III. Life, soul, and homonymous predication

Let us examine the senses of synonymy and homonymy in Aristotle and then see what use Plotinus is making of these terms in the treatise On Well-being, 1.4[46]. In 1.4[46].3 Plotinus distinguishes between synonymous and homonymous predication. It will prove useful to examine Aristotle's understanding of homonymy. Aristotle defines as "synon-ymous" predicates that share both a common name and a common definition, as "animal" is predicable both of man and of ox. Such terms are also said to be employed in one way only (Hovaxas leyóueva)* and to be predicated with reference to one thing (a®' ё)? Homonymy per accidens amounts only to a sharing of the same name or pure equivo-cation. This is not, however, the only sense of the homonym which is (unlike the synonym) ambiguous. Homonymy may include terms which have nothing truly in common (катà...кotvòv unèr) and those which are related by something in common (кат í kovór)." A term that is used homonymously in the latter sense is said to be employed in different senses (1éyeTaL...ollaxws). 2 Some homonymous predicates admit of unity of reference appropriate to focal meaning (pòs Ev). 13 Other homonymous terms enjoy that unity and identity that derives from participation in a series (the kind that will concern us here).

Henry and Schwyzer properly refer us to Aristotle, Categories 13.14b33 for the sense of avidiapeiv in 1.4 [461.3.17, where it describes a simple classification by dichotomy or co-ordinate species as distinct from predication in a hierarchy that exhibits priority and posteriority. The example offered in Categories 13 of predication by dichotomy are the terms "half" and "double." Predication according to co-ordinate species is exemplified by species of animal as having feet, winged, or aquatic. The various species do not exhibit priority and posteriority, but are on the same plane (áua).14

1. Cat. 1.1a6-12.
2. Top. 1.15.106a9.
3. Met. A.1.981a10; K.3.1060b31-1061a7; Top. 6.10.148a29-33.
4. Cat. 1.1al; E.N. 1.6.1096b26-27.
5. Met. К..3.1060b31-36.
6. Met. Г.1.1003a33.
7. Met. Г.1.1003a33-1003b2.

1. Met. Г.1.1003a33-1003b2.
2. Cf. also Armstrong (1966-88), vol. 1, p. 178, note 1 and Harder et al. (1956-60), vol. 5b, p. 318 who also refer us to De An. 2.2.413a22 and Met. B.999a6-10; for a lucid exposition of the treatment of priority and posteriority in Aristotle, Categories 12 and 13, see Cleary (1988), pp. 20-32.

Harder-Beutler-Theiler properly refer us to Aristotle,

De Anima

2.2.413a22 where it is said that "life" is predicated in different senses (TEOvaxOS... EyouÉvOr) of various organisms accordingly as they possess various faculties (intellect, sensation, locomotion, change as diminution or increase).l5 Now Aristotle formally defines the soul as the first entelechy of a natural body potentially endowed with life. ' To understand what Aristotle means by saying that "life" is predicable in different senses, it is helpful to examine what he says about the status of "soul" as predicate. Aristotle argues that soul will not admit of a common account (kolvòs lóyos) any more than will the succession of geometrical figures."7

Thus there is no generic geometrical figure with reference to which we may explain the triangle and the quadrilateral. The one is a development from the other. Similarly, the various grades of soul, from the simplest to the most complex, form such a series or succession, each a higher stage and a development of the lower. For example, without the nutritive faculty, there is no perceptive faculty, but the nutritive faculty may (as in plants) exist in the absence of the perceptive faculty. Obviously, both

"life" and "soul" are, for Aristotle, predicates that occur in such a series.

It is common, following Lloyd, to refer to such a series as an ordered series of terms and to a group containing such terms as a p-series. 18 Joachim calls such a succession a "developing series,"' which he defines as "one the terms of which increase in complexity, and are so ordered that the succeeding terms imply the preceding ones, involving or containing them in an altered form. Each succeeding term i) differs specifically from its predecessor, yet (ii) is a development of it - depends upon it for its being and carries it further. "20

We have seen that Plotinus entertains the possibility that "life" might be predicated as a synonym of the various grades of organism." Now that

1. Harder et al. (1956-60), vol. 5, p. 318, note on 1.4 [46].3.16.
2. De An. 2.1.412a27-28: this is the first definition; the second (2.1.412b5-6) defines soul as the first entelechy of a natural organic body.
3. De An. 2.3 414620-415a13

1. De An. 2.3.414620-415a13.
2. Lloyd (1962), p. 67.
3. Joachim (1951), p. 38.
4. Joachim (1951), p. 38 offers as further examples "the series of natural numbers [EN

1.4.1096a18-19], the successive forms of figure [De An. 2.3.414b21-22; 29-32], the forms of friendship [EN8.3.1156a6-24], and the forms of constitution [Pol. 3.1.1275a34-1275b2]." 1 4 1275b2]."

he has excluded this alternative, he argues that the predicate is rather employed homonymously (óuovúws) of the various grades.22

IV. Aristotle's critique of the Platonic Good and the ordered

series

The commentators have correctly shown us the origin of the Plotinian interest in the connection between life and well-being in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. For the distinction between synonymous and homon-ymous predication of "life" and "living well" in Plotinus, they have correctly referred us to the Aristotelian use of these terms in works other than the Nicomachean Ethics. What they have not done is to demonstrate the vital debt of this distinction to an argument advanced against the Platonic Idea of the Good in the Nicomachean Ethics.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle advances arguments against the Platonic Idea of the Good. Among these is the contention that an ordered series, that exhibits priority and posteriority, cannot admit of univocal predication. Thus even the Platonists did not advance a Platonic Idea of numbers which do exhibit such a series. Now "good" is predi-predicable in the categories of substance, quality, and relation.?3 Obviously

substance is prior to relation (1.4.1096a11-21). In the ensuing argument (1.4.1096a 23-29), Aristotle goes on to show that "good" is predicable in all the categories. Joachim remarks, "How far they [the categories] could be shown to constitute a developing series is doubtful. It is enough for Aristotle's purpose to show - what is sufficiently obvious - that that whose being consists in its relatedness to something else is derivative or posterior to that whose being is substantial or self-dependent, that which exists in its own right."24 The Eudemian Ethics 1.8.1218a 1-9, on the other hand, in argument against the Platonic Form of the Good, specifically contends that "good" is predicable within a developing series and thus cannot be separate from the series in which "good" is predicated. If it were separable, then the first term in the series would not be first. ThusIV. Aristotle's critique of the Platonic Good and the ordered

series

The commentators have correctly shown us the origin of the Plotinian interest in the connection between life and well-being in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. For the distinction between synonymous and homon-ymous predication of "life" and "living well" in Plotinus, they have correctly referred us to the Aristotelian use of these terms in works other than the Nicomachean Ethics. What they have not done is to demonstrate the vital debt of this distinction to an argument advanced against the Platonic Idea of the Good in the Nicomachean Ethics.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle advances arguments against the Platonic Idea of the Good. Among these is the contention that an ordered series, that exhibits priority and posteriority, cannot admit of univocal predication. Thus even the Platonists did not advance a Platonic Idea of numbers which do exhibit such a series. Now "good" is predicable in the categories of substance, quality, and relation.?3 Obviously substance is prior to relation (1.4.1096a11-21). In the ensuing argument (1.4.1096a 23-29), Aristotle goes on to show that "good" is predicable in all the categories. Joachim remarks, "How far they [the categories) could be shown to constitute a developing series is doubtful. It is enough for Aristotle's purpose to show - what is sufficiently obvious - that that whose being consists in its relatedness to something else is derivative or posterior to that whose being is substantial or self-dependent, that which exists in its own right."24 The Eudemian Ethics 1.8.1218a 1-9, on the other hand, in argument against the Platonic Form of the Good, specifically contends that "good" is predicable within a developing series and thus cannot be separate from the series in which "good" is predicated. If it were separable, then the first term in the series would not be first. Thus

22. 1.4 [46].3.20.

1. There were, of course, Platonic Forms of numbers such as Twoness, Threeness, etc., considered not as members of a series, but as universal natures, cf. Joachim (1951), p. 40.
2. Joachim (1951), p. 41. Lloyd (1962), p. 69 does not see this second argument, which he sees Aristotle's own (as distinct from the argument of the Platonists) can depend upon what he calls a p-series, for then he would simply be repeating the first argument.