Philosophy, on its first introduction into Rome in the wake of
Greek literature, art and science, encountered fierce opposition, but the personal influence of the younger Scipio and his * hmoeh of mends procured the nevrleaming a hearing; and the teachers, cuttun. notably Panaetius, had the tact to keep abstruse speculation out of sight and present their subject to their Roman pupils on its practical and literary side. Each of the three Schools most prominent at the time, the Stoic, the Epicurean and the New Academy, gained some adherents,
but the influence of the first was undoubtedly the greatest and the most
permanent It has been well said that the heroes of the early Republic
were unconscious Stoics, and no sooner was this system of moral plillosophy
made intelligible to cultivated Romans than it exercised an irresistible attraction. In a time when religious belief was decaying, the best intellects
welcomed in its place a doctrine which had so strong an affinity with the
national character: there was a sort of informal alliance between the public
policy and the philosophic convictions of such a man as Cato. But, though
phil(»ophy had its triumphs at Rome, it never quite shook off the national
prejudice. Having been committed to the Republican cause by Cato, the
Stoics were Rcnerally in opposition during the early Empire, and more than
once the government, as a precautionary measure, banished philosophers
from Rome. The educational value of philosophic study was, indeed,
recognised, and its wide influence is attested by much of the best literature. But zeal on the part of the pupils never supplied the lack of initiative ; they had no ambition to found new schools of thought, originality was confined either to the choice of a system (thus Varro selected the Old Academy out of aS8 possible systems), or to the arbitrary fitting together of various parts from different. ^sterns, according to the individual's own caprice. In confining their attention to popular philosophy and to practical questions, the Roman students conformed to, and by their adhesion strengthened, a tendency already powerful in the later Greek schools, where the con-
troversies of centuries had led to scepticism on the one hand and eclecticism on the other. The doctrine of Epicurus at the very outset excited general interest in Italy and was for a time exceedingly popular. Cicero tells us that crude translations of Epicurean text- LumtTui!'*"" books, written in a wretched style by Amafinius and others,
enjoyed a wide circulation {Acad, i 5, 6; l^sc Dhp. i 6, ii 7, iv 6 f; Ad
Fam. XV 19, 2). Curiosity fastened on a theory which offered explanations
of all the natural phenomena, especially those which have ever excited awe
and dread tn the popular mind. The poem of Lucretius, Ht £etuM
I^atura, which superseded these earlier efforts, was the fruit of a thorough
study and complete assimilation of the system, which he embraced with the
passionate enthusiasm of a religious convert. We are compensated. foLibe
almost total loss of the voluminous works of Epicurus himself by the match-
less exposition of his Roman pupil. The first two books lay down the
main principles of the system and trace the process by which the world was
formed, the next deals with the soul, in Book iv the difficult problem of
perception is grappled with, and the rest of the poem deals with celestial
phenomena, and generally with what is infrequent and obscure in the order
of Nature. One of the most interesting f)arts of the poem is the passive
(v 780 ff) in which is traced the gradual progress of mankind and the
growth of civil society. (Cp. §915 i supra.) Epicimis adopted fully the common principle of the Greek
physicists that every event has a natural cause (er nihiio nihil), which' it' is the business of the inquirer to discover. He fully recc^nised that the laws of nature are constant (i 592 — 598). From Democritus he 1
void!"""' "fJ^ over the atomic theory, which postulates two ultimate 1 eidstencffS: — matter, and void space, both constant and in-
destructible. Vord^exists fio less than matter : all nature consists of void
and matter, and nothing is ever added to the sum of things, nothing is
annihilated. But matter or body must be carefully distinguished from what
we call ' things'. Matter is the general term for the inRnity of minute
indivisible solids, which are"'t]ie indestructible constituents of 'things'.
'Things', in spite of their seeming solidity, are a^egates, containing void
space within them as well as solid matter. It is from the atoms of solid matter within them that sucli aggregates derive the name of bodies. Each atom is a little kernel, perfectly solid and therefore indestructible ; for, being wi^out void, it does aotadmitxhe
disintegrating i^ency of wet, cold and fire. Besides being solid, unchange-
able, everlasting, it has the property of rebounding after impact, now known
as 'elasticity^. Being extended, it can be conceived as having parts, but
the atom IS not a compound of these parts, which are inseparable from it.
Atoms differ in shape, size and weight, such difference being due to the
different disposition of their least parts. The number of atoms of each
shape is infinite; the numbenof the-diCTerent shapes, though large, is finite; 'SOtnetimcs, as in 'red', in 'fire' and in 'lightning', atoms are spherical. They are too small to be perceived by sense, we discern them by reason alone. The aggregates, or things which are made up of atoms, have many
secondary qualities, e.g. colour, taste, hardness or softness, heat or cold,
sound, and odour, but none of these belong to the atoms. Lucretius argues
that, if we postulate solid atoms, soft, porous bodies can be explained by
the presence in them of void, and hard bodies by the closer union of the
atoms, whereas, on the assumption that the first principles of things are not
solid atoms, but porous, and therefore soft, it would be impossible to
explain the hardness of bodies (i 565 — 576); further, that the constancy of
the phenomena of nature necessarily implies the unchangeableness of the atoms (i 584 — S9^)* Ih?_inQ5t marvellous property of the atom isjts mo-
bility. Matter does not cohere inseparably massed together ;
atoms are in ceasdesS_inQliQirt' After collision, they can
neyet stop,"lait rebound in an opposite direction, with the original velocity
unaltered. If atoms ever slopped, this would mean the destruction
matter. Even when combined, they are still in motion. If some n '
within very narrow limits, they must move to and fro oftener thai
which form more porous bodies; for the velocity of atoms i
stone or iron is as great as when they are streaming through the vS
Lucretius, as to modem science, heat is a mode of motion ; ind< conceived life itself as a mode of motion and the difference of atomic
structure in any two substances as sufficient to account for any difference in their qualities, even for that between the living and the lifeless. The inherent motion of the atom is in parallel lines downward ; at least, it would be so, but for a capricious tendency of individual atoms to swerve ever so slightly from the perpendicular. This dinamen must be assumed in order
to account for the fact that atoms moving with uniform velocity in one
direction ever came into collision at all (ii zi6 — 150). Given that collision, the gradual process by which a world like ours was evolved
can be traced step by step with inexorable consistency. Here,
as elsewhere, Lucretius refused to see any evidence of design ; he held
firmly that, Jf atoms exist, the world must have made itself. By a 'world'
hS-means a system containing an earthi a heaven and heavenly bodies, mth
the ether as a barrier to protect it against danger from withouL Relatiray,
the earth is a large part of this world and occupies a large part of the space within it ; for Epicurus trusted his senses so far as to believe that the apparent size of the heavenly bodies was approximately their real size
(v 564). From the infinite void, which contains an infinity of worlds, some
like our world, others unlike it, there is a constant stream of the fresh
atoms necessary to repair the waste which is constantly going on. Our;
world and all worlds had a beginning and will have an end, its structure isj already decaying and it will one day be once more reduced to its con-|
stituent and imperishable atoms, The sou] is mortal : it is as much corporeal as the body of the
animal, but its matter is incoinparabty finer, some of its constituents are not found in inanimate things, and it is the unique character of its composition which accounts for the motions of
sensation {sensi/eri mgtus). Soulj as sentient (am'ma), is diffused_all. QVer
the body, but its principal part (animus, mens) has its seat in the bre^t : the two, however, form a single nature. Of the four kinds of atoms composing the soul, the first to feel are those of the fourth nameless substance; their motions are the sensations, which are transmitted to the atoms of heat, then to those of wind, then to those of air, and finally to those of the whole body. The beating of the heart in fear or joy proves that, like thought and will, the passions have their seat in the animus, where soul-atoms are condensed and give rise to a greater variety of complex motions. The
PencDtioD processes of sensation and intellect are alike explained on
the assumption of contact between the material soul and the
material object In some of the senses (sight, hearing and smell), and in
^ination, memory and thought, contact is not directly with the external
'tself, but with a film or husk given off by the object, which travels
khe intervening space and is lodged in the sensenji^jan or the mind,
^sary to assume that all bodies are constantly giving otT such iilms
_ ntions {simulacra, ti&oXa) of infinitesimal depth or thickness, but
preserving more or less faithfully the superiicial shape of the bodies which
discbarge them. The constant emission of particles by radium may serve
I to illustrate this hypothesis. It is in keeping with the rest of the system
\ that Epicurus derived all knowledge from the senses ; no one sense could
correct another, for their objects are different ; nor could reason correct
impressions of sense, for reason is ultimately derived from sense. . This
implicit trust in sense made Epicurus sceptical of the mathematical sciences,
which he supposed to contradict it; and the current views on astronomy he
rejected, whenever they conflicted with the evidence of the senses. He
demanded clear and explicit testimony for every inference; and, if this
could not be given, his conception of physical research was limited to the
suggestion of means by which, without contradicting known facts, the
phenomena in question might have come about. He preferred, where
possible, several explanations, and left us to take our choice. In ethics,
h(*was a hedonist : the pleasure of the agent is the only standard of con-
g , ducL^Cic De Finibus, i and ii). But pleasure is an ambiguous term, and it is not the excitement of the moment, but the
calm feeling of satisfaction, which succeeds the removal of discomfort,
which he set up as the end. Human misery springs largely from unsatisfied
wants: natural desires are easily satisfied, some desires are unnecessary and ought not to be gratified. This is still more true of Che whole class of
artificial or conventional desires, which are stimulated by idle fancy and the
opinion of others, the gratification bringing the agent no direct pleasure at
all. Ambition and the love of fame are illustrations. Justice is entirely
conventional, but the agent finds his advantage in fulfilling contracts and
'obeying authority, for 'honesty is the best policy'. Virtue should be
pursued, not as an end in itself, but as a means (indeed, as society is
constituted, a necessary and indispensable means) to happiness, which, as we have seen, means tranquil pleasure, /The existence of gods
* ' *' is guaranteed by our ideas and imaginations of them, which
must have an external cause. They are blessed and immortal beings,
inhabiting the inttrmundia, or interspaces between world and world, and
taking no part in the government of the world, a task which would effectu-
ally interfere with their happiness. On friendship Epicurus
'"' laid especial stress : it guaranteed the highest and purest
pleasure. The members of his school were to be a band of brothers and at the cost of some inconsistency, he maintained that on behalf of a friend
the wise man would even dare to die.
iosi> The interest of Cicero in philosophic studies was life-long and
sincere. He had good opportunities for becoming acquainted
with all the schools and had heard most of the leading men. ' ^ His reading was wide and directed by the ambition of adding a ntm
department to Roman literature. In the proems or introductions toMiis
dialogues, he combats the current opinion that the public were not ii^rested in philosophy and that it could not be effectively expounded in Latin. His own contributions were, as he tells Atticus (Ad Alt. xii 51), translations:
'droypa^ sunt,...uerba tantum adfero, quibusabundo'. He also supplied
the setting and the numerous illustrations from Roman life and history. He had no original views to publish, he merely expounded those of others,
taking them from some received Greek authority, Panaetius in De Officiis,
and possibly H&ato in the De Finibus. But, for exposition, he had a
rare talent and uncommon advant^es ; and, for all the haste with which he
wrote, he was fired with enthusiasm for his subject and vrith the desire to
produce a really good book upon it. (Cp. § 972 supra.") As Cicero professedhimself an adherent of the New Academy, it
is necessary to explain the meaning of the term before we proceed to con-
sider his exact relation to contemporary thought Plato's school, after the
death of its founder, had passed through many vicissitudes. /FgL^^tirne
the teaching was rjngtnntin nnd mniply p^hiral the peculiM: Platonic
metaphysics being either greatly modified or quietly" propped. In this
phase Tl~ft known as Hm Old Academy. TTTis dogmatic teaching was
abandoned by Arc£silas (died 140 b.c), under whose headship the school
became the home of scepticism, by which is meant free inquiry, unbiassed
by any positive conviction. As much could be advanced for, as against,
any opinion under discussion, and the wise man, renouncing absolute
knowledge as unattainable, held his judgement in abeyance
(iirox^). This sceptical phase is known generally as the New AMdrmy",
Academy. Sometimes, however, Arcesilas and his immediate
successors are called the Middle Academy, and the New Academy proper is
made to begin a century later with CarnSides (214 — 129), the most gifted
of all the successors of Plato. Arcesilas and Carneades both contended that, in their scepticism, they were the legitimate heirs of the Socratic and
Platonic traditio'nT^^ut it was one thing to maintain with Arcesilas the
abstract thesis that knowledge is unattainable : it was another and harder
task to prove by argument that it had not been attained. Cameadeji
essayed this task. He undertook to overthrow the existing dogmatic
systems by a refutation of their dogmas in detail, and the negative dialectic
with which he attacked them made him the terror of all his contemporaries,
jMrticularly the Stoics. At the same time, he developed a doctrine of ,
probability which, so far as action was concerned, served as a substitute for
the certainty which he regarded as beyond our reacK In the long run,
however, simple agnosticism failed to satisfy the tendency of the time, which
became ever more distinctively eclectic and sought to discover in the
different schools a common basis for practical morality. Some concessions
to dogmatism were made by Philo of Larissa (c. 88) : things, he said, were
in their own nature knowable, but not by the standard of knowledge which
th« Stoics proposed. His disciple, Antiochus of Ascalon (^. 78), weary of
a |ppeless straggle, at length recanted his agnostic errors and declared
knowle^e to be possible. In thus violently breaking with the sceptical
tradition of the past two centuries, he professed to revive the Old Academy,
but the staple element of his eclectic doctrine was distinctively Stoic,
although, in defiance of plain historical fact, he accused the Stoics of having
borrowed it without acknowledgement from the Academy. In Cicero's case there is a wide gulf between speculative inquiries in general and (heir particular application to morals. On
Phiiouphic tjjg theoretical issue, he remained loyal to the scepticism, or
poillieo of , . . ' „ ,4-, .. J, Cicera. rather agnosticism, of Cameades. He was equally opposed to the compromise of Philo and the downright surrender of
Antiochus. He valued highly the privilege of criticising all opinions without being committed unreservedly to the defence of any, a privilege which
a barrister above alt men would appreciate. Nothing can be known, but
one opinion may be maintained as more probable than another. When,
however, we come to questions of law and morality, the case is different.
The use which Cicero here makes of his freedom to hold whatever opinion
seems probable, is a singular one. He wholly dissociates himself from the
negative views of Cameades. Nothing had done so much to prejudice the
average Roman against philosophy at the very outset as the versatility with
which Cameades on two successive days advocated arguments, first for, and
then against, the obligations of justice. With such an attitude Cicero had no sympathy, any more than with the utilitarian ethics of Epicurus. A
violent reaction against both led him at first to accept the eclecticism of
Antiochus, but gradually he approximated more closely to the Stoics, whose
rigid consistency and moral idealism had an attraction for him, as for other
Romans, in spite of [he hard criticism which he passed upon them-
Hence, in reviewing his opinions, we have to distinguish the pupil of
Cameades, in the Academica, De Natura Deorum, De Diuinatiom and De
Fate, from the pupil of Antiochus, in De Legibus and De Finibus, and from
the defender of Stoic ethics in the Tusailam and t>e Offidis. We can
never be sure, however, whether any opinion advanced in Cicero's works is
really his own, and he protests emphatically that he is not bound by
previous utterances and that it is a mistake to fasten upon himself the
inconsistencies of his different writings {Tusc. v 33 and 82 f)'. ' How diflicult ii is, in the absence of a irualworthy clue, (o infer from internal
evidence what authority he \% al the time following may be seen from one instance. In
Ihe Tuieulan Diipulatiom the preference is given lo the Stoic conception of emotion, as
somelbing, in its own nature, vicious, and therefore 10 be eradicated. The more
ro53— loss] In the current view, there were two great problems of philosophy,
one theoretical, the criterion of truth, the other practical, the
end of action. With the first of these Cicero deals in the T'le ciiurioo
Acadtmica. The question discussed is whether knowledge is Aca^timica.
possible, and the single book of the earlier edition now extant
gives the arguments of the dogmatist for, and of the agnostic (in the person of Cicero) against, this possibility. The former points to the body of received
truth possessed by the arts and sciences and insists on the suicidal inconsistency of the Sceptic in maintaining, whether dogmatically or otherwise,
that knowledge is impossible. Moreover, such a view paralyses action,
brings man to the level of a machine, and renders definition impossible.
But the stress of the Carneadean onslaught had reduced the dogmatists to
the defensive, and much space is devoted to an examination of those facts of experience (hallucinations, dreams, delusions of the insane) from which
the inference was apparently irresistible that there was no criterion for
discriminating the true from the false. On this issue, the reply of the
agnostic is overwhelming. The position of the Epicurean, who placed
implicit faith in the senses, is intelligible, that of the Sceptic, who distrusted
them all, is likewise intelligible, but a dogmatist has to base knowledge on
the senses, while at the same time admitting that they are sometimes
deceived. That this is impossible is shown in detail. For action, again,
Cicero insists that probability is just as good a guide as knowledge.
Lastly, in a review of the entire history of philosophy, he dwells with
evident delight upon the inconsistent and sometimes absurd opinions on
every conceivable subject advanced by different Schools. What, then,
becomes of that body of received truth which is the common possession of
the sciences ? The exact impression which the treatise De Natura Deorum
was intended to leave on the reader, is not quite clear. The honours of
debate rest with the negative critic, although the author professes his own
sympathy with the Stoic supporter of orthodoxy. The theological views of
the two great contemporary Schools, the Stoic and the Epicurean, are alone
seriously expounded, and are in turn subjected to merciless criticism at the
hands of the New Academy, represented by Cotta. \n De Diuinatione
and De Fato (the latter a fragment) the treatment is very similar. A Stoic
doctrine, in the one case divination, in the other fate, is first expounded
and then riddled with all the skill and ingenuity of that negative criticism
in which Carneades excelled. The other chief problem of philosophy was a practical one : what
is the chief good ? This forms the subject of De Finibus. The Epicurean doctrine that pleasure is the end of action is ^"/'.viw"?''" ' expounded in Book i and refuted from Stoic sources in Book II. Stoicism finds a champion and exponent in the person of Cato mtxletate doclrlne of Ihe Academy, which permitted emotion to be indulged wilhin
bounds, is rejecied. Vet, in spiie of ihis Stoic linge, some scholars contend that this
treatise is modelled upon a work by the Academic Philo. in Book 111. The reply of Cicerd in Book iv is on the lines of Antiochus,
embodying his unhistorical assumption that there was no real difTerence on
ethics between the Stoics and the Old Academy, and that Zeno stole the
doctrines of his predecessors and invented a ctabbed terminology to
conceal the theft. The views of Antiochus on the whole question of the
chief good are presented as a positive doctrine in Book v. He did not
hold with the Stoics that virtue alone is self-sufficient for happiness; the
complex nature of man requires that he should be adequately furnished
with corporeal and external, as well as with mental, goods. Nevertheless,
virtue is the supreme, though not the only, good. In the earlier unfinished
work, De Legiius, law is treated from the same Antiochean standpoint but
with closer approximation to Stoicism, and the New Academy is quietly
snubbed (i 39). Cicero is sometimes said to have been the first to state
explicitly that all men have innate moral ideas (notiones innatae, natura
nobis insltae), and that the belief in the existence and immortality of God is
found in mankind everywhere (eonsensus gentium). But, on closer examina-
tion, we discover that Cicero's innate ideas are merely his somewhat
rhetorical way of presenting the Stoic conception of hvouii or rpoK^^tvi,
and, as these are similarly developed in normal man everywhere, the Stoics
often employed the argument from consensus gentium. Cicero's accuracy has often been impugned. But,'setting aside
the carelessness ineWtable in hasty writing {e.g. Acad. Post. ecuracy. . ^^^^ ^^^ gravei charge has not been substantiated. He is
our earliest authority for the later Greek systems; at the time he wrote, the Stoa and the Academy had passed through many phases of doctrine, and,
except in a few cases where he cites his authority, it is not easy to determine which phase or which philosopher he is reporting. As a mere
question of probability, the chances are far greater that his statements are
accurate than that we have the means of correcting them- His very
dependence upon his sources (of which the translation of part of Plato's
Timaeus for the purpose of insertion in some work contemplated, but never
written, is a proof), makes his philosophical writings a treasure-house of r.luable fragments and testimonia.
1057. In the history of Stoicism it is usual to distinguish three periods.
In the first, from Zeno (c. 350 — 264) to the death of
of'stoic'i^' Chrysippus {e. 208-4), 'he theory was elaborated. The
next two centuries form a period of transition, during which
the older doctrines were modified, simplified and occasionally relaxed in an eclectic spirit : it was in this modified form that they began to be taught at
Rome. In the last period, under the Empire, the practical Roman intellect
made its influence felt by a reaction against scientific theory altogether.
1058. Zeno (ob. 364), the founder of .the school, adopted the famous
threefold division of philosophy into (i) Iq^ic, (2) physics,
stai!^iiii. including psychology and theology, and (3) ethics. Logic is a mere propaedeutic of philosophy, its most important function being to determine what is the standard of truth. The Stoics adopted
an empirical theory of knowledge ; not, however, without concessions to
rationalism. At lirst, we are told, they were content with right reason as
the standard, but, as their doctrine became definitely more materialistic,
they looked for their criterion in sensation, empirical notions or pre-
conceptions, as well as in vpokij^w {noiiorus, ttotitiae). The presentations
or impressions (uim, iJMvTiuriiu), which the senses convey to the mind, are often erroneous A certain peculiar definite- ^f'^th'*''"'
ness, a degree of force, in impressions is the ultimate test of
their truth, because it satisfies us, immediately and irresistibly, that such an impression must proceed from a real object and agree with it and could
not have been produced by an unreal object. When this is the case, the
mind, itself active, by giving assent (aiisensio, miyKaToBtuii) to the im-
pression, grasps and apprehends a real object. Like all the later Schools,
the Stoics were materialists. Nothing exists but body,
for body alone is capable of acting and being acted upon.
At the same time, any mechanical explanation of the universe, such as
that of £[ifi:{iKis/ is insufficient, and must give place lo a teleolt^'cal
explanation. Everywhere we see the adaptation of means lo ends : as
in human actions, so in nature, every event fulfils a purpose. If this
teleolt^y is combined with dynamic materialism^ the result is monism or
pantheism. What ultimately exists is at once spirit and matter, or, in other
words, spirit is itself one, the purest, form of matter, viz. ether. We must
conceive it as fiery breath and carefully distinguish it, as the element of warmth, by which all life is sustained, from the destroying fire which we know upon earth. This divine primitive substance may either remain what
it is in its purity, or it may be transformed by perpetual succession into its
various modifications, the four elements, out of which all particular things,
all bodies, animate or inanimate, are formed. All of them are permeated
by the divine ether or spirit in varying degrees of tension. This identical
essence, manifested in diverse forms in everything that exists, makes the
universe one. Moreover, its unity is not that of casual a^egation : it
forms an organic whole, to which all the parts are so related that they are
in mutual sympathy; and, whatever directly affects one member, affects
them all. For the world is a living being, an animal, 'whose
body Nature is, and God the soul". It is both sentient and
intelligent. By intelligence it conthils and directs all that happens ;
whether it be called 'Reason, Providence, Nature, or Fate, makes no
difference. God is meant by all these terms, and God is the living
universe. The creation, development, and ultimate destruction of this
universe, are all phases in the life of this eternal Being. By the unceasing
law of fate a time will come when the world and all that it contains will be
merged in the primeval fire, only to be created anew, when it will run
identically the same course as before. Pope's Essay en Man, i 968. The parallel between the individual and the universe, the
The tout microcosm and the macrocosm, is best seen in psychology. As God is, in essence, fiery breath, the soul of the universe,
so the soul which holds tc^ether and moves the human body is a fiery
breath or sentient exhalation, fed by exhalations from the blood. Here
is a striking contrast with the Epicurean psychology. In both systems
the soul is corporeal, but, in that of Epicurus, life, sensation and reason
are produced from lifeless atoms, themselves devoid of sensation and
reason. According to the Stoics, the soul grows to the perfection of reason
with the growth of the body. Its essence is one, its varying functions
being conditioned by the varying degrees of tension in its substance.
There can be no distinct parts of the soul, as maintained by Plato and
Aristotle ; and, when the Stoics speak of eight parts, they are careful to
explain them as currents or channels, permeating the whole body and
connecting the ruling principle {Y/t/iovixuv) in the heart with the extremities.
The soul is not immortal, but after separation from the body the souls of
the wise endure for a time, viz., until the general conflagration at the end
of the present cycle of existence.
On this groundwork of physics the Stoics based their ethical doctrine. Good, the end of life, is defined as agreement
with nature — whether the individual nature of man or, as
Cleanthes maintained, the nature of the universe, had been left undefined
by Zeno. Chrysippus held that the term 'nature' embraced both. This
harmony with nature consists in virtue. Virtue is the one unconditional
good, good at all times and under all circumstances. Similarly, vicis is
absolutely and at all times evil. All intermediate things are morally
indifferent {intiifermiia, dSuii^opa), but have d^rees of worth and worth-
lessness, positive and negative value {aestimatio, inaesHmalio), according
as they are in conformity with, or contrary to, nature. Such value as
belongs to things indifferent, is not a permanent attribute, but is contingent
upon circumstances: so that what at one time accords with nature, may at
another time conflict with it The emotions are not produced by any
principle in the soul distinct from reason ; for the unity of the soul would be sacrificed by the recognition of any such principle. They can only
be defined as morbid states of the reason itself, due to excessive Impulse
and ultimately to an erroneous judgement The soul which forms a iaise
estimate of the value of things, is hurried by a violent and irregular movement towards fancied goods in pleasure and desire and away from fancied evils in grief and fear, these being the four leading species of emotion. The contrast here with the teaching of Plato and Aristotle is obvious. So long as parts or faculties of the soul, essentially distinct, were recognised, it was the function of the reason to regulate and control the impulses of
the lower animal nature, fiut the Stoics deduce from the unity of the
soul the unity of its activity, whether in a healthy or a morbid state.
Hence they demanded no mere regulation of the passions, but their entire suppression and eradication. The absence of reason not only renders
virtue impossible in the child or in the brute ; it makes emotion and vice
equally impossible. The truly 'wise' man performs all his actions in
accordance with reason and virtue, being preserved by his wisdom from
intellectual error, no less than from moral failings. Mankind are sharply
divided into the two classes of the 'wise' and the 'foolish'; and, as virtue and vice admit of no degrees, every action of the former is a right action
(rettum, icoropSui/ui), of the latter is wrong {pueatutn, dfiapTTj/ta). Here
Stoicism approaches Christian ethics : the passionless sage, like the Christian
saint, is set over against a world lying in wickedness, The change from
the state of folly to the state of wisdom was at first regarded as an
instantaneous conversion, and the question- of final perseverance, or the
possibility of a lapse from wisdom, had as much interest for the older
Stoics as for Christian theologians. In the above meagre outline the moral idealism of the earlier
Stoics is as conspicuous as the optimism of their physics. Otj^er creeds and systems point 10 a brighter future, whether on earth itself or in a life
beyond: Stoicism takes the world as it is, and resolutely finds it here and
now perfect. It can hardly be said to have flourished in Greece. Men
were repelled by its indifference to art and culture, its swictamin
pedantic formalism, and uncouth terminology. Two causes thcHcsnd
profoundly altered its character and prospects; firstly, the P^^od.
criticism of Carneades, who fastened upon the many inconsistencies of the
Stoics and compelled the more intelligent among them to reconsider their position ; secondly, the necessity of modifying what was originally a
speculative doctrine, to meet the needs of the Romans. The two men
most instrumental in introducing philosophy to Rome were also the most
considerable figures in the middle period of Stoicism and handled the
traditional doctrine with great freedom. PanaeCius (180 — in), the friend of Scipio and Laelius, came as
the missionary of Hellenic culture, commending to his Roman pupils the works of Plato, whom he reverenced and
admired, as readily as those of his Stoic predecessors. He himself
diverged from orthodoxy on several points. He denied the doctrine of
a general conflagration and, in consequence, the limited immortality
which early Stoics had held out as the privilege of the souls of 'wise'
men. He rejected the old Stoic doctrine of divination. In these de-
viations it is easy to trace the influence of Carneades. In ethics, he
adopted a terminology less calculated to offend common sense and
common prejudices. He divided virtues into two classes, theoretical
and practical. Without altogether abandoning the aspiration after perfect
wisdom and virtue, he recognised that his business was with those who
had set out on the road to virtue, and were a long way removed from
the ideal 'sage.' It was for these he wrote his treatise ir«pi roij mi^
ncotTM, of which we have a paraphrase in the first two books of Cicero's De Officiis, dealing successively with the (MAdK or honestum, and the
u^fXifioi' or ulile. Poseiddniiis of Apimfa (c. 130 — 46) was the pupil of Panaetius, and the last great Stoic who took an interest in theoretical
philosophy! ^nd busied himself with the positive sciences.
It is probable that his work n-fpi 0(uv has been used by Cicero in Book it of the De Natura Deorvm. As regards divination and the general
conflagration, he fell back upon the orthodox Stoic view. In psychology,
he abandoned the strict unity of the soul, finding it impossible to explain
the emotions as morbid conditions of the reason, and'with Plato and
Aristotle assumed an irrational part of the soul (ira^riKdi') to account for
them. He also maintained the immortality, and, very probably, the preezistence, of the rational soul. Many tendencies in the later Stoics, such
as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, are explained by his influence. The Romans in general cared little for the ground-work of theory.
Attitude t* ''"' vicx^ profoundly interested in all which concerned religion,
the popular The Stoics from the first, while maintaining that the universe
"ligion. j^ God, had taken the popular theology under their patronage. Rationalising and allegorising the myths, they could interpret the many divinities of the poets as all manifestations of the one supreme Being. In this defence of the truth in polytheism, etymology played a large part. Nor, again, if all events happen by divine ordinance, is it at all unreasonable to suppose that what is fore-ordained should be disclosed by God to His rational creatures through signs and portents for their warning and instruction. Upon this principle, and upon the interdependence and close sympathy existing between all parts of the one universe, was based the philosophic defence of augury, oracles and divination. This twofold attitude of the system, at once tolerant and critical, towards the popular beliefs and cults attracted the Roman statesmen who, anxious, on polirical grounds, to uphold the national faith, gladly accepted the assurance of the philosophers that it was an imperfect adumbration of ultimate truth. In the Second Book De Natura Deorvm, we find Cicero's Stoic DcMumii advancing the most dissimilar arguments to prove the existence of the gods. Some of them are wholly inconclusive, such as the universal belief of mankind : for this wide-spread belief in anthropomorphic beings, resting partly on legends of their intervention in human affairs, certainly could not establish what the Stoics wished to prove, viz., that the universe itself is living, sentient, intelligent and perfect. Again, to argue from divination, auguries and oracles is. to ai^ue in a circle, for the divine existence would be assumed as the main argument in support of divination. Popular superstition might be satisfied with such grounds of belief, but the philosophical arguments, cited from Zeno and Chrysippus, are of a very different order. They start with the assumption that the universe is perfect What has reason is better than what has not reason : therefore the universe, as the best of things, must possess reason. ' The universe as a whole must be more perfect than its parts, it must be sentient, because it has sentient parts ; and intelligent, because one part, man, is intelligent. The inference is from the effect to the cause. We assume that there are everywhere the marLs of adaptation and design, such as no human reason, or human power, could produce : the effects, and in particular the phenomena of the heavenly bodies, point to a cause, and this must be an intelligence superior to that of man. The scale of existence rises by gradual ascent from vegetable to animal, from animal to human existence ; and, if the universe is perfect, this scale must be completed in a Being who is perpetually virtuous and wise, in whom the striving after perfection common to all finite natures finds its fulfilment. These a^uments establish the divinity of the whole universe, conceived, as in Plato's Timaeus, as spherical. But its activity is not limited to the eternal revolution of the heavenly sphere. It is displayed in the creation and government of the particular beings over whom it exerts its providence. The highest of such individual existences are the spirits of the stars, inhabiting the purest element, ether. From the point of vantage obtained by these results the gods of mythology admit of easy explanation. They are personifications either of the forces of nature, like Jupiter and Neptune ; or of benefits universally enjoyed, lite Ceres and Liber ; of virtues and passions, hke Concord, Victory, Ops and Venus ; or even of departed human benefactors, like Hercules, Aesculapius and Quirinus. Here, it
is easy to recognise two distinct lines of argument. The cosmological
proof or argument from design is used explicitly, the ontological used
implicitly, when it is assumed that the universe is perfect and thtrefore
corresponds in actuality to our conception of what is perfect. The
opposition of the Stoics to the Epicureans was bitter and uncompromising,
and many parts of the system are best explained by contrast with Epicurean
tenets. This is the case with the doctrine of providence. The working
of intelligence, the adaptation of means to ends, which the Stoics saw every-
where, was fiercely denied by Epicurus. The God of the Stoics foreknows
and ordains all events, even to the minutest details ; the Epicureans, and
agnostics like Carneades, joined issue with them, pointing to the calamities
which befall the innocent and the virtuous and to notorious examples of
prosperous villainy. It was easy to retort that external circumstances are
not the rewards of virtue or of vice. Still, a difficulty remained in the
familiar fact of ' conquered good and conquering ill ', which is but a part , of the tai^er problem, the existence of moral evil in a perfect universe.
This problem the Stoics were bound to face, and they offered the best
solution they could. Either, it may be said, God is the author of all
things except wickedness ; or, the very nature of good presupposes its
contrary, evil ; or, there may be a point of view from which what we call
evil is not evil. The same fundamental difference of view appears, when the two
Schools, at the outset of their ethical inquiries, take up the purely psychological question: — what are the objects of natural and instinctive desire?
It may seem absurd to assume that any special importance for ethics can
attach to observations of the unreasoning actions of children and the lower
animals. However, both Schools joined in making the assumption and
only differed as to the fnterpretation of the facts. Epicurus interpreted
them as showing that every movement and action was directed to the
attainment of pleasure. The Stoics asserted, on the contrary, that, not
pleasure nor freedom from pain, but self-preservation, was the end
instinctively sought. The exposition of Stoic ethics in the
&t FinibM •pjjjj.j gj^jj j^^ Finibus starts from this point In man, as
in every other animal, from the moment of birth natural
impulse {appefiius, ipi^n) prompts to self-preservation, and to the mun-
tenance of the physical frame in its original integrity. Thus, self-love is
anterior in our experience to pleasure or pain and is presupposed in all pursuit
of particular pleasures or avoidance of particular pains. The objects of
these early impulses, the so-called prima naturae (or s-piuni koto ^vviv),
are partly corporeal, health and bodily soundness, partly mental, the
knowledge which we acquire, either directly through the senses or in-
directly through the arts and sciences : they do not include
naiune. pleasure. The phrase prima naturae was adopted by the Stoics from the Old Academy, and the relation to virtue of
these primary natural advantages caused no little trouble, exposing them
to damaging criticism. According to the strict theory of the Older School,
these objects must belong to the class of things intermediate, which in
themselves are neither good nor evil ; no added value can make them
good ; any such addition is infinitesimal in comparison with the absolute
value which attaches to virtue. And yet, under the pressure of con-
troversy, the Stoics of the middle period endeavoured to bring them into
some sort of connexion with the end. Cicero's Stoic speaks of them, like
all things intermediate, as the field for the exercise of wisdom. Though
not in themselves good, they are secondary results procured by what is
moral, honeslum, ro koXov (De Fin. iii 31, 39. 49). Thus, all or most of
the things commonly judged to be good (though the older Stoics had
refused to call them so) — such as health, strength, wealth, fame — are
brought within the sphere of the wise man's choice, and yet his real good
still lies solely in the wisdom of the''choice, and not in the thing chosen.
This is illustrated by a simile : — an archer aims at a bull's eye, but his end
is not the mark itself, but the manifestation of his skill in hitting it (16.
iii 2i). The same tendency is shown in the classification of actions. Of
intermediate things, those which are natural are to be preferred (praepotita,
Trporrfi^iva); their opposites, which are contrary to nature, are to be rejected
{reiecta, a.irtnrpoijyfi.a'a.). Every action connected with the former is an
appropriate action {officium, KoBi^Kov), which is dehned as
'any action, the performance of which admitsjof reasonable
justilication '. Reason requires us to perform such actions. The wise man and the fool alike choose what is natural, and reject what is contrary
to nature, so that here they are on common ground. Both may perform
the same external act, e^. of faithfully returning a deposit ; it is the motive
which underlies the performance which makes the difference. The action
is not virtuous unless it be done with the right intention, which the
possession of wisdom can alone ensure. Virtuous action is appropriate
action carried to perfection, and this implies the imperfect performance
(in^atum officiutn or simply efficium, fMaov KaBiJKOv). It was inevitable
that, as the perfect sage receded more and more into the region of the
ideal, moralists should take more and more account of these appropriate
actions ; and this offiaum of the Stoics, and not the KaropSioiJM, forms (he
startii^-point for the modern conception of duty. The view thus taken
of appropriate action or inchoate duty admits of a very special application
to the case of suicide, which was regarded as permissible, ^^^^ for the wise and unwise alike, under stress of special external
circumstances. We must remember that the Stoics held the good to be
independent of time; the temporal , prolongation added no whit to
happiness. Its characteristic is seasonableness («wcoipia). We must
further remember that lijjej and death belong to the class of things
intermediate which .gj^s'ubmitted to the wise man's choice, and which
determine all his plans. If anyone, on reviewing his external circumstances,
finds that those in accord with nature preponderate, it is appropriate for
him to remain in Ufe ; if the balance inclines the other way, or seems
likely to do so, it is appropriate to quit life (migrare de uila, tvXnym
iiaytoYn)- The door is open ; nothing compels him to stay. The
principle here laid down (th. 60, 6t) covers the case of Cato himself,
and of the host of Stoics who, particularly in the reign of Nero, followed
his example. It was on the social side of ethics that the Stoic theory presented
the greatest contrast with that of Epicurus. The latter had _ , . ,,
, ■ , ■ , r r 1 • , f Socl«l ethlci.
no place in his scheme for a mans duties to the State, or
even 10 his neighbours, unless they were his friends. The Epicurean
sage would not marry, would not engage in politics, would not, in fact,
assume any of the responsibilities of social life, from which, nevertheless,
he strove to derive as much advantage for himself and his friends as
possible. His motto was Aa'fl< ^luo-as. Here, however, where their
opponents were weakest, the Stoics made their most original contributions
to practical morality. They conceived the whole universe as a common-
wealth embracing gods and men, under divine government and with a
common law in virtue of the reason which man shares with God
(Dt Finibus, iii 64; De Ltgibus, i 33). They taught that the general
interest must be preferred to our own. They required men to maintain
the obligations of the family and the Slate. Man was made for society,
and justice has a natural basis. Men are united in social fellowship : all
being God's creatures, they should observe contracts, abstain from mutual
ham), and combine to protect one another from injury. Even the tie of
common humanity demands, not only just dealing, but an active benevolence
and kindness. The extension of the Roman Empire approximately realised
the dream of one world-wide commonwealth for civilised mankind, its
members bound each to each by civil law, if not by the law of nature.
The idea of an immutable law, emanating from God, reason or nature, was clearly apprehended and assimilated by the Roman Stoics.
of'naiutc. ^^ divine and eternal, this law of nature is valid for all at all times and places, and is superior in authority to any
positive legislation that may conflict with it. Or again, as Cicero puts it,
it is the utterance of that supreme reason which is implanted in the mind
of each man at birth, and, when duly developed, enjoins unmistakeably
what he should or should not do {reda ratio in iubendo el uttando, De
Legibus, i 33). From Cicero onwards, through a long succession of lawyers
more avowedly Stoical, this conception guided Roman jurisprudence and
through the praetor's edict influenced legislation. In the ius gentium,
developed to meet the practical needs of intercourse with foreigners, Rome ,
already possessed the germ of a law common to all nations. The great
jurists of the Empire exerted themselves to bring it into conformity with
what, in their judgement, a universal code should be, id quod naturalis
ratio apud omnes homines (onslituit. Thus, the positive ordinances and
customs of actual society were gradually merged in the rational law of an
ideal community. Before the rise of imperial Rome the narrow limits of
the City-State had been transcended in consequence of Alexander's
conquests, and that cosmopolitan spirit, which external causes contributed
to foster, exactly corresponded with the precepts of philosophy. For the later Roman Stoics we have in Latin the writings of Seneca (^991-5) and in Greek the discourses of Epictetus reported by Arrian and the meditations of the Emperor
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Seneca (who died in 65 a.d.) was, like
most Roman Stoics, an eclectic'. He is our earliest authority (belonging to
the School itself) whose writings have come down to us at Rrst-hand and
not in fr^ments or translations, but they are of little scientific value, partly
from his eclecticism, partly from his mode of treatment. Under whatever
title, dialogues, treatises, epistles, his works are substantially moral essays
on practical themes. The Naturales Quaestiones form an exception : in
them, by precept and example, the author recommends the contemplation
of the wonders of nature as a means of elevating the mind. When Seneca ' II is an inlere^ting fad ihal two of his philosophical teachers, Soiion and rapfrius
Fabianiu, were 'adherenis of the one avowedly independenl school which claimed lo be of
native Roman origin. Its founder, Quintus Sextius Niger {horn aboul 70 B.C.), seems to
have confined his originality lo combining Pythagorean elements with a variation on
Stoicism, into which he infused a fresh vigour of moral leal and a conlempl for useless
dialectics. Seneca, who several limes mentions him, describes him, in spite of his own
denial, as a Stoic [Ep. 64). does touch upon the theoretical side of - Stoicism, it is in the hope of
finding some novelty to interest his readers and almost in the spirit of
antiquarian research, quae scire magis iuual quam predest {£pp. 58, 65,
89, 106). In short, his mission was Co the reason and conscience of men,
but it was no part of his ambition to be a thinker himself, or to make
thinkers of others. Indifference to exact scientific theory and willingness
to accept good moral teaching from any quarter, from Plato or Epicurus
as readily as from Chrysippus, is not peculiar to Seneca, it is the common
characteristic of all writers of this period. To be over-curious on speculative
questions is generally regarded as reprehensible, as diverting the attention
of the individual from the all-important task of his own moral improve-
ment. Here it is worth while to note how important has become the
conception of the moral life as a pilgrimage, a progress Progremi
towards virtue and away from folly and vice {progressio ad «<n™tdi
uirtutem, trpoKtnrq). In the eyes of the earlier Stoics, who ^ '""'
claimed wisdom for themselves and expected others to attain to it, such a state of probation was a concession to individual weakness, and, after all,
the probationer was involved in the same condemnation as the fool. How
diderent this is in Seneca ! He does not claim to be a sage himself, he is
only progressing towards wisdom, and he sadly recognises that this is the
common condition of humanity. How are we to emerge from the misery
and folly of the world ? The way to virtue is easy to find, but the life
of one who treads it is a continual struggle with inward corruption. It is
a campaign in which there is no repose, in preparation for which a man
needs not only ascetic bodily exercise, meagre diet and coarse raiment,
but the harder mental discipline of keeping a strict guard on his opinions
and notions, and controlling his affections and desires. Opinions and
notions, affections and impulses are in our own power (ru ii^ ijt^tv) ;
external circumstances, our bodies, wealth and position in the world are
not in our power (ra oIk t'ft ijnir). By constant effort alone can we emerge
victorious from the conflict, and build up a fixed habit and rational
character. Philosophy, in the view of Seneca and Epictetus, comes to be
regarded as the healer to whom men come from a sense of their weakness
and disease, whose business is 'with the sick, not with the whole'. The
wisdom by which she heals, needs no long dissertations or dialectical
subtleties, but rather continual meditation and self-discipline. On the
religious side may be noted a greater feeling of dependence upon God and
the necessity of cheerfully submitting to the Divine will and acquiescing
in the course of external events. 'Endurance and renunciation' is the
motto of Epictetus, avixov vai iiir(;^ov : ' everything ', says Marcus Aurelius,
' is harmonious to me which is harmonious to Thee, O Universe '. The
duties of philanthropy, mildness, and fo^iveness of injuries, are insisted
upon. We should love men from the heart, love even those who have
injured us, reflecting that they are kinsmen who err through ignorance.
Tolerant judgement will be aided, if we bear in mind that he who hurts us by word or deed has acted on his own opinion, not outs, and that, if he
does wrong, it is he who suffers, for he is the person deceived. It is not
surprising to find an underlying vein of sadness in these Roman Stoics.
Their moral earnestness made them realise the misery and folly of the
actual world and the obstacles to a radical reform of human nature. In
some directions, however, their efforts were not unsuccessful. In particular,
their insistence on the duty of a more humane treatment of slaves led the
way to that gradual amelioration of slavery throughout the Roman world
which Christianity afterwards completed.
Zellet's Philosophie der Griecktn, Vol. iii i (Dritter Thcil, Erstc Abtheilung),
has been translated into English under the tides The Stoics,
Bibiiocnphy. Epicureans and Sceptia,a.'aA The History of Eclecticism in Greek
Philosophy. For Stoicism consult also Grant's essay in The Ethics 0/ Aristotle,
Vol. i; for the ancient aulhorities on Epicurus, Usener's Epicures, 1887; for
Lucretius, the edition of H. A. J. .Munra, the more recent Italian edition of
Giussani, 1896, Guyau, La morale d'ipicure, 1878, J. Masson, .^/offtiV Theory
0/ Lucretius, 1%^^ and Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet, 1907-9; for Cicero,
Madvig's De Finibus, Reid's Aeademica, J. B. Mayor's De Nalura Deorum ;
for Seneca and later Stoics, Martha, £m moralistes sous tempire romain, ed. 5,
1886, Bonhoefler, Epictet und die Stoa, 1890, and Die Ethik des Stoikers EpicUt,
1894, S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero lo Marcus Aurelius, 1904. For
Stoicism and Epicureanism, cp. also J. Adam's Texts. ..on Greek Philosophy
after Aristotle, 1902, and R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (with select biblio-
graphy), igio.
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