1. As for words with specificatory derivative senses, there seems to be some tendency for one of two things to happen: Either the original general sense becomes obsolete (like car, meaning "wheeled vehicle"), or the specificatory condition takes over; we should perhaps continue to call gramophone records discs even if (say) they came to be made square (provided they remain not too unlike discs, in the original sense of the word), and perhaps the word cylinder exemplifies the same feature. But there are words of which neither is true: an obvious example is the word animal (meaning (i) "member of animal king-dom," (ii) "beast"). There is here some sort of a parallel, in relation to Modified Occam's Razor and its variants, between animal and the candidate word or. Animal perhaps infringes a weak principle to the effect that a further sense should not be recognized if, on the assumption that the word were to have a specificatory further sense, the identity of that sense would be predictable; for it could no doubt be predicted that if the word animal were to have such a sense, it would be one in which the word did not apply to human beings. But it would seem not to be predictable (history of language apart) that anyone would in fact use the word animal to mean "beast," whereas given a truth-functional or it is predictable (assuming conversational prin-ciples) that people would use A or B to imply the existence of non-truth-functional grounds. So, at least, so far as I can see (not far, l think), there is as yet no reason not to accept Modified Occam's Razor.