GRICE E VERRECCHIA

  "Developing Series" -- From Aristotle To Grice -- And Back I'm analyzing a passage from Ethica Nichomachea by Aristotle -- what a difficulty!  It is mentioned by Grice in his "Method in philosophical  psychology".  Apparently, Aristotle coined the term, 'developing series'. This when first reading Grice, I thought it was a boring notion in evolution theory; but it's not: it's a fascinating area of semantics.  For Aristotle (and Grice), various notions allow for a 'developing  series'.  One is _number_ indeed. Aristotle criticises Plato for having failed to  reflect on 'number' (but only on oneness, twoness, threness, etc). Then  Aristotle uses the argument of 'developing series' not just for 'number' but to elucidate the meaning of 'good' (agathon) -- as per the passage below.  Finally, and this is what interested primarily Grice: to identify  'psyche' in terms of a 'developing series'. Thus, Grice quotes Witters. Witters  had said, "an animal can expect food (e.g. Geary's feral cats) but a man can expect a drought in the summer. Yet we wouldn't say that 'expect' has a  different sense for cats and men. It's a developing series.  Aristotle writes:  "to men gar zên koinon einai phainetai kai tois phutois, zêteitai de to idion. aphoristeon ara tên te threptikên kai tên auxêtikên zôên. hepomenê de aisthêtikê tis an eiê, phainetai de kai autê koinê kai hippôi kai boï kai panti  zôiôi. leipetai dê praktikê tis tou logon echontos: toutou de to men hôs  epipeithes logôi, to d' hôs echon kai dianooumenon. dittôs de kai tautês legomenês tên kat' energeian theteon: kuriôteron gar hautê dokei legesthai. ei  d' estin ergon anthrôpou psuchês energeia kata logon ê mê aneu logou, to d' auto  phamen ergon einai tôi genei toude kai toude spoudaiou, hôsper kitharistou kai  spoudaiou kitharistou, kai haplôs dê tout' epi pantôn, prostithemenês tês kata  tên aretên huperochês pros to ergon: kitharistou men  gar kitharizein, spoudaiou  de to eu: ei d' houtôs, [anthrôpou de tithemen ergon zôên tina, tautên de  psuchês energeian kai praxeis meta logou, spoudaiou d' andros eu tauta kai  kalôs, hekaston d' eu kata tên oikeian aretên apoteleitai: ei d' houtô,] to  anthrôpinon agathon psuchês energeia ginetai kat' aretên, ei de pleious hai  aretai, kata tên aristên kai teleiotatên. eti d' en biôi teleiôi. mia gar  chelidôn ear ou poiei, oude mia hêmera: houtô de oude makarion kai eudaimona mia  hêmera oud' oligos chronos. perigegraphthô men oun tagathon tautêi: dei gar isôs  hupotupôsai prôton, eith' husteron anagrapsai. doxeie d' an pantos einai  proagagein kai diarthrôsai ta kalôs echonta têi perigraphêi, kai ho chronos tôn  toioutôn heuretês ê sunergos  agathos einai: hothen kai tôn technôn gegonasin hai  epidoseis: pantos gar prostheinai to elleipon. memnêsthai de kai tôn  proeirêmenôn chrê, kai tên  akribeian mê homoiôs en hapasin epizêtein, all' en  hekastois kata tên hupokeimenên hulên kai epi tosouton eph' hoson oikeion têi  methodôi. kai gar tektôn kai geômetrês diapherontôs epizêtousi tên orthên: ho  men gar eph' hoson chrêsimê pros to ergon, ho de ti estin ê poion ti: theatês  gar talêthous. ton auton dê tropon kai en tois allois poiêteon, hopôs mê ta  parerga tôn ergôn pleiô ginêtai."  The Loeb Classical Library translates:  "The mere act of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are  looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore set aside the vital  activity of nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come some form of  sentient life; but this too appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals  generally. [13] There remains therefore what may be called the practical1 life  of the rational part of man. (This part has two divisions,2 one rational as  obedient to principle, the others possessing principle and exercising  intelligence). Rational life again has two meanings; let us assume that we are  here concerned with the active exercise3 of the rational faculty, since this  seems to be the more proper sense of the term. [14] If then the function of man  is the active exercise of the soul's faculties4 in conformity with rational  principle, or at all events not in dissociation from rational principle, and if  we acknowledge the function of an individual and of a good individual of the  same class (for instance, a harper and a good harper, and so generally with all  classes) to be generically the same, the qualification of the latter's  superiority in excellence being added to the function in his case (I mean that  if the function of a harper is to play the harp, that of a good harper is to  play the harp well): if this is so, and if we declare that the function of man  is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the  soul's faculties and activities in association with rational principle, [15] and  say that the function of a good man is to perform these activities well and  rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance  with its own  proper excellence--from these premises it follows that the Good of  man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence  or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity  with the best and most perfect among them. [16] Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day;  and similarly one day or a brief period of happinessdoes not make a man supremely blessed5 and happy."