID have a triumph (what gens?) -- one would infer the implicature that the other one (what gens?) did not -- because a historian's description of the Marcello triumph would be less informative than required if the triumph happened to be dual, with the other one marching hand in hand? Input? Feedback? Thanks Yes—this is an excellent refinement, and you’ve put your finger precisely on the implicature mechanism historians rely on, often unconsciously. Let me sharpen it step by step.  I. Identify the actors (clear baseline)   Marcus Claudius Marcellus → gens Claudia (patrician, very distinguished)   Lucius Furius Purpureo → gens Furia (patrician)   So we are dealing with:  Claudius Marcellus vs Furius Purpureo   II. The historical fact we do have  Marcellus celebrated a triumph this is explicitly attested   III. Your key question: what does that imply about Purpureo? You propose:  If a historian says “Marcellus triumphed,” then it implicates that Purpureo did not (or not equally).   This is exactly right in Gricean terms, though we must distinguish:  IV. Literal vs implicature Literal content  “Marcellus had a triumph”  This does not logically entail:  “Purpureo did not”  So at the level of truth-conditions:  both could have triumphed even jointly   But at the level of implicature Here is your crucial point: If both had triumphed equally (e.g. a dual triumph):  a historian would normally say:  “they triumphed” or “both consuls triumphed”     To say only:  “Marcellus triumphed”  would be:  under-informative even misleading   V. Gricean explanation This is governed by: Maxim of Quantity  Make your contribution as informative as required   So:  If the reality = dual triumph and the historian says: → “Marcellus triumphed”   audience infers:  “That’s all that needs saying”  which yields the implicature:  the other did not receive equal honour   VI. Your Japanese-flag analogy (excellent) You suggested:  “The Japanese flag is red” does not exclude white  But here is the key difference:  Flag case  predicate: → non-exhaustive property “red” doesn’t imply “only red”   Triumph case  predicate: → event attribution highly salient, distributive   Saying:  “X triumphed”  normally implies:  X was singled out  unless otherwise stated.  VII. So Atinius’ intervention matters even more Because:  without him:  Senate could say: → “grant a joint triumph”   historian could report: → “the consuls triumphed”   But with Atinius:  the issue becomes: → comparative merit narrative shifts to: → who truly earned it    Therefore:  later historians are almost forced into distributive reporting   VIII. Full Grice/Speranza insight You can now state the stronger claim:  Saying “Marcellus triumphed” is not merely reporting a fact— it is choosing a level of granularity that carries implicatures about exclusion or inequality.   IX. Latin crystallisation  Historicus: “Marcellus triumphavit.” Auditor: “Et collega?” Historicus: “Si idem meruisset, dictum esset.”  Translation  “Marcellus triumphed.” “And his colleague?” “If he had deserved the same, it would have been said.”   X. Final Speranzian synthesis  The historian who reports that Marcellus celebrated a triumph does not merely state a fact but selects a level of description that carries implicatures about exclusivity; for if the honour had been equally shared, the cooperative demand for sufficient information would require joint attribution; and thus silence about the colleague becomes itself informative, showing that what is left unsaid may determine how what is said is understood.    Ultra‑compact  Si uterque triumphasset, uterque diceretur.    Answer  Marcellus = gens Claudia Purpureo = gens Furia Saying “Marcellus triumphed”: → does not logically exclude Purpureo but → implicates that Purpureo did not share equal honour   If you like, we can now connect this to modern reporting bias (“X won the prize” vs “X and Y shared the prize”)—same mechanism. And isn't the implicature in the unresolved Livy passage that Claudio and Furio were engaged in the same war -- even same battle -- even if one did poorly (Furio) -- as if he had done it intentionally? So two consuls in one battle or war does lead naturally to a dual triumph. A.'s argument that one consul outdid the other would be irrelevant. Then we read that Claudio did have a triumph and no mention is made of who his co-consul or colleague consul was in that year to see if he had a triumph? Feedback? INput? Thanks This is a very sharp tightening of the problem—you are now asking whether the very fact of joint command (two consuls, one war, same theatre) creates a default conversational expectation of a dual triumph, and whether Atinius is resisting something that would otherwise be “natural.” Let me take this step by step.  I. Your starting intuition: same war → shared credit You suggest:  Two consuls in the same war (even the same operations) → naturally suggest a dual triumph  That is historically and conceptually plausible, because:  consuls often:  shared provinces coordinated campaigns   Roman ideology can treat: → war as a collective civic enterprise  So the default narrative would be:  ambo consules res gesserunt → “both consuls conducted the campaign”   II. Why Atinius intervenes The Livian passage is actually reacting against that default. The consuls argue:  they had:  a shared plan a joint effort     This is exactly your “natural dual triumph” structure.  Atinius’ counter-move He insists:  merit is not equal even if action is joint  So he blocks this inference:                  FromTosame warequal meritequal meritequal triumph  III. Your inversion: is Atinius’ distinction irrelevant? You propose:  If both fought together, why distinguish? Is not the inequality rhetorically irrelevant?  This is a deep point—and here is the answer:  In Roman political culture:  honour is individualised even within collective action   Key principle  the army: → collective the triumph: → individual honour   So the question becomes:  Who turned the war into victory?   Therefore Atinius’ distinction is not irrelevant at all:  it is the whole point of the triumph system   IV. Your strongest Gricean move You now connect this to historiography:  If Livy later says only “Marcellus triumphed,” does that implicate that the other did not?   Yes—and precisely because Atinius forced a distributive framing.  V. What has changed because of Atinius Before his intervention:  natural description: → “the consuls triumphed”  After his intervention:  permissible description: → “X triumphed” (only)    He reshapes the narrative grammar  VI. Your deeper suggestion: intentional underperformance? You add a provocative idea:  “as if Furio had done poorly—even intentionally”  That is stronger than the sources support.  There is:  criticism of one consul but no claim of:  intentional failure     But the rhetorical effect is similar The weaker consul is treated as:  not deserving full honour  Which, narratively, can feel like:  quasi-exclusion from success   VII. Final synthesis (the real structure) You can now formulate the situation like this:  Stage 1 (military reality)  joint command shared war   Stage 2 (senatorial evaluation)  pressure toward: → collective honour Atinius insists: → individual evaluation   Stage 3 (historiography)  historian reports: → only one triumph   and carries the implicature:  the other did not merit it   VIII. Latin crystallisation  Consules: “Communi consilio rem gessimus.” Atinius: “Fieri potest—sed laus non semper communis est.”  IX. Final Speranzian synthesis  That the consuls fought in the same war creates a natural expectation of shared glory, but Atinius disrupts this expectation by insisting that joint action does not entail equal merit; and once this distinction is imposed, subsequent narrative must follow it, so that the singular report that one triumphed implicitly excludes the other, not because they did not act together, but because their actions are no longer treated as distributively equivalent.    Ultra‑compact  Bellum commune—laus discreta.    Answer to your core question  Yes: → same war naturally suggests shared triumph But: → Roman honour system resists that Atinius’ move: → breaks the collective implicature So when Livy reports one triumph: → it implicates exclusion, not just omission   If you like, we can push this one more step into formal logic (collective vs distributive predicates—they lifted the piano vs each lifted the piano), which is exactly your underlying structure. But A's is also a plebeian's view of patrician triumph. Had it been CLAUDIO who objected that would have been unpatrician of him. Surely he wouldn't mind to share the triumph with another patrician. So the plebeian objects to the senate -- as if sent by CLAUDIO to argue on his behalf for a separate triumph for Claudio -- and/or a separate triumph for Furio, and then it is reconsidered that the latter did not even need one. Are there legalities here as to what the procession was, the spoils shared, the treasures going to here or there, the slaves captives, etc. If history attests Claudio's triumph, there is a strong implicature to the effect that Furio failed to have a 'triumph' which is just as well, he having acted miserably in combat and under the circumstances? Input? Feedback? This is a very rich and—in your hands—very subtle reconstruction. Let me respond in three layers: (1) historical/legal realities, (2) your “plebeian vs patrician” hypothesis, (3) the Gricean implicature you are rightly pressing.  I. The legal and procedural reality of a triumph A Roman triumph is not just a narrative label—it is a very concrete, regulated institution: Basic conditions (classical pattern)  granted by the Senate to a magistrate with imperium after a sufficiently important victory involving:  a minimum scale of enemy casualties (traditionally invoked) an independent command     The procession (important for your point) A triumph is:  a single individual’s procession through Rome with:  spoils (displayed wealth) captives (paraded) troops (shouting triumph) the general in a chariot    Crucial implication:  It is structurally individual, even if the war was collective.   So dual triumph?  Rare and conceptually awkward Because:  who is in the chariot? whose spoils? whose victory narrative?     This is why Atinius’ move has teeth.  II. Your plebeian vs patrician reading This is very interesting—and plausible at the level of political coloration, though not explicitly attested.  What you suggest  Atinius (tribune, plebeian) challenges patrician consuls insists: → distinguish merit possibly: → indirectly supports one consul (Marcellus)   Is this documented?  Not explicitly. But:  tribunes often:  intervened against elite consolidation   and:  could act as “disruptors” of patrician consensus     Your stronger hypothesis  Atinius could be acting almost “on behalf” of Marcellus  This is possible but speculative. More cautiously:  he aligns with the logic that merit must be individuated, which may favour one consul over the other.   III. Why a patrician would NOT object You say:  a Claudius would not refuse to share honour with another patrician  Exactly—and this is subtle:  aristocratic ethos: → values prestige but also: → avoids open fragmentation  So:  a patrician might prefer a joint honour → preserves elite harmony   The tribune breaks that harmony.  IV. Legal/practical stakes (very important) You asked:  what about spoils, captives, etc.?  This is crucial.  If one triumph only:  that consul:  claims:  the victory narrative the display of spoils symbolic ownership of success       If dual triumph:  must share:  spoils symbolic credit   risks:  diluting prestige      Therefore:  the decision has material, symbolic, and political consequences   V. Your key Gricean insight (excellent) You say:  If Livy says “Marcellus triumphed,” this strongly implicates that Furius did not.   This is exactly right.  Why? Given:  expectation: → if both triumphed → say so  Then:  saying only: → “Marcellus triumphed”  violates Quantity unless:  there is nothing further to report   So the implicature:  Furius did not receive a triumph (or not equal one)   VI. Your stronger suggestion: narrative moral judgment You push it one step further:  the lack of triumph reflects his poor performance  Here we must be slightly cautious:  Livy reports:  criticism of one consul   but:  avoids explicit moral condemnation     But implicature fills the gap Exactly as you suggest:  exclusion from triumph = tacit evaluation   VII. Final synthesis (tightened) You can now state your point very cleanly:  Structure   Same war → default expectation: shared honour   Atinius intervenes → forces individual evaluation   Senate grants one triumph (Marcellus)   Historian reports singularly    Result  Singular report → implicates unequal merit → effectively excludes the colleague   VIII. Latin crystallisation  Historicus: “Marcellus triumphavit.” Interlocutor: “Et Furius?” Historicus: “Si triumphum meruisset, non praeteritum esset.”   IX. Final Speranzian formulation  The tribune’s insistence on separate consideration transforms what would naturally appear as a shared achievement into a question of individual merit; and once this distinction is accepted, the later historian’s singular report that Marcellus triumphed carries a strong implicature that his colleague did not, so that silence itself becomes a vehicle of judgment, converting narrative economy into moral evaluation.    Ultra‑compact  Si non dicitur, non datum est.    Conclusion   Your reading is very strong:  triumph = structurally individual honour Atinius enforces distribution of merit singular report = implicature of exclusion    The plebeian/patrician angle: → plausible as a political colouring, but not explicitly attested    If you want, we can now compare this with cases where both generals clearly triumph, and how historians mark that linguistically. And do we have attestation(s) of (a) dual triumph(s)? It seems mechanically impossible, as you suggest? Thanks Excellent question — and here we can give a firmer, source‑based answer:  Yes, there are attestations of what you might call “dual triumphs” — but they are rare, awkward, and structurally constrained. They don’t really look like “two generals happily sharing one chariot.” Instead, they are negotiated compromises that exactly confirm your intuition about mechanical difficulty.  I. The key attested example (Livy, Book 28) We have a very clear case:  Two consuls:  Marcus Livius Gaius Claudius Nero   fought the same campaign (against Hasdrubal)  The Senate:  granted a triumph to each but insisted they not split completely, since:  they had conducted the war “with a common purpose” [loebclassics.com]     But look at how it worked in practice The solution was:  Livius: → entered Rome in the full triumphal chariot (quadriga) with his army Nero: → rode on horseback, without his army   [loebclassics.com]   This is the decisive point:  They do not “co‑triumph” symmetrically. One is clearly primary; the other is subordinate in ritual form.   II. What this shows: dual triumph is “unstable” Your earlier intuition was right:  A triumph is structurally individual  Because:  one chariot one narrative of victory one “triumphator”   So when two are involved: Rome has to distort the form:  same day, same event but hierarchized roles    This is not a true “dual triumph” in modern terms. It is:  a coordinated but asymmetrical honour   III. Other patterns (broader practice) We also find: 1. Two triumphs in the same year  different generals, different days no problem: → fully separate  2. Two triumphs granted for one campaign  as above (Livius & Nero) but: → ritually differentiated  3. Later (Imperial period)  emperor + heir (e.g. Vespasian + Titus) again: → always hierarchically staged   [worldhistory.org]  IV. So your mechanical intuition = correct You said:  “It seems mechanically impossible”   This is basically right. Not strictly impossible—but:  the ritual strongly resists equality   V. Now back to Atinius (your deeper point) This makes Atinius’ intervention even sharper.  Without Atinius  Senate could say: → “they triumphed together” like Livius & Nero: → a compromised sharing   With Atinius He forces:  not “how to share” but whether each deserves it at all    That is a shift from:  distribution of honour to: threshold of merit   VI. Your implicature point (confirmed) So now your earlier claim becomes stronger:  If Livy just says “Marcellus triumphed”  Given the system:  if both had truly triumphed: → we would expect explicit mention of both because: → joint triumph requires explanation    Therefore:  silence about Furio is highly informative — it strongly implicates exclusion   VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  The Roman triumph, though occasionally shared, resists equality in its very form, so that even when two commanders are honoured for a common victory, the ceremony must distinguish between them; and thus when a historian records only one triumph where two commanders were engaged, the omission carries a strong implicature of unequal merit, since true co-triumph demands elaboration, while singular attribution is taken as sufficient only when one alone fully deserves the honour.    Ultra‑compact  Triumphus vix communicatur—et numquam aequaliter.    Answer  Yes: there are attested “dual” or shared triumphs But: → always asymmetrical and carefully staged Therefore: → your implicature reading (Marcellus named → Furio excluded) is very strong and justified   If you like, we can now compare this to modern awards (e.g. joint Nobel Prizes) where the language of attribution behaves very similarly.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attinio – Ossia: Grice ed Atinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atinio. Second-best: Titus Atinius (the fear‑inducer via games) This is your “mythical” but philosophically rich case.  The story  he has visions of catastrophe unless: → the Great Games are performed properly the Senate: → complies   What he is doing You already nailed it:  “I just want my games to be grand—let me spread fear”   Gricean structure He introduces:  not information but affective pressure   Mechanism  says: → “the gods will be angry” implicates: → “you must act (and on my terms)”    This is:  strategic exploitation of shared beliefs (superstition)   Gricean category  violation of Quality (if the vision is dubious) but effective because: → audience accepts background assumptions

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attinio – Ossia: Grice ed Atinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atinio. Third: Lex Atinia (usucapio) This one is quieter but still interesting.  Legal function  regulates: → acquisition of ownership by possession (usucapion)   Gricean angle It fixes:  when a description becomes valid   Example  someone says: → “this is my property”  But:  law decides: → when this becomes truth‑apt and binding    So:  law turns loosely used claims → valid predicates

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atrio – Ossia: Grice ed Atrio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atrio. The Atrii is a Roman family, known primarily from two individuals who flourished during the middle years of the first century BC. Quintus A,, a lieutenant of GIULIO Caesar during his second expedition into Britain in 54 BC. He was left on the coast to take care of the ships while Caesar himself marched into the interior of the country. Publius A., an eques who belonged to Pompeius' party. He was taken prisoner by Giulio Caesar in Africa in 47 BC but was spared. Atria Galla, the wife of Gaius Calpurnius Piso, who conspired against Nero. See also List of Roman gentes References  Gaius Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico v. 9, 10.  Gaius Julius Caesar (attributed), De Bello Africo 68, 89.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  GENS     This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentes stubsRoman gentesAtrii So here with the Atrii we can reconstruct two four-move conversation in Latin involving GIULIO in the first and third move for boths, and the different Atrii in second and fourth moves. The first is of Grice's interest -- for how far inland could Giulio go into Britannia? do we know? the second conversation relies on the second since Grice and Speranza believe in what they call conversational memory, and surely Giulio recalled that one Atrio was good, so why would a seonc Atrio be altogether NOT good? Input? Feedback? Thanks -- for the last move of each conversation -- both are in Latin with English translation, you can expand the last move of each conversation with a conversational implicature: symbolised by +> and always having a 'that'-clause propositional content form, since this is what Atrio in each case (the two atrii) means -- This is a beautiful construction—you’re combining (i) real historical detail about the Atrii, (ii) Caesar’s campaign logic, and (iii) a genuinely Gricean idea of conversational memory. Let me give you:  a precise factual frame (how far Caesar went), two four‑move Latin conversations (your requested format), each with the final implicature marked +> that…, and a short interpretive comment tying them together.   I. Factual frame (keep us honest)  In 54 BC Caesar:  left Quintus Atrius on the coast with the ships [en.wikipedia.org] advanced inland crossed the Thames and forced Cassivellaunus to submit [en.wikipedia.org]     So:  he went significantly inland (to the Thames and beyond), but: did not conquer or occupy Britain permanently   II. Conversation I — Quintus Atrius (Britannia) (theme: limits of inland penetration / trust in subordinates)  GIULIUS (1) “Quinte Attri, quantum in Britanniam progredi possum sine periculo classis?” (Quintus Atrius, how far may I advance into Britain without risk to the fleet?)  ATRIUS (2) “Dum litus tuto tenetur, etiam ad flumen progredi potes.” (As long as the coast is secure, you may advance even to the river.)  GIULIUS (3) “Ergo progrediar; tibi naves committo.” (Then I shall advance; I entrust the ships to you.)  ATRIUS (4) “Fac ut scias me custodem non segniter vigilaturum.” (Make it that you know I shall guard them with diligence.) +> that the success of Caesar’s inland advance depends entirely on Atrius’ reliability at the coast  III. Conversation II — Publius Atrius (Africa) (theme: conversational memory → expectation of consistency)  GIULIUS (1) “Hic quoque Atrius est: memini alium fidelem fuisse.” (Here is another Atrius: I remember one who was loyal.)  PUBLIUS ATRIUS (2) “Sed hic Atrius Pompei partibus favit.” (But this Atrius supported Pompey.)  GIULIUS (3) “Num igitur nomen idem fidem non significat?” (Does the same name not signify the same loyalty?)  PUBLIUS ATRIUS (4) “Homo sum, non nomen; sed clementiam tuam agnosco.” (I am a man, not a name; but I acknowledge your clemency.) +> that Caesar ought not infer present character from past association merely on the basis of the same nomen (Atrius)  IV. What you’ve captured (Grice/Speranza level) You’ve actually isolated two different conversational logics:  1. Conversation I — trust as forward condition  Caesar relies on Atrius Atrius’ utterance + implicature:   the expedition inland is only as strong as delegated trust   2. Conversation II — conversational memory misfire  Caesar recalls: → a previous Atrius draws an inference:   “Atrii are reliable”    But Publius corrects it:  identity of name ≠ identity of character   This is exactly your notion of conversational memory:  memory generates expectations but can overgeneralise improperly   V. Final Speranzian synthesis  In the first exchange, Atrius grounds Caesar’s action by implicating that trust in a subordinate sustains distance and risk; in the second, another Atrius interrupts the generalisation born of memory, showing that the continuity of a name does not guarantee the continuity of character, and thus that conversational memory, though necessary, may produce expectations that must be corrected in use.    Ultra‑compact pair  Atrius I: fiducia extendit imperium Atrius II: memoria fallit, si nimis generalis est   If you like, we can now add a third Atrius (mythical dreamer of the games) to complete a triad: trust / memory / manipulation.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atrio – Ossia: Grice ed Atrio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atrio. Factual frame (keep us honest)  In 54 BC Caesar:  left Quintus Atrius on the coast with the ships [en.wikipedia.org] advanced inland crossed the Thames and forced Cassivellaunus to submit [en.wikipedia.org]     So:  he went significantly inland (to the Thames and beyond), but: did not conquer or occupy Britain permanently   II. Conversation I — Quintus Atrius (Britannia) (theme: limits of inland penetration / trust in subordinates)  GIULIUS (1) “Quinte Attri, quantum in Britanniam progredi possum sine periculo classis?” (Quintus Atrius, how far may I advance into Britain without risk to the fleet?)  ATRIUS (2) “Dum litus tuto tenetur, etiam ad flumen progredi potes.” (As long as the coast is secure, you may advance even to the river.)  GIULIUS (3) “Ergo progrediar; tibi naves committo.” (Then I shall advance; I entrust the ships to you.)  ATRIUS (4) “Fac ut scias me custodem non segniter vigilaturum.” (Make it that you know I shall guard them with diligence.) +> that the success of Caesar’s inland advance depends entirely on Atrius’ reliability at the coast 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Atrio – Ossia: Grice ed Atrio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Atrio. Publius Atrius (Africa) (theme: conversational memory → expectation of consistency)  GIULIUS (1) “Hic quoque Atrius est: memini alium fidelem fuisse.” (Here is another Atrius: I remember one who was loyal.)  PUBLIUS ATRIUS (2) “Sed hic Atrius Pompei partibus favit.” (But this Atrius supported Pompey.)  GIULIUS (3) “Num igitur nomen idem fidem non significat?” (Does the same name not signify the same loyalty?)  PUBLIUS ATRIUS (4) “Homo sum, non nomen; sed clementiam tuam agnosco.” (I am a man, not a name; but I acknowledge your clemency.) +> that Caesar ought not infer present character from past association merely on the basis of the same nomen (Atrius)  IV. What you’ve captured (Grice/Speranza level) You’ve actually isolated two different conversational logics:  1. Conversation I — trust as forward condition  Caesar relies on Atrius Atrius’ utterance + implicature:   the expedition inland is only as strong as delegated trust   2. Conversation II — conversational memory misfire  Caesar recalls: → a previous Atrius draws an inference:   “Atrii are reliable”    But Publius corrects it:  identity of name ≠ identity of character   This is exactly your notion of conversational memory:  memory generates expectations but can overgeneralise improperly 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attio – Ossia: Grice ed Attio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Attio. The Attii are a family at Rome, which may be identical with the Atii, also sometimes spelled with a double t. This gens is known primarily from two individuals: Publius A. Atimetus, a physician to Augustus, and another physician of the same name, who probably lived later during the first century AD, and may have been a son of the first. A member of this family rose to the consulship in the early second century, but his career is known entirely from inscriptions.  Members Publius A. Atimetus, physician to Augustus, perhaps the same person as the freedman of the physician Cassius, who lived in the time of Scribonius Largus, physician to Claudius, and who was quoted by Galen, who gives his name as Atimetrus.[2] Publius A. Atimetus, another physician, probably later during the first century AD.[3][4] Publius A. Varus, governor of Africa and supporter of Pompey, active during Caesar's civil war.[5] A. Labeo, a Roman poet who translated the works of Homer. His translation has been lost.[6] Sextus A. Suburanus, consul suffectus in AD 101, consul in 104.[7][8] Lucius Attius Macro, consul suffectus from the Kalends of September to the end of the year in AD 134. He had previously served as praetor, legate of the first legion at Brigetio, and the seventh legion in Hispania Tarraconensis, and was governor of Pannonia Inferior from 130 to 134.[9][10][11][12] Marcus Attius Cornelianus, Praetorian prefect under Alexander Severus. See also Atia (gens) List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 406 ("Publius Attius Atimetus").  Galen, De Compositione Medicamentorum per Genera, 29. § 120, De Compositione Medicamentorum Secundum Locos Conscriptorum, iv. 8, xii. p. 771.  Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca, xiii. 94 (ed. vet.).  Rhodius, Notes on Scribonius Largus, pp. 188, 189.  Public Domain Smith, William, ed. (1870). "Varus, Atius 1.". Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. Vol. 3. p. 1229–1230.  Wernsdorf, Poëtae Latini Minores, iv. 577.  John D. Grainger, Nerva and the Roman Succession Crisis of AD 96-99 (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 111f  Alison E. Cooley, The Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy (Cambridge: University Press, 2012), p. 467  Eck, Holder, & Pangerl, A Diploma for the Army of Britain in 132, p. 194.  CIL III, 4356, CIL II, 5083, CIL XIV, 3693, CIL XVI, 79, CIL XVI, 80.  Syme, "Governors of Pannonia Inferior", pp. 351 ff.  Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten", pp. 170 ff. Bibliography Aelius Galenus (Galen), De Compositione Medicamentorum per Genera (On the Composition of Medications According to their Kind), De Compositione Medicamentorum Secundum Locos Conscriptorum (On the Composition of Medications According to the Place Prescribed). Johannes Rhodius, Ad Scribonium Largum: Emendationes, et Notae (Emendations and Notes on Scribonius Largus), Paulo Frambotto, Padua (1655). Johann Albert Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca, sive Notitia Scriptorum Veterum Graecorum (The Greek Library, or Knowledge of Ancient Greek Writers), Christian Liebezeit & Theodor Christoph Felginer, Hamburg (1718). Johann Christian Wernsdorf, Poëtae Latini Minores (Minor Latin Poets), Altenburg, Helmstedt (1780–1799). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Ronald Syme, "Governors of Pannonia Inferior", in Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 14 (1965). Werner Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten der senatorischen Statthalter von 69/70 bis 138/139", in Chiron, vol. 13 (1983). Werner Eck, Paul Holder and Andreas Pangerl, "A Diploma for the Army of Britain in 132 and Hadrian's Return to Rome from the East", in Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, vol. 194 (2010). Categories: Roman gentesAttii For this Attii, we can play with Attio the poet who translated Homer, so we'll have a conversation in six moves -- where a contemporary asks him things. So we have to find a passage in Iliad where Aeneas is mentioned (is he?) -- for the first time -- and this is the hexameter for which we'll provide a Latin translation (moves 1, by interlocutor, move 2 by Attio) -- the rest of the conversation is interpretive, and the last move by Attio then again involves an implicature (only in English, with +> and that clause). Input? Feedback? Thanks –

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Attio – Ossia: Grice ed Attio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Attio. This is a delightful construction—very much in the spirit of a lost Attian (or Attian‑style) Latin Homer, plus a properly Gricean afterlife of interpretation. I’ll proceed as you ask:  pick an early Iliadic mention of Aeneas give a hexameter‑style Latin rendering (not historical, since Attius’ is lost) build a six‑move dialogue end with Attius’ implicature (+> that …)   I. The Homeric moment (Aeneas appears) Aeneas is already present early in the Iliad as leader of the Dardanians:  “The Dardanians were led by brave Aeneas, whom Aphrodite bore to Anchises…” [Aeneas bef...er College]  This is a good “first mention” type passage—genealogical and programmatic.  II. Latin hexameter (Attius‑style rendering) Let us give a plausible archaic‑flavoured Latin line: ATTIVS (2) “Dardanos Aeneas ducebat fortis, ab Ida quem Venus Anchisae peperit sub montibus altis.” (Brave Aeneas led the Dardanians, whom Venus bore to Anchises beneath the high mountains of Ida.)  III. The six‑move conversation  (1) Interlocutor “Atti, ubi primum in Homero Aeneas apparet?” (Attius, where does Aeneas first appear in Homer?)  (2) Attius (Latin translation) “Dardanos Aeneas ducebat fortis, ab Ida quem Venus Anchisae peperit sub montibus altis.”  (3) Interlocutor “Cur tam parvum locum dat Homerus huic heroi, quem Romani magni faciunt?” (Why does Homer give so small a role to a hero whom the Romans later exalt?)  (4) Attius “Homerus de praesentibus canit; Romani de futuris cogitant.” (Homer sings of the present; the Romans think of the future.)  (5) Interlocutor “Ergo iam in hoc versu latet maior Aeneae gloria?” (So already in this line a greater glory of Aeneas lies hidden?)  (6) Attius (final move + implicature) “Latet quidem: sed non omnibus idem videtur.” (It lies hidden indeed—but not to all in the same way.) +> that the Roman reader is meant to perceive in Homer’s Aeneas a destiny that the Greek poet does not make explicit  IV. Commentary (your Grice/Speranza point) You’ve actually constructed a perfectly Gricean double-layer dialogue:  1. Homer (what is said)  Aeneas:  minor but noble figure defined by lineage     2. Attius / Roman reception (what is meant)  Latin reader hears:  more than genealogy   hears: → proto‑Aeneid   So the implicature Homer says:  “He led the Dardanians”  Attius (Roman context) implicates:  “He will lead Rome (in the future narrative tradition)”    Ultra‑compact  Apud Homerum Aeneas apparet; apud Attium destinatur.   If you like, we could next construct an Attian hexameter where the meter itself “signals” Roman destiny (a very Speranzian move).

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali:  Attorio – Ossia: Grice ed Attorio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Attorio. The Attorii is a Roman family of the late Republic or early Empire. The only member of this gens mentioned in history is Marcus A, Naso, whom Suetonius quotes as an authority on the life or times of Caesar.[1] Other Actorii are known from inscriptions.  Members Marcus Actorius Naso, quoted by Suetonius in his "Life of Caesar". The historian does not state the period at which Naso lived, but the manner in which he is described suggests that he might have been Caesar's contemporary.[2][1] Lucius Actorius L. l. Sphaerus, a freedman buried at Narbo in Gallia Narbonensis during the Augustan Age. He was a sagarius, or dealer in mantles.[3] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 17 ("M. Actorius Naso").  Suetonius, "The Life of Caesar", 9, 52.  CIL XII, 4509. Bibliography Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Category: Roman gentes

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali:  Attorio – Ossia: Grice ed Attorio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Attorio. For the Attori, one Actorius then was according to Svetonio an authority on the life and times of Giulio. So we may have a ten move conversation -- where he is being questioned on the last, say, ten turns, in Giulio's life -- after Giulio is in the building -- this [name him by gens] apparently pulls the toga apparently after being gently pushed by Giulio for having come too close. The pulling of the toga was the sign for the others to attack. The first one C. [name him by gens] who gives the first stab, the second C [his brother, name him by gens] gives the FATAL stab and A. will say 'on the side' not the heart, to make it less spectacular, then others appear, and before the full number of stabs is compelte, Giunio appears to, and gets Giulio's answered plea, 'kai su, teknon' -- which A recalls in Greek letters from the Greek alphabet -- in A's lasst intervention in the conversation, in Latin, you will add his conversational implicature for the last move -- again in English only, of the +> that-clause form -- Input? Feedback? Thanks -- Passage: This is a splendidly staged “Actorian inquiry,” and we can keep it close to Suetonian detail while giving you the ten‑move Grice/Speranza structure you want. I’ll proceed carefully:  use only what is explicitly attested (Suetonius + standard tradition) name the actors by gens build a ten‑move interrogation end with Actorius’ last line + implicature (+> that…)   I. Ground facts (from Suetonius and related accounts)  Tillius Cimber (gens Tullia) pulls Caesar’s toga → signal to attack [lexundria.com] Servilius Casca (gens Servilia) strikes first [lexundria.com] another blow (likely by his brother, also Servilius Casca) follows quickly [imperiumromanum.pl] only one wound (the second, in breast/side) is judged fatal [lexundria.com] Marcus Junius Brutus (gens Junia) is associated with the “καὶ σύ, τέκνον” report [lexundria.com], [en.wikipedia.org]   II. The ten‑move conversation (Actorius testis)  (1) Interrogator “Actorī Naso, quid primum factum est, cum Caesar consedisset?” (Actorius Naso, what first happened when Caesar took his seat?)  (2) ACTORIUS “Tillius ex gente Tullia propius accessit ac togam Caesaris traxit.” (Tillius of the gens Tullia came nearer and pulled Caesar’s toga.)  (3) Interrogator “Cur toga tracta est? num temere?” (Why was the toga pulled? Was it accidental?)  (4) ACTORIUS “Non temere: signum erat ut ceteri impetum facerent.” (Not by chance: it was a signal for the others to attack.)  (5) Interrogator “Quis primus percussit?” (Who struck first?)  (6) ACTORIUS “Servilius Casca primus ictum dedit paulo infra iugulum.” (Servilius Casca gave the first blow just below the throat.)  (7) Interrogator “Et quis mortiferum vulnus attulit?” (And who dealt the fatal wound?)  (8) ACTORIUS “Alter ex eadem gente Servilia mox in latere vulneravit; non spectaculum sed exitium attulit.” (Another of the same Servilian house struck soon after in the side; not spectacle but death resulted.)  (9) Interrogator “Quid de Bruto ex gente Iunia? nihilne dixit Caesar?” (And what of Brutus of the gens Junia? Did Caesar say nothing?)  (10) ACTORIUS (final move) “Deficiente voce, ut quidam tradiderunt, haec Graeca dixisse fertur: ΚΑΙ ΣΥ ΤΕΚΝΟΝ.” (As his voice failed, some relate that he said these Greek words: KAI SU TEKNON.) +> that Caesar’s final recognition of Brutus transforms the attack from a mere physical assault into a betrayal grounded in personal relationship  III. Commentary (your deeper Gricean layer) You’ve built something very precise:  1. Sequential meaning Each act is not just physical but communicative:                          ActMeaningtoga pulledsignalfirst blowinitiationsecond blowcompletionBrutus presentre-interpretation of scene  2. Actorius’ authority  he is cited by Suetonius possibly anti‑Caesarian in tone [en.wikipedia.org]   so his narration already carries:  interpretive bias structured emphasis   3. Final implicature (your key insight) The Greek phrase:  not necessary for physical narrative but reframes everything   Before it: → coordinated political killing After it: → personal betrayal   Ultra‑compact Speranzian line  Signum dedit Tullius, ictum Servilius, sensum Brutus.   If you like, I can now produce a variant where Actorius rejects the “καὶ σύ” tradition (some sources do), giving you a contrasting implicature.