Will any kind of intended effect do, or may there be cases

where an effect is intended (with the required qualifications)

and yet we should not want to talk of meaningNN? Suppose I

discovered some person so constituted that, when I told him that

whenever I grunted in a special way I wanted him to blush or to

incur some physical malady, thereafter whenever he recognized

the grunt (and with it my intention), he did blush or incur the

malady. Should we then want to say that the grunt meantNu

something? I do not think so. This points to the fact that for x

to have meaningNN, the intended effect must be something which

in some sense is within the control of the audience, or that in some

sense of "reason" the recognition of the intention behind x is for

the audience a reason and not merely a cause. It might look as if

there is a sort of pun here ("reason for believing" and "reason

for doing"), but I do not think this is serious. For though no

doubt from one point of view questions about reasons for believing

are questions about evidence and so quite different from questionsH. P. GRICE

about reasons for doing, nevertheless to recognize an utterer's

intention in uttering x (descriptive utterance), to have a reason

for believing that so-and-so, is at least quite like "having a

motive for" accepting so-and-so. Decisions "that" seem to involve

decisions "to" (and this is why we can "refuse to believe7' and

also be "compelled to believe"). (The "cutting" case needs

slightly different treatment, for one cannot in any straight-

forward sense "decide" to be offended; but one can refuse to be

offended.) It looks then as if the intended effect must be some-

thing within the control of the audience, or at least the sort of

thing which is within its control.