Grice
Let “σ” abbreviate the operator “… consists in the fact that…,” which, when pre-fixed to a sentence, produces a predicate, or epithet.
Let S abbreviate “Snow is white,” and let G abbreviate “Grass is green.”
In that case:
xσ(y(y=y and S) = y(y=y) is 1 just in case xσ(y(if y=y, G) = y(y=y) is 1,
since
y(if y=y, S)
and
y(if y=y, G)
are each a singular term, which, if S and G are both true, each refers to y(y=y), and are therefore co-referential and inter-substitutable.
So:
Provided that S and G are both 1 — and regardless of what an utterer explicitly conveys by uttering a token of any:
any event which consists of the otiose fact that S is also an event which consists of the otiose fact that G.
i. e., this randomly chosen event is *identical* to any other randomly chosen event.
I hasten to criticise this slingshot fallacy licensing the
inter-substitution
of
— this or that co-referential singular term
and
— this or that logically equivalent sub-sentence
as officially demanded because it is needed to license a patently valid, if baffling, inference.
If, in spite of this alleged benefit, the manoeuvre slso saddles you with a commitment to some hideous consequence, the rational course is to endeavour to find a way of retaining the alleged benefit while eliminating the disastrous accompaniment.
I’m hardly being original here:
In standard set theory it is always rational to search for as generous a comprehension axiom if it permits you to escape this or that paradox.
I propose then to retain the principle of co-reference, and only prohibit its use *after* any appeal to the principle of logical equivalence.
Note that the initial deployment of the principle of logical equivalence — involving snowing being white and grass being green — is tailored to the generation of a conjunctive sentence which provides opportunity only for a very trouble-raising application of the principle of co-referentiality.
And if that is what the game is, why not stop it?
Especially when there other ways around!


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