GRICE ITALO A/Z A AQ

 Grice ed Aquilino – Roma – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Roma). A philosopher of considerable learning and eloquence. In Rome, he debates with members of the Accademia of his day, although it is unclear what his own philosophical views are. He is a close friend of FRONTONE (si veda). Giulio Aquilino. Aquilino.

 

Grice ed Aquino: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della teoria dell’intenzione – la scuola di Roccasecca – filosofia lazia -- filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza, pel Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice, The Swimming-Pool Library (Roccasecca). Filosofo lazio. Filosofo italiano. Roccasecca, Frossinone, Lazio.Grice: “Srawson used to joke and call me St. Thomas, as I rushed to tutor on ‘De interpretatione’ ‘That’s precisely what Aquino did at Bologna! Can’t the tutee not interpret it by himself?!’” Tommaso d'Aquino (Roccasecca, 1225 – Abbazia di Fossanova, 7 marzo 1274) è stato un religioso, teologo, filosofo e accademico italiano. Frate domenicano esponente della Scolastica, era definito Doctor Angelicus dai suoi contemporanei. È venerato come santo dalla Chiesa cattolica che dal 1567 lo considera anche dottore della Chiesa.  Tommaso rappresenta uno dei principali pilastri teologici e filosofici della Chiesa cattolica: egli è anche il punto di raccordo fra la cristianità e la filosofia classica, che ha i suoi fondamenti e maestri in Socrate, Platone e Aristotele, e poi passati attrav erso il periodo ellenistico, specialmente in autori come Plotino. Fu allievo di sant'Alberto Magno, che lo difese quando i compagni lo chiamavano "il bue muto" dicendo: «Ah! Voi lo chiamate il bue muto! Io vi dico, quando questo bue muggirà, i suoi muggiti si udranno da un'estremità all'altra della terra!». San Tommaso d'Aquino San Tommaso d'Aquino e gli angeliSan Tommaso sorretto dagli angeli, del Guercino   Sacerdote e Dottore della Chiesa Venerato daChiesa cattolica e Chiesa anglicana Canonizzazione18 luglio 1323 da Papa Giovanni XXII Santuario principaleChiesa dei Giacobini Tolosa Ricorrenza28 gennaio; 7 marzo (forma straordinaria) AttributiAbito domenicano, libro, penna e calamaio, modellino di chiesa, sole raggiato sul petto, colomba. Patrono diTeologi, accademici, librai, scolari, studenti, fabbricanti di matite; regione Campania; comune di Aquino, Grottaminarda, Monte San Giovanni Campano e Priverno; diocesi di Sora-Cassino-Aquino-Pontecorvo; Belcastro; Falerna; San Mango d'Aquino. San Tommaso in una vetrata della Cattedrale di Saint-Rombouts, Mechelen (Belgio). Tommaso dei conti d'A. Nasce nella contea d’A., territorio dell'odierna Roccasecca, nel Regno di Sicilia (Sgarbossa). Secondo altre tesi, A. È nato a Belcastro; a sostegno di esse si segnalano quelle di fra' Giovanni Fiore da Cropani, storico calabrese, che lo scriveva nella sua opera Della Calabria illustrata, di Barrio nella sua opera De antiquitate et situ Calabriae e di padre Marafioti, teologo dell'ordine dei Minori Osservanti, nella sua opera Croniche ed antichità di Calabria.  Il castello paterno di Roccasecca rimane comunque ancora oggi il luogo più accreditato della sua nascita, da Landolfo d'A. e da Donna Teodora Galluccio, nobildonna teanese appartenente al ramo Rossi della famiglia napoletana dei Caracciolo. La sua data di nascita non è certa, ma è calcolata in maniera approssimativa a partire da quella della sua morte. Gui, ad esempio, afferma che A. è morto quando aveva compiuto i suoi quarantanove anni e iniziato il suo cinquantesimo anno. Oppure, in un testo un po' anteriore, Tolomeo da Lucca fa eco ad un'incertezza. Egli è morto all'età di 50 anni, ma alcuni dicono 48. Tuttavia, oggi, sembra che ci sia accordo nel fissare la sua data di nascita tra il 1224 e il 1226.  Da Montecassino a Napoli Secondo le usanze del tempo A., essendo il figlio più piccolo, è destinato alla vita ecclesiastica e proprio per questo a soli cinque anni è inviato dal padre come oblato nella vicina Abbazia di Montecassino, di cui è abate Landolfo Sinibaldo, figlio di Rinaldo d'A., per ricevere l'educazione religiosa e succedere a Sinibaldo in qualità di abate. In ossequio alla regola benedettina, Landolfo versa un'oblazione di venti once d'oro al monastero cassinese perchè accettasero il figlio di una nobile famiglia e in tenera età. In quegli anni l'abbazia si trova in un periodo di decadenza e costituiva una preda contesa dal Papa e dall'imperatore. Ma il trattato di San Germano, concluso tra il Papa Gregorio IX e l'imperatore Federico II, inaugura un periodo di relativa pace ed è proprio allora che si può collocare l'ingresso d’A. nel monastero. In quel luogo A. ricevette i primi rudimenti delle lettere ed è iniziato alla vita religiosa benedettina.  Ma la calma di cui gode il monastero è nuovamente turbata e Landolfo, consigliato dal nuovo abate, Stefano di Corbario, volle mettere al riparo il figlio dai disordini e invia A. a Napoli, perché puo seguire degli studi più approfonditi. Così A. s’iscrive al nuovo Studium generale, l'Università degli studi fondata da Federico II per formare la classe dirigente del suo Impero. Èproprio a Napoli, dove è stato fondato un convento, che A. conosce i Domenicani, ordine in cui entra a far parte e in cui fa la sua vestizione.  Ma l'ingresso d’A. presso i Frati predicatori compromettedefinitivamente i piani dei suoi genitori riguardo al suo futuro incarico di abate di Montecassino. Così la madre invia un corriere ai suoi figli, che in quel periodo sta guerreggiando nella regione di Acquapendente, perché intercettassero il loro fratello e glielo conducessero. Essi, accompagnati da un piccolo drappello, catturano facilmente il religioso, lo fanno salire su di un cavallo e lo conduceno al Castello di Monte San Giovanni Campano, un castello di famiglia ove è tenuto prigioniero. Qui tutta la famiglia tenta di far cambiare idea ad A., ma inutilmente. Tuttavia bisogna precisare che egli non è né maltrattato né rinchiuso in qualche prigione. Si tratta piuttosto di un soggiorno obbligato, in cui A. puo entrare e uscire a piacimento e anche ricevere visite. Ma prendendo atto che A. è ben saldo nella sua risoluzione, la sua famiglia lo restituì al convento di Napoli. Ciò avvenne in occasione del Concilio di Lione, allorché Innocenzo IV ufficializzò la deposizione dell'imperatore Federico II di Svevia. Gli studi a Parigi e a Colonia Beato Angelico: San Tommaso d'Aquino  Dipinto del Velazquez. I Domenicani di Napoli ritennero che non è sicuro trattenere presso di loro il novizio e lo inviano a Roma dove si trova il maestro dell'Ordine, Giovanni Teutonico, il quale sta per partire alla volta di Parigi, dove si sarebbe celebrato il Capitolo generale. Egli accolse A. inviandolo prima a Parigi e poi a Colonia, dove c'è un fiorente Studium generale sotto la direzione di fra Alberto (il futuro sant'Alberto Magno), maestro in teologia, il quale è ritenuto sapiente in tutti i campi del sapere.  Al seguito di Giovanni Teutonico, si sarebbe dunque messo in viaggio per Parigi e vi avrebbe trascorso corsi scolastici. Qui potrebbe aver studiato le arti, sia IN FACOLTÀ che in convento. Partì per Colonia con fra' Alberto, presso il quale continua il suo studio e il suo lavoro di assistente. Il soggiorno di A. a Colonia, al contrario di quello a Parigi, non è mai stato messo in dubbio, poiché è ben testimoniato dalle fonti. Il capitolo generale dei Domenicani riunito a Parigi decide la creazione di uno studium generale a Colonia, città nella quale esiste già un convento domenicano fondato da fra' Enrico, compagno di Giordano di Sassonia.  L'incarico di insegnare venne affidato a fra Alberto, la cui reputazione in quel periodo è già notevole. Questo soggiorno a Colonia costituì una tappa decisiva nella vita d’A. A. puo assimilare profondamente la filosofia d’Alberto. Un esempio di questa influenza lo troviamo nell'opera nota con il nome di Tabula libri Ethicorum, la quale si presenta come un lessico le cui definizioni sono molto spesso delle citazioni quasi letterali d’Alberto.  Il primo periodo di insegnamento a Parigi. Chiesa dei domenicani di Friesach: San Tommaso e papa Urbano V e il dogma della transustanziazione Quando il Maestro Generale dei Domenicani domanda ad Alberto di indicargli un filosofo che puo essere nominato baccelliere per insegnare a Parigi, Alberto gli propone A. che stima sufficientemente preparato in scientia et vita. Sembra che Giovanni Teutonico abbia esitato per via della giovane età del prescelto, 27 anni, perché secondo gli statuti dell'Università egli avrebbe dovuto averne 29 per poter assumere canonicamente quest'impegno. È grazie alla mediazione del cardinale Ugo di Saint-Cher che la richiesta di Alberto fu esaudita ed A. riceve quindi l'ordine di recarsi subito a Parigi e di prepararsi a insegnare. Egli inizia il suo insegnamento come BACCELLIERE, sotto la responsabilità del maestro Brunet de Bergerac che occupa il posto lasciato vacante a causa della partenza di Alberto.  A Parigi A. trova un clima intellettuale meno tranquillo di quello di Colonia. Ancora è vietato commentare Aristotele. Ma, durante la prima parte del soggiorno d’A., la FACOLTÀ DELL’ARTI avrebbe finalmente ottenuto il permesso di insegnare pubblicamente tutti i libri del grande filosofo greco. Fu nuovamente in Italia, impegnato nell'insegnamento e negli scritti teologici: fu prima assegnato a Orvieto, come lettore, vale a dire responsabile per la formazione continua della comunità. Qui ebbe il tempo per completare la stesura della Summa contra Gentiles e della Expositio super Iob ad litteram. Inoltre qui Tommaso, che non conosceva direttamente il greco in maniera sufficiente a leggere i testi di Aristotele in originale, si poté avvalere dell'opera di traduzione di un confratello, Guglielmo di Moerbeke, eccellente grecista. Guglielmo rifece o rivide le traduzioni delle opere di Aristotele e pure dei principali commentatori greci (Temistio, Ammonio, Proclo). Alcune fonti riportano addirittura che Guglielmo avrebbe tradotto Aristotele dietro richiesta (ad istantiam) di A. stesso. Il contributo di Guglielmo, anche lui in Italia come Tommaso dopo il 1260, fornì a Tommaso un prezioso apporto che gli permise di redigere le prime parti dei Commenti alle opere di Aristotele, spesso validi ancora oggi per la comprensione e discussione del testo aristotelico. Soggiornò a Roma come maestro reggente. Nel febbraio 1265 il neoeletto papa Clemente IV lo convocò a Roma come teologo pontificio. Nello stesso anno gli fu ordinato dal Capitolo domenicano di Agnani di insegnare allo studium conventuale del convento romano della Basilica di Santa Sabina, fondato alcuni anni prima. Lo studium di Santa Sabina diviene un esperimento per i domenicani, il primo studium provinciale dell'Ordine, una scuola intermedia tra lo studium conventuale e lo studium generale. Prima di allora la Provincia romana non offriva una formazione specializzata di alcun tipo, solo semplici scuole conventuali, con i loro corsi di base di teologia per i frati residenti. Il nuovo studium provinciale di Santa Sabina divenne la scuola più avanzata per la provincia. Durante il suo soggiorno romano, Tommaso cominciò a scrivere la Summa Theologiae e compilò numerosi altri scritti su varie questioni economiche, canoniche e morali. Durante questo periodo, ebbe l'opportunità di lavorare con la corte papale (che non era residente a Roma). Nel secondo periodo di insegnamento a Parigi, la sua occupazione principale fu l'insegnamento della Sacra Pagina e proprio a questo periodo risalgono alcune delle sue opere più celebri, come i commenti alla Scrittura e le Questioni Disputate. Anche se i commenti al Nuovo Testamento restano il cuore della sua attività, egli si segnala anche per la varietà della sua produzione, come ad esempio la scrittura di diversi brevi scritti (come ad esempio il De Mixtione elementorum, il De motu cordis, il De operationibus occultis naturae...) e per la partecipazione alle problematiche del suo tempo: che si tratti di secolari o dell'averroismo vediamo A. impegnato su tutti i fronti.  A questa multiforme attività bisogna aggiungere un ultimo tratto: Tommaso è anche il commentatore di Aristotele. Tra queste opere ricordiamo: l' Expositio libri Peri ermenias, l' Expositio libri Posteriorum, la Sententia libri Ethicorum, la Tabula libri Ethicorum, il Commento alla Fisica e alla Metafisica. Vi sono poi anche delle opere incompiute, come la Sententia libri Politicorum, il De Caelo et Mundo, il De Generatione et corruptione, il Super Meteora.  Gli ultimi anni e la morte  Ritratto di Tommaso ad opera di Fra Bartolomeo Fu quindi richiamato in Italia a Firenze per il Capitolo generale dell'Ordine dei Domenicani[8], secondo dopo quello del 1251. Lascia definitivamente Parigi e poco dopo la Pentecoste di quello stesso anno il capitolo della provincia domenicana di Roma gli affidò il compito di organizzare uno Studium generale di teologia, lasciandolo libero di scegliere il luogo, le persone e il numero degli studenti. Ma la scelta di Napoli era già stata designata da un precedente capitolo provinciale ed è anche verosimile che Carlo I d'Angiò abbia fatto pressione perché venisse scelta la sua capitale come sede e che a capo di questo nuovo centro di teologia venisse insediato un maestro di fama. Tommaso D'Aquino abitò per oltre un anno San Domenico Maggiore nell'ultimo periodo della sua vita, lasciandovi scritti e reliquie[10]. Gli fu offerto l'arcivescovado di Napoli, che non volle mai accettare, continuando a vivere in povertà, dedito allo studio e alla preghiera. Durante gli ultimi anni del periodo napoletano, continuò a procurarsi testi filosofici che leggeva e commentava con cura, disputandone i contenuti con i suoi confratelli e studenti. Si dedicò anche alle opere scientifiche di Aristotele relative ai fenomeni atmosferici e ai terremoti, cercando di procurarsi testi sulla costruzione degli acquedotti e la possibilità di applicazione della geometria alle costruzioni, commentando le traduzioni di testi greci e arabi in latino.  La famiglia D'aquino era in rapporti con Federico II di Svevia che aveva istituzionalizzato la Scuola Medica Salernitana, primo centro di fruizione culturale degli scritti medici e filosofici di Avicenna e Averroè, noti al Dottore Angelico. Stabilendosi presso la sorella Teodora al Castello dei Sanseverino, tenne una serie di lezioni straordinarie nella celebre Scuola Medica che aveva sollecitato l'onore ed il decoro della parola dell'Aquinate[8]. A memoria del suo soggiorno, nella Chiesa di San Domenico si conservano la reliquia del suo braccio e le spoglie delle sorelle. Partecipò al capitolo della sua provincia a Roma in qualità di definitore. Ma alcune settimane più tardi, mentre celebrava la Messa nella cappella di San Nicola, A. ebbe una sorprendente visione tanto che dopo la messa non scrisse, non dettò più nulla e anzi si sbarazzò persino degli strumenti per scrivere. A Reginaldo da Piperno, che non comprendeva ciò che accadeva, Tommaso rispose dicendo: «Non posso più. Tutto ciò che ho scritto mi sembra paglia in confronto con quanto ho visto».  «San Bonaventura, entrato nello studio di A. mentre scriveva, vide la colomba dello Spirito accanto al suo volto. Ultimato il trattato sull'Eucaristia, lo depose sull'altare davanti al crocifisso per ricevere dal Signore un segno. Subito fu sollevato da terra e udì le parole: Bene scripsisti, Thoma, de me quam ergo mercedem accipies? E rispose Non aliam nisi te, Domine. Anche Paolo fu rapito al terzo cielo, e poi Antonio e tutta una serie di santi fino a Caterina; il volo, il levarsi in aria indica la vicinanza con il cielo e con Dio, con archetipo nelle figure di Enoch e Elia.»  (Il piccolo A. e l'"appetito" per i libri in L'Osservatore Romano, 28 gennaio 2010. Tommaso e il socius si misero in viaggio per partecipare al Concilio che Gregorio X aveva convocato per il 1º maggio 1274 a Lione. Dopo qualche giorno di viaggio arrivarono al castello di Maenza, dove abitava sua nipote Francesca. È qui che si ammalò e perse del tutto l'appetito. Dopo qualche giorno, sentendosi un po' meglio, tentò di riprendere il cammino verso Roma, ma dovette fermarsi all'abbazia di Fossanova per riprendere le forze. A. rimane a Fossanova per qualche tempo e tra il 4 e il 5 marzo, dopo essersi confessato da Reginaldo, ricevette l'eucaristia e pronuncia, com'era consuetudine, la professione di fede eucaristica. Il giorno successivo ricevette l'unzione dei malati, rispondendo alle preghiere del rito. Morì di lì a tre giorni, mercoledì 7 marzo 1274, alle prime ore del mattino dopo aver ricevuto l'Eucaristia. Le spoglie di Tommaso d'Aquino sono conservate nella chiesa domenicana detta Les Jacobins a Tolosa. La reliquia della mano destra, invece, si trova a Salerno, nella chiesa di San Domenico; il suo cranio si trova invece nella concattedrale di Priverno, mentre la costola del cuore nella Basilica concattedrale di Aquino.  Il pensiero di Tommaso  San Tommaso d'Aquino, ritratto di Carlo Crivelli Per Tommaso l'anima è creata "a immagine e somiglianza di Dio" (come dice la Genesi), unica, immateriale (priva di volume, peso ed estensione), forma del corpo e non localizzata in un punto particolare di esso, trascendente come Dio e come lui in una dimensione al di fuori dello spazio e del tempo in cui sono il corpo e gli altri enti. L'anima è tota in toto corpore, contenuta interamente in ogni parte del corpo, e in questo senso legata ad esso indissolubilmente: si veda, sul tema, la questione 76 della Prima Parte della Summa theologiae, questione dedicata appunto al rapporto tra anima e corpo. Secondo Tommaso:  «Ciò che si accetta per fede sulla base della rivelazione divina non può essere contrario alla conoscenza naturale... Dio non può indurre nell'uomo un'opinione o una fede contro la conoscenza naturale... tutti gli argomenti contro la fede non procedono rettamente dai primi principii per sé noti.»  (Tommaso d'Aquino, Summa contra Gentiles, I, 7.) Nella filosofia tomista Dio è descritto con le seguenti proprietà:[senza fonte]  massimo grado possibile di ogni qualità (che è, è stata o possa essere fra gli enti), fra queste: sommo amore e sommo bene immutabile, semplice e indivisibile: è da sempre e per sempre uguale a sé stesso, a lui nulla manca e in lui nulla cambia. eterno: non nasce e non muore, vive da sempre e per sempre infinito in atto (non infinito potenziale): non ha limite-confine di tempo o di spazio onnisciente unico: nessuno, nemmeno Dio può creare un altro Dio onnipotente: ma non può perpetrare il male e non può creare un altro Dio per sé: non riceve la vita o altre proprietà da alcuno, poteva esistere senza gli enti da lui creati, che perciò non nascono come parte di lui e non sono Dio. trascendente: Dio non è un ente qualunque tra gli altri enti, la differenza tra Dio e gli altri enti è una differenza quantitativa, vale a dire stesse qualità ma in un minore grado di completezza e perfezione. Gli enti creati, fra cui gli angeli e l'uomo, in infiniti gradi a lui somigliano, sono come Dio, ma non sono Dio: non hanno una parte fisica dell'essere per essenza, poiché l'essere è semplice, senza parti e indivisibile. Questo essere (inteso da S.Tommaso come "Ipsum esse subsistens") ha molte proprietà in comune con l'essere della filosofia greca, così come lo definì Parmenide: uno e unico, semplice e indivisibile, infinito ed eterno, onnisciente. La differenza sostanziale però consiste nel fatto che crea gli enti, è più grande della somma di essi, e può esistere senza. Anche nell'ultima forma del pensiero greco, quello di Plotino, troviamo che l'emanazione dall'essere agli enti è un fatto eterno, ma anche necessario e reversibile, non una libera scelta dell'assoluto, che avrebbe potuto non manifestarsi. Il concetto di creazione ("produzione dal nulla") è peraltro estraneo alla filosofia greca ed è proprio del pensiero giudaico-cristiano.  Se la trascendenza nega il panteismo, la personalità di Dio nega a sua volta il deismo (che sarà proprio degli Illuministi): trascendenza ed essere per sé non significano lontananza inarrivabile. Gli uomini non nascono, ma hanno la possibilità di diventare parte integrante di Dio e, già in questa esistenza terrena, di identificare la propria vita con la vita del creatore.  In modo identico, si può dire che l'essere per san Tommaso non è solo l'essere comune o la piattaforma di tutto ciò che esiste, ma è l’esse ut actus inteso come atto puro che perfeziona ogni altra perfezione (essenza, sostanza, forma). Dio è atto puro, puro da ogni potenza, limite e imperfezione. Quando l'essere è mischiato o ricevuto in una potenza, allora è atto misto ed è ente finito. A. fonda la sua concezione metafisica sul concetto di Analogia, rielaborando in maniera molto originale il pensiero aristotelico.  Le cinque vie per dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio A. distinse tre forme di conoscenza umana in relazione all'ente e al suo Creatore: an sit ("se sia"), quomodo sit ("in che modo sia"), quid sit ("che cosa sia"). La conoscenza umana di Dio è possibile soltanto in merito alla Sua esistenza e ad un quomodo sit negativo, nel quale la mente umana procede ad analizzare il creato sensibile, e, per analogia e differenza, identifica tutte le qualità dell'ente che non possono essere proprie di Dio Creatore, pur essendone l'opera. Tale percorso fu chiamato via negationis (o anche ' via remotionis) ordinata al fine di descrivere il quomodo non sit("in che modo non sia") di Dio. Esso è effetto della grazia divina ed è possibile soltanto perché il Creatore decide liberamente di rivelarSi all'uomo, conducendolo per mano da una serie di negazioni delle qualità dell'ente colte con i cinque sensi fino a pervenire ad un'affermazione intelligibile e positiva di Lui.  L'autore delle Cinque Vie, infine, escluse che la dimostrazione razionale dell'esistenza e unicità di Dio potesse rivelare all'uomo anche la Sua vera essenza, quel qui sit che rimane un mistero accessibile soltanto alla virtù ed è ritenuto un limite esterno per il dominio possibile della ragione. La conoscenza teologica può essere soltanto indiretta, relativa agli effetti della causa prima e del fine ultimo sulla Sua creazione. Molti pensatori cristiani hanno elaborato diversi percorsi razionali per cercare di dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio: mentre Anselmo d'Aosta, sulla scia neoplatonica di Agostino d'Ippona procedeva sia a simultaneo, cioè dal concetto stesso di Dio, da lui ritenuto id quo maius cogitari nequit (nel Proslogion, cap.2.3), sia a posteriori (nel Monologion) per dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio, l'unico modo per arrivarci, secondo Tommaso, consiste nel procedere a posteriori: partendo cioè dagli effetti, dall'esperienza sensibile, che è la prima a cadere sotto i nostri sensi, per dedurne razionalmente la sua Causa prima. Si tratta di quella che chiama demonstratio quia, cioè, appunto dagli effetti, il cui risultato è ammettere necessariamente che esista il punto d'arrivo della dimostrazione, anche se non è pienamente intelligibile, come in questo caso, ed in altri, il perché (demonstratio quid, es. i sillogismi: le premesse esprimono proprietà che sono cause della conclusione: «Ogni uomo è mortale; ogni ateniese è uomo; ogni ateniese è mortale": essere uomo e mortale è necessaria causa della mortalità di ogni ateniese)»  Sulla base di questo sfondo di pensiero Tommaso espone le sue prove dell'esistenza di Dio, Tutte e cinque, con alcune variazioni, seguono questa struttura. Constatazione di un fatto in rerum natura, nell'esperienza sensibile ordinaria (movimento inteso come trasformazione; causalità efficiente subordinata; inizio e fine dell'esistenza degli esseri generabili e corruttibili, perciò materiali, contingenti nel suo vocabolario, che quindi possono essere e non essere; gradualità degli esseri nelle perfezioni trascendentali, come bontà, verità, nobiltà ed essere stesso; finalità nei processi degli esseri non intelligenti);  2) analisi metafisica di quel dato iniziale esperenziale alla luce del principio metafisico di causalità, enunciato in varie formulazioni ("Tutto ciò che si muove è mosso da un altro"; "È impossibile che una cosa sia causa efficiente di sé stessa"; "Ora, è impossibile che tutte di tal natura siano state sempre, perché ciò che può non essere un tempo non esisteva"; "Ma il grado maggiore o minore si attribuiscono alle diverse cose secondo che si accostano di più o di meno a qualcosa di sommo o di assoluto"; "Ora, ciò che è privo di intelligenza non tende al fine se non perché è diretto da un essere conoscitivo e intelligente");  3) impossibilità di un regressus in infinitum inteso in senso metafisico, non quantitativo, perché ciò renderebbe inintelligibile, inspiegabile pienamente il dato di fatto di partenza esistente ("Ora, non si può in tal modo procedere all'infinito, perché altrimenti non vi sarebbe un primo motore, e di conseguenza nessun altro motore..."; "Ma procedere all'infinito nelle cause efficienti equivale ad eliminare la prima causa efficiente; e così non avremmo neppure l'effetto ultimo, né le cause intermedie..."; "Dunque non tutti gli esseri sono contingenti, ma bisogna che nella realtà ci sia qualcosa di necessario. Ora, tutto ciò che è necessario, o ha la causa della sua necessità in un altro essere oppure no. D'altra parte [in questo genere di esseri] non si può procedere all'infinito..."; questo passaggio manca, per la sua evidenza agli occhi dell'Aquinate manca nella quarta via e nella quinta via, si passa direttamente alla conclusione;  4) conclusione deduttiva strettamente razionale (senza nessuna cogenza di fede) che identifica il 'conosciuto' sotto quel determinato aspetto con quello "che tutti chiamano Dio", o espressioni simili ("Dunque è necessario arrivare ad un primo motore che non sia mosso da altri; e tutti riconoscono che esso è Dio"; "Dunque bisogna ammettere una prima causa efficiente, che tutti chiamano Dio"; "Dunque bisogna concludere all'esistenza di un essere che sia di per sé necessario e non tragga da altri la propria necessità, ma sia causa di necessità agli altri. E questo tutti dicono Dio"; "Ora ciò che è massimo in un dato genere è causa di tutti gli appartenenti a quel genere, come il fuoco, caldo al massimo, è causa di ogni calore, come dice lo stesso Aristotele. Dunque vi è qualcosa che per tutti gli enti è causa dell'essere, della bontà e di qualsiasi perfezione. E questo chiamiamo Dio"; "Vi è dunque un qualche essere intelligente, dal quale tutte le cose naturali sono ordinate ad un fine: e quest'essere chiamiamo Dio".  I cinque percorsi indicati da A. sono: Ex motu et mutatione rerum (tutto ciò che si muove esige un movente primo perché, come insegna Aristotele nella Metafisica: "Non si può andare all'infinito nella ricerca di un primo motore"); Ex ordine causarum efficientium (cioè "dalla causa efficiente", intesa in senso subordinato, non in senso coordinato nel tempo. Tommaso non è, per sola ragione, in grado di escludere la durata indefinita nel tempo di un mondo creato da Dio, la cosiddetta creatio ab aeterno: ogni essere finito, partecipato, dipende nell'essere da un altro detto causa; necessità di una causa prima incausata); Ex rerum contingentia (cioè "dalla contingenza". Nella terminologia di A. la generabilità e corruttibilità sono prese come segno evidente della possibilità di essere e non essere legata alla materialità, sinonimo, nel suo vocabolario di "contingenza", ben diverso dall'uso più comune, legato ad una terminologia avicenniana, dove "contingente" è qualsiasi realtà che non sia Dio. Tommaso, in questa argomentazione della Summa Theologiae distingue attentamente il necessario dipendente da altro (anima umana e angeli) e necessario assoluto (Dio). L'esistenza di esseri generabili e corruttibili è in sé insufficiente metafisicamente, rimanda ad esseri necessari, dapprima dipendenti da altro, quindi ad un essere assolutamente necessario); Ex variis gradibus perfectionis (le cose hanno diversi gradi di perfezioni, intese in senso trascendentale, come verità, bontà, nobiltà ed essere, sebbene sia usato un 'banale' esempio fisico legato al fuoco e al calore; ma solo un grado massimo di perfezione rende possibile, in quanto causa, i gradi intermedi); Ex rerum gubernatione (cioè "dal governo delle cose": le azioni di realtà non intelligenti nell'universo sono ordinate secondo uno scopo, quindi, non essendo in loro quest'intelligenza, ci deve essere un'intelligenza ultima che le ordina così). Kant, pur ammettendo l'esistenza di Dio come postulato della ragion pratica, ritiene che l'esistenza di Dio sia indimostrabile da un punto di vista teoretico-speculativo: nella Dialettica trascendentale della Critica della ragion pura, Kant ha contestato tali dimostrazioni, pur non prendendo in realtà in considerazione direttamente le cinque "vie" di San Tommaso, ma le prove dell'esistenza di Dio nella filosofia leibniziano-wollfiana. La critica kantiana si rivolge infatti alla: 1) prova ontologica; 2) prova cosmologica e 3) prova fisico-teologica. Se per quanto riguarda almeno nelle conclusioni sia S.Tommaso, sia Kant sono concordi nel rifiutare la prova ontologica, per quanto riguarda la prova cosmologica e quella fisico- teologica, Kant critica queste due prove (a cui si possono ridurre le cinque "vie tomistiche), in quanto sarebbero legate ad un'estensione indebita dell'uso della ragione (nel suo uso teoretico-speculativo), i cui concetti razionali, cioè le idee, sono vuote. Solo l'intuizione empirica infatti potrebbe ovviare a ciò: per questo motivo l'idea di Dio è assolutamente non verificabile tramite la ragione, superando i limiti dell'esperienza possibile. Processo conoscitivo. Tommaso, affermava che la conoscenza dell'essere umano, in quanto dotato di un corpo creato da Dio, muove sempre dall'universo immanente, sensibile e corporeo nella direzione dell'universo trascendente, intellegibile (invisibile) e incorporeo. In tale aspetto, si differenziò da sant'Agostino, che pensava che questa avvenisse tramite l'illuminazione divina.  Agostino sostenne che la sorgente del sapere e dell'essere è la stessa, Dio Creatore dell'universo, e che quindi i due piani dell'essere e del sapere non possono cadere in contraddizione l'uno con l'altro. Senza negare Agostino, A. aggiunse che il corpo umano deve poter essere capace di conoscere il creato mediante la sua mente e i suoi sensi, poiché l'uomo non soltanto è una creatura di Dio, ma più di ogni altro vivente è l'unico creato a immagine e somiglianza della mente e del Suo corpo umano-divino di Dio Padre e di Gesù, Suo Figlio. A. aggiunse che i due piani dell'essere e del sapere sono tra loro comunicanti: infatti, le Cinque Vie dimostrarono che dall'essere della natura corporea è possibile giungere a conoscere e dimostrare la possibilità, la realtà e la necessità dell'esistenza e dell'unicità di Dio.  Prima ancora di questo, mediante ogni conoscenza (anche scientifica) del creato, Tommaso riuscì a raggiungere il dono e il raro privilegio della visione del Corpo del Cristo risorto e del dialogo personale con Lui, il giorno della ricorrenza di San Nicola, poco tempo prima di completare la Summa theologica e di morire. Ciò non significa che A. disconoscesse il pensiero di sant'Agostino, che è invece citato a più riprese nella Summa Theologica', e che fu dichiarato Dottore della Chiesa, dopo la morte dell'Aquinate.  La conoscenza degli universali però appartiene solo alle intelligenze angeliche; noi, invece, conosciamo gli universali post-rem, ossia li ricaviamo dalla realtà sensibile. Soltanto Dio conosce ante rem.  La conoscenza è, quindi, un processo di adeguamento dell'anima o dell'intelletto e della cosa, secondo una formula che dà ragione del sofisticato aristotelismo di Tommaso. Veritas: Adaequatio intellectus ad rem. Adaequatio rei ad intellectum. Adaequatio intellectus et rei.» «Verità: Adeguamento dell'intelletto alla cosa. Adeguamento della cosa all'intelletto. Adeguamento dell'intelletto e della cosa.»  (A.) A. spiega che l'uomo può stabilire a partire dalla ragione il rapporto creaturale di dipendenza dell'universo da Dio ovvero la creatio ex nihilo intesa come totale dipendenza dell'essere creato, anche quello sostanziale, dall'Essere divino. Ciò che la sola ragione non può stabilire è se il mondo è eterno o se è stato creato nel tempo ovvero se ha un cominciamento. La verità della seconda alternativa (la creazione con un inizio temporale) può essere conosciuta, secondo Tommaso, solamente per fede a partire dalla rivelazione divina. Dio, creando l'uomo, fornisce l'esistenza all'uomo secondo una dinamica simile a quella di atto e potenza, e lo rende quindi ente reale, fornito di esistenza (che è propriamente definita da Tommaso actus essendi oltre che di essenza. Soltanto in Dio, atto puro, essenza ed esistenza coincidono. Il rapporto tra Dio (necessario) e la creatura (contingente) è analogico in un solo senso: le creature sono simili a Dio. Il rapporto è di somiglianza non univoca né equivoca. Secondo Tommaso tutti gli enti sono buoni, poiché somigliano a Dio: "bonum" è uno dei tre trascendenti (o trascendentali), ovvero di caratteri applicabili a ogni ente e perciò trascendenti le categorie di Aristotele. Gli altri due sono "unum" e "verum".  Nelle opere di Tommaso l'universo (o cosmo) ha una struttura rigorosamente gerarchica[senza fonte]: posto al vertice da Dio che viene posto come al di là della fisicità, governa da solo il mondo al di sopra di tutte le cose e gli enti; al di sotto di Dio troviamo gli angeli (forme pure e immateriali), ai quali Tommaso attribuisce la definizione di intelligenze motrici dei cieli anch'esse ordinate gerarchicamente tra di loro; poi un gradino più in basso troviamo l'uomo, posto al confine tra il mondo delle sostanze spirituali e il regno della corporeità, in ogni uomo infatti si ha l'unione del corpo (elemento materiale) con l'anima intellettiva (ovvero la forma, che secondo Tommaso costituisce l'ultimo grado delle intelligenze angeliche): l'uomo è l'unico ente che fa parte sia del mondo fisico, sia del mondo spirituale. Tommaso crede che la conoscenza umana cominci con i sensi: l'uomo, non avendo il grado di intelligenza degli angeli, non è in grado di apprendere direttamente gli intelligibili, ma può apprendere solamente attribuendo alle cose una forma e quindi solamente grazie all'esperienza sensibile.  Un'altra facoltà necessaria che caratterizza l'uomo è la sua tendenza a realizzare pienamente la propria natura ovvero compiere ciò per cui è stato creato[senza fonte]. Ciascun uomo infatti corrisponde all'idea divina su cui è modellato, di cui l'uomo è consapevole e razionale, conscio delle proprie finalità, alle quali si dirige volontariamente avvalendosi dell'uso dell'intelletto: l'uomo prende le proprie decisioni sulla base di un ragionamento pratico, attraverso il quale tra due beni sceglie sempre quello più consono al raggiungimento del suo fine. Nel fare ciò segue la Legge naturale, che è scritta nel cuore dell'uomo. La legge naturale, che è un riflesso della Legge eterna, deve essere il fondamento della Legge positiva, cioè l'insieme delle norme che gli uomini stabiliscono storicamente in un dato tempo ed in un dato luogo.  Al di sotto dell'uomo troviamo le piante e le varie molteplicità degli elementi.  Concezione della donna  Sacra conversazione di Monticelli (Ghirlandaio) Tommaso riprende e cita, nella prima parte della Summa theologiae, alle questioni 92 e 99, l'affermazione di Aristotele (De generatione et corruptione 2,3) per cui la donna sarebbe un uomo mancato (mas occasionatus). L'aquinate afferma che "rispetto alla natura particolare la femmina è un essere difettoso e manchevole.  «Infatti la virtù attiva racchiusa nel seme del maschio tende a produrre un essere perfetto simile a sé, di sesso maschile, e il fatto che ne derivi una femmina può dipendere dalla debolezza della virtù attiva, o da un'indisposizione della materia, o da una trasmutazione causata dal di fuori, per esempio dai venti australi, che sono umidi, come dice il filosofo.»  Ma aggiunge: «Rispetto invece alla natura nella sua universalità, la femmina non è un essere mancato, ma è espressamente voluto in ordine alla generazione. Ora, l'ordinamento della natura nella sua universalità dipende da Dio, il quale è l'autore universale della natura. Quindi, nel creare la natura, egli produsse non solo il maschio, ma anche la femmina 2. Ci sono due specie di sudditanza. La prima, servile, è quella per cui chi è a capo si serve dei sottoposti per il proprio interesse: e tale dipendenza sopravvenne dopo il peccato. Ma vi è una seconda sudditanza, economica o politica, in forza della quale chi è a capo si serve dei sottoposti per il loro interesse e per il loro bene. E tale sudditanza ci sarebbe stata anche prima del peccato, poiché senza il governo dei più saggi sarebbe mancato il bene dell'ordine nella società umana. E in questa sudditanza la donna è naturalmente soggetta all'uomo: poiché l'uomo ha per natura un più vigoroso discernimento razionale.»  (Somma teologica) «la diversità dei sessi rientra nella perfezione della natura umana»  (Somma teologica) Importanza ed eredità Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svgTomismo.  Tommaso disputa con Averroè  Trionfo di san Tommaso, di Lippo Memmi  Trionfo di san Tommaso, di Benozzo Gozzoli San Tommaso fu uno dei pensatori più eminenti della filosofia Scolastica, che verso la metà del XIII secolo aveva raggiunto il suo apice. Egli indirizzò diversi aspetti della filosofia del tempo: la questione del rapporto tra fede e ragione, le tesi sull'anima (in contrapposizione ad Averroè), le questioni sull'autorità della religione e della teologia, che subordina ogni campo della conoscenza.  Tali punti fermi del suo pensiero furono difesi da diversi suoi seguaci successivi, tra i quali Reginaldo da Piperno, Tolomeo da Lucca, Giovanni di Napoli, il domenicano francese Giovanni Capreolus e Antonino di Firenze. Infine però, con la lenta dissoluzione della Scolastica, si ebbe parallelamente anche la dissoluzione del Tomismo, col conseguente prevalere di un indirizzo di pensiero nominalista nel successivo sviluppo della filosofia, e una progressiva sfiducia nelle possibilità metafisiche della ragione, che indurrà Lutero a giudicare quest'ultima «cieca, sorda, stolta, empia e sacrilega». Oggigiorno il pensiero di A. trova ampio consenso anche in ambienti non cattolici (studiosi protestanti statunitensi, ad esempio) e perfino non cristiani, grazie al suo metodo di lavoro, fortemente razionale e aperto a fonti e contributi di ogni genere: la sua indagine intellettuale procede dalla Bibbia agli autori pagani, dagli ebrei ai musulmani, senza alcun pregiudizio, ma tenendo sempre il suo centro nella Rivelazione cristiana, alla quale ogni cultura, dottrina o autore antico faceva capo. Il suo operato culmina nella Summa Theologiae (cioè "Il complesso di teologia"), in cui tratta in maniera sistematica il rapporto fede-ragione e altre grandi questioni teologiche.  Agostino vedeva il rapporto fede-ragione come un circolo ermeneutico (dal greco ermeneuo, cioè "interpreto") in cui credo ut intelligam et intelligo ut credam (ossia "credo per comprendere e comprendo per credere"). Tommaso porta la fede su un piano superiore alla ragione, affermando che dove la ragione e la filosofia non possono proseguire inizia il campo della fede e il lavoro della teologia.[senza fonte] Dunque, fede e ragione sono certamente in circolo ermeneutico e crescono insieme sia in filosofia che in teologia. Mentre però la filosofia parte da dati dell'esperienza sensibile o razionale, la teologia inizia il circolo con i dati della fede, su cui ragiona per credere con maggiore consapevolezza ai misteri rivelati. La ragione, ammettendo di non poterli dimostrare, riconosce che essi, pur essendo al di sopra di sé, non sono mai assurdi o contro la ragione stessa: fede e ragione, sono entrambe dono di Dio e non possono contraddirsi. Questa posizione esalta ovviamente la ricerca umana: ogni verità che io posso scoprire non minaccerà mai la Rivelazione anzi, rafforzerà la mia conoscenza complessiva dell'opera di Dio e della Parola di Cristo. Si vede qui un esempio tipico della fiducia che nel Medioevo si riponeva nella ragione umana. Nel XIV secolo queste certezze andranno in crisi, coinvolgendo l'intero impianto culturale del periodo precedente.  La teologia, in ambito puramente speculativo, rispetto alla tradizione classica, era considerata una forma inferiore di sapere, poiché usava in prestito gli strumenti della filosofia, ma Tommaso fa notare, citando Aristotele, che anche la filosofia non può dimostrare tutto, perché sarebbe un processo all'infinito. Egli distingue due tipi di scienze: quelle che esaminano i propri principi e quelle che ricevono i principi da altre scienze. L'ideale, per uno spirito concreto come Tommaso, sarebbe superare la fede e raggiungere la conoscenza ma, sui misteri fondamentali della Rivelazione, questo non è possibile nella vita terrena del corpo. Avverrà nella vita eterna dello spirito.  La filosofia è dunque ancilla theologiae e regina scientiarum, prima fra i saperi delle scienze. Il primato del sapere teologico non è nel metodo, ma nei contenuti divini che affronta, per i quali è sacrificabile anche la necessità filosofica.  Il punto di discrimine fra filosofia e teologia è la dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio; dei due misteri fondamentali della Fede (Trinitario e Cristologico), la ragione può dimostrare solamente il primo, l'esistenza di Dio, mentre non può dimostrare che questo Dio è necessariamente Trinitario. Ciò non è un paradosso razionale, perché da una premessa falsa non possono che derivare nel sillogismo conseguenze false, è più semplicemente qualcosa che la ragione non può spiegare: un Dio Uno e Trino. Il maggior servizio che la ragione può fare alla fede è che non è possibile nemmeno dimostrare il contrario, che Dio non è Trinitario, che la negazione non dimostrabile della Trinità a sua volta porta conseguenze paradossali e contraddittorie, laddove invece la Sua affermazione per fede è feconda di verità e conseguenze non contraddittorie. La ragione non può entrare nella parte storica dei misteri religiosi, può mostrare solo prove storiche che tal "profeta" è esistito, ma non che era Dio, e il senso della Sua missione, che è appunto un dato, un fatto a cui si può credere o meno.  Il primato della teologia verrà fortemente discusso nei secoli successivi, ma sarà anche lo studio praticato da tutti i filosofi cristiani nel Medioevo e oltre, tant'è che Pascal fece la sua famosa "scommessa" ancora nel XVII secolo. La teologia era questione sentita dal popolo nelle sacre rappresentazioni, era il mondo dei medioevali e degli zelanti studenti che attraversavano a piedi le paludi di Francia per ascoltare le lectiones dell'Aquinate nella prestigiosa Università della Sorbonne di Parigi, incontrandosi da tutta Europa.  Gli storici della filosofia richiamano l'attenzione anche sulla prevalenza dell'intelletto rispetto ad una prevalenza della volontà nella vita intellettuale/spirituale dell'uomo. La prima è seguita da San Tommaso e dalla sua scuola, mentre l'altra è propria di San Bonaventura e della scuola francescana. Per Tommaso il fine supremo è "vedere Dio", mentre per Bonaventura fine ultimo dell'uomo è "amare Dio". Quindi per Tommaso la categoria più alta è "il vero", mentre per Bonaventura è "il bene". Per ambedue però, "il vero" è anche "il bene", e "il bene" è anche "il vero".  Il pensiero di Tommaso ebbe influenza anche su autori non cristiani, a cominciare dal famoso pensatore ebreo Hillel da Verona.  A partire dal secondo Novecento poi il suo pensiero viene ripreso nel dibattito etico da autori cattolici e non, quali Anscombe, MacIntyre, Foot e Maritain.  Culto Fu canonizzato da Giovanni XXII. La sua memoria viene celebrata dalla Chiesa cattolica; la stessa, nella Forma straordinaria, lo ricorda il 7 marzo. La Chiesa luterana lo ricorda.  San Tommaso d'A, è patrono dei teologi, degli accademici, dei librai e degli studenti. È patrono della città e della diocesi privernate e della Città e della diocesi aquinate.  Pio V lo dichiarò dottore della Chiesa con la bolla Mirabilis Deus. Nel centenario della canonizzazione, Pio XI gli dedica l'enciclica Studiorum Ducem.  L'enciclica Aeterni Patris di Leone XIII ricorda A. come il più illustre esponente della scolastica. Gli statuti dei Benedettini, degli Carmelitani, degl’agostiniani, della Compagnia di Gesù dispongono l'obbligatorietà dello studio e della messa in pratica delle dottrine di Tommaso, del quale l'enciclica afferma:  «Per la verità, sopra tutti i Dottori Scolastici, emerge come duce e maestro San Tommaso d’Aquino, il quale, come avverte il cardinale Gaetano, “perché tenne in somma venerazione gli antichi sacri dottori, per questo ebbe in sorte, in certo qual modo, l’intelligenza di tutti”. Le loro dottrine, come membra dello stesso corpo sparse qua e là, raccolse Tommaso e ne compose un tutto; le dispose con ordine meraviglioso, e le accrebbe con grandi aggiunte, così da meritare di essere stimato singolare presidio ed onore della Chiesa Cattolica. Clemente VI, Nicolò V, Benedetto XIII ed altri attestano che tutta la Chiesa viene illustrata dalle sue meravigliose dottrine; San Pio V poi confessa che mercé la stessa dottrina le eresie, vinte e confuse, si disperdono come nebbia, e che tutto il mondo si salva ogni giorno per merito suo dalla peste degli errori. Altri, con Clemente XII, affermano che dagli scritti di lui sono pervenuti a tutta la Chiesa copiosissimi beni, e che a lui è dovuto quello stesso onore che si rende ai sommi Dottori della Chiesa Gregorio, Ambrogio, Agostino e Girolamo. Altri, infine, non dubitarono di proporlo alle Accademie e ai grandi Licei quale esempio e maestro da seguire a piè sicuro. A conferma di questo Ci sembrano degnissime di essere ricordate le seguenti parole del Beato Urbano V all’Accademia di Tolosa: “Vogliamo, e in forza delle presenti vi imponiamo, che seguiate la dottrina del Beato Tommaso come veridica e cattolica, e che vi studiate con tutte le forze di ampliarla”. Successivamente innocenzo XII, nella Università di Lovanio, e Benedetto XIV, nel Collegio Dionisiano presso Granata, rinnovarono l’esempio di Urbano.»  (Enciclica Aeterni Patris) Opere di A. Sintesi teologiche Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Summa contra Gentiles Summa Theologiae  Questioni disputate Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Quaestio disputata De anima Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis Quaestiones disputatae De malo Quaestiones disputatae De uirtutibus Quaestio disputata De unione uerbi incarnati Quaestiones de Quodlibet I-XII  Commenti biblici Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram Super Ieremiam et Threnos Principium “Rigans montes de superioribus” et “Hic est liber mandatorum Dei” Expositio super Iob ad litteram Glossa continua super Evangelia (Catena Aurea) Lectura super Mattheum Lectura super Ioannem Expositio et Lectura super Epistolas Pauli Apostoli Postilla super Psalmos  Commenti ad Aristotele Sententia Libri De anima Sententia Libri De sensu et sensato Sententia super Physicam Sententia super Meteora Expositio Libri Peryermenias Expositio Libri Posteriorum Sententia Libri Ethicorum Tabula Libri Ethicorum Sententia Libri Politicorum Sententia super Metaphysicam Sententia super Librum De caelo et mundo Sententia super Libros De generatione et corruptione  Super libros de generatione et corruptione Altri commenti Super Boetium De Trinitate Expositio Libri Boetii De ebdomadibus Super Librum Dionysii De divinis nomibus Super Librum De Causis  Scritti polemici Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem De perfectione spiritualis vitae Contra doctrinam retrahentium a religione De unitate intellectus contra Avveroistas De aeternitate mundi  Trattati De ente et essentia De principiis naturae Compendium theologiae seu brevis compilatio theologiae ad fratrem Raynaldum De regno ad regem Cypri De substantiis separatis  Lettere e pareri De emptione et venditione ad tempus Contra errores Graecorum De rationibus fidei ad Cantorem Antiochenum Expositio super primam et secundam Decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum De articulis fidei et ecclesiae sacramentis ad archiepiscopum Panormitanum Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis De forma absolutionis De secreto Liber De sortibus ad dominum Iacobum de Tonengo Responsiones ad lectorem Venetum de 30 et 36 articulis Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 43 articulis Responsio ad lectorem Bisuntinum de 6 articulis Epistola ad ducissam Brabantiae De mixtione elementorum ad magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli De motu cordis ad magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli De operationibus occultis naturae ad quendam militem ultramontanum De iudiciis astrorum Epistola ad Bernardum abbatem casinensem  Opere liturgiche, prediche, preghiere Officium de festo Corporis Christi ad mandatum Urbani Papae Inno Adoro te devote Collationes in decem precepta Collationes in orationem dominicam in Symbolum Apostolorum in salutationem angelicam. Traduzioni italiane Lo specchio dell'anima, La sentenza di Tommaso d'Aquino sul "De anima" di Aristotele, Traduzione e testo latino a fronte, Ed. San Paolo, Milano 2012. (È tradotto anche il testo dell'Aristotele latino). Catena aurea, Glossa continua super Evangelia vol. 1, Matteo, Bologna, Matteo, Bologna, Marco, Bologna  Commento ai Libri di Boezio, Super Boetium De Trinitate, Expositio Libri Boetii De Ebdomadibus, Bologna, Commento ai Nomi Divini di Dionigi, Super Librum Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus vol. 1, Bologna (comprende anche De ente et essentia), Bologna, 2004 Commento al Corpus Paulinum, Expositio et lectura super Epistolas Pauli Apostoli vol. 1, Romani, Bologna, 1 Corinzi, Bologna , 2 Corinzi, Galati, Bologna, Efesini, Filippesi, Colossesi, Bologna, Tessalonicesi, Timoteo, Tito, Filemone, Bologna, Ebrei, Bologna, Commento al Libro di Giobbe, Bologna, Commento all'Etica Nicomachea di Aristotele, Sententia Libri Ethicorum, in 2 volumi, Bologna, 1998 Commento alla Fisica di Aristotele, Sententia super Physicorum vol. 1, Bologna, Bologna, Bologna, Commento alla Metafisica di Aristotele, Sententia super Metaphysicorum vol. 1, Bologna, Bologna, 2005 vol. 3, Bologna, Commento alla Politica di Aristotele, Sententia Libri Politicorum, Bologna, Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro Lombardo, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, Bologna, Ed. ESD, 2002 Compendio di teologia, Compendium theologiae, Bologna, I Sermoni e le due Lezioni inaugurali, Bologna, 2003 La conoscenza sensibile, Commenti ai libri di Aristotele: Il senso e il sensibile; La memoria e la reminiscenza, Bologna, La perfezione cristiana nella vita consacrata, Bologna, De venerabili sacramentu altaris, Bologna, La Somma contro i Gentili, Summa contra Gentiles vol. 1, (traduzione Tito Centi), Bologna (traduzione Tito Centi), Bologna, 2001 vol. 3, (traduzione Tito Centi), Bologna, 2001 La Somma Teologica, Summa Theologiae, in 35 volumi La Somma Teologica, Summa Theologiae, in 6 volumi, Bologna, Ed. ESD Le Questioni Disputate, Quaestiones Disputatae, La Verità, Bologna, La Verità, Bologna, La Verità, Bologna, 1993 vol. 4, L'anima umana, Bologna, 2001 vol. 5, Le virtù, Bologna, 2002 vol. 6, Il male, Bologna, Il male, Bologna,  La potenza divina, Bologna, La potenza divina, Bologna, Questioni su argomenti vari, Bologna, Questioni su argomenti vari, Bologna, Logica dell'enunciazione, Commento al libro di Aristotele Peri Hermeneias, Expositio Libri Peryermenias, Bologna, Opuscoli politici: Il governo dei principi, Lettera alla duchessa del Brabante, La dilazione nella compravendita, Bologna, Opuscoli spirituali: Commenti al Credo, Padre Nostro, Ave Maria, Dieci Comandamenti, Ufficio e Messa per la Festa del Corpus Domini, Le preghiere di san Tommaso, Lettera a uno studente, Bologna, Pagine di Filosofia: I principi della natura, De principiis naturae ad fratrem Silvestrum, sola trad. it., e antologia ragionata e commentata di altri brani filosofici di antropologia, gnoseologia, teologia naturale, etica, politica e pedagogia. Inni eucaristici A Tommaso d'Aquino sono classicamente attribuiti gli inni eucaristici per la solennità del Corpus Domini, usati per secoli in occasione dell'adorazione eucaristica. Gli inni sono stati confermati nella liturgia solenne dal Concilio Vaticano II:  Adoro te devote Pange lingua, che contiene al termine il Tantum ergo sacramentum Sacris sollemniis Verbum supernum prodiens Note  Napoli A.N. Rossi, Delle dissertazioni di Alessio Niccolo Rossi intorno ad alcune materie alla citta di Napoli appartenenti, Pasquale Cayro, Storia sacra e profana d'Aquino e sua diocesi del signor D. Pasquale Cayro, patrizio anagnino, Orsino, Marra, Discorsi delle famiglie estinte, forastiere o non comprese ne' seggi di Napoli imparentate colla casa della Marra. Composti dal signor Ferrante della Marra duca della Guardia, dati in luce da Tutini, Beltrano, Torrell, O. P., Amico della verità: vita e opere di Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Fino a pochi anni fa gli storici avevano dei dubbi sulla veridicità del soggiorno di Tommaso a Parigi nel periodo immediatamente successivo a quello in cui la sua famiglia lo restituì all'Ordine. Dallo studio delle fonti, Walz-Novarina concludono che il viaggio di Tommaso in compagnia di Giovanni Teutonico «... senza essere certo, può considerarsi probabile... », ma erano più riservati circa la questione degli studi a Parigi. Grandi eruditi come Denifle e De Groot si associano a questa opinione, ma altri come Mandonnet, Chenu e Glorieux, osservano che il viaggio a Parigi non avrebbe avuto alcun senso se Tommaso non avesse dovuto svolgervi i suoi studi, questo perché lo studium generale di Colonia non era funzionante prima del 1248, data della sua apertura dovuta a fra Alberto al momento del suo ritorno in questa città.  Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Introduzione a Tommaso d'Aquino, Roma-Bari, Laterza, Aristotele, Etica Nicomachea, a cura di Marcello Zanatta, traduzione di Marcello Zanatta, vol. 1, 8. ed, Milano, Rizzoli, Filangieri, La vita e le Opere di San Tommaso d'Aquino. Storia dell'Ordine Domenicano a Firenze, su fiorentininelmondo.La cella di San Tommaso a San Domenico Maggiore (Napoli). G. Bosco, Storia ecclesiastica ad uso della gioventù utile ad ogni grado di persone, Torino, Libreria Salesiana Editore, con l'approvazione del card. Lorenzo Gastaldi, arcivescovo di Torino  Filmato audio Luca Bianchi, Onorato Grassi e Costantino Esposito, Tommaso e la sua eredità - il pensiero che nasce dall'esperienza, Centro Culturale di Milano,   «Non è vero che alcuni traduttori lavorassero al suo servizio, come Guglielmo di Moerbeke». (v. 1h 14').  Premio letterario internazionale San Tommaso d’Aquino, sabato 4 a Mercato San Severino., su gazzettadisalerno, Mercato San Severino (SA), Convento di San Domenico a Salerno, oggi caserma, su salernodavedere. Sandra Isetta, Il piccolo Tommaso e l'"appetito" per i libri, in L'Osservatore Romano. Jean-Pierre Torrell, Amico della verità,392  Quaestio 76 della Parte I della Summa Theologiae di A.. A cura di Landi  Massimo Adinolfi, Francesco Paolo Adorno, Francesco Berto, Massimo Cacciari, Piero Coda, Carmela Covino, Adriano Fabris, Franco Ferrari, Ernesto Forcellino, Carlo Sini, Luigi Vero Tarca, Vincenzo Vitiello, La conoscenza di Dio tra remotio e revelatio nella "Summa theologiae" di San Tommaso D'Aquino, in Il Pensiero. Rivista di filosifia, Inschibboleth Edizioni,  S. Th. I, q.2, a.2, c. e luoghi paralleli nei commenti aristotelici  Cf. Summa Theologiae, Iª q. 2 a. 3  Cf. Summa Theologiae, pars I, quaestio 2 articolo 3. Kant, Critica della ragion pura, Laterza, Leo Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St. Thomas A., E.J. Brill, When St. Thomas A. had a foretaste of heaven on St. Nicholas’ feast day, su lifesitenews.com, Cf. Quaestio disputata de anima, a. 3 ad 1; Summa Theologiae, Iª q. 16 aa. 1-2.  Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Introduzione ad A., Roma-Bari, Laterza,  Summa contra gentiles, libro II, 31-37 e Summa theologiae, pars I quaestio 46  La Somma Teologica. Sola trad. italiana: Volume 1 - Prima Parte, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, «Né prima né dopo, si è pensato con tanta precisione, con tanta intima sicurezza logica, quanto nell'epoca dell'alta Scolastica. L'essenziale è che allora il puro pensiero si svolgeva con matematica sicurezza di idea in idea, di giudizio in giudizio, di conclusione in conclusione» (Rudolf Steiner, La filosofia di Tommaso d'Aquino, II, Opera Omnia, 74). Steiner aggiungeva che «il nominalismo è il padre di tutto lo scetticismo moderno, cit. in Posizione dell'antroposofia nei confronti della filosofia, O.O.).  Martin Lutero, Servo arbitrio, WA 51, 126.  Encilica Aeterni Patris, su vatican.va. (o la traduzione similare qui riportata.  Heinrich Fries, Georg Kretschmar (a cura di), I classici della teologia, Jaca Book, 2005,978-88-16-30402-4. Annotazioni  Nella Sala del Tesoro di San Domenico Maggiore è conservato un arazzo raffigurante il Carro del Sole, parte delle Storie ed alle Virtù di san Tommaso d’Aquino, donato ai domenicani da Vincenza Maria d’Aquino Pico Bibliografia Tommaso d'Aquino, Super libros de generatione et corruptione, Jacques Myt, Jacques Giunta. Thomas Aquinas; Richard J. Regan, Compendium of theology Oxford University Press. Aimé Forest, Saint Thomas d'Aquin,Mellottée, Le Ragioni del Tomismo dopo il centenario dell'enciclica "Aeterni Patris", Ares, Milano, Maria Cristina Bartolomei, Tomismo e Principio di non contraddizione, Milani, Padova, 1973 Giuseppe Barzaghi, La Somma Teologica di San Tommaso d'A., in Compendio. Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, Biffi, La teologia e un teologo. San Tommaso d'A., Edizioni Piemme, Casale Monferrato (AL), [Charamsa, Dispensa introduttiva “Trinità di San A.”, Pontificio Ateneo Regina Apostolorum - Facoltà di Teologia, Marie-Dominique Chenu, Introduzione allo studio di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze, Chesterton, Tommaso d'A., Guida Editori, Napoli, Piero Coda, Contemplare e condividere la luce di Dio: la missione della Teo-logia in Tommaso d'Aquino, Città Nuova, Roma, 2014 Marco D'Avenia, La Conoscenza per Connaturalità, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1992 Cornelio Fabro, Introduzione a San Tommaso. La metafisica tomista e il pensiero moderno, Ares, Milano, Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino, S.E.I., Torino, Umberto Galeazzi, L'etica Filosofica in Tommaso D'Aquino: Dalla Summa Theologiae Alla Contra Gentiles per Una Riscoperta Dei Fondamenti Della Morale Città Nuova, Roma, Lagrange, La Sintesi Tomistica, Queriniana, Brescia, Alessandro Ghisalberti, Tommaso d'Aquino, in Enciclopedia Filosofica (diretta da Melchiorre),  Bompiani, Milano,  Étienne Gilson, Saint Thomas Moraliste, J. Vrin, Parigi, Gilson, Realisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance, J. Vrin, Parigi, Gilson, Il tomismo: introduzione alla filosofia di San Tommaso d'A., Milano, Jaca Book 2011 Marcello Landi, Un contributo allo studio della scienza nel Medio Evo. Il trattato Il cielo e il mondo di Giovanni Buridano e un confronto con alcune posizioni di Tommaso d'Aquino, in Divus Thomas Lorenz, I Fondamenti dell'Ontologia Tomista, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, Masnovo, San Agostino e S. Tomaso, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, Mcinerny, L'analogia in Tommaso d'A., Armando, Roma, Mondin, Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di San Tommaso d'A., Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 2002 Battista Mondin, Il Sistema Filosofico di Tommaso d'A., Massimo, Milano, Possenti, Filosofia e rivelazione, Città Nuova Editrice, Roma, Pereira, La filosofia nel Medioevo, Carocci, Roma, Pili, Il taedium tra relazione e non-senso. Cristo crocifisso in Tommaso d'Aquino, Città Nuova, Roma, 2014 Pasquale Porro, Tommaso D'A.. Un profilo storico-filosofico, Carocci Roma, Samek Lodovici, La felicità del bene. Una rilettura di Tommaso d'Aquino, Vita e pensiero, Milano, 2002 Giacomo Samek Lodovici, L'esistenza di Dio, Quaderni del Timone, Hurtado, Intelecto-razón en Tomás de Aquino. Aproximación noética a la metafísica, EDUSC, Roma, 2005 Juan José Sanguineti, La Filosofia del Cosmo in Tommaso d'A., Ares, Milano, Sbaffoni, San Tommaso d'Aquino e l'Influsso degli Angeli, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, Schimdt, The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, Martinus Nijhoff, L'Aia (Paesi Bassi), Schönberger, Tommaso d'Aquino, Il Mulino, Bologna, Sgarbossa, I Santi e i Beati della Chiesa d'Occidente e d'Oriente, II edizione, Edizioni Paoline, Milano, Spiazzi, O.P. San Tommaso d'Aquino: biografia documentata, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, Tisi, A. e Salerno, Grafica Jannone-Salerno, Salerno, Torrell, Tommaso d'A.. L'uomo e il teologo, Casale Monferrato, Piemme, Torrell, Tommaso d'A.. Maestro spirituale, Città Nuova, Roma, Torrell, Amico della verità. Vita e opere di Tommaso d'Aquino, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Introduzione a Tommaso d'A., Laterza, Bari, Angelus Walz, Paul Novarina, Saint Thomas d'A., Parigi, Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, Weisheipl, Tommaso d'A. Vita, pensiero, opere, Jaca Book, Milano, Wohl, La Liberazione del Gigante, Milano: BUR Rizzoli. Voci correlate Corpus Domini Dio, essere e ragione in Tommaso d'A. Ebraismo e Cristianità Opere Adoro Te Devote Quaestio disputata de malo Summa Theologiae Personalità Al-Ghazali Domingo Báñez Hillel ben Samuel da Verona San Bernardo di Chiaravalle San Bonaventura da Bagnoregio Teologia e filosofia Comunione dei santi Tomismo Filosofia medioevale Analogia entis Trascendenza Nunc stans Essenza Timeo hominem unius libri; Tommaso d'A., su Treccani – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.Tommaso d'Aquino, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.Tommaso d'A., in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Tommaso d'A., su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.Tommaso d'A., su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana.Tommaso d'A. / Tommaso d'A. (altra versione), su Find a Grave.Opere di Tommaso d'Aquino / Tommaso d'A. (altra versione) / A. (altra versione) / Tommaso d'A. (altra versione), su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.Opere di Tommaso d'A. / Tommaso d'A. (altra versione) / Tommaso d'Aquino (altra versione), su Open Library, Internet Archive.Opere di Tommaso d'Aquino, su Progetto Gutenberg.Audiolibri di Tommaso d'Aquino, su LibriVox.Bibliografia di Tommaso d'A., su Internet Speculative Fiction Database, Al von Ruff.Thomas A., su Goodreads. Bibliografia su Tommaso d'A., su Les Archives de littérature du Moyen Âge.Tommaso d'A., in Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company.Tommaso d'A., su Santi, beati e testimoni, santiebeati.Spartiti o libretti di Tommaso d'Aquino, su International Music Score Library Project, Project Petrucci LLC.BiografiaTommaso d'A. dall'Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, su iep.utm.edu. Naddeo, Pasquale, Modernità, attualità, italianità di S. Tommaso D'A., Salerno: Stab. Tip. F.lli Di Giacomo di Giov., La figura di Tommaso I conte di Acerra, braccio destro di Federico II, su web.archive.org. Opere Opera omnia di A., su corpus thomisticum.). A. in Inglese, su dhspriory.org. Opera omnia di san Tommaso d'Aquino, su documentacatholicaomnia.eu. Opere di Tommaso d'A., su intratext.com. testo con concordanze e lista di frequenza Traduzione italiana del trattato De Ente et Essentia, su ariannascuola.eu. Traduzione italiana del De Ente et essentia in formato epub, su ledizioni. Traduzione parziale della Lettera alla Duchessa di Brabante, sui rapporti con gli Ebrei su digilander.libero. Fusaro, Il pensiero e le opere d’A. in breve, su filosofico.net. Il catechismo di san Tommaso d'Aquino, su lettereadioealluomo.com  (summa di 5 opere, con l'imprimatur di Mons. Giovanni Canestri)The Catechetical Instructions of Saint Thomas Aquinas (PDF), su documenta catholica omnia.eu. Summa Theologiae Testo integrale della Somma Teologica. La Somma Teologica (ZIP), su digilander.libero. La Summa theologiae d’A., su newadvent.org. TomismoSaint Thomas A., su Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (PT) Instituto Teológico São Tomás de Aquino - Brasile, su ittanoticias.arautos.org. Presentazione globale del pensiero filosofico di Tommaso, su mondodomani.org. Scheda su san Tommaso a cura di Marcello Landi, su lgxserver.uniba Le cinque vie di Tommaso, su ariannascuola.eu. V · D · M Padri e dottori della Chiesa cattolica V · D · M Famiglia domenicana. ·Biografie Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo Filosofia Portale Filosofia Medioevo Portale Medioevo Categorie: Religiosi italiani Teologi italiani Filosofi italiani Nati a RoccaseccaTommaso d'Aquino Accademici italiani Professori dell'Università di Parigi Dottori della Chiesa cattolica Filosofi cattolici Filosofi della politica Domenicani italiani ScolasticiSanti italiani del XIII secoloSanti canonizzati da Giovanni XXII Santi domenicani Santi per nome Personaggi citati nella Divina Commedia (Paradiso) Studenti dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II Scrittori medievali in lingua latina  Tomismo Santi incorrotti [altre] “Perhaps the Italian most studied at Oxford!” Grice. A. and intentionality Clark Armini -- aquinokeyword: “medieval pragmatics”! -- thomism, the theology and philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The term is applied broadly to various thinkers from different periods who were heavily influenced by Aquinas’s thought in their own philosophizing and theologizing. Here three different eras and three different groups of thinkers will be distinguished: those who supported Aquinas’s thought in the fifty years or so following his death; certain highly skilled interpreters and commentators who flourished during the period of “Second Thomism” sixteenthseventeenth centuries; and various late nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers who have been deeply influenced in their own work by Aquinas. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Thomism. Although Aquinas’s genius was recognized by many during his own lifetime, a number of his views were immediately contested by other Scholastic thinkers. Controversies ranged, e.g., over his defense of only one substantial form in human beings; his claim that prime matter is purely potential and cannot, therefore, be kept in existence without some substantial form, even by divine power; his emphasis on the role of the human intellect in the act of choice; his espousal of a real distinction betweeen the soul and its powers; and his defense of some kind of objective or “real” rather than a merely mind-dependent composition of essence and act of existing esse in creatures. Some of Aquinas’s positions were included directly or indirectly in the 219 propositions condemned by Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris, and his defense of one single substantial form in man was condemned by Archbishop Robert Kilwardby at Oxford in 1277, with renewed prohibitions by his successor as archbishop of Canterbury, John Peckham, in 1284 and 1286. Only after A.’s canonization are the Paris prohibitions revoked insofar as they touched on his teaching . Even within his own Dominican order, disagreement about some of his views developed within the first decades after his death, notwithstanding the order’s highly sympathetic espousal of his cause. Early English Dominican defenders of his general views included Hothum, Knapwell, Orford, Sutton, and Macclesfield, Dominican Thomists included Bernard of Trilia d.1292, Giles of Lessines in present-day Belgium, Quidort of Paris d. 1306, Bernard of Auvergne d. after 1307, Hervé Nédélec d.1323, Armand of Bellevue fl. 131634, and William Peter Godin d.1336. The secular master at Paris, Peter of Auvergne, while remaining very independent in his own views, knew Aquinas’s thought well and completed some of his commentaries on Aristotle. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Thomism. Sometimes known as the period of Second Thomism, this revival gained impetus from the early fifteenth-century writer John Capreolus in his Defenses of A.’s Theology Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae, a commentary on the Sentences. A number of fifteenth-century Dominican and secular teachers in G. universities also contributed: Kaspar Grunwald Freiburg; Cornelius Sneek and John Stoppe in Rostock; Leonard of Brixental Vienna; Gerard of Heerenberg, Lambert of Heerenberg, and John Versor all at Cologne; Gerhard of Elten; and in Belgium Denis the Carthusian. Outstanding among various sixteenth-century commentators on Thomas were Tommaso de Vio Cardinal Cajetan, Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, Francisco de Vitoria Salamanca, and Francisco’s disciples Domingo de Soto and Melchior Cano. Most important among early seventeenth-century Thomists was John of St. Thomas, who lectured at Piacenza, Madrid, and Alcalá, and is best known for his Cursus philosophicus and his Cursus theologicus. Theravada Buddhism Thomism The nineteenth- and twentieth-century revival. By the early to mid-nineteenth century the study of A. had been largely abandoned outside Dominican circles, and in most Roman Catholic s and seminaries a kind of Cartesian and Suarezian Scholasticism was taught. Long before he became Pope Leo XIII, Joachim Pecci and his brother Joseph had taken steps to introduce the teaching of Thomistic philosophy at the diocesan seminary at Perugia. Earlier efforts in this direction had been made by Vincenzo Buzzetti, by Buzzetti’s students Serafino and Domenico Sordi, and by Taparelli d’Aglezio, who became director of the Collegio Romano Gregorian. Leo’s encyclical Aeterni Patris1879 marked an official effort on the part of the Roman Catholic church to foster the study of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas. The intent was to draw upon Aquinas’s original writings in order to prepare students of philosophy and theology to deal with problems raised by contemporary thought. The Leonine Commission was established to publish a critical edition of all of Aquinas’s writings; this effort continues today. Important centers of Thomistic studies developed, such as the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain founded by Cardinal Mercier, the Dominican School of Saulchoir in France, and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. Different groups of Roman, Belgian, and  Jesuits acknowledged a deep indebtedness to A. for their personal philosophical reflections. There was also a concentration of effort in the United States at universities such as The Catholic  of America, St. Louis, Notre Dame, Fordham, Marquette, and Boston, to mention but a few, and by the Dominicans at River Forest. A great weakness of many of the nineteenthand twentieth-century Latin manuals produced during this effort was a lack of historical sensitivity and expertise, which resulted in an unreal and highly abstract presentation of an “Aristotelian-Thomistic” philosophy. This weakness was largely offset by the development of solid historical research both in the thought of Aquinas and in medieval philosophy and theology in general, championed by scholars such as H. Denifle, M. De Wulf, M. GrabmannMandonnet, F. Van Steenberghen, E. Gilson and many of his students at Toronto, and by a host of more recent and contemporary scholars. Much of this historical work continues today both within and without Catholic scholarly circles. At the same time, remarkable diversity in interpreting Aquinas’s thought has emerged on the part of many twentieth-century scholars. Witness, e.g., the heavy influence of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on the Thomism of Maritain; the much more historically grounded approaches developed in quite different ways by Gilson and F. Van Steenberghen; the emphasis on the metaphysics of participation in Aquinas in the very different presentations by L. Geiger and C. Fabro; the emphasis on existence esse promoted by Gilson and many others but resisted by still other interpreters; the movement known as Transcendental Thomism, originally inspired byRousselot and by J. Marechal in dialogue with Kant; and the long controversy about the appropriateness of describing Thomas’s philosophy and that of other medievals as a Christian philosophy. An increasing number of non-Catholic thinkers are currently directing considerable attention to A., and the varying backgrounds they bring to his texts will undoubtedly result in still other interesting interpretations and applications of his thought to contemporary concerns.  : --a strange genitive for “Aquino,” the little village where the saint was born. while Grice, being C. of E., would avoid Aquinas like the rats, he was aware of Aquinas’s clever ‘intention-based semantics’ in his commentary of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.  Thomas, philosopher-theologian, the most influential thinker of the medieval period. He produced a powerful philosophical synthesis that combined Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements within a Christian context in an original and ingenious way. Life and works. A. was born at A. castle in Roccasecca, Italy, and took early schooling at the Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino. He then studies liberal arts and philosophy at Naples  and joins the Dominican order. While going to Paris for further studies as a Dominican, he is detained by his family. Upon being released, he studies with the Dominicans at Paris, until when he journeyed to [a priori argument A., Saint A>] Cologne to work under Albertus Magnus. A.’s own report reportatio of Albertus’s lectures on the Divine Names of Dionysius and his notes on Albertus’s lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics date from this period. A. returns to Paris to lecture there as a BACHELOR in theology. His resulting commentary on the Sentences of LOMBARDO (si veda) dates from this period, as do two philosophical treatises, On Being and Essence De ente et essentia and On the Principles of Nature De principiis naturae. He beguins lecturing as MASTER of theology at Paris. From this period date a series of scriptural commentaries, the disputations On Truth De veritate, Quodlibetal Questions VIIXI, and earlier parts of the Summa against the Gentiles Summa contra gentiles; hereafter SCG. At different locations in Italy, A. continues to write prodigiously, including, among other works, the completion of the SCG; a commentary on the Divine Names; disputations On the Power of God De potentia Dei and On Evil De malo; and Summa of Theology Summa theologiae; hereafter ST, Part I. He resumes teaching in Paris as REGENT MASTER and writes extensively until returning to Italy. From this second Parisian regency date the disputations On the Soul De anima and On Virtues De virtutibus; continuation of ST; Quodlibets IVI and XII; On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Most if not all of his commentaries on Aristotle; a commentary on the Book of Causes Liber de causis; and On the Eternity of the World De aeternitate mundi. A. returns to Italy where he lectures on theology at Naples and continues to write. He died en route to the Second Council of Lyons. Doctrine. A. was both a philosopher and a theologian. The greater part of his writings are theological, but there are many strictly philosophical works within his corpus, such as On Being and Essence, On the Principles of Nature, On the Eternity of the World, and the commentaries on Aristotle and on the Book of Causes. Also important are large sections of strictly philosophical writing incorporated into theological works such as the SCG, ST, and various disputations. Aquinas clearly distinguishes between strictly philosophical investigation and theological investigation. If philosophy is based on the light of natural reason, theology sacra doctrina presupposes faith in divine revelation. While the natural light of reason is insufficient to discover things that can be made known to human beings only through revelation, e.g., belief in the Trinity, Thomas holds that it is impossible for those things revealed to us by God through faith to be opposed to those we can discover by using human reason. For then one or the other would have to be false; and since both come to us from God, God himself would be the author of falsity, something Thomas rejects as abhorrent. Hence it is appropriate for the theologian to use philosophical reasoning in theologizing. Aquinas also distinguishes between the orders to be followed by the theologian and by the philosopher. In theology one reasons from belief in God and his revelation to the implications of this for created reality. In philosophy one begins with an investigation of created reality insofar as this can be understood by human reason and then seeks to arrive at some knowledge of divine reality viewed as the cause of created reality and the end or goal of one’s philosophical inquiry SCG II, c. 4. This means that the order A. follows in his theological Summae SCG and ST is not the same as that which he prescribes for the philosopher cf. Prooemium to Commentary on the Metaphysics. Also underlying much of Aquinas’s thought is his acceptance of the difference between theoretical or speculative philosophy including natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics and practical philosophy. Being and analogy. For A. the highest part of philosophy is metaphysics, the science of being as being. The subject of this science is not God, but being, viewed without restriction to any given kind of being, or simply as being Prooemium to Commentary on Metaphysics; In de trinitate, qu. 5, a. 4. The metaphysician does not enjoy a direct vision of God in this life, but can reason to knowledge of him by moving from created effects to awareness of him as their uncreated cause. God is therefore not the subject of metaphysics, nor is he included in its subject. God can be studied by the metaphysician only indirectly, as the cause of the finite beings that fall under being as being, the subject of the science. In order to account for the human intellect’s discovery of being as being, in contrast with being as mobile studied by natural philosophy or being as quantified studied by mathematics, Thomas appeals to a special kind of intellectual operation, a negative judgment, technically named by him “separation.” Through this operation one discovers that being, in order to be realized as such, need not be material and chang Aquinas, Saint Thomas A., Saint Thomas 37   37 ing. Only as a result of this judgment is one justified in studying being as being. Following Aristotle and Averroes, Thomas is convinced that the term ‘being’ is used in various ways and with different meanings. Yet these different usages are not unrelated and do enjoy an underlying unity sufficient for being as being to be the subject of a single science. On the level of finite being Thomas adopts and adapts Aristotle’s theory of unity by reference to a first order of being. For Thomas as for Aristotle this unity is guaranteed by the primary referent in our predication of being  substance. Other things are named being only because they are in some way ordered to and dependent on substance, the primary instance of being. Hence being is analogous. Since Thomas’s application of analogy to the divine names presupposes the existence of God, we shall first examine his discussion of that issue. The existence of God and the “five ways.” Thomas holds that unaided human reason, i.e., philosophical reason, can demonstrate that God exists, that he is one, etc., by reasoning from effect to cause De trinitate, qu. 2, a. 3; SCG I, c. 4. Best-known among his many presentations of argumentation for God’s existence are the “five ways.” Perhaps even more interesting for today’s student of his metaphysics is a brief argument developed in one of his first writings, On Being and Essence c.4. There he wishes to determine how essence is realized in what he terms “separate substances,” i.e., the soul, intelligences angels of the Christian tradition, and the first cause God. After criticizing the view that created separate substances are composed of matter and form, Aquinas counters that they are not entirely free from composition. They are composed of a form or essence and an act of existing esse. He immediately develops a complex argument: 1 We can think of an essence or quiddity without knowing whether or not it actually exists. Therefore in such entities essence and act of existing differ unless 2 there is a thing whose quiddity and act of existing are identical. At best there can be only one such being, he continues, by eliminating multiplication of such an entity either through the addition of some difference or through the reception of its form in different instances of matter. Hence, any such being can only be separate and unreceived esse, whereas esse in all else is received in something else, i.e., essence. 3 Since esse in all other entities is therefore distinct from essence or quiddity, existence is communicated to such beings by something else, i.e., they are caused. Since that which exists through something else must be traced back to that which exists of itself, there must be some thing that causes the existence of everything else and that is identical with its act of existing. Otherwise one would regress to infinity in caused causes of existence, which Thomas here dismisses as unacceptable. In qu. 2, a. 1 of ST I Thomas rejects the claim that God’s existence is self-evident to us in this life, and in a. 2 maintains that God’s existence can be demonstrated by reasoning from knowledge of an existing effect to knowledge of God as the cause required for that effect to exist. The first way or argument art. 3 rests upon the fact that various things in our world of sense experience are moved. But whatever is moved is moved by something else. To justify this, Thomas reasons that to be moved is to be reduced from potentiality to actuality, and that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act; for it would then have to be in potency if it is to be moved and in act at the same time and in the same respect. This does not mean that a mover must formally possess the act it is to communicate to something else if it is to move the latter; it must at least possess it virtually, i.e., have the power to communicate it. Whatever is moved, therefore, must be moved by something else. One cannot regress to infinity with moved movers, for then there would be no first mover and, consequently, no other mover; for second movers do not move unless they are moved by a first mover. One must, therefore, conclude to the existence of a first mover which is moved by nothing else, and this “everyone understands to be God.” The second way takes as its point of departure an ordering of efficient causes as indicated to us by our investigation of sensible things. By this Thomas means that we perceive in the world of sensible things that certain efficient causes cannot exercise their causal activity unless they are also caused by something else. But nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, since it would then have to be prior to itself. One cannot regress to infinity in ordered efficient causes. In ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediary, and the intermediary is the cause of the last whether the intermediary is one or many. Hence if there were no first efficient cause, there would be no intermediary and no last cause. Thomas concludes from this that one must acknowledge the existence of a first efficient cause, “which everyone names God.” The third way consists of two major parts. Some Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas 38   38 textual variants have complicated the proper interpretation of the first part. In brief, Aquinas appeals to the fact that certain things are subject to generation and corruption to show that they are “possible,” i.e., capable of existing and not existing. Not all things can be of this kind revised text, for that which has the possibility of not existing at some time does not exist. If, therefore, all things are capable of not existing, at some time there was nothing whatsoever. If that were so, even now there would be nothing, since what does not exist can only begin to exist through something else that exists. Therefore not all beings are capable of existing and not existing. There must be some necessary being. Since such a necessary, i.e., incorruptible, being might still be caused by something else, Thomas adds a second part to the argument. Every necessary being either depends on something else for its necessity or it does not. One cannot regress to infinity in necessary beings that depend on something else for their necessity. Therefore there must be some being that is necessary of itself and that does not depend on another cause for its necessity, i.e., God. The statement in the first part to the effect that what has the possibility of not existing at some point does not exist has been subject to considerable dispute among commentators. Moreover, even if one grants this and supposes that every individual being is a “possible” and therefore has not existed at some point in the past, it does not easily follow from this that the totality of existing things will also have been nonexistent at some point in the past. Given this, some interpreters prefer to substitute for the third way the more satisfactory versions found in SCG I ch. 15 and SCG II ch. 15. Thomas’s fourth way is based on the varying degrees of perfection we discover among the beings we experience. Some are more or less good, more or less true, more or less noble, etc., than others. But the more and less are said of different things insofar as they approach in varying degrees something that is such to a maximum degree. Therefore there is something that is truest and best and noblest and hence that is also being to the maximum degree. To support this Thomas comments that those things that are true to the maximum degree also enjoy being to the maximum degree; in other words he appeals to the convertibility between being and truth of being. In the second part of this argument Thomas argues that what is supremely such in a given genus is the cause of all other things in that genus. Therefore there is something that is the cause of being, goodness, etc., for all other beings, and this we call God. Much discussion has centered on Thomas’s claim that the more and less are said of different things insofar as they approach something that is such to the maximum degree. Some find this insufficient to justify the conclusion that a maximum must exist, and would here insert an appeal to efficient causality and his theory of participation. If certan entities share or participate in such a perfection only to a limited degree, they must receive that perfection from something else. While more satisfactory from a philosophical perspective, such an insertion seems to change the argument of the fourth way significantly. The fifth way is based on the way things in the universe are governed. Thomas observes that certain things that lack the ability to know, i.e., natural bodies, act for an end. This follows from the fact that they always or at least usually act in the same way to attain that which is best. For Thomas this indicates that they reach their ends by “intention” and not merely from chance. And this in turn implies that they are directed to their ends by some knowing and intelligent being. Hence some intelligent being exists that orders natural things to their ends. This argument rests on final causality and should not be confused with any based on order and design. Aquinas’s frequently repeated denial that in this life we can know what God is should here be recalled. If we can know that God exists and what he is not, we cannot know what he is see, e.g., SCG I, c. 30. Even when we apply the names of pure perfections to God, we first discover such perfections in limited fashion in creatures. What the names of such perfections are intended to signify may indeed be free from all imperfection, but every such name carries with it some deficiency in the way in which it signifies. When a name such as ‘goodness’, for instance, is signified abstractly e.g., ‘God is goodness’, this abstract way of signifying suggests that goodness does not subsist in itself. When such a name is signified concretely e.g., ‘God is good’, this concrete way of signifying implies some kind of composition between God and his goodness. Hence while such names are to be affirmed of God as regards that which they signify, the way in which they signify is to be denied of him. This final point sets the stage for Thomas to apply his theory of analogy to the divine names. Names of pure perfections such as ‘good’, ‘true’, ‘being’, etc., cannot be applied to God with Aquinas, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas 39   39 exactly the same meaning they have when affirmed of creatures univocally, nor with entirely different meanings equivocally. Hence they are affirmed of God and of creatures by an analogy based on the relationship that obtains between a creature viewed as an effect and God its uncaused cause. Because some minimum degree of similarity must obtain between any effect and its cause, Thomas is convinced that in some way a caused perfection imitates and participates in God, its uncaused and unparticipated source. Because no caused effect can ever be equal to its uncreated cause, every perfection that we affirm of God is realized in him in a way different from the way we discover it in creatures. This dissimilarity is so great that we can never have quidditative knowledge of God in this life know what God is. But the similarity is sufficient for us to conclude that what we understand by a perfection such as goodness in creatures is present in God in unrestricted fashion. Even though Thomas’s identification of the kind of analogy to be used in predicating divine names underwent some development, in mature works such as On the Power of God qu. 7, a. 7, SCG I c.34, and ST I qu. 13, a. 5, he identifies this as the analogy of “one to another,” rather than as the analogy of “many to one.” In none of these works does he propose using the analogy of “proportionality” that he had previously defended in On Truth qu. 2, a. 11. Theological virtues. While Aquinas is convinced that human reason can arrive at knowledge that God exists and at meaningful predication of the divine names, he does not think the majority of human beings will actually succeed in such an effort SCG I, c. 4; ST IIIIae, qu. 2, a. 4. Hence he concludes that it was fitting for God to reveal such truths to mankind along with others that purely philosophical inquiry could never discover even in principle. Acceptance of the truth of divine revelation presupposes the gift of the theological virtue of faith in the believer. Faith is an infused virtue by reason of which we accept on God’s authority what he has revealed to us. To believe is an act of the intellect that assents to divine truth as a result of a command on the part of the human will, a will that itself is moved by God through grace ST II IIae, qu. 2, a. 9. For Thomas the theological virtues, having God the ultimate end as their object, are prior to all other virtues whether natural or infused. Because the ultimate end must be present in the intellect before it is present to the will, and because the ultimate end is present in the will by reason of hope and charity the other two theological virtues, in this respect faith is prior to hope and charity. Hope is the theological virtue through which we trust that with divine assistance we will attain the infinite good  eternal enjoyment of God ST IIIIae, qu. 17, aa. 12. In the order of generation, hope is prior to charity; but in the order of perfection charity is prior both to hope and faith. While neither faith nor hope will remain in those who reach the eternal vision of God in the life to come, charity will endure in the blessed. It is a virtue or habitual form that is infused into the soul by God and that inclines us to love him for his own sake. If charity is more excellent than faith or hope ST II IIae, qu. 23, a. 6, through charity the acts of all other virtues are ordered to God, their ultimate end qu. 23, a. 8.  Aquino -- Aquinismo“If followers of William are called Occamists, followers of a Saint should surely call themselves “Aquinistae”! -- neo-Thomismas opposed to palaeo-Thomism --, a philosophical-theological movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries manifesting a revival of interest in Aquinas. It was stimulated by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris 1879 calling for a renewed emphasis on the teaching of Thomistic principles to meet the intellectual and social challenges of modernity. The movement reached its peak in the 0s, though its influence continues to be seen in organizations such as the  Catholic Philosophical Association. Among its major figures are Joseph Kleutgen, Désiré Mercier, Joseph Maréchal, Pierre Rousselot, Réginald Garrigou-LaGrange, Martin Grabmann, M.-D. Chenu, Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson, Yves R. Simon, Josef Pieper, Karl Rahner, Cornelio Fabro, Emerich Coreth, Bernard Lonergan, and W. Norris Clarke. Few, if any, of these figures have described themselves as NeoThomists; some explicitly rejected the designation. Neo-Thomists have little in common except their commitment to Aquinas and his relevance to the contemporary world. Their interest produced a more historically accurate understanding of Aquinas and his contribution to medieval thought Grabmann, Gilson, Chenu, including a previously ignored use of the Platonic metaphysics of participation Fabro. This richer understanding of Aquinas, as forging a creative synthesis in the midst of competing traditions, has made arguing for his relevance easier. Those Neo-Thomists who were suspicious of modernity produced fresh readings of Aquinas’s texts applied to contemporary problems Pieper, Gilson. Their influence can be seen in the revival of virtue theory and the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. Others sought to develop Aquinas’s thought with the aid of later Thomists Maritain, Simon and incorporated the interpretations of Counter-Reformation Thomists, such as Cajetan and Jean Poinsot, to produce more sophisticated, and controversial, accounts of the intelligence, intentionality, semiotics, and practical knowledge. Those Neo-Thomists willing to engage modern thought on its own terms interpreted modern philosophy sympathetically using the principles of Aquinas Maréchal, Lonergan, Clarke, seeking dialogue rather than confrontation. However, some readings of Aquinas are so thoroughly integrated into modern philosophy that they can seem assimilated Rahner, Coreth; their highly individualized metaphysics inspired as much by other philosophical influences, especially Heidegger, as Aquinas. Some of the labels currently used among Neo-Thomists suggest a division in the movement over critical, postKantian methodology. ‘Existential Thomism’ is used for those who emphasize both the real distinction between essence and existence and the role of the sensible in the mind’s first grasp of being. ‘Transcendental Thomism’ applies to figures like Maréchal, Rousselot, Rahner, and Coreth who rely upon the inherent dynamism of the mind toward the real, rooted in Aquinas’s theory of the active intellect, from which to deduce their metaphysics of being.  Dedicatio. Dilecto sibi praeposito Lovaniensi frater Thomas de Aquino salutem et verae sapientiae incrementa. Diligentiae tuae, qua in iuvenili aetate non vanitati sed sapientiae intendis, studio provocatus, et desiderio satisfacere cupiens, libro Aristotelis, qui peri hermeneias dicitur, multis obscuritatibus involuto, inter multiplices occupationum mearum sollicitudines, expositionem adhibere curavi, hoc gerens in animo sic altiora pro posse perfectioribus exhibere, ut tamen iunioribus proficiendi auxilia tradere non recusem. Suscipiat ergo studiositas tua praesentis expositionis munus exiguum, ex quo si profeceris, provocare me poteris ad maiora. 1 Sicut dicit philosophus in III de anima, duplex est operatio intellectus: una quidem, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet intellectus apprehendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in seipsa; alia est operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et dividentis. Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a notis ad inquisitionem ignotorum. Harum autem operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia non potest esse compositio et divisio, nisi simplicium apprehensorum. Secunda vero ordinatur ad tertiam: quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis. There is a twofold operation of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. One is the understanding of simple objects, that is, the operation by which the intellect apprebends just the essence of a thing alone; the other is the operation of composing and dividing. There is also a third operation, that of reasoning, by which reason proceeds from what is known to the investigation of things that are unknown. The first of these operations is ordered to the second, for there cannot be composition and division unless things have already been apprehended simply. The second, in turn, is ordered to the third, for clearly we must proceed from some known truth to which the intellect assents in order to have certitude about something not yet known. Aquinas pr. 2 Cum autem logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis. De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro praedicamentorum. De his vero, quae pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat philosophus in libro perihermeneias. De his vero quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat in libro priorum et in consequentibus, in quibus agitur de syllogismo simpliciter et de diversis syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus, quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud. Et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium operationum, liber praedicamentorum ordinatur ad librum perihermeneias, qui ordinatur ad librum priorum et sequentes. 2. Since logic is called rational science it must direct its consideration to the things that belong to the three operations of reason we have mentioned. Accordingly, Aristotle treats those belonging to the first operation of the intellect, i.e., those conceived by simple understanding, in the book Praedicamentorum; those belonging to the second operation, i.e., affirmative and negative enunciation, in the book Perihermeneias; those belonging to the third operation in the book Priorum and the books following it in which he treats the syllogism absolutely, the different kinds of syllogism, and the species of argumentation by which reason proceeds from one thing to another. And since the three operations of reason are ordered to each other so are the books: the Praedicamenta to the Perihermeneias and the Perihermeneias to the Priora and the books following it. Aquinas pr. 3. Dicitur ergo liber iste, qui prae manibus habetur, perihermeneias, quasi de interpretatione. Dicitur autem interpretatio, secundum Boethium, vox significativa, quae per se aliquid significat, sive sit complexa sive incomplexa. Unde coniunctiones et praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non dicuntur interpretationes, quia non per se aliquid significant. Similiter etiam voces signi-ficantes naturaliter, non ex proposito aut cum imaginatione aliquid significandi, sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium, interpretationes dici non possunt. Qui enim interpretatur aliquid exponere intendit. Et ideo sola nomina et verba et orationes dicuntur interpretationes, de quibus in hoc libro determinatur. Sed tamen nomen et verbum magis interpretationis principia esse videntur, quam interpretationes. Ille enim interpretari videtur, qui exponit aliquid esse verum vel falsum. Et ideo sola oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur, interpretatio vocatur. Caeterae vero orationes, ut optativa et imperativa, magis ordinantur ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad interpretandum id quod in intellectu habetur. Intitulatur ergo liber iste de interpretatione, ac si dicetur de enunciativa oratione: in qua verum vel falsum invenitur. Non autem hic agitur de nomine et verbo, nisi in quantum sunt partes enunciationis. Est enim proprium uniuscuiusque scientiae partes subiecti tradere, sicut et passiones. Patet igitur ad quam partem philosophiae pertineat liber iste, et quae sit necessitas istius, et quem ordinem teneat inter logicae libros.3. The one we are now examining is named Perihermeneias, that is, On Interpretation. Interpretation, according to Boethius, is "significant vocal sound —whether complex or incomplex — which signifies something by itself.” Conjunctions, then, and prepositions and other words of this kind are not called interpretations since they do not signify anything by themselves. Nor can sounds signifying naturally but not from purpose or in connection with a mental image of signifying something—such as the sounds of brute animals—be called interpretations, for one who in terprets intends to explain something. Therefore only names and verbs and speech are called interpretations and these Aristotle treats in this book. The name and verb, however, seem to be principles of interpretation rather than interpretations, for one who interprets seems to explain something as either true or false. Therefore, only enunciative speech in which truth or falsity is found is called interpretation. Other kinds of speech, such as optatives and imperatives, are ordered rather to expressing volition than to interpreting what is in the intellect. This book, then, is entitled On Interpretation, that is to say, On Enunciative Speech in which truth or falsity is found. The name and verb are treated only insofar as they are parts of the enunciation; for it is proper to a science to treat the parts of its subject as well as its properties. It is clear, then, to which part of philosophy this book belongs, what its necessity is, and what its place is among the books on logic. I. 1. Praemittit autem huic operi philosophus prooemium, in quo sigillatim exponit ea, quae in hoc libro sunt tractanda. Et quia omnis scientia praemittit ea, quae de principiis sunt; partes autem compositorum sunt eorum principia; ideo oportet intendenti tractare de enunciatione praemittere de partibus eius. Unde dicit: primum oportet constituere, idest definire quid sit nomen et quid sit verbum. In Graeco habetur, primum oportet poni et idem significat. Quia enim demonstrationes definitiones praesupponunt, ex quibus concludunt, merito dicuntur positiones. Et ideo praemittuntur hic solae definitiones eorum, de quibus agendum est: quia ex definitionibus alia cognoscuntur. The Philosopher begins this work with an introduction in which he points out one by one the things that are to be treated. For, since every science begins with a treatment of the principles, and the principles of composite things are their parts, one who intends to treat enunciation must begin with its parts, Therefore Aristotle begins by saying: First we must determine, i.e., define, what a name is and what a verb is. In the Greek text it is First we must posit, which signifies the same thing, for demonstrations presuppose definitions, from which they conclude, and hence definitions are rightly called "positions.” This is the reason he only points out here the definitions of the things to be treated; for from definitions other things are known. 2. Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro praedicamentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur. Ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio. Una quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum praedicamentorum. Alio modo, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enunciationis. Et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt enunciationem. Tertio modo, considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinatur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro priorum. It might be asked why it is necessary to treat simple things again, i.e., the name and the verb, for they were treated in the book Praedicamentorum. In answer to this we should say that simple words can be considered in three ways: first, as they signify simple intellection absolutely, which is the consideration proper to the book Praedicamentorum; secondly, according to their function as parts of the enunciation, which is the way they are considered in this book. Hence, they are treated here under the formality of the name and the verb, and under this formality they signify something with time or without time and other things of the kind that belong to the formality of words as they are components of an enunciation. Finally, simple words may be considered as they are components of a syllogistic ordering. They are treated then under the formality of terms and this Aristotle does in the book Priorum. 3 Potest iterum dubitari quare, praetermissis aliis orationis partibus, de solo nomine et verbo determinet. Ad quod dicendum est quod, quia de simplici enunciatione determinare intendit, sufficit ut solas illas partes enunciationis pertractet, ex quibus ex necessitate simplex oratio constat. Potest autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex enunciatio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus sine his; et ideo sufficiens ei fuit de his duabus determinare. Vel potest dici quod sola nomina et verba sunt principales orationis partes. Sub nominibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae, etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur: sub verbo vero participium, quod consignificat tempus: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam habeat. Alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones. It might be asked why he treats only the name and verb and omits the other parts of speech. The reason could be that Aristotle intends to establish rules about the simple enunciation and for this it is sufficient to consider only the parts of the enunciation that are necessary for simple speech. A simple enunciation can be formed from just a name and a verb, but it cannot be formed from other parts of speech without these. Therefore, it is sufficient to treat these two.On the other hand, the reason could be that names and verbs are the principal parts of speech. Pronouns, which do not name a nature but determine a person-and therefore are put in place of names-are comprehended under names. The participle-althougb it has similarities with the name-signifies with time and is therefore comprehended under the verb. The others are things that unite the parts of speech. They signify relations of one part to another rather than as parts of speech; as nails and other parts of this kind are not parts of a ship, but connect the parts of a ship. 4 His igitur praemissis quasi principiis, subiungit de his, quae pertinent ad principalem intentionem, dicens: postea quid negatio et quid affirmatio, quae sunt enunciationis partes: non quidem integrales, sicut nomen et verbum (alioquin oporteret omnem enunciationem ex affirmatione et negatione compositam esse), sed partes subiectivae, idest species. Quod quidem nunc supponatur, posterius autem manifestabitur. After he has proposed these parts [the name and the verb] as principles, Aristotle states what he principally intends to establish:... then what negation is and affirmation. These, too, are parts of the enunciation, not integral parts however, as are the name and the verb—otherwise every enunciation would have to be formed from an affirmation and negation—but subjective parts, i.e., species. This is supposed here but will be proved later. 5 Sed potest dubitari: cum enunciatio dividatur in categoricam et hypotheticam, quare de his non facit mentionem, sicut de affirmatione et negatione. Et potest dici quod hypothetica enunciatio ex pluribus categoricis componitur. Unde non differunt nisi secundum differentiam unius et multi. Vel potest dici, et melius, quod hypothetica enunciatio non continet absolutam veritatem, cuius cognitio requiritur in demonstratione, ad quam liber iste principaliter ordinatur; sed significat aliquid verum esse ex suppositione: quod non sufficit in scientiis demonstrativis, nisi confirmetur per absolutam veritatem simplicis enunciationis. Et ideo Aristoteles praetermisit tractatum de hypotheticis enunciationibus et syllogismis. Subdit autem, et enunciatio, quae est genus negationis et affirmationis; et oratio, quae est genus enunciationis. Since enunciation is divided into categorical and hypothetical, it might be asked why he does not list these as well as affirmation and negation. In reply to this we could say that Aristotle has not added these because the hypothetical enunciation is composed of many categorical propositions and hence categorical and hypothetical only differ according to the difference of one and many.Or we could say—and this would be a better reason—that the hypothetical enunciation does not contain absolute truth, the knowledge of which is required in demonstration, to which this book is principally ordered; rather, it signifies something as true by supposition, which does not suffice for demonstrative sciences unless it is confirmed by the absolute truth of the simple enunciation. This is the reason Aristotle does not treat either hypothetical enunciations or syllogisms. He adds, and the enunciation, which is the genus of negation and affirmation; and speech, which is the genus of enunciation.  6 Si quis ulterius quaerat, quare non facit ulterius mentionem de voce, dicendum est quod vox est quoddam naturale; unde pertinet ad considerationem naturalis philosophiae, ut patet in secundo de anima, et in ultimo de generatione animalium. Unde etiam non est proprie orationis genus, sed assumitur ad constitutionem orationis, sicut res naturales ad constitutionem artificialium. If it should be asked why, besides these, he does not mention vocal sound, it is because vocal sound is something natural and therefore belongs to the consideration of natural philosophy, as is evident in II De Anima and at the end of De generatione animalium [ch. 8]. Also, since it is something natural, vocal sound is not properly the genus of speech but is presupposed for the forming of speech, as natural things are presupposed for the formation of artificial things. 7 Videtur autem ordo enunciationis esse praeposterus. Nam affirmatio naturaliter est prior negatione, et iis prior est enunciatio, sicut genus. Et per consequens oratio enunciatione. Sed dicendum quod, quia a partibus inceperat enumerare, procedit a partibus ad totum. Negationem autem, quae divisionem continet, eadem ratione praeponit affirmationi, quae consistit in compositione: quia divisio magis accedit ad partes, compositio vero magis accedit ad totum. Vel potest dici, secundum quosdam, quod praemittitur negatio, quia in iis quae possunt esse et non esse, prius est non esse, quod significat negatio, quam esse, quod significat affirmatio. Sed tamen, quia sunt species ex aequo dividentes genus, sunt simul natura; unde non refert quod eorum praeponatur. In this introduction, however, Aristotle seems to have inverted the order of the enunciation, for affirmation is naturally prior to negation and enunciation prior to these as a genus; and consequently, speech to enunciation. We could say in reply to this that he began to enumerate from the parts and consequently he proceeds from the parts to the whole. He puts negation, which contains division, before affirmation, which consists of composition, for the same reason: division is closer to the parts, composition closer to the whole. Or we could say, as some do, that he puts negation first because in those things that can be and not be, non-being, which negation signifies, is prior to being, which affirmation signifies. Aristotle, however, does not refer to the fact that one of them is placed before the other, for they are species equally dividing a genus and are therefore simultaneous according to nature. Praemisso prooemio, philosophus accedit ad propositum exequendum. Et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt voces signi-ficativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de sign-ificatione vocum. Et deinde de vocibus signi-ficativis determinat de quibus in prooemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi:. Nomen ergo est vox significativa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Pprimo, determinat qualis sit sign-ificatio vocum. Scundo, ostendit differentiam significationum vocum complexarum et incomplexarum. Ibi: est autem quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo quidem, praemittit ordinem signi-ficationis vocum. Secundo, ostendit qualis sit vocum signi-ficatio, utrum sit ex natura vel *ex impositione* [ex positione, ex arte non ex natura – signo ex natura – signo ex arte, segno da natura, segno d’arte --. Ibi: et quemadmodum nec litterae et cetera. After his introduction the Philosopher begins to investigate the things he has proposed. Since the things he promised to speak of are either complex or incomplex significant vocal sounds, he prefaces this with a treatment of the signification of vocal sounds; then he takes up the significant vocal sounds he proposed in the introduction where he says, A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, etc. In regard to the signification of vocal sounds he first determines what kind of signification vocal sound has and then shows the difference between the signification of complex and incomplex vocal sounds where he says, As sometimes there is thought in the soul, etc. With respect to the first point, he presents the order of the signification of vocal sounds and then shows what kind of signification vocal sound has, i.e., whether it is from nature or by imposition. This he does where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men, etc. Est ergo considerandum quod circa primum tria proponit, ex quorum uno intelligitur quartum. Aristoteles proponit enim scripturam, voces et animae passiones, ex quibus intelliguntur res. Nam passio est ex im-pressione alicuius agentis. Et sic passiones animae originem habent ab ipsis rebus [teoria causale della percezione]. Et si quidem homo esset naturaliter animal solitarium, sufficerent sibi animae passiones, quibus ipsis rebus conformaretur, ut earum *notitiam* [nota, notitia – notizia – notatura --]  in se haberet. Sed quia homo est animal naturaliter politicum et sociale [chi ama la comunicazione!], necesse fuit quod conceptiones unius hominis *innotescerent* [co-gnoscere] [informare, notificare, essibire, per influire] aliis, quod fit per vocem. Et ideo necesse fuit esse voces signi-ficativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem conviverent. Unde illi, qui sunt diversarum linguarum, non possunt bene convivere ad invicem. Rursum si homo uteretur sola cognitione sensitiva, quae respicit solum ad hic et nunc, sufficeret sibi ad convivendum aliis vox signi-ficativa, sicut et caeteris animalibus, quae per quasdam voces, suas conceptiones invicem sibi manifestant. Sed quia homo utitur etiam intellectuali cognitione, quae abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Consequitur ipsum sollicitudo non solum de praesentibus secundum locum et tempus, sed etiam de his quae distant loco et futura sunt tempore. Unde ut homo conceptiones suas etiam his qui distant secundum locum et his qui venturi sunt in futuro tempore manifestet, necessarius fuit usus scripturae. Apropos of the order of signification of vocal sounds he proposes three things, from one of which a fourth is understood. He proposes writing, vocal sounds, and passions of the soul; things is understood from the latter, for passion is from the impression of something acting, and hence passions of the soul have their origin from things. Now if man were by nature a solitary animal the passions of the soul by which he was conformed to things so as to have knowledge of them would be sufficient for him; but since he is by nature a political and social animal it was necessary that his conceptions be made known to others. This he does through vocal sound. Therefore there had to be significant vocal sounds in order that men might live together. Whence those who speak different languages find it difficult to live together in social unity. Again, if man had only sensitive cognition, which is of the here and now, such significant vocal sounds as the other animals use to manifest their conceptions to each other would be sufficient for him to live with others. But man also has the advantage of intellectual cognition, which abstracts from the here and now, and as a consequence, is concerned with things distant in place and future in time as well as things present according to time and place. Hence the use of writing was necessary so that he might manifest his conceptions to those who are distant according to place and to those who will come in future time. 3. Sed quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, signi-ficatio vocum, quae est *immediate* [senza medio, non-mediata] ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius. Signi-ficatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota [mediate], non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici e non filosofi. Et ideo exponens ordinem signi-ficationum non incipit a litteris, sed a vocibus. Quarum primo signi-ficationem exponens, dicit: sunt ergo ea, quae sunt in voce, notae, idest, signa earum passionum quae sunt in anima. Dicit autem ergo, quasi ex praemissis concludens. Qquia supra dixerat determinandum esse de nomine et verbo et aliis praedictis. Haec autem sunt voces signi-ficativae. Ergo oportet vocum significationem exponere. However, since logic is ordered to obtaining knowledge about things, the signification of vocal sounds, which is immediate to the conceptions of the intellect, is its principal consideration. The signification of written signs, being more remote, belongs to the consideration of the grammarian rather than the logician. Aristotle therefore begins his explanation of the order of signification from vocal sounds, not written signs. First he explains the signification of vocal sounds: Therefore those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul. He says "therefore” as if concluding from premises, because he has already said that we must establish what a name is, and a verb and the other things he mentioned; but these are significant vocal sounds; therefore, signification of vocal sounds must be explained. 4. Utitur autem hoc modo loquendi, ut dicat, ea quae sunt in voce, et non, voces, ut quasi continuatim loquatur cum praedictis. Dixerat enim dicendum esse de nomine et verbo et aliis huiusmodi. Haec autem tripliciter habent esse. Uno quidem modo, in conceptione intellectus. Alio modo, in prolatione vocis. Tertio modo, in conscriptione litterarum. Dicit ergo, ea quae sunt in voce etc. Ac si dicat, nomina et verba et alia consequentia, quae tantum sunt in voce, sunt notae. Vel, quia non omnes voces sunt signi-ficativae, et earum quaedam sunt signi-ficativae *naturaliter*, quae longe sunt a ratione nominis et verbi et aliorum consequentium. Ut appropriet suum dictum ad ea de quibus intendit, ideo dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, idest quae continentur sub voce, sicut partes sub toto. Vel, quia vox est quoddam naturale, nomen autem et verbum signi-ficant *ex institutione humana*, quae advenit rei naturali sicut materiae, ut forma lecti ligno. Ideo ad *de-signandum* [DE-SIGNARE, desegno] nomina et verba et alia consequentia dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, ac si de lecto diceretur, ea quae sunt in ligno. When he says "Those that are in vocal sound,” and not "vocal sounds,” his mode of speaking implies a continuity with what he has just been saying, namely, we must define the name and the verb, etc. Now these have being in three ways: in the conception of the intellect, in the utterance of the voice, and in the writing of letters. He could therefore mean when he says "Those that are in vocal sound,” etc., names and verbs and the other things we are going to define, insofar as they are in vocal sound, are signs. On the other hand, he may be speaking in this way because not all vocal sounds are significant, and of those that are, some are significant naturally and hence are different in nature from the name and the verb and the other things to be defined. Therefore, to adapt what he has said to the things of which he intends to speak he says, "Those that are in vocal sound,” i.e., that are contained under vocal sound as parts under a whole. There could be still another reason for his mode of speaking. Vocal sound is something natural. The name and verb, on the other hand, signify by human institution, that is, the signification is added to the natural thing as a form to matter, as the form of a bed is added to wood. Therefore, to designate names and verbs and the other things he is going to define he says, "Those that are in vocal sound,” in the same way he would say of a bed, "that which is in wood.” 5. Circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod passiones animae communiter dici solent appetitus *sensibilis* affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum. Et verum est quod huiusmodi passiones significant naturaliter quaedam voces hominum, ut gemitus infirmorum [infirmi], et aliorum animalium, ut dicitur in I politicae. Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis *ex institutione* humana. Et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis. Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet. Significat enim hoc nomen ‘homo’ naturam humanam [homo] in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem. Unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam *ideam* [hominis] separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu. Ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate [IN-MEDIATA, NON-MEDIATA – senza medio] et eis mediantibus [MEDIATA -- medio] res. U segna [mediatamente] che piove non che CREDE che piove.  When he speaks of passions in the soul we are apt to think of the affections of the sensitive appetite, such as anger, joy, and the other passions that are customarily and commonly called passions of the soul, as is the case in II Ethicorum. It is true that some of the vocal sounds man makes signify passions of this kind naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the sounds of other animals, as is said in I Politicae. But here Aristotle is speaking of vocal sounds that are significant by human institution. Therefore "passions in the soul” must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name "man” signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them. 6. Sed quia non est consuetum quod conceptiones intellectus Aristoteles nominet passiones. Ideo Andronicus posuit hunc librum non esse Aristotelis. Sed manifeste invenitur in 1 de anima quod passiones animae vocat omnes animae *operations* [judicate/volere – accetare]. Unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus passio dici potest. Vel quia intelligere nostrum non est sine “phantasmate” [sing. fantasma – etym. – fendere, offendere, manifestare, diafano]. Quod non est sine corporali [del corpo] passione. Unde et *imaginativam* philosophus in III de anima vocat passivum [non activum] intellectum. Vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem, etiam ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis [passibilis] quoddam *pati* est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Utitur autem potius nomine passionum, quam intellectuum: tum quia ex aliqua animae passione provenit, puta *ex amore* vel odio, ut homo interiorem conceptum per vocem alteri significare velit. Tum etiam quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam *impressionis* [im-primere – ex-primere] vel passionis. Since Aristotle did not customarily speak of conceptions of the intellect as passions, Andronicus took the position that this book was not Aristotle’s. In I De anima, however, it is obvious that he calls all of the operations of the soul "passions” of the soul. Whence even the conception of the intellect can be called a passion and this either because we do not understand without a phantasm, which requires corporeal passion (for which reason the Philosopher calls the imaginative power the passive intellect) [De Anima]; or because by extending the name "passion” to every reception, the understanding of the possible intellect is also a kind of undergoing, as is said in III De anima. Aristotle uses the name "passion,” rather than "understanding,” however, for two reasons: first, because man wills to signify an interior conception to another through vocal sound as a result of some passion of the soul, such as love or hate; secondly, because the signification of vocal sound is referred to the conception of the intellect inasmuch as the conception arises from things by way of a kind of impression or passion. 7. Secundo, cum dicit: et ea quae scribuntur etc., agit de signi-ficatione Scripturae: et secundum Alexandrum hoc inducit ad manifestandum praecedentem sententiam per modum similitudinis, ut sit sensus. Ita ea quae sunt in voce sunt signa passionum animae, sicut et litterae sunt signa vocum. Quod etiam manifestat per sequentia, cum dicit: et quemadmodum nec litterae etc.; inducens hoc quasi signum praecedentis. Quod enim litterae significent voces, significatur per hoc, quod, sicut sunt diversae voces apud diversos, ita et diversae litterae. Et secundum hanc expositionem, ideo non dixit, et litterae eorum quae sunt in voce, sed ea quae scribuntur. Quia dicuntur litterae etiam in prolatione et Scriptura, quamvis magis proprie, secundum quod sunt in Scriptura, dicantur litterae; secundum autem quod sunt in prolatione, dicantur elementa vocis. Sed quia Aristoteles non dicit, sicut et ea quae scribuntur, sed continuam narrationem facit, melius est ut dicatur, sicut Porphyrius exposuit, quod Aristoteles procedit ulterius ad complendum ordinem significationis. Postquam enim dixerat quod *nomina* [Fido -- denotatum] et verba [-- is shaggy -- attributum], quae sunt in voce, sunt *signa* eorum quae sunt *in* *anima*, continuatim subdit quod nomina et verba quae scribuntur, signa sunt eorum nominum et verborum quae sunt in voce. When he says, and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound, he treats of the signification of writing. According to Alexander he introduces this to make the preceding clause evident by means of a similitude; and the meaning is: those that are in vocal sound are signs of the passions of the soul in the way in which letters are of vocal sound; then he goes On to manifest this point where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same—by introducing this as a sign of the preceding. For when he says in effect, just as there are diverse vocal sounds among diverse peoples so there are diverse letters, he is signifying that letters signify vocal. sounds. And according to this exposition Aristotle said those that are written are signs... and not, letters are signs of those that are in vocal sound, because they are called letters in both speech and writing, alt bough they are more properly called letters in writing; in speech they are called elements of vocal sound. Aristotle, however, does not say, just as those that are written, but continues with his account. Therefore it is better to say as Porphyry does, that Aristotle adds this to complete the order of signification. For after he says that names and verbs in vocal sound are signs of those [names and verbs – ‘Fido is shaggy’ denotative – attributive – the S is P -- in the soul, he adds—in continuity with this—that names and verbs that are written are signs of the names and verbs that are in vocal sound. 8. Deinde cum dicit: et quemadmodum nec litterae etc., ostendit differentiam praemissorum signi-ficantium et signi-ficatorum, quantum ad hoc, quod est esse secundum naturam, vel non esse. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim, ponit quoddam signum, quo manifestatur quod nec voces nec litterae naturaliter significant. Ea enim, quae naturaliter significant sunt eadem apud omnes. Significatio autem litterarum et vocum, de quibus nunc agimus, non est eadem apud omnes. Sed hoc quidem apud nullos unquam dubitatum fuit quantum ad litteras. Quarum non solum *ratio significandi est ex impositione* [positione], sed etiam ipsarum formatio fit *per artem* [per arte ma non ‘artificiale’ – signo di natura, signo di arte, signum naturae, signum artis, signum naturalis – signum artis – segno artato -- --. [non per naturam]. Voces autem naturaliter formantur; unde et apud quosdam dubitatum fuit, utrum naturaliter significent. Sed Aristoteles hic determinat ex similitudine litterarum, quae sicut non sunt eaedem apud omnes, ita nec voces. Unde manifeste relinquitur quod sicut nec litterae, ita nec voces naturaliter significant, sed *ex institutione* humana. Voces autem illae, quae naturaliter signi-FICANT, sicut gemitus infirmorum [infirmi] et alia huiusmodi, sunt *eadem* apud omnes. Then where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same, he shows that the foresaid things differ as signified and signifying inasmuch as they are either according to nature or not. He makes three points here. He first posits a sign to show that neither vocal sounds nor letters signify naturally; things that signify naturally are the same among all men; but the signification of letters and vocal sounds, which is the point at issue here, is not the same among all men. There has never been any question about this in regard to letters, for their character of signifying is from imposition and their very formation is through art. Vocal sounds, however, are formed naturally and hence there is a question as to whether they signify naturally. Aristotle determines this by comparison with letters: these are not the same among all men, and so neither are vocal sounds the same. Consequently, like letters, vocal sounds do not signify naturally but by human institution. The vocal sounds that do signify naturally, such as groans of the sick and others of this kind, are the same among all men.  9. Secundo, ibi. Quorum autem etc., ostendit passiones animae naturaliter esse, sicut et res, per hoc quod eaedem sunt apud omnes. Unde dicit. Quorum autem. Idest sicut passiones animae sunt eaedem omnibus (quorum primorum, idest quarum passionum primarum, hae, scilicet voces, sunt *notae*, idest *signa*; comparantur enim passiones animae ad voces, sicut primum ad secundum. Voces enim non proferuntur, nisi ad ex-primendum [exprimere] in-teriores [interior/exterior] animae passiones), et res etiam eaedem, scilicet sunt apud omnes, quorum, idest quarum rerum, hae, scilicet passiones animae sunt similitudines. Ubi attendendum est quod litteras dixit esse notas, idest signa vocum, et voces passionum animae similiter. Passiones autem animae dicit esse similitudines rerum. Et hoc ideo, quia res non cognoscitur ab anima nisi per aliquam sui similitudinem existentem vel in sensu vel in intellectu. Litterae autem ita sunt signa vocum, et voces passionum, quod non attenditur ibi aliqua ratio similitudinis, sed sola ratio *institutionis*, sicut et in multis aliis signis. Ut *tuba* est signum [sola ratio institutionis] belli [notifica la partenza dalla battaglia]. In passionibus autem animae oportet attendi rationem similitudinis ad exprimendas res, quia naturaliter eas designant, non ex institutione. Secondly, when he says, but the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs, are the same for all, he shows that passions of the soul exist naturally, just as things exist naturally, for they are the same among all men. For, he says, but the passions of the soul, i.e., just as the passions of the soul are the same for all men; of which first, i.e., of which passions, being first, these, namely, vocal sounds, are tokens [cf. teach] --,” i.e., signs” (for passions of the soul are compared to vocal sounds as first to second since vocal sounds are produced *only* to express interior passions of the soul), so also the things... are the same, i.e., are the same among all, of which, i.e., of which things, passions of the soul are likenesses. Notice he says here that letters are signs, i.e., signs of vocal sounds, and similarly vocal sounds are signs of passions of the soul, but that passions of the soul are likenesses of things. This is because a thing is not known by the soul unless there is some likeness of the thing existing either in the sense or in the intellect. Now letters are signs of vocal sounds and vocal sounds of passions in such a way that we do not attend to any idea of likeness in regard to them but *only one [idea] of institution, as is the case in regard to many other signs, for example, the trumpet as a sign of war. But in the passions of the soul we have to take into account the idea of a likeness to the things represented, since passions of the soul designate things naturally, not by institution. 10 Obiiciunt autem quidam, ostendere volentes contra hoc quod dicit passiones animae, quas significant voces, esse omnibus easdem. Primo quidem, quia diversi diversas sententias habent de rebus, et ita non videntur esse eaedem apud omnes animae passiones. Ad quod respondet Boethius quod Aristoteles hic nominat passiones animae conceptiones intellectus, qui numquam decipitur; et ita oportet eius conceptiones esse apud omnes easdem. Quia, si quis a vero discordat, hic non intelligit. Sed quia etiam in intellectu potest esse falsum, secundum quod componit et dividit, non autem secundum quod cognoscit quod quid est, idest essentiam rei, ut dicitur in III de anima; referendum est hoc ad simplices intellectus conceptiones (quas significant voces incomplexae), quae sunt eaedem apud omnes: quia, si quis vere intelligit quid est [homo] [viz. animale razionale], quodcunque aliud aliquid, quam [hominem] apprehendat, non intelligit hominem. Huiusmodi autem simplices conceptiones intellectus sunt, quas primo voces significant. Unde dicitur in IV metaphysicae quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Et ideo *signanter* dicit. Quorum primorum hae *notae* sunt, ut scilicet referatur ad primas conceptiones a vocibus primo signi-ficatas. There are some who object to Aristotle’s position that passions of the soul, which vocal sounds signify, are the same for all men. Their argument against it is as follows. Different men have different opinions about things. Therefore, passions of the soul do not seem to be the same among all men. Boethius in reply to this objection says that here Aristotle is using ‘passions of the soul’ to denote conceptions of the intellect, and since the intellect is never deceived, conceptions of the intellect must be the same among all men. For if someone is at variance with what is true, in this instance he does not understand. However, since what is false can also be in the intellect, not as it *knows* what a thing is, i.e., the essence of a thing, but as it composes and divides, as is said in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. Aristotle’s statement should be referred to the simple conceptions of the intellect — that are signified by the incomplex vocal sounds — which are the same among all men. For if someone truly understands what man [homo[ is [viz. animale razionale], whatever else than man he apprehends he does not understand *as* man. Simple conceptions of the intellect, which vocal sounds first signify, are of this kind. This is why Aristotle says in IV Metaphysicae [IV, 4: 1006b 4] that the notion which the name signifies is the definition.” And this is the reason Aristotle expressly says, ‘of which first [passions] these are signs [notae]’, I.e., so that this will be referred to the first conceptions [conceptiones] first signified by vocal sounds. 11. Sed adhuc obiiciunt aliqui de nominibus aequi-vocis, in quibus eiusdem vocis non est eadem passio, quae significatur apud omnes. Et respondet ad hoc Porphyrius quod unus homo, qui vocem profert, ad unam intellectus conceptionem signi-ficandam eam refert. Et si aliquis alius, cui loquitur, aliquid aliud intelligat, ille qui loquitur, se exponendo, faciet quod referet intellectum ad idem. Sed melius dicendum est quod intentio Aristotelis non est asserere *identitatem* conceptionis animae per comparationem ad vocem, ut scilicet unius vocis una sit conception. Quia voces sunt diversae apud diversos. Sed intendit asserere identitatem conceptionum animae per comparationem ad res, quas similiter dicit esse easdem. The equivocal name is given as another objection to this position, for in the case of an equivocal name the same vocal sound does *not* signify the same passion among all men. Porphyry answers this by pointing out that a man who utters a vocal sound *intends* it to signify one conception of the intellect. If the person to whom he is speaking understands something else by it, the one who is speaking, by explaining himself, will make the one to whom he is speaking refer his understanding to the same thing. However it is better to say that it is not Aristotle’s intention to maintain an identity of the conception of the soul in relation to a vocal sound such that there is one conception in relation to one vocal sound, for vocal sounds are different among different peoples. Rather, he intends to maintain an identity of the conceptions of the soul in relation to things, which things he also says are the same. 12 Tertio, ibi: de his itaque etc., excusat se a diligentiori harum consideratione: quia quales sint *animae passiones*, et quomodo sint rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro de anima. Non enim hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, sed ad naturale. Thirdly when he says, This has been discussed, however, in our study of the soul, etc., he excuses himself from a further consideration of these things, for the nature of the passions of the soul and the way in which they are likenesses of things does not pertain to logic but to philosophy of nature and has already been treated in the book De anima  III. Postquam philosophus tradidit ordinem signi-ficationis vocum, hic agit de diversa vocum signi-ficatione. Quarum quaedam significant verum vel falsum, quaedam non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, praemittit differentiam. Secundo, manifestat eam; ibi: circa compositionem enim et cetera. Quia vero conceptiones intellectus prae-ambulae sunt ordine naturae vocibus, quae *ad eas exprimendas* [exprimere] proferuntur [pro-ferere], ideo ex similitudine differentiae, quae est circa intellectum, assignat differentiam, quae est circa signi-ficationes vocum. Ut scilicet haec manifestatio non solum sit ex simili, sed etiam ex causa quam imitantur effectus. After the Philosopher has treated the order of the signification of vocal sounds, he goes on to discuss a diversity in the signification of vocal sounds, i.e., some of them signify the true or the false, others do not. He first states the difference and then manifests it where he says, for in composition and division there is truth and falsity. Now because in the order of nature conceptions of the intellect precede vocal sounds, which are uttered to express them, he assigns the difference in respect to the significations of vocal sounds from a likeness to the difference in intellection. Thus the manifestation is from a likeness and at the same time from the cause which the effects imitate. 2. Est ergo considerandum quod, sicut in principio dictum est, duplex est operatio intellectus, ut traditur in III de anima. In quarum una non invenitur verum et falsum, in altera autem invenitur. Et hoc est quod dicit quod in anima aliquoties est intellectus sine vero et falso, aliquoties autem ex necessitate habet alterum horum. Et quia voces significativae [notae, signa, vestigial] formantur ad exprimendas – exprimere -- conceptiones – conceptus -- intellectus, ideo ad hoc quod *signum* [signans – segno -- segnante] conformetur [conformatur] signato [segnato], necesse est quod etiam vocum significativarum similiter quaedam significent sine vero et falso, quaedam autem cum vero et falso. The operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said in the beginning, and as is explained in III De anima. Now truth and falsity is found in one of these operations but not in the other. This is what Aristotle says at the beginning of this portion of the text, i.e., that in the soul sometimes there is thought without truth and falsity, but sometimes of necessity it has one or the other of these. And since significant vocal sounds are formed to express these conceptions of the intellect, it is necessary that some significant vocal sounds signify without truth and falsity, others with truth and falsity—in order that the sign be conformed to what is signified. 3 Deinde cum dicit: circa compositionem etc., manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo, quantum ad id quod dixerat de intellectu; secundo, quantum ad id quod dixerat de assimilatione vocum ad intellectum; ibi: nomina igitur ipsa et verba et cetera. Ad ostendendum igitur quod intellectus quandoque est sine vero et falso, quandoque autem cum altero horum, dicit primo quod veritas et falsitas est circa compositionem et divisionem. Ubi oportet intelligere quod una duarum operationum intellectus est indivisibilium intelligentia: in quantum scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute cuiusque rei quidditatem sive essentiam per seipsam, puta quid est homo vel quid album vel quid aliud huiusmodi. Alia vero operatio intellectus est, secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia concepta simul componit et dividit. Dicit ergo quod in hac secunda operatione intellectus, idest componentis et dividentis, invenitur veritas et falsitas: relinquens quod in prima operatione non invenitur, ut etiam traditur in III de anima. Then when he says, for in composition and division there is truth and falsity, he manifests what he has just said: first with respect to what he has said about thought; secondly, with respect to what he has said about the likeness of vocal sounds to thought, where he says Names and verbs, then are like understanding without composition or division, etc. To show that sometimes there is thought without truth or falsity and sometimes it is accompanied by one of these, he says first that truth and falsity concern composition and division. To understand this we must note again that one of the two operations of the intellect is the understanding of what is indivisible. This the intellect does when it understands the quiddity or essence of a thing absolutely, for instance, what man is or what white is or what something else of this kind is. The other operation is the one in which it composes and divides simple concepts of this kind. He says that in this second operation of the intellect, i.e., composing and dividing, truth and falsity is found; the conclusion being that it is not found in the first, as he also says in III De anima. Sed circa hoc primo videtur esse dubium: quia cum divisio fiat per resolutionem ad indivisibilia sive simplicia, videtur quod sicut in simplicibus non est veritas vel falsitas, ita nec in divisione. Sed dicendum est quod cum conceptiones intellectus sint similitudines rerum, ea quae circa intellectum sunt dupliciter considerari et nominari possunt. Uno modo, secundum se: alio modo, secundum rationes rerum quarum sunt similitudines. Sicut imago Herculis secundum se quidem dicitur et est cuprum; in quantum autem est similitudo Herculis nominatur homo. Sic etiam, si consideremus ea quae sunt circa intellectum secundum se, semper est compositio, ubi est veritas et falsitas; quae nunquam invenitur in intellectu, nisi per hoc quod intellectus comparat unum simplicem conceptum alteri. Sed si referatur ad rem, quandoque dicitur compositio, quandoque dicitur divisio. Compositio quidem, quando intellectus comparat unum conceptum alteri, quasi apprehendens coniunctionem aut identitatem rerum, quarum sunt conceptiones; divisio autem, quando sic comparat unum conceptum alteri, ut apprehendat res esse diversas. Et per hunc etiam modum in vocibus affirmatio dicitur compositio, in quantum coniunctionem ex parte rei significat; negatio vero dicitur divisio, in quantum significat rerum separationem. There seems to be a difficulty about this point, for division is made by resolution to what is indivisible, or simple, and therefore it seems that just as truth and falsity is not in simple things, so neither is it in division. To answer this it should be pointed out that the conceptions of the intellect are likenesses of things and therefore the things that are in the intellect can be considered and named in two ways: according to themselves, and according to the nature of the things of which they are the likenesses. For just as a statue—say of Hercules—in itself is called and is bronze but as it is a likeness of Hercules is named man, so if we consider the things that are in the intellect in themselves, there is always composition where there is truth and falsity, for they are never found in the intellect except as it compares one simple concept with another. But if the composition is referred to reality, it is sometimes called composition, sometimes division: composition when the intellect compares one concept to another as though apprehending a conjunction or identity of the things of which they are conceptions; division, when it so compares one concept with another that it apprehends the things to be diverse. In vocal sound, therefore, affirmation is called composition inasmuch as it signifies a conjunction on the part of the thing and negation is called division inasmuch as it signifies the separation of things. 5 Ulterius autem videtur quod non solum in compositione et divisione veritas consistat. Primo quidem, quia etiam res dicitur vera vel falsa, sicut dicitur aurum verum vel falsum. Dicitur etiam quod ens et verum convertuntur. Unde videtur quod etiam simplex conceptio intellectus, quae est similitudo rei, non careat veritate et falsitate. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in Lib. de anima quod sensus propriorum sensibilium semper est verus; sensus autem non componit vel dividit; non ergo in sola compositione vel divisione est veritas. Item, in intellectu divino nulla est compositio, ut probatur in XII metaphysicae; et tamen ibi est prima et summa veritas; non ergo veritas est solum circa compositionem et divisionem. There is still another objection in relation to this point. It seems that truth is not in composition and division alone, for a thing is also said to be true or false. For instance, gold is said to be true gold or false gold. Furthermore, being and true are said to be convertible. It seems, therefore, that the simple conception of the intellect, which is a likeness of the thing, also has truth and falsity. Again, the Philosopher says in his book De anima, that the sensation of proper sensibles is always true. But the sense does not compose or divide. Therefore, truth is not in composition and division exclusively. Moreover, in the divine intellect there is no composition, as is proved in XII Metaphysicae.  But the first and highest truth is in the divine intellect. Therefore, truth is not in composition and division exclusively. 6 Ad huiusmodi igitur evidentiam considerandum est quod veritas in aliquo invenitur dupliciter: uno modo, sicut in eo quod est verum: alio modo, sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum. Invenitur autem veritas sicut in eo quod est verum tam in simplicibus, quam in compositis; sed sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum, non invenitur nisi secundum compositionem et divisionem. Quod quidem sic patet. To answer these difficulties the following considerations are necessary. Truth is found in something in two ways: as it is in that which is true, and as it is in the one speaking or knowing truth. Truth as it is in that which is true is found in both simple things and composite things, but truth in the one speaking or knowing truth is found only according to composition and division. This will become clear in what follows. 7 Verum enim, ut philosophus dicit in VI Ethicorum, est bonum intellectus. Unde de quocumque dicatur verum, oportet quod hoc sit per respectum ad intellectum. Comparantur autem ad intellectum voces quidem sicut signa, res autem sicut ea quorum intellectus sunt similitudines. Considerandum autem quod aliqua res comparatur ad intellectum dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, sicut mensura ad mensuratum, et sic comparantur res naturales ad intellectum speculativum humanum. Et ideo intellectus dicitur verus secundum quod conformatur rei, falsus autem secundum quod discordat a re. Res autem naturalis non dicitur esse vera per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, sicut posuerunt quidam antiqui naturales, existimantes rerum veritatem esse solum in hoc, quod est videri: secundum hoc enim sequeretur quod contradictoria essent simul vera, quia contradictoria cadunt sub diversorum opinionibus. Dicuntur tamen res aliquae verae vel falsae per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, non essentialiter vel formaliter, sed effective, in quantum scilicet natae sunt facere de se veram vel falsam existimationem; et secundum hoc dicitur aurum verum vel falsum. Alio autem modo, res comparantur ad intellectum, sicut mensuratum ad mensuram, ut patet in intellectu practico, qui est causa rerum. Unde opus artificis dicitur esse verum, in quantum attingit ad rationem artis; falsum vero, in quantum deficit a ratione artis. Truth, as the Philosopher says in VI Ethicorum, is the good of the intellect. Hence, anything that is said to be true is such by reference to intellect. Now vocal sounds are related to thought as signs, but things are related to thought as that of which thoughts are likenesses. It must be noted, however, that a thing is related to thought in two ways: in one way as the measure to the measured, and this is the way natural things are related to the human speculative intellect. Whence thought is said to be true insofar as it is conformed to the thing, but false insofar as it is not in conformity with the thing. However, a natural thing is not said to be true in relation to our thought in the way it was taught by certain ancient natural philosophers who supposed the truth of things to be only in what they seemed to be. According to this view it would follow that contradictories could be at once true, since the opinions of different men can be contradictory. Nevertheless, some things are said to be true or false in relation to our thought—not essentially or formally, but effectively—insofar as they are so constituted naturally as to cause a true or false estimation of themselves. It is in this way that gold is said to be true or false. In another way, things are compared to thought as measured to the measure, as is evident in the practical intellect, which is a cause of things. In this way, the work of an artisan is said to be true insofar as it achieves the conception in the mind of the artist, and false insofar as it falls short of that conception. 8 Et quia omnia etiam naturalia comparantur ad intellectum divinum, sicut artificiata ad artem, consequens est ut quaelibet res dicatur esse vera secundum quod habet propriam formam, secundum quam imitatur artem divinam. Nam falsum aurum est verum aurichalcum. Et hoc modo ens et verum convertuntur, quia quaelibet res naturalis per suam formam arti divinae conformatur. Unde philosophus in I physicae, formam nominat quoddam divinum. Now all natural things are related to the divine intellect as artifacts to art and therefore a thing is said to be true insofar as it has its own form, according to which it represents divine art; false gold, for example, is true copper. It is in terms of this that being and true are converted, since any natural thing is conformed to divine art through its form. For this reason the Philosopher in I Physicae says that form is something divine. 9. Et sicut res dicitur vera per comparationem ad suam mensuram, ita etiam et sensus vel intellectus, cuius mensura est res extra animam. Unde sensus dicitur verus, quando per formam suam conformatur rei extra animam existenti. Et sic intelligitur quod sensus proprii sensibilis sit verus. Et hoc etiam modo intellectus apprehendens quod quid est absque compositione et divisione, semper est verus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Est autem considerandum quod quamvis sensus proprii obiecti sit verus, non tamen cognoscit hoc esse verum. Non enim potest cognoscere habitudinem conformitatis suae ad rem, sed solam rem apprehendit; intellectus autem potest huiusmodi habitudinem conformitatis cognoscere; et ideo solus intellectus potest cognoscere veritatem. Unde et philosophus dicit in VI metaphysicae quod veritas est solum in mente, sicut scilicet in cognoscente veritatem. Cognoscere autem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem nihil est aliud quam iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse: quod est componere et dividere; et ideo intellectus non cognoscit veritatem, nisi componendo vel dividendo per suum iudicium. Quod quidem iudicium, si consonet rebus, erit verum, puta cum intellectus iudicat rem esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est. Falsum autem quando dissonat a re, puta cum iudicat non esse quod est, vel esse quod non est. Unde patet quod veritas et falsitas sicut in cognoscente et dicente non est nisi circa compositionem et divisionem. Et hoc modo philosophus loquitur hic. Et quia voces sunt signa intellectuum, erit vox vera quae significat verum intellectum, falsa autem quae significat falsum intellectum: quamvis vox, in quantum est res quaedam, dicatur vera sicut et aliae res. Unde haec vox, homo est asinus, est vere vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo dicitur falsa. And just as a thing is said to be true by comparison to its measure, so also is sensation or thought, whose measure is the thing outside of the soul. Accordingly, sensation is said to be true when the sense through its form is in conformity with the thing existing outside of the a soul. It is in this way that the sensation of proper sensibles is true, and the intellect apprehending what a thing is apart from composition and division is always true, as is said in III De anima. It should be noted, however, that although the sensation of the proper object is true the sense does not perceive the sensation to be true, for it cannot know its relationship of conformity with the thing but only apprehends the thing. The intellect, on the other hand, can know its relationship of conformity and therefore only the intellect can know truth. This is the reason the Philosopher says in VI Metaphysicae that truth is only in the mind, that is to say, in one knowing truth. To know this relationship of conformity is to judge that a thing is such or is not, which is to compose and divide; therefore, the intellect does not know truth except by composing and dividing through its judgment. If the judgment is in accordance with things it will be true, i.e., when the intellect judges a thing to be what it is or not to be what it is not. The judgment will be false when it is not in accordance with the thing, i.e., when it judges that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. It is evident from this that truth and falsity as it is in the one knowing and speaking is had only in composition and division. This is what the Philosopher is speaking of here. And since vocal sounds are signs of thought, that vocal sound will be true which signifies true thought, false which signifies false thought, although vocal sound insofar as it is a real thing is said to be true in the same way other things are. Thus the vocal sound "Man is an ass” is truly vocal sound and truly a sign, but because it is a sign of something false it is said to be false. 10 Sciendum est autem quod philosophus de veritate hic loquitur secundum quod pertinet ad intellectum humanum, qui iudicat de conformitate rerum et intellectus componendo et dividendo. Sed iudicium intellectus divini de hoc est absque compositione et divisione: quia sicut etiam intellectus noster intelligit materialia immaterialiter, ita etiam intellectus divinus cognoscit compositionem et divisionem simpliciter. It should be noted that the Philosopher is speaking of truth here as it relates to the human intellect, which judges of the conformity of things and thought by composing and dividing. However, the judgment of the divine intellect concerning this is without composition and division, for just as our intellect understands material things immaterially, so the divine intellect knows composition and division simply.” Deinde cum dicit: nomina igitur ipsa et verba etc., manifestat quod dixerat de similitudine vocum ad intellectum. Et primo, manifestat propositum. Secundo, probat per signum. Ibi: huius autem signum et cetera. Concludit ergo ex praemissis quod, cum solum circa compositionem et divisionem sit veritas et falsitas in intellectu, consequens est quod ipsa nomina et verba, divisim accepta, assimilentur intellectui qui est sine compositione et divisione; sicut cum homo vel album dicitur, si nihil aliud addatur: non enim verum adhuc vel falsum est; sed postea quando additur esse vel non esse, fit verum vel falsum. When he says, Names and verbs, then, are like thought without composition or division, he manifests what he has said about the likeness of vocal sounds to thought. Next he proves it by a sign when he says, A sign of this is that "goatstag” signifies something but is neither true nor false, etc. Here he concludes from what has been said that since there is truth and falsity in the intellect only when there is composition or division, it follows that names and verbs, taken separately, are like thought which is without composition and division; as when we say "man” or "white,” and nothing else is added. For these are neither true nor false at this point, but when "to be” or "not to be” is added they be come true or false. Nec est instantia de eo, qui per unicum nomen veram responsionem dat ad interrogationem factam; ut cum quaerenti: quid natat in mari? Aliquis respondet, piscis. Nam intelligitur verbum quod fuit in interrogatione positum. Et sicut nomen per se positum non significat verum vel falsum, ita nec verbum per se dictum. Nec est instantia de verbo primae et secundae personae, et de verbo exceptae actionis: quia in his intelligitur certus et determinatus nominativus. Unde est *implicita* -- im-plicata – implicatura – implicitura -- compositio, licet non explicita – ex-plicata – explicatura – explicitura --.  Although one might think so, the case of someone giving a,, single name as a true response to a question is not an instance that can be raised against this position; for example, suppose someone asks, "What swims in the sea?” and the answer is "Fish”; this is not opposed to the position Aristotle is taking here, for the verb that was posited in the question is understood. And just as the name said by itself does not signify truth or falsity, so neither does the verb said by itself. The verbs of the first and second person and the intransitive verb” are not instances opposed to this position either, for in these a particular and determined nominative is understood. Consequently there is implicit composition, though not explicit.  13. Deinde cum dicit: signum autem etc., inducit signum ex nomine composito, scilicet “hirco-cervus”, quod componitur ex “hirco” et “cervus” et quod in graeco dicitur “tragelaphos” -- nam “tragos” est ‘hircus’, et “elaphos” ‘cervus’. [Benedetto Croce – Calogero – antifascism – liberaldemocrazia – Berlusconi – ‘che diavolo e un icocerco? Una chimera, ma anche un obggetivo possibile”] Huiusmodi enim nomina significant aliquid, scilicet quosdam conceptus simplices, licet rerum compositarum; et ideo non est verum vel falsum, nisi quando additur esse vel non esse, per quae exprimitur iudicium intellectus. Potest autem addi esse vel non esse, vel secundum praesens tempus, quod est esse vel non esse in actu, et ideo hoc dicitur esse simpliciter; vel secundum tempus praeteritum, aut futurum, quod non est esse simpliciter, sed secundum quid; ut cum dicitur aliquid fuisse vel futurum esse. Signanter autem utitur exemplo ex nomine significante quod non est in rerum natura, in quo statim falsitas apparet, et quod sine compositione et divisione non possit verum vel falsum esse.  Then he says, A sign of this is that "goatstag” signifies something but is neither true nor false unless "to be or "not to be” is added either absolutely or according to time. Here he introduces as a sign the composite name "goatstag,” from "goat” and "stag.” In Greek the word is "tragelaphos,” from "tragos” meaning goat and "elaphos” meaning stag. Now names of this kind signify something, namely, certain simple concepts (although the things they signify are composite), and therefore are not true or false unless "to be” or "not to be” is added, by which a judgment of the intellect is expressed. The "to be” or "not to be” can be added either according to present time, which is to be or not to be in act and for this reason is to be simply; or according to past or future time, which is to be relatively, not simply; as when we say that something has been or will be. Notice that Aristotle expressly uses as an example here a name signifying something that does not exist in reality, in which fictiveness is immediately evident, and which cannot be true or false without composition and division.  Postquam [Aristoteles] philosophus determinavit de ordine significationis vocum, hic accedit ad determinandum de ipsis vocibus signi-ficativis. Et quia principaliter intendit de enunciatione, quae est subiectum huius libri. In qualibet autem scientia oportet praenoscere principia subiecti. Ideo primo, determinat de principiis enunciationis; secundo, de ipsa enunciatione. Ibi: enunciativa vero non omnis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo enim, determinat principia quasi materialia enunciationis, scilicet partes integrales ipsius. Secundo, determinat principium formale, scilicet orationem, quae est enunciationis genus. Ibi: oratio autem est vox signi-ficativa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo, determinat de nomine, quod signi-ficat rei substantiam. Secundo, determinat de verbo, quod significat actionem vel passionem procedentem a re. Ibi: verbum autem est quod con-significat tempus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo, definit nomen; secundo, definitionem exponit. Ibi: in nomine enim quod est equiferus etc. Tertio, excludit quaedam, quae perfecte rationem nominis non habent, ibi: non homo vero non est nomen. [“Having determined the order of the signification of vocal sounds, the Philosopher begins here to establish the definitions of the significant vocal sounds. His principal intention is to establish what an enunciation is—which is the subject of this book—but since in any science the principles of the subject must be known first, he begins with the principles of the enunciation and then establishes what an enunciation is where he says, All speech is not enunciative, etc.” With respect to the principles of the enunciation he first determines the nature of the quasi material principles, i.e., its integral parts, and secondly the formal principle, i.e., speech, which is the genus of the enunciation, where he says, Speech is significant vocal sound, etc.” Apropos of the quasi material principles of the enunciation he first establishes that a name signifies the substance of a thing and then that the verb signifies action or passion proceeding from a thing, where he says The verb is that which signifies with time, etc.” In relation to this first point, he first defines the name, and then explains the definition where he says, for in the name "Campbell” the part "bell,” as such, signifies nothing, etc., and finally excludes certain things—those that do not have the definition of the name perfectly—where he says, "Non-man,” however, is not a name, etc.”] 2. Circa primum considerandum est quod definitio ideo dicitur terminus, quia includit totaliter rem. Ita scilicet, quod nihil rei est extra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio non conveniat. Nec aliquid aliud est infra definitionem, cui scilicet definitio conveniat. [“It should be noted in relation to defining the name, that a definition is said to be a limit because it includes a thing totally, i.e., such that nothing of the thing is outside of the definition, that is, there is nothing of the thing to which the definition does not belong; nor is any other thing under the definition, that is, the definition belongs to no other thing.”] 3 Et ideo quinque ponit in definitione nominis. Primo, ponitur vox per modum generis, per quod distinguitur nomen ab omnibus sonis, qui non sunt voces. Nam vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam, ut dicitur in II de anima. Additur autem prima differentia, scilicet *signi-ficativa*, ad differentiam quarumcumque vocum non significantium, sive sit vox litterata et articulata, sicut “biltris”, sive non litterata et non articulata, sicut sibilus pro nihilo factus. Et quia de signi-ficatione vocum in superioribus actum est, ideo ex praemissis concludit quod nomen est vox signi-ficativa. Aristotle posits five parts in the definition of the name. Vocal sound is given first, as the genus. This distinguishes the name from all sounds that are not vocal; for vocal sound is sound produced from the mouth of an animal and involves a certain kind of mental image, as is said in II De anima. The second part is the first difference, i.e., significant, which differentiates the name from any non-significant vocal sound, whether lettered and articulated, such as "biltris,” or non-lettered and non-articulated, as a hissing for no reason. Now since he has already determined the signification of vocal sounds, he concludes from what has been established that a name is a significant vocal sound.  4 Sed cum vox sit quaedam res *naturalis*, nomen autem non est aliquid naturale sed ab hominibus institutum, videtur quod non debuit genus nominis ponere vocem, quae est *ex natura*, sed magis *signum*, quod est *ex institutione*. Ut diceretur: nomen est *signum* vocale. Sicut etiam convenientius definiretur scutella, si quis diceret quod est vas ligneum, quam si quis diceret quod est lignum formatum in vas.  But vocal sound is a natural thing, whereas a name is not natural but instituted by men; it seems, therefore, that Aristotle should have taken sign, which is from institution, as the genus of the name, rather than vocal sound, which is from nature. Then the definition would be: a name is a vocal sign, etc., just as a salver would be more suitably defined as a wooden dish than as wood formed into a dish. 5. Sed dicendum quod *arti-ficialia* sunt quidem in genere substantiae ex parte materiae, in genere autem accidentium ex parte formae. Nam formae *arti-ficialium* accidentia sunt. Nomen ergo signi-ficat formam accidentalem ut concretam subiecto. Cum autem in definitione omnium accidentium oporteat poni subiectum, necesse est quod, si qua nomina accidens in abstracto signi-ficant quod in eorum definitione ponatur accidens in recto, quasi genus, subiectum autem in obliquo, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simitas est curvitas nasi. Si qua vero nomina accidens significant in concreto, in eorum definitione ponitur materia, vel subiectum, quasi genus, et accidens, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simum est nasus curvus. Si igitur nomina rerum *arti-ficialium* significant formas accidentales, ut concretas subiectis *naturalibus*, convenientius est, ut in eorum definitione ponatur res *naturalis* quasi genus, ut dicamus quod scutella est lignum figuratum, et similiter quod nomen est vox signi-ficativa. Secus autem esset, si nomina *arti-ficialium* acciperentur, quasi signi-ficantia ipsas formas arti-ficiales in abstracto. [5. “It should be noted, however, that while it is true that artificial things are in the genus of substance on the part of matter, they are in the genus of accident on the part of form, since the forms of artificial things are accidents. A name, therefore, signifies an accidental form made concrete in a subject. Now the subject must be posited in the definition of every accident; hence, when names signify an accident in the abstract the accident has to be posited directly (i.e., in the nominative case) as a quasi-genus in their definition and the subject posited obliquely (i.e., in an oblique case such as the genitive, dative, or accusative) as a quasi-difference; as for example, when we define snubness as curvedness of the nose. But when names signify an accident ill the concrete, the matter or subject has to be posited in their definition as a quasi-genus and the accident as a quasi-difference, as when we say that a snub nose is a curved nose. Accordingly, if the names of artificial things signify accidental forms as made concrete in *natural* subjects, then it is more appropriate to posit the natural thing in their definition as a quasi-genus. We would say, therefore, that a salver is shaped wood, and likewise, that a name is a significant vocal sound. It would be another matter if names of *artificial* things were taken as signifying artificial forms in the abstract”]. Aristotele ponit secundam differentiam cum dicit: ‘secundum placitum’, idest *secundum institutionem humanam a beneplacito hominis procedentem*. Et per hoc differt nomen a vocibus signi-FICANTIBUS *naturaliter*, sicut sunt *gemitus infirmorum* [gemitus infirmi] et voces brutorum animalium. Ponit tertiam differentiam, scilicet sine tempore, per quod differt nomen a verbo. Sed videtur hoc esse falsum: quia hoc nomen dies vel annus significat tempus. Sed dicendum quod circa tempus tria possunt considerari. Primo quidem, ipsum tempus, secundum quod est res quaedam, et sic potest significari a nomine, sicut quaelibet alia res. Alio modo, potest considerari id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huiusmodi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tempore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio et passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat cum tempore. Substantia autem secundum se considerata, prout significatur per nomen et pronomen, non habet in quantum huiusmodi ut tempore mensuretur, sed solum secundum quod subiicitur motui, prout per participium significatur. Et ideo verbum et participium significant cum tempore, non autem nomen et pronomen. Tertio modo, potest considerari ipsa habitudo temporis mensurantis; quod significatur per adverbia temporis, ut cras, heri et huiusmodi. The fourth part is the third difference, i.e., without time, which differentiates the name from the verb. This, however, seems to be false, for the name "day” or "year” signifies time. But there are three things that can be considered with respect to time; first, time itself, as it is a certain kind of thing or reality, and then it can be signified by a name just like any other thing; secondly, that which is measured by time, insofar as it is measured by time. Motion, which consists of action and passion, is what is measured first and principally by time, and therefore the verb, which signifies action and passion, signifies with time. Substance considered in itself, which a name or a pronoun signify, is not as such measured by time, but only insofar as it is subjected to motion, and this the participle signifies. The verb and the participle, therefore, signify with time, but not the name and pronoun. The third thing that can be considered is the very relationship of time as it measures. This is signified by adverbs of time such as "tomorrow,” "yesterday,” and others of this kind. 8 Quinto, ponit quartam differentiam cum subdit: cuius nulla pars est significativa separata, scilicet a toto nomine; comparatur tamen ad significationem nominis secundum quod est in toto. Quod ideo est, quia significatio est quasi forma nominis; nulla autem pars separata habet formam totius, sicut manus separata ab homine non habet formam humanam. Et per hoc distinguitur nomen ab oratione, cuius pars significat separata; ut cum dicitur, homo iustus. The fifth part is the fourth difference, no part of which is significant separately, that is, separated from the whole name; but it is related to the signification of the name according as it is in the whole. The reason for this is that signification is a quasi-form of the name. But no separated part has the form of the whole; just as the hand separated from the man does not have the human form. This difference distinguishes the name from speech, some parts of which signify separately, as for example in "just man.” 9 Deinde cum dicit: in nomine enim quod est etc., manifestat praemissam definitionem. Et primo, quantum ad ultimam particulam; secundo, quantum ad tertiam; ibi: secundum vero placitum et cetera. Nam primae duae particulae manifestae sunt ex praemissis; tertia autem particula, scilicet sine tempore, manifestabitur in sequentibus in tractatu de verbo. Circa primum duo facit: primo, manifestat propositum per nomina composita; secundo, ostendit circa hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita; ibi: at vero nonquemadmodum et cetera. Manifestat ergo primo quod pars nominis separata nihil significat, per nomina composita, in quibus hoc magis videtur. In hoc enim nomine quod est equiferus, haec pars ferus, per se nihil significat sicut significat in hac oratione, quae est equus ferus. Cuius ratio est quod unum nomen imponitur ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur a laesione pedis, quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. Et inde est quod pars nominis compositi, quod imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non significat partem conceptionis compositae, a qua imponitur nomen ad significandum. Sed oratio significat ipsam conceptionem compositam: unde pars orationis significat partem conceptionis compositae. When he says, for in the name "Campbell” the part "bell” as such signifies nothing, etc., he explains the definition. First he explains the last part of the definition; secondly, the third part, by convention. The first two parts were explained in what preceded, and the fourth part, without time, will be explained later in the section on the verb. And first he explains the last part by means of a composite name; then he shows what the difference is between simple and composite names where he says, However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names, etc. First, then, he shows that a part separated from a name signifies nothing. To do this he uses a composite name because the point is more striking there. For in the name "Campbell” the part "bell” per se signifies nothing, although it does signify something in the phrase "camp bell.” The reason for this is that one name is imposed to signify one simple conception; but that from which a name is imposed to signify is different from that which a name signifies. For example, the name "pedigree”, The Latin here is lapis, from laesione pedis. To bring out the point St. Thomas is making herean equivalent English word of Latin derivation, i.e., "pedigree,” has been used. Close is imposed from pedis and grus [crane’s foot] which it does not signify, to signify the concept of a certain thing. Hence, a part of the composite name—which composite name is imposed to signify a simple concept—does not signify a part of the composite conception from which the name is imposed to signify. Speech, on the other hand, does signify a composite conception. Hence, a part of speech signifies a part of the composite conception. 10. Deinde cum dicit: at vero non etc., ostendit quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia et composita, et dicit quod non ita se habet in nominibus simplicibus, sicut et in compositis: quia in simplicibus pars nullo modo est significativa, neque secundum veritatem, neque secundum apparentiam; sed in compositis vult quidem, idest apparentiam habet significandi; nihil tamen pars eius significat, ut dictum est de nomine equiferus. Haec autem ratio differentiae est, quia nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum conceptum simplicem, ita etiam imponitur ad significandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu; nomen vero compositum imponitur a composita conceptione, ex qua habet apparentiam quod pars eius significet. When he says, However, the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names, etc., he shows that there is a difference between simple and composite names in regard to their parts not signifying separately. Simple names are not the same as composite names in this respect because in simple names a part is in no way significant, either according to truth or according to appearance, but in composite names the part has meaning, i.e., has the appearance of signifying; yet a part of it signifies nothing, as is said of the name "breakfast.” The reason for this difference is that the simple name is imposed to signify a simple concept and is also imposed from a simple concept; but the composite name is imposed from a composite conception, and hence has the appearance that a part of it signifies. 11. Deinde cum dicit: “secundum placitum”, etc., manifestat tertiam partem praedictae definitionis; et dicit quod ideo dictum est quod nomen “significat secundum placitum”, quia nullum nomen est “naturaliter”. Ex hoc enim est nomen, quod significat: non autem significat *naturaliter*, sed *ex institutione*. Et hoc est quod subdit: sed quando fit nota, idest quando imponitur ad significandum. Id enim quod naturaliter significat *non fit* [cfr. signi-FICARE], sed naturaliter est signum. Et hoc *signi-ficat* cum dicit. Illitterati enim soni, ut ferarum, quia scilicet litteris *signi-FICARI* non possunt. Et dicit potius sonos quam voces, quia quaedam animalia non habent vocem, eo quod carent pulmone, sed tantum quibusdam sonis proprias *passiones* *naturaliter* *signi-FICANT*. Nihil autem horum sonorum est nomen. Ex quo manifeste datur intelligi quod nomen non significat naturaliter. -Sciendum tamen est quod circa hoc fuit diversa quorumdam opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod nomina nullo modo naturaliter significant: nec differt quae res quo nomine significentur. Alii vero dixerunt quod nomina omnino naturaliter significant, quasi nomina sint naturales similitudines rerum. Quidam vero dixerunt quod nomina non naturaliter significant quantum ad hoc, quod eorum significatio non est a natura, ut Aristoteles hic intendit; quantum vero ad hoc naturaliter significant quod eorum significatio congruit naturis rerum, ut Plato dixit. Nec obstat quod una res multis nominibus significatur: quia unius rei possunt esse multae similitudines; et similiter ex diversis proprietatibus possunt uni rei multa diversa nomina imponi. Non est autem intelligendum quod dicit: quorum nihil est nomen, quasi soni animalium non habeant nomina: nominantur enim quibusdam nominibus, sicut dicitur rugitus leonis et mugitus bovis; sed quia nullus talis sonus est nomen, ut dictum est. However, there were diverse opinions about this. Some men said that names in no way signify naturally and that it makes no difference which things are signified by which names. Others said that names signify naturally in every way, as if names were natural likenesses of things. Still others said names do not signify naturally, i.e., insofar as their signification is not from nature, as Aristotle maintains here, but that names do signify naturally in the sense that their signification corresponds to the natures of things, as Plato held. The fact that one thing is signified by many names is not in opposition to Aristotle’s position here, for there can be many likenesses of one thing; and similarly, from diverse properties many diverse names can be imposed on one thing. When Aristotle says, but none of them is a name, he does not mean that the sounds of animals are not named, for we do have names for them; "roaring,” for example, is said of the sound made by a lion, and "lowing” of that of a cow. What he means is that no such sound is a name. 13 Deinde cum dicit: non homo vero etc., excludit quaedam a nominis ratione. Et primo, nomen infinitum; secundo, casus nominum; ibi: Catonis autem vel Catoni et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod non homo non est nomen. Omne enim nomen significat aliquam naturam determinatam, ut homo; aut personam determinatam, ut pronomen; aut utrumque determinatum, ut Socrates. Sed hoc quod dico non homo, neque determinatam naturam neque determinatam personam significat. Imponitur enim a negatione hominis, quae aequaliter dicitur de ente, et non ente. Unde non homo potest dici indifferenter, et de eo quod non est in rerum natura; ut si dicamus, Chimaera est non homo, et de eo quod est in rerum natura; sicut cum dicitur, equus est non homo. Si autem imponeretur a privatione, requireret subiectum ad minus existens: sed quia imponitur a negatione, potest dici de ente et de non ente, ut Boethius et Ammonius dicunt. Quia tamen significat per modum nominis, quod potest subiici et praedicari, requiritur ad minus suppositum in apprehensione. Non autem erat nomen positum tempore Aristotelis sub quo huiusmodi dictiones concluderentur. Non enim est oratio, quia pars eius non significat aliquid separata, sicut nec in nominibus compositis; similiter autem non est negatio, id est oratio negativa, quia huiusmodi oratio superaddit negationem affirmationi, quod non contingit hic. Et ideo novum nomen imponit huiusmodi dictioni, vocans eam nomen infinitum propter indeterminationem significationis, ut dictum est. When he says, "Non-man,” however, is not a name, etc., he points out that certain things do not have the nature of a name. First he excludes the infinite name; then the cases of the name where he says, "Of Philo” and "to Philo,” etc. He says that "non-man” is not a name because every name signifies some determinate nature, for example, "man,” or a determinate person in the case of the pronoun, or both determinately, as in "Socrates.” But when we say "non-man” it signifies neither a determinate nature nor a determinate person, because it is imposed from the negation of man, which negation is predicated equally of being and non-being. Consequently, "non-man” can be said indifferently both of that which does not exist in reality, as in "A chimera is non-man,” and of that which does exist in reality, as in "A horse is non-man.” Now if the infinite name were imposed from a privation it would require at least an existing subject, but since it is imposed from a negation, it can be predicated of being and nonbeing, as Boethius and Ammonius say. However, since it signifies in the mode of a name, and can therefore be subjected and predicated, a suppositum is required at least in apprehension. In the time of Aristotle there was no name for words of this kind. They are not speech since a part of such a word does not signify something separately, just as a part of a composite name does not signify separately; and they are not negations, i.e., negative speech, for speech of this kind adds negation to affirmation, which is not the case here. Therefore he imposes a new name for words of this kind, the "infinite name,” because of the indetermination of signification, as has been said. 14 Deinde cum dicit: Catonis autem vel Catoni etc., excludit casus nominis; et dicit quod Catonis vel Catoni et alia huiusmodi non sunt nomina, sed solus nominativus dicitur principaliter nomen, per quem facta est impositio nominis ad aliquid significandum. Huiusmodi autem obliqui vocantur casus nominis: quia quasi cadunt per quamdam declinationis originem a nominativo, qui dicitur rectus eo quod non cadit. Stoici autem dixerunt etiam nominativos dici casus: quos grammatici sequuntur, eo quod cadunt, idest procedunt ab interiori conceptione mentis. Et dicitur rectus, eo quod nihil prohibet aliquid cadens sic cadere, ut rectum stet, sicut stilus qui cadens ligno infigitur. When he says, "Of Philo” and "to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but modes of names, he excludes the cases of names from the nature of the name. The nominative is the one that is said to be a name principally, for the imposition of the name to signify something was made through it. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are called cases of the name because they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their declension. On the other hand, the nominative, because it does not fall away, is said to be erect. The Stoics held that even the nominatives were cases (with which the grammarians agree), because they fall, i.e., proceed from the interior conception of the mind; and they said they were also called erect because nothing prevents a thing from falling in such a way that it stands erect, as when a pen falls and is fixed in wood. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 4 n. 15Deinde cum dicit: ratio autem eius etc., ostendit consequenter quomodo se habeant obliqui casus ad nomen; et dicit quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est eadem et in aliis, scilicet casibus nominis; sed in hoc est differentia quod nomen adiunctum cum hoc verbo est vel erit vel fuit semper significat verum vel falsum: quod non contingit in obliquis. Signanter autem inducit exemplum de verbo substantivo: quia sunt quaedam alia verba, scilicet impersonalia, quae cum obliquis significant verum vel falsum; ut cum dicitur, poenitet Socratem, quia actus verbi intelligitur ferri super obliquum; ac si diceretur, poenitentia habet Socratem. Then he says, The definition of these is the same in all other respects as that of the name itself, etc. Here Aristotle shows how oblique cases are related to the name. The definition, as it signifies the name, is the same in the others, namely, in the cases of the name. But they differ in this respect: the name joined to the verb "is” or "will be” or "has been” always signifies the true or false; in oblique cases this is not so. It is significant that the substantive verb is the one he uses as an example, for there are other verbs, i.e., impersonal verbs, that do signify the true or false when joined with a name in an oblique case, as in "It grieves Socrates,” because the act of the verb is understood to be carried over to the oblique cases, as though what were said were, "Grief possesses Socrates.” Aquinas lib. 1 l. 4 n. 16Sed contra: si nomen infinitum et casus non sunt nomina, inconvenienter data est praemissa nominis definitio, quae istis convenit. Sed dicendum, secundum Ammonium, quod supra communius definit nomen, postmodum vero significationem nominis arctat subtrahendo haec a nomine. Vel dicendum quod praemissa definitio non simpliciter convenit his: nomen enim infinitum nihil determinatum significat, neque casus nominis significat secundum primum placitum instituentis, ut dictum est. However, an objection could be made against Aristotle’s position in this portion of his text. If the infinite name and the cases of the name are not names, then the definition of the name (which belongs to these) is not consistently presented. There are two ways of answering this objection. We could say, as Ammonius does, that Aristotle defines the name broadly, and afterward limits the signification of the name by subtracting these from it. Or, we could say that the definition Aristotle has given does not belong to these absolutely, since the infinite name signifies nothing determinate, and the cases of the name do not signify according to the first intent of the one instituting the name, as has been said. V. 1. Postquam philosophus determinavit de nomine: hic determinat de verbo. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, definit verbum; secundo, excludit quaedam a ratione verbi; ibi: non currit autem, et non laborat etc.; tertio, ostendit convenientiam verbi ad nomen; ibi: ipsa quidem secundum se dicta verba, et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit definitionem verbi; secundo exponit eam; ibi: dico autem quoniam consignificat et cetera. After determining the nature of the name the Philosopher now determines the nature of the verb. First he defines the verb; secondly, he excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition, where he says, "Non-matures” and "non-declines” I do not call verbs, etc.; finally, he shows in what the verb and name agree where he says, Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names, etc. First, then, he defines the verb and immediately begins to explain the definition where he says, I mean by "signifies with time,” etc. 2 Est autem considerandum quod Aristoteles, brevitati studens, non ponit in definitione verbi ea quae sunt nomini et verbo communia, relinquens ea intellectui legentis ex his quae dixerat in definitione nominis. Ponit autem tres particulas in definitione verbi: quarum prima distinguit verbum a nomine, in hoc scilicet quod dicit quod consignificat tempus. Dictum est enim in definitione nominis quod nomen significat sine tempore. Secunda vero particula est, per quam distinguitur verbum ab oratione, scilicet cum dicitur: cuius pars nihil extra significat. In order to be brief, Aristotle does not give what is common to the name and the verb in the definition of the verb, but leaves this for the reader to understand from the definition of the name. He posits three elements in the definition of the verb. The first of these distinguishes the verb from the name, for the verb signifies with time, the name without time, as was stated in its definition. The second element, no part of which signifies separately, distinguishes the verb from speech. 3 Sed cum hoc etiam positum sit in definitione nominis, videtur hoc debuisse praetermitti, sicut et quod dictum est, vox significativa ad placitum. Ad quod respondet Ammonius quod in definitione nominis hoc positum est, ut distinguatur nomen ab orationibus, quae componuntur ex nominibus; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal. Quia vero sunt etiam quaedam orationes quae componuntur ex verbis; ut cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri, ut ab his distinguatur verbum, oportuit hoc etiam in definitione verbi iterari. Potest etiam aliter dici quod quia verbum importat compositionem, in qua perficitur oratio verum vel falsum significans, maiorem convenientiam videbatur verbum habere cum oratione, quasi quaedam pars formalis ipsius, quam nomen, quod est quaedam pars materialis et subiectiva orationis; et ideo oportuit iterari. This second element was also given in the definition of the name and therefore it seems that this second element along with vocal sound significant by convention, should have been omitted. Ammonius says in reply to this that Aristotle posited this in the definition of the name to distinguish it from speech which is composed of names, as in "Man is an animal”; but speech may also be composed of verbs, as in "To walk is to move”; therefore, this also bad to be repeated in the definition of the verb to distinguish it from speech. We might also say that since the verb introduces the composition which brings about speech signifying truth or falsity, the verb seems to be more like speech (being a certain formal part of it) than the name which is a material and subjective part of it; therefore this had to be repeated. 4 Tertia vero particula est, per quam distinguitur verbum non solum a nomine, sed etiam a participio quod significat cum tempore; unde dicit: et est semper eorum, quae de altero praedicantur nota, idest signum: quia scilicet nomina et participia possunt poni ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sed verbum semper est ex parte praedicati. The third element distinguishes the verb not only from the name, but also from the participle, which also signifies with time. He makes this distinction when he says, and it is a sign of something said of something else, i.e., names and participles can be posited on the part of the subject and the predicate, but the verb is always posited on the part of the predicate. 5 Sed hoc videtur habere instantiam in verbis infinitivi modi, quae interdum ponuntur ex parte subiecti; ut cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri. Sed dicendum est quod verba infinitivi modi, quando in subiecto ponuntur, habent vim nominis: unde et in Graeco et in vulgari Latina locutione suscipiunt additionem articulorum sicut et nomina. Cuius ratio est quia proprium nominis est, ut significet rem aliquam quasi per se existentem; proprium autem verbi est, ut significet actionem vel passionem. Potest autem actio significari tripliciter: uno modo, per se in abstracto, velut quaedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; ut cum dicitur actio, passio, ambulatio, cursus et similia; alio modo, per modum actionis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per verba aliorum modorum, quae attribuuntur praedicatis. Sed quia etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia actionis potest apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res quaedam, inde est quod ipsa verba infinitivi modi, quae significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut verba, ratione concretionis, et ut nomina prout significant quasi res quasdam. But it seems that verbs are used as subjects. The verb in the infinitive mode is an instance of this, as in the example, "To walk is to be moving.” Verbs of the infinitive mode, however, have the force of names when they are used as subjects. (Hence in both Greek and ordinary Latin usage articles are added to them as in the case of names.) The reason for this is that it is proper to the name to signify something as existing per se, but proper to the verb to signify action or passion. Now there are three ways of signifying action or passion. It can be signified per se, as a certain thing in the abstract and is thus signified by a name such as "action,” "passion,” "walking,” "running,” and so on. It can also be signified in the mode of an action, i.e., as proceeding from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; in this way action or passion is signified by the verbs of the different modes attributed to predicates. Finally—and this is the third way in which action or passion can be signified—the very process or inherence of action can be apprehended by the intellect and signified as a thing. Verbs of the infinitive mode signify such inherence of action in a subject and hence can be taken as verbs by reason of concretion, and as names inasmuch as they signify as things. 6 Potest etiam obiici de hoc quod etiam verba aliorum modorum videntur aliquando in subiecto poni; ut cum dicitur, curro est verbum. Sed dicendum est quod in tali locutione, hoc verbum curro, non sumitur formaliter, secundum quod eius significatio refertur ad rem, sed secundum quod materialiter significat ipsam vocem, quae accipitur ut res quaedam. Et ideo tam verba, quam omnes orationis partes, quando ponuntur materialiter, sumuntur in vi nominum. On this point the objection may also be raised that verbs of other modes sometimes seem to be posited as subjects; for example when we say, "‘Matures’is a verb.” In such a statement, however, the verb "matures” is not taken formally according as its signification is referred to a thing, but as it signifies the vocal sound itself materially, which vocal sound is taken as a thing. When posited in this way, i.e., materially, verbs and all parts of speech are taken with the force of names.  7 Deinde cum dicit: dico vero quoniam consignificat etc., exponit definitionem positam. Et primo, quantum ad hoc quod dixerat quod consignificat tempus; secundo, quantum ad hoc quod dixerat quod est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur, cum dicit: et semper est et cetera. Secundam autem particulam, scilicet: cuius nulla pars extra significat, non exponit, quia supra exposita est in tractatu nominis. Exponit ergo primum quod verbum consignificat tempus, per exemplum; quia videlicet cursus, quia significat actionem non per modum actionis, sed per modum rei per se existentis, non consignificat tempus, eo quod est nomen. Curro vero cum sit verbum significans actionem, consignificat tempus, quia proprium est motus tempore mensurari; actiones autem nobis notae sunt in tempore. Dictum est autem supra quod consignificare tempus est significare aliquid in tempore mensuratum. Unde aliud est significare tempus principaliter, ut rem quamdam, quod potest nomini convenire, aliud autem est significare cum tempore, quod non convenit nomini, sed verbo. Then he says, I mean by "signifies with time” that "maturity,” for example, is a name, but "matures” is a verb, etc.”’ With this he begins to explain the definition of the verb: first in regard to signifies with time; secondly, in regard to the verb being a sign of something said of something else. He does not explain the second part, no part of which signifies separately, because an explanation of it has already been made in connection with the name. First, he shows by an example that the verb signifies with time. "Maturity,” for example, because it signifies action, not in the mode of action but. in the mode of a thing existing per se, does not signify with time, for it is a name. But "matures,” since it is a verb signifying action, signifies with time, because to be measured by time is proper to motion; moreover, actions are known by us in time. We have already mentioned that to signify with time is to signify something measured in time. Hence it is one thing to signify time principally, as a thing, which is appropriate to the name; however, it is another thing to signify with time, which is not proper to the name but to the verb. 8 Deinde cum dicit: et est semper etc., exponit aliam particulam. Ubi notandum est quod quia subiectum enunciationis significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid, cum verbum significet actionem per modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhaereat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in vi nominis, ut dictum est. Dicitur ergo verbum semper esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum quia verbum semper significat id, quod praedicatur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet esse verbum, eo quod verbum importat compositionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto. Then he says, Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something, i.e., of something present in a subject. Here he explains the last part of the definition of the verb. It should be noted first that the subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which something inheres. Hence, when the verb signifies action through the mode of action (the nature of which is to inhere) it is always posited on the part of the predicate and never on the part of the subject—unless it is taken with the force of a name, as was said. The verb, therefore, is always said to be a sign of something said of another, and this not only because the verb always signifies that which is predicated but also because there must be a verb in every predication, for the verb introduces the composition by which the predicate is united with the subject. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 9Sed dubium videtur quod subditur: ut eorum quae de subiecto vel in subiecto sunt. Videtur enim aliquid dici ut de subiecto, quod essentialiter praedicatur; ut, homo est animal; in subiecto autem, sicut accidens de subiecto praedicatur; ut, homo est albus. Si ergo verba significant actionem vel passionem, quae sunt accidentia, consequens est ut semper significent ea, quae dicuntur ut in subiecto. Frustra igitur dicitur in subiecto vel de subiecto. Et ad hoc dicit Boethius quod utrumque ad idem pertinet. Accidens enim et de subiecto praedicatur, et in subiecto est. Sed quia Aristoteles disiunctione utitur, videtur aliud per utrumque significare. Et ideo potest dici quod cum Aristoteles dicit quod, verbum semper est nota eorum, quae de altero praedicantur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi significata verborum sint quae praedicantur, quia cum praedicatio videatur magis proprie ad compositionem pertinere, ipsa verba sunt quae praedicantur, magis quam significent praedicata. Est ergo intelligendum quod verbum semper est signum quod aliqua praedicentur, quia omnis praedicatio fit per verbum ratione compositionis importatae, sive praedicetur aliquid essentialiter sive accidentaliter. The last phrase of this portion of the text presents a difficulty, namely, "of something belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.” For it seems that something is said of a subject when it is predicated essentially, as in "Man is an animal”; but in a subject, when it is an accident that is predicated of a subject, as in "Man is white.” But if verbs signify action or passion (which are accidents), it follows that they always signify what is in a subject. It is useless, therefore, to say "belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.” In answer to this Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing, for an accident is predicated of a subject and is also in a subject. Aristotle, however, uses a disjunction, which seems to indicate that he means something different by each. Therefore it could be said in reply to this that when Aristotle says the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another” it is not to be understood as though the things signified by verbs are predicated. For predication seems to pertain more properly to composition; therefore, the verbs themselves are what are predicated, rather than signify predicates.” The verb, then, is always a sign that something is being predicated because all predication is made through the verb by reason of the composition introduced, whether what is being predicated is predicated essentially or accidentally. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 10Deinde cum dicit: non currit vero et non laborat etc., excludit quaedam a ratione verbi. Et primo, verbum infinitum; secundo, verba praeteriti temporis vel futuri; ibi: similiter autem curret vel currebat. Dicit ergo primo quod non currit, et non laborat, non proprie dicitur verbum. Est enim proprium verbi significare aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis; quod praedictae dictiones non faciunt: removent enim actionem vel passionem, potius quam aliquam determinatam actionem vel passionem significent. Sed quamvis non proprie possint dici verbum, tamen conveniunt sibi ea quae supra posita sunt in definitione verbi. Quorum primum est quod significat tempus, quia significat agere et pati, quae sicut sunt in tempore, ita privatio eorum; unde et quies tempore mensuratur, ut habetur in VI physicorum. Secundum est quod semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, sicut et verbum: et hoc ideo, quia negatio reducitur ad genus affirmationis. Unde sicut verbum quod significat actionem vel passionem, significat aliquid ut in altero existens, ita praedictae dictiones significant remotionem actionis vel passionis. When he says, "Non-matures” and "non-declines” I do not call verbs, etc., he excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition of the verb. And first he excludes the infinite verb, then the verbs of past and future time. "Non-matures” and "non-declines” cannot strictly speaking be called verbs for it is proper to the verb to signify something in the mode of action or passion. But these words remove action or passion rather than signify a determinate action or passion. Now while they cannot properly be called verbs, all the parts of the definition of the verb apply to them. First of all the verb signifies time, because it signifies to act or to be acted upon; and since these are in time so are their privations; whence rest, too, is measured by time, as is said in VI Physicorum. Again, the infinite verb is always posited on the part of the predicate just as the verb is; the reason is that negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation. Hence, just as the verb, which signifies action or passion, signifies something as existing in another, so the foresaid words signify the remotion of action or passion. 11 Si quis autem obiiciat: si praedictis dictionibus convenit definitio verbi; ergo sunt verba; dicendum est quod definitio verbi supra posita datur de verbo communiter sumpto. Huiusmodi autem dictiones negantur esse verba, quia deficiunt a perfecta ratione verbi. Nec ante Aristotelem erat nomen positum huic generi dictionum a verbis differentium; sed quia huiusmodi dictiones in aliquo cum verbis conveniunt, deficiunt tamen a determinata ratione verbi, ideo vocat ea verba infinita. Et rationem nominis assignat, quia unumquodque eorum indifferenter potest dici de eo quod est, vel de eo quod non est. Sumitur enim negatio apposita non in vi privationis, sed in vi simplicis negationis. Privatio enim supponit determinatum subiectum. Differunt tamen huiusmodi verba a verbis negativis, quia verba infinita sumuntur in vi unius dictionis, verba vero negativa in vi duarum dictionum. Now someone might object that if the definition of the verb applies to the above words, then they are verbs. In answer to this it should be pointed out that the definition which has been given of the verb is the definition of it taken commonly. Insofar as these words fall short of the perfect notion of the verb, they are not called verbs. Before Aristotle’s time a name bad not been imposed for a word that differs from verbs as these do. He calls them infinite verbs because such words agree in some things with verbs and yet fall short of the determinate notion of the verb. The reason for the name, he says, is that an infinite verb can be said indifferently of what is or what is not; for the adjoined negation is taken, not with the force of privation, but with the force of simple negation since privation supposes a determinate subject. Infinite verbs do differ from negative verbs, however, for infinite verbs are taken with the force of one word, negative verbs with the force of two. 12 Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem curret etc., excludit a verbo verba praeteriti et futuri temporis; et dicit quod sicut verba infinita non sunt simpliciter verba, ita etiam curret, quod est futuri temporis, vel currebat, quod est praeteriti temporis, non sunt verba, sed sunt casus verbi. Et differunt in hoc a verbo, quia verbum consignificat praesens tempus, illa vero significant tempus hinc et inde circumstans. Dicit autem signanter praesens tempus, et non simpliciter praesens, ne intelligatur praesens indivisibile, quod est instans: quia in instanti non est motus, nec actio aut passio; sed oportet accipere praesens tempus quod mensurat actionem, quae incepit, et nondum est determinata per actum. Recte autem ea quae consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum, non sunt verba proprie dicta: cum enim verbum proprie sit quod significat agere vel pati, hoc est proprie verbum quod significat agere vel pati in actu, quod est agere vel pati simpliciter: sed agere vel pati in praeterito vel futuro est secundum quid. When he says, Likewise, "has matured” and "will mature” are not verbs, but modes of verbs, etc., he excludes verbs of past and future time from the definition. For just as infinite verbs are not verbs absolutely, so "will mature,” which is of future time, and "has matured,” of past time, are not verbs. They are cases of the verb and differ from the verb—which signifies with present time—by signifying time before and after the present. Aristotle expressly says "present time” and not just "present” because he does not mean here the indivisible present which is the instant; for in the instant there is neither movement, nor action, nor passion. Present time is to be taken as the time that measures action which has begun and has not yet been terminated in act. Accordingly, verbs that signify with past or future time are not verbs in the proper sense of the term, for the verb is that which signifies to act or to be acted upon and therefore strictly speaking signifies to act or to be acted upon in act, which is to act or to be acted upon simply, whereas to act or to be acted upon in past or future time is relative. 13 Dicuntur etiam verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis rationabiliter casus verbi, quod consignificat praesens tempus; quia praeteritum vel futurum dicitur per respectum ad praesens. Est enim praeteritum quod fuit praesens, futurum autem quod erit praesens. It is with reason that verbs of past or future time are called cases of the verb signifying with present time, for past or future are said with respect to the present, the past being that which was present, the future, that which will be present. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 14Cum autem declinatio verbi varietur per modos, tempora, numeros et personas, variatio quae fit per numerum et personam non constituit casus verbi: quia talis variatio non est ex parte actionis, sed ex parte subiecti; sed variatio quae est per modos et tempora respicit ipsam actionem, et ideo utraque constituit casus verbi. Nam verba imperativi vel optativi modi casus dicuntur, sicut et verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. Sed verba indicativi modi praesentis temporis non dicuntur casus, cuiuscumque sint personae vel numeri. Although the inflection of the verb is varied by mode, time, number, and person, the variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the verb, the reason being that such variation is on the part of the subject, not on the part of the action. But variation in mode and time refers to the action itself and hence both of these constitute cases of the verb. For verbs of the imperative or optative modes are called cases as well as verbs of past or future time. Verbs of the indicative mode in present time, however, are not called cases, whatever their person and number. 15 Deinde cum dicit: ipsa itaque etc., ostendit convenientiam verborum ad nomina. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: et significant aliquid et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ipsa verba secundum se dicta sunt nomina: quod a quibusdam exponitur de verbis quae sumuntur in vi nominis, ut dictum est, sive sint infinitivi modi; ut cum dico, currere est moveri, sive sint alterius modi; ut cum dico, curro est verbum. Sed haec non videtur esse intentio Aristotelis, quia ad hanc intentionem non respondent sequentia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod nomen hic sumitur, prout communiter significat quamlibet dictionem impositam ad significandum aliquam rem. Et quia etiam ipsum agere vel pati est quaedam res, inde est quod et ipsa verba in quantum nominant, idest significant agere vel pati, sub nominibus comprehenduntur communiter acceptis. Nomen autem, prout a verbo distinguitur, significat rem sub determinato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut per se existens. Unde nomina possunt subiici et praedicari. He points out the conformity between verbs and names where he says, Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names. He proposes this first and then manifests it. He says then, first, that verbs said by themselves are names. Some have taken this to mean the verbs that are taken with the force of names, either verbs of the infinitive mode, as in "To run is to be moving,” or verbs of another mode, as in "‘Matures’ is a verb.” But this does not seem to be what Aristotle means, for it does not correspond to what he says next. Therefore "name” must be taken in another way here, i.e., as it commonly signifies any word whatever that is imposed to signify a thing. Now, since to act or to be acted upon is also a certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, i.e., as they signify to act or to be acted upon, are comprehended under names taken commonly. The name as distinguished from the verb signifies the thing under a determinate mode, i.e., according as the thing can be understood as existing per se. This is the reason names can be subjected and predicated. 6 Deinde cum dicit: et significant aliquid etc., probat propositum. Et primo, per hoc quod verba significant aliquid, sicut et nomina; secundo, per hoc quod non significant verum vel falsum, sicut nec nomina; ibi: sed si est, aut non est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod in tantum dictum est quod verba sunt nomina, in quantum significant aliquid. Et hoc probat, quia supra dictum est quod voces significativae significant intellectus. Unde proprium vocis significativae est quod generet aliquem intellectum in animo audientis. Et ideo ad ostendendum quod verbum sit vox significativa, assumit quod ille, qui dicit verbum, constituit intellectum in animo audientis. Et ad hoc manifestandum inducit quod ille, qui audit, quiescit. He proves the point he has just made when he says, and signify something, etc., first by showing that verbs, like names, signify something; then by showing that, like names, they do not signify truth or falsity when he says, for the verb is not a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing. He says first that verbs have been said to be names only insofar as they signify a thing. Then he proves this: it has already been said that significant vocal sound signifies thought; hence it is proper to significant vocal sound to produce something understood in the mind of the one who hears it. To show, then, that a verb is significant vocal sound he assumes that the one who utters a verb brings about understanding in the mind of the one who bears it. The evidence he introduces for this is that the mind of the one who bears it is set at rest. 17 Sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia sola oratio perfecta facit quiescere intellectum, non autem nomen, neque verbum si per se dicatur. Si enim dicam, homo, suspensus est animus audientis, quid de eo dicere velim; si autem dico, currit, suspensus est eius animus de quo dicam. Sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intellectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit nomen vel verbum secundum se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam operationem, quae est simplex conceptio alicuius, et secundum hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in suspenso erat antequam nomen vel verbum proferretur et eius prolatio terminaretur; non autem constituit intellectum quantum ad secundam operationem, quae est intellectus componentis et dividentis, ipsum verbum vel nomen per se dictum: nec quantum ad hoc facit quiescere audientem. But what Aristotle says here seems to be false, for it is only perfect speech that makes the intellect rest. The name or the verb, if said by themselves, do not do this. For example, if I say "man,” the mind of the hearer is left in suspense as to what I wish to say about mail; and if I say "runs,” the bearer’s mind is left in suspense as to whom I am speaking of. It should be said in answer to this objection that the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said above, and therefore the one who utters a name or a verb by itself, determines the intellect with respect to the first operation, which is the simple conception of something. It is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose mind was undetermined before the name or the verb was being uttered and its utterance terminated, is set at rest. Neither the name nor the verb said by itself, however, determines the intellect in respect to the second operation, which is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing; nor do the verb or the name said alone set the hearer’s mind at rest in respect to this operation. 18 Et ideo statim subdit: sed si est, aut non est, nondum significat, idest nondum significat aliquid per modum compositionis et divisionis, aut veri vel falsi. Et hoc est secundum, quod probare intendit. Probat autem consequenter per illa verba, quae maxime videntur significare veritatem vel falsitatem, scilicet ipsum verbum quod est esse, et verbum infinitum quod est non esse; quorum neutrum per se dictum est significativum veritatis vel falsitatis in re; unde multo minus alia. Vel potest intelligi hoc generaliter dici de omnibus verbis. Quia enim dixerat quod verbum non significat si est res vel non est, hoc consequenter manifestat, quia nullum verbum est significativum esse rei vel non esse, idest quod res sit vel non sit. Quamvis enim omne verbum finitum implicet esse, quia currere est currentem esse, et omne verbum infinitum implicet non esse, quia non currere est non currentem esse; tamen nullum verbum significat hoc totum, scilicet rem esse vel non esse. Aristotle therefore immediately adds, but they do not yet signify whether a thing is or is not, i.e., they do not yet signify something by way of composition and division, or by way of truth or falsity. This is the second thing he intends to prove, and he proves it by the verbs that especially seem to signify truth or falsity, namely the verb to be and the infinite verb to non-be, neither of which, said by itself, signifies real truth or falsity; much less so any other verbs. This could also be understood in a more general way, i.e., that here he is speaking of all verbs; for he says that the verb does not signify whether a thing is or is not; he manifests this further, therefore, by saying that no verb is significative of a thing’s being or non-being, i.e., that a thing is or is not. For although every finite verb implies being, for "to run” is "to be running,” and every infinite verb implies nonbeing, for "to non-run” is "to be non-running,” nevertheless no verb signifies the whole, i.e., a thing is or a thing is not. 19 Et hoc consequenter probat per id, de quo magis videtur cum subdit: nec si hoc ipsum est purum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. Ubi notandum est quod in Graeco habetur: neque si ens ipsum nudum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. Ad probandum enim quod verba non significant rem esse vel non esse, assumpsit id quod est fons et origo ipsius esse, scilicet ipsum ens, de quo dicit quod nihil est (ut Alexander exponit), quia ens aequivoce dicitur de decem praedicamentis; omne autem aequivocum per se positum nihil significat, nisi aliquid addatur quod determinet eius significationem; unde nec ipsum est per se dictum significat quod est vel non est. Sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et posterius; unde simpliciter dictum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur: tum etiam, quia dictio aequivoca non nihil significat, sed multa significat; et quandoque hoc, quandoque illud per ipsam accipitur: tum etiam, quia talis expositio non multum facit ad intentionem praesentem. Unde Porphyrius aliter exposuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen homo vel sapiens, sed solum designat quamdam coniunctionem; unde subdit quod consignificat quamdam compositionem, quam sine compositis non est intelligere. Sed neque hoc convenienter videtur dici: quia si non significaret aliquam rem, sed solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen, neque verbum, sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones. Et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut Ammonius exponit, quod ipsum ens nihil est, idest non significat verum vel falsum. Et rationem huius assignat, cum subdit: consignificat autem quamdam compositionem. Nec accipitur hic, ut ipse dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur quod verbum consignificat tempus, sed consignificat, idest cum alio significat, scilicet alii adiunctum compositionem significat, quae non potest intelligi sine extremis compositionis. Sed quia hoc commune est omnibus nominibus et verbis, non videtur haec expositio esse secundum intentionem Aristotelis, qui assumpsit ipsum ens quasi quoddam speciale. He proves this point from something in which it will be clearer when he adds, Nor would it be a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing if you were to say "is” alone, for it is nothing. It should be noted that the Greek text has the word "being” in place of "is” here. In order to prove that verbs do not signify that a thing is or is not, he takes the source and origin of to be [esse], i.e., being [ens] itself, of which he says, it is nothing. Alexander explains this passage in the following way: Aristotle says being itself is nothing because "being” [ens] is said equivocally of the ten predicaments; now an equivocal name used by itself signifies nothing unless something is added to determine its signification; hence, "is” [est] said by itself does not signify what is or is not. But this explanation is not appropriate for this text. In the first place "being” is not, strictly speaking, said equivocally but according to the prior and posterior. Consequently, said absolutely, it is understood of that of which it is said primarily. Secondly, an equivocal word does not signify nothing, but many things, sometimes being taken for one, sometimes for another. Thirdly, such an explanation does not have much application here. Porphyry explains this passage in another way. He says that "being” [ens] itself does not signify the nature of a thing as the name "man” or "wise” do, but only designates a certain conjunction and this is why Aristotle adds, it signifies with a composition, which cannot be conceived apart from the things composing it. This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if "being” itself does not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb. Therefore Ammonius thought this should be explained in another way. He says "being itself is nothing” means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And the reason for this is given when Aristotle says, it signifies with a composition. The "signifies with,” according to Ammonius, does not mean what it does when it is said that the verb signifies with time; "signifies with,” means here signifies with something, i.e., joined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition. But this explanation does not seem to be in accordance with the intention of Aristotle, for it is common to all names and verbs not to signify truth or falsity, whereas Aristotle takes "being” here as though it were something special. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 5 n. 20 Et ideo ut magis sequamur verba Aristotelis considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod verbum non significat rem esse vel non esse, sed nec ipsum ens significat rem esse vel non esse. Et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non significat aliquid esse. Etenim hoc maxime videbatur de hoc quod dico ens: quia ens nihil est aliud quam quod est. Et sic videtur et rem significare, per hoc quod dico quod et esse, per hoc quod dico est. Et si quidem haec dictio ens significaret esse principaliter, sicut significat rem quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. Sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico est, non principaliter significat, sed consignificat eam in quantum significat rem habentem esse. Unde talis consignificatio compositionis non sufficit ad veritatem vel falsitatem: quia compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsitas, non potest intelligi, nisi secundum quod innectit extrema compositionis. Therefore in order to understand what Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just said that the verb does not signify that a thing exists or does not exist [rem esse vel non esse]; nor does "being” [ens] signify that a thing exists or does not exist. This is what he means when he says, it is nothing, i.e., it does not signify that a thing exists. This is indeed most clearly seen in saying "being” [ens], because being is nothing other than that which is. And thus we see that it signifies both a thing, when I say "that which,” and existence [esse] when I say "is” [est]. If the word "being” [ens] as signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence [esse] principally, without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word "being” [ens] does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying "is” [est]; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence. Such signifying with composition is not sufficient for truth or falsity; for the composition in which truth and falsity consists cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition. 21 Si vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri nostri habent, planior est sensus. Quod enim nullum verbum significat rem esse vel non esse, probat per hoc verbum est, quod secundum se dictum, non significat aliquid esse, licet significet esse. Et quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio quaedam, et ita hoc verbum est, quod significat esse, potest videri significare compositionem, in qua sit verum vel falsum; ad hoc excludendum subdit quod illa compositio, quam significat hoc verbum est, non potest intelligi sine componentibus: quia dependet eius intellectus ab extremis, quae si non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus compositionis, ut possit in ea esse verum, vel falsum. If in place of what Aristotle says we say nor would "to be” itself [nec ipsum esse], as it is in our texts, the meaning is clearer. For Aristotle proves through the verb "is” [est] that no verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist, since "is” said by itself does not signify that a thing exists, although it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of composition, so also the verb "is” [est], which signifies to be, can seem to signify the composition in which there is truth or falsity. To exclude this Aristotle adds that the composition which the verb "is” signifies cannot be understood without the composing things. The reason for this is that an understanding of the composition which "is” signifies depends on the extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is not complete and hence cannot be true or false. 22 Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum est significat compositionem. Therefore he says that the verb "is” signifies with composition; for it does not signify composition principally but consequently. it primarily signifies that which is perceived in the mode of actuality absolutely; for "is” said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb "is” principally signifies is the actuality of every form commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb "is,” either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time, relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb "is” signifies composition, not principally, but consequently. VI. 1. Postquam philosophus determinavit de nomine et de verbo, quae sunt principia materialia enunciationis, utpote partes eius existentes; nunc determinat de oratione, quae est principium formale enunciationis, utpote genus eius existens. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo enim, proponit definitionem orationis; secundo, exponit eam; ibi: dico autem ut homo etc.; tertio, excludit errorem; ibi: est autem oratio omnis et cetera. Having established and explained the definition of the name and the verb, which are the material principles of the enunciation inasmuch as they are its parts, the Philosopher now determines and explains what speech is, which is the formal principle of the enunciation inasmuch as it is its genus. First he proposes the definition of speech; then he explains it where he says, Let me explain. The word "animal” signifies something, etc.; finally, he excludes an error where he says, But all speech is significant—not just as an instrument, however, etc.  2 Circa primum considerandum est quod philosophus in definitione orationis primo ponit illud in quo oratio convenit cum nomine et verbo, cum dicit: oratio est vox significativa, quod etiam posuit in definitione nominis, et probavit de verbo quod aliquid significet. Non autem posuit in eius definitione, quia supponebat ex eo quod positum erat in definitione nominis, studens brevitati, ne idem frequenter iteraret. Iterat tamen hoc in definitione orationis, quia significatio orationis differt a significatione nominis et verbi, quia nomen vel verbum significat simplicem intellectum, oratio vero significat intellectum compositum. In defining speech the Philosopher first states what it has in common with the name and verb where he says, Speech is significant vocal sound. This was posited in the definition of the name but not repeated in the case of the verb, because it was supposed from the definition of the name. This was done for the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition; but subsequently he did prove that the verb signifies something. He repeats this, however, in the definition of speech because the signification of speech differs from that of the name and the verb; for the name and the verb signify simple thought, whereas speech signifies composite thought. 3 Secundo autem ponit id, in quo oratio differt a nomine et verbo, cum dicit: cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatim. Supra enim dictum est quod pars nominis non significat aliquid per se separatum, sed solum quod est coniunctum ex duabus partibus. Signanter autem non dicit: cuius pars est significativa aliquid separata, sed cuius aliquid partium est significativum, propter negationes et alia syncategoremata, quae secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum, sed solum habitudinem unius ad alterum. Sed quia duplex est significatio vocis, una quae refertur ad intellectum compositum, alia quae refertur ad intellectum simplicem; prima significatio competit orationi, secunda non competit orationi, sed parti orationis. Unde subdit: ut dictio, non ut affirmatio. Quasi dicat: pars orationis est significativa, sicut dictio significat, puta ut nomen et verbum, non sicut affirmatio, quae componitur ex nomine et verbo. Facit autem mentionem solum de affirmatione et non de negatione, quia negatio secundum vocem superaddit affirmationi; unde si pars orationis propter sui simplicitatem non significat aliquid, ut affirmatio, multo minus ut negatio. Secondly, he posits what differentiates speech from the name and verb when he says, of which some of the parts are significant separately; for a part of a name taken separately does not signify anything per se, except in the case of a name composed of two parts, as he said above. Note that he says, of which some of the parts are significant, and not, a part of which is significant separately; this is to exclude negations and the other words used to unite categorical words, which do not in themselves signify something absolutely, but only the relationship of one thing to another. Then because the signification of vocal sound is twofold, one being referred to composite thought, the other to simple thought (the first belonging to speech, the second, not to speech but to a part of speech), he adds, as words but not as an affirmation. What he means is that a part of speech signifies in the way a word signifies, a name or a verb, for instance; it does not signify in the way an affirmation signifies, which is composed of a name and a verb. He only mentions affirmation because negation adds something to affirmation as far as vocal sound is concerned for if a part of speech, since it is simple, does not signify as an affirmation, it will not signify as a negation. 4 Sed contra hanc definitionem Aspasius obiicit quod videtur non omnibus partibus orationis convenire. Sunt enim quaedam orationes, quarum partes significant aliquid ut affirmatio; ut puta, si sol lucet super terram, dies est; et sic de multis. Et ad hoc respondet Porphyrius quod in quocumque genere invenitur prius et posterius, debet definiri id quod prius est. Sicut cum datur definitio alicuius speciei, puta hominis, intelligitur definitio de eo quod est in actu, non de eo quod est in potentia; et ideo quia in genere orationis prius est oratio simplex, inde est quod Aristoteles prius definivit orationem simplicem. Vel potest dici, secundum Alexandrum et Ammonium, quod hic definitur oratio in communi. Unde debet poni in hac definitione id quod est commune orationi simplici et compositae. Habere autem partes significantes aliquid ut affirmatio, competit soli orationi, compositae; sed habere partes significantes aliquid per modum dictionis, et non per modum affirmationis, est commune orationi simplici et compositae. Et ideo hoc debuit poni in definitione orationis. Et secundum hoc non debet intelligi esse de ratione orationis quod pars eius non sit affirmatio: sed quia de ratione orationis est quod pars eius sit aliquid quod significat per modum dictionis, et non per modum affirmationis. Et in idem redit solutio Porphyrii quantum ad sensum, licet quantum ad verba parumper differat. Quia enim Aristoteles frequenter ponit dicere pro affirmare, ne dictio pro affirmatione sumatur, subdit quod pars orationis significat ut dictio, et addit non ut affirmatio: quasi diceret, secundum sensum Porphyrii, non accipiatur nunc dictio secundum quod idem est quod affirmatio. Philosophus autem, qui dicitur Ioannes grammaticus, voluit quod haec definitio orationis daretur solum de oratione perfecta, eo quod partes non videntur esse nisi alicuius perfecti, sicut omnes partes domus referuntur ad domum: et ideo secundum ipsum sola oratio perfecta habet partes significativas. Sed tamen hic decipiebatur, quia quamvis omnes partes referantur principaliter ad totum perfectum, quaedam tamen partes referuntur ad ipsum immediate, sicut paries et tectum ad domum, et membra organica ad animal: quaedam vero mediantibus partibus principalibus quarum sunt partes; sicut lapides referuntur ad domum mediante pariete; nervi autem et ossa ad animal mediantibus membris organicis, scilicet manu et pede et huiusmodi. Sic ergo omnes partes orationis principaliter referuntur ad orationem perfectam, cuius pars est oratio imperfecta, quae etiam ipsa habet partes significantes. Unde ista definitio convenit tam orationi perfectae, quam imperfectae. Aspasius objects to this definition because it does not seem to belong to all parts of speech. There is a kind of speech he says, in which some of the parts signify as an affirmation; for instance, "If the sun shines over the earth, it is day,” and so in many other examples. Porphyry says in reply to this objection that in whatever genus there is something prior and posterior, it is the prior thing that has to be defined. For example, when we give the definition of a species—say, of man—the definition is understood of that which is in act, not of that which is in potency. Since, then, in the genus of speech, simple speech is prior, Aristotle defines it first. Or, we can answer the objection in the way Alexander and Ammonious do. They say that speech is defined here commonly. Hence what is common to simple and composite speech ought to be stated in the definition. Now to have parts signifying something as an affirmation belongs only to composite speech, but to have parts signifying something in the mode of a word and not in the mode of an affirmation is common to simple and composite speech. Therefore this had to be posited in the definition of speech. We should not conclude, however, that it is of the nature of speech that its part not be an affirmation, but rather that it is of the nature of speech that its parts be something that signify in the manner of words and not in the manner of an affirmation. Porphyry’s solution reduces to the same thing as far as meaning is concerned, although it is a little different verbally. Aristotle frequently uses "to say” for "to affirm,” and hence to prevent "word” from being taken as "affirmation” when he says that a part of speech signifies as a word, he immediately adds, not as an affirmation, meaning—according to Porphyry’s view—"word” is not taken here in the sense in which it is the same as "affirmation.” A philosopher called John the Grammarian thought that this definition could only apply to perfect speech because there only seem to be parts in the case of something perfect, or complete; for example, a house to which all of the parts are referred. Therefore only perfect speech has significant parts. He was in error on this point, however, for while it is true that all the parts are referred principally to the perfect, or complete whole, some parts are referred to it immediately, for example, the walls and roof to a house and organic members to an animal; others, however, are referred to it through the principal parts of which they are parts; stones, for example, to the house by the mediate wall, and nerves and bones to the animal by the mediate organic members like the hand and the foot, etc. In the case of speech, therefore, all of the parts are principally referred to perfect speech, a part of which is imperfect speech, which also has significant parts. Hence this definition belongs both to perfect and to imperfect speech. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 6 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: dico autem ut homo etc., exponit propositam definitionem. Et primo, manifestat verum esse quod dicitur; secundo, excludit falsum intellectum; ibi: sed non una hominis syllaba et cetera. Exponit ergo quod dixerat aliquid partium orationis esse significativum, sicut hoc nomen homo, quod est pars orationis, significat aliquid, sed non significat ut affirmatio aut negatio, quia non significat esse vel non esse. Et hoc dico non in actu, sed solum in potentia. Potest enim aliquid addi, per cuius additionem fit affirmatio vel negatio, scilicet si addatur ei verbum. When he says, Let me explain. The word "animal” signifies something, etc., he elucidates the definition. First he shows that what he says is true; secondly, he excludes a false understanding of it where he says, But one syllable of "animal” does not signify anything, etc. He explains that when he says some parts of speech are significant, he means that some of the parts signify something in the way the name "animal,” which is a part of speech, signifies something and yet does not signify as an affirmation or negation, because it does not signify to be or not to be. By this I mean it does not signify affirmation or negation in act, but only in potency; for it is possible to add something that will make it an affirmation or negation, i.e., a verb. 6 Deinde cum dicit: sed non una hominis etc., excludit falsum intellectum. Et posset hoc referri ad immediate dictum, ut sit sensus quod nomen erit affirmatio vel negatio, si quid ei addatur, sed non si addatur ei una nominis syllaba. Sed quia huic sensui non conveniunt verba sequentia, oportet quod referatur ad id, quod supra dictum est in definitione orationis, scilicet quod aliquid partium eius sit significativum separatim. Sed quia pars alicuius totius dicitur proprie illud, quod immediate venit ad constitutionem totius, non autem pars partis; ideo hoc intelligendum est de partibus ex quibus immediate constituitur oratio, scilicet de nomine et verbo, non autem de partibus nominis vel verbi, quae sunt syllabae vel litterae. Et ideo dicitur quod pars orationis est significativa separata, non tamen talis pars, quae est una nominis syllaba. Et hoc manifestat in syllabis, quae quandoque possunt esse dictiones per se significantes: sicut hoc quod dico rex, quandoque est una dictio per se significans; in quantum vero accipitur ut una quaedam syllaba huius nominis sorex, soricis, non significat aliquid per se, sed est vox sola. Dictio enim quaedam est composita ex pluribus vocibus, tamen in significando habet simplicitatem, in quantum scilicet significat simplicem intellectum. Et ideo in quantum est vox composita, potest habere partem quae sit vox, inquantum autem est simplex in significando, non potest habere partem significantem. Unde syllabae quidem sunt voces, sed non sunt voces per se significantes. Sciendum tamen quod in nominibus compositis, quae imponuntur ad significandum rem simplicem ex aliquo intellectu composito, partes secundum apparentiam aliquid significant, licet non secundum veritatem. Et ideo subdit quod in duplicibus, idest in nominibus compositis, syllabae quae possunt esse dictiones, in compositione nominis venientes, significant aliquid, scilicet in ipso composito et secundum quod sunt dictiones; non autem significant aliquid secundum se, prout sunt huiusmodi nominis partes, sed eo modo, sicut supra dictum est. He excludes a false understanding of what has been said by his next statement. But one syllable of "animal” does not signify anything. This could be referred to what has just been said and the meaning would be that the name will be an affirmation or negation if something is added to it, but not if what is added is one syllable of a name. However, what he says next is not compatible with this meaning and therefore these words should be referred to what was stated earlier in defining speech, namely, to some parts of which are significant separately. Now, since what is properly called a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the whole, and not that which is a part of a part, "some parts” should be understood as the parts from which speech is immediately formed, i.e., the name and verb, and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or letters. Hence, what is being said here is that a part of speech is significant separately but not such a part as the syllable of a name. He manifests this by means of syllables that sometimes can be words signifying per se. "Owl,” for example, is sometimes one word signifying per se. When taken as a syllable of the name "fowl,” however, it does not signify something per se but is only a vocal sound. For a word is composed of many vocal sounds, but it has simplicity in signifying insofar as it signifies simple thought. Hence, a word inasmuch as it is a composite vocal sound can have a part which is a vocal sound, but inasmuch as it is simple in signifying it cannot have a signifying part. Whence syllables are indeed vocal sounds, but they are not vocal sounds signifying per se. In contrast to this it should be noted that in composite names, which are imposed to signify a simple thing from some composite understanding, the parts appear to signify something, although according to truth they do not. For this reason he adds that in compound words, i.e., composite names, the syllables may be words contributing to the composition of a name, and therefore signify something, namely, in the composite, and according as they are words; but as parts of this kind of name they do not signify something per se, but in the way that has already been explained. 7 Deinde cum dicit: est autem oratio etc., excludit quemdam errorem. Fuerunt enim aliqui dicentes quod oratio et eius partes significant naturaliter, non ad placitum. Ad probandum autem hoc utebantur tali ratione. Virtutis naturalis oportet esse naturalia instrumenta: quia natura non deficit in necessariis; potentia autem interpretativa est naturalis homini; ergo instrumenta eius sunt naturalia. Instrumentum autem eius est oratio, quia per orationem virtus interpretativa interpretatur mentis conceptum: hoc enim dicimus instrumentum, quo agens operatur. Ergo oratio est aliquid naturale, non ex institutione humana significans, sed naturaliter. Then he says, But all speech is significant—not just as an instrument, however, etc. Here he excludes the error of those who said that speech and its parts signify naturally rather than by convention. To prove their point they used the following argument. The instruments of a natural power must themselves be natural, for nature does not fail in regard to what is necessary; but the interpretive power is natural to man; therefore, its instruments are natural. Now the instrument of the interpretive power is speech since it is through speech that expression is given to the conception of the mind; for we mean by an instrument that by which an agent operates. Therefore, speech is something natural, signifying, not from human institution, but naturally. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 6 n. 8Huic autem rationi, quae dicitur esse Platonis in Lib. qui intitulatur Cratylus, Aristoteles obviando dicit quod omnis oratio est significativa, non sicut instrumentum virtutis, scilicet naturalis: quia instrumenta naturalia virtutis interpretativae sunt guttur et pulmo, quibus formatur vox, et lingua et dentes et labia, quibus litterati ac articulati soni distinguuntur; oratio autem et partes eius sunt sicut effectus virtutis interpretativae per instrumenta praedicta. Sicut enim virtus motiva utitur naturalibus instrumentis, sicut brachiis et manibus ad faciendum opera artificialia, ita virtus interpretativa utitur gutture et aliis instrumentis naturalibus ad faciendum orationem. Unde oratio et partes eius non sunt res naturales, sed quidam artificiales effectus. Et ideo subdit quod oratio significat ad placitum, idest secundum institutionem humanae rationis et voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, sicut et omnia artificialia causantur ex humana voluntate et ratione. Sciendum tamen quod, si virtutem interpretativam non attribuamus virtuti motivae, sed rationi; sic non est virtus naturalis, sed supra omnem naturam corpoream: quia intellectus non est actus alicuius corporis, sicut probatur in III de anima. Ipsa autem ratio est, quae movet virtutem corporalem motivam ad opera artificialia, quibus etiam ut instrumentis utitur ratio: non sunt autem instrumenta alicuius virtutis corporalis. Et hoc modo ratio potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus, quasi instrumentis: quamvis non naturaliter significent. Aristotle refutes this argument, which is said to be that of Plato in the Cratylus, when he says that all speech is significant, but not as an instrument of a power, that is, of a natural power; for the natural instruments of the interpretive power are the throat and lungs, by which vocal sound is formed, and the tongue, teeth and lips by which letters and articulate sounds are formulated. Rather, speech and its parts are effects of the interpretative power through the aforesaid instruments. For just as the motive power uses natural instruments such as arms and hands to make an artificial work, so the interpretative power uses the throat and other natural instruments to make speech. Hence, speech and its parts are not natural things, but certain artificial effects. This is the reason Aristotle adds here that speech signifies by convention, i.e., according to the ordinance of human will and reason. It should be noted, however, that if we do not attribute the interpretative power to a motive power, but to reason, then it is not a natural power but is beyond every corporeal nature, since thought is not an act of the body, as is proved in III De anima [4: 429a 10]. Moreover, it is reason itself that moves the corporeal motive power to make artificial works, which reason then uses as instruments; and thus artificial works are not instruments of a corporeal power. Reason can also use speech and its parts in this way, i.e., as instruments, although they do not signify naturally. Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis enunciationis, hic incipit determinare de ipsa enunciatione. Et dividitur pars haec in duas: in prima, determinat de enunciatione absolute; in secunda, de diversitate enunciationum, quae provenit secundum ea quae simplici enunciationi adduntur; et hoc in secundo libro; ibi: quoniam autem est de aliquo affirmatio et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres. In prima, definit enunciationem; in secunda, dividit eam; ibi: est autem una prima oratio etc., in tertia, agit de oppositione partium eius ad invicem; ibi: quoniam autem est enunciare et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, ponit definitionem enunciationis; secundo, ostendit quod per hanc definitionem differt enunciatio ab aliis speciebus orationis; ibi: non autem in omnibus etc.; tertio, ostendit quod de sola enunciatione est tractandum, ibi: et caeterae quidemrelinquantur. Having defined the principles of the enunciation, the Philosopher now begins to treat the enunciation itself. This is divided into two parts. In the first he examines the enunciation absolutely; in the second the diversity of enunciations resulting from an addition to the simple enunciation. The latter is treated in the second book, where he says, Since an affirmation signifies something about a subject, etc.”’ The first part, on the enunciation absolutely, is divided into three parts. In the first he defines enunciation; in the second he divides it where he says, First affirmation, then negation, is enunciative speech that is one, etc.;” in the third he treats of the opposition of its parts to each other, where he says, Since it is possible to enunciate that what belongs to a subject does not belong to it, etc. In the portion of the text treated in this lesson, which is concerned with the definition of enunciation, he first states the definition, then shows that this definition differentiates the enunciation from other species of speech, where he says, Truth and falsity is not present in all speech however, etc., and finally indicates that only the enunciation is to be treated in this book where he says, Let us therefore consider enunciative speech, etc. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod oratio, quamvis non sit instrumentum alicuius virtutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumentum rationis, ut supra dictum est. Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine, qui est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut et omnis vocis significativae est significare conceptionem intellectus, ut supra dictum est: duae autem sunt operationes intellectus, in quarum una non invenitur veritas et falsitas, in alia autem invenitur verum vel falsum. Et ideo orationem enunciativam definit ex significatione veri et falsi, dicens quod non omnis oratio est enunciativa, sed in qua verum vel falsum est. Ubi considerandum est quod Aristoteles mirabili brevitate usus, et divisionem orationis innuit in hoc quod dicit: non omnis oratio est enunciativa, et definitionem enunciationis in hoc quod dicit: sed in qua verum vel falsum est: ut intelligatur quod haec sit definitio enunciationis, enunciatio est oratio, in qua verum vel falsum est. The point has just been made that speech, although it is not an instrument of a power operating naturally, is nevertheless an instrument of reason. Now every instrument is defined by its end, which is the use of the instrument. The use of speech, as of every significant vocal sound, is to signify a conception of the intellect. But there are two operations of the intellect. In one truth and falsity is found, in the other not. Aristotle therefore defines enunciative speech by the signification of the true and false: Yet not all speech is enunciative; but only speech in which there is truth or falsity. Note with what remarkable brevity he signifies the division of speech by Yet not all speech is enunciative, and the definition by, but only speech in which there is truth or falsity. This, then, is to be understood as the definition of the enunciation: speech in which there is truth and falsity. 3 Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse verum vel falsum, sicut in signo intellectus veri vel falsi: sed sicut in subiecto est verum vel falsum in mente, ut dicitur in VI metaphysicae, in re autem sicut in causa: quia ut dicitur in libro praedicamentorum, ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. True or false is said to be in the enunciation as in a sign of true or false thought; but true or false is in the mind as in a subject (as is said in VI Metaphysicae), and in the thing as in a cause (as is said in the book Predicamentorum [5: 4a 35–4b 9])—for it is from the facts of the case, i.e., from a thing’s being so or not being so, that speech is true or false. 4 Deinde cum dicit: non autem in omnibus etc., ostendit quod per hanc definitionem enunciatio differt ab aliis orationibus. Et quidem de orationibus imperfectis manifestum est quod non significant verum vel falsum, quia cum non faciant perfectum sensum in animo audientis, manifestum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium rationis, in quo consistit verum vel falsum. His igitur praetermissis, sciendum est quod perfectae orationis, quae complet sententiam, quinque sunt species, videlicet enunciativa, deprecativa, imperativa, interrogativa et vocativa. (Non tamen intelligendum est quod solum nomen vocativi casus sit vocativa oratio: quia oportet aliquid partium orationis significare aliquid separatim, sicut supra dictum est; sed per vocativum provocatur, sive excitatur animus audientis ad attendendum; non autem est vocativa oratio nisi plura coniungantur; ut cum dico, o bone Petre). Harum autem orationum sola enunciativa est, in qua invenitur verum vel falsum, quia ipsa sola absolute significat conceptum intellectus, in quo est verum vel falsum. Next he shows that this definition differentiates the enunciation from other speech, when he says, Truth or falsity is not present in all speech however, etc. In the case of imperfect or incomplete speech it is clear that it does not signify the true or false, since it does not make complete sense to the mind of the hearer and therefore does not completely express a judgment of reason in which the true or false consists. Having made this point, however, it must be noted that there are five species of perfect speech that are complete in meaning: enunciative, deprecative, imperative, interrogative, and vocative. (Apropos of the latter it should be noted that a name alone in the vocative case is not vocative speech, for some of the parts must signify something separately, as was said above. So, although the mind of the hearer is provoked or aroused to attention by a name in the vocative case, there is not vocative speech, unless many words are joined together, as in "O good Peter!”) Of these species of speech the enunciative is the only one in which there is truth or falsity, for it alone signifies the conception of the intellect absolutely and it is in this that there is truth or falsity. 5 Sed quia intellectus vel ratio, non solum concipit in seipso veritatem rei tantum, sed etiam ad eius officium pertinet secundum suum conceptum alia dirigere et ordinare; ideo necesse fuit quod sicut per enunciativam orationem significatur ipse mentis conceptus, ita etiam essent aliquae aliae orationes significantes ordinem rationis, secundum quam alia diriguntur. Dirigitur autem ex ratione unius hominis alius homo ad tria: primo quidem, ad attendendum mente; et ad hoc pertinet vocativa oratio: secundo, ad respondendum voce; et ad hoc pertinet oratio interrogativa: tertio, ad exequendum in opere; et ad hoc pertinet quantum ad inferiores oratio imperativa; quantum autem ad superiores oratio deprecativa, ad quam reducitur oratio optativa: quia respectu superioris, homo non habet vim motivam, nisi per expressionem sui desiderii. Quia igitur istae quatuor orationis species non significant ipsum conceptum intellectus, in quo est verum vel falsum, sed quemdam ordinem ad hoc consequentem; inde est quod in nulla earum invenitur verum vel falsum, sed solum in enunciativa, quae significat id quod mens de rebus concipit. Et inde est quod omnes modi orationum, in quibus invenitur verum vel falsum, sub enunciatione continentur: quam quidam dicunt indicativam vel suppositivam. Dubitativa autem ad interrogativam reducitur, sicut et optativa ad deprecativam. But the intellect, or reason, does not just conceive the truth of a thing. It also belongs to its office to direct and order others in accordance with what it conceives. Therefore, besides enunciative speech, which signifies the concept of the mind, there had to be other kinds of speech to signify the order of reason by which others are directed. Now, one man is directed by the reason of another in regard to three things: first, to attend with his mind, and vocative speech relates to this; second, to respond with his voice, and interrogative speech relates to this; third, to execute a work, and in relation to this, imperative speech is used with regard to inferiors, deprecative with regard to superiors. Optative speech is reduced to the latter, for a man does not have the power to move a superior except by the expression of his desire. These four species of speech do not signify the conception of the intellect in which there is truth or falsity, but a certain order following upon this. Consequently truth or falsity is not found in any of them, but only in enunciative speech, which signifies what the mind conceives from things. It follows that all the modes of speech in which the true or false is found are contained under the enunciation, which some call indicative or suppositive. The dubitative, it should be noted, is reduced to the interrogative, as the optative is to the deprecative. 6 Deinde cum dicit: caeterae igitur relinquantur etc., ostendit quod de sola enunciativa est agendum; et dicit quod aliae quatuor orationis species sunt relinquendae, quantum pertinet ad praesentem intentionem: quia earum consideratio convenientior est rhetoricae vel poeticae scientiae. Sed enunciativa oratio praesentis considerationis est. Cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrativam, in qua animus hominis per rationem inducitur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt propria rei; et ideo demonstrator non utitur ad suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est in anima. Sed rhetor et poeta inducunt ad assentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam per dispositiones audientis. Unde rhetores et poetae plerumque movere auditores nituntur provocando eos ad aliquas passiones, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. Et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum orationis, quae pertinet ad ordinationem audientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub consideratione rhetoricae vel poeticae, ratione sui significati; ad considerationem autem grammatici, prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum constructio. Then Aristotle says, Let us therefore consider enunciative speech, etc. Here he points out that only enunciative speech is to be treated; the other four species must be omitted as far as the present intention is concerned, because their investigation belongs rather to the sciences of rhetoric or poetics. Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration and for the following reason: this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the mind of man is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing; to this end the demonstrator uses only enunciative speech, which signifies things according as truth about them is in the mind. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing but also through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to move their auditors by arousing certain passions in them, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetorica. This kind of speech, therefore, which is concerned with the ordination of the hearer toward something, belongs to the consideration of rhetoric or poetics by reason of its intent, but to the consideration of the grammarian as regards a suitable construction of the vocal sounds. VIII. 1. Postquam philosophus definivit enunciationem, hic dividit eam. Et dividitur in duas partes: in prima, ponit divisionem enunciationis; in secunda, manifestat eam; ibi: necesse est autem et cetera. Having defined the enunciation the Philosopher now divides it. First he gives the division, and then manifests it where he says, Every enunciative speech however, must contain a verb, etc. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod Aristoteles sub breviloquio duas divisiones enunciationis ponit. Quarum una est quod enunciationum quaedam est una simplex, quaedam est coniunctione una. Sicut etiam in rebus, quae sunt extra animam, aliquid est unum simplex sicut indivisibile vel continuum, aliquid est unum colligatione aut compositione aut ordine. Quia enim ens et unum convertuntur, necesse est sicut omnem rem, ita et omnem enunciationem aliqualiter esse unam. It should be noted that Aristotle in his concise way gives two divisions of the enunciation. The first is the division into one simply and one by conjunction. This parallels things outside of the soul where there is also something one simply, for instance the indivisible or the continuum, and something one either by aggregation or composition or order. In fact, since being and one are convertible, every enunciation must in some way be one, just as every thing is. 3 Alia vero subdivisio enunciationis est quod si enunciatio sit una, aut est affirmativa aut negativa. Enunciatio autem affirmativa prior est negativa, triplici ratione, secundum tria quae supra posita sunt: ubi dictum est quod vox est signum intellectus, et intellectus est signum rei. Ex parte igitur vocis, affirmativa enunciatio est prior negativa, quia est simplicior: negativa enim enunciatio addit supra affirmativam particulam negativam. Ex parte etiam intellectus affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat compositionem intellectus, est prior negativa, quae significat divisionem eiusdem: divisio enim naturaliter posterior est compositione, nam non est divisio nisi compositorum, sicut non est corruptio nisi generatorum. Ex parte etiam rei, affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat esse, prior est negativa, quae significat non esse: sicut habitus naturaliter prior est privatione. The other is a subdivision of the enunciation: the division of it as it is one into affirmative and negative. The affirmative enunciation is prior to the negative for three reasons, which are related to three things already stated. It was said that vocal sound is a sign of thought and thought a sign of the thing. Accordingly, with respect to vocal sound, affirmative enunciation is prior to negative because it is simpler, for the negative enunciation adds a negative particle to the affirmative. With respect to thought, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies composition by the intellect, is prior to the negative, which signifies division, for division is posterior by nature to composition since division is only of composite things—just as corruption is only of generated things. With respect to the thing, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies to be is prior to the negative, which signifies not to be, as the having of something is naturally prior to the privation of it. 4 Dicit ergo quod oratio enunciativa una et prima est affirmatio, idest affirmativa enunciatio. Et contra hoc quod dixerat prima, subdit: deinde negatio, idest negativa oratio, quia est posterior affirmativa, ut dictum est. Contra id autem quod dixerat una, scilicet simpliciter, subdit quod quaedam aliae sunt unae, non simpliciter, sed coniunctione unae. What he says, then, is this: Affirmation, i.e., affirmative enunciation, is one and the first enunciative speech. And in opposition to first he adds, then negation, i.e., negative speech, for it is posterior to affirmative, as we have said. In Opposition to one, i.e., one simply, he adds, certain others are one, not simply, but one by conjunction. 5 Ex hoc autem quod hic dicitur argumentatur Alexander quod divisio enunciationis in affirmationem et negationem non est divisio generis in species, sed divisio nominis multiplicis in sua significata. Genus enim univoce praedicatur de suis speciebus, non secundum prius et posterius: unde Aristoteles noluit quod ens esset genus commune omnium, quia per prius praedicatur de substantia, quam de novem generibus accidentium. From what Aristotle says here Alexander argues that the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation is Dot a division of a genus into species, but a division of a multiple name into its meanings; for a genus is not predicated according to the prior and posterior, but is predicated univocally of its species; this is the reason Aristotle would not grant that being is a common genus of all things, for it is predicated first of substance, and then of the nine genera of accidents. 6 Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc ens non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio. Sic ergo affirmatio secundum propriam rationem prior est negatione; tamen aequaliter participant rationem enunciationis, quam supra posuit, videlicet quod enunciatio est oratio in qua verum vel falsum est. However, in the division of that which is common, one of the dividing members can be prior to another in two ways: according to the proper notions” or natures of the dividing members, or according to the participation of that common notion that is divided in them. The first of these does not destroy the univocity of a genus, as is evident in numbers. Twoness, according to its proper notion, is naturally prior to threeness, yet they equally participate in the notion of their genus, i.e., number; for both a multitude consisting of three and a multitude consisting of two is measured by one. The second, however, does impede the univocity of a genus. This is why being cannot be the genus of substance and accident, for in the very notion of being, substance, which is being per se, has priority in respect to accident, which is being through another and in another. Applying this distinction to the matter at hand, we see that affirmation is prior to negation in the first way, i.e., according to its notion, yet they equally participate in the definition Aristotle has given of the enunciation, i.e., speech in which there is truth or falsity. 7 Deinde cum dicit: necesse est autem etc., manifestat propositas divisiones. Et primo, manifestat primam, scilicet quod enunciatio vel est una simpliciter vel coniunctione una; secundo, manifestat secundam, scilicet quod enunciatio simpliciter una vel est affirmativa vel negativa; ibi: est autem simplex enunciatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, praemittit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad propositum manifestandum; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: est autem una oratio et cetera. Where he says, Every enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, etc., he explains the divisions. He gives two explanations, one of the division of enunciation into one simply and one by conjunction, the second of the division of the enunciation which is one simply into affirmative or negative. The latter explanation begins where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, etc. Before he explains the first division, i.e., into one simply and one by conjunction, he states certain things that are necessary for the evidence of the explanation, and then explains the division where he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc. 8 Circa primum duo facit: primo, dicit quod omnem orationem enunciativam oportet constare ex verbo quod est praesentis temporis, vel ex casu verbi quod est praeteriti vel futuri. Tacet autem de verbo infinito, quia eumdem usum habet in enunciatione sicut et verbum negativum. Manifestat autem quod dixerat per hoc, quod non solum nomen unum sine verbo non facit orationem perfectam enunciativam, sed nec etiam oratio imperfecta. Definitio enim oratio quaedam est, et tamen si ad rationem hominis, idest definitionem non addatur aut est, quod est verbum, aut erat, aut fuit, quae sunt casus verbi, aut aliquid huiusmodi, idest aliquod aliud verbum seu casus verbi, nondum est oratio enunciativa. He states the first thing that is necessary for his explanation when he says that every enunciative speech must contain a verb in present time, or a case of the verb, i.e., in past or future time. (The infinite verb is not mentioned because it has the same function in the enunciation as the negative verb.) To manifest this he shows that one name, without a verb, does not even constitute imperfect enunciative speech, let alone perfect speech. Definition, he points out, is a certain kind of speech, and yet if the verb "is” or modes of the verb such as "was” or "has been” or something of the kind, is not added to the notion of man, i.e., to the definition, it is not enunciative speech. 9 Potest autem esse dubitatio: cum enunciatio constet ex nomine et verbo, quare non facit mentionem de nomine, sicut de verbo? Ad quod tripliciter responderi potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla oratio enunciativa invenitur sine verbo vel casu verbi; invenitur autem aliqua enunciatio sine nomine, puta cum nos utimur infinitivis verborum loco nominum; ut cum dicitur, currere est moveri. Secundo et melius, quia, sicut supra dictum est, verbum est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur. Praedicatum autem est principalior pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis et completiva ipsius. Unde vocatur apud Graecos propositio categorica, idest praedicativa. Denominatio autem fit a forma, quae dat speciem rei. Et ideo potius fecit mentionem de verbo tanquam de parte principaliori et formaliori. Cuius signum est, quia enunciatio categorica dicitur affirmativa vel negativa solum ratione verbi, quod affirmatur vel negatur; sicut etiam conditionalis dicitur affirmativa vel negativa, eo quod affirmatur vel negatur coniunctio a qua denominatur. Tertio, potest dici, et adhuc melius, quod non erat intentio Aristotelis ostendere quod nomen vel verbum non sufficiant ad enunciationem complendam: hoc enim supra manifestavit tam de nomine quam de verbo. Sed quia dixerat quod quaedam enunciatio est una simpliciter, quaedam autem coniunctione una; posset aliquis intelligere quod illa quae est una simpliciter careret omni compositione: sed ipse hoc excludit per hoc quod in omni enunciatione oportet esse verbum, quod importat compositionem, quam non est intelligere sine compositis, sicut supra dictum est. Nomen autem non importat compositionem, et ideo non exigit praesens intentio ut de nomine faceret mentionem, sed solum de verbo. But, one might ask, why mention the verb and not the name, for the enunciation consists of a name and a verb? This can be answered in three ways. First of all because enunciative speech is not attained without a verb or a mode of the verb, but it is without a name, for instance, when infinitive forms of the verb are used in place of names, as in "To run is to be moving.” A second and better reason for speaking only of the verb is that the verb is a sign of what is predicated of another. Now the predicate is the principal part of the enunciation because it is the formal part and completes it. This is the reason the Greeks called the enunciation a categorical, i.e., predicative, proposition. It should also be noted that denomination is made from the form which gives species to the thing. He speaks of the verb, then, but not the name, because it is the more principal and formal part of the enunciation. A sign of this is that the categorical enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative solely by reason of the verb being affirmed or denied, and the conditional enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative by reason of the conjunction by which it is denominated being affirmed or denied. A third and even better reason is that Aristotle did not intend to show that the name or verb is not sufficient for a complete enunciation, for he explained this earlier. Rather, he is excluding a misunderstanding that might arise from his saying that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction. Some might think this means that the kind that is one simply, lacks all composition. But he excludes this by saying that there must be a verb in every enunciation; for the verb implies composition and composition cannot be understood apart from the things composed, as he said earlier.” The name, on the other hand, does not imply composition and therefore did not have to be mentioned. 10 Secundo; ibi: quare autem etc., ostendit aliud quod est necessarium ad manifestationem propositi, scilicet quod hoc quod dico, animal gressibile bipes, quae est definitio hominis, est unum et non multa. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis definitionibus. Sed huiusmodi rationem assignare dicit esse alterius negocii. Pertinet enim ad metaphysicum; unde in VII et in VIII metaphysicae ratio huius assignatur: quia scilicet differentia advenit generi non per accidens sed per se, tanquam determinativa ipsius, per modum quo materia determinatur per formam. Nam a materia sumitur genus, a forma autem differentia. Unde sicut ex forma et materia fit vere unum et non multa, ita ex genere et differentia. The other, point necessary for the evidence of the first division is made where he says, but then the question arises as to why the definition "terrestrial biped animal” is something one, etc. He indicates by this that "terrestrial biped animal,” which is a definition of man, is one and not many. The reason it is one is the same as in the case of all definitions but, he says, to assign the reason belongs to another subject of inquiry. It belongs, in fact, to metaphysics and he assigns the reason in VII and VIII Metaphysicae which is this: the difference does not accrue to the genus accidentally but per se and is determinative of it in the way in which form determines matter; for the genus is taken from matter, the difference from form. Whence, just as one thing—not many—comes to be from form and matter, so one thing comes to be from the genus and difference. 11 Excludit autem quamdam rationem huius unitatis, quam quis posset suspicari, ut scilicet propter hoc definitio dicatur unum, quia partes eius sunt propinquae, idest sine aliqua interpositione coniunctionis vel morae. Et quidem non interruptio locutionis necessaria est ad unitatem definitionis, quia si interponeretur coniunctio partibus definitionis, iam secunda non determinaret primam, sed significarentur ut actu multae in locutione: et idem operatur interpositio morae, qua utuntur rhetores loco coniunctionis. Unde ad unitatem definitionis requiritur quod partes eius proferantur sine coniunctione et interpolatione: quia etiam in re naturali, cuius est definitio, nihil cadit medium inter materiam et formam: sed praedicta non interruptio non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem prolationis servari in his, quae non sunt simpliciter unum, sed per accidens; ut si dicam, homo albus musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter. The reason for the unity of this definition might be supposed by some to be only that of juxtaposition of the parts, i.e., that "terrestrial biped animal” is said to be one only because the parts are side by side without conjunction or pause. But he excludes such a notion of its unity. Now it is true that non-interruption of locution is necessary for the unity of a definition, for if a conjunction were put between the parts the second part would not determine the first immediately and the many in locution would consequently signify many in act. The pause used by rhetoricians in place of a conjunction would do the same thing. Whence it is a requirement for the unity of a definition that its parts be uttered without conjunction and interpolation, the reason being that in the natural thing, whose definition it is, nothing mediates between matter and form. However, non-interruption of locution is not the only thing that is needed for unity of the definition, for there can be continuity of utterance in regard to things that are not one simply, but are accidentally, as in white musical man.” Aristotle has therefore manifested very subtly that absolute unity of the enunciation is not impeded either by the composition which the verb implies or by the multitude of names from which a definition is established. And the reason is the same in both cases, i.e., the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter, as is the difference to a genus; but from form and matter a thing that is one simply comes into existence. 12 Deinde cum dicit: est autem una oratio etc., accedit ad manifestandam praedictam divisionem. Et primo, manifestat ipsum commune quod dividitur, quod est enunciatio una; secundo, manifestat partes divisionis secundum proprias rationes; ibi: harum autem haec simplex et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, manifestat ipsam divisionem; secundo, concludit quod ab utroque membro divisionis nomen et verbum excluduntur; ibi: nomen ergo et verbum et cetera. Opponitur autem unitati pluralitas; et ideo enunciationis unitatem manifestat per modos pluralitatis. He begins to explain the division when he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc. First he makes the common thing that is divided evident, i.e., the enunciation as it is one; secondly, he makes the parts of the division evident according to their own proper notions, where he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, etc. After he has made the division of the common thing evident, i.e., enunciation, he then concludes that the name and the verb are excluded from each member of the division where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc. Now plurality is opposed to unity. Therefore he is going to manifest the unity of the enunciation through the modes of plurality. 13 Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio dicitur vel una absolute, scilicet quae unum de uno significat, vel una secundum quid, scilicet quae est coniunctione una. Per oppositum autem est intelligendum quod enunciationes plures sunt, vel ex eo quod plura significant et non unum: quod opponitur primo modo unitatis; vel ex eo quod absque coniunctione proferuntur: et tales opponuntur secundo modo unitatis. He begins his explanation by saying that enunciation is either one absolutely, i.e., it signifies one thing said of one thing, or one relatively, i.e., it is one by conjunction. In opposition to these are the enunciations that are many, either because they signify not one but many things, which is opposed to the first mode of unity or because they are uttered without a connecting particle, which is opposed to the second mode of unity. 14 Circa quod considerandum est, secundum Boethium, quod unitas et pluralitas orationis refertur ad significatum; simplex autem et compositum attenditur secundum ipsas voces. Et ideo enunciatio quandoque est una et simplex puta cum solum ex nomine et verbo componitur in unum significatum; ut cum dico, homo est albus. Est etiam quandoque una oratio, sed composita, quae quidem unam rem significat, sed tamen composita est vel ex pluribus terminis; sicut si dicam, animal rationale mortale currit, vel ex pluribus enunciationibus, sicut in conditionalibus, quae quidem unum significant et non multa. Similiter autem quandoque in enunciatione est pluralitas cum simplicitate, puta cum in oratione ponitur aliquod nomen multa significans; ut si dicam, canis latrat, haec oratio plures est, quia plura significat, et tamen simplex est. Quandoque vero in enunciatione est pluralitas et compositio, puta cum ponuntur plura in subiecto vel in praedicato, ex quibus non fit unum, sive interveniat coniunctio sive non; puta si dicam, homo albus musicus disputat: et similiter est si coniungantur plures enunciationes, sive cum coniunctione sive sine coniunctione; ut si dicam, Socrates currit, Plato disputat. Et secundum hoc sensus litterae est quod enunciatio una est illa, quae unum de uno significat, non solum si sit simplex, sed etiam si sit coniunctione una. Et similiter enunciationes plures dicuntur quae plura et non unum significant: non solum quando interponitur aliqua coniunctio, vel inter nomina vel verba, vel etiam inter ipsas enunciationes; sed etiam si vel inconiunctione, idest absque aliqua interposita coniunctione plura significat, vel quia est unum nomen aequivocum, multa significans, vel quia ponuntur plura nomina absque coniunctione, ex quorum significatis non fit unum; ut si dicam, homo albus grammaticus logicus currit. Boethius interprets this passage in the following way. "Unity” and "plurality” of speech refers to what is signified, whereas "simple” and "composite” is related to the vocal sounds. Accordingly, an enunciation is sometimes one and simple, namely, when one thing is signified by the composition of name and verb, as in "Man is white.” Sometimes it is one and composite. In this case it signifies one thing, but is composed either from many terms, as in "A mortal rational animal is running,” or from many enunciations, as in conditionals that signify one thing and not many. On the other hand, sometimes there is plurality along with simplicity, namely, when a name signifying many things is used, as in "The dog barks,” in which case the enunciation is many because it signifies many things [i.e., it signifies equivocally], but it is simple as far as vocal sound is concerned. But sometimes there is plurality and composition, namely, when many things are posited on the part of the subject or predicate from which one thing does not result, whether a conjunction intervenes or not, as in "The musical white man is arguing.” This is also the case if there are many enunciations joined together, with or without connecting particles as in "Socrates runs, Plato discusses. According to this exposition the meaning of the passage in question is this: an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing, and this is the case whether the enunciation is one simply or is one by conjunction; an enunciation is many when it signifies not one but many things, and this not only when a conjunction is inserted between either the names or verbs or between the enunciations themselves, but even if there are many things that are not conjoined. In the latter case they signify many things either because an equivocal name is used or because many names signifying many things from which one thing does not result are used without conjunctions, as in "The white grammatical logical man is running.” Sed haec expositio non videtur esse secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Primo quidem, quia per disiunctionem, quam interponit, videtur distinguere inter orationem unum significantem, et orationem quae est coniunctione una. Secundo, quia supra dixerat quod est unum quoddam et non multa, animal gressibile bipes. Quod autem est coniunctione unum, non est unum et non multa, sed est unum ex multis. Et ideo melius videtur dicendum quod Aristoteles, quia supra dixerat aliquam enunciationem esse unam et aliquam coniunctione unam, vult hic manifestare quae sit una. Et quia supra dixerat quod multa nomina simul coniuncta sunt unum, sicut animal gressibile bipes, dicit consequenter quod enunciatio est iudicanda una non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati, etiam si sint plura nomina quae unum significent. Vel si sit aliqua enunciatio una quae multa significet, non erit una simpliciter, sed coniunctione una. Et secundum hoc, haec enunciatio, animal gressibile bipes est risibile, non est una quasi coniunctione una, sicut in prima expositione dicebatur, sed quia unum significat. However, this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in mind. First of all the disjunction he inserts seems to indicate that he is distinguishing between speech signifying one thing and speech which is one by conjunction. In the second place, he has just said that terrestrial biped animal is something one and not many. Moreover, what is one by conjunction is not one, and not many, but one from many. Hence it seems better to say that since he has already said that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction be is showing here what one enunciation is. Having said, then, that many names joined together are something one as in the example "terrestrial biped animal,” he goes on to say that an enunciation is to be judged as one, not from the unity of the name but from the unity of what is signified, even if there are many names signifying the one thing; and if an enunciation which signifies many things is one, it will not be one simply, but one by conjunction. Hence, the enunciation "A terrestrial biped animal is risible,” is not one in the sense of one by conjunction as the first exposition would have it, but because it signifies one thing. 16 Et quia oppositum per oppositum manifestatur, consequenter ostendit quae sunt plures enunciationes, et ponit duos modos pluralitatis. Primus est, quod plures dicuntur enunciationes quae plura significant. Contingit autem aliqua plura significari in aliquo uno communi; sicut cum dico, animal est sensibile, sub hoc uno communi, quod est animal, multa continentur, et tamen haec enunciatio est una et non plures. Et ideo addit et non unum. Sed melius est ut dicatur hoc esse additum propter definitionem, quae multa significat quae sunt unum: et hic modus pluralitatis opponitur primo modo unitatis. Secundus modus pluralitatis est, quando non solum enunciationes plura significant, sed etiam illa plura nullatenus coniunguntur, et hic modus pluralitatis opponitur secundo modo unitatis. Et secundum hoc patet quod secundus modus unitatis non opponitur primo modo pluralitatis. Ea autem quae non sunt opposita, possunt simul esse. Unde manifestum est, enunciationem quae est una coniunctione, esse etiam plures: plures in quantum significat plura et non unum. Secundum hoc ergo possumus accipere tres modos enunciationis. Nam quaedam est simpliciter una, in quantum unum significat; quaedam est simpliciter plures, in quantum plura significat, sed est una secundum quid, in quantum est coniunctione una; quaedam sunt simpliciter plures, quae neque significant unum, neque coniunctione aliqua uniuntur. Ideo autem Aristoteles quatuor ponit et non solum tria, quia quandoque est enunciatio plures, quia plura significat, non tamen est coniunctione una, puta si ponatur ibi nomen multa significans. Then — because an opposite is manifested through an opposite — he goes on to show which enunciations are many, and he posits two modes of plurality. Enunciations are said to be many which signify many things. Many things may be signified in some one common thing however; when I say, for example, "An animal is a sentient being,” many things are contained under the one common thing, animal, but such an enunciation is still one, not many. Therefore Aristotle adds, and not one. It would be better to say, however, that the and not one is added because of definition, which signifies many things that are one. The mode of plurality he has spoken of thus far is opposed to the first mode of unity. The second mode of plurality covers enunciations that not only signify many things but many that are in no way joined together. This mode is opposed to the second mode of unity. Thus it is evident that the second mode of unity is not opposed to the first mode of plurality. Now those things that are not opposed can be together. Therefore, the enunciation that is one by conjunction is also many many insofar as it signifies many and not one. According to this understanding of the text there are three modes of the enunciation: the enunciation that is one simply inasmuch as it signifies one thing; the enunciation that is many simply inasmuch as it signifies many things, but is one relatively inasmuch as it is one by conjunction; finally, the enunciations that are many simply—those that do not signify one thing and are not united by any conjunction. Aristotle posits four kinds of enunciation rather than three, for an enunciation is sometimes many because it signifies many things, and yet is not one by conjunction; a case in point would be an enunciation in which a name signifying many things is used. 17 Deinde cum dicit: nomen ergo et verbum etc., excludit ab unitate orationis nomen et verbum. Dixerat enim quod enunciatio una est, quae unum significat: posset autem aliquis intelligere, quod sic unum significaret sicut nomen et verbum unum significant. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit: nomen ergo, et verbum dictio sit sola, idest ita sit dictio, quod non enunciatio. Et videtur, ex modo loquendi, quod ipse imposuerit hoc nomen ad significandum partes enunciationis. Quod autem nomen et verbum dictio sit sola manifestat per hoc, quod non potest dici quod ille enunciet, qui sic aliquid significat voce, sicut nomen, vel verbum significat. Et ad hoc manifestandum innuit duos modos utendi enunciatione. Quandoque enim utimur ipsa quasi ad interrogata respondentes; puta si quaeratur, quis sit in scholis? Respondemus, magister. Quandoque autem utimur ea propria sponte, nullo interrogante; sicut cum dicimus, Petrus currit. Dicit ergo, quod ille qui significat aliquid unum nomine vel verbo, non enunciat vel sicut ille qui respondet aliquo interrogante, vel sicut ille qui profert enunciationem non aliquo interrogante, sed ipso proferente sponte. Introduxit autem hoc, quia simplex nomen vel verbum, quando respondetur ad interrogationem, videtur verum vel falsum significare: quod est proprium enunciationis. Sed hoc non competit nomini vel verbo, nisi secundum quod intelligitur coniunctum cum alia parte proposita in interrogatione. Ut si quaerenti, quis legit in scholis? Respondeatur, magister, subintelligitur, ibi legit. Si ergo ille qui enunciat aliquid nomine vel verbo non enunciat, manifestum est quod enunciatio non sic unum significat, sicut nomen vel verbum. Hoc autem inducit sicut conclusionem eius quod supra praemisit: necesse est omnem orationem enunciativam ex verbo esse vel ex casu verbi. Where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc., he excludes the name and the verb from the unity of speech. His reason for making this point is that his statement, "an enunciation is one inasmuch as it signifies one thing,” might be taken to mean that an enunciation signifies one thing in the same way the name or verb signify one thing. To prevent such a misunderstanding he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, i.e., a locution which is not an enunciation. From his mode of speaking it would seem that Aristotle himself imposed the name "phasis” [word] to signify such parts of the enunciation. Then he shows that a name or verb is only a word by pointing out that we do not say that a person is enunciating when be signifies something in vocal sound in the way in which a name or verb signifies. To manifest this he suggests two ways of using the enunciation. Sometimes we use it to reply to questions; for example if someone asks "Who is it who discusses,” we answer "The teacher.” At other times we use the enunciation, not in reply to a question, but of our own accord, as when we say "Peter is running.” What Aristotle is saying, then, is that the person who signifies something one by a name or a verb is not enunciating in the way in which either the person who replies to a question or who utters an enunciation of his own accord is enunciating. He introduces this point because the simple name or verb, when used in reply to a question seems to signify truth or falsity and truth or falsity is what is proper to the enunciation. Truth and falsity is not proper, however, to the name or verb unless it is understood as joined to another part proposed in a question; if someone should ask, for example, "Who reads in the schools,” we would answer, "The teacher,” understanding also, "reads there.” If, then, something expressed by a name or verb is not an enunciation, it is evident that the enunciation does not signify one thing in the same way as the name or verb signify one thing. Aristotle draws this by way of a conclusion from, Every enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, which was stated earlier. 18 Deinde cum dicit: harum autem haec simplex etc., manifestat praemissam divisionem secundum rationes partium. Dixerat enim quod una enunciatio est quae unum de uno significat, et alia est quae est coniunctione una. Ratio autem huius divisionis est ex eo quod unum natum est dividi per simplex et compositum. Et ideo dicit: harum autem, scilicet enunciationum, in quibus dividitur unum, haec dicitur una, vel quia significat unum simpliciter, vel quia una est coniunctione. Haec quidem simplex enunciatio est, quae scilicet unum significat. Sed ne intelligatur quod sic significet unum, sicut nomen vel verbum, ad excludendum hoc subdit: ut aliquid de aliquo, idest per modum compositionis, vel aliquid ab aliquo, idest per modum divisionis. Haec autem ex his coniuncta, quae scilicet dicitur coniunctione una, est velut oratio iam composita: quasi dicat hoc modo, enunciationis unitas dividitur in duo praemissa, sicut aliquod unum dividitur in simplex et compositum. Then when he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, etc., he manifests the division of enunciation by the natures of the parts. He has said that the enunciation is one when it signifies one thing or is one by conjunction. The basis of this division is the nature of one, which is such that it can be divided into simple and composite. Hence, Aristotle says, Of these, i.e., enunciations into which one is divided, which are said to be one either because the enunciation signifies one thing simply or because it is one by conjunction, simple enunciation is one kind, i.e., the enunciation that signifies one thing. And to exclude the understanding of this as signifying one thing in the same way as the name or the verb signifies one thing he adds, something affirmed of something, i.e., by way of composition, or something denied of something, i.e., by way of division. The other kind—the enunciation that is said to be one by conjunction—is composite, i.e., speech composed of these simple enunciations. In other words, he is saying that the unity of the enunciation is divided into simple and composite, just as one is divided into simple and composite. 19 Deinde cum dicit: est autem simplex etc., manifestat secundam divisionem enunciationis, secundum videlicet quod enunciatio dividitur in affirmationem et negationem. Haec autem divisio primo quidem convenit enunciationi simplici; ex consequenti autem convenit compositae enunciationi; et ideo ad insinuandum rationem praedictae divisionis dicit quod simplex enunciatio est vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid: quod pertinet ad affirmationem; vel non est aliquid: quod pertinet ad negationem. Et ne hoc intelligatur solum secundum praesens tempus, subdit: quemadmodum tempora sunt divisa, idest similiter hoc habet locum in aliis temporibus sicut et in praesenti. He manifests the second division of the enunciation where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, i.e., the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division that belongs primarily to the simple enunciation and consequently to the composite enunciation; therefore, in order to suggest the basis of the division he says that a simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which pertains to affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which pertains to negation. And to make it clear that this is not to be understood only of present time he adds, according to the divisions of time, i.e., this holds for other times as well as the present. Alexander autem existimavit quod Aristoteles hic definiret enunciationem; et quia in definitione enunciationis videtur ponere affirmationem et negationem, volebat hic accipere quod enunciatio non esset genus affirmationis et negationis, quia species nunquam ponitur in definitione generis. Id autem quod non univoce praedicatur de multis (quia scilicet non significat aliquid unum, quod sit unum commune multis), non potest notificari nisi per illa multa quae significantur. Et inde est quod quia unum non dicitur aequivoce de simplici et composito, sed per prius et posterius, Aristoteles in praecedentibus semper ad notificandum unitatem enunciationis usus est utroque. Quia ergo videtur uti affirmatione et negatione ad notificandum enunciationem, volebat Alexander accipere quod enunciatio non dicitur de affirmatione et negatione univoce sicut genus de suis speciebus. Alexander thought that Aristotle was defining the enunciation here and because he seems to put affirmation and negation in the "definition” he took this to mean that enunciation is not the genus of affirmation and negation, for the species is never posited in the definition of the genus. Now what is not predicated univocally of many (namely, because it does not signify something one that is common to many) cannot be made known except through the many that are signified. "One” is not said equivocally of the simple and composite, but primarily and consequently, and hence Aristotle always used both "simple” and "composite” in the preceding reasoning to make the unity of the enunciation known. Now, here he seems to use affirmation and negation to make the enunciation known; therefore, Alexander took this to mean that enunciation is not said of affirmation and negation univocally as a genus of its species. 21 Sed contrarium apparet ex hoc, quod philosophus consequenter utitur nomine enunciationis ut genere, cum in definitione affirmationis et negationis subdit quod, affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo, scilicet per modum compositionis, negatio vero est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo, scilicet per modum divisionis. Nomine autem aequivoco non consuevimus uti ad notificandum significata eius. Et ideo Boethius dicit quod Aristoteles suo modo breviloquio utens, simul usus est et definitione et divisione eius: ita ut quod dicit de eo quod est aliquid vel non est, non referatur ad definitionem enunciationis, sed ad eius divisionem. Sed quia differentiae divisivae generis non cadunt in eius definitione, nec hoc solum quod dicitur vox significativa, sufficiens est definitio enunciationis; melius dici potest secundum Porphyrium, quod hoc totum quod dicitur vox significativa de eo quod est, vel de eo quod non est, est definitio enunciationis. Nec tamen ponitur affirmatio et negatio in definitione enunciationis sed virtus affirmationis et negationis, scilicet significatum eius, quod est esse vel non esse, quod est naturaliter prius enunciatione. Affirmationem autem et negationem postea definivit per terminos utriusque cum dixit: affirmationem esse enunciationem alicuius de aliquo, et negationem enunciationem alicuius ab aliquo. Sed sicut in definitione generis non debent poni species, ita nec ea quae sunt propria specierum. Cum igitur significare esse sit proprium affirmationis, et significare non esse sit proprium negationis, melius videtur dicendum, secundum Ammonium, quod hic non definitur enunciatio, sed solum dividitur. Supra enim posita est definitio, cum dictum est quod enunciatio est oratio in qua est verum vel falsum. In qua quidem definitione nulla mentio facta est nec de affirmatione, nec de negatione. Est autem considerandum quod artificiosissime procedit: dividit enim genus non in species, sed in differentias specificas. Non enim dicit quod enunciatio est affirmatio vel negatio, sed vox significativa de eo quod est, quae est differentia specifica affirmationis, vel de eo quod non est, in quo tangitur differentia specifica negationis. Et ideo ex differentiis adiunctis generi constituit definitionem speciei, cum subdit: quod affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo, per quod significatur esse; et negatio est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo quod significat non esse. But the contrary appears to be the case, for the Philosopher subsequently uses the name "enunciation” as a genus when in defining affirmation and negation he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something, i.e., by way of composition; negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, i.e., by way of division. Moreover, it is not customary to use an equivocal name to make known the things it signifies. Boethius for this reason says that Aristotle with his customary brevity is using both the definition and its division at once. Therefore when he says that something belongs or does not belong to a subject he is not referring to the definition of enunciation but to its division. However, since the differences dividing a genus do not fall in its definition and since vocal sound signifying is not a sufficient definition of the enunciation, Porphyry thought it would be better to say that the whole expression, vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, is the definition of the enunciation. According to his exposition this is not affirmation and negation that is posited in the definition, but capacity for affirmation and negation, i.e., what the enunciation is a sign of, which is to be or not to be, which is prior in nature to the enunciation. Then immediately following this he defines affirmation and negation in terms of themselves when he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something. But just as the species should not be stated in the definition of the genus, so neither should the properties of the species. Now to signify to be is the property of the affirmation, and to signify not to be the property of the negation. Therefore Ammonius thought it would be better to say that the enunciation was not defined here, but only divided. For the definition was posited above when it was said that the enunciation is speech in which there is truth or falsity—in which definition no mention is made of either affirmation or negation. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle proceeds very skillfully here, for he divides the genus, not into species, but into specific differences. He does not say that the enunciation is an affirmation or negation, but vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which is the specific difference of affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which is the specific difference of negation. Then when he adds, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something which signifies to be, and negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, which signifies not to be, he establishes the definition of the species by joining the differences to the genus. IX. 1. Posita divisione enunciationis, hic agit de oppositione partium enunciationis, scilicet affirmationis et negationis. Et quia enunciationem esse dixerat orationem, in qua est verum vel falsum, primo, ostendit qualiter enunciationes ad invicem opponantur; secundo, movet quamdam dubitationem circa praedeterminata et solvit; ibi: in his ergo quae sunt et quae facta sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit qualiter una enunciatio opponatur alteri; secundo, ostendit quod tantum una opponitur uni; ibi: manifestum est et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas partes: in prima, determinat de oppositione affirmationis et negationis absolute; in secunda, ostendit quomodo huiusmodi oppositio diversificatur ex parte subiecti; ibi: quoniam autem sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quod omni affirmationi est negatio opposita et e converso; secundo, manifestat oppositionem affirmationis et negationis absolute; ibi: et sit hoccontradictio et cetera.Having mad e the division of the enunciation, Aristotle now deals with the opposition of the parts of the enunciation, i.e., the opposition of affirmation and negation. He has already said that the enunciation is speech in which there is truth or falsity; therefore, he first shows how enunciations are opposed to each other; secondly, he raises a doubt about some things previously determined and then resolves it where he says, In enunciations about that which is or has taken place, etc. He not only shows how one enunciation is opposed to another, but that only one is opposed to one, where he says, It is evident also that there is one negation of one affirmation. In showing how one enunciation is opposed to another, he first treats of the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely, and then shows in what way opposition of this kind is diversified on the part of the subject where he says, Since some of the things we are concerned with are universal and others singular, etc. With respect to the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely, he first shows that there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and vice versa, and then where he says, We will call this opposed affirmation and negation "contradiction,” he explains the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod ad ostendendum suum propositum philosophus assumit duplicem diversitatem enunciationis: quarum prima est ex ipsa forma vel modo enunciandi, secundum quod dictum est quod enunciatio vel est affirmativa, per quam scilicet enunciatur aliquid esse, vel est negativa per quam significatur aliquid non esse; secunda diversitas est per comparationem ad rem, ex qua dependet veritas et falsitas intellectus et enunciationis. Cum enim enunciatur aliquid esse vel non esse secundum congruentiam rei, est oratio vera; alioquin est oratio falsa. In relation to the first point, that there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and vice versa, the Philosopher assumes a twofold diversity of enunciation. The first arises from the very form or mode of enunciating. According to this diversity, enunciation is either affirmative—in which it is enunciated that something is — or negative — in which it is signified that something is not. The second is the diversity that arises by comparison to reality. Truth and falsity of thought and of the enunciation depend upon this comparison, for when it is enunciated that something is or is not, if there is agreement with reality, there is true speech; otherwise there is false speech. 3 Sic igitur quatuor modis potest variari enunciatio, secundum permixtionem harum duarum divisionum. Uno modo, quia id quod est in re enunciatur ita esse sicut in re est: quod pertinet ad affirmationem veram; puta cum Socrates currit, dicimus Socratem currere. Alio modo, cum enunciatur aliquid non esse quod in re non est: quod pertinet ad negationem veram; ut cum dicitur, Aethiops albus non est. Tertio modo, cum enunciatur aliquid esse quod in re non est: quod pertinet ad affirmationem falsam; ut cum dicitur, corvus est albus. Quarto modo, cum enunciatur aliquid non esse quod in re est: quod pertinet ad negationem falsam; ut cum dicitur, nix non est alba. Philosophus autem, ut a minoribus ad potiora procedat, falsas veris praeponit: inter quas negativam praemittit affirmativae, cum dicit quod contingit enunciare quod est, scilicet in rerum natura, non esse. Secundo autem, ponit affirmativam falsam cum dicit: et quod non est, scilicet in rerum natura, esse. Tertio autem, ponit affirmativam veram, quae opponitur negativae falsae, quam primo posuit, cum dicit: et quod est, scilicet in rerum natura, esse. Quarto autem, ponit negativam veram, quae opponitur affirmationi falsae, cum dicit: et quod non est, scilicet in rerum natura, non esse. The enunciation can therefore be varied in four ways according to a combination of these two divisions: in the first way, what is in reality is enunciated to be as it is in reality. This is characteristic of true affirmation. For example, when Socrates runs, we say, "Socrates is running.” In the second way, it is enunciated that something is not what in reality it is not. This is characteristic of true negation, as when we say, "An Ethiopian is not white.” In the third way, it is enunciated that something is what in reality it is not. This is characteristic of a false affirmation, as in "The raven is white.” In the fourth way, it is enunciated that something is not what it is in reality. This is characteristic of a false negation, as in "Snow is not white.” In order to proceed from the weaker to the stronger the Philosopher puts the false before the true, and among these he states the negative before the affirmative. He begins, then, with the false negative; it is possible to enunciate, that what is, namely, in reality, is not. Secondly, he posits the false affirmative, and that what is not, namely, in reality, is. Thirdly, he posits the true affirmative—which is opposed to the false negative he gave first—and that what is, namely, in reality, is. Fourthly, he posits the true negative—which is opposed to the false affirmative—and that what is not, namely, in reality, is not. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 9 n. 4Non est autem intelligendum quod hoc quod dixit: quod est et quod non est, sit referendum ad solam existentiam vel non existentiam subiecti, sed ad hoc quod res significata per praedicatum insit vel non insit rei significatae per subiectum. Nam cum dicitur, corvus est albus, significatur quod non est, esse, quamvis ipse corvus sit res existens. In saying what is and what is not, Aristotle is not referring only to the existence or nonexistence of a subject. What he is saying is that the reality signified by the predicate is in or is not in the reality signified by the subject. For what is signified in saying, "The raven is white,” is that what is not, is, although the raven itself is an existing thing. 5 Et sicut istae quatuor differentiae enunciationum inveniuntur in propositionibus, in quibus ponitur verbum praesentis temporis, ita etiam inveniuntur in enunciationibus in quibus ponuntur verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. Supra enim dixit quod necesse est enunciationem constare ex verbo vel ex casu verbi. Et hoc est quod subdit: quod similiter contingit, scilicet variari diversimode enunciationem circa ea, quae sunt extra praesens tempus, idest circa praeterita vel futura, quae sunt quodammodo extrinseca respectu praesentis, quia praesens est medium praeteriti et futuri. These four differences of enunciations are found in propositions in which there is a verb of present time and also in enunciations in which there are verbs of past or future time. He said earlier that every enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb. Here he makes this point in relation to the four differences of enunciations: similarly it is possible to enunciate these, i.e., that the enunciation be varied in diverse ways in regard to those times outside of the present, i.e., with respect to the past or future, which are in a certain way extrinsic in respect to the present, since the present is between the past and the future. 6 Et quia ita est, contingit omne quod quis affirmaverit negare, et omne quod quis negaverit affirmare: quod quidem manifestum est ex praemissis. Non enim potest affirmari nisi vel quod est in rerum natura secundum aliquod trium temporum, vel quod non est; et hoc totum contingit negare. Unde manifestum est quod omne quod affirmatur potest negari, et e converso. Et quia affirmatio et negatio opposita sunt secundum se, utpote ex opposito contradictoriae, consequens est quod quaelibet affirmatio habeat negationem sibi oppositam et e converso. Cuius contrarium illo solo modo posset contingere, si aliqua affirmatio affirmaret aliquid, quod negatio negare non posset. Since there are these four differences of enunciation in past and future time as well as in present time, it is possible to deny everything that is affirmed and to affirm everything that is denied. This is evident from the premises, for it is only possible to affirm either that which is in reality according to past, present, or future time, or that which is not; and it is possible to deny all of this. It is clear, then, that everything that is affirmed can be denied or vice versa. Now, since affirmation and negation are per se opposed, i.e., in an opposition of contradiction, it follows that any affirmation would have a negation opposed to it, and conversely. The contrary of this could happen only if an affirmation could affirm something that the negation could not deny. 7 Deinde cum dicit: et sit hoc contradictio etc., manifestat quae sit absoluta oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Et primo, manifestat eam per nomen; secundo, per definitionem; ibi: dico autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum cuilibet affirmationi opponatur negatio, et e converso, oppositioni huiusmodi imponatur nomen hoc, quod dicatur contradictio. Per hoc enim quod dicitur, et sit hoc contradictio, datur intelligi quod ipsum nomen contradictionis ipse imposuerit oppositioni affirmationis et negationis, ut Ammonius dicit. When he says, We will call this opposed affirmation and negation "contradiction,” he explains what absolute opposition of affirmation and negation is. He does this first through the name; secondly, through the definition where he says, I mean by "opposed” the enunciation of the same thing of the same subject, etc. "Contradiction,” he says, is the name imposed for the kind of opposition in which a negation is opposed to an affirmation and conversely. By saying We will call this "contradiction,” we are given to understand—as Ammonius points out—that he has himself imposed the name "contradiction” for the opposition of affirmation and negation. 8 Deinde cum dicit: dico autem opponi etc., definit contradictionem. Quia vero, ut dictum est, contradictio est oppositio affirmationis et negationis, illa requiruntur ad contradictionem, quae requiruntur ad oppositionem affirmationis et negationis. Oportet autem opposita esse circa idem. Et quia enunciatio constituitur ex subiecto et praedicato, requiritur ad contradictionem primo quidem quod affirmatio et negatio sint eiusdem praedicati: si enim dicatur, Plato currit, Plato non disputat, non est contradictio; secundo, requiritur quod sint de eodem subiecto: si enim dicatur, Socrates currit, Plato non currit, non est contradictio. Tertio, requiritur quod identitas subiecti et praedicati non solum sit secundum nomen, sed sit simul secundum rem et nomen. Nam si non sit idem nomen, manifestum est quod non sit una et eadem enunciatio. Similiter autem ad hoc quod sit enunciatio una, requiritur identitas rei: dictum est enim supra quod enunciatio una est, quae unum de uno significat; et ideo subdit: non autem aequivoce, idest non sufficit identitas nominis cum diversitate rei, quae facit aequivocationem. Then he defines contradiction when he says, I mean by "opposed” the enunciation of the same thing of the same subject, etc. Since contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation, as he has said, whatever is required for the opposition of affirmation and negation is required for contradiction. Now, opposites must be about the same thing and since the enunciation is made up of a subject and predicate the first requirement for contradiction is affirmation and negation of the same predicate, for if we say "Plato runs” and "Plato does not discuss,” there is no contradiction. The second is that the affirmation and negation be of the same subject, for if we say "Socrates runs” and "Plato does not run,” there is no contradiction. The third requirement is identity of subject and predicate not only according to name but according to the thing and the name at once; for clearly, if the same name is not used there is not one and the same enunciation; similarly there must be identity of the thing, for as was said above, the enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing.”’ This is why he adds, not equivocally however, for identity of name with diversity of the thing—which is equivocation—is not sufficient for contradiction. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 9 n. 9Sunt autem et quaedam alia in contradictione observanda ad hoc quod tollatur omnis diversitas, praeter eam quae est affirmationis et negationis: non enim esset oppositio si non omnino idem negaret negatio quod affirmavit affirmatio. Haec autem diversitas potest secundum quatuor considerari. Uno quidem modo, secundum diversas partes subiecti: non enim est contradictio si dicatur, Aethiops est albus dente et non est albus pede. Secundo, si sit diversus modus ex parte praedicati: non enim est contradictio si dicatur, Socrates currit tarde et non movetur velociter; vel si dicatur, ovum est animal in potentia et non est animal in actu. Tertio, si sit diversitas ex parte mensurae, puta loci vel temporis; non enim est contradictio si dicatur, pluit in Gallia et non pluit in Italia; aut, pluit heri, hodie non pluit. Quarto, si sit diversitas ex habitudine ad aliquid extrinsecum; puta si dicatur, decem homines esse plures quoad domum, non autem quoad forum. Et haec omnia designat cum subdit: et quaecumque caetera talium determinavimus, idest determinare consuevimus in disputationibus contra sophisticas importunitates, idest contra importunas et litigiosas oppositiones sophistarum, de quibus plenius facit mentionem in I elenchorum. There are also certain other things that must be observed with respect to contradiction in order that all diversity be destroyed except the diversity of affirmation and negation, for if the negation does not deny in every way the same thing that the affirmation affirms there will not be opposition. Inquiry can be made about this diversity in respect to four things: first, are there diverse parts of the subject, for if we say "An Ethiopian is white as to teeth” and "An Ethiopian is not white as to foot,” there is no contradiction; secondly, is there a diverse mode on the part of the predicate, for there is no contradiction if we say "Socrates runs slowly” and "Socrates is not moving swiftly,” or "An egg is an animal in potency” and "An egg is not an animal in act”; thirdly, is there diversity on the part of measure, for instance, of place or time, for there is no contradiction if we say "It is raining in Gaul” and "It is not raining in Italy,” or "It rained yesterday” and "It did not rain today”; fourthly, is there diversity from a relationship to something extrinsic, as when we say "Ten men are many in respect to a house, but not in respect to a court house.” Aristotle designates all of these when he adds, nor in any of the other ways that we have distinguished, i.e., that it is usual to determine in disputations against the specious difficulties of the sophists, i.e., against the fallacious and quarrelsome objections of the sophists, which he mentions more fully in I Elenchorum [5: 166b 28–167a 36]. X. 1 Quia philosophus dixerat oppositionem affirmationis et negationis esse contradictionem, quae est eiusdem de eodem, consequenter intendit distinguere diversas oppositiones affirmationis et negationis, ut cognoscatur quae sit vera contradictio. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, praemittit quamdam divisionem enunciationum necessariam ad praedictam differentiam oppositionum assignandam; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: si ergo universaliter et cetera. Praemittit autem divisionem enunciationum quae sumitur secundum differentiam subiecti. Unde circa primum duo facit: primo, dividit subiectum enunciationum; secundo, concludit divisionem enunciationum, ibi: necesse est enunciare et cetera. The Philosopher has just said that contradiction is the opposition of the affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same subject. Following upon this he distinguishes the diverse oppositions of affirmation and negation, the purpose being to know what true contradiction is. He first states a division of enunciation which is necessary in order to assign the difference of these oppositions; then he begins to manifest the different oppositions where he says, If, then, it is universally enunciated of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, etc. The division he gives is taken from the difference of the subject and therefore he divides the subject of enunciations first; then he concludes with the division of enunciation, where he says, we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular, etc. 2 Subiectum autem enunciationis est nomen vel aliquid loco nominis sumptum. Nomen autem est vox significativa ad placitum simplicis intellectus, quod est similitudo rei; et ideo subiectum enunciationis distinguit per divisionem rerum, et dicit quod rerum quaedam sunt universalia, quaedam sunt singularia. Manifestat autem membra divisionis dupliciter: primo quidem per definitionem, quia universale est quod est aptum natum de pluribus praedicari, singulare vero quod non est aptum natum praedicari de pluribus, sed de uno solo; secundo, manifestat per exemplum cum subdit quod homo est universale, Plato autem singulare. Now the subject of an enunciation is a name or something taken in place of a name. A name is a vocal sound significant by convention of simple thought, which, in turn, is a likeness of the thing. Hence, Aristotle distinguishes the subject of enunciation by a division of things; and he says that of things, some are universals, others singulars. He then explains the members of this division in two ways. First he defines them. Then he manifests them by example when he says, "man” is universal, "Plato” singular. 3 Accidit autem dubitatio circa hanc divisionem, quia, sicut probat philosophus in VII metaphysicae, universale non est aliquid extra res existens. Item, in praedicamentis dicitur quod secundae substantiae non sunt nisi in primis, quae sunt singulares. Non ergo videtur esse conveniens divisio rerum per universalia et singularia: quia nullae res videntur esse universales, sed omnes sunt singulares. There is a difficulty about this division, for the Philosopher proves in VII Metaphysicae [14: 1039a 23] that the universal is not something existing outside of the thing; and in the Predicamenta [5: 2a 11] he says that second substances are only in first substances, i.e., singulars. Therefore, the division of things into universals and singulars does not seem to be consistent, since according to him there are no things that are universal; on the contrary, all things are singular. 4 Dicendum est autem quod hic dividuntur res secundum quod significantur per nomina, quae subiiciuntur in enunciationibus: dictum est autem supra quod nomina non significant res nisi mediante intellectu; et ideo oportet quod divisio ista rerum accipiatur secundum quod res cadunt in intellectu. Ea vero quae sunt coniuncta in rebus intellectus potest distinguere, quando unum eorum non cadit in ratione alterius. In qualibet autem re singulari est considerare aliquid quod est proprium illi rei, in quantum est haec res, sicut Socrati vel Platoni in quantum est hic homo; et aliquid est considerare in ea, in quo convenit cum aliis quibusdam rebus, sicut quod Socrates est animal, aut homo, aut rationalis, aut risibilis, aut albus. Quando igitur res denominatur ab eo quod convenit illi soli rei in quantum est haec res, huiusmodi nomen dicitur significare aliquid singulare; quando autem denominatur res ab eo quod est commune sibi et multis aliis, nomen huiusmodi dicitur significare universale, quia scilicet nomen significat naturam sive dispositionem aliquam, quae est communis multis. Quia igitur hanc divisionem dedit de rebus non absolute secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed secundum quod referuntur ad intellectum, non definivit universale et singulare secundum aliquid quod pertinet ad rem, puta si diceret quod universale extra animam, quod pertinet ad opinionem Platonis, sed per actum animae intellectivae, quod est praedicari de multis vel de uno solo. The things divided here, however, are things as signified by names—which names are subjects of enunciations. Now, Aristotle has already said that names signify things only through the mediation of the intellect; therefore, this division must be taken as a division of things as apprehended by the intellect. Now in fact, whatever is joined together in things can be distinguished by the intellect when one of them does not belong to the notion of the other. In any singular thing, we can consider what is proper to the thing insofar as it is this thing, for instance, what is proper to Socrates or to Plato insofar as he is this man. We can also consider that in which it agrees with certain other things, as, that Socrates is an animal, or man, or rational, or risible, or white. Accordingly, when a thing is denominated from what belongs only to this thing insofar as it is this thing, the name is said to signify a singular. When a thing is denominated from what is common to it and to many others, the name is said to signify a universal since it signifies a nature or some disposition which is common to many. Immediately after giving this division of things, then—not of things absolutely as they are outside of the soul, but as they are referred to the intellect—Aristotle defines the universal and the singular through the act of the intellective soul, as that which is such as to be predicated of many or of only one, and not according to anything that pertains to the thing, that is, as if he were affirming such a universal outside of the soul, an opinion relating to Plato’s teaching. 5 Est autem considerandum quod intellectus apprehendit rem intellectam secundum propriam essentiam, seu definitionem: unde et in III de anima dicitur quod obiectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est. Contingit autem quandoque quod propria ratio alicuius formae intellectae non repugnat ei quod est esse in pluribus, sed hoc impeditur ab aliquo alio, sive sit aliquid accidentaliter adveniens, puta si omnibus hominibus morientibus unus solus remaneret, sive sit propter conditionem materiae, sicut est unus tantum sol, non quod repugnet rationi solari esse in pluribus secundum conditionem formae ipsius, sed quia non est alia materia susceptiva talis formae; et ideo non dixit quod universale est quod praedicatur de pluribus, sed quod aptum natum est praedicari de pluribus. There is a further point we should consider in relation to this portion of the text. The intellect apprehends the thing—understood according to the thing’s essence or definition. This is the reason Aristotle says in III De anima [4:429b 10] that the proper object of the intellect is what the thing essentially is. Now, sometimes the proper nature of some understood form is not repugnant to being in many but is impeded by something else, either by something occurring accidentally (for instance if all men but one were to die) or because of the condition of matter; the sun, for instance, is only one, not because it is repugnant to the notion of the sun to be in many according to the condition of its form, but because there is no other matter capable of receiving such a form. This is the reason Aristotle did not say that the universal is that which is predicated of many, but that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 6Cum autem omnis forma, quae nata est recipi in materia quantum est de se, communicabilis sit multis materiis; dupliciter potest contingere quod id quod significatur per nomen, non sit aptum natum praedicari de pluribus. Uno modo, quia nomen significat formam secundum quod terminata est ad hanc materiam, sicut hoc nomen Socrates vel Plato, quod significat naturam humanam prout est in hac materia. Alio modo, secundum quod nomen significat formam, quae non est nata in materia recipi, unde oportet quod per se remaneat una et singularis; sicut albedo, si esset forma non existens in materia, esset una sola, unde esset singularis: et propter hoc philosophus dicit in VII Metaphys. quod si essent species rerum separatae, sicut posuit Plato, essent individua. Now, since every form which is so constituted as to be received in matter is communicable to many matters, there are two ways in which what is signified by a name may not be of such a nature as to be predicated of many: in one way, because a name signifies a form as terminated in this matter, as in the case of the name "Socrates” or "Plato,” which signifies human nature as it is in this matter; in another way, because a name signifies a form which is not constituted to be received in matter and consequently must remain per se one and singular. Whiteness, for example, would be only one if it were a form not a existing in matter, and consequently singular. This is the reason the Philosopher says in VII Metaphysicae [6: 1045a 36–1045b 7] that if there were separated species of things, as Plato held, they would be individuals. 7 Potest autem obiici quod hoc nomen Socrates vel Plato est natum de pluribus praedicari, quia nihil prohibet multos esse, qui vocentur hoc nomine. Sed ad hoc patet responsio, si attendantur verba Aristotelis. Ipse enim non divisit nomina in universale et particulare, sed res. Et ideo intelligendum est quod universale dicitur quando, non solum nomen potest de pluribus praedicari, sed id, quod significatur per nomen, est natum in pluribus inveniri; hoc autem non contingit in praedictis nominibus: nam hoc nomen Socrates vel Plato significat naturam humanam secundum quod est in hac materia. Si vero hoc nomen imponatur alteri homini significabit naturam humanam in alia materia; et sic eius erit alia significatio; unde non erit universale, sed aequivocum. It could be objected that the name "Socrates” or "Plato” is of such a kind as to be predicated of many, since there is nothing to prevent their being applied to many. The response to this objection is evident if we consider Aristotle’s words. Notice that he divides things into universal and particular, not names. It should be understood from this that what is said to be universal not only has a name that can be predicated of many but what is signified by the name is of such a nature as to be found in many. Now this is not the case in the above-mentioned names, for the name "Socrates” or "Plato” signifies human nature as it is in this matter. If one of these names is imposed on another man it will signify human nature in other matter and thus another signification of it. Consequently, it will be equivocal, not universal. 8 Deinde cum dicit: necesse est autem enunciare etc., concludit divisionem enunciationis. Quia enim semper enunciatur aliquid de aliqua re; rerum autem quaedam sunt universalia, quaedam singularia; necesse est quod quandoque enuncietur aliquid inesse vel non inesse alicui universalium, quandoque vero alicui singularium. Et est suspensiva constructio usque huc, et est sensus: quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum etc., necesse est enunciare et cetera. When he says, we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not belong to it, he infers the division of the enunciation. Since something is always enunciated of some thing, and of things some are universals and some singulars, it follows that sometimes it will be enunciated that something belongs or does not belong to something universal, sometimes to something singular. The construction of the sentence was interrupted by the explanation of universal and singular but now we can see the meaning: Since some of the things we are concerned with are universal and others singular... we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not belong to it. 9 Est autem considerandum quod de universali aliquid enunciatur quatuor modis. Nam universale potest uno modo considerari quasi separatum a singularibus, sive per se subsistens, ut Plato posuit, sive, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. Et sic potest ei aliquid attribui dupliciter. Quandoque enim attribuitur ei sic considerato aliquid, quod pertinet ad solam operationem intellectus, ut si dicatur quod homo est praedicabile de multis, sive universale, sive species. Huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas naturae intellectae, secundum quod comparat ipsam ad res, quae sunt extra animam. Quandoque vero attribuitur aliquid universali sic considerato, quod scilicet apprehenditur ab intellectu ut unum, tamen id quod attribuitur ei non pertinet ad actum intellectus, sed ad esse, quod habet natura apprehensa in rebus, quae sunt extra animam, puta si dicatur quod homo est dignissima creaturarum. Hoc enim convenit naturae humanae etiam secundum quod est in singularibus. Nam quilibet homo singularis dignior est omnibus creaturis irrationalibus; sed tamen omnes homines singulares non sunt unus homo extra animam, sed solum in acceptione intellectus; et per hunc modum attribuitur ei praedicatum, scilicet ut uni rei. Alio autem modo attribuitur universali, prout est in singularibus, et hoc dupliciter. Quandoque quidem ratione ipsius naturae universalis, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod ad essentiam eius pertinet, vel quod consequitur principia essentialia; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, vel homo est risibilis. Quandoque autem attribuitur ei aliquid ratione singularis in quo invenitur, puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod pertinet ad actionem individui; ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat. Singulari autem attribuitur aliquid tripliciter: uno modo, secundum quod cadit in apprehensione; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est singulare, vel praedicabile de uno solo. Quandoque autem, ratione naturae communis; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est animal. Quandoque autem, ratione sui ipsius; ut cum dicitur, Socrates ambulat. Et totidem etiam modis negationes variantur: quia omne quod contingit affirmare, contingit negare, ut supra dictum est. In relation to the point being made here we have to consider the four ways in which something is enunciated of the universal. On the one band, the universal can be considered as though separated from singulars, whether subsisting per se as Plato held or according to the being it has in the intellect as Aristotle held; considered thus, something can be attributed to it in two ways. Sometimes we attribute something to it which pertains only to the operation of the intellect; for example when we say, "Man,” whether the universal or the species, "is predicable” of many. For the intellect forms intentions of this kind, attributing them to the nature understood according as it compares the nature to the things outside of the mind. But sometimes we attribute something to the universal thus considered (i.e., as it is apprehended by the intellect as one) which does not belong to the act of the intellect but to the being that the nature apprehended has in things outside of the soul; for example, when we say "Man is the noblest of creatures.” For this truly belongs to human nature as it is in singulars, since any single man is more noble than all irrational creatures; yet all singular men are not one man outside of the mind, but only in the apprehension of the intellect; and the predicate is attributed to it in this way, i.e., as to one thing. On the other hand, we attribute something to the universal as in singulars in another way, and this is twofold: sometimes it is in view of the universal nature itself; for instance, when we attribute something to it that belongs to its essence, or follows upon the essential principles, as in "Man is an animal,” or "Man is risible.” Sometimes it is in view of the singular in which the universal is found; for instance, when we attribute something to the universal that pertains to the action of the individual, as in "Man walks. Moreover, something is attributed to the singular in three ways: in one way, as it is subject to the intellect, as when we say "Socrates is a singular,” or "predicable of only one”; in another way, by reason of the common nature, as when we say "Socrates is an animal”; in the third way, by reason of itself, as when we say "Socrates is walking.” The negations are varied in the same number of ways, since everything that can be affirmed can also be denied, as was said above. 10 Est autem haec tertia divisio enunciationis quam ponit philosophus. Prima namque fuit quod enunciationum quaedam est una simpliciter, quaedam vero coniunctione una. Quae quidem est divisio analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et posterius: sic enim unum dividitur secundum prius in simplex et per posterius in compositum. Alia vero fuit divisio enunciationis in affirmationem et negationem. Quae quidem est divisio generis in species, quia sumitur secundum differentiam praedicati ad quod fertur negatio; praedicatum autem est pars formalis enunciationis; et ideo huiusmodi divisio dicitur pertinere ad qualitatem enunciationis, qualitatem, inquam, essentialem, secundum quod differentia significat quale quid. Tertia autem est huiusmodi divisio, quae sumitur secundum differentiam subiecti, quod praedicatur de pluribus vel de uno solo, et ideo dicitur pertinere ad quantitatem enunciationis, nam et quantitas consequitur materiam. This is the third division the Philosopher has given of the enunciation. The first was the division of the enunciation into one simply and one by conjunction. This is an analogous division into those things of which one is predicated primarily and consequently, for one is divided according to the prior and posterior into simple and composite. The second was the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division of genus into species, for it is taken from the difference of the predicate to which a negation is added. The predicate is the formal part of the enunciation and hence such a division is said to pertain to the quality of the enunciation. By "quality” I mean essential quality, for in this case the difference signifies the quality of the essence. The third division is based upon the difference of the subject as predicated of many or of only one, and is therefore a division that pertains to the quantity of the enunciation, for quantity follows upon matter. 11 Deinde cum dicit: si ergo universaliter etc., ostendit quomodo enunciationes diversimode opponantur secundum diversitatem subiecti. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, distinguit diversos modos oppositionum in ipsis enunciationibus; secundo, ostendit quomodo diversae oppositiones diversimode se habent ad verum et falsum; ibi: quocirca hasquidem impossibile est et cetera.Aristotle shows next how enunciations are opposed in diverse ways according to the diversity of the subject when he says, If, then, it is universally enunciated of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, etc. He first distinguishes the diverse modes of opposition in enunciations; secondly, he shows how these diverse oppositions are related in different ways to truth and falsity where he says, Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that both be at once true, etc. Aquinas lib. Circa primum considerandum est quod cum universale possit considerari in abstractione a singularibus vel secundum quod est in ipsis singularibus, secundum hoc diversimode aliquid ei attribuitur, ut supra dictum est. Ad designandum autem diversos modos attributionis inventae sunt quaedam dictiones, quae possunt dici determinationes vel signa, quibus designatur quod aliquid de universali, hoc aut illo modo praedicetur. Sed quia non est ab omnibus communiter apprehensum quod universalia extra singularia subsistant, ideo communis usus loquendi non habet aliquam dictionem ad designandum illum modum praedicandi, prout aliquid dicitur in abstractione a singularibus. Sed Plato, qui posuit universalia extra singularia subsistere, adinvenit aliquas determinationes, quibus designaretur quomodo aliquid attribuitur universali, prout est extra singularia, et vocabat universale separatum subsistens extra singularia quantum ad speciem hominis, per se hominem vel ipsum hominem et similiter in aliis universalibus. Sed universale secundum quod est in singularibus cadit in communi apprehensione hominum; et ideo adinventae sunt quaedam dictiones ad significandum modum attribuendi aliquid universali sic accepto. First, then, he distinguishes the diverse modes of opposition and since these depend upon a diversity in the subject we must first consider the latter diversity. Now the universal can be considered either in abstraction from singulars or as it is in singulars, and by reason of this something is attributed in diverse modes to the universal, as we have already said. To designate diverse modes of attribution certain words have been conceived which may be called determinations or signs and which designate that something is predicated in this or that mode. But first we should note that since it is not commonly apprehended by all men that universals subsist outside of singulars there is no word in common speech to designate the mode of predicating in which something is said of a universal thus in abstraction from singulars. Plato, who held that universals subsist outside of singulars, did, however, invent certain determinations to designate the way in which something is attributed to the universal as it is outside of singulars. With respect to the species man he called the separated universal subsisting outside of singulars "man per se”’or "man itself,” and he designated other such universals in like manner. The universal as it is in singulars, however, does fall within the common apprehension of men and accordingly certain words have been conceived to signify the mode of attributing something to the universal taken in this way. 13 Sicut autem supra dictum est, quandoque aliquid attribuitur universali ratione ipsius naturae universalis; et ideo hoc dicitur praedicari de eo universaliter, quia scilicet ei convenit secundum totam multitudinem in qua invenitur; et ad hoc designandum in affirmativis praedicationibus adinventa est haec dictio, omnis, quae designat quod praedicatum attribuitur subiecto universali quantum ad totum id quod sub subiecto continetur. In negativis autem praedicationibus adinventa est haec dictio, nullus, per quam significatur quod praedicatum removetur a subiecto universali secundum totum id quod continetur sub eo. Unde nullus dicitur quasi non ullus, et in Graeco dicitur, udis quasi nec unus, quia nec unum solum est accipere sub subiecto universali a quo praedicatum non removeatur. Quandoque autem attribuitur universali aliquid vel removetur ab eo ratione particularis; et ad hoc designandum, in affirmativis quidem adinventa est haec dictio, aliquis vel quidam, per quam designatur quod praedicatum attribuitur subiecto universali ratione ipsius particularis; sed quia non determinate significat formam alicuius singularis, sub quadam indeterminatione singulare designat; unde et dicitur individuum vagum. In negativis autem non est aliqua dictio posita, sed possumus accipere, non omnis; ut sicut, nullus, universaliter removet, eo quod significat quasi diceretur, non ullus, idest, non aliquis, ita etiam, non omnis, particulariter removeat, in quantum excludit universalem affirmationem. As was said above, sometimes something is attributed to the universal in view of the universal nature itself; for this reason it is said to be predicated of the universal universally, i.e., that it belongs to the universal according to the whole multitude in which it is found. The word "every” has been devised to designate this in affirmative predications. It designates that the predicate is attributed to the universal subject with respect to the whole of what is contained under the subject. In negative predications the word "no” has been devised to signify that the predicate is removed from the universal subject according to the whole of what is contained under it. Hence, saying nullus in Latin is like saying non ullus [not any] and in Greek??de?? [none] is like??de e?? [not one], for not a single one is understood under the universal subject from which the predicate is not removed. Sometimes something is either attributed to or removed from the universal in view of the particular. To designate this in affirmative enunciations, the word "some,” or "a certain one,” has been devised. We designate by this that the predicate is attributed to the universal subject by reason of the particular. "Some,” or "a certain one,” however, does not signify the form of any singular determinately, rather, it designates the singular under a certain indetermination. The singular so designated is therefore called the vague individual. In negative enunciations there is no designated word, but "not all” can be used. just as "no,” then, removes universally, for it signifies the same thing as if we were to say "not any,” (i.e., "not some”) so also "not all” removes particularly inasmuch as it excludes universal affirmation. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 14Sic igitur tria sunt genera affirmationum in quibus aliquid de universali praedicatur. Una quidem est, in qua de universali praedicatur aliquid universaliter; ut cum dicitur, omnis homo est animal. Alia, in qua aliquid praedicatur de universali particulariter; ut cum dicitur, quidam homo est albus. Tertia vero est, in qua aliquid de universali praedicatur absque determinatione universalitatis vel particularitatis; unde huiusmodi enunciatio solet vocari indefinita. Totidem autem sunt negationes oppositae. There are, therefore, three kinds of affirmations in which something is predicated of a universal: in one, something is predicated of the universal universally, as in "Every man is an animal”; in another, something is predicated of the universal particularly, as in "Some man is white.” The third is the affirmation in which something is predicated of the universal without a determination of universality or particularity. Enunciations of this kind are customarily called indefinite. There are the same number of opposed negations. De singulari autem quamvis aliquid diversa ratione praedicetur, ut supra dictum est, tamen totum refertur ad singularitatem ipsius, quia etiam natura universalis in ipso singulari individuatur; et ideo nihil refert quantum ad naturam singularitatis, utrum aliquid praedicetur de eo ratione universalis naturae; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est homo, vel conveniat ei ratione singularitatis. In the case of the singular, although something is predicated of it in a different respect, as was said above, nevertheless the whole is referred to its singularity because the universal nature is individuated in the singular; therefore it makes no difference as far as the nature of singularity is concerned whether something is predicated of the singular by reason of the universal nature, as in "Socrates is a man,” or belongs to it by reason of its singularity. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 16Si igitur tribus praedictis enunciationibus addatur singularis, erunt quatuor modi enunciationis ad quantitatem ipsius pertinentes, scilicet universalis, singularis, indefinitus et particularis. If we add the singular to the three already mentioned there will be four modes of enunciation pertaining to quantity: universal singular, indefinite, and particular. 17 Sic igitur secundum has differentias Aristoteles assignat diversas oppositiones enunciationum adinvicem. Et primo, secundum differentiam universalium ad indefinitas; secundo, secundum differentiam universalium ad particulares; ibi: opponi autem affirmationem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, agit de oppositione propositionum universalium adinvicem; secundo, de oppositione indefinitarum; ibi: quando autem in universalibus etc.; tertio, excludit dubitationem; ibi: in eo vero quod et cetera. Aristotle assigns the diverse oppositions of enunciations according to these differences. The first opposition is based on the difference of universals and indefinites; the second bn the difference of universals and particulars, the latter being treated where he says, Affirmation is opposed to negation in the way I call contradictory, etc. With respect to the first opposition, the one between universals and indefinites, the opposition of universal propositions to each other is treated first, and then the opposition of indefinite enunciations where he says, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, etc. Finally he precludes a possible question where he says, In the predicate, however, the universal universally predicated is not true, etc. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 18Dicit ergo primo quod si aliquis enunciet de subiecto universali universaliter, idest secundum continentiam suae universalitatis, quoniam est, idest affirmative, aut non est, idest negative, erunt contrariae enunciationes; ut si dicatur, omnis homo est albus, nullus homo est albus. Huius autem ratio est, quia contraria dicuntur quae maxime a se distant: non enim dicitur aliquid nigrum ex hoc solum quod non est album, sed super hoc quod est non esse album, quod significat communiter remotionem albi, addit nigrum extremam distantiam ab albo. Sic igitur id quod affirmatur per hanc enunciationem, omnis homo est albus, removetur per hanc negationem, non omnis homo est albus. Oportet ergo quod negatio removeat modum quo praedicatum dicitur de subiecto, quem designat haec dictio, omnis. Sed super hanc remotionem addit haec enunciatio, nullus homo est albus, totalem remotionem, quae est extrema distantia a primo; quod pertinet ad rationem contrarietatis. Et ideo convenienter hanc oppositionem dicit contrarietatem. He says first, then, that if someone enunciates universally of a universal subject, i.e., according to the content of its universality, that it is, i.e., affirmatively, or is not, i.e., negatively, these enunciations will be contrary; as when we say, "Every man is white,” "No man is white.” And the reason is that the things that are most distant from each other are said to be contraries. For a thing is not said to be black only because it is not white but because over and beyond not being white—which signifies the remotion of white commonly—it is, in addition, black, the extreme in distance from white. What is affirmed by the enunciation "Every man is white” then, is removed by the negation "Not every man is white”; the negation, therefore, removes the mode in which the predicate is said of the subject which the word "every” designates. But over and beyond this remotion, the enunciation "No man is white” which is most distant from "Every man is white,” adds total remotion, and this belongs to the notion of contrariety. He therefore appropriately calls this opposition contrariety. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 19Deinde cum dicit: quando autem etc., ostendit qualis sit oppositio affirmationis et negationis in indefinitis. Et primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum per exempla; ibi: dico autem non universaliter etc.; tertio, assignat rationem manifestationis; ibi: cum enim universale sit homo et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quando de universalibus subiectis affirmatur aliquid vel negatur non tamen universaliter, non sunt contrariae enunciationes, sed illa quae significantur contingit esse contraria. Deinde cum dicit: dico autem non universaliter etc., manifestat per exempla. Ubi considerandum est quod non dixerat quando in universalibus particulariter, sed non universaliter. Non enim intendit de particularibus enunciationibus, sed de solis indefinitis. Et hoc manifestat per exempla quae ponit, dicens fieri in universalibus subiectis non universalem enunciationem; cum dicitur, est albus homo, non est albus homo. Et rationem huius expositionis ostendit, quia homo, qui subiicitur, est universale, sed tamen praedicatum non universaliter de eo praedicatur, quia non apponitur haec dictio, omnis: quae non significat ipsum universale, sed modum universalitatis, prout scilicet praedicatum dicitur universaliter de subiecto; et ideo addita subiecto universali, semper significat quod aliquid de eo dicatur universaliter. Tota autem haec expositio refertur ad hoc quod dixerat: quando in universalibus non universaliter enunciatur, non sunt contrariae. When he says, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, etc., he shows what kind of opposition there is between affirmation and negation in indefinite enunciations. First he states the point; he then manifests it by an example when he says, I mean by "enunciated of a universal but not universally,” etc. Finally he gives the reason for this when he says, For while "man” is a universal, it is not used as universal, etc. He says first, then, that when something is affirmed or denied of a universal subject, but not universally, the enunciations are not contrary but the things that are signified may be contraries. He clarifies this with examples where he says, I mean by "enunciated of a universal but not universally,” etc. Note in relation to this that what he said just before this was "when... of universals but not universally enunciated” and not, "when... of universals particularly,” the reason being that he only intends to speak of indefinite enunciations, not of particulars. This he manifests by the examples he gives. When we say "Man is white” and "Man is not white,” the universal subjects do not make them universal enunciations. He gives as the reason for this, that although man, which stands as the subject, is universal, the predicate is not predicated of it universally because the word "every” is not added, which does not itself signify the universal, but the mode of universality, i.e., that the predicate is said universally of the subject. Therefore when "every” is added to the universal subject it always signifies that something is said of it universally. This whole exposition relates to his saying, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, they are not contraries. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 20Sed hoc quod additur: quae autem significantur contingit esse contraria, non est expositum, quamvis obscuritatem contineat; et ideo a diversis diversimode exponitur. Quidam enim hoc referre voluerunt ad contrarietatem veritatis et falsitatis, quae competit huiusmodi enunciationibus. Contingit enim quandoque has simul esse veras, homo est albus, homo non est albus; et sic non sunt contrariae, quia contraria mutuo se tollunt. Contingit tamen quandoque unam earum esse veram et alteram esse falsam; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, homo non est animal; et sic ratione significati videntur habere quamdam contrarietatem. Sed hoc non videtur ad propositum pertinere, tum quia philosophus nondum hic loquitur de veritate et falsitate enunciationum; tum etiam quia hoc ipsum posset de particularibus enunciationibus dici. Immediately after this he adds, although it is possible for the things signified to be contraries, and in spite of the fact that this is obscure he does not explain it. It has therefore been interpreted in different ways. Some related it to the contrariety of truth and falsity proper to enunciations of this kind, For such enunciations may be simultaneously true, as in "Man is white” and "Man is not white,” and thus not be contraries, for contraries mutually destroy each other. On the other hand, one may be true and the other false, as in "Man is an animal” and "Man is not an animal,” and thus by reason of what is signified seem to have a certain kind of contrariety. But this does not seem to be related to what Aristotle has said: first, because the Philosopher has not yet taken up the point of truth and falsity of enunciations; secondly, because this very thing can also be said of particular enunciations. Alii vero, sequentes Porphyrium, referunt hoc ad contrarietatem praedicati. Contingit enim quandoque quod praedicatum negatur de subiecto propter hoc quod inest ei contrarium; sicut si dicatur, homo non est albus, quia est niger; et sic id quod significatur per hoc quod dicitur, non est albus, potest esse contrarium. Non tamen semper: removetur enim aliquid a subiecto, etiam si contrarium non insit, sed aliquid medium inter contraria; ut cum dicitur, aliquis non est albus, quia est pallidus; vel quia inest ei privatio actus vel habitus seu potentiae; ut cum dicitur, aliquis non est videns, quia est carens potentia visiva, aut habet impedimentum ne videat, vel etiam quia non est aptus natus videre; puta si dicatur, lapis non videt. Sic igitur illa, quae significantur contingit esse contraria, sed ipsae enunciationes non sunt contrariae, quia ut in fine huius libri dicetur, non sunt contrariae opiniones quae sunt de contrariis, sicut opinio quod aliquid sit bonum, et illa quae est, quod aliquid non est bonum. Others, following Porphyry, relate this to the contrariety of the predicate. For sometimes the predicate may be denied of the subject because of the presence of the contrary in it, as when we say, "Man is not white” because he is black; thus it could be the contrary that is signified by "is not white.” This is not always the case, however, for we remove something from a subject even when it is not a contrary that is present in it but some mean between contraries, as in saying, "So-and-so is not white” because he is pale; or when there is a privation of act or habit or potency, as in saying, "So-and-so is non-seeing” because he lacks the power of sight or has an impediment so that he cannot see, or even because something is not of such a nature as to see, as in saying, "A stone does not see.” It is therefore possible for the things signified to be contraries, but the enunciations themselves not to be; for as is said near the end of this book, opinions that are about contraries are not contrary,”’ for example, an opinion that something is good and an opinion that something is evil. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 22Sed nec hoc videtur ad propositum Aristotelis pertinere, quia non agit hic de contrarietate rerum vel opinionum, sed de contrarietate enunciationum: et ideo magis videtur hic sequenda expositio Alexandri. Secundum quam dicendum est quod in indefinitis enunciationibus non determinatur utrum praedicatum attribuatur subiecto universaliter (quod faceret contrarietatem enunciationum), aut particulariter (quod non faceret contrarietatem enunciationum); et ideo huiusmodi enunciationes indefinitae non sunt contrariae secundum modum quo proferuntur. Contingit tamen quandoque ratione significati eas habere contrarietatem, puta, cum attribuitur aliquid universali ratione naturae universalis, quamvis non apponatur signum universale; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, homo non est animal: quia hae enunciationes eamdem habent vim ratione significati; ac si diceretur, omnis homo est animal, nullus homo est animal. This does not seem to relate to what Aristotle has proposed either, for he is not treating here of contrariety of things or opinions, but of contrariety of enunciations. For this reason it seems better here to follow the exposition of Alexander. According to his exposition, in indefinite enunciations it is not determined whether the predicate is attributed to the subject universally (which would constitute contrariety of enunciations), or particularly (which would not constitute contrariety of enunciations). Accordingly, enunciations of this kind are not contrary in mode of expression. However, sometimes they have contrariety by reason of what is signified, i.e., when something is attributed to a universal in virtue of the universal nature although the universal sign is not added, as in "Man is an animal” and "Man is not an animal,” for in virtue of what is signified these enunciations have the same force as "Every man is an animal” and "No man is an animal.” Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 23Deinde cum dicit: in eo vero quod etc., removet quoddam quod posset esse dubium. Quia enim posuerat quamdam diversitatem in oppositione enunciationum ex hoc quod universale sumitur a parte subiecti universaliter vel non universaliter, posset aliquis credere quod similis diversitas nasceretur ex parte praedicati, ex hoc scilicet quod universale praedicari posset et universaliter et non universaliter; et ideo ad hoc excludendum dicit quod in eo quod praedicatur aliquod universale, non est verum quod praedicetur universale universaliter. Cuius quidem duplex esse potest ratio. Una quidem, quia talis modus praedicandi videtur repugnare praedicato secundum propriam rationem quam habet in enunciatione. Dictum est enim supra quod praedicatum est quasi pars formalis enunciationis, subiectum autem est pars materialis ipsius: cum autem aliquod universale profertur universaliter, ipsum universale sumitur secundum habitudinem quam habet ad singularia, quae sub se continet; sicut et quando universale profertur particulariter, sumitur secundum habitudinem quam habet ad aliquod contentorum sub se; et sic utrumque pertinet ad materialem determinationem universalis: et ideo neque signum universale neque particulare convenienter additur praedicato, sed magis subiecto: convenientius enim dicitur, nullus homo est asinus, quam, omnis homo est nullus asinus; et similiter convenientius dicitur, aliquis homo est albus, quam, homo est aliquid album. Invenitur autem quandoque a philosophis signum particulare appositum praedicato, ad insinuandum quod praedicatum est in plus quam subiectum, et hoc praecipue cum, habito genere, investigant differentias completivas speciei, sicut in II de anima dicitur quod anima est actus quidam. Alia vero ratio potest accipi ex parte veritatis enunciationis; et ista specialiter habet locum in affirmationibus quae falsae essent si praedicatum universaliter praedicaretur. Et ideo manifestans id quod posuerat, subiungit quod nulla affirmatio est in qua, scilicet vere, de universali praedicato universaliter praedicetur, idest in qua universali praedicato utitur ad universaliter praedicandum; ut si diceretur, omnis homo est omne animal. Oportet enim, secundum praedicta, quod hoc praedicatum animal, secundum singula quae sub ipso continentur, praedicaretur de singulis quae continentur sub homine; et hoc non potest esse verum, neque si praedicatum sit in plus quam subiectum, neque si praedicatum sit convertibile cum eo. Oporteret enim quod quilibet unus homo esset animalia omnia, aut omnia risibilia: quae repugnant rationi singularis, quod accipitur sub universali. When he says, But as regards the predicate the universal universally predicated is not true, etc., he precludes a certain difficulty. He has already stated that there is a diversity in the opposition of enunciations because of the universal being taken either universally or not universally on the part of the subject. Someone might think, as a consequence, that a similar diversity would arise on the part of the predicate, i.e., that the universal could be predicated both universally and not universally. To exclude this he says that in the case in which a universal is predicated it is not true that the universal is predicated universally. There are two reasons for this. The first is that such a mode of predicating seems to be repugnant to the predicate in relation to its status in the enunciation; for, as has been said, the predicate is a quasi-formal part of the enunciation, while the subject is a material part of it. Now when a universal is asserted universally the universal itself is taken according to the relationship it has to the singulars contained under it, and when it is asserted particularly the universal is taken according to the relationship it has to some one of what is contained under it. Thus both pertain to the material determination of the universal. This is why it is not appropriate to add either the universal or particular sign to the predicate, but rather to the subject; for it is more appropriate to say, "No man is an ass” than "Every man is no ass”; andlikewise, to say, "Some man is white” than, "Man is some white.” However, sometimes philosophers put the particular sign next to the predicate to indicate that the predicate is in more than the subject, and this especially when they have a genus in mind and are investigating the differences which complete the species. There is an instance of this in II De anima where Aristotle says that the soul is a certain act.”’ The other reason is related to the truth of enunciations. This has a special place in affirmations, which would be false if the predicate were predicated universally. Hence to manifest what he has stated, he adds, for there is no affirmation in which, i.e., truly, a universal predicate will be predicated universally, i.e., in which a universal predicate is used to predicate universally, for example, "Every man is every animal.” If this could be done, the predicate "animal” according to the singulars contained under it would have to be predicated of the singulars contained under "man”; but such predication could not be true, whether the predicate is in more than the subject or is convertible with the subject; for then any one man would have to be all animals or all risible beings, which is repugnant to the notion of the singular, which is taken tinder the universal. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 10 n. 24Nec est instantia si dicatur quod haec est vera, omnis homo est omnis disciplinae susceptivus: disciplina enim non praedicatur de homine, sed susceptivum disciplinae; repugnaret autem veritati si diceretur, omnis homo est omne susceptivum disciplinae. The truth of the enunciation "Every man is susceptible of every discipline” is not an instance that can be used as an objection to this position, for it is not "discipline” that is predicated of man but "susceptible of discipline.” It would be repugnant to truth if it were said that "Every man is everything susceptible of discipline.” 25 Signum autem universale negativum, vel particulare affirmativum, etsi convenientius ponantur ex parte subiecti, non tamen repugnat veritati etiam si ponantur ex parte praedicati. Contingit enim huiusmodi enunciationes in aliqua materia esse veras: haec enim est vera, omnis homo nullus lapis est; et similiter haec est vera, omnis homo aliquod animal est. Sed haec, omnis homo omne animal est, in quacumque materia proferatur, falsa est. Sunt autem quaedam aliae tales enunciationes semper falsae; sicut ista, aliquis homo omne animal est (quae habet eamdem causam falsitatis cum hac, omnis homo omne animal est); et si quae aliae similes, sunt semper falsae: in omnibus enim eadem ratio est. Et ideo per hoc quod philosophus reprobavit istam, omnis homo omne animal est, dedit intelligere omnes consimiles esse improbandas. On the other hand, although the negative universal sign or the particular affirmative sign are more appropriately posited on the part of the subject, it is not repugnant to truth if they are posited on the part of the predicate, for such enunciations may be true in some matter. The enunciation "Every man is no stone,” for example, is true, and so is "Every man is some animal.” But the enunciation "Every man is every animal,” in whatever matter it occurs, is false. There are other enunciations of this kind that are always false, such as, "Some man is every animal” (which is false for the same reason as "Every man is every animal” is false). And if there are any others like these, they are always false; and the reason is the same in every case. And, therefore, in rejecting the enunciation "Every man is every animal,” the Philosopher meant it to be understood that all similar enunciations are to be rejected. XI. 1. Postquam philosophus determinavit de oppositione enunciationum, comparando universales enunciationes ad indefinitas, hic determinat de oppositione enunciationum comparando universales ad particulares. Circa quod considerandum est quod potest duplex oppositio in his notari: una quidem universalis ad particularem, et hanc primo tangit; alia vero universalis ad universalem, et hanc tangit secundo; ibi: contrariae vero et cetera. Now that he has determined the opposition of enunciations by comparing universal enunciations with indefinite enunciations, Aristotle determines the opposition of enunciations by comparing universals to particulars. It should be noted that there is a twofold opposition in these enunciations, one of universal to particular, and he touches upon this first; the other is the opposition of universal to universal, and this he takes up next, where he says, They are opposed contrarily when the universal affirmation is opposed to the universal negation, etc. 2 Particularis vero affirmativa et particularis negativa, non habent proprie loquendo oppositionem, quia oppositio attenditur circa idem subiectum; subiectum autem particularis enunciationis est universale particulariter sumptum, non pro aliquo determinato singulari, sed indeterminate pro quocumque; et ideo, cum de universali particulariter sumpto aliquid affirmatur vel negatur, ipse modus enunciandi non habet quod affirmatio et negatio sint de eodem: quod requiritur ad oppositionem affirmationis et negationis, secundum praemissa. The particular affirmative and particular negative do not have opposition properly speaking, because opposition is concerned with the same subject. But the subject of a particular enunciation is the universal taken particularly, not for a determinate singular but indeterminately for any singular. For this reason, when something is affirmed or denied of the universal particularly taken, the mode of enunciating is not such that the affirmation and negation are of the same thing; hence what is required for the opposition of affirmation and negation is lacking. 3 Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio, quae universale significat, scilicet universaliter, opponitur contradictorie ei, quae non significat universaliter sed particulariter, si una earum sit affirmativa, altera vero sit negativa (sive universalis sit affirmativa et particularis negativa, sive e converso); ut cum dicitur, omnis homo est albus, non omnis homo est albus: hoc enim quod dico, non omnis, ponitur loco signi particularis negativi; unde aequipollet ei quae est, quidam homo non est albus; sicut et nullus, quod idem significat ac si diceretur, non ullus vel non quidam, est signum universale negativum. Unde hae duae, quidam homo est albus (quae est particularis affirmativa), nullus homo est albus (quae est universalis negativa), sunt contradictoriae. First he says that the enunciation that signifies the universal, i.e., universally, is opposed contradictorily to the one that does not signify universally but particularly, if one of them is affirmative and the other negative (whether the universal is affirmative and the particular negative or conversely), as in "Every man is white,” "Not every man is white.” For, the "not every” is used in place of the particular negative sign; consequently, "Not every man is white” is equivalent to "Some man is not white.” In a parallel way "no,” which signifies the same thing as "not any” or "not some,” is the universal negative sign; consequently, the two enunciations, "Some man is white,” which is the particular affirmative, and "No man is white,” which is the universal negative, are contradictories. 4 Cuius ratio est quia contradictio consistit in sola remotione affirmationis per negationem; universalis autem affirmativa removetur per solam negationem particularis, nec aliquid aliud ex necessitate ad hoc exigitur; particularis autem affirmativa removeri non potest nisi per universalem negativam, quia iam dictum est quod particularis affirmativa non proprie opponitur particulari negativae. Unde relinquitur quod universali affirmativae contradictorie opponitur particularis negativa, et particulari affirmativae universalis negativa. The reason for this is that contradiction consists in the mere removal of the affirmation by a negation. Now the universal affirmative is removed by merely the negation of the particular and nothing else is required of necessity; but the particular affirmative can only be removed by the universal negative because, as has already been said, the particular negative is not properly opposed to the particular affirmative. Consequently, the particular negative is opposed contradictorily to the universal affirmative and the universal negative to the particular affirmative. 5 Deinde cum dicit: contrariae vero etc., tangit oppositionem universalium enunciationum; et dicit quod universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa sunt contrariae; sicut, omnis homo est iustus, nullus homo est iustus, quia scilicet universalis negativa non solum removet universalem affirmativam, sed etiam designat extremam distantiam, in quantum negat totum quod affirmatio ponit; et hoc pertinet ad rationem contrarietatis; et ideo particularis affirmativa et negativa se habent sicut medium inter contraria. When he says, They are opposed contrarily when the universal affirmation is opposed to the universal negation, etc., he touches on the opposition of universal enunciations. The universal affirmative and universal negative, he says, are contraries, as in "Every man is just... No man is just”; for the universal negative not only removes the universal affirmative but also designates an extreme of distance between them inasmuch as it denies the whole that the affirmation posits; and this belongs to the notion of contrariety. The particular affirmative and particular negative, for this reason, are related as a mean between contraries. 6 Deinde cum dicit: quocirca has quidem etc., ostendit quomodo se habeant affirmatio et negatio oppositae ad verum et falsum. Et primo, quantum ad contrarias; secundo, quantum ad contradictorias; ibi: quaecumque igiturcontradictiones etc.; tertio, quantum ad ea quae videntur contradictoria, et non sunt; ibi: quaecumque autem in universalibus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quia universalis affirmativa et universalis negativa sunt contrariae, impossibile est quod sint simul verae. Contraria enim mutuo se expellunt. Sed particulares, quae contradictorie opponuntur universalibus contrariis, possunt simul verificari in eodem; sicut, non omnis homo est albus, quae contradictorie opponitur huic, omnis homo est albus, et, quidam homo est albus, quae contradictorie opponitur huic, nullus homo est albus. Et huiusmodi etiam simile invenitur in contrarietate rerum: nam album et nigrum numquam simul esse possunt in eodem, sed remotiones albi et nigri simul possunt esse: potest enim aliquid esse neque album neque nigrum, sicut patet in eo quod est pallidum. Et similiter contrariae enunciationes non possunt simul esse verae, sed earum contradictoriae, a quibus removentur, simul possunt esse verae. He shows how the opposed affirmation and negation are related to truth and falsity when he says, Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that both be at once true, etc. He shows this first in regard to contraries; secondly, in regard to contradictories, where he says, Whenever there are contradictions with respect to universal signifying universally, etc.; thirdly, in regard to those that seem contradictory but are not, where he says, But when the contradictions are of universals not signifying universally, etc. First, he says that because the universal affirmative and universal negative are contraries, it is impossible for them to be simultaneously true, for contraries mutually remove each other. However, the particular enunciations that are contradictorily opposed to the universal contraries, can be verified at the same time in the same thing, for example, "Not every man is white” (which is opposed contradictorily to "Every man is white”) and "Some man is white” (which is opposed contradictorily to "No man is white”). A parallel to this is found in the contrariety of things, for white and black can never be in the same thing at the same time; but the remotion of white and black can be in the same thing at the same time, for a thing may be neither white nor black, as is evident in something yellow. In a similar way, contrary enunciations cannot be at once true, but their contradictories, by which they are removed, can be true simultaneously. 7 Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque igitur contradictiones etc., ostendit qualiter veritas et falsitas se habeant in contradictoriis. Circa quod considerandum est quod, sicut dictum est supra, in contradictoriis negatio non plus facit, nisi quod removet affirmationem. Quod contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quando est altera earum universalis, altera particularis, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quando utraque est singularis: quia tunc negatio ex necessitate refertur ad idem (quod non contingit in particularibus et indefinitis), nec potest se in plus extendere nisi ut removeat affirmationem. Et ideo singularis affirmativa semper contradicit singulari negativae, supposita identitate praedicati et subiecti. Et ideo dicit quod, sive accipiamus contradictionem universalium universaliter, scilicet quantum ad unam earum, sive singularium enunciationum, semper necesse est quod una sit vera et altera falsa. Neque enim contingit esse simul veras aut simul falsas, quia verum nihil aliud est, nisi quando dicitur esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est; falsum autem, quando dicitur esse quod non est, aut non esse quod est, ut patet ex IV metaphysicorum. Then he says, Whenever there are contradictions with respect to universals signifying universally, one must be true and the other false, etc. Here he shows how truth and falsity are related in contradictories. As was said above, in contradictories the negation does no more than remove the affirmation, and this in two ways: in one way when one of them is universal, the other particular; in another way when each is singular. In the case of the singular, the negation is necessarily referred to the same thing—which is not the case in particulars and indefinites—and cannot extend to more than removing the affirmation. Accordingly, the singular affirmative is always contradictory to the singular negative, the identity of subject and predicate being supposed. Aristotle says, therefore, that whether we take the contradiction of universals universally (i.e., one of the universals being taken universally) or the contradiction of singular enunciations, one of them must always be true and the other false. It is not possible for them to be at once true or at once false because to be true is nothing other than to say of what is, that it is, or of what is not that it is not; to be false, to say of what is not, that it is, or of what is, that it is not, as is evident in IV Metaphysicorum [7: 1011b 25]. 8 Deinde cum dicit: quaecumque autem universalium etc., ostendit qualiter se habeant veritas et falsitas in his, quae videntur esse contradictoria, sed non sunt. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo proponit quod intendit; secundo, probat propositum; ibi: si enim turpis non probus etc.; tertio, excludit id quod facere posset dubitationem; ibi: videbitur autem subito inconveniens et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est quod affirmatio et negatio in indefinitis propositionibus videntur contradictorie opponi propter hoc, quod est unum subiectum non determinatum per signum particulare, et ideo videtur affirmatio et negatio esse de eodem. Sed ad hoc removendum philosophus dicit quod quaecumque affirmative et negative dicuntur de universalibus non universaliter sumptis, non semper oportet quod unum sit verum, et aliud sit falsum, sed possunt simul esse vera. Simul enim est verum dicere quod homo est albus, et, homo non est albus, et quod homo est probus, et, homo non est probus. When he says, But when the contradictions are of universals not signifying universally, etc., he shows how truth and falsity are related to enunciations that seem to be contradictory, but are not. First he proposes how they are related; then he proves it where he says, For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful, etc.; finally, he excludes a possible difficulty where he says, At first sight this might seem paradoxical, etc. With respect to the first point we should note that affirmation and negation in indefinite propositions seem to be opposed contradictorily because there is one subject in both of them and it is not determined by a particular sign. Hence, the affirmation and negation seem to be about the same thing. To exclude this, the Philosopher says that in the case of affirmative and negative enunciations of universals not taken universally, one need not always be true and the other false, but they can be at once true. For it is true to say both that "Man is white” and that "Man is not white,” and that "Man is honorable” and "Man is not honorable. 9 In quo quidem, ut Ammonius refert, aliqui Aristoteli contradixerunt ponentes quod indefinita negativa semper sit accipienda pro universali negativa. Et hoc astruebant primo quidem tali ratione: quia indefinita, cum sit indeterminata, se habet in ratione materiae; materia autem secundum se considerata, magis trahitur ad id quod indignius est; dignior autem est universalis affirmativa, quam particularis affirmativa; et ideo indefinitam affirmativam dicunt esse sumendam pro particulari affirmativa: sed negativam universalem, quae totum destruit, dicunt esse indigniorem particulari negativa, quae destruit partem, sicut universalis corruptio peior est quam particularis; et ideo dicunt quod indefinita negativa sumenda est pro universali negativa. Ad quod etiam inducunt quod philosophi, et etiam ipse Aristoteles utitur indefinitis negativis pro universalibus; sicut dicitur in libro Physic. quod non est motus praeter res; et in libro de anima, quod non est sensus praeter quinque. Sed istae rationes non concludunt. Quod enim primo dicitur quod materia secundum se sumpta sumitur pro peiori, verum est secundum sententiam Platonis, qui non distinguebat privationem a materia, non autem est verum secundum Aristotelem, qui dicit in Lib. I Physic. quod malum et turpe et alia huiusmodi ad defectum pertinentia non dicuntur de materia nisi per accidens. Et ideo non oportet quod indefinita semper stet pro peiori. Dato etiam quod indefinita necesse sit sumi pro peiori, non oportet quod sumatur pro universali negativa; quia sicut in genere affirmationis, universalis affirmativa est potior particulari, utpote particularem affirmativam continens; ita etiam in genere negationum universalis negativa potior est. Oportet autem in unoquoque genere considerare id quod est potius in genere illo, non autem id quod est potius simpliciter. Ulterius etiam, dato quod particularis negativa esset potior omnibus modis, non tamen adhuc ratio sequeretur: non enim ideo indefinita affirmativa sumitur pro particulari affirmativa, quia sit indignior, sed quia de universali potest aliquid affirmari ratione suiipsius, vel ratione partis contentae sub eo; unde sufficit ad veritatem eius quod praedicatum uni parti conveniat (quod designatur per signum particulare); et ideo veritas particularis affirmativae sufficit ad veritatem indefinitae affirmativae. Et simili ratione veritas particularis negativae sufficit ad veritatem indefinitae negativae, quia similiter potest aliquid negari de universali vel ratione suiipsius, vel ratione suae partis. Utuntur autem quandoque philosophi indefinitis negativis pro universalibus in his, quae per se removentur ab universalibus; sicut et utuntur indefinitis affirmativis pro universalibus in his, quae per se de universalibus praedicantur. On this point, as Ammonius reports, some men, maintaining that the indefinite negative is always to be taken for the universal negative, have taken a position contradictory to Aristotle’s. They argued their position in the following way. The indefinite, since it is indeterminate, partakes of the nature of matter; but matter considered in itself is regarded as what is less worthy. Now the universal affirmative is more worthy than the particular affirmative and therefore they said that the indefinite affirmative was to be taken for the particular affirmative. But, they said, the universal negative, which destroys the whole, is less worthy than the particular negative, which destroys the part (just as universal corruption is worse than particular corruption); therefore, they said that the indefinite negative was to be taken for the universal negative. They went on to say in support of their position that philosophers, and even Aristotle himself, used indefinite negatives as universals. Thus, in the book Physicorum [III, 1: 200b 32] Aristotle says that there is not movement apart from the thing; and in the book De anima [III, 1: 424b 20], that there are not more than five senses. However, these reasons are not cogent. What they say about matter—that considered in itself it is taken for what is less worthy—is true according to the opinion of Plato, who did not distinguish privation from matter; however, it is not true according to Aristotle, who says in I Physicae [9: 192a 3 & 192a 22], that the evil and ugly and other things of this kind pertaining to defect, are said of matter only accidentally. Therefore the indefinite need not stand always for the more ignoble. Even supposing it is necessary that the indefinite be taken for the less worthy, it ought not to be taken for the universal negative; for just as the universal affirmative is more powerful than the particular in the genus of affirmation, as containing the particular affirmative, so also the universal negative is more powerful in the genus of negations. Now in each genus one must consider what is more powerful in that genus, not what is more powerful simply. Further, if we took the position that the particular negative is more powerful than all other modes, the reasoning still would not follow, for the indefinite affirmative is not taken for the particular affirmative because it is less worthy, but because something can be affirmed of the universal by reason of itself, or by reason of the part contained under it; whence it suffices for the truth of the particular affirmative that the predicate belongs to one part (which is designated by the particular sign); for this reason the truth of the particular affirmative suffices for the truth of the indefinite affirmative. For a similar reason the truth of the particular negative suffices for the truth of the indefinite negative, because in like manner, something can be denied of a universal either by reason of itself, or by reason of its part. Apropos of the examples cited for their argument, it should be noted that philosophers sometimes use indefinite negatives for universals in the case of things that are per se removed from universals; and they use indefinite affirmatives for universals in the case of things that are per se predicated of universals. 10 Deinde cum dicit: si enim turpis est etc., probat propositum per id, quod est ab omnibus concessum. Omnes enim concedunt quod indefinita affirmativa verificatur, si particularis affirmativa sit vera. Contingit autem accipi duas affirmativas indefinitas, quarum una includit negationem alterius, puta cum sunt opposita praedicata: quae quidem oppositio potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum perfectam contrarietatem, sicut turpis, idest inhonestus, opponitur probo, idest honesto, et foedus, idest deformis secundum corpus, opponitur pulchro. Sed per quam rationem ista affirmativa est vera, homo est probus, quodam homine existente probo, per eamdem rationem ista est vera, homo est turpis, quodam homine existente turpi. Sunt ergo istae duae verae simul, homo est probus, homo est turpis; sed ad hanc, homo est turpis, sequitur ista, homo non est probus; ergo istae duae sunt simul verae, homo est probus, homo non est probus: et eadem ratione istae duae, homo est pulcher, homo non est pulcher. Alia autem oppositio attenditur secundum perfectum et imperfectum, sicut moveri opponitur ad motum esse, et fieri ad factum esse: unde ad fieri sequitur non esse eius quod fit in permanentibus, quorum esse est perfectum; secus autem est in successivis, quorum esse est imperfectum. Sic ergo haec est vera, homo est albus, quodam homine existente albo; et pari ratione, quia quidam homo fit albus, haec est vera, homo fit albus; ad quam sequitur, homo non est albus. Ergo istae duae sunt simul verae, homo est albus, homo non est albus. When he says, For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful, etc., he proves what he has proposed by something conceded by everyone, namely, that the indefinite affirmative is verified if the particular affirmative is true. We may take two indefinite affirmatives, one of which includes the negation of the other, as for example when they have opposed predicates. Now this opposition can happen in two ways. It can be according to perfect contrariety, as shameful (i.e., dishonorable) is opposed to worthy (i.e., honorable) and ugly (i.e., deformed in body) is opposed to beautiful. But the reasoning by which the affirmative enunciation, "Man is worthy,” is true, i.e., by some worthy man existing, is the same as the reasoning by which "Man is shameful” is true, i.e., by a shameful man existing. Therefore these two enunciations are at once true, "Man is worthy” and "Man is shameful.” But the enunciation, "Man is not worthy,” follows upon "Man is shameful.” Therefore the two enunciations, " Man is worthy,” and "Man is not worthy,” are at once true; and by the same reasoning these two, "Man is beautiful” and "Man is not beautiful.” The other opposition is according to the complete and incomplete, as to be in movement is opposed to to have been moved, and becoming to to have become. Whence the non-being of that which is coming to be in permanent things, whose being is complete, follows upon the becoming but this is not so in successive things, whose being is incomplete. Thus, "Man is white” is true by the fact that a white man exists; by the same reasoning, because a man is becoming white, the enunciation "Man is becoming white” is true, upon which follows, "Man is not white.” Therefore, the two enunciations, "Man is white” and "Man is not white” are at once true. 11 Deinde cum dicit: videbitur autem etc., excludit id quod faceret dubitationem circa praedicta; et dicit quod subito, id est primo aspectu videtur hoc esse inconveniens, quod dictum est; quia hoc quod dico, homo non est albus, videtur idem significare cum hoc quod est, nullus homo est albus. Sed ipse hoc removet dicens quod neque idem significant neque ex necessitate sunt simul vera, sicut ex praedictis manifestum est. Then when he says, At first sight this might seem paradoxical, etc., he excludes what might present a difficulty in relation to what has been said. At first sight, he says, what has been stated seems to be inconsistent; for "Man is not white” seems to signify the same thing as "No man is white.” But he rejects this when he says that they neither signify the same thing, nor are they at once true necessarily, as is evident from what has been said. XII. 1. Postquam philosophus distinxit diversos modos oppositionum in enunciationibus, nunc intendit ostendere quod uni affirmationi una negatio opponitur, et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quod uni affirmationi una negatio opponitur; secundo, ostendit quae sit una affirmatio vel negatio, ibi: una autem affirmatio et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: hoc enim idem etc.; tertio, epilogat quae dicta sunt; ibi: manifestum est ergo et cetera. Having distinguished the diverse modes of opposition in enunciations, the Philosopher now proposes to show that there is one negation opposed to one affirmation. First he shows that there is one negation opposed to one affirmation; then he manifests what one affirmation and negation are, where he says, Affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, etc. With respect to what he intends to do he first proposes the point; then he manifests it where he says, for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirms, etc. Finally, he gives a summary of what has been said, where he says, We have said that there is one negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, etc.  2 Dicit ergo primo, manifestum esse quod unius affirmationis est una negatio sola. Et hoc quidem fuit necessarium hic dicere: quia cum posuerit plura oppositionum genera, videbatur quod uni affirmationi duae negationes opponerentur; sicut huic affirmativae, omnis homo est albus, videtur, secundum praedicta, haec negativa opponi, nullus homo est albus, et haec, quidam homo non est albus. Sed si quis recte consideret huius affirmativae, omnis homo est albus, negativa est sola ista, quidam homo non est albus, quae solummodo removet ipsam, ut patet ex sua aequipollenti, quae est, non omnis homo est albus. Universalis vero negativa includit quidem in suo intellectu negationem universalis affirmativae, in quantum includit particularem negativam, sed supra hoc aliquid addit, in quantum scilicet importat non solum remotionem universalitatis, sed removet quamlibet partem eius. Et sic patet quod sola una est negatio universalis affirmationis: et idem apparet in aliis. He says, then, that it is evident that there is only one negation of one affirmation. It is necessary to make this point here because he has posited many kinds of opposition and it might appear that two negations are opposed to one affirmation. Thus it might seem that the negative enunciations, "No man is white” and "Some man is not white” are both opposed to the affirmative enunciation, "Every man is white.” But if one carefully examines what has been said it will be evident that the only negative opposed to "Every man is white” is "Some man is not white,” which merely removes it, as is clear from its equivalent, "Not every man is white.” It is true that the negation of the universal affirmative is included in the understanding of the universal negative inasmuch as the universal negative includes the particular negative, but the universal negative adds something over and beyond this inasmuch as it not only brings about the removal of universality but removes every part of it. Thus it is evident that there is only one negation of a universal affirmation, and the same thing is evident in the others. 3 Deinde cum dicit: hoc enim etc., manifestat propositum: et primo, per rationem; secundo, per exempla; ibi: dico autem, ut est Socrates albus. Ratio autem sumitur ex hoc, quod supra dictum est quod negatio opponitur affirmationi, quae est eiusdem de eodem: ex quo hic accipitur quod oportet negationem negare illud idem praedicatum, quod affirmatio affirmavit et de eodem subiecto, sive illud subiectum sit aliquid singulare, sive aliquid universale, vel universaliter, vel non universaliter sumptum; sed hoc non contingit fieri nisi uno modo, ita scilicet ut negatio neget id quod affirmatio posuit, et nihil aliud; ergo uni affirmationi opponitur una sola negatio. When he says, for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirms, etc., he manifests what he has said: first, from reason; secondly, by example. The reasoning is taken from what has already been said, namely, that negation is opposed to affirmation when the enunciations are of the same thing of the same subject. Here he says that the negation must deny the same predicate the affirmation affirms, and of the same subject, whether that subject he something singular or something universal, either taken universally or not taken universally. But this can only be done in one way, i.e., when the negation denies what the affirmation posits, and nothing else. Therefore there is only one negation opposed to one affirmation. 4 Deinde cum dicit: dico autem, ut est etc., manifestat propositum per exempla. Et primo, in singularibus: huic enim affirmationi, Socrates est albus, haec sola opponitur, Socrates non est albus, tanquam eius propria negatio. Si vero esset aliud praedicatum vel aliud subiectum, non esset negatio opposita, sed omnino diversa; sicut ista, Socrates non est musicus, non opponitur ei quae est, Socrates est albus; neque etiam illa quae est, Plato est albus, huic quae est, Socrates non est albus. Secundo, manifestat idem quando subiectum affirmationis est universale universaliter sumptum; sicut huic affirmationi, omnis homo est albus, opponitur sicut propria eius negatio, non omnis homo est albus, quae aequipollet particulari negativae. Tertio, ponit exemplum quando affirmationis subiectum est universale particulariter sumptum: et dicit quod huic affirmationi, aliquis homo est albus, opponitur tanquam eius propria negatio, nullus homo est albus. Nam nullus dicitur, quasi non ullus, idest, non aliquis. Quarto, ponit exemplum quando affirmationis subiectum est universale indefinite sumptum et dicit quod isti affirmationi, homo est albus, opponitur tanquam propria eius negatio illa quae est, non est homo albus. In manifesting this by example, where he says, For example, the negation of "Socrates is white,” etc., he first takes examples of singulars. Thus, "Socrates is not white” is the proper negation opposed to "Socrates is white.” If there were another predicate or another subject, it would not be the opposed negation, but wholly different. For example, "Socrates is not musical” is not opposed to "Socrates is white,” nor is "Plato is white” opposed to "Socrates is not white.” Then he manifests the same thing in an affirmation with a universal universally taken as the subject. Thus, "Not every man is white,” which is equivalent to the particular negative, is the proper negation opposed to the affirmation, "Every man is white.” Thirdly, he gives an example in which the subject of the affirmation is a universal taken particularly. The proper negation opposed to the affirmation "Some man is white” is "No man is white,” for to say "no” is to say "not any,” i.e., "not some.” Finally, he gives as an example enunciations in which the subject of the affirmation is the universal taken indefinitely; "Man is not white” is the proper negation opposed to the affirmation "Man is white.” 5 Sed videtur hoc esse contra id, quod supra dictum est quod negativa indefinita verificatur simul cum indefinita affirmativa; negatio autem non potest verificari simul cum sua opposita affirmatione, quia non contingit de eodem affirmare et negare. Sed ad hoc dicendum quod oportet quod hic dicitur intelligi quando negatio ad idem refertur quod affirmatio continebat; et hoc potest esse dupliciter: uno modo, quando affirmatur aliquid inesse homini ratione sui ipsius (quod est per se de eodem praedicari), et hoc ipsum negatio negat; alio modo, quando aliquid affirmatur de universali ratione sui singularis, et pro eodem de eo negatur. The last example used to manifest his point seems to be contrary to what he has already said, namely, that the indefinite negative and the indefinite affirmative can be simultaneously verified; but a negation and its opposite affirmation cannot be simultaneously verified, since it is not possible to affirm and deny of the same subject. But what Aristotle is saying here must be understood of the negation when it is referred to the same thing the affirmation contained, and this is possible in two ways: in one way, when something is affirmed to belong to man by reason of what he is (which is per se to be predicated of the same thing), and this very thing the negation denies; secondly, when something is affirmed of the universal by reason of its singular, and the same thing is denied of it. 6 Deinde cum dicit: quod igitur una affirmatio etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, et concludit manifestum esse ex praedictis quod uni affirmationi opponitur una negatio; et quod oppositarum affirmationum et negationum aliae sunt contrariae, aliae contradictoriae; et dictum est quae sint utraeque. Tacet autem de subcontrariis, quia non sunt recte oppositae, ut supra dictum est. Dictum est etiam quod non omnis contradictio est vera vel falsa; et sumitur hic large contradictio pro qualicumque oppositione affirmationis et negationis: nam in his quae sunt vere contradictoriae semper una est vera, et altera falsa. Quare autem in quibusdam oppositis hoc non verificetur, dictum est supra; quia scilicet quaedam non sunt contradictoriae, sed contrariae, quae possunt simul esse falsae. Contingit etiam affirmationem et negationem non proprie opponi; et ideo contingit eas esse veras simul. Dictum est autem quando altera semper est vera, altera autem falsa, quia scilicet in his quae vere sunt contradictoria. He concludes by summarizing what has been said: We have said that there is one negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, etc. He considers it evident from what has been said that one negation is opposed to one affirmation; and that of opposite affirmations and negations, one kind are contraries, the other contradictories; and that what each kind is has been stated. He does not speak of subcontraries because it is not accurate to say that they are opposites, as was said above. He also says here that it has been shown that not every contradiction is true or false, "contradiction” being taken here broadly for any kind of opposition of affirmation and negation; for in enunciations that are truly contradictory one is always true and the other false. The reason why this may not be verified in some kinds of opposites has already been stated, namely, because some are not contradictories but contraries, and these can be false at the same time. It is also possible for affirmation and negation not to be properly opposed and consequently to be true at the same time. It has been stated, however, when one is always true and the other false, namely, in those that are truly contradictories. 7 Deinde cum dicit: una autem affirmatio etc., ostendit quae sit affirmatio vel negatio una. Quod quidem iam supra dixerat, ubi habitum est quod una est enunciatio, quae unum significat; sed quia enunciatio, in qua aliquid praedicatur de aliquo universali universaliter vel non universaliter, multa sub se continet, intendit ostendere quod per hoc non impeditur unitas enunciationis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quod unitas enunciationis non impeditur per multitudinem, quae continetur sub universali, cuius ratio una est; secundo, ostendit quod impeditur unitas enunciationis per multitudinem, quae continetur sub sola nominis unitate; ibi: si vero duobus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod una est affirmatio vel negatio cum unum significatur de uno, sive illud unum quod subiicitur sit universale universaliter sumptum sive non sit aliquid tale, sed sit universale particulariter sumptum vel indefinite, aut etiam si subiectum sit singulare. Et exemplificat de diversis sicut universalis ista affirmativa est una, omnis homo est albus; et similiter particularis negativa quae est eius negatio, scilicet non est omnis homo albus. Et subdit alia exempla, quae sunt manifesta. In fine autem apponit quamdam conditionem, quae requiritur ad hoc quod quaelibet harum sit una, si scilicet album, quod est praedicatum, significat unum: nam sola multitudo praedicati impediret unitatem enunciationis. Ideo autem universalis propositio una est, quamvis sub se multitudinem singularium comprehendat, quia praedicatum non attribuitur multis singularibus, secundum quod sunt in se divisa, sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno communi. The Philosopher explains what one affirmation or negation is where he says, Affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, etc. He did in fact state this earlier when he said that an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing, but because the enunciation in which something is predicated of a universal, either universally or not universally, contains under it many things, he is going to show here that unity of enunciation is not impeded by this. First he shows that unity of enunciation is not impeded by the multitude contained under the universal, whose notion is one. Then he shows that unity of enunciation is impeded by the multitude contained under the unity of a name only, where he says, But if one name is imposed for two things, etc. He says, then, that an affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, whether the one thing that is subjected be a universal taken universally, or not, i.e., it may be a universal taken particularly or indefinitely, or even a singular. He gives examples of the differ6nt kinds: such as, the universal affirmative "Every man is white” and the particular negative, which is its negation, "Not every man is white,” each of which is one. There are other examples which are evident. At the end he states a condition that is required for any of them to be one, i.e., provided the "white,” which is the predicate, signifies one thing; for a multiple predicate with a subject signifying one thing would also impede the unity of an enunciation. The universal proposition is therefore one, even though it comprehends a multitude of singulars under it, for the predicate is not attributed to many singulars according as each is divided from the other, but according as they are united in one common thing. 8 Deinde cum dicit: si vero duobus etc., ostendit quod sola unitas nominis non sufficit ad unitatem enunciationis. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, exemplificat; ibi: ut si quis ponat etc.; tertio, probat; ibi: nihil enim differt etc.; quarto, infert corollarium ex dictis; ibi: quare nec in his et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod si unum nomen imponatur duabus rebus, ex quibus non fit unum, non est affirmatio una. Quod autem dicit, ex quibus non fit unum, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ad excludendum hoc quod multa continentur sub uno universali, sicut homo et equus sub animali: hoc enim nomen animal significat utrumque, non secundum quod sunt multa et differentia ad invicem, sed secundum quod uniuntur in natura generis. Alio modo, et melius, ad excludendum hoc quod ex multis partibus fit unum, sive sint partes rationis, sicut sunt genus et differentia, quae sunt partes definitionis: sive sint partes integrales alicuius compositi, sicut ex lapidibus et lignis fit domus. Si ergo sit tale praedicatum quod attribuatur rei, requiritur ad unitatem enunciationis quod illa multa quae significantur, concurrant in unum secundum aliquem dictorum modorum; unde non sufficeret sola unitas vocis. Si vero sit tale praedicatum quod referatur ad vocem, sufficiet unitas vocis; ut si dicam, canis est nomen. When he says, But if one name is imposed for two things, he shows that unity of name alone does not suffice for unity of an enunciation. He first makes the point; secondly, he gives an example, where he says, if someone were to impose the name "cloak” on horse and man, etc.; thirdly, he proves it where he says, For this is no different from saying "Horse and man is white,” etc.; finally, he infers a corollary from what has been said, where he says, Consequently, in such enunciations, it is not necessary, etc. If one name is imposed for two things, he says, from which one thing is not formed, there is not one affirmation. The from which one thing is not formed can be understood in two ways. It can be understood as excluding the many that are contained under one universal, as man and horse under animal, for the name "animal” signifies both,.not as they are many and different from each other but as they are united in the nature of the genus. It can also be understood—and this would be more accurate—as excluding the many parts from which something one is formed, whether the parts of the notion as known, as the genus and the difference, which are parts of the definition, or the integral parts of some composite, as the stones and wood from which a house is made. If, then, there is such a predicate which is attributed to a thing, the many that are signified must concur in one thing according to some of the modes mentioned in order that there be one enunciation; unity of vocal sound alone would not suffice. However, if there is such a predicate which is referred to vocal sound, unity of vocal sound would suffice, as in "‘Dog’is a name.” 9 Deinde cum dicit: ut si quis etc., exemplificat quod dictum est, ut si aliquis hoc nomen tunica imponat ad significandum hominem et equum: et sic, si dicam, tunica est alba, non est affirmatio una, neque negatio una. Deinde cum dicit: nihil enim differt etc., probat quod dixerat tali ratione. Si tunica significat hominem et equum, nihil differt si dicatur, tunica est alba, aut si dicatur, homo est albus, et, equus est albus; sed istae, homo est albus, et equus est albus, significant multa et sunt plures enunciationes; ergo etiam ista, tunica est alba, multa significat. Et hoc si significet hominem et equum ut res diversas: si vero significet hominem et equum ut componentia unam rem, nihil significat, quia non est aliqua res quae componatur ex homine et equo. Quod autem dicit quod non differt dicere, tunica est alba, et, homo est albus, et, equus est albus, non est intelligendum quantum ad veritatem et falsitatem. Nam haec copulativa, homo est albus et equus est albus, non potest esse vera nisi utraque pars sit vera: sed haec, tunica est alba, praedicta positione facta, potest esse vera etiam altera existente falsa; alioquin non oporteret distinguere multiplices propositiones ad solvendum rationes sophisticas. Sed hoc est intelligendum quantum ad unitatem et multiplicitatem. Nam sicut cum dicitur, homo est albus et equus est albus, non invenitur aliqua una res cui attribuatur praedicatum; ita etiam nec cum dicitur, tunica est alba. He gives an example of what he means where he says, For example, if someone were to impose the name "cloak,” etc. That is, if someone were to impose the name "cloak” to signify man and horse and then said, "Cloak is white,” there would not be one affirmation, nor would there be one negation. He proves this where he says, For this is no different from saying, etc. His argument is as follows. If "cloak” signifies man and horse there is no difference between saying "Cloak is white” and saying, "Man is white, and, Horse is white.” But "Man is white, and, horse is white” signify many and are many enunciations. Therefore, the enunciation, "Cloak is white,” signifies many things. This is the case if "cloak” signifies man and horse as diverse things; but if it signifies man and horse as one thing, it signifies nothing, for there is not any thing composed of man and horse. When Aristotle says that there is no difference between saying "Cloak is white” and, "Man is white, and, horse is white,” it is not to be understood with respect to truth and falsity. For the copulative enunciation "Man is white and horse is white” cannot be true unless each part is true; but the enunciation "Cloak is white,” under the condition given, can be true even when one is false; otherwise it would not be necessary to distinguish multiple propositions to solve sophistic arguments. Rather, it is to be understood with respect to unity and multiplicity, for just as in "Man is white and horse is white” there is not some one thing to which the predicate is attributed, so also in "Cloak is white.” 10 Deinde cum dicit: quare nec in his etc., concludit ex praemissis quod nec in his affirmationibus et negationibus, quae utuntur subiecto aequivoco, semper oportet unam esse veram et aliam falsam, quia scilicet negatio potest aliud negare quam affirmatio affirmet. When he says, Consequently, it is not necessary in such enunciations, etc., he concludes from what has been said that in affirmations and negations that use an equivocal subject, one need not always be true and the other false since the negation may deny something other than the affirmation affirms. XIII. 1. Postquam philosophus determinavit de oppositione enunciationum et ostendit quomodo dividunt verum et falsum oppositae enunciationes; hic inquirit de quodam quod poterat esse dubium, utrum scilicet id quod dictum est similiter inveniatur in omnibus enunciationibus vel non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, proponit dissimilitudinem; secundo, probat eam; ibi: nam si omnis affirmatio et cetera. Now that he, has treated opposition of enunciations and has shown the way in which opposed enunciations divide truth and falsity, the Philosopher inquires about a question that might arise, namely, whether what has been said is found to be so in all enunciations or not. And first he proposes a dissimilarity in enunciations with regard to dividing truth and falsity, then proves it where he says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc. Circa primum considerandum est quod philosophus in praemissis triplicem divisionem enunciationum assignavit, quarum prima fuit secundum unitatem enunciationis, prout scilicet enunciatio est una simpliciter vel coniunctione una; secunda fuit secundum qualitatem, prout scilicet enunciatio est affirmativa vel negativa; tertia fuit secundum quantitatem, utpote quod enunciatio quaedam est universalis, quaedam particularis, quaedam indefinita et quaedam singularis. In relation to the dissimilarity which he intends to prove we should recall that the Philosopher has given three divisions of the enunciation. The first was in relation to the unity of enunciation, and according to this it is divided into one simply and one by conjunction; the second was in relation to quality, and according to this it is divided into affirmative and negative; the third was in relation to quantity, and according to this it is either universal, particular, indefinite, or singular. 3 Tangitur autem hic quarta divisio enunciationum secundum tempus. Nam quaedam est de praesenti, quaedam de praeterito, quaedam de futuro; et haec etiam divisio potest accipi ex his quae supra dicta sunt: dictum est enim supra quod necesse est omnem enunciationem esse ex verbo vel ex casu verbi; verbum autem est quod consignificat praesens tempus; casus autem verbi sunt, qui consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum. Potest autem accipi quinta divisio enunciationum secundum materiam, quae quidem divisio attenditur secundum habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum: nam si praedicatum per se insit subiecto, dicetur esse enunciatio in materia necessaria vel naturali; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, vel, homo est risibile. Si vero praedicatum per se repugnet subiecto quasi excludens rationem ipsius, dicetur enunciatio esse in materia impossibili sive remota; ut cum dicitur, homo est asinus. Si vero medio modo se habeat praedicatum ad subiectum, ut scilicet nec per se repugnet subiecto, nec per se insit, dicetur enunciatio esse in materia possibili sive contingenti. Here he treats of a fourth division of enunciation, a division according to time. Some enunciations are about the present, some about the past, some about the future. This division could be seen in what Aristotle has already said, namely, that every enunciation must have a verb or a mode of a verb, the verb being that which signifies the present time, the modes with past or future time. In addition, a fifth division of the enunciation can be made, a division in regard to matter. It is taken from the relationship of the predicate to the subject. If the predicate is per se in the subject, it will be said to be an enunciation in necessary or natural matter. Examples of this are "Man is an animal” and "Man is risible.” If the predicate is per se repugnant to the subject, as excluding the notion of it, it is said to be an enunciation in impossible or remote matter; for example, the enunciation "Man is an ass.” If the predicate is related to the subject in a way midway between these two, being neither per se repugnant to the subject nor per se in it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or contingent matter. 4 His igitur enunciationum differentiis consideratis, non similiter se habet iudicium de veritate et falsitate in omnibus. Unde philosophus dicit, ex praemissis concludens, quod in his quae sunt, idest in propositionibus de praesenti, et in his quae facta sunt, idest in enunciationibus de praeterito, necesse est quod affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera vel falsa. Diversificatur tamen hoc, secundum diversam quantitatem enunciationis; nam in enunciationibus, in quibus de universalibus subiectis aliquid universaliter praedicatur, necesse est quod semper una sit vera, scilicet affirmativa vel negativa, et altera falsa, quae scilicet ei opponitur. Dictum est enim supra quod negatio enunciationis universalis in qua aliquid universaliter praedicatur, est negativa non universalis, sed particularis, et e converso universalis negativa non est directe negatio universalis affirmativae, sed particularis; et sic oportet, secundum praedicta, quod semper una earum sit vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia. Et eadem ratio est in enunciationibus singularibus, quae etiam contradictorie opponuntur, ut supra habitum est. Sed in enunciationibus, in quibus aliquid praedicatur de universali non universaliter, non est necesse quod semper una sit vera et altera sit falsa, qui possunt ambae esse simul verae, ut supra ostensum est. Given these differences of enunciations, the judgment of truth and falsity is not alike in all. Accordingly, the Philosopher says, as a conclusion from what has been established: In enunciations about that which is, i.e., in propositions about the present, or has taken place, i.e., in enunciations about the past, the affirmation or the negation must be determinately true or false. However, this differs according to the different quantity of the enunciations. In enunciations in which something is universally predicated of universal subjects, one must always be true, either the affirmative or negative, and the other false, i.e., the one opposed to it. For as was said above, the negation of a universal enunciation in which something is predicated universally, is not the universal negative, but the particular negative, and conversely, the universal negative is not directly the negation of the universal affirmative, but the particular negative. According to the foregoing, then, one of these must always be true and the other false in any matter whatever. And the same is the case in singular enunciations, which are also opposed contradictorily. However, in enunciations in which something is predicated of a universal but not universally, it is not necessary that one always be true and the other false, for both could be at once true. 5 Et hoc quidem ita se habet quantum ad propositiones, quae sunt de praeterito vel de praesenti: sed si accipiamus enunciationes, quae sunt de futuro, etiam similiter se habent quantum ad oppositiones, quae sunt de universalibus vel universaliter vel non universaliter sumptis. Nam in materia necessaria omnes affirmativae determinate sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut in praeteritis et praesentibus; negativae vero falsae. In materia autem impossibili, e contrario. In contingenti vero universales sunt falsae et particulares sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut in praeteritis et praesentibus. In indefinitis autem, utraque simul est vera in futuris sicut in praesentibus vel praeteritis. The case as it was just stated has to do with propositions about the past or the present. Enunciations about the future that are of universals taken either universally or not universally are also related in the same way in regard to oppositions. In necessary matter all affirmative enunciations are determinately true; this holds for enunciations in future time as well as in past and present time; and negative enunciations are determinately false. In impossible matter the contrary is the case. In contingent matter, however, universal enunciations are false and particular enunciations true. This is the case in enunciations about the future as well as those of the past and present. In indefinite enunciations, both are at once true in future enunciations as well as in those of the present or the past. 6 Sed in singularibus et futuris est quaedam dissimilitudo. Nam in praeteritis et praesentibus necesse est quod altera oppositarum determinate sit vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia; sed in singularibus quae sunt de futuro hoc non est necesse, quod una determinate sit vera et altera falsa. Et hoc quidem dicitur quantum ad materiam contingentem: nam quantum ad materiam necessariam et impossibilem similis ratio est in futuris singularibus, sicut in praesentibus et praeteritis. Nec tamen Aristoteles mentionem fecit de materia contingenti, quia illa proprie ad singularia pertinent quae contingenter eveniunt, quae autem per se insunt vel repugnant, attribuuntur singularibus secundum universalium rationes. Circa hoc igitur versatur tota praesens intentio: utrum in enunciationibus singularibus de futuro in materia contingenti necesse sit quod determinate una oppositarum sit vera et altera falsa. In singular future enunciations, however, there is a difference. In past and present singular enunciations, one of the opposites must be determinately true and the other false in any matter whatsoever, but in singulars that are about the future, it is not necessary that one be determinately true and the other false. This holds with respect to contingent matter; with respect to necessary and impossible matter the rule is the same as in enunciations about the present and the past. Aristotle has not mentioned contingent matter until now because those things that take place contingently pertain exclusively to singulars, whereas those that per se belong or are repugnant are attributed to singulars according to the notions of their universals. Aristotle is therefore wholly concerned here with this question: whether in singular enunciations about the future in contingent matter it is necessary that one of the opposites be determinately true and the other determinately false. 7 Deinde cum dicit: nam si omnis affirmatio etc., probat praemissam differentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, probat propositum ducendo ad inconveniens; secundo, ostendit illa esse impossibilia quae sequuntur; ibi: quare ergo contingunt inconvenientia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; secundo, ostendit quod non potest esse quod utraque veritate careat; ibi: at vero nequequoniam et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes, in quarum prima ponit quamdam consequentiam, scilicet quod si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate est vera vel falsa ita in singularibus et futuris sicut in aliis, consequens est quod omnia necesse sit vel determinate esse vel non esse. Deinde cum dicit: quare si hic quidem etc. vel, si itaque hic quidem, ut habetur in Graeco, probat consequentiam praedictam. Ponamus enim quod sint duo homines, quorum unus dicat aliquid esse futurum, puta quod Socrates curret, alius vero dicat hoc idem ipsum non esse futurum; supposita praemissa positione, scilicet quod in singularibus et futuris contingit alteram esse veram, scilicet vel affirmativam vel negativam, sequetur quod necesse sit quod alter eorum verum dicat, non autem uterque: quia non potest esse quod in singularibus propositionibus futuris utraque sit simul vera, scilicet affirmativa et negativa: sed hoc habet locum solum in indefinitis. Ex hoc autem quod necesse est alterum eorum verum dicere, sequitur quod necesse sit determinate vel esse vel non esse. Et hoc probat consequenter: quia ista duo se convertibiliter consequuntur, scilicet quod verum sit id quod dicitur, et quod ita sit in re. Et hoc est quod manifestat consequenter dicens quod si verum est dicere quod album sit, de necessitate sequitur quod ita sit in re; et si verum est negare, ex necessitate sequitur quod ita non sit. Et e converso: quia si ita est in re vel non est, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit verum affirmare vel negare. Et eadem etiam convertibilitas apparet in falso: quia, si aliquis mentitur falsum dicens, ex necessitate sequitur quod non ita sit in re, sicut ipse affirmat vel negat; et e converso, si non est ita in re sicut ipse affirmat vel negat, sequitur quod affirmans vel negans mentiatur. He proves that there is a difference between these opposites and the others where he says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc. First he proves it by showing that the opposite position leads to what is unlikely; secondly, he shows that what follows from this position is impossible, where he says, These absurd consequences and others like them, etc. In his proof he first shows that in enunciations about future singulars, truth cannot always be determinately attributed to one of the opposites, and then he shows that both cannot lack truth, where he says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true, etc. He gives two arguments with respect to the first point. In the first of these he states a certain consequence, namely, that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true or false, in future singulars as in the others, it follows that all things must determinately be or not be. He proves this consequence where he says, wherefore, if one person says, etc.,or as it is in the Greek, for if one person says something will be, etc.”’ Let us suppose, he argues, that there are two men, one of whom says something will take place in the future, for instance, that Socrates will run, and the other says this same thing will not take place. If the foregoing position is supposed—that in singular future enunciations one of them will be true, either the affirmative or the negative it would follow that only one of them is saying what is true, because in singular future propositions both cannot be at once true, that is, both the affirmative and the negative. This occurs only in indefinite propositions. Moreover, from the fact that one of them must be speaking the truth, it follows that it must determinately be or not be. Then he proves this from the fact that these two follow upon each other convertibly, namely, truth is that which is said and which is so in reality. And this is what he manifests when he says that, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it necessarily follows that it is so in reality; and if it is true to deny it, it necessarily follows that it is not so. And conversely, for if it is so in reality, or is not, it necessarily follows that it is true to affirm or deny it. The same convertibility is also evident in what is false, for if someone lies, saying what is false, it necessarily follows that in reality it is not as he affirms or denies it to be; and conversely, if it is not in reality as he affirms or denies it to be, it follows that in affirming or denying it he lies. 8. Est ergo processus huius rationis talis. Si necesse est quod omnis affirmatio vel negatio in singularibus et futuris sit vera vel falsa, necesse est quod omnis affirmans vel negans determinate dicat verum vel falsum. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod omne necesse sit esse vel non esse. Ergo, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera, necesse est omnia determinate esse vel non esse. Ex hoc concludit ulterius quod omnia sint ex necessitate. Per quod triplex genus contingentium excluditur. The process of Aristotle’s reasoning is as follows. If it is necessary that every affirmation or negation about future singulars is true or false, it is necessary that everyone who affirms or denies, determinately says what is true or false. From this it follows that it is necessary that everything be or not be. Therefore, if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, it is necessary that everything determinately be or not be. From this he concludes further that all things are of necessity. This would exclude the three kinds of contingent things. 9 Quaedam enim contingunt ut in paucioribus, quae accidunt a casu vel fortuna. Quaedam vero se habent ad utrumlibet, quia scilicet non magis se habent ad unam partem, quam ad aliam, et ista procedunt ex electione. Quaedam vero eveniunt ut in pluribus; sicut hominem canescere in senectute, quod causatur ex natura. Si autem omnia ex necessitate evenirent, nihil horum contingentium esset. Et ideo dicit nihil est quantum ad ipsam permanentiam eorum quae permanent contingenter; neque fit quantum ad productionem eorum quae contingenter causantur; nec casu quantum ad ea quae sunt in minori parte, sive in paucioribus; nec utrumlibet quantum ad ea quae se habent aequaliter ad utrumque, scilicet esse vel non esse, et ad neutrum horum sunt determinata: quod significat cum subdit, nec erit, nec non erit. De eo enim quod est magis determinatum ad unam partem possumus determinate verum dicere quod hoc erit vel non erit, sicut medicus de convalescente vere dicit, iste sanabitur, licet forte ex aliquo accidente eius sanitas impediatur. Unde et philosophus dicit in II de generatione quod futurus quis incedere, non incedet. De eo enim qui habet propositum determinatum ad incedendum, vere potest dici quod ipse incedet, licet per aliquod accidens impediatur eius incessus. Sed eius quod est ad utrumlibet proprium est quod, quia non determinatur magis ad unum quam ad alterum, non possit de eo determinate dici, neque quod erit, neque quod non erit. Quomodo autem sequatur quod nihil sit ad utrumlibet ex praemissa hypothesi, manifestat subdens quod, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera, oportet quod vel ille qui affirmat vel ille qui negat dicat verum; et sic tollitur id quod est ad utrumlibet: quia, si esse aliquid ad utrumlibet, similiter se haberet ad hoc quod fieret vel non fieret, et non magis ad unum quam ad alterum. Est autem considerandum quod philosophus non excludit hic expresse contingens quod est ut in pluribus, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tale contingens non excludit quin altera oppositarum enunciationum determinate sit vera et altera falsa, ut dictum est. Secundo, quia remoto contingenti quod est in paucioribus, quod a casu accidit, removetur per consequens contingens quod est ut in pluribus: nihil enim differt id quod est in pluribus ab eo quod est in paucioribus, nisi quod deficit in minori parte. The three kinds of contingent things are these: some, the ones that happen by chance or fortune, happen infrequently; others are in determinate to either of two alternatives because they are not inclined more to one part than to another, and these proceed from choice; still others occur for the most part, for example, men becoming gray in old age, which is caused by nature. If, however, everything took place of necessity, there would be none of these kinds of contingent things. Therefore, Aristotle says, nothing is with respect to the very permanence of those things that are contingently permanent; or takes place with respect to those that are caused contingently; by chance with respect to those that take place for the least part, or infrequently; or is indeterminate to either of two alternatives with respect to those that are related equally to either of two, i.e., to being or to nonbeing, and are determined to neither of these, which he signifies when he adds, or will be, or will not be. For of that which is more determined to one part we can truly and determinately say that it will be or will not be, as for example, the physician truly says of the convalescent, "He will be restored to health,” although perchance by some accident his cure may be impeded. The Philosopher makes this same point when he says in II De generatione, "A man about to walk might not walk.” For it can be truly said of someone who has the determined intention to walk that he will walk, although by some accident his walking might be impeded. But in the case of that which is indeterminate to either of two, it cannot determinately be said of it either that it will be or that it will not be, for it is proper to it not to be determined more to one than to another. Then he manifests how it follows from the foregoing hypothesis that nothing is indeterminate to either of two when he adds that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, then either the one who affirms or the one who denies must be speaking the truth. That which is indeterminate to either of two is therefore destroyed, for if there is something indeterminate to either of two, it would be related alike to taking place or not taking place, and no more to one than to the other. It should be, noted that the Philosopher is not expressly excluding the contingent that is for the most part. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, this kind of contingency still excludes the determinate truth of one of the opposite enunciations and the falsity of the other, as has been said. Secondly, when the contingent that is infrequent, i.e., that which takes place by chance, is removed, the contingent that is for the most part is removed as a consequence, for there is no difference between that which is for the most part and that which is infrequent except that the former fails for the least part. 10 Deinde cum dicit: amplius si est album etc., ponit secundam rationem ad ostendendum praedictam dissimilitudinem, ducendo ad impossibile. Si enim similiter se habet veritas et falsitas in praesentibus et futuris, sequitur ut quidquid verum est de praesenti, etiam fuerit verum de futuro, eo modo quo est verum de praesenti. Sed determinate nunc est verum dicere de aliquo singulari quod est album; ergo primo, idest antequam illud fieret album, erat verum dicere quoniam hoc erit album. Sed eadem ratio videtur esse in propinquo et in remoto; ergo si ante unum diem verum fuit dicere quod hoc erit album, sequitur quod semper fuit verum dicere de quolibet eorum, quae facta sunt, quod erit. Si autem semper est verum dicere de praesenti quoniam est, vel de futuro quoniam erit, non potest hoc non esse vel non futurum esse. Cuius consequentiae ratio patet, quia ista duo sunt incompossibilia, quod aliquid vere dicatur esse, et quod non sit. Nam hoc includitur in significatione veri, ut sit id quod dicitur. Si ergo ponitur verum esse id quod dicitur de praesenti vel de futuro, non potest esse quin illud sit praesens vel futurum. Sed quod non potest non fieri idem significat cum eo quod est impossibile non fieri. Et quod impossibile est non fieri idem significat cum eo quod est necesse fieri, ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Sequitur ergo ex praemissis quod omnia, quae futura sunt, necesse est fieri. Ex quo sequitur ulterius, quod nihil sit neque ad utrumlibet neque a casu, quia illud quod accidit a casu non est ex necessitate, sed ut in paucioribus; hoc autem relinquit pro inconvenienti; ergo et primum est falsum, scilicet quod omne quod est verum esse, verum fuerit determinate dicere esse futurum. When he says, Furthermore, on such a supposition, if something is now white, it was true to say formerly that it will be white, etc., he gives a second argument to show the dissimilarity of enunciations about future singulars. This argument is by reduction to the impossible. If truth and falsity. are related in like manner in present and in future enunciations, it follows that whatever is true of the present was also true of the future, in the way in which it is true of the present. But it is now determinately true to say of some singular that it is white; therefore formerly, i.e., before it became white, it was true to say that this will be white. Now the same reasoning seems to hold for the proximate and the remote. Therefore, if yesterday it was true to say that this will be white, it follows that it was always true to say of anything that has taken place that it will be. And if it is always true to say of the present that it is, or of the future that it will be, it is not possible that this not be, or, that it will not be. The reason for this consequence is evident, for these two cannot stand together, that something truly be said to be, and that it not be; for this is included in the signification of the true, that that which is said, is. If therefore that which is said concerning the present or the future is posited to be true, it is not possible that this not be in the present or future. But that which cannot not take place signifies the same thing as that which is impossible not to take place. And that which is impossible not to take place signifies the same thing as that which necessarily takes place, as will be explained more fully in the second book. It follows, therefore, that all things that are future must necessarily take place. From this it follows further, that there is nothing that is indeterminate to either of two or that takes place by chance, for what happens by chance does not take place of necessity but happens infrequently. But this is unlikely. Therefore the first proposition is false, i.e., that of everything of which it is true that it is, it was determinately true to say that it would be. 11 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod cum verum hoc significet ut dicatur aliquid esse quod est, hoc modo est aliquid verum, quo habet esse. Cum autem aliquid est in praesenti habet esse in seipso, et ideo vere potest dici de eo quod est: sed quamdiu aliquid est futurum, nondum est in seipso, est tamen aliqualiter in sua causa: quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ut sic sit in sua causa ut ex necessitate ex ea proveniat; et tunc determinate habet esse in sua causa; unde determinate potest dici de eo quod erit. Alio modo, aliquid est in sua causa, ut quae habet inclinationem ad suum effectum, quae tamen impediri potest; unde et hoc determinatum est in sua causa, sed mutabiliter; et sic de hoc vere dici potest, hoc erit, sed non per omnimodam certitudinem. Tertio, aliquid est in sua causa pure in potentia, quae etiam non magis est determinata ad unum quam ad aliud; unde relinquitur quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit vel non sit. For clarification of this point, we must consider the following. Since "true” signifies that something is said to be what it is, something is true in the manner in which it has being. Now, when something is in the present it exists in itself, and hence it can be truly said of it that it is. But as long as something is future, it does not yet exist in itself, but it is in a certain way in its cause, and this in a threefold way. It may be in its cause in such a way that it comes from it necessarily. In this case it has being determinately in its cause, and therefore it can be determinately said of it that it will be. In another way, something is in its cause as it has an inclination to its effect but can be impeded. This, then, is determined in its cause, but changeably, and hence it can be truly a said of it that it will be but not with complete certainty. Thirdly, something is in its cause purely in potency. This is the case in which the cause is as yet not determined more to one thing than to another, and consequently it cannot in any way be said determinately of these that it is going to be, but that it is or is not going to be. 12 Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque quoniam etc., ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in singularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo, proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum dicere quod non utrumque sit verum; ut si quod dicamus, neque erit, neque non erit. Secundo, ibi: primum enim cum sit etc., probat propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex definitione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est falsa, qua dicitur, hoc erit; nec tamen negatio est vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est impossibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique oppositorum. Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: ad haec si verum est et cetera. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid, sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utraque esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: sequitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum; ut navale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis. Then Aristotle says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true, etc. Here he shows that truth is not altogether lacking to both of the opposites in singular future enunciations. First he says that just as it is not true to say that in such enunciations one of the opposites is determinately true, so it is not true to say that neither is true; as if we could say that a thing neither will take place nor will not take place. Then when he says, In the first place, though the affirmation be false, etc., he gives two arguments to prove his point. The first is as follows. Affirmation and negation divide the true and the false. This is evident from the definition of true and false, for to be true is to be what in fact is, or not to be what in fact is not; and to be false is to be what in fact is not, or not to be what in fact is. Consequently, if the affirmation is false, the negation must be true, and conversely. But if the position is taken that neither is true, the affirmation, "This will be” is false, yet the negation is not true; likewise the negation will be false and the affirmation not be true. Therefore, the aforesaid position is impossible, i.e., that truth is lacking to both of the opposites. The second argument begins where he says, Secondly, if it is true to say that a thing is white and large, etc. The argument is as follows. If it is true to say something, it follows that it is. For example, if it is true to say that something is large and white, it follows that it is both. And this is so of the future as of the present, for if it is true to say that it will be tomorrow, it follows that it will be tomorrow. Therefore, if the position that it neither will be or not be tomorrow is true, it will be necessary that it neither happen nor not happen, which is contrary to the nature of that which is indeterminate to either of two, for that which is indeterminate to either of two is related to either; for example, a naval battle will take place tomorrow, or will not. The same unlikely things follow, then, from this as from the first argument. XIV. 1. Ostenderat superius philosophus ducendo ad inconveniens quod non est similiter verum vel falsum determinate in altero oppositorum in singularibus et futuris, sicut supra de aliis enunciationibus dixerat; nunc autem ostendit inconvenientia ad quae adduxerat esse impossibilia. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit impossibilia ea quae sequebantur; secundo, concludit quomodo circa haec se veritas habeat; ibi: igitur esse quod est et cetera. The Philosopher has shown—by leading the opposite position to what is unlikely—that in singular future enunciations truth or falsity is not determinately in one of the opposites, as it is in other enunciations. Now he is going to show that the unlikely things to which it has led are impossibilities. First he shows that the things that followed are impossibilities; then he concludes what the truth is, where he says, Now that which is, when it is, necessarily is, etc. 2 Circa primum tria facit: primo, ponit inconvenientia quae sequuntur; secundo, ostendit haec inconvenientia ex praedicta positione sequi; ibi: nihil enim prohibet etc.; tertio, ostendit esse impossibilia inconvenientia memorata; ibi: quod si haecpossibilia non sunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, ex praedictis rationibus concludens, quod haec inconvenientia sequuntur, si ponatur quod necesse sit oppositarum enunciationum alteram determinate esse veram et alteram esse falsam similiter in singularibus sicut in universalibus, quod scilicet nihil in his quae fiunt sit ad utrumlibet, sed omnia sint et fiant ex necessitate. Et ex hoc ulterius inducit alia duo inconvenientia. Quorum primum est quod non oportebit de aliquo consiliari: probatum est enim in III Ethicorum quod consilium non est de his, quae sunt ex necessitate, sed solum de contingentibus, quae possunt esse et non esse. Secundum inconveniens est quod omnes actiones humanae, quae sunt propter aliquem finem (puta negotiatio, quae est propter divitias acquirendas), erunt superfluae: quia si omnia ex necessitate eveniunt, sive operemur sive non operemur erit quod intendimus. Sed hoc est contra intentionem hominum, quia ea intentione videntur consiliari et negotiari ut, si haec faciant, erit talis finis, si autem faciunt aliquid aliud, erit alius finis. With respect to the impossibilities that follow he first states the unlikely things that follow from the opposite position, then shows that these follow from the aforesaid position, where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc. Finally he shows that these are impossibilities where he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc. He says, then, concluding from the preceding reasoning, that these unlikely things follow—if the position is taken that of opposed enunciations one of the two must be determinately true and the other false in the same way in singular as in universal enunciations—namely, that in things that come about nothing is indeterminate to either of two, but all things are and take place of necessity. From this he infers two other unlikely things that follow. First, it will not be necessary to deliberate about anything; whereas he proved in III Ethicorum that counsel is not concerned with things that take place necessarily but only with contingent things, i.e., things which can be or not be. Secondly, all human actions that are for the sake of some end (for example, a business transaction to acquire riches) will be superfluous, because what we intend will take place whether we take pains to bring it about or not—if all things come about of necessity. This, however, is in opposition to the intention of men, for they seem to deliberate and to transact business with the intention that if they do this there will be such a result, but if they do something else, there will be another result. 3 Deinde cum dicit: nihil enim prohibet etc., probat quod dicta inconvenientia consequantur ex dicta positione. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit praedicta inconvenientia sequi, quodam possibili posito; secundo, ostendit quod eadem inconvenientia sequantur etiam si illud non ponatur; ibi: at nec hoc differt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, non esse impossibile quod ante mille annos, quando nihil apud homines erat praecogitatum, vel praeordinatum de his quae nunc aguntur, unus dixerit quod hoc erit, puta quod civitas talis subverteretur, alius autem dixerit quod hoc non erit. Sed si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate est vera, necesse est quod alter eorum determinate verum dixerit; ergo necesse fuit alterum eorum ex necessitate evenire; et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis; ergo omnia ex necessitate eveniunt. Where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc., he proves that the said unlikely things follow from the said position. First he shows that the unlikely things follow from the positing of a certain possibility; then he shows that the same unlikely things follow even if that possibility is not posited, where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. He says, then, that it is not impossible that a thousand years before, when men neither knew nor ordained any of the things that are taking place now, a man said, "This will be,” for example, that such a state would be overthrown, and another man said, "This will not be.” But if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, one of them must have spoken the truth. Therefore one of them had to take place of necessity; and this same reasoning holds for all other things. Therefore everything takes place of necessity. Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque hoc differt etc., ostendit quod idem sequitur si illud possibile non ponatur. Nihil enim differt, quantum ad rerum existentiam vel eventum, si uno affirmante hoc esse futurum, alius negaverit vel non negaverit; ita enim se habebit res si hoc factum fuerit, sicut si hoc non factum fuerit. Non enim propter nostrum affirmare vel negare mutatur cursus rerum, ut sit aliquid vel non sit: quia veritas nostrae enunciationis non est causa existentiae rerum, sed potius e converso. Similiter etiam non differt quantum ad eventum eius quod nunc agitur, utrum fuerit affirmatum vel negatum ante millesimum annum vel ante quodcumque tempus. Sic ergo, si in quocumque tempore praeterito, ita se habebat veritas enunciationum, ut necesse esset quod alterum oppositorum vere diceretur; et ad hoc quod necesse est aliquid vere dici sequitur quod necesse sit illud esse vel fieri; consequens est quod unumquodque eorum quae fiunt, sic se habeat ut ex necessitate fiat. Et huiusmodi consequentiae rationem assignat per hoc, quod si ponatur aliquem vere dicere quod hoc erit, non potest non futurum esse. Sicut supposito quod sit homo, non potest non esse animal rationale mortale. Hoc enim significatur, cum dicitur aliquid vere dici, scilicet quod ita sit ut dicitur. Eadem autem habitudo est eorum, quae nunc dicuntur, ad ea quae futura sunt, quae erat eorum, quae prius dicebantur, ad ea quae sunt praesentia vel praeterita; et ita omnia ex necessitate acciderunt, et accidunt, et accident, quia quod nunc factum est, utpote in praesenti vel in praeterito existens, semper verum erat dicere, quoniam erit futurum.Then he shows that the same thing follows if this possibility is not posited where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. It makes no difference in relation to the existence or outcome of things whether a person denies that this is going to take place when it is affirmed, or not; for as was previously said, the event will either take place or not whether the affirmation and denial have been made or not. That something is or is not does not result from a change in the course of things to correspond to our affirmation or denial, for the truth of our enunciation is not the cause of the existence of things, but rather the converse. Nor does it make any difference to the outcome of what is now being done whether it was affirmed or denied a thousand years before, or at any other time before. Therefore, if in all past time, the truth of enunciations was such that one of the opposites had to have been truly said and if upon the necessity of something being truly said it follows that this must be or take place, it will follow that everything that takes place is such that it takes place of necessity. The reason he assigns for this consequence is the following. If it is posited that someone truly says this will be, it is not possible that it will not be, just as having supposed that man is, he cannot not be a rational mortal animal. For to be truly said means that it is such as is said. Moreover, the relationship of what is said. now to what will be is the same as the relationship of what was said previously to what is in the present or the past. Therefore, all things have necessarily happened, and they are necessarily happening, and they will necessarily happen, for of what is accomplished now, as existing in the present or in the past, it was always true to say that it would be. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quod si haec possibilia non sunt etc., ostendit praedicta esse impossibilia: et primo, per rationem; secundo, per exempla sensibilia; ibi: et multa nobis manifesta et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit propositum in rebus humanis; secundo, etiam in aliis rebus; ibi: et quoniam est omnino et cetera. Quantum autem ad res humanas ostendit esse impossibilia quae dicta sunt, per hoc quod homo manifeste videtur esse principium eorum futurorum, quae agit quasi dominus existens suorum actuum, et in sua potestate habens agere vel non agere; quod quidem principium si removeatur, tollitur totus ordo conversationis humanae, et omnia principia philosophiae moralis. Hoc enim sublato non erit aliqua utilitas persuasionis, nec comminationis, nec punitionis aut remunerationis, quibus homines alliciuntur ad bona et retrahuntur a malis, et sic evacuatur tota civilis scientia. Hoc ergo philosophus accipit pro principio manifesto quod homo sit principium futurorum; non est autem futurorum principium nisi per hoc quod consiliatur et facit aliquid: ea enim quae agunt absque consilio non habent dominium sui actus, quasi libere iudicantes de his quae sunt agenda, sed quodam naturali instinctu moventur ad agendum, ut patet in animalibus brutis. Unde impossibile est quod supra conclusum est quod non oporteat nos negotiari vel consiliari. Et sic etiam impossibile est illud ex quo sequebatur, scilicet quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant. When he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc., he shows that what has been said is impossible. He shows this first by reason, secondly by sensible examples, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc. First he argues that the position taken is impossible in relation to human affairs, for clearly man seems to be the principle of the future things that he does insofar as he is the master of his own actions and has the power to act or not to act. Indeed, to reject this principle would be to do away with the whole order of human association and all the principles of moral philosophy. For men are attracted to good and withdrawn from evil by persuasion and threat, and by punishment and reward; but rejection of this principle would make these useless and thus nullify the whole of civil science. Here the Philosopher accepts it as an evident principle that man is the principle of future things. However, he is not the principle of future things unless he deliberates about a thing and then does it. In those things that men do without deliberation they do not have dominion over their acts, i.e., they do not judge freely about things to be done, but are moved to act by a kind of natural instinct such as is evident in the case of brute animals. Hence, the conclusion that it is not necessary for us to take pains about something or to deliberate is impossible; likewise what it followed from is impossible, i.e., that all things take place of necessity. Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 6Deinde cum dicit: et quoniam est omnino etc., ostendit idem etiam in aliis rebus. Manifestum est enim etiam in rebus naturalibus esse quaedam, quae non semper actu sunt; ergo in eis contingit esse et non esse: alioquin vel semper essent, vel semper non essent. Id autem quod non est, incipit esse aliquid per hoc quod fit illud; sicut id quod non est album, incipit esse album per hoc quod fit album. Si autem non fiat album permanet non ens album. Ergo in quibus contingit esse et non esse, contingit etiam fieri et non fieri. Non ergo talia ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt, sed est in eis natura possibilitatis, per quam se habent ad fieri et non fieri, esse et non esse. Then he shows that this is also the case in other things where he says, and that universally in the things not always in act, there is a potentiality to be and not to be, etc. In natural things, too, it is evident that there are some things not always in act; it is therefore possible for them to be or not be, otherwise they would either always be or always not be. Now that which is not begins to be something by becoming it; as for example, that which is not white begins to be white by becoming white. But if it does not become white it continues not to be white. Therefore, in things that have the possibility of being and not being, there is also the possibility of becoming and not becoming. Such things neither are nor come to be of necessity but there is in them the kind of possibility which disposes them to becoming and not becoming, to being and not being. 7 Deinde cum dicit: ac multa nobis manifesta etc., ostendit propositum per sensibilia exempla. Sit enim, puta, vestis nova; manifestum est quod eam possibile est incidi, quia nihil obviat incisioni, nec ex parte agentis nec ex parte patientis. Probat autem quod simul cum hoc quod possibile est eam incidi, possibile est etiam eam non incidi, eodem modo quo supra probavit duas indefinitas oppositas esse simul veras, scilicet per assumptionem contrarii. Sicut enim possibile est istam vestem incidi, ita possibile est eam exteri, idest vetustate corrumpi; sed si exteritur non inciditur; ergo utrumque possibile est, scilicet eam incidi et non incidi. Et ex hoc universaliter concludit quod in aliis futuris, quae non sunt in actu semper, sed sunt in potentia, hoc manifestum est quod non omnia ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt, sed eorum quaedam sunt ad utrumlibet, quae non se habent magis ad affirmationem quam ad negationem; alia vero sunt in quibus alterum eorum contingit ut in pluribus, sed tamen contingit etiam ut in paucioribus quod altera pars sit vera, et non alia, quae scilicet contingit ut in pluribus. Next he shows the impossibility of what was said by examples perceptible to the senses, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc. Take a new garment for example. It is evident that it is possible to cut it, for nothing stands in the way of cutting it either on the part of the agent or the patient. He proves it is at once possible that it be cut and that it not be cut in the same way he has already proved that two opposed indefinite enunciations are at once true, i.e., by the assumption of contraries. just as it is possible that the garment be cut, so it is possible that it wear out, i.e., be corrupted in the course of time. But if it wears out it is not cut. Therefore both are possible, i.e., that it be cut and that it not be cut. From this he concludes universally in regard to other future things which are not always in act, but are in potency, that not all are or take place of necessity; some are indeterminate to either of two, and therefore are not related any more to affirmation than to negation; there are others in which one possibility happens for the most part, although it is possible, but for the least part, that the other part be true, and not the part which happens for the most part. 8 Est autem considerandum quod, sicut Boethius dicit hic in commento, circa possibile et necessarium diversimode aliqui sunt opinati. Quidam enim distinxerunt ea secundum eventum, sicut Diodorus, qui dixit illud esse impossibile quod nunquam erit; necessarium vero quod semper erit; possibile vero quod quandoque erit, quandoque non erit. Stoici vero distinxerunt haec secundum exteriora prohibentia. Dixerunt enim necessarium esse illud quod non potest prohiberi quin sit verum; impossibile vero quod semper prohibetur a veritate; possibile vero quod potest prohiberi vel non prohiberi. Utraque autem distinctio videtur esse incompetens. Nam prima distinctio est a posteriori: non enim ideo aliquid est necessarium, quia semper erit; sed potius ideo semper erit, quia est necessarium: et idem patet in aliis. Secunda autem assignatio est ab exteriori et quasi per accidens: non enim ideo aliquid est necessarium, quia non habet impedimentum, sed quia est necessarium, ideo impedimentum habere non potest. Et ideo alii melius ista distinxerunt secundum naturam rerum, ut scilicet dicatur illud necessarium, quod in sua natura determinatum est solum ad esse; impossibile autem quod est determinatum solum ad non esse; possibile autem quod ad neutrum est omnino determinatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad alterum, sive se habeat aequaliter ad utrumque, quod dicitur contingens ad utrumlibet. Et hoc est quod Boethius attribuit Philoni. Sed manifeste haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc loco. Assignat enim rationem possibilitatis et contingentiae, in his quidem quae sunt a nobis ex eo quod sumus consiliativi, in aliis autem ex eo quod materia est in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum. With regard to this question about the possible and the necessary, there have been different opinions, as Boethius says in his Commentary, and these will have to be considered. Some who distinguished them according to result—for example, Diodorus—said that the impossible is that which never will be, the necessary, that which always will be, and the possible, that which sometimes will be, sometimes not. The Stoics distinguished them according to exterior restraints. They said the necessary was that which could not be prevented from being true, the impossible, that which is always prevented from being true, and the possible, that which can be prevented or not be prevented. However, the distinctions in both of those cases seem to be inadequate. The first distinctions are a posteriori, for something is not necessary because it always will be, but rather, it always will be because it is necessary; this holds for the possible as well as the impossible. The second designation is taken from what is external and accidental, for something is not necessary because it does not have an impediment, but it does not have an impediment because it is necessary. Others distinguished these better by basing their distinction on the nature of things. They said that the necessary is that which in its nature is determined only to being, the impossible, that which is determined only to nonbeing, and the possible, that which is not altogether determined to either, whether related more to one than to another or related equally to both. The latter is known as that which is indeterminate to either of two. Boethius attributes these distinctions to Philo. However, this is clearly the opinion of Aristotle here, for he gives as the reason for the possibility and contingency in the things we do the fact that we deliberate, and in other things the fact that matter is in potency to either it of two opposites. 9 Sed videtur haec ratio non esse sufficiens. Sicut enim in corporibus corruptibilibus materia invenitur in potentia se habens ad esse et non esse, ita etiam in corporibus caelestibus invenitur potentia ad diversa ubi, et tamen nihil in eis evenit contingenter, sed solum ex necessitate. Unde dicendum est quod possibilitas materiae ad utrumque, si communiter loquamur, non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi etiam addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determinata ad unum; alioquin si ita sit determinata ad unum quod impediri non potest, consequens est quod ex necessitate reducat in actum potentiam passivam eodem modo. But this reasoning does not seem to be adequate either. While it is true that in corruptible bodies matter is in potency to being and nonbeing, and in celestial bodies there is potency to diverse location; nevertheless nothing happens contingently in celestial bodies, but only of necessity. Consequently, we have to say that the potentiality of matter to either of two, if we are speaking generally, does not suffice as a reason for contingency unless we add on the part of the active potency that it is not wholly determined to one; for if it is so determined to one that it cannot be impeded, it follows that it necessarily reduces into act the passive potency in the same mode. 10 Hoc igitur quidam attendentes posuerunt quod potentia, quae est in ipsis rebus naturalibus, sortitur necessitatem ex aliqua causa determinata ad unum quam dixerunt fatum. Quorum Stoici posuerunt fatum in quadam serie, seu connexione causarum, supponentes quod omne quod in hoc mundo accidit habet causam; causa autem posita, necesse est effectum poni. Et si una causa per se non sufficit, multae causae ad hoc concurrentes accipiunt rationem unius causae sufficientis; et ita concludebant quod omnia ex necessitate eveniunt. Considering this, some maintained that the very potency which is in natural things receives necessity from some cause determined to one. This cause they called fate. The Stoics, for example, held that fate was to be found in a series or interconnection of causes on the assumption that everything that happens has a cause; but when a cause has been posited the effect is posited of necessity, and if one per se cause does not suffice, many causes concurring for this take on the nature of one sufficient cause; so, they concluded, everything happens of necessity. Sed hanc rationem solvit Aristoteles in VI metaphysicae interimens utramque propositionum assumptarum. Dicit enim quod non omne quod fit habet causam, sed solum illud quod est per se. Sed illud quod est per accidens non habet causam; quia proprie non est ens, sed magis ordinatur cum non ente, ut etiam Plato dixit. Unde esse musicum habet causam, et similiter esse album; sed hoc quod est, album esse musicum, non habet causam: et idem est in omnibus aliis huiusmodi. Similiter etiam haec est falsa, quod posita causa etiam sufficienti, necesse est effectum poni: non enim omnis causa est talis (etiamsi sufficiens sit) quod eius effectus impediri non possit; sicut ignis est sufficiens causa combustionis lignorum, sed tamen per effusionem aquae impeditur combustio. Aristotle refutes this reasoning in VI Metaphysicae [2: 1026a 33] by destroying each of the assumed propositions. He says there that not everything that takes place has a cause, but only what is per se has a cause. What is accidental does not have a cause, for it is not properly being but is more like nonbeing, as Plato also held. Whence, to be musical has a cause and likewise to be white, but to be musical white does not have a cause; and the same is the case with all others of this kind. It is also false that when a cause has been posited—even a sufficient one—the effect must be posited, for not every cause (even if it is sufficient) is such that its effect cannot be impeded. For example, fire is a sufficient cause of the combustion of wood, but if water is poured on it the combustion is impeded. 12 Si autem utraque propositionum praedictarum esset vera, infallibiliter sequeretur omnia ex necessitate contingere. Quia si quilibet effectus habet causam, esset effectum (qui est futurus post quinque dies, aut post quantumcumque tempus) reducere in aliquam causam priorem: et sic quousque esset devenire ad causam, quae nunc est in praesenti, vel iam fuit in praeterito; si autem causa posita, necesse est effectum poni, per ordinem causarum deveniret necessitas usque ad ultimum effectum. Puta, si comedit salsa, sitiet: si sitiet, exibit domum ad bibendum: si exibit domum, occidetur a latronibus. Quia ergo iam comedit salsa, necesse est eum occidi. Et ideo Aristoteles ad hoc excludendum ostendit utramque praedictarum propositionum esse falsam, ut dictum est. However, if both of the aforesaid propositions were true, it would follow infallibly that everything happens necessarily. For if every effect has a cause, then it would be possible to reduce an effect (which is going to take place in five days or whatever time) to some prior cause, and so on until it reaches a cause which is now in the present or already has been in the past. Moreover, if when the cause is posited it is necessary that the effect be posited, the necessity would reach through an order of causes all the way to the ultimate effect. For instance, if someone eats salty food, he will be thirsty; if he is thirsty, he will go outside to drink; if he goes outside to drink, he will be killed by robbers. Therefore, once he has eaten salty food, it is necessary that he be killed. To exclude this position, Aristotle shows that both of these propositions are false. 13 Obiiciunt autem quidam contra hoc, dicentes quod omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquid per se, et ita oportet effectum qui est per accidens reduci in causam per se. Sed non attendunt quod id quod est per accidens reducitur ad per se, in quantum accidit ei quod est per se, sicut musicum accidit Socrati, et omne accidens alicui subiecto per se existenti. Et similiter omne quod in aliquo effectu est per accidens consideratur circa aliquem effectum per se: qui quantum ad id quod per se est habet causam per se, quantum autem ad id quod inest ei per accidens non habet causam per se, sed causam per accidens. Oportet enim effectum proportionaliter referre ad causam suam, ut in II physicorum et in V methaphysicae dicitur. However, some persons object to this on the grounds that everything accidental is reduced to something per se and therefore an effect that is accidental must be reduced to a per se cause. Those who argue in this way fail to take into account that the accidental is reduced to the per se inasmuch as it is accidental to that which is per se; for example, musical is accidental to Socrates, and every accident to some subject existing per se. Similarly, everything accidental in some effect is considered in relation to some per se effect, which effect, in relation to that which is per se, has a per se cause, but in relation to what is in it accidentally does not have a per se cause but an accidental one. The reason for this is that the effect must be proportionately referred to its cause, as is said in II Physicorum [3: 195b 25-28] and in V Metaphysicae [2: 1013b 28]. 14 Quidam vero non attendentes differentiam effectuum per accidens et per se, tentaverunt reducere omnes effectus hic inferius provenientes in aliquam causam per se, quam ponebant esse virtutem caelestium corporum in qua ponebant fatum, dicentes nihil aliud esse fatum quam vim positionis syderum. Sed ex hac causa non potest provenire necessitas in omnibus quae hic aguntur. Multa enim hic fiunt ex intellectu et voluntate, quae per se et directe non subduntur virtuti caelestium corporum: cum enim intellectus sive ratio et voluntas quae est in ratione, non sint actus organi corporalis, ut probatur in libro de anima, impossibile est quod directe subdantur intellectus seu ratio et voluntas virtuti caelestium corporum: nulla enim vis corporalis potest agere per se, nisi in rem corpoream. Vires autem sensitivae in quantum sunt actus organorum corporalium per accidens subduntur actioni caelestium corporum. Unde philosophus in libro de anima opinionem ponentium voluntatem hominis subiici motui caeli adscribit his, qui non ponebant intellectum differre a sensu. Indirecte tamen vis caelestium corporum redundat ad intellectum et voluntatem, in quantum scilicet intellectus et voluntas utuntur viribus sensitivis. Manifestum autem est quod passiones virium sensitivarum non inferunt necessitatem rationi et voluntati. Nam continens habet pravas concupiscentias, sed non deducitur, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethicorum. Sic igitur ex virtute caelestium corporum non provenit necessitas in his quae per rationem et voluntatem fiunt. Similiter nec in aliis corporalibus effectibus rerum corruptibilium, in quibus multa per accidens eveniunt. Id autem quod est per accidens non potest reduci ut in causam per se in aliquam virtutem naturalem, quia virtus naturae se habet ad unum; quod autem est per accidens non est unum; unde et supra dictum est quod haec enunciatio non est una, Socrates est albus musicus, quia non significat unum. Et ideo philosophus dicit in libro de somno et vigilia quod multa, quorum signa praeexistunt in corporibus caelestibus, puta in imbribus et tempestatibus, non eveniunt, quia scilicet impediuntur per accidens. Et quamvis illud etiam impedimentum secundum se consideratum reducatur in aliquam causam caelestem; tamen concursus horum, cum sit per accidens, non potest reduci in aliquam causam naturaliter agentem. Some, however, not considering the difference between accidental and per se effects, tried to reduce all the effects that come about in this world to some per se cause. They posited as this cause the power of the heavenly bodies and assumed fate to be dependent on this power—fate being, according to them, nothing else but the power of the position of the constellations. But such a cause cannot bring about necessity in all the things accomplished in this world, since many things come about from intellect and will, which are not subject per se and directly to the power of the heavenly bodies. For the intellect, or reason, and the will which is in reason, are not acts of a corporeal organ (as is proved in the treatise De anima [III, 4: 429a 18]) and consequently cannot be directly subject to the power of the heavenly bodies, since a corporeal force, of itself, can only act on a corporeal thing. The sensitive powers, on the other hand, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, are accidentally subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. Hence, the Philosopher in his book De anima [III, 3: 427a 21] ascribes the opinion that the will of man is subject to the movement of the heavens to those who hold the position that the intellect does not differ from sense. The power of the heavenly bodies, however, does indirectly redound to the intellect and will inasmuch as the aq intellect and will use the sensitive powers. But clearly the passions of the sensitive powers do not induce necessity of reason and will, for the continent man has wrong desires but is not seduced by them, as is shown in VII Ethicorum. Therefore, we may conclude that the power of the heavenly bodies does not bring about necessity in the things done through reason and will. This is also the case in other corporeal effects of corruptible things, in which many things happen accidentally. What is accidental cannot be reduced to a per se cause in a natural power because the power of nature is directed to some one thing; but what is accidental is not one; whence it was said above that the enunciation "Socrates is a white musical being” is not one because it does not signify one thing. This is the reason the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia [object] Close that many things of which the signs pre-exist in the heavenly bodies—for example in storm clouds and tempests—do not take place because they are accidentally impeded. And although this impediment considered as such is reduced to some celestial cause, the concurrence of these, since it is accidental, cannot be reduced to a cause acting naturally. 15 Sed considerandum est quod id quod est per accidens potest ab intellectu accipi ut unum, sicut album esse musicum, quod quamvis secundum se non sit unum, tamen intellectus ut unum accipit, in quantum scilicet componendo format enunciationem unam. Et secundum hoc contingit id, quod secundum se per accidens evenit et casualiter, reduci in aliquem intellectum praeordinantem; sicut concursus duorum servorum ad certum locum est per accidens et casualis quantum ad eos, cum unus eorum ignoret de alio; potest tamen esse per se intentus a domino, qui utrumque mittit ad hoc quod in certo loco sibi occurrant. However, what is accidental can be taken as one by the intellect. For example, "the white is musical,” which as such is not one, the intellect takes as one, i.e., insofar as it forms one enunciation by composing. And in accordance with this it is possible to reduce what in itself happens accidentally and fortuitously to a preordaining intellect For example, the meeting of two servants at a certain place may be accidental and fortuitous with respect to them, since neither knew the other would be there, but be per se intended by their master who sent each of them to encounter the other in a certain place. 16 Et secundum hoc aliqui posuerunt omnia quaecumque in hoc mundo aguntur, etiam quae videntur fortuita vel casualia, reduci in ordinem providentiae divinae, ex qua dicebant dependere fatum. Et hoc quidem aliqui stulti negaverunt, iudicantes de intellectu divino ad modum intellectus nostri, qui singularia non cognoscit. Hoc autem est falsum: nam intelligere divinum et velle eius est ipsum esse ipsius. Unde sicut esse eius sua virtute comprehendit omne illud quod quocumque modo est, in quantum scilicet est per participationem ipsius; ita etiam suum intelligere et suum intelligibile comprehendit omnem cognitionem et omne cognoscibile; et suum velle et suum volitum comprehendit omnem appetitum et omne appetibile quod est bonum; ut, scilicet ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadat sub eius cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate: sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens. Accordingly, some have maintained that everything whatever that is effected in this world—even the things that seem fortuitous and casual—is reduced to the order of divine providence on which they said fate depends. Other foolish men have denied this, judging of the Divine Intellect in the mode of our intellect which does not know singulars. But the position of the latter is false, for His divine thinking and willing is His very being. Hence, just as His being by its power comprehends all that is in any way (i.e., inasmuch as it is through participation of Him) so also His thinking and what He thinks comprehend all knowing and everything knowable, and His willing and what He wills comprehend all desiring and every desirable good; in other words, whatever is knowable falls under His knowledge and whatever is good falls under His will, just as whatever is falls under His active power, which He comprehends perfectly, since He acts by His intellect. 17 Sed si providentia divina sit per se causa omnium quae in hoc mundo accidunt, saltem bonorum, videtur quod omnia ex necessitate accidant. Primo quidem ex parte scientiae eius: non enim potest eius scientia falli; et ita ea quae ipse scit, videtur quod necesse sit evenire. Secundo ex parte voluntatis: voluntas enim Dei inefficax esse non potest; videtur ergo quod omnia quae vult, ex necessitate eveniant. It may be objected, however, that if Divine Providence is the per se cause of everything that happens in this world, at least of good things, it would look as though everything takes place of necessity: first on the part of His knowledge, for His knowledge cannot be fallible, and so it would seem that what He knows happens necessarily; secondly, on the part of the will, for the will of God cannot be inefficacious; it would seem, therefore, that everything He wills happens of necessity. 18 Procedunt autem hae obiectiones ex eo quod cognitio divini intellectus et operatio divinae voluntatis pensantur ad modum eorum, quae in nobis sunt, cum tamen multo dissimiliter se habeant. These objections arise from judging of the cognition of the divine intellect and the operation of the divine will in the way in which these are in us, when in fact they are very dissimilar. 19 Nam primo quidem ex parte cognitionis vel scientiae considerandum est quod ad cognoscendum ea quae secundum ordinem temporis eveniunt, aliter se habet vis cognoscitiva, quae sub ordine temporis aliqualiter continetur, aliter illa quae totaliter est extra ordinem temporis. Cuius exemplum conveniens accipi potest ex ordine loci: nam secundum philosophum in IV physicorum, secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine est prius et posterius in motu et per consequens in tempore. Si ergo sint multi homines per viam aliquam transeuntes, quilibet eorum qui sub ordine transeuntium continetur habet cognitionem de praecedentibus et subsequentibus, in quantum sunt praecedentes et subsequentes; quod pertinet ad ordinem loci. Et ideo quilibet eorum videt eos, qui iuxta se sunt et aliquos eorum qui eos praecedunt; eos autem qui post se sunt videre non potest. Si autem esset aliquis extra totum ordinem transeuntium, utpote in aliqua excelsa turri constitutus, unde posset totam viam videre, videret quidem simul omnes in via existentes, non sub ratione praecedentis et subsequentis (in comparatione scilicet ad eius intuitum), sed simul omnes videret, et quomodo unus eorum alium praecedit. Quia igitur cognitio nostra cadit sub ordine temporis, vel per se vel per accidens (unde et anima in componendo et dividendo necesse habet adiungere tempus, ut dicitur in III de anima), consequens est quod sub eius cognitione cadant res sub ratione praesentis, praeteriti et futuri. Et ideo praesentia cognoscit tanquam actu existentia et sensu aliqualiter perceptibilia; praeterita autem cognoscit ut memorata; futura autem non cognoscit in seipsis, quia nondum sunt, sed cognoscere ea potest in causis suis: per certitudinem quidem, si totaliter in causis suis sint determinata, ut ex quibus de necessitate evenient; per coniecturam autem, si non sint sic determinata quin impediri possint, sicut quae sunt ut in pluribus; nullo autem modo, si in suis causis sunt omnino in potentia non magis determinata ad unum quam ad aliud, sicut quae sunt ad utrumlibet. Non enim est aliquid cognoscibile secundum quod est in potentia, sed solum secundum quod est in actu, ut patet per philosophum in IX metaphysicae. On the part of cognition or knowledge it should be noted that in knowing things that take place according to the order of time, the cognitive power that is contained in any way under the order of time is related to them in another way than the cognitive power that is totally outside of the order of time. The order of place provides a suitable example of this. According to the Philosopher in IV Physicorum [11:219a 14], before and after in movement, and consequently in time, corresponds to before and after in magnitude. Therefore, if there arc many men passing along some road, any one of those in the ranks has knowledge of those preceding and following as preceding and following, which pertains to the order of place. Hence any one of them sees those who are next to him and some of those who precede him; but he cannot see those who follow behind him. If, however, there were someone outside of the whole order of those passing along the road, for instance, stationed in some high tower where he could see the whole road, he would at once see all those who were on the road—not under the formality of preceding and subsequent (i.e., in relation to his view) but all at the same time and how one precedes another. Now, our cognition falls under the order of time, either per se or accidentally; whence the soul in composing and dividing necessarily includes time, as is said in III De anima [6: 430a 32]. Consequently, things are subject to our cognition under the aspect of present, past, and future. Hence the soul knows present things as existing in act and perceptible by sense in some way; past things it knows as remembered; future things are not known in themselves because they do not yet exist, but can be known in their causes—with certitude if they are totally determined in their causes so that they will take place of necessity; by conjecture if they are not so determined that they cannot be impeded, as in the case of those things that are for the most part; in no way if in their causes they are wholly in potency, i.e., not more determined to one than to another, as in the case of those that are indeterminate to either of two. The reason for this is that a thing is not knowable according as it is in potency, but only according as it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in IX Metaphysicae [9: 1051a 22]. 20 Sed Deus est omnino extra ordinem temporis, quasi in arce aeternitatis constitutus, quae est tota simul, cui subiacet totus temporis decursus secundum unum et simplicem eius intuitum; et ideo uno intuitu videt omnia quae aguntur secundum temporis decursum, et unumquodque secundum quod est in seipso existens, non quasi sibi futurum quantum ad eius intuitum prout est in solo ordine suarum causarum (quamvis et ipsum ordinem causarum videat), sed omnino aeternaliter sic videt unumquodque eorum quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua. God, however, is wholly outside the order of time, stationed as it were at the summit of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to Him the whole course of time is subjected in one simple intuition. For this reason, He sees in one glance everything that is effected in the evolution of time, and each thing as it is in itself, and it is not future to Him in relation to His view as it is in the order of its causes alone (although He also sees the very order of the causes), but each of the things that are in whatever time is seen wholly eternally as the human eye sees Socrates sitting, not in its causes but in itself. 21 Ex hoc autem quod homo videt Socratem sedere, non tollitur eius contingentia quae respicit ordinem causae ad effectum; tamen certissime et infallibiliter videt oculus hominis Socratem sedere dum sedet, quia unumquodque prout est in seipso iam determinatum est. Sic igitur relinquitur, quod Deus certissime et infallibiliter cognoscat omnia quae fiunt in tempore; et tamen ea quae in tempore eveniunt non sunt vel fiunt ex necessitate, sed contingenter. Now from the fact that man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his sitting which concerns the order of cause to effect, is not destroyed; yet the eye of man most certainly and infallibly sees Socrates sitting while he is sitting, since each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Hence it follows that God knows all things that take place in time most certainly and infallibly, and yet the things that happen in time neither are nor take place of necessity, but contingently. 22 Similiter ex parte voluntatis divinae differentia est attendenda. Nam voluntas divina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias. Sunt autem differentiae entis possibile et necessarium; et ideo ex ipsa voluntate divina originantur necessitas et contingentia in rebus et distinctio utriusque secundum rationem proximarum causarum: ad effectus enim, quos voluit necessarios esse, disposuit causas necessarias; ad effectus autem, quos voluit esse contingentes, ordinavit causas contingenter agentes, idest potentes deficere. Et secundum harum conditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel necessarii vel contingentes, quamvis omnes dependeant a voluntate divina, sicut a prima causa, quae transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae. Hoc autem non potest dici de voluntate humana, nec de aliqua alia causa: quia omnis alia causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel contingentiae; et ideo oportet quod vel ipsa causa possit deficere, vel effectus eius non sit contingens, sed necessarius. Voluntas autem divina indeficiens est; tamen non omnes effectus eius sunt necessarii, sed quidam contingentes. There is likewise a difference to be noted on the part of the divine Will, for the divine will must be understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing the whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are differences of being, an(] therefore necessity and contingency in things and the distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes originate from the divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the effects that He wills to be necessary, and He ordains causes acting contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects that He wills to be contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects are called either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine will as on a first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency. This, however, cannot be said of the human will, nor of any other cause, for every other cause already falls under the order of necessity or contingency; hence, either the cause itself must be able to fail or, if not, its effect is not contingent, but necessary. The divine will, on the other hand, is unfailing; yet not all its effects are necessary, but some are contingent. 23 Similiter autem aliam radicem contingentiae, quam hic philosophus ponit ex hoc quod sumus consiliativi, aliqui subvertere nituntur, volentes ostendere quod voluntas in eligendo ex necessitate movetur ab appetibili. Cum enim bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, non potest (ut videtur) ab hoc divertere quin appetat illud quod sibi videtur bonum; sicut nec ratio ab hoc potest divertere quin assentiat ei quod sibi videtur verum. Et ita videtur quod electio consilium consequens semper ex necessitate proveniat; et sic omnia, quorum nos principium sumus per consilium et electionem, ex necessitate provenient. Some men, in their desire to show that the will in choosing is necessarily moved by the desirable, argued in such a way as to destroy the other root of contingency the Philosopher posits here, based on our deliberation. Since the good is the object of the will, they argue, it cannot (as is evident) be diverted so as not to seek that which seems good to it; as also it is not possible to divert reason so that it does not assent to that which seems true to it. So it seems that choice, which follows upon deliberation, always takes place of necessity; thus all things of which we are the principle through deliberation and choice, will take place of necessity. 24 Sed dicendum est quod similis differentia attendenda est circa bonum, sicut circa verum. Est autem quoddam verum, quod est per se notum, sicut prima principia indemonstrabilia, quibus ex necessitate intellectus assentit; sunt autem quaedam vera non per se nota, sed per alia. Horum autem duplex est conditio: quaedam enim ex necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita scilicet quod non possunt esse falsa, principiis existentibus veris, sicut sunt omnes conclusiones demonstrationum. Et huiusmodi veris ex necessitate assentit intellectus, postquam perceperit ordinem eorum ad principia, non autem prius. Quaedam autem sunt, quae non ex necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita scilicet quod possent esse falsa principiis existentibus veris; sicut sunt opinabilia, quibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus, quamvis ex aliquo motivo magis inclinetur in unam partem quam in aliam. Ita etiam est quoddam bonum quod est propter se appetibile, sicut felicitas, quae habet rationem ultimi finis; et huiusmodi bono ex necessitate inhaeret voluntas: naturali enim quadam necessitate omnes appetunt esse felices. Quaedam vero sunt bona, quae sunt appetibilia propter finem, quae comparantur ad finem sicut conclusiones ad principium, ut patet per philosophum in II physicorum. Si igitur essent aliqua bona, quibus non existentibus, non posset aliquis esse felix, haec etiam essent ex necessitate appetibilia et maxime apud eum, qui talem ordinem perciperet; et forte talia sunt esse, vivere et intelligere et si qua alia sunt similia. Sed particularia bona, in quibus humani actus consistunt, non sunt talia, nec sub ea ratione apprehenduntur ut sine quibus felicitas esse non possit, puta, comedere hunc cibum vel illum, aut abstinere ab eo: habent tamen in se unde moveant appetitum, secundum aliquod bonum consideratum in eis. Et ideo voluntas non ex necessitate inducitur ad haec eligenda. Et propter hoc philosophus signanter radicem contingentiae in his quae fiunt a nobis assignavit ex parte consilii, quod est eorum quae sunt ad finem et tamen non sunt determinata. In his enim in quibus media sunt determinata, non est opus consilio, ut dicitur in III Ethicorum. Et haec quidem dicta sunt ad salvandum radices contingentiae, quas hic Aristoteles ponit, quamvis videantur logici negotii modum excedere. In regard to this point there is a similar diversity with respect to the good and with respect to the true that must be noted. There are some truths that are known per se, such as the first indemonstrable principles; these the intellect assents to of necessity. There are others, however, which are not known per se, but through other truths. The condition of these is twofold. Some follow necessarily from the principles, i.e., so that they cannot be false when the principles are true. This is the case with all the conclusions of demonstrations, and the intellect assents necessarily to truths of this kind after it has perceived their order to the principles, but not before. There are others that do not follow necessarily from the principles, and these can be false even though the principles be true. This is the case with things about which there can be opinion. To these the intellect does not assent necessarily, although it may be inclined by some motive more to one side than another. Similarly, there is a good that is desirable for its own sake, such as happiness, which has the nature of an ultimate end. The will necessarily adheres to a good of this kind, for all men seek to be happy by a certain kind of natural necessity. There are other good things that are desirable for the sake of the end. These are related to the end as conclusions are to principles. The Philosopher makes this point clear in II Physicorum [7: 198a 35]. If, then, there were some good things without the existence of which one could not be happy, these would be desirable of necessity, and especially by the person who perceives such an order. Perhaps to be, to live, and to think, and other similar things, if there are any, are of this kind. However, particular good things with which human acts are concerned are not of this kind nor are they apprehended as bein,r such that without tbeni happiness is impossible, for instance, to eat this food or that, or abstain from it. Such things, nevertheless, do have in them that whereby they move the appetite according to some good considered in them. The will, therefore, is not induced to choose these of necessity. And on this account the Philosopher expressly designates the root of the contingency of things effected by us on the part of deliberation—which is concerned with those things that are for the end and yet are not determined. In those things in which the means are determined there is no need for deliberation, as is said in III Ethicorum [3: 1112a 30–1113a 14]. These things have been stated to save the roots of contingency that Aristotle posits here, although they may seem to exceed the mode of logical matter. XV. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit esse impossibilia ea, quae ex praedictis rationibus sequebantur; hic, remotis impossibilibus, concludit veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia enim argumentando ad impossibile, processerat ab enunciationibus ad res, et iam removerat inconvenientia quae circa res sequebantur; nunc, ordine converso, primo ostendit qualiter se habeat veritas circa res; secundo, qualiter se habeat veritas circa enunciationes; ibi: quare quoniam orationes verae sunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit qualiter se habeant veritas et necessitas circa res absolute consideratas; secundo, qualiter se habeant circa eas per comparationem ad sua opposita; ibi: et in contradictione eadem ratio est et cetera. Now that the Philosopher has shown the impossibilities that follow from the foresaid arguments, he concludes what the truth is on this point. In arguing to the impossibility of the position, he proceeded from enunciations to things, and has already rejected the unlikely consequences in respect to things. Now, in the converse order, he first shows the way in which there is truth about things; secondly, the way in which there is truth in enunciations, where he says, And so, since speech is true as it corresponds to things, etc. With respect to truth about things be first shows the way in which there is truth and necessity about things absolutely considered; secondly, the way in which there is truth and necessity about things through a comparing of their opposites, where he says, And this is also the case with respect to contradiction, etc. 2 Dicit ergo primo, quasi ex praemissis concludens, quod si praedicta sunt inconvenientia, ut scilicet omnia ex necessitate eveniant, oportet dicere ita se habere circa res, scilicet quod omne quod est necesse est esse quando est, et omne quod non est necesse est non esse quando non est. Et haec necessitas fundatur super hoc principium: impossibile est simul esse et non esse: si enim aliquid est, impossibile est illud simul non esse; ergo necesse est tunc illud esse. Nam impossibile non esse idem significat ei quod est necesse esse, ut in secundo dicetur. Et similiter, si aliquid non est, impossibile est illud simul esse; ergo necesse est non esse, quia etiam idem significant. Et ideo manifeste verum est quod omne quod est necesse est esse quando est; et omne quod non est necesse est non esse pro illo tempore quando non est: et haec est necessitas non absoluta, sed ex suppositione. Unde non potest simpliciter et absolute dici quod omne quod est, necesse est esse, et omne quod non est, necesse est non esse: quia non idem significant quod omne ens, quando est, sit ex necessitate, et quod omne ens simpliciter sit ex necessitate; nam primum significat necessitatem ex suppositione, secundum autem necessitatem absolutam. Et quod dictum est de esse, intelligendum est similiter de non esse; quia aliud est simpliciter ex necessitate non esse et aliud est ex necessitate non esse quando non est. Et per hoc videtur Aristoteles excludere id quod supra dictum est, quod si in his, quae sunt, alterum determinate est verum, quod etiam antequam fieret alterum determinate esset futurum. 2. He begins, then, as though concluding from premises: if the foresaid things are unlikely (namely, that all things take place of necessity), then the case with respect to things must be this: everything that is must be when it is, and everything that is not, necessarily not be when it is not. This necessity is founded on the principle that it is impossible at once to be and not be; for if something is, it is impossible that it at the same time not be; therefore it is necessary that it be at that time. For "impossible not to be” signifies the same thing as "necessary to be,” as Aristotle says in the second book. Similarly, if something is not, it is impossible that it at the same time be. Therefore it is necessary that it not be, for they also signify the same thing. Clearly it is true, then, that everything that is must be when it is, and everything that is not must not be when it is not. This is not absolute necessity, but necessity by supposition. Consequently, it cannot be said absolutely and simply that everything that is must be, and that everything that is not must not be. For "every being, when it is, necessarily is” does not signify the same thing as "every being necessarily is, simply. The first signifies necessity by supposition, the second, absolute necessity. What has been said about to be must be understood to apply also to not to be, for "necessarily not to be simply” and "necessarily not to be when it is not” are also different. By this Aristotle seems to exclude what was said above, namely, that if in those things that are, one of the two is determinately true, then even before it takes place one of the two would determinately be going to be. 3 Deinde cum dicit: et in contradictione etc., ostendit quomodo se habeant veritas et necessitas circa res per comparationem ad sua opposita: et dicit quod eadem ratio est in contradictione, quae est in suppositione. Sicut enim illud quod non est absolute necessarium, fit necessarium ex suppositione eiusdem, quia necesse est esse quando est; ita etiam quod non est in se necessarium absolute fit necessarium per disiunctionem oppositi, quia necesse est de unoquoque quod sit vel non sit, et quod futurum sit aut non sit, et hoc sub disiunctione: et haec necessitas fundatur super hoc principium quod, impossibile est contradictoria simul esse vera vel falsa. Unde impossibile est neque esse neque non esse; ergo necesse est vel esse vel non esse. Non tamen si divisim alterum accipiatur, necesse est illud esse absolute. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum: quia necessarium est navale bellum esse futurum cras vel non esse; sed non est necesse navale bellum futurum esse cras; similiter etiam non est necessarium non esse futurum, quia hoc pertinet ad necessitatem absolutam; sed necesse est quod vel sit futurum cras vel non sit futurum: hoc enim pertinet ad necessitatem quae est sub disiunctione. 3. He shows how truth and necessity is had about things through the comparing of their opposites where he says, This is also the case with respect to contradiction, etc. The reasoning is the same, he says, in respect to contradiction and in respect to supposition. For just as that which is not absolutely necessary becomes necessary by supposition of the same (for it must be when it is), so also what in itself is not necessary absolutely, becomes necessary through the disjunction of the opposite, for of each thing it is necessary that it is or is not, and that it will or will not be in the future, and this under disjunction. This necessity is founded upon the principle that it is impossible for contradictories to be at once true and false. Accordingly, it is impossible that a thing neither be nor not be; therefore it is necessary that it either be or not be. However if one of these is taken separately [i.e., divisively], it is not necessary that that one be absolutely. This he manifests by example: it is necessary that there will be or will not be a naval battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary that a naval battle will take place tomorrow, nor is it necessary that it will not take place, for this pertains to absolute necessity. It is necessary, however, that it will take place or will not take place tomorrow. This pertains to the necessity which is under disjunction. 4 Deinde cum dicit: quare quoniam etc. ex eo quod se habet circa res, ostendit qualiter se habeat circa orationes. Et primo, ostendit quomodo uniformiter se habet in veritate orationum, sicut circa esse rerum et non esse; secundo, finaliter concludit veritatem totius dubitationis; ibi: quare manifestum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia hoc modo se habent orationes enunciativae ad veritatem sicut et res ad esse vel non esse (quia ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio est vera vel falsa), consequens est quod in omnibus rebus quae ita se habent ut sint ad utrumlibet, et quaecumque ita se habent quod contradictoria eorum qualitercumque contingere possunt, sive aequaliter sive alterum ut in pluribus, ex necessitate sequitur quod etiam similiter se habeat contradictio enunciationum. Et exponit consequenter quae sint illae res, quarum contradictoria contingere queant; et dicit huiusmodi esse quae neque semper sunt, sicut necessaria, neque semper non sunt, sicut impossibilia, sed quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt. Et ulterius manifestat quomodo similiter se habeat in contradictoriis enunciationibus; et dicit quod harum enunciationum, quae sunt de contingentibus, necesse est quod sub disiunctione altera pars contradictionis sit vera vel falsa; non tamen haec vel illa determinate, sed se habet ad utrumlibet. Et si contingat quod altera pars contradictionis magis sit vera, sicut accidit in contingentibus quae sunt ut in pluribus, non tamen ex hoc necesse est quod ex necessitate altera earum determinate sit vera vel falsa. Then when he says, And so, since speech is true as it corresponds to things, etc., he shows how truth in speech corresponds to the way things are. First he shows in what way truth of speech conforms to the being and nonbeing of things; secondly, and finally, he arrives at the truth of the whole question, where he says, Therefore it is clear that it is not necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and one false, etc. He says, then, that enunciative speech is related to truth in the way the thing is to being or nonbeing (for from the fact that a thing is or is not, speech is true or false). It follows, therefore, that when things are such as to be indeterminate to either of two, and when they are such that their contradictories could happen in whichever way, whether equally or one for the most part, the contradiction of enunciations must also be such. He explains next what the things are in which contradictories can happen. They are those that neither always are (i.e., the necessary), nor always are not (i.e., the impossible), but sometimes are and some times are not. He shows further how this is maintained in contradictory enunciations. In those enunciations that are about contingent things, one part of the contradiction must be true or false tinder disjunction; but it is related to either, not to this or that determinately. If it should turn out that one part of the contradiction is more true, as happens in contingents that are for the most part, it is nevertheless not necessary on this account that one of them is determinately true or false. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quare manifestum est etc., concludit principale intentum et dicit manifestum esse ex praedictis quod non est necesse in omni genere affirmationum et negationum oppositarum, alteram determinate esse veram et alteram esse falsam: quia non eodem modo se habet veritas et falsitas in his quae sunt iam de praesenti et in his quae non sunt, sed possunt esse vel non esse. Sed hoc modo se habet in utriusque, sicut dictum est, quia scilicet in his quae sunt necesse est determinate alterum esse verum et alterum falsum: quod non contingit in futuris quae possunt esse et non esse. Et sic terminatur primus liber. 5. Then he says, Therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and one, false, etc. This is the conclusion he principally intended. It is evident from what has been said that it is not necessary in every genus of affirmation and negation of opposites that one is determinately true and the other false, for truth and falsity is not had in the same way in regard to things that are already in the present and those that are not but which could be or not be. The position in regard to each has been explained. In those that are, it is necessary that one of them be determinately true and the other false; in things that are future, which could be or not be, the case is not the same. The first book ends with this. lib. 2 l. 1 n. 1Postquam philosophus in primo libro determinavit de enunciatione simpliciter considerata; hic determinat de enunciatione, secundum quod diversificatur per aliquid sibi additum. Possunt autem tria in enunciatione considerari: primo, ipsae dictiones, quae praedicantur vel subiiciuntur in enunciatione, quas supra distinxit per nomina et verba; secundo, ipsa compositio, secundum quam est verum vel falsum in enunciatione affirmativa vel negativa; tertio, ipsa oppositio unius enunciationis ad aliam. Dividitur ergo haec pars in tres partes: in prima, ostendit quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc quod aliquid additur ad dictiones in subiecto vel praedicato positas; secundo, quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc quod aliquid additur ad determinandum veritatem vel falsitatem compositionis; ibi: his vero determinatis etc.; tertio, solvit quamdam dubitationem circa oppositiones enunciationum provenientem ex eo, quod additur aliquid simplici enunciationi; ibi: utrum autem contraria est affirmatio et cetera. Est autem considerandum quod additio facta ad praedicatum vel subiectum quandoque tollit unitatem enunciationis, quandoque vero non tollit, sicut additio negationis infinitantis dictionem. Circa primum ergo duo facit: primo, ostendit quid accidat enunciationibus ex additione negationis infinitantis dictionem; secundo, ostendit quid accidat circa enunciationem ex additione tollente unitatem; ibi: at vero unum de pluribus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, determinat de enunciationibus simplicissimis, in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur tantum ex parte subiecti; secundo, determinat de enunciationibus, in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur non solum ex parte subiecti, sed etiam ex parte praedicati; ibi: quando autem est tertium adiacens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit rationes quasdam distinguendi tales enunciationes; secundo, ponit earum distinctionem et ordinem; ibi: quare prima est affirmatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit rationes distinguendi enunciationes ex parte nominum; secundo, ostendit quod non potest esse eadem ratio distinguendi ex parte verborum; ibi: praeter verbum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit rationes distinguendi enunciationes; secundo, exponit quod dixerat; ibi: nomen autem dictum est etc.; tertio, concludit intentum; ibi: erit omnis affirmatio et cetera. 1. In the first book, the Philosopher has dealt with the enunciation considered simply. Now he is going to treat of the enunciation as it is diversified by the addition of something to it. There are three things that can be considered in the enunciation: first, the words that are predicated or subjected, which he has already distinguished into names and verbs; secondly, the composition, according to which there is truth or falsity in the affirmative or negative enunciation; finally, the opposition of one enunciation to another. This book is divided into three parts which are related to these three things in the enunciation. In the first, he shows what happens to the enunciation when something is added to the words posited as the subject or predicate; in the second, what happens when something is added to determine the truth or falsity of the composition. He begins this where he says, Having determined these things, we must consider in what way negations and affirmations of the possible and not possible, etc. In the third part he solves a question that arises about the oppositions of enunciations in which something is added to the simple enunciation. This he takes up where he says, There is a question as to whether the contrary of an affirmation is a negation, or whether the contrary of an affirmation is another affirmation, etc. With respect to additions made to the words used in the enunciation, it should be noted that an addition made to the predicate or the subject sometimes destroys the unity of the enunciation, and sometimes not, the latter being the case in which the addition is a negative making a word infinite. Consequently, he first shows what happens to the enunciation when the added negation makes a word infinite. Secondly, he shows what happens when an addition destroys the unity of the enunciation where he says, Neither the affirmation nor the negation which affirms or denies one predicate of many subjects or many predicates of one subject is one, unless something one is constituted from the many, etc. In relation to the first point he first investigates the simplest of enunciations, in which a finite or infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject. Then he considers the enunciation in which a finite or infinite name is posited not only on the part of the subject, but also on the part of the predicate, where he says, But when "is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, etc. Apropos of these simple enunciations, he proposes certain grounds for distinguishing such enunciations and then gives their distinction and order where he says, Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is "Man is,” "Man is not,” etc. And first he gives the grounds for distinguishing enunciations on the part of the name; secondly, he shows that there are not the same grounds for a distinction on the part of the verb, where he says, There can be no affirmation or negation without a verb, etc. First, then, he proposes the grounds for distinguishing these enunciations; secondly, he explains this where he says, we have already stated what a name is, etc.; finally, he arrives at the conclusion he intended where he says, every affirmation will be made up of a name and a verb, or an infinite name and a verb. 2 Resumit ergo illud, quod supra dictum est de definitione affirmationis, quod scilicet affirmatio est enunciatio significans aliquid de aliquo; et, quia verbum est proprie nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur, consequens est ut illud, de quo aliquid dicitur, pertineat ad nomen; nomen autem est vel finitum vel infinitum; et ideo, quasi concludens subdit quod quia affirmatio significat aliquid de aliquo, consequens est ut hoc, de quo significatur, scilicet subiectum affirmationis, sit vel nomen, scilicet finitum (quod proprie dicitur nomen, ut in primo dictum est), vel innominatum, idest infinitum nomen: quod dicitur innominatum, quia ipsum non nominat aliquid cum aliqua forma determinata, sed solum removet determinationem formae. Et ne aliquis diceret quod id quod in affirmatione subiicitur est simul nomen et innominatum, ad hoc excludendum subdit quod id quod est, scilicet praedicatum, in affirmatione, scilicet una, de qua nunc loquimur, oportet esse unum et de uno subiecto; et sic oportet quod subiectum talis affirmationis sit vel nomen, vel nomen infinitum. First of all, he goes back to what was said above in defining affirmation, namely, that affirmation is an enunciation signifying something about something; and, since it is peculiar to the verb to be a sign of what is predicated of another, it follows that that about which something is said pertains to the name; but the name is either finite or infinite; therefore, as if drawing a conclusion, he says that since affirmation signifies something about something it follows that that about which something is signified, i.e., the subject of an affirmation, is either a finite name (which is properly called a name), or unnamed, i.e., an infinite name. It is called "unnamed” because it does not name something with a determinate form but removes the determination of form. And lest anyone think that what is subjected in an affirmation is at once a name and unnamed, he adds, and one thing must be signified about one thing in an affirmation, i.e., in the enunciation, of which we are speaking now; and hence the subject of such an affirmation must be either the name or the infinite name. 3 Deinde cum dicit: nomen autem etc., exponit quod dixerat, et dicit quod supra dictum est quid sit nomen, et quid sit innominatum, idest infinitum nomen: quia, non homo, non est nomen, sed est infinitum nomen, sicut, non currit, non est verbum, sed infinitum verbum. Interponit autem quoddam, quod valet ad dubitationis remotionem, videlicet quod nomen infinitum quodam modo significat unum. Non enim significat simpliciter unum, sicut nomen finitum, quod significat unam formam generis vel speciei aut etiam individui, sed in quantum significat negationem formae alicuius, in qua negatione multa conveniunt, sicut in quodam uno secundum rationem. Unum enim eodem modo dicitur aliquid, sicut et ens; unde sicut ipsum non ens dicitur ens, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum quid, idest secundum rationem, ut patet in IV metaphysicae, ita etiam negatio est unum secundum quid, scilicet secundum rationem. Introducit autem hoc, ne aliquis dicat quod affirmatio, in qua subiicitur nomen infinitum, non significet unum de uno, quasi nomen infinitum non significet unum. When he says, we have already stated what a name is, etc., he relates what he has previously said. We have already stated, he says, what a name is and what that which is unnamed is, i.e., the infinite name. "Non-man” is not a name but an infinite name, and "non-runs” is not a verb but an infinite verb. Then he interposes a point that is useful for the preclusion of a difficulty, i.e., that an infinite name in a certain way does signify one thing. It does not signify one thing simply as the finite name does, which signifies one form of a genus or species, or even of an individual; rather it signifies one thing insofar as it signifies the negation of a form, in which negation many things are united, as in something one according to reason. For something is said to be one in the same way it is said to be a being. Hence, just as nonbeing is said to be being, not simply, but according to something, i.e., according to reason, as is evident in IV Metaphysicae, so also a negation is one according to something, i.e., according to reason. Aristotle introduces this point so that no one will say that an affirmation in which an infinite name is the subject does not signify one thing about one subject on the grounds that an infinite name does not signify something one. 4 Deinde cum dicit: erit omnis affirmatio etc., concludit propositum scilicet quod duplex est modus affirmationis. Quaedam enim est affirmatio, quae constat ex nomine et verbo; quaedam autem est quae constat ex infinito nomine et verbo. Et hoc sequitur ex hoc quod supra dictum est quod hoc, de quo affirmatio aliquid significat, vel est nomen vel innominatum. Et eadem differentia potest accipi ex parte negationis, quia de quocunque contingit affirmare, contingit et negare, ut in primo habitum est. When he says, every affirmation will be made up of a name and a verb or an infinite name and a verb, he concludes that the mode of affirmation is twofold. One consists of a name and a verb, the other of an infinite name and a verb. This follows from what has been said, namely, that that about which an affirmation signifies something is either a name or unnamed. The same difference can be taken on the part of negation, for of whatever something can be affirmed it can be denied, as was said in the first book. 5 Deinde cum dicit: praeter verbum etc., ostendit quod differentia enunciationum non potest sumi ex parte verbi. Dictum est enim supra quod, praeter verbum nulla est affirmatio vel negatio. Potest enim praeter nomen esse aliqua affirmatio vel negatio, videlicet si ponatur loco nominis infinitum nomen: loco autem verbi in enunciatione non potest poni infinitum verbum, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia infinitum verbum constituitur per additionem infinitae particulae, quae quidem addita verbo per se dicto, idest extra enunciationem posito, removet ipsum absolute, sicut addita nomini, removet formam nominis absolute: et ideo extra enunciationem potest accipi verbum infinitum per modum unius dictionis, sicut et nomen infinitum. Sed quando negatio additur verbo in enunciatione posito, negatio illa removet verbum ab aliquo, et sic facit enunciationem negativam: quod non accidit ex parte nominis. Non enim enunciatio efficitur negativa nisi per hoc quod negatur compositio, quae importatur in verbo: et ideo verbum infinitum in enunciatione positum fit verbum negativum. Secundo, quia in nullo variatur veritas enunciationis, sive utamur negativa particula ut infinitante verbum vel ut faciente negativam enunciationem; et ideo accipitur semper in simpliciori intellectu, prout est magis in promptu. Et inde est quod non diversificavit affirmationem per hoc, quod sit ex verbo vel infinito verbo, sicut diversificavit per hoc, quod est ex nomine vel infinito nomine. Est autem considerandum quod in nominibus et in verbis praeter differentiam finiti et infiniti est differentia recti et obliqui. Casus enim nominum, etiam verbo addito, non constituunt enunciationem significantem verum vel falsum, ut in primo habitum est: quia in obliquo nomine non concluditur ipse rectus, sed in casibus verbi includitur ipsum verbum praesentis temporis. Praeteritum enim et futurum, quae significant casus verbi, dicuntur per respectum ad praesens. Unde si dicatur, hoc erit, idem est ac si diceretur, hoc est futurum; hoc fuit, hoc est praeteritum. Et propter hoc, ex casu verbi et nomine fit enunciatio. Et ideo subiungit quod sive dicatur est, sive erit, sive fuit, vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi verba, sunt de numero praedictorum verborum, sine quibus non potest fieri enunciatio: quia omnia consignificant tempus, et alia tempora dicuntur per respectum ad praesens. When he says, There can be no affirmation or negation without a verb, etc., he intends to show that enunciations cannot be differentiated on the part of the verb. He made the point earlier that there is no affirmation or negation without a verb. However there can be an affirmation or negation without a name, i.e., when an infinite name is posited in place of a name.” An infinite verb, on the other hand, cannot be posited in an enunciation in place of a verb, and this for two reasons. First of all, the infinite verb is constituted by the addition of an infinite particle which, when added to a verb said by itself (i.e., posited outside of the enunciation), removes it absolutely, just as it removes the form of the name absolutely when added to it. Therefore, outside of the enunciation, the infinite verb, as well as the infinite name, can be taken in the mode of one word. But when a negation is added to the verb in an enunciation it removes the verb from something and thus makes the enunciation negative, which is not the case with respect to the name. For an enunciation is made negative by denying the composition which the verb introduces; hence, an infinite verb posited in the enunciation becomes a negative verb. Secondly, whichever way we use the negative particle, whether as making the verb infinite or as making a negative enunciation, the truth of the enunciation is not changed. The negative particle, therefore, is always taken in the more absolute sense, as being clearer. This, then, is why Aristotle does not diversify the affirmation as made up of a verb or infinite verb, but as made up of a name or an infinite name. It should also be noted that besides the difference of finite and infinite there is the difference of nominative and oblique cases. The cases of names even with a verb added do not constitute an enunciation signifying truth or falsity, as was said in the first book, for the nominative is not included in an oblique name. The verb of present time, however, is included in the cases of the verb, for the past and future, which the cases of the verb signify, are said with respect to the present. Whence, ‘if we say, "This will be,” it is the same as if we were to say, "This is future”; and "This has been” the same as "This is past.” A name, then, and a case of the verb do constitute an enunciation. Therefore Aristotle adds that "is,” or "will be,” or "was,” or any other verb of this kind that we use are of the number of the foresaid verbs without which an enunciation cannot be made, since they all signify with time and past and future time are said with respect to the present. 6 Deinde cum dicit: quare prima erit affirmatio etc., concludit ex praemissis distinctionem enunciationum in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur solum ex parte subiecti, in quibus triplex differentia intelligi potest: una quidem, secundum affirmationem et negationem; alia, secundum subiectum finitum et infinitum; tertia, secundum subiectum universaliter, vel non universaliter positum. Nomen autem finitum est ratione prius infinito sicut affirmatio prior est negatione; unde primam affirmationem ponit, homo est, et primam negationem, homo non est. Deinde ponit secundam affirmationem, non homo est, secundam autem negationem, non homo non est. Ulterius autem ponit illas enunciationes in quibus subiectum universaliter ponitur, quae sunt quatuor, sicut et illae in quibus est subiectum non universaliter positum. Praetermisit autem ponere exemplum de enunciationibus, in quibus subiicitur singulare, ut, Socrates est, Socrates non est, quia singularibus nominibus non additur aliquod signum. Unde in huiusmodi enunciationibus non potest omnis differentia inveniri. Similiter etiam praetermittit exemplificare de enunciationibus, quarum subiecta particulariter ponuntur, quia tale subiectum quodammodo eamdem vim habet cum subiecto universali, non universaliter sumpto. Non ponit autem aliquam differentiam ex parte verbi, quae posset sumi secundum casus verbi, quia sicut ipse dicit, in extrinsecis temporibus, idest in praeterito et in futuro, quae circumstant praesens, est eadem ratio sicut et in praesenti, ut iam dictum est. When he says, Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is, etc., he infers from the premises the distinction of enunciations in which the finite and infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject. Among these there is a threefold difference to be noted: the first, according to affirmation and negation; the second, according to finite and infinite subject; the third, according as the subject is posited universally or not universally. Now the finite name is prior in notion to the infinite name just as affirmation is prior to negation. Accordingly, he posits "Man is” as the first affirmation and "Man is not” as the first negation. Then he posits the second affirmation, "Non-man is,” and the second negation, "Non-man is not.” Finally he posits the enunciations in which the subject is universally posited. These are four, as are those in which the subject is not universally posited. The reason he does not give examples of the enunciation with a singular subject, such as "Socrates is” and "Socrates is not,” is that no sign is added to singular names, and hence not every difference can be found in them. Nor does he give examples of the enunciation in which the subject is taken particularly, for such a subject in a certain way has the same force as a universal subject not universally taken. He does not posit any difference on the part of the verb according to its cases because, as he himself says, affirmations and negations in regard to extrinsic times, i.e., past and future time which surround the prcsent, are similar to these, as has already been said. II. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit enunciationes, in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur solum ex parte subiecti, hic accedit ad distinguendum illas enunciationes, in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur ex parte subiecti et ex parte praedicati. Et circa hoc duo facit; primo, distinguit huiusmodi enunciationes; secundo, manifestat quaedam quae circa eas dubia esse possent; ibi: quoniam vero contrariaest et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, agit de enunciationibus in quibus nomen praedicatur cum hoc verbo, est; secundo de enunciationibus in quibus alia verba ponuntur; ibi: in his vero in quibus et cetera. Distinguit autem huiusmodi enunciationes sicut et primas, secundum triplicem differentiam ex parte subiecti consideratam: primo namque, agit de enunciationibus in quibus subiicitur nomen finitum non universaliter sumptum; secundo de illis in quibus subiicitur nomen finitum universaliter sumptum; ibi: similiter autem se habent etc.; tertio, de illis in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum; ibi: aliae autem habent ad id quod est non homo et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit diversitatem oppositionis talium enunciationum; secundo, concludit earum numerum et ponit earum habitudinem; ibi: quare quatuor etc.; tertio, exemplificat; ibi: intelligimus vero et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, exponit quoddam quod dixerat; ibi: dico autem et cetera. After distinguishing enunciations in which either a finite or an infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject, the Philosopher begins here to distinguish enunciations in which either a finite or an infinite name is posited as the subject and as the predicate. First he distinguishes these enunciations, and then he manifests certain things that might be doubtful in relation to them where he says, Since the negation contrary to "Every animal is just,” is the one signifying "No animal is just,” etc. With respect to their distinction he first deals with enunciations in which the name is predicated with the verb "is”; secondly, with those in which other verbs are used, where he says, In enunciations in which "is” does not join the predicate to the subject, for example, when the verb "matures” or "walks” is used, etc.” He distinguishes these enunciations as he did the primary enunciations, according to a threefold difference on the part of the subject, first treating those in which the subject is a finite name not taken universally, secondly, those in which the subject is a finite name taken universally where he says, The same is the case when the affirmation is of a name taken universally, etc.” Thirdly, he treats those in which an infinite name is the subject, where he says, and there are two other pairs, if something is added to non-man” as a subject, etc. With respect to the first enunciations [in which the subject is a finite name not taken universally] he proposes a diversity of oppositions and then concludes as to their number and states their relationship, where he says, In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, etc. Finally, he exemplifies this with a table. Aquinas lib. 2 l. 2 n. 2Circa primum duo oportet intelligere: primo quidem, quid est hoc quod dicit, est tertium adiacens praedicatur. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod hoc verbum est quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est: per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se, quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi coniunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est albus, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo, est; et ideo in talibus, est, praedicatur ut adiacens principali praedicato. Et dicitur esse tertium, non quia sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enunciatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum, ut sic enunciatio dividatur in duas partes et non in tres. In relation to the first point two things have to be understood. First, what is meant by "is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation. To clarify this we must note that the verb "is” itself is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in "Socrates is.” By this we intend to signify that Socrates really is. Sometimes, however, "is” is not predicated as the principal predicate, but is joined to the principal predicate to connect it to the subject, as in "Socrates is white.” Here the intention is not to assert that Socrates really is, but to attribute whiteness to him by means of the verb "is.” Hence, in such enunciations "is” is predicated as added to the principal predicate. It is said to be third, not because it is a third predicate, but because it is a third word posited in the enunciation, which together with the name predicated makes one predicate. The enunciation is thus divided into two parts and not three. Considerandum est quid est hoc, quod dicit quod quando est, eo modo quo dictum est, tertium adiacens praedicatur, dupliciter dicuntur oppositiones. Circa quod considerandum est quod in praemissis enunciationibus, in quibus nomen ponebatur solum ex parte subiecti, secundum quodlibet subiectum erat una oppositio; puta si subiectum erat nomen finitum non universaliter sumptum, erat sola una oppositio, scilicet est homo, non est homo. Sed quando est tertium adiacens praedicatur, oportet esse duas oppositiones eodem subiecto existente secundum differentiam nominis praedicati, quod potest esse finitum vel infinitum; sicut haec est una oppositio, homo est iustus, homo non est iustus: alia vero oppositio est, homo est non iustus, homo non est non iustus. Non enim negatio fit nisi per appositionem negativae particulae ad hoc verbum est, quod est nota praedicationis. Secondly, we must consider what he means by when "is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, in the mode in which we have explained, there are two oppositions. In the enunciations already treated, in which the name is posited only on the part of the subject, there was one opposition in relation to any subject. For example, if the subject was a finite name not taken universally there was only one opposition, "Man is,” "Man is not.” But when "is” is predicated in addition there are two oppositions with regard to the same subject corresponding to the difference of the predicate name, which can be finite or infinite. There is the opposition of "Man is just,” "Man is not just,” and the opposition, "Man is non-just,” "Man is not non-just.” For the negation is effected by applying the negative particle to the verb "is,” which is a sign of a predication. 4 Deinde cum dicit: dico autem, ut est iustus etc., exponit quod dixerat, est tertium adiacens, et dicit quod cum dicitur, homo est iustus, hoc verbum est, adiacet, scilicet praedicato, tamquam tertium nomen vel verbum in affirmatione. Potest enim ipsum est, dici nomen, prout quaelibet dictio nomen dicitur, et sic est tertium nomen, idest tertia dictio. Sed quia secundum communem usum loquendi, dictio significans tempus magis dicitur verbum quam nomen, propter hoc addit, vel verbum, quasi dicat, ad hoc quod sit tertium, non refert utrum dicatur nomen vel verbum.When he says, I mean by this that in an enunciation such as"Man is just,” etc., he explains what he means by when "is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation. When we say "Man is just,” the verb "is” is added to the predicate as a third name or verb in the affirmation. Now "is,” like any other word, may be called a name, and thus it is a third name, i.e., word. But because, according to common usage, a word signifying time is called a verb rather than a name Aristotle adds here, or verb, as if to say that with respect to the fact that it is a third thing, it does not matter whether it is called a name or a verb. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quare quatuor erunt etc., concludit numerum enunciationum. Et primo, ponit conclusionem numeri; secundo, ponit earum habitudinem; ibi: quarum duae quidem etc.; tertio, rationem numeri explicat; ibi: dico autem quoniam est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quia duae sunt oppositiones, quando est tertium adiacens praedicatur, cum omnis oppositio sit inter duas enunciationes, consequens est quod sint quatuor enunciationes illae in quibus est, tertium adiacens, praedicatur, subiecto finito non universaliter sumpto. Deinde cum dicit: quarum duae quidem etc., ostendit habitudinem praedictarum enunciationum ad invicem; et dicit quod duae dictarum enunciationum se habent ad affirmationem et negationem secundum consequentiam, sive secundum correlationem, aut analogiam, ut in Graeco habetur, sicut privationes; aliae vero duae minime. Quod quia breviter et obscure dictum est, diversimode a diversis expositum est. He goes on to say, In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, etc. Here he concludes to the number of the enunciations, first giving the number, and then their relationship where he says, two of which will correspond in their sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation, with the privations but two will not. Finally, he explains the reason for the number where he says, I mean that the "is” will be added either to "just” or to "non-just,” etc. He says first, then, that since there are two oppositions when "is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, and since every opposition is between two enunciations, it follows that there are four enunciations in which "is” is predicated as a third element when the subject is finite and is not taken universally. When he says, two of which will correspond in their sequence, etc., he shows their relationship. Two of these enunciations are related to affirmation and negation according to consequence (or according to correlation or proportion, as it is in the Greek) like privations; the other two are not. Because this is said so briefly and obscurely, it has been explained in diverse ways. 6 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod tripliciter nomen potest praedicari in huiusmodi enunciationibus. Quandoque enim praedicatur nomen finitum, secundum quod assumuntur duae enunciationes, una affirmativa et altera negativa, scilicet homo est iustus, et homo non est iustus; quae dicuntur simplices. Quandoque vero praedicatur nomen infinitum, secundum quod etiam assumuntur duae aliae, scilicet homo est non iustus, homo non est non iustus; quae dicuntur infinitae. Quandoque vero praedicatur nomen privativum, secundum quod etiam sumuntur duae aliae, scilicet homo est iniustus, homo non est iniustus; quae dicuntur privativae. Before we take up the various explanations of this passage there is a general point in relation to it that needs to be clarified. In this kind of enunciation a name can be predicated in three ways. We can predicate a finite name and by this we obtain two enunciations, one affirmative and one negative, "Man is just” and "Man is not just.” These are called simple enunciations. Or, we can predicate an infinite name and by this we obtain two other enunciations, "Man is non-just” and "Man is not non-just,” These are called infinite enunciations. Finally, we can predicate a privative name and again we will have two, "Man is unjust” and "Man is not unjust.” These are called privative. 7 Quidam ergo sic exposuerunt, quod duae enunciationes earum, quas praemiserat scilicet illae, quae sunt de infinito praedicato, se habent ad affirmationem et negationem, quae sunt de praedicato finito secundum consequentiam vel analogiam, sicut privationes, idest sicut illae, quae sunt de praedicato privativo. Illae enim duae, quae sunt de praedicato infinito, se habent secundum consequentiam ad illas, quae sunt de finito praedicato secundum transpositionem quandam, scilicet affirmatio ad negationem et negatio ad affirmationem. Nam homo est non iustus, quae est affirmatio de infinito praedicato, respondet secundum consequentiam negativae de praedicato finito, huic scilicet homo non est iustus. Negativa vero de infinito praedicato, scilicet homo non est non iustus, affirmativae de finito praedicato, huic scilicet homo est iustus. Propter quod Theophrastus vocabat eas, quae sunt de infinito praedicato, transpositas. Et similiter etiam affirmativa de privativo praedicato respondet secundum consequentiam negativae de finito praedicato, scilicet haec, homo est iniustus, ei quae est, homo non est iustus. Negativa vero affirmativae, scilicet haec, homo non est iniustus, ei quae est, homo est iustus. Disponatur ergo in figura. Et in prima quidem linea ponantur illae, quae sunt de finito praedicato, scilicet homo est iustus, homo non est iustus. In secunda autem linea, negativa de infinito praedicato sub affirmativa de finito et affirmativa sub negativa. In tertia vero, negativa de privativo praedicato similiter sub affirmativa de finito et affirmativa sub negativa: ut patet in subscripta figura. (Figura). Sic ergo duae, scilicet quae sunt de infinito praedicato, se habent ad affirmationem et negationem de finito praedicato, sicut privationes, idest sicut illae quae sunt de privativo praedicato. Sed duae aliae quae sunt de infinito subiecto, scilicet non homo est iustus, non homo non est iustus, manifestum est quod non habent similem consequentiam. Et hoc modo exposuit herminus hoc quod dicitur, duae vero, minime, referens hoc ad illas quae sunt de infinito subiecto. Sed hoc manifeste est contra litteram. Nam cum praemisisset quatuor enunciationes, duas scilicet de finito praedicato et duas de infinito, subiungit quasi illas subdividens, quarum duae quidem et cetera. Duae vero, minime; ubi datur intelligi quod utraeque duae intelligantur in praemissis. Illae autem quae sunt de infinito subiecto non includuntur in praemissis, sed de his postea dicetur. Unde manifestum est quod de eis nunc non loquitur. Now the passage in question has been explained by some in the following way. Two of the enunciations he has given, those with an infinite predicate, are related to the affirmation and negation of the finite predicate according to consequence or analogy, as are privations, i.e., as those with a privative predicate. For the two with an infinite predicate are related according to consequence to those with a finite predicate but in a transposed way, namely, affirmation to negation and negation to affirmation. That is, "Man is non-just,” the affirmation of the infinite predicate, corresponds according to consequence to the negative of the finite predicate, i.e., to "Man is not just”; the negative of the infinite predicate, "Man is not non-just,” corresponds to the affirmative of the finite predicate, i.e., to "Man is just.” Theophrastus for this reason called those with the infinite predicate, "transposed.” The affirmative with a privative predicate also corresponds according to consequence to the negative with a finite predicate, i.e., "Man is unjust” to "Man is not just”; and the negative of the privative predicate to the affirmative of the finite predicate, "Man is not unjust” to "Man is just.” These enunciations can therefore be placed in a table in the following way: Man is just Man is not non-just Man is not unjust Man is not just Man is non-just Man is unjust This makes it clear that two, those with the infinite predicate, are related to the affirmation and negation of the finite predicate in the way privations are, i.e., as those that have a privative predicate. It is also evident that there are two others that do not have a similar consequence, i.e., those with an infinite subject, "Non-man is just” and "Non-man is not just.” This is the way Herminus explained the words but two will not, i.e., by referring it to enunciations with an infinite subject. This, however, is clearly contrary to the words of Aristotle, for after giving the four enunciations, two with a finite predicate and two with an infinite predicate, he adds two of which... but two will not, as though he were subdividing them, which can only mean that both pairs are comprised in what he is saying. He does not include among these the ones with an infinite subject but will mention them later. It is clear, then, that he is not speaking of these here. 8 Et ideo, ut Ammonius dicit, alii aliter exposuerunt, dicentes quod praedictarum quatuor propositionum duae, scilicet quae sunt de infinito praedicato, sic se habent ad affirmationem et negationem, idest ad ipsam speciem affirmationis et negationis, ut privationes, idest ut privativae affirmationes seu negationes. Haec enim affirmatio, homo est non iustus, non est simpliciter affirmatio, sed secundum quid, quasi secundum privationem affirmatio; sicut homo mortuus non est homo simpliciter, sed secundum privationem; et idem dicendum est de negativa, quae est de infinito praedicato. Duae vero, quae sunt de finito praedicato, non se habent ad speciem affirmationis et negationis secundum privationem, sed simpliciter. Haec enim, homo est iustus, est simpliciter affirmativa, et haec, homo non est iustus, est simpliciter negativa. Sed nec hic sensus convenit verbis Aristotelis. Dicit enim infra: haec igitur quemadmodum in resolutoriis dictum est, sic sunt disposita; ubi nihil invenitur ad hunc sensum pertinens. Et ideo Ammonius ex his, quae in fine I priorum dicuntur de propositionibus, quae sunt de finito vel infinito vel privativo praedicato, alium sensum accipit. Since this exposition is not consonant with Aristotle’s words, others, Ammonius says, have explained this in another way. According to them, two of the four propositions, those of the infinite predicate, are related to affirmation and negation, i.e., to the species itself of affirmation and negation, as privations, that is, as privative affirmations and negations. For the affirmation, "Man is non-just,” is not an affirmation simply, but relatively, as though according to privation; as a dead man is not a man simply, but according to privation. The same thing applies to the negative enunciation with an infinite predicate. However, the two enunciations having finite predicates are not related to the species of affirmation and negation according to privation, but simply, for the enunciation "Man is just” is simply affirmative and "Man is not just” is simply negative. But this meaning does not correspond to the words of Aristotle either, for he says further on: This, then, is the way these are arranged, as we have said in the Analytics, but there is nothing in that text pertaining to this meaning. Ammonius, therefore, interprets this differently and in accordance with what is said at the end of I Priorum [46: 51b 5] about propositions having a finite or infinite or privative predicate. Aquinas lib. 2 l. 2 n. 9 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, sicut ipse dicit, enunciatio aliqua virtute se habet ad illud, de quo totum id quod in enunciatione significatur vere praedicari potest: sicut haec enunciatio, homo est iustus, se habet ad omnia illa, de quorum quolibet vere potest dici quod est homo iustus; et similiter haec enunciatio, homo non est iustus, se habet ad omnia illa, de quorum quolibet vere dici potest quod non est homo iustus. Secundum ergo hunc modum loquendi, manifestum est quod simplex negativa in plus est quam affirmativa infinita, quae ei correspondet. Nam, quod sit homo non iustus, vere potest dici de quolibet homine, qui non habet habitum iustitiae; sed quod non sit homo iustus, potest dici non solum de homine non habente habitum iustitiae, sed etiam de eo qui penitus non est homo: haec enim est vera, lignum non est homo iustus; tamen haec est falsa, lignum est homo non iustus. Et ita negativa simplex est in plus quam affirmativa infinita; sicut etiam animal est in plus quam homo, quia de pluribus verificatur. Simili etiam ratione, negativa simplex est in plus quam affirmativa privativa: quia de eo quod non est homo non potest dici quod sit homo iniustus. Sed affirmativa infinita est in plus quam affirmativa privativa: potest enim dici de puero et de quocumque homine nondum habente habitum virtutis aut vitii quod sit homo non iustus, non tamen de aliquo eorum vere dici potest quod sit homo iniustus. Affirmativa vero simplex in minus est quam negativa infinita: quia quod non sit homo non iustus potest dici non solum de homine iusto, sed etiam de eo quod penitus non est homo. Similiter etiam negativa privativa in plus est quam negativa infinita. Nam, quod non sit homo iniustus, potest dici non solum de homine habente habitum iustitiae, sed de eo quod penitus non est homo, de quorum quolibet potest dici quod non sit homo non iustus: sed ulterius potest dici de omnibus hominibus, qui nec habent habitum iustitiae neque habent habitum iniustitiae. To make Ammonius’ explanation clear, it must be noted that, as Aristotle himself says, the enunciation, by some power, is related to that of which the whole of what is signified in the enunciation can be truly predicated. The enunciation, "Man is just,” for example, is related to all those of which in any way "is a just man” can be truly said. So, too, the enunciation "Man is not just” is related to all those of which in any way "is not a just man” can be truly said. According to this mode of speaking it is evident, then, that the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative which corresponds to it. Thus, "is a non-just man” can truly be said of any man who does not have the habit of justice; but "is not a just man” can be said not only of a man not having the habit of justice, but also of what is not a man at all. For example, it is true to say "Wood is not a just man,” but false to say, "Wood is a non-just man.” The simple negative, then, is wider than the infinite affirmative-just as animal is wider than man, since it is verified of more. For a similar reason the simple negative is wider than the privative affirmative, for "is an unjust man” cannot be said of what is not man. But the infinite affirmative is wider than the private affirmative, for "is a non-just man” can be truly said of a boy or of any man not yet having a habit of virtue or vice, but "is an unjust man” cannot. And the simple affirmative is narrower than the infinite negative, for "is not a non-just man” can be said not only of a just man, but also of what is not man at all. Similarly, the privative negative is wider than the infinite negative. For "is not an unjust man” can be said not only of a man having the habit of justice and of what is not man at all—of which "is not a non-just man” can be said—but over and beyond this can be said about all men who neither have the habit of justice nor the habit of injustice. 10 His igitur visis, facile est exponere praesentem litteram hoc modo. Quarum, scilicet quatuor enunciationum praedictarum, duae quidem, scilicet infinitae, se habebunt ad affirmationem et negationem, idest ad duas simplices, quarum una est affirmativa et altera negativa, secundum consequentiam, idest in modo consequendi ad eas, ut privationes, idest sicut duae privativae: quia scilicet, sicut ad simplicem affirmativam sequitur negativa infinita, et non convertitur (eo quod negativa infinita est in plus), ita etiam ad simplicem affirmativam sequitur negativa privativa, quae est in plus, et non convertitur. Sed sicut simplex negativa sequitur ad infinitam affirmativam; quae est in minus, et non convertitur; ita etiam negativa simplex sequitur ad privativam affirmativam, quae est in minus, et non convertitur. Ex quo patet quod eadem est habitudo in consequendo infinitarum ad simplices quae est etiam privativarum. With these points in mind it is easy to explain the present sentence in Aristotle. Two of which, i.e., the infinites, will be related to the simple affirmation and negation according to consequence, i.e., in their mode of following upon the two simple enunciations, the infinitives will be related as are privations, i.e., as the two privative enunciations. For just as the infinite negative follows upon the simple affirmative, and.is not convertible with it (because the infinite negative is wider), so also the privative negative which is wider follows upon the simple affirmative and is not convertible. But just as the simple negative follows upon the infinite affirmative, which is narrower and is not convertible with it, so also the simple negative follows upon the privative affirmative, which is narrower and is not convertible. From this it is clear that there is the same relationship, with respect to consequence, of infinites to simple enunciations as there is of privatives. 11 Sequitur, duae autem, scilicet simplices, quae relinquuntur, remotis duabus, scilicet infinitis, a quatuor praemissis, minime, idest non ita se habent ad infinitas in consequendo, sicut privativae se habent ad eas; quia videlicet, ex una parte simplex affirmativa est in minus quam negativa infinita, sed negativa privativa est in plus quam negativa infinita: ex alia vero parte, negativa simplex est in plus quam affirmativa infinita, sed affirmativa privativa est in minus quam infinita affirmativa. Sic ergo patet quod simplices non ita se habent ad infinitas in consequendo, sicut privativae se habent ad infinitas. He goes on to say, but two, i.e., the simple entinciations that are left after the two infinite enunciations have been taken care of, will not, i.e., are not related to infinites according to consequence as privatives are related to them, because, on the one hand, the simple affirmative is narrower than the infinite negative, and the privative negative wider than the infinite negative; and on the other hand, the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative, and the privative affirmative narrower than the infinite affirmative. Thus it is clear that simple entinciations are riot related to infinites in respect to consequence as privatives are related to infinites. 12 Quamvis autem secundum hoc littera philosophi subtiliter exponatur, tamen videtur esse aliquantulum expositio extorta. Nam littera philosophi videtur sonare diversas habitudines non esse attendendas respectu diversorum; sicut in praedicta expositione primo accipitur similitudo habitudinis ad simplices, et postea dissimilitudo habitudinis respectu infinitarum. Et ideo simplicior et magis conveniens litterae Aristotelis est expositio Porphyrii quam Boethius ponit; secundum quam expositionem attenditur similitudo et dissimilitudo secundum consequentiam affirmativarum ad negativas. Unde dicit: quarum, scilicet quatuor praemissarum, duae quidem, scilicet affirmativae, quarum una est simplex et alia infinita, se habebunt secundum consequentiam ad affirmationem et negationem; ut scilicet ad unam affirmativam sequatur alterius negativa. Nam ad affirmativam simplicem sequitur negativa infinita; et ad affirmativam infinitam sequitur negativa simplex. Duae vero, scilicet negativae, minime, idest non ita se habent ad affirmativas, ut scilicet ex negativis sequantur affirmativae, sicut ex affirmativis sequebantur negativae. Et quantum ad utrumque similiter se habent privativae sicut infinitae. But although this explains the words of the Philosopher in a subtle manner the explanation appears a bit forced. For the words of the Philosopher seem to say that diverse relationships will not apply in respect to diverse things; however, in the exposition we have just seen, first there is an explanation of a similitude of relationship to simple enunciations and then an explanation of a dissimilitude of relationship in respect to infinites. The simpler exposition of this passage of Aristotle by Porphyry, which Boethius gives, is therefore more apposite. According to Porphyry’s explanation there is similitude and dissimilitude according to consequence of affirmatives and negatives. Thus Aristotle is saying: Of which, i.e., the four enunciations we are discussing, two, i.e., affirmatives, one simple and the other infinite, will be related according to consequence in regard to affirmation and negation, i.e., so that upon one affirmative follows the other negative, for the infinite negative follows upon the simple affirmative and the simple negative upon the infinite affirmative. But two, i.e., the negatives, will not, i.e., are not so related to affirmatives, i.e., so that affirmatives follow from negatives. And with respect to both, privatives are related in the same way as the infinites. Aquinas lib. 2 l. 2 n. 13Deinde cum dicit: dico autem quoniam etc., manifestat quoddam quod supra dixerat, scilicet quod sint quatuor praedictae enunciationes: loquimur enim nunc de enunciationibus, in quibus hoc verbum est solum praedicatur secundum quod est adiacens alicui nomini finito vel infinito: puta secundum quod adiacet iusto; ut cum dicitur, homo est iustus, vel secundum quod adiacet non iusto; ut cum dicitur, homo est non iustus. Et quia in neutra harum negatio apponitur ad verbum, consequens est quod utraque sit affirmativa. Omni autem affirmationi opponitur negatio, ut supra in primo ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod praedictis duabus enunciationibus affirmativis respondet duae aliae negativae. Et sic consequens est quod sint quatuor simplices enunciationes. Then Aristotle says, I mean that the "is” will be added either to "just” or to "non-just,” etc. Here he shows how, under these circumstances, we get four enunciations. We are speaking now of enunciations in which the verb "is” is predicated as added to some finite or infinite name, for instance as it adjoins "just” in "Man is just,” or "non-just” in "Man is non-just.” Now since the negation is not applied to the verb in either of these, each is affirmative. However, there is a negation opposed to every affirmation as was shown in the first book. Therefore, two negatives correspond to the two foresaid affirmative enunciations, making four simple enunciations. 14 Deinde cum dicit: intelligimus vero etc., manifestat quod supra dictum est per quandam figuralem descriptionem. Dicit enim quod id, quod in supradictis dictum est, intelligi potest ex sequenti subscriptione. Sit enim quaedam quadrata figura, in cuius uno angulo describatur haec enunciatio, homo est iustus, et ex opposito describatur eius negatio quae est, homo non est iustus; sub quibus scribantur duae aliae infinitae, scilicet homo est non iustus, homo non est non iustus. (Figura). In qua descriptione apparet quod hoc verbum est, affirmativum vel negativum, adiacet iusto et non iusto. Et secundum hoc diversificantur quatuor enunciationes. Then he says, The following diagram will make this clear. Here he manifests what he has said by a diagrammatic description; for, as he says, what has been stated can be understood from the following diagram. Take a four-sided figure and in one corner write the enunciation "Man is just.” Opposite it write its negation "Man is not just,” and under these the two infinite enunciations, "Man is non-just,” "Man is not non-just.” Man is just Man is not non-just Man is not just Man is non-just It is evident from this table that the verb "is” whether affirmative or negative is adjoined to "just” and "non-just.” It is according to this that the four enunciations are diversified. 15 Ultimo autem concludit quod praedictae enunciationes disponuntur secundum ordinem consequentiae, prout dictum est in resolutoriis, idest in I priorum. Alia littera habet: dico autem, quoniam est aut homini aut non homini adiacebit, et in figura, est, hoc loco homini et non homini adiacebit. Quod quidem non est intelligendum, ut homo, et non homo accipiatur ex parte subiecti, non enim nunc agitur de enunciationibus quae sunt de infinito subiecto. Unde oportet quod homo et non homo accipiantur ex parte praedicati. Sed quia philosophus exemplificat de enunciationibus in quibus ex parte praedicati ponitur iustum et non iustum, visum est Alexandro, quod praedicta littera sit corrupta. Quibusdam aliis videtur quod possit sustineri et quod signanter Aristoteles nomina in exemplis variaverit, ut ostenderet quod non differt in quibuscunque nominibus ponantur exempla. Finally, he concludes that these enunciations are disposed aaccording to an order of consequence that he has stated in the Analytics, i.e., in I Priorum [46: 51b 5]. There is a variant reading of a previous portion of this text, namely, I mean that "is” will be added either to "man” or to non-man,” and in the diagram "is” is added to "man” and "non-man. This cannot be understood to mean that "man” and "non-man” are taken on the part of the subject; for Aristotle is not treating here of enunciations with an infinite subject and hence "man” and "non-man” must be taken on the part of the predicate. This variant text seemed to Alexander to be corrupt, for the Philosopher has been explicating enunciations in which "just” and "non-just” are posited on the part of the predicate. Others think it can be sustained and that Aristotle has intentionally varied the names to show that it makes no difference what names are used in the examples. III. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit enunciationes in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum non universaliter sumptum, hic intendit distinguere enunciationes, in quibus subiicitur nomen finitum universaliter sumptum. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, ponit similitudinem istarum enunciationum ad infinitas supra positas; secundo, ostendit dissimilitudinem earumdem; ibi: sed non similiter etc.; tertio, concludit numerum oppositionum inter dictas enunciationes; ibi: hae duae igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod similes sunt enunciationes, in quibus est nominis universaliter sumpti affirmatio. Having distinguished enunciations in which the subject is an infinite name not taken universally, Aristotle now distinguishes enunciations in which the subject is a finite name taken universally. He first proposes a similarity between these enunciations and the infinite enunciations already discussed, and then shows their difference where he says, But it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that those on the diagonal both be true, etc. Finally, he concludes with the number of oppositions there are between these enunciations where he says, These two pairs, then, are opposed, etc. He says first, then, that enunciations in which the affirmation is of a name taken universally are similar to those already discussed. 2 Quoad primum notandum est quod in enunciationibus indefinitis supra positis erant duae oppositiones et quatuor enunciationes, et affirmativae inferebant negativas, et non inferebantur ab eis, ut patet tam in expositione Ammonii, quam Porphyrii. Ita in enunciationibus in quibus subiicitur nomen finitum universaliter sumptum inveniuntur duae oppositiones et quatuor enunciationes: et affirmativae inferunt negativas et non e contra. Unde similiter se habent enunciationes supradictae, si nominis in subiecto sumpti fiat affirmatio universaliter. Fient enim tunc quatuor enunciationes: duae de praedicato finito, scilicet omnis homo est iustus, et eius negatio quae est non omnis homo est iustus; et duae de praedicato infinito, scilicet omnis homo est non iustus, et eius negatio quae est, non omnis homo est non iustus. Et quia quaelibet affirmatio cum sua negatione unam integrat oppositionem, duae efficiuntur oppositiones, sicut et de indefinitis dictum est. Nec obstat quod de enunciationibus universalibus loquens particulares inseruit; quoniam sicut supra de indefinitis et suis negationibus sermonem fecit, ita nunc de affirmationibus universalibus sermonem faciens de earum negationibus est coactus loqui. Negatio siquidem universalis affirmativae non est universalis negativa, sed particularis negativa, ut in I libro habitum est. It is to be noted in relation to Aristotle’s first point that in indefinite enunciations there were two oppositions and four enunciations, the affirmatives inferring the negatives and not being inferred by them, as is clear in the exposition of Ammonius as well as of Porphyry. In enunciations in which the finite name universally taken is the subject there are also two oppositions and four eminciations, the affirmatives inferring the negatives and not the contrary. Hence, enunciations are related in a similar way if the affirmation is made universally of the name taken as the subject. For again, four enunciations will be made, two with a finite predicate-"Every man is just,” and its negation, "Not every man is just”-and two with an infinite predicate-"Every man is non-just” and its negation, "Not every man is non-just.” And since any affirmation together with its negation makes one whole opposition, two oppositions are made, as was also said of indefinite enunciations. There might seem to be an objection to his use of particulars when speaking of universal enunciations, but this cannot be objected to, for just as in dealing with indefinite enunciations he spoke of their negations, so now in dealing with universal affirmatives be is forced to speak of their negations. The negation of the universal affirmative, however, is not the do universal but the particular negative as was stated in the first book. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 3 n. 3Quod autem similis sit consequentia in istis et supradictis indefinitis patet exemplariter. Et ne multa loquendo res clara prolixitate obtenebretur, formetur primo figura de indefinitis, quae supra posita est in expositione Porphyrii, scilicet ex una parte ponatur affirmativa finita, et sub ea negativa infinita, et sub ista negativa privativa. Ex altera parte primo negativa finita, et sub ea affirmativa infinita, et sub ea affirmativa privativa. Deinde sub illa figura formetur alia figura similis illi universaliter: ponatur scilicet ex una parte universalis affirmativa de praedicato finito, et sub ea particularis negativa de praedicato infinito, et ad complementum similitudinis sub ista particularis negativa de praedicato privativo; ex altera vero parte ponatur primo particularis negativa de praedicato infinito, et sub ea universalis affirmativa de praedicato finito, et sub ista universalis affirmativa de praedicato privativo, hoc modo: (Figura). Quibus ita dispositis, exerceatur consequentia semper in ista proxima figura, sicut supra in indefinitis exercita est: sive sequendo expositionem Ammonii, ut infinitae se habeant ad finitas, sicut privativae se habent ad ipsas finitas; finitae autem non se habeant ad infinitas medias, sicut privativae se habent ad ipsas infinitas: sive sectando expositionem Porphyrii, ut affirmativae inferant negativas, et non e contra. Utrique enim expositioni suprascriptae deserviunt figurae, ut patet diligenter indaganti. Similiter ergo se habent enunciationes istae universales ad indefinitas in tribus, scilicet in numero propositionum, et numero oppositionum, et modo consequentiae. A table will make it evident that the consequence is similar in these and in indefinite eminciations. And lest what is clear be made obscure by prolixity let us first make a diagram of the indefinites posited in the last lesson, based upon the exposition of Porphyry. Place the finite affirmative on one side and under it the infinite negative, and under this the privative negative. On the other side put the finite negative first, under it the infinite affirmative, and under this the privative affirmative. Then under this diagram make another similar to it but of universals. On one side put the universal affirmative of the finite predicate, under it the particular negative of the infinite predicate, and to complete the parallel put the particular negative of the privative predicate under this. On the other side, first put the particular negative of the infinite predicate, under it the universal affirmative of the finite predicate,” and under this the universal affirmative of the privative predicate. Thus: DIAGRAM OF THE INDEFINITES Man is just Man is not just Man is not non-just Man is non-just Man is not unjust Man is unjust DIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSALS Every man is just Not every man is just. Not every man is non-just Every man is non-just Not every man is unjust Every man is unjust In this disposition of enunciations, the consequence always follows in the second diagram just as it followed in regard to indefinites in the first diagram. This is true if we follow the exposition of Ammonius in which infinites are related to finites as privatives are related to the same finites, and the finites not related to the infinite middle enunciatious as privatives are related to those infinites. It is equally true if we follow the exposition of Porphyry, in which affirmatives infer negatives and not vice versa. That the tables serve both expositions will be clear to one studying them. These universal enunciations, therefore, are related in like manner to indefinite entinciations in three things: the number of propositions, the number of oppositions, and the mode of consequence. 4 Deinde cum dicit: sed non similiter angulares etc., ponit dissimilitudinem inter istas universales et supradictas indefinitas, in hoc quod angulares non similiter contingit veras esse. Quae verba primo exponenda sunt secundum eam, quam credimus esse ad mentem Aristotelis, expositionem; deinde secundum alios. Angulares enunciationes in utraque figura suprascripta vocat eas quae sunt diametraliter oppositae, scilicet affirmativam finitam ex uno angulo, et affirmativam infinitam sive privativam ex alio angulo: et similiter negativam finitam ex uno angulo, et negativam infinitam vel privativam ex alio angulo. When he says, But it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that those on the diagonal both be true, etc., he proposes a difference between the universals and the indefinites, i.e., that it is not possible for the diagonals to be true in the case of universals. First we will explain these words according to the exposition we believe Aristotle had in mind, then according to the opinion of others. Aristotle means by diagonal eminciations those that are diametrically opposed in the diagram above, i.e., the finite affirmative in one corner and the infinite affirmative or the privative in the other; and the finite negative in one corner and the, infinite negative or privative in the other. 5 Enunciationes ergo in qualitate similes angulares vocatae, eo quod angulares, idest diametraliter distant, dissimilis veritatis sunt apud indefinitas et universales. Angulares enim indefinitae tam in diametro affirmationum, quam in diametro negationum possunt esse simul verae, ut patet in suprascripta figura indefinitarum. Et hoc intellige in materia contingenti. Angulares vero in figura universalium non sic se habent, quoniam angulares secundum diametrum affirmationum impossibile est esse simul veras in quacumque materia. Angulares autem secundum diametrum negationum quandoque possunt esse simul verae, quando scilicet fiunt in materia contingenti: in materia enim necessaria et remota impossibile est esse ambas veras. Haec est Boethii, quam veram credimus, expositio. Enunciations that are similar in quality, and called diagonal because diametrically distant, are dissimilar in truth, tben, in the case of indefinites and universals. The indefinites on the corners, both oil the diagonal of affirmations and the diagonal of negations can be simultaneously true, as is evident in the table of the indefinite entinciations. This is to be understood in regard to contingent matter. But diagonals of universals are not so related, for angtilars on the diagonal of affirmations cannot be simultaneously true in any matter. Those on the diagonal of negations, however, can sometimes be true simultaneously, i.e., when they are in contingerlt matter. In necessary and rernote matter it is impossible for both of these to be true. This is the exposition of Boethitis, which we believe to be the true one. 6 Herminus autem, Boethio referente, aliter exponit. Licet enim ponat similitudinem inter universales et indefinitas quoad numerum enunciationum et oppositionum, oppositiones tamen aliter accipit in universalibus et aliter in indefinitis. Oppositiones siquidem indefinitarum numerat sicut et nos numeravimus, alteram scilicet inter finitas affirmativam et negativam, et alteram inter infinitas affirmativam et negativam, quemadmodum nos fecimus. Universalium vero non sic numerat oppositiones, sed alteram sumit inter universalem affirmativam finitam et particularem negativam finitam, scilicet omnis homo est iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, et alteram inter eamdem universalem affirmativam finitam et universalem affirmativam infinitam, scilicet omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo est non iustus. Inter has enim est contrarietas, inter illas vero contradictio. Dissimilitudinem etiam universalium ad indefinitas aliter ponit. Non enim nobiscum fundat dissimilitudinem inter angulares universalium et indefinitarum supra differentiam quae est inter angulares universalium affirmativas et negativas, sed supra differentiam quae est inter ipsas universalium angulares inter se ex utraque parte. Format namque talem figuram, in qua ex una parte sub universali affirmativa finita, universalis affirmativa infinita est; et ex alia parte sub particulari negativa finita, particularis negativa infinita ponitur; sicque angulares sunt disparis qualitatis, et similiter indefinitarum figuram format hoc modo: (Figura). Quibus ita dispositis, ait in hoc stare dissimilitudinem, quod angulares indefinitarum mutuo se invicem compellunt ad veritatis sequelam, ita quod unius angularis veritas suae angularis veritatem infert undecumque incipias. Universalium vero angulares non se mutuo compellunt ad veritatem, sed ex altera parte necessitas deficit illationis. Si enim incipias ab aliquo universalium et ad suam angularem procedas, veritas universalis non ita potest esse simul cum veritate angularis, quod compellit eam ad veritatem: quia si universalis est vera, sua universalis contraria erit falsa: non enim possunt esse simul verae. Et si ista universalis contraria est falsa, sua contradictoria particularis, quae est angularis primae universalis assumptae, erit necessario vera: impossibile est enim contradictorias esse simul falsas. Si autem incipias e converso ab aliqua particularium et ad suam angularem procedas, veritas particularis ita potest stare cum veritate suae angularis, quod tamen non necessario infert eius veritatem: quia licet sequatur: particularis est vera; ergo sua universalis contradictoria est falsa; non tamen sequitur ultra: ista universalis contradictoria est falsa; ergo sua universalis contraria, quae est angularis particularis assumpti, est vera. Possunt enim contrariae esse simul falsae. Herminus, however, according to Boethius, explains this in another way. He takes the oppositions in one way in universals and in another in indefinites, although he holds that there is a likeness between universals and indefinites with respect to the n timber of enunciations and of oppositions. He arrives at the oppositions of indefinites we have, i.e., one between the affirmative and negative finites, and the other between the affirmative and negative infinites. But he disposes the oppositions of universals in another way, taking one between the finite universal affirmative and finite particular negative, "Every man is just” and "Not every man is just,” and the other between the same finite universal affirmative and the infinite universal affirmative, "Every man is just” and "Every man is non-just.” Between the latter there is contrariety, between the former contradiction. He also proposes the dissimilarity between universals and indefinites in another way. He does not base the dissimilarity between diagonals of universals and indefinites on the difference between affirinative and negative diagonals of universals, as we do, but on the difference between the diagonals of universals on both sides among themselves. Hence he forms his diagram in this way: under the finite universal affirmative be places the infinite universal affirmative, and on the other side, under the finite particular negative the infinite particular negative. Thus the diagonals are of different quality. He also diagrams the indefinites in this way. Every man is just? contradictories? Not every man is just contraries subcontraries Every man is non-just? contradictories? Not every man is non-just Man is just Man is non-just Man is not just Man is not non-just With enunciations disposed in this way he says their difference is this: that in indefinite enunciations, one on the diagonal is true as a necessary consequence of the truth of the other, so that the truth of one enunciation infers the truth of its diagonal from wherever you begin * But there is no such mutual necessary consequence in universals—from the truth of one on a diagonal to the other—since the necessity of inference fails in part. If you begin from any of the universals and proceed to its diagonal, the truth of the universal cannot be simultaneous with the truth of its diagonal so as to compel it to truth. For if the universal is true its universal contrary will be false, since they cannot be at once true; and if this universal contrary is false, its particular contradictory, which is the diagonal of the first universal assumed, will necessarily be true, since it is impossible for contradictories to be at once false; but if, conversely, you begin with a particular enunciation and proceed to its diagonal, the truth of the particular can so stand with the truth of its diagonal that it does not infer its truth necessarily. For this follows: the particular is true, therefore its universal contradictory is false. But this does not follow: this universal contradictory is false, therefore its universal contrary, which is the diagonal of the particular assumed, is true. For contraries can be at once false. 7 Sed videtur expositio ista deficere ab Aristotelis mente quoad modum sumendi oppositiones. Non enim intendit hic loqui de oppositione quae est inter finitas et infinitas, sed de ea quae est inter finitas inter se, et infinitas inter se. Si enim de utroque modo oppositionis exponere volumus, iam non duas, sed tres oppositiones inveniemus: primam inter finitas, secundam inter infinitas, tertiam quam ipse herminus dixit inter finitam et infinitam. Figura etiam quam formavit, conformis non est ei, quam Aristoteles in fine I priorum formavit, ad quam nos remisit, cum dixit: haec igitur quemadmodum in resolutoriis dictum est, sic sunt disposita. In Aristotelis namque figura, angulares sunt affirmativae affirmativis, et negativae negativis. But the way in which oppositions are taken in this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in mind. He did not intend to speak here of the opposition between finites and infinites, but of the opposition between finites themselves and infinites themselves. For if we meant to explain each mode of opposition, there would not be two but three oppositions: first, between finites; second, between infinites; and third, the one Herminus states between finite and infinite. Even the diagram Herminus makes is not like the one Aristotle makes at the end of I Priorum, to which Aristotle himself referred us in the last lesson when he said, This, then, is the way these are arranged, as we have said in the Analytics; for in Aristotle’s diagram affirmatives are diagonal to affirmatives and negatives to negatives. 8 Deinde cum dicit: hae igitur duae etc., concludit numerum propositionum. Et potest dupliciter exponi; primo, ut ly hae demonstret universales, et sic est sensus, quod hae universales finitae et infinitae habent duas oppositiones, quas supra declaravimus; secundo, potest exponi ut ly hae demonstret enunciationes finitas et infinitas quoad praedicatum sive universales sive indefinitas, et tunc est sensus, quod hae enunciationes supradictae habent duas oppositiones, alteram inter affirmationem finitam et eius negationem, alteram inter affirmationem infinitam et eius negationem. Placet autem mihi magis secunda expositio, quoniam brevitas cui Aristoteles studebat, replicationem non exigebat, sed potius quia enunciationes finitas et infinitas quoad praedicatum secundum diversas quantitates enumeraverat, ad duas oppositiones omnes reducere, terminando earum tractatum, voluit. Then Aristotle says, These two pairs, then, are opposed, etc. Here he concludes to the number of propositions. What he says here can be interpreted in two ways. In the first way, "these” designates universals, and thus the meaning is that the finite and infinite universals have two oppositions, which we have explained above. In the second, "these” designates enunciations which are finite and infinite with respect to the predicate, whether universal or indefinite, and then the meaning is that these enunciations have two oppositions, one between the finite affirmation and its negation and the other between the infinite affirmation and its negation. The second exposition seems more satisfactory to me, for the brevity for which, Aristotle strove allows for no repetition; hence, in terminating his treatment of the enunciations he had enumerated—those with a finite and infinite predicate according to diverse quantities—he meant to reduce all the oppositions to two.  9 Deinde cum dicit: aliae autem ad id quod est etc., intendit declarare diversitatem enunciationum de tertio adiacente, in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, proponit et distinguit eas; secundo, ostendit quod non dantur plures supradictis; ibi: magis autem etc.; tertio, ostendit habitudinem istarum ad alias; ibi: hae autem extra et cetera. Ad evidentiam primi advertendum est tres esse species enunciationum de inesse, in quibus explicite ponitur hoc verbum est. Quaedam sunt, quae subiecto sive finito sive infinito nihil habent additum ultra verbum, ut, homo est, non homo est. Quaedam vero sunt quae subiecto finito habent, praeter verbum, aliquid additum sive finitum sive infinitum, ut, homo est iustus, homo est non iustus. Quaedam autem sunt quae subiecto infinito, praeter verbum, habent aliquid additum sive finitum sive infinitum, ut, non homo est iustus, non homo est non iustus. Et quia de primis iam determinatum est, ideo de ultimis tractare volens, ait: aliae autem sunt, quae habent aliquid, scilicet praedicatum, additum supra verbum est, ad id quod est, non homo, quasi ad subiectum, idest ad subiectum infinitum. Dixit autem quasi, quia sicut nomen infinitum deficit a ratione nominis, ita deficit a ratione subiecti. Significatum siquidem nominis infiniti non proprie substernitur compositioni cum praedicato quam importat, est, tertium adiacens. Enumerat quoque quatuor enunciationes et duas oppositiones in hoc ordine, sicut in superioribus fecit. Distinguit etiam istas ex finitate vel infinitate praedicata. Unde primo, ponit oppositiones inter affirmativam et negativam habentes subiectum infinitum et praedicatum finitum, dicens: ut, non homo est iustus, non homo non est iustus. Secundo, ponit oppositionem alteram inter affirmativam et negativam, habentes subiectum infinitum et praedicatum infinitum, dicens: ut, non homo est non iustus, non homo non est non iustus. When he says, and there, are two other pairs if something is added to "non-man” as a subject, etc., he shows the diversity of enunciations when "is” is added as a third element and the subject is an infinite name. First, he proposes and distinguishes them; secondly, he shows that there are no more opposites than these where he says, There will be no more opposites than these; thirdly, he shows the relationship of these to the others where he says, The latter, however, are separate from the former and distinct from them, etc. With respect to the first point, it should be noted that there are three species of absolute [de inesse] enunciations in which the verb "is” is posited explicitly. Some have nothing added to the subject—which can be either finite or infinite—beyond the verb, as in "Man is,” "Non-man is.” Some have, besides the verb, something either finite or infinite added to a finite subject, as in "Man is just,” "Man is non-just.” Finally, some have, besides the verb, something either finite or infinite added to an infinite subject, as in "Non-man is just,” "Non-man is non-just.” He has already treated the first two and now intends to take tip the last ones. And there are two other pairs, he says, that have something, namely a predicate. added beside the verb "is” to "non-man” as if to a subject, i.e., to an infinite subject. He says "as if” because the infinite name falls short of the notion of a subject insofar as it falls short of the notion of a name. Indeed, the signification of an infinite name is not properly submitted to composition with the predicate, which "is,” the third element added, introduces. Aristotle enumerates four enunciations and two oppositions in this order as he did in the former. In addition he distinguishes these from the former finiteness and infinity. First, he posits the opposition between affirmative and negative enunciations with an infinite subject and a finite predicate, "Non-man is just,” "Non-man is not just.” Then he posits another opposition between those with an infinite subject and an infinite predicate, "Non-man is non-just,” "Non-man is not non-just. 10 Deinde cum dicit: magis autem plures etc., ostendit quod non dantur plures oppositiones enunciationum supradictis. Ubi notandum est quod enunciationes de inesse, in quibus explicite ponitur hoc verbum est, sive secundum, sive tertium adiacens, de quibus loquimur, non possunt esse plures quam duodecim supra positae; et consequenter oppositiones earum secundum affirmationem et negationem non sunt nisi sex. Cum enim in tres ordines divisae sint enunciationes, scilicet in illas de secundo adiacente, in illas de tertio subiecti finiti, et in illas de tertio subiecti infiniti, et in quolibet ordine sint quatuor enunciationes; fiunt omnes enunciationes duodecim, et oppositiones sex. Et quoniam subiectum earum in quolibet ordine potest quadrupliciter quantificari, scilicet universalitate, particularitate, et singularitate et indefinitione; ideo istae duodecim multiplicantur in quadraginta octo. Quater enim duodecim quadraginta octo faciunt. Nec possibile est plures his imaginari. Et licet Aristoteles nonnisi viginti harum expresserit, octo in primo ordine, octo in secundo, et quatuor in tertio, attamen per eas reliquas voluit intelligi. Sunt autem sic enumerandae et ordinandae secundum singulos ordines, ut affirmationi negatio prima ex opposito situetur, ut oppositionis intentum clarius videatur. Et sic contra universalem affirmativam non est ordinanda universalis negativa, sed particularis negativa, quae est illius negatio; et e converso, contra particularem affirmativam non est ordinanda particularis negativa, sed universalis negativa quae est eius negatio. Ad clarius autem intuendum numerum, coordinandae sunt omnes, quae sunt similis quantitatis, simul in recta linea, distinctis tamen ordinibus tribus supradictis. Quod ut clarius elucescat, in hac subscripta videatur figura: (Figura). Quod autem plures his non sint, ex eo patet quod non contingit pluribus modis variari subiectum et praedicatum penes finitum et infinitum, nec pluribus modis variantur finitum et infinitum subiectum. Nulla enim enunciatio de secundo adiacente potest variari penes praedicatum finitum vel infinitum, sed tantum penes subiectum quod sufficienter factum apparet. Enunciationes autem de tertio adiacente quadrupliciter variari possunt, quia aut sunt subiecti et praedicati finiti, aut utriusque infiniti, aut subiecti finiti et praedicati infiniti, aut subiecti infiniti et praedicati finiti. Quarum nullam praetermissam esse superior docet figura. Then he says, There will be no more opposites than these. Here he points out that there are no more oppositions of enunciations than the ones be has already given. We should note, then, that simple [or absolute] enunciations—of which we have been speaking—in which the verb "is” is explicitly posited whether it is the second or third element added, cannot be more than the twelve posited. Consequently, their oppositions according to affirmation and negation are only six. For enunciations are divided into three orders: those with the second element added, those with the third element added to a finite subject, and those with the third element added to an infinite subject; and in any order there are four enunciations. And since their subject in any order can be quantified in four ways, i.e., by universality, particularity, singularity, and indefiniteness, these twelve will be increased to fortyeight (four twelves being forty-eight). Nor is it possible to imagine more than these. Aristotle has only expressed twenty of these, eight in the first order, eight in the second, and four in the third, but through them be intended the rest to be understood. They are to be enumerated and disposed according to each order so that the primary negation is placed opposite an affirmation in order to make the relation of opposition more evident. Thus, the universal negative should not be ordered as opposite to the universal affirmative, but the particular negative, which is its negation. Conversely, the particular negative should not be ordered as opposite to the particular affirmative, but the universal negative, which is its negation. For a clearer look at their number all those of similar quantity should be co-ordered in a straight line and in the three distinct orders given above. The following diagram will make this clear. FIRST ORDER Socrates is Socrates is not Non-Socrates is Non-Socrates is not Some man is Some man is not Some non-man is Some non-man is not Man is Man is not Non-man is Non-man is not Every man is No man is Every non-man is No non-man is SECOND ORDER Socrates is just Socrates is not just Socrates is non-just Socrates is not non-just Some man is just Some man is not just Some man is non-just Some man is not non-just Man is just Man is not just Man is non-just Man is not non-just Every man is just No man is just Every man is non-just No man is non-just THIRD ORDER Non-Socrates is just Non-Socrates is not just Non-Socrates is non-just Non-Socrates is not non-just Some non-man is just Some non-man is not just Some non-man is non-just Some non-man is not non-just Non-man is just Non-man is not just Non-man is non-just Non-man is not non-just Every non-man is just No non-man is just Every non-man is non-just No non-man is non-just It is evident that there are no more than these, for the subject and the predicate cannot be varied in any other way with respect to finite and infinite. Nor can the finite and infinite subject be varied in any other way, for the enunciation with a second adjoining element cannot be varied with a finite and infinite predicate but only in respect to the subject. This is clear enough. But enunciations with a third adjoining element can be varied in four ways: they may have either a finite subject and predicate, or an infinite subject and predicate, or a finite subject and infinite predicate, or an infinite subject and finite predicate. These variations are all evident in the above table. 11 Deinde cum dicit: hae autem extra illas etc., ostendit habitudinem harum quas in tertio ordine numeravimus ad illas, quae in secundo sitae sunt ordine, et dicit quod istae sunt extra illas, quia non sequuntur ad illas, nec e converso. Et rationem assignans subdit: ut nomine utentes eo quod est non homo, idest ideo istae sunt extra illas, quia istae utuntur nomine infinito loco nominis, dum omnes habent subiectum infinitum. Notanter autem dixit enunciationes subiecti infiniti uti ut nomine, infinito nomine, quia cum subiici in enunciatione proprium sit nominis, praedicari autem commune nomini et verbo, omne subiectum enunciationis ut nomen subiicitur. Then when he says, The latter, however, are separate from the former and distinct from them, etc., he shows the relationship of those we have put in the third order to those in the second order. The former, he says, are distinct from the latter because they do not follow upon the latter, nor conversely. He assigns the reason when he adds: because of the use of "non-man” as a name, i.e., the former are separate from the latter because the former use an infinite name in place of a name, since they all have an infinite subject. It should be noted that he says enunciations of an infinite subject use an infinite name as a name; for to be subjected in an enunciation is proper to a name, to be predicated common to a name and a verb, and therefore every subject of an enunciation is subjected as a name. 12 Deinde cum dicit: in his vero in quibus est etc., determinat de enunciationibus in quibus ponuntur verba adiectiva. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, distinguit eas; secundo, respondet cuidam tacitae quaestioni; ibi: non enim dicendum est etc.; tertio, concludit earum conditiones; ibi: ergo et caetera eadem et cetera. Ad evidentiam primi resumendum est, quod inter enunciationes in quibus ponitur est secundum adiacens, et eas in quibus ponitur est tertium adiacens talis est differentia quod in illis, quae sunt de secundo adiacente, simpliciter fiunt oppositiones, scilicet ex parte subiecti tantum variati per finitum et infinitum; in his vero, quae habent est tertium adiacens dupliciter fiunt oppositiones, scilicet et ex parte praedicati et ex parte subiecti, quia utrumque variari potest per finitum et infinitum. Unde unum ordinem tantum enunciationum de secundo adiacente fecimus, habentem quatuor enunciationes diversimode quantificatas et duas oppositiones. Enunciationes autem de tertio adiacente oportuit partiri in duos ordines, quia sunt in eis quatuor oppositiones et octo enunciationes, ut supra dictum est. Considerandum quoque est quod enunciationes, in quibus ponuntur verba adiectiva, quoad significatum aequivalent enunciationibus de tertio adiacente, resoluto verbo adiectivo in proprium participium et est, quod semper fieri licet, quia in omni verbo adiectivo clauditur verbum substantivum. Unde idem significant ista, omnis homo currit, quod ista, omnis homo est currens. Propter quod Boethius vocat enunciationes cum verbo adiectivo de secundo adiacente secundum vocem, de tertio autem secundum potestatem, quia potest resolvi in tertium adiacens, cui aequivalet. Quoad numerum autem enunciationum et oppositionum, enunciationes verbi adiectivi formaliter sumptae non aequivalent illis de tertio adiacente, sed aequivalent enunciationibus, in quibus ponitur est secundum adiacens. Non possunt enim fieri oppositiones dupliciter in enunciationibus adiectivis, scilicet ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sicut fiebant in substantivis de tertio adiacente, quia verbum, quod praedicatur in adiectivis, infinitari non potest. Sed oppositiones adiectivarum fiunt simpliciter, scilicet ex parte subiecti tantum variati per infinitum et finitum diversimode quantificati, sicut fieri didicimus supra in enunciationibus substantivis de secundo adiacente, eadem ducti ratione, quia praeter verbum nulla est affirmatio vel negatio, sicut praeter nomen esse potest. Quia autem in praesenti tractatu non de significationibus, sed de numero enunciationum et oppositionum sermo intenditur, ideo Aristoteles determinat diversificandas esse enunciationes adiectivas secundum modum, quo distinctae sunt enunciationes in quibus ponitur est secundum adiacens. Et ait quod in his enunciationibus, in quibus non contingit poni hoc verbum est formaliter, sed aliquod aliud, ut, currit, vel, ambulat, idest in enunciationibus adiectivis, idem faciunt quoad numerum oppositionum et enunciationum sic posita, scilicet nomen et verbum, ac si est secundum adiacens subiecto nomini adderetur. Habent enim et istae adiectivae, sicut illae, in quibus ponitur est, duas oppositiones tantum, alteram inter finitas, ut, omnis homo currit, omnis homo non currit, alteram inter infinitas quoad subiectum, ut, omnis non homo currit, omnis non homo non currit. Next he takes up enunciations in which adjective verbs are posited, when he says, In enunciations in which "is” does not join the predicate to the subject, etc. First, he distinguishes these adjective verbs; secondly, he answers an implied question where he says, We must not say "non-every man,” etc.; thirdly, he concludes with their conditions where he says, All else in the enunciations in which "is” does not join the predicate to the subject will be the same, etc. It is necessary to note here that there is a difference between enunciations in which "is” is posited as a second adjoining element and those in which it is posited as a third element. In those with "is” as a second element oppositions are simple, i.e., varied only on the part of the subject by finite and infinite. In those having "is” as a third element oppositions are made in two ways—on the part of the predicate and on the part of the subject—for both can be varied by finite and infinite. Hence we made only one order of enunciations with "is” as the second element. It had four enunciations quantified in diverse ways, and two oppositions. But enunciations with "is” as a third element must be divided into two orders, because in them there are four oppositions and eight enunciations, as we said above. Enunciations with adjective verbs are made equivalent in signification to enunciations with "is” as the third element by resolving the adjective verb into its proper participle and "is,” which may always be done because a substantive verb is contained in every adjective verb. For example, "Every man runs” signifies the same thing as "Every man is running.” Because of this Boethius calls enunciations having an adjective verb "eminciations of the second adjoining element according to vocal sound, but of the third adjoining element according to power.” He designates them in this manner because they can be resolved into enunciations with a third adjoining element to which they are equivalent. With respect to the number and oppositions of enunciations, those with an adjective verb, formally taken, are not equivalent to those with a third adjoining element but to those in which "is” is posited as the second element. For oppositions cannot be made in two ways in adjectival enunciations as they are in the case of substantival enunciations with a third adjoining element, namely, on the part of the subject and predicate, because the verb which is predicated in adjectival enunciations cannot be made infinite. Hence oppositions of adjectival enunciations are made simply, i.e., only by the subject quantified in diverse ways being varied by finite and infinite, as was done above in substantival enunciations with a second adjoining element, and for the same reason, i.e., there can be no affirmation or negation without a verb but there can be without a name. Since the present treatment is not of significations but of the number of enunciations and oppositions, Aristotle determines that adjectival enunciations are to be diversified according to the mode in which enunciations with "is” as the second adjoining element are distinguished. And he says that in enunciations in which the verb "is” is not posited formally, but some other verb, such as "matures” or "walks,” i.e., in adjectival enunciations, the name and verb form the same scheme with respect to the number of oppositions and enunciations as when is as a second adjoining element is added to the name as a subject. For these adjectival enunciations, like the ones in which "is” is posited, have only two oppositions, one between the finites, as in "Every man runs,” "Not every man runs,” the other between the infinites with respect to subject, as in "Every non-man runs,” "Not every non-man runs.” 13 Deinde cum dicit: non enim dicendum est etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni. Et circa hoc facit duo: primo, ponit solutionem quaestionis; deinde, probat eam; ibi: manifestum est autem et cetera. Est ergo quaestio talis: cur negatio infinitans numquam addita est supra signo universali aut particulari, ut puta, cum vellemus infinitare istam, omnis homo currit, cur non sic infinitata est, non omnis homo currit, sed sic, omnis non homo currit? Huic namque quaestioni respondet, dicens quod quia nomen infinitabile debet significare aliquid universale, vel singulare; omnis autem et similia signa non significant aliquid universale aut singulare, sed quoniam universaliter aut particulariter; ideo non est dicendum, non omnis homo, si infinitare volumus (licet debeat dici, si negare quantitatem enunciationis quaerimus), sed negatio infinitans ad ly homo, quod significat aliquid universale, addenda est, et dicendum, omnis non homo. Then he answers an implied question when he says, We, must not say "non-every man” but must add the negation to man, etc. First he states the solution of the question, then he proves it where he says, This is evident from the following, etc. The question is this: Why is the negation that makes a word infinite never added to the universal or particular sign? For example, when we wish to make "Every man runs” infinite, why do we do it in this way "Every non-man runs,” and not in this, "Non-every man runs.” He answers the question by saying that to be capable of being made infinite a name has to signify something universal or singular. "Every” and similar signs, however, do not signify something universal or singular, but that something is taken universally or particularly. Therefore, we should not say "non-every man” if we wish to infinitize (although it may be used if we wish to deny the quantity of an enunciation), but must add the infinitizing negation to "man,” which signifies something universal, and say "every non-man.” 14 Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autem ex eo quod est etc., probat hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod omnis et similia non significant aliquod universale, sed quoniam universaliter tali ratione. Illud, in quo differunt enunciationes praecise differentes per habere et non habere ly omnis, est non universale aliquod, sed quoniam universaliter; sed illud in quo differunt enunciationes praecise differentes per habere et non habere ly omnis, est significatum per ly omnis; ergo significatum per ly omnis est non aliquid universale, sed quoniam universaliter. Minor huius rationis, tacita in textu, ex se clara est. Id enim in quo, caeteris paribus, habentia a non habentibus aliquem terminum differunt, significatum est illius termini. Maior vero in littera exemplariter declaratur sic. Illae enunciationes homo currit, et omnis homo currit, praecise differunt ex hoc, quod in una est ly omnis, et in altera non. Tamen non ita differunt ex hoc, quod una sit universalis, alia non universalis. Utraque enim habet subiectum universale, scilicet ly homo, sed differunt, quia in ea, ubi ponitur ly omnis, enunciatur de subiecto universaliter, in altera autem non universaliter. Cum enim dico, homo currit, cursum attribuo homini universali, sive communi, sed non pro tota humana universitate; cum autem dico, omnis homo currit, cursum inesse homini pro omnibus inferioribus significo. Simili modo declarari potest de tribus aliis, quae in textu adducuntur, scilicet, homo non currit, respectu suae universalis universaliter, omnis homo non currit: et sic de aliis. Relinquitur ergo, quod, omnis et nullus et similia signa nullum universale significant, sed tantummodo significant, quoniam universaliter de homine affirmant vel negant. Where he says, This is evident from the following, etc., he proves that "every” and similar words do not signify a universal but that a universal is taken universally. His argument is the following: That by which enunciations having or not having the "every” differ is not the universal; rather, they differ in that the universal is taken universally. But that by which enunciations having and not having the "every” differ is signified by the "every.” Therefore, that which is signified by the "every” is not a universal but that the universal is taken universally. The minor of the argument is evident, though not explicitly given in the text: that in which the having of some term differs from the not having of it, other things being equal, is the signification of that term. The major is made evident by examples. The enunciations "Man matures” and "Every man matures” differ precisely by the fact that in one there is an "every,” in the other not. However, they do not differ in such a way by this that one is universal, the other not universal, for both have the universal subject, "man”; they differ because in the one in which "every” is posited, the enunciation is of the subject universally, but in the other not universally. For when I say, "Man matures,” I attribute maturing to "man” as universal or common but not to man as to the whole human race; when I say, "Every man matures,” however, I signify maturing to be present to man according to all the inferiors. This is evident, too, in the three other examples of enunciations in Aristotle’s text. For example, "Non-man matures” when its universal is taken universally becomes "Every non-man matures,” and so of the others. It follows, therefore, that "every” and "no” and similar signs do not signify a universal but only signify that they affirm or deny of man universally. 15 Notato hic duo: primum est quod non dixit omnis et nullus significat universaliter, sed quoniam universaliter; secundum est, quod addit, de homine affirmant vel negant. Primi ratio est, quia signum distributivum non significat modum ipsum universalitatis aut particularitatis absolute, sed applicatum termino distributo. Cum enim dico, omnis homo, ly omnis denotat universitatem applicari illi termino homo, ita quod Aristoteles dicens quod omnis significat quoniam universaliter, per ly quoniam insinuavit applicationem universalitatis importatam in ly omnis in actu exercito, sicut et in I posteriorum, in definitione scire applicationem causae notavit per illud verbum quoniam, dicens: scire est rem per causam cognoscere, et quoniam illius est causa. Ratio autem secundi insinuat differentiam inter terminos categorematicos et syncategorematicos. Illi siquidem ponunt significata supra terminos absolute; isti autem ponunt significata sua supra terminos in ordine ad praedicata. Cum enim dicitur, homo albus, ly albus denominat hominem in seipso absque respectu ad aliquod sibi addendum. Cum vero dicitur, omnis homo, ly omnis etsi hominem distribuat, non tamen distributio intellectum firmat, nisi in ordine ad aliquod praedicatum intelligatur. Cuius signum est, quia, cum dicimus, omnis homo currit, non intendimus distribuere hominem pro tota sua universitate absolute, sed in ordine ad cursum. Cum autem dicimus, albus homo currit, determinamus hominem in seipso esse album et non in ordine ad cursum. Quia ergo omnis et nullus, sicut et alia syncategoremata, nil aliud in enunciatione faciunt, nisi quia determinant subiectum in ordine ad praedicatum, et hoc sine affirmatione et negatione fieri nequit; ideo dixit quod nil aliud significant, nisi quoniam universaliter de nomine, idest de subiecto, affirmant vel negant, idest affirmationem vel negationem fieri determinant, ac per hoc a categorematicis ea separavit. Potest etiam referri hoc quod dixit, affirmant vel negant, ad ipsa signa, scilicet omnis et nullus, quorum alterum positive distribuit, alterum removendo. Two things should be noted here: first, that Aristotle does not say "every” and "no” signify universally, but that the universal is taken universally; secondly, that he adds, they affirm or deny of man. The reason for the first is that the distributive sign does not signify the mode of universality or of particularity absolutely, but the mode applied to a distributed term. When I say, "every man” the "every” denotes that universality is applied to the term "man.” Hence, when Aristotle says "every” signifies that a universal is taken universally, by the "that” he conveys the application in actual exercise of the universality denoted by the "every,” just as in I Posteriorum [2: 71b 10] in the definition of "to know,” namely, To know scientifically is to know a thing through its cause and that this is its cause, he signifies by the word "that” the application of the cause. The reason for the second is to imply the difference between categorematic and syneategorematic terms. The former apply what is signified to the terms absolutely; the latter apply what they signify to the terms in relation to the predicates. For example, in "white man” the "white” denominates man in himself apart from any regard to something to be added; but in "every man,” although the "every” distributes man,” the distribution does not confirm the intellect unless it is under stood in relation to some predicate. A sign of this is that when we say "Every man runs” we do not intend to distribute "man” in its whole universality absolutely, but only in relation to "running.” When we say "White man runs,” on the other hand, we designate man in himself as "white” and not in relation to "running.” Therefore, since "every” and "no” and the other syncategorematic terms do nothing except determine the subject in relation to the predicate in the enunciation, and this cannot be done without affirmation and negation, Aristotle says that they only signify that the affirmation or negation is of a name, i.e., of a subject, universally, i.e., they prescribe the affirmation or negation that is being formed, and by this he separates them from categorematic terms. They affirm, or deny can also be referred to the signs themselves i.e., "every” and "no,” one of which distributes positively, the other distributes by removing. 16 Deinde cum dicit: ergo et caetera eadem etc., concludit adiectivarum enunciationum conditiones. Dixerat enim quod adiectivae enunciationes idem faciunt quoad oppositionum numerum, quod substantivae de secundo adiacente; et hoc declaraverat, oppositionum numero exemplariter subiuncto. Et quia ad hanc convenientiam sequitur convenientia quoad finitationem praedicatorum, et quoad diversam subiectorum quantitatem, et earum multiplicationem ex ductu quaternarii in seipsum, et si qua sunt huiusmodi enumerata; ideo concludit: ergo et caetera, quae in illis servanda erant, eadem, idest similia istis apponenda sunt. When he says All else in enunciations in which "is”does not join the predicate to the subject, etc., he concludes the treatment of the conditions of adjectival enunciations. He has already stated that adjectival enunciations are the same with respect to the number of oppositions as substantival enunciations with "is” as the second element, and has clarified this by a table showing the number of oppositions. Now, since upon this conformity follows conformity both with respect to finiteness of predicates and with respect to the diverse quantity of subjects, and also-if any enunciations of this kind are enumerated—their multiplication in sets of four, he concludes, Therefore also the other things, which are to be observed in them, are to be considered the same, i.e., similar to these. IV. 1. Postquam determinatum est de diversitate enunciationum, hic intendit removere quaedam dubia circa praedicta. Et circa hoc facit sex secundum numerum dubiorum, quae suis patebunt locis. Quia ergo supra dixerat quod in universalibus non similiter contingit angulares esse simul veras, quia affirmativae angulares non possunt esse simul verae, negativae autem sic; poterat quispiam dubitare, quae est causa huius diversitatis. Ideo nunc illius dicti causam intendit assignare talem, quia, scilicet, angulares affirmativae sunt contrariae inter se; contrarias autem in nulla materia contingit esse simul veras. Angulares autem negativae sunt subcontrariae illis oppositae; subcontrarias autem contingit esse simul veras. Et circa haec duo facit: primo, declarat conditiones contrariarum et subcontrariarum; secundo, quod angulares affirmativae sint contrariae et quod angulares negativae sint subcontrariae; ibi: sequuntur vero et cetera. Dicit ergo resumendo: quoniam in primo dictum est quod enunciatio negativa contraria illi affirmativae universali, scilicet, omne animal est iustum, est ista, nullum animal est iustum; manifestum est quod istae non possunt simul, idest in eodem tempore, neque in eodem ipso, idest de eodem subiecto esse verae. His vero oppositae, idest subcontrariae inter se, possunt esse simul verae aliquando, scilicet in materia contingenti, ut, quoddam animal est iustum, non omne animal est iustum. Having treated the diversity of enunciations Aristotle now answers certain questions about them. He takes up six points related to the number of difficulties. These will become evident as we come to them. Since he has said that in universal enunciations the diagonals in one case cannot be at once true but can be in another, for the diagonal affirmatives cannot be at once true but the negatives can,” someone might raise a question as to the cause of this diversity. Therefore, it is his intention now to assign the cause of this: namely, that the diagonal affirmatives are contrary to each other, and contraries cannot be at once true in any matter; but the diagonal negatives are subcontraries opposed to these and can be at once true. In relation to this he first states the conditions for contraries and subcontraries. Then he shows that diagonal affirmatives are contraries and that diagonal negatives are subcontraries where he says, Now the enunciation "No man is just” follows upon the enunciation "Every man is nonjust,” etc. By way of resumé, therefore, he says that in the first book it was said that the negative enunciation contrary to the universal affirmative "Every animal is just” is "No animal is just.” It is evident that these cannot be at once true, i.e., at the same time, nor of the same thing, i.e., of the same subject. But the opposites of these, i.e., the subcontraries, can sometimes be at once true, i.e., in contingent matter, as in "Some animal is just” and "Not every animal is just.” 2 Deinde cum dicit: sequuntur vero etc., declarat quod angulares affirmativae supra positae sint contrariae, negativae vero subcontrariae. Et primum quidem ex eo quod universalis affirmativa infinita et universalis negativa simplex aequipollent; et consequenter utraque earum est contraria universali affirmativae simplici, quae est altera angularis. Unde dicit quod hanc universalem negativam finitam, nullus homo est iustus, sequitur aequipollenter illa universalis affirmativa infinita, omnis homo est non iustus. Secundum vero declarat ex eo quod particularis affirmativa finita et particularis negativa infinita aequipollent. Et consequenter utraque earum est subcontraria particulari negativae simplici, quae est altera angularis, ut in figura supra posita inspicere potes. Unde subdit quod illam particularem affirmativam finitam, aliquis homo est iustus, opposita sequitur aequipollenter (opposita intellige non istius particularis, sed illius universalis affirmativae infinitae), non omnis homo est non iustus. Haec enim est contradictoria eius. Ut autem clare videatur quomodo supra dictae enunciationes sint aequipollentes, formetur figura quadrata, in cuius uno angulo ponatur universalis negativa finita, et sub ea contradictoria particularis affirmativa finita; ex alia vero parte locetur universalis affirmativa infinita, et sub ea contradictoria particularis negativa infinita, noteturque contradictio inter angulares et collaterales inter se, hoc modo: (Figura). His siquidem sic dispositis, patet primo ipsarum universalium mutua consequentia in veritate et falsitate, quia si altera earum est vera, sua angularis contradictoria est falsa; et si ista est falsa, sua collateralis contradictoria, quae est altera universalis, erit vera, et similiter procedit quoad falsitatem particularium. Deinde eodem modo manifestatur mutua sequela. Si enim altera earum est vera, sua angularis contradictoria est falsa, ista autem existente falsa, sua contradictoria collateralis, quae est altera particularis erit vera; simili quoque modo procedendum est quoad falsitatem. When he says, Now the enunciation, "No man is just” follows upon the enunciation "Every man is nonjust,” etc., he shows that the diagonal affirmatives previously posited are contraries, the negatives subcontraries. First he manifests this from the fact that the infinite universal affirmative and the simple universal negative are equal in meaning, and consequently each of them is contrary to the simple universal affirmative, which is the other diagonal. Hence, he says that the infinite universal affirmative "Every man is non-just” follows upon the finite universal negative "No man is just,” equivalently. Secondly he shows this from the fact that the finite particular affirmative and the infinite particular negative are equal in meaning, and consequently each of these is subcontrary to the simple particular negative, which is the other diagonal. This you can see in the previous diagram. He says, then, that the opposite "Not every man is non-just” follows upon the finite particular "Some man is just” equivalently (understand "the opposite” not of this particular but of the infinite universal affirmative, for this is its contradictory). In order to see clearly how these enunciations are equivalent, make a four-sided figure, putting the finite universal negative in one corner and under it the contradictory, the finite particular affirmative. On the other side, put the infinite universal affirmative and under it the contradictory, the infinite particular negative. Now indicate the contradiction between diagonals and the contradiction between collaterals. No man is just equivalents Every man is non-just contradictories contradictories Some man is just equivalents Not every man is non-just This arrangement makes the mutual consequence of the universals in truth and falsity evident, for if one of them is true, its diagonal contradictory is false; and if this is false, its collateral contradictory, which is the other universal, will be true. With respect to the falsity of the particulars the procedure is the same. Their mutual consequence is made evident in the same way, for if one of them is true, its diagonal contradictory is false, and if this is false, its contradictory collateral, which is the other particular, will be true; the procedure is the same with respect to falsity. 3 Sed est hic unum dubium. In I enim priorum, in fine, Aristoteles ex proposito determinat non esse idem iudicium de universali negativa et universali affirmativa infinita; et superius in hoc secundo, super illo verbo: quarum duae se habent secundum consequentiam, duae vero minime, Ammonius, Porphyrius, Boethius et sanctus Thomas dixerunt quod negativa simplex sequitur affirmativam infinitam, sed non e converso. Ad hoc dicendum est, secundum Albertum, quod negativam finitam sequitur affirmativa infinita subiecto constante; negativa vero simplex sequitur affirmativam absolute. Unde utrumque dictum verificatur, et quod inter eas est mutua consequentia cum subiecti constantia, et quod inter eas non est mutua consequentia absolute. Potest dici secundo, quod supra locuti sumus de infinita enunciatione quoad suum totalem significatum ad formam praedicati reductum; et secundum hoc, quia negativa finita est superior affirmativa infinita, ideo non erat mutua consequentia: hic autem loquimur de ipsa infinita formaliter sumpta. Unde s. Thomas tunc adducendo Ammonii expositionem dixit, secundum hunc modum loquendi: negativa simplex, in plus est quam affirmativa infinita. Textus vero I priorum ultra praedicta loquitur de finita et infinita in ordine ad syllogismum. Manifestum est autem quod universalis affirmativa sive finita sive infinita non concluditur nisi in primo primae. Universalis autem negativa quaecumque concluditur et in secundo primae, et primo et secundo secundae. However, a question arises with respect to this. At the end of I Priorum [46: 51b 5], Aristotle determines from what he has proposed that the judgment of the universal negative and the infinite universal affirmative is not the same. Furthermore, in the second book of the present work, in relation to the phrase Of which two are related according to consequence, two are not. Ammonius, Porphyry, Boethius, and St. Thomas say that the simple negative follows upon the infinite affirmative and not conversely.” Albert answers this latter difficulty by pointing out that the infinite affirmative follows upon the finite negative when the subject is constant, but the simple negative follows upon the affirmative absolutely. Hence both positions are verified, for with a constant subject there is a mutual consequence between them, but there is not a mutual consequence between them absolutely. We could also answer this difficulty in this way. In Book II, Lesson 2 we were speaking of the infinite enunciation with the whole of what it signified reduced to the form of the predicate, and according to this there was not a mutual consequence, since the finite negative is superior to the infinite affirmative. But here we are speaking of the infinite itself formally taken. Hence St. Thomas, when he introduced the exposition of Ammonius in his commentary on the above passage, said that according to this mode of speaking the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative. In the above mentioned text in I Priorum [46: 52a 36], Aristotle is speaking of finite and infinite enunciations in relation to the syllogism. It is evident, however, that the universal affirmative, whether finite or infinite is only inferred in the first mode of the first figure, while any universal negative whatever is inferred in the second mode of the first figure and in the first and second modes of the second figure. 4 Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autem etc., movet secundum dubium de vario situ negationis, an scilicet quoad veritatem et falsitatem differat praeponere et postponere negationem. Oritur autem haec dubitatio, quia dictum est nunc quod non refert quoad veritatem si dicatur, omnis homo est non iustus, aut si dicatur, omnis homo non est iustus; et tamen in altera postponitur negatio, in altera praeponitur, licet multum referat quoad affirmationem et negationem. Hanc, inquam, dubitationem solvere intendens cum distinctione, respondet quod in singularibus enunciationibus eiusdem veritatis sunt singularis negatio et infinita affirmatio eiusdem, in universalibus autem non est sic. Si enim est vera negatio ipsius universalis non oportet quod sit vera infinita affirmatio universalis. Negatio enim universalis est particularis contradictoria, qua existente vera, non est necesse suam subalternam, quae est contraria suae contradictoriae esse veram. Possunt enim duae contrariae esse simul falsae. Unde dicit quod in singularibus enunciationibus manifestum est quod, si est verum negare interrogatum, idest, si est vera negatio enunciationis singularis, de qua facta est interrogatio, verum etiam est affirmare, idest, vera erit affirmatio infinita eiusdem singularis. Verbi gratia: putasne Socrates est sapiens? Si vera est ista responsio, non; Socrates igitur non sapiens est, idest, vera erit ista affirmatio infinita, Socrates est non sapiens. In universalibus vero non est vera, quae similiter dicitur, idest, ex veritate negationis universalis affirmativae interrogatae non sequitur vera universalis affirmativa infinita, quae similis est quoad quantitatem et qualitatem enunciationi quaesitae; vera autem est eius negatio, idest, sed ex veritate responsionis negativae sequitur veram esse eius, scilicet universalis quaesitae negationem, idest, particularem negativam. Verbi gratia: putasne omnis homo est sapiens? Si vera est ista responsio, non; affirmativa similis interrogatae quam quis ex hac responsione inferre intentaret est illa: igitur omnis homo est non sapiens. Haec autem non sequitur ex illa negatione. Falsum est enim hoc, scilicet quod sequitur ex illa responsione; sed inferendum est, igitur non omnis homo sapiens est. Et ratio utriusque est, quia haec particularis ultimo illata est opposita, idest contradictoria illi universali interrogatae quam respondens falsificavit; et ideo oportet quod sit vera. Contradictoriarum enim si una est falsa, reliqua est vera. Illa vero, scilicet universalis affirmativa infinita primo illata, est contraria illi eidem universali interrogatae. Non est autem opus quod si universalium altera sit falsa, quod reliqua sit vera. In promptu est autem causa huius diversitatis inter singulares et universales. In singularibus enim varius negationis situs non variat quantitatem enunciationis; in universalibus autem variat, ut patet. Ideo fit ut non sit eadem veritas negantium universalem in quarum altera praeponitur, in altera autem postponitur negatio, ut de se patet. When he says, And it is also clear with respect to the singular that if a question is asked and a negative answer is the true one, there is also a true affirmation, etc., he presents a difficulty relating to the varying position of the negation, i.e., whether there is a difference as to truth and falsity when the negation is a part of the predicate or a part of the verb. This difficulty arises from what he has just said, namely, that it is of no consequence as to truth or falsity whether you say, "Every man is non-just” or "Every man is not just”; yet in one case the negation is a part of the predicate, in the other part of the copula, and this makes a great deal of difference with respect to affirmation and negation. To solve this problem Aristotle makes a distinction: in singular enunciations, the singular negation and infinite affirmation of the same subject are of the same truth, but in universals this is not so. For if the negation of the universal is true it is not necessary that the infinite affirmation of the universal is true. The negation of the universal is the contradictory particular, but if it is true [i.e., the contradictory particular] it is not necessary that the subaltern, which is the contrary of the contradictory, be true, for two contraries can be at once false. Hence he says that in singular enunciations it is evident that if it is true to deny the thing asked, i.e., if the negation of a singular enunciation, which has been made into an interrogation, is true, there will also be a true affirmation, i.e., the infinite affirmation of the same singular will be true. For example, if the question "Do you think Socrates is wise?” has "No” as a true response, then "Socrates is non-wise,” i.e., the infinite affirmation "Socrates is non-wise” will be true. But in the case of universals the affirmative inference is not true, i.e., from the truth of a negation to a universal affirmative question, the truth of the infinite universal affirmative (which is similar in quantity and quality to the enunciation asked) does not follow. But the negation is true, i.e., from the truth of the negative response it follows that its negation is true, i.e., the negation of the universal asked, which is the particular negative. Consider, for example, the question "Do you think every man is wise?” If the response "No” is true, one would be tempted to infer the affirmative similar to the question asked, i.e., then "Every man is non-wise.” This, however, does not follow from the negation, for this is false as it follows from that response. Rather, what must be inferred is "Then not every man is wise.” And the reason for both is that the particular enunciation inferred last is the opposite, i.e., the contradictory of the universal question, which, being falsified by the negative response, makes the contradictory of the universal affirmative true, for of contradictories, if one is false the other is true. The infinite universal affirmative first inferred, however, is contrary to the same universal question. Should it not also be true? No, because it is not necessary in the case of universals that if one is false the other is true. The cause of the diversity between singulars and universals is now clear. In singulars the varying position of the negation does not vary the quantity of the enunciation ‘ but in universals it does. Therefore there is not the same truth in enunciations denying a universal when in one the negation is a part of the predicate and in the other a part of the verb. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 4 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: illae vero secundum infinitaetc., solvit tertiam dubitationem, an infinita nomina vel verba sint negationes. Insurgit autem hoc dubium, quia dictum est quod aequipollent negativa et infinita. Et rursus dictum est nunc quod non refert in singularibus praeponere et postponere negationem: si enim infinitum nomen est negatio, tunc enunciatio, habens subiectum infinitum vel praedicatum, erit negativa et non affirmativa. Hanc dubitationem solvit per interpretationem, probando quod nec nomina nec verba infinita sint negationes, licet videantur. Unde duo circa hoc facit: primo, proponit solutionem dicens: illae vero, scilicet dictiones, contraiacentes: verbi gratia: non homo, et, homo non iustus et iustus. Vel sic: illae vero, scilicet dictiones, secundum infinita, idest secundum infinitorum naturam, iacentes contra nomina et verba (utpote quae removentes quidem nomina et verba significant, ut non homo et non iustus et non currit, quae opponuntur contra ly homo ly iustus et ly currit), illae, inquam, dictiones infinitae videbuntur prima facie esse quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo ex eo quod comparatae nominibus et verbis contra quae iacent, ea removent, sed non sunt secundum veritatem. Dixit sine nomine et verbo quia nomen infinitum, nominis natura caret, et verbum infinitum verbi natura non possidet. Dixit quasi, quia nec nomen infinitum a nominis ratione, nec verbum infinitum a verbi proprietate omnino semota sunt. Unde, si negationes apparent, videbuntur sine nomine et verbo non omnino sed quasi. Deinde probat distinctiones infinitas non esse negationes tali ratione. Semper est necesse negationem esse veram vel falsam, quia negatio est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo; nomen autem infinitum non dicit verum vel falsum; igitur dictio infinita non est negatio. Minorem declarat, quia qui dixit, non homo, nihil magis de homine dixit quam qui dixit, homo. Et quoad significatum quidem clarissimum est: non homo, namque, nihil addit supra hominem, imo removet hominem. Quoad veritatis vero vel falsitatis conceptum, nihil magis profuit qui dixit, non homo, quam qui dixit, homo, si aliquid aliud non addatur, imo minus verus vel falsus fuit, idest magis remotus a veritate et falsitate, qui dixit, non homo, quam qui dixit, homo: quia tam veritas quam falsitas in compositione consistit; compositioni autem vicinior est dictio finita, quae aliquid ponit, quam dictio infinita, quae nec ponit, nec componit, idest nec positionem nec compositionem importat. Then he says, The antitheses in infinite names and verbs, as in " non-man” and "nonjust,” might seem to be negations without a name or a verb, etc. Here he raises the third difficulty, i.e., whether infinite names or verbs are negations. This question arises from his having said that the negative and infinite are equivalent and from having just said that in singular enunciations it makes no difference whether the negative is a part of the predicate or a part of the verb. For if the infinite name is a negation, then the enunciation having an infinite subject or predicate will be negative and not affirmative. He resolves this question by an interpretation which proves that neither infinite names nor verbs are negations although they seem to be. First he proposes the solution saying, The antitheses in infinite names and verbs, i.e., words contraposed, e.g., "non-man,” and "non-just man” and "just man”; or this may be read as, Those (namely, words) corresponding to infinites, i.e., corresponding to the nature of infinites, placed in opposition to names or verbs (namely, removing what the names and verbs signify, as in "non-man,” "non-just,” and "non-runs,” which are opposed to "man,” "just” and "runs”), would seem at first sight to be quasi-negations without Dame and verb, because, as related to the names and verbs before which they are placed, they remove them; they are not truly negations however. He says without a name or a verb because the infinite name lacks the nature of a name and the infinite verb does not have the nature of a verb. He says quasi because the infinite name does not fall short of the notion of the name in every way, nor the infinite verb of the nature of the verb. Hence, if it is thought that they are negations, they will be regarded as without a name or a verb, not in every way but as though they were without a name or a verb. He proves that infinitizing signs of separation are not negations by pointing out that it is always necessary for the negation to be true or false since a negation is an enunciation of something separated from something. The infinite name, however, does not assert what is true or false. Therefore the infinite word is not a negation. He manifests the minor when he says that the one who says "non-man” says nothing more of man than the one who says "man.” Clearly this is so with respect to what is signified, for "non-man” adds nothing beyond "man”; rather, it removes "man.” Moreover, with respect to a conception of truth or falsity, it is of no more use to say "non-man” than to say "man” if something else is not added; rather, it is less true or false, i.e., one who says non-man is more removed from truth and falsity than one who says man,” for both truth and falsity depend on composition, and the finite word which posits something is closer to composition than the infinite word, which neither posits nor composes, i.e., it implies neither positing nor composition. 6 Deinde cum dicit: significat autem etc., respondet quartae dubitationi, quomodo scilicet intelligatur illud verbum supradictum de enunciationibus habentibus subiectum infinitum: hae autem extra illas, ipsae secundum se erunt. Et ait quod intelligitur quantum ad significati consequentiam, et non solum quantum ad ipsas enunciationes formaliter. Unde duas habentes subiectum infinitum, universalem scilicet affirmativam et universalem negativam adducens, ait quod neutra earum significat idem alicui illarum, scilicet habentium subiectum finitum. Haec enim universalis affirmativa, omnis non homo est iustus, nulli habenti subiectum finitum significat idem: non enim significat idem quod ista, omnis homo est iustus; neque quod ista, omnis homo est non iustus. Similiter opposita negatio et universalis negativa habens subiectum infinitum, quae est contrarie opposita supradictae, scilicet omnis non homo non est iustus, nulli illarum de subiecto finito significat idem. Et hoc clarum est ex diversitate subiecti in istis et in illis. When he says, Moreover, "Every non-man is just does not signify the same thing as any of the other enunciations, etc., he answers a fourth difficulty, i.e., how the earlier statement concerning enunciations having an infinite subject is to be understood. The statement was that these stand by themselves and are distinct from the former [in consequence of using the name "non-man”]. This is to be understood not just with respect to the enunciations themselves formally, but with respect to the consequence of what is signified. Hence, giving two examples of enunciations with an infinite subject, the universal affirmative and universal negative,” he says that neither of these signifies the same thing as any of those, namely of those having a finite subject. The universal affirmative "Every non-man is just” does not signify the same thing as any of the enunciations with a finite subject; for it does not signify "Every man is just” nor "Every man is non-just.” Nor do the opposite negation, or the universal negative having an infinite subject which is contrarily opposed to the universal affirmative, signify the same thing as enunciations with a finite subject; i.e., "Not every non-man is just” and "No non-man is just,” do not signify the same thing as any of those with a finite subject. This is evident from the diversity of subject in the latter and the former. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 4 n. 7Deinde cum dicit: illa vero quae est etc., respondet quintae quaestioni, an scilicet inter enunciationes de subiecto infinito sit aliqua consequentia. Oritur autem dubitatio haec ex eo, quod superius est inter eas ad invicem assignata consequentia. Ait ergo quod etiam inter istas est consequentia. Nam universalis affirmativa de subiecto, et praedicato infinitis et universalis negativa de subiecto infinito, praedicato vero finito, aequipollent. Ista namque, omnis non homo est non iustus, idem significat illi, nullus non homo est iustus. Idem autem est iudicium de particularibus indefinitis et singularibus similibus supradictis. Cuiuscunque enim quantitatis sint, semper affirmativa de utroque extremo infinita et negativa subiecti quidem infiniti, praedicati autem finiti, aequipollent, ut facile potes exemplis videre. Unde Aristoteles universales exprimens, caeteras ex illis intelligi voluit. When he says, But "Every non-man is non-just” signifies the same thing as "No non-man is just,” he answers a fifth difficulty, i.e., is there a consequence among enunciations with an infinite subject? This question arises from the fact that consequences were assigned among them earlier.” He says, therefore, that there is a consequence even among these, for the universal affirmative with an infinite subject and predicate and the universal negative with an infinite subject but a finite predicate are equivalent, i.e., "Every non-man is non-just” signifies the same thing as "No non-man is just.” This is also the case in particular infinites and singulars which are similar to the foresaid, for no matter what their quantity, the affirmative with both extremes infinite and the negative with an infinite subject and a finite predicate are always equivalent, as may be easily seen by examples. Hence, Aristotle in giving the universals intends the others to be understood from these. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 4 n. 8Deinde cum dicit: transposita vero nomina etc., solvit sextam dubitationem, an propter nominum vel verborum transpositionem varietur enunciationis significatio. Oritur autem haec quaestio ex eo, quod docuit transpositionem negationis variare enunciationis significationem. Aliud enim dixit significare, omnis homo non est iustus, et aliud, non omnis homo est iustus. Ex hoc, inquam, dubitatur, an similiter contingat circa nominum transpositionem, quod ipsa transposita enunciationem varient, sicut negatio transposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ponit solutionem dicens, quod transposita nomina et verba idem significant: verbi gratia, idem significat, est albus homo, et, est homo albus, ubi est transpositio nominum. Similiter transposita verba idem significant, ut, est albus homo, et, homo albus est. When he says, When the names and verbs are transposed, the enunciations signify the same thing, etc., he resolves a sixth difficulty: whether the signification of the enunciation is varied because of the transposition of names or verbs. This question arises from his having shown that the transposition of the negation varies the signification of the enunciation. "Every man is non-just,” he said, does not signify the same thing as "Not every man is just.” This raises the question as to whether a similar thing happens when we transpose names. Would this vary the enunciation as the transposed negation does? First he states the solution, saying that transposed names and verbs signify the same thing, e.g., "Man is white” signifies the same thing as "White is man.” Transposed verbs also signify the same thing, as in "Man is white” and "Man white is.” Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 4 n. 9Deinde cum dicit: nam si hoc non est etc., probat praedictam solutionem ex numero negationum contradictoriarum ducendo ad impossibile, tali ratione. Si hoc non est, idest si nomina transposita diversificant enunciationem, eiusdem affirmationis erunt duae negationes; sed ostensum est in I libro, quod una tantum est negatio unius affirmationis; ergo a destructione consequentis ad destructionem antecedentis transposita nomina non variant enunciationem. Ad probationis autem consequentiae claritatem formetur figura, ubi ex uno latere locentur ambae suprapositae affirmationes, transpositis nominibus; et ex altero contraponantur duae negativae, similes illis quoad terminos et eorum positiones. Deinde, aliquantulo interiecto spatio, sub affirmativis ponatur affirmatio infiniti subiecti, et sub negativis illius negatio. Et notetur contradictio inter primam affirmationem et duas negationes primas, et inter secundam affirmationem et omnes tres negationes, ita tamen quod inter ipsam et infimam negationem notetur contradictio non vera, sed imaginaria. Notetur quoque contradictio inter tertiam affirmationem et tertiam negationem inter se. Hoc modo: (Figura). His ita dispositis, probat consequentiam Aristoteles sic. Illius affirmationis, est albus homo, negatio est, non est albus homo; illius autem secundae affirmationis, quae est, est homo albus, si ista affirmatio non est eadem illi supradictae affirmationi, scilicet, est albus homo, propter nominum transpositionem, negatio erit altera istarum, scilicet aut, non est non homo albus, aut, non est homo albus. Sed utraque habet affirmationem oppositam alia ab illa assignatam, scilicet, est homo albus. Nam altera quidem dictarum negationum, scilicet, non est non homo albus, negatio est illius quae dicit, est non homo albus; alia vero, scilicet, non est homo albus, negatio est eius affirmationis, quae dicit, est albus homo, quae fuit prima affirmatio. Ergo quaecunque dictarum negationum afferatur contradictoria illi mediae, sequitur quod sint duae unius, idest quod unius negationis sint duae affirmationes, et quod unius affirmationis sint duae negationes: quod est impossibile. Et hoc, ut dictum est, sequitur stante hypothesi erronea, quod illae affirmationes sint propter nominum transpositionem diversae. Then he proves the solution from the number of contradictory negations when he says, For if this is not the case there will be more than one negation of the same enunciation, etc. He does this by a reduction to the impossible and his reasoning is as follows. If this is not so, i.e., if transposed names diversify enunciations, there will be two negations of the same affirmation. But in the first book it was shown that there is only one negation of one affirmation. Going, then, from the destruction of the consequent to the destruction of the antecedent, transposed names do not vary the enunciation. To clarify the proof of the consequent, make a figure in which both of the affirmations posited above, with the names transposed are located on one side. Put the two negatives similar to them in respect to terms and position on the opposite side. Then leaving a little space, under the affirmatives put the affirmation with an infinite subject and under the negatives the negation of it. Mark the contradiction between the first affirmation and the first two negations and between the second affirmation and all three negations, but in the latter case mark the contradiction between it and the lowest negation as not true but imaginary. Mark, also, the contradiction between the third affirmation and negation. (1) Man is white - contradictories - Man is not white (2) White is man – contradictories - White is not man (3) Non-man is white - contradictories - Non-man is not white Now we can see how Aristotle proves the consequent. The negation of the affirmation "Man is white” is "Man is not white.” But if the second affirmation, "White is man,” is not the same as "Man is white,” because of the transposition of the names, its negation, [i.e., of "White is man”] will be either of these two: "Non-man is not white,” or "White is not man.” But each of these has another opposed affirmation than that assigned, namely, than "White is man.” For one of the negations, namely, "Non-man is not white,” is the negation of "Non-man is white”; the other, "White is not man” is the negation of the affirmation "Man is white,” which was the first affirmation. Therefore whatever negation is given as contradictory to the middle enunciation, it follows that there are two of one, i.e., two affirmations of one negation, and two negations of one affirmation, which is impossible. And this, as has been said, follows upon an erroneously set up hypothesis, i.e., that these affirmations are diverse because of the transposition of names. 10 Adverte hic primo quod Aristoteles per illas duas negationes, non est non homo albus, et, non est homo albus, sub disiunctione sumptas ad inveniendam negationem illius affirmationis, est homo albus, caeteras intellexit, quasi diceret: aut negatio talis affirmationis acceptabitur illa quae est vere eius negatio, aut quaecunque extranea negatio ponetur; et quodlibet dicatur, semper, stante hypothesi, sequitur unius affirmationis esse plures negationes, unam veram quae est contradictoria suae comparis habentis nomina transposita, et alteram quam tu ut distinctam acceptas, vel falso imaginaris; et e contra multarum affirmationum esse unicam negationem, ut patet in opposita figura. Ex quacunque enim illarum quatuor incipias, duas sibi oppositas aspicis. Unde notanter concludit indeterminate: quare erunt duae unius. Notice first that Aristotle through these two negations, "Non-man is not white” and "White is not man,” taken under disjunction to find the negation of the affirmation "Man is white,” has comprehended other things. It is as though he said: The negation which will be taken will either be the true negation of such an affirmation or some extraneous negation; and whichever is taken, it always follows, given the hypothesis, that there are many negations of one affirmation—one which is the contradictory of it, having equal truth with the one having its name transposed, and the other which you accept as distinct, or you imagine falsely. And conversely, there is a single negation of many affirmations, as is clear in the diagram. Hence, from whichever of these four you begin, you see two opposed to it. It is significant, therefore, that Aristotle concludes indeterminately: Therefore, there will be two [negations] of one [affirmation]. 11 Nota secundo quod Aristoteles contempsit probare quod contradictoria primae affirmationis sit contradictoria secundae, et similiter quod contradictoria secundae affirmationis sit contradictoria primae. Hoc enim accepit tamquam per se notum, ex eo quod non possunt simul esse verae neque simul falsae, ut manifeste patet praeposito sibi termino singulari. Non stant enim simul aliquo modo istae duae, Socrates est albus homo, Socrates non est homo albus. Nec turberis quod eas non singulares proposuit. Noverat enim supra dictum esse in primo quae affirmatio et negatio sint contradictoriae et quae non, et ideo non fuit sollicitus de exemplorum claritate. Liquet ergo ex eo quod negationes affirmationum de nominibus transpositis non sunt diversae quod nec ipsae affirmationes sunt diversae et sic nomina et verba transposita idem significant. Note secondly that Aristotle does not consider it important to prove that the contradictory of the first affirmation is the contradictory of the second, and similarly that the contradictory of the second affirmation is the contradictory of the first. This he accepts as self-evident since they can neither be true at the same time nor false at the same time. This is manifestly clear when a singular term is placed first, for "Socrates is a white man” and "Socrates is not a white man” cannot be maintained at the same time in any mode. You should not be disturbed by the fact that he does not propose these singulars here, for he was undoubtedly aware that he had already stated in the first book which affirmation and negation are contradictories and which not and for this reason felt that a careful elaboration of the examples was not necessary here. It is therefore evident that since negations of affirmations with transposed names are not diverse the affirmations themselves are not diverse, and hence transposed names and verbs signify the same thing. 12 Occurrit autem dubium circa hoc, quia non videtur verum quod nominibus transpositis eadem sit affirmatio. Non enim valet: omnis homo est animal; ergo omne animal est homo. Similiter, transposito verbo, non valet: homo est animal rationale; ergo homo animal rationale est, de secundo adiacente. Licet enim nugatio committatur, tamen non sequitur primam. Ad hoc est dicendum quod sicut in rebus naturalibus est duplex transmutatio, scilicet localis, scilicet de loco ad locum, et formalis de forma ad formam; ita in enunciationibus est duplex transmutatio, situalis scilicet, quando terminus praepositus postponitur, et e converso, et formalis, quando terminus, qui erat praedicatum efficitur subiectum, et e converso vel quomodolibet, simpliciter et cetera. Et sicut quandoque fit in naturalibus transmutatio pure localis, puta quando res transfertur de loco ad locum, nulla alia variatione facta; quandoque autem fit transmutatio secundum locum, non pura sed cum variatione formali, sicut quando transit de loco frigido ad locum calidum: ita in enunciationibus quandoque fit transmutatio pure situalis, quando scilicet nomen vel verbum solo situ vocali variatur; quandoque autem fit transmutatio situalis et formalis simul, sicut contingit cum praedicatum fit subiectum, vel cum verbum tertium adiacens fit secundum. Et quoniam hic intendit Aristoteles de transmutatione nominum et verborum pure situali, ut transpositionis vocabulum praesefert, ideo dixit quod transposita nomina et verba idem significant, insinuare volens quod, si nihil aliud praeter transpositionem nominis vel verbi accidat in enunciatione, eadem manet oratio. Unde patet responsio ad instantias. Manifestum est namque quod in utraque non sola transpositio fit, sed transmutatio de subiecto in praedicatum, vel de tertio adiacente in secundum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad similia. A doubt does arise, however, about the point Aristotle is making here, for it does not seem true that with transposed names the affirmation is the same. This, for example, is not valid: "Every man is an animal”; therefore, "Every animal is a man.” Nor is the following example with a transposed verb valid: "Man is a rational animal and (taking "is” as the second element), therefore "Man animal rational is”; for although it is nugatory as a whole combination, nevertheless it does not follow upon the first. The answer to this is as follows. just as there is a twofold transmutation in natural things, i.e., local, from place to place, and formal, from form to form, so in enunciations there is a twofold transmutation: a positional transmutation when a term placed before is placed after, and conversely, and a formal transmutation when a term that was a predicate is made a subject, and conversely, or in whatever mode, simply, etc. And just as in natural things sometimes a purely local transmutation is made (for instance, when a thing is transferred from place to place, with no other variation made) and sometimes a transmutation is made according to place—not simply but with a formal variation (as when a thing passes from a cold place to a hot place), so in enunciations a transmutation is sometimes made which is purely positional, i.e., when the name and verb are varied only in vocal position, and sometimes a transmutation is made which is at once formal and positional, as when the predicate becomes the subject, or the verb which is the third element added becomes the second. Aristotle’s purpose here was to treat of the purely positional transmutation of names and verbs, as the vocabulary of the transposition indicates; when he says, then, that transposed names and verbs signify the same thing, he intends to imply that if nothing other than the transposition of name and verb takes place in the enunciation, what is said remains the same. Hence, the response to the present objection is clear, for in both examples there is not only a transposition but a transmutation of subject to predicate in one case, and from an enunciation with a third element to one with a second element in the other. The response to similar questions is evident from this. V. 1. Postquam Aristoteles determinavit diversitatem enunciationis unius provenientem ex additione negationis infinitatis, hic intendit determinare quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc quod additur aliquid subiecto vel praedicato tollens eius unitatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo, determinat diversitatem earum; secundo, consequentias earum; ibi: quoniam vero haec quidem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit earum diversitatem; secundo, probat omnes enunciationes esse plures; ibi: si ergo dialectica et cetera. Dicit ergo quoad primum, resumendo quod in primo dictum fuerat, quod affirmare vel negare unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno, si ex illis pluribus non fit unum, non est enunciatio una affirmativa vel negativa. Et declarando quomodo intelligatur unum debere esse subiectum aut praedicatum, subdit quod unum dico non si nomen unum impositum sit, idest ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati. Cum enim plura conveniunt in uno nomine, ita quod ex eis non fiat unum illius nominis significatum, tunc solum vocis unitas est. Cum autem unum nomen pluribus impositum est, sive partibus subiectivis, sive integralibus, ut eadem significatione concludat, tunc et vocis et significati unitas est, et enunciationis unitas non impeditur. After the Philosopher has treated the diversity in an enunciation arising from the addition of the infinite negation, he explains what happens to an enunciation when something is added to the subject or predicate which takes away its unity. He first determines their diversity, and then proves that all the enunciations are many where he says, In fact, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc. Secondly, he determines their consequences, where he says, Some things predicated separately are such that they unite to form one predicate, etc. He begins by taking up something he said in the first book: there is not one affirmative enunciation nor one negative enunciation when one thing is affirmed or denied of many or many of one, if one thing is not constituted from the many. Then he explains what he means by the subject or predicate having to be one where he says, I do not use "one” of those things which, although one name may be imposed, do not constitute something one, i.e., a subject or predicate is one, not from the unity of the name, but from the unity of what is signified. For when many things are brought together under one name in such a way that what is signified by that name is not one, then the unity is only one of vocal sound. But when one name has been imposed for many, whether for subjective or for integral parts, so that it encloses them in the same signification, then there is unity both of vocal sound and what is signified. In the latter case, unity of the enunciation is not impeded. 2 Secundum quod subiungit: ut homo est fortasse animal et mansuetum et bipes obscuritate non caret. Potest enim intelligi ut sit exemplum ab opposito, quasi diceret: unum dico non ex unitate nominis impositi pluribus ex quibus non fit tale unum, quemadmodum homo est unum quoddam ex animali et mansueto et bipede, partibus suae definitionis. Et ne quis crederet quod hae essent verae definitionis nominis partes, interposuit, fortasse. Porphyrius autem, Boethio referente et approbante, separat has textus particulas, dicens quod Aristoteles hucusque declaravit enunciationem illam esse plures, in qua plura subiicerentur uni, vel de uno praedicarentur plura, ex quibus non fit unum. In istis autem verbis: ut homo est fortasse etc., intendit declarare enunciationem aliquam esse plures, in qua plura ex quibus fit unum subiiciuntur vel praedicantur; sicut cum dicitur, homo est animal et mansuetum et bipes, copula interiecta, vel morula, ut oratores faciunt. Ideo autem addidisse aiunt, fortasse, ut insinuaret hoc contingere posse, necessarium autem non esse. Then he adds, For example, man probably is an animal and biped and civilized. This, however, is obscure, for it can be understood as all example of the opposite, as if he were saying, "I do not mean by ‘one’ such a ‘one’ as the unity of the name imposed upon many from which one thing is not constituted, for instance, ‘man’ as ‘one’ from the parts of the definition, animal and civilized and biped.” And to prevent anyone from thinking these are true parts of the definition of the name he interposes perhaps. Porphyry, however, referred to with approval by Boethius, separates these parts of the text. He says Aristotle first states that that enunciation is many in which many are subjected to one, or many are predicated of one, when one thing is not constituted from these. And when he says, For example, man perhaps is, etc., he intends to show that an enunciation is many when many from which one thing is constituted are subjected or predicated, as in the example "Man is an animal and civilized and biped,” with copulas interjected or a pause such as orators make. He added perhaps, they say, to imply that this could happen, but it need not. 3 Possumus in eamdem Porphyrii, Boethii et Alberti sententiam incidentes subtilius textum introducere, ut quatuor hic faciat. Et primo quidem, resumit quae sit enunciatio in communi dicens: enunciatio plures est, in qua unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno enunciantur. Si tamen ex illis pluribus non fit unum, ut in primo dictum et expositum fuit. Deinde dilucidat illum terminum de uno, sive unum, dicens: dico autem unum, idest, unum nomen voco, non propter unitatem vocis, sed significationis, ut supra dictum est. Deinde tertio, dividendo declarat, et declarando dividit, quot modis contingit unum nomen imponi pluribus ex quibus non fit unum, ut ex hoc diversitatem enunciationis multiplicis insinuet. Et ponit duos modos, quorum prior est, quando unum nomen imponitur pluribus ex quibus fit unum, non tamen in quantum ex eis fit unum. Tunc enim, licet materialiter et per accidens loquendo nomen imponatur pluribus ex quibus fit unum, formaliter tamen et per se loquendo nomen unum imponitur pluribus, ex quibus non fit unum: quia imponitur eis non in quantum ex eis est unum, ut fortasse est hoc nomen, homo, impositum ad significandum animal et mansuetum et bipes, idest, partes suae definitionis, non in quantum adunantur in unam hominis naturam per modum actus et potentiae, sed ut distinctae sint inter se actualitates. Et insinuavit quod accipit partes definitionis ut distinctas per illam coniunctionem, et per illud quoque adversative additum: sed si ex his unum fit, quasi diceret, cum hoc tamen stat quod ex eis unum fit. Addidit autem, fortasse, quia hoc nomen, homo, non est impositum ad significandum partes sui definitivas, ut distinctae sunt. Sed si impositum esset aut imponeretur, esset unum nomen pluribus impositum ex quibus non fit unum. Et quia idem iudicium est de tali nomine, et illis pluribus; ideo similiter illae plures partes definitivae possunt dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, per modum actualis et possibilis, et sic unum faciunt; et sic formaliter loquendo vocantur plura, ex quibus fit unum, et pronunciandae sunt continuata oratione, et faciunt enunciationem unam dicendo, animal rationale mortale currit. Est enim ista una sicut et ista, homo currit. Alio modo, accipiuntur praedictae definitionis partes ut distinctae sunt inter se actualitates, et sic non faciunt unum: ex duobus enim actibus ut sic, non fit unum, ut dicitur VII metaphysicae; et sic faciunt enunciationes plures et pronunciandae sunt vel cum pausa, vel coniunctione interposita, dicendo, homo est animal et mansuetum et bipes; sive, homo est animal, mansuetum, bipes, rhetorico more. Quaelibet enim istarum est enunciatio multiplex. Et similiter ista, Socrates est homo, si homo est impositum ad illa, ut distinctae actualitates sunt, significandum. Secundus autem modus, quo unum nomen impositum est pluribus ex quibus non fit unum, subiungitur, cum dicit: ex albo autem et homine et ambulante etc., idest, alio modo hoc fit, quando unum nomen imponitur pluribus, ex quibus non potest fieri unum, qualia sunt: homo, album, et ambulans. Cum enim ex his nullo modo possit fieri aliqua una natura, sicut poterat fieri ex partibus definitivis, clare liquet quod nomen aliquod si eis imponeretur, esset nomen non unum significans, ut in primo dictum fuit de hoc nomine, tunica, imposito homini et equo. While agreeing with the opinion of Porphyry, Boethius, and Albert, we think a more subtle construction can be made of the text. According to it Aristotle makes four points here. First, he reviews what an enunciation is in general when he says, The enunciation is many in which one is enunciated of many or many of one, unless from the many something one is constituted... as he stated and explained in the first book. Secondly, he clarifies the term "one,” when he says, I do not use "one” of those things, etc., i.e., I call a name one, not by reason of the unity of vocal sound, but of signification, as was said above. Thirdly, he manifests (by dividing) and divides (by manifesting) the number of ways in which one name may be imposed on many things from which one thing is not constituted. From this he implies the diversity of the multiple enunciation. And he posits two ways in which one name may be imposed on many things from which one thing is not constituted: first, when one name is imposed upon many things from which one thing is constituted but not as one thing is constituted from them. In this case, materially and accidentally speaking, the name is imposed on many from which one thing is constituted, but it is formally and per se imposed on many from which one thing is not constituted; for it is not imposed upon them in the respect in which they constitute one thing; as perhaps the name "man” is imposed to signify animal and civilized and biped (i.e., parts of its definition) not as they are united in the one nature of man in the mode of act and potency, but as they are themselves distinct actualities. Aristotle implies that he is taking these parts of the definition as distinct by the conjunctions and by also adding adversatively, but if there is something one formed from these, Neither the Greek nor the Latin text of Aristotle has the "if” that Cajetan puts into this phrase.The correct reading is "...but there is something one formed from these.” Close as if to say, "when however it holds that one thing is constituted from these.” He adds perhaps because the name "man” is not imposed to signify its definitive parts as they are distinct. But if it had been so imposed or were imposed, it would be one name imposed on many things from which no one thing is constituted. And since the judgment with respect to such a name and those many things is the same, the many definitive parts can also be taken in two ways: first, in the mode of the actual and possible, and thus they constitute one thing, and formally speaking are called many from which one thing is constituted, and they are to be pronounced in continuous speech and they make one enunciation, for example, "A mortal rational animal is running.” For this is one enunciation, just as is "Man is running.” In the second way, the foresaid parts of the definition are taken as they are distinct actualities, and thus they do not constitute one thing, for one thing is not constituted from two acts as such, as Aristotle says in VII Metaphysicae [13: 1039a 5]. In this case they constitute many enunciations and are pronounced either with conjunctions interposed or with a pause in the rhetorical manner, for example, "Man is an animal and civilized and biped” or "Man is an animal–civilized–biped.” Each of these is a multiple enunciation. And so is the enunciation, "Socrates is a man” if "man” is imposed to signify animal, civilized, and biped as they are distinct actualities. Aristotle takes up the second way in which one name is imposed on many from which one thing is not constituted where he says, whereas from "white” and "man” and "walking” there is not [something one formed]. Since in no way can any one nature be constituted from "man,” white,” and "walking” (as there can be from the definitive parts), it is evident that if a name were imposed on these it would be a name that does not signify one thing, as was said in the first book of the name "cloak” imposed for man and horse. 4 Habemus ergo enunciationis pluris seu multiplicis duos modos, quorum, quia uterque fit dupliciter, efficiuntur quatuor modi. Primus est, quando subiicitur vel praedicatur unum nomen impositum pluribus, ex quibus fit unum, non in quantum sunt unum; secundus est, quando ipsa plura ex quibus fit unum, in quantum sunt distinctae actualitates, subiiciuntur vel praedicantur; tertius est, quando ibi est unum nomen impositum pluribus ex quibus non fit unum; quartus est, quando ista plura ex quibus non fit unum, subiiciuntur vel praedicantur. Et notato quod cum enunciatio secundum membra divisionis illius, qua divisa est, in unam et plures, quadrupliciter variari possit, scilicet cum unum de uno praedicatur, vel unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno, vel plura de pluribus; postremum sub silentio praeterivit, quia vel eius pluralitas de se clara est, vel quia, ut inquit Albertus, non intendebat nisi de enunciatione, quae aliquo modo una est, tractare. Demum concludit totam sententiam, dicens: quare nec si aliquis affirmet unum de his pluribus, erit affirmatio una secundum rem: sed vocaliter quidem erit una, significative autem non una, sed multae fient affirmationes. Nec si e converso de uno ista plura affirmabuntur, fiet affirmatio una. Ista namque, homo est albus, ambulans et musicus, importat tres affirmationes, scilicet, homo est albus et est ambulans et est musicus, ut patet ex illius contradictione. Triplex enim negatio illi opponitur correspondens triplici affirmationi positae. We have, therefore, two modes of the many (i.e., the multiple enunciation) and since both are constituted in two ways, there will be four modes: first, when one name imposed on many from which one thing is constituted is subjected or predicated as though the name stands for many; the second, when the many from one which one thing is constituted are subjected or predicated as distinct actualities; the third, when one name is imposed for a many from which nothing one is constituted; the fourth, when many which do not constitute one thing are subjected or predicated. Note that the enunciation, according to the members of the division by which it has been divided into one and many, can be varied in four ways, i.e., one is predicated of one, one of many, many of one, and many of many. Aristotle has not spoken of the last one, either because its plurality is clear enough or because, as Albert says, he only intends to treat of the enunciation which is one in some way. Finally [fourthly], he concludes with this summary: Consequently, if someone affirms something one of these latter there will not be one affirmation according to the thing: vocally it will be one; significatively, it will not be one, but many. And conversely, if the many are affirmed of one subject, there will not be one affirmation. For example, "Man is white, walking, and musical” implies three affirmations, i.e., "Man is white” and "is walking” and "is musical,” as is clear from its contradiction, for a threefold negation is opposed to it, corresponding to the threefold affirmation. 5 Deinde cum dicit: si ergo dialectica etc., probat a posteriori supradictas enunciationes esse plures. Circa quod duo facit: primo, ponit rationem ipsam ad hoc probandum per modum consequentiae; deinde probat antecedens dictae consequentiae; ibi: dictum est autem de his et cetera. Quoad primum talem rationem inducit. Si interrogatio dialectica est petitio responsionis, quae sit propositio vel altera pars contradictionis, nulli enunciationum supradictarum interrogative formatae erit responsio una; ergo nec ipsa interrogatio est una, sed plures. Cuius rationis primo ponit antecedens: si ergo et cetera. Ad huius intelligendos terminos nota quod idem sonant enunciatio, interrogatio et responsio. Cum enim dicitur, caelum est animatum, in quantum enunciat praedicatum de subiecto, enunciatio vocatur; in quantum autem quaerendo proponitur, interrogatio; ut vero quaesito redditur, responsio appellatur. Idem ergo erit probare non esse responsionem unam, et interrogationem non esse unam, et enunciationem non esse unam. Adverte secundo interrogationem esse duplicem. Quaedam enim est utram partem contradictionis eligendam proponens; et haec vocatur dialectica, quia dialecticus habet viam ex probabilibus ad utramque contradictionis partem probandam. Altera vero determinatam ad unum responsionem exoptat; et haec est interrogatio demonstrativa, eo quod demonstrator in unum determinate tendit. Considera ulterius quod interrogationi dialecticae dupliciter responderi potest. Uno modo, consentiendo interrogationi, sive affirmative sive negative; ut si quis petat, caelum est animatum? Et respondeatur, est; vel, Deus non movetur? Et respondeatur, non: talis responsio vocatur propositio. Alio modo, potest responderi interimendo; ut si quis petat, caelum est animatum? Et respondeatur, non; vel Deus non movetur? Et respondeatur, movetur: talis responsio vocatur contradictionis altera pars, eo quod affirmationi negatio redditur et negationi affirmatio. Interrogatio ergo dialectica est petitio annuentis responsionis, quae est propositio, vel contradicentis, quae est altera pars contradictionis secundum supradictam Boethii expositionem. Then when he says, In fact, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc., he proves a posteriori that the foresaid enunciations are many. First he states an argument to prove this by way of the consequent; then he proves the antecedent of the given consequent where he says, But we have spoken about these things in the Topics, etc. Now if dialectical questioning is a request for an answer, either a proposition or one part of a contradiction, none of the foresaid enunciations, put in the form of a question, will have one answer. Therefore, the question is not one, but many. Aristotle first states the antecedent of the argument, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc. To understand this it should be noted that an enunciation, a question, and an answer sound the same. For when we say, "The region of heaven is animated,” we call it an enunciation inasmuch as it enunciates a predicate of a subject, but when it is proposed to obtain an answer we call it an interrogation, and as applied to what was asked we call it a response. Therefore, to prove that there is not one response or one question or one enunciation will be the same thing. It should also be noted that interrogation is twofold. One proposes either of the two parts of a contradiction to choose from. This is called dialectical interrogation because the dialectician knows the way to prove either part of a contradiction from probable positions. The other kind of interrogation seeks one determinate response. This is the demonstrative interrogation, for the demonstrator proceeds determinately toward a single alternative. Note, finally, that it is possible to reply to a dialectical question in two ways. We may consent to the question, either affirmatively or negatively; for example, when someone asks, "Is the region of heaven animated,” we may respond, "It is,” or to the question "Is not God moved,” we may say, "No.” Such a response is called a proposition. The second way of replying is by destroying; for example, when someone asks "Is the region of heaven animated?” and we respond, "No,” or to the question, "Is not God moved?” we respond, "He is moved.” Such a response is called the other part of a contradiction, because a negation is given to an affirmation and an affirmation to a negation. Dialectical interrogation, then, according to the exposition just given, which is that of Boethius, is a request for the admission of a response which is a proposition, or which is one part of a contradiction. 6 Deinde subdit probationem consequentiae, cum ait: propositio vero unius contradictionis est et cetera. Ubi notandum est quod si responsio dialectica posset esse plures, non sequeretur quod responsio enunciationis multiplicis non posset esse dialectica; sed si responsio dialectica non potest esse nisi una enunciatio, tunc recte sequitur quod responsio enunciationis pluris, non est responsio dialectica, quae una est. Notandum etiam quod si enunciatio aliqua plurium contradictionum pars est, una non esse comprobatur: una enim uni tantum contradicit. Si autem unius solum contradictionis pars est, una est eadem ratione, quia scilicet unius affirmationis unica est negatio, et e converso. Probat ergo Aristoteles consequentiam ex eo quod propositio, idest responsio dialectica unius contradictionis est, idest una enunciatio est affirmativa vel negativa. Ex hoc enim, ut iam dictum est, sequitur quod nullius enunciationis multiplicis sit responsio dialectica, et consequenter nec una responsio sit. Nec praetereas quod cum propositionem, vel alteram partem contradictionis, responsionemque praeposuerit dialecticae interrogationis, de sola propositione subiunxit, quod est una; quod ideo fecit, quia illius alterius vocabulum ipsum unitatem praeferebat. Cum enim alteram contradictionis partem audis, unam affirmationem vel negationem statim intelligis. Adiunxit autem antecedenti ly ergo, vel insinuans hoc esse aliunde sumptum, ut postmodum in speciali explicabit, vel, permutato situ, notam consequentiae huius inter antecedens et consequens locandam, antecedenti praeposuit; sicut si diceretur, si ergo Socrates currit, movetur; pro eo quod dici deberet, si Socrates currit, ergo movetur. Sequitur deinde consequens: non erit una responsio ad hoc; et infert principalem conclusionem subdens, quod neque una erit interrogatio et cetera. Si enim responsio non potest esse una, nec interrogatio ipsa una erit. He adds the proof of the consequent when he says, and a proposition is a part of one contradiction. In relation to this it should be noted that if a dialectical response could be many, it would not follow that a response to a multiple enunciation would not be dialectical. However, if the dialectical response can only be one enunciation then it follows that a response to a plural enunciation is not a dialectical response, for it is one [i.e., it inclines to one part of a contradiction at a time]. It should also be noted that if an enunciation is a part of many contradictions, it is thereby proven not to be one, for one contradicts only one. But if an enunciation is a part of only one contradiction, it is one by the same reasoning, i.e., because there is only one negation of one affirmation, and conversely. Hence Aristotle proves the consequent from the fact that the proposition, i.e., the dialectical response, is a part of one contradiction, i.e., it is one affirmative or one negative enunciation. It follows from this, as has been said, that there is no dialectical response of a multiple enunciation, and consequently not one response. It should not be overlooked that when he designates a proposition or one part of a contradiction as the response to a dialectical interrogation, it is only of the proposition that he adds that it is one, because the very wording shows the unity of the other. For when you hear one part of a contradiction, you immediately understand one affirmation or negation. He puts the "therefore” with the antecedent, either implying that this is taken from another place and he will explain in particular afterward, or having changed the structure, he places the sign of the consequent, which should be between the antecedent and consequent before the antecedent, as when one says, "Therefore if Socrates runs, he is moved,” for "If Socrates runs, therefore he is moved.” Then the consequent follows: there will not be one answer to this, etc.; and the inference of the principal conclusion, for there would not be a single question. For if the response cannot be one, the question will not be one. 7 Quod autem addidit: nec si sit vera, eiusmodi est. Posset aliquis credere, quod licet interrogationi pluri non possit dari responsio una, quando id de quo quaestio fit non potest de omnibus illis pluribus affirmari vel negari (ut cum quaeritur, canis est animal? Quia non potest vere de omnibus responderi, est, propter caeleste sidus, nec vere de omnibus responderi, non est, propter canem latrabilem, nulla possit dari responsio una); attamen quando id quod sub interrogatione cadit potest vere de omnibus affirmari aut negari, tunc potest dari responsio una; ut si quaeratur, canis est substantia? Quia potest vere de omnibus responderi, est, quia esse substantiam omnibus canibus convenit, unica responsio dari possit. Hanc erroneam existimationem removet dicens: nec si sit vera, idest, et dato quod responsio data enunciationi multiplici de omnibus verificetur, nihilominus non est una, quia unum non significat, nec unius contradictionis est pars, sed plures responsio illa habet contradictorias, ut de se patet. He adds, even if there is a true answer, because someone might think that although one response cannot be given to a plural interrogation when the question concerns something that cannot be affirmed or denied of all of the many (for example, when someone asks, "Is a dog an animal?” no one response can be given, for we cannot truly say of every dog that it is an animal because of the star by that name; nor can we truly say of every dog that it is not an animal, because of the barking dog), nevertheless one response could be given when that which falls tinder the interrogation can be truly said of all. For example, when someone asks, "Is a dog a substance?” a single response can be given because it can truly he said of every dog that it is a substance, for to be a substance belongs to all dogs. Aristotle adds the phrase, even if there is a true answer, to remove such an erroneous judgment. For even if the response to the multiple enunciation is verified of all, it is nonetheless not one, since it does not signify one thing, nor is it a part of one contradiction. Rather, as is evident, this response has many contradictories. 8 Deinde cum dicit: dictum est autem de his in Topicis etc., probat antecedens dupliciter: primo, auctoritate eorum quae dicta sunt in Topicis; secundo, a signo. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo, ponit ipsum signum, dicens: quod similiter etc., cum auctoritate topicorum, manifestum est, scilicet, antecedens assumptum, scilicet quod dialectica interrogatio est petitio responsionis affirmativae vel negativae. Quoniam nec ipsum quid est, idest ex eo quod nec ipsa quaestio quid est, est interrogatio dialectica: verbi gratia; si quis quaerat, quid est animal? Talis non quaerit dialectice. Deinde subiungit probationem assumpti, scilicet quod ipsum quid est, non est quaestio dialectica; et intendit quod quia interrogatio dialectica optionem respondenti offerre debet, utram velit contradictionis partem, et ipsa quaestio quid est talem libertatem non proponit (quia cum dicimus, quid est animal? Respondentem ad definitionis assignationem coarctamus, quae non solum ad unum determinata est, sed etiam omni parte contradictionis caret, cum nec esse, nec non esse dicat); ideo ipsa quaestio quid est, non est dialectica interrogatio. Unde dicit: oportet enim ex data, idest ex proposita interrogatione dialectica, hunc respondentem eligere posse utram velit contradictionis partem, quam contradictionis utramque partem interrogantem oportet determinare, idest determinate proponere, hoc modo: utrum hoc animal sit homo an non: ubi evidenter apparet optionem respondenti offerri. Habes ergo pro signo cum quaestio dialectica petat responsionem propositionis, vel alterius contradictionis partem, elongationem quaestionis quid est a quaestionibus dialecticis. Where he says, But we have spoken about these things in the Topics, etc., he proves the antecedent in two ways. First, he proves it on the basis of what was said in the Topics; secondly, by a sign. The sign is given first where he says, Similarly it is clear that the question "What is it?” is not a dialectical one, etc. That is, given the doctrine in the Topics, it is clear (i.e., assuming the antecedent that the dialectical interrogation is a request for an affirmative or negative response) that the question "What is it?” is not a dialectical interrogation, e.g., when someone asks, "What is an animal?” he does not interrogate dialectically. Secondly, he gives the proof of what was assumed, namely, that the question "What is it?” is not a dialectical question. He states that a dialectical interrogation must offer to the one responding the option of whichever part of the contradiction he wishes. The question "What is it?” does not offer such liberty, for in saying "What is an animal?” the one responding is forced to assign a definition, and a definition is not only determined to one but is also entirely devoid of contradiction, since it affirms neither being nor non-being. Therefore, the question "What is it?” is not a dialectical interrogation. Whence he says, For the dialectical interrogation must provide, i.e., from the proposed dialectical interrogation the one responding must be able to choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes, which parts of the contradiction the interrogator must specify, i.e., he must propose the question in this way: "Is this animal man or not?” wherein the wording of the question clearly offers an option to the one answering. Therefore, you have as a sign that a dialectical question is seeking a response of a proposition or of one part of a contradiction, the setting apart of the question "What is it?” from dialectical questions. VI. 1 Postquam declaravit diversitatem multiplicis enunciationis, intendit determinare de earum consequentiis. Et circa hoc duo facit, secundum duas dubitationes quas solvit. Secunda incipit; ibi: verum autem est dicere et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit quaestionem; secundo, ostendit rationabilitatem quaestionis; ibi: si enim quoniam etc.; tertio, solvit eam; ibi: eorum igitur et cetera. Est ergo dubitatio prima: quare ex aliquibus divisim praedicatis de uno sequitur enunciatio, in qua illamet unita praedicantur de eodem, et ex aliquibus non. Unde haec diversitas oritur? Verbi gratia; ex istis, Socrates est animal et est bipes; sequitur, ergo Socrates est animal bipes; et similiter ex istis, Socrates est homo et est albus; sequitur, ergo Socrates est homo albus. Ex illis vero, Socrates est bonus, et est citharoedus; non sequitur, ergo est bonus citharoedus. Unde proponens quaestionem inquit: quoniam vero haec, scilicet praedicta, ita praedicantur composita, idest coniuncta, ut unum sit praedicamentum quae extra praedicantur, idest, ut ex eis extra praedicatis unite fiat praedicatio, alia vero praedicata non sunt talia, quae est inter differentia; unde talis innascitur diversitas? Et subdit exempla iam adducta, et ad propositum applicata: quorum primum continet praedicata ex quibus fit unum per se, scilicet, animal et bipes, genus et differentia; secundum autem praedicata ex quibus fit unum per accidens, scilicet, homo albus; tertium vero praedicata ex quibus neque unum per se neque unum per accidens inter se fieri sequitur; ut, citharoedus et bonus, ut declarabitur. Having explained the diversity of the multiple enunciation Aristotle now proposes to determine the consequences of this. He treats this in relation to two questions which he solves. The second begins where he says, On the other hand, it is also true to say predicates of something singly, etc. With respect to the other question, first he proposes it, then he shows that the question is a reasonable one where he says, For if we hold that whenever each is truly said of a subject, both together must also be true, many absurdities will follow, etc. Finally, he solves it where he says, Those things that are predicated—taken in relation to that to which they are joined in predication, etc. The first question is this: Why is it that from some things predicated divisively of a subject an enunciation follows in which they are predicated of the same subject unitedly, and from others not? What is the reason for this diversity? For example, from "Socrates is an animal and he is biped” follows, "Therefore, Socrates is a biped animal”; and similarly, from "Socrates is a man and he is white” follows, "Therefore, Socrates is a white man.” But from "Socrates is good and he is a lute player,” the enunciation, "Therefore, he is a good lute player” does not follow. Hence in proposing the question Aristotle says, Some things, i.e., predicates, are so predicated when combined, that there is one predicate from what is predicated separately, i.e., from some things that are predicated separately, a united predication is made but from others this is riot so. What is the difference between these; whence does such a diversity arise? He adds the examples which we have already cited and applied to the question. Of these examples, the first contains predicates from which something one per se is formed, i.e., "animal” and "biped,” a genus and difference; the second contains predicates from which something accidentally one is formed, namely, "white man”; the third contains predicates from which neither one per se nor one accidentally is formed, "lute player” and "good,” as will be explained. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 6 n. 2Deinde cum dicit: si enim quoniam etc., declarat veritatem diversitatis positae, ex qua rationabilis redditur quaestio: si namque inter praedicata non esset talis diversitas, irrationabilis esset dubitatio. Ostendit autem hoc ratione ducente ad inconveniens, nugationem scilicet. Et quia nugatio duobus modis committitur, scilicet explicite et implicite; ideo primo deducit ad nugationem explicitam, secundo ad implicitam; ibi: amplius, si Socrateset cetera. Ait ergo quod si nulla est inter quaecumque praedicata differentia, sed de quolibet indifferenter censetur quod quia alterutrum separatum dicitur, quod utrumque coniunctim dicatur, multa inconvenientia sequentur. De aliquo enim homine, puta Socrate, verum est separatim dicere quod, homo est, et albus est; quare et omne, idest et coniunctim dicetur, Socrates est homo albus. Rursus et de eodem Socrate potest dici separatim quod, est homo albus, et quod, est albus; quare et omne, idest, igitur coniunctim dicetur, Socrates est homo albus albus: ubi manifesta est nugatio. Rursus si de eodem Socrate iterum dicas separatim quod, est homo albus albus, verum dices et congrue quod est albus, et secundum hoc, si iterum hoc repetes separatim, a veritate simili non discedes, et sic in infinitum sequetur, Socrates est homo albus, albus, albus in infinitum. Simile quod ostenditur in alio exemplo. Si quis de Socrate dicat quod, est musicus, albus, ambulans, cum possit et separatim dicere quod, est musicus, et quod, est albus, et quod, est ambulans; sequetur, Socrates est musicus, albus, ambulans, musicus, albus, ambulans. Et quia pluries separatim, in eodem tamen tempore, enunciari potest, procedit nugatio sine fine. Deinde deducit ad implicitam nugationem, dicens, cum de Socrate vere dici possit separatim quod, est homo, et quod, est bipes, si coniunctim inferre licet, sequetur quod, Socrates sit homo bipes. Ubi est implicita nugatio. Bipes enim circumloquens differentiam hominis actu et intellectu clauditur in hominis ratione. Unde ponendo loco hominis suam rationem (quod fieri licet, ut docet Aristoteles II topicorum), apparebit manifeste nugatio. Dicetur enim: Socrates est homo, idest, animal bipes, bipes. Quoniam ergo plurima inconvenientia sequuntur si quis ponat complexiones, idest, adunationes praedicatorum fieri simpliciter, idest, absque diversitate aliqua, manifestum est ex dictis; quomodo autem faciendum est, nunc, idest, in sequentibus dicemus. Et nota quod iste textus non habetur uniformiter apud omnes quoad verba, sed quia sententia non discrepat, legat quicunque ut vult. When he says, For if we hold that whenever each is truly said of a subject, both together must also be true, etc., he shows that there truly is such a diversity among predicates and in so doing renders the question reasonable, for if there were not such a diversity among predicates the question would be pointless. He shows this by reasoning lead-ing to an absurdity, i.e., to something nugatory. Now, something nugatory is effected in two ways, explicitly and implicitly. Therefore, he first makes a deduction to the explicitly nugatory, secondly to the implicitly, where he says, Furthermore, if Socrates is Socrates and a man, Socrates is a Socrates man, etc. If, he says, there is no difference between predicates, and it is supposed of any of them indifferently that because both are said separately both may he said conjointly, many absurdities will follow. For of some man, say Socrates, it is true to say separately that he is a man and he is white; therefore both -together, i.e., we may also say conjointly, "Socrates is a white man.” Again, of the same Socrates we can say separately that he is a white man and that he is white, and both together, i.e., therefore conjointly, "Socrates is a white white man.” Here the nugatory expression is evident. Further, if of the same Socrates that you again say separately is a white white man it will be true and consistent to say that he is white, and according to this, if again repeating this separately, you will not deviate from a similar truth, and this will follow to infinity, then Socrates is a white white white man to infinity. The same thing can be shown by another example, If someone says of Socrates that he is musical, white, and walking, since it is also possible to say separately that he is musical, and that he is white, and that he is walking, it will follow that Socrates is musical, white, walking, musical, white, walking. And since these can be enunciated many times separately, yet at the same time, the nugatory statement proceeds without end. Then he makes a deduction to the implicitly nugatory. Since it can be truly said of Socrates separately that he is man and that he is biped, it will follow that Socrates is a biped man, if it is licit to infer conjointly. This is implicitly nugatory because the "biped,” which indirectly expresses the difference of man in act and in understanding, is included in the notion of man. Hence, if we posit the definition of man in place of "man” (which it is licit to do, as Aristotle teaches in II Topicorum [2: 110a 5]) the nugatory character of the enunciation will be evident, for when we say "Socrates is a biped man,” we are saying "Socrates is a biped biped animal.” From what has been said it is evident that many absurdities follow if anyone proposes that combinations, i.e., unions of predicates, be made simply, i.e., without any distinction. Now, i.e., in what follows, we will state how this must be settled. This particular text is not uniformly worded in the manuscripts, but since no discrepancy of thought is involved one may read it as he wishes. 3 Deinde cum dicit: eorum igitur etc., solvit propositam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, respondet instantiis in ipsa propositione quaestionis adductis; secundo, satisfacit instantiis in probatione positis; ibi: amplius nec quaecumqueet cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo namque, declarat veritatem; secundo, applicat ad propositas instantias; ibi: quocirca et cetera. Determinat ergo dubitationem tali distinctione. Praedicatorum sive subiectorum plurium duo sunt genera: quaedam sunt per accidens, quaedam per se. Si per accidens, hoc dupliciter contingit, vel quia ambo dicuntur per accidens de uno tertio, vel quia alterum de altero mutuo per accidens praedicatur. Quando illa plura divisim praedicata sunt per accidens quovis modo, ex eis non sequitur coniunctim praedicatum; quando autem sunt per se, tum ex eis sequitur coniuncte praedicatum. Unde continuando se ad praecedentia ait: eorum igitur quae praedicantur, et de quibus praedicantur, idest subiectorum, quaecumque dicuntur secundum accidens (et per hoc innuit oppositum membrum, scilicet per se), vel de eodem, idest accidentaliter concurrunt ad unius tertii denominationem, vel alterutrum de altero, idest accidentaliter mutuo se denominant (et per hoc ponit membra duplicis divisionis), haec, scilicet plura per accidens, non erunt unum, idest non inferent praedicationem coniunctam. When he says, Those things that are predicated—taken in relation to that to which they are joined in predication, etc., he solves the proposed question. First he makes an answer with respect to the instances cited in proposing the question; secondly, he solves the problem as related to the instances posited in his proof where he says, Furthermore, predicates that are present in one another cannot be combined simply. In relation to the first answer, he states the true position first and then applies it to the instances where he says, This is the reason "good” and "shoemaker” cannot be combined simply, etc. He settles the question with this distinction: there are two kinds of multiple predicates and subjects. Some are accidental, some per se. If they are accidental this occurs in two ways, either because both are said accidentally of a third thing or because they are predicated of each other accidentally. Now when the many predicated divisively are in any way accidental, a conjoined predicate does not follow from them; but when they are per se, a conjoined predicate does follow from them. In answering the question, therefore, Aristotle connects what he is saying with what has gone before: Of those things that are predicated and those of which they are predicated, i.e., subjects, whichever are said accidentally (by which he intimates the opposite member, i.e., per se), either of the same subject, i.e., they unite accidentally for the denomination of one third thing, or of one another, i.e., they denominate each other accidentally (and by this he posits the members of a two-fold division), these (i.e., these many accidentally) will not be one, i.e., do not produce a conjoined predication. 4 Et explanat utrumque horum exemplariter. Et primo, primum, quando scilicet illa plura per accidens dicuntur de tertio, dicens: ut si homo albus est et musicus divisim. Sed non est idem, idest non sequitur adunatim, ergo homo est musicus albus. Utraque enim sunt accidentia eidem tertio. Deinde explanat secundum, quando solum illa plura per accidens de se mutuo praedicantur, subdens: nec si album musicum verum est dicere, idest, et etiamsi de se invicem ista praedicantur per accidens ratione subiecti in quo uniuntur, ut dicatur, homo est albus, et est musicus, et album est musicum, non tamen sequitur quod album musicum unite praedicetur, dicendo, ergo homo est albus musicus. Et causam assignat, quia album dicitur de musico per accidens, et e converso. He explains both of these by examples. First, the many said accidentally of a third; for example, man is white and musical divisively. But they are not the same, i.e., it does not follow unitedly that "Man is musical white” for both are accidental to the same third thing. Then he explains the second member by an example. In it the many are predicated only of one another. Even if it were true to say white is musical, i.e., even if these are predicated accidentally of each other by reason of the subject in which they are united, so that we may say "Man is white and he is musical, and white is musical,” it still does not follow that "musical white” is predicated as a unity when we say, "Therefore, man is musical white.” He gives as the cause of this that "white” is said of "musical” accidentally and conversely. 5 Notandum est hic quod cum duo membra per accidens enumerasset, unico tamen exemplo utrumque membrum explanavit, ut insinuaret quod distinctio illa non erat in diversa praedicata per accidens, sed in eadem diversimode comparata; album enim et musicum, comparata ad hominem, sub primo cadunt membro; comparata autem inter se, sub secundo. Diversitatem ergo comparationis pluralitate membrorum, identitatem autem praedicatorum unitate exempli astruxit. It must be noted here that although he has enumerated two accidental members, he explains both members by this single example so as to imply that the distinction is not one of different accidental predicates, but of the same predicates compared in different ways. "White” and "musical” compared to "man” fall under the first member, but compared with each other, under the second. Hence he has provided diversity of comparison by the plurality of the members, but identity of predicates by the unity of the example. 6 Advertendum est ulterius, ad evidentiam divisionis factae in littera, quod, secundum accidens, potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, ut distinguitur contra perseitatem posterioristicam, et sic non sumitur hic: quoniam cum dicitur plura praedicata secundum accidens, aut ly secundum accidens determinaret coniunctionem inter se, et sic manifeste esset falsa regula; quoniam inter prima praedicata, animal bipes, seu, animal rationale, est praedicatio secundum accidens hoc modo (differentia enim in nullo modo perseitatis praedicatur de genere, et tamen Aristoteles in textu dicit ea non esse praedicata per accidens, et asserit quod est optima illatio, est animal et bipes, ergo est animal bipes); aut determinaret coniunctionem illarum ad subiectum, et sic etiam inveniretur falsitas in regula: bene namque dicitur, paries est coloratus, et est visibilis, et tamen coloratum visibile non per se inest parieti. Alio modo, accipitur ly secundum accidens, ut distinguitur contra hoc quod dico, ratione sui, seu, non propter aliud, et sic idem sonat, quod, per aliud: et hoc modo accipitur hic. Quaecunque enim sunt talis naturae quod non ratione sui iunguntur, sed propter aliud, ab illatione coniuncta deficere necesse est, ex eo quod coniuncta illatio unum alteri substernit, et ratione sui ea adunata denotat ut potentiam et actum. Est ergo sensus divisionis, quod praedicatorum plurium, quaedam sunt per accidens, quaedam per se, idest, quaedam adunantur inter se ratione sui, quaedam propter aliud. Ea quae per se uniuntur inferunt coniunctum, ea autem quae propter aliud, nequaquam. To make this division evident it must also be noted that accidentally can be taken in two ways. It may be taken as it is distinguished from "posterioristic perseity.” This is not the way it is taken here, for "many predicates accidentally” would then mean that the "accidentally” determines a conjunction between predicates, and thus the rule would clearly be false, for the first predicates he gave as examples are predicated accidentally in this way, namely, "biped animal,” or "rational animal” (for a difference is not predicated of a genus in any mode of perseity, and yet Aristotle says in the text that these are not predicated accidentally, and has asserted that "He is an animal and biped, therefore he is a biped animal” is a good inference). Or it would mean that the "accidentally” determines a conjunction of the predicates with the subject, and thus also the rule would be false, for it is valid to say, "The wall is colored and it is visible,” yet visible colored is not per se in the wall. Accidentally” taken in the second way is distinguished from what I call "on its own account,” i.e., not because of something else; "accidentally” then means "through another.” This is the way it is taken here, for whatever are of such a nature that they are joined because of something else, and not on their own account, do not admit of conjoined inference, because a conjoined inference subjects one to the other, and denotes the things united on their own account as potency and act. Therefore, the sense of the division is this: of many predicates, some are accidental, some per se, i.e., some are united among themselves on their own account, some on account of another. Those that are per se united infer conjointly; those that are united on account of another do not infer conjointly in any way. 7 Deinde cum dicit: quocirca nec citharoedusetc., applicat declaratam veritatem ad partes quaestionis. Et primo, ad secundam partem, quia scilicet non sequitur: est bonus et est citharoedus; ergo est bonus citharoedus, dicens: quocirca nec citharoedus bonus etc.; secundo, ad aliam partem quaestionis, quare sequebatur: est animal et est bipes; ergo est animal bipes: et ait: sed animal bipes et cetera. Et subiungit huius ultimi dicti causam, quia, animal bipes, non sunt praedicata secundum accidens coniuncta inter se aut in tertio, sed per se. Et per hoc explanavit alterum membrum primae divisionis, quod adhuc positum non fuerat explicite. Adverte quod Aristoteles, eamdem tenens sententiam de citharoedo et bono et musico et albo, conclusit quod album et musicum non inferunt coniunctum praedicatum; ideo nec citharoedus et bonus inferunt citharoedus bonus simpliciter, idest coniuncte. Est autem ratio dicti, quia licet musica et albedo dissimiles sint bonitati et arti citharisticae in hoc, quod bonitas nata est denominare et subiectum tertium, puta hominem et ipsam artem citharisticam (propter quod falsitas manifeste cernitur, quando dicitur: est bonus et citharoedus; ergo bonus citharoedus), musica vero et albedo subiectum tertium natae sunt denominare tantum, et non se invicem (propter quod latentior est casus cum proceditur: est albus et est musicus; ergo est musicus albus), licet, inquam, in hoc sint dissimiles, et propter istam dissimilitudinem processus Aristotelis minus sufficiens videatur; attamen similes sunt in hoc quod, si servetur identitas omnimoda praedicatorum quam servari oportet, si illamet divisa debent inferri coniunctim, sicut musica non denominat albedinem, neque contra, ita nec bonitas, de qua fit sermo, cum dicitur, homo est bonus, denominat artem citharisticam, neque e converso. Cum enim bonum sit aequivocum, licet a consilio, alia ratione dicitur de perfectione citharoedi, et alia de perfectione hominis. Quando namque dicimus, Socrates est bonus, intelligimus bonitatem moralem, quae est hominis bonitas simpliciter (analogum siquidem simpliciter positum sumitur pro potiori); cum autem infertur, citharoedus bonus, non bonitatem moris sed artis praedicas: unde terminorum identitas non salvatur; sufficienter igitur et subtiliter Aristoteles eamdem de utrisque protulit sententiam, quia eadem est haec, et ibi ratio et cetera. When he says, This is the reason "good” and "shoemaker” cannot be combined simply, etc., he applies the truth he has stated to the parts of the question. He applies it first to the second part, i.e., why this does not follow: "He is good and he is a shoemaker, therefore he is a good shoemaker.” Then he applies it to the other part of the question, i.e., why this follows: "He is an animal and he is biped, therefore he is a biped animal.” He adds the reason in the case of the latter: "biped” and "animal” are not predicates accidentally conjoined among themselves, nor in a third thing, but per se. This also explains the other member of the first division which has not yet been explicitly posited. Notice that he maintains the same judgment is to be made about lute player and good, and musical and white. He has concluded that "white” and "musical” do not infer a conjoined predicate; hence neither do "lute player” and "good” infer "good lute player” simply, i.e., conjointly. There is a reason for saying this. For although there is a difference between musical and white, and goodness and the art of luteplaying, they are also similar. Let us consider their difference first. Goodness is of such a nature that it denominates both a third subject, namely, man, and the art of lute-playing. This is the reason the falsity is clearly discernible when we say "He is good and a lute player, therefore he is a good lute player.” Musical and whiteness, on the other band, are of such a nature that they denominate only a third subject, and not each other, and hence, the error is less obvious in "He is white and be is musical, therefore he is musical white.” Now it is this difference that makes Aristotle’s process of reasoning appear somewhat inconclusive. However, they are similar. For if identity of predicates is kept in every way that is required for the same things divided to be inferred conjointly, then, just as "musical” does not denominate "whiteness,” nor the contrary, so neither does "goodness,” of which we are speaking when we say "Man is good,” denominate the art of lute-playing,,nor conversely. For "good” is equivocal—by choice though—and therefore is said of the perfection of the lute player by means of one notion and of the perfection of man by means of another. For example, when we say, "Socrates is good” we understand moral goodness, which is the goodness of man absolutely (for the analogous term posited simply, stands for what is mainly so); but when good lute player is inferred, it is not the goodness of morality that is predicated but the goodness of art; whence identity of the terms is not saved. Therefore, Aristotle has adequately and subtly expressed the same judgment about both, i.e., "white” and "musical,” and "good” and "lute player,” for the reason here is the same as there. Nec praetereundum est quod, cum tres consequentias adduxit quaestionem proponendo, scilicet; est animal et bipes; ergo est animal bipes: et, est homo et albus; ergo est homo albus: et, est citharoedus et bonus; ergo est homo albus: et, est citharoedus et bonus; ergo est bonus citharoedus; et duas primas posuerat esse bonas, tertiam vero non; huius diversitatis causam inquirere volens, cur solvendo quaestionem nullo modo meminerit secundae consequentiae, sed tantum primae et tertiae. Indiscussum namque reliquit an illa consequentia sit bona an mala. Et ad hoc videtur mihi dicendum quod ex his paucis verbis etiam illius consequentiae naturam insinuavit. Profundioris enim sensus textus capax apparet cum dixit quod, non sunt unum album et musicum etc., ut scilicet non tantum indicet quod expositum est, sed etiam eius causam, ex qua natura secundae consequentiae elucescit. Causa namque quare album et musicum non inferunt coniunctam praedicationem est, quia in praedicatione coniuncta oportet alteram partem alteri supponi, ut potentiam actui, ad hoc ut ex eis fiat aliquo modo unum, et altera a reliqua denominetur (hoc enim vis coniunctae praedicationis requirit, ut supra diximus de partibus definitionis); album autem et musicum secundum se non faciunt unum per se, ut patet, neque unum per accidens. Licet enim ipsa ut adunantur in subiecto uno sint unum subiecto per accidens, tamen ipsamet quae adunantur in uno, tertio subiecto, non faciunt inter se unum per accidens: tum quia neutrum informat alterum (quod requiritur ad unitatem per accidens aliquorum inter se, licet non in tertio); tum quia non considerata subiecti unitate, quae est extra eorum rationes, nulla remanet inter ea unitatis causa. Dicens ergo quod album et musicum non sunt unum, scilicet inter se, aliquo modo, causam expressit quare coniunctim non infertur ex eis praedicatum. Et quia oppositorum eadem est disciplina, insinuavit per illamet verba bonitatem illius consequentiae. Ex eo enim quod homo et albus se habent sicut potentia et actus (et ita albedo informet, denominet atque unum faciat cum homine ratione sui), sequitur quod ex divisis potest inferri coniuncta praedicatio; ut dicatur: est homo et albus; ergo est homo albus. Sicut per oppositum dicebatur quod ideo musicum et album non inferunt coniunctum praedicatum quia neutrum alterum informabat. There is another point that must be mentioned. Aristotle in proposing the question draws three consequences: "He is an animal and biped, therefore he is a biped animal” and "He is a man and white, therefore he is a white man” and "He is a lute player and good, therefore he is a good lute player.” Then he states that the first two consequences are good, the third not. His intention was to inquire into the cause of this diversity, but in solving the question he mentions only the first and third consequences, leaving the goodness or badness of the second consequence undiscussed. Why is this? I would say in answer to this that in these few words he has also implied the nature of the second consequence, for there is a more profound meaning to the statement in the text that whiteness and being musical is not one. It is a meaning that not only indicates what has already been explained but also its cause, and from this the nature of the second consequence is apparent. For the reason "white” and "musical” do not infer a conjoined predication is that in conjoined predication one part must be subjected to the other as potency to act such that in some way one thing is formed from them and one is denominated from the other (for the force of the conjoined predication requires this, as we have said above concerning the parts of the definition). "White” and "musical,” however, do not in themselves form one thing per se, as is evident, nor do they form one thing accidentally. For while it is true that as united in a subject they are one in subject accidentally, nevertheless things that are united in one third subject do not form one thing accidentally among themselves: first, because neither informs the other (which is required for accidental unity of things among themselves, although not in a third thing); secondly, because, considered apart from the unity of a subject, which is outside of their notions, there is no cause of unity between them. Therefore, when Aristotle says that whiteness and being musical are not one, i.e., among themselves, in some measure he expresses the reason why a predicate is not conjointly inferred from them. And since the same discipline extends to opposites, the goodness of the second consequence is implied by these words. That is, man and white are related as potency and act (and so, on its own account whiteness informs, denominates, and forms one thing with ‘man’); therefore from these taken divisively a conjoined predication can be inferred, i.e., "He is man and white, therefore be is a white man”; just as, in the opposite case, it was said that "musical” and "white” do not infer a conjoined predicate because neither informs the other. 9 Nec obstat quod album faciat unum per accidens cum homine: non enim dictum est quod unitas per accidens aliquorum impedit ex diversis inferre coniunctum, sed quod unitas per accidens aliquorum ratione tertii tantum est illa quae impedit. Talia enim quae non sunt unum per accidens nisi ratione tertii, inter se nullam habent unitatem; et propterea non potest inferri coniunctum, ut dictum est, quod unitatem importat. Illa vero quae sunt unum per accidens ratione sui, seu inter se, ut, homo albus, cum coniuncta accipiuntur, unitate necessaria non carent, quia inter se unitatem habent. Notanter autem apposui ly tantum: quoniam si aliqua duo sunt unum per accidens, ratione tertii subiecti scilicet, sed non tantum ex hoc habent unitatem, sed etiam ratione sui, ex hoc quod alterum reliquum informat, ex istis divisis non prohibetur inferri coniunctum. Verbi gratia, optime dicitur: est quantum et est coloratum; ergo est quantum coloratum: quia color informat quantitatem. There is no opposition between the position just stated and the fact that white forms an accidental unity with man. For we did not say that accidental unity of certain things impedes inferring a conjunction from divided things,” but that accidental unity of certain things only by reason of a third thing is the one that impedes. Things that are one accidentally only by reason of a third thing have no unity among them selves; and for this reason a conjunction, which implies unity, cannot be inferred, as we have said. But things that are one accidentally on their own account, i.e., among themselves, as for example, "white man,” when taken conjointly, have the necessary unity because they have unity among themselves. Notice that I have added "only.” The reason is that if any two C are one accidentally, namely, by reason of a third subject, and they not only have unity from this but also on their own account (because one informs the other), then from these taken divisively a conjoined inference can be made. For example, we can infer, "It is a quantity and it is colored, therefore it is a colored quantity,” because color informs quantity. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 6 n. 10Potes autem credere quod secunda illa consequentia, quam non explicite confirmavit Aristoteles respondendo, sit bona et ex eo quod ipse proponendo quaestionem asseruit bonam, et ex eo quod nulla instantia reperitur. Insinuavit autem et Aristoteles quod sola talis unitas impedit illationem coniunctam, quando dixit quaecumque secundum accidens dicuntur vel de eodem vel alterutrum de altero. Cum enim dixit, secundum accidens de eodem, unitatem eorum ex sola adunatione in tertio posuit (sola enim haec per accidens praedicantur de eodem, ut dictum est); cum autem addidit, vel alterutrum de altero, mutuam accidentalitatem ponens, ex nulla parte inter se unitatem reliquit. Utraque ergo per accidens adducta praedicata, in tertio scilicet vel alterutrum, quae impediant illationem coniunctam, nonnisi in tertio unitatem habent. You can hold as true that this second consequence is good even though Aristotle has not explicitly confirmed it by returning to it, both from the fact that in proposing the question he has claimed it as good and also because there is no instance opposed to it. Moreover, Aristotle has implied that it is only such unity that impedes the conjoined inference where he says: which are said accidentally, either of the same subject or of one another. By accidentally of the same subject, he posits their unity to be only from union in a third thing (for only these are predicated accidentally of the same subject, as was said). When he adds, or of one another—positing mutual accidentality—no unity at all is left between them. Therefore, both kinds of accidental predicates, namely, in a third thing or in one another, that impede a conjoined inference have unity only in a third thing. 11 Deinde cum dicit: amplius nec etc., satisfacit instantiis in probatione adductis, et in illis in quibus explicita committebatur nugatio, et in illis in quibus implicita; et ait quod non solum inferre ex divisis coniunctum non licet quando praedicata illa sunt per accidens, sed nec etiam quaecunque insunt in alio: idest, sed nec hoc licet quando praedicata includunt se, ita quod unum includatur in significato formali alterius intrinsece, sive explicite, ut album in albo, sive implicite, ut animal et bipes in homine. Quare neque album frequenter dictum divisim infert coniunctum, neque homo divisim ab animali vel bipede enunciatum, animal bipes, coniunctum cum homine infert; ut dicatur, ergo Socrates est homo bipes, vel animal homo. Insunt enim in hominis ratione, animal et bipes actu et intellectu, licet implicite. Stat ergo solutio quaestionis in hoc, quod unitas plurium per accidens in tertio tantum et nugatio, impediunt ex divisis inferri coniunctum; et consequenter, ubi neutrum horum invenitur, ex divisis licebit inferre coniunctum. Et hoc intellige quando divisae sunt simul verae de eodem et cetera. Then when he says, Furthermore, predicates that are present in one another cannot be combined simply, etc., he gives the solution for the instances (both the explicitly nugatory and the implicitly nugatory) cited in the proof. It is not only not licit, he says, to infer a union from divided predicates when these are accidental, but it is not licit when the predicates are present in one another. That is, it is not licit to infer a conjoined predicate from divided predicates when the predicates include one another in such a way that one is included in the formal signification of another intrinsically, or explicitly, as "white” in white,” or implicitly, as "animal” and "biped” in "man.” Therefore, white” said repeatedly and divisively does not infer a conjoined predication, nor does "man” divisively enunciated from "animal” or "biped” infer "biped” or "animal” conjoined with man, such that we could say, "Therefore, Socrates is a biped-man” or "animal-man.” For animal and biped are included in the notion of man in act and in understanding, although implicitly. The solution of the question, then, is this: the inferring of a conjunction from divided predicates is impeded when there is unity of the many accidentally only in a third thing and when there is a nugatory result. Consequently, where neither of these is found it will be licit to infer a conjunction from divided predicates. It is to be understood that this applies when the divided predicates are at once true of the same subject. VII. 1. Postquam expedita est prima dubitatio, tractat secundam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, movet ipsam quaestionem; secundo, solvit eam; ibi: sed quando in adiecto etc., tertio, ex hoc excludit quemdam errorem; ibi: quod autem non est et cetera. Est ergo quaestio: an ex enunciatione habente praedicatum coniunctum, liceat inferre enunciationes dividentes illud coniunctum; et est quaestio contraria superiori. Ibi enim quaesitum est an ex divisis inferatur coniunctum; hic autem quaeritur an ex coniuncto sequantur divisa. Unde movendo quaestionem dicit: verum autemaliquando est dicere de aliquo et simpliciter, idest divisim, quod scilicet prius dicebatur coniunctim, ut quemdam hominem album esse hominem, aut quoddam album hominem album esse, idest ut ex ista, Socrates est homo albus, sequitur divisim, ergo Socrates est homo, ergo Socrates est albus. Non autem semper, idest aliquando autem ex coniuncto non inferri potest divisim; non enim sequitur, Socrates est bonus citharoedus, ergo est bonus. Unde haec est differentia, quod quandoque licet et quandoque non. Et adverte quod notanter adduxit exemplum de homine albo, inferendo utramque partem divisim, ut insinuaret quod intentio quaestionis est investigare quando ex coniuncto potest utraque pars divisim inferri, et non quando altera tantum. Aristotle now takes up the second question in relation to multiple enunciations. He first presents it, and then solves it where he says, When something opposed is present in the adjunct, from which a contradiction follows, it will not be true to predicate them singly, but false, etc. Finally, he excludes an error where he says, In the case of non-being, however, it is not true to say that because it is a matter of opinion, it is something, etc. The second question is this: Is it licit to infer from an enunciation having a conjoined predication, enunciations dividing that conjunction? This question is the contrary of the first question. The first asked whether a conjoined predicate could be inferred from divided predicates; the present one asks whether divided predicates follow from conjoined predicates. When he presents the question he says, on the other hand, it is also true to say predicates of something singly, i.e., what was previously said conjointly may be said divisively; for example, that some white man is a man, or that some white man is white. That is, from "Socrates is a white man,” follows divisively, "Therefore Socrates is a man,” "There fore Socrates is white.” However, this is not always the case, i.e., some times it is not possible to infer divisively from conjoined predicates, for this does not follow: "Socrates is a good lute player, therefore he is good.” Hence, sometimes it is licit, sometimes not. Note that in inferring each part divisively he takes as an ex ample "white man.” This is significant, for by it he means to imply that his intention is to investigate when each part can be inferred divisively from a conjoined predicate, and not when only one of the two can be inferred. 2 Deinde cum dicit: sed quando in adiecto etc., solvit quaestionem. Et duo facit: primo, respondet parti negativae quaestionis, quando scilicet non licet; secundo, ibi: quare in quantiscumque etc., respondet parti affirmativae, quando scilicet licet. Circa primum considerandum quod quia dupliciter contingit fieri praedicatum coniunctum, uno modo ex oppositis, alio modo ex non oppositis, ideo duo facit: primo, ostendit quod numquam ex praedicato coniuncto ex oppositis possunt inferri eius partes divisim; secundo, quod nec hoc licet universaliter in praedicato coniuncto ex non oppositis, ibi: vel etiam quando et cetera. Ait ergo quod quando in termino adiecto inest aliquid de numero oppositorum, ad quae sequitur contradictio inter ipsos terminos, non verum est, scilicet inferre divisim, sed falsum. Verbi gratia cum dicitur, Caesar est homo mortuus, non sequitur, ergo est homo: quia ly mortuus, adiacens homini, oppositionem habet ad hominem, quam sequitur contradictio inter hominem et mortuum: si enim est homo, non est mortuus, quia non est corpus inanimatum; et si est mortuus, non est homo, quia mortuum est corpus inanimatum. Quando autem non inest, scilicet talis oppositio, verum est, scilicet inferre divisim. Ratio autem quare, quando est oppositio in adiecto, non sequitur illatio divisa est, quia alter terminus ex adiecti oppositione corrumpitur in ipsa enunciatione coniuncta. Corruptum autem seipsum absque corruptione non infert, quod illatio divisa sonaret. When he says, When something opposed is present in the adjunct, etc., he solves the question, first by responding to the negative part of the question, i.e., when it is not licit; secondly, to the affirmative part, i.e., when it is licit, where he says, Therefore, in whatever predications no contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, and wherein predicates are predicated per se and not accidentally, etc. It should be noted, in relation to the negative part of the question, that a conjoined predicate may be formed in two ways: from opposites and from non-opposites. Therefore, he shows first that the parts in a conjoined predicate of opposites can never be inferred divisively. Secondly, he shows that this is not licit universally in a conjoined predicate of non-opposites, where he says, Or, rather, when something opposed is present in it, it is never true; but when something opposed is not present, it is not always true. Aristotle says, then, that when something that is an opposite is contained in the adjacent term, which results in a contradiction between the terms themselves, it is not true, namely, to infer divisively, but false. For example, when we say, "Caesar is a dead man,” it does not follow, "Therefore he is a man,” because the contradiction between 11 man” and "dead” which results from adding the "dead” to "man” is opposed to man, for if he is a man he is not dead, because he is not an inanimate body; and if he is dead he is not a man, because as dead he is an inanimate body. When something opposed is not present, i.e., there is no such opposition, it is true, i.e., it is true to infer divisively. The reason a divided inference does not follow when there is opposition in the added term is that in a conjoined enunciation the other term is destroyed by the opposition of the added term. But that which has been destroyed is not inferred apart from the destruction, which is what the divided inference would signify. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 3Dubitatur hic primo circa id quod supponitur, quomodo possit vere dici, Caesar est homo mortuus, cum enunciatio non possit esse vera, in qua duo contradictoria simul de aliquo praedicantur. Hoc enim est primum principium. Homo autem et mortuus, ut in littera dicitur, contradictoriam oppositionem includunt, quia in homine includitur vita, in mortuo non vita. Dubitatur secundo circa ipsam consequentiam, quam reprobat Aristoteles: videtur enim optima. Cum enim ex enunciatione praedicante duo contradictoria possit utrumque inferri (quia aequivalet copulativae), aut neutrum (quia destruit seipsam), et enunciatio supradicta terminos oppositos contradictorie praedicet, videtur sequi utraque pars, quia falsum est neutram sequi. Two questions arise at this point. The first concerns something assumed here: how can it ever be true to make such a statement as "Caesar is a dead man,” since an enunciation cannot be true in which two contradictories are predicated at the same time of something (for this is a first principle). But "man” and "dead,” as is said in the text, include contradictory opposition, for in man is included life, and in dead, non-life. The second question concerns the consequent that Aristotle rejects, which appears to be good. The enunciation given as an example predicates terms that are opposed contradictorily. But from an enunciation predicating two contradictory terms, either both can be inferred (because it is equivalent to a copulative enunciation), or neither (because it destroys itself); therefore both parts seem to follow, since it is false that neither follows. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 4Ad hoc simul dicitur quod aliud est loqui de duobus terminis secundum se, et aliud de eis ut unum stat sub determinatione alterius. Primo namque modo, homo et mortuus, contradictionem inter se habent, et impossibile est quod simul in eodem inveniantur. Secundo autem modo, homo et mortuus, non opponuntur, quia homo transmutatus iam per determinationem corruptivam importatam in ly mortuus, non stat pro suo significato secundum se, sed secundum exigentiam termini additi, a quo suum significatum distractum est. Ad utrunque autem insinuandum Aristoteles duo dixit, et quod habent oppositionem quam sequitur contradictio, attendens significata eorum secundum se, et quod etiam ex eis formatur una vera enunciatio cum dicitur, Socrates est homo mortuus, attendens coniunctionem eorum alterius corruptivam. Unde patet quid dicendum sit ad dubitationes. Ad utramque siquidem dicitur, quod non enunciantur duo contradictoria simul de eodem, sed terminus ut stat sub distractione, seu transmutatione alterius, cui secundum se esset contradictorius. These two questions can be answered simultaneously. It is one thing to speak of two terms in themselves, and another to speak of them as one stands under the determination of another. Taken in the first way, "man” and "dead” have a contradiction between them and it is impossible that they be found in the same thing at the same time. In the second way, however, "man” and "dead” are not opposed, since "man,” changed by the destructive element introduced by "dead,” no longer stands for what it signifies as such, but as determined by the term added, by which what is signified is removed. Aristotle, in order to imply both, says two things: that they have the opposition upon which contradiction follows if you regard what they signify in themselves; and, that one true enunciation is formed from them as in "Socrates is a dead man,” if you regard their conjunction as destructive of one of them. Accordingly, the answer to the two questions is evident. In a case such as this two contradictories are not enunciated of the same thing at the same time, but one term as it stands under dissolution or transmutation from the other, to which by itself it would be contradictory. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 5Dubitatur quoque circa id quod ait: inest aliquid oppositorum quae consequitur contradictio; superflue enim videtur addi illa particula, quae consequitur contradictio. Omnia enim opposita consequitur contradictio, ut patet discurrendo in singulis; pater enim est non filius, et album non nigrum, et videns non caecum et cetera. Et ad hoc dicendum est quod opposita possunt dupliciter accipi: uno modo formaliter, idest secundum sua significata; alio modo denominative, seu subiective. Verbi gratia, pater et filius possunt accipi pro paternitate et filiatione, et possunt accipi pro eo qui denominatur pater vel filius. Rursus cum omnis distinctio fiat oppositione aliqua, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae, supponatur omnino distincta esse opposita. Dicendum ergo est quod, licet ad omnia opposita seu distincta contradictio sequatur inter se formaliter sumpta, non tamen ad omnia opposita sequitur contradictio inter ipsa denominative sumpta. Quamvis enim pater et filius mutuam sui negationem inferant inter se formaliter, quia paternitas est non filiatio, et filiatio est non paternitas; in relatione tamen ad denominatum, contradictionem non necessario inferunt. Non enim sequitur, Socrates est pater; ergo non est filius; nec e converso. Ut persuaderet igitur Aristoteles quod non quaecunque opposita colligata impediunt divisam illationem (quia non illa quae habent contradictionem annexam formaliter tantum, sed illa quae habent contradictionem et formaliter et secundum rem denominatam), addidit: quae consequitur contradictio, in tertio scilicet denominato. Et usus est satis congrue vocabulo, scilicet, consequitur: contradictio enim ista in tertio est quodammodo extra ipsa opposita. There is also a question about something else that Aristotle says, namely, something opposed is present... from which a contradiction follows. The phrase from which a contradiction follows seems to be superfluous, for contradiction follows upon all opposites, as is evident in discoursing about singulars; for a father is not a son, and white is not black, and one seeing is not blind, etc. Opposites, however, can be taken in two ways: formally, i.e., according to what they signify, and denominatively, or subjectively. For example, father and son can be taken for paternity and filiation, or they can be taken for the one who is denominated a father or a son. But, again, since every distinction is made by some opposition, as is said in X Metaphysicae [3: 1054a 20], it could be supposed that opposites are wholly distinct. It must be pointed out, therefore, that although contradiction follows between all opposites or distinct things formally taken, nevertheless, contradiction does not follow upon all opposites denominatively taken. Father and son formally taken infer a mutual negation of one another, for paternity is not filiation and filiation is not paternity, but in respect to what is denominated they do not necessarily infer a contradiction. It does not follow, for example, that "Socrates is a father; therefore he is not a son,” nor conversely. Aristotle, therefore, in order to establish that not all combined opposites prevent a divided inference (since those having a contradiction applying only formally do not prevent a divided inference, but those having a contradiction both formally and according to the thing denominated do prevent a divided inference) adds, from which a contradiction follows, namely, in the third thing denominated. And appropriately enough he uses the word follows, for the contradiction in " the third thing denominated is in a certain way outside of the opposites themselves. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 6Deinde cum dicit: vel etiam quando est etc., declarat quod ex non oppositis in tertio coniunctis secundum unum praedicatum, non universaliter possunt inferri partes divisim. Et primo, hoc proponit quasi emendans quod immediate dixerat, subiungens: vel etiam quando est, scilicet oppositio inter terminos coniunctos, falsum est semper, scilicet inferre divisim; quasi diceret: dixi quod quando inest oppositio, non verum sed falsum est inferre divisim; quando autem non inest talis oppositio, verum est inferre divisim. Vel etiam ut melius dicatur, quod quando est oppositio, falsum est semper, quando autem non inest talis oppositio, non semper verum est. Et sic modificavit supradicta addendo ly semper, et, non semper. Et subdens exemplum quod non semper ex non oppositis sequatur divisio, ait: ut, Homerus est aliquid ut poeta; ergo etiam est? Non. Ex hoc coniuncto, est poeta, de Homero enunciato, altera pars, ergo Homerus est, non sequitur; et tamen clarum est quod istae duae partes colligatae, est et poeta, non habent oppositionem, ad quam sequitur contradictio. Igitur non semper ex non oppositis coniunctis illatio divisa tenet et cetera. When he says, Or, rather, when something opposed is present in it, it is never true, etc., he explains that the parts cannot universally be inferred divisively in the case of a conjoined predicate in which there is a non-opposite as the third thing denominated. He proposes this—Or, rather, when something opposed is contained in it, i.e., opposition between the terms conjoined—as if amending what he has just said, namely, it is always false, i.e., to infer divisively. What he is saying, then, is this: I have said that when there is inherent opposition it is not true but false to infer divisively; but when there is not such opposition it is true to infer divisively; or, even better, when there is opposition it is always false but when there is not such opposition it is not always true. That is, he modifies what he first said by the addition of "always” and "not always.” Then he adds an example to show that division does not always follow from non-opposites: For example, Homer is something, say, a poet. Is it therefore true to say also that Homer "is,” or not? From the conjoined predicate, is a poet, enunciated of Homer, one part, Therefore Homer is, does not follow; yet it is evident that these two conjoined parts, "is” and "poet,” do not have the opposition upon which contradiction follows. Therefore, in the case of conjoined non-opposites a divided inference does not always hold. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 7Deinde cum dicit: secundum accidens etc., probat hoc, quod modo dictum est, ex eo quod altera pars istius compositi, scilicet, est, in antecedente coniuncto praedicatur de Homero secundum accidens, idest ratione alterius, quoniam, scilicet poeta, praedicatur de Homero, et non praedicatur secundum se ly est de Homero; quod tamen infertur, cum concluditur: ergo Homerus est. Considerandum est hic quod ad solvendam illam conclusionem negativam, scilicet,- non semper ex non oppositis coniunctis infertur divisim,- sufficit unam instantiam suae oppositae universali affirmativae afferre. Et hoc fecit Aristoteles adducendo illud genus enunciationum, in quo altera pars coniuncti est aliquid pertinens ad actum animae. Loquimur enim modo de Homero vivente in poematibus suis in mentibus hominum. In his siquidem enunciationibus partes coniunctae non sunt oppositae in tertio, et tamen non licet inferre utramque partem divisim. Committitur enim fallacia secundum quid ad simpliciter. Non enim valet, Caesar est laudatus, ergo est: et simile est de esse in effectu dependente in conservari. Quomodo autem intelligenda sit ratio ad hoc adducta ab Aristotele in sequenti particula dicetur. When he says, The "is” here is predicated accidentally of Homer, he proves what he has said. One part of this composite, namely, "is,” is predicated of Homer in the antecedent conjunction accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, namely, with regard to the "poet” which is predicated of Homer; it is not predicated as such of Homer. Nevertheless, this is what is inferred when one concludes "Therefore Homer is.” To validate his negative conclusion, namely, that it is not always true to infer divisively from conjoined non-opposites, it was sufficient to give one instance of the opposite of the universal affirmative. To do this Aristotle introduces that genus of enunciation in which one part of the conjunction is something pertaining to an act of the mind (for we are speaking only of Homer living in his poems in the minds of men). In such enunciations the parts conjoined are not opposed in the third thing denominated; nevertheless it is not licit to infer each part divisively, for the fallacy of going from the relative to the absolute will be committed. For example, it is not valid to say, "Caesar is praiseworthy, therefore he is,” which is a parallel case, i.e., of an effect whose existence requires maintenance. Aristotle will explain in the following sections of the text how the reasoning in the above text is to be understood. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 8Deinde cum dicit: quare in quantiscunque etc., respondet parti affirmativae quaestionis, quando scilicet ex coniunctis licet inferre divisim. Et ponit duas conditiones oppositas supradictis debere convenire in unum, ad hoc ut possit fieri talis consequentia; scilicet, quod nulla inter partes coniuncti oppositio sit, et quod secundum se praedicentur. Unde dicit inferendo ex dictis: quare in quantiscunque praedicamentis, idest praedicatis ordine quodam adunatis, neque contrarietas aliqua, in cuius ratione ponitur contradictio in tertio (contraria enim sunt quae mutuo se ab eodem expellunt), aut universaliter nulla oppositio inest, ex qua scilicet sequatur contradictio in tertio, si definitiones pro nominibus sumantur. Dixit hoc, quia licet in quibusdam non appareat oppositio, solis nominibus positis, sicut, homo mortuus, et in quibusdam appareat, ut, vivum mortuum; hoc tamen non obstante, si, positis nominum definitionibus loco nominum, oppositio appareat, inter opposita collocamus. Sicut, verbi gratia, homo mortuus, licet oppositionem non praeseferat, tamen si loco hominis et mortui eorum definitionibus utamur, videbitur contradictio. Dicemus enim corpus animatum rationale, corpus inanimatum irrationale. In quantiscunque, inquam, coniunctis nulla est oppositio, et secundum se, et non secundum accidens praedicantur, in his verum erit dicere et simpliciter, idest divisim quod fuerat coniunctim enunciatum. When he says, Therefore, in whatever predications no contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, etc., he replies to the affirmative part of the question, i.e., when it is licit to infer divisively from conjoined predicates. He maintains that two conditions—opposed to what has been said earlier in this portion of the text—must combine in one enunciation in order that such a consequence be effected: there must be no opposition between the parts conjoined, and they must be predicated per se. He says, then, inferring from what has been said: Therefore, in whatever predicaments, i.e., predicates joined in a certain order, no contrariety, in virtue of which contradiction is posited in the third thing denominated (for contraries mutually remove each other from the same thing), is present, or universally, no opposition is present, i.e., upon which a contradiction follows in the third thing denominated, when definitions are taken in place of the names.... He says this because it may be the case that the opposition is not apparent from the names alone, as in "dead man,” and again it may be, as in "living dead,” but whether apparent or not it will be evident that we are putting together opposites if we posit the definitions of the names in place of the names. For example, in the case of "dead man,” if we replace "man” and "dead,” with their definitions, the contradiction will be evident, for what we are saying is "rational animate body, irrational inanimate body.” In whatever conjoined predicates, then, there is no opposition, and wherein predicates are predicated per se and not accidentally, in these it will also be true to predicate them singly, i.e., say divisively what had been enunciated conjointly. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 7 n. 9Ad evidentiam secundae conditionis hic positae, nota quod ly secundum se potest dupliciter accipi: uno modo positive, et sic dicit perseitatem primi, secundi, universaliter, quarti modi; alio modo negative, et sic idem sonat quod non per aliud. Rursus considerandum est quod cum Aristoteles dixit de praedicato coniuncto quod, secundum se praedicetur, ly secundum se potest ad tria referri, scilicet, ad partes coniuncti inter se, ad totum coniunctum respectu subiecti, et ad partes coniuncti respectu subiecti. Si ergo accipiatur ly secundum se positive, licet non falsus, extraneus tamen a mente Aristotelis reperitur sensus ad quodcunque illorum trium referatur. Licet enim valeat, est homo risibilis, ergo est homo et est risibilis, et, est animal rationale, ergo est animal et est rationale; tamen his oppositae inferunt similes consequentias. Dicimus enim, est albus musicus, ergo est musicus et est albus: ubi nulla est perseitas, sed est coniunctio per accidens, tam inter partes inter se, quam inter totum et subiectum, quam etiam inter partes et subiectum. Liquet igitur quod non accipit Aristoteles ly secundum se positive, ex eo quod vana fuisset talis additio, quae ab oppositis non facit in hoc differentiam. Ad quid enim addidit, secundum se, et non, secundum accidens, si tam illae quae sunt secundum se, modo exposito, quam illae quae sunt secundum accidens ex coniuncto, inferunt divisum? Si vero accipiatur secundum se, negative, idest, non per aliud, et referatur ad partes coniuncti inter se, falsa invenitur regula. Nam non licet dicere, est bonus citharoedus; ergo est bonus et citharoedus; et tamen ars citharizandi et bonitas eius sine medio coniunguntur. Et similiter contingit, si referatur ad totum coniunctum respectu subiecti, ut in eodem exemplo apparet. Totum enim hoc, citharoedus bonus, non propter aliud convenit homini; et tamen non infert, ut dictum est, divisionem. Superest ergo ut ad partem coniuncti respectu subiecti referatur, et sit sensus: quando aliqua coniunctim praedicata, secundum se, idest, non per aliud, praedicantur, idest, quod utraque pars praedicatur de subiecto non propter alteram, sed propter seipsam et subiectum, tunc ex coniuncto infertur divisa praedicatio. In order to make this second condition clear, it should be noted that "per se” can be taken in two ways: positively, and thus it refers to "perseity” of the first, of the second, and of the fourth mode universally; or negatively, and thus it means the same as not through something else. It should also be noted that when Aristotle says of a conjoined predicate that it is predicated "per se,” the "per se” can be referred to three things: to the parts of the conjunction among themselves, to the whole conjunction with respect to the subject, and to the parts of the conjoined predicate with respect to the subject. Now if "per se” is taken positively, although it will not be false, nevertheless in reference to any of these three the meaning will be found to be foreign to the mind of Aristotle. For, although these are valid: "He is a risible man, therefore he is man and he is risible” and "He is a rational animal, therefore he is animal and he is rational,” nevertheless the opposite kind of predication infers consequences in a similar way. For example, there is no 11 perseity” in "He is a white musician, therefore he is white and he is a musician”; rather, there is an accidental conjunction, not only between the parts among themselves and between the whole and the subject, but even between the parts and the subject. It is evident, therefore, that Aristotle is not taking "per se” positively, for an addition that does not differentiate this kind of predication from the opposed kind of predication would be useless. Why add "per se and not accidentally,” if both those that are per se in the way explained and those that are conjoined accidentally infer divisively? If "per se” is taken negatively, i.e., as not through another, and is referred to the parts of the conjoined predicate among themselves, the rule is found to be false. It is not licit, for example, to say, "He is a good lute player, therefore he is good and a lute player”; yet the art of lute-playing and its goodness are conjoined without anything as a medium. And the case is the same if it is referred to the whole conjoined predicate with respect to the subject, as is clear in the same example, for the whole, "good lute player,” does not belong to man on account of another, and yet it does not infer the division, as has already been said. Therefore, "per se” is referred to the parts of the conjoined predicate with respect to the subject and the meaning is: when the predicates are conjointly predicated per se, i.e., not through another, i.e., each part is predicated of the subject, not on account of another but on account of itself and the subject, then a divided predication is inferred from the conjoined predication. 10 Et hoc modo exponunt Averroes et Boethius; et vera invenitur regula, ut inductive facile manifestari potest, et ratio ipsa suadet. Si enim partes alicuius coniuncti praedicati ita inhaerent subiecto quod neutra propter alteram insit, earum separatio nihil habet quod veritatem impediat divisarum. Est et verbis Aristotelis consonus sensus iste. Quoniam et per hoc distinguit inter enunciationes ex quibus coniunctum infert divisam praedicationem, et eas quibus haec non inest consequentia. Istae siquidem ultra habentes oppositiones in adiecto, sunt habentes praedicatum coniunctum, cuius una partium alterius est ita determinatio, quod nonnisi per illam subiectum respicit, sicut apparet in exemplo ab Aristotele adducto, Homerus est poeta. Est siquidem ibi non respicit Homerum ratione ipsius Homeri, sed praecise ratione poesis relictae; et ideo non licet inferre, ergo Homerus est. Et simile est in negativis. Si quis enim dicat, Socrates non est paries, non licet inferre, ergo Socrates non est, eadem ratione, quia esse non est negatum de Socrate, sed de pariete in Socrate. This is the way in which Averroes and Boethius explain this and, explained in this way, a true rule is found, as can easily be manifested inductively; moreover, the reasoning is compelling. For, if the parts of some conjoined predicate so inhere in the subject that neither is in it on account of another, their separation produces nothing that could impede the truth of the divided predicates. And this meaning is consonant with the words of Aristotle, for by this he also distinguishes between enunciations in which the conjoined predicate infers a divided predicate, and those in which this consequence is not inherent. For besides the predicates having opposition in the additional determining element, there are those with a conjoined predicate wherein one part is a determination of the other in such a way that only through it does it regard the subject, as is evident in Aristotle’s example, "Homer is a poet.” The "is” does not regard Homer by reason of Homer himself, but precisely by reason of the poetry he left. Hence it is not licit to infer, "Therefore Homer is.” The same is true with respect to negative enunciations of this type, for it is not licit to infer from "Socrates is not a wall,” "Therefore Socrates is not.” And the reason is the same: "to be” is not denied of Socrates, but of "wallness” in Socrates. 11 Et per hoc patet qualiter sit intelligenda ratio in textu superiore adducta. Accipitur enim ibi, secundum se negative, modo hic exposito, et secundum accidens, idest propter aliud. In eadem ergo significatione est usus ly secundum accidens, solvendo hanc et praecedentem quaestionem: utrobique enim intellexit secundum accidens, idest, propter aliud, coniuncta, sed ad diversa retulit. Ibi namque ly secundum accidens determinabat coniunctionem duorum praedicatorum inter se; hic vero determinat partem coniuncti praedicati in ordine ad subiectum. Unde ibi, album et musicum, inter ea quae secundum accidens sunt, numerabantur; hic autem non. Accordingly, it is evident how the reasoning in the text above is to be understood. "Per se” is taken negatively in the way explained here, and "accidentally” as "on account of another.” The "accidentally” is used with the same signification in solving this and the preceding question. In both he understands "accidentally” to mean conjoined on account of another, but it is referred to diverse things. In the preceding question "accidentally” determines the way in which two predicates are conjoined among themselves; in the latter question it determines the way in which the part of the conjoined predicate is ordered to the subject. Hence, in the former, "white” and "musician” are numbered among the things that are accidental, but in the latter they are not. 12 Sed occurrit circa hanc expositionem dubitatio non parva. Si enim ideo non licet ex coniuncto inferre divisim, quia altera pars coniuncti non respicit subiectum propter se, sed propter alteram partem (ut dixit Aristoteles de ista enunciatione, Homerus est poeta), sequetur quod numquam a tertio adiacente ad secundum erit bona consequentia: quia in omni enunciatione de tertio adiacente, est respicit subiectum propter praedicatum et non propter se et cetera. This exposition seems a bit dubious, however. For if it is not licit to infer divisively from a conjoined predicate because one part of the conjoined predicate does not regard the subject on account of itself but on account of another part (as Aristotle says of the enunciation, "Homer is a poet”), it will follow that there will never be a good consequence from the third determinant to the second, since in every enunciation with a third determinant, "is” regards the subject on account of the predicate and not on account of itself. 13 Ad huius difficultatis evidentiam, nota primo hanc distinctionem. Aliud est tractare regulam, quando ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum et quando non, et aliud quando ex coniuncto fit illatio divisa et quando non. Illa siquidem est extra propositum, istam autem venamur. Illa compatitur varietatem terminorum, ista non. Si namque unus terminorum, qui est altera pars coniuncti, secundum significationem seu suppositionem varietur in separatione, non infertur ex coniuncto praedicato illudmet divisim, sed aliud. Nota secundo hanc propositionem: cum ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum, non servatur identitas terminorum. Liquet ista quoad illum terminum, est. Dictum siquidem fuit supra a sancto Thoma, quod aliud importat est secundum adiacens, et aliud est tertium adiacens. Illud namque importat actum essendi simpliciter, hoc autem habitudinem inhaerentiae vel identitatis praedicati ad subiectum. Fit ergo varietas unius termini cum ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum, et consequenter non fit illatio divisi ex coniuncto. Unde praelucet responsio ad obiectionem, quod, licet ex tertio adiacente quandoque possit inferri secundum, numquam tamen ex tertio adiacente licet inferri secundum tamquam ex coniuncto divisum, quia inferri non potest divisim, cuius altera pars ipsa divisione perit. Negetur ergo consequentia obiectionis et ad probationem dicatur quod, optime concludit quod talis illatio est illicita infra limites illationum, quae ex coniuncto divisionem inducunt, de quibus hic Aristoteles loquitur. To make this difficulty clear, we must first note a distinction. It is one thing to treat of the rule when inferring a second determinant from a third determinant, and when not; it is quite another thing when a divided inference is made from a conjoined predicate, and when not. The former is an additional point; the latter is the question we have been inquiring about. The former is compatible with variety of the terms, the latter not. For if one of the terms which is one part of a conjoined predicate will be varied according to signification, or supposition when taken separately, it is not inferred divisively from the conjoined predicate, but the other is. Secondly, note this proposition: when a second determinant is inferred from a third, identity of the terms is not kept. This is evident with respect to the term "is.” Indeed, St. Thomas said above that "is” as the second determinant implies one thing and "is” as the third determinant another. The former implies the act of being simply, the latter implies the relationship of inherence, or identity of the predicate with the subject. Therefore, when the second determinant is inferred from the third, one term is varied and consequently an inference is not made of the divided from the conjoined. Accordingly, the response to the objection is clear, for although the second determinant can sometimes be inferred from the third, it is never licit for the second to be inferred from the third as divided from conjoined, because you cannot infer divisively when one part is destroyed by that very division. Therefore, let the consequence of the objection be denied and for proof let it be said that the conclusion that such an inference is illicit under the limits of inferences which induce division from a conjoined predicate-is good, for this is what Aristotle is speaking of here. 14 Sed contra hoc instatur. Quia etiam tanquam ex coniuncto divisa fit illatio, Socrates est albus, ergo est, per locum a parte in modo ad suum totum, ubi non fit varietas terminorum. Et ad hoc dicitur quod licet homo albus sit pars in modo hominis (quia nihil minuit de hominis ratione albedo, sed ponit hominem simpliciter), tamen est album non est pars in modo ipsius est, eo quod pars in modo est universale cum conditione non minuente, ponente illud simpliciter. Clarum est autem quod album minuit rationem ipsius est, et non ponit ipsum simpliciter: contrahit enim ad esse secundum quid. Unde apud philosophos, cum fit aliquid album, non dicitur generari, sed generari secundum quid. But the objection is raised against this that in the case of "Socrates is white, therefore be is,” a divided inference can be made as from a conjoined predicate, in virtue of the argument that we can go from what is in the mode of part to its whole as long as the terms remain the same. The answer to this is as follows. It is true that white man is a part in the mode of man (because white diminishes nothing of the notion of man but posits man simply); is white, however, is not a part in the mode of is, because a part in the mode of its whole is a universal, the condition not diminishing the positing of it simply. But it is evident that white diminishes the notion of is, and does not posit it simply, for it contracts it to relative being. Whence when something becomes white, philosophers do not say that it is generated, but generated relatively. 15 Sed instatur adhuc quia secundum hoc, dicendo, est animal, ergo est, fit illatio divisa per eumdem locum. Animal enim non minuit rationem ipsius est. Ad hoc est dicendum quod ly est, si dicat veritatem propositionis, manifeste peccatur a secundum quid ad simpliciter. Si autem dicat actum essendi, illatio est bona, sed non est de tertio, sed de secundo adiacente. In accordance with this, the objection is raised that in saying "It is an animal, therefore it is,” a divided inference is made in virtue of the same argument; for animal does not diminish the notion of is itself. The answer to this is that if the is asserts the truth of a proposition, the fallacy is committed of going from the relative to the absolute; if the is asserts the act of being, the inference is good, but it is of the second determinant, not of the third. 16 Potest ulterius dubitari circa principale: quia sequitur, est quantum coloratum, ergo est quantum, et, est coloratum; et tamen coloratum respicit subiectum mediante quantitate: ergo non videtur recta expositio supra adducta. Ad hoc et similia dicendum est quod coloratum non ita inest subiecto per quantitatem quod sit eius determinatio et ratione talis determinationis subiectum denominet, sicut bonitas artem citharisticam determinat; cum dicitur, est citharoedus bonus; sed potius subiectum ipsum primo coloratum denominatur, quantum vero secundario coloratum dicitur, licet color media quantitate suscipiatur. Unde notanter supra diximus, quod tunc altera pars coniuncti praedicatur per accidens, quando praecise denominat subiectum, quia denominat alteram partem. Quod nec in similibus instantiis invenitur. There is another doubt, this time about the principle in the exposition; for this follows, "It is a colored quantity, therefore it is a quantity and it is colored”; but "colored” regards the subject through the medium of quantity; therefore the exposition given above does not seem to be correct. The answer to this and to similar objections is that "colored” is not so present in a subject by means of quantity that it is its determination, and by reason of such a determination denominates the subject; as goodness,” for instance, determines the art of lute-playing when we say "He is a good lute player.” Rather, the subject itself is first denominated "colored” and quantity is called "colored” secondarily, although color is received through the medium of quantity. Hence, we made a point of saying earlier that one part of a conjoined predicate is predicated accidentally when it denominates the subject precisely because it denominates the other part.93 This is not the case here nor in similar instances. 17 Deinde cum dicit: quod autem non est etc., excludit quorumdam errorem qui, quod non est, esse tali syllogismo concludere satagebant: quod est, opinabile est. Quod non est, est opinabile. Ergo quod non est, est. Hunc siquidem processum elidit Aristoteles destruendo primam propositionem, quae partem coniuncti in subiecto divisim praedicat, ac si diceret: est opinabile, ergo est. Unde assumendo subiectum conclusionis illorum ait: quod autem non est; et addit medium eorum, quoniam opinabile est; et subdit maiorem extremitatem, non est verum dicere, esse aliquid. Et causam assignat, quia talis opinatio non propterea est, quia illud sit, sed potius quia non est. When he says, In the case of non-being, however, it is not true to say that it is something, etc., he excludes the error of those who were satisfied to conclude that what is not, is. This is the syllogism they use: "That which is, is ‘opinionable’; that which is not, is ‘opinionable’; therefore what is not, is.” Aristotle destroys this process of reasoning by destroying the first proposition, which predicates divisively a part of what is conjoined in the subject, as if it said "It is ‘opinionable,’ therefore it is.” Hence, assuming the subject of their conclusion, he says, In the case of that which is not, however; and he adds their middle term, because it is a matter of opinion; then he adds the major extreme, it is not true to say that it is something. He then assigns the cause: it is not because it is but rather because it is not, that there is such opinion. VIII. 1 Postquam determinatum est de enunciationibus, quarum partibus aliud additur tam remanente quam variata unitate, hic intendit declarare quid accidat enunciationi, ex eo quod aliquid additur, non suis partibus, sed compositioni eius. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, determinat de oppositione earum; secundo, de consequentiis; ibi: consequentiae vero et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, exequitur; ibi: nam si eorum et cetera. Proponit ergo quod iam perspiciendum est, quomodo se habeant affirmationes et negationes enunciationum de possibili et non possibili et cetera. Et causam subdit: habent enim multas dubitationes speciales. Sed antequam ulterius procedatur, quoniam de enunciationibus, quae modales vocantur, sermo inchoatur, praelibandum est esse quasdam modales enunciationes, et qui et quot sunt modi reddentes propositiones modales; et quid earum sit subiectum et quid praedicatum; et quid sit ipsa enunciatio modalis; quisque sit ordo earum ad praecedentes; et quae necessitas sit specialem faciendi tractatum de his. Now that he has treated enunciations in which something added to the parts leaves the unity intact on the one hand, and varies it on the other, Aristotle begins to explain what happens to the enunciation when something is added, not to its parts, but to its composition. First, he explains their opposition; secondly, he treats of the consequences of their opposition where he says, Logical sequences result from modals ordered thus, etc. With respect to the first point, he proposes the question he intends to consider and then begins his consideration where he says, Let us grant that of mutually related enunciations, contradictories are those opposed to each other, etc. He proposes that we must now investigate the way in which affirmations and negations of the possible and not possible are related. He gives the reason when he adds, for the question has many special difficulties. However, before we proceed with the consideration of enunciations that are called modal, we must first see that there are such things as modal enunciations, and which and how many modes render propositions modal; we must also know what their subject is and their predicate, what the modal enunciation itself is, what the order is between modal enunciations and the enunciations already treated, and finally, why a special treatment of them is necessary. 2 Quia ergo possumus dupliciter de rebus loqui; uno modo, componendo rem unam cum alia, alio modo, compositionem factam declarando qualis sit, insurgunt duo enunciationum genera; quaedam scilicet enunciantes aliquid inesse vel non inesse alteri, et hae vocantur de inesse, de quibus superius habitus est sermo; quaedam vero enunciantes modum compositionis praedicati cum subiecto, et hae vocantur modales, a principaliori parte sua, modo scilicet. Cum enim dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile, non enunciatur cursus de Socrate, sed qualis sit compositio cursus cum Socrate, scilicet possibilis. Signanter autem dixi modum compositionis, quoniam modus in enunciatione positus duplex est. Quidam enim determinat verbum, vel ratione significati ipsius verbi ut Socrates currit velociter, vel ratione temporis consignificati, ut Socrates currit hodie; quidam autem determinat compositionem ipsam praedicati cum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile. In illis namque determinatur qualis cursus insit Socrati, vel quando; in hac autem, qualis sit coniunctio cursus cum Socrate. Modi ergo non illi qui rem verbi, sed qui compositionem determinant, modales enunciationes reddunt, eo quod compositio veluti forma totius totam enunciationem continet. We can speak about things in two ways: in one, composing one thing with another; in the other, declaring the kind of composition that exists between the two things. To signify these two ways of speaking about things we form two kinds of enunciations. One kind enunciates that something belongs or does not belong to something. These are called absolute [de inesse] enunciations; these we have already discussed. The other enunciates the mode of composition of the predicate with the subject. These are called modal, from their principal part, the mode. For when we say, "That Socrates run is possible,” it is not the running of Socrates that is enunciated but the kind of composition there is between running and Socrates-in this case, possible. I have said "mode of composition” expressly, for there are two kinds of mode posited in the enunciation. One modifies the verb, either with respect to what it signifies, as in "Socrates runs swiftly,” or with respect to the time signified along with the verb, as in "Socrates runs today.” The other kind modifies the very composition of the predicate with the subject, as in the example, "That Socrates run is possible.” The former determines how or when running is in Socrates; the latter determines the kind of conjunction there is between running and Socrates. The former, which affects the actuality of the verb, does not make a modal enunciation. Only the modes that affect the composition make a modal enunciation, the reason being that the composition, as the form of the whole, contains the whole enunciation. 3 Sunt autem huiusmodi modi quatuor proprie loquendo, scilicet possibile et impossibile, necessarium et contingens. Verum namque et falsum, licet supra compositionem cadant cum dicitur, Socratem currere est verum, vel hominem esse quadrupedem est falsum, attamen modificare proprie non videntur compositionem ipsam. Quia modificari proprie dicitur aliquid, quando redditur aliquale, non quando fit secundum suam substantiam. Compositio autem quando dicitur vera, non aliqualis proponitur, sed quod est: nihil enim aliud est dicere, Socratem currere est verum, quam quod compositio cursus cum Socrate est. Et similiter quando est falsa, nihil aliud dicitur, quam quod non est: nam nihil aliud est dicere, Socratem currere est falsum, quam quod compositio cursus cum Socrate non est. Quando vero compositio dicitur possibilis aut contingens, iam non ipsam esse, sed ipsam aliqualem esse dicimus: cum siquidem dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile, non substantificamus compositionem cursus cum Socrate, sed qualificamus, asserentes illam esse possibilem. Unde Aristoteles hic modos proponens, veri et falsi nullo modo meminit, licet infra verum et non verum inferat, propter causam ibi assignandam. This kind of mode, properly speaking, is fourfold: possible, impossible, necessary, and contingent. True and false are not included because, strictly speaking, they do not seem to modify the composition even though they fall upon the composition itself, as is evident in "That Socrates runs is true,” and "That man is four-footed is false.” For something is said to be modified in the proper sense of the term when it is caused to be in a certain way, not when it comes to be according to its substance. Now, when a composition is said to be true it is not proposed that it is in a certain way, but that it is. To say, "That Socrates runs is true,” for example, is to say that the composition of running with Socrates is. The case is similar when it is false, for what is said is that it is not; for example, to say, "That Socrates runs is false” is to say that the composition of running with Socrates is not. On the other hand, when the composition is said to be possible or contingent, we are not saying that it is but that it is in a certain way. For example, when we say, "That Socrates run is possible,” we do not make the composition of running with Socrates substantial, but we qualify it, asserting that it is possible. Consequently, Aristotle in proposing the modes, does not mention the true and false at all, although later on he infers the true and the not true, and assigns the reason for it where he does this. 4 Et quia enunciatio modalis duas in se continet compositiones, alteram inter partes dicti, alteram inter dictum et modum, intelligendum est eam compositionem modificari, idest, quae est inter partes dicti, non eam quae est inter modum et dictum. Quod sic perpendi potest. Huius enunciationis modalis, Socratem esse album est possibile, duae sunt partes; altera est, Socratem esse album, altera est, possibile. Prima dictum vocatur, eo quod est id quod dicitur per eius indicativam, scilicet, Socrates est albus: qui enim profert hanc, Socrates est albus, nihil aliud dicit nisi Socratem esse album: secunda vocatur modus, eo quod modi adiectio est. Prima compositionem quandam in se continet ex Socrate et albo; secunda pars primae opposita compositionem aliquam sonat ex dicti compositione et modo. Prima rursus pars, licet omnia habeat propria, subiectum scilicet, et praedicatum, copulam et compositionem, tota tamen subiectum est modalis enunciationis; secunda autem est praedicatum. Dicti ergo compositio subiicitur et modificatur in enunciatione modali. Qui enim dicit, Socratem esse album est possibile, non significat qualis est coniunctio possibilitatis cum hoc dicto, Socratem esse album, sed insinuat qualis sit compositio partium dicti inter se, scilicet albi cum Socrate, scilicet quod est compositio possibilis. Non dicit igitur enunciatio modalis aliquid inesse, vel non inesse, sed dicti potius modum enunciat. Nec proprie componit secundum significatum, quia compositionis non est compositio, sed rerum compositioni modum apponit. Unde nihil aliud est enunciatio modalis, quam enunciatio dicti modificativa. Since the modal enunciation contains two compositions, one between the parts of what is said, the other between what is said and the mode, it must be understood that it is the former composition that is modified, i.e., the composition between the parts of what is said, not the composition between what is said and the mode. This can be seen in an example. In the modal enunciation, "That Socrates be white is possible,” there are two parts: one, "That Socrates be white,” the other, "is possible.” The first is called the dictum because it is that which is asserted by the indicative, namely, "Socrates is white”; for in saying "Socrates is white” we are simply saying, "That Socrates be white.” The second part is called the mode because it is the addition of a restriction. The first part of the modal enunciation consists of a certain composition of Socrates and white; the second part, opposed to the first, 4 indicates a composition from the composition of dictum and mode. Again, the first part, although it has all the properties of an enunciation—subject, predicate, copula, and composition—is, in its entirety, the subject of the modal enunciation; the second part, the mode, is the predicate. In a modal enunciation, therefore, the composition of the dictum is subjected and modified; for when we say, "That Socrates be white is possible,” it does not signify the kind of conjunction of possibility there is with the dictum "That Socrates be white,” but it implies the kind of composition there is of the parts of the dictum among themselves, i.e., of white with Socrates, namely, that it is a possible composition. The modal enunciation, therefore, does not say that something is present in or not present in a subject, but rather, it enunciates a mode of the dictum. Nor properly speaking does it compose according to what is signified, since it is not a composition of the composition; rather, it adds a mode to the composition of the things. Hence the modal enunciation is simply an enunciation in which the dictum is modified. 5 Nec propterea censenda est enunciatio plures modalis, quia omnia duplicata habeat: quoniam unum modum de unica compositione enunciat, licet illius compositionis plures sint partes. Plura enim illa ad dicti compositionem concurrentia, veluti plura ex quibus fit unum subiectum concurrunt, de quibus dictum est supra quod enunciationis unitatem non impediunt. Sicut nec cum dicitur, domus est alba, est enunciatio multiplex, licet domus ex multis consurgat partibus. Because the modal enunciation has everything duplicated, it must not on that account be thought to be many. It enunciates one mode of only one composition, although there are many parts of that composition. The many concurring for the composition of the dictum are like the many that concur to make one subject, of which it was said above that it does not impede the unity of the enunciation.” The enunciation, "The house is white,” is also a case in point, for it is not multiple, although a house is built of many parts. 6 Merito autem est, post enunciationes de inesse, de modalibus tractandum, quia partes naturaliter sunt toto priores, et cognitio totius ex partium cognitione dependet; et specialis sermo de his est habendus, quia proprias habet difficultates. Notavit quoque Aristoteles in textu multa. Horum ordinem scilicet, cum dixit: his vero determinatis etc.; modos qui et quot sunt, cum eos expressit et inseruit; variationem eiusdem modi, per affirmationem et negationem, cum dixit: possibile et non possibile, contingens et non contingens; necessitatem cum addidit: habent enim multas dubitationes proprias et cetera. Modal enunciations are rightly treated after the absolute enunciation, for parts are naturally prior to the whole, and knowledge of the whole depends on knowledge of the parts. Moreover, a special discussion of them was necessary because the modal enunciation has its own peculiar difficulties. Aristotle indicates in his text many of the things we have taken up here: the order of modal enunciations, when he says, Having determined these things, etc.; what and how many modes there are when he expresses and lists them, the variation of the same mode by affirmation and negation when he says, the possible and not possible, contingent and not contingent; the necessity of treating them, when he adds, for they have many difficulties of their own. 7 Deinde cum dicit: nam si eorum etc., exequitur tractatum de oppositione modalium. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, movendo quaestionem arguit ad partes; secundo, determinat veritatem; ibi: contingit autem et cetera. Est autem dubitatio: an in enunciationibus modalibus fiat contradictio negatione apposita ad verbum dicti, quod dicit rem; an non, sed potius negatione apposita ad modum qui qualificat. Et primo, arguit ad partem affirmativam, quod scilicet addenda sit negatio ad verbum; secundo, ad partem negativam, quod non apponenda sit negatio ipsi verbo; ibi: videtur autem et cetera. Then he investigates the opposition of modal enunciations, where he says, Let us grant that of those things that are combined, contradictories are those opposed to each other by being related in a certain way according to "to be” and "not to be,” etc. First, he presents the question and in so doing gives arguments for the parts; secondly, he determines the truth, where he says, For it follows from what we have said, either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, etc. The question with respect to the opposition of modals is this: Is a contradiction made in modal enunciations by a negation added to the verb of the dictum, which expresses what is; or is it not, but rather by a negation added to the mode which qualifies? Aristotle first argues for the affirmative part, that the negation must be added to the verb; then he argues for the negative part, that the negation must not be added to the verb, where he says, However it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be, etc. 8 Intendit ergo primo tale argumentum; si complexorum contradictiones attenduntur penes esse et non esse (ut patet inductive in enunciationibus substantivis de secundo adiacente et de tertio, et in adiectivis), contradictionesque omnium hoc modo sumendae sunt, contradictoria huius, possibile esse, erit, possibile non esse, et non illa, non possibile esse. Et consequenter apponenda est negatio verbo, ad sumendam oppositionem in modalibus. Patet consequentia, quia cum dicitur, possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, negatio cadit supra esse. Unde dicit: nam si eorum, quae complectuntur, idest complexorum, illae sibi invicem sunt oppositae contradictiones, quae secundum esse vel non esse disponuntur, idest in quarum una affirmatur esse, et in altera negatur. His first argument is this. If of combined things, contradictions are those related according to "to be” and "not to be” (as is clear inductively in substantive enunciations with a second determinant, in those with a third determinant, and in adjectival enunciations) and all contradictions must be obtained in this way, the contradictory of "possible to be” will be "possible not to be,” and not, "not possible to be.” Consequently, the negation must be added to the verb to get opposition in modal enunciations. The consequence is clear, for when we say "possible to be” and possible not to be” the negation falls on "to be.” Accordingly, he says, Let us grant that of those things that are combined, i.e., of complex things, contradictions are those opposed to each other which are disposed according to "to be” and "not to be,” i.e., in one of which "to be” is affirmed and in the other denied. Et subdit inductionem, inchoans a secundo adiacente: ut, eius enunciationis quae est, esse hominem, idest, homo est, negatio est, non esse hominem, ubi verbum negatur, idest, homo non est; et non est eius negatio ea quae est, esse non hominem, idest, non homo est: haec enim non est negativa, sed affirmativa de subiecto infinito, quae simul est vera cum illa prima, scilicet, homo est. He goes on to give an induction, beginning with an enunciation having a second determinant. The negation of "Man is,” is, "Man is not,” in which the verb is negated. The negation of "Man is,” is not, "Non-man is,” for this is not the negative but the affirmative of the infinite subject, which is true at the same time as the first enunciation, "Man is.” Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 8 n. 10Deinde prosequitur inductionem in substantivis de tertio adiacente: ut, eius quae est, esse album hominem idest, ut illius enunciationis, homo est albus, negatio est, non esse album hominem, ubi verbum negatur, idest, homo non est albus; et non est negatio illius ea, quae est, esse non album hominem, idest, homo est non albus. Haec enim non est negativa, sed affirmativa de praedicato infinito. Et quia istae duae affirmativae de praedicato finito et infinito non possunt de eodem verificari, propterea quia sunt de praedicatis oppositis, posset aliquis credere quod sint contradictoriae; et ideo ad hunc errorem tollendum interponit rationem probantem quod hae duae non sunt contradictoriae. Est autem ratio talis. Contradictoriorum talis est natura quod de omnibus aut dictio, idest affirmatio aut negatio verificatur. Inter contradictoria siquidem nullum potest inveniri medium; sed hae duae enunciationes, scilicet, est homo albus, et, est homo non albus, sunt contradictoriae per se; ergo sunt talis naturae quod de omnibus altera verificatur. Et sic, cum de ligno sit falsum dicere, est homo albus, erit verum dicere de eo, scilicet ligno, esse non album hominem, idest, lignum est homo non albus. Quod est manifeste falsum: lignum enim neque est homo albus, neque est homo non albus. Restat ergo ex quo utraque est simul falsa de eodem, quod non sit inter eas contradictio. Sed contradictio fit quando negatio apponitur verbo. He continues the induction with substantive enunciations having a third determinant. The negation of the enunciation "Man is white” is "Man is not white,” in which the verb is negated. The negation is not "Man is nonwhite,” for this is not the negative, but the affirmative of the infinite predicate. Now it might be thought that the affirmatives of the finite and infinite predicates are contradictories since they cannot be verified of the same thing because of their opposed predicates. To obviate this error, Aristotle interposes an argument proving that these two are not contradictories. The nature of contradictories, he reasons, is such that either the assertion, i.e., the affirmation, or the negation, is verified of anything, for between contradictories no middle is possible. Now the two enunciations, that something "is white man” and "is nonwhite man” are per se contradictories. Therefore, they are of such a nature that one of them is verified of anything. For example, it is false to say "is white man” of wood; hence "is nonwhite man” will be true to say of it, namely of wood, i.e., "Wood is nonwhite man.” This is manifestly false, for wood is neither white man nor nonwhite man. Consequently, there is not a contradiction in the case in which each is at once false of the same subject. Therefore, contradiction is effected when the negation is added to the verb. 11 Deinde prosequitur inductionem in enunciationibus adiectivi verbi, dicens: quod si hoc modo, scilicet supradicto, accipitur contradictio, et in quantiscunque enunciationibus esse non ponitur explicite, idem faciet quoad oppositionem sumendam, id quod pro esse dicitur (idest verbum adiectivum, quod locum ipsius esse tenet, pro quanto, propter eius veritatem in se inclusam, copulae officium facit), ut eius enunciationis quae est, homo ambulat, negatio est, non ea quae dicit, non homo ambulat (haec enim est affirmativa de subiecto infinito), sed negatio illius est, homo non ambulat; sicut et in illis de verbo substantivo, negatio verbo addenda erat. Nihil enim differt dicere verbo adiectivo, homo ambulat, vel substantivo, homo est ambulans. He continues his induction with enunciations having an adjective verb: Now if the case is as we have stated it, i.e., contradiction is taken as said above, then in enunciations in which "to be” is not the determining word added (explicitly), that which is said in place of "to be” will effect the same thing with respect to the opposition obtained (i.e., the adjective verb that occupies the place of "to be,” inasmuch as the truth of "to be” is included in it, effects the function of the copula). For example, the negation of the enunciation "Man walks” is not, "Non-man walks” (for this is the affirmative of the infinite subject) but "Man is not walking.” In this case, as in that of the substantive verb, the negation must be added to the verb, for there is no difference between using the adjective verb, as in "Man walks,” and using the substantive verb, as in "Man is walking.” 12 Deinde ponit secundam partem inductionis dicens: et si hoc modo in omnibus sumenda est contradictio, scilicet, apponendo negationem ad esse, concluditur quod et eius enunciationis, quae dicit, possibile esse, negatio est, possibile non esse, et non illa quae dicit, non possibile esse. Patet conclusionis sequela: quia in illa, possibile non esse, negatio apponitur verbo; in ista autem non. Dixit autem in principio huius rationis: eorum quae complectuntur, idest complexorum, contradictiones fiunt secundum esse et non esse, ad differentiam incomplexorum quorum oppositio non fit negatione dicente non esse, sed ipsi incomplexo apposita, ut, homo, et, non homo, legit, et non legit. Then he posits the second part of the induction: And if this is always the case, i.e., that contradiction must be gotten by adding the negation to "to be,” we must conclude that the negation of the enunciation that asserts "Possible to be” is "possible not to be,” and not, "not possible to be.” The consequent of the conclusion is evident, for in "possible not to be” the negation is added to the verb, in "not possible to be,” it is not. At the beginning of this argument, Aristotle said, Of those things that are combined, i.e., complex things, the contradictions are effected according to "to be” and "not to be.” He said this in reference to the difference between complex and incomplex things, for opposition in the latter is not made by the negation expressing "not to be,” but by adding the negative to the incomplex thing itself, as in "man” and "non-man,” "reads” and "non-reads.” Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 8 n. 13Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem idem etc., arguit ad quaestionis partem negativam (scilicet quod ad sumendam contradictionem in modalibus non addenda est negatio verbo), tali ratione. Impossibile est duas contradictorias esse simul veras de eodem; sed supradictae, scilicet, possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, simul verificantur de eodem; ergo istae non sunt contradictoriae: igitur contradictio modalium non attenditur penes verbi negationem. Huius rationis primo ponitur in littera minor cum sua probatione; secundo maior; tertio conclusio. Minor quidem cum dicit: videtur autem idem possibile esse, et, non possibile esse. Sicut verbi gratia, omne quod est possibile dividi est etiam possibile non dividi, et quod est possibile ambulare est etiam possibile non ambulare. Ratio autem huius minoris est, quoniam omne quod sic possibile est (sicut, scilicet, est possibile ambulare et dividi), non semper actu est: non enim semper actualiter ambulat, qui ambulare potest; nec semper actu dividitur, quod dividi potest. Quare inerit etiam negatio possibilis, idest, ergo non solum possibilis est affirmatio, sed etiam negatio eiusdem. Adverte quod quia possibile est multiplex, ut infra dicetur, ideo notanter Aristoteles addidit ly sic, assumens, quod sic possibile est, non semper actu est. Non enim de omni possibili verum est dicere quod non semper actu est, sed de aliquo, eo scilicet quod est sic possibile, quemadmodum ambulare et dividi. Nota ulterius quod quia tale possibile habet duas conditiones, scilicet quod potest actu esse et quod non semper actu est, sequitur necessario quod de eo simul est verum dicere, possibile esse, et, non esse. Ex eo enim quod potest actu esse, sequitur quod sit possibile esse; ex eo vero quod non semper actu est, sequitur quod sit possibile non esse. Quod enim non semper est, potest non esse. Bene ergo intulit Aristoteles ex his duobus: quare inerit etiam negatio possibilis et non solum affirmatio; potest igitur et non ambulare, quod est ambulabile, et non videri, quod est visibile. Maior vero subiungitur, cum ait: at vero impossibile est de eodem veras esse contradictiones. Infertur quoque ultimo conclusio: non est igitur ista (scilicet, possibile non esse) negatio illius, quae dicit, possibile esse: quia sunt simul verae de eodem. Caveto autem ne ex isto textu putes possibile, ut est modus, debere semper accipi pro possibili ad utrumlibet: quoniam hoc infra declarabitur esse falsum; sed considera quod satis fuit intendenti declarare quod in modalibus non sumitur contradictio ex verbi negatione, afferre instantiam in una modali, quae continetur sub modalibus de possibili. When he says, However, it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be, etc., he argues for the negative part of the question, namely, to get a contradiction in modals the negation should not be added to the verb. His reasoning is the following: It is impossible for two contradictories to be true at once of the same subject; but "possible to be” and "possible not to be” are verified at once of the same thing; therefore, these are not contradictories. Consequently, contradiction of the modals is not obtained by negation of the verb. In this reasoning, the minor is posited first, with its proof; secondly, the major; finally, the conclusion. The minor is: However, it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be. For instance, everything that has the possibility of being divided also has the possibility of not being divided, and that which has the possibility of walking also has the possibility of not walking. The proof of this minor is that everything that is possible in this way (as are possible to walk and to be divided) is not always in act; for he who is able to walk is not always actually walking, nor is that which can be divided always divided. And so the negation of the possible will also be inherent in it, i.e., therefore not only is the affirmation possible but also the negation. Notice that since the possible is manifold, as will be said further on, Aristotle explicitly adds "in this way” when he assumes here that that which is possible is not always in act. For it is not true to say of every possible that it is not always in act, but only of some, namely, those that are possible in the way in which to walk and to be divided are possible. Note also that "possible in this way” has two conditions: that it is able to be in act, and that it is not always in act. It follows necessarily, then, that it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is both possible to be and possible not to be. From the fact that it can be in act it follows that it is possible to be; from the fact that it is not always in act it follows that it is possible not to be, for that which not always is, is able not to be. Aristotle, then, rightly infers from these two: and so the negation of the possible will also be inherent in it; and not just the affirmation, for that which could walk could also not walk and that which could be seen not be seen. The major is: But it is impossible that contradictions in respect to the same thing be true. The final conclusion inferred is: Therefore, the negation of "possible to be” is not, "possible not to be” because they are true at once of the same thing. In relation to this part of the text, be careful not to suppose that possible as it is a mode, is always to be taken for possible to either of two alternatives, for this will be shown to be false later on. If you consider the matter carefully you will see that it was enough for his intention to give as an instance one modal contained under the modals of the possible in order to show that contradiction in modals is not obtained by negation of the verb. 14 Deinde cum dicit: contingit autem unum ex his etc., determinat veritatem huius dubitationis. Et quia duo petebat, scilicet, an contradictio modalium ex negatione verbi fiat an non, et, an potius ex negatione modi; ideo primo, determinat veritatem primae petitionis, quod scilicet contradictio harum non fit negatione verbi; secundo determinat veritatem secundae petitionis, quod scilicet fiat modalium contradictio ex negatione modi; ibi: est ergo negatioet cetera. Dicit ergo quod propter supradictas rationes evenit unum ex his duobus, quae conclusimus determinare, aut idem ipsum, idest, unum et idem dicere, idest affirmare et negare simul de eodem: idest, aut quod duo contradictoria simul verificantur de eodem, ut prima ratio conclusit; aut affirmationes vel negationes modalium, quae opponuntur contradictorie, fieri non secundum esse vel non esse, idest, aut contradictio modalium non fiat ex negatione verbi, ut secunda ratio conclusit. Si ergo illud est impossibile, scilicet quod duo contradictoria possunt simul esse vera de eodem, hoc, scilicet quod contradictio modalium non fiat secundum verbi negationem, erit magis eligendum. Impossibilia enim semper vitanda sunt. Ex ipso autem modo loquendi innuit quod utrique earum aliquid obstat. Sed quia primo obstat impossibilitas quae acceptari non potest, secundo autem nihil aliud obstat nisi quod negatio supra enunciationis copulam cadere debet, si negativa fieri debet enunciatio, et hoc aliter fieri potest quam negando dicti verbum, ut infra declarabitur; ideo hoc secundum, scilicet quod contradictio modalium non fiat secundum negationem verbi, eligendum est: primum vero est omnino abiiciendum. Aristotle establishes the truth with respect to this difficulty where he says, For it follows from what we have said, either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, etc. Since he is investigating two things, i.e., whether contradiction of modals is made by the negation of the verb or not; and, whether it is not rather by negation of the mode, he first determines the truth in relation to the first question, namely, that contradiction of modals is not made by negation of the verb; then he determines the truth in relation to the second, namely, that contradiction of modals is made by negation of the mode, where he says, Therefore, the negation of "possible to be” is "not possible to be,” etc. Hence he says that because of the foresaid reasoning one of these two follows: first, that either the same thing, i.e., one and the same thing is said, i.e., is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, i.e., either two contradictories are verified at once of the same thing, as the first argument concluded; or secondly, that assertions and denials of modals, which are opposed contradictorily are not made by the addition of "to be” or "not to be,” i.e., contradiction of modals is not made by the negation of the verb, as the second argument concluded. If the former alternative is impossible, namely, that two contradictories can be true of the same thing at once, the latter, that contradiction of modals is not made according to negation of the verb, must obtain, for impossible things must always be avoided. His mode of speaking here indicates that there is some obstacle to each alternative. But since in the first the obstacle is an impossibility that cannot be accepted, while in the second the only obstacle is that the negation must fall upon the copula of the enunciation if a negative enunciation is to be formed, and this can be done otherwise than by denying the verb of the dictum, as will be shown later on, then the second alternative must be chosen, i.e., that the contradiction of modals is not made according to negation of the verb, and the first alternative is to be rejected. IX. 1. Determinat ubi ponenda sit negatio ad assumendam modalium contradictionem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, determinat veritatem summarie; secundo, assignat determinatae veritatis rationem, quae dicitur rationi ad oppositum inductae; ibi: fiunt enim etc.; tertio, explanat eamdem veritatem in omnibus modalibus; ibi: eius veroetc.; quarto, universalem regulam concludit; ibi: universaliter vero et cetera. Quia igitur negatio aut verbo aut modo apponenda est, et quod verbo non addenda est, declaratum est per locum a divisione; concludendo determinat: est ergo negatio eius quae est possibile esse, ea quae est non possibile esse, in qua negatur modus. Et eadem est ratio in enunciationibus de contingenti. Huius enim, quae est, contingens esse, negatio est, non contingens esse. Et in aliis, scilicet de necesse et impossibile idem est iudicium. Aristotle now determines where the negation must be placed in order to obtain contradiction in modals. He first determines the truth summarily; secondly, he presents the argument for the truth of the position, which is also the answer to the reasoning induced for the opposite position, where he says, For just as "to be” and "not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are "white” and "man,” etc.; thirdly, he makes this truth evident in all the modals, where he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” is "not possible not to be,” etc.; fourthly, he arrives at a universal rule where he says, And universally, as has been said, "to be” and "not to be must be posited as the subject, etc. Since the negation must be added either to the verb or to the mode and it was shown above in virtue of an argument from division that it is not to be added to the verb, he concludes: Therefore, the negation of "possible to be” is "not possible to be”, that is, the mode is negated. The reasoning is the same with respect to enunciations of the contingent, for the negation of "contingent to be” is "not contingent to be.” And the judgment is the same in the others, i.e., the necessary and the impossible. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 2Deinde cum dicit: fiunt enim in illis appositiones etc., subdit huius veritatis rationem talem. Ad sumendam contradictionem inter aliquas enunciationes oportet ponere negationem super appositione, idest coniunctione praedicati cum subiecto; sed in modalibus appositiones sunt modi; ergo in modalibus negatio apponenda est modo, ut fiat contradictio. Huius rationis, maiore subintellecta, minor ponitur in littera per secundam similitudinem ad illas de inesse. Et dicitur quod quemadmodum in illis enunciationibus de inesse appositiones, idest praedicationes, sunt esse et non esse, idest verba significativa esse vel non esse (verbum enim semper est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur), subiective vero appositionibus res sunt, quibus esse vel non esse apponitur, ut album, cum dicitur, album est, vel homo, cum dicitur, homo est; eodem modo hoc in loco in modalibus accidit: esse quidem subiectum fit, idest dictum significans esse vel non esse subiecti locum tenet; contingere vero et posse oppositiones, idest modi, praedicationes sunt. Et quemadmodum in illis de inesse penes esse et non esse veritatem vel falsitatem determinavimus, ita in istis modalibus penes modos. Hoc est enim quod subdit, determinantes, scilicet, fiunt ipsi modi veritatem, quemadmodum in illis esse et non esse, eam determinat. When he says, For just as "to be” and "not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are "white” and "man,” etc., he gives the argument for the truth of his position. To obtain contradiction among any enunciations the negation must be applied to the determining addition, i.e., to the word that joins the predicate with the subject; but in modals the determining additions are the modes; therefore, to get a contradiction in modals, the negation must be added to the mode. The major of the argument is subsumed; the minor is stated in Aristotle’s wording by a further similitude to absolute enunciations. In absolute enunciations the determining additions, i.e., the predications, are "to be” and "not to be,” i.e., the verb signifying "to be” or "not to be” (for the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another). The things subjected to the determining additions, i.e., to which to be” and "not to be” are applied, are "white,” in "White is, "or man,” in "Man is.” This happens in modals in the same way but in a manner appropriate to them. "To be” is as the subject, i.e., the dictum signifying "to be” or "not to be” holds the place of the subject; "is possible” and "is contingent,” i.e., the modes, are the predicates. And just as in absolute enunciations we determine truth or falsity with "to be” and "not to be,” so in modals with the modes. He makes this point when he says, determining additions, i.e., these modes effect truth just as "to be” and "not to be” determine truth and falsity in the others. 3. Et sic patet responsio ad argumentum in oppositum primo adductum, concludens quod negatio verbo apponenda sit, sicut illis de inesse. Dicitur enim quod cum modalis enunciet modum de dicto sicut enunciatio de inesse, esse vel esse tale, puta esse album de subiecto, eumdem locum tenet modus hic, quem ibi verbum; et consequenter super idem proportionaliter cadit negatio hic et ibi. Eadem enim, ut dictum est, proportio est modi ad dictum, quae est verbi ad subiectum. Rursus cum veritas et falsitas affirmationem et negationem sequantur, penes idem attendenda est affirmatio vel negatio enunciationis, et veritas vel falsitas eiusdem; sicut autem in enunciationibus de inesse veritas vel falsitas esse vel non esse consequitur, ita in modalibus modum. Illa namque modalis est vera quae sic modificat dictum sicut dicti compositio patitur, sicut illa de inesse est vera, quae sic significat esse sicut est. Est ergo negatio modo hic apponenda, sicut ibi verbo, cum sit eadem utriusque vis quoad veritatem et falsitatem enunciationis. Adverte quod modos, appositiones, idest, praedicationes vocavit, sicut esse in illis de inesse, intelligens per modum totum praedicatum enunciationis modalis, puta, est possibile. In cuius signum modos ipsos verbaliter protulit dicens: contingere vero et posse appositiones sunt. Contingit enim et potest, totum praedicatum modalis continent. Thus the response to the argument for the opposite position, which he gave first, is evident. That argument concluded that the negation should be added to the verb as it is in absolute enunciations. But since the modal enunciates a mode of a dictum—as the absolute enunciation enunciates "to be” or "not to be” such, for instance, "to be white” of a subject—the mode holds the same place here that the verb does there. Consequently, the negation falls upon the same thing proportionally here and there, for the proportion of mode to dictum is the same as the proportion of verb to subject. Again, since truth and falsity follow upon affirmation and negation, the affirmation and negation of an enunciation and its truth and falsity must be controlled by the same thing. In absolute enunciations truth and falsity follow upon "to be” or "not to be,” hence in the modals they follow upon the mode; for that modal is true which modifies the dictum as the composition of the dictum permits, just as that absolute enunciation is true which signifies that something is as it is. Therefore, negation is added here to the mode just as it is added there to the verb, since the power of each is the same with respect to the truth and falsity of an enunciation. Notice that he calls the modes "determining additions,” i.e., predications—as "to be” is in absolute enunciations—understanding by the mode the whole predicate of the modal enunciation, for example, "is possible.” As a sign of this he expresses the modes themselves verbally when he says, "is possible” and "is contingent” are determining additions. For "is contingent” and "is possible” comprise the whole predicate of the modal enunciation. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 4Deinde cum dicit: eius vero quod est possibile est non esse etc., explanat determinatam veritatem in omnibus modalibus, scilicet de possibili, et necessario, et impossibili. Contingens convertitur cum possibili. Et quia quilibet modus facit duas modales affirmativas, alteram habentem dictum affirmatum, et alteram habentem dictum negatum; ideo explanat in singulis modis quae cuiusque affirmationis negatio sit. Et primo in illis de possibili. Et quia primae affirmativae de possibili (quae scilicet habet dictum affirmatum) scilicet possibile esse, negatio assignata fuit, non possibile esse; ideo ad reliquam affirmativam de possibili transiens ait: eius vero, quae est possibile non esse (ubi dictum negatur) negatio est non possibile non esse. Et hoc consequenter probat per hoc quod contradictoria huius, possibile non esse, aut est, possibile esse, aut illa, quam diximus, scilicet, non possibile non esse. Sed illa, scilicet, possibile esse, non est eius contradictoria. Non enim sunt sibi invicem contradicentes, possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, quia possunt simul esse verae. Unde et sequi sese invicem putabuntur: quoniam, ut supra dictum fuit, idem est, possibile esse, et, non esse, et consequenter sicut ad, posse esse, sequitur, posse non esse, ita e contra ad, posse non esse, sequitur, posse esse; sed contradictoria illius, possibile esse, quae non potest simul esse vera est, non possibile esse: hae enim, ut dictum est, opponuntur. Remanet ergo quod huius negatio, possibile non esse, sit illa, non possibile non esse: hae namque simul nunquam sunt verae vel falsae. Dixit quod possibile esse et non esse sequi se invicem putabuntur, et non dixit quod se invicem consequuntur: quia secundum veritatem universaliter non sequuntur se, sed particulariter tantum, ut infra dicetur; propter quod putabitur quod simpliciter se invicem sequantur. Deinde declarat hoc idem in illis de necessario. Et primo, in affirmativa habente dictum affirmatum, dicens: similiter eius quae est, necessarium esse, negatio non est ea, quae dicit necessarium non esse, ubi modus non negatur, sed ea quae est, non necessarium esse. Deinde subdit de affirmativa de necessario habente dictum negatum, et ait: eius vero, quae est, necessarium non esse, negatio est ea, quae dicit, non necessarium non esse. Deinde transit ad illas de impossibili, eumdem ordinem servans, et inquit: et eius, quae dicit, impossibile esse, negatio non est ea quae dicit, impossibile non esse, sed, non impossibile esse: ubi iam modus negatur. Alterius vero affirmativae, quae est, impossibile non esse, negatio est ea quae dicit non impossibile non esse. Et sic semper modo negatio addenda est. When he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” is [not, "not possible to be” but] "not possible not to be,” etc., he makes this truth evident in all the modals, i.e., the possible, the necessary, and the impossible (the contingent being convertible with the possible). And since any mode makes two modal affirmatives, one having an affirmed dictum and the other having a negated dictum, he shows what the negation of each affirmation is in each mode. First he takes those of the possible. The negation of the first affirmative of the possible (the one with an affirmed dictum), i.e., "possible to be,” was assigned as "not possible to be.” Hence, going on to the remaining affirmative of the possible he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be” [wherein the dictum is negated] is, "not possible not to be.” Then he a proves this. The contradictory of "possible not to be” is either "Possible to be” or "not possible not to be.” But the former, i.e., "possible to be,” is not the contradictory of "possible not to be,” for they can be at once true. Hence they are also thought to follow upon each other, for, as was said above, the same thing is possible to be and not to be. Consequently, just as "possible not to be” follows upon "possible to be,” so conversely "possible to be” follows upon "possible not to be.” But the contradictory of "possible to be,” which cannot be true at the same time, is "not possible to be,” for these, as has been said, are opposed. Therefore, the negation of "possible not to be” is, "not possible not to be,” for these are never at once true or false. Note that he says, Wherefore "possible to be” and "possible not to be” would appear to be consequent to each other, and not that they do follow upon each other, for it is not true that they follow upon each other universally, but only particularly (as will be said later); this is the reason they appear to follow upon each other simply. Then he manifests the same thing in the modals of the necessary, and first in the affirmative with an affirmed dictum: The case is the same with respect to the necessary. The negation of "necessary to be” is not, "necessary not to be” (in which the mode is not negated) but, "not necessary to be.” Next he adds the affirmative of the necessary with a negated dictum: and the negation of "necessary not to be is "not necessary not to be.” Next, he takes up the impossible, keeping the same order. The negation of "impossible to be” is not, "impossible not to be” but, "not impossible to be,” in which the mode is negated. The negation of the other affirmative, "impossible not to be” is "not impossible not to be.” The negation, therefore, is always added to the mode. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 9 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: universaliter vero etc., concludit regulam universalem dicens quod, quemadmodum dictum est, dicta importantia esse et non esse oportet ponere in modalibus ut subiecta, negationem vero et affirmationem hoc, idest contradictionis oppositionem, facientem, oportet apponere tantummodo ad suum eumdem modum, non ad diversos modos. Debet namque illemet modus negari, qui prius affirmabatur, si contradictio esse debet. Et exemplariter explanans quomodo hoc fiat, subdit: et oportet putare has esse oppositas dictiones, idest affirmationes et negationes in modalibus, possibile et non possibile, contingens et non contingens. Item cum dixit negationem alio tantum modo ad modum apponi debere, non exclusit modi copulam, sed dictum. Hoc enim est singulare in modalibus quod eamdem oppositionem facit, negatio modo addita, et eius verbo. Contradictorie enim opponitur huic, possibile est esse, non solum illa, non possibile est esse, sed ista, possibile non est esse; meminit autem modi potius, et propter hoc quod nunc diximus, ut scilicet insinuaret quod negatio verbo modi postposita, modo autem praeposita, idem facit ac si modali verbo praeponeretur, et quia, cum modo numquam caret modalis enunciatio, semper negatio supra modum poni potest. Non autem sic de eius verbo: verbo enim modi carere contingit modalem, ut cum dicitur, Socrates currit necessario; et ideo semper verbo negatio aptari potest. Quod autem in fine addidit, verum et non verum, insinuat, praeter quatuor praedictos modos, alios inveniri, qui etiam compositionem enunciationis determinant, puta, verum et non verum, falsum et non falsum: quos tamen inter modos supra non posuit, quia, ut declaratum fuit, non proprie modificant. Then he says, And universally, as has been said, "to be”and "not to be” must be posited as the subject, and those that produce affirmation and negation must be joined to "to be” and "not to be,” etc. Here he concludes with the universal rule. As has been said, the dictums denoting "to be” and "not to be” must be posited in the modals as subjects, and the one making this an affirmation and negation, i.e., the opposition of contradiction, must be added only to the selfsame mode, not to diverse modes, for the selfsame mode which was previously affirmed must be denied if there is to be a contradiction. He gives examples of how this is to be done when he adds, And these are the words that are to be considered opposed, i.e., affirmations and negations in modals, possible–not possible, contingent–not contingent. Moreover, when he said elsewhere but in another way that the negation must be applied only to the mode, he did not exclude the copula of the mode, but the copula of the dictum. For it is unique to modals that the same opposition is made by adding a negation to the mode and to its verb. The contradictory of "is possible to be,” for instance, is not only "is not possible to be,” but also "not is possible to be.” There are two reasons, however, for his mentioning the mode rather than the verb: first, for the reason we have just given, namely, so as to imply that the negation placed after the verb of the mode, the mode having been put first, accomplishes the same thing as if it were placed before the modal verb; and secondly, because the modal enunciation is never without a mode; hence the negation can always be put on the mode. However, it cannot always be put on the verb of a mode, for the modal enunciation may lack the verb of a mode as for example in "Socrates runs necessarily,” in which case the negation can always be adapted to the verb. In adding "true” and "not true” at the end he implies that besides the four modes mentioned previously there are others that also determine the composition of the enunciation, for example, "true” and "not true,” "false” and "not false”; nevertheless he did not posit these among the modes first given because, as was shown, they do not properly modify. Postquam determinavit de oppositione modalium, hic determinare intendit de consequentiis earum. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, tradit veritatem; secundo, movet quandam dubitationem circa determinata; ibi: dubitabit autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit consequentias earum secundum opinionem aliorum; secundo, examinando et corrigendo dictam opinionem, determinat veritatem; ibi: ergo impossibile et cetera. Having established the opposition of modals, Aristotle now intends to determine their consequents. He first presents the true doctrine; then, he raises a difficulty where he says, But it may be questioned whether "Possible to be follows upon "necessary to be,” etc. In presenting the true doctrine, he first posits the consequents of the opposition of modals according to the opinion of others; secondly, he determines the truth by examining and correcting their opinion, where he says, Now the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, but inversely, etc. 2 Quoad primum considerandum est quod cum quilibet modus faciat duas affirmationes, ut dictum fuit, et duabus affirmationibus opponantur duae negationes, ut etiam dictum fuit in primo; secundum quemlibet modum fient quatuor enunciationes, duae scilicet affirmativae et duae negativae. Cum autem modi sint quatuor, efficientur sexdecim modales: quaternarius enim in seipsum ductus sexdecim constituit. Et quoniam apud omnes, quaelibet cuiusque modi, undecumque incipias, habet unam tantum cuiusque modi se consequentem, ideo ad assignandas consequentias modalium, singulas ex singulis modis accipere oportet et ad consequentiae ordinem inter se adunare. Before we consider these consequents according to the opinion of others, we must first note that since any mode makes two affirmations and there are two negations opposed to these, there will be four enunciations according to any one mode, two affirmatives and two negatives. And since there are four modes, there will be sixteen modals. Among these sixteen, anyone of each mode, from wherever you begin, has only one of each mode following upon it. Hence, to assign the consequents of the modals, we have to take one from each mode and arrange them among themselves to form an order of consequents. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 3Et hoc modo fecerunt antiqui, de quibus inquit Aristoteles: consequentiae vero fiunt secundum infrascriptum ordinem, antiquis ita ponentibus. Formaverunt enim quatuor ordines modalium, in quorum quolibet omnes quae se consequuntur collocaverunt. Ut autem confusio vitetur, vocetur, cum Averroe, de caetero, in quolibet modo, affirmativa de dicto, et modo, affirmativa simplex; affirmativa autem de modo et negativa de dicto, affirmativa declinata; negativa vero de modo et non dicto, negativa simplex; negativa autem de utroque, negativa declinata: ita quod modi affirmationem vel negationem simplicitas, dicti vero declinatio denominet. Dixerunt ergo antiqui quod affirmationem simplicem de possibili, scilicet, possibile est esse, sequitur affirmativa simplex de contingenti, scilicet, contingens est esse (contingens enim convertitur cum possibili); et negativa simplex de impossibili, scilicet, non impossibile esse; et similiter negativa simplex de necessario, scilicet, non necesse est esse. Et hic est primus ordo modalium consequentium se. In secundo autem dixerunt quod affirmativas declinatas de possibili et contingenti, scilicet, possibile non esse, et, contingens non esse, sequuntur negativae declinatae de necessario et impossibili, scilicet, non necessarium non esse, et, non impossibile non esse. In tertio vero ordine dixerunt quod negativas simplices de possibili et contingenti, scilicet, non possibile esse, non contingens esse, sequuntur affirmativa declinata de necessario, scilicet, necesse non esse, et affirmativa simplex de impossibili, scilicet, impossibile esse. In quarto demum ordine dixerunt quod negativas declinatas de possibili et contingenti, scilicet, non possibile non esse, et, non contingens non esse, sequuntur affirmativa simplex de necessario, scilicet, necesse esse, et affirmativa declinata de impossibili, scilicet, impossibile est non esse. The modals were ordered in this way by the ancients. They disposed them in four orders placing together in each order those that were a consequent to each other. Aristotle speaks of this order when he says, Logical consequents follow according to the order in the table below, which is the way in which the ancients posited them. Henceforth, however, to avoid confusion let us call the affirmative of dictum and mode in any one mode, the simple affirmative, as it is by Averroes, among others; affirmative of mode and negative of dictum, the declined affirmative; negative of mode and not of dictum, the simple negative; negative of both mode and dictum, the declined negative. Hence, simplicity of mode designates affirmation or negation, and so, too, does declination of dictum. The ancients said, then, that simple affirmation of the contingent, i.e., "contingent to be” follows upon simple affirmation of the possible, i.e., "Possible to be” (for the contingent is converted with the possible); the simple negative of the impossible also follows upon this, i.e., "not impossible to be”; and the simple negative of the necessary, i.e., "not necessary to be.” This is the first order of modal consequents. In the second order they said that the declined negatives of the necessary and impossible, i.e., "not necessary not to be” and "not impossible not to be,” follow upon the declined affirmative of the possible and the contingent, i.e., "possible not to be” and "contingent not to be.” In the third order, according to them, the declined affirmative of the necessary, i.e., "necessary not to be,” and the simple affirmative of of the impossible, i.e., "impossible to be,” follow upon the simple negatives of the possible and the contingent, i.e., "not possible to be” and not contingent to be.” Finally, in the fourth order, the simple affirmative of the necessary, i.e., "necessary to be,” and the declined affirmative of the impossible, i.e., "impossible not to be,” follow upon the declined negatives of the possible and the contingent, i.e., "not possible not to be” and "not contingent not to be.” 4 Consideretur autem ex subscriptione appositae figurae, quemadmodum dicimus, ut clarius elucescat depictum. Consequentiae enunciationum modalium secundum quatuor ordines ab antiquis positae et ordinatae. (Figura). To make this ordering more evident, let us consider it with the help of the following table. CONSEQUENTS OF MODAL ENUNCIATIONS IN THE FOUR ORDERS POSITED AND ORDERED BY THE ANCIENTS FIRST ORDER It is possible to be It is contingent to be It is not impossible to be It is not necessary to be SECOND ORDER It is possible not to be It is contingent not to be It is not impossible not to be It is not necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is not contingent to be It is impossible to be It is necessary not to be FOURTH ORDER It is not possible not to be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be It is necessary to be Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 5Deinde cum dicit: ergo impossibile et non impossibile etc., examinando dictam opinionem, determinat veritatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo examinat consequentias earum de impossibili; secundo, illarum de necessario; ibi: necessarium autem et cetera. Unde ex praemissa opinione concludens et approbans, dicit: ergo istae, scilicet, impossibile, et, non impossibile, sequuntur illas, scilicet, contingens et possibile, non contingens, et, non possibile, sequuntur, inquam, contradictorie, idest ita ut contradictoriae de impossibili contradictorias de possibili et contingenti consequantur, sed conversim, idest, sed non ita quod affirmatio affirmationem et negatio negationem sequatur, sed conversim, scilicet, quod affirmationem negatio et negationem affirmatio. Et explanans hoc ait: illud enim quod est possibile esse, idest affirmationem possibilis negatio sequitur impossibilis, idest, non impossibile esse; negationem vero possibilis affirmatio sequitur impossibilis. Illud enim quod est, non possibile esse, sequitur ista, impossibile est esse; haec autem, scilicet, impossibile esse, affirmatio est; illa vero, scilicet, non possibile esse, negatio est: hic siquidem modus negatur; ibi, non. Bene igitur dixerunt antiqui in quolibet ordine quoad consequentias illarum de impossibili, quia, ut in suprascripta figura apparet, semper ex affirmatione possibilis negationem impossibilis, et ex negatione possibilis affirmationem impossibilis inferunt.When he says, Now the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, but inversely, etc., he determines the truth by examining the foresaid opinion. First, he examines the consequents of enunciations predicating impossibility; secondly, those predicating necessity, where he says, Now we must consider how enunciations predicating necessity are related to these, etc. From the opinion advanced, then, he concludes with approval that the impossible and the not impossible follow upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, contradictorily, i.e., the contradictories of the impossible follow upon the contradictories of the possible and the contingent, but inversely, i.e., not so that affirmation follows upon affirmation and negation upon negation, but inversely, i.e., negation follows upon affirmation and affirmation upon negation. He explains this when he says, The negation of "impossible to be” follows upon "possible to be,” i.e., the negation of the impossible, i.e., "not impossible to be,” follows upon the affirmation of the possible, and the affirmation of the impossible follows upon the negation of the possible. For the affirmation, "impossible to be” follows upon the negation, "not possible to be.” In the latter the mode is negated, in the former it is not. Therefore, the ancients were right in saying that in any order, the consequences of enunciations predicating impossibility are as follows: from affirmation of the possible, negation of the impossible is inferred; and from negation of the possible, affirmation of the impossible is inferred. This is apparent in the diagram. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 6Deinde cum dicit: necessarium autem etc., intendit examinando determinare consequentias de necessario. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo examinat dicta antiquorum; secundo, determinat veritatem intentam; ibi: at vero neque necessarium et cetera. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo, declarat quid bene et quid male dictum sit ab antiquis in hac re. Ubi attendendum est quod cum quatuor sint enunciationes de necessario, ut dictum est, differentes inter se secundum quantitatem et qualitatem, adeo ut unam integrent figuram oppositionis iuxta morem illarum de inesse; duae earum sunt contrariae inter se, duae autem illis contrariis contradictoriae, ut patet in hac figura. (Figura). Quia ergo antiqui universales contrarias bene intulerunt ex aliis, contradictorias autem earum, scilicet particulares, male intulerunt; ideo dicit quod considerandum restat de his, quae sunt de necessario, qualiter se habeant in consequendo illas de possibili et non possibili. Manifestum est autem ex dicendis quod non eodem modo istae de necessario illas de possibili consequuntur, quo easdem sequuntur illae de impossibili. Nam omnes enunciationes de impossibili recte illatae sunt ab antiquis. Enunciationes autem de necessario non omnes recte inferuntur: sed duae earum, quae sunt contrariae, scilicet, necesse est esse, et, necesse est non esse, sequuntur, idest recta consequentia deducuntur ab antiquis, in tertio scilicet et quarto ordine; reliquae autem duae de necessario, scilicet, non necesse non esse, et, non necesse esse, quae sunt contradictoriae supradictis, sunt extra consequentias illarum, in secundo scilicet et primo ordine. Unde antiqui in tertio et quarto ordine omnia recte fecerunt; in primo autem et in secundo peccaverunt, non quoad omnia, sed quoad enunciationes de necessario tantum. When he says, Now we must consider how enunciations predicating necessity are related to these, etc., he proposes an examination of the consequents of enunciations predicating necessity in order to determine the truth about them. First he examines what was said by the ancients; secondly, he determines the truth, where he says, But in fact neither " necessary to be” nor "necessary not to be” follow upon "possible to be,” etc. In his examination of the ancients, Aristotle makes four points. First, he shows what was well said by the ancients and what was badly said. It must be noted in regard to this that, as we have said, there are four enunciations predicating necessity, which differ among themselves in quantity and quality, and hence they make up a diagram of opposition in the manner of the absolute enunciations. Two of them are contrary to each other, and two are contradictory to these contraries, as is clear in the diagram below. necessary to be contraries necessary not to be not necessary not to be subcontraries not necessary to be Now the ancients correctly inferred the universal contraries from the possibles, contingents, and impossibles, but incorrectly inferred their contradictories, namely, particulars. This is the reason Aristotle says that it remains to be considered how enunciations predicating necessity are related consequentially to the possible and not possible. From what Aristotle says, it is clear that those predicating necessity do not follow upon the possibles in the same way as those predicating impossibility follow upon the possibles, for all of the enunciations predicating impossibility were correctly inferred by the ancients, but those predicating necessity were not. Two of them, the contraries, "necessary to be” and "necessary not to be,” follow, i.e., correct consequents were deduced by the ancients in the third and fourth orders; the remaining two, "not necessary not to be” and "not necessary to be,” which are contradictories of the contraries, are outside of the consequents of these, i.e., in the second and first orders. Hence, the ancients represented everything correctly in the third and fourth orders, but in the first and second they erred, not with respect to all things, but only with respect to enunciations predicating necessity. Cajetanus lib. Secundo cum dicit: non enim est negatio eius etc., respondet cuidam tacitae obiectioni, qua defendi posset consequentia enunciationis de necessario in primo ordine ab antiquis facta. Est autem obiectio tacita talis. Non possibile esse, et, necesse non esse, convertibiliter se sequuntur in tertio ordine iam approbato; ergo, possibile esse, et, non necesse esse, invicem se sequi debent in primo ordine. Tenet consequentia: quia duorum convertibiliter se sequentium contradictoria mutuo se sequuntur; sed illae duae tertii ordinis convertibiliter se sequuntur, et istae duae primi ordinis sunt earum contradictoriae; ergo istae primi ordinis, scilicet, possibile esse, et, non necesse esse, mutuo se sequuntur. Huic, inquam, obiectioni respondet Aristoteles hic interimendo minorem quoad hoc quod assumit, quod scilicet necessaria primi ordinis et necessaria tertii ordinis sunt contradictoriae. Unde dicit: non enim est negatio eius quod est, necesse non esse (quae erat in tertio ordine), illa quae dicit, non necesse est esse, quae sita erat in primo ordine. Et causam subdit, quia contingit utrasque simul esse veras in eodem; quod contradictoriis repugnat. Illud enim idem, quod est necessarium non esse, non est necessarium esse. Necessarium siquidem est hominem non esse lignum et non necessarium est hominem esse lignum. Adverte quod, ut infra patebit, istae duae de necessario, quas posuerunt antiqui in primo et tertio ordine, sunt subalternae (et ideo sunt simul verae), et deberent esse contradictoriae; et ideo erraverunt antiqui. Secondly, he says, For the negation of "necessary not to be” is not "not necessary to be,” since both may be true of the same subject, etc. Here he replies to a tacit objection. This reply could be used to defend the consequent of the enunciation of the necessary made by the ancients in the first order. The tacit objection is this: "not possible to be” and "necessary not to be” follow convertibly in the third order which has already been shown to be correct; therefore, "possible to be” and "not necessary to be” ought to follow upon each other in the first order. The consequent holds; for the contradictories of two that convertibly follow upon each other, mutually follow upon each other; but those two follow upon each other convertibly in the third order and these two in the first order are their contradictories; therefore, those of the first order, i.e., "possible to be” and "not necessary to be,” mutually follow upon each other. Aristotle replies here to this objection by destroying what was assumed in the minor, i.e., that the necessary of the first order and the necessary of the third order are contradictories. He says, For the negation of "necessary not to be” (which is in the third order) is not "not necessary to be” (which has been placed in the first order). He also gives the reason: it is possible for both to be true at once of the same subject, which is repugnant to contradictories. For the same thing which is necessary not to be, is not necessary to be; for example, it is necessary that man not be wood and it is not necessary that man be wood. Notice, as will be clear later, that these two which the ancients posited in the first and third orders, are subalterns and therefore are at once true, whereas they should be contradictories; hence the ancients were in error. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 8Boethius autem et Averroes non reprehensive legunt tam hanc, quam praecedentem textus particulam, sed narrative utramque simul iungentes. Narrare enim aiunt Aristotelem qualitatem suprascriptae figurae quoad consequentiam illarum de necessario, postquam narravit quo modo se habuerint illae de impossibili, et dicere quod secundum praescriptam figuram non eodem modo sequuntur illas de possibili illae de necessario, quo sequuntur illae de impossibili. Nam contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de impossibili sequuntur, licet conversim; contradictoriae autem de necessario non dicuntur sequi illas contradictorias de possibili, sed potius eas sequi dicuntur contrariae de necessario: non inter se contrariae, sed hoc modo, quod affirmationem possibilis negatio de necessario sequi dicitur, negationem vero possibilis non affirmatio de necessario sequi ponitur, quae sit contradictoria illi negativae quae ponebatur sequi ad possibilem, sed talis affirmationis de necessario contrario. Et quod hoc ita fiat in illa figura ut dicimus, patet ex primo et tertio ordine, quorum capita sunt negatio et affirmatio possibilis, et extrema sunt, non necesse esse, et, necesse non esse. Hae siquidem non sunt contradictoriae. Non enim est negatio eius, quae est, necesse non esse, non necesse esse (quoniam contingit eas simul verificari de eodem), sed illa scilicet, necesse non esse, est contraria contradictoriae huius, scilicet, non necesse esse, quae est, necesse est esse. Sed quia sequenti litterae magis consona est introductio nostra, quae etiam Alberto consentit, et extorte videtur ab aliis exponi ly contrariae, ideo prima, iudicio meo, acceptanda est expositio et ad antiquorum reprehensionem referendus est textus. Boethius and Averroes read both this and the preceding part of the text, not reprovingly, but as explanatorily joined together. They say Aristotle explains the quality of the above table with respect to the consequents of enunciations predicating necessity after he has explained in what way those predicating impossibility are related. What Aristotle is saying, then, is that those of the necessary do not follow those of the possible in the same way as those of the impossible follow upon the possible. For contradictories of the impossible follow upon contradictories of the possible, although inversely; but contradictories of the necessary are not said to follow the contradictories of the possible, but rather the contraries of the necessary follow upon them. It is not the contraries among themselves that follow, but contraries in this way: the negation of the necessary is said to follow upon the affirmation of the possible; but what follows on the negation of this possible is not the affirmation of the necessary contradictory to that negative of the necessary following upon the possible, but the contrary of such an affirmation of the necessary. That this is the case is evident in the first and third orders. The sources are negation and affirmation of the possible, and the extremes are "not necessary to be” and "necessary not to be.” But these are not contradictories, for the negation of "necessary not to be” is not "not necessary to be,” for it is possible for them to be at once true of the same thing. "Necessary not to be” is the contrary of the contradictory of "not necessary to be,” which contradictory is "necessary to be.” In my judgment, however, the first exposition should be accepted and this portion of the text taken as a reproof of the ancients, because the contraries seem to be explained in a forced way by others, whereas our introduction is more in accord with what follows in the next part of the text; in addition, it agrees with Albert’s interpretation. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 9Tertio cum dicit: causa autem cur etc., manifestat id quod praemiserat, scilicet, quod non simili modo ad illas de possibili sequuntur illae de impossibili et illae de necessario. Antiquorum enim hoc peccatum fuit tam in primo quam in secundo ordine, et quod simili modo intulerunt illas de impossibili et necessario. In primo siquidem ordine, sicut posuerunt negativam simplicem de impossibili, ita posuerunt negativam simplicem de necessario, et similiter in secundo ordine utranque negativam declinatam locaverunt. Hoc ergo quare peccatum sit, et causa autem quare necessarium non sequitur possibile, similiter, idest, eodem modo cum caeteris, scilicet, de impossibili, est, quoniam impossibile redditur idem valens necessario, idest, aequivalet necessario, contrarie, idest, contrario modo sumptum, et non eodem modo. Nam si, hoc esse est impossibile, non inferemus, ergo hoc esse est necesse, sed, hoc non esse est necesse. Quia ergo impossibile et necesse mutuo se sequuntur, quando dicta eorum contrario modo sumuntur, et non quando dicta eorum simili modo sumuntur, sequitur quod non eodem modo ad possibile se habeant impossibile et necessarium, sed contrario modo. Nam ad id possibile quod sequitur dictum affirmatum de impossibili, sequitur dictum negatum de necessario; et e contrario. Quare autem hoc accidit infra dicetur. Erraverunt igitur antiqui quod similes enunciationes de impossibili et necessario in primo et in secundo ordine locaverunt. Thirdly, he says, Now the reason why enunciations predicating necessity do not follow in the same way as the others, etc. Here Aristotle shows why enunciations predicating impossibility and necessity do not follow in a similar way upon those predicating possibility. This was the error made by the ancients in both the first and second orders, for in the first order they posited the simple negative of the impossible, and in a similar way the simple negative of the necessary, and in the second order their declined negatives, the reason being that they inferred those predicating impossibility and necessity in a similar way. The cause of this error, then, and the reason why enunciations predicating necessity do not follow the possible in the same way, i.e., in a similar mode, as the others, i.e., as the impossibles, is that the impossible expresses the same meaning as the necessary, i.e., is equivalent to the necessary, contrarily, i.e., taken in a contrary mode, and not in the same mode. For if something is impossible to be, we do not infer, therefore it is necessary to be, but it is necessary not to be. Since, therefore, the impossible and necessary mutually follow each other when their dictums are taken in a contrary mode—and not when their dictums are taken in a similar mode — it follows that the impossible and necessary are not related in the same way to the possible, but in a contrary way. For the negated dictum of the necessary follows upon that possible which follows the affirmed dictum of the impossible, and contrarily. Why this is so will be explained later. Therefore, the ancients erred when they located similar enunciations of the impossible and necessary in the first and in the second orders. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 10 Hinc apparet quod supra posita nostra expositio conformior est Aristoteli. Cum enim hunc textum induxerit ad manifestandum illa verba: manifestum est autem quoniam non eodem modo, etc., eo accipiendo sunt sensu illa verba, quo hic per causam manifestantur. Liquet autem quod hic redditur causa dissimilitudinis verae inter necessarias et impossibiles in consequendo possibiles, et non dissimilitudinis falso opinatae ab antiquis: quoniam ex vera causa nonnisi verum concluditur. Ergo reprehendendo antiquos, veram dissimilitudinem inter necessarias, et impossibiles in consequendo possibiles, quam non servaverunt illi, proposuisse tunc intelligendum est, et nunc eam manifestasse. Quod autem dissimilitudo illa, quam antiqui posuerunt inter necessarias et impossibiles, sit falso posita, ex infra dicendis patebit. Ostendetur enim quod contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de necessario sequuntur conversim; et quod in hoc non differunt ab his quae sunt de impossibili, sed differunt in hoc quod modo diximus, quod possibilium et impossibilium se consequentium dictum est similiter, possibilium autem et necessariorum, se invicem consequentium dictum est contrarium, ut infra clara luce videbitur. Hence it appears that our exposition is more in conformity with Aristotle. For he introduced this text to manifest these words: It is evident that the case here is not the same, etc. By taking this meaning, then, these words are made clear through the cause. Moreover, it is evident that here the cause is given of a true dissimilitude between necessaries and impossibles in following the possibles, and not of a dissimilitude falsely held by the ancients, for from a true cause only the truth is concluded. Therefore in reproving the ancients it must be understood that a true dissimilitude between the necessary and impossible in following the possible, which they did not beed, has been proposed, and now has been made manifest. It will be clear from what will be said later that the dissimilitude posited by the ancients between the necessary and impossible is falsely posited, for it will be shown that contradictories of the necessary follow contradictories of the possible inversely, and that in this they do not differ from enunciations predicating impossibility. They do differ, however, in the way we have indicated, i.e., the dictum of the possibles and of the impossibles following on them is similar, but the dictum of the possibles and of the necessaries following on them is contrary, as will be seen clearly later. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 11 Quarto cum dicit: aut certe impossibile est etc., manifestat aliud quod proposuerat, scilicet, quod contradictoriae de necessario male situatae sint secundum consequentiam ab antiquis, qui contradictiones necessarii ita ordinaverunt. In primo ordine posuerunt contradictoriam negationem, necesse esse, idest, non necesse esse; et in secundo contradictoriam negationem, necesse non esse, idest, non necesse non esse. Et probat hunc consequentiae modum esse malum in primo ordine. Cognita enim malitia primi, facile est secundi ordinis agnoscere defectum. Probat autem hoc tali ratione ducente ad impossibile. Ad necessarium esse sequitur possibile esse: aliter sequeretur non possibile esse, quod manifeste implicat; ad possibile esse sequitur non impossibile esse, ut patet; ad non impossibile esse, secundum antiquos, sequitur in primo ordine non necessarium esse; ergo de primo ad ultimum, ad necessarium esse sequitur non necessarium esse: quod est inconveniens, quia est manifesta implicatio contradictionis. Relinquitur ergo quod male dictum sit, quod non necessarium esse consequatur in primo ordine. Ait ergo et certe impossibile est poni sic secundum consequentiam, ut antiqui posuerunt, necessarii contradictiones, idest illas duas enunciationes de necessario, quae sunt negationes contradictoriae aliarum duarum de necessario. Nam ad id quod est, necessarium esse, sequitur, possibile est esse: nam si non, idest quoniam si hanc negaveris consequentiam, negatio possibilis sequitur illam, scilicet, necesse esse. Necesse est enim de necessario aut dicere, idest affirmare possibile, aut negare possibile: de quolibet enim est affirmatio vel negatio vera. Quare si dicas quod, ad necesse esse, non sequitur, possibile esse, sed, non possibile est esse; cum haec aequivaleat illi quae dicit, impossibile est esse, relinquitur quod ad, necesse esse, sequitur, impossibile esse, et idem erit, necesse esse et impossibile esse: quod est inconveniens. Bona ergo erat prima illatio, scilicet, necesse est esse, ergo possibile est esse. Tunc ultra. Illud quod est, possibile esse, sequitur, non impossibile esse, ut patet in primo ordine. Ad hoc vero, scilicet, non impossibile esse, secundum antiquos eodem primo ordine, sequitur, non necesse est esse (quare contingit de primo ad ultimum); ad id quod est, necessarium esse, sequitur, non necessarium esse: quod est inconveniens, immo impossibile. Fourthly, when he says, Or is it impossible to arrange the contradictions of enunciations predicating necessity in this way? he manifests another point he had proposed, namely, that contradictories of enunciations predicating necessity were badly placed according to consequence by the ancients when they ordered them thus: the contradictory negation to "necessary to be,” i.e., "not necessary to be,” in the first order, and the contradictory negation to "necessary not to be,” i.e., "not necessary not to be,” in the second. Aristotle only proves that this mode of consequence is incorrect in the first order, for when this is known the mistake in the second order is readily seen. He does this by an argument leading to an impossibility. "Possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be”; otherwise "not possible to be” would follow, which it manifestly implies. "Not impossible to be” follows upon "possible to be” as is evident, and, according to the ancients, in the first order, "not necessary to be” follows upon "not impossible to be.” Therefore, from first to last, "not necessary to be” follows upon "necessary to be,” which is inadmissible because there is an obvious implication of contradiction. Therefore, it is erroneous to say that "not necessary to be” follows in the first order. He says, then, that in fact it is impossible to posit contradictions of the necessary according to consequence as the ancients posited them, i.e., in the first order the contradictory negation of "necessary to be,” i.e., "not necessary to be” and in the second the contradictory negation of "necessary not to be,” i.e., "not necessary not to be.” For "possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be”; if not, i.e., if you deny this consequence, the negation of the possible follows upon "necessary to be,” since the possible must either be asserted of the necessary or denied, the reason being that of anything there is a true affirmation or a true negation. Therefore, if you say that "possible to be” does not follow upon "necessary to be,” but "not possible to be” does follow, then, since the latter is equivalent to the former, i.e., "not possible to be” to "impossible to be,” "impossible to be” follows upon "necessary to be” and the same thing will be "necessary to be” and "impossible to be,” which cannot be admitted. Consequently, the first inference was good, i.e., "It is necessary to be, therefore it is possible to be.” But again, "possible to be” follows upon "not impossible to be,” as is evident in the first order, and according to the ancients, "not necessary to be” follows upon "not impossible to be” in the same first order. Therefore, from first to last we arrive at this: "not necessary to be” follows upon "necessary to be,” which is unlikely, not to say impossible. 12 Dubitatur hic: quia in I priorum dicitur quod ad possibile sequitur non necessarium, hic autem dicitur oppositum. Ad hoc est dicendum quod possibile sumitur dupliciter. Uno modo in communi, et sic est quoddam superius ad necessarium et contingens ad utrunque, sicut animal ad hominem et bovem; et sic ad possibile non sequitur non necessarium, sicut ad animal non sequitur non homo. Alio modo sumitur possibile pro una parte possibilis in communi, idest pro possibili seu contingenti, scilicet ad utrunque, scilicet quod potest esse et non esse; et sic ad possibile sequitur non necessarium. Quod enim potest esse et non esse, non necessarium est esse, et similiter non necessarium est non esse. Loquimur ergo hic de possibili in communi, ibi vero in speciali. There is a doubt about this, for in I Priorum, it is said that the not necessary follows upon the possible, while here the opposite is said. The possible, however, is taken in two ways: commonly, and thus it is superior to the necessary and the contingent to either of two alternatives, as is the case with animal in relation to man and cow; taken in this way, the not necessary does not follow upon the possible, just as not-man does not follow upon animal. In another way the possible is taken for one part of the possible commonly, i.e., for the possible or contingent to either of two alternatives, namely, for what can be and not be. The not necessary follows upon the possible taken in this way, for what can be and not be is not necessary to be, and likewise is not necessary not to be. In the Prior Analytics, then, Aristotle is speaking of the possible in particular; here of the possible commonly. Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque necessarium etc., determinat veritatem intentam. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, determinat quae enunciatio de necessario sequatur ad possibile; secundo, ordinat consequentias omnium modalium; ibi: sequuntur enim et cetera. Quoad primum, sicut duabus viis reprehendit antiquos, ita ex illis duobus motivis intentum probat. Et intendit quod, ad possibile esse, sequitur, non necesse non esse. Primum motivum est per locum a divisione. Ad, possibile esse, non sequitur (ut probatum est), non necesse esse, at vero neque, necesse esse, neque, necesse non esse. Reliquum est ergo ut sequatur ad eam, non necesse non esse: non enim dantur plures enunciationes de necessario. Huius communis divisionis primo proponit reliqua duo membra excludenda, dicens: at vero neque necessarium esse, neque necessarium non esse, sequitur ad possibile non esse; secundo probat hoc sic. Nullum formale consequens minuit suum antecedens: tunc enim oppositum consequentis staret cum antecedente; sed utrumque horum, scilicet, necesse esse, et, necesse non esse, minuit possibile esse; ergo, et cetera. Unde, tacita maiore, ponit minoris probationem dicens: illi enim, scilicet, possibile esse, utraque, scilicet, esse et non esse, contingit accidere; horum autem, scilicet, necesse esse et necesse non esse, utrumlibet verum fuerit, non erunt illa duo, scilicet, esse et non esse, vera simul in potentia. Et primum horum explanans ait: cum dico, possibile esse, simul est possibile esse et non esse. Quoad secundum vero subdit. Si vero dicas, necesse esse vel necesse non esse, non remanet utrumque, scilicet, esse et non esse, possibile: si enim necesse est esse, possibilitas ad non esse excluditur; et si necesse est non esse, possibilitas ad esse removetur. Utrumque ergo istorum minuit illud antecedens, possibile esse, quoniam ad esse et non esse se extendit, et cetera. Tertio subdit conclusionem: relinquitur ergo quod, non necessarium non esse, comes est ei quae dicit, possibile esse; et consequenter haec ponenda erit in primo ordine. When he says, But in fact neither "necessary to be” nor "necessary not to be” follow upon "possible to be,” etc., he determines the truth. First he determines which enunciation of the necessary follows upon the possible; secondly, he orders the consequents of all of the modals, where he says, Thus, these contradictions also follow in the way indicated, etc. Aristotle has reproved the ancients in two ways; on the basis of these two he now proves which enunciation of the necessary follows upon the possible. What he intends to show is that "not necessary not to be” follows upon "possible to be.” The first argument is taken from a locus of division. "Not necessary to be” does not follow upon possible to be” (as has been proved), but neither does "necessary to be” nor "necessary not to be.” Therefore, "not necessary not to be” follows upon "possible to be,” since there are no more enunciations of the necessary. He first proposes the remaining two members that are to be excluded from this common division: But in fact neither "necessary to be” nor "necessary not to be” follow upon "possible to be.” Then he proves this: no formal consequent diminishes its antecedent, for if it did, the opposite of the consequent would stand with the antecedent; but both of these, namely, "necessary to be” and "necessary not to be,” diminish possible to be”; therefore, etc. The major is therefore implied and he gives the proof of the minor when he says that "possible to be” admits of two possibilities, namely, "to be” and "not to be”; but of these, namely, "necessary to be” and "necessary not to be” (whichever should be true), these two, "to be” and "not to be,” will not be true at the same time in potency. He explains the first point thus: when I say "possible to be” it is at once possible to be and not to be. With respect to the second, he adds: if you should say, "necessary to be” or "necessary not to be,” both do not remain, i.e., possible to be and not to be do not remain, for if a thing is necessary to be, possibility not to be is excluded, and if it is necessary not to be, possibility to be is removed. Both of these, then, diminish the antecedent, possible to be, for it is extended to "to be” and "not to be,” etc. Thirdly, he concludes: it remains, therefore, that "not necessary not to be” accompanies "possible to be,” and consequently will have to be placed in the first order. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 10 n. 14 Occurrit in hac parte dubium circa hoc quod dicit quod, ad possibile non sequitur necessarium, cum superius dixerit quod ad ipsum non sequitur non necessarium. Cum enim necessarium et non necessarium sint contradictoria opposita, et de quolibet sit affirmatio vel negatio vera, non videtur posse evadi quin ad possibile sequatur necessarium, vel, non necessarium. Et cum non sequatur necessarium, sequetur non necessarium, ut dicebant antiqui. Augetur et dubitatio ex eo quod Aristoteles nunc usus est tali argumentationis modo, volens probare quod ad necessarium sequatur possibile. Dixit enim: nam si non negatio possibilis consequatur. Necesse est enim aut dicere aut negare. A difficulty arises at this point with respect to his saying that the necessary does not follow upon the possible, since he has also said that the not necessary does not follow upon it. For the necessary and the not necessary are opposed contradictorily, and since of anything there is a true affirmation or negation, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that either the necessary or the not necessary follows upon the possible; and since the necessary does not follow, the not necessary must follow, as the ancients said. Furthermore, the difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle just used such a mode of argumentation when, to prove that the possible follows upon the necessary, he said, for if not, the negation will follow; for it is necessary either to affirm or deny. 15. Pro solutione huius, oportet reminisci habitudinis quae est inter possibile et necessarium, quod scilicet possibile est superius ad necessarium, et attendere quod superius potestate continet suum inferius et eius oppositum, ita quod neutrum eorum actualiter sibi vindicat, sed utrunque potest sibi contingere; sicut animali potest accidere homo et non homo: et consequenter inspicere debes quod, eadem est proportio superioris ad habendum affirmationem et negationem unius inferioris, quae est alicuius subiecti ad affirmativam et negativam futuri contingentis. Utrobique enim neutrum habetur, et salvatur potentia ad utrumlibet. Unde, sicut in futuris contingentibus nec affirmatio nec negatio est determinate vera, sed sub disiunctione altera est necessario vera, ut in fine primi conclusum est; ita nec affirmatio nec negatio inferioris sequitur determinate affirmationem vel negationem superioris, sed sub disiunctione altera sequitur necessario. Unde non valet, est animal, ergo est homo, neque, ergo non est homo, sed, ergo est homo vel non est homo. Quia ergo possibile superius est ad necessarium, ideo optime determinavit Aristoteles neutram contradictionis partem de necessario determinate sequi ad possibile. Non tamen dixit quod sub disiunctione neutra sequatur; hoc enim est contra illud primum principium: de quolibet est affirmatio vera vel falsa. Ad id autem quod additur, ex eadem trahitur radice responsio. Quia enim necessarium inferius est ad possibile, et inferius non in potentia sed in actu includit suum superius, necesse est ad inferius determinate sequi suum superius: aliter determinate sequetur eius contradictorium. Unde per dissimilem habitudinem, quae est inter necessarium et possibile et non possibile, ex una parte, et inter possibile et necessarium et non necessarium, ex altera parte, ibi optimus fuit processus ad alteram contradictionis partem determinate, et hic optimus ad neutram determinate. In order to resolve this, we must recall the relationship between the possible and the necessary, namely, that the possible is superior to the necessary. Now the superior potentially contains its own inferior and the opposite of it in such a way that neither of them is actually appropriated by the superior, but each is possible to it; as in the case of man and not-man in relation to animal. We must also consider that the proportion of the superior as related to the affirmation and negation of one inferior is the same (which is the proportion of some subject to the affirmative and negative of a future contingent), for it is had by neither of the two, and the potency to either is kept. Accordingly, as in future contingents neither the affirmation nor the negation is determinately true, but under disjunction one is necessarily true (as was concluded at the end of the first book), so neither the affirmation nor negation of the inferior follows upon the affirmation or negation of the superior determinately, but under disjunction one follows necessarily. This, for instance, is not valid: "It is animal, therefore it is man,” nor is "therefore it is not man” valid, but, "therefore it is man or it is not man.” Since, then, the possible is superior to the necessary, Aristotle has correctly determined that neither part of the contradiction of the necessary determinately follows upon the possible. However, he has not said that under disjunction neither follows; for this would be opposed to the first principle, that of anything there is a true or false affirmation. The response to what was added, beginning with "Furthermore, the difficulty is augmented,” etc., is based upon the same point. Since the necessary is inferior to the possible, and the inferior does not include its superior in potency but in act, the superior must follow determinately upon the inferior; otherwise the contradiction of it would follow determinately. Hence, because of the dissimilar relationship between the necessary and the possible and not possible on the one hand, and between the possible and the necessary and not necessary on the other, the movement of the earlier argument to one part of the contradiction determinately was quite right, and the movement here to neither determinately was quite right. 16. Oritur quoque alia dubitatiuncula. Videtur enim quod Aristoteles difformiter accipiat ly possibile in praecedenti textu et in isto. Ibi enim accipit ipsum in communi, ut sequitur ad necessarium; hic videtur accipere ipsum specialiter pro possibili ad utrumlibet, quia dicit quod possibile est simul potens esse et non esse. Et ad hoc dicendum est quod uniformiter usus est possibili. Nec eius verba obstant: quoniam et de possibili in communi verum est dicere quod potest sibi utrunque accidere, scilicet, esse et non esse: tum quia quidquid verificatur de suo inferiori, verificatur etiam de suo superiori, licet non eodem modo; tum quia possibile in communi neutram contradictionis partem sibi determinat, et consequenter utranque sibi advenire compatitur, licet non asserat potentiam ad utranque partem, quemadmodum possibile ad utrunque. There is another slight difficulty, for it seems that Aristotle takes the possible in a different way in the preceding text and in this. There he takes it commonly as it follows upon the necessary; here he seems to take it specifically for the possible that is indifferent to alternatives, since he says that the possible is at once possible to be and not to be. But in fact Aristotle has used the possible uniformly. Nor are his words at variance, for it is also true to say of the possible as common that it admits of both possibilities, i.e., of "to be” and "not to be”; first, because whatever is verified of its inferior is verified also of its superior, although not in the same mode; secondly, because the possible as common determines neither part of the contradiction to itself and consequently admits of either happening, although it does not affirm a potency to each part, as does the possible to either of two alternatives. 17. Secundum motivum ad idem, correspondens tacitae obiectioni antiquorum quam supra exclusit, addit cum subdit: hoc enim verum est et cetera. Ubi notandum quod Aristoteles sub illa maiore adducta pro antiquis (scilicet, convertibiliter se consequentium contradictoria se mutuo consequuntur), subsumit minorem: sed horum convertibiliter se sequentium in tertio ordine (scilicet, non possibile esse et necesse non esse), contradictoria sunt, possibile esse et non necesse non esse (quoniam modi negatione eis opponuntur); ergo istae duae (scilicet, possibile esse et non necesse non esse) se consequuntur et in primo locandae sunt ordine. Unde motivum tangens ait: hoc enim, quod dictum est, verum est, idest verum esse ostenditur, et de necesse non esse, idest, et ex illius, scilicet, non necesse non esse, opposita, quae est, necesse non esse. Vel, hoc enim, scilicet, non necesse non esse, verum est, scilicet, contradictorium illius de necesse non esse. Et minorem subdens ait: haec enim, scilicet, non necesse non esse, fit contradictio eius, quae convertibiliter sequitur, non possibile esse. Et explanans hoc in terminis subdit. Illud enim, non possibile esse, quod est caput tertii ordinis, sequitur hoc de impossibili, scilicet, impossibile esse, et haec de necessario, scilicet, necesse non esse, cuius negatio seu contradictoria est, non necesse non esse. Et quia, caeteris paribus, modus negatur, et illa, possibile esse, est (subauditur) contradictoria illius, scilicet, non possibile; igitur ista duo mutuo se consequuntur, scilicet, possibile esse, et, non necesse non esse, tamquam contradictoria duorum se mutuo consequentium. The second grounds for proving the same thing corresponds to the tacit objection of the ancients he excluded above: For this, he says, is true also with respect to "necessary to be,” etc. It should be noted here that Aristotle subsumes under the major cited as a proof for the position of the ancients (namely, contradictories of consequences convertibly following each other mutually follow upon each other) this minor: but the contradictories of those following upon each other convertibly in the third order (i.e., of "not possible to be” and "necessary not to be”) are "possible to be” and "not necessary not to be” (for they are opposed to them by negation of mode); therefore, these two (i.e., "possible to be” and "not necessary not to be”) follow upon each other and are to be placed in the first order. Hence, with respect to the basis of the above argument, he says, For this, i.e., what has been said, is true, i.e., is shown to be true, also with respect to "necessary not to be,” i.e., of the opposite of "not necessary not to be,” i.e., "necessary not to be.” Or, For this, namely, not necessary not to be,” is true, namely, is the true contradictory of necessary not to be.” He gives the minor when he says, For "not necessary not to be” is the contradictory of what follows upon "not possible to be.” Then he states this explicitly: for "not possible to be,” which is the source of the third order is followed by this impossible, namely, "impossible to be,” and by this one of the necessary, namely, "necessary not to be,” of which the negation or contradictory is "not necessary not to be.” And since, other things being equal, the mode is negated, and, "possible to be” is (it is understood) the contradictory of "not possible to be,” therefore, these two mutually follow upon each other, namely, "possible to be” and "not necessary not to be,” as contradictories of the two mutually following upon each other. Cajetanus lib. Deinde cum dicit: sequuntur enim etc., ordinat omnes consequentias modalium secundum opinionem propriam; et ait quod, hae contradictiones, scilicet, de necessario, sequuntur illas de possibili, secundum modum praedictum et approbatum illarum de impossibili. Sicut enim contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de impossibili sequuntur, licet conversim; ita contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de necessario sequuntur conversim: licet in hoc, ut dictum est, dissimilitudo sit quod, contradictoriarum de possibili et impossibili similiter est dictum, contradictoriarum autem de possibili et necessario contrarium est dictum, ut in sequenti videtur figura: consequentiae enunciationum modalium secundum quatuor ordines ab Aristotele positae et ordinatae. (Figura). Ubi vides quod nulla est inter Aristotelem et antiquos differentia, nisi in duobus primis ordinibus quoad illas de necessario. Praepostero namque situ usi sunt antiqui, eam de necessario, quae locanda erat in primo ordine, in secundo ponentes, et eam quae in secundo ponenda erat, in primo locantes. Et aspice quoque quod convertibiliter se consequentium semper contradictoria se consequi ordinavit. Singulis enim tertii ordinis singulae primi ordinis contradictoriae sunt; et similiter singulae quarti ordinis singulis, quae in secundo sunt, contradictoriae sunt. Quod antiqui non observarunt. When he says, Thus, these contradictions also follow in the way indicated, etc., he orders all of the consequents of modals according to his own opinion. He says, then, that these contradictions, namely, of the necessary, follow those of the possible, according to the foresaid and approved mode of those of the impossible. For just as contradictories of the impossible follow upon contradictories of the possible, although inversely, so contradictories of the necessary follow contradictories of the possible inversely. In the latter, however, as has been said, there is a dissimilarity in that the dictum of the contradictories of the possible and impossible is similar, but the dictum of the contradictories of the possible and necessary is contrary. This can be seen in the following table. CONSEQUENTS OF MODAL ENUNCIATIONS POSITED AND ORDERED BY ARISTOTLE ACCORDING TO FOUR ORDERS FIRST ORDER It is possible to be It is contingent to be It is not impossible to be It is not necessary to be SECOND ORDER It is possible not to be It is contingent not to be It is not impossible not to be It is not necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is not contingent to be It is impossible to be It is necessary not to be FOURTH ORDER It is not possible not to be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be It is necessary to be Here you see that there is no difference between Aristotle and the ancients except in the first two orders with respect to those of the necessary. The ancients inverted the position of these, placing the necessary that should have been placed in the first order in the second order, and the one that should have been in the second in the first. Notice, too, that he has ordered them in such a way that the contradictories of those following upon each other convertibly, always follow each other, for each one in the first order is the contradictory of each one in the third order, and similarly, each of the fourth order the contradictory of each in the second. This the ancients did not observe. Postquam Aristoteles declaravit modalium consequentias, hic movet quandam dubitationem circa unum eorum quae determinata sunt, scilicet quod possibile sequitur ad necesse. Et duo facit: quia primo dubitationem absolvit; secundo, ex determinata quaestione alium ordinem earumdem consequentiarum modalibus statuit; ibi: et est fortasse et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, movet quaestionem; secundo, determinat eam; ibi: manifestum est et cetera. Movet ergo quaestionem: primo dicens: dubitabit autem aliquis si ad id quod est necesse esse sequatur possibile esse; et secundo, arguit ad partem affirmativam subdens: nam si non sequatur, contradictoria eius sequetur, scilicet non possibile esse, ut supra deductum est: quia de quolibet est affirmatio vel negatio vera. Et si quis dicat hanc, scilicet, non possibile esse, non esse contradictoriam illius, scilicet, possibile esse, et propterea subterfugiendum velit argumentum, et dicere quod neutra harum sequitur ad necesse esse; talis licet falsum dicat, tamen concedatur sibi, quoniam necesse erit ipsum dicere illius contradictoriam fore, possibile non esse. Oportet namque aut non possibile esse aut possibile non esse, esse contradictoriam, possibile esse; et tunc in eumdem redibit errorem, quoniam utraeque, scilicet, non possibile esse et possibile non esse, falsae sunt de eo quod est, necesse esse. Et consequenter ad ipsum neutra sequi potest. Nulla enim enunciatio sequitur ad illam, cuius veritatem destruit. Relinquitur ergo quod, ad necesse esse sequitur possibile esse. Now that he has explained the consequents of modals, Aristotle raises a question about one of the points that has already been determined, namely, that the possible follows upon the necessary. He first raises the question and then settles it where he says, It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking is one that admits of opposites, etc. Secondly, he establishes another order of the same consequents from the determination of the present question, where he says Indeed the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of all that is or is not, etc. First, then, he raises the question: But it may be questioned whether "Possible to be follows upon "necessary to be.” Secondly, he argues to the affirmative part: Yet if not, the contradictory, "not possible to be,” would have to follow, as was deduced earlier, for either the affirmation or the negation is true of anything. And if someone should say "not possible to be” is not the contradictory of "possible to be,” because he wants to avoid the conclusion by saying that neither of these follows upon "necessary to be,” this may be conceded, although what he says is false. But then he will have to say that the contradictory of "possible to be” is "possible not to be,” for the contradictory of "possible to be” has to be either "not possible to be” or "possible not to be.” But if he says this, he will fall into another error, for it is false to say it is not possible to be of that which is necessary to be, and it is false to say it is possible not to be. Consequently, neither follows upon it, for no enunciation follows upon an enunciation whose truth it destroys. Therefore, "possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be.” 2. Tertio, arguit ad partem negativam cum subdit: at vero rursus etc., et intendit talem rationem. Si ad necesse esse sequitur possibile esse, cum ad possibile sequatur possibile non esse (per conversionem in oppositam qualitatem, ut dicitur in I priorum, quia idem est possibile esse et non esse), sequetur de primo ad ultimum quod necesse est possibile non esse: quod est falsum manifeste. Unde oppositionis hypothesim subdit: at vero rursus videtur idem possibile esse et non esse, ut domus, et possibile incidi et non incidi, ut vestis. Quare de primo ad ultimum necesse esse, erit contingens non esse. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo hypothesis illa, scilicet, quod possibile sequatur ad necesse, est falsa. Thirdly, he argues to the negative part where he says, On the other hand, it seems possible for the same thing to be cut and not to be cut, etc. His argument is as follows: If "possible to be” follows upon "necessary to be,” then, since "possible not to be” follows upon the possible (through conversion to the opposite quality, as is said in I Priorum, for the same thing is possible to be and not to be), from first to last it will follow that the necessary is possible not to be, which is clearly false. In this argument, Aristotle supplies a hypothesis opposed to the position that possible to be follows upon necessary to be: On the other hand, it seems possible for the same thing to be cut and not to be cut, for instance a garment, and to be and not to be, for instance a house. Therefore, from first to last, necessary to be will be possible not to be. But this is false. Therefore, the hypothesis that the possible follows upon the necessary is false. 3. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autemetc., respondet dubitationi. Et primo, declarat veritatem simpliciter; secundo, applicat ad propositum; ibi: hoc igitur possibile et cetera. Proponit ergo primo ipsam veritatem declarandam, dicens: manifestum est autem, ex dicendis, quod non omne possibile esse vel ambulare, idest operari: idest, non omne possibile secundum actum primum vel secundum ad opposita valet, idest ad opposita viam habet, sed est invenire aliqua possibilia, in quibus non sit verum dicere quod possunt in opposita. Deinde, quia possibile a potentia nascitur, manifestat qualiter se habeat potentia ipsa ad opposita: ex hoc enim clarum erit quomodo possibile se habeat ad opposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo manifestat hoc in potentiis eiusdem rationis; secundo, in his quae aequivoce dicuntur potentiae; ibi: quaedam vero potentiae et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: quia primo manifestat qualiter potentia irrationalis se habeat ad opposita; et ait quod potentia irrationalis non potest in opposita. When he says, It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking, etc., he answers the question he proposed. First, he manifests the truth simply, then applies it to the question where he says, So it is not true to say the latter possible of what is necessary simply, etc. First, then, he proposes the truth he is going to explain: It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking, i.e., of operating; that is, not everything possible according to first or second act admits of opposites, i.e., has access to opposites; there are some possibles of which it is not true to say that they are capable of opposites. Then, since the possible arises from potency, he manifests how potency is related to opposites; for it will be clear from this bow the possible is related to opposites. First he manifests this in potencies having the same notion; secondly, in those that are called potencies equivocally where he says, But some are called potentialities equivocally, etc. With respect to the way in which potencies of the same specific notion are related to opposites, he does three things. First of all he manifests how an irrational potency is related to opposites; an irrational potency, he says, is not a potency that is capable of opposites. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 11 n. 4Ubi notandum est quod, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., potentia activa, cum nihil aliud sit quam principium quo in aliud agimus, dividitur in potentiam rationalem et irrationalem. Potentia rationalis est, quae cum ratione et electione operatur; sicut ars medicinae, qua medicus cognoscens quid sanando expediat infirmo, et volens applicat remedia. Potentia autem irrationalis vocatur illa, quae non ex ratione et libertate operatur, sed ex naturali sua dispositione; sicut calor ignis potentia irrationalis est, quia calefacit, non ut cognoscit et vult, sed ut natura sua exigit. Assignatur autem ibidem duplex differentia proposito deserviens inter istas potentias. Prima est quod activa potentia irrationalis non potest duo opposita, sed est determinata ad unum oppositorum, sive sumatur oppositum contradictorie sive contrarie. Verbi gratia: calor non potest calefacere et non calefacere, quae sunt contradictorie opposita, neque potest calefacere et frigefacere, quae sunt contraria, sed ad calefactionem determinatus est. Et hoc intellige per se, quia per accidens calor frigefacere potest, vel resolvendo materiam caloris, humidum scilicet, vel per antiperistasin contrarii. Et similiter potest non calefacere per accidens, scilicet si calefactibile deest. Potentia autem rationalis potest in opposita et contradictorie et contrarie. Arte siquidem medicinae potest medicus adhibere remedia et non adhibere, quae sunt contradictoria; et adhibere remedia sana et nociva, quae sunt contraria. Secunda differentia est quod potentia activa irrationalis, praesente passo, necessario operatur, deductis impedimentis: calor enim calefactibile sibi praesens calefacit necessario, si nihil impediat; potentia autem rationalis, passo praesente, non necessario operatur: praesente siquidem infirmo, non cogitur medicus remedia adhibere. It must be noted in this connection that active potency, since it is the principle by which we act on something else, is divided into rational and irrational potency, as is said in IX Metaphysicae [2: 1046a 36]. Rational potency operates in connection with reason and choice; for example, the art of medicine by which the physician, knowing and willing what is expedient in healing an illness, applies a remedy. Irrational potency operates according to its own natural disposition, not according to reason and liberty; for example, the heat of fire is an irrational potency, because it heats, not as it knows and wills, but as its nature requires. In the Metaphysics, a twofold difference between these potencies is assigned which is relevant here. The first is that an irrational active potency is not capable of two opposites, but is determined to one opposite, whether "opposite” is taken contradictorily or contrarily; e.g., heat cannot heat and not heat, which are opposed contradictorily; nor can it heat and cool, which are contraries, but is deter mined to heating. Understand this per se, for heat can cool accidentally, either by destroying the matter of heat, namely, the humid, or through alternation of the contrary. It also has the potentiality not to heat accidentally, if that which can be heated is lacking. A rational potency, on the other hand, is capable of opposites, both contradictorily and contrarily; for by the art of medicine the physician can employ a remedy and not employ it, which are contradictories, and employ healing and harmful remedies, which are contraries. The second difference is that an irrational active potency necessarily operates when a subject is present and impediments are with drawn; for heat necessarily heats when a subject that can be heated is present, and nothing impedes it. A rational potency, however, does not necessarily operate when a subject is present; e.g., when a sick man is present the physician is not forced to employ a remedy. 5. Dimittantur autem metaphysico harum differentiarum rationes et ad textum redeamus. Ubi narrans quomodo se habeat potentia irrationalis ad oppositum, ait: et primum quidem, scilicet, non est verum dicere quod sit potentia ad opposita in his quae possunt non secundum rationem, idest, in his quorum posse est per potentias irrationales; ut ignis calefactivus est, idest, potens calefacere, et habet vim, idest, potentiam istam irrationalem. Ignis siquidem non potest frigefacere; neque in eius potestate est calefacere et non calefacere. Quod autem dixit primum ordinem, nota, ad secundum genus possibilis infra dicendum, in quo etiam non invenitur potentia ad opposita. The reasons for these differences are given in the Metaphysics, but let us return to the text. Explaining bow an irrational potency is related to opposites, he says, First of all, this is not true, i.e., it is not true to say that there is a potency to opposites in those which are not according to reason, i.e., whose power is through irrational potencies; as fire which is calefactive, i.e., capable of heating, has this power, i.e., this irrational potentiality, since it is not able to cool, nor is it in its power 4 to heat and not to heat. Note that he speaks here of a first kind. This is in relation to a second genus of the possible which he will speak of later, in which there is not a potency to opposites either. 6. Secundo, manifestat quomodo potentia rationalis se habeat ad opposita, intendens quod potentia rationalis potest in opposita. Unde subdit: ergo potestates secundum rationem, idest rationales, ipsae eaedem sunt contrariorum, non solum duorum, sed etiam plurimorum, ut arte medicinae medicus plurima iuga contrariorum adhibere potest, et a multarum operationum contradictionibus abstinere potest. Praeposuit autem ly ergo, ut hoc consequi ex dictis insinuaret: cum enim oppositorum oppositae sint proprietates, et potentia irrationalis ex eo quod irrationalis ad opposita non se extendat; oportet potentiam rationalem ad opposita viam habere, eo quod rationalis sit. Secondly, he shows how a rational potency is related to opposites, i.e., it is capable of opposites: Therefore potentialities that are in conjunction with reason, i.e., rational potencies, are capable of contraries, not only of two, but even of many; for example, a physician by the art of medicine can employ many pairs of contraries and he can abstain from doing or not doing many things. He begins with "therefore” so as to imply that this follows from what has been said.”’ The argument would be: properties of opposites are opposites; an irrational potency, because it is irrational, does not extend itself to opposites; therefore a rational potency, because it is rational, has access to opposites. Cajetanus lib. Tertio, explanat id quod dixit de potentiis irrationalibus, propter causam infra assignandam ab ipso; et intendit quod illud quod dixit de potentia irrationali, scilicet quod non potest in opposita, non est verum universaliter, sed particulariter. Ubi nota quod potentia irrationalis dividitur in potentiam activam, quae est principium faciendi, et potentiam passivam, quae est principium patiendi: verbi gratia, potentia ad calorem dividitur in posse calefacere, et in posse calefieri. In potentiis activis irrationalibus verum est quod non possunt in opposita, ut declaratum est; in potentiis autem passivis non est verum. Illud enim quod potest calefieri, potest etiam frigefieri, quia eadem est materia, seu potentia passiva contrariorum, ut dicitur in II de caelo et mundo, et potest non calefieri, quia idem est subiectum privationis et formae, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et propter hoc ergo explanando, ait: irrationales vero potentiae non omnes a posse in opposita excludi intelligendae sunt, sed illae quae sunt quemadmodum potentia ignis calefactiva (ignem enim non posse non calefacere manifestum est), et universaliter, quaecunque alia sunt talis potentiae, quod semper agunt, idest quod quantum est ex se non possunt non agere, sed ad semper agendum ex sua forma necessitantur. Huiusmodi autem sunt, ut declaravimus, omnes potentiae activae irrationales. Alia vero sunt talis conditionis quod etiam secundum irrationales potentias, scilicet passivas, simul possunt in quaedam opposita, ut aer potest calefieri et frigefieri. Quod vero ait, simul, cadit supra ly possunt, et non supra ly opposita; et est sensus, quod simul aliquid habet potentiam passivam ad utrunque oppositorum, et non quod habeat potentiam passivam ad utrunque oppositorum simul habendum. Opposita namque impossibile est haberi simul. Unde et dici solet et bene, quod in huiusmodi est simultas potentiae, non potentia simultatis. Irrationalis igitur potentia non secundum totum suum ambitum a posse in opposita excluditur, sed secundum partem eius, secundum potentias scilicet activas. Thirdly, he explains what he has said about irrational potencies. He will assign the reason for doing this later. He makes the point that what he has said about irrational potentiality, i.e., that it is not capable of opposites, is not true universally, but particularly. It should be noted here that irrational potency is divided into active potency, which is the principle of acting, and passive potency, which is the principle of being acted upon; e.g., potency to heat is divided into potentiality to heat and potentiality to be heated. Now it is true that active irrational potencies are not capable of opposites, as was explained. This is not true, however, of passive potencies, for what can be heated can also be cooled, because the mat ter is the same, i.e., the passive potency of contraries, as is said in II De caelo et mundo [7: 286a 23]. It can also not be heated, since the subject of privation and of form is the same, as is said in I Physic [7: 189b 32]. Therefore, in explaining about irrational potencies, he says, But not all irrational potentialities should be understood to be excluded from the capacity of opposites. Those like the potentiality of fire to heat are to be excluded (for it is evident that fire cannot not heat) I and universally, whatever others are potencies of such a kind that they always act, i.e., the ones that of themselves cannot not act, but are necessitated by their form always to act. All active irrational potencies are of this kind, as we have explained. There are others, however, of such a condition that even though they are irrational potencies (i.e., passive) are simultaneously capable of certain opposites; for example, air can be heated and cooled. "Simultaneously” modifies "are capable” and not "opposites.” What he means is that the thing simultaneously has a passive potency to each opposite, and not that it has a passive potency to have both opposites simultaneously, for it is impossible to have opposites at one and the same time. Hence it is customary and correct to say that in these there is simultaneity of potency, not potency of simultaneity. Therefore, irrational potency is excluded from the capacity of opposites, not completely, but according to its part, namely, according to active potencies. Quia autem videbatur superflue addidisse differentias inter activas et passivas irrationales, quia sat erat proposito ostendisse quod non omnis potentia oppositorum est; ideo subdit quod hoc idcirco dictum est, ut notum fiat quoniam nedum non omnis potestas oppositorum est, loquendo de potentia communissime, sed neque quaecunque potentiae dicuntur secundum eamdem speciem ad opposita possunt. Potentiae siquidem irrationales omnes sub una specie irrationalis potentiae concluduntur, et tamen non omnes in opposita possunt, sed passive tantum. Non supervacanea ergo fuit differentia inter passivas et activas irrationales, sed necessaria ad declarandum quod non omnes potentiae eiusdem speciei possunt in opposita. Potest et ly hoc demonstrare utranque differentiam, scilicet, inter rationales et irrationales, et inter irrationales activas et passivas inter se; et tunc est sensus, quod hoc ideo fecimus, ut ostenderemus quod non omnis potestas, quae scilicet secundum eamdem rationem potentiae physicae dicitur, quia scilicet potest in aliquid ut rationalis et irrationalis, neque etiam omnis potestas, quae sub eadem specie continetur, ut irrationalis activa et passiva sub specie irrationalis, ad opposita potest. Because it might seem superfluous to have added the differences between active and passive irrational potencies, since enough had already been said to show that not every potency is of opposites, Aristotle gives the reason for this. It was not only to make it known that not every potency is of opposites, speaking of potency most commonly, but also that not all that are called potencies according to the same species are capable of opposites. For all irrational potencies are included under one species of irrational potency, and yet not all are capable of opposites, but only the passive potencies. It was not superfluous, therefore, to point out the difference between passive and active irrational potencies, since this was necessary in order to show that not all potencies of the same species are capable of opposites. " This” in the phrase "this has been said” could designate each difference, the one between rational and irrational potencies, and the one between active and passive irrational potencies. The meaning is, then, that we have said this to show that not every potentiality which is said according to the same notion of physical power—namely, because it can be in something as rational and irrational—not even every potentiality which is contained under the same species, as active and passive under the species irrational, is capable of opposites. Intendit declarare quomodo illae quae aequivocae dicuntur potentiae, se habeant ad opposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, declarat naturam talis potentiae; secundo, ponit differentiam et convenientiam inter ipsas et supradictas, ibi: et haec quidem et cetera. Ad evidentiam primi advertendum est quod V et IX Metaphys., Aristoteles dividit potentiam in potentias, quae eadem ratione potentiae dicuntur, et in potentias, quae non ea ratione qua praedictae potentiae nomen habent, sed alia. Et has appellat aequivoce potentias. Sub primo membro comprehenduntur omnes potentiae activae, et passivae, et rationales, et irrationales. Quaecunque enim posse dicuntur per potentiam activam vel passivam quam habeant, eadem ratione potentiae sunt, quia scilicet est in eis vis principiata alicuius activae vel passivae. Sub secundo autem membro comprehenduntur potentiae mathematicales et logicales. Mathematica potentia est, qua lineam posse dicimus in quadratum, et eo quod in semetipsam ducta quadratum constituit. Logica potentia est, qua duo termini coniungi absque contradictione in enunciatione possunt. Sub logica quoque potentia continetur quae ea ratione potentia dicitur, quia est. Hae vero merito aequivoce a primis potentiae dicuntur, eo quod istae nullam virtutem activam vel passivam praedicant; et quod possibile istis modis dicitur, non ea ratione possibile appellatur quia aliquis habeat virtutem ad hoc agendum vel patiendum, sicut in primis. Unde cum potentiae habentes se ad opposita sint activae vel passivae, istae quae aequivocae potestates dicuntur ad opposita non se habent. De his ergo loquens ait: quaedam vero potestates aequivocae sunt, et ideo ad opposita non se habent. Aristotle now proposes to show in what way potencies that are called equivocal are related to opposites. He first explains the nature of this kind of potency, and then gives the difference and agreement all between these and the foresaid, where he says, This latter potentiality is only in that which is movable, but the former is also in the immovable, etc. In V and IX Metaphysicae [V, 12: 1019a 15; 12, 1: 1046a 4], Aristotle divides potency into those that are called potencies for the same reason, and those that have the name potency for another reason than the aforesaid potencies. The latter are named "potencies” equivocally. Under the first member are included all active and passive, rational and irrational potencies, for whatever are said to be possible through the active or passive potency they have, are potencies for the same reason, i.e., because there is in them the originative force of something active or passive. Mathematical and logical potencies are included under the second member of this division. That by which a line can lead to a square we call a mathematical potency, for a line constitutes a square when protracted back to itself. That by which two terms can be joined in an enunciation without contradiction is a logical potency. Logical potency also comprises that which is called "potency” because it is. The latter [mathematical and logical potencies] are named from the former equivocally because they predicate no active or passive capacity; and what is said to be possible in these ways is not termed possible in virtue of having the capacity to do or undergo as in the first case. Hence, since the potencies related to opposites are active or passive, the ones that are called potentialities equivocally are not related to opposites. These, then, are the potencies he speaks of when he says But some are called potentialities equivocally, and therefore they are not related to opposites. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 2Deinde declarans qualis sit ista potestas aequivoce dicta, subdit divisionem usitatam possibilis per quam hoc scitur, dicens: possibile enim non uno modo dicitur, sed duobus. Et uno quidem modo dicitur possibile eo quod verum est ut in actu, idest ut actualiter est; ut, possibile est ambulare, quando ambulat iam: et omnino, idest universaliter possibile est esse, quoniam est actu iam quod possibile dicitur. Secundo modo autem possibile dicitur aliquid non ea ratione quia est actualiter, sed quia forsitan aget, idest quia potest agere; ut possibile est ambulare, quoniam ambulabit. Ubi advertendum est quod ex divisione bimembri possibilis divisionem supra positam potentiae declaravit a posteriori. Possibile enim a potentia dicitur: sub primo siquidem membro possibilis innuit potentias aequivoce; sub secundo autem potentias univoce, activas scilicet et passivas. Intendebat ergo quod quia possibile dupliciter dicitur, quod etiam potestas duplex est. Declaravit autem potestates aequivocas ex uno earum membro tantum, scilicet ex his quae dicuntur possibilia quia sunt, quia hoc sat erat suo proposito. To clarify the kind of potency that is called equivocal, he gives the usual division of the possible through which this is known. "Possible,” he says, is not said in one way, but in two. Something is said to be possible because it is true as in act, i.e., inasmuch as it actually is; for example, it is possible to walk when one is already walking, and in gene eral, i.e., universally, that is said to be possible which is possible to be because it is already in act. Something is said to be possible in the second way, not because it actually is, but because it is about to act, i.e., because it can act; for instance, it is possible for someone to walk because be is about to walk. Notice here that by this two-membered division of the possible he makes the division of potency posited above evident a posteriori, for the possible is named from potency. Under the first member of the possible he signifies potencies equivocally; under the second, potencies univocally, i.e., active and passive potencies. He means to show, then, that since possible is said in two ways, potentiality is also twofold. He explains equivocal potentialities in terms of only one member, namely, those that are called possible because they are, since this was sufficient for his purpose. Cajetanus lib. Deinde cum dicit: et haec quidem etc., assignat differentiam inter utranque potentiam, et ait quod potentia haec ultimo dicta physica, est in solis illis rebus, quae sunt mobiles; illa autem est et in rebus mobilibus et immobilibus. Possibile siquidem a potentia dictum eo quod possit agere, non tamen agit, inveniri non potest absque mutabilitate eius, quod sic posse dicitur. Si enim nunc potest agere et non agit, si agere debet, oportet quod mPombaur de otio ad operationem. Id autem quod possibile dicitur eo quod est, nullam mutabilitatem exigit in eo quod sic possibile dicitur. Esse namque in actu, quod talem possibilitatem fundat, invenitur et in rebus necessariis, et in immutabilibus, et in rebus mobilibus. Possibile ergo hoc, quod logicum vocatur, communius est illo quod physicum appellari solet. When he says, This latter potentiality is only in that which is movable, but the former is also in the immovable, etc., he specifies the difference between each potency. This last potency, he says, [possible because it can be] which is called physical potency, is only in things that are movable; but the former is in movable and immovable things. The possible that is named from the potency which can act, but is not yet acting, cannot be found without the mutability of that which is said to be possible in this way. For if that which can act now and is not acting, should act, it is necessary that it be changed from rest to operation. On the other hand, that which is called possible because it is, requires no mutability in that which is said to be possible in this way, for to be in act, which is the basis of such a possibility, is found in necessary things, in immutable things, and in mobile things. Therefore, the possible which is called logical, is more common than the one we customarily call physical. Cajetanus lib. Deinde subdit convenientiam inter utrunque possibile, dicens quod in utrisque potestatibus et possibilibus verum est non impossibile esse, scilicet, ipsum ambulare, quod iam actu ambulat seu agit, et quod iam ambulabile est; idest, in hoc conveniunt quod, sive dicatur possibile ex eo quod actu est, sive ex eo quod potest esse, de utroque verificatur non impossibile; et consequenter necessario verificatur possibile, quoniam ad non impossibile sequitur possibile. Hoc est secundum genus possibilis, respectu cuius Aristoteles supra dixit: et primum quidem etc., in quo non invenitur via ad utrunque oppositorum, hoc, inquam, est possibile quod iam actu est. Quod enim tali ratione possibile dicitur, iam determinatum est ex eo quod actu esse suppositum est. Non ergo possibile omne ad utrunque possibile est, sive loquamur de possibili physice, sive logice.Then he shows that there is a correspondence between these possibles when he adds that not impossible to be is true of both of these potentialities and possibles, e.g., to walk is not impossible for that which is already walking in act, i.e., acting, and it is not impossible for that which could now walk; that is, they agree in that not impossible is verified of both—of either what is said to be possible from the fact that it is in act or of what is said to be possible from the fact that it could be. Consequently, the necessary is verified as possible, for possible follows upon not impossible. The possible that is already in act is the second genus of the possible in which access is not found to both opposites, of which Aristotle spoke when he said, First of all this is not true of the potentialities which are not according to reason, etc. For that which is said to be possible because it is already in act is already determined, since it is supposed as being in act. Therefore, not every possible is the possible of alternatives, whether we speak of the physical possible or the logical. Cajetanus lib. Deinde cum dicit: sic igitur possibile etc., applicat determinatam veritatem ad propositum. Et primo, concludendo ex dictis, declarat habitudinem utriusque possibilis ad necessarium, dicens quod hoc ergo possibile, scilicet physicum quod est in solis mobilibus, non est verum dicere et praedicare de necessario simpliciter: quia quod simpliciter necessarium est, non potest aliter esse. Possibile autem physicum potest sic et aliter esse, ut dictum est. Addit autem ly simpliciter, quoniam necessarium est multiplex. Quoddam enim est ad bene esse, quoddam ex suppositione: de quibus non est nostrum tractare, sed solummodo id insinuare. Quod ut praeservaret se ab illis modis necessarii qui non perfecte et omnino habent necessarii rationem, apposuit ly simpliciter. De tali enim necessario possibile physicum non verificatur. Alterum autem possibile logicum, quod in rebus immobilibus invenitur, verum est de illo enunciare, quoniam nihil necessitatis adimit. Et per hoc solvitur ratio inducta ad partem negativam quaestionis. Peccabat siquidem in hoc, quod ex necessario inferebat possibile ad utrunque quod convertitur in oppositam qualitatem. When he says, So it is not true to say the latter possible of what is necessary simply, etc., he applies the truth he has determined to what has been proposed. First, by way of a conclusion from what has been said, he shows the relationship of each possible to the necessary. So, he says, it is not true to say and predicate this possible, namely physical, which is only in mobile things, of the necessary simply, because what is necessary simply cannot be otherwise. The physical possible, however, can be thus and otherwise, as has been said. He adds "simply” because the necessary is manifold. There is the necessary for well-being and there is also the necessary from supposition, but it is not our business to treat these, only to indicate them. In order, then, to avoid the modes of the necessary that do not have the notion of the necessary perfectly and in every way, he adds "simply.” Now the physical possible is not verified of this kind of necessary [i.e., of the necessary simply], but it is true to enunciate the logical possible, the one found in immovable things, of the necessary, since it takes away nothing of the necessity. The argument introduced for the negative part of this question”’ is destroyed by this. The error in that argument was the inference—by way of conversion into the opposite quality—of the possible to both alternatives from the necessary. Cajetanus lib. Deinde respondet quaestioni formaliter intendens quod affirmativa pars quaestionis tenenda sit, quod scilicet ad necessarium sequitur possibile; et assignat causam. Quia ad partem subiectivam sequitur constructive suum totum universale; sed necessarium est pars subiectiva possibilis: quia possibile dividitur in logicum et physicum, et sub logico comprehenditur necessarium; ergo ad necessarium sequitur possibile. Unde dicit: quare, quoniam partem, scilicet subiectivam, suum totum universale sequitur, illud quod ex necessitate est, idest necessarium, tamquam partem subiectivam, consequitur posse esse, idest possibile, tamquam totum universale. Sed non omnino, idest sed non ita quod omnis species possibilis sequatur; sicut ad hominem sequitur animal, sed non omnino, idest non secundum omnes suas partes subiectivas sequitur ad hominem: non enim valet: est homo, ergo est animal irrationale. Et per hoc confirmata ratione adducta ad partem affirmativam, expressius solvit rationem adductam ad partem negativam, quae peccabat secundum fallaciam consequentis, inferens ex necessario possibile, descendendo ad unam possibilis speciem, ut de se patet. Then he replies to the question formally. He states that the affirmative part of the question must be held, namely, that the possible follows upon the necessary. Next, he assigns the cause. The whole universal follows constructively upon its subjective part; but the necessary is a subjective part of the possible, because the possible is divided into logical and physical and under the logical is comprehended the necessary; therefore, the possible follows upon the necessary. Hence he says, Therefore, since the universal follows upon the part, i.e., since the whole universal follows upon its subjective part, to be possible to be, i.e., possible, as the whole universal, follows upon that which necessarily is, i.e., necessary, as a subjective part. He adds: though not every kind of possible does, i.e., not every species of the possible follows; just as animal follows upon man, but not in every way, i.e., it does not follow upon man according to all its subjective parts, for it is not valid to say, "He is a man, therefore he is an irrational animal.” By this proof of the validity of the affirmative part, Aristotle has explicitly destroyed the reasoning adduced for the negative part, which, as is evident, erred according to the fallacy of the consequent in inferring the possible from the necessary by descending to one species of the possible. Cajetanus lib. Deinde cum dicit: et est fortasse quidem etc., ordinat easdem modalium consequentias alio situ, praeponendo necessarium omnibus aliis modis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, assignat causam dicti ordinis; ibi: manifestum est autem et cetera. Dicit ergo: et est fortasse principium omnium enunciationum modalium vel esse vel non esse, idest, affirmativarum vel negativarum, necessarium et non necessarium. Et oportet considerare alia, scilicet, possibile contingere et impossibile esse, sicut horum, scilicet, necessarii et non necessarii, consequentia, hoc modo: consequentiae enunciationum modalium secundum quatuor ordines alio convenienti situ ab Aristotele positae et ordinatae: (Figura). Vides autem hic nihil immutatum, nisi quod necessariae quae ultimum locum tenebant, primum sortitae sunt. Quod vero dixit fortasse, non dubitantis, sed absque determinata ratione rem proponentis est. When he says, Indeed the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of all that is or is not, etc., he disposes the same consequences of modals in another arrangement, placing the necessary before all the other modes. First he proposes the order of modals and then assigns the cause of the order where he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said that that which necessarily is, actually is, etc. Indeed, he says, the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of the "to be” or "not to be” of all modal enunciations, i.e., the necessary and not necessary is the principle of affirmatives or negatives. And the others, i.e., the possible, contingent, and impossible to be must be considered as consequent to these, i.e., to the necessary and not necessary. THE CONSEQUENTS OF MODAL ENUNCIATIONS ACCORDING TO THE FOUR ORDERS, POSITED AND DISPOSED BY ARISTOTLE IN ANOTHER APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENT FIRST ORDER It is necessary to be It is not possible not to be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be SECOND ORDER It is necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is not contingent to be It is impossible to be It is not necessary to be It is possible not to be It is contingent not to be It is not impossible not to be FOURTH ORDER It is not necessary not to be It is possible to be It is contingent to be It is not impossible to be Nothing is changed here except the enunciations predicating necessity. They have been allotted the first place, whereas in the former table they were placed last. When he says "may well be,” it is not because he is in any doubt, but because he is proposing this here without a determinate proof. 8. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autemetc., intendit assignare causam dicti ordinis. Et primo, assignat causam, quare praeposuerit necessarium possibili tali ratione. Sempiternum est prius temporali; sed necessarium dicit sempiternitatem (quia dicit esse in actu, excludendo omnem mutabilitatem, et consequenter temporalitatem, quae sine motu non est imaginabilis), possibile autem dicit temporalitatem (quia non excludit quin possit esse et non esse); ergo necesse merito prius ponitur quam possibile. Unde dicit, proponendo minorem: manifestum est autem ex his quae dicta sunt etc., tractando de necessario: quoniam id quod ex necessitate est, secundum actum est totaliter, scilicet quia omnem excludit mutabilitatem et potentiam ad oppositum: si enim mutari posset in oppositum aliquo modo, iam non esset necessarium. Deinde subdit maiorem per modum antecedentis conditionalis: quare si priora sunt sempiterna temporalibus et cetera. Ultimo ponit conclusionem: et quae actu sunt omnino, scilicet necessaria, priora sunt potestate, idest possibilibus, quae omnino actu esse non possunt, licet compatiantur. When he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said that that which necessarily is, actually is, etc., he gives the cause of this order. First he gives the reason for placing the necessary before the possible: the sempiternal is prior to the temporal; but "necessary” signifies sempiternal (because it signifies "to be in act,” excluding all mutability and consequently temporality, which is not imaginable without movement) and the possible signifies temporality (since it does not exclude the possibility of being and not being); therefore, the necessary is rightly placed before the possible. He proposes the minor of this argument when he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said in treating the necessary, that that which necessarily is, is totally in act, since it excludes all mutability and potency to the opposite—for if it could be changed into the opposite in any way, then it would not be necessary. Next he gives the major, which is in the mode of an antecedent conditional: and if eternal things are prior to temporal, etc. Finally, he posits the conclusion: those that are wholly in act in every way, namely necessary, are prior to the potential, i.e., to possibles, which do not have being in act wholly although they are compatible with it. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 12 n. 9Deinde cum dicit: et hae quidem etc., assignat causam totius ordinis a se inter modales statuti, tali ratione. Universi triplex est gradus. Quaedam sunt actu sine potestate, idest sine admixta potentia, ut primae substantiae, non illae quas in praesenti diximus primas, eo quod principaliter et maxime substent, sed illae quae sunt primae, quia omnium rerum sunt causae, intelligentiae scilicet. Alia sunt actu cum possibilitate, ut omnia mobilia, quae secundum id quod habent de actu sunt priora natura seipsis secundum id quod habent de potentia, licet e contra sit, aspiciendo ordinem temporis. Sunt enim secundum id quod habent de potentia priora tempore seipsis secundum id quod habent de actu. Verbi gratia, Socrates prius secundum tempus poterat esse philosophus, deinde fuit actualiter philosophus. Potentia ergo praecedit actum secundum ordinem temporis in Socrate, ordine autem naturae, perfectionis et dignitatis e converso contingit. Prior enim secundum dignitatem, idest dignior et perfectior habebatur Socrates cum philosophus actualiter erat, quam cum philosophus esse poterat. Praeposterus est igitur ordo potentiae et actus in unomet, utroque ordine, scilicet, naturae et temporis attento. Alia vero nunquam sunt actu sed potestate tantum, ut motus, tempus, infinita divisio magnitudinis, et infinita augmentatio numeri. Haec enim, ut IX Metaphys. dicitur, nunquam exeunt in actum, quoniam eorum rationi repugnat. Nunquam enim aliquid horum ita est quin aliquid eius expectetur, et consequenter nunquam esse potest nisi in potentia. Sed de his alio tractandum est loco. Then he says, Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary substances, etc. Here he assigns the cause of the whole order established among modals. The grades of the universe are threefold. Some things are in act without potentiality, i.e., not combined with potency. These are the primary substances—not those we have called "first” in the present work because they principally and especially sustain—but those that are first because they are the causes of all things, namely, the Intelligences. In others, act is accompanied with possibility, as is the case with all mobile things, which, according to what they have of act, are prior in nature to themselves according to what they have of potency, although the contrary is the case in regard to the order of time. According to what they have of potency they are prior in time to themselves according to what they have of act. For example, according to time, Socrates first was able to be a philosopher, then he actually was a philosopher. In Socrates therefore, potency precedes act according to the order of time. The converse is the case, however, in the order of nature, perfection, and dignity, for when he actually was a philosopher, Socrates was regarded as prior according to dignity, i.e., more worthy and more perfect than when he was potentially a philosopher. Hence, when we consider each order, i.e., nature and time, in one and the same thing, the order of potency and act is reversed. Others never are in act but are only in potency, e.g., motion, time, the infinite division of magnitude, and the infinite augmentation of number. These, as is said in IX Metaphysicae, never terminate in act, for it is repugnant to their nature. None of them is ever such that something of it is not expected, and consequently they can only be in potency. These, however, must be treated in another place. Cajetanus lib. Nunc haec ideo dicta sint ut, inspecto ordine universi, appareat quod illum imitati sumus in nostro ordine. Posuimus siquidem primo necessarium, quod sonat actu esse sine potestate seu mutabilitate, imitando primum gradum universi. Locavimus secundo loco possibile et contingens, quorum utrunque sonat actum cum possibilitate, et sic servatur conformitas ad secundum gradum universi. Praeposuimus autem possibile et non contingens, quia possibile respicit actum, contingens autem secundum vim nominis respicit defectum causae, qui ad potentiam pertinet: defectus enim potentiam sequitur; et ex hoc conforme est secundae parti universi, in qua actus est prior potentia secundum naturam, licet non secundum tempus. Ultimum autem locum impossibili reservavimus, eo quod sonat nunquam fore, sicut et ultima universi pars dicta est illa, quae nunquam actu est. Pulcherrimus igitur ordo statutus est, quando divinus est observatus. This has been said so that once the order of the universe has been seen it should appear that we were imitating it in our present ordering. The necessary, which signifies "to be in act” without potentiality or mutability, has been placed first, in imitation of the first grade of the universe. We have put the possible and contingent, both of which signify act with possibility, in second place in conformity with the second grade of the universe. The possible has been Placed before the contingent because the possible relates to act whereas the contingent, as the force of the name suggests, relates to the defect of a cause-which pertains to potency, for defect follows upon potency. The order of these is similar to the order in the second part of the universe, where act is prior to potency according to nature, though not according to time. We have reserved the last place for the impossible because it signifies what never will be, just as the last part of the universe is said to be that which is never in act. Thus, a beautifully proportioned order is established when the divine is observed. Cajetanus lib. Quia autem suppositae modalium consequentiae nil aliud sunt quam aequipollentiae earum, quae ob varium negationis situm, qualitatem, vel quantitatem, vel utranque mutantis, fiunt; ideo ad completam notitiam consequentium se modalium, de earum qualitate et quantitate pauca admodum necessaria dicenda sunt. Quoniam igitur natura totius ex partium naturis consurgit, sciendum est quod subiectum enunciationis modalis et dicit esse vel non esse, et est dictum unicum, et continet in se subiectum dicti; praedicatum autem modalis enunciationis, modus scilicet, et totale praedicatum est (quia explicite vel implicite verbum continet, quod est semper nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur: propter quod Aristoteles dixit quod modus est ipsa appositio), et continet in se vim distributivam secundum partes temporis. Necessarium enim et impossibile distribuunt in omne tempus vel simpliciter vel tale; possibile autem et contingens pro aliquo tempore in communi. Since the consequents of modals, i.e., those placed under each other, are their equivalents in meaning, and these are produced by the varying position of the negation changing the quality or quantity or both, a few things must be said about their quality and quantity to complete our knowledge of them. The nature of the whole arises from the parts, and therefore we should note the following things about the parts of the modal enunciation. The subject of the modal enunciation asserts to be or not to be, and is a singular dictum, and contains in itself the subject of the dictum. The predicate of a modal enunciation, namely, the mode, is the total predicate (since it explicitly or implicitly contains the verb, which is always a sign of something predicated of another, for which reason Aristotle says that the mode is a determining addition) and contains in itself distributive force according to the parts of time. The necessary and impossible distribute in all time either simply or in a limited way; the possible and contingent distribute according to some time commonly. Cajetanus lib. Nascitur autem ex his quinque conditionibus duplex in qualibet modali qualitas, et triplex quantitas. Ex eo enim quod tam subiectum quam praedicatum modalis verbum in se habet, duplex qualitas fit, quarum altera vocatur qualitas dicti, altera qualitas modi. Unde et supra dictum est aliquam esse affirmativam de modo et non de dicto, et e converso. Ex eo vero quod subiectum modalis continet in se subiectum dicti, una quantitas consurgit, quae vocatur quantitas subiecti dicti: et haec distinguitur in universalem, particularem et singularem, sicut et quantitas illarum de inesse. Possumus enim dicere, Socratem, quemdam hominem, vel omnem hominem, vel nullum hominem, possibile est currere. Ex eo autem quod subiectum unius modalis dictum unum est, consurgit alia quantitas, vocata quantitas dicti; et haec unica est singularitas: secundum omne enim dictum cuiusque modalis singulare est istius universalis, scilicet dictum. Quod ex eo liquet quod cum dicimus, hominem esse album est possibile, exponitur sic, hoc dictum, hominem esse album, est possibile. Hoc dictum autem singulare est, sicut et, hic homo. Propterea et dicitur quod omnis modalis est singularis quoad dictum, licet quoad subiectum dicti sit universalis vel particularis. Ex eo autem quod praedicatum modalis, modus scilicet, vim distributivam habet, alia quantitas consurgit vocata quantitas modi seu modalis; et haec distinguitur in universalem et particularem. As a consequence of these five conditions there is a twofold quality and a threefold quantity in any modal. The twofold quality results from the fact that both the subject and the predicate of a modal have a verb in them. One of these is called the quality of the dictum, the other the quality of the mode. This is why it was said above that there is an enunciation which is affirmative of mode and not of dictum, and conversely. Of the threefold quantity of a modal enunciation, one arises from the fact that the subject of the modal contains in it the subject of the dictum. This is called the quantity of the subject of the dictum, and is distinguished into universal, particular, and singular, as in the case of the quantity of an absolute enunciation. For we can say: "That ‘Socrates,’ ‘some man,’ ‘every man,”’ or "‘no man,’ run is possible’ " The second quantity is that of the dictum, which arises from the fact that the subject of one modal is one dictum. This is a unique singularity, for every dictum of a modal is the singular of that universal, i.e.,dictum. "That man be white is possible” means "This dictum, ‘that man be white,’ is possible.” "This dictum” is singular in quantity, just as "this man” is. Hence, every modal is singular with respect to dictum, although with respect to the subject of the dictum it is universal or particular. The third quantity is that of the mode, or modal quantity, which arises from the fact that the predicate of the modal, i.e., the mode, has distributive force. This is distinguished into universal and particular. Cajetanus lib. Ubi diligenter duo attendenda sunt. Primum est quod hoc est singulare in modalibus, quod praedicatum simpliciter quantificat propositionem modalem, sicut et simpliciter qualificat. Sicut enim illa est simpliciter affirmativa, in qua modus affirmatur, et illa negativa, in qua modus negatur; ita illa est simpliciter universalis cuius modus est universalis, et illa particularis cuius modus est particularis. Et hoc quia modalis modi naturam sequitur. Secundum attendendum (quod est causa istius primi) est, quod praedicatum modalis, scilicet modus, non habet solam habitudinem praedicati respectu sui subiecti, scilicet esse et non esse, sed habitudinem syncategorematis distributivi, sed non secundum quantitatem partium subiectivarum ipsius subiecti, sed secundum quantitatem partium temporis eiusdem. Et merito. Sicut enim quia subiecti enunciationis de inesse propria quantitas est penes divisionem vel indivisionem ipsius subiecti (quia est nomen quod significat per modum substantiae, cuius quantitas est per divisionem continui: ideo signum quantificans in illis distribuit secundum partes subiectivas), ita quia subiecti enunciationis modalis propria quantitas est tempus (quia est verbum quod significat per modum motus, cuius propria quantitas est tempus), ideo modus quantificans distribuit ipsum suum subiectum, scilicet, esse vel non esse, secundum partes temporis. Unde subtiliter inspicienti apparebit quod quantitas ista modalis proprii subiecti modalis enunciationis quantitas est, scilicet, ipsius esse vel non esse. Ita quod illa modalis est simpliciter universalis, cuius proprium subiectum distribuitur pro omni tempore: vel simpliciter, ut, hominem esse animal est necessarium vel impossibile; vel accepto, ut, hominem currere hodie, vel, dum currit, est necessarium vel impossibile. Illa vero est particularis, in qua non pro omni, sed aliquo tempore distributio fit in communi tantum; ut, hominem esse animal, est possibile vel contingens. Est ergo et ista modalis quantitas subiecti sui passio (sicut et universaliter quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae), sed derivatur a modo, non in quantum praedicatum est (quod, ut sic, tenetur formaliter), sed in quantum syncategorematis officio fungitur, quod habet ex eo quod proprie modus est. Now, there are two things about modal enunciations that must be carefully noted. The first—which is peculiar to modals—is that the predicate quantifies the modal proposition simply, as it also qualifies it simply. For just as the modal enunciation in which the mode is affirmed is affirmative simply, and negative when the mode is negated, so the modal enunciation in which the mode is universal is universal simply and particular in which the mode is particular. The reason for this is that the modal follows the nature of the mode. The second thing to be noted (which is the cause of the first) is that the predicate of a modal, i.e., the mode, not only has the relationship of a predicate to its subject (i.e., to "to be” and "not to be”), but also has the relationship to the subject, of a distributive syncategorematic term, which has the effect of distributing the subject, not according to the quantity of its subjective parts, but according to the quantity of the parts of its time. And rightly so, for just as the proper quantity of the subject of an absolute enunciation varies according to the division or lack of division of its subject (since the subject is a name which signifies in the mode of substance, whose quantity is from the division of the continuous, and therefore the quantifying sign distributes according to the subjective parts), so, because the proper quantity of the subject of a modal enunciation is time (since the subject is a verb, which signifies in the mode of movement, whose proper quantity is time), the quantifying mode distributes the subject, i.e., "to be” or "not to be” according to the parts of time. Hence, we arrive at the subtle point that the quantity of the modal is the quantity of the proper subject of the modal enunciation, namely, of "to be” or "not to be.” Therefore, a modal enunciation is universal simply when the proper subject is distributed throughout all time, either simply, as in "That man is an animal is necessary or impossible,” or taken in a limited way, as in "That man is running today,” or "while he is running, is necessary or impossible.” A modal enunciation is particular in which "to be” or "not to be” is distributed, not throughout all time, but commonly throughout some time, as in "That man is an animal is possible or contingent.” This modal quantity is therefore also a property of its subject (in that, universally, quantity comes from the matter) but is derived from the mode, not insofar as it is a predicate (because, as such, it is understood formally), but insofar as it performs a syncategorematic function, which it has in virtue of the fact that it is properly a mode. Cajetanus lib. Sunt igitur modalium (de propria earum quantitate loquendo) aliae universales affirmativae, ut illae de necessario, quia distribuunt ad semper esse; aliae universales negativae, ut illae de impossibili, quia distribuunt ad nunquam esse; aliae particulares affirmativae, ut illae de possibili et contingenti, quia distribuunt utrunque ad aliquando esse; aliae particulares negativae, ut illae de non necesse et non impossibili, quia distribuunt ad aliquando non esse: sicut in illis de inesse, omnis, nullus, quidam, non omnis, non nullus, similem faciunt diversitatem. Et quia, ut dictum est, haec quantitas modalium est inquantum modales sunt, et de his, inquantum huiusmodi, praesens tractatus fit ab Aristotele; idcirco aequipollentiae, seu consequentiae earum, ordinatae sunt negationis vario situ, quemadmodum aequipollentiae illarum de inesse: ut scilicet, negatio praeposita modo faciat aequipollere suae contradictoriae; negatio autem modo postposita, posita autem dicti verbo, suae aequipollere contrariae facit; praeposita vero et postposita suae subalternae, ut videre potes in consequentiarum figura ultimo ab Aristotele formata. In qua, tali praeformata oppositionum figura, clare videbis omnes se mutuo consequentes, secundum alteram trium regularum aequipollere, et consequenter, totum primum ordinem secundo contrarium, tertio contradictorium, quarto vero subalternum. (Figura). Therefore, with respect to their proper quantity, some modals are universal affirmatives, i.e., those of the necessary because they distribute "to be” to all time. Others are universal negatives, i.e., those of the impossible because they distribute "to be” to no time. Still others are particular affirmatives, i.e., those signifying the possible and contingent, for both of these distribute "to be” to some time. Finally, there are particular negatives, i.e., those of the not necessary and not impossible, for they distribute "not to be” to some time. This is similar to the diversity in absolute enunciations from the use of "every,” "no” "some,” not all,” and "not none.” Now, since this quantity belongs to modals insofar as they are modals, as has been said, and since Aristotle is now considering them in this particular respect, the modal enunciations that are equivalent, i.e., their consequents, are ordered by the different location of the negation, as is the case with absolute enunciations that are equivalent. A negative placed before the mode makes an enunciation equivalent to its contradictory; placed after the mode, i.e., with the verb of the dictum, makes it equivalent to its contrary; placed before and after the mode makes it equivalent to its subaltern, as you can see in the last table of consequents given by Aristotle. In that table of oppositions, you see all the mutual consequents, according to one of the three rules for making enunciations equivalent. Consequently, the whole first order of equivalent enunciations is contrary to the second, contradictory to the third, and the fourth is subalternated to it. Necessary to be - contraries - Impossible to be subalterns subalterns Possible to be - subcontraries - Contingent not to be TABLE OF OPPOSITION OF EQUIPOLLENT MODALS This table is not Cajetan’s but is a full arrangement of the orders of modal enunciations asdeveloped in this lesson. Close I Universal Affirmatives It is necessary to be It is not possible not to be It is not contingent not to be It is impossible not to be contraries II Universal Negatives It is necessary not to be It is not possible to be It is not contingent to be It is impossible to be subalterns subalterns IV Particular Affirmatives It is not necessary not to be It is possible to be It is contingent to be It is not impossible to be subcontraries III Particular Negatives It is not necessary to be It is possible not to be It is contingent not to be It is not impossible not to be. XIII. 1 Postquam determinatum est de enunciatione secundum quod diversificatur tam ex additione facta ad terminos, quam ad compositionem eius, hic secundum divisionem a s. Thoma in principio huius secundi factam, intendit Aristoteles tractare quandam quaestionem circa oppositiones enunciationum provenientes ex eo quod additur aliquid simplici enunciationi. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, movet quaestionem secundo, declarat quod haec quaestio dependet ab una alia quaestione praetractanda; ibi: nam si ea, quae sunt in voce etc.; tertio, determinat illam aliam quaestionem; ibi: nam arbitrari etc.; quarto, redit ad respondendum quaestioni primo motae; ibi: quare si in opinione et cetera. Quaestio quam movere intendit est: utrum affirmativae enunciationi contraria sit negatio eiusdem praedicati, an affirmatio de praedicato contrario seu privativo? Unde dicit: utrum contraria est affirmatio negationi contradictoriae, scilicet, et universaliter oratio affirmativa orationi negativae; ut, affirmativa oratio quae dicit, omnis homo est iustus, illi contraria sit orationi negativae, nullus homo est iustus, aut illi, omnis homo est iniustus, quae est affirmativa de praedicato privativo? Et similiter ista affirmatio, Callias est iustus, est ne contraria illi contradictoriae negationi, Callias non est iustus, aut illi, Callias est iniustus, quae est affirmativa de praedicato privativo? Now that he has treated the enunciation as it is diversified by an addition made to the terms and by an addition made to its composition (which is the division of the text made by St. Thomas at the beginning of the second book), Aristotle takes up another question about oppositions of enunciations. This question concerns the oppositions that result from something added to the simple enunciation. First he asks the question; secondly, he shows that this question depends upon another, which must be treated first, where he says, For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect, etc.; third, he settles the latter question where he says, It is false, course, to suppose that opinions are to be defined as contrary because they are about contraries, etc.; finally, he replies to the first question where he says, If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, etc. The first question he raises is this: is the contrary of an affirmative enunciation the negation of the same predicate or the affirmation of a contrary or privative predicate? Hence he says, There is a question as to whether the contrary of an affirmation is the contradictory negation, and universally, whether affirmative speech is contrary to negative speech. For instance, is affirmative speech which says "Every man is just,” contrary to negative speech which says "No man is just,” or to the affirmative of the privative predicate, "Every man is unjust”? And similarly, is the affirmation "Callias is just” contrary to the contradictory negation, "Callias is not just” or is it contrary to "Callias is unjust,” the affirmative of the privative predicate? Cajetanus lib. Ad evidentiam tituli huius quaestionis, quia hactenus indiscusse ab aliis est relictus, considerare oportet quod cum in enunciatione sint duo, scilicet ipsa enunciatio seu significatio et modus enunciandi seu significandi, duplex inter enunciationes fieri potest oppositio, una ratione ipsius enunciationis, altera ratione modi enunciandi. Si modos enunciandi attendimus, duas species oppositionis in latitudine enunciationum inveniemus, contrarietatem scilicet et contradictionem. Divisae enim superius sunt enunciationes oppositae in contrarias et contradictorias. Contradictio inter enunciationes ratione modi enunciandi est quando idem praedicatur de eodem subiecto contradictorio modo enunciandi; ut sicut unum contradictorium nil ponit, sed alterum tantum destruit, ita una enunciatio nil asserit, sed id tantum quod altera enunciabat destruit. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnes quae contradictoriae vocantur, scilicet, omnis homo est iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, Socrates est iustus, Socrates non est iustus, ut de se patet. Et ex hoc provenit quod non possunt simul verae aut falsae esse, sicut nec duo contradictoria. Contrarietas vero inter enunciationes ratione modi enunciandi est quando idem praedicatur de eodem subiecto contrario modo enunciandi; ut sicut unum contrariorum ponit materiam sibi et reliquo communem in extrema distantia sub illo genere, ut patet de albo et nigro, ita una enunciatio ponit subiectum commune sibi et suae oppositae in extrema distantia sub illo praedicato. Huiusmodi quoque sunt omnes illae quae contrariae in figura appellantur, scilicet, omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo non est iustus. Hae enim faciunt subiectum, scilicet hominem, maxime distare sub iustitia, dum illa enunciat iustitiam inesse homini, non quocunque modo, sed universaliter; ista autem enunciat iustitiam abesse homini, non qualitercunque, sed universaliter. Maior enim distantia esse non potest quam ea, quae est inter totam universitatem habere aliquid et nullum de universitate habere illud. Et ex hoc provenit quod non possunt esse simul verae, sicut nec contraria possunt eidem simul inesse; et quod possunt esse simul falsae, sicut et contraria simul non inesse eidem possunt. Si vero ipsam enunciationem sive eius significationem attendamus secundum unam tantum oppositionis speciem, in tota latitudine enunciationum reperiemus contrarietatem, scilicet secundum veritatem et falsitatem: quia duarum enunciationum significationes entia positiva sunt, ac per hoc neque contradictorie neque privative opponi possunt, quia utriusque oppositionis alterum extremum est formaliter non ens. Et cum nec relative opponantur, ut clarum est, restat ut nonnisi contrarie opponi possunt. Since this question has not been discussed by others, we must begin by noting that there are two things in an enunciation, namely, the enunciation itself, i.e., the signification, and the mode of enunciating or signifying. Hence, a twofold opposition can be made between enunciations, one by reason of the enunciation itself, the other by reason of the mode of enunciating. If we consider the modes of enunciating, we find two species of opposition among enunciations, namely, contrariety and contradiction. This point was made earlier when opposed enunciations were divided into contraries and contradictories. There is contradiction by reason of mode of enunciating when the same thing is predicated of the same subject in a contradictory mode; so that just as one of a pair of contradictories posits nothing but only destroys the other, so one enunciation 4 asserts nothing, but only destroys what the other was enunciating. All enunciations that are called contradictories are of this kind; e.g., "Every man is just,” "Not every man is just”; "Socrates is just,” "Socrates is not just.” It follows from this that they cannot be at once true or false, just as two contradictories cannot be at once. There is contrariety between enunciations by reason of mode of enunciating when the same thing is predicated of the same subject in a contrary mode of enunciating; so that just as one of a pair of contraries posits matter common to itself and to the other which is at the extreme distance under that genus—as is evident for instance in white and black—so one enunciation posits a subject common to itself and its opposite at the extreme distance under that predicate. All the enunciations in the diagram that are called contrary are of this kind, for example, "Every man is just,” "No man is just.” These make the subject "man” distant to the greatest degree possible under justice, one enunciating justice to be in man, not in any way, but universally, the other enunciating justice to be absent from man, not in any way, but universally. For no distance can be greater than the distance between the total number of things having something and none of the total number of things having that thing. It follows that contrary enunciations cannot be at once true, just as contraries cannot be in the same thing at once. They can, however, be false at the same time, just as it is possible that contraries not be in the same thing at the same time. If we consider the enunciation itself (viz., its signification) according to only one species of opposition, we will find in the whole range of enunciations an opposition of contrariety, i.e., an opposition according to truth and falsity. The reason for this is that the significations of two enunciations are positive, and accordingly cannot be opposed either contradictorily or privatively because the other extreme of both of these oppositions is formally non-being. And since significations are not opposed relatively, as is evident, the only way they can be opposed is contrarily. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 13 n. 3Consistit autem ista contrarietas in hoc quod duarum enunciationum altera alteram non compatitur vel in veritate vel in falsitate, praesuppositis semper conditionibus contrariorum, scilicet quod fiant circa idem et in eodem tempore. Patere quoque potest talem oppositionem esse contrarietatem ex natura conceptionum animae componentis et dividentis, quarum singulae sunt enunciationes. Conceptiones siquidem animae adaequatae nullo alio modo opponuntur conceptionibus inadaequatis nisi contrarie, et ipsae conceptiones inadaequatae, si se mutuo expellunt, contrariae quoque dicuntur. Unde verum et falsum, contrarie opponi probatur a s. Thoma in I parte, qu. 17. Sicut ergo hic, ita et in enunciationibus ipsae significationes adaequatae contrarie opponuntur inadaequatis, idest verae falsis; et ipsae inadaequatae, idest falsae, contrarie quoque opponuntur inter se, si contingat quod se non compatiantur, salvis semper contrariorum conditionibus. Est igitur in enunciationibus duplex contrarietas, una ratione modi, altera ratione significationis, et unica contradictio, scilicet ratione modi. Et, ut confusio vitetur, prima contrarietas vocetur contrarietas modalis, secunda contrarietas formalis. Contradictio autem non ad confusionis vitationem quia unica est, sed ad proprietatis expressionem contradictio modalis vocari potest. Invenitur autem contrarietas formalis enunciationum inter omnes contradictorias, quia contradictoriarum altera alteram semper excludit; et inter omnes contrarias modaliter quoad veritatem, quia non possunt esse simul verae, licet non inveniatur inter omnes quoad falsitatem, quia possunt esse simul falsae. The contrariety spoken of here consists in this: of two enunciations one is not compatible with the other either in truth or falsity—presupposing always the conditions for contraries, that they are about the same thing and at once. It can be shown that such opposition is contrariety from the nature of the conceptions of the soul when composing and dividing, each of which is an enunciation. Adequate conceptions of the soul are opposed to inadequate conceptions only contrarily, and inadequate conceptions, if each cancels the other, are also called contraries. It is from this that St. Thomas proves, in [Summa theologiae] part I, question 17, that the true and false are contrarily opposed. Therefore, as in the conceptions of the soul, so in enunciations, adequate significations are contrarily opposed to inadequate, i.e., true to false; and the inadequate, i.e., the false, are also contrarily opposed among themselves if it happens that they are not compatible, supposing always the conditions for contraries. There is, therefore, in enunciations a twofold contrariety, one by reason of mode, the other by reason of signification, and only one contradiction, that by reason of mode. To avoid confusion, let us call the first contrariety modal and the second formal. We may call contradiction modal—not to avoid confusion since it is unique—but for propriety of expression. Formal contrariety is found between all contradictory enunciations, since one contradictory always excludes the other. It is also found between all modally contrary enunciations in regard to truth, since they cannot be at once true. However it is not found between the latter in regard to falsity, since they can be at once false. Cajetanus lib. Quia igitur Aristoteles in hac quaestione loquitur de contrarietate enunciationum quae se extendit ad contrarias modaliter, et contradictorias, ut patet in principio et in fine quaestionis (in principio quidem, quia proponit utrasque contradictorias dicens: affirmatio negationi etc.; et contrarias modaliter dicens: et oratio orationi etc., unde et exempla utrarunque statim subdit, ut patet in littera. In fine vero, quia ibi expresse quam conclusit esse contrariam affirmativae universali verae dividit, in contrariam modaliter universalem negativam, scilicet, et contradictoriam: quae divisio falsitate non careret, nisi conclusisset contrariam formaliter, ut de se patet), quia, inquam, sic accipit contrarietatem, ideo de contrarietate formali enunciationum quaestio intelligenda est. Et est quaestio valde subtilis, necessaria et adhuc nullo modo superius tacta. Est igitur titulus quaestionis; utrum affirmativae verae contraria formaliter sit negativa falsa eiusdem praedicati, aut affirmativa falsa de praedicato, vel contrario? Et sic patet quis sit sensus tituli, et quare non movet quaestionem de quacunque alia oppositione enunciationum (quia scilicet nulla alia in eis formaliter invenitur), et quod accipit contrarietatem proprie et strictissime, licet talis contrarietas inveniatur inter contradictorias modaliter et contrarias modaliter. Dictum vero fuit a s. Thoma provenire hanc dubitationem ex eo quod additur aliquid simplici enunciationi, quia si tantum simplices, idest, de secundo adiacente enunciationes attendantur, non habet haec quaestio radicem. Quia autem simplici enunciationi, idest subiecto et verbo substantivo, additur aliquid, scilicet praedicatum, nascitur dubitatio circa oppositionem, an illud additum in contrariis debeat esse illudmet praedicatum, negatione apposita verbo, an debeat esse praedicatum contrarium seu privativum, absque negatione praeposita verbo. Aristotle in this question is speaking of the contrariety of enunciations that extends to contraries modally and to contradictories. This is evident from what he says in the beginning and at the end of the question. In the beginning, he proposes both contradictories when he says, an affirmation... to a negation, etc.; and contraries modally, when he says, and in the case of speech whether the one saying... is opposed to the one saying... etc. It is evident, too, from the examples immediately added. At the end, he explicitly divides what he has concluded to be contrary to a true universal affirmative, into the modally contrary universal negative and the contradictory. It is clear at once that this division would be false unless it comprised the contrary formally. Since he takes contrariety in this way the question must be understood with respect to formal contrariety of enunciations. This is a very subtle question and one that has to be treated and has not been thus far. The question, therefore, is this: whether the formal contrary of the true affirmative is the false negative of the same predicate or the false affirmative of the privative predicate, i.e., of the contrary. The meaning of the question is now clear, and it is evident why he does not ask about any other oppositions of enunciations-no other opposition is found in them formally. It is also evident that he is taking contrariety properly and strictly, notwithstanding the fact that such contrariety is found among contradictories modally and contraries modally. St. Thomas has already pointed out that this question arises from the fact that something is added to the simple enunciation, for as it far as simple enunciations are concerned, i.e., those with only a second determinant, there is no occasion for the question. When, however, something is added, namely a predicate, to the simple enunciation, i.e., to the subject and the substantive verb, the question arises as to whether what ought to be added in contrary enunciations is the selfsame predicate with a negation added to the verb or a contrary, i.e., privative, predicate without a negation added to the verb. 5. Deinde cum dicit: nam siea etc., declarat unde sumenda sit decisio huius quaestionis. Et duo facit: quia primo declarat quod haec quaestio dependet ex una alia quaestione, ex illa scilicet: utrum opinio, idest conceptio animae, in secunda operatione intellectus, vera, contraria sit opinioni falsae negativae eiusdem praedicati, an falsae affirmativae contrarii sive privativi. Et assignat causam, quare illa quaestio dependet ex ista, quia scilicet enunciationes vocales sequuntur mentales, ut effectus adaequati causas proprias, et ut significata signa adaequata, et consequenter similis est in hoc utraque natura. Unde inchoans ab hac causa ait: nam si ea quae sunt in voce sequuntur ea, quae sunt in anima, ut dictum est in principio I libri, et illic, idest in anima, opinio contrarii praedicati circa idem subiectum est contraria illi alteri, quae affirmat reliquum contrarium de eodem (cuiusmodi sunt istae mentales enunciationes, omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo est iniustus); si ita inquam est, etiam et in his affirmationibus quae sunt in voce, idest vocaliter sumptis, necesse est similiter se habere, ut scilicet sint contrariae duae affirmativae de eodem subiecto et praedicatis contrariis. Quod si neque illic, idest in anima, opinatio contrarii praedicati, contrarietatem inter mentales enunciationes constituit, nec affirmatio vocalis affirmationi vocali contraria erit de contrario praedicato, sed magis affirmationi contraria erit negatio eiusdem praedicati. When Aristotle says, For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect, etc.; he shows where we have to begin in order to settle this question. First he shows that the question depends on another question, namely, whether a true opinion (i.e., a conception of the soul in the second operation of the intellect) is contrary to a false negative opinion of the same predicate, or to a false affirmative of the contrary, i.e., privative, predicate. Then he gives the reason why the former question depends on this. Vocal enunciations follow upon mental as adequate effects upon proper causes and as the signified upon adequate signs. So, in this the nature of each is similar. He begins, then, with the reason for this dependence: For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect (as was said in the beginning of the first book) and if in the soul, those opinions are contrary which affirm contrary predicates about the same subject, (for example, the mental enunciations, "Every man is just, "Every man is unjust”), then in affirmations that are in vocal sound, the case must be the same. The contraries will be two affirmatives about the same subject with contrary predicates. But if in the soul this is not the case, i.e., that opinions with contrary predicates constitute contrariety in mental enunciations, then the contrary of a vocal affirmation will not be a vocal affirmation with a contrary predicate. Rather, the contrary of an affirmation will be the negation of the same predicate. Cajetanus lib. Dependet ergo mota quaestio ex ista alia sicut effectus ex causa. Propterea et concludendo addit secundum, quod scilicet de hac quaestione prius tractandum est, ut ex causa cognita effectus innotescat dicens: quare considerandum est, opinio vera cui opinioni falsae contraria est: utrum negationi falsae an certe ei affirmationi falsae, quae contrarium esse opinatur. Et ut exemplariter proponatur, dico hoc modo: sunt tres opiniones de bono, puta vita: quaedam enim est ipsius boni opinio vera, quoniam bonum est, puta, quod vita sit bona; alia vero falsa negativa, scilicet, quoniam bonum non est, puta, quod vita non sit bona; alia item falsa affirmativa contrarii, scilicet, quoniam malum est, puta, quod vita sit mala. Quaeritur ergo quae harum falsarum contraria est verae? The first question, then, depends on this question as an effect upon its cause. For this reason, and by way of a conclusion to what he has just been saying, he adds the second question, which must be treated first so that once the cause is known the effect will be known: We must therefore consider to which false opinion the true opinion is contrary, whether it is to the false negation or to the false affirmation that it is to be judged contrary. Then in order to propose the question by examples he says: what I mean is this; there are three opinions of a good, for instance, of life. One is a true opinion, that it is good, for instance, that life is good. The other is a false negative, that it is not good, for instance, that life is not good. Still another, likewise false, is the affirmative of the contrary, that it is evil, for instance, that life is evil. The question is, then, which of these false opinions is contrary to the true one. Cajetanus lib. Quod autem subdidit: et si est una, secundum quam contraria est, tripliciter legi potest. Primo, dubitative, ut sit pars quaestionis; et tunc est sensus: quaeritur quae harum falsarum contraria est verae: et simul quaeritur, si est tantum una harum falsarum secundum quam fiat contraria ipsi verae: quia cum unum uni sit contrarium, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae, quaerendo quae harum sit contraria, quaeremus etiam an una earum sit contraria. Alio modo, potest legi adversative, ut sit sensus: quaeritur quae harum sit contraria; quamquam sciamus quod non utraque sed una earum est secundum quam fit contrarietas. Tertio modo, potest legi dividendo hanc particulam, et si est una, ab illa sequenti, secundum quam contraria est; et tunc prima pars expressive, secunda vero dubitative legitur; et est sensus: quaeritur quae harum falsarum contraria est verae, non solum si istae duae falsae inter se differunt in consequendo, sed etiam si utraque est una, idest alteri indivisibiliter unita, quaeritur secundum quam fit contrarietas. Et hoc modo exponit Boethius, dicens quod Aristoteles apposuit haec verba propter contraria immediata, in quibus non differt contrarium a privativo. Inter contraria enim mediata et immediata haec est differentia, quod in immediatis a privativo contrarium non infertur. Non enim valet, corpus colorabile est non album, ergo est nigrum: potest enim esse rubrum. In immediatis autem valet; verbi gratia: animal est non sanum, ergo infirmum; numerus est non par, ergo impar. Voluit ergo Aristoteles exprimere quod nunc, cum quaerimus quae harum falsarum, scilicet negativae et affirmativae contrarii, sit contraria affirmativae verae, quaerimus universaliter sive illae duae falsae indivisibiliter se sequantur, sive non. Then he adds, the question, and if there is one, is either one the contrary. This passage can be read in three ways. It can be read inquiringly so that it is a part of the question, and then the meaning is: which of these false opinions is contrary to the true opinion, and, is there one of these by which the contrary to the true one is effected? For since one is contrary to one other, as is said in X Metaphysicae, in asking which of these is the contrary we are also asking whether one of them is the contrary. This can also be read adversatively, and then the meaning is: which of these is the contrary, given that we know it is not both but one by which the contrariety is effected? This can be read in a third way by dividing the first clause, "and if it is one” from the second clause, "is either one the contrary.” The first part is then read assertively, the second inquiringly, and the meaning is: which of these two false opinions is contrary to the true opinion if the two false opinions differ as to consequence, and also if both are one, i.e., united to each other indivisibly? Boethius explains this passage in the last way. He says that Aristotle adds these words because of immediate contraries in which the contrary does not differ from the privative. For the difference between mediate and immediate contraries is that in the former the contrary is not inferred from the privative. For example, this is not valid: "A colored body is not white, therefore it is black”—for it could be red. In immediate contraries, on the other hand, it is valid to infer the contrary from the privative; e.g., "An animal is not healthy, therefore it is number is not even, therefore it is odd.” Therefore, Aristotle intends to show here that when we ask which of these false opinions, i.e., negative and affirmative contraries, is contrary to the true affirmative, we are asking universally whether these two false opinions follow each other indivisibly or not. 8. Deinde cum dicit: nam arbitrari, prosequitur hanc secundam quaestionem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit. Primo, declarat quod contrarietas opinionum non attenditur penes contrarietatem materiae, circa quam versantur, sed potius penes oppositionem veri vel falsi; secundo, declarat quod non penes quaecunque opposita secundum veritatem et falsitatem est contrarietas opinionum; ibi: si ergo boni etc.; tertio, determinat quod contrarietas opinionum attenditur penes per se primo opposita secundum veritatem et falsitatem tribus rationibus; ibi: sed in quibus primo fallacia etc.; quarto declarat hanc determinationem inveniri in omnibus veram; ibi: manifestum est igitur et cetera. Dicit ergo proponens intentam conclusionem, quod falsum est arbitrari opiniones definiri seu determinari debere contrarias ex eo quod contrariorum obiectorum sunt. Et adducit ad hoc duplicem rationem. Prima est: opiniones contrariae non sunt eadem opinio; sed contrariorum eadem est fortasse opinio; ergo opiniones non sunt contrariae ex hoc quod contrariorum sunt. Secunda est: opiniones contrariae non sunt simul verae; sed opiniones contrariorum, sive plures, sive una, sunt simul verae quandoque; ergo opiniones non sunt contrariae ex hoc quod contrariorum sunt. Harum rationum, suppositis maioribus, ponit utriusque minoris declarationem simul, dicens: boni enim, quoniam bonum est, et mali, quoniam malum est, eadem fortasse opinio est, quoad primam. Et subdit esse vera, sive plures sive una sit, quoad secundam. Utitur autem dubitativo adverbio et disiunctione, quia non est determinandi locus an contrariorum eadem sit opinio, et quia aliquo modo est eadem et aliquo modo non. Si enim loquamur de habituali opinione, sic eadem est; si autem de actuali, sic non eadem est. Alia siquidem mentalis compositio actualiter fit, concipiendo bonum esse bonum, et alia concipiendo malum esse malum, licet eodem habitu utrunque cognoscamus, illud per se primo, et hoc secundario, ut dicitur IX metaphysicae. Deinde subdit quod ista quae ad declarationem minorum sumpta sunt, scilicet bonum et malum, contraria sunt etiam contrarietate sumpta stricte in moralibus, ac per hoc congrua usi sumus declaratione. Ultimo inducit conclusionem. Sed non in eo quod contrariorum opiniones sunt, contrariae sunt, sed magis in eo quod contrariae, idest, sed potius censendae sunt opiniones contrariae ex eo quod contrariae adverbialiter, scilicet contrario modo, idest vere et false enunciant. Et sic patet primum. When he says, It is false, of course, to suppose that opinions are to be defined as contrary because they are about contraries, etc., he proceeds with the second question. First he shows that contrariety of opinions is not determined by the contrariety of the matter involved, but rather by the opposition of true and false; secondly, he shows that there is not contrariety of opinions in just any opposites according to truth and falsity, where he says, Now if there is the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not good, etc.; third, he determines that contrariety of opinions is concerned with the per se first opposites; according to truth and falsity, for three reasons, where he says, Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions, etc.; finally, he shows that this determination is true of all, where he says, It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, for the universal negation will be the contrary, etc. Aristotle says, then, proposing the conclusion he intends to prove, that it is false to suppose that opinions are to be defined or determined as contrary because they are about contrary objects. He gives two arguments for this. Contrary opinions are not the same opinion; but opinions about contraries are probably the same opinion; therefore, opinions are not contrary from the fact that they are about contraries. And, contrary opinions are not simultaneously true; but opinions about contraries, whether many or one, are sometimes true simultaneously; therefore, opinions are not contraries because they are about contraries. Having supposed the majors of these arguments, he posits a manifestation of each minor at the same time. In relation to the first argument, he says, for the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is evil, that it is evil are probably the same. In relation to the second argument he adds: and, whether many or one, are true. He uses "probably,” an adverb expressing doubt and disjunction, because this is not the place to determine whether the opinion of contraries is the same opinion, and, because in some way the opinion is the same and in some way not. In the case of habitual opinion, the opinion of contraries is the same, but in the case of an actual opinion it is not. One mental composition is actually made in conceiving that a good is good and another in conceiving that an evil is evil, although we know both by the same habit, the former per se and first, the latter secondarily, as is said in IX Metaphysicae [4: 1051a 4]. Then he adds that good and evil—which are used for the manifestation of the minor—are contraries even when the contrariety is taken strictly in moral matters; and so in using this our exposition is apposite. Finally, he draws the conclusion: however, opinions are not contraries because they are about contraries, but rather because they are contraries, i.e., opinions are to be considered as contrary from the fact that they enunciate contrarily, adverbially, i.e., in a contrary mode, i.e., they enunciate truly and falsely. Thus the first argument is clear. Cajetanus lib. Si ergo boni et cetera. Quia dixerat quod contrarietas opinionum accipitur secundum oppositionem veritatis et falsitatis earum, declarat modo quod non quaecunque secundum veritatem et falsitatem oppositae opiniones sunt contrariae, tali ratione. De bono, puta, de iustitia, quatuor possunt opiniones haberi, scilicet quod iustitia est bona, et quod non est bona, et quod est fugibilis, et quod est non appetibilis. Quarum prima est vera, reliquae sunt falsae. Inter quas haec est diversitas quod, prima negat idem praedicatum quod vera affirmabat; secunda affirmat aliquid aliud quod bono non inest; tertia negat id quod bono inest, non tamen illud quod vera affirmabat. Tunc sic. Si omnes opiniones secundum veritatem et falsitatem sunt contrariae, tunc uni, scilicet verae opinioni non solum multa sunt contraria, sed etiam infinita: quod est impossibile, quia unum uni est contrarium. Tenet consequentia, quia possunt infinitae imaginari opiniones falsae de una re similes ultimis falsis opinionibus adductis, affirmantes, scilicet ea quae non insunt illi, et negantes ea quae illi quocunque modo coniuncta sunt: utraque namque indeterminata esse et absque numero constat. Possumus enim opinari quod iustitia est quantitas, quod est relatio, quod est hoc et illud; et similiter opinari quod iustitia non sit qualitas, non sit appetibilis, non sit habitus. Unde ex supradictis in propositione quaestionis, inferens pluralitatem falsarum contra unam veram, ait: si ergo est opinatio vera boni, puta iustitiae, quoniam est bonum; et si est etiam falsa opinatio negans idem, scilicet, quoniam non est quid bonum; est vero et tertia opinatio falsa quoque, affirmans aliquid aliud inesse illi, quod non inest nec inesse potest, puta, quod iustitia sit fugibilis, quod sit illicita; et hinc intelligitur quarta falsa quoque, quae scilicet negat aliquid aliud ab eo quod vera opinio affirmat inesse iustitiae, quod tamen inest, ut puta quod non sit qualitas, quod non sit virtus; si ita inquam est, nulla aliarum falsarum ponenda est contraria opinioni verae. Et exponens quid demonstret per ly aliarum, subdit: neque quaecunque opinio opinatur esse quod non est, ut tertii ordinis opiniones faciunt: neque quaecunque opinio opinatur non esse quod est, ut quarti ordinis opiniones significant. Et causam subdit: infinitae enim utraeque sunt, et quae esse opinantur quod non est, et quae non esse quod est, ut supra declaratum fuit. Non ergo quaecunque opiniones oppositae secundum veritatem et falsitatem contrariae sunt. Et sic patet secundum.When he says, Now, if there is the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not good, etc., he takes up the second point. Since he has just said that contrariety of opinions is taken according to their opposition of truth and falsity, he goes on to show that not just any opposites according to truth and falsity are contraries. This is his argument. Four opinions can be held about a good, for instance justice: that justice is good, that it is not good, that it is avoidable, that it is not desirable. Of these, the first is true, the rest false. The three false ones are diverse. The first denies the same predicate the true one affirmed; the second affirms something which does not belong to the good; the third denies what belongs to the good, but something other than the true one affirmed. Now if all opinions opposed as to truth and falsity are contraries, then not only are there many contraries to one true opinion, but an infinite number. But this is impossible, for one is contrary to one other. The consequence holds because infinite false opinions about one thing, similar to those cited, can be imagined; such opinions would affirm of it what does not belong to it and deny what is joined to it in some way. Both kinds are indeterminate and without number. We can think, for instance, that justice is a quantity, that it is a relation, that it is this and that; and likewise we can think that it is not a quality, is not desirable, is not a habit. Hence, from what was said above in proposing the question, Aristotle infers a plurality of false opinions opposed to one true opinion: Now if there is the opinion of that which is good, for instance justice, that it is good, and there is a false opinion denying the same thing, namely, that it is not good, and besides these a third opinion, false also, affirming that some other thing belongs to justice that does not belong and cannot belong to it (for instance, that justice is avoidable, that it is illicit) and a fourth opinion, also false, that denies something other than the true opinion affirms, something, however, which does belong to justice (for instance, that it is not a quality, that it is not a virtue), none of these other false enunciations are to be posited as the contrary of the true opinion. To explain what he is designating by "of these others,” he adds, neither those purporting that what is not, is, as opinions of the third order do, nor those purporting that what is, is not, as opinions of the fourth order signify. Then he adds the reason these cannot be posited as the contrary of the true opinion: for both the opinions that that is which is not, and that which is not, is, are infinite, as was shown above. Therefore, not just any opinions opposed according to truth and falsity are contraries. Thus the second argument is clear. Cajetanus lib. Quia subtili indagatione ostendit quod nec materiae contrarietas, nec veri falsique qualiscunque oppositio contrarietatem opinionum constituit, sed quod aliqua veri falsique oppositio id facit, ideo nunc determinare intendit qualis sit illa veri falsique oppositio, quae opinionum contrarietatem constituit. Ex hoc enim directe quaestioni satisfit. Et intendit quod sola oppositio opinionum secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem etc. constituit contrarietatem earum. Unde intendit probare istam conclusionem per quam ad quaesitum respondet: opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae; et consequenter illae, quae sunt oppositae secundum affirmationem contrariorum praedicatorum de eodem, non sunt contrariae, quia sic affirmativa vera haberet duas contrarias, quod est impossibile. Unum enim uni est contrarium.Aristotle has just completed a subtle investigation in which he has shown that contrariety of matter does not constitute contrariety of opinion, nor does just any kind of opposition of true and false, but some opposition of true and false does. Now he intends to determine what kind of opposition of true and false it is that constitutes contrariety of opinions, for this will answer the question directly. He maintains that only opposition of opinions according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing, etc., constitutes their contrariety. Accordingly, as the response to the question, he intends to prove the following conclusion: opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing are contraries; and consequently, opinions opposed according to affirmation of contrary predicates of the same subject are not contraries, for if these were contraries, the true affirmative would have two contraries, which is impossible, since one is contrary to one other. Cajetanus lib. Probat autem istam conclusionem tribus rationibus. Prima est: opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contrariae; opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt in quibus primo est fallacia; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae. Sensus maioris est: opiniones quae primo ordine naturae sunt termini fallaciae, idest deceptionis seu erroris, sunt contrariae: sunt enim, cum quis fallitur seu errat, duo termini, scilicet a quo declinat, et ad quem labitur. Huius rationis in littera primo ponitur maior, cum dicitur: sed in quibus primo fallacia est; adversative enim continuans sermonem supradictis, insinuavit non tot enumeratas opiniones esse contrarias, sed eas in quibus primo fallacia est modo exposito. Deinde subdit probationem minoris talem: eadem proportionaliter sunt, ex quibus sunt generationes et ex quibus sunt fallaciae; sed generationes sunt ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem; ergo et fallaciae sunt ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem. Quod erat assumptum in minore. Unde ponens maiorem huius prosyllogismi, ait: haec autem, scilicet fallacia, est ex his, scilicet terminis, proportionaliter tamen, ex quibus sunt et generationes. Et subsumit minorem: ex oppositis vero, scilicet secundum affirmationem et negationem, et generationes fiunt. Et demum concludit: quare etiam fallacia, scilicet, est ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem. Aristotle uses three arguments to prove this conclusion. The first one is as follows: Those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries. Opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same predicate of the same subject are those in which there is fallacy first. Therefore, these are contraries. The sense of the major is this: Opinions which first in the order of nature are the limits of fallacy, i.e., of deception or error, are contraries; for when someone is deceived or errs, there are two limits, the one from which he turns away and the one toward which he turns. In the text the major of the argument is posited first: Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. By uniting this part of the text adversatively with what was said previously, Aristotle implies that not just any of the number of opinions enumerated are contraries, but those in which there is fallacy first in the manner we have explained. Then he gives this proof of the minor: those things from which generations are and from which fallacies are, are the same proportionally; generations are from opposites according to affirmation and negation; therefore fallacies, too, are from opposites according to affirmation and negation (which was assumed in the minor). Hence he posits the major of this prosyllogism: Now the things from which fallacies arise, namely, limits, are the things from which generations arise—proportionally however. Under it he posits the minor: but generations are from opposites, i.e., according to affirmation and negation. Finally, he concludes, therefore also fallacies, i.e., they are from opposites according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing. Cajetanus lib. Ad evidentiam huius probationis scito quod idem faciunt in processu intellectus cognitio et fallacia seu error, quod in processu naturae generatio et corruptio. Sicut namque perfectiones naturales generationibus acquiruntur, corruptionibus desinunt; ita cognitione perfectiones intellectuales acquiruntur, erroribus autem seu deceptionibus amittuntur. Et ideo, sicut tam generatio quam corruptio est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut proprios terminos, ut dicit V Physic.; ita tam cognoscere aliquid, quam falli circa illud, est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut proprios terminos: ita quod id ad quod primo attingit cognoscens aliquid in secunda operatione intellectus est veritatis affirmatio, et quod per se primo abiicitur est illius negatio. Et similiter quod per se primo perdit qui fallitur est veritatis affirmatio, et quod primo incurrit est veritatis negatio. Recte ergo dixit quod iidem sunt termini inter quos primo est generatio, et illi inter quos est primo fallacia, quia utrobique termini sunt affirmatio et negatio. This proof will be more evident from the following: Knowledge and fallacy, or error, bring about the same thing in the intellect’s progression as generation and corruption do in nature’s progression. For just as natural perfections are acquired by generations and perish by corruptions, so intellectual perfections are acquired by knowledge and lost by errors or deceptions. Accordingly, just as generation and corruption are between affirmation and negation as proper terms, as is said in V Physicae [1:224b 35] so both to know something and to be deceived about it is between affirmation and negation as proper terms. Consequently, what one who knows attains first in the second operation of the intellect is affirmation of the truth, and what he rejects per se and first is the negation of it. In like manner, what he who is deceived loses per se and first is affirmation of the truth, and acquires first is negation of the truth. Therefore Aristotle is correct in maintaining that the terms between which there is generation first and between which there is fallacy first are the same, because with respect to both, the terms are affirmation and negation. Cajetanus lib. Deinde cum dicit: si ergo quod bonum est etc., intendit probare maiorem principalis rationis. Et quia iam declaravit quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt affirmatio et negatio, ideo utitur, loco maioris probandae, scilicet, opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt contrariae, sua conclusione, scilicet, opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt contrariae. Aequivalere enim iam declaratum est. Fecit autem hoc consuetae brevitati studens, quoniam sic procedendo, et probat maiorem, et respondet directe quaestioni, et applicat ad propositum simul. Probat ergo loco maioris conclusionem principaliter intentam quaestionis, hanc, scilicet: opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt contrariae; et non illae, quae sunt oppositae secundum contrariorum affirmationem de eodem. Et intendit talem rationem. Opinio vera et eius magis falsa sunt contrariae opiniones; oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt vera et eius magis falsa; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt contrariae. Maior probatur ex eo quod, quae plurimum distant circa idem sunt contraria; vera autem et eius magis falsa plurimum distant circa idem, ut patet. Minor vero probatur ex eo quod opposita secundum negationem eiusdem de eodem est per se falsa respectu suae affirmationis verae. Opinio autem per se falsa magis falsa est quacunque alia. Unumquodque enim quod est per se tale, magis tale est quolibet quod est per aliud tale. When he says, Now, if that which is good is both good and not evil, the former per se, the latter accidentally, etc., he intends to prove the major of the principal argument. He has already shown that the opinions in which there is fallacy first are affirmation and negation, and therefore in place of the major to be proved (i.e., opinions in which it there is fallacy first are contraries) he uses his conclusion—which has already been shown to be equivalent—that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries. Thus with his customary brevity he at once proves the major, responds directly to the question, and applies it to what he has proposed. In place of the major, then, he proves the conclusion principally intended, i.e., that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries, and not those opposed according to affirmation of contraries about the same thing. His argument is as follows: A true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it are contrary opinions, but opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are the true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it; therefore, opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are contraries. The major is proved thus: those things that are most distant in respect to the same thing are contraries; but the true and the more false are most distant in respect to the same thing, as is clear. The proof of the minor is that the opposite according to negation of the same thing of the same thing is per se false in relation to the true affirmation of it. But a per se false opinion is more false than any other, since each thing that is per se such is more such than anything that is such by reason of something else. Cajetanus lib. Unde ad suprapositas opiniones in propositione quaestionis rediens, ut ex illis exemplariter clarius intentum ostendat, a probatione minoris inchoat tali modo. Sint quatuor opiniones, duae verae, scilicet, bonum est bonum, bonum non est malum, et duae falsae, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et, bonum est malum. Clarum est autem quod prima vera est ratione sui, secunda autem est vera secundum accidens, idest, ratione alterius, quia scilicet non esse malum est coniunctum ipsi bono: ideo enim ista est vera, bonum non est malum, quia bonum est bonum, et non e contra; ergo prima quae est secundum se vera, est magis vera quam secunda: quia in unoquoque genere quae secundum se est vera est magis vera. Illae autem duae falsae eodem modo censendae sunt, quod scilicet magis falsa est, quae secundum se est falsa. Unde quia prima earum, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, quae est negativa, est per se et non ratione alterius falsa, relata ad illam affirmativam, bonum est bonum; et secunda, scilicet, bonum est malum, quae est affirmativa contrarii, ad eamdem relata est falsa per accidens, idest ratione alterius (ista enim, scilicet, bonum est malum, non immediate falsificatur ab illa vera, scilicet bonum est bonum, sed mediante illa alia falsa, scilicet, bonum non est bonum); idcirco magis falsa respectu affirmationis verae est negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio contrarii. Quod erat assumptum in minore. Accordingly, returning to the opinions already given in proposing the question so as to show his intention more clearly by example, he begins with the proof of the minor. There are four opinions, of which two are true, "A good is good,” "A good is not evil”; two are false, "A good is not good” and "A good is evil.” It is evident that the first is true by reason of itself, the second accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, for not to be evil is added to that which is good. Hence, "A good is not evil” is true because a good is good, and not contrarily. Therefore, the first of these opinions, which is per se true, is more true than the second, for in each genus that which per se is true is more true. The two false opinions are to be judged in the same way. The more false is the one that is per se false. The first of them, the negative, "A good is not good,” in relation to the affirmative, "A good is good,” is per se false, not false by reason of another. The second, the affirmative of the contrary, "A good is evil,” in relation to the same opinion, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another (for "A good is evil” is not immediately falsified by the true opinion, "A good is good,” but mediately through the other false opinion "A good is not good”). Therefore, the negation of the same thing is more false in respect to a trite affirmation than the affirmation of a contrary. This was assumed in the minor. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 6Unde rediens ad supra positas (ut dictum est) opiniones, infert primas duas veras opiniones dicens: si ergo quod bonum est et bonum est et non est malum, et hoc quidem, scilicet quod dicit prima opinio, est verum secundum se, idest ratione sui; illud vero, scilicet quod dicit secunda opinio, est verum secundum accidens, quia accidit, idest, coniunctum est ei, scilicet bono, malum non esse. In unoquoque autem ordine magis vera est illa quae secundum se est vera. Etiam igitur falsa magis est quae secundum se falsa est: siquidem et vera huius est naturae, ut declaratum est, quod scilicet magis vera est, quae secundum se est vera. Ergo illarum duarum opinionum falsarum in quaestione propositarum, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et, bonum est malum, ea quae est dicens, quoniam non est bonum quod bonum est, idest negativa; scilicet, bonum non est bonum, est consistens falsa secundum se, idest, ratione sui continet in seipsa falsitatem; illa vero reliqua falsa opinio, quae est dicens, quoniam malum est, idest, affirmativa contraria, scilicet, bonum est malum, eius, quae est, idest, illius affirmationis dicentis, bonum est bonum, secundum accidens, idest, ratione alterius falsa est. Deinde subdit ipsam minorem: quare erit magis falsa de bono, opinio negationis, quam contrarii. Deinde ponit maiorem dicens quod, semper magis falsus circa singula est ille qui habet contrariam opinionem, ac si dixisset, verae opinioni magis falsa est contraria. Quod assumptum erat in maiore. Et eius probationem subdit, quia contrarium est de numero eorum quae circa idem plurimum differunt. Nihil enim plus differt a vera opinione quam magis falsa circa illam. As was pointed out above, Aristotle returns to the opinions already posited, and infers the first two true opinions: Now if that which is good is both good and not evil, and if what the first opinion says is true per se, i.e., by reason of itself, and what the second opinion says is trite accidentally (since it is accidental to it, i.e., added to it, that is, to the good, not to be evil) and if in each order that which is per se true is more true, then that which is per se false is more false, since, as has been shown, the true also is of this nature, namely, that the more true is that which per se is true. Therefore, of the two false opinions proposed in the question, namely, "A good is not good,” and "A good is evil,” the one saying that what is good is not good, namely, the negative, is an opinion positing what is per se false, i.e., by reason of itself it contains falsity in it. The other false opinion, the one saying it is evil, namely, the affirmative contrary in respect to it, i.e., in respect to the affirmation saying that a good is good, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another. Then he gives the minor: Therefore, the opinion of the negation of the good will be more false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Next, he posits the major, the one who holds the contrary judgment about each thing is most mistaken, i.e., in relation to the true judgment the contrary is more false. This was assumed in the major. He gives as the proof of this, for contraries are those that differ most with respect to the same thing, for nothing differs more from a true opinion than the more false opinion in respect to it. Cajetanus lib. 2 l. 14 n. 7Ultimo directe applicat ad quaestionem dicens: quod si (pro, quia) harum falsarum, scilicet, negationis eiusdem et affirmationis contrarii, altera est contraria verae affirmationi, opinio vero contradictionis, idest, negationis eiusdem de eodem, magis est contraria secundum falsitatem, idest, magis est falsa, manifestum est quoniam haec, scilicet opinio falsa negationis, erit contraria affirmationi verae, et e contra. Illa vero opinio quae est dicens, quoniam malum est quod bonum est, idest, affirmatio contrarii, non contraria sed implicita est, idest, sed implicans in se verae contrariam, scilicet, bonum non est bonum. Etenim necesse est ipsum opinantem affirmationem contrarii opinari, quoniam idem de quo affirmat contrarium non est bonum. Oportet siquidem si quis opinatur quod vita est mala, quod opinetur quod vita non sit bona. Hoc enim necessario sequitur ad illud, et non e converso; et ideo affirmatio contrarii implicita dicitur. Negatio autem eiusdem de eodem implicita non est. Et sic finitur prima ratio. Finally, he directly approaches the question. If (for "since”), then, of two opinions (namely, false opinions—the negation of the same thing and the affirmation of a contrary), one is the contrary of the true affirmation, and, the contradictory opinion, i.e., the negation of the same thing of the same thing, is more contrary according to falsity, i.e., is more false, it is evident that the false opinion of negation will be contrary to the true affirmation, and conversely. The opinion saying that what is good is evil, i.e., the affirmation of a contrary, is not the contrary but implies it, i.e., it implies in itself the opinion contrary to the true opinion, i.e., "A good is not good.” The reason for this is that the one conceiving the affirmation of a contrary must conceive that the same thing of which he affirms the contrary, is not good. If, for example, someone conceives that life is evil, he must conceive that life is not good, for the former necessarily follows upon the latter and not conversely. Hence, affirmation of a contrary is said to be implicative, but negation of the same thing of the same thing is not implicative. This concludes the first argument. Cajetanus lib. Notandum est hic primo quod ista regula generalis tradita hic ab Aristotele de contrarietate opinionum, quod scilicet contrariae opiniones sunt quae opponuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem, et in se et in assumptis ad eius probationem propositionibus scrupulosa est. Unde multa hic insurgunt dubia. Primum est quia cum oppositio secundum affirmationem et negationem non constituat contrarietatem sed contradictionem apud omnes philosophos, quomodo Aristoteles opiniones oppositas secundum affirmationem et negationem ex hoc contrarias ponat. Augetur et dubitatio quia dixit quod ea in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contraria, et tamen subdit quod sunt oppositae sicut termini generationis, quos constat contradictorie opponi. Nec dubitatione caret quomodo sit verum id quod supra diximus ex intentione s. Thomae, quod nullae duae opiniones opponantur contradictorie, cum hic expresse dicitur aliquas opponi secundum affirmationem et negationem. Dubium secundo insurgit circa id quod assumpsit, quod contraria cuiusque verae est per se falsa. Hoc enim non videtur verum. Nam contraria istius verae, Socrates est albus, est ista, Socrates non est albus, secundum determinata; et tamen non est per se falsa. Sicut namque sua opposita affirmatio est per accidens vera, ita ista est per accidens falsa. Accidit enim isti enunciationi falsitas. Potest enim mutari in veram, quia est in materia contingenti. Dubium est tertio circa id quod dixit: magis vero contradictionis est contraria. Ex hoc enim videtur velle quod utraque, scilicet, opinio negationis et contrarii, sit contraria verae affirmationi; et consequenter vel uni duo ponit contraria, vel non loquitur de contrarietate proprie sumpta: cuius oppositum supra ostendimus. The general rule about the contrariety of opinions that Aristotle has given here (namely, that contrary opinions are those opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing) is accurate both in itself and in the propositions assumed for its proof. Many questions may arise, however, as a consequence of this doctrine and its proof. First of all, all philosophers hold that opposition according to affirmation and negation constitutes contradiction, not contrariety. How, then, can Aristotle maintain that opinions opposed in this way are contraries? The difficulty is augmented by the fact that he has said that those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries, yet he adds that they are opposed as the terms of generation are, which he establishes to be opposed contradictorily. In addition, there is a difficulty as to the way in which the assertion of St. Thomas, which we used above, is true, namely, that no two opinions are opposed contradictorily, since here it is explicitly said that some are opposed according to affirmation and negation. The second uestion involves his assumption that the contrary of each true opinion is per se false. This does not seem to be true, for according to what was determined previously, the contrary of the true opinion "Socrates is white” is "Socrates is not white.” But this is not per se false, for the opposed affirmation is true accidentally, and hence its negation is false accidentally. Falsity is accidental to such an enunciation because, being in contingent matter, it can be changed into a true one. A third difficulty arises from the fact that Aristotle says the contradictory opinion is nwre contrary. He seems to be proposing, according to this, that both the opinion of the negation and of a contrary are contrary to a true affirmation. Consequently, he is either positing two opinions contrary to one or he is not taking contrariety strictly, although we showed above that he was taking contrariety properly and strictly. Cajetanus lib. Ad evidentiam omnium, quae primo loco adducuntur, sciendum quod opiniones seu conceptiones intellectuales, in secunda operatione de quibus loquimur, possunt tripliciter accipi: uno modo, secundum id quod sunt absolute; alio modo, secundum ea quae repraesentant absolute; tertio, secundum ea quae repraesentant, ut sunt in ipsis opinionibus. Primo membro omisso, quia non est praesentis speculationis, scito quod si accipiantur secundo modo secundum repraesentata, sic invenitur inter eas et contradictionis, et privationis, et contrarietatis oppositio. Ista siquidem mentalis enunciatio, Socrates est videns, secundum id quod repraesentat opponitur illi, Socrates non est videns, contradictorie; privative autem illi, Socrates est caecus; contrarie autem illi, Socrates est luscus; si accipiantur secundum repraesentata. Ut enim dicitur in postpraedicamentis, non solum caecitas est privatio visus, sed etiam caecum esse est privatio huius quod est esse videntem, et sic de aliis. Si vero accipiantur opiniones tertio modo, scilicet, prout repraesentata per eas sunt in ipsis, sic nulla oppositio inter eas invenitur nisi contrarietas: quoniam sive opposita contradictorie sive privative sive contrarie repraesententur, ut sunt in opinionibus, illius tantum oppositionis capaces sunt, quae inter duo entia realia inveniri potest. Opiniones namque realia entia sunt. Regulare enim est quod quidquid convenit alicui secundum esse quod habet in alio, secundum modum et naturam illius in quo est sibi convenit, et non secundum quod exigeret natura propria. Inter entia autem realia contrarietas sola formaliter reperitur. Taceo nunc de oppositione relativa. Opiniones ergo hoc modo sumptae, si oppositae sunt, contrarietatem sapiunt, sed non omnes proprie contrariae sunt, sed illae quae plurimum differunt circa idem veritate et falsitate. Has autem probavit Aristoteles esse opiniones affirmationis et negationis eiusdem de eodem. Istae igitur verae contrariae sunt. Reliquae vero per reductionem ad has contrariae dicuntur. In order to answer all of the difficulties in regard to the first argument it must be noted that opinions, or intellectual conceptions in the second operation, can be taken in three ways: according to what they are absolutely; (2) according to the things they represent absolutely, according to the things they represent, as they are in opinions. We will omit the first since it does not belong to the present consideration. If they are taken in the second way, i.e., according to the things represented, there can be opposition of contradiction, of privation, and of contrariety among them. The mental enunciation "Socrates sees,” according to what it represents, is opposed contradictorily to. Socrates does not see”; privatively to "Socrates is blind”; contrarily to "Socrates is purblind.” Aristotle points out the reason for this in the Postpredicamenta [Categ.]: not only is blindness privation of sight but to be blind is also a privation of to be seeing, and so of others. Opinions taken in the third way, i.e., as the things represented through opinions are in the opinions, have no opposition except contrariety; for opposites as they are in opinions, whether represented contradictorily or privatively or contrarily, only admit of the opposition that can be found between two real beings, for opinions are real beings. The rule is that whatever belongs to something according to the being which it has in another, belongs to it according to the mode and nature of that in which it is, and not according to what its own nature would require. Now, between real beings only contrariety is found formally. (I am omitting here the consideration of relative opposition.) Therefore, opinions taken in this mode, if they are opposed, represent contrariety, although not all are contraries properly. Only those differing most in respect to truth and falsity about the same thing are contraries properly. Now Aristotle proved that these are - judgments affirming and denying the same thing of the same thing. Therefore, these are the true contraries. The rest are called contraries by reduction to these. Cajetanus lib. Ex his patet quid ad obiecta dicendum sit. Fatemur enim quod affirmatio et negatio in seipsis contradictionem constituunt; in opinionibus vero existentes contrarietatem inter illas causant propter extremam distantiam, quam ponunt inter entia realia, opinionem scilicet veram et opinionem falsam circa idem. Stantque ista duo simul quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sint opposita ut termini generationis, et tamen sint contraria utendo supradicta distinctione: sunt enim opposita contradictorie ut termini generationis secundum repraesentata; sunt autem contraria, secundum quod habent in seipsis illa contradictoria. Unde plurimum differunt. Liquet quoque ex hoc quod nulla est dissentio inter dicta Aristotelis et s. Thomae, quia opiniones aliquas opponi secundum affirmationem et negationem verum esse confitemur, si ad repraesentata nos convertimus, ut hic dicitur. From this the answer to the objections is clear. We grant that affirmation and negation in themselves constitute contradiction. In actual judgments,”’ affirmation and negation cause contrariety between opinions because of the extreme distance they posit between real beings, namely, true opinion and false opinion in respect to the same thing. And these two stand at the same time: those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as the terms of generation are and yet they are contraries by the use of the foresaid distinction—for they are opposed contradictorily as terms of generation according to the things represented, but they are contraries insofar as they have in themselves those contradictories and hence differ most. It is also evident that there is no disagreement between Aristotle and St. Thomas, for we have shown that it is true that some opinions are opposed according to affirmation and negation if we consider the things represented, as is said here. 11. Tu autem qui perspicacioris ac provectioris ingenii es compos, hinc habeto quod inter ipsas opiniones oppositas quidam tantum motus est, eo quod de affirmato in affirmatum mutatio fit: inter ipsas vero secundum repraesentata, similitudo quaedam generationis et corruptionis invenitur, dum inter affirmationem et negationem mutatio clauditur. Unde et fallacia sive error quandoque et motus et mutationis rationem habet diversa respiciendo, quando scilicet ex vera in per se falsam, vel e converso, quis mutat opinionem; quandoque autem solam mutationem imitatur, quando scilicet absque praeopinata veritate ipsam falsam offendit quis opinionem; quandoque vero motus undique rationem possidet, quando scilicet ex vera affirmatione in falsam circa idem contrarii affirmationem transit. Quia tamen prima ut quis fallatur radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis, merito ea in quibus primo est fallacia, sicut generationis terminos opponi dixit. It will be noted, however, by those of you who are more penetrating and advanced in your thinking, that between opposite opinions there is something of true motion when a change is made from the affirmed to the affirmed; but according to the order of representation there is a certain similitude to generation and corruption so long as the change is bounded by affirmation and negation. Consequently, fallacy or error may be regarded in different ways. Sometimes it has the aspect of both movement and change. This is the case when someone changes his opinion from a true one to one that is per se false, or conversely. Sometimes change alone is imitated. This happens when someone arrives at a false opinion apart from a former true opinion. Sometimes, however, there is movement in every respect. This is the case when reason passes from the true affirmation to the false affirmation of a contrary about the same thing. However, since the first root of being in error is the opposition of affirmation and negation, Aristotle is correct in saying that those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as are the terms of generation. 12. Ad dubium secundo loco adductum dico quod peccatur ibi secundum aequivocationem illius termini per se falsa, seu per se vera. Opinio enim et similiter enunciatio potest dici dupliciter per se vera seu falsa. Uno modo, in seipsa, sicut sunt omnes verae secundum illos modos perseitatis qui enumerantur I posteriorum, et similiter falsae secundum illosmet modos, ut, homo non est animal. Et hoc modo non accipitur in hac regula de contrarietate opinionum et enunciationum opinio per se vera aut falsa, ut efficaciter obiectio adducta concludit. Si enim ad contrarietatem opinionum hoc exigeretur non possent esse opiniones contrariae in materia contingenti: quod est falsissimum. Alio modo potest dici opinio sive enunciatio per se vera aut falsa respectu suae oppositae. Per se vera quidem respectu suae falsae, et per se falsa respectu suae verae. Et tunc nihil aliud est dicere, est per se vera respectu illius, nisi quod ratione sui et non alterius verificatur ex falsitate illius. Et similiter cum dicitur, est per se falsa respectu illius, intenditur quod ratione sui et non alterius falsificatur ex illius veritate. Verbi gratia; istius verae, Socrates currit, non est per se falsa, Socrates sedet, quia falsitas eius non immediate sequitur ex illa, sed mediante ista alia falsa, Socrates non currit, quae est per se illius falsa, quia ratione sui et non per aliquod medium ex illius veritate falsificatur, ut patet. Et similiter istius falsae, Socrates est quadrupes, non est per se vera ista, Socrates est bipes, quia non per seipsam veritas istius illam falsificat, sed mediante ista, Socrates non est quadrupes, quae est per se vera respectu illius: propter seipsam enim falsitate istius verificatur, ut de se patet. Et hoc secundo modo utimur istis terminis tradentes regulam de contrarietate opinionum et enunciationum. Invenitur siquidem sic universaliter vera in omni materia regula dicens quod, vera et eius per se falsa, et falsa et eius per se vera, sunt contrariae. Unde patet responsio ad obiectionem, quia procedit accipiendo ly per se vera, et per se falsa primo modo. With respect to the second question, I say that there is an equivocation of the term "per se false” and "per se true” in the objection. Opinion, as well as enunciation, can be called per se true or false in two ways. It can be called per se true in itself. This is the case in respect to all opinions and enunciations that are in accordance with the modes of perseity enumerated in I Posteriorum. Similarly, they can be said to be per se false according to the same modes. An example of this would be "Man is not an animal.” Per se true or false is not taken in this mode in the rule about contrariety of opinions and enunciations, as the objection concludes. For if this were needed for contrariety of opinions there could not be contrary opinions in contingent matter, which is false. Secondly, an opinion or enunciation can be said to be per se true or false in respect to its opposite: per se true with respect to its opposite false opinion, and per se false with respect to its opposite true opinion. Accordingly, to say that an opinion is per se true in respect to its opposite is to say that on its own account and not on account of another it is verified by the falsity of its opposite. Similarly, to say that an opinion is per se false in respect to its opposite means that on its own account and not on account of another it is falsified by the truth of the opposite. For example, the opinion that is per se false in respect to the true opinion "Socrates is running "is not, "Socrates is sitting,” since the falsity of the latter does not immediately follow from the former, but mediately from the false opinion, "Socrates is not running.” It is the latter opinion that is per se false in relation to "Socrates is running,” since it is falsified on its own account by the truth of the opinion "Socrates is running,” and not through an intermediary. Similarly, the per se true opinion in respect to the false opinion "Socrates is four-footed” is not, "Socrates is two-footed,” for the truth of the latter does not by itself make the former false; rather, it is through "Socrates is not four-footed” as a medium, which is per se true in respect to "Socrates is four-footed”; for "Socrates is not four-footed” is verified on its own account by the falsity of "Socrates is four-footed,” as is evident. We are using "per se true” and "per se false” in this second mode in propounding the rule concerning contrariety of opinions and enunciations. Thus the rule that the true opinion and the per se false opinion in relation to it and the false opinion and the per se true in relation to it are contraries, is universally true in all matter. Consequently, the response to the objection is clear, for it results from taking "per se true” and "per se false” in the first mode. Ad ultimum dubium dicitur quod, quia inter opiniones ad se invicem pertinentes nulla alia est oppositio nisi contrarietas, coactus fuit Aristoteles (volens terminis specialibus uti) dicere quod una est magis contraria quam altera, insinuans quidem quod utraque contrarietatis oppositionem habet respectu illius verae. Determinat tamen immediate quod tantum una earum, scilicet negationis opinio, contraria est affirmationi verae. Subdit enim: manifestum est quoniam haec contraria erit. Duo ergo dixit, et quod utraque, tam scilicet negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio contrarii, contrariatur affirmationi verae, et quod una tantum earum, negatio scilicet, est contraria. Et utrunque est verum. Illud quidem, quia, ut dictum est, ambae contrarietates oppositione contra affirmationem moliuntur; sed difformiter, quia opinio negationis primo et per se contrariatur, affirmationis vero contrarii opinio secundario et per accidens, idest per aliud, ratione scilicet negativae opinionis, ut declaratum est: sicut etiam in naturalibus albo contrariantur et nigrum et rubrum, sed illud primo, hoc reductive, ut reducitur scilicet ad nigrum illud inducendo, ut dicitur V Physic. Secundum autem dictum simpliciter verum est, quoniam simpliciter contraria non sunt nisi extrema unius latitudinis, quae maxime distant; extrema autem unius distantiae non sunt nisi duo. Et ideo cum inter pertinentes ad se invicem opiniones unum extremum teneat affirmatio vera, reliquum uni tantum falsae dandum est, illi scilicet quae maxime a vera distat. Hanc autem negativam opinionem esse probatum est. Haec igitur una tantum contraria est illi, simpliciter loquendo. Caeterae enim oppositae ratione istius contrariantur, ut de mediis dictum est. Non ergo uni plura contraria posuit, nec de contrarietate large loquutus est, ut obiiciendo dicebatur. The answer to the third difficulty is the following. Since there is no other opposition but contrariety between opinions pertaining to each other, Aristotle (since he chose to use limited terms) has been forced to say that one is more contrary than another, which implies that both have opposition of contrariety in respect to a true opinion. However, he determines immediately that only one of them, the negative opinion, is contrary to a true affirmation, when he adds, it is evident that it must be the contrary. What he says, then, is that each, i.e., both negation of the same thing and affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to a true affirmation, and that only one of them, i.e., the negation, is contrary. Both of these statements are true, for both contrarieties are caused by an opposition contrary to the affirmation, as was said, but not uniformly. The opinion of negation is contrary first and per se, the opinion of affirmation of a contrary, secondarily and accidentally, i.e., through another, namely, by reason of the negative opinion, as has already been shown. There is a parallel to this in natural things: both black and red are contrary to white, the former first, the latter reductively, i.e., inasmuch as red is reduced to black in a motion from white to red, as is said in V Physicorum. However, the second statement, i.e., that only one of them, the negation, is contrary, is true simply, for the most distant extremes of one extent are contraries absolutely. Nov,, there are only two extremes of one distance and since between opinions pertaining to each other true affirmation is at one extreme, the remaining extreme must be granted to only one false opinion, i.e., to the one that is most distant from the true opinion. This has been proved to be the negative opinion. Only this one, then, is contrary to that absolutely speaking. Other opposites are contrary by reason of this one, as was said of those in between. Therefore, Aristotle has not posited many opinions contrary to one, nor used contrariety in a broad sense, both of which were maintained by the objector. Cajetanus lib. Deinde cum dicit: amplius si etiam etc., probat idem, scilicet quod affirmationi contraria est negatio eiusdem, et non affirmatio contrarii secunda ratione, dicens: si in aliis materiis oportet opiniones se habere similiter, idest, eodem modo, ita quod contrariae in aliis materiis sunt affirmatio et negatio eiusdem; et hoc, scilicet quod diximus de boni et mali opinionibus, videtur esse bene dictum, quod scilicet contraria affirmationi boni non est affirmatio mali, sed negatio boni. Et probat hanc consequentiam subdens: aut enim ubique, idest, in omni materia, ea quae est contradictionis altera pars censenda est contraria suae affirmationi, aut nusquam, idest, aut in nulla materia. Si enim est una ars generalis accipiendi contrariam opinionem, oportet quod ubique et in omni materia uno et eodem modo accipiatur contraria opinio. Et consequenter, si in aliqua materia negatio eiusdem de eodem affirmationi est contraria, in omni materia negatio eiusdem de eodem contraria erit affirmationi. Deinde intendens concludere a positione antecedentis, affirmat antecedens ex sua causa, dicens quod illae materiae quibus non inest contrarium, ut substantia et quantitas, quibus, ut in praedicamentis dicitur, nihil est contrarium. De his quidem est per se falsa ea, quae est opinioni verae opposita contradictorie, ut qui putat hominem, puta Socratem non esse hominem, per se falsus est respectu putantis, Socratem esse hominem. Deinde affirmando ipsum antecedens formaliter, directe concludit intentum a positione antecedentis ad positionem consequentis dicens: si ergo hae, scilicet, affirmatio et negatio in materia carente contrario, sunt contrariae, et omnes aliae contradictiones contrariae censendae sunt. When Aristotle says, Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in till other cases it would seen that what we have said is correct, etc., he gives the second argument to prove that the negation of the same thing is contrary to the affirmation, and not the affirmation of a contrary. If opinions are necessarily related in a similar way, i.e., in the same way, in other matter, that is, in such a way that affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries in other matter, it would seem that what we have said about the opinions of that which is good and that which is evil is correct, i.e., that the contrary of the affirmation of that which is good is not the affirmation of evil but the negation of good. He proves this consequence when he adds: for the opposition of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere, i.e., in every matter one part of a contradiction must be judged contrary to its affirmation—or never, i.e., in no matter. For if there is a general art which deals with contrary opinions, contrary Opinions must be taken everywhere and in every matter in one and the same mode. Consequently, if in any matter, negation of the same thing of the same thin- is the contrary of the affirmation, then in all matter negation of the same thing of the same thing will be the contrary of the affirmation. Since he intends in his proof to conclude from the position of the antecedent, Aristotle affirms the antecedent through its cause: in matter in which there is not a contrary, such as substance and quantity, which have no contraries, as is said in the Predicamcnta [Categ.], the one contradictorily opposed to the true opinion is per se false. For example, he who thinks that man, for instance Socrates, is not man, is per se mistaken with regard to one who thinks that Socrates is man. Then he affirms the antecedent formally and concludes directly from the position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. If then these, namely, affirmation and negation in matter which lacks a contrary, are contraries, all other contradictions must be judged to be contraries. Deinde cum dicit: amplius similiter etc., probat idem tertia ratione, quae talis est: sic se habent istae duae opiniones de bono, scilicet, bonum est bonum, et, bonum non est bonum, sicut se habent istae duae de non bono, scilicet, non bonum non est bonum, et, non bonum est bonum. Utrobique enim salvatur oppositio contradictionis. Et primae utriusque combinationis sunt verae, secundae autem falsae. Unde proponens hanc maiorem quoad primas veras utriusque combinationis ait: similiter se habet opinio boni, quoniam bonum est, et non boni quoniam non est bonum. Et subdit quoad secundas utriusque falsas: et super has opinio boni quoniam non est bonum, et non boni quoniam est bonum. Haec est maior. Sed illi verae opinioni de non bono, scilicet, non bonum non est bonum, contraria non est, non bonum est malum, nec bonum non est malum, quae sunt de praedicato contrario, sed illa, non bonum est bonum, quae est eius contradictoria; ergo et illi verae opinioni de bono, scilicet, bonum est bonum, contraria erit sua contradictoria, scilicet, bonum non est bonum, et non affirmatio contrarii, scilicet, bonum est malum. Unde subdit minorem supradictam dicens: illi ergo verae opinioni non boni, quae est dicens quoniam scilicet non bonum non est bonum, quae est contraria. Non enim est sibi contraria ea opinio, quae dicit affirmativae praedicatum contrarium, scilicet, quod non bonum est malum: quia istae duae aliquando erunt simul verae. Nunquam autem vera opinio verae contraria est. Quod autem istae duae aliquando simul sint verae, patet ex hoc quod quoddam non bonum malum est: iniustitia enim quoddam non bonum est, et malum. Quare contingeret contrarias esse simul veras: quod est impossibile. At vero nec supradictae verae opinioni contraria est illa opinio, quae est dicens praedicatum contrarium negativae, scilicet, non bonum non est malum, eadem ratione, quia simul et hae erunt verae. Chimaera enim est quoddam non bonum, de qua verum est simul dicere quod non est bona, et quod non est mala. Relinquitur ergo tertia pars minoris quod ei opinioni verae quae, est dicens quoniam non bonum non est bonum, contraria est ea opinio non boni, quae est dicens quod est bonum, quae est contradictoria illius. Deinde subdit conclusionem intentam: quare et ei opinioni boni, quae dicit bonum est bonum, contraria est ea boni opinio, quae dicit quod bonum non est bonum, idest, sua contradictoria. Contradictiones ergo contrariae in omni materia censendae sunt. Then he says, Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. This begins the third argument to prove the same thing. The two opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and that it is not good, are related in the same way as the two opinions of that which is not good, that it is not good and that it is good; i.e., the opposition of contradiction is kept in both. The first opinion of each combination is true, the second false. Hence with respect to the first true opinions of each combination he proposes this major: Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. With respect to the second false judgment of each combination he adds: so also are the opinions of that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it is good. This is the major. But the contrary of the true opinion of that which is not good, namely, the true opinion "That which is not good is not good,” is not, "That which is not good is evil,” nor "That which is not good is not evil,” which have a contrary predicate, but the opinion that that which is not good is good, which is its contradictory. Therefore, the contrary of the true opinion of that which is good, namely, the true opinion "That which is good is good,” will also be its contradictory, "That which is good is not good,” and not the affirmation of the contrary "That which is good is evil.” Hence he adds the minor which we have already stated: What, then, would be the contrary of the true opinion asserting that that which is not good is not good? The contrary of it is not the opinion which asserts the contrary predicate affirmatively, "That which is not good is evil,” because these two are sometimes at once true. But a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion. That these two are sometimes at once true is evident from the fact that some things that are not good are evil. Take injustice; it is something not good, and it is evil. Therefore, contraries would be true at one and the same time, which is impossible. But neither is the contrary of the above true opinion the one asserting the contrary predicate negatively, "That which is not good is not evil,” and for the same reason. These will also be true at the same time. For example, a chimera is something not good, and it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is not good and that it is not evil. There remains the third part of the minor: the contrary of the true opinion that that which is not good is not good is the opinion that it is good, which is the contradictory of it. Then he concludes as he intended: the opinion that a good is not good is contrary to the opinion that a good is good, i.e., its contradictory. Therefore, it must be judged that contradictions are contraries in every matter. 16. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est igitur etc., declarat determinatam veritatem extendi ad cuiusque quantitatis opiniones. Et quia de indefinitis, et particularibus, et singularibus iam dictum est, eo quod idem evidenter apparet de eis in hac re iudicium (indefinitae enim et particulares nisi pro eisdem supponant sicut singulares, per modum affirmationis et negationis non opponuntur, quia simul verae sunt); ideo ad eas, quae universalis quantitatis sunt se transfert, dicens, manifestum esse quod nihil interest quoad propositam quaestionem, si universaliter ponamus affirmationes. Huic enim, scilicet, universali affirmationi, contraria est universalis negatio, et non universalis affirmatio de contrario; ut opinioni quae opinatur, quoniam omne bonum est bonum, contraria est, nihil horum, quae bona sunt, idest, nullum bonum est bonum. Et declarat hoc ex quid nominis universalis affirmativae, dicens: nam eius quae est boni, quoniam bonum est, si universaliter sit bonum: idest, istius opinionis universalis, omne bonum est bonum, eadem est, idest, aequivalens, illa quae opinatur, quidquid est bonum est bonum; et consequenter sua negatio contraria est illa quam dixi, nihil horum quae bona sunt bonum est, idest, nullum bonum est bonum. Similiter autem se habet in non bono: quia affirmationi universali de non bono reddenda est negatio universalis eiusdem, sicut de bono dictum est. He then says, It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, etc. Here he shows that the truth he has determined is extended to opinions of every quantity. The case has already been stated in respect to indefinites, particulars, and singulars. On this point their status is alike, for indefinites and particulars, unless they stand for the same thing, as is the case in singulars, are not opposed by way of affirmation and negation, since they are at once true. Therefore he turns his attention to those of universal quantity. It is evident, he says, that it will make no difference with respect to the proposed question if we posit the affirmations universally, for the contrary of the universal affirmative is the universal negative, and not the universal affirmation of a contrary. For example, the contrary of the opinion that everything that is good is good is the opinion that nothing that is good (i.e., no good) is good. He manifests this by the nominal definition of universal affirmative: for the opinion that that which is good is good, if the good is universal, i.e., the universal opinion "Every good is good,” is the same, i.e., is equivalent to the opinion that whatever is good is good. Consequently, its negation is the contrary I have stated, "Nothing which is good is good,” i.e., "No good is good.” The case is similar with respect to the not good. The universal negation of the not good is opposed to the universal affirmation of the not good, as we have stated with respect to the good. Deinde cum dicit: quare si in opinione sic se habet etc., revertitur ad respondendum quaestioni primo motae, terminata iam secunda, ex qua illa dependet. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia primo respondet quaestioni; secundo, declarat quoddam dictum in praecedenti solutione; ibi: manifestum est autem quoniam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo, directe respondet quaestioni, dicens: quare si in opinione sic se habet contrarietas, ut dictum est; et affirmationes et negationes quae sunt in voce, notae sunt eorum, idest, affirmationum et negationum quae sunt in anima; manifestum est quoniam affirmationi, idest, enunciationi affirmativae, contraria erit negatio circa idem, idest, enunciatio negativa eiusdem de eodem, et non enunciatio affirmativa contrarii. Et sic patet responsio ad primam quaestionem, qua quaerebatur, an enunciationi affirmativae contraria sit sua negativa, an affirmativa contraria. Responsum est enim quod negativa est contraria. Secundo, dividit negationem contrariam affirmationi, idest, negationem universalem et contradictoriam, dicens: universalis, scilicet, negatio, affirmationi contraria est et cetera. Ut exemplariter dicatur, ei enunciationi universali affirmativae quae est, omne bonum est bonum, vel, omnis homo est bonus, contraria est universalis negativa, ea scilicet, nullum bonum est bonum, vel, nullus homo est bonus: singula singulis referendo. Contradictoria autem negatio, contraria illi universali affirmationi est, aut, non omnis homo est bonus, aut, non omne bonum est bonum, singulis singula similiter referendo. Et sic posuit utrunque divisionis membrum, et declaravit. Then he says, If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and. affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, etc. With this he returns to the question first advanced, to reply to it, for he has now completed the second on which the first depends. He first replies to the question, then manifests a point in the solution of a preceding difficulty where he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc. First, then, he replies directly to the question: If, therefore, contrariety is such in the case of opinions, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of affirmations and negations in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the affirmation, i.e., of the affirmative, enunciation, is the negation of the same subject. In other words, the negative enunciation of the same predicate of the same subject will be the contrary, and not the affirmative enunciation of a contrary. Thus the response to the first question—whether the contrary of the affirmative enunciation is its negative or the contrary affirmative—is clear. The answer is that the negative is the contrary. Next, he divides negation as it is contrary to affirmation, i.e., into the universal negation, and the contradictory: The universal, i.e., negation, is contrary to the affirmation, etc. In order to state this division by way of example he relates one enunciation to one enunciation: the contrary of the universal affirmative enunciation "Every good is’ good” or "Every man is good,” is the universal negative "No good is good” or "No man is good.” Again, relating one to one, he says that the contradictory negation contrary to the universal affirmation is "Not every man is good” or "Not everything good is good.” Thus he posits both members of the division and makes the division evident. Cajetanus lib. Sed est hic dubitatio non dissimulanda. Si enim affirmationi universali contraria est duplex negatio, universalis scilicet et contradictoria, vel uni duo sunt contraria, vel contrarietate large utitur Aristoteles: cuius oppositum supra declaravimus. Augetur et dubitatio: quia in praecedenti textu dixit Aristoteles quod, nihil interest si universalem negationem faciamus ita contrariam universali affirmationi, sicut singularem singulari. Et ita declinari non potest quin affirmationi universali duae sint negationes contrariae, eo modo quo hic loquitur de contrarietate Aristoteles. A difficulty arises at this point which we cannot disregard. If the contrary of the universal affirmative is a twofold negation, namely, the universal and the contradictory, either there are two contraries to one affirmation or Aristotle is using contrariety in a broad sense, although we showed that this was not the case apropos of an earlier passage of the text. The difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle said in the passage immediately preceding that it makes no difference if we take the universal negation as contrary to the universal affirmation, i.e., as one of its negations. Hence, the conclusion cannot be avoided that in the mode in which Aristotle speaks of contrariety here, there are two contrary negations to the universal affirmative. Cajetanus lib. Ad huius evidentiam notandum est quod, aliud est loqui de contrarietate quae est inter negationem alicuius universalis affirmativae in ordine ad affirmationem contrarii de eodem, et aliud est loqui de illamet universali negativa in ordine ad negationem eiusdem affirmativae contradictoriam. Verbi gratia: sint quatuor enunciationes, quarum nunc meminimus, scilicet, universalis affirmativa, contradictoria, universalis negativa, et universalis affirmatio contrarii, sic dispositae in eadem linea recta: omnis homo est iustus, non omnis homo est iustus, omnis homo non est iustus, omnis homo est iniustus: et intuere quod licet primae omnes reliquae aliquo modo contrarientur, magna tamen differentia est inter primae et cuiusque earum contrarietatem. Ultima enim, scilicet affirmatio contrarii, primae contrariatur ratione universalis negationis, quae ante ipsam sita est: quia non per se sed ratione illius falsa est, ut probavit Aristoteles, quia implicita est. Tertia autem, idest universalis negatio, non per se sed ratione secundae, scilicet negationis contradictoriae, contrariatur primae eadem ratione, quia, scilicet, non est per se falsa illius affirmationis veritate, sed implicita: continet enim negationem contradictoriam, scilicet, non omnis homo est iustus, mediante qua falsificatur ab affirmationis veritate, quia simpliciter et prior est falsitas negationis contradictoriae falsitate negationis universalis: totum namque compositius et posterius est partibus. Est ergo inter has tres falsas ordo, ita quod affirmationi verae contradictoria negatio simpliciter sola est contraria, quia est simpliciter respectu illius per se falsa; affirmativa autem contrarii est per accidens contraria, quia est per accidens falsa; universalis vero negatio, tamquam medium sapiens utriusque extremi naturam, relata ad contrarii affirmationem est per se contraria et per se falsa, relata autem ad negationem contradictoriam est per accidens falsa et contraria. Sicut rubrum ad nigrum est album, et ad album est nigrum, ut dicitur in V physicorum. Aliud igitur est loqui de negatione universali in ordine ad affirmationem contrarii, et aliud in ordine ad negationem contradictoriam. Si enim primo modo loquamur, sic negatio universalis per se contraria et per se falsa est; si autem secundo modo, non est per se falsa, nec contraria affirmationi. To clear up this difficulty we must note that it is one thing to speak of the contrariety there is between the negation of some universal affirmative in relation to the affirmation of a contrary, and another to speak of that same universal negative in relation to the negation contradictory to the same affirmative. For example, the four enunciations of which we are now speaking are the universal affirmative, the contradictory, the universal negative, and the universal affirmation of a contrary: "Every man is just,” "Not every man is just,” "No man is just,” "Every man is unjust.” Notice that although all the rest are contrary to the first in some way, there is a great difference between the contrariety of each to the first. The last one, the affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to the first by reason of the preceding universal negation, for it is false, not per se but by reason of that negation, i.e., it is implicative, as Aristotle has already proved. The third, the universal negation, is not per se contrary to the first either. It is contrary by reason of the second, the contradictory negation, and for the same reason, i.e., it is not per se false in respect to the truth of the affirmation but is implicative, for it contains the contradictory negation "Not every man is just,” by means of which it is made false in respect to the truth of the affirmation. The reason for this is that the falsity of the contradictory negation is prior absolutely to the falsity of the universal negation, for the whole is more composite and posterior as compared to its parts. There is, therefore, an order among these three false enunciations. Only the contradictory negation is simply contrary to the true affirmation, for it is per se false simply in respect to the affirmation; the affirmative of the contrary is per accidens contrary, since it is per accidens false; the universal negation, which is a medium partaking of the nature of each extreme, is per se contrary and per se false as related to the affirmation of a contrary, but is per accidens false and per accidens contrary as related to the contradictory negation; just as red in a motion from red to black takes the place of white, and in a motion from red to white takes the place of black, as is said in V Physicorum. Therefore, it is one thing to speak of the universal negation in relation to affirmation of a contrary and another to speak of it in relation to the contradictory negation. If we are speaking of it in the first way, the universal negation is per se contrary and per se false; if in the second, it is not per se false or contrary to the affirmation. Quia ergo agitur ab Aristotele nunc quaestio, inter affirmationem contrarii et negationem quae earum contraria sit affirmationi verae, et non agitur quaestio ipsarum negationum inter se, quae, scilicet, earum contraria sit illi affirmationi, ut patet in toto processu quaestionis; ideo Aristoteles indistincte dixit quod utraque negatio est contraria affirmationi verae, et non affirmatio contrarii. Intendens per hoc declarare diversitatem quae est inter affirmationem contrarii et negationem in hoc quod verae affirmationi contrariantur, et non intendens dicere quod utraque negatio est simpliciter contraria. Hoc enim in dubitatione non est quaesitum, sed illud tantum. Et similiter dixit quod nihil interest si quis ponat negationem universalem: nihil enim interest quoad hoc, quod affirmatio contrarii ostendatur non contraria affirmationi verae, quod inquirimus. Plurimum autem interesset, si negationes ipsas inter se discutere vellemus quae earum esset affirmationi contraria. Sic ergo patet quod subtilissime Aristoteles locutus de vera contrarietate enunciationum, unam uni contrariam posuit in omni materia et quantitate, dum simpliciter contrarias contradictiones asseruit. Since Aristotle is now treating the question as to which is the contrary of a true affirmation, affirmation of a contrary or the negation, and not the question as to which of the negations is contrary to a true affirmation—as is clear in the whole progression of the question—bis answer is that both negations are contrary to the true affirmation without distinction, and that affirmation of a contrary is not. His intention is to manifest the diversity between the negation, and the affirmation of a contrary, inasmuch as they are contrary to a true affirmation. He does not intend to say that both negations are contrary simply, for this is not the difficulty in question here, but the former is. With respect to his saying that it makes no difference if we posit the universal negation, the same point applies, for in regard to showing that affirmation of a contrary is not contrary to a true affirmation, which is the question at issue here, it makes no difference which negation is posited. It would make a great deal of difference, however, if we wished to discuss which negation was contrary to a true affirmation. It is evident, then, that Aristotle’s discussion of the true contrariety of enunciations is very subtle, for he has posited one to one contraries in every matter and quantity, and affirmed that contradictions are contraries simply. 21. Deinde cum dicit: manifestum est autem etc., resumit quoddam dictum ut probet illud, dicens manifestum est autem ex dicendis quod non contingit veram verae contrariam esse, nec in opinione mentali, nec in contradictione, idest, vocali enunciatione. Et causam subdit: quia contraria sunt quae circa idem opposita sunt; et consequenter enunciationes et opiniones verae circa diversa contrariae esse non possunt. Circa idem autem contingit simul omnes veras enunciationes et opiniones verificari, sicut et significata vel repraesentata earum simul illi insunt: aliter verae tunc non sunt. Et consequenter omnes verae enunciationes et opiniones circa idem contrariae non sunt, quia contraria non contingit eidem simul inesse. Nullum ergo verum sive sit circa idem, sive sit circa aliud, est alteri vero contrarium. Et sic finitur expositio huius libri perihermenias.  IN  LIBROS PERI HERMENEIAS  EXPOSITIO  "ET  ; Ἶ ;: ^  s s ye xv pr Wu  T ἐπα νύν, es ocuscide ἄτα d ᾿ 5 t NAE ; vefiusi:  E ΥΩ D  ; i P ὃ qu τῷ My δὲ L  1 Ἂν , , οὐδὲ d Je ^ia 1  ῷ viel. δὲ : i m. 3 A E A La cem au  ^ sese "o AMIUADA Gd (Ü 3 m US ΟΞ ΊΩΝ . ββῷ!ς  τ 5 Ses ΤΣ M E puo uw gr e qas vy T veu ΠΤ ΎΤΟ  j y 53. Ὁ: DIENEN E V Ax. 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Scots catena wed cibo DM EET [  3. j 2 ^ our Tyecséeb indt e nwe  F * ἢ E eu zd Wen  r t A í Ἢ Lr ἔξω Tum nc  : ze "T ES n qua acénu da :  See ci d "AUEY dA (a ἔδυ not ^is egit Dri.  "ies K » ) ! aedis d: $5  5 qui ji νυ A MEER ἢ «uunc. di  4 2 ; í Í " " j " i [x] P M Sega: A a x 4  ΓΟ Ἢ M. rd gue zu v Rede Sade 4 "Uds icon ἢ. es dip :  RAS ; : Miu JE ogEESL wet ἢ ἐλ παγδα pynuet Mene σχῇ ἢ. το σα ἐν:  Ξ à "I "TER E c IM IE * she Ἶ ΠΟΎΣ ΤῊΝ ξαπτώγε. , S  Ὁ" vk aee Δ εξ Pam - pina  ἿΣ ^ AM ^ dox jos:  ay  JU E γι Hide dta vos abii hn:  " ; b-X4 ET  , Ρ 5| cm Toy € e gehst: ahead fS "  Lg m tme 2 PLygIsysy wil Ooymesdia. ἵ bu Byte doner iiri, ecd fudcMbs ὩΣ " E.» ncs Eurtsuii Ege 1 ds énmprimiokgoe oi UÉ  CHINOS TV NET . 51052 aea να νῆζοιν 1 Pune; τ, oy BENT. Ü  ; Ν ; ᾿ ! bcr Mee s iemtant. iita, ΓΝ  : Hx " sse d We agis d Migiiengt Dying  : Sagem ἐξ spe Fs  1  d  EIAFIACP|DBO  uae  A  fuerit s. Thomae occasio interpretandi hoc Aristotelis opus de primis  A (Logicae elementis declaratur in Epistola nuncupatoria, quam Commentario  ( jpraemittimus. Hanc Epistolam, quae in nonnullis antiquioribus editionibus  ex legitur (ut in Veneta Peri hermeneias et Posteriorum analyficor. 1526, iussu  ac  impensis nobilis viri Lucae Antonii Iunta florentini, et in altera etiam  Veneta 1557, apud Hieronymum Scotum), Echardus tom. I Scriptorum | Ordinis Prae-  dicafor. ad annum 1274, pag. 283, col. 1, testatur in omnibus codd. mss. a se visis extare.  Revera extat in codicibus Parisiensibüs, Vatic. 2115, et Urbinate. Eam uti genuinam  habet laudatus Echardus: nec dissentit De Rubeis, Dissert. XXIII, capp. 1 et nr, n.r  Hunc autem Commentarium docti viri magno in pretio semper habuere non secus  ac alios, quos in altioris philosophiae Aristotelis libros s. Thomas conscripsit. Aegidius  Columna (t 1316) romanus ex Ordine Erem. s. Augustini, in commentariis quos et  ipse scripsit in librum Pez? Aermeneias, saepe verba s. Thomae recitans, ait: Dici Ex-  fositor. Hinc Ludovicus de Valle-Oleti Ord. Praedic. in brevi historia, quam scripsit con-  ventus Parisiensis (eruit ex cod. ms. Victorino Martene vulgavitque tom. VI "ferum  scriptorum et. monumentorum 8. vm, col. 549), postquam catalogum ordinavit Opp.  5. Thomae, de Commentariis eiusdem in Aristotelis libros haec profert notatu dignis-  sima:  »  «  Sanctus Doctor scripsit multa de scientiis philosophicis et habemus videlicet,  Super librum Perihermenias. Item, Super librum Posteriorum... Yn exponendo autem  »  »  litteraliter Aristotelem non habuit aequalem; unde a philosophis Zxfosz/or per excel-  lentiam nominatur » (Ib. col. 561). Quod Valleoletani iudicium prima medietate sae-  .culi XV prolatum - posteriores sapientes unanimiter confirmarunt. Scrutatur Angelicus  textum Aristotelis, et in antecessum succincta ac perlucida analysi argumentum eiusque  partes principales ac subdivisiones ob oculos ponit; deinde ad partes singillatim interpre-  tandas procedit: nec in cortice litterae sistit, sed ad medullam penetrat; ita ut miretur  lector tantas divitias in Philosopho esse, quae prima fronte haud conspiciuntur. Ve-  rum non Aristotelis mentem solum recitat Angelicus, sed de thesauro suo multa profert ,  Stagiritae doctrinam mirifice amplificando, corrigendo ubi opus est, illustrando semper,  ita nempe ut Expositor Aristotele sapientior videatur.  Opus istud Peri hermeneias, quod apud graecos unico libro continetur, in duos libros  a  quinque  latinis interpretibus divisum passim reperitur: quorum primus priora novem capita,  reliqua  (x-xiv)  alter  complectitur.  Hanc  divisionem  sequutus  s.  Thomas  integrum primum librum exposuit, sed in alterum nonnisi duas lectiones scripsit su-  per primam partem capitis x. - Piani editores hanc in fine notam ponunt: Comenta-  riorum α΄. Thomae Aquinatis, quae ob eius mortem incomplefa manserunt, finis. At  mortem non fuisse in causa cur opus non compleverit s. Doctor contendit Echardus, in-  quiens, vel quod nimiae occupationes obstiterunt, vel potius iuvenis ille et sapiens Praepo-  situs forsàn praesens plura non postulavit, religionique habuit maioribus intentum in his  tyronum propriis diutius distinere.- Addit De Rubeis quod opes zncompletum mansit, nec  ab alio subbletum: quae ultima verba quo sensu dicantur a viro eruditissimo haud facile  Opp. D. Tnuowax T. I.  Lp*  s.  intelligitur. Eum namque non latuit a Caietano nostro fuisse suppletum, quod in Com-  mentaris  Thomae desideratur: quod Caietani supplementum pluries typis editum  huic Editioni adnectimus. Verum et longe ante Caietanum nonnulli incompletum Angelici  opus supplere moliti sunt. In Veneta Peri hermeneias editione 1477, fol. 21 verso, legitur:  Explicit sententia libri peryermenias secundum sanctissimum doctorem Thomam de Aquino.  Deinde fol. 22 recto: /7oc quod sequitur est secundum. expositionem Gratiadei de Esculo,  Ordinis Praedicatorum. Ef fer eum completur lectura haec: nam 5. Thomas non flus  fecit ioríe fraeventus. Incipit: Dezude cum. dicit: Similiter autem se habet, distinguit  enunciationes, quae accipiunt bro subiecto nomen finitum unzversaliter sumptum etc. Deni-  que fol.32 verso: ZExfAceu supplementum in librum. secundum  Periermenias. secundum  Gratiadeum de Esculo Ordinis Praedicatorum. Floruit Gratiadeus, iuxta Leandrum AI-  bertum, ad annum 1341, et eximius fuit, inquit Echard, et celebris sua aetate philo-  sophus et theologus (Scerzptor. Ord. Praedic. ad ann. 1341, tom. I, pag. 603). Supple-  mentum Gratiadei extat etiam in alia Veneta editione 1495, sed additur ex commentariis  eiusdem Auctoris zz eosdem. libros Jristofelis excerptum fuisse (fol. 15 verso). Denique  in  tertia  editione pariter Veneta 1496, fol. 15 recto dicitur: Z"/wres eiusdem Ordinis  (Praedic.) doctores clarissimi suppleverunt, quae nempe deerant Commentario s. Thomae.  Revera in codice Urbinate post ultimam s. Thomae lectionem, haec leguntur fol. 233  verso: ZZucusque scrifsit s. Thomas de Aquino Ordinis Praedicatorum. Ea vero quae se-  cuntur scrübsit frater Robertus de l'ulgarbia Ordinis eorumdem. Praedicatorum. Incipit:  Szmiliter autem se habet. In hac farte multiplicat ofpositionem in universalibus etc. De-  sinit fol. 241 verso, col. 2: //e/ de eodem in diversis tempore. Tum: Laus fibi Christe,  Explicit expositio secundi libri Periarmenias s. Thomae de Aquino. Sed finita fuit per  magistrum Robertum de l'ulgarbia Ordinis eorumdem Praedicatorum. Finis. Fragmen-  tum huius supplementi, sed sine auctoris nomine, habetur etiam in cod. Vatic. 2115; ex  quo eiusdem antiquitas constituitur: codex enim est labentis saeculi XIII. Codex Pari-  siensis 16154 habet et ipse fragmentum, sine nomine auctoris, alterius supplementi cuius  specimen exhibeo in fine Commentarii s. Thomae.  Tres supradictas Venetas editiones saeculi XV prae manibus habui in adornanda hac  Leonina editione. Prima, anni 1477, zmensis Johannis de Colonia, scatet mendis;  altera  1495 per Bonetum Bergomensem, expensis Octaviani Scoti, swma diligentia  castigata fer quemdam fratrem. eiusdem. Ordinis (Praedicatorum) v/ae regularis frofes-  sorem, tertia denique 1496 cum supplemento Caietani per Otinum Papiensem, impensa...  Alexandri Calcedonii, pisaurensis mercatoris. His adde duas alias editiones Venetas, supra  etiam recensitas, saeculi XVI, quae praelaudatum supplementum habent Cardinalis Caie-  tani.- Rari nunc sunt codices Pez Aermeneias. Duo extant Lutetiae Parisiorum, quos  Romae penes me habui. Codices sunt saeculi XIII, in bibliotheca Nationali signati  sub  cae  nn.  16101  et  16154, Collectionis operum latinorum, sed erant olim bibliothe-  Sorbonicae, cuius sigillum impressum retinent. Primus membran. in 4, diligentiori  scriptura exaratus; alter vero, item membran. in 4, lectu minus facilis est. Hos có-  dices olim in Sorbon. recensitos sub nn. 804 et 867, se vidisse testatur Echardus  Op. et loc. cit. - Cod. 16101 (in Sorbon. 804) continet Commentarium s. Thomae in  Peri hermeneiam (fol. 3-22); commentarium b. Alberti Magni in 8 libros 7ofecorum  (fol. 23-110); commentarium eiusdem b. Alberti in librum ZeucAorum. (fol.1 12-169):  in  »  eoque legitur: « Iste liber est Scolarium ex legato magistri Henrici de Leiliis in  Brabantia,  canonici  Leodiensis, quondam socii de Sorbona. » - Cod. 16154 (in  Sorb. 867) habet Commentarios s. Thomae in libros yscorum | Aristotelis (fol. 2-66);  in I et II PosZeriorum (fol. 67-93); in I, II et III (octo lectiones) De cae/o e£ mundo  (fol. 94-123), cum supplemento ;agzsíri Petri de Zlvermia; in tres libros De amima  (fol. 172-202); in Peri hermeneiam (fol 259-271 verso et ultim.). Continet praeterea  commentar.  Aegidii Romani De generatione (fol 136-170), et eiusdem commentar.  (incomplet) super librum Z/ezcAorum ad Domin. Philippum Comit. Handrens. (fol. 204-  257). Additur: « Iste liber est pauperum Magistrorum de Sorbona ex legato magistri  »  »  Iacobi de Padua, doctoris in theologia, medicina et artibus, socii huius Domus de  Sorbona Parisii. » - Tres insuper codices eiusdem operis exstant in bibliotheca Va-  ticana. Primus est codex Vatic. n. 2115, membranac., in quarto, saeculi XIII: nonnulla  Aristotelis  continet  opera,  inter  quae librum eri Aermeneias (fol 34-43). Huic im-  mediate subnectitur s. Thomae Commentarius (complectens folia 44-48 palimpsesta, in  quibus Aristotelis erat liber primus 720f2corws), scriptus manu diversa, minuta scri-  ptura et ferme sine ullo margine. Est codex caeteris, meo iudicio, praestantior. Quod  Fol.  si in ipso lacunas interdum ac saepe sphalmata offendimus, talia tamen haec sunt ut  seipsa prodant. Alter est Vaticanus n. 784, in fol magn. membranaceus, saeculi XIV  ineuntis.  195, recto, legitur: Zuczfut sententia super libro Peryarmenias secundum  fratrem Thomam de Aquino Ordinis fratrum Praedicatorum: desinit expositio seu sez-  lentia  fol  229  recto.  Praecedunt duo alia opuscula, nempe Cow£ra impugnantes Dei  cultum et religionem (fol. 1-84) et Zxfosifio librorum. Dyonisii (fol. 84-195): sequuntur  autem:  .  Couíra pluralitatem formarum (fol. 229-244); Zvactatfus im quo principaliter  beatifudo: consistat creata, in. intellectus (sic) vel voluntatis (fol. 244-249); Quaestio óre-  Ve (sic) edifa a fratre Thoma de Aquino Ordinis Praedicatorum de fide, sbe et caritate  (fol. 249-328 et ultimo). Quae opuscula utrum omnia s. Thomae sint nec ne adiudicanda,  suo loco dicemus. Codex est nitidis characteribus scriptus, sed ab amanuensi ignaro tum  philosophiae, tum linguae latinae: unde mirum non est si erroribus scateat.- Tertius est  codex Urbinas n. 214 membranaceus in fol. parvo, saeculi XV. Quàmvis nitida scriptura  exaratus, inscitiam oscitantiamque amanuensis passim prodit; et scriptus videtur non  ad studium, sed ad solum ornamentum bibliothecae. Complectitur folia 306, et praeter  Commentarium in librum Peri hermeneias alia continet opuscula, quae s. Thomae licet  tribuantur, non omnia tamen s. Doctoris sunt. Nullam adnotationem codices Vaticani  habent. - Exinde colliget lector codices Vatic. 2115 et Parisiens. longe maiorem, prae aliis,  auctoritatem praeseferre quoad librum Peri hermeneias.  Codd. et Edd. citat.  Cod. Vatic. 2115  »  ΡΒ  σα»,  V  »  WV.V  Paris.  Paris.  16,154  16,101  Vatic. 784  Urb.  214  Editio Piana  Editio Veneta Perih. 1477  Ed. Ven. Perih. 1495  Ed. Ven. 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Dub xat lutetae P  Pct abd avos Marce XHL x» bibliotheca :  Dod: qb  3*6  dee  jx  md.  LOI  ae.  hana  n  in md  AT 253 y 73 ὅθ. tatnotaf.,.  $3 ds ΝΣ τ ΠΝ AE n  6s  MEM  ρῶς  uL.  Ve  Ww.  "EPheie:  ab  :  oETAm -  TUM e d pu ΩΝ "  "τ΄  τὸ,  μων 4} qe: ctetu  |  mans b Afbsetü Minis US  my:  d.  fibeten dodo hortatis Lol τὰ  PAM Jegato ipagtstit Hénrisà ide  B -  "M P  SOCH  de: Pear NN  T nt aote te Δ ΟΣ;  esee Foe de γάδτονεε, in tnm  res RA TTL "VePSo b uMtim,  &  ν pec I ics HOT 70 jc :  tinm ad deno; Philtgpuin C "orit.  Fus M, gt SROIR: quee Sorbi  :  zw  E  1  DIVI  IHOMAE AQUINATIS  DOCTORIS ANGELICI  IN LIBROS PERI HERMENEIAS  EXPOSITIO  EPISTOLA NUNCUPATORIA  29  v  DILECTO SIBI PRAEPOSITO * LOVANIENSI  FRATER THOMAS DE AQUINO  SALUTEM ET VERAE SAPIENTIAE INCREMENTA  nem adhibere curavi, hoc gerens in animo sic altiora pro posse perfe-  ctioribus exhibere, ut tamen iunioribus proficiendi auxilia tradere non  recusem.  Suscipiat ergo studiositas tua praesentis expositionis munus  exiguum, ex quo si profeceris, provocare me poteris ad maiora.  z) Dilecto sibi Praeposito etc. - Cod. B: Dilecto sibi | dam Edit.: « Quanquam, inquit, multa sint Aristotelis ,  Proposito (et ita A) Lovaniensi Thomas etc.  »  quae subtilissima philosophiae arte celata sunt; hic ta-  6) Multis obscuritatibus involuto. Consentiunt commen- | » men ante omnia liber nimis et acumine sententiarum  tatores in hac s. Thomae sententia quoad obscuritatem huius | » et verborum brevitate constrictus est. » Eadem ferme  "Tractatus Aristotelis. « Magna quidem, inquit Boethius in | notaverat ante Boethium Ammonius in praefatione in  »  exordio I Editionis in lib. I Perihermeneias, libri huius | hunc Peri hermeneias librum: « Celebris, inquit, apud  »  »  »  »  »  apud Peripateticam sectam probatur auctoritas. Hic nam- | » philosophos nec quaquam ignobilis Aristotelis De inter-  que Aristoteles simplicium propositionum naturam dili- | » pretatione liber est, tum praeceptorum quae in eo tra-  genter examinat, sed eius series scrupulosa impeditur | » duntur frequentia, tum dictionis difficultate: τῆς περὶ  semita, et sublimibus pressa sententiis, aditum intelli- | » τὴν λέξιν δυσκολίας.» ( Venetiis, ed. graec. Aldi Pii Ma-  gentiae facilem non relinquit. » Et in prologo ad secun-  Lo  πα], 1503).  Ege ———  ΤΟΥΣ boa iin  ix i ES 58  »  ^  ;  mou y d  rm - nsbe "  cocco Runpet 8 einoili&oqx s.  ra P RIT : anoisim bs 22  A  Barn lal ati Mind —^——  w  ;  ᾿  uf tiute ndo» ena eos per a  αν  dee  shimgmp ὩΣ sagi. wit  Τῇ  motmedoo sms  pd ooh (e n Ten qma 4 EU  ἐς  E  *  Στ un. 3 E pn: actzdsbo s imaudib euiaa  1  sod  og ujeuenp α  vt  dnd  ARISTOTELIS PERI HERMENEIAS  LIBER I.  LECTIO PRIMA  PROOEMIUM  Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι, τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα, τί  ἐστιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις, καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ  λόγος.  ΘΥΝΟΡΒΙ5, --- 1. Duplex est operatio ἱητο]θοῖαβ, simplex ap-  prehensio et iudicium: quibus additur tertia, scilicet ratiocinium.—  2.  Obiectum circa quod Logica versatur; et libri Aristotelis ad  Logicam spectantes. — 3. De titulo huius libri deque eius obiecto,  quod est oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum invenitur. —  4. Prooemium libri.— 5. Quaestioni cuidam respondetur.  — In hoc  libro Peri hermeneias agitur de nomine et de verbo non quatenus  absolute significant simplices intellectus, neque quatenus ex eis  constituitur ordo syllogisticus, sed quatenus sunt partes enun-  *  Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen, et quid sit  verbum: postea quid negatio et affirmatio, et enuncia-  tio et oratio.  verbo simplex oratio fieri potest; et illa sunt principales orationis  partes:  sub quibus comprehenduntur pronomina et participia.  Alia sunt magis colligationes partium orationis.  — 7. Negatio et  affirmatio sunt partes subiectivae seu species, non vero partes  integrales enunciationis. - 8. Dubitatio removetur:  hypothetica ex pluribus categoricis componitur.  absolutam veritatem. - 9. Vox est quoddam naturale, et non est  proprie orationis genus. — 10. Dubii solutio:  ciationis.— 6. Alterum dubium removetur.— Ex solo nomine et  icut  dicit Philosophus in III De  SS anima, duplex est operatio intel-  XeZ« lectus: una quidem, quae dicitur  indivisibilium intelligentia *, per  DI  quam scilicet intellectus ^ appre-  hendit essentiam uniuscuiusque rei in seipsa; alia  est * operatio intellectus scilicet componentis et  eilice.  Lon est mm  *  B  omittit zres.  dividentis. Additur autem * et tertia operatio, sci-  licet ratiocinandi, secundum quod ratio procedit a  notis ad inquisitionem * ignotorum. Harum autem  operationum prima ordinatur ad secundam: quia  non potest esse compositio et divisio, nisi simpli-  cium apprehensorum. Secunda vero ordinatur ad  tertiam: quia videlicet oportet quod ex aliquo vero  cognito, cui intellectus assentiat, procedatur ad  certitudinem accipiendam de aliquibus ignotis.  2.  Cum autem Logica dicatur rationalis scien-  tia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur  circa ea quae pertinent ad tres * praedictas ope-  rationes rationis. De his igitur quae pertinent ad  αὐ Dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Ita cum editione Piana le-  gunt Venetae editiones bc et codd. ABCE; editio autem Veneta a et  codex D habent: dicitur indivisibilium intellectiva. Utraque lectio bona  est, retinenda tamen ea, quam praetulerunt Romani editores. Sicut  enim actio componens et dividens dicitur uno vocabulo iudicium,  et operatio, qua proceditur a notis ad cognitionem ignotorum, dicitur  ratiocinium; ita operatio intellectiva indivisibilium dicitur intelligentia  (Cf. infra lect. zr, n. 3) vel etiam simpliciter intellectus, non prout  vocabulum istud designat facultatem intelligendi, sed actum vel habi-  tum  eius,  nempe intelligere et intellectionem (Cf. lib. I Posterior.  analytic. lect. xxiv, n. 3).— Aliunde dubium omne pellitur ex libro IIT  De anima, quem citat s. Thomas. Ibi enim cap. v1, Aristoteles habet:  'H.... τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις, indivisibilium intelligentia; et s. Thomas  hunc locum exponens lect. xi dicit: « Una operationum intellectus est,  »  secundum quod intelligit indivisibilia... Et haec intelligentia » etc.  Haec notanda esse duxi, ut novitius ediscat penes s. Thomam et alios  Scholasticos nomine intelligentiae proprie non designari facultatem in-  tellectivam, sed actionem eiusdem facultatis, hoc est, cognitionem (P. 1,  qu. Lxxix, artic. x).  — Divisio magis ac-  cedit ad partes; compositio ad totum. —In iis, quae possunt esse  et  non esse, prius est non esse, quam esse.  primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae  simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat * Ari-  stoteles in libro Praedicamentorum. De his vero,  quae pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet  de  enunciatiorie affirmativa et negativa, deter-  minat Philosophus in libro Perihermeneias. De  his vero quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem  determinat in libro Priorum et in consequen-  tibus, in quibus agitur de syllogismo simpliciter  et  de  diversis  syllogismorum et argumentatio-  num speciebus, quibus * ratio de uno procedit ad  aliud. Et ideo secundum praedictum ordinem trium  operationum, liber Praedicamentorum ordinatur  ad librum Perihermeneias, qui ordinatur ad li-  brum Priorum et sequentes *.  3. Dicitur ergo liber iste, qui prae manibus ha-  betur, Perihermeneias *, quasi De interpretatione.  Dicitur autem ;nterpretatio, secundum Boethium,  vox significativa, quae per se aliquid significat *,  sive sit complexa sive incomplexa. Unde coniun-  B) Per quam scilicet intellectus etc. In editione Piana deest vocabulum  intellectus, quod, licet de facili subintelligatur, adiicimus tamen expli-  cite ex codd.  y) Interpretatio, secundum Boethium etc. Haec Boethius habet Prooe-  mio Edit. prim. in lib. De interpretatione (Opp.-Basileae 1570, pag. 215).  Interpretatio (ἑρμηνεία) est vox significativa, per seipsam aliquid si-  gnificans. Et quia non solum propositio (quae est vox complexa), sed  etiam nomen et verbum (quae sunt voces incomplexae) aliquid per  seipsa significant, sequitur quod, iuxta sententiam Boethii, ab eodem ex-  pressam (ib.), nomen et verbum subiectum Peri hermeneias consti-  tuant  recte  non solum prout sunt partes enunciationis seu propositionis,  sed etiam secundum se sumpta. — Sed Boethio haud consentit s. Tho-  mas,  notando quod ille interpretatur, proprie loquendo, qui  exponit  non  aliquid esse verum vel falsum. Ergo interpretatio proprie  erit quaelibet vox per se significans, sed quae et per se signi-  ficat et simul per se continet enunciatque verum vel falsum. Hoc au-  tem  proprium est vocis complexae seu orationis, imo solius orationis  enunciativae, quatenus haec distinguitur ab oratione optativa et impe-  rativa et aliis, ut in hoc ipso numero optime dicit Angelicus. Unde  *  — Enunciatio - Non continet  *  Cap. 1.  Codd. - p.: de-  terminavit. Etita  infra.  *  *  A: fn quibus.  Codd.: conse-  quentes.  *  A:  liber Peri-  hermeneias, id-  est De etc.  Y  8  cliones  *  A:  et cum.  et  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I.  praepositiones et alia huiusmodi non  dicuntur interpretationes, quia non per se aliquid  significant. Similiter etiam voces significantes na-  turaliter, non ex proposito aut* cum imaginatione  Codd.- P. omit-  *  tit sunt.  ACDE: determi-  *  nat; 9n: dicit.  *  AC  omitt. ad.  proprium uniuscuiusque scientiae partes subiecti  tradere, sicut et passiones. Patet igitur ad quam  partem philosophiae pertineat liber iste, et quae  sit necessitas istius, et quem ordinem teneat * inter  Logicae libros.  4.  aliquid significandi, sicut sunt * voces brutorum  animalium, interpretationes dici non possunt. Qui  enim interpretatur aliquid exponere intendit. Et  ideo sola nomina et verba et orationes dicuntur  interpretationes, de quibus in hoc libro determi-  natur *. - Sed tamen nomen et verbum magis in-  terpretationis principia esse videntur, quam in-  terpretationes. Ille enim interpretari videtur, qui  exponit aliquid esse verum vel falsum. Et ideo  sola oratio enunciativa, in qua verum vel falsum  invenitur, interpretatio vocatur. Caeterae vero ora-  tiones, ut optativa et imperativa, magis ordinantur  ad exprimendum affectum, quam ad * interpretan-  dum id quod in intellectu habetur. Intitulatur ergo  liber  iste De interpretatione, ac si diceretur De  enunciativa oratione: in qua verum vel falsum in-  venitur. Non autem hic agitur de nomine et verbo,  nisi in quantum sunt partes enunciationis. Est enim  colligitur quod titulus περὶ ἑρμηνείας, qui de verbo ad verbum vertitur  De interpretatione, philosophice reddi iure merito potest, De enun-  ciativa oratione. Hinc Ammonius in prologo sui Commentarii in librum  Peri hermeneias dicit: « De interpretatione librum inscripsit, perinde  »  »  »  quasi hoc modo, an De enunciativa inscribas oratione, nihil intersit:  ἐπέγραψε τὸ βιβλίον περὶ ἑρμηνείας, ὡς οὐδεν διαφέρον ἢ οὕτως ἐπιγράφειν,  ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἀποφαντιχοῦ λόγου » (Venetiis, 1546, interprete Bartholo-  maeo Sylvanio, fol. r, col. 3. - ib. graec. ed. cit. Aldi Pii Manutii).  Attamen quamvis oratio enunciativa constituat subiectum huius tra-  ctatus, non de illa solummodo hic agitur, sed etiam de nomine et verbo,  alüsque ad ipsam enunciativam orationem pertinentibus. Ratio est quia  proprium scientiae est cognitio sui subiecti ad quod tanquam ad suum  finem ordinatur. Non autem possibile est cognoscere naturam cuiusque  subiecti nisi cognoscantur partes ex quibus constituitur (sicut ad cogno-  scendam hominis naturam necesse est cognoscere eius partes, tum phy-  sicas, nempe animam et corpus organicum, tum metaphysicas, scilicet  animalitatem et rationalitatem) ; neque plene iterum cognoscitur ipsum  subiectum , cognita ipsius natura, nisi etiam cognoscantur eius pro-  prietates, seu propriae passiones, quae naturam ipsam subiecti conse-  quuntur (eo modo quo capacitas sciendi in-homine sequitur eius na-  turam rationalem). Atqui partes seu principia ex quibus constituitur  oratio  enunciativa sunt nomina et verba. Ergo et de istis et de pro-  prietatibus enunciationis, prout ordinantur ad principale subiectum quod  est ipsa enunciativa oratio, determinat liber iste Peri hermeneias.  Quibus constitutis, non est difficilis solutio quaestionis, quae quoad  titulum περὶ ἑρμηνείας, praefixum huic libro ab ipso Aristotele, uti vi-  detur, penes veteres agitabatur, quamque iterum recentiores versant.  Aspasius enim et Alexander Aphrodisiensis, uti refert Boethius in Pro-  logo secundae Ed. Commentarior. in hunc librum (pag. 291—2), de ora-  tione hic tractari ab Aristotele iuxta titulum affirmabant: nam si proferre  aliquid oratione, ut aiunt ipsi, interpretari est, De interpretatione liber  veluti de oratione perscriptus est. Unde Alexander imperfectum addebat  esse titulum praefixum ; quia cum ἑρμηνεία sonet orationem quamcumque,  nonnisi de oratione enunciativa, jj de oratione in qua continetur ve-  rum vel falsum in libro est sermo. « Sed, respondet Boethius, qui (Ale-  »  xander) semel solam orationem interpretationis nomine vocari recipit,  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  in intellectu quoque ipsius inscriptionis ( nempe περὶ ἑρμηνείας) erravit.  Cur enim putaret imperfectum esse titulum, quoniam nihil de qua  oratione disputaret adiecerit; ut si quis interrogans quid est homo,  alio respondente animal, culpet ac dicat imperfecte illum dixisse quid  sit, quoniam non sit omnes differentias persecutus?... Eodem quoque  modo et de oratione, si quis hoc concedat primum, nihil aliud inter-  pretatione diti nisi orationem, cur qui de interpretatione inscripserit,  et  de qua interpretatione dicat non addiderit, culpetur? Satis est enim  eum libri titulum etiam de aliqua continenti communione fecisse, ut nos  eum et de nominibus et verbis et de orationibus, cum haec omnia uno  interpretationis nomine continerentur, supra fecisse docuimus, cum hic  liber ab eo ( Aristotele) de interpretatione nominatus est » (Loc. supra  cit. ex II Edit.). Neque Alexandro neque Boethio subscribit s. Thomas:  titulus non est imperfectus, quia ἑρμηνεία non orationem quamcumque,  sed illam quae continet verum vel falsum seu emunciativam proprie  significat; neque est titulus communis nomini, verbo et orationi, quia  ἑρμηνεία non est λέξις, nempe dictio vel oratio quaecumque per se si-  gnificans, sed significans verum vel falsum, ut dictum est: proindeque  non  comprehendit nomina et verba praecise quia per se significant ali-  quid, sed quatenus sunt partes τῆς ἑρμηνείας, orationis videlicet inter-  pretativae seu enunciativae, a qua, sicut a principaliori subiecto liber  Praemittit autem huic operi Philosophus  prooemium, in quo sigillatim exponit ea, quae in  hoc libro sunt tractanda. Et quia omnis scientia  praemittit ea, quae de principiis sunt; partes autem  compositorum sunt eorum principia; ideo opor-  tet  intendenti tractare de enunciatione praemit-  tere de partibus eius. Unde dicit: Primum opor-  let  constituere,  nomen  et quid sit verbum. 1n graeco habetur, Primum  oporlet poni et idem significat. Quia enim de-  monstrationes definitiones praesupponunt, ex qui-  bus concludunt, merito dicuntur positiones?. Et ideo  praemittuntur hic * solae definitiones eorum, de  quibus agendum est: quia ex definitionibus alia  cognoscuntur *.  5. Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro Praedi-  camentorum de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit*  denominatur (Cf. Albert. Magn. in lib. I Perihermeneias tract. I,.c. 1,  P. 237).  λον Waitz, Aristotelis Organon graece, p.l, pag. 323, Li-  psiae 1844,—recitat et approbat sententiam Aquinatis aientis, nomen et ver-  rum magis interpretationis principia esse quam interpretationes; verum  loquens postea de Gumposch ait: « Titulum libri plane ineptum iudicat  »  »  »  (Gumposch) quem equidem ferri posse putaverim, quum ἑρμηνεία de  communicatione sermonis intelligitur, cuius principia in hoc libro tra-  satis  duntur » (Ib. pag. 324). Adde quod haec s. Thomae explicatio videtur  haud  conformis ipsi Aristoteli. In libro enim 16 respiratione  cap. ΧΙ ait: « In quibusdam lingua et ad percipiendos sapores et ad for-  »  mandum sermonem, xai πρὸς τὴν ἑρμηνείαν, (matura) utitur. » Hoc  loco, sicut et II. De anima, cap. vi, n. 10, ἑρμηνείαν pro sermone  usurpat Aristoteles; et pro elocutione sumit in libro .De rhetorica ad  Alexandrum capp. xxur et xxiv, Quibus cohaerenter s. Isidorus in libro II  Originum seu Etymologiarum, cap. xxv, De perihermeniis Aristo-  telis loquens, ait: « Omnis elocutio conceptae rei interpres est; inde  »  »  Perihermeniam nominat (Aristoteles) quam interpretationem nos ap-  pellamus. » — Hisce de causis nuperus auctor libri De logica Aristo-  telis  existimat titulum Peri hermeneias verius verti de sermone, non  quidem generice accepto, prouti nempe est signum quodlibet sensibile  manifestativum passionum animae (ut sumitur loco citato ex libro De  respiratione) , sed prouti strictiori sensu assumitur ad efformandas  diversas propositiones.  Quae omnia, deducta ex ipso vocabulo περὶ ἑρμηνείας non infirmant,  meo iudicio, sententiam s. Thomae. Etenim cum, philosophice loquendo,  verum sit nomen et verbum, ex quibus enunciatio componitur, esse  potius principia interpretationis quam interpretationes, sequitur quod  interpretatio, ἑρμηνεία, proprie orationem in genere et magis etiam pro-  prie orationem enunciativam designet. - Praeterea concedimus quod elo-  cutio conceptae rei interpres est; sed ea de qua in hoc tractatu agitur,  elocutio est non rhetorica sed philosophica vel dialectica  refert Boethius loc. do. quae est idem ac enunciatio, qua mens conce-  ptam rei veritatem aut falsitatem manifestat. Et ideo sermo manifestativus  conceptuum mentis suam perfectionem propriumque finem non attingit  nisi in enunciatione. Unde merito s. Thomas dicit ἑρμηνείαν hoc est inter-  pretationem sumi ab Aristotele pro enunciatione in titulo huius libri, —  Aegidius Columna, s. Thomae discipulus doctissimus: « Hic, inquit,  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  intendit determinare de compositione simplicium quidditatum , scilicet  de enunciatione sive interpretatione. Et in hoc patet subiectum huius  libri scilicet interpretatio... Et, si obiiciatur: interpretatio est locus dia-  lecticus; ergo non est subiectum in hoc libro; dicendum quod locus  dialecticus est prout unum nomen exponitur per alia nomina; ut phi-  losophus per hoc quod est amator sapientiae. Sed in hoc libro est  subiectum prout est idem quod enunciatio. Unde neque nomen per  se, neque verbum dicitur interpretatio, quae sunt partes interpreta-  tionis; et interpretatio idem est quod enunciatio » (In lib. Periherm.  Exposit. in princ. — Venetiis per Simonem De Luere 1507 fol. 47, verso,  "col. 1). Nempe Aegidius vestigia premit Magistri, quem, ut in Praefa-  tione diximus, sub nomine Expositoris frequentissime citat.  ὃ) Merito dicuntur positiones. De hac re copiose disserit s. Thomas  in 1 Posterior., lect. v, et in II, lect. vr. — Cod. B: et merito, sed  non bene. Corrector autem huius cod. ex proprio arbitrio ef mutat in  ideo.  £) Alia cognoscuntur. Codd. omnes.- P.: alia capimus consequenter, —  A lectionem habet non admittendam: et ideo praemittuntur solae defi-  nitiones, de quibus... alia cognoscuntur.  Proprium unius-  cuiusque scien-  tiae.  *  Codd.-».: reti-  neat.  Scientia praemit-  tit ea quae de  principiis sunt.  idest  definire  quid  sit  ὃ  * Hicomittitur ab  A et B.  *  (ut ex Alexandro  Codd. - p.: sit.  CAP. 1, LECT. 1  Triplex simpli-  cium  dictionum  consideratio.  *  Codd.- p.: intel-  lectiones.  necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo de-  terminaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod. simplicium  dictionum triplex potest esse consideratio. Una  quidem, secundum quod absolute significant sim-  plices intellectus *, et sic earum | consideratio per-  tinet ad librum Praedicamentorum. Alio modo,  secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enuncia-  tionis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et  ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de  quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum  tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi,  quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum  quod constituunt enunciationem. 'T'ertio modo, con-  siderantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo  syllogisticus, et sic determinatur de eis sub ra-  tione terminorum in libro Priorum.  9  iungit de his, quae pertinent ad principalem in-  tentionem, dicens: Postea quid negatio et quid  affirmatio, quae sunt enunciationis partes: non  quidem integrales, sicut nomen et verbum (alio-  quin oporteret omnem enunciationem ex affirma-  tione et negatione compositam esse '), sed partes  subiectivae, idest species. Quod quidem nunc sup-  ponatur, posterius autem manifestabitur *.  8. Sed potest dubitari: cum enunciatio divi-  datur in categoricam et hypotheticam, quare de  his non facit mentionem, sicut de affirmatione et  negatione. Et potest dici quod hypothetica enun-  ciatio ex pluribus categoricis componitur. Unde  non differunt nisi secundum differentiam unius et  multi. - Vel potest dici, et melius, quod hypothe-  tica enunciatio non continet absolutam veritatem,  * ABC: Orationum.  καὶ  significan-  6. Potest iterum dubitari quare, praetermissis  aliis orationis * partibus, de solo nomine et verbo  determinet. Ad quod dicendum est quod, quia de  simplici enunciatione 5 determinare intendit, sufficit  ut solas illas partes enunciationis pertractet, ex qui-  bus ex necessitate simplex oratio constat. Potest  autem ex solo nomine et verbo simplex * enuncia-  tio fieri, non autem ex aliis orationis partibus sine  his; et ideo sufficiens ei fuit de his duabus de-  terminare. Vel potest dici quod sola nomina et  verba sunt principales orationis partes. Sub no-  minibus enim comprehenduntur pronomina, quae,  etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen de-  terminant ?, et ideo loco nominum ponuntur: sub  verbo vero participium, quod consignificat tem-  pus?: quamvis et cum nomine convenientiam ha-  beat. Alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium  orationis,  significantes * habitudinem unius ad  aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia  huiusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium  navis coniunctiones.  7. His igitur praemissis quasi principiis, sub-  t) Quia de simpli enunciatione..... solas illas partes etc. Ve-  ram hanc lectionem codd. ACDE sufficimus lectioni Pianae, quae cum  cod. B habet: quia de simplici oratione..... solas partes etc. Etenim  lect. vir enumerantur diversae orationis species, et de sola oratione  enunciativa, utpote quae directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrati-  vam, dicitur esse praesens consideratio; sed aliae orationis partes ad  alias artes pertinent, puta ad rhetoricam, poéticam etc. Qua de re  vide quae hic supra num. 3 dicta sunt tum in textu tum in nota. — Sed  praeterea cod. A immediate prosequitur: solas illas partes orationis etc.  Quae lectio mihi omnino placet, et certe dubio proposito magis re-  spondet, quam enunciationis. Sed his positis, legendum mihi videtur  in fine, non oratio, sed enunciatio; nempe: quia de simplici enun-  ciatione determinare intendit, sufficit ut solas illas partes orationis  pertractet, ex quibus ex necessitate simplex enunciatio constat.  Ἢ) Etsi non nominant naturam, personam tamen determinant.  Codd. DE habent: etsi non naturam, personam tamen determinant.  Editio vero a legit sicut Piana: etsi non nominant (naturam) perso-  nam tamen determinant. Sensus idem est, sed retinenda lectio Piana,  utpote quae magis perspicua. Vult enim s. Thomas quod nomen si-  gnificat naturam; et quod pronomen non determinatam significat na-  turam, sed personam determinatam, ut ipse explicite tradit lect. 1v,  num.  13. — Cod. A: etsi unam personam tantum determinant, sub  verbo etc. Quae lectio mutila est, et sensum nullum exhibet. Etiam codd.  BC turbatam omnino atque inintelligibilem produnt lectionem , omit-  tendo cum A verba non nominant... et ideo loco nominum ponun-  tur.  In.  cod.  denique B abrasa est primitiva lectio, ita ut non sit  amplius legibilis, et verba naturam, personam, secunda manu scripta  sunt.  9) Quod consignificat tempus. lta legendum est cum editione Piana  et cod.  B; non  autem, quod significat tempus, ut habent codd. ACD.  Participium enim quia participat verbum, hac de ratione conmsignificat  actionem vel passionem verbi; et ideo etiam ex consequenti significat  tempus, nempe consignificat, ut s. Thomas lect. v dicit. Verbum autem  primo et per se: significat actionem vel passionem, quae nobis notae  sunt in tempore. Qua de causa et ipsum verbum primo et per se non  Opp. D. Tnuowax T. I.  cuius cognitio requiritur * in demonstratione, ad  quam liber iste principaliter ordinatur; sed signi-  ficat aliquid verum esse ex suppositione: quod  non  sufficit in scientiis demonstrativis, nisi con-  firmetur per absolutam veritatem simplicis enun-  ciationis. Et ideo Aristoteles praetermisit tracta-  tum de hypotheticis enunciationibus et syllogismis.  Subdit autem, ef enunciatio, quae est genus ne-  gationis et affirmationis; ef oratio, quae est genus  enunciationis.  9. Si quis ulterius quaerat, quare non facit  ulterius * mentionem de voce, dicendum est quod  vox est quoddam naturale; unde pertinet ad con-  siderationem Naturalis philosophiae, ut patet in  secundo De anima *, et in ultimo De generatione  animalium *. Unde etiam ** non est proprie oratio-  nis genus, sed assumitur ad constitutionem ora-  tionis, sicut res naturales ad constitutionem arti-  ficialium.  10.  Videtur  autem  ordo  enunciationis  esse  praeposterus *: nam affirmatio naturaliter est prior  negatione, et iis prior est enunciatio, sicut genus;  significat tempus, sed significat cum tempore, seu consignificat tempus. —  Sed de his plura infra.  — Cod. E: quod signat tempus.  t) Compositam esse. Codd. omnes et tres editiones Venetae saeculi XV,  nec non alia 1526 legunt compositam esse. In editione Parisiensi 1660  locus  iste, si a mendis typographicis expurgetur, convenit cum edi-  tionis Pianae lectione , quae est: compositam nomen esse vel verbum.  Sic etiam legitur in Veneta editione Perihermen. 1557 et Opp. s. Tho-  mae  1595; item in Antuerpiensi 1612. Cuius autem codicis auctori-  tate freti Piani editores (et cum his Mallet in ed. Paris. ac Morelles in  Antuerp.) posuerint compositam nomen esse vel verbum , non dicunt;  at procul dubio non sine codicibus optimae notae viri doctissimi moti  fuissent ad praefatam lectionem adhibendam, si eam adhibuissent: quod  ideo dico, quia mendum existimo irrepsisse ex typographorum oscitantia  in Ven. 1557, quam deinde sequutae sunt posteriores editiones. Sed quid-  quid denique hac de re sit, lectio est reiicienda: nam sensus expressus  ἃ  s. Thoma est: sicut ex eo quod nomen et verbum sunt partes integra-  les, seu partes necessario requisitae ad propositionem , omnis propo-  sitio est necessario composita ex nomine simul et verbo; ita necessario  componeretur ex affirmatione simul et negatione, si ipsae non secus ac  nomen et verbum essent partes integrales propositionis. - Cod. B non  legit, alioquin oporteret, sicut revera legendum est cum aliis codd. et  edd., sed, a quo enim oportet. ldem cod. contra textum Aristotelis et  apertum commentarium s. Thomae (Cf. infr. n. 10) legit paulo supra:  postea quid affirmatio et negatio.  :  x) Videtur autem ordo enunciationis esse praeposterus. « Syrianus  »  »  »  »  vero, inquit Boethius, cui Philoxenus cognomen est, hoc loco quaerit,  cur  proponens prius de negatione post de affirmatione pronunciaverit  (Aristoteles) dicens: Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et  quid verbum, postea quid negatio et affirmatio » (7n lib. De interpret.  Ed. II, De signis, pag. 295). Quod quidem dubium a se propositum  solvit ipse Syrianus duabus adductis rationibus, quas primo et secundo  loco  »  recitat  s.  Thomas: « qua in expositione, addit Boethius ib., ab  Alexandri quoque opinione non recedit. » — Cod. C verba omnia tran-  scripta in principio huius notae omittit, ac incipit: tam affirmatio; sed  ilis omissis, cur caetera transcriberet imperitus amanuensis ignoravit.  2*  *  Lect.viin., n.20  et seq.  *  A: requisita est.  *  tur a cod. 4.  Ulterius omitti-  *  Cap. vii, n. 10  et seqq. - Com-  ment. s. Thomae  lect. xvi.  *  Cap.  **  vir.  Codd.  tunt etiam.  omit-  10  et per consequens oratio enunciatione. - Sed di-  cendum quod, quia a partibus inceperat enume-  ταῦθ, procedit a partibus ad totum. Negationem  autem, quae divisionem continet, eadem ratione  praeponit affirmationi, quae consistit in composi-  tione: quia divisio magis accedit ad partes, com-  positio vero magis accedit ad totum. Vel potest  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  dici, secundum quosdam, quod praemittitur nega-  tio, quia in iis quae possunt esse et non esse,  prius est non esse, quod significat negatio, quam  esse, quod significat affirmatio. - Sed tamen *, quia  sunt species ex aequo dividentes genus, sunt si-  mul natura; unde non refert quod eorum prae-  X) Sed dicendum quod quia a partibus inceperat enumerare etc.  Ita edit. Piana. — Codd. BC legunt: sed dicendum (C dicendum est) quod  quia a partibus inceperat enunciare; et in hac lectione consentiunt  codd. DE. Nolo contradicere auctoritati quatuor codd., praesertim Pa-  risiensium; at enumerare edd. Pianae et Ven. retineo, quia sensum per-  spicuum exhibet, cum enunciare nonnihil obscuri habeat. Posito ta-  men enumerare, dubium subit num forte in principio huius numeri  legendum sit ordo enumerationis, potius quam ordo enunciationis, uti  habent codd. et edd. omnes, — Cod. autem A primam partem huius sen-  *  ACDE: S7 lame  sunt. - Β: sed ta-  men sunt,  ponatur.  tentiae sed dicendum etc. omnino omittit; alteram vero partem corrumpit  legendo: ab enuntiatione procedit ad totum. Sed et corruptam etiam  lectionem habet in principio huius numeri; videntur autem affirmatio-  nes  esse posterius: nam affirmatio est prior etc. Infra etiam legit:  negationem etiam... eadem ratione postponitur (praeponitur?)... quae  ratio consistit... quam quod significat... si tamen sunt species ex quo  dividentes.— Haec noto in specimen corruptionis huius codicis, cuius  gemmae plurimo luto foedantur; ne a me postulet lector ut σφάλματα  omnia tum huius, tum aliorum, quibus utor, codd. recenseam.  CAP. I, LECT. II  LECTIO SECUNDA  DE VOCUM SIGNIFICATIONE  Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν i» τῇ ψυχῇ παθη-  μάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ.  11  * Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima  passionum notae: et ea quae scribuntur, eorum quae  sunt in voce.  Καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ  αἱ  αὐταί:  φωναὶ  ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως, vd αὐτὸ πᾶσι παθή-  ματα τῆς ψυχῆς, xal ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πραάγ-  ματα ἤδη ταὐτά.  Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς" ἄλλης  γὰρ ταῦτα πραγματείας.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Ordo dicendorum.- 2. Homini, natura sua ra-  tionali et sociali, necessariae sunt voces et scriptura. 3. Vocum  significatio, utpote quae est immediata conceptionibus intellectus,  E ad principalem considerationem Logicae. - 4. Nomen et  erbum et alia huiusmodi tripliciter habent esse, in conceptione  intellectus, in prolatione vocis et in conscriptione litterarum. —  P. Nomina, verba et orationes significant immediate intellectus  Conceptiones, et eis mediantibus res.— 6. Conceptio intellectus  lato sensu potest dici passio:— vocesque dicuntur esse signa pas-  Sionum animae, tum quia ex passione provenit ut homo inte-  riorem conceptum per voces alteri significare velit; tum quia  conceptio intellectus, quam significant, a rebus quodammodo ori-  tur per modum cuiusdam passionis sensus, à quo est phantasma,  raemisso prooemio, Philosophus acce-  dit  ad. propositum exequendum. Et  quia ea, de quibus promiserat se di-  x2  LU  cturum, sunt voces significativae com-  plexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum  de significatione vocum: et deinde de vocibus  significativis  *  NEP  *  BCE : praedixe-  rat.  *  Y:  Lect. 1v.  *  ,  p omittit s/gni-  oe A  *  *  *  Lect. iti,  Infra n, 8.  Infra n. 5.  *g: ex.  ΨΥ,  ΟΠ  determinat de quibus in prooemio  se dicturum promiserat.* Et hoc ibi: Nomen ergo  est vox significativa * etc. - Circa primum duo  facit: primo, determinat qualis sit significatio vo-  cum; secundo, ostendit differentiam significatio-  num * vocum complexarum et incomplexarum; ibi:  Est. autem quemadmodum * etc. - Circa. primum  duo facit: primo quidem, praemittit ordinem si-  gnificationis vocum; secundo, ostendit qualis sit  vocum significatio, utrum sit ex natura vel ex  impositione; ibi: Et quemadmodum nec litterae * etc.  2.  Est ergo considerandum quod circa pri-  mum tria proponit, ex quorum uno intelligitur  quartum. Proponit enim scripturam, voces et ani-  mae passiones *, ex quibus intelliguntur res. Nam  passio est ex impressione alicuius agentis; et sic  passiones animae originem habent ab * ipsis rebus.  Et si quidem homo esset naturaliter animal so-  litarium, sufficerent sibi animae passiones, quibus  ipsis rebus conformaretur, ut earum notitiam in  se  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  haberet; sed quia homo est animal naturaliter  a) Non possunt bene convivere ad. invicem : « Linguarum diversitas,  inquit s. Augustinus, hominem alienat ab homine, Nam si duo sibimet  invicem fiant obviam, neque praeterire, sed simul esse aliqua mneces-  sitate cogantur, quorum neuter norit linguam alterius; facilius sibi  animalia muta, etiam diversi generis, quam illi, cum sint homines  ambo, sociantur. Quando enim quae sentiunt, inter se communicare  non possunt, propter solam linguae diversitatem, nihil prodest ad con-  sociandos homines tanta similitudo naturae: ita ut libentius homo sit  Et quemadmodum nec litterae eaedem omnibus, sic nec  eaedem voces:  quorum autem hae primorum primo notae sunt, eaedem  omnibus passiones animae sunt; et quorum hae simi-  litudines, res etiam eaedem.  De his itaque dictum est in his, quae dicta sunt de anima:  alterius est enim negocii.  sine quo in nobis non est intelligere.- 7. Nomina et verba scripta  immediate significant nomina et verba quae sunt in voce.- 8. Quia  nec voces articulatae, nec litterae sunt eaedem apud omnes, ideo  non naturaliter significant, sed ex institutione humana.- Attamen  sunt quaedam voces quae naturaliter significant, et quae propterea  eaedem sunt apud omnes.— 9. Passiones seu cognitiones natu-  raliter res designant, ex vi requisitae similitudinis rei cognitae  in cognoscente; et ideo eaedem sunt apud omnes. - 10. Simplices  intellectus conceptiones, quibus essentia rei cognoscitur, semper  sunt verae et eaedem apud omnes et eas primo voces significant. —  11. Identitas conceptionis adserta in omnibus non est per com-  parationem ad voces, sed per comparationem ad res. — 12. Tra-  ctatus de cognitione non pertinet ad Logicam.  unius  politicum. et sociale, necesse fuit quod. conceptio-  nes  hominis innotescerent alis, quod fit  per vocem; et ideo necesse fuit esse voces signi-  ficativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem * con-  viverent. Unde illi, qui sunt diversarum lingua-  rum, non possunt bene convivere ad invicem *.  Rursum si homo uteretur sola cognitione sensi-  tiva, quae respicit solum * ad Ac et nunc P, suffi-  ceret sibi ad convivendum aliis vox significativa,  Sicut et caeteris animalibus, quae per quasdam  voces, suas conceptiones invicem sibi manifestant:  sed  quia homo utitur etiam intellectuali cogni-  tione, quae abstrahit ab Aic et nunc; consequitur  ipsum sollicitudo non solum de praesentibus se-  cundum /ocum et tempus *, sed etiam de his quae  distant loco et futura sunt tempore. Unde ut homo  conceptiones suas etiam his qui distant secundum  locum et his qui venturi sunt in futuro tempore  manifestet, necessarius fuit usus scripturae ?.  3. Sed quia Logica ordinatur ad cognitionem  de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est  immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, per-  tinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius; si-  gnificatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remo-  ta, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed  magis * ad considerationem grammatici. Et ideo  exponens ordinem significationum non incipit a  »  cum cane suo, quam cum homine alieno » (De civitate Dei, lib. XIX,  cap. vit, ed. Maur.). — Cod. B: unde aliqui (in marg. add. qui) sunt di-  versarum.. ad invicem convivere.  8) Hic et nunc, idest loci et temporis determinatio (Cf. Posterior.  analytic. lib. I, lect. xri).  Y) Secundum locum, quod Scholastici etiam dicunt secundum hic;  sicut secundum tempus determinatum dicunt secundum nunc.  9) Scripturae vel prout communiter hoc vocabulo intelligitur, vel  *  Seq. c. 1.  *  p  omittit ad in-  vicem.  *  pc omittunt so-  lum.  *  A  omitt. nagis.  12  *  AB.  Autem deest in  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  5. Circa id autem * quod dicit, earum quae sunt  in  anima passionum, considerandum est quod  passiones animae communiter dici solent appeti-  litteris, sed a vocibus: quarum primo significatio-  nem exponens, dicit: Sunt ergo ea, quae sunt in  voce, nolae, idest, signa earum passionum. quae  sunt in anima. Dicit autem * ergo, quasi ex prae-  ε  *  Ut deest in A; et  B omittit quasz.  *  gc: descriptio-  ne.  missis concludens: quia supra dixerat * determi-  nandum esse de nomine et verbo et aliis prae-  dictis; haec autem sunt voces significativae; ergo  oportet vocum significationem exponere.  4. Utitur autem hoc modo loquendi, ut dicat,  t  ea quae sunt in voce, et non, voces, ut * quasi con-  tinuatim loquatur cum praedictis. Dixerat enim  dicendum esse de nomine et verbo et aliis huius-  modi.  Haec autem tripliciter habent esse. Uno  quidem modo, in conceptione intellectus; alio  modo, in prolatione vocis; tertio modo, in con-  scriptione * litterarum. Dicit ergo, ea quae sunt in  voce  etc.; ac si dicat, nomina et verba et alia  consequentia, quae tantum sunt in voce, sunt πὸ-  tae. - Vel, quia non omnes voces sunt significa-  tivae, et earum quaedam sunt significativae natu-  raliter, quae longe sunt a ratione nominis et verbi  et aliorum consequentium; ut appropriet suum di-  ctum  ad  ea  de quibus intendit, ideo dicit, ea  quae sunt in voce, idest quae continentur sub voce,  Sicut partes sub toto. - Vel, quia vox est quoddam  naturale, nomen autem et verbum significant ex  institutione  humana, quae advenit rei naturali  sicut materiae, ut forma lecti ligno; ideo ad de-  signandum nomina et verba et alia consequen-  tia  dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, ac si de lecto di-  ceretur, ea quae sunt in ligno *.  prout etiam scriptura comprehendit signa quaecumque sensibilia, a vo-  cibus diversa; cuiusmodi sunt signa ideographica. ὁ  c) Concludens: quia supra dixerat etc. — Codd. BC: quasi ex. prae-  missis concludens, ut supra dixerat etc. Cod. A: quasi... ut etiam dixe-  rat.— Retinenda Piana, ut ex contextu est manifestum.  Ὁ Acsi de lecto diceretur etc.  — Cod. A: ac^si diceretur, ea quae sunt  in lecto. Lectio obscura: vult enim exemplo inducto s. Thomas ostendere  quod significatio est in voce eo ferme modo, quo forma lecti est in ligno.  Quam comparationem subintellectam a cod. cit. Piana ed. aliique codd.  explicite ponunt, et melius, — Cod. C habet dicerentur, et amanuensis osci-  tanter omittit nomina et verba et, alia consequentia.  Ὁ) Andronicus posuit hunc librum non esse Aristotelis. Andronici Rho-  dii (flor. saecul. Ciceronis) temeritatem. merito notat s. Thomas; sed  placet etiam addere quae habet b. Albertus Magnus in I Peri herm. tract. I,  cap.1in fine: « Quod de auctore quidam quaerunt supervacuum est et  tus  alia  sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et  huiusmodi, ut dicitur in Il. Ethicorum *. Et  verum est quod huiusmodi passiones significant  naturaliter quaedam voces hominum, ut gemitus  infirmorum, et aliorum animalium *, ut dicitur in I  Politicae *. Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus signi-  ficativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet  passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus. con-  ceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes si-  gnificant immediate *, secundum sententiam Ari-  stotelis. Non enim potest esse quod significent  immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi  apparet: significat enim hoc nomen homo natu-  ram humanam in abstractione * a singularibus.  Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate  hominem singularem; unde * Platonici posuerunt  quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis * separatam.  Sed quia hoc * secundum suam abstractionem non  subsistit realiter * secundum sententiam Aristotelis,  sed. est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Ari-  stoteli  dicere  quod voces significant intellectus  conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.  6. Sed quia non est consuetum quod. conce-  ptiones intellectus * Aristoteles nominet passiones;  ideo Andronicus posuit hunc librum non esse  Aristotelis ἢ, Sed manifeste invenitur in 1 De ani-  ma * quod passiones animae vocat omnes ani-  mae operationes ^. Unde et ipsa conceptio intel-  »  »  »  »  inquit, aut legitime non esse Aristotelis suspicor, sed ab aliquo qui  eo fuerit posterior addita...; aut ab eo quidem fuisse conscripta, verum  ut qui lectorem modo exercere ad rationes eas diiudicandas quae pro-  babiliter quidem, .non tamen vere dicerentur, voluerit. » In hanc suspi-  cionem descendit Ammonius quia existimabat «contraria sentire in libris  »  suis omnibus videri Philosophum iis quae hoc loco disseruntur. » Ad-  ditque hanc quoque, ut ipse opinatur, causam. fuisse Porphyrio « ut hu-  »  iusce theorematis expositionem recusarit » (Ib. fol. 38, recto, col. 1 et 2).  Quae sint illa contraria ad quae alludit Ammonius non dicit, et existimo  a  *  *  pomitt. autem.  Cap. v (al. 1v),  n.2. - Comment.  S. Th. lect. v.  *  ,  A: aliorum hu-  iusmodi   simili-  um.-BCE: aliorum  similium.  *  Cap. 1, n. 10. -  Comment. s.Th.  lect. t.  *  ABCE  omittunt  immediate ; sed  non bene.  *  c: abstractam a  singularibus.  nemine posse indicari, — Andronicus nonnisi saeculis posterioribus, ..  nempe XVI et XVII quatuor alicuius nominis nactus est sectatores, ne  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  numquam ab aliquo philosopho quaesitum. est nisi in scholis Pytha-  gorae: quia in illis scholis nihil recipiebatur nisi quod fecit Pytha-  goras.  Ab aliis autem hoc quaesitum non est; a quocumque enim  dicta erant recipiebantur, dummodo probatae veritatis haberent ratio-  nem, Causa enim efficiens extra rem est, et ab ea res non habet fir-  mitatem vel infirmitatem, sed potius a ratione dictorum. Fuit autem  Aristoteles huius scientiae primus auctor; et ideo non verum dicit  Andronicus hunc librum aliis attribuens » (Opp. tom. I, pag. 238, col. 2—  Lugduni 1651). — Andronicum vere ac fortiter redarguit Alexander Aphro-  disiensis (floruit saeculo II aerae Christ.), qui tanta apud vetéres polluit  auctoritate, ut per antonomasiam Commentator Aristotelis vocaretur, ὁ  ἐξηγητής. Alexandri argumenta postquam retulit Boethius , - concludit :  «  Quare non est audiendus Andronicus, qui propter passionum nomen  »  hunc librum ab Aristotelis operibus separat » (Prolog. in lib. De in-  terpretatione, Edit. altera, pag. 292). Etiam Ammonius Hermea (flor.  saec. V), discipulus Procli, contra Andronicum haec urget: « An vero sit  »  »  »  »  »  ex  »  legitimum opus (Peri hermeneias) Philosophi, nemo in Aristotelis le-  ctione versatus, si tum orationis probabilitatem,  severum  ac  familiare   artificiosumque et  Philosopho praeceptorum genus quae in eo  traduntur, tum cum aliis eius libris consensum respiciat, dubitandum  existimabit, praeter Andronicum Rhodium. » Deinde argumento deducto  vocabulo passionis refutato, concludit: « Quapropter non iure An-  dronicus falso librum ferri acceptam Philosopho suspicatus est» o  praefat. ad lib. De interpretatione... latina oratione reddente Bartholo-  maeo Sylvanio. Venetiis 1546, fol. 1, verso).  Verum, licet Ammonius Hermeneiam veluti genuinum Aristotelis  foetum cum sapientioribus criticis defendat, ultimam tamen partem huius  operis (cap. xiv) quae est de vi oppositarum propositionum ( Utrum au-  tem contraria etc.), non esse Aristotelis suspicatur: « Quae sequuntur,  Ludovicum Vivés (4 1540), Petrum Ramum (1$ 1572), Franciscum  tricium. (f. 1597) et Petrum Gassendi (t: 1655). Quos tamen sicut et  Andronicum merito sapientes omnes non curarunt. Nostro. saeculo in  defensionem authentiae Logicae Aristotelis erudita opera prodierunt.  0) Passiones. animae. vocat omnes animae operationes. Quae hic  8. Thomas notat de vocabulo passionis, prout eo Aristoteles utitur ad  designandum etiam quamcumque animae operationem, recto sensu acci-  pienda sunt. - Possumus ergo constituere omnes operationes animge vo-  cari, generico. vocabulo et sensu latissimo, passiones vel affectiones ani-  mae; at non viceversa passiones animae proprie dictae possunt significare  omnes animae operationes, v. g. intelligere, velle etc. Ratio est, quia ope-  rationes animae etsi omnes conveniant in genere operationis, ad invicem  tamen distinguuntur specie, neque debet una cum alia confundi, vel in  ipso vocabulo. Ceterum ad haec plenius intelligenda, transcribere licet  quae s. Thomas habet p. I, qu. rxxix, art. zr: « Pati, inquit, tripliciter  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  dicitur, Uno modo propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab  eo, quod convenit sibi secundum naturam aut secundum propriam  inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem,  et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. - Secundo modo minus proprie  dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abicitur, sive. sit ei  conveniens sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc dicitur pati non  solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui tristatur  sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel  moveatur,  — Tertio dicitur aliquis pati communiter ex hoc solo, quod  id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in po-  tentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum,  omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati, etiam. cum  perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati. » — Nota etiam pulcher-  rimas rationes cut Aristoteles, iuxta s. Thomae interpretationem, utatur  hic potius nomine passionum quam intellectuum, nomine nempe gene-  rico potius quam specifico (Cf. lect. 11 cit. in marg., in I De anima).  Sed heic quoque novitios ducimus  praemonendos ut caveant a con-  fusione in quam novimus homines  etiam  doctos nostri temporis in-  URN  IH RARI  CAP. I, LECT. II  *  Aomittit νοὶ.  *pcerronee omit-  tunt nostrum.  *  Cap. v, n. 2. -  Comment. s. Th.  lect. x.  **  Codd.: nomi-  nat.  *  *  Cap. 1v, n. 10 et  seq. - Comment.  5.  Th.  lect. ix.  t  * Codd.-p.: szgni-  ficari.  c  —  i*eWwein o:  Ane 5  Ji gue εἴνι  *  pc: vocum.  Porphyrius.  quen  vw  lectus passio dici potest. -- Vel * quia intelligere no-  strum * non est sine phantasmate: quod non est  sine  corporali passione; unde et zmaginativam  Philosophus in ΠΠ De anima * vocat ** passivum  intellectum. - Vel quia extenso nomine passionis  ad omnem receptionem , etiam ipsum zntelligere  intellectus possibilis quoddam pati est, ut dicitur in  HI De anima*. Utitur autem potius nomine pas-  sionum, quam Zntellectuum: tum quia ex aliqua  animae passione provenit*, puta ex amore vel odio,  ut homo interiorem conceptum per vocem alteri  significare * velit: tam etiam quia significatio vo-  cum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secun-  dum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam  impressionis vel passionis.  7. Secundo, cum dicit: Et ea quae scribun-  tur etc., agit de significatione scripturae: et secun-  dum Alexandrum hoc inducit ad manifestandum *  praecedentem sententiam per modum similitudinis,  ΠΕ sit sensus: Ita ea quae sunt in voce sunt signa  passionum animae, sicut et litterae sunt signa vo-  cum. Quod etiam manifestat per sequentia, cum  dicit: Et quemadmodum nec litterae etc.; inducens  hoc quasi signum praecedentis. Quod enim litterae  significent voces, significatur per hoc, quod, sicut  sunt diversae voces apud diversos, ita et * diversae  litterae. Et secundum hanc expositionem, ideo non  dixit, et * Jifferae eorum quae sunt in voce, sed ea  quae scribuntur: quia * dicuntur litterae etiam in  prolatione et scriptura, quamvis magis proprie,  secundum quod sunt in scriptura, dicantur litte-  rae; secundum autem quod sunt in prolatione, di-  cantur elementa vocis. *- Sed quia Aristoteles non  dicit, sicut et ea quae scribuntur, sed continuam  narrationem facit, melius est ut dicatur, sicut Por-  Cidere, et quae una ex rationibus est cur in Aristotelis doctrinis antilo-  gias inveniri nonnulli contendant. Loquor de intellectu passivo et de  intellectu possibili. Porro intellectus passivi nomine designatur ab Ari-  stotele facultas sensitiva interna, quae est vel imaginativa, sicut dicitur  in citato tertio libro De anima, vel aestimativa, quae frequentius nomine  intellectus passivi designatur; et ideo est facultas organica, corruptoque  corpore organico perit. At contra intellectus possibilis est facultas pro-  pria animae humanae, sine corporis commixtione, ab anima inseparabilis,  et ideo inorganica, spiritualis et incorruptibilis sicut anima ipsa. De utro-  que intellectu passim occurrit sermo in Aristotele, quem Scholastici hac  in re sequuntur: sed de uno et de altero opposita affirmantur et affir-  manda sunt. Quia tamen intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, ut au-  divimus a s. Thoma, et ideo intellectus possibilis est passivus quodam-  modo; ex hoc sumpserunt nonnulli occasionem confundendi intellectum  possibilem cum intellectu passivo: qua admissa confusione, antilogiae  revera existunt in Aristotelis doctrina de intellectu nostro; sed de huius-  modi antilogiis non quidem Philosophus culpandus est, sed illi qui con-  fundunt quae Stagirita accurate distinguit.  c  Ὁ) Ex aliqua animae passione provenit etc. Hanc rationem.tangit Boe-  thius contra Andronicum: « Aristoteles enim, inquit, idcirco passiones ani-  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  mae intellectus vocavit, quod intellectus quos sermone dicere et oratio-  ne proferre consuevimus, ex aliqua causa atque utilitate profecti sunt.  Ut enim dispersi homines colligerentur, et legibus vellent esse subiecti,  civitatesque condere, utilitas quaedam fuit et causa; quocirca quae ex  aliqua utilitate eveniunt, ex passione quoque venire necesse est. Nam ut  divina sine ulla. sunt passione, ita nulla illis extrinsecus utilitas valet  adiungi. Quae vero sunt passibilia, semper aliquam causam atque uti-  litatem quibus sustententur inveniunt. Quocirca huiusmodi intellectus  qui ad aiterum oratione proferendi sunt, quoniam ex aliqua causa  atque utilitate videntur esse collecti, recte passiones animi nominati  sunt » (Prol. in lib De interpretatione, Edit. secund. pag. 292, et seq.—  edit. cit.).  x) Esse secundum naturam hic sumitur prout significat esse a na-  fura ut a causa, non autem prout significat esse naturae seu inclina-  tioni naturae conforme; et consequenter non esse secundum naturam  non sumitur in hac quaestione quasi esse contra naturam, sed solum-  modo nzon esse a natura ut a causa. Quaestio enim est, utrum voces  vel litterae habeant significationem a natura impositam, vel ab hominum  institutione et arbitrio. Quod vero significare per voces mentis conceptus  13  phyrius exposuit, quod Aristoteles procedit ulte-  rius ad complendum ordinem significationis. Post-  quam enim dixerat quod nomina et verba, quae  sunt  in voce, sunt signa eorum * quae sunt in  anima, continuatim subdit quod nomina et verba  quae scribuntur, signa sunt eorum nominum et  verborum quae sunt in voce.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Et quemadmodum nec  litterae etc., ostendit differentiam praemissorum  significantium et significatorum, quantum ad hoc,  quod est esse secundum naturam, vel non esse *.  Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim, ponit quod-  dam signum, quo manifestatur quod nec voces  nec  litterae naturaliter significant. Ea enim, quae  naturaliter significant *, sunt eadem apud omnes.  Significatio autem litterarum et vocum, de quibus  nunc agimus, non est eadem apud omnes. Sed *  hoc quidem apud nullos unquam dubitatum fuit  quantum ad litteras: quarum non solum ratio si-  gnificandi est ex impositione, sed etiam ipsarum  formatio fit per artem. Voces autem naturaliter  !  formantur; unde et apud quosdam dubitatum fuit,  utrum naturaliter significent. Sed Aristoteles hic *  determinat ex similitudine litterarum, quae sicut  non  sunt eaedem? apud omnes, ita nec voces.  Unde manifeste relinquitur quod sicut nec litte-  rae, ita nec voces naturaliter significant, sed ex  institutione humana *. Voces autem illae, quae  naturaliter significant, sicut gemitus infirmorum et  alia huiusmodi, sunt eaedem apud omnes.  9. Secundo, ibi: Quorum autem etc., ostendit  passiones animae naturaliter esse, sicut et res *, per  hoc quod eaedem sunt apud omnes. Unde dicit:  Quorum autem; idest sicut passiones animae sunt  eaedem omnibus (quorum primorum ^, idest qua-  sit conforme naturae, sine disputatione relinquitur, quia certum, et ex  dictis n. 2 manifestum.  X) Sicut non sunt eaedem etc.— Cod. A: quia sicut litterae non eaedem  apud etc. Quae lectio materialiter conformior est verbis Aristotelis ,  ut  in textu videre est.  — Cod. D hoc loco magnam habet lacunam. Post  enim verba superius recitata, ea enim quae naturaliter significant sunt  eadem apud omnes, amanuensis ex recursu eiusdem verbi omaes di-  stractus, immediate prosequitur: easdem: quia si quis a nota discordat ;  quae sunt verba n. 10 circa medietatem. Error est autem nofa pro vero,  ut  lector per se intelligit.  — Codex etiam B omittit verba: unde mani-  feste. relinquitur, quod sicut nec litterae ita nec voces.  u) Quorum primorum etc. Verbum primorum, quod hic a s. Thoma  exponitur, non est in textu graeco, ubi solummodo habetur: quorum  autem hae primo notae (seu signa) sunt; ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημέϊα πρώ-  τως. — Notat Theodorus Waitz (Aristotelis Organon graece, tom.I,  pag. 123 in notis.- Lipsiae 1844) in duobus codd. Laurentianis legi πρῶ-  τον. Ex utraque lectione facilis digressio amanuensium ad πρωτῶν graece  et primorum latine. At si s. Thomas legit primorum, mentionem tamen  haud facit lectionis quae exhibetur a Piana: primorum primo. Boethius  habet primo, sed non primorum; codex vero A habet primorum, sed  non primo. — Optime tamen notat Angelicus quod passiones compa-  rantur ad voces sicut primum ad secundum, quia cum voces non. pro-  ferantur nisi ad exprimendum interiores animae passiones, prius sunt  animae passiones et postea voces (Cf. lect. seq. n. 1). Sed et ulterius notat  quod voces ab Aristotele dicuntur notae seu signa passionum ; passiones  vero non signa dicuntur rerum, sed similitudines naturales; proindeque  sunt eaedem apud omnes, et non ex institutione. Quae s. Thomae inter-  pretatio et intimius penetrat mentem Aristotelis, et una cum dictis num, 5  respondet interpretationi tum. Boethii tum Ammonii, qui non primorum  sed primo (πρώτως) legunt: « Quorum tamen, ait Ammonius, haec signa  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  sunt primum, haec, inquiens, quae voce continentur, hoc est nomina  et verba. Quorum ergo haec signa primum sunt, dicit autem conce-  ptuum: nam res quoque ab his, non tamen proxime, sed interia-  centibus  significantur conceptibus. At conceptus non aliis etiam sese  interserentibus, sed primum ac proxime connotantur. Itaque quorum  signa primum sunt ea quae in voce consistunt, hoc est significativa,  ac  velut notae, hi sunt conceptus: qui affectus animi sunt iidemque  1.  —  omnibus; atque ob id natura » (Op. sup. cit. sect. I, 8. τι, pag. 4,  col.  Cf. Boeth. Op. cit. ed. π, 8. De signis, pag. 302—3.) Igitur  *  Codd. - p. : ea-  rum, nempe pas-  sionum, quae etc.  *  *  ABC : Sunt.  ABC: et  * CE et  lius A:  *  λ  róbabi-  Qc.  Cf. lect. iv, nn.  II ,12.  *  Codd., excepto  D.- P.: Sicut res.  o9  14  rum passionum primarum, Ze, scilicet voces,  sunt nofae, idest signa; comparantur enim pas-  siones animae ad voces, sicut primum ad secun-  dum: voces enim non proferuntur, nisi ad ex-  primendum interiores animae passiones), et res  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  quid est, idest essentiam rei, ut dicitur in III De  anima *; referendum est hoc ad simplices intel-  lectus  conceptiones (quas significant voces in-  complexae), quae sunt eaedem apud omnes: quia,  si quis vere * intelligit quid est homo, quodcun-  que aliud aliquid, quam * hominem apprehendat,  non intelligit hominem. Huiusmodi autem simpli-  ces  ces  *  p: simpliciter.  y  conceptiones intellectus sunt, quas primo vo-  significant. Unde dicitur in IV Metaphysicae *  quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio.  Et ideo signanter dicit: Quorum primorum hae  *  A:  *pg:  non cogno-  scuntur.  per  dam.  *  quam-  Codd. - p. : in  omnibus.  Boethius  *  Cf. lect. seq. ,  n. 3.  etiam eaedem , scilicet sunt apud omnes, quorum,  idest quarum rerum, Aae, scilicet passiones animae  sunt similitudines. Ubi attendendum est quod lit-  teras dixit esse notas, idest signa vocum, et voces  passionum animae similiter *; passiones autem ani-  mae dicit esse similitudines rerum *: et hoc ideo,  quia res non cognoscitur * ab anima nisi. per ali-  quam * sui similitudinem existentem vel in sensu  vel in intellectu.  Litterae  autem ita sunt signa  vocum, et voces passionum, quod non attenditur  ibi aliqua ratio similitudinis, sed sola ratio insti-  tutionis, sicut et in multis aliis signis: ut tuba est  signum belli. In passionibus autem animae oportet  attendi rationem similitudinis ad exprimendas res,  quia naturaliter eas designant, non ex institutione.  10. Obiiciunt autem quidam ^, ostendere vo-  lentes  contra  hoc quod dicit passiones animae,  quas significant voces, esse omnibus * easdem.  Primo quidem, quia diversi diversas sententias  habent de rebus, et ita non videntur esse eaedem  apud omnes animae passiones. - Ad quod respondet  Boethius quod Aristoteles hic nominat passiones  animae conceptiones intellectus, qui numquam de-  cipitur; et ita oportet eius conceptionés esse apud  omnes easdem: quia, si quis a vero discordat, hic  non intelligit. - Sed quia etiam in intellectu potest  esse  falsum, secundum quod componit et divi-  dit *, non autem secundum quod cognoscit quod  primo est germana lectio Aristotelis; sed philosophice loquendo etiam  primorum ab ipso Aristotele non recusaretur in sensu a s. Thoma ex-  plicato tum in hoc numero, tum in fine sequentis, ubi pulcherrime illud  primorum refert ad primas mentis conceptiones quas voces primo  significant, et in quibus veritas per se loquendo semper invenitur, ut  in sequenti nota o explicabitur.  v) Passiones autem animae dicit esse similitudines rerum. Notat hic  Aegidius (fol. 47 verso, col. 2, ed. cit.) quod quatuor nomina quae passim  recurrunt, scilicet passio, similitudo, intellectus, conceptus, idem penitus  significant; sed a diversis proprietatibus imponuntur. Nam similitudo rei  prout imprimitur per quamdam impressionem in anima, dicitur passio  (sumpto hoc vocabulo in sensu explicato a s. Thoma in nota 0); et simi-  litudo  dicitur  per comparationem ad rem, cuius est similitudo; sed  prout est in intellectu dicitur intellectus; prout per eam ab intellectu res  apprehenditur, dicitur conceptus.  0) Obiiciunt autem quidam etc. Hos inter Boethius (Prol. in lib. De  interpretat. Ed. II, pag. 303) nominat Herminum, Alexandri Aphrodisién-  sis magistrum, et Aspasium. Et huius est obiectio, quae in hoc numero  versatur; quae vero n. sequenti expenditur est obiectio Hermini. Respon-  sionem autem Boethii (quae ib.legitur) s. Thomas admittit, eam tamen  coarctando ad simplices animi conceptiones, in quibus per se loquendo  veritas semper invenitur, sicut hic probatur. Ait enim Boethius contra  Aspasium: Neque fieri potest, ut qui quod bonum est, malum esse arbi-  tretur, similitudinem boni mente conceperit.— Quae verba si intelligantur  de simplici boni apprehensione vera sunt: non enim fieri potest ut aliquis  percipiendo bonum, illud non percipiat; quod contingeret si pérceptioni  simplici inesset falsum. At si eadem verba intelligantur de iudicio, vera  esse nequeunt: quippe quod, consentiente Boethio, iudiciis nostris sicut  verum inest, ita quandoque subest falsum; et inde est quod homines  judicant quandoque malum bonum et bonum malum.  Dixi quod in simplici mentis apprehensione, qua cognoscitur quod  notae sunt, ut scilicet referatur ad primas conce-  ptiones a vocibus primo significatas.  11.  Sed adhuc obiiciunt aliqui de nominibus  aequivocis, in quibus eiusdem vocis non est ea-  dem passio, quae significatur apud omnes. Et re-  spondet ad hoc Porphyrius quod unus homo,  qui vocem profert, ad unam intellectus conce-  ptionem significandam eam refert; et si aliquis  alius?, cui loquitur, aliquid aliud intelligat, ille qui  loquitur, se exponendo, faciet quod referet intelle-  ctum ad idem ^. - Sed melius dicendum est quod  intentio Aristotelis non est asserere * identitatem  conceptionis animae per comparationem ad vocem,  ut  ces  scilicet unius vocis una sit conceptio: quia vo-  sunt diversae apud diversos ; sed intendit as-  serere identitatem conceptionum animae per com-  parationem ad res, quas similiter dicit esse easdem.  12. Tertio, ibi: De his itaque * etc., excusat  se a  diligentiori harum * consideratione: quia quales sint  animae passiones, et quomodo sint rerum simili-  tudines, dictum est in libro De anima *. Non enim  hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, sed ad naturale.  quid est seu essentia rei non est per se loquendo falsitas, sed semper  per se veritas: nam per accidens contingit in simplici apprehensione esse  deceptionem seu falsitatem, non quidem ratione ipsius simplicis apprehen-  sionis, sed ratione compositionis intervenientis, Et hoc ex duplici capite.  Vel quia definitio unius rei alteri tribuitur, sicut si essentia vel definitio  circuli attribueretur triangulo; vel quia partes definitionis non cohaerent  sibi invicem, sicut si in definitione animalis poneretur insensibile,  di-  cendo quod, animal est vivens insensibile. Quae definitio est falsa sim-  pliciter non ratione apprehensionis, sed ratione compositionis. Quae  compositio ideo accidit, quia in definito animali (et idem de similibus  dicatur) partes assignare licet seu metaphysicas seu physicas. Quocirca  in perceptione rerum quarum in definitione nulla est compositio, non potest  sub hoc respectu esse deceptio, sed aut vere intelliguntur aut nullo modo  (Cf. s. Th. praeter loc. cit. in nota marg.,  p.I, qu. xvr, artic, 11; item  qu. xvir, artic. mr). In sequenti lectione s. Thomas declarat quomodo  veritas sit in prima mentis operatione. De quatuor vero modis quibus  aliquid dicitur pars videsis lib. V Metaphys. lect. xxt.  x) Et si aliquis alius etc.— Cod. D: sed si alius etc.— B: et si aliquis.  —  ACE: et si alius etc. Et haec lectio magis placet.  e) Faciet quod referet intellectum ad idem. - Codd. AD: faciet  quod refertur ( &: refét) intellectum ad idem. — BCE: faciet quod re-  fert (BC: referet?) intellectum ad idem. Adiicimus ergo ex omnibus  codd. vocabulum intellectum, quo lectio magis perspicua efficitur: dum-  modo per intellectum non potentia seü facultas intellectiva designetur,  sed res intellecta seu-mudus conceptus mentis, qui natura sua ordinem  dicit ad obiectum intellectum. — Editio Veneta a habet eamdem lectionem,  nisi quod, ex errore procul dubio typothetarum, non intellectum sed  intelligit refert: quae forte occasio fuit cur duae aliae Venetae editiones  bc  (quas sequitur P.) imo et editiones etiam Venetae 1526 et 1557  omiserint intellectum: verbum enim intelligit nullum sensum hoc loco  habet.  *  Cap. v1, n. 1 et  sede Comment.  s.  ΤῊ. lect. xr. -  Cf.p.I,qu..xxxv,  artic. vi.  "  *  A:  nunc.  p melius: quid-  quid aliud quam  etc.  *  Commen.s.Th.  lect.vii.-Ed. Did.  lib. III, cap.1iv ,  n. 5 et seq.  Porphyrius i  e  *A : assignare:  et ita infra.  *  6.  Locis sup. cit.  n.  .  CAP. I, LECT. Ill  LECTIO TERTIA  DE DIVERSA VOCUM SIGNIFICATIONE  Ἔστι δ᾽, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁτὲ μ  ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ὁτὲ δὲ ἤδη ᾧ  ὑπάρχειν θάτερον, οὕτω xol ἐν τῇ  περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ  ἀληθές.  φωνῇ"  ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ  Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ῥήματα ἔοιχε τῷ ἄνευ  συνϑέσεως καὶ διαιρέσεως νοήματι, οἷον τὸ ἄνθρωπος,  ἢ τὸ λευχόν, ὅταν μιὴ προστεθῇ vv οὔτε γὰρ ψεῦδος  οὔτε ἀληθές πω.  Σημεῖον δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦδε" xal γὰρ ὁ τ ἀγέλαφος σημαί-  νει μέν τι; οὔπω. δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ jedes. ἂν μὴ τὸ  εἶναι ἢ τὸ μιηὴ εἶναι προστεθῇ. ἢ ἁπλῶς 7 χκατὸ  χρόνον.  * Est autem, quemadmodum in anima aliquoties quidem  intellectus sine vero vel falso, aliquoties autem cui iam  necesse est horum alterum inesse; sic etiam in voce:  circa compositionem enim et divisionem est veritas falsi-  15  tasque.  Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt sine composi-  tione vel divisione intellectui; ut est, homo vel album,  quando non additur aliquid: neque enim adhuc verum  aut falsum est.  Si$num autem huius est, etenim hircocervus significat qui-  dem aliquid, sed quod nondum verum vel falsum sit,  si non (τὸ) esse vel (τὸ) non esse addatur, vel simpli-  citer vel secundum tempus.  —  * -  A: quaedam au  tem non.  *  Cf. lect. praec.,  n. 9.  *  *  —  Lect. 1, n. t,  Cap. vr, n. 1. -  Comment. s. Th.  lect. xi.  *  EE  ABCE: Zslorum.  —————  SxyNoPsis.— r.Quia voces ordinantur ad exprimendas praeceden-  tes intellectus conceptiones, ex differentia quae est circa conceptio-  nes intellectus assignatur differentia quae est circa significationes  vocum.- 2. Ergo sicut in conceptionibus intellectus, ita in vocibus  eas  significantibus aliquoties est veritas vel falsitas, aliquoties  non.—- 3. In sola secunda mentis operatione, quae est iudicium,  invenitur veritas vel falsitas.- 4. Resolvitur primum dubium. — Ea  quae sunt circa intellectum dupliciter considerari et nominari  possunt, secundum se et secundum rationes rerum, quarum sunt  ideales similitudines. — In se considerata, comparantur inter se a  mente nostra, et semper quodammodo componuntur; in ordine  ad res aut componuntur iudicio affirmativo aut dividuntur iudi-  cio negativo.- 5. Alterum dubium proponitur. Et primo arguitur  ex  veritate rei; secundo ex veritate sensus; tertio ex veritate Zn-  tellectus divini.  — 6. Praenotamen primum. Veritas in aliquo in-  venitur dupliciter: uno modo sicut in eo quod est verum, seu sicut  in subiecto vero; alio modo sicut in dicente vel cognoscente ve-  rum. Hoc secundo sensu asseritur verum non habeti a cogno-  Scente nisi per iudicium (Cf. lect. vri, 3). — 7. Praenotamen alte-  rum. Verum dicitur de re quacumque per respectum ad intellectum,  vel ut de mensura, vel ut de mensurato. Primo modo res natura-  Ir  ostquam Philosophus tradidit ordinem  (Q9 JO significationis vocum, hic agit de di-  A  SEX versa vocum significatione: quarum  quaedam significant verum vel fal-  CA  sum, quaedam *non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo,  praemittit differentiam ; secundo, manifestat eam;  ibi: Circa compositionem enim etc. Quia vero con-  ceptiones intellectus praeambulae * sunt ordine na-  turae vocibus, quae ad eas exprimendas proferun-  tur “, ideo ex similitudine differentiae, quae est circa  intellectum , assignat differentiam, quae est circa  significationes vocum: ut*scilicet haec manifesta-  tio non solum sit ex simili, sed etiam ex causa  quam imitantur effectus.  2.  Est  ergo  considerandum quod, sicut in  principio dictum est *, duplex est operatio intel-  lectus, ut traditur in III De anima*; in quarum  una non invenitur verum et falsum, in altera au-  tem  invenitur. Et hoc est quod dicit quod in  anima aliquoties est intellectus sine vero et falso,  aliquoties autem ex necessitate habet alterum ho-  rum *. Et quia voces significativae formantur ad  «) Quae ad eas exprimendas proferuntur.  — A: cum ad eas expri-  mendas proferantur. — BCE: quia ad eas etc.- D: et ad eas etc.  — Reti-  nemus lectionem Pianam.— B omittit proferuntur.  8) Veritas et falsitas est etc. Ita codd., et est lectio melior Piana:  veritas et falsitas consistit etc. At cod. D erronee habet: veritas et fal-  sitas est contra.  les dicuntur verae in ordine ad intellectum creatum, cuius veritas  dependet a veritate rei.— Altero modo in ordine ad intelléctum  divinum a quo dependet sicut a causa veritas rerum.- 8. Respon-  detur primae obiectioni. Quaelibet res vera est secundum quod  per propriam formam imitatur artem divini intellectus. Seu veritas  est in re sicut in subiecto vero (Cf. n. 6).—9. Solvitur altera obie-  ctio. In sensu et in simplici mentis apprehensione est veritas, sicut  in eo quod est verum (ut in primo praenotamine), non autem sicut  in cognoscente veritatem, quod est cognoscere habitudinem con-  formitatis cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, seu dicere rem ita esse  in seipsa vel non esse; quod sine iudicio esse nequit, et sensui  atque simplici apprehensioni non convenit.— ro. Respondetur ter-  tiae obiectioni, concedendo quod in intellectu divino sit veritas  absque compositione vel divisione; sed hic est sermo de solo in-  tellectu humano.- 11. Corollarium. Ergo nomina et verba divisim  accepta non significant veritatem aut falsitatem intellectus, quia  non exprimunt iudicium (Cf. lect. v, nn. 17-18).- 12. Excluditur  instantia de responsionibus ad interrogationes, deque verbo pri-  mae et secundae personae, et exceptae actionis. In his enim com-  positio est implicita.- 13. Corollarium confirmatur adducto exem-  plo de nominibus compositis, seorsum a verbo acceptis.  exprimendas conceptiones intellectus, ideo ad hoc  quod signum conformetur signato, necesse est  quod etiam vocum significativarum similiter quae-  dam significent sine vero et falso, quaedam au-  tem * cum vero et falso.  ^  3. Deinde cum dicit: Circa compositionem etc.,  manifestat quod dixerat. Et primo, quantum ad id  quod dixerat de intellectu; secundo, quantum ad  id  quod dixerat de assimilatione vocum ad in-  tellectum; ibi: Nomina igitur ipsa et verba etc.  Ad ostendendum igitur quod intellectus quando-  que est sine vero et falso, quandoque autem cum  altero horum, dicit primo quod veritas et fal-  sitas est ^ circa compositionem et divisionem. Ubi  oportet intelligere quod una duarum operationum  intellectus est indivisibilium intelligentia: in quan-  tum  scilicet intellectus intelligit absolute  cuius-  que rei quidditatem sive essentiam per seipsam,  puta quid est homo * vel quid album vel quid  aliud huiusmodi 7, Alia vero operatio intellectus  est, secundum quod huiusmodi simplicia * conce-  pta simul componit et dividit ?. Dicit ergo quod  p) Vel quid aliud huiusmodi. Optima est haec Piana lectio, eam-  que ideo retinemus, Variant codices. ABC: vel aliquid aliud (aliud  omittitur ab A) huiusmodi; sed aliquid non satis indicat quidditatem,  de qua s. Thomas loquitur.—D: vel alia huiusmodi.—E: vel aliud huius.  9) Componit et dividit. Nomine compositionis in operationibus in-  tellectualibus utitur Aristoteles ad designandum iudicium affirmativum ;  *  *  Seq. 6.1.  Autem ex codd.  *  Β: quod quid est  homo.  *  4  Y  omittit sm-  plicia. K  ο  VM  16  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  in hac secunda operatione intellectus, idest com-  ponentis et dividentis, invenitur veritas et falsi-  tas:  5. Ulterius autem videtur quod non solum  in compositione et divisione veritas consistat. Pri-  mo  *  Cap. v1, n.r. -  Comment. s. Th.  *  *  n.  cp: contra hoc.  Cf. lect. praec.,  9.  * A: consideratio-  nem; alii codd. :  considerationes.  Sed  relinquens quod in prima operatione non  invenitur, ut etiam traditur in III De anima *.  4.  circa * hoc primo videtur esse du-  bium: quia cum divisio fiat per resolutionem ad  indivisibilia sive simplicia, videtur quod sicut in  simplicibus non est veritas vel falsitas, ita nec in  divisione. - Sed dicendum est quod cum conce-  ptiones intellectus sint similitudines rerum *, ea  quae circa intellectum sunt dupliciter considerari  et nominari possunt. Uno modo, secundum se: alio  modo, secundum rationes * rerum quarum sunt  similitudines. Sicut imago Herculis secundum se  quidem dicitur et est cuprum; in quantum autem  est  similitudo  Herculis  nominatur  Sic  etiam, si consideremus ea quae sunt circa intelle-  /07mo.  quidem, quia etiam res dicitur vera vel fal-  88, sicut dicitur aurum verum vel falsum. Dici-  tur etiam quod ens et verum convertuntur. Unde  videtur quod etiam simplex conceptio intellectus,  quae est similitudo rei, non careat veritate et fal-  sitate. -- Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in lib. De ani-  ma * quod sensus propriorum sensibilium semper  est  verus; sensus autem non componit  vel di-  vidit; non ergo in sola compositione vel divisione  est veritas. - Item, in intellectu divino nulla est  compositio, ut probatur in XII Melaphysicae; * et  tamen ibi est prima et summa veritas; non ergo  veritas  sionem.  est 'solum circa compositionem et divi-  *  Lib. II, c. vr,  n. 2. - Comment.  s. Th.lect.xur.- Et  lib. III, cap. ur,  n.12.-  Comment.  s.  Th. lect. 1v.  ε  6. Ad huiusmodi igitur * evidentiam conside- sc omin. igi-  ctum secundum se, semper est compositio, ubi | randum est quod veritas in aliquo invenitur du- sequens es  est veritas et falsitas; quae nunquam invenitur in  intellectu, nisi per hoc quod intellectus compa-  rat unum simplicem conceptum alteri. Sed si re-  pliciter: uno modo, sicut in eo quod est verum:  alio modo, sicut in dicente vel cognoscente ve-  rum. Invenitur autem veritas sicüt in eo quod  feratur ad rem, quandoque dicitur compositio ,  quandoque dicitur divisio. Compositio quidem,  quando intellectus comparat unum conceptum al-  teri, quasi apprehendens coniunctionem aut iden-  titatem rerum, quarum sunt conceptiones; divisio  autem, quando sic comparat unum conceptum  alteri,  * A omittit e£ et-  ut apprehendat res esse diversas *. Et per  hunc etiam * modum in vocibus affirmatio dicitur  compositio, in quantum coniunctionem ex parte  rei significat; negatio vero dicitur divisio, in quan-  tum significat rerum separationem.  et nomine divisionis ad designandum iudicium negativum. Aristotelem  sequuti sunt Scholastici, et bene. Revera enim mens in iudiciis affir-  mativis dicit praedicatum inesse subiecto, et ideo quasi componit prae-  dicatum cum subiecto in quadam ideali unitate; quam in iudiciis nega-  tivis quia negat, ideo in istis dividit praedicatum a subiecto.— Et hac  etiam de ratione praedicatum passim vocatur a Scholasticis passio (et  passio propria praedicatum exprimens aliquid proprium, idest a su-  biecto inseparabile): nam in iudiciis affirmativis subiectum concipitur ut  recipiens quodammodo praedicatum; et omnis receptio extensa signifi-  catione potest dici passio, ut lect. praeced., n. 6 in nota 0 cum ipso  s. Thoma explicavimus.  — At ex eo quod iudicium componit, non se-  quitur quod ipsum sit actus mentalis compositus. Plura praecedunt  quidem iudicium, quae requirunt pluritatem actuum mentalium, sicut  sunt apprehensiones subiecti et praedicati, eorum ad invicem compa-  ratio; at haec sunt praesupposita iudicii, non iudicium ipsum, quod  totum  seu  perficitur  in  affirmanda (est) vel neganda (mom est) unitate  identitate praedicati et subiecti. Et illa sive affirmatio sive negatio  est actus simplex, sicut actus simplex est apprehensio. - Quae omnia ut  paucis comprehendamus, dicimus quod iudicium est actus simplex ex  parte intellectus iudicantis, et compositus ex parte rerum iudicatarum.  Unde iudicium affirmativum ideo componit, quia affirmat coniunctionem  seu  identitatem rerum; et iudicium negativum ideo dividit quia negat  illam rerum identitatem seu coniunctionem, nempe affirmat earumdem  inter se divisionem (Cf. VI Metaphys. lect. 1v).  €) In XII Metaphysicae. Ita. Piana. At codd. ABC: in XI Metaphy-  Sicorum, seu Métaphysicae. In Commentariis s. Thomae sententia ista  Aristotelis habetur XII Metaphys. lect. vr; at in ed. Didot est lib. XI,  cap. vr, n. 3.: Ἔστι δὲ τὸ fy καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν. Notandum est opus Me-  taphysicae Aristotelis varie a variis fuisse in X, vel XI vel XII li-  et  bros, imo etiam in XIII, et XIV divisum. Quae divisionum varietas  sicut  quaestiones de authentia quarumdam partium huius Operis  haud s. Thomam latuerunt, ut data occasione demonstrabimus. Interea  remittimus criticum lectorem ad lect. xr, lib. IIl De anima. Sed haec in-  nuisse sufficiat: haec enim quaestio suum habet locum in Metaphysica  Aristotelis.  t) Est bonum intellectus. Unus codex E legit: est obiectum intel-  lectus; cui lectioni consentire videtur C, sed corrigitur per bonum. Quae  lectio  verum enunciat, eamque passim adoptat et explicat s. Thomas  dicendo: verum est obiectum intellectus. Etenim quia verum est obie-  ctum  intellectus, et obiectum cuiusque facultatis est eius perfectio et  bonum; ideo dicitur quod verum sit bonum intellectus. Utraque ergo  lectio  vera est; at hoc loco retinenda est lectio Piana, quia s. Thomas  citat VI Ethicorum (cap. rt, n. 3), et ib. lect. n ipsemet habet: Verum ab-  est  verum tam in simplicibus, quam in compo-  sitis; sed sicut in dicente vel cognoscente verum,  non invenitur nisi secundum compositionem et  divisionem. Quod quidem sic patet.  7.  Verum enim, ut Philosophus dicit in VI  Ethicorum, est bonum intellectus *. Unde de quo-  cumque dicatur verum, oportet quod hoc sit per  respectum ad intellectum. Comparantur autem ad  intellectum voces quidem sicut signa, res autem si-  cut ea quorum intellectus sunt similitudines. Con-  siderandum autem * quod aliqua res comparatur ad  solutum est bonum eius (intellectus), et falsum absolutum est malum  ipsius.  Attendat tamen novitius et, ex eo quod verum dicitur bonum. seu  obiectum intellectus, non inferat (sicut quidam erronee intulerunt) ens  haud intelligi a nobis posse nisi ratio veri intelligatur, eo modo quo  visus e. g. non videt sensibile nisi sub ratione colorati. Haec enim illatio  est  contra veritatem et contra mentem s. Thomae. — Est contra verita-  tem: nam verum idem realiter est ac ens, eo nempe sensu quod ve-  rum est ipsum ens, addita relatione rationis, quae relatio est ordo seu  respectus ad intellectum, sicut hic docet s. Thomas. Atqui absolutum  per se intelligitur sine sua relatione quae ipsi a ratione superadditur,  imo praeintelligitur suae relationi. Ergo ens potest intelligi imo et intel-  ligitur antequam intelligatur eius ratio veri, seu relatio ad intellectum. —  Est contra mentem s. Thomae: ipse enim p. 1, qu. xvi, artic. πὶ ad 3  docet:  »  «  Cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione  veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod non appre-  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  hendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis. Et sic  locutio habet veritatem ('et hoc sensu verum dicitur bonum intellectus ).  Alio modo, posset sic intelligi quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi  apprehenderetur ratio veri. Et hóc falsum est. Sed verum non potest  apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione  veri (nam et ratio veri est ens). Et est simile, sicut si comparemus  intelligibile ad ens: non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intel-  ligibile. Sed tarnen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius  intelligibilitas.  Et  similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen  intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum. »  ]  7). Considerandum autem etc. Principium quod heic enunciatur et  saepe saepius inculcatur a s. Thoma, maximi momenti est; quippe quod  in ipso philosophia nostra tota fundatur. Principium est: Res matura-  lis non dicitur esse vera per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum,  scilicet veritas rei non efficitur ab intellectu nostro, et ideo ab ipso ut a  causa non dependet. -- Ratio est quia ems et verum convertuntur, seu  sunt  realiter  una  eademque res, quamvis per rationem distinguan-  tur, videlicet quamvis ratio nostra distinguat in ente conceptum veri-  tatis  a  conceptu entitatis eius. Ex quo consequitur quod si intellectus  noster efficeret rem quoad suam veritatem, efficeret etiam eam quoad  suam entitatem ; consequenter tantum haberet res de entitate et veritate  quantum ei daretur ab intellectu. Et quia intellectus rem efficeret,  quatenus eam intelligeret, et una simul eam intelligeret quatenus eam  efficeret; impossibile foret rém non esse id quod intelligitur ab intel-  lectu. In hac autem conformitate intellectus nostri iudicantis cum re  consistit veritas nostrae cognitionis. Ergo impossibile foret falsitatem  inesse iudiciis nostris; etiamsi de una eademque re iudicia opposita enun-  n  CA  RI  ἢ...  IRR  ἀνεμενω  2  CAISSES  INANNOTETETIRIN  m  ...-.......,  CAP. I, LECT. III  *  *  Quidem ex 4.  Cod. p. - ABC:  aestimantes. - E  p: extimantes.  *  *  Ut supra.  t  Cod. 4:  cia.- BC:  cialia.  *Aomittit esse.  x  *  ag: unde etiam. -c: unde et.  **  Cap. IX, n.  3.-  Com bant, a. Th-  lect. xv.  intellectum dupliciter.- Uno quidem * modo, sicut  mensura ad mensuratum, et sic comparantur res  naturales ad intellectum speculativum humanum.  Et ideo intellectus dicitur verus secundum quod  conformatur rei, falsus autem secundum quod di-  scordat a re. Res autem naturalis non dicitur esse  vera per comparationem ad intellectum nostrum,  sicut posuerunt quidam antiqui naturales, existi-  mantes  * rerum veritatem esse solum in hoc, quod  est videri: secundum hoc enim sequeretur quod  contradictoria essent simul vera, quia contradicto-  ria cadunt sub diversorum opinionibus. Dicuntur  tamen res aliquae verae vel falsae per compara-  tionem ad intellectum nostrum, non essentialiter  vel formaliter, sed effective, in quantum scilicet  natae sunt facere de se veram vel falsam existi-  mationem *; et secundum hoc dicitur aurum verum  vel falsum.- Alio autem modo, res comparantur  ad intellectum, sicut mensuratum ad mensuram, -ut patet in intellectu practico ^, qui est causa re-  rum.  Unde opus artificis dicitur esse verum, in  quantum attingit ad rationem artis; falsum vero,  in quantum deficit a ratione artis.  8. Et quia omnia etiam naturalia * comparan-  tur ad intellectum divinum, sicut artificiata * ad  artem, consequens est ut quaelibet res dicatur  esse * vera secundum quod habet propriam for-  mam, secundum quam imitatur artem divinam.  Nam falsum aurum est verum aurichalcum. Et  hoc modo ens et verum convertuntur, quia quae-  libet res naturalis per suam formam arti divinae  conformatur*. Unde * Philosophus in I Physicae **,  formam nominat quoddam divinum. -  nem  9. Et sicut res dicitur vera per comparatio-  ad  suam mensuram, ita etiam et sensus  vel intellectus, cuius mensura est res extra ani-  mam. Unde sensus dicitur verus, quando per  formam suam conformatur rei extra animam exi-  stenti. Et sic intelligitur quod sensus proprii sen-  ciaremus : quia etiam in iudiciis oppositis res, quia efficitur a nobis, non  aliter est quam a nobis enunciatur. Quae cum sint absurda, sequitur  entitatem et veritatem rei non effici ab intellectu nostro; sed veritatem  intellectus nostri, hoc est nostrarum cognitionum, causari ab entitate et  veritate rei: cui si iudicia nostra conformantur, vera sunt; si non con-  formantur falsa sunt.  Ex his sequuntur duo corollaria, quae ipse s. Thomas tradit: Pri-  mum corollarium est quod res naturales dicuntur verae per compara-  tionem ad intellectum nostrum, non quidem essentialiter (quia non a  nobis habent rationem entifatis), neque formaliter (quia non a nobis  habent rationem formalem veritatis), sed causaliter, quia revera ex  ipsis, ut a causis generatur in nobis cognitio vera, quando eas cogno-  Scimus, ut in seipsis sunt.  Alterum corollarium est quod res (et consequenter intellectus noster,  et ipsae ideae nostrae, quae etiam res quaedam sunt) dicuntur esse verae  formaliter per ordinem essentialem ad intellectum divinum, non secus ac  effectus dicitur essentialiter per ordinem ad suam causam. Ens enim et  verum, ut dictum est, quamvis ratione differant, realiter tamen sunt  idem. Porro res omnes creatae a Deo sunt, a quo ad existentiam sunt  productae. Et quia Deus per intellectum agit, necesse est ut ipsarum  rerum ideae in mente divina ab aeterno extiterint, ad quarum similitu-  dinem facta dicantur quaecumque creata sunt; sicut in mente artificis  ideam praeexistere necesse est, quae est exemplar ideale ad cuius simi-  litudinem artifex exterius operatur. Igitur quia Deus infinitus est in  agendo sicut et in intelligendo, non possunt res creatae non conformari  ideis illis, in quarum conformitate veritas earum consistit; sicut veritas  nostrae cognitionis consistit in conformitate cum re cognita, seu con-  sistit in eo quod a nobis res dicatur esse sicut in seipsa est. — Hinc  res  naturales sunt quasi mediae inter intellectum nostrum et intellectum  divinum; ad intellectum nostrum comparantur ut causae et mensura  nostrae veritatis; ad intellectum vero divinum ut mensurata et effectus  ad mensuram et causam (Cf. Summ. theol. p. I, qu. xvr, artic. 1; et Qq.  disp. De veritate, q. τ, artic. 1).  :  Opp. D. Tuowazx T. I.  17  sibilis sit verus. Et hoc etiam modo intellectus  apprehendens quod quid est * absque compositione  et divisione, semper est verus, ut dicitur in III De  anima *. Est autem considerandum quod quam-  vis sensus proprii obiecti sit verus, non tamen  cognoscit hoc esse * verum. Non enim potest co-  gnoscere habitudinem conformitatis suae * ad rem,  sed solam rem apprehendit; intellectus autem po-  test huiusmodi habitudinem conformitatis cogno-  scere; et ideo solus intellectus potest cognoscere  veritatem. Unde et Philosophus dicit in VI Me-  taphysicae * quod veritas est solum in mente, sicut  scilicet in cognoscente veritatem. Cognoscere au-  tem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem ? nihil  est aliud quam iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse:  quod est componere et dividere; et ideo intellectus  non cognoscit veritatem, nisi componendo vel di-  videndo per suum iudicium. Quod quidem iudi-  cium, si consonet rebus, erit verum, puta cum  intellectus iudicat rem esse quod est, vel non  esse  quod non est.  Falsum autem quando disso-  nat a re, puta cum iudicat non esse quod est,  vel esse quod non est. Unde patet quod veritas  et  falsitas  sicut in cognoscente et dicente non  est nisi circa compositionem et divisionem. Εἴ  hoc modo Philosophus loquitur hic. Et quia vo-  ces  sunt signa intellectuum, erit vox vera quae  significat  verum intellectum, falsa autem quae  significat falsum intellectum: quamvis vox, in quan-  tum est res quaedam, dicatur vera sicut et aliae  res.  Unde haec vox, homo est asinus, est vere *  vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi,  ideo dicitur falsa.  10.  Sciendum est autem * quod Philosophus  de veritate hic loquitur secundum quod pertinet  ad intellectum humanum, qui iudicat de confor-  mitate rerum et intellectus componendo et divi-  dendo ^. Sed iudicium intellectus divini de hoc est  absque compositione et divisione: quia sicut etiam  0) In intellectu practico. Cod. A: in intellectu praedicto: quae  lectio cum sit manifeste falsa, quia supra dictum est de intellectu spe-  culativo, cui in hac secunda parte s. Thomas opponit intellectum pra-  cticum , ideo in margine lectio corrigitur: im intellectu divino. Sed et  ipsa correctio falsa est, ut patet exemplo de artifice, cuius intellectus  practicus est causa operis artificiosi. Adde quod de intellectu divino, cui  omnes res creatae comparantur sicut artificialia ad artem, in sequenti  numero disseritur.  Ὁ Et quia omnia etiam naturalia comparantur etc. Ita legimus  cum codd. BCDE. — A: et quia omnia entia naturalia etc. — Omnes edd.  Ven. et P. habent: et quia omnia etiam naturaliter comparantur etc.  Lectio cod. A bona est.— Videat autem lector num codd. ex quibus de-  sumpserunt lectionem edd. citatae legerint aut sicut codices nostri, aut:  et  quia omnia entia naturaliter comparantur etc.  x) Arti divinae conformatur. Hanc lectionem codd. praetuli lectioni  Pianae: arti divinae comparatur: non enim formaliter loquendo in  comparatione, sed in conformatione cum arte divina veritas rerum  naturalium consistit. Veritas enim, ut superiori numero, et alibi saepe  s. Thomas docet, est conformitas rei et intellectus. Hinc in prima parte  Summae theol. qu. xvz, artic. 1: Res naturales dicuntur esse verae, se-  cundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum, quae sunt in mente  divina.  X) Cognoscere autem praedictam conformitatis habitudinem etc.  Non uno sensu accipitur haec cognitio conformitatis intellectus cogno-  Sscentis cum re cognita, in qua conformitatis cognitione s. Thomas ponit  veritatem subiectivam seu logicam. Profunde, ut assolet, hac de re agit  Caietanus in p. Ll, qu. xv, artic. πι, 8 Ad evidentiam etc. Verum quae  ibi doctissimus Cardinalis copiose disserit, compendiose hic a s. Thoma  traduntur, aiendo quod cognoscere praedictam conformitatis habitudi-  nem est iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse, nempe esse in ipsa re  identitatem, quam mens asserit iudicio affirmativo, vel non esse identitatem  rerum, quam negat iudicio negativo (Cf. lect. 1v in VI Metaphy'sic.).  p) Qui iudicat de conformitate etc.  * Nempe essen-  tiam rei.- Cf. su-  pra n. 3.  *  Cap.rinn.r, 2.-  Comment. s. Th.  lect. vi.  "ABC  esse.  *  omittunt  BC: 85:7.  *  Coinmen. s. Th.  lect. iv. -  Edit.  Didot,lib.V, cap.  IV, D. I.  *  *  — P.: qui iudicat de re secun-  3*  BC:  vera.  A: tamen.  18  *  Cf. p.I, q. xtv,  art. xiv.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I :  instantia de verbo primae et secundae personae,  et  intellectus noster intelligit materialia immateriali-  ter, ita etiam intellectus divinus cognoscit compo-  sitionem et divisionem simpliciter *.  11.  Deinde cum dicit: Nomina igitur ipsa et  verba etc., manifestat quod dixerat de similitudine  vocum ad intellectum. Et primo, manifestat propo-  situm; secundo, probat per signum"; ibi: Huius au-  tem signum etc. Concludit ergo ex praemissis quod,  cum  solum circa compositionem et divisionem  sit veritas et falsitas in intellectu, consequens est  quod ipsa nomina et verba, divisim accepta, as-  similentur intellectui qui est sine compositione  et  "Βα. - P.: quod.  divisione; sicut cum omo vel album dicitur 5,  si nihil aliud addatur: non enim verum adhuc  vel falsum est; sed postea quando additur esse  vel non esse, fit verum vel falsum.  12. Nec est instantia de eo, qui * per unicum  nomen veram responsionem dat ad interrogatio-  nem factam; ut cum quaerenti: quid natat in mari?  aliquis respondet, piscis. Nam intelligitur verbum  quod fuit in interrogatione positum. Et sicut no-  men per se positum non significat verum vel  falsum, ita nec verbum per se dictum. - Nec est  dum conformitatem in intellectu componente vel dividente. Editores  Piani hanc lectionem, ut mihi videtur, desumpserunt ex editione b, sed  aliquantulum est intricata, Altera ed. a est etiam intricata: qui iudicat  esse conformitate rerum et intellectus componendo et dividendo: nisi  forte irrepserit ex typographi incuria esse conformitate loco de confor-  mitate. — Veneta c et aliae 1526, 1557 legunt cum codd. DE: qui iudicat  de  conformitate rerum et intellectus componendo et dividendo. Quae  lectio  perspicua est et fere eadem cum lect. codd. ABC: qui iudicat  de conformitate rerum intellectus componendo et dividendo. Coniun-  ctionem e£ amanuensium oscitantia omisit. Patet ergo lectionem de con-  formitate ab omnibus codd. uniformiter exhiberi item a duabus Venetis  edd. saec. XV et XVI; rerum et intellectus componendo et dividendo legi  etiam tum in citatis edd., tum in codd. Unde lectionem istam et propter  formae perspicuitatem et propter codd. auctoritatem suffecimus Pianae.  y) Secundo probat per signum. lta codd.— P.: secundo manifesta-  tum probat per signum.  — Et quia de signis, quibus simplices mentis  conceptus manifestantur sermo impraesentiarum est, opportunum ducimus  ex  Philopono declarare diversa nomina quibus signa illa appellantur in  schola: « Scito (inquit) terminum, vocem simplicem, dictionem, nomen,  »  verbum, subiecto non, sed habitu quadamque relatione differre. Quando  »  »  »  »  enim dictio ratiocinationis pars fuerit, terminus dicitur: quando pars  propositionis, dictio: quando huius subiectum, »omen: quando enun-  ciatum de subiecto, verbum: quando vox simpliciter significans, vox  simplex » ( Commentar. super libros Priorum... Lucilli Phylalthaei  latinitate donata. Lib. 1, col. ro Venetiis 1560).  £) Sicut cum homo vel album dicitur etc. Est lectio P. — ACDE: sicut  cum dico, homo vel album. — Cod. B: sicut cum dicit, homo εἴς. -- Infra  vero cod. A: non enim habet adhuc verum vel falsum. — Codd. BCDE:  non enim adhuc est verum vel falsum.  Circa autem comparationem institutam inter voces et intellectiones  notandum est, quod non sic accipienda est quasi in ipsis vocibus sive  de verbo exceptae actionis *: quia in his intel-  ligitur certus et * determinatus nominativus. Unde  est implicita compositio, licet non explicita.  13. Deinde cum dicit: Signum autem etc.,indu-  cit signum ex nomine composito, scilicet hircocer-  vus,  quod componitur ex hirco et cervus * et  quod in graeco dicitur tragelaphos; nam 'ragos est  hircus, et elaphos cervus. Huiusmodi enim nomi-  na  significant aliquid, scilicet quosdam conceptus  simplices, licet rerum compositarum; et ideo non  est verum vel falsum, nisi quando additur esse  vel non esse, per quae exprimitur iudicium intel-  lectus. Potest autem addi esse vel non esse, vel  secundum praesens tempus, quod est esse vel non  esse in actu, et ideo hoc dicitur esse simpliciter;  vel secundum tempus praeteritum, aut futurum,  quod non est esse simpliciter, sed secundum quid;  ut  cum dicitur aliquid fuisse vel futurum esse.-  Signanter autem utitur exemplo ex nomine signi-  ficante quod non est in rerum natura, in quo  statim falsitas apparet, et quod sine compositione  et divisione non possit verum vel falsum esse *.  simplicibus sive compositis sit veritas vel falsitas non secus ac in in-  tellectu. Ut enim docet s. Thomas in par. I, qu. xvi, artic. vir, veritas  enunciabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus: enunciabile enim  est in intellectu et est in voce. Secundum autem quod est in intellectu  habet per se veritatem, sed secundum quod est in voce, dicitur verum  enunciabile secundum quod significat aliquam veritatem intellectus, non  propter aliquam veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto.  (Cf. lect. vi, n. 3).  9) Et quod sine compositione et divisione non possit verum vel  falsum esse. Ita editores Piani cum ed. c. — Duae aliae edd. ab: in quo  statim falsitas apparet et sine compositione et divisione posset verum  vel falsum esse. Quae est lectio codd. DE, nisi quod uterque habet:  sed  sine compositione et divisione posset etc. Cod. A: in quo statim  falsitas apparet, sed sine compositione et divisione non posset esse  verum  vel falsum. — Cod. C: in quo' statim falsitas appareret, sed  sine compositione et divisione posset esse verum vel falsum etc.. De-  nique B: in quo statim falsitas apparet, si sine compositione et di-  visione posset esse verum vel falsum. Quae ultima lectio, mutato ex  cod. C apparet in appareret, mihi vera videtur et adoptanda.— « Ad de-  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  monstrandam vim simplicis nominis, inquit Boethius, quod omni  veritate atque mendacio careat, tale in exemplo posuit nomen, cui  res  nulla subiecta sit. Quod si quid verum vel falsum unum nomen  significare posset, nomen, quod eam rem designat, quae in rebus  non sit, omnino falsum esset; sed non est; non igitur ulla veritas  falsitasque in simplici unquam nomine reperietur. Nec illud parvae  curae fuit nomen non ponere quod omnino nihil significaret, sed cum  significaret quiddam, tamen verum aut falsum esse non posset, ut  non videretur veritatis falsitatisque causa esse, eo quoniam nihil si-  gnificaret » (In lib. De interpretatione, Ed. II, lib. I, 8 De signis, pag. 307).  Hanc Boethii expositionem paucis complectitur s. Thomas, cum ait:  Signanter autem etc., eamque exhibet lectio a nobis proposita.  *  nat, pluit, etc.  *  Verb. grat.: £o-  ABCE - omittunt  certus et.  *  Codd.  ABCE. -  DP.: Cer'vO.  CAP. II, LECT. IV  LECTIO QUARTA  :  :  DE NOMINE  "Ovop.x μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήχην,  ἄνευ  χρόνου, ἧς  μνηδὲν  μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν χεχω-  *  19  Nomen igitur est vox significativa secundum placitum,  sine  tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa, sepa-  vdd  "  μὰς  :  ^  Ἔν γὰρ τῷ Κάλλιππος τὸ ἵππος οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ  σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ Καλὸς ἵππος.  ἐν  Οὐ μὴν οὐδ᾽, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει  χαὶ  τοῖς συμπεπλεγμιένοις" ἐν ἐχείνοίς μὲν yap  τὸ μέρος οὐδαμῶς σημαντικόν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις βού-  λεται  μέν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδενὸς κεχωρισμένον, οἷον ἐν τῷ  ἐπαχτροχέλης τὸ κέλης οὐδέν τι σημαίνει καθ᾽ ἑαυτό.  Τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήχην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν  ἔστιν, ἀλλ, ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον, ἐπεὶ δηλοῦσί  γέ τι καὶ οἱ ἀγράμψιατοι ψόφοι, οἷον θηρίων, ὧν οὐδέν  ἐστιν ὄνομα.  “Τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἄνθρωπος οὐχ ὄνομα. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ χεῖται  ὄνομα, ὅ, τι δεῖ καλεῖν αὐτό: οὔτε γὰρ λόγος, οὔτε  ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν" ἀλλ᾽ ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον, ὅτι ὁμοίω  À  Li  —  ε  Eg ὁτουοῦν ὑπάρχει,  As.  xal ὄντος xal μὴ ὄντος.  Τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος, ἢ Φίλωνι, x«l ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐχ ὀνό-  μάτα; ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὀνόματος.  Λόγος δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ τὰ αὐτά"  ὅτι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἔστιν, ἢ ἦν, ἢ ἔσται, οὐκ ἀληθεύει  ^  ἢ  “δ  ψεύδεται, τὸ  '  δὲ  δὲ  ».  i  ὄνομα ἀεί. olov  dx  ,  H  Φίλωνός ἐστιν,  ἢ οὐχ ἔστιν" οὐδὲν γάρ πω οὔτε ἀληθεύει οὔτε ψεύ-  εται.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Textus divisiones et subdivisiones.- 2. Defi-  nitio ideo dicitur terminus, quia rem definitam totaliter includit.  3. In definitione nominis vox est per modum generis, ut distin-  guatur ab aliis sonis; significativa est prima differentia, qua no-  men distinguitur a vocibus non significantibus.— 4. Obiectio. Vi-  detur  quod non vox sed signum sit genus assumendum in  definitione nominis.— 5. Solvitur obiectio. Quamvis szgnum posset  assumi ut genus nominis, tamen quia nomen significat formam  accidentalem ut concretam materiae, seu subiecto, convenientius  ponitur ut gerus res naturalis, scilicet vox.— 6. Additur altera diffe-  rentia secundum placitum, qua nomen distinguitur a vocibus natu-  raliter significantibus.-  7. Tertia differentia sine tempore qua nomen  distinguitur a verbo.— Dubium quoad tertiam differentiam solvitur,  tria distinguendo circa tempus: rem quamdam; id quod tempore  mensuratur, nempe motum (secundum prius et posterius) in quo  consistunt actio et passio; ac denique ipsam: habitudinem temporis  mensurantis. Nomen potest significare tempus primo modo acce-  ptum; secundo sensu tempus significatur per verbum; tertio modo  per adverbium (Cf. lect. v, n. 7). - 8. Denique quarta et ultima  differentia, qua nomen distinguitur ab oratione, est quod pars  nominis non significat separata a suo /oto, quod est ipsum no-  men.- 9. Manifestatur quarta differentia in nominibus compositis :  unum nomen quamvis compositum ponitur ad significandum  unum conceptum simplicem; et ideo pars nominis compositi si  jj  * Cf. lect. τ.  ostquam Philosophus determinavit de  Jordine significationis vocum, hic ac-  cedit ad determinandum de ipsis vo-  x U^ cibus significativis. Et quia principa-  de enunciatione, quae est subiectum  huius libri *; in qualibet autem scientia oportet prae-  noscere * principia subiecti; ideo primo, determi-  nat de principiis enunciationis; secundo, de ipsa  «) Oportet praenoscere. Eligo hanc lectionem codd. AE, quia vere  respondet menti s. Thomae, ut patet ex lect. r1 super lib. I Poster.: Necesse  est quod antequam habeatur cognitio conclusionis , cognoscatur aliquo  modo subiectum et passio. Et lect. 1: Omnis... disciplinae acceptio ex  praeexistente cognitione fit.- Cod. D legit praecognoscere; et est lectio  rata.  :  In nomine enim quod est equiferus, ferus per se nihil signi-  ficat, quemadmodum in oratione, quae est,equus ferus.  At vero non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus, sic  se  habet etiam in compositis: in illis enim nullo modo  pars significativa est; in his autem vult quidem, sed  nihil significat separata: ut in eo quod est equiferus.  Secundum placitum vero, quoniam naturaliter nomen nul-  Ium est, sed quando fit nota; nam designant et illitterati  soni, ut ferarum, quorum nullum est nomen.  $  Non homo vero non est nomen. At vero nec positum est  nomen, quo illud oporteat appellari, nam neque oratio,  neque negatio est; sed sit nomen infinitum, quoniam  similiter in quolibet est, et quod est, et quod non est.  Catonis (Philonis) autem, vel Catoni (Philoni) et quae-  cumque talia sunt non nomina, sed casus nominis sunt.  Ratio autem eius in aliis quidem eadem est, sed differt:  quoniam cum est vel fuit vcl erit adiunctum, neque  verum, neque falsum est: nomen vero semper: ut Ca-  tonis (Philonis) est, vel non est, nondum enim aliquid  verum dicit aut falsum.  separata significaret, significaret partem illius conceptus simpli-  cis: quod esse non potest.— ro. Attamen in nominibus simplici-  bus pars separata non significat neque realiter neque apparenter;  sed pars in nominibus compositis aliquid non quidem realiter,  sed apparenter videtur significare: quia licet nomen compositum  significet conceptum simplicem, tamen a conceptu composito im-  ponitur ( Cf. lect. vr, n. 6.). - 11. Manifestatur secunda differentia  nominis  est  (szgnificativum secundum placitum): quia nullum nomen  naturaliter. (Cf. lect. rr, n. 8).— 12. Tres sententiae de nominum .  significatione: duae extremae; quarum una absolute negat, altera  absolute affirmat naturalem nominum significationem. — Senten-  tia  media negans significationem nominum esse a natura, sed  affirmans nominum significationem congruere naturis rerum. —  13. Dictiones quae a negatione imponuntur, et quae appellari  solent infinitae, nomina dici nequeunt propter indeterminationem  significationis. Nomina enim significant aut aliquam naturam de-  terminatam, aut personam determinatam, aut utramque determi-  nate. - 14. Solus nominativus dicitur principaliter nomen, quia  per ipsum facta est impositio nominis ad aliquid significandum.  —  15. Nomen in recto cum verbo substantivo adiunctum, sem-  per significat verum vel falsum, quod non contingit de nomine  in casu obliquo. - 16. Solvitur obiectio. Praemissa (in principio  textus) definitio nominis non simpliciter convenit neque nomini  infinito, neque casibus nominis.- Est corollarium praecedentium.  enunciatione ; ibi: Enunciativa vero non omnis etc.*  Circa primum duo facit: primo enim, determinat  principia quasi materialia enunciationis, scilicet  partes integrales ipsius; secundo, determinat princi-  pium formale, scilicet orationem *, quae est enun-  ciationis genus; ibi: Oratio autem est vox significa-  tiva* etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo, determi-  nat  de nomine, quod significat rei substantiam;  eiusdem sensus. — Edit. Piana habet noscere; cod. B legit cognoscere.  Vera utraque lectio, sed non melior: non enim s. Thomas vult hic in-  dicare simplicem cognitionem, sed inculcare per illa verba intendit huius  cognitionis ordinem, nempe praenotionem. — Cod. C omittit verba, quae  est subiectum huius libri etc., usque ad illa de principiis inclusive.  *  *  Cap. π᾿.  Lect. vir.  "Βα  enunciationem.  erronee :  *  Lect. vi.  20  secundo, determinat de verbo, quod significat actio-  *'Tect v.  Definitio cur di-  catur derminus.  *  A: concludit.  "p:  remaneat  extra definitum.  *  A:  liis.  omnibus a-  Vocis natura.  *  Cap.vir, ἢ.11.-  Comment. s. Th.  lect. xviit.  "Βα:  dam.  *  quarum-  Cf. infra n. rr.  *  *  ABC:  A:  debeat.  cum sit na-  turale; - 8c: quod  est naturale.  e  *  *  A: accidentis.  A:  artificiales.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  si qua nomina accidens in abstracto significant *  quod in eorum definitione ponatur accidens in  recto, quasi genus, subiectum autem in obliquo,  quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simitas est cur-  vitas nasi. Si qua vero nomina accidens signifi-  cant  nem vel passionem procedentem a re; ibi: Verbum  autem est quod consignificat tempus * etc. Circa  primum tria facit: primo, definit nomen; secundo,  definitionem exponit; ibi: Zn nomine enim quod  est equiferus etc.; tertio, excludit quaedam, quae  perfecte rationem nominis non habent, ibi: Non  homo vero non est nomen.  Circa primum considerandum est quod de-  finitio ideo dicitur terminus, quia includit * totali-  ter  rem ; ita scilicet, quod nihil rei est extra de-  finitionem *, cui scilicet definitio non conveniat ^;  nec  aliquid aliud est infra definitionem, cui sci-  licet definitio conveniat.  3. Et ideo quinque ponit in definitione no-  minis. Primo, ponitur vox per modum generis ,  per quod distinguitur nomen ab omnibus * sonis,  qui non sunt voces. Nam vox est sonus ab ore  animalis prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam ,  ut  dicitur in II De anima *. Additur autem prima  differentia, scilicet szgnizficativa, ad differentiam  quarumcunque * vocum non significantium, sive sit  vox litterata * et articulata, sicut biliris, sive non  litterata et non articulata, sicut szbilus pro nihilo  factus 7. Et quia de significatione vocum in su-  perioribus actum est, ideo ex praemissis concludit  quod nomen est vox significativa.  4. Sed cum vox sit quaedam res naturalis,  nomen autem non est aliquid naturale sed ab  hominibus institutum, videtur quod. non debuit *  genus nominis ponere vocem, quae est ex natura *,  sed magis signum, quod est ex institutione; ut  diceretur: Nomen, est signum vocale; sicut etiam  convenientius definiretur scufella, si quis diceret  quod est vas ligneum, quam si quis diceret quod  est  lignum formatum in vas.  5.  Sed dicendum quod artificialia ? sunt qui-  dem in genere substantiae ex parte materiae, in  genere autem accidentium * ex parte formae: nam  formae artificialium * accidentia sunt. Nomen ergo  significat formam accidentalem ut concretam sub-  iecto. Cum autem in definitione omnium acciden-  tium oporteat poni subiectum, necesse est quod,  8) Cui scilicet. definitio non conveniat. Haec verba usque ad illa  inclusive infra definitionem, desiderantur in cod. C. Sed manifestum est  quod error irrepsit ex recursu eorumdem verborum définitionem cui  scilicet. - Quae vero in hoc numero habentur, Aegidius explicat per haec  verba: « Notat hic Expositor (.S. Zhomas) quod definitio vocatur termi-  »  »  »  »  nus, secundum Philosophum in libro Posteriorum. Nam sicut termi-  nus  continet illud quod est de proprio, et dimittit illud quod est de  alieno; ita definitio debet continere illud quod est de essentia definiti,  et dimittere illud quod est extra essentiam definiti» (In I Peri her-  meneias, 8 Nomen ergo est vox etc. fol. 48 verso, col. 2, seq.  — Vene-  tiis  1507).  y) Pro nihilo factus. Haec verba desunt in cod. D, sed retinenda  sunt cum edd. Piana et Venetis, nec non codd. ABC: si enim omit-  tantur, potest accipi sibilus ut aliquid significans, sicut revera est quan-  doque; quod est contra mentem s. Doctoris, cuius sérmo est de vocibus  sive articulatis sive non articulatis, sed non significantibus.  9) Artificialia sunt quidem etc. Quaedam heic opportunum est de-  clarare pro novitiis.— In artificialibus duo sunt, materia, puta lignum vel  aes vel marmor, et forma, puta figura Petri vel Pauli. Illa est res natu-  ralis  et  aes  substantia quaedam ab artifice praesupposita; forma vero est  ab artifice, a quo ponitur in illa materia et est quid ipsi materiae ac-  cidentale:  enim  non  propterea in seipsa substantialiter mutatur  quia diversimode figuratur. Porro ab hac forma et non a materia denomi-  natur et constituitur artificiale quodvis; et ideo communiter dicitur quod  artefacta, ut sunt talia, ex parte nempe formae, sunt accidentia. hun  forma si accipiatur ut revera existit, non est sine materia, seu est con-  creta subiecto; ethac de causa materia seu subiectum ingreditur defini-  in  concreto, in eorum definitione ponitur  materia, vel subiectum, quasi genus, et accidens,  quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simum est nasus  currus. Si igitur. nomina rerum artificialium 51-  gnificant formas accideritales, ut concretas sub-  iectis naturalibus, convenientius est, ut in eorum  definitione ponatur res naturalis quasi genus, ut  dicamus quod scutella est lignum figuratum, et  similiter quod nomen est vox significativa. Secus  autem esset, si nomina artificialium acciperentur,  quasi significantia ipsas formas artificiales in ab-  stracto.  6.  Tertio, ponit secundam differentiam cum  dicit : Secundum placitum, idest sécundum insti-  tutionem humanam a beneplacito hominis proce-  dentem. Et per hoc differt nomen a vocibus signi-  ficantibus naturaliter, sicut sunt gemitus infirmo-  rum et voces brutorum animalium.  7.  Quarto, ponit tertiam differentiam, scilicet  sine tempore, per quod differt nomen a verbo. -  Sed videtur hoc esse falsum: quia hoc nomen  dies vel annis significat tempus *.- Sed dicendum  quod circa tempus tria possunt considerari. Primo  quidem, ipsum tempus, secundum quod est res  quaedam, et sic potest significari a nomine, sicut  quaelibet alia res. Alio modo, potest considerari  id, quod tempore mensuratur, in quantum huius-  modi: et quia id quod primo et principaliter tem-  pore mensuratur est motus, in quo consistit actio  et  passio, ideo verbum quod significat actionem  vel passionem, significat cum tempore. Substantia  autem * secundum se considerata, prout significa-  tur per nomen et pronomen, non habet in quantum  huiusmodi ut tempore mensuretur, sed solum  secundum quod subiicitur motui, prout * per par-  ticipium significatur *. Et ideo verbum et partici-  pium significant cum tempore, non autem nomen  et pronomen. Tertio modo, potest considerari ipsa  tionem rerum artificialium, sicut et aliorum accidentium, ut explicatur in  textu; nempe, vel in recto, hoc est in casu nominativo si artificialia vel  accidentia quaecumque eorumque nomina definiantur in concreto; vel in  obliquo, hoc est in genitivo aliisque casibus, si definiantur in abstracto,  hoc est, si accipiantur quasi sint aliquid in seipsis, ut explicatur in textu.—  Quia ergo nomina seu vocabula res sunt artificiales; ideo per ordinem  ad subiectum, sicut caetera artificialia et accidentia, esse definienda recte  s.  Thomas concludit. — Ratio vero cur in definitione accidentium poni  oporteat eorum subiectum, in ipsa natura accidentis est, ut hic supra  innuimus, Accidens enim non in se est, sed in subiecto, nempe de eius  natura non est esse sed inesse; et ideo haec inhaerentia seu dependentia  a  subiecto est de ratione seu de definitione accidentis (Cf. 1 Posterior.  lect. x). - Cum autem dicitur quod subiectum ingreditur definitionem ac-  cidentis, non sic est intelligendum quasi subiectum sit pars essentialis  intrinseca et constitutiva accidentis (absurdum enim est dicere quod  homo e.g. sit de essentia albi); sed quia subiectum est extrinsece de  ratione accidentis, hoc sensu nempe quod accidentis natura non intelli-  gitur sine inhaerentia sive actuali sive potentiali vel habitudinali ad subie-  ctum, cui inesse debet ut existat, sicut explicatum est (Cf. VII Metaphysic.  lect. 1v).  ε) Si qua nomina accidens in abstracto significant. Lectio ista, quam  habent codd., ponitur loco lectionis Pianae et Venetae c: si qua mo-  mina accidentis in abstracto definiantur: nam vere concordat cum  altera  parte  sententiae  infra  posita a s. Thoma: si qua vero nomina  accidens significant in. concreto. — Aliae duae Venetae edd. ab: si qua  nomina accidentis in abstracto significant, — Libenter tamen admitterem  definiantur editionis Pianae, si codices et contextus consentirent.  *  In marg. n: si-  gnificat  cum tem-  pore.  Tempus ut est  res quaedam.  Id quod tempore  mensuratur.  *  c: quae,et omit-  it autem,  CAP. II,  Habitudotempo- habitudo temporis mensurantis; quod significatur  ris  *  A:  mensurantis.  et hodie.  "Βα:  coopera-  tur; et forte est  vera lectio.  *  Quarta ?  * Nomen  Y  ex codd.  Pec  Quinto,  per adverbia temporis, ut cras, heri et huiusmodi *.  8.  ponit quartam differentiam cum  subdit: Cuius nulla pars est significativa separata,  scilicet a toto nomine; comparatur * tamen ad si-  gnificationem nominis secundum quod est in toto.  Quod ideo est, quia significatio est quasi forma  nominis; nulla autem pars separata habet formam  totius, sicut manus separata ab homine non habet  formam humanam. Et per hoc distinguitur nomen  ab oratione, cuius pars significat separata ὃ; ut cum  dicitur, homo iustus.  9. Deinde cum dicit: Zn nomine enim quod est etc.,  manifestat praemissam definitionem. Et primo,  quantum ad ultimam particulam; secundo, quantum  ad tertiam; ibi: Secundum vero placitum etc. Nam  primae duae particulae manifestae sunt ex prae-  missis; tertia * autem particula, scilicet sine tem-  pore, manifestabitur in sequentibus in tractatu De  Verbo. Circa primum duo facit: primo, manifestat  propositum per nomina composita; secundo, osten-  dit circa hoc differentiam inter nomina simplicia  et composita; ibi: Af vero non quemadmodum etc.  Manifestat ergo primo quod pars nominis sepa-  rata nihil significat, per nomina composita, in qui-  bus hoc magis * videtur. In hoc enim nomine quod  est equiferus ^, haec pars ferus, per se nihil signi-  ficat 'sicut  significat in hac oratione, quae est  equus ferus. Cuius ratio est quod unum nomen  imponitur * ad significandum unum simplicem in-  tellectum; aliud autem est id a quo imponitur no-  men ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen signi-  ficat; sicut hoc nomen /apis imponitur a laesione  pedis, quam non significat: quod tamen imponitur *  ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei. Et inde  est quod pars nominis compositi, quod imponitur  ad significandum conceptum simplicem, non si-  gnificat partem conceptionis compositae, a qua  imponitur nomen * ad significandum. Sed oratio  significat ipsam conceptionem compositam: unde  pars orationis significat partem conceptionis com-  positae.  Ὁ Cuius pars significat separata , ut cum etc. — Codd. ABC: quae  etiam significat quandoque sine tempore, ut cum etc. Sed haec lectio  non videtur adoptanda. Non enim est amplius sermo de tertia differen-  tia, quae est significatio sine tempore, sed de quarta differentia quae  est non significatio partis nominis separatae a toto nomine.  τῇ Quod est equiferus. Textus graecus habet: ἐν τῷ χάλλιππος τὸ  ἵππος nihil significat; et infra: Sicut in τῷ ἐπαχτροχέλης, τὸ χέλης  non aliquid significat secundum seipsum. Quae dictiones quia latine non  integre unico vocabulo redduntur, ponitur equiferus, quod aeque valet  ad mentem Aristotelis exprimendam. Alii malunt vocabulum graecum  inserere versioni latinae quam mutare; sed est scrupulus non curandus.'  Argyropolus autem neque ἐπαχτροχέλητον ponit neque equiferum, sed  vertit, uf in exemplo patet antea dicto; exemplum autem ab ipso an-  tea dictum, de equifero est. In translatione denique, qua utimur, omit-  tuntur sequentis versus ultima verba: τὸ χέλης etc.  9) Sicut et in compositis. Haec verba et immediate sequentia, quia  in simplicibus, desunt in D, sed est mendum amanuensis, ex recursu  vocis simplicibus. Contextus autem praefata verba requirit ad sententiae  sensum complendum.- Codd. alii legunt simplicibus et compositis: quae  lectio bona est. Retineo tamen Pianam quia comparatio instituta inter  nomina simplicia-et composita magis clare indicatur.  Ὁ Nihil tamen pars eius significat, ut dictum est de nomine equi-  ferus. « Hoc nomen equiferus ( inquit doctissimus Sylvester Maurus),  »  »  »  »  »  differt ab hac oratione equus ferus, quod ferus in quantum est pars  huius orationis equus ferus per se significat ferum; in quantum vero  est pars huius nominis equiferus per se nihil significat (Cf. n. 10).  Hinc patet differentia inter nomina simplicia et composita, Partes no-  minum simplicium separatae non solum non significant, sed neque  LECT. IV  21  10. Deinde cum dicit: 41 vero non etc., ostendit  quantum ad hoc differentiam inter nomina sim-  plicia et composita, et dicit quod non ita se habet  in nominibus simplicibus, sicut et in compositis ^:  quia in simplicibus pars nullo modo est signifi-  cativa, neque secundum veritatem, neque secun-  dum apparentiam; sed in compositis vult quidem,  idest apparentiam habet significandi; nihil tamen  pars eius significat, ut dictum est de nomine equi-  ferus*. Haec autem ratio differentiae est *, quia  nomen simplex sicut imponitur ad significandum  conceptum simplicem, ita etiam imponitur ad si-  gnificandum ab aliquo simplici conceptu; nomen  vero  compositum imponitur a composita conce-  ptione, ex qua habet apparentiam quod pars eius  significet.  11. Deinde cum dicit: Secundum placitum etc.,  manifestat tertiam partem praedictae definitionis; et  dicit quod ideo dictum est quod nomen significat  secundum placitum, quia nullum nomen est na-  turaliter - Ex hoc enim est nomen, quod signi-  ficat: non autem significat naturaliter, sed ex in-  stitutione.  Et  hoc est quod subdit: Sed quando  fit nota, idest quando imponitur ad significandum.  Id enim quod naturaliter significat non fit, sed  naturaliter est signum. Et hoc significat cum dicit:  Illlitterati enim soni, ut ferarum ?, quia scilicet litteris  significari non possunt. Et dicit potius sonos quam  voces, quia quaedam animalia non habent vocem,  eo quod carent pulmone, sed tantum quibusdam  sonis proprias passiones naturaliter significant:  nihil autem horum sonorum est nomen. Ex quo  manifeste datur intelligi quod nomen non signi-  ficat naturaliter.  12.  Sciendum tamen est quod circa hoc fuit  diversa quorumdam opinio. Quidam enim dixe-  runt quod nomina nullo modo naturaliter signi-  ficant:  nec  differt quae res quo nomine signifi-  centur. Alii vero dixerunt quod nomina omnino  naturaliter significant, quasi nomina sint naturales  similitudines rerum. Quidam vero dixerunt quod  nomina non naturaliter significant quantum ad hoc,  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  habent vim significandi: e. gr. partes huius nominis Petrus, quae sunt  Pe, trus, non habent ullam vim significandi, quia non sunt impositae  ad aliquid significandum. At vero pàrtes nominum compositorum se-  paratae habent vim significandi, sed in quantum sunt partes talis no-  minis non exercent talem vim significativam : e. g. ferus, quod est pars  huius nominis equiferus, separatim habet vim significandi, sed in quan-  tum est pars huius nominis, non exercet talem vim, neque significat  » ferum » (Aristotelis Opera, quae extant omnia, brevi paraphrasi, ac  litterae perpetuo inhaerente explanatione illustrata, tom. 1, De inter-  pretatione, lib. I, cap. τι, pag. 68, seq. - Romae 1668).  x) Nullum nomen est naturaliter. Vera est haec lectio omnium no-  strorum codd., ut videre est in textu Aristotelico, cuius verba hic recitan-  tur a s. Thoma. Vult enim s. Thomas probare cum Aristotele quod  nomen significat ex institutione; probat autem hoc modo: nullum ποὸ-  men  est a natura; ergo nomen significat ex institutione. Antecedens  probatur: nam non est nomen nisi quatenus significat; ergo ab eo est  nomen, a quo est significatio; sed significatio nominis non est a natura  (quia id quod naturaliter significat non fit, sed naturaliter est signum);  ergo nullum nomen est a natura. — Si autem legatur cum Piana: nmul-  lum nomen significat naturaliter; probatio est repetitio asserti, nempe, *  nullum  nomen significat naturaliter , quia nullum nomen significat  naturaliter.  X) Et hoc significat, cum dicit etc. — Codd. CE: et hoc significari  dicit per illitteratos sonos ferarum.—B: et hoc significari debet per etc.—  A: et hoc significare erit per illitteratos sonos ferarum, qui scilicet etc.—  D: et hoc significare dicit propter illitteratos etc. Retinemus Pianam, sed  non  displicet codd. CE lectio, cui etiam aliorum codd. lectio est magis  conformis.  *  t  c: huius autem  differentiae ra-  lio est.  Sw  22  quod eorum significatio non est a natura, ut Aristo-  *  Naturaliter cx  ABC.  Plato.  *  Cf. infra lect.vi,  num. ὃ in not. π᾿  Voces brutorum  habent nomina,  sed non sunt no-  mina.  *A:  ut  ego vel  fu; et omittit pro-  nomen.  *A:  δὲ  autem.  *  negatio  pk: requiretur;  forte; requirere-  tur.  Boethius.  Ammonius.  *  Loc. citand. in  nota seq.  teles hic intendit; quantum vero ad hoc naturaliter *  significant quod eorum significatio congruit na-  turis rerum, ut Plato dixit *. - Nec obstat quod  una res multis nominibus significatur: quia unius  rei possunt esse multae similitudines; et similiter  ex  diversis proprietatibus possunt uni rei multa  diversa nomina imponi.  Non est autem intelligendum quod dicit: Quorum  nihil est nomen, quasi soni animalium non habeant  nomina: nominantur enim quibusdam nominibus,  sicut dicitur rugitus leonis et mugitus bovis; sed  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  hic. Et ideo novum nomen imponit * huiusmodi  dictioni, vocans eam nomen znfinitum propter in-  determinationem significationis, ut dictum est.  14. Deinde cum dicit: Catonis autem vel Cato-  ni ctc., excludit casus nominis; et dicit quod Cato-  nis vel Catoni et alia huiusmodi non sunt nomina,  sed solus nominativus dicitur principaliter nomen,  per quem facta est impositio nominis ad aliquid  significandum. Huiusmodi autem obliqui vocantur  casus nominis: quia quasi cadunt ^ per quamdam  declinationis originem a nominativo, qui dicitur re-  ctus  quia nullus talis sonus est nomen, ut dictum est,  13. Deinde cum dicit: Non homo vero etc., ex-  cludit quaedam a nominis ratione. Et primo, nomen  infinitum; secundo, casus nominum ; ibi: Catonis  autem vel Caioni etc. Dicit ergo primo quod non  homo non est nomen. Omne enim nomen signi-  ficat aliquam naturam determinatam, ut omo;  aut personam determinatam, ut pronomen *; aut  utrumque determinatum, ut Sortes. Sed hoc quod  dico  non  homo, neque determinatam naturam  neque determinatam personam significat. Impo-  nitur enim a negatione hominis, quae aequa-  liter dicitur de ente, et non ente. Unde non homo  potest dici indifferenter, et de eo quod non est  in rerum natura; ut si dicamus, chimaera est non  homo, et de eo quod est in rerum natura; sicut  cum dicitur, equus est non homo. Si autem * im-  poneretur a privatione ^, requireret * subiectum ad  minus existens: sed quia imponitur a negatione,  potest dici de ente et de non ente, ut Boethius  et Ammonius dicunt *. Quia tamen significat per  modum nominis, quod potest subiici et praedi-  cari, requiritur ad minus suppositum in apprehen-  sione. Non autem erat nomen positum tempore  Aristotelis" sub quo huiusmodi dictiones conclude-  rentur. Non enim est oratio, quia pars eius non  significat aliquid separata, sicut nec in nominibus  compositis; similiter autem non est negatio, id  est oratio negativa, quia huiusmodi oratio super-  addit negationem affirmationi, quod non contingit  9) Si autem. imponeretur a privatione etc. Quia ex inordinata ver-  borum prolatione de facili incurritur error, ideo in scientiis proprietas  etiam verborum est accurate servanda. Igitur privatio est negatio alicuius  proprietatis in subiecto; at negatio a subiecto omnino praescindit, imo  quandoque afficit subiectum ipsum, ut cum dicitur, non-Aomo. Ex quo  sequitur quod privatio semper praesupponat subiectum, quod non ne-  gatur, sed de quo aliquid negatur (Cf. lect. v, n. 11). — Exinde est quod  privatio, si strictiori etiam sensu accipiatur, est negatio perfectionis in  subiecto, ad quam habendam subiectum natura. sua ordinatur, et quam  proinde non habere est defectus: quod non est de negatione simpliciter  dicta. Hinc homo dicitur privatus visu, quae privatio est defectus in  homine; sed visus negatur lapidi, in quo carentia visus non est suae  naturae defectus, quinimo suae naturae consentanea est (Cf. s. Th. in  IV Metaphys. lect. ur, et V lect. xx).  v) Non autem erat nomen positum tempore Aristotelis etc. His  verbis intelligimus Aristotelem auctorem fuisse ut huiusmodi dictiones  negativae, non homo, non ens etc., infinitae dicerentur (Cf. lect. seq.  n.  11): quod aliunde ex ipsis Aristotelis verbis ἔστω ὄνομα ἀόριστον  aperte  indicatur. « Si placet, vocetur (praefata dictio) nomen infini-  »  »  tum, ut et habeat rationem nominis quoad modum grammaticae, et  quoad dialecticum extra perfectam rationem nominis extrahatur. » Ita  interpretatur Aristotelem  b. Albertus Magnus in I Peri hermeneias,  tract.  11, cap. v. Et Ammonius in librum Je interpretatione sect. I,  eo  quod non cadit. Stoici autem dixerunt  etiam nominativos dici casus: quos grammatici  sequuntur, eo quod cadunt, idest procedunt ab  interiori conceptione mentis. Et dicitur rectus, eo  quod nihil * prohibet aliquid cadens sic cadere, ut  rectum stet, sicut stilus qui cadens ligno infigitur.  15. Deinde cum dicit: Ratio autem eius etc. τ,  ostendit consequenter quomodo se habeant obliqui  casus ad nomen; et dicit quod ratio, quam signi-  ficat nomen, est eadem et * in aliis, scilicet casibus  nominis; sed in hoc est differentia quod * no-  men adiunctum cum hoc verbo es? vel erit * vel  fwit semper significat verum vel falsum: quod  non contingit in obliquis. Signanter autem inducit  exemplum de verbo substantivo: quia sunt quae-  dam alia verba, scilicet impersonalia, quae cum  obliquis * significant verum vel falsum; ut cum di-  citur, poenitet Sortem, quia actus verbi intelligitur  ferri super obliquum; ac si diceretur, poenitentia  habet * Sortem.  16. Sed contra *: si nomen infinitum et casus  non sunt nomina, inconvenienter data est prae-  missa nominis definitio, quae istis convenit. - Sed  dicendum, secundum Ammonium *, quod supra  communius definit * nomen, postmodum vero si-  gnificationem nominis arctat subtrahendo haec a  nomine.- Vel dicendum quod praemissa definitio  non simpliciter convenit his: nomen enim infinitum  nihil determinatum significat, neque casus nominis  significat secundum primum placitum instituentis,  ut  dictum est.  8.7 Non homo etc., ait: «Id genus voces,... nomen nullum ab anti-  »  quioribus meruerunt... per verba autem illa, sed sit infinitum nomen,  »  constat ipsum (Aristotelem) eius notae vocibus hoc nomen indidisse »  (Ed. cit. fol. 6, col. 3 et 4). — Cf. Boeth. De interpret. Ed. II, lib. I, De  nomine, ὃ. Non homo etc., pag. 312, ed. cit. Basileae.  E) Et ideo novum nomen imponit. Adiicio novum ex codd. ABCE,  quamvis illo careant edd. Ven., P. et cod. D. — Etenim illud indicari vide-  tur ex contextu orationis, in qua agitur de novo vocabulo, quo Aristo-  teles designavit nomina quae a negatione imponuntur. — Infra, lect. vtt,  occurret aliud vocabulum introductum ab Aristotele, nempe dictio, et aliud  lect. 1x, scilicet contradictio.  0) Quia quasi cadunt. — Quasi ex codd.  — Piana: quia cadunt. Eligo  codd. lectionem: nam cadere hoc loco figurate accipitur; et ideo scien-  tifice loquendo, magis a figura (scientiis impropria)-receditur adiuncto  adverbio quasi. — Cod. A: qui quasi cadunt.— Supra vero tum in prin-  cipio huius numeri, tum praecedentis reliquimus exemplum Catonis et  Catoni versionis latinae, quamvis in graeco habeatur Philonis et Philoni,  ut  notavimus in textu.  x) Deinde cum dicit: Ratio autem eius etc. Codd. ABC omittunt  haec verba; et cod. A incipit: ostendit autem qualiter etc. - BC: osten-  dit autem consequenter qualiter etc. Sed sunt lectiones non àdoptandae.  S. Thomas enim in exponendo partes textus Aristotelis semper illo aut  simili modo utitur: Deinde cum dicit etc.  Stoici et gram-  matici.  *  *  *  *  Bc: quia nihil.  ABCOmittunt ef.  A:  quia.  Codd.- P.: non  est ( Cf. text.)  *  A: obliquis ca-  sibus.  *  *  p: tenet.  Contra  tunt ABC.  omit-  CAP. III, LECT. V  LECTIO QUINTA  DE VERBI NATURA ET EIUS CONVENIENTIA AD NOMEN -Ὁ  Ρῆμα  δέ *  δέ  ἐστι  ,  τὸ  ' -  Y , fen kis rhe -  ,  τ  ΄  προσσημιαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν  δὲ  σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑτέρου λε-  oU.  y.  *  23  Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus, cuius pars  nihil extra significat, et est semper eorum, quae de  altero praedicantur, nota.  ν  '  4  ,  ,  Λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι προσσημαίνει χρόνον, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ὄνομα,  τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνει ῥῆμα" προσσημαίνει γὰρ τὸ νῦν ὑπάρ-  etw.  Καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖόν ἐστιν. οἷον  τῶν καθ᾽ ὑποχειμένου. T] ἐν ὑποχειμένῳ.  ῃ  Η  ,  "  t  υ  ;  ῳ  ,  ,  h  »  e  Τὸ δὲ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, χαὶ τὸ οὐ κάμνει, οὐ QT.  προσσημαίνει μὲν do χρόνον, καὶ ἀεὶ κατά τινος  ὑπάρχει" τῇ δὲ διαφορᾷ ὄνομα οὐ χεῖται" ἀλλ᾽ ἔστω  ἀόριστον ῥῆμα, ὅτι ὁμοίως ἐφ᾽ ὁτουοῦν ὑπάρχει; καὶ  ὄντος. καὶ μὴ ὄντος.  $-  pm .  5 1  ^  H  7*9,  μοίως  δὲ  ,  e,  "J  .  €  » -  Met  ^  ,  P  καὶ τὸ ὑγίανεν, ἢ τὸ ὑγιανεῖ, οὐ ῥῆμα, ἀλλὰ  πτώσεις ῥήματος διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ῥήματος, ὅτι τὸ  μὲν τὸν παρόντα προσσημαίνει χρόνον; τοὶ δὲ τὸν  ,  ^^  q  el  Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν xa" ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά  ,  ^  ,  Li  '  ἐστι;  καὶ σημαίνει τι" (στησι  rop ὁ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ὁ  ἀκούσας ἠρέμησεν") ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν, ἢ μιή, οὔπω σημαίνει"  οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ μὴ εἶναι; σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ πράγ-  ματος" οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν τὸ ὃν εἴπῃς αὐτὸ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ ψιλόν"  αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι" προσσημαίνει δὲ σύνθεσίν  τινα, ἣν ἄνευ τῶν συγκειμένων οὐχ ἔστι νοῆσαι.  SyNopsrs. — 1. Textus argumentum et divisiones. — 2. In  verbi definitione omittuntur, ut subintellecta, quae verbum  habet communia cum nomine.- Duae primae particulae defini-  tionis verbi.—3. Solvitur duplici ratione difficultas, quare nihi-  lominus apponatur particula communis etiam nomini.  particula definitionis verbi affertur.  — 4. Tertia  — Verbum est semper ex parte  praedicati: per quod distinguitur non solum a nomine, sed  etiam a participio (infra n. 8).— 5. Solvitur difficultas. Verba  infinitivi modi quando in subiecto propositionis ponuntur habent  vim nominis: ratio est quia ipsa, non secus ac nomina, signi-  ficant res quasi per se stantes, nempe ipsum processum vel inhae-  rentiam actionis quasi res quasdam, non autem significant per  modum passionis et actionis egredientis a substantia et ipsi ?nAae-  rentis: quae significatio est propria verbo. - 6. Tam verba, quam  omnes orationis partes, quando ponuntur in propositione rate-  rialiter, sumuntur ut nomina.—7. Quia verbum significat actio-  nem, ideo consignificat, seu ex consequenti (infr. n. 20 et 22) signi-  ficat tempus: sed hoc relative ad nos, quibus actiones notae sunt  in tempore. -- ὃ. Quia verbum significat id quod praedicatur de  alio, et componit praedicatum subiecto; ideo dicitur ποία seu si-  gnum eorum quae de altero praedicantur. - 9. Solvitur dubium  quoad esse de subiecto et esse 7n subiecto. — Responsio Boethii. —  Alia responsio. Omnis praedicatio fit per verbum ratione com-  positionis importatae, sive praedicetur aliquid essentialiter, nempe  ut  de subiecto, sive accidentaliter, scilicet ut /n subiecto.— 10. Ver-  bum infinitum (Cf. lect. rv, n. 13) quia non significat aliquid per  modum actionis vel passionis, non proprie potest dici verbum.  Dicitur tamen verbum quia cum verbis convenit in eo quod po-  nitur ex parte praedicati, et aliquo sensu consignificat tempus. —  11.  Solvitur obiectio. — 12. Verba praeteriti et futuri temporis  excluduntur a verbo stricte sumpto, quia non consignificant  [Twy  ostquam Philosophus determinavit de  (QV Jo nomine:  hic  determinat de verbo.  Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, definit  *  a  J^ verbum; secundo, excludit quaedam  ratione verbi; ibi: Non currit autem, et non  laborat etc.; tertio, ostendit convenientiam verbi  ad nomen; ibi: psa quidem secundum se dicta ver-  ba, etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit de-  Dico vero quoniam consignificat tempus; ut cursus ( vale-  δ  2  λέγω  7... οἱ  ^  LI  tudo ) quidem nomen est, currit (valet) autem verbum:  consignificat enim nunc esse.  Et est semper eorum, quae de altero dicuntur, nota, ut  eorum quae de subiecto dicuntur vel in subiecto sunt.  Non currit (valet) vero et non laborat, non verbum dico:  consignificat etenim tempus, et semper de aliquo est:  differentiae  autem huic nomen non est positum: sed  sit infinitum verbum, quoniam similiter in quolibet est,  et  quod est et quod non est.  Similiter autem curret (valuit) et currebat (valebit ), verbum  non est, sed casus verbi; differt autem a verbo, quo-  niam hoc quidem consignificat praesens tempus, illa  vero quae circa sunt.  Ipsa itaque, secundum se dicta verba, nomina sunt,  et significant aliquid: (constituit enim qui dicit intellectum,  et qui audit, quiescit): sed si est vel non est, nondum  significat: neque enim signum est rei esse vel non esse;  nec si hoc ipsum es? purum dixeris: ipsum enim nihil  est; consignificat autem quamdam compositionem, quam  sihe compositis non .est intelligere.  tempus praesens, quod a verbo proprie dicto consignificatur:  ab ipso enim significatur agere et pati simpliciter, quod pro-  prie est de re praesenti.- 13. Quia praeteritum et futurum  dicuntur per ordinem ad praesens, verba praeteriti et futuri  temporis rationabiliter dicuntur casus verbi.— 14. Ergo variatio  quae  nisi  est  sit  in  ex  declinatione  parte  verbi  non  constituit  casus  verbi,  actionis. — 15. Verba habent aliquam con-  venientiam cum nomine non stricté, sed communiter accepto.—  16.  Probatur assertum. Et primo quod verbum convenit cum  nomine in significando aliquid, scilicet agere vel pati, ut sunt  res  quaedam: quod intenditur a proferente verbum, et appre-  henditur ab audiente illud. - 17. Verbum secundum se non si-  gnificat nisi simplicem conceptionem alicüius, sicut et nomen  (C£. lect. ut, n. 11). — 18. Corollarium. Ergo altera convenientia  verbi cum nomine in eo. est, quod sicut nec nomen, ita nec  verbum per se sumptum significat verum vel falsum logicum  seu  cognitionis (Cf. lect. rtr, n. 6).— Quamvis enim omne verbum  implicet esse vel mon esse, tamen secundum se non significat  rem esse vel non esse; in qua significatione veritas vel falsitas  cognitionis consistit. — 19. Specialis difficultas quoad ens a quo  esse  originem habet.—20. Ens secundum se sumptum consigni-  ficat, sed principaliter non significat esse: et ideo non significat  veritatem vel falsitatem cognitionis.— 21. Verbum est non signi-  ficat compositionem, quae possit intelligi sine componentibus;  et  ideo secundum se non habet veritatem vel falsitatem | logi-  cam.—22. Quia tamen verbum es: significat illud quod primo  cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis communis omni for-  mae, et per ipsum significamus quamcunque formam vel actum  actualiter  inesse alicui subiecto; ex consequenti significat, seu  consignificat compositionem illam, in qua verum et falsum lo-  gice continetur.  finitionem verbi; secundo exponit eam *; ibi: Dico  autem quoniam consignificat etc.  ;  2. Est autem considerandum quod Aristoteles,  brevitati studens, non ponit in definitione verbi  ea  quae sunt nomini et verbo communia, relin-  quens ea intellectui legentis ex his quae dixerat  in definitione nominis. Ponit autem tres particulas  in definitione verbi: quarum prima distinguit ver-  *  *  Cap. tr.  Eam ex ABDE.  *"ABCE  omittunt  cum dicitur.  *  n. 7.  Lect. praeced.,  Ammonius.  [1  *  *  4:  videtur.  pin marg.: quía  est quasi.  *  *  A: subiectum.  g:  Codd. - ».: et  dicit.  *  dicuntur.  8  *  p: potest.  *A: in. vulgari  latinitate susti-  nent etc.  *  *  c: adiectionem.  p:  rem aliquam  ut subsistentem.  24  bum a nomine, in hoc scilicet quod dicit quod  consignificat tempus. .Dictum est enim in defini-  tione nominis quod nomen significat sine tem-  pore *.- Secunda vero particula est, per quam di-  stinguitur verbum ab oratione, scilicet cum dici-  tur:  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  quaedam res, et sic significatur per nomen; ut  cum dicitur * actio, passio, ambulatio, cursus et  similia; alio modo, per modum actionis, ut scilicet  est  egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut su-  biecto, et sic significatur per verba aliorum mo-  dorum, quae attribuuntur praedicatis *. Sed quia  etiam ipse processus vel inhaerentia actionis po-  test apprehendi ab intellectu et significari ut res  quaedam, inde est quod ipsa verba infinitivi  modi, quae significant ipsam inhaerentiam actionis  ad subiectum, possunt accipi ut verba, ratione  concretionis, et ut nomina prout significant quasi *  res  quasdam.  6. Potest etiam obiici de hoc * quod etiam verba  aliorum modorum videntur aliquando in subiecto  Cuius pars nihil extra significat.  3. Sed cum hoc etiam positum sit in definitione  nominis, videtur hoc debuisse praetermitti, sicut et  quod dictum est, vox significativa ad placitum. --  Ad quod respondet Ammonius * quod in definitio-  ne nominis hoc positum est, ut distinguatur nomen  ab orationibus, quae componuntur ex nominibus;  ut cum dicitur, lomo est animal. Quia vero sunt  etiam quaedam orationes quae componuntur ex  verbis; ut cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri, ut ab  his distinguatur verbum, oportuit hoc etiam in defi-  nitione verbi iterari. - Potest etiam aliter dici quod  quia verbum importat compositionem, in qua per-  ficitur oratio verum vel falsum significans, maio-  rem convenientiam videbatur * verbum habere cum  oratione, quasi * quaedam pars formalis ipsius,  quam nomen, quod est quaedam pars materialis  et subiectiva * orationis; et ideo oportuit iterari.  4. Tertia vero particula est, per quam distin-  guitur verbum non solum a nomine, sed etiam  a  participio quod significat cum tempore; unde  dicit *: Ef est semper eorum, quae de altero prae-  dicantur * nota, idest signum: quia scilicet nomina  et  participia possunt poni ex parte subiecti et  praedicati, sed verbum semper est ex parte prae-  dicati £.  5. Sed hoc videtur * habere instantiam in verbis  "infinitivi modi, quae interdum ponuntur ex parte  subiecti; ut cum dicitur, ambulare est moveri.-  Sed dicendum est quod verba infinitivi modi,  quando in subiecto ponuntur, habent vim nominis:  unde et in graeco et in vulgari latina locutione *  suscipiunt additionem *articulorum sicut et nomina.  Cuius ratio est quia proprium nominis est, ut  significet rem aliquam quasi per se existentem *;  proprium autem verbi est, ut significet actionem  vel passionem. Potest autem actio significari tri-  pliciter:  uno  modo, per se in abstracto, velut  «) Ad quod respondet Ammonius etc. Responsionem Ammonii  am-  plectitur Boethius, Op. cit. 8 De verbo pag. 313, sed Ammonium non no-  minat. Auctor autem iste responsionem, quae hic a s. Thoma recitatur,  tribuit Porphyrio, cui subscribit: « Ad hanc difficultatem porphyricum  »  illud dicamus quasdam esse orationes ex verbis compositas, quarum  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  significativae sunt partes, ipsa inquam verba ex quibus orationes con-  sistunt, ceu cum dico, ambulare est moveri. Namque ambulare et  moveri et est, cum totius partes sint orationis, significativa per se  sunt ipsa. Ergo ut ab id genus orationibus verba secerneret, quibus  partes aliae verbi finitionis conveniunt, vox, inquam, significativa, ex  composito, tempus adsignificans, ipsam necessario vel hoc loco differen-  tiam adiecit. » (In lib. Peri herm. sect. I De verbo, 8 x, fol. 7, col. 3). De  his nihil habet b. Albertus Magn. in I Peri hermeneias, tract. III, cap. 11. —  Haec autem noto ut animadvertat lector hanc Ammonii responsionem  fuisse a sancto Thoma ex ipso Ammonii Commentario desumptam. Vul-  gata quippe penes nonnullos sententia fuit Scholasticis non verum grae-  cumque Aristotelem innotuisse, sed fictitium atque depravatum, nempe  arabieum; vixque ac ne vix quidem excipiebatur s. Thomas: de quo ta-  men nostra aetate aequiores critici verius sapientiusque iudicarunt (Cf.  Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'áge et l'origine des traductions la-  tines d'Aristote etc. Paris 1819). S. Doctor nedum versiones Aristotelis  ex  graecis exemplaribus habuit, sed, ut ego existimo, graeca exemplaria  ipsa legit (ea enim non infrequenter citat, et ad eorum lectionem tanta  fiducia veritateque recurrit, ut mirum prorsus esset si ipse graecae lin-  guae fuisset omnino ignarus); quinimo commentatorum sententias, quas  profert, non ex citationibus aliorum, sed ex fontibus haurit et expendit  ad mentem textus Aristotelici.  poni; ut cum dicitur, curro est verbum. - Sed  dicendum est quod in tali locutione, hoc verbum  curro, non sumitur formaliter, secundum quod  eius significatio refertur ad rem, sed secundum  quod materialiter significat ipsam vocem, quae:  accipitur ut res quaedam. Et ideo tam verba,  quam omnes orationis partes, quando ponuntur  materialiter, sumuntur in vi nominum.  ;  7. Deinde cum dicit: Dico vero quoniam con-  significat etc., exponit definitionem positam. Et  primo, quantum ad hoc quod dixerat quod con-  significat tempus; secundo, quantum ad hoc quod  dixerat quod est ποία eorum quae de altero prae-  dicantur, cum dicit: E/ semper est etc, Secun-  dam autem particulam 7, scilicet: Cuius nulla pars  extra significat, non exponit, quia supra exposita  est in tractatu nominis. * Exponit ergo primum  quod verbum consignificat tempus, per exem-  plum; quia videlicet cursus, quia significat actio-  nem non per modum actionis, sed per modum  rei per se existentis, non consignificat tempus,  eo quod est nomen *. Curro vero cum sit verbum.  significans actionem, consignificat tempus, quia  proprium est motus tempore mensurari; actiones  autem nobis notae sunt in tempore. Dictum est  autem supra * quod consignificare tempus est si-  gnificare aliquid in tempore mensuratum. Unde  aliud est significare tempus principaliter, ut rem  8) Verbum semper est (A omittit est) ex parte praedicati. Id pro-  batur infra n.8. - B. Albertus Magn. Op. et lib. cit. tract. I, cap. mi, inquit:  «  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  Nomen est de quo enunciatur ; verbum autem est quod de alio enun-  ciatur. Quod est praecipue manifestum in verbis adiectivis, ut cum di-  citur: Petrus docet. Et si obiiciatur, prosequitur Albertus ib. tract. III,  cap. 1, quod verbum non. semper est praedicatum quod de altero di-  citur, sed ut frequenter praedicantur nomina, ut homo est animal,  Sortes est homo..., facile est solvere: quia praedicatum est duplex,  scilicet materiale et formale. — Formale quidem est quod intra se con-  cipit formam quam retorquet ad alterum cui inest, et de quo est ut  de subiecto; haec autem forma non est nisi compositio: et hanc for-  ».mam verbum (per hoc quod alterius est) in se concipit. Et ideo so-  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  lum verbum praedicatum formale est. Hoc autem probatur exemplo: :  quia cum dicitur, omo currit, sensus est, homo est currens, ut parti-  cipium sit res verbi praedicata materialiter; ipsum autem quod dico,  est,  quod est nota compositionis, formam dicit qua res verbi refertur  ad subiectum, sicut inhaerens sibi, vel aliquid eius, et ut aliquid  quod de ipso sit; talis autem forma non est concepta in significato  nominis » (Opp. tom. I, pag. 254. Lugduni 1651).  Y) Secundam autem particulam etc. Haec lectio est P. et codd. DE.—  AC habent fertiam, sed errore plane manifesto. Tres enim sunt par-  tes  dere  ab Aristotele ordinatim positae in definitione verbi, ut in textu vi-  est,  nempe,  1.  quod consignificat tempus; 2. quod eius pars  separata non significat; 3. quod est semper nota eorum quae de altero  praedicantur. — Porro primam et tertiam partem exponit Aristoteles, sed  secundam non exponit, quia supra exposita est in tractatu de nomine. —  Magis etiam erronee legit B: deinde cum dicit: Et est semper etc.  *  *  *  ACDE: personis.  Quasi ex codd.  p  hoc.  omittit  de  * Lect.praec. n.8.  CAP. III, LECT. V  25  primo, verbum infinitum; secundo, verba prae-  * -  *  Autem ex codd.  omittit esf.  e  Sup. nn. 4. et5.  * ABC Omnitt. Sunt.  Ἧ  my  * A: sint praedi-  catum.  *  Codd. et edd.  Ven.: ad vocem.  *  Cf.  in not.  supra  n. 4  f; et lect.  vit, n. 9.  terii  temporis vel futuri; ibi: Similiter autem  curret vel currebat. - Dicit ergo primo quod non  currit, et non laborat, non proprie dicitur ver-  bum. Est enim proprium verbi significare aliquid  per modum actionis vel passionis; quod praedictae  dictiones non faciunt: removent enim actionem  vel passionem, potius quam aliquam determinatam  actionem vel passionem significent. Sed quamvis  quamdam, quod potest nomini convenire, aliud  autem * est significare cum tempore, quod non  convenit nomini, sed verbo.  8. Deinde cum dicit: E? est semper etc., exponit  aliam particulam. Ubi notandum est quod quia  subiectum enunciationis significatur ut cui inhae-  ret aliquid?, cum. verbum significet actionem per  modum actionis, de cuius ratione est ut inhae-  reat, semper ponitur ex parte praedicati, nunquam  autem ex parte subiecti, nisi sumatur in vi nomi-  nis, ut dictum est *. Dicitur ergo verbum semper  esse nota eorum quae dicuntur de altero: tum  quia verbum semper significat id, quod praedi-  catur; tum quia in omni praedicatione oportet  esse verbum, eo quod verbum importat compo-  'Ssitionem, qua praedicatum componitur subiecto.  9. Sed dubium videtur quod subditur: Ut eorum  quae de subiecto vel in subiecto sunt *. Videtur  enim aliquid dici ut de subiecto, quod essentia-  liter- praedicatur; ut, homo est animal; in subiecto  autem, sicut accidens de subiecto praedicatur; ut,  homo est albus. Si ergo verba significant actionem  vel passionem, quae sunt accidentia, consequens  est ut semper significent ea, quae dicuntur ut n  Subiecto. Frustra igitur dicitur zm subiecto vel de  .Subiecto. -- Et ad hoc dicit Boethius * quod utrum-  que * ad idem pertinet. Accidens enim et de  subiecto praedicatur, et in subiecto est. - Sed quia  Aristoteles disiunctione utitur, videtur aliud per  utrumque significare. Et idco potest dici quod  cum  Aristoteles dicit quod, Verbum semper est  nota eorum, quae de altero praedicantur, non est  sic intelligendum, quasi significata verborum sint  quae praedicantur *; quia cum praedicatio videatur  magis proprie ad. compositionem * pertinere, ipsa  verba sunt quae praedicantur*, magis quam signi-  ficent praedicata. - Est ergo intelligendum quod  verbum semper est signum quod aliqua prae-  dicentur, quia omnis praedicatio fit per verbum  ratione compositionis importatae, sive praedicetur  aliquid essentialiter sive accidentaliter.  10.  |  Deinde cum dicit: Non currit vero et non  laborat etc., excludit quaedam a ratione verbi. Et  ponit tertiam particulam, scilicet: cuius nulla pars extra significat et  non exponit, quia etc. Amanuensis addit deinde et omittit, secundam  autem particulam: quae particula illa est quam Aristoteles non exponit.  9) Significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquid. Retineo hanc lectionem  Pianam et codd. AC. — E: est ut illud cui inhaeret aliquid. Quae le-  ctio bona est.— D erronee legit: significatur id cui non inhaeret aliquid.  —  B  denique: significatur ut cui inhaeret aliquod, tamen verbum etc.  Lectio confusa.  t) Et ad hoc dicit Boethius etc. — ABC: et ad hoc respondet  Boethius. Quae hic ex Boethio recitantur, habentur in secunda Edit. in  lib. De interpretatione, lib. I, De verbo, pag. 314. Sed praeter hanc expo-  sitionem, aliam inducit Boethius (quam Ammonius innuit, De interpre-  tatione, sect. I De verbo fol.7, col. 4), eamque meliorem ipse vocat: « Vel  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  melior, inquit, haec expositio est si similiter dixisse eum ( Aristotelem )  arbitremur, tanquam si diceret, omne verbum significat quidem ac-  cidens, sed ita ut id quod significat aut particulare sit aut universale,  ut id quod ait de subiecto ad universalitatem referamus, quod in subie-  cto ad solam particularitatem. Cum enim dico, movetur, verbum qui-  dem est et accidens, sed universale: motus enim plures species habet,  ut cursus sub motu ponitur. Ergo cursus si definiendus est, motum  de cursu praedicamus. Quocirca motus genus quoddam est cursus,  atque ideo motus de cursu ut de subiecto praedicabitur; cursus vero  ipse quoniam species alias non habet, im subiecto tantum est, id est  in currente. Motus autem quamquam et ipse sit in subiecto, tamen  de subiecto praedicatur. Ideo dicit (Aristoteles) eorum esse notam  verbum, quae de altero praedicantur, atque addit, ut eorum quae  de subiecto vel in subiecto. Hoc dicit, accidentium quidem vim verba  Opp. D. Tuoxaz T. I.  non proprie possint * dici verbum, tamen conve-  niunt sibi ea quae supra posita sunt in defini-  tione verbi. Quorum primum est quod signifi-  cat tempus 5, quia significat agere et pali, quae  sicut sunt in tempore, ita privatio eorum; unde  et  quies tempore mensuratur, ut habetur in VI  Physicor. * Secundum est quod semper ponitur  ex parte praedicati, sicut et verbum: et hoc ideo,  quia negatio reducitur ad genus affirmationis. Unde  sicut verbum quod significat actionem vel pas-  sionem, significat aliquid ut in altero existens;  ita  praedictae dictiones significant remotionem  actionis vel passionis.  11.  Si quis autem obiiciat: Si praedictis dictio-  nibus convenit definitio verbi; ergo sunt verba; -  dicendum est quod definitio verbi supra po-  sita datur de verbo communiter sumpto. Huius-  modi autem dictiones negantur esse verba, quia  deficiunt a perfecta ratione verbi. Nec ante * Ari-  stotelem erat nomen positum huic generi dictio-  num a verbis differentium; sed quia huiusmodi  dictiones in aliquo cum verbis conveniunt, defi-  ciunt tamen a determinata ratione verbi, ideo * vo-  cat ea verba infinita *. Et rationem nominis assi-  gnat, quia unumquodque * eorum indifferenter po-  test dici de eo quod est, vel de eo quod non est.  Sumitur enim negatio apposita non in vi privatio-  nis, sed in vi simplicis negationis. Privatio enim  supponit  determinatum  subiectum *. Differunt  tamen huiusmodi verba a verbis negativis, quia  verba infinita sumuntur in vi unius dictionis,  verba vero negativa in vi duarum dictionum.  12. Deinde cum dicit: Similiter autem curret etc.,  excludit a verbo verba praeteriti et futuri tem-  »  »  »  »  significant, sed talium quae aut universalia sint aut particularia; ut  cum dico, moveor, universale quiddam est et de subiecto dicitur, ut  de cursu; cum vero dico, curro, particulare est, et quoniam de  subiecto non dicitur, im subiecto solum est. » — Haec Boethius, loc.  et pag. citt.— Huius secundae Boethii interpretationis s. Thomas specialem  mentionem non facit, quia revera convenit cum prima: in utraque enim  Boethius verba de subiecto vel im subiecto ad praedicationem acciden-  talem refert; proindeque Angelicus utramque recusat, et planiorem in-  terpretationem proponit. -  t) Significat tempus. Est lectio P., edd. bc et codd. ACDE.- Cod.B,  edd. a et 1526: consignificat tempus. Quam lectionem existimo esse  veram  et  adoptandam. Et quamvis differentia lectionum materialiter  spectata nullius momenti esse videatur, philosophice tamen considerata  est valde notanda. Verbum enim primo et per se significat ex natura sua  aut  actionem aut passionem (Cf. lect. τῷ n. 6, not. 0); imo verbum nomi-  natur apud Arabes actio, ut Averroes ait super lib. De interpretatione,  8. Dictio in verbo. Porro absolute loquendo actio et passio non dicunt  tempus: nam actiones intellectivae actiones sunt, quae tamen neque sunt  tempus, neque proprie in tempore fiunt. Ergo verbum per se et primo non  significat tempus. — Attamen actiones ipsae, per verbum immediate signi-  ficatae, nobis notae sunt in tempore. Et ideo verbum ratione actionis quam  significat, ex consequenti significat tempus, nempe significando actionem  adsignifíicat tempus. Unde dici proprie nequit quod verbum significat  tempus (quamvis adhibitis necessariis distinctionibus aliquando id dicatur),  sed quod consignificat tempus , aut significat cum tempore (Cf. lect. cit.;  et supra, n. 7). Quod adamussim reddit verbum Aristotelis dicentis in  definitione verbi προσσημαῖΐνον, non autem σημαῖνον (Cf. infra n.19 et seqq.).  4*  "B: posset. - c:  possit.  *  Commen.s.Th.  lect. x. - In edit.  Didot, cap.vru;-  al. ΧΗ et xii.  ΒΟ: nec tamen  ante. - A: nec ta-  men secundum.  *  *  Ideo ex 4.  Cf. lect. praec.,  n. 13.  *  *  At utrumque.  Cf. lect. praec.,  n.13, not. p.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  *pc : praeteriti  temporis vel fu-  turi.  26  poris *; et dicit quod sicut verba infinita non sunt  simpliciter verba, ita etiam curret, quod est fu-  turi  »  currere est moveri, sive sint alterius modi; ut cum  dico, curro est verbum. Sed haec non videtur  esse * intentio Aristotelis, quia ad hanc intentionem  non  respondent sequentia *. Et ideo aliter di-  cendum est quod nomen hic sumitur, prout  communiter significat quamlibet dictionem   im-  7  *  Codd. - P.: cir-  cumdans (Conf.  lib.Il, lect. 1, n. 5).  κα:  *  mec passio.  Nempe  nem quae incepit  et  nondum  terminata (Conf.  Aegid. in hunc  loc.).  *  ABCD: . SeCun-  dum numerum.  *  Codd. -P.: πολ  constituit casum  vel casus verbi.  *  Codd.: secun-  dum modos.  temporis, vel currebat, quod est praeteriti  temporis, non sunt verba, sed sunt casus verbi.  Et differunt in hoc a verbo, quia verbum con-  significat praesens tempus, illa vero significant  tempus "* hinc et inde circumstans *. Dicit autem  signanter praesens lempus, et. non simpliciter  praesens, ne intelligatur praesens indivisibile, quod  est  actio-  est  instans: quia in instanti non est motus, nec  ea  actio aut passio *; sed oportet accipere praesens  tempus quod mensurat actionem, quae incepit,  et nondum est determinata per actum *. Recte au-  tem  quae consignificant tempus ^ praeteritum  vel futurum, non sunt verba proprie dicta: cum  enim verbum proprie sit quod significat agere vel  pati, hoc est proprie verbum quod significat* agere  vel pati in actu, quod est agere vel pati simpliciter:  sed agere vel pati in praeterito vel futuro est se-  cundum. quid.  13. Dicuntur etiam verba praeteriti vel futuri  temporis rationabiliter casus verbi, quod consi-  gnificat praesens tempus; quia praeteritum vel  futurum dicitur per respectum ad praesens. Est  enim praeteritum quod fuit praesens, futurum  autem quod erit praesens.  14.  Cum autem declinatio verbi varietur per  modos, tempora, numeros et personas, variatio  quae fit per numerum * et personam non consti-  tuit  casus  verbi *: quia talis variatio non est ex  parte actionis, sed ex parte subiecti; sed variatio  quae est per modos * et tempora respicit ipsam  actionem, et ideo utraque constituit casus verbi.  Nam verba imperativi vel optativi modi casus  dicuntur, sicut et verba praeteriti vel futuri tem-  poris. Sed verba indicativi modi praesentis tem-  poris non dicuntur casus, cuiuscumque sint per-  sonae vel numeri.  15. Deinde cum dicit: Zpsa itaque etc., ostendit  positam ad significandum aliquam rem. Et quia  etiam ipsum * agere vel pati est quaedam res, inde  est quod et ipsa verba in quantum nominant, idest  significant agere vel pati, sub nominibus com-  prehenduntur communiter acceptis. Nomen autem,  prout a verbo distinguitur, significat rem sub de-  terminato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut  per se * existens. Unde nomina possunt subiici et  praedicari.  16. Deinde cum dicit: Et significant aliquid etc.,  probat propositum. Et primo, per hoc quod verba  significant aliquid, sicut et nomina; secundo, per  hoc quod non significant verum vel falsum, sicut  nec nomina; ibi: Sed si est, aut non est etc. - Dicit  ergo primo quod in tantum dictum est quod verba  sunt nomina, in quantum significant aliquid. Et  hoc probat, quia supra dictum est * quod voces  significativae significant intellectus. Unde proprium  vocis significativae ést quod generet aliquem in-  tellectum in animo audientis. Et ideo ad osten-  dendum quod verbum sit vox significativa, as-  sumit  quod ille, qui dicit verbum, constituit  intelleetum in animo audientis. Et ad hoc ma-  nifestandum inducit quod ille, qui audit, quiescit.  17.  oratio  Sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia sola  *  *  4  omittit esse.  Codd. - p.: con-  sequentia.  *  ABCE  omittunt  ipsum.- p erro-  nee: in ipsum.  *  *  perfecta facit quiescere intellectum, non  autem nomen, neque verbum si per se dicatur *.  Si enim dicam, homo, suspensus est animus au-  dientis, quid de eo dicere velim; si autem dico,  currit *, suspensus est eius animus de quo dicam.- .  Sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intel-  lectus  operatio, ut supra habitum est *, ille qui  dicit nomen vel verbum secundum se, constituit  intellectum  *  Primo ex codd.  convenientiam verborum ad nomina. Et circa hoc  duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secun-  do, manifestat propositum; ibi: E? significant ali-  quid etc. Dicit ergo primo * quod ipsa verba secun-  dum se dicta sunt nomina: quod a quibusdam ex-  ponitur de verbis quae sumuntur in vi nominis, ut  dictum est, sive sint infinitivi modi; ut cum dico,  quantum ad primam operationem,  quae est simplex conceptio alicuius, et secundum  hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in suspenso erat ? an-  tequam nomen vel verbum proferretur * et eius  prolatio terminaretur; non autem constituit intel-  lectum quantum ad secundam operationem, quae  *  ACDE: £n se.  Lect. rit, n. 2.  Lect. 1, n. τ.  κα: diceretur.  est  Ἢ) llla vero significant tempus etc. Ita edit. Piana et ita codices.  Verum ob rationes adductas in superiori nota, videtur haec lectio  non esse sancti Thomae, sed esse legendum: illa vero consignificant  tempus: quae est lectio a sancto Thoma passim adoptata, imo ab im-  subtili  intellectus.  componentis et dividentis, ipsum  distinctione accipere agere et pati in' genere, cuius veluti species  forent agere et pati simpliciter et agere et pati secundum quid. Qua  adhibita  distinctione,  diceretur verbum significare agere, vel pati in  genere, consignificare autem agere vel pati simpliciter. Verum prudens  mediate praecedentibus, quia verbum consignificat etc. omnino indi-  cata. - Duo tamen codices AB habent hoc etiam loco: quia verbum  significat.  9) Consignificant tempus etc. — Unus cod. A: significat (Cf. notas prae-  ced. et seq.). — Attende quid a s. Thoma dicatur de actione praesenti,  praeterita et futura. Actio enim praesens est simpliciter actio quia habet  esse seu existit actu; ergo quia de ratione verbi est significare actionem  (vel pau, quod est agere vel pati simpliciter:  sed agere vel pati in praeterito vel futuro est se-  cundum. quid.  13. Dicuntur etiam verba praeteriti vel futuri  temporis rationabiliter casus verbi, quod consi-  gnificat praesens tempus; quia praeteritum vel  futurum dicitur per respectum ad praesens. Est  enim praeteritum quod fuit praesens, futurum  autem quod erit praesens.  14.  Cum autem declinatio verbi varietur per  modos, tempora, numeros et personas, variatio  quae fit per numerum * et personam non consti-  tuit  casus  verbi *: quia talis variatio non est ex  parte actionis, sed ex parte subiecti; sed variatio  quae est per modos * et tempora respicit ipsam  actionem, et ideo utraque constituit casus verbi.  Nam verba imperativi vel optativi modi casus  dicuntur, sicut et verba praeteriti vel futuri tem-  poris. Sed verba indicativi modi praesentis tem-  poris non dicuntur casus, cuiuscumque sint per-  sonae vel numeri.  15. Deinde cum dicit: Zpsa itaque etc., ostendit  positam ad significandum aliquam rem. Et quia  etiam ipsum * agere vel pati est quaedam res, inde  est quod et ipsa verba in quantum nominant, idest  significant agere vel pati, sub nominibus com-  prehenduntur communiter acceptis. Nomen autem,  prout a verbo distinguitur, significat rem sub de-  terminato modo, prout scilicet potest intelligi ut  per se * existens. Unde nomina possunt subiici et  praedicari.  16. Deinde cum dicit: Et significant aliquid etc.,  probat propositum. Et primo, per hoc quod verba  significant aliquid, sicut et nomina; secundo, per  hoc quod non significant verum vel falsum, sicut  nec nomina; ibi: Sed si est, aut non est etc. - Dicit  ergo primo quod in tantum dictum est quod verba  sunt nomina, in quantum significant aliquid. Et  hoc probat, quia supra dictum est * quod voces  significativae significant intellectus. Unde proprium  vocis significativae ést quod generet aliquem in-  tellectum in animo audientis. Et ideo ad osten-  dendum quod verbum sit vox significativa, as-  sumit  quod ille, qui dicit verbum, constituit  intelleetum in animo audientis. Et ad hoc ma-  nifestandum inducit quod ille, qui audit, quiescit.  17.  oratio  Sed hoc videtur esse falsum: quia sola  *  *  4  omittit esse.  Codd. - p.: con-  sequentia.  *  ABCE  omittunt  ipsum.- p erro-  nee: in ipsum.  *  *  perfecta facit quiescere intellectum, non  autem nomen, neque verbum si per se dicatur *.  Si enim dicam, homo, suspensus est animus au-  dientis, quid de eo dicere velim; si autem dico,  currit *, suspensus est eius animus de quo dicam.- .  Sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intel-  lectus  operatio, ut supra habitum est *, ille qui  dicit nomen vel verbum secundum se, constituit  intellectum  *  Primo ex codd.  convenientiam verborum ad nomina. Et circa hoc  duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secun-  do, manifestat propositum; ibi: E? significant ali-  quid etc. Dicit ergo primo * quod ipsa verba secun-  dum se dicta sunt nomina: quod a quibusdam ex-  ponitur de verbis quae sumuntur in vi nominis, ut  dictum est, sive sint infinitivi modi; ut cum dico,  quantum ad primam operationem,  quae est simplex conceptio alicuius, et secundum  hoc, quiescit audiens, qui in suspenso erat ? an-  tequam nomen vel verbum proferretur * et eius  prolatio terminaretur; non autem constituit intel-  lectum quantum ad secundam operationem, quae  *  ACDE: £n se.  Lect. rit, n. 2.  Lect. 1, n. τ.  κα: diceretur.  est  Ἢ) llla vero significant tempus etc. Ita edit. Piana et ita codices.  Verum ob rationes adductas in superiori nota, videtur haec lectio  non esse sancti Thomae, sed esse legendum: illa vero consignificant  tempus: quae est lectio a sancto Thoma passim adoptata, imo ab im-  subtili  intellectus.  componentis et dividentis, ipsum  distinctione accipere agere et pati in' genere, cuius veluti species  forent agere et pati simpliciter et agere et pati secundum quid. Qua  adhibita  distinctione,  diceretur verbum significare agere, vel pati in  genere, consignificare autem agere vel pati simpliciter. Verum prudens  mediate praecedentibus, quia verbum consignificat etc. omnino indi-  cata. - Duo tamen codices AB habent hoc etiam loco: quia verbum  significat.  9) Consignificant tempus etc. — Unus cod. A: significat (Cf. notas prae-  ced. et seq.). — Attende quid a s. Thoma dicatur de actione praesenti,  praeterita et futura. Actio enim praesens est simpliciter actio quia habet  esse seu existit actu; ergo quia de ratione verbi est significare actionem  (vel passionem), verbum proprie est verbum praesentis temporis, — Sed  s.  actio praeterita vel futura revera non est actio, quia revera non existit,  sed fuit vel erit, quando fuit vel erit praesens; et ideo verba praeteriti  vel futuri temporis non sunt proprie verba, sed dicuntur casus verbi,  ut  Doctor explicat n. seq.  ,  Ὁ Hoc est proprie verbum quod significat etc. Editio Piana habet  consignificat, sequens editionem b. — Sed forte verius, ut patet ex nota  praecedenti &, legendum est significat cum aliis edd. Venetis ac, et  codd. AC (codd. alii habent lacunam). Hinc immediate ante et infra  n.  15 ipsa Piana legit: verba... significant agere vel pati. — Attamen dixi  forte ad praecavendum importunam subtilitatem. Nam posset aliquis  Eo  enim  lector iudicet utrum haec distinctio sit scientiae utilis, sicut revera est  subtilis:  ipso quod agere et pati secundum quid non est  agere et pati proprie, et verba proprie non sunt quae agere et pati  secundum quid significant (ut dicitur optime a s. Thoma de verbis  praeteriti vel futuri temporis) ; videtur sapientius dicendum quod verbum  proprie dictum non consignificet, sed significet agere vel pati simpli-  citer, quod est agere vel pati proprie.  x) Si autem dico (A dicam), currit. Est lectio ABE (D, cur).— Piana: si  autem dico,curro etc. Quae lectio est falsa. Cum enim dico curro non est  animus audientis suspensus de quo dicam; siquidem ego determinor, ut  ilius motus seu actionis subiectum, quae designatur cum dico curro.  At dicendo currit, nullum subiectum determinatur; et ideo suspensus  est animus audientis de quo cursus dicatur. — C: si autem dicam, et tum  currit tum curro omittit.  5  λ) Quiescit audiens qui in suspenso erat etc. Conservo hanc lectio-  nem Pianam, quae etiam est edd. Venet. et codicis D.,— Codd. AB:  quiescit animus audientis qui suspensus erat etc. — CE: animus au-  diens qui suspensus erat.  LECT. V  * ACD: Secundum  se.  *  *  *  pc: aut.  Cf. supra n. 16.  V  Cf. supra n. τι.  *ADE:  Signum.  ** ABDE. - C: e$-  CAP. III,  verbum vel nomen per se * dictum: nec quantum  ad hoc facit quiescere audientem.  18. Et ideo statim subdit: Sed si est, aut non  est, nondum. significat, idest nondum significat ali-  quid per modum compositionis et* divisionis, aut  veri vel falsi. Et hoc est secundum *, quod pro-  bare intendit. Probat autem consequenter ^ per  illa verba, quae maxime videntur significare ve-  ritatem vel falsitatem, scilicet ipsum verbum quod  est esse, et verbum infinitum * quod est non esse;  quorum neutrum per se dictum est significativum  veritatis vel falsitatis in re; unde multo minus  alia. Vel potest intelligi hoc generaliter dici de  omnibus verbis. Quia enim dixerat quod verbum  non  significat si es? res vel non est, hoc conse-  quenter manifestat, quia nullum verbum est si-  gnificativum * esse rel ** vel non esse, idest quod  sevelreinones- res sit vel non sit. Quamvis enim omne verbum  $e.-P.: ret esse  vel non esse.  finitum implicet esse, quia currere est currentem  — 6556, et omne verbum infinitum implicet non  esse, quia non currere est non currentem esse;  tamen nullum verbum significat hoc totum, sci-  licet rem esse vel non esse.  19. Et hoc consequenter probat per id, de quo  magis videtur, cum subdit: Nec si hoc ipsum ksT  purum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est. Ubi no-  tandum est quod in graeco habetur *: Neque si  ENS  esse  ipsum nudum dixeris, ipsum quidem nihil est.  Ad probandum enim quod verba non significant  rem  vel  non  esse,  assumpsit id quod est  ) Probat autem consequenter. Ita Piana post Venetas saeculi XV. —  Codd. ABCE: probat autem hoc consequenter ; — Cod. D: probat autem  .hic consequenter. Immediate ante codd. ABC legunt: et hoc est quod,  omittendo secundum.  y) Ubi notandum est quod in graeco etc. Revera textus graecus habet  quod est, seu Ns, ut vertit s. Thomas: οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν τὸ ὃν εἴπης αὐτὸ καθ᾽  ἑαυτὸ duAóv: αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι.-- « In mentem venit, inquit. Wait,  »  placitum Hegelii quamquam alia ratione accipiendum: Das .Seyn ist  »  Nichts » (Aristotelis Organon, graece, tom. I, Schol. pag. 53.30). Certum  est cum Hegelii placito, Esse est nihil, vel, Nihil est esse, praefatam  sententiam Aristotelis nihil habere commune, ut patet ex interpretatio-  nibus datis a s. Thoma. Aristoteles enim docet verbum est sumi posse vel  prout est dictio quaedam (Cf. supra n. 15), vel prout est copula coniun-  gens partes propositionis. Primo modo significat rem aliquam sicut et  caetera nomina (supra n. 16); et ideo nullo pacto dicitur, neque dici  potest quod ezs, vel est sumptum ut dictio nihil est. Alio modo, ens, vel  est pure dictum, nihil est, quatenus ens vel est non significat rem esse  vel non esse, seu non significat cognitionem in qua est verum vel fal-  sum: quia ens significat rem (quod est), sed non dicit hanc rem exi-  stere vel non existere; est vero ex opposito significat actualitatem exi-  stentiae (quod est) sed non dicit subiectum cui applicetur haec existentia  (Cf. n. 20 etseq.). At Hegel eatenus dicit quod esse est nihil, quia esse  et nihil vult identificari in conceptu transcendentaliori, quem ipsé vocat  fieri. Unde sententia Hegelii omnino discrepat a sententia Aristotelis (Cf.  lib. ΠῚ Metaphys., cap. 11 et 1v.— In Commentar. s. Th. lib. IV, lect. 1 seqq.).  Cod. A: neque si ἘΞῚ ipsum etc.— Sed est erronea lectio, ut patet ex his  omnibus quae in hoc numero et sequenti declarantur.  £) Ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed secundum prius et poste-  rius, idest analogice. Nomina recte a Scholasticis dividuntur post Ari-  stotel. (De antepraedicamentis cap. 1) in aequivoca, analoga et uni-  voca. — Aequivocum nomen, graece ὁμώνυμον, plura significat, quae ad  invicem nihil commune habent praeter solum nomen. lta, e. g., canis  et  animal domesticum, et piscem marinum, et sidus caeleste significat,  quae nonnisi in solo nomine communicant. Unde nomen aequivocum  est nomen diversarum significationum. — Univocum nomen, quod graeci  συνώνυμον. dicunt, plura significat, quae et in nomine et in eadem  omnino nominis significatione seu definitione vel ratione conveniunt.  Ita homo, e. g., dicitur de omnibus humanis individuis in quibus hu-  mana natura, quam /0710 significat, eodem modo quo in definitione  hominis ponitur, invenitur. Hinc univocum nomen est nomen unius eius-  demque significationis seu definitionis. - Denique nomen analogum est  veluti medium inter aequivocum et univocum. Convenit enim cum no-  mine univoco in eo quod sit unius significationis, sed differt in eo quod  haec significatio non eadem sit, seu melius non eodem modo reperiatur  in omnibus, quibus idem nomen tribuitur; et ex hac parte convenit cum  27  fons et origo ipsius esse, scilicet ipsum ens, de  quo dicit quod nihil est * (ut Alexander exponit),  quia ens aequivoce dicitur de decem praedica-  menlis; omne autem aequivocum per se posi-  tum nihil significat *, nisi aliquid addatur quod  determinet eius significationem; unde nec ipsum  EST per se dictum significat quod est vel non est.  Sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, tum  quia ens non dicitur proprie aequivoce, sed se-  cundum prius et posterius ἔ; unde simpliciter di-  ctum intelligitur de eo, quod per prius dicitur:  tum etiam, quia dictio aequivoca non nihil signi-  ficat, sed multa significat; et quandoque hoc,  quandoque illud per ipsam accipitur: tum etiam,  quia talis expositio non multum facit ad inten-  tionem praesentem. - Unde Porphyrius aliter ex-  posuit quod hoc ipsum ens non significat naturam  alicuius rei, sicut hoc nomen omo vel sapiens,  sed  solum  designat quamdam coniunctionem ;  unde subdit * quod Consignificat quamdam com-  positionem , quam sine compositis non est in-  telligere.  neque hoc convenienter videtur  dici *: quia si non significaret aliquam rem, sed  solum coniunctionem, non esset neque nomen,  neque verbum, sicut nec praepositiones aut con-  iunctiones ^. - Et ideo aliter exponendum est, sicut  Ammonius exponit?, quod ipsum ens nihil est, idest  non significat verum vel falsum. Et rationem huius  assignat, cum subdit: Consignificat autem quam-  dam compositionem. Nec accipitur hic, ut ipse *  nomine aequivoco, ita ut quandoque et aequivocum ab auctoribus dicitur,  sed non proprie, ut hic innuit s. Doctor. Ita esse; non secundum purum  nomen, sed quoad rem etiam significatam vere et realiter. affirmatur  de Deo et de creaturis, quando dicimus: Deus est; creatura est; ergo  esse,  proprie loquendo, non est quid aequivoce Deo atque creaturis  tributum. Attamen non eodem modo esse Deo et creaturis convenit, sed  suo cuique modo. Esse igitur est nomen non aequivocum, nec tamen  univocum, sed analogum Deo et creaturis. Et dicitur analogum ana-  logia proportionalitatis: quia revera proportionato modo Deo et crea-  turis  esse tribuitur. -- Est etiam aliud nomen analogum analogia ha-  bitudinis seu attributionis, cuius nempe significatio pluribus tribuitur  per ordinem ad aliquid in quo primo et principaliter et perfecte ratio  significata per nomen invenitur; sicut medicina, cibus, aer etc. dicuntur  sana per ordinem ad sanitatem, quae est in animali. Hoc etiam modo,  nempe secundum analogiam attributionis, dicitur quod Deus est ens, et  quod creatura est ems; quia creatura vere habet rationem entis, non  tamen ex se, sed participatam a Deo, qui est ens a se seu imparticipa-  tum, et ad quem proinde creatura dicit illam habitudinem quam effectus  dicit ad suam causam. -- Exinde infertur quod significatio in analogis per-  fecte et per prius invenitur in uno (quod ideo a Scholasticis dicebatur  famosum analogatum), in caeteris autem imperfecte et per posterius,  ut  s.  Thomas hic dicit. - Haec de nominibus univoco, analogo et aequi-  voco novitius mente percipiat et memoriae commendet: saepissime enim  recurrunt in philosophia, et in solvendis non parvi momenti quaestio-  nibus sunt scitu necessaria (Cf. s. Th. in IV Metaphys., lect. 1).  0) Sicut nec praepositiones aut coniunctiones. Haec lectio codd. AC  et Venetae edit. b est retinenda. Non enim intelligo lectionem Pianam  et  Venetas ac: sicut mec compositiones aut coniunctiones. Sed addo  hanc lectionem Pianam videri falsam. Porphyrius enim, cuius sententia  hic exponitur, dicebat ens non significare aliquam rem, sed esse si-  gnum compositionis et coniunctionis; ergo, infert, ens per se dictum  nihil est.  — Sed haec ratio nulla est, reponit merito s. Thomas: si enim  ens nihil nisi coniunctionem significat, eo modo quo nonnisi coniun-  ctionem significant particulae coniunctivae ;-sicut istae non sunt neque ver-  bum neque nomen, ita neque nomen neque verbum erit ens. Si autem  non praepositiones sed compositiones legamus , nulla erit responsio a  s. Thoma data.— Codd. BDE, non praepositiones sed propositiones legunt;  quae lectio cum nostra concordat: etenim, ob affinitatem materialem, im-  peritis amanuensibus excidit propositiones loco praepositiones.  x) Sicut Ammonius exponit. In hanc Ammonii expositionem (super  lib. De interpretatione sect.1, 8 x, fol. 8 verso) consentit Boethius in Edit. II  in librum De interpretatione: « Vel certe ita intelligendum est quod ait  »  »  »  (Aristoteles), ipsum quidem nihil est, non quoniam nihil significet, sed  quoniam nihil verum falsumve demonstret, si purum dictum sit: cum  enim coniungitur, tunc fit enunciatio » (Ed. cit. pag. 317).  A:  *  ficat vel est.  nihil signi-  Alexander.  *  A:  Jicat  nihil signi-  vel  desi-  gnat. - c: nihil  designat.- p: p"  seipsum nihil...  Porphyrius.  *  Nempe Aristo-  teles.  Sed  *  A: dictum.  0  Ammonius.  π  *  Nempe Ammo-  nius.  *  *  Cf. supra n. 7.  ABDE. - C et P.:  cum aliquo.  *  ABC : tnum ens  etc.  28  dicit, consignificat, sicut cum dicebatur * quod  verbum consignificat tempus, sed consignificat,  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  nostri habent, planior est sensus. Quod enim nul-  lum  idest cum alio * significat, scilicet alii adiunctum  compositionem significat, quae non potest intel-  ligi sine extremis compositionis. - Sed quia hoc  commune est omnibus nominibus et verbis, non  videtur haec expositio esse secundum intentionem  Aristotelis, qui assumpsit ipsum ens * quasi quod-  dam speciale.  20.  telis  Et ideo ut magis sequamur verba Aristo-  considerandum est quod ipse dixerat quod  verbum non significat rem esse vel non esse, sed  nec  ipsum 675 significat rem esse vel non esse.  Et hoc est quod dicit, nihil est, idest non signi-  ficat aliquid esse. Etenim hoc maxime videbatur  de hoc quod dico ezs: quia ens nihil est aliud  quam quod est. Et sic videtur et rem significare,  per hoc quod dico Quop et esse, per hoc quod  dico Esr. Et si quidem haec dictio ens significaret  esse  principaliter, sicut significat rem quae habet  esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. Sed  ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc  quod dico EsTr, non principaliter significat, sed  consignificat eam in quantum significat rem ha-  bentem esse ?. Unde talis consignificatio composi-  tionis  non  sufficit  ad veritatem vel falsitatem:  quia. compositio, in qua consistit veritas et falsi-  tas, non potest intelligi, nisi secundum quod in-  nectit extrema compositionis.  21.  Si vero dicatur, nec ipsum esse, ut libri  p) Sed consignificat eam in quantum significat rem habentem esse.  Liquet ex his magnam, iuxta s. Thomam, existere differentiam inter duo  ista vocabula, significare et consignificare. Quod prius quidem Aristoteles  et  post ipsum et cum ipso commentatores omnes caute notarunt, ut  videre est apud Ammonium et Boethium, Opp. cit., 8. De verbo. - Sed  quid, quaeret novitius, scientiae interest haec differentia? Interest ma-  gnopere. - Nomen enim significat formaliter illud quod significat; quod  autem consignificat, non formaliter, hoc est ratione praecise suae im-  mediatae significationis significat, sed ex consequenti et quasi materiali-  ter, tanquam inclusum in sua significatione immediata. Exemplum habe-  tur in hoc quod de nomine ens dicitur in hoc numero 20. Si ens pure,  hoc est sine addito dicatur, nonnisi rem significat; et ideo res est formalis  significatio entis pure dicti. Sed res significata formaliter per ems habet  vel potest habere esse. Quia ergo ems pure dictum significat rem illam,  consignificat etiam esse eiusdem rei; consignificat, inquam, non ex vi suae  verbum significat rem esse vel mon esse,  probat per hoc verbum rEsr, quod secundum se  dictum, non significat aliquid esse, licet significet  esse. Et quia hoc ipsum esse videtur compositio  quaedam, et ita hoc verbum rsr, quod significat  esse, potest videri significare compositionem, in qua  sit verum vel falsum; ad hoc excludendum sub-  dit quod illa * compositio, quam significat hoc ver-  bum EsT, non potest intelligi sine componentibus:  quia dependet eius intellectus ab extremis, quae si  non apponantur, non est perfectus intellectus com-  positionis, ut possit in ea esse verum, vel falsum.  22. Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum rsr con-  significat compositionem, quia non eam principa-  liter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim  primo illud quod * cadit in intellectu per modum  actualitatis absolute: nam EST, simpliciter dictum,  significat in actu esse *; et ideo significat per mo-  dum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter  significat hoc verbum ΕΒΤ, est communiter actuali-  tas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel acci-  dentalis *, inde est quod cum volumus significare  quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse  alicui  subiecto, significamus illud per hoc ver-  bum rsr, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid *: sim-  pliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; se-  cundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et  ideo  ex  consequenti hoc verbum rsr significat  compositionem.  immediatae significationis, sed ex conditione rei significatae. Porro in  scientiis nisi distinguatur significatio formalis a significatione materiali,  seu significatio a consignificatione, impossibile est cavere a sophismatibus.  c)  quod  Significat enim primo illud etc. — Cod. A: significat primo id  cadit etc. — Cod. B: significat enim illud primo quod primo ca-  dit etc. — Piana, edd. Ven. et alii codd.: significat enim illud quod pri-  mo etc. Lectiones diversum exhibent sensum. Lectio Piana, edd. Ven.  et  aliorum codd. dicit quod res significata per τὸ esse in ordine chro-  nologico est illud quod primo cadit in intellectu nostro, seu quod primo  a  nostro intellectu apprehenditur; lectio autem adoptata enunciat quod  esse significat primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum   actua-  litatis absolute. Tum unam tum alteram lectionem complectitur cod. B.—  Uterque sensus est verus; sed primus tamen a s. Thoma heic non in-  tenditur, sed secundus inculcatur. Et hinc est quod additur esse secun-  dario et ex consequenti significare compositionem,  *  *  pc : ista.  AQ?  esse actu.- B: si-  gnificat actu es-  se.  *  BC erronee: a-  ctualis.  * pc omittunt ve/  simpliciter  vel se-  cundum quid.  CAP. IV, LECT. VI  LECTIO SEXTA  DE PRINCIPIO FORMALI ENUNCIATIONIS, QUOD EST ORATIO  τι  Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντιχὴ X0 cd, συνθήχην, ἧς τῶν  μερῶν  σημαντικόν ἐστι χεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις,  ἀλλ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις, ἢ ἀπόφασις.  Λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μέν τι, dXX οὐχ ὅτι  29  * Oratio autem est vox significativa, cuius partium 'aliquid  significativum est separatim, ut dictio, non ut affirma-  tio vel negatio.  Dico  autem  ἔστιν  Gig,  ἢ οὐχ ἔστιν" ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται χατάφασις 7 ἀπόφα-  ἐᾶν τι προστεθῇ.  'AXX οὐχὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συλλαβὴ μία" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν  ἐν  τῷ μῦς τὸ ὃς σημαντικόν, ἀλλὰ φωνή ἐστι νῦν μό-  vov:  δὲ τοῖς διπλοῖς σημαίνει μέν, ἀλλ οὐ xaf'  «αὐτό, ὥσπερ προείρηται.  Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός,) οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον  δέ, ἀλλ ὡς προείρηται, χατοὸ συνθήκην.  ut  homo: significat enim aliquid, sed non  quoniam est, aut non est, sed erit affirmatio vel ne-  gatio, si aliquid addatur.  Sed non una hominis syllaba: neque enim in eo quod est  sorex, rex significat, sed vox nunc est sola; in dupli-  cibus vero significat quidem aliquid, sed non secundum  se,  quemadmodum dictum est.  Est autem oratio omnis quidem significativa non sicut in-  strumentum, sed, quemadmodum dictum est, secundum  placitum.  εὐνστττ  SywoPsIs. — 1. Textus argumentum.- 2. Oratio significat in-  telletum. compositum. -- 3. Pars aliqua orationis aliquid signi-  ficat, non quidem intellectum compositum, sed simplicem intel-  lectum, nempe simplicem rei apprehensionem.-4. Aspasii obiectio  solvitur.—Improbatur sententia Philoponi.— 5. Pars orationis si-  gnificans, ideo non significat iudicium (affirmationem vel negatio-  nem) quia non significat esse vel non esse.- 6. At pars quidem  orationis significat, sed non partis pars, ut pars est, quia dictio  etiamsi sit composita, significat unum simplicem intellectum (Cf. -  x83 ostquam Philosophus determinavit de  a» KSnomine et de verbo, quae sunt prin-  cipia materialia enunciationis, utpote  D^  partes eius existentes; nunc determi-  nat  de oratione, quae est principium formale  enunciationis*, utpote genus eius existens *. Et circa  :  *  n. 2.  Cf. lect. praec.,  hoc tria facit: primo enim, proponit * definitionem  orationis ; secundo, exponit eam; ibi: Dico autem  ut  homo etc.; tertio, excludit errorem; ibi: Es/  autem oratio omnis etc.  !  2. Circa primum considerandum est quod Phi-  losophus in definitione orationis primo * ponit illud  in quo oratio convenit cum nomine et verbo, cum  dicit: Oratio est vox significativa, quod etiam po-  suit in definitione nominis, et probavit de verbo  quod aliquid significet. Non autem posuit * in eius  definitione *, quia supponebat ex eo quod positum  erat in definitione nominis, studens brevitati, ne  a) Est principium formale enunciationis, utpote genus eius exi-  stens. Haec verba s. Thomae dubium ingerere videntur. Genus enim  est principium non formale sed materiale (Cf. infra lect. vr, n. 9, not. x)  in rerum definitionibus. Igitur cum oratio sit genus enunciationis, non  videtur quod dici possit principium formale eiusdem.  Ad hoc dicendum est quod, nihil prohibet unum et idem respectu  diversorum, esse principium materiale et formale. Etenim partes spe-  ciei quae ponuntur in definitione (puta animal et rationale in defini-  tione hominis) sunt partes materiales eiusdem speciei: quia species est  totum, quod ex illis partibus resultat; partes autem comparantur ad  lect. 1v, n. 9). — 7. Argumentatio ad probandum orationes eiusque  partes esse aliquid naturale, videlicet non ex institutione humana  significans, sed naturaliter. -- 8. Refellitur praefata argumentatio  (C£ lect. rv, n. 11, seq.). Instrumenta seu organa quibus tum  voces, tum soni articulati formantur sunt quidem naturalia: sed  tamen sola virtus rationalis utitur huiusmodi organis, et per ea  efficit orationem et eius partes: quae ideo non sunt res naturales  sed artificiales, ad manifestandos interiores mentis conceptus ab  ipsa ratione compositae.  idem frequenter iteraret. Iterat tamen hoc in de-  finitione orationis, quia significatio orationis dif-  fert a significatione nominis et verbi, quia nomen  vel verbum significat simplicem intellectum, oratio  vero significat intellectum compositum.  3. Secundo autem ponit id, in quo oratio differt  a nomine et verbo, cum dicit: Cuius partium ali-  quid significativum est separatim *. Supra enim  dictum  est  quod pars nominis non significat  aliquid. per se separatum *, sed solum quod est  coniunctum ex duabus partibus. Signanter autem  non  dicit:  Cuius pars est significativa aliquid se-  parata, sed cuius aliquid partium est significativum,  propter negationes et alia syncategoremata ?, quae  secundum se non significant aliquid absolutum, sed  solum habitudinem unius ad alterum. Sed quia du-  plex est significatio vocis, una quae refertur ad in-  tellectum compositum ?, alia* quae refertur ad  B) Non autem posuit (scilicet verba illa, vox significativa) in eius  (scilicet verbi) definitione... Iterat tamen hoc (nempe, vox significa-  tiva) in definitione orationis etc. S. Thomas non dicit utrum et quare  iteret Philosophus etiam alia  vfrba  ad placitum, quae et in definitione  nominis posita sunt. Quae verba in versione latina non habentur, sed  ponuntur in textu graeco: xarà συνθήχην. Sciendum est ergo verba ista  non solum in versione Boethiana non inveniri, sed neque etiam in Am-  monio, qui eadem verba ab Aristotele praetermissa esse dicit (De in-  terpretat., 8. De enunciativa oratione): imo vero in nonnullis codd. grae-  cis verba illa non habentur. Unde Theodorus Waitz in sua Περὶ ἑρμενείας  totum, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo sicut materia ad for-  mam. Praeterea si partes ipsae inter se comparentur, non est dubium  quin genus sit principium materiale et differentia sit principium formale  (Cf. lect.cit.). Attamen 'si considerentur respectu individui, seu. suppo-  Siti naturae specificae, tum genus tum differentia sunt partes formales;  quia constituunt atque determinant natüram specificam, quae est prin-  cipium formale respectu suppositi. — Hinc apparet quod oratio est prin-  cipium materiale in definitione enunciationis, quia in definitione enun-  ciationis oratio est pars; est etiam principium materiale respectu diffe-  rentiae in ipsa definitione; sed est principium formale respectu rei de-  finitae, nempe enunciationis (Cf. s. Th. in II PAysic., lect. v; et Par. I,  qu. Lxxxv, artic. nr, ad 4).  editione a textu Aristotelico ea expungit (pag. 125), rationemque expun-  ctionis reddit in Scholiis, pag. 331 aiens, brevitati, qua Aristoteles uti  solet, parum convenire, ut expresse dicat quod facile intelligatur ( Ari-  stotelis Organon, graece, p. 1. — Lipsiae 1844).  Q) Et alia syncategoremata. Συγχατηγόρημα, ut vox ipsa indicat,  non ex se aliquid significat, sed una cum alio. Huiusmodi sunt omne,  nullum, aliquid etc,, quae sunt particulae additae nominibus ut eorum  significatio determinetur, seu, ut ait s. Thomas, significant habitudinem  unius ad alterum.  ὃ) Ad intellectum compositum. lam supra (lect. ri, n. 3, not. 9) novi-  tium monuimus intellectum dici compositum non quidem subiective , sed  obiective: quia in iudicio est revera actus simplex componens seu con-  *  *  *  Cap. iw.  c:  separatum.  Edd. Ven. 1526  et 1557: separa-  "  ta. |  (Cont. MAN.  B.8  *  )-  pc: alia vero.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  *  Codd.: secun-  da vero competit  parti orationis.  A erronee: affir-  matio et negatio  (Cf. not. ε).  ε  *  (Conf. lect. virt,  n. 3). Codd.: su-  peradditaliquid.  *  Codd. : multo  minus significat  aliquid ut nega-  tio.  Aspasius.  t  Porphyrius.  "  3o  intellectum simplicem; prima significatio competit  orationi, secunda non competit orationi, sed parti  orationis *. Unde subdit: Ut dictio, non ut affirma-  tio *. Quasi dicat: pars orationis est significativa,  sicut dictio significat, puta ut nomen et verbum,  non sicut affirmatio, quae componitur ex nomine  et verbo. Facit autem mentionem solum de affir-  matione et non de negatione *, quia negatio se-  cundum vocem superaddit * affirmationi; unde  si  pars  orationis  propter sui simplicitatem non  significat aliquid, ut affirmatio, multo minus ut  negatio *.  4.  Sed contra hanc definitionem Aspasius obii-  cit quod videtur non omnibus partibus orationis  convenire. Sunt enim quaedam orationes 5, qua-,  rum  partes significant aliquid ut affirmatio; ut  puta, si sol lucet super terram, dies est; et sic  de multis.  Et  ad  hoc respondet Porphyrius " quod in  quocumque genere invenitur prius et posterius,  debet definiri id quod prius est. Sicut cum datur  iungens praedicatum cum subiecto, in simplici vero apprehensione est  actus simplex tum subiective tum obiective.  j  t) Facit autem mentionem solum de affirmatione non et de nega-  tione. etc. Quod hic notatur a s. Thoma prima fronte videtur falso sup-  posito innixum, cum et in translatione latina quam damus textus Ari-  stotelis,  et  in  ipso textu graeco ex editione Didot habeatur mentio  tum de affirmatione tum de negatione: sed non ut affirmatio vel ne-  gatio; ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις, ἢ ἀπόφασις. -- Verum Theodorus Waitz  (Or. et loc. supra cit.) affirmat nonnisi in duobus codicibus, Urbinate  nempe et Marciano, addi ἢ ἀπόφασις, a caeteris autem omitti. Unde et  ipse omittit in sua editione legitque: ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ, ὡς κατάφασις:  ut dictio, sed non ut affirmatio; additque in Scholiis super cap.tv, pag.331:  «  Verba ἢ ἀπόφασις aliena manu addita videntur e vs. 3o ( Cf. vers.  »  »  »  »  Dico autem etc.): quare cum Ammonio et vet. intp. lat. ea omisimus  eosdem codices secuti, quamquam retinet versio Boethiana. Quid Ale-  xander et Porphyrius habuerint, ex quorum commentariis Boethius  multa affert, incertum est. » Quamvis ergo versione Boethiana veteres  interpretes communiter usi fuerint, eam tamen ad textum graecum exege-  runt atque emendarunt. Quod de 5. Thoma ex hucusque declaratis mani-  festum est (Cf. Jourdain, Recherches critiques... des traductions latines  d'Aristote, cap. 1v, pag. 252. Paris. 1819). - Codex A, qui versionem in-  tegram habet Peri hermeneias, cui adnectitur s. Thomae Commentarius,  omittit verba vel negatio, et legit: oratio autem est vox significativa,  cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatum, ut dictio, non vero  ut affirmatio. Dico autem etc.  t) Sunt enim quaedam orationes etc. — Codd. omnes: sunt enim  quaedam orationes compositae. Hae quidem habent quod earum partes  significent aliquid, ut affirmatio; quod infra declaratur (lect. vr). Impli-  cite tamen lectio Piana eumdem habet sensum, dicendo quaedam ora-  tiones: nam τὸ quaedam in hoc casu designat orationes compositas. Sed  utrum compositae sit explicite apponendum textui non auderem affir-  mare.  Dicendo enim quaedam... compositae , vi particulae disiunctivae  quaedam innui videtur dari orationes compositas, quarum partes non  significent aliquid per modum affirmationis: quod est falsum. Aliunde  s. Thomas infra adducto exemplo enunciationis conditionalis, addit: e£ sic  de  multis. Verius autem videretur dicendum: et sic de aliis, si legen-  dum sit compositae, quia omnibus propositionibus compositis commune  :  est, quod de enunciatione conditionali ex Aspasio asseritur. Haec autem  aequivocatio removetur a lectione Piana, quae est etiam omnium edd.  Venet. Si igitur adoptetur lectio codd. videtur subintelligendum esse ali-  quid et legendum: sunt enim quaedam orationes, nempe compositae. —  Unus cod. C omittit: e£ sic de multis.  ἡ) Respondet Porphyrius. Codd. unanimiter: Alexander. Videtur  legendum esse Porphyrius, nam de Alexandri opinione infra agitur. Re-  vera  Porphyrius, texte Boethio, lib. II. Edit. secund. De interpreta-  tione, pag. 322, hanc tenuit sententiam: « Porphyrius autem ita dicit.  »  Volens, inquit, Aristoteles ostendere non omnem orationem, aut sim-  »  »  »  plices tantum habere partes aut compositas, a simplicibus sumpsit  exemplum, ut diceret significare partes orationis, ut dictionem non  ut  affirmationem, ut cum est oratio. » - Nihilominus haec eadem ipsa  interpretatio Alexandro tribuitur a Boethio ib. pag. 319: « Prior autem  »  simplicitas est, posterior vero compositio. In quibus est autem prius  »  »  »  »  »  »  vel posterius aliquid, illud sine dubio definiendum est priori loco quod  natura quoque praecedit. Ita ergo quoniam prior simplex oratio est,  posterior vero composita, prius simplicem orationem definitione con-  stituit (Aristoteles) dicens, cuius partes significant ut dictio non ut  affirmatio, dictionem simplicis nominis aut verbi nuncupationem po-  nens. » — Sed praeterea Boethius alteram interpretationem quam se-  cundo loco (vel potest dici etc.) refert s.Thomas, tribuit ipsi Alexandro ;  definitio alicuius speciei, puta hominis, intelligitur  definitio de eo quod est in actu, non de eo quod  est in polentia; et ideo quia in genere orationis  prius * est oratio simplex, inde est quod Ari-  stoteles prius * definivit orationem simplicem.  Vel potest dici, secundum Alexandrum et Am-  monium *, quod hic definitur oratio in communi.  Unde debet poni in hac definitione id quod est  commune orationi simplici et compositae. Habere  autem partes significantes aliquid ut affirmatio *,  competit soli. orationi compositae; sed habere  partes significantes aliquid per modum dictionis,  et  non per modum affirmationis, est commune  orationi simplici et compositae. Et ideo hoc de-  buit poni in definitione orationis. Et secundum  hoc non debet intelligi esse de ratione oratio-  nis quod pars eius non sit affirmatio: sed quia  de ratione orationis est quod pats eius sit ali-  quid quod significat per modum dictionis, et non  per modum affirmationis *. Et in idem redit solutio  Porphyrii quantum ad sensum, licet quantum ad  «  »  »  »  »  Addit (Alexander) quoque illud: omnem, inquit, definitionem vel con-  tractiorem esse definita specie, vel excedere non oportet. Quod si  Aristoteles ita constituisset definitionem, ut significare partes oratio-  nis diceret uf orationes, ac non ut dictiones, simplices orationes ab  hac definitione secluderet. Orationum namque simplicium partes, non  » ut orationes, sed ut simplicia verba nominaque significant (Op. et  »  pag.cit.).» — Denique quae infra ponuntur ut dicta a Porphyrio de  dictione sumpta ab Aristotele ad significandum tum simpliciter dicere,  tum etiam affirmare, Boethius (ib. pag. 320) Alexandro tribuit. Haec igi-  tur  quae ex fide Boethii retulimus videntur suadere lectionem codd.  praeferendam esse lectioni Pianae. At Porphyrius quoque, iterum Boe-  thius ib., in eadem sententia (Alexandri) est, quamvis in uno ab Ale-  xandro discrepans; quod unum late Boethius exponit, quodve »on quan-  tum ad sensum, licet quantum ad verba parumper differt a sententia  Alexandri, ut s. Thomas infra habet. Quae cum ita sint legi secundum  rei veritatem potest tum Porphyrius tum Alexander; spectato tamen  ordine litterae s. Thomae, ut dixi supra, malo lectionem retinere Pianam  quae est etiam omnium Venet. edd.  Sed dubium remanet, videlicet cur sententia Porphyrii non differat  quantum ad sensum a sententia Alexandri, ut s. Thomas affirmat? —  Obiectio Aspasii est: Aristoteles voluit hoc loco definire orationem in  genere, non autem solam orationem simplicem; atqui definitio tradita  non est nisi de oratione simplici; ergo non recta est definitio Aristote-  lis.- Respondet Porphyrius, negando maiorem argumentationis Aspasii,  et concedendo minorem. Et hinc est, addit Porphyrius, quod Aristoteles  addidit partem orationis a se definitae significare quidem ut dictionem,  prout dictio distinguitur ab affirmatione. Porro in oratione simplici pars  significat ut dictio: significare vero ut affirmationem proprium est par-  tis orationis  posito innixa,  compositae. Ruit ergo obiectio Aspasii, utpote falso sup-  Respondet Alexander, concedendo maiorem argumentationis Aspasii,  et  negando minorem. In definitione enim generís non debet poni dif-  ferentia, sed id solum quod est commune speciebus sub illo genere  comprehensis. Hinc definiendo animal recte. dicitur, quod est vivens ut  sensitivum et non ut rationale vel irrationale: quia rationale et irra-  tionale sunt non constitutiva generis quod est animal, sed differentiae  constituentes species animalis. Porro significare ut dictionem est pro-  prium partis orationis in genere ut distinguitur a nomine; ergo est quid  commune orationi tum simplici, tum compositae. At significare ut affir-  mationem est differentia qua oratio composita differt a simplici; et ideo  debet excludi a definitione orationis in genere. - Haec autem omnia con-  ceduntur a Porphyrio: discrepantia est non in conclusione, sed in eo  quod Porphyrius putat orationem simplicem definiri ab Aristotele; con-  tra Alexander vult definiri orationem in genere, et nonnisi consequen-  ter orationem simplicem. Et propterea im idem redeunt solutiones  tum Porphyrii tum Alexandri, licet quantum ad verba parumper. dif-  ferant.  9) Habere autem partes significantes aliquid ut affirmatio etc. Haec  lectio Piana bona est, et cohaeret cum forma dicendi infra n. 5 adhibita,  et antiquioribus Aristotelis expositoribus usitata, ut videre est apud Boe-  thium loc. cit. in nota praecedenti. Imo ea utitur Aristoteles : ὡς κατάφασις.  Codd. ACDE (B habet lacunam) legunt: habere autem partes signifi-  cantes (^, aliquid) per modum affirmationis competit soli orationi com-  positae; sed habere partes significantes (A, quae significant) per modum  dictionis etc. Horum autem codd. lectio, eumdem sensum exhibet  Piana; expeditior tamen mihi videtur et magis perspicua: imo vero magis  respondens iis quae immediate sequuntur: sed habere partes etc.  praefatis autem codicibus legimus: competit soli orationi compositae. -  Piana habet: hoc solum competit orationi compositae.  *A: prior; sed  corrig.  in  pri-  'mum; quae est  lect. BC.  .  prius.  omittunt  Alexander.  Ammonius.  *  Op. cit. sect. I,  $ xi, pag. 9, coi.5.  6  EMT:  sed eR  Porphyrius  1  ac - Cum  CAP. IV, LECT. VI  *  ABC  legere vi-  dentur et melius:  dicto (vel dicen-  do) quod; et omit-  tunt  particulam  etante vocem ad-  or  [e hyri  t  us.  Codd. - P. nOn  accipitur.  Toannes gramma-  ticus.  *  t  Codd.: et ita.  *  Codd.: sed in  «hoc.  *aBc  autem.  omittunt  verba parumper differat. Quia enim Aristoteles  frequenter ponit dicere pro affirmare, ne dictio  pro affirmatione sumatur, subdit * quod pars ora-  tionis significat u£ dictio, et addit non ut affirma-  tio: quasi diceret, secundum sensum Porphyrii ,  non accipiatur * nunc dictio secundum quod idem  est quod affirmatio.  Philosophus autem, qui dicitur Ioannes gram-  maticus ', voluit quod haec definitio orationis da-  retur solum de oratione perfecta, eo quod partes  non videntur esse nisi alicuius perfecti, sicut omnes  partes domus referuntur ad domum: et ideo * se-  cundum ipsum sola oratio perfecta habet partes  significativas. Sed tamen hic * decipiebatur, quia  quamvis omnes partes referantur principaliter ad  totum perfectum *, quaedam tamen partes re-  feruntur ad ipsum immediate, sicut paries et te-  ctum ad domum, et membra organica ad animal:  quaedam vero mediantibus partibus principalibus  quarum sunt partes; sicut lapides referuntur ad  domum mediante pariete; nervi autem * et ossa  ad animal mediantibus membris organicis, scilicet  manu et pede * et huiusmodi. Sic ergo omnes partes  orationis principaliter referuntur ad orationem per-  fectam, cuius pars est oratio imperfecta, quae etiam  ipsa habet partes significantes. Unde ista definitio  convenit tam orationi perfectae, quam imperfectae.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem ut homo etc.,  exponit propositam definitionem. Et primo, ma-  nifestat verum esse quod dicitur; secundo, exclu-  dit falsum intellectum ; ibi: Sed non una hominis  syllaba etc. Exponit ergo * quod dixerat aliquid  partium orationis esse significativum, sicut hoc no-  men 0o, quod est * pars orationis, significat ali-  quid, sed non significat ut affirmatio aut negatio,  quia non significat esse vel mon esse. Et hoc dico  non in actu ?, sed solum in potentia. Potest enim  aliquid addi, per cuius additionem fit * affirmatio  vel negatio, scilicet si addatur ei verbum.  Ὁ Joannes grammaticus. Commentaria non habemus quae loannes  grammaticus (Flor. saec. VII Eccl), qui et Philoponus cognominatur,  scripsit in librum Peri hermenias; sed eius citata sententia innuitur suo  in Commentar. in lib. I Priorum analytic. cap. τι, col. 27 (Venetiis, 1560).  Eamdem interpretationem tradit b. Albertus: « Et quia, inquit in persona  »  »  »  »  »  »  Aristotelis, immediatum genus interpretationis est oratio perfecta, ideo  quaeremus orationis perfectae definitionem secundum logicum. Sic  enim compositum correspondebit componentibus: quia cum definivi-  mus  nomen et verbum, definivimus prout sunt elementa orationis  perfectissimae; propterea etiam de oratione loquentes, ut de perfecta  loquimur » (In lib. I Peri herm. tractat. IV, cap. 1, in princip.). Sed  et hanc sententiam praedocuerat Syrianus, uti refert Boethius op. et  »  loc. cit. pag. 321: « Syrianus vero, qui Philoxenus cognominatur, non  »  »  »  putat orationes esse, quarum intellectus sit imperfectus, atque ideo  nec eas aliquas habere partes. Nam cum dicit: Plato in Academia di-  Ssputans ; haec quoniam perfecta non est, partes, inquit, non habet.»  x) Quia quamvis omnes partes referantur principaliter ad totum  perfectum etc.— Codd. ABCE uniformiter legunt: quia quamvis orationis  partes referantur principaliter ad totum perfectum. Sed haec lectio  minus mihi placet quam Piana quae est cod. D et Ven. edd. Prin-  cipium enim hic a s. Thoma enunciatur quod universim respicit par-  tium relationem ad totum, ut patet exemplo adducto de parietibus in  ordine ad domum, et de membris organicis in ordine ad animal. Quod  quidem principium applicatur deinde partibus orationis: Sic ergo etc.—  Admitto in textu principaliter tum quia omnes codices illud habent,  tum quia a s. Thoma infra indicatur, applicando enunciatum principium  ad partes orationis.  A) Et hoc dico non in actu, sed etc. Haec lectio Piana et omnium  Ven. edd. non concordat cum codd. ABC qui omittunt particulam ne-  gantem, ac legunt: et hoc dico in actu. Quae lectio quoad formam  non cohaeret cum sequentibus: sed solum in potentia. Attamen lectio  ipsa Piana aliquid necessario vi particulae negantis subintelligit. Vult  *nim s. Thomas quod aliquid partium orationis non significat ut affir-  31  6. Deinde cum dicit: Sed non una hominis etc.,  excludit falsum intellectum. Et posset hoc referri  ad immediate dictum, ut sit sensus quod nomen  erit affirmatio vel negatio, si quid ei addatur, sed  non si addatur ei una nominis syllaba. Sed quia  huic  sensui  conveniunt * verba sequentia,  oportet quod referatur ad id, quod supra dictum  est  in definitione orationis, scilicet quod aliquid  partium eius sit significativum separatim *. Sed  quia pars alicuius totius dicitur proprie illud, quod  immediate venit ad constitutionem totius, non au-  tem pars partis; ideo hoc intelligendum est de par-  tibus ex quibus immediate constituitur oratio, sci-  licet de nomine et verbo, non autem de partibus  nominis vel verbi, quae sunt syllabae vel litterae ^.  Et ideo dicitur quod pars orationis est significa-  tiva separata *, non tamen talis pars, quae est una  nominis syllaba. Et hoc manifestat in syllabis,  quae quandoque possunt esse dictiones per se si-  gnificantes: sicut hoc quod dico rex, quandoque  est una * dictio per se significans; in quantum vero  accipitur ut una quaedam syllaba huius nominis  Sorex, soricis, non significat aliquid per se, sed  est vox sola. Dictio enim quaedam est compo-  sita" ex pluribus vocibus, tamen in significando ha-  bet simplicitatem, in quantum scilicet significat sim-  plicem intellectum *. Et ideo in quantum est vox  composita, potest habere partem quae sit vox **,  in quantum autem est simplex in significando, non  potest habere partem significantem. Unde sylla-  significantes.  bae quidem sunt voces, sed non sunt voces per  se  Sciendum tamen quod in nominibus compo-  sitis, quae imponuntur * ad significandum rem  simplicem ex aliquo intellectu composito, partes  secundum apparentiam aliquid significant, licet  non secundum veritatem *. Et ideo subdit quod in  duplicibus, idest in nominibus compositis, syllabae  quae possunt esse * dictiones, in compositione **  matio aut negatio, quia non significat esse vel non esse. Sed quia non  significare ut affirmationem aut negationem intelligi potest jn actu. so-  lummodo vel etiam in potentia; ideo addit s. Thomas quod aliquid  partium orationis quamvis non significet in actu ut affirmatio aut negatio,  significet tamen in potentia. Potest enim aliquid addi etc. Manifestum  est hanc esse mentem s. Thomae; sed eam forma tum codd. tum edd.  haud perspicue tradit.  u) Ideo hoc intelligendum est de partibus, ex quibus etc. Hanc le-  ctionem germanam s. Thomae restituimus ex codd. omnibus, ac deni-  que ex Veneta editione b. — Editio Piana cum duabus edd. ac plura  omittit, quamvis a mente s. Thomae non aberret. Legit enim: ideo hoc  non intelligendum est de partibus nominis vel verbi, quae sunt syllabae  vel litterae. Addita particula negativa, nempe legendo nom intelligen-  dum, sententia s. Thomae servatur; minime vero perspicuitati consu-  litur:  quia illatio, ideo hoc etc. non perfecte respondet praemisso ante-  cedenti: sed quia pars etc. Huic enim nectitur illud, de partibus ex  quibus immediate constituitur oratio etc.  v) Dictio enim quaedam est composita etc.- Codd. ABDE: dictio enim  est quaedam vox composita.—  Cod. C: dictio enim est quidem vox com-  posita: quae lectio est ad sensum aliorum codd. Utraque lectio bona est.  Si Piana adoptetur, per illa verba dictio enim etc. s. Thomas enunciat prin-  cipium de omni dictione composita; at si vera est lectio codd., verba dictio  enim etc. referuntur ad dictionem in exemplum positam, nempe Sorex, et  erit sensus sententiae: dictio enim Sorex est quaedam vox composita etc.  E) Quae sit vox. Est lect. codd. CDE.  — B: quae est vox. A: quae  sit vox non significativa. Igitur vox ponitur ab omnibus nostris co-  dicibus.— P. et ac, nec non ed. 1526: quae est rex.— Ed. b: quae si-  gnificet. - Adoptamus lectionem, quae sit vox, tum propter consensum  codd., tum quia cohaeret cum iis quae immediate sequuntur: in quantum  autem est simplex etc. Posita tamen hac lectione, aut addendum est  vocabulum significativa cod. A (particula enim, non, est corruptio), aut  supponendum, sicut adnotavimus in margine. Quod etiam indicatur a  lect. ed. b: quae significet.  *  non  *  "  c: congruunt.  pc: separatum.  μ  Codd.: separa-  tim.  *  A:  estuna quae-  dam. - Bc: est  quaedam.  *  *  Cf. lect.ri, n.13.  Nempe vox si-  gnificativa.  *  Codd.: in quan-  tum imponuntur.  *  *  Cf. lect.tv, n.10.  ABC: eliam es-  se.  **  c: compositio-  nem.  :  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  *  Codd. - P.: 4-  nientes.  *  Codd. - p.: si-  gnificant per se.  *  ABC:  Sunt  gnificativae.  *  si-  Ct. lect. iv, n.i,  seq.  *  c:  ad quod pro-  bandum uteban-  tur etc.  *  0  Homini ex co-  dicibus.  Plato.  7T  .* Omnis ex codd.  (Cf. textum Ari-  stotel.).  *  AC : instrumen-  ta enim natura-  lis virtutis etc.  32  nominis venientes *, significant aliquid, scilicet in  ipso composito et secundum quod sunt. dictiones ;  non autem significant aliquid secundum 56 *, pro-  ut sunt huiusmodi nominis partes, sed eo modo,  sicut supra dictum est.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Est autem oralio etc., ex-  cludit quemdam errorem. Fuerunt enim aliqui di-  centes quod oratio et eius partes significant * natu-  raliter, non ad placitum *. Ad probandum autem  hoc utebantur  * tali ratione. Virtutis naturalis opor-  tet esse naturalia instrumenta: quia natura non de-  ficit in necessariis; potentia autem interpretativa ?  est naturalis homini *; ergo instrumenta eius sunt  naturalia. Instrumentum autem eius est oratio,  quia per orationem virtus interpretativa interpre-  tatur mentis conceptum: hoc enim dicimus in-  strumentum, quo agens operatur. Ergo oratio est  aliquid naturale, non ex institutione humana si-  gnificans, sed naturaliter.  !  8. Huic autem rationi, quae dicitur esse Plato-  nis in lib. qui intitulatur Cratylus?, Aristoteles ob-  viando dicit quod omnis * oratio est significativa,  non sicut instrumentum virtutis, scilicet naturalis:  quia instrumenta naturalia virtutis * interpretativae  sunt guttur et pulmo, quibus formatur vox, et lin-  0) Potentia interpretativa etc. Dictum est supra (lect. 1, n. 3, nota y)  interpretationem stricte acceptam idem sonare ac enunciationem; late  autem sumptam idem esse ac locutionem in genere. Hinc nomine fa-  cultatis interpretativae intelligitur hoc loco facultas, qua homo naturaliter  pollet manifestandi exterius interiores mentis conceptus affectionesque ;  ex  qua manifestatione nobis patescunt quae in mente alterius hominis  versantur.  ;  x) Huic autem rationi quae dicitur esse Platonis etc. Cratylus Pla-  tonis liber est de recta nominum ratione. In exordio legitur ab Hermogene  dictum: « Cratylus hic, o Socrates, rebus singulis ait natura iaesse re-  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  ctam nominis rationem, neque id esse nomen, quod quidam ex con-  stitutione vocant, dum vocis suae particulam quandam pronuntiant ,  sed rectam rationem aliquam nominum et Graecis et Barbaris ean-  dem omnibus innatam (pag. 265)... Socn. Cratylus vera loquitur, cum  nomina dicit natura rebus competere, neque unum quemvis esse no-  minum auctorem, sed illum dumtaxat, qui ad nomen respicit, quod  natura cuique convenit, posteaque speciem eam litteris syllabisque in-  serere » (pag. 269). Ratio vero huius sententiae sequens indicatur.  Etenim « nomen.... rerum substantias docendi, discernendique instru-  »  »  »  mentum est, sic ut pecten et radius ipse telae » (pag. 268); et «no-  minandum... ea ratione qua rerum ipsarum natura nominare ac no-  minari postulat, et quo postulat, non autem pro nostrae voluntatis  gua et dentes et labia, quibus litterati ac articulati  soni distinguuntur; oratio autem et partes eius sunt  sicut effectus virtutis interpretativae per instru-  menta praedicta. Sicut enim ? virtus motiva utitur  naturalibus instrumentis, sicut brachiis et manibus  ad faciendum opera artificialia, ita virtus inter-  pretativa utitur gutture et aliis instrumentis na-  turalibus ad faciendum orationem. Unde oratio  et partes eius non sunt res naturales, sed quidam  artificiales  effectus.  Et ideo subdit quod oratio  significat ad placitum *, idest secundum institutio-  nem humanae rationis et voluntatis, ut supra di-  ctum est *, sicut et omnia artificialia causantur ex  humana voluntate et ratione. Sciendum tamen *  virtuti  quod, si virtutem interpretativam non attribua-  mus  motivae,  rationi; sic non est  virtus naturalis, sed supra omnem naturam cor-  poream: quia intellectus non est actus alicuius cor-  poris, sicut probatur in III De anima *. Ipsa autem  ratio est, quae movet virtutem corporalem moti-  vam ad opera artificialia, quibus etiam ut instru-  mentis utitur ratio: non sunt autem * instrumenta  alicuius virtutis corporalis. Et hoc modo ratio *  potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus, quasi  instrumentis: quamyis non naturaliter significent.  »  »  »  arbitrio (pag. 267)... Nam quod natura cuique congruit, instrumentum  adinveniendum est, atque id illi attribuendum, ex quo efficit non  lecumque vult qui fabricat, sed quale natura ipsa exigit » (Pag. 208.—  Platonis Opera Marsilio Ficino interprete. — Francofurti 1602).  9) Sicut enim etc. Retinenda est haec lectio Piana et edd. Ven., quia  perspicua et requisita a forma textus s. Thomae. — Cod. A: sicut etiam  virtus motiva utitur etiam etc. — B: sicut etiam virtus motiva utitur  instrumentis sicut naturalibus. etc.  — C: sicut etiam virtus motiva uti-  tur etc.: caetera ut in P. Quae vero sequuntur: ifa virtus interpreta-  tiva usque ad illa verba inclusive ad faciendum orationem omittunt  codd. praefati; proindeque sententiam s. Thomae mancam et obscuram  exhibent.  c)  quod  Sciendum tamen etc. Ita codd.- Edd, Piana et Ven.: sciendum ergo  etc. -- Novitius autem notet quid hic a s. Thoma doceatur circa  virtutem naturalem. In hypothesi enim (quae vera est, ut dicitur lect.  seq. n. 2) quod virtus interpretativa non attribuatur virtuti motivae,  sed rationi, negatur ipsam esse naturalem. Sed numquid quod a ra-  tione est naturale dici nequit? Dici utique potest quatenus id quod  a  natura  quacunque profluit maturale dicitur. At Scholastici strictiori  etiam significatione usurpabant vocabulum maturale, nempe ad desi-  gnandum id quod a materia dependet vel est in materia sensibili, Quo  sensu negatur naturale esse illud quod a sola ratione est.  Βα: secundum  placitum.  *  sed  *  Lect. 1v, n. 11.  σ  .  12. -  Iv nn. 4 et  Commentar.  s. Th. lect. vir.  *  Supple: opera  artijitialia.  * Codd. - r. omit-  qua-  :  CAP. IV, LECT. VII  LECTIO SEPTIMA  DE ENUNCIATIONIS DEFINITIONE  ᾿Αποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς; ἀλλ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύ-  δέεσθαι ὑπά χει"  οὐχ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ᾽  οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής.  Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν᾽ ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ πονητικῆς  οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις" ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεω-  ρίας.  ;  *  33  Enunciativa vero non omnis, sed illa in qua verum vel  falsum est;  non autem omnibus inest, ut deprecatio oratio quidem est,  sed neque vera neque falsa.  Caeterae igitur relinquantur: rhetoricae enim vel poeticae  convenientior est consideratio. Enunciativa vero prae-  sentis speculationis est.  ΘΎΝΟΡΒΙΒ. — 1. Textus argumentum, eiusque divisiones et  subdivisiones.- 2. Omne instrumentum oportet definiri ex fine  ad quem destinatur; ergo oratio enunciativa debet definiri ex eo  quod sit significativa veritatis vel falsitatis iudicii mentalis.- 3. Co-  rollarium. Verum et falsum sunt in enunciatione sicut in signo:  in mente sicut in subiecto cognoscente: in re sicut in causa  —(€f- lect. mr, n. 6. et seqq.). - 4. Sola enunciativa oratio, quae  etiam indicativa et suppositiva dicitur, significat verum vel fal-  "eg  ostquam * Philosophus determinavit  ," de principiis enunciationis, hic incipit *  |  s  ESSA determinare de ipsa enunciatione. Et  Qd  dividitur pars haec in duas: in pri-  ma, determinat de enunciatione absolute; in se-  cunda, de diversitate enunciationum, quae pro-  venit  secundum ea quae simplici enunciationi  adduntur; et hoc in secundo libro; ibi: Quo-  niam autem est de aliquo affirmatio etc. - Prima  autem pars dividitur in partes tres. In prima, de-  finit enunciationem ; in secunda, dividit eam; ibi:  Est autem una prima oratio * etc.; in tertia, agit de  oppositione partium eius ad invicem; ibi: Quo-  niam autem est enunciare * etc. Circa primum  tria facit: primo, ponit definitionem enunciationis;  secundo, ostendit quod per hanc definitionem  differt enunciatio ab aliis speciebus orationis; ibi:  Non autem in omnibus etc.; tertio, ostendit quod  ει  de sola enunciatione * est tractandum; ibi: E? cae-  terae quidem relinquantur.  «) Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine. Cod. A:  definiri debet ex suo fine.— Quod s. Thomas affirmat de instrumento, est  dicendum de omni eo quod est propter finem aliquem, ut scilicet ex  exigentia finis petatur ratio eius definitionis. « In omnibus, inquit s. Doctor,  »  »  »  quae sunt propter finem definitio, quae est per causam finalem, est ratio  definitionis, quae est per causam materialem ('ex qua res est) et me-  dium probans ipsam ( quia scilicet talis res esse debet , qualem exigit  » finis ad quem ordinatur ): propter hoc enim oportet ut domus fiat ex  »  »  lapidibus et lignis, quia est operimentum protegens nos a frigore et  aestu » (In I Poster. analytic., lect. 1v). — Et haec doctrina philosopho  necessaria est, et magis late patet quam prima fronte videatur. Nonnulli,  duce Bacone a Verulamio, notarunt Aristotelem et Scholasticos quod  in  causis  finalibus anchoram fixerint; sed huic accusationi facilis est  responsio. Et imprimis negamus quod Scholastici omnia per causas  finales definiverint: in metaphysicis enim principia, ex quibus res con-  stituuntur et ad invicem ordinantur summa diligentia quaerebant; in  rebus autem physicis ac psychologicis observationem factorum diligenti  studio  prosequebantur. Ubicumque vero quis per analysim contraire  moliebatur principiis universalibus rationis, aut haec metiri criterio sen-  suum, Scholastici repugnabant et merito: nam neque analysis vera  est  si contradicat principiis abstractis per se notis, cum veritas veritati  non opponatur, neque iudicium veritatis est committendum sensibus,  cum rationis sit proprium. — Deinde concedimus Scholasticos plurimum  valuisse in expendendis causis finalibus atque in explicandis per ipsas  naturae operibus; sed hac de causa non vituperandi seq, laudandi sunt.  Etenim opus naturae est opus intelligentiae divinae; et ideo ita ad finem  ordinatum ut unicuique rei talis indita sit natura, qualem ratio finis  uniuscuiusque postulat. Quocirca sicut merito dicimus a priori quod si  Opp. D. Tuowar T. I.  sum, quia ipsa sola absolute significat conceptum intellectus, in  quo est verum vel falsum, nempe iudicium.- 5. Praeter oratio-  nem enunciativam sunt necessariae etiam aliquae aliae orationis  species, quae tamen quia non significant iudicium, non continent  logice neque verum neque falsum. — 6. De sola enunciativa oratio-  ne proprie agit demonstrator, quia ad suum finem non utitur nisi  orationibus significantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est  in  anima.  2.  Circa primum considerandum est quod ora-  tio, quamvis non sit instrumentum alicuius vir-  tutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumen-  tum rationis, ut supra dictum est *. Omne autem  instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine *, qui  est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut  et  omnis vocis significativae est significare con-  ceptionem intellectus, ut supra * dictum est^: duae  autem sunt operationes intellectus, in quarum una  non  invenitur veritas et falsitas, in alia autem  invenitur verum vel falsum. Et ideo orationem  enunciativam definit ex significatione veri et* falsi,  dicens quod non omnis oratio est enunciativa , sed  in qua verum vel falsum est. Ubi considerandum est  quod Aristoteles mirabili brevitate usus *, et divisio-  nem orationis innuit in hoc quod dicit: Non omnis  oralio est enunciativa, et definitionem enunciatio-  nis in hoc? quod dicit: Sed in qua verum vel falsum  est: ut intelligatur quod haec sit definitio enunciatio-  nis, Enunciatio estoratio,in qua verum vel falsum est.  e. g., caput est a natura capillis coopertum, procul dubio capilli non sunt  inutiles, sed ad aliquem finem a Creatore naturae ordinati; ita cognito hoc  fine immediato, recte per ipsum explicamus existentiam capillorum in  capite, qui ideo sunt et tales sunt, quia finis ille requirit eos esse et ita  esse. Hinc causas finales sapiens non potest praeterire: esset enim idem ac  sentire naturam non esse ordinatam ad finem, et consequenter non esse  opus intelligentiae, sed casus et temeritatis. — Non diffiteor hac in re  abusus irrepere posse et de facto irrepsisse, sicut quando ad arbitrium  fingitur finis immediatus; at etiam in ratiocinio sunt abusus, et tamen  ratiocinationem . necessariam in scientiis omnes proclamamus: abusus  enim sunt tollendi, rectus autem rerum usus retinendus.  B) Est significare conceptionem intellectus, ut supra dictum est. —  Haec verba, uf supra dictum est, desiderantur in editione Piana, et ea  adiicimus ex omnibus codd.: qui praeterea habent conceptionem et non  conceptum ut legit Piana. — Quae vero immediate sequuntur codd. BC  ita  legunt: operationes autem intellectus duae sunt in quarum una  (B, quarum in una).  Y) Et definitionem enunciationis in hoc etc. Codd. - Piana: et defi-  nitionem in hoc etc. Quae lectio falsa non est, sed tamen vocabulum  enunciationis, quod explicite habent codd., subintelligit ad sententiae  perspicuitatem. — Infra codd. AB legunt: ut intelligatur haec esse defi-  nitio enunciationis, Enunciatio etc. (A, scilicet, enunciatio etc.). - C:  ut intelligatur hanc esse definitionem enunciationis, Enunciatio etc.  Enunciatio, propositio, vocabula sunt quae frequenter in scientiis  occurrunt,  nec  «  subiecto  seu  realiter  inter  se  significatione differunt,  sed quadam solum comparatione et relatione. Haec enim propositio,  »  »  verbi causa, - animus (est) immortalis, - enunciatio est, quando ali-  quid significandi dumtaxat causa sumitur; quando vero conclusionis  5*  *  *  *  *  *  Seq. cap. 1v.  Lect. praec.n.8.  «  Lect. i1, n. 5.  A: vel.  p omittit usus.  34  3. Dicitur  sicut  autem in enunciatione esse verum  vel falsum, sicut in szgno intellectus veri vel falsi:  sed  in  Commen.s.Th.  *  lect. iv.- Ed. Did.  lib.v, cap. IV, n. I.  *  Categor. cap.1it  subiecto  est  verum vel falsum in  mente, ut dicitur in VI. Metaphysicae *, in re au-  tem sicut in causa: quia ut dicitur in libro Prae-  dicamentorum *, ab eo quod res est vel non est,  (v) De substan-  tia, n. 22.  *  cP. etedd. Ven. -  AB: dicitur ora-  tio vera vel fal-  sa.  *  *  *  ABC: quomodo.  p:  quoniam.  Codd. - P.: au-  ditoris..  *  ABC Omitt.scZen-  dum est quod.  e  *  Lect. praec.n.3.  κα: ad audien-  dum  vel  dendum.  atten-  * ABC: Intellectus  (internum?) mez-  tis conceptum.  * agcomitt.aZ/ae.  *  Oratio ex codd. -  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  tum ad inferiores oratio imperativa; quantum au-  tem ad superiores oratio deprecativa, ad quam  reducitur * oratio optativa: quia respectu superio-  ris, homo non habet vim motivam, nisi per ex-  pressionem sui desiderii. Quia igitur istae quatuor  orationis species non significant ipsum conceptum  intellectus, in quo est verum vel falsum, sed quem-  oratio vera vel falsa est *.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Non autem in omnibus etc.,  ostendit quod * per hanc definitionem enunciatio  differt ab alis orationibus. Et quidem de oratio-  nibus imperfectis manifestum est quod * non si-  gnificant verum vel falsum, quia cum non faciant  perfectum sensum in animo audientis *, manife-  stum est quod perfecte non exprimunt iudicium  rationis, in quo consistit verum vel falsum. His  igitur praetermissis, sciendum est quod * perfectae  orationis, quae complet sententiam, quinque sunt  species, videlicet Enunciativa, Deprecativa, Impe-  rativa, Interrogativa et Vocativa (Non tamen in-  teligendum est quod solum nomen vocativi ca-  sus  sit ? vocativa oratio: quia oportet aliquid  partium orationis significare aliquid separatim ,  sicut supra dictum est *; sed per vocativum pro-  vocatur, sive excitatur animus audientis ad atten-  dendum *; non autem est vocativa oratio nisi  plura coniungantur; ut cum dico, o bone Petre).  Harum autem orationum sola enunciativa est,  in qua invenitur verum vel falsum, quia ipsa sola  absolute significat conceptum intellectus *, in quo  'est verum vel falsum.  5. Sed quia intellectus vel ratio, non solum  concipit in seipso veritatem rei tantum *, sed etiam  ad eius officium pertinet secundum suum conce-  ptum alia dirigere et ordinare; ideo necesse fuit  quod sicut per enunciativam orationem significa-  tur ipse mentis conceptus, ita etiam essent aliquae  aliae * orationes significantes ordinem rationis, se-  cundum quam alia diriguntur. Dirigitur autem ex  ratione unius hominis alius homo aad tria: primo  quidem, ad attendendum mente; et ad hoc pertinet  vocaliva oratio: secundo, ad respondendum voce;  et ad hoc pertinet oratio interrogativa* : tertio, ad  exequendum in opere; et ad hoc pertinet quan-  .  »  »  gratia, ut ratiocinationis pars praeponitur, propositio vocatur, quoniam  constare ratiocinationem ex duabus propositionibus arbitramur » (Phi-  lopon. in I Prior., cap. 11, col.18. - Cf. c. 1, col. 10.- Ven. 1560). Quae cum  ita sint, vocabulis enunciatio et propositio promiscue utuntur philosophi.  9) Nomen vocativi casus sit etc. - Codd.: nomen vocativi casus pro-  latum sit etc.— Supra ABC legunt: »on. enim intelligendum est: at non  datur a s. Thoma ratio quare inter species orationis perfectae sit adnu-  meranda vocativa; sed explicatur quando habeatur oratio vocativa. Unde  ectio P., non tamen, est retinenda, quae est etiam aliorum codd. et  e v  Xo DICE δὲν ἃ,  QE  *  ABCD: efiam re-  ducitur.  dam ordinem ad hoc consequentem ; inde est quod  in nulla earum invenitur verum vel falsum , sed  solum in enunciativa, quae significat id quod mens  de rebus concipit *. Et inde est quod omnes modi  orationum, in quibus invenitur verum vel falsum,  sub  enunciatione continentur: quam quidam di-  cunt zndicativam vel suppositivam. Dubitativa au-  tem ad interrogativam reducitur, sicut et optativa  ad deprecativam.  6. Deinde cum dicit: Caeterae igitur relinquan-  tur etc., ostendit quod de sola enunciativa est  agendum; et dicit quod aliae quatuor orationis  species sunt relinquendae , quantum pertinet ad  praesentem intentionem: quia earum consideratio  convenientior est rhetoricae vel poéticae scien-  tiae. Sed enunciativa * oratio praesentis considera-  tionis* est. Cuius ratio est, quia consideratio huius  libri directe ordinatur ad scientiam demonstrati-  vam, in qua animus hominis per rationem indu-  citur ad consentiendum vero ex his quae sunt  propria rei; et ideo demonstrator * non utitur ad  suum finem nisi enunciativis orationibus, signifi-  cantibus res secundum quod earum veritas est  in anima. Sed rhetor et poéta inducunt * ad as-  sentiendum ei quod intendunt, non solum per ea  quae sunt propria rei, sed etiam per dispositiones  audientis.  Unde rhetores et poétae plerumque  movere auditores nituntur * provocando eos ad  aliquas passiones, ut Philosophus dicit in sua Rhe-  torica. Et ideo consideratio dictarum specierum  orationis,  quae pertinet * ad ordinationem au-  dientis in aliquid, cadit proprie sub considera-  tione rhetoricae vel poéticae, ratione sui signi-  ficati; ad considerationem autem grammatici *,  prout consideratur in eis congrua vocum con-  structio.  omnium edd. Ven. — Infra codd. BC legunt: quia oportet aliquid par-  tium significare separatim.  t) Concipit in seipso veritatem rei tantum. Adverbium tantum  deest  in codd. necnon in Veneta editione c et altera Venet. 1526. —  Illud habent edd. Venetae ab, quas sequitur Piana. - Revera post nom  solum, adverbium tantum redundare videtur.  t) Quae significat id quod mens de rebus concipit. Perspicua est  haec lectio, quam ex codd. restituimus.- Piana: quae significat id quod  de rebus concipitur.  Pes  us  LANG  :  *  Codd.-». et edd.  Ven.: movent au-  s in unum.  *  ABC: spectat.  CAP. V, LECT. VIII  LECTIO OCTAVA  .DE DIVISIONE ENUNCIATIONIS IN SIMPLICEM ET COMPOSITAM,  AFFIRMATIVAM ET NEGATIVAM  Ἔστι δὲ cl; πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα  ἀπόφασις" οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμῳ cic.  ᾿Ανάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι,  ἢ πτώσεως δήματος" καὶ vao ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος;  *  35  Est autem una prima oratio enunciativa affirmatio, deinde  negatio, aliae vero omnes coniunctione unae.  Necesse est autem omnem orationem enunciativam ex verbo  esse, vel casu verbi; etenim hominis ratio, si non est,  ἐὰν  μὴ τὸ ἔστιν, ἢ ἦν, ἢ ἔσται, Tj τι τοιοῦτον προ-  στεθῇ, οὔπω λόγος ἀποφαντιχός.  Διότι Oy) ἕν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ οὐ πολλά, τὸ ζῷον πεζὸν  δίπουν" οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ σύνεγγυς εἰρῆσθαι εἷς ἔσται"  ἔστι δὲ ἄλλης πραγματείας τοῦτο εἰπεῖν.  Ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἕν δηλῶν, ἢ ὁ συν-  δέσμῳ εἷς" πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἕν, ἢ οἱ ἀσύν-  το  δετοι.  Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα. ἢ ῥῆμα, φάσις ἔστω μόνον’ ἐπειδὴ  οὐχ  EOS  PEUT  ἔστιν  εἰπεῖν οὕτω δηλοῦντά τι τῇ φωνῇ; ὦστε  ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐρωτῶντός τινος, 7) μή, ἀλλ αὐτὸν  ,  προαιρούμιενον.  Τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἁπλῇ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσις, οἷον τὶ κατά  τινος, 7| τὶ από τινος" ἡ δὲ Ex τούτων συγκειμένη;  οἷον λόγος. τις ἤδη σύνθετος.  Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀπόφασις φωνὴ σημαντικὴ περὶ τοῦ  ὑπάρχειν τι; ἢ p ὑπάρχειν, ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διήρηνται.  Κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσοίς τινος κατά τινος. "᾿Από-  φάσις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανοίς τινος ἀπό τινος.  ΘΎΝΟΡΞΒΙ5. — 1. Textus argumentum.- 2. Propositio est quod-  dam ens. Sed ens et unum convertuntur. Ergo omnis propositio  aliqualiter est una, vel unitate simplicitatis, vel unitate composi-  tionis.— 3. Alia subdivisio enunciationis est quod sit vel affirma-  tiva vel negativa: et affirmativa prior est negativa, tum ex parte  vocis quia simplicior; tum ex parte intellectus, quia compositio  est prior divisione; tum ex parte rei, quia affirmativa signi-  ficat esse, quod est prius non esse. — 4. Textus declaratio. —  5. Opinio Alexandri quod divisio enunciationis in affirmationem  et negationem non sit divisio generis in species. — 6. Reprobatur.  Quamvis propositio affirmativa sit prior negativa secundum pro-  priam rationem, tamen aequaliter participant rationem ezun-  ciationis  (scilicet  verum vel falsum continere); quae proinde  ad utramque est genus. — 7. Textus divisio. — 8. Praenotamen.  Omnem enunciationem constare necessario ex verbo (quod est  formale ipsius enunciationis), ostenditur ex definitione, quae  nihil enunciat sine verbo.  — 9. Dubium proponitur, cui respon-  detur  tripliciter. - 10. Aliud praenotamen.  Sicut  ex  forma et  materia fit vere unum et non multa, ita in definitionibus ex  genere et differentia.— 1 1. Absoluta unitas enunciationis exigit non  interruptionem partium eius; sed non impeditur neque per com-  positionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem  nominum, ex quibus constat definitio. - 12. Textus subdivisio. —  13. Una absolute dicitur enunciatio, quae unum de uno signifi-  *  Enunciationis  οι  .  * Codd.-».: enun-  ciatio.  ὦ  Ὁ  complexio-  ne, et sic saepe.  *  gc: simpliciter  (Cf. Ὁ D. 4).  2.  Circa primum considerandum est quod Ari-  stoteles sub;breviloquio duas divisiones enunciatio-  nis ponit. Quarum una est quod enunciationum *  quaedam est una simplex, quaedam est coniun-  ctione * una. Sicut etiam in rebus, quae sunt extra  animam, aliquid est unum simplex * sicut zndivi-  sibile  vel continuum , aliquid est unum colliga-  aut  erit, aut fuit, aut aliquid huiusmodi addatur, non-  dum est oratio enunciativa.  Quare autem unum quoddam est et non multa, animal  gressibile bipes; neque enim in eo quod propinquae  dicuntur, unum erit: est autem alterius hoc tractare  negocii.  Est autem una oratio enunciativa, vel quae unum signi-  ficat, vel coniunctione una: plures autem, quae plura,  et  non unum, vel inconiunctione.  ὃ  Nomen ergo et verbum dictio sit sola: quoniam non est  dicere sic aliquid significantem voce enunciare, vel ali-  quo interrogante, vel non, sed ipso proferente.  Harum autem haec simplex quidem est enunciatio, ut ali-  quid de aliquo, vel aliquid ab aliquo; haec autem ex  his coniuncta, velut oratio quaedam iam composita.  Est autem simplex enunciatio, vox significativa de eo quod  est  aliquid, vel non est: quemadmodum tempora divisa  sunt.  *  Affirmatio vero est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo. Negatio  vero  enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo.  cat; una secundum quid ila dicitur quae est coniunctione una,  hoc est, una ex multis.— Et per oppositum intelligenda est enun-  ciationum pluritas. — 14. Opinio Boethii de unitate et pluralitate  enunciationis ex ordine ad significatum; de simplicitate et com-  positione ex ordine ad voces.—- 15. Non approbatur Boethii expo-  sitio. -  Tum unitas, tum simplicitas (Cf. infra n. 18) enunciatio-  nis est iudicanda non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate signifi-  cati (ad quod ordinatur), etiamsi sint plura nomina quae unum  significent. -- 16. Tres sunt modi enunciationis; simpliciter und,  quae unum simpliciter significat; simpliciter plures et una se-  cundum quid, quae multa significat quae sunt coniunctione unum ;  simpliciter plures quae plura significat, quae non sunt coniun-  ctione unum. — 17. Enunciatio una non sic unum significat sicut  nomen et verbum. — 18. Ex ratione suae unitatis dividitur pro-  positio in simplicem et compositam, non secus ac unum; simplex  est quae unum significat vel per modum compositionis, vel per  modum divisionis; composita est quae plura significat, et ideo ex  simplicibus propositionibus coalescit.— r9. De altera divisione  enunciationis (n. 3). Divisio enunciationis in affirmativam et ne-  gativam primo convenit enunciationi simplici; et ex consequenti  compositae.— 20. Iterum de opinione Alexandri (n. 5).- 21. Enun-  ciatis sententiis Boethii, Porphyrii et Ammonii, concluditur: signi-  ficare esse et non esse recte assignari ab Aristotele ut differentias  specificas propositionis seu enunciationis.  lione aut compositione aut ordine. Quia enim ens  et unum convertuntur, necesse est sicut omnem  rem *, ita et omnem enunciationem aliqualiter esse  unam.  3. Alia vero subdivisio enunciationis est * quod  si enunciatio sit una, aut est affirmativa aut ne-  gativa. Enunciatio  autem  affirmativa prior est  negativa, triplici ratione, secundum tria quae supra  posita sunt: ubi dictum est * quod vox est si-  gnum intellectus, et intellectus est signum rei. Ex  parte igitur vocis, affirmativa enunciatio * est prior  negativa *, quia est simplicior: negativa enim enun-  *  *  *  Cap. v.  Cap. vi.  A:  nam.  *  rem esse u-  De tertia divi-  sione,  infra le-  ct.  *  x, n. 10.  Lect. τι, nn. 5  et 9.  *  Enunciatio ex  codd.  * ABCOmittunt π6-  gativa.  36  ciatio addit supra affirmativam particulam negati-  vam. Ex parte etiam intellectus affirmativa* enun-  ciatio, quae significat compositionem intellectus ,  est prior negativa, quae significat divisionem eius-  dem: divisio enim naturaliter posterior est com-  positione, nam non est divisio nisi composito-  rum,  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  de substantia, quam de novem generibus acci-  dentium ὃ,  sicut  non  est  corruptio nisi generatorum.  Ex parte etiam rei, affirmativa enunciatio, quae  significat esse, prior est negativa, quae significat  non  esse: sicut habitus naturaliter prior est pri-  vatione.  4.  *  **  ACD melius: e-  nunciatio.  A:  quae.  *  Scilicet ex ABC.  Alexander.  Dicit ergo quod oratio enunciativa una et  prima est affirmatio, idest affirmativa enunciatio.  Et contra hoc quod dixerat prima, subdit: Deinde  negatio, idest negativa oratio *, quia ** est posterior  affirmativa, ut dictum est. Contra id autem quod  dixerat una, scilicet * simpliciter, subdit quod  quaedam aliae sunt unae, non simpliciter, sed con-  iunctione unae Ὑ.  5. Ex hoc autem quod hic dicitur argumen-  tatur Alexander quod divisio enunciationis in af-  firmationem et negationem non est divisio generis  in species, sed divisio nominis multiplicis in sua  significata. Genus enim univoce praedicatur de  suis speciebus, non secundum prius et posterius:  unde  Aristoteles  noluit  quod ens esset genus  commune omnium, quia per prius praedicatur  ^  a) Ex parte etiam intellectus affirmativa etc. Est lectio codd. ABC  quam adoptamus loco Pianae et D: ex parte autem intellectus etiam  affirmativa etc. — Cod. E: ex parte intellectus enim affirmativa etc. Sed  quia enim magis quam autem, extra propositum ponitur, pronum est  inferre in codice, ex quo E transcriptus est, fuisse etiam, et ab imperito  vel distracto amanuensi scriptum enim.  β) Ex parte etiam rei, affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat xssE,  prior est negativa, quae significat NoN Ἐ55Ε. Ita legimus cum ABE: ex  parte etiam rei, non autem cum Piana: ex parte autem.- Cod. D habet:  ex parte rei. - C omittit omnino verba: ex parte etiam rei affirmativa  enunciatio; sed his omissis, ea quae immediate-sequuntur, et quae habet  etiam C, sunt sine significatione. - Hoc principium, simplicissimum qui-  dem in se est, sed virtute est propemodum infinitum. Dixerat s. Tho-  mas lect. i, n. ult. negationem relative, respectu nempe eorum quae  possunt esse et non esse praecedere affirmationem, quia revera ea quae  possunt esse et mom esse prius concipiuntur ut non existentia (seu ton  esse) quam ut existentia. Nunc autem loquendo in sensu absoluto af-  firmationem dicit praecedere negationem, et esse seu existere, prae-  cedere non esse seu non existere. Et vere sic est. Nam negatio ne-  gat esse, et ideo illud subaudit; at contra affirmatio affirmat esse, quod  per se sumptum stare potest nihilque praesupponit. Quo statuto ab-  stractissimo principio, s. Thomas frequenter illud applicat peculiaribus  subiectis; puta: actus est esse, potentia est non esse; ergo absolute  loquendo actus prior est potentia: perfectio est esse, imperfectio est  non esse; ergo absolute loquendo perfectio prior est imperfectione: ha-  bitus seu habere est esse, privatio est non esse; ergo habitus prior  est  et  privatione. Et sic de caeteris. - Applica eadem principia, et logice  vere  inferes:  ergo  existentia entis perfectissimi praecedit existen-  tiam entis finiti, quod est perfectio mista imperfectione, seu affirma-  tio  mista negatione; ergo perfectio finita dari nequit quin praeexistat  perfectio infinita, a qua sit; ergo bonitas, veritas, entitas, causa finita exi-  stens supponit causam infinitam, et infinite bonam, infinite veram, infi-  nite ens. - Hisce aliisque bene multis consequentis illatis, adde quod  quia Deus est esse, et veritas, et causa, et bonitas, et perfectio etc. per  essentiam ; Deo per hypothesim sublato, nihil omnino relinquitur, neque  veritas cuiusque affirmationis, neque consequenter veritas cuiusque ne-  gationis. Quocirca philosophia necessario Dei existentiam praesupponit  et  in  omni sua cognitione implicite includit Deum, quo negato, se-  ipsam negat.  Y) Sed coniunctione unae.— Codd. BCDE: sed coniunctione, ita sci-  licet quod quaelibet earum est coniunctione una. Et haec mihi videtur  esse lectio germana 8. Thomae.- A habet: sed coniunctione una, nempe  legit ferme cum Piana.  !  9) Quam de novem generibus accidentium. Piana immediate prose-  quitur: sed enunciatio praedicatur secundum prius et posterius de affir-  matione et negatione, ut videtur per hoc quod dicitur primo et deinde.  Ergo etc.— Quae omnia, explicite constituentia minorem argumentationis  Alexandri, desunt in edd. Venetis Peri hermeneias saec. XV et XVI, nec  non in edd. Opp. s. Th. Veneta 1595 et Parisiensi 1660. Sed et codices  6.  Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium ali-  quod commune potest esse prius altero duplici-  ter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut  naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum par-  ticipationem rationis illius communis quod in ea di-  viditur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem *  generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus  binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter  est prior ternario *; sed tamen aequaliter par-  ticipant  rationem generis sui, scilicet * numeri:  ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per  unum, sicut et * binarius. Sed secundum impedit  univocationem generis. Et propter hoc ems non  potest esse genus * substantiae et accidentis: quia  in ipsa ratione en£is, substantia, quae est ens per  se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est  ens  per aliud et in alio *. Sic ergo affirmatio se-  cundum propriam rationem prior est negatione;  tamen aequaliter participant rationem enunciatio-  nis, quam supra posuit, videlicet quod enunciatio  est oratio in qua verum vel falsum est.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Necesse est autem etc.,  manifestat propositas divisiones. Et primo, mani-  festat  primam, scilicet quod enunciatio vel est  una simpliciter vel coniunctione * una; secundo,  nostri omnes praefata verba omittunt. Adde quod minor illa et prae-  sertim abbreviatio ergo etc., qua s. Thomas aut numquam aut rarissime  utitur, videntur esse nota marginalis, quae postea textui inserta est,— Su-  pra autem cod. A hanc exhibet lectionem: unde Aristoteles voluit quod  ens non esset genus omnium praedicatorum, nempe praedicamentorum.  Praedicatorum loco praedicamentorum non raro excidit amanuensibus.  ε) Binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ter-  nario. Codd. omnes ita legunt. — Piana: secundum rationem propriam  prior est etc. Adverbium naturaliter potest sine inconvenienti omitti,  quia sufficienter exprimitur, dicendo, secundum propriam rationem ;  illud tamen adiecimus explicite propter codd. unanimitatem. — Ratio vero  asserti fundatur in principio nota $ explicato. Ternarius enim resultat  ex binario et ex unitate, sicut ex duabus unitatibus componitur binarius.  Ergo sicut unitas supponitur a binario et prior est ipso; ita binarius  supponitur a ternario et ipso prior est. t) Ens non potest esse genus etc.; et ideo non univoce praedicatur  de rebus, quamvis nec proprie aequivoce, sed analogice (Cf. lect. v, n. 19  et not. ξ). Recte enim argumentamur: Est gemus; ergo est univocum.  Et viceversa: Non est univocum; ergo non est genus. - Disputatum est  a  Scholasticis utrum revera ens (quod est ultimum ad quod ascendit  mens in abstractionibus idealibus, et a quo in synthesi ideali mens de-  scendit ad genera et species) sit quid univocum, et ideo genus, vel quid  analogum et ideo transcendens omne genus. Affirmavit Scotus univoca-  tionem entis; negavit s. Thomas. Recentiores vero plerique hanc quae-  stionem inter inutiles subtilitates scholasticas recensuerunt. Sed postquam  invaluit pantheismus idealisticus, qui fundamentum quaerit in entis con-  ceptu abstractissimo, tunc tandem cognitum est quaestionem illam inter  praecipuas locum habere. Sed praeterea quaestioni de univocatione vel  analogia entis intimo nexu doctrina de ordine supernaturalium verita-  tum connectitur. Haec, suis locis explicanda, sufficiat impraesentiarum  innuisse, ut novitius non summis labiis attingat, sed intime penetret  quae hic tradit s. Thomas ac firmiter mente retineat ad rationem univo-  cationis essentialiter requiri, ut illud quod dicitur univocum aequaliter  participetur vel possit participari a pluribus; ita nempe ut subtracta ista  participabilitatis aequalitate, eo ipso subtrahatur univocatio.  Ἢ) Est ens per aliud et in alio. lllud per aliud, quod dicitur de  accidente, accipiendum est per oppositionem ad illud per se, quod di-  citur de substantia. Porro per se esse non excludit causam a quo sub-  stantia habeat esse (substantiae enim creatae sunt per se, sed non sunt  4  se), sed solum excludit subiectum cui inhaereat ut existat: quia de  ratione substantiae est quod per seipsam et consequenter in seipsa existat  et non in alio. Igitur per aliud, quod de accidente affirmatur, dicit nega-  tionem existendi per se, et consequenter necessitatem inhaerendi alicui  subiecto substantiali: non enim accidens naturaliter existit, nisi quatenus  inexistit,  ut  dictum est lect. iv, n. 5, nota ὃ. - Codd. hoc modo le-  gunt: prioritatem habet substantia, quae est ens per se respectu acci-  dentis, quod etc. Sic ergo etc. Hanc alteram inversionem adoptavi-  mus, seposita Piana: sic ergo affirmatio prior est negatione secundum  propriam rationem.  *  Cf. lect.v, n. 19,  nota  *  £.  t  Codd.:  nem  ratio-  communis,  scilicet etc., et vi-  detur melius.  *  A: Sicul est.  ΓΒ:  secundum  coniunciionem ,  et  omittit  cum AC.  wa  manifestat  *cpE:  proposi-  ti manifestatio-  nem.  *  ABC :  est.  *  AC:  necesse  est tempo-  ris praeteriti etc.  CAP. V, LECT. VIII  secundam , scilicet quod enunciatio  simpliciter una vel est affirmativa vel negativa;  ibi: Est autem. simplex enunciatio etc. Circa pri-  mum duo facit: primo, praemittit quaedam, quae  sunt necessaria ad propositum manifestandum *;  secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: Est autem  una oratio etc.  8. Circa primum duo facit: primo, dicit quod  omnem orationem enunciativam oportet * con-  stare ex verbo quod est praesentis temporis, vel  ex casu verbi quod est praeteriti * vel futuri. Tacet  autem de verbo infinito, quia eumdem usum ha-  bet in enunciatione sicut et verbum negativum ,  Manifestat autem quod dixerat per hoc, quod non  solum nomen unum sine verbo non facit oratio-  nem perfectam enunciativam, sed nec etiam oratio  imperfecta. Definitio enim oratio quaedam est, et  tamen si ad rationem hominis, idest definitionem  non addatur aut θεέ, quod est verbum, aut erat,  —aut-fuit, quae sunt casus verbi, aut * aliquid hu-  iusmodi, idest aliquod aliud verbum seu casus  verbi, nondum est oratio enunciativa.  9. Potest autem esse dubitatio: cum enunciatio  constet ex nomine et verbo, quare non facit men-  tionem de nomine, sicut de verbo? - Ad quod tri-  pliciter responderi potest *. - Primo quidem, quia  nulla oratio enunciativa invenitur sine verbo vel  casu verbi; invenitur autem aliqua * enunciatio  sine nomine, puta cum nos * utimur infinitivis ver-  borum loco nominum; ut cum dicitur, currere est  moveri. - Secundo et melius, quia, sicut supra di-  ctum est *, verbum est nota eorum quae de altero  praedicantur. Praedicatum autem est principalior  pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis * et  completiva ipsius. Unde * vocatur apud graecos pro-  positio cafegorica, idest praedicativa. Denomina-  tio autem fit a forma, quae dat speciem rei *. Et  ideo potius fecit? mentionem de verbo tanquam  de parte principaliori et formaliori. Cuius signum  9) In enunciatione etc. Haec verba adiecimus Pianae ex codd.: vi-  dentur enim requisita ex contextu, qui est de elementis necessariis ad  enunciationem. Imo s. Thomas lect. 1, n. 5, lib. II distinguit verbum  infinitum  extra  enunciationem et in enunciatione, et prout ponitur in  enunciatione dicit: Verbum infinitum in enunciatione positum fit verbum  negativum. Quo autem pacto verbum infinitum in enunciatione habeat  eumdem sensum ac verbum megativum, explicat ib. Angelicus. — Infra  vero codd. ABC legunt: manifestat... non solum unicum nomen sine  verbo facit enunciationem, sed nec etc. Facit est error plane manifestus ;  sed unicum nomen, quod etiam habent DE haud mihi displicet; enuncia-  tionem denique mihi videtur esse lectio praeferenda: enunciatio enim  est oratio perfecta, ut dictum est lect. praeced. n. 4: inutile ergo videtur  ut designetur per orationem perfectam enunciativam.  — Noto etiam le-  ctionem codd. ABDE: definitio enim..., et tamen si rationi, idest defi-  nitioni hominis (A omittit hominis) non addatur etc. Et haec lectio  videtur melior Piana, cum qua conveniunt edd. Venet. et cod. C.  t) Ad quod tripliciter responderi potest. Primo quidem, quia, etc.  Haec lectio codd. indicatur a contextu, et etiam. quoad formam melior  est Piana: ad hoc tripliciter... Uno modo quia etc.  x) Denominatio autem fit a forma, quae dat speciem rei. Homo de-  nominatur doctus a doctrina, qua in specie, ut ita. dicam, docti consti-  tuitur. Ex quo patet aliquid denominari ab eo, a quo in determinato  esse vel modo essendi constituitur; illud autem a quo aliquid constitui-  tur et denominatur, consuevit apud Scholasticos appellari forma; illud  vero quod constituitur et denominatur a forma, appellatur subiect um  et  quandoque etiam latiori sensu dicitur materia, quia materiae est  proprium ut per formam determinetur et constituatur in aliqua rerum  specie. Et hinc etiam est quod, quia genus est quid determinabile, dif-  ferentia vero concipitur ut quid determinans (sicut animal est genus de-  terminabile ad hominem et brutum, rationale autem est differentia deter-  minans animal ad esse hominis), infra n. seq. dicitur quod a materia,  physice loquendo, sumitur genus, a forma vero differentia (Metaph. lib. X,  *  ACE: ex eo quod.  ΒΕ: mom erat  hic.-4: haec.  est, quia enunciatio categorica dicitur affirmativa  vel negativa solum ratione verbi, quod affirmatur  vel negatur; sicut etiam conditionali$ dicitur affir-  mativa vel negativa, eo * quod affirmatur vel nega-  tur coniunctio a qua denominatur. -- Zertio, potest  dici, et adhuc melius, quod non erat * intentio Ari-  stotelis ostendere quod nomen vel verbum non suf-  ficiant ad enunciationem complendam: hoc enim  supra manifestavit tam de nomine quam de verbo.  Sed quia dixerat quod quaedam enunciatio est  una simpliciter, quaedam autem coniunctione una;  posset aliquis intelligere * quod illa quae est una  simpliciter careret omni compositione: sed ipse  hoc excludit per hoc, quod in omni enunciatione  oportet esse verbum *, quod importat compositio-  nem, quam non est intelligere sine compositis ,  sicut supra dictum est *. Nomen autem non im-  portat compositionem, et ideo non exigit prae-  sens intentio ut de nomine faceret mentionem,  sed solum de verbo.  10. Secundo; ibi: Quare autem etc., ostendit *  aliud quod est necessarium ad manifestationem  propositi, scilicet quod hoc quod dico, animal  gressibile bipes, quae * est definitio hominis, est  unum et non multa. Et eadem ratio est de omni-  bus aliis definitionibus ^. Sed * huiusmodi rationem  assignare dicit esse alterius negocii. Pertinet enim  ad metaphysicum; unde * in VII etin VIII Metaphy-  sicae* ratio huius assignatur: quia scilicet differentia  advenit generi non per accidens sed per se, tanquam  determinativa ipsius, per modum quo materia de-  terminatur per formam. Nam a materia sumitur  genus, a forma autem differentia ". Unde sicut ex  forma et materia fit vere unum et non multa,  ita * ex genere et differentia.  11. Excludit autem quamdam rationem * huius  unitatis,  quam quis posset suspicari, ut scilicet  propter hoc definitio * dicatur unum, quia partes  eius sunt propinquae, idest sine aliqua interpositio-  lect. xir. 7 Cf. ib. lect. x et xi). - Codd. ACDE: denominatio enim fit a  forma, quae dat speciem rei. Qua in lectione, si adoptetur, assignatur  ratio cur propositio graece denominetur categorica et latine praedicativa.  λ) Et ideo potius fecit. Adiicimus potius ex codd. ABCD;  et  infra  cum eisd. et E legimus: parte principaliori et formaliori, loco Pianae,  principaliori et formaliori; et (E habet lacunam): negativa solum ra-  tione loco negativa ratione; et cum AC (B lacunam habet): sicut etiam  conditionalis, loco, sicut conditionalis (D: sic et conditionalis).  y) De omnibus aliis definitionibus. Est lectio cod. D. — Codd. ABC:  de universis aliis definitionibus.  — E: de diversis aliis definitionibus. —  Aliis ergo traditur ab omnib. codd. — Piana: de omnibus definitionibus.  y) A materia sumitur genus etc. Vide quae supra, nota x dicta sunt. —  Sed hic addendum est quod quamvis genus sumatur a materia, in sensu  supra explicato, imo quamvis contingat aliquando aliquid esse et genus  et  materiam alicuius (sicut vox, e. g., est genus et materia littera-  rum) non tamen utrumque est eodem modo acceptum. Materia enim  est  pars  integralis rei, et ideo non potest praedicari seu affirmari de  toto, cuius pars integralis est: non enim dici potest quod homo sit caro,  vel os, quamvis caro et os sint materia et partes integrales hominis.  At ex opposito genus vere praedicatur de toto: vere enim dicimus quod  homo sit animal, Consequenter genus significat aliquo modo totum,  quod est species — (Conf. s. Th. VII Metaphysic., lect. xir et loc. citt.  nota x).  E) Ut scilicet propter hoc definitio etc. Adiicimus propter hoc ex  codd.: causalis enim illa perspicuitatem confert sententiae, et magis eam  connectit iis quae sequuntur, nempe quia partes eius sunt, seu ut iidem  codd.  habent,  quia partes eius dicuntur propinquae.— At dicuntur  melius sonat, si supra cum ACDE legatur: definitio sit unum, quia pdrtes  eius dicuntur propinquae (propinque?). Et revera sic legendum esse  videtur: nam statim subiungitur quod partes definitionis debent dici sine  aliqua inferpositione coniunctionis vel morae.—- Omnes etiam codices  legunt immediate: et quidem non interruptio prolationis.  *  Codd.- p.: dice-  re.  *  A: esse verbum  est.  *  Lect, v, n. 2t.  *  Codd.: pro-  ponit.  *  τ  *  *  A:  quod.  δας Ρ.: et.  ACDE. -».: κεἴ  Comment. san-  cti Th. lect.xi et  lect. v. - Ed. Did.  lib. VI, c. xit, et  lib. VII, c. vi.  *  *  pc: ita etiam.  Codd.- P: du-  bitationem.  0  n  *  p: accidit.  κα:  contingit  hancunitatem( ).  *  Cf. sup.,  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  membro divisionis nomen et verbum excluduntur;  ibi: Nomen ergo et verbum etc. Opponitur autem  unitati  38  ne coniunctionis vel morae *. Et quidem non inter-  ruptio locutionis necessaria est ad unitatem defini-  tionis, quia si interponeretur coniunctio partibus  definitionis,iam secunda non determinaret primam,  sed significarentur uf actu multae in locutione 7: et  idem operatur interpositio morae, qua utuntur  rhetores  loco  coniunctionis. Unde ad unitatem  definitionis requiritur quod partes eius proferan-  tur sine coniunctione et interpolatione: quia etiam  in re naturali, cuius est definitio, nihil cadit * me-  dium inter materiam et formam: sed praedicta  non interruptio non sufficit ad unitatem defini-  tionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem *  prolationis servari in his, quae non sunt szmpliciter  unum, sed per accidens; ut si dicam, homo albus  musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter ma-  nifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non  impeditur ^, neque per compositionem quam im-  portat  n. 9.  verbum, neque per multitudinem nomi-  num ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem  ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad  subiectum ut forma ad materiam*, et similiter dif-  ferentia ad genus: ex forma. autem et materia fit  unum simpliciter.  12. Deinde cum dicit: Est autem una oratio etc.,  accedit ad manifestandam praedictam divisionem.  Et primo, manifestat ipsum commune quod di-  viditur, quod est enunciatio una; secundo, mani-  festat partes divisionis secundum proprias ratio-  nes; ibi: Harum autem haec simplex etc. Circa  primum duo facit: primo, manifestat ipsam di-  visionem ^; secundo, concludit quod ab utroque  0) Sine aliqua interpositione coniunctionis vel morae. Quae de in-  terpositione ac de interruptione hic dicuntur quoad unitatem definitio-  nis, imo et cuiusque orationis, novitius accipiat non physice sed mora-  liter, hoc est, secundum hominum communem existimationem. Si enim  interpositio vel interruptio sit talis ac tanta .ut secundum communem  hominum existimationem non amplius sensus propositionis habeatur,  perit unitas definitionis vel orationis; secus autem si sensus, non obstante  interpositione vel interruptione, perseveret idem (Cf. quae hac de re do-  cet s. Thomas P. III, qu. rx, artic. viri, ad 3, et quae Caietanus ib. com-  mentatur). Ratio est quia cum verba ex institutione humana significent, ad  communem hominum sensum est etiam hac in re recurrendum.  x) Sed significarentur ut actu multae in locutione. Est lectio codd.  et Ven. edd. 1526 et 1557, quae est adoptanda loco Pianae et aliarum  edd. Ven.: significaretur. Ad hoc enim ut unitas definitionis habeatur  requiritur ut partes fiant actu unum: fiunt autem actu unum (cum in  seipsis, hoc est divisim acceptae sint multae), quatenus una determinat  aliam, sicut forma determinat materiam. At posita interpositione coniun-  ctionis vel morae una pars non determinat aliam; ergo partes non fiunt,  seu  non significantur ut unum actu, sed manent actu multae.  — Codd.  omittunt in locutione, quae licet non necessaria, tamen retinemus cum  Piana aliisque edd. — Denique edd. bc et 1526 habent cum P.: et ideo  idem operatur etc. At codd. ABC omittunt ideo, ac melius legunt: et  (A omittit etiam ef) idem operatur etc.- Edd. a et 1557: et ideo ope-  ratur; ideo erronee ponitur pro idem.  e) Non impeditur; sic habent codices omnes, quorum lectionem  praetulimus τῷ interrumpitur (quod, quamvis non male, legitur in  editione Piana), quia melior nobis visa est ex toto contextu.  c) Primo manifestat ipsam divisionem. Codd. omnes: primo ma-  nifestat praemissam divisionem: quae lectio repetit quae supra dicta  sunt: accedit ad etc. — Praeterea cod. A immediate prosequitur: secundo  concludit ab utroque membro divisionis nomen et verbum excludi.  1) Per modos pluralitatis. Quia per unum oppositorum cognoscitur  aliud, ex diversis pluralitatis modis declaratur unitas propositionis. Piana  habet: per modum pluralitatis. -- Codd. ACDE legunt: oppositum autem  unitati  (A unitatis) est pluralitas; et ideo modos unitatis manifestat  per modos pluralitatis. Quam lectionem, quamvis corrupte, indicat etiam  cod. B: (in marg. cum) omni autem unitati est pluralitas (marg. opposita) ;  et ideo per modos unitatis manifestat per modos pluralitatis. Hinc per  modos est lectio codd. omnium. Quod si sapiens lector integram lectionem  ACDE amplecti maluerit, non ego contradicam (Cf. infra, nn. seq. et 16).  v) Et tales opponuntur secundo modo unitatis. Haec verba quae in  edd. habentur, desiderantur in codd. nostris. — Procul dubio haec secunda  pars de oppositione ad unitatem secundum quid de facili suppletur ex  pluralitas; et ideo enunciationis unitatem  manifestat per modos pluralitatis *.  13.  Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio dicitur  vel una absolute, scilicet quae * unum de uno si-  gnificat, vel una * secundum quid, scilicet quae est  coniunctione una. Per oppositum autem est intel-  ligendum quod enunciationes plures sunt, vel ex  eo  quod plura significant et non unum: quod *  opponitur primo modo unitatis *; vel ex eo quod  absque coniunctione proferuntur: et tales oppo-  nuntur secundo modo unitatis " *,  14. Circa quod considerandum est, secundum  Boethium, quod unitas et pluralitas orationis re-  fertur * ad significatum; simplex autem et com-  positum attenditur secundum ipsas voces. Et ideo.  enunciatio quandoque est una et simplex * puta  cum solum ex nomine et verbo componitur in  unum significatum; ut cum dico, homo est albus.  Est etiam quandoque una oratio, sed composita,  quae quidem unam rem significat, sed tamen  composita est vel ex pluribus terminis; sicut si  dicam, animal rationale mortale currit, vel ex plu-  ribus enunciationibus, sicut * in conditionalibus,  quae quidem unum significant et non multa. Si-  militer autem quandoque in enunciatione est plu-  ralitas cum simplicitate, puta cum in oratione po-  nitur aliquod nomen multa significans; ut si dicam,  canis latrat, haec oratio plures est, quia plura *  significat *, et tamen simplex est. Quandoque vero  in enunciatione est pluralitas et compositio, puta  prima parte enunciata; at non mihi persuasum est hanc ipsam secundam  partem subintelligendam fuisse a s. Thoma relictam, et non explicite  appositam.  ) Secundum Boethium... unitas et pluralitas refertur. Codd. ABD:  secundum Boethium (D erronee, Aristotelem)... refertur ad significa-  tionem. — Cod. E: refertur ad significationem rei. — Cod. C: unitas et  pluralitas referuntur ad significatum. Lectionem refertur (non referun-  tur, ut ex attenditur sequente, quod codd. ipsi habent, est manifestum)  Pianae, potest referri, praetulimus, tum auctoritate codd., tum quia  magis respondet secundae parti, nempe: simplex autem et compositum  attenditur (non, possunt vel potest attendi).— Quae de Boethio hoc loco  affirmat s. Thomas habentur in Editione secunda in librum De interpre-  tatione, pag. 328 edit. cit. Basileae: « Una, inquit Boethius, vel multiplex  »  oratio intelligitur si unum vel multa significat; et de propria signi-  » ficatione semper iudicantur. Simplex autem et composita non ex si-  »  »  »  gnificatione, sed ex verborum et nominum pluralitate cognoscitur: si  enim ultra duos terminos habet propositio, composita est; si duos  tantum, simplex. » Quae verba cum absolute dicantur, magis magisque  confirmant lectionem codd.  X) Quandoque est una et simplex. Haec lectio codd., quae cum  sequentibus una oratio sed composita cohaeret, sufficitur Pianae: sim-  plex et una.  — Sed alia occurrunt notanda ex cod. A. Habet: quandoque  quidem est una et simplex, puta cum solum ex nomine et verbo compo-  nitur quae unum significant (quae unum significant habent etiam BDE)...  Est autem oratio una (id. alii codd.), sed composita ex pluribus ter-  minis, ut si dicam... quae unum et non multa significant (id. BC). Si-  militer autem etiam in enunciatione quandoque est etiam pluralitas...  multa significans. At hic amanuensis repente distrahitur, et immediate  prosequitur: »on dicitur de affirmatione et negatione univoce sicut ge-  nus de suis speciebus. Quae sunt ultima verba numeri 20. Caetera omnia  intermedia per incredibilem oscitantiam omittit.  Y) Quia plura significat. Ratio est quia canis est nomen aequivocum,  ut in fine huius numeri dicitur; nomen autem aequivocum licet sit sim-  plex voce, multa tamen, eaque diversa significat, ut dictum est lect. v,  n. 19 et not. £; et ideo multiplex est significatione. Unde haec propositio:  Cato philosophus est (est exemplum Boethii, quatenus nempe Cato potest  significare tum Catonem Uticensem tum Catonem Censorium oratorem)  vel, canis latrat, non est una, sed est multiplex, licet sit simplex.  Infra post verba, homo albus musicus disputat, codd. BC addunt:  vel homo albus et musicus disputat. Per hanc additionem codd. citati  ponunt exempla utriusque partis praemissae, nempe, sive interveniat  coniunctio, pro qua est secundum exemplum; sive mom, pro qua pri-  mum exemplum inducitur.  *  Codd.: quia sci-  licet. - ABc omit«  tunt de uno; et  sic  fere semper  in similibus casi-  bus.  *  A  Una  ex  iterum  scilicet.  *  ABC.-  quía  Codd. - ».: et  haec.  *  ;  Nempe unitati  absolute dictae.  v  *  Nempe unitati  secundum quid.  Boethius  ?  x  *  ABC:  tet.  Sicut pa-  39  statur,  ini.  *  cpE: multae.  consequenter ostendit quae sunt * plures  enunciationes, et ponit duos modos pluralitatis. -  Primus est, quod plures dicuntur enunciationes  quae plura significant. Contingit autem aliqua plura  significari in aliquo uno communi; sicut cum dico,  animal est sensibile 9, sub hoc uno communi,  quod est animal, multa continentur, et tamen haec  *Éc: | oratio e-  nunciativa est u-  na, quae etc.  CAP. VIII, LECT. VIII  22e ples cum. ponuntur plura * in subiecto vel in praedi-  cato, ex quibus non fit unum, sive interveniat  coniunctio sive non; puta si dicam, homo albus  musicus disputat: et similiter est si. coniungantur  plures * enunciationes, sive cum coniunctione sive  sine coniunctione; ut si dicam, Socrates currit, Plato  disputat. Et secundum hoc sensus litterae est quod  enunciatio una* est illa, quae unum de uno signi-  ficat, non solum si sit simplex, sed etiam si sit  coniunctione una. Et similiter enunciationes plu-  res  dicuntur quae plura et non unum significant:  non solum quando interponitur aliqua coniunctio,  vel inter nomina. vel verba, vel etiam inter ipsas  [27]  '* Codd.:  absque  sita con-  one.  enunciationes; sed etiam si vel inconiunciione ,  idest absque aliqua interposita coniunctione plura  significat, vel quia est unum nomen aequivocum,  multa significans *, vel quia ponuntur plura nomina  absque coniunctione *, ex quorum significatis non  fit unum; ut si dicam, 4omo albus grammaticus  Jogieus currit.  15. Sed haec expositio non videtur esse secun-  dum intentionem Aristotelis. Primo. quidem, quia  per disiunctionem, quam interponit, videtur distin-  guere inter orationem unum significantem, et ora-  enunciatio est una et non plures *. Et ideo addit  et non unum.- Sed melius est ut dicatur hoc esse  additum propter definitionem, quae multa signi-  ficat quae sunt unum: et hic modus pluralitatis op-  ponitur primo jmodo unitatis*. - Secundus modus  pluralitatis est, quando non solum enunciationes  plura significant, sed etiam illa plura nullatenus  coniunguntur, et hic modus pluralitatis opponitur  secundo modo unitatis*. Et secundum hoc patet  quod secundus modus unitatis non opponitur  primo modo pluralitatis. Ea autem quae non sunt  opposita, possunt simul esse. Unde manifestum  est,  esse  enunciationem quae est una coniunctione,  *  Codd.:  tur.  *  e eo  dicun-  Cf. lect.xit, n.7.  *  *  etiam plures: plures * in quantum significat "  plura et non unum. Secundum hoc ergo * pos-  sumus accipere tres modos enunciationis. Nam  quaedam est simpliciter una, in quantum unum  Supra n. 13.  Loc. cit.  pc omittt: p/u-  res.  *  BCE.- D Gt P.: QU  tem.  significat; quaedam * est simpliciter plures, in quan-  **  ἢ quid (Conf.  text. graec.).  *  Codd. et edd.-  *  p: quaedam au-  tem (et ita c) sunt  ..  Significant.  "sc:  vero.  tum plura significat, sed est una secundum quid, -  in quantum est coniunctione una; quaedam * sunt  simpliciter plures, quae neque significant unum,  A  ow ef  multa.  tionem quae est coniunctione una. Secundo, quia  supra * dixerat quod est unum quoddam ** et non  multa, animal gressibile bipes. Quod autem est co-  niunctione unum, non est unum et non multa *  sed est unum ex multis. Et ideo melius videtur di-  cendum quod Aristoteles, quia supra dixerat ali-  * quaedam  Est cx Βου.  τῆς  ὙΌΣ  quam enunciationem esse unam et aliquam con- -  iunctione unam, vult hic manifestare ^* quae sit una.  Et quia supra dixerat quod multa nomina simul  coniuncta sunt unum, sicut animal gressibile bipes,  dicit consequenter £^ quod enunciatio est iudicanda  una non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate signifi-  cati, etiam si sint plura nomina quae unum signi-  ficent. Velsi sit aliqua enunciatio 7 una quae multa  significet, non erit una simpliciter, sed coniunctione  una. Et secundum hoc, haec enunciatio, animal  gressibile bipes est risibile, non est una quasi con-  iunctione una, sicut in prima expositione diceba-  tur, sed quia unum significat.  16. Et quia oppositum per oppositum manife-  w) Plura significat (BCD: significet; E: significaret), vel quia est  unum nomen aequivocum multa significans etc. Haec verba mult a si-  gnificans, quae desunt Pianae, quia codd. unanimiter habent, nostrae  μὰν cian editioni, Est sermo de pluralitate orationis. quando enunciatio  absque interposita coniunctione plura significat: quod quidem ex du-  plici capite provenire dicitur, nempe aut quia ponitur nomen aequivo-  cum multa significans, et cum unitate nominis habetur pluritas signifi-  cationwm; aut quia ponuntur. plura nomina ex quorum significatis non  fit unum significatum, et cum pluralitate nominum babetur etiam plu-  ralitas  significationum.  «x) Vult hic manifestare etc. Codd. - P.: hic manifestat. Et imme-  diate C: et quia iam supra ostendit;— DE: et quia iam ostendit; — B:  et quia supra ostendit.  88) Dicit consequenter. Edd. Piana et Ven. habent: dicit Commen-  tator Algagzel etc. Sed codd. neque Commentator habent neque AI-  ga1el, sed legunt consequenter. B. Albertus Magnus in 1 Peri hermeneias,  tract. IV, cap. rt, pag. 258 col. 2, refert Avicennam et Algazelem hac in  re  Boethio consentire. Cum codd. ergo retinemus nomen Algamelis  esse  expungendum ex hoc s. Thomae textu atque legendum conse-  quenter. — Revera quae hoc loco disseruntur, mera expositio sunt textus  Aristotelici, quem longiori sermone exponit Averroes in suis commen-  taris in librum Peri hermeneias (8. Sermo in oratione — Venetiis 1483.  Absque num.).  YY) Vel si sit aliqua enunciatio etc. Adoptamus hanc lectionem  codd. BC quam indicant etiam codd. DE. - Edd. Piana et Ven.: vel si aliqua  neque coniunctione aliqua uniuntur. Ideo autem  Aristoteles quatuor ponit et non solum tria, quia  quandoque est enunciatio plures, quia plura si-  gnificat, non tamen est * coniunctione una, puta si  ponatur ibi nomen multa significans.  17. Deinde cum dicit: Nomen ergo et verbum etc.,  excludit ab unitate orationis nomen et verbum.  Dixerat enim quod enunciatio una est, quae unum  significat: posset autem aliquis intelligere, quod sic  unum significaret * sicut nomen et verbum unum  significant. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit:  Nomen ergo, et verbum dictio sit sola, idest ita sit  dictio, quod non enunciatio. Et videtur, ex modo  loquendi, quod ipse imposuerit hoc nomen ad  significandum partes enunciationis. Quod autem  nomen et verbum dictio sit sola ** manifestat per  enunciatio una plura etc. et infra: et secundum hoc, animal gressibile  bipes est risibile, non est una, coniunctione una, sicut prius dicebatur,  sed quia unum significat.  98) Animal est sensibile. Codd. BCE. - Ed. Piana: animal gressi-  bile bipes, sed male, quia animal gressibile bipes non est enunciatio,  cum verbo seu copula careat. S. Thomas autem ponit exemplum de  enunciatione quae est una et non plures, quamvis eius subiectum ani-  mal sit quid commune multa sub se continens. Ob eamdem rationem  seponenda est etiam lectio cod. D: animal sensibile.  ec) Sic unum significaret. Ita optime codd., ut videre est in n. seq. -  C prosequitur: sicut nomen vel verbum unum significat.  — Ed. Piana:  sic  significaret. — Prius autem ubi Piana legit, posset enim, legimus cum  eisdem codd., posset autem, prout natüra ipsa contextus postulat. — Infra  etiam legimus: dictio sit sola, idest ita sit dictio quod non enunciatio ,  correcta Piana: dictio sit sola, ita dictio sit quod non enunciatio. Parti-  culam enim idest habent codd. Attamen lectiones codd. DE in omnibus  non sequimur: narh D habet erronee: idest ita sit dictio quod enunciatio;  et E non bene: idest ita fit dictio quod non enunciatio.  CC) Quod autem nomen et verbum dictio sit sola. Codd. ΒΟ. (E  habet lacunam) legunt: quod autem nomen vel verbum sit sola dictio  et non enunciatio. Quae lectio videtur anteponenda, quia magis com-  plet sententiam Aristotelis; attamen non est necessaria, quia per par-  ticulam  ita  exclusivam so/a, satis exprimitur quod nomen. vel verbum  sunt dictiones, ut non sint enunciationes. Hinc Aristoteles ponit,  dictio sit sola: quae verba s. Thomas hic supra interpretatur per exclu-  [13  *  Codd.:  quasi  interroganti.  7n  00  *p:  sicut enun-  ciat; et ita infra  cum c.  *  Hoc ex codd.  nt.  n.  *  12.  lect.  nt,  Codd.-».: intel-  ligitur.- Ibi deest  in codd.  *  Codd.: praemi-  serat.  Βα:  gnificat  vel  quae  si-  unum,  quae est con-  iunclione una.  *c: una enun-  ciatio.  ,  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  primo quidem convenit enunciationi simplici; ex  consequenti autem convenit compositae enuncia-  tioni; et ideo ad insinuandum rationem praedictae  divisionis dicit quod simplex enunciatio est vox  significativa de eo quod est aliquid: quod pertinet  ad affirmationem; vel non est aliquid: quod perti-  40  hoc, quod non potest dici quod ille enunciet, qui  sic aliquid significat voce, sicut nomen, vel verbum  significat. Et ad hoc manifestandum innuit duos  modos utendi enunciatione. Quandoque enim uti-  mur ipsa quasi ad interrogata * respondentes; puta  si quaeratur, quis sit in scholis? respondemus, ma-  gister ". Quandoque autem utimur ea propria spon-  te, nullo interrogante; sicut cum dicimus, Zetrus  currit *. Dicit ergo, quod ille qui significat aliquid  unum nomine vel verbo, non enunciat vel sicut *  ille  ille  qui respondet aliquo interrogante, vel sicut  qui profert enunciationem non aliquo inter-  rogante, sed ipso proferente sponte. Introduxit au-  tem hoc, quia simplex nomen vel verbum, quando  respondetur ad interrogationem , videtur verum  vel falsum significare: quod est proprium enun-  ciationis. Sed hoc * non competit nomini vel ver-  bo, nisi secundum quod intelligitur coniunctum  cum alia parte proposita in interrogatione *. Ut si  quaerenti , quis legit in scholis? respondeatur, ma-  gister , subintelligitur, ibi * legit. Si ergo ille qui  enunciat aliquid nomine vel verbo non enunciat,  manifestum est quod enunciatio non sic unum  significat, sicut nomen vel verbum. Hoc autem  inducit sicut conclusionem eius quod supra prae-  misit *: Necesse est omnem orationem enunciativam  ex  verbo esse vel ex casu verbi.  18. Deinde cum dicit: Harum autem haec sim-  plex etc., manifestat praemissam divisionem se-  cundum rationes partium. Dixerat enim quod una  enunciatio est quae unum de uno significat, et  alia est quae est coniunctione una *. Ratio autem  huius divisionis est ex eo quod unum natum est  dividi per simplex et compositum. Et ideo dicit:  Harum autem, scilicet enunciationum, in quibus  dividitur unum, /aec dicitur una, vel quia signi-  ficat unum simpliciter, vel quia una est coniun-  ctione. Haec quidem simplex enunciatio est, quae  scilicet unum significat. Sed ne intelligatur quod  sic significet unum, sicut nomen vel verbum, ad  excludendum hoc subdit: Uf aliquid de aliquo,  idest per modum compositionis, vel aliquid ab  aliquo, idest per modum divisionis. Haec autem  ex his coniuncta, quae scilicet dicitur coniunctione  una, est velut oratio iam composita: quasi dicat  hoc modo, enunciationis unitas dividitur in duo  praemissa, sicut aliquod unum dividitur in sim-  plex et compositum.  19.  Deinde cum dicit: Est autem simplex etc.,  manifestat secundam  divisionem  enunciationis ,  secundum : videlicet quod enunciatio * dividitur in  affirmationem et negationem. Haec autem divisio  sionem enunciationis. — Infra autem codd. habent: et ad hoc manifestan-  dum consequenter innuit (BC: insinuat) etc.  2n) Si quaeratur, quis sit in scholis? Respondemus, magister. Omnes  edd. Venetae saeculi XV et 1526 habent non quis, sed quid sit in scholis;  et  ita codices, qui etiam legunt unanimiter: respondemus, magister  disputat : quae lectio supponit interrogationem : quid fit in scholis. Quae  utrum sit vera lectio ex aliis codicibus esset definienda.  00) Quandoque... propria sponte etc. - BCD: quandoque... propria  sponte a nullo interrogati (D interroganti). Dicit ergo quod ille etc. —  E: quandoque.... propria sponte, scilicet a novo interrogati. Dicit  ergo ille quod etc. Lectiones codd. DE sunt corruptiones lect. codd. BC:  a  nullo interrogati. At P. aliaeque edd. addunt: sicut cum dicimus ,  Petrus currit; quo exemplo carent citati codices. Posset igitur aliquis  net ad negationem. Et ne hoc * intelligatur solum  secundum praesens tempus, subdit: Quemadmo-  dum tempora sunt divisa, idest similiter hoc habet  locum in aliis temporibus sicut et in praesenti.  20. Alexander autem existimavit * quod Aristo-  et  teles hic definiret enunciationem ; et quia in de-  finitione enunciationis videtur ponere affirmatio-  nem  negationem, volebat hic accipere quod  enunciatio non esset genus affirmationis et nega-  tionis, quia species nunquam ponitur * in definitione  generis. Id autem quod non univoce praedicatur  de  multis  (quia scilicet non significat aliquid  unum, quod sit unum * commune multis), non po-  test notificari nisi per illa multa quae significantur *.  Et inde est quod quia unum non dicitur aequi-  voce * de simplici et composito, sed per prius  et posterius, Aristoteles in praecedentibus semper  ad notificandum unitatem enunciationis usus est  utroque. Quia ergo videtur * uti affirmatione et  negatione ad notificandum enunciationem *, vole-  bat Alexander accipere quod enunciatio non di-  citur de affirmatione et negatione univoce sicut  genus de suis speciebus.  21. Sed contrarium apparet ex hoc, quod Phi-  losophus  consequenter utitur nomine enuncia-  tionis ut genere, cum in definitione affirmationis et  negationis subdit quod *, affirmatio est enunciatio  alicuius de aliquo, scilicet per modum compositio-  nis, negatio vero est enuncialio alicuius ab aliquo,  scilicet per modum divisionis. Nomine autem ae-  quivoco non consuevimus uti ad notificandum *  significata eius. Et ideo Boethius dicit quod Aristo-  teles suo modo breviloquio utens, simul usus est et  definitione et divisione eius: ita ut quod dicit de eo  quod est aliquid vel non est, non referatur ad defi-  quia  nitionem enunciationis, sed ad eius divisionem.  Sed  differentiae  divisivae  generis  non  cadunt in eius definitione *, nec hoc solum quod  dicitur vox significativa, sufficiens est definitio  enunciationis; melius dici potest secundum Por-  phyrium, quod hoc totum quod dicitur vox si-  gnificativa de eo quod est, vel de eo quod non  est, est definitio enunciationis. Nec tamen ponitur  |  affirmatio et negatio in definitione enunciationis  sed virtus affirmationis et negationis, scilicet signi-  ficatum eius **, quod est esse vel non esse, quod  quaerere utrum verba ista sint additio marginalis? Salvo meliori iudicio,  non videntur esse marginalis additio, sed genuina s. Thomae lectio: qua  in sententia confirmor ex immediate praecedentibus, in quibus etiam in-  ducit s. Thomas exemplum positum ab ed. Piana et ab omnibus codd.  wu) Alexander autem existimavit etc. « Aspasius etiam, inquit Boe-  thius, consentit Alexandro » (In lib. De interpretat. Edit. II, pag. 333).—  De sua vero interpretatione, quam s. Thomas n. seq. recitat atque im-  probat, ait ipse Boethius: « Hanc expositionem (quod adhuc sciam) ne-  »  —  que Porphyrius, neque ullus alius commentatorum vidit » (ib..  xx) Scilicet significatum eius etc.- P.:'scilicet quod esse vel non esse etc.;  Edd. abc: scilicet quod est esse vel non esse; — Venetae 1526 et 1557: sci-  licet esse vel non esse, etc.;— AB: scilicet significatum eius, quod esse vel  non esse etc.;— C: idest significativum ipsius, quod esse vel non esse etc.;—  *  Codd. - p.: et  ne intelligatur.  Alexander.  Uu  *  *  c: ponuntur.  Cf.  lect.  n. 4, not. ἢ.  Porphyrius.  v,  41  mentio facta est nec * de affirmatione, nec de ne-  gatione.  XX  *ABC:  n.  864 quia  *ABG: Sicut nec  species.  *  gc: famen.  Ammonius.  *  Codd. : adhuc  melius. - A: vide-  tur  .  Ammonius  dicere.  *  pc: eius. defi-  nitio.  CAP. VI, LECT. VIII  est naturaliter prius enunciatione. Affirmationem  autem et negationem postea definivit per terminos  utriusque ? cum dixit: Affirmationem esse enuncia-  tionem alicuius de aliquo, et negationem enuncia-  in  Est autem considerandum quod * artificiosis-  sime procedit: dividit enim genus non in species,  sed  differentias  specificas.  Non enim dicit  quod enunciatio est affirmatio vel negatio, sed  vox significativa * de eo quod est ** , quae est dif-  ferentia  non  specifica affirmationis, vel de eo quod  est, in quo tangitur differentia specifica ne-  lionem alicuius ab aliquo.  Sed sicutin * definitione generis non debent poni  species *, ita nec ea quae sunt propria specierum.  Cum igitur * significare esse sit proprium affirma-  tionis, et significare non esse sit proprium negatio-  nis, melius * videtur dicendum, secundum Ammo-  nium, quod hic non definitur enunciatio, sed solum  dividitur. Supra enim posita est definitio *, cum  dictum est quod enunciatio est oratio in qua est  verum vel falsum. In qua quidem definitione nulla  .  D: idest significatum. ipsius est esse vel non esse naturaliter etc.; - E:  idest significatum ipsius, quod est esse vel non esse etc. ut P. - Supra  autem, post verba secundum Porphyrium, codd. ABC legunt: quod totum  est definitio enunciationis quod (C: quia) dicitur vox significativa de  60 quod  est aliquid vel non est. Nec (B: ut) tamen etc.  Opp. D. Τβομαξ T. I.  gationis. Et ideo ex * differentiis adiunctis generi  constituit definitionem speciei, cum subdit: Quod  affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo, per  quod significatur esse; et negatio est enunciatio  alicuius ab aliquo quod significat non esse.  XX) Per terminos utriusque. Addo haec verba quae desunt in editione  Piana et edd. Ven., sed habentur in codd., et magis perspicuum reddunt  sensum s. Thomae.- Ex eisdem codd. addo etiam semel et iterum enun-  ciationem , ut habetur in textu citato Aristotelis: Κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν  ἀπόφανσις εἴς.  *  Nec ex codd.  *  hic.  Codd.:  quod  *Codd.: sed quod  est sign.  is  Codd. -P.: est  esse.  *  Codd.: ex his.  42  !' E  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO NONA  DE OPPOSITIONE AFFIRMATIONIS ET NEGATIONIS ABSOLUTE  *  ^  ^v  ,  ,  ,  .  ^  *  ,  πεὶ δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὑπάρ-  χον; χαὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς ὑπάρχον; καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον  ὡς  ὑπάρχον, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον;  καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν χρόνους ὡσαύτως,  ἅπαν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ὃ κατέφησέ τις ἀποφῆσαι,  καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησέ τις xa vaga ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πάσῃ  χαταφάσει ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις ἀντικειμένη, καὶ πάσῃ  ἀποφάσει κατάφασις.  Καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο’ κατάφασις χαὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ  ἀντιχείμεναι,  Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ χατοὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ,  τ ὁμωνύμως δέ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων προσ-  ιοριζόμεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικος ἐνοχλήσεις.  ΘΥΝΟΡΒΙ5. — 1. Textus divisio. - 2. Prima diversitas proposi-  tionis est ex sua forma, qua enunciatur aliquid esse vel non  esse; altera diversitas est per comparationem ad rem enunciatam,  ex  qua propositio est vera vel falsa.—3. Ergo quatuor modis  variari potest enunciatio ut sit vel affirmativa et vera (quod est,  esse); vel negativa et vera (quod non est, non esse); vel affir-  mativa et falsa (quod non est, esse); vel negativa et falsa (quod  est, non esse).—4. Esse vel mon esse quae affirmantur vel ne-  gantur in propositione non solam existentiam vel non existentiam  subiecti significant, sed inesse vel non inesse praedicati subiecto. —  5. Quatuor praecitatae differentiae in enunciationibus inveniuntur  *  Codd. - P:pro-  posita... tangit.-  A: agit auctor.  *  *  Lect. vir, n. 2.  4:  contra.  Lect. xir.  *  pc: determinat;  et  infra cum 4  omittunt tantum.  *  *  Lect. xit.  «  Lect. x.  *  n.  Lect. praec.  19.  osita divisione enunciationis, hic agit *  de oppositione partium enunciationis,  scilicet affirmationis et negationis. Et  quia  enunciationem  esse  dixerat**  orationem, in qua est verum vel falsum, primo,  ostendit qualiter enunciationes ad invicem oppo-  nantur; secundo, movet quamdam dubitationem  circa * praedeterminata et solvit; ibi: Zn his ergo  quae sunt et quae facta sunt * etc. Circa primum  duo facit: primo, ostendit * qualiter una enunciatio  opponatur alteri; secundo, ostendit quod tantum  una opponitur uni; ibi: Manifestum est * etc. Prima  autem pars * dividitur in duas partes: in prima,  determinat de oppositione affirmationis et nega-  tionis  absolute; in secunda, ostendit quomodo  huiusmodi oppositio diversificatur ex parte subie-  cti; ibi: Quoniam autem sunt* etc. Circa primum  duo facit: primo, ostendit quod omni affirmationi  est negatio opposita et e converso; secundo, ma-  nifestat oppositionem affirmationis et negationis  absolute; ibi: E? sit hoc contradictio etc.  2.  Circa primum considerandum est quod ad  ostendendum suum propositum Philosophus assu-  mit duplicem diversitatem enunciationis: quarum  prima est ex ipsa forma vel modo enunciandi *,  secundum quod dictum est quod enunciatio vel  est  affirmativa, per quam scilicet enunciatur  aliquid esse, vel est negativa per quam significatur  «) Prima autem pars etc. Est lectio codd. - In edd. Piana et Ven.  legitur: prima adhuc dividitur in duas. Primo determinat etc... Secun-  do etc. —In eisdem etiam codd. habetur: in secunda parte. Freti denique  eorumdem codd. auctoritate supra, post praedeterminata (B, praedicta),  adiecimus et solvit (E: et solvit eam); quae desunt in Piana.  B) Secundum congruentiam rei etc. — Codd. DE: secundum con-  gruentiam ad rem. — ABC: secundum convenientiam ad rem etc.  *  Quoniam autem est enunciare et quod est, non esse: et  quod non est, esse: et quod est, esse: et quod non est,  non esse; et circa ea quae sunt extra praesens tempus,  similiter omne contingit, quod quis affirmaverit, negare,  et quod negaverit, affirmare; quare manifestum est, quo-  niam omni affirmationi negatio est opposita: et omni  negationi affirmatio.  Et sit hoc contradictio, affirmatio et negatio oppositae.  et  Dico autem opponi eiusdem de eodem, non autem aequi-  voce  quaecumque caetera talium determinavimus  contra sophisticas importunitates.  sive verbum sit praesentis temporis, sive praeteriti vel futuri.—  6. Corollarium. Ergo omne id quod propositione affirmativa af-  firmatur potest propositione negativa negari; et ideo quaelibet  propositio affirmativa habet negativam sibi oppositam.— 7. Abso-  luta oppositio affirmationis et negationis dicitur contradictio. —  8. Conditiones  ad contradictionem sunt identitas praedicati et  identitas subiecti; identitas, inquam, tum secundum nomen signi-  ficans, tum secundum rem significatam. — 9. Aliae conditiones;  quae, non secus ac superiores hoc generali principio nituntur: ut  habeatur contradictio necesse est ut id quod negatio negat sit  omnino idem ac illud quod affirmatio affirmat.  aliquid non esse; secunda ἢ diversitas est per com-  parationem ad rem, ex qua dependet veritas et  falsitas  intellectus.  Cum enim  enunciatur aliquid esse vel non esse secundum  congruentiam rei ?, est oratio vera; alioquin est  oratio falsa.  3. Sic igitur quatuor modis potest variari enun-  ciatio, secundum permixtionem * harum duarum  divisionum. Uno modo, quia id quod est in re  enunciatur ita esse sicut in re est: quod pertinet  ad affirmationem veram; puta cum Socrates currit,  dicimus * Socratem currere. Alio modo, cum enun-  ciatur aliquid non esse quod in re non est ἢ: quod  pertinet ad negationem veram; ut cum dicitur,  aethiops albus non est. Tertio modo, cum enun-  ciatur aliquid esse quod in re non est: quod per-  tinet ad affirmationem falsam; ut cum dicitur,  corvus est albus. Quarto modo, cum enunciatur  aliquid non esse quod in re est: quod pertinet  ad negationem falsam; ut cum dicitur, nix non  est alba.  Philosophus autem *, ut a minoribus ad potiora  procedat, falsas veris praeponit*: inter quas ** nega-  tivam praemittit affirmativae, cum dicit quod con-  tingit enunciare quod est, scilicet * in rerum natura,  non esse. Secundo autem, ponit affirmativam falsam  cum dicit: E? quod non est, scilicet in rerum na-  tura, esse. Tertio autem, ponit affirmativam veram,  Y) Quod in re non est. Ita legunt codd., et bene, uti patet ex his  quae immediate praecedunt et sequuntur. — Piana legit: alio modo, cum  enunciatur aliquid non esse quod est.— BC oscitanter omittunt supe-  riora verba: quod pertinet ad affirmationem veram, sicut infra omittunt  cum A: quod pertinet ad negationem falsam, et legunt: ut si dicatur  (A, ut cum dicitur) nix non est alba: quod (C, quae) est negatio  falsa.  *  *  et  enunciationis.  :  *  Seq. cap. vr.  Codd.: secunda  Codd.: tamen.  *aABC:  praemit-  tit falsas veris.  **  Nempe falsas.  *Scilicet ex codd.  /  CAP. VI,  ἊΣ  e.3 ὑπάρχον...  μὴ “ὙΦ ai  *  Lect. praec.n.8.  » Codd p. Con-  e  se  unt  sita. -DE:  te  to  ex  condi-  . AC hoc lo-  Eu inintelli-  y  CRINE  SE  TCR  quae opponitur negativae falsae ὃ, quam primo  posuit, cum dicit: Ef quod est, scilicet in rerum  natura, esse. Quarto autem, ponit negativam ve-  ram, quae opponitur affirmationi falsae, cum dicit:  Et quod non est, scilicet in. rerum natura, non  esse.  4. Non est autem intelligendum quod hoc quod  dixit: Quod est et quod non est, sit referendum  ad solam existentiam vel non existentiam subiecti,  sed ad hoc quod res significata per praedicatum  insit vel non insit * rei significatae per subiectum.  Nam cum dicitur, corvus est albus, significatur  quod non est, esse, quamvis ipse corvus sit res  existens.  5. Et sicut istae quatuor differentiae enuncia-  tionum inveniuntur in propositionibus *, in quibus  ponitur verbum praesentis temporis, ita etiam in-  veniuntur in enunciationibus in quibus ponuntur  verba praeteriti vel futuri temporis. Supra enim  dixit * quod necesse est enunciationem constare ex  verbo vel ex casu verbi. Et hoc est quod subdit:  Quod similiter contingit, scilicet variari diversi-  mode enunciationem circa ea, quae sunt extra  praesens tempus, idest circa praeterita vel futu-  ra, quae sunt quodammodo extrinseca respectu  praesentis, quia praesens est medium praeteriti  et  futuri.  .6. Et quia ita est, contingit omne quod quis  affirmaverit negare, et omne quod quis negaverit  affirmare: quod quidem manifestum est ex prae-  missis *. Non enim potest affirmari nisi vel quod  est in rerum natura secundum aliquod trium tem-  porum, vel quod non est; et hoc totum contingit *  negare. Unde manifestum est quod omne quod  affirmatur potest negari, et e converso.  Et quia affirmatio et negatio opposita sunt se-  cundum se *, utpote ex opposito contradictoriae,  consequens est quod quaelibet affirmatio habeat  ὃ) Opponitur negativae falsae, sicut infra dicitur quod negativa vera  opponitur affirmationi falsae.— Piana cum edd. Ven. saecul. XV et XVI  legit: opponitur negativae; sed opponitur negativae falsae optime habent  codd. — Deinde et quam primo posuit ex eisdem codd. et ed. a substi-  tuimus lectioni Pianae et aliarum edd. Ven.: quam posuit in primo; quae  lectio est impropria et obscura. — Cod. D: quae opponitur secundum ne-  gationem falsae, quam primo posuit. Melior quoque nobis videtur codd.  lectio,  infra: quae opponitur secundae, scilicet. affirmationi ( ANDE me-  lius, affíirmativae) falsae etc.  zi  t) In propositionibus. Haec verba quae supplemus ex codd. omnibus  desunt in Piana, cuius propterea lectio, inveniuntur, in quibus etc., non-  nihil obscuritatis habet: non enim scitur cui praecise referri, vi formae,  debeat relativum illud, i quibus. Satis insuper ex immediate sequentibus  indicatur (in enunciationibus etc.) deesse in propositionibus. — Praeterea  cum codd. ABCE legimus paulo supra: e£ sicut istae quatuor εἴς. --  Cod. D: et sicut ipsae quatuor etc.  — Piana: et sicut quatuor etc.  Ὁ Manifestum est ex praemissis. Est lectio omnium codd. — Piana et  Ven. edd.: ostensum est in praemissis. Atqui si ostensum est in praemissis,  inutile foret iterum hoc loco ostendere. Ostenditur tamen (non enim etc.),  et quasi corollarium ex his infertur, quae in praemissis fuerunt pro-  bata. Hinc A: et quia ita est, sequitur concludi quod omne quod quis  affirmaverit etc.— Codd. BE: et quia ita est, sequitur quod contingit etc.;—  D: et quia ita est, sequitur quod convenit omne quod quis etc.;— C:  et quia ita est, quod contingit omne quod quis etc. Quae lectio videtur  requirere sequitur, quod alii codd. habent. — Cum codd. ABCE legimus  immediate infra: non enim potest affirmari nisi vel quod est etc., quae  est  lectio indicata ex altera parte, vel quod non est.  — Piana: non enim  potest affirmari nisi aliquid quod est etc.  — Cod. D: non enim potest  rmari nisi secundum quod est etc.  ἢ) Ut Ammonius dicit: « Hanc enim affirmationis pugnam cum ne-  » gatione vocandam Aristoteles contradictionem .censet, perinde quasi  »  nomen ipse hoc illi imposuerit..., ut declarat cum ait: Siftque hoc con-  »  »  tradictio: tametsi neque in affirmatione, neque in negatione vel enun-  ciatione huiusmodi quicquam locutus. Siquidem vel apud apprime  LECT. IX  43  negationem sibi oppositam et e converso. Cuius  contrarium illo solo modo posset contingere, si  aliqua affirmatio affirmaret aliquid, quod. negatio  negare non posset *.  7. Deinde cum dicit: ΕἸ sit hoc contradictio etc.,  manifestat quae sit absoluta oppositio affirmationis  et negationis. Et primo, manifestat eam per nomen;  secundo, per definitionem; ibi: Dico autem etc. - Di-  cit ergo primo quod cum cuilibet affirmationi op-  ponatur negatio, et e converso, oppositioni huius-  modi imponatur nomen hoc, quod dicatur con-  tradictio.  Per hoc enim quod dicitur, et sit hoc  coniradictio , datur intelligi quod ipsum nomen  contradictionis ipse imposuerit * oppositioni affir-  mationis et negationis, ut Ammonius dicit ".  8. Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem opponi etc.,  definit contradictionem. Quia vero, ut dictum est *,  contradictio est oppositio affirmationis et nega-  tionis, illa requiruntur ad contradictionem, quae  requiruntur * ad oppositionem affirmationis et ne-  gationis. Oportet autem opposita esse circa idem.  Et quia enunciatio constituitur ex subiecto et prae-  dicato, requiritur ad contradictionem primo qui-  dem quod affirmatio et negatio sint eiusdem prae-  dicati: si enim dicatur, Plato currit, Plato non di-  sputat, non est contradictio; secundo, requiritur  quod sint de eodem subiecto : si enim dicatur, So-  crates currit, Plato non currit*, non est contradictio.  Tertio, requiritur quod identitas subiecti et prae-  dicati non  solum sit secundum nomen, sed sit  simul secundum rem et nomen. Nam si non sit  idem nomen *, manifestum est quod non sit una et  eadem enunciatio. Similiter autem *ad hoc quod sit  enunciatio una, requiritur identitas rei: dictum est  enim supra * quod enunciatio una est, quae unum  de uno significat; et ideo subdit: Non autem ae-  quivoce, idest non sufficit identitas nominis cum  diversitate rei, quae * facit aequivocationem.  »  »  »  »  divinum Piatonem horum quodlibet positum nomen reperias, sicut  plurima quoque ex iis praecepta, quae hoc libro de enunciativae ora-  tionis principiis traduntur, cum locis apud ipsum pluribus dispersa  invenias, tum vel maxime in Sophista » (In lib. De interpretatione,  sect. I, 8. De affirmatione etc. fol. 12, col. 3, ed. cit.). Fatemur equidem  plura ex iis quae Aristoteles de logica tradit praecepta in Sophista  aliisque Platonis libris inveniri; dispersa tamen, ut Ammonius recte  animadvertit; imo síc perexiliter, inquit Georgius Trapezuntius, ac te-  nuiter, rariterque factum est (a Platone in iis quae ad dialecticam per-  tinent), uf casui non consilio et rationi attribuendum esse contenderim.  Neque existimo huius Scriptoris iudicium detrectandum esse cum ait:  «  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  Quodque admirabilius est, pauca nimium et ipsa confusa ex antiquio-  ribus ( Aristoteles ) accepit. In dialecticis autem nihil penitus: nec enim,  ut  ipse in codicis calce testatur, aliquid hac de re aut scriptum aut  dictum erat, unde facto gradu ad maiora posset aspirare, nisi forte  de cavillatoria et sophistica disputatione. Quare non iniuria motus  quoque fuisse videtur, adeo ut gratias sibi habendas, a posteris pu-  taverit, idque libere non fuerit veritus postulare, tum quia solus  totum hoc disserendi negotium excogitavit, inchoavit, perfecit, scri-  psit, edidit, tum quia facilis ad omnia rationis negotia via et quasi  trita,  communisque cuique constituitur » (Comparatio Platonis et  Aristotelis, lib. I, cap, rv Venetiis 1523, per lacobum Pentium de  Leuco).  9) Socrates currit, Plato non currit. Est lectio codd. — Editio Piana:  Socrates currit et Plato non currit et non disputat. Sed non disputat  manifeste est superfluum, quia est unice sermo de identitate subiecti  necessaria in propositionibus contradictoriis. — Supra vero legimus etiam  cum BCDE: P/ato currit, Plato non disputat; eamdemque lectionem  habet A, quamvis erronee omittat negationem: Plato currit, Plato dis-  putat. — P.: Plato currit et non disputat.  ) Nam si non sit idem nomen etc. Ita P. cum BCDE. - Cod. A:  nam si nomen sit idem et res diversa , manifestum. est etc. Quae lectio  est falsa, ut patet ex contextu: in hac enim prima parte sermo est de  identitate nominis; in altera vero (similiter etc.) de identitate rei.  *  *  BCDE.-P.: potest,  AC: Zpse nomen  contradictionis  imposuit.  Ammonius.  *  *  Num. praeced. ᾿  Codd.: suntne-  cessaría.  t  *  *  c: etiam.  Lect. viii, n. 13,  seqq.  *  Quae , scilicet  identitas  nominis.  solius  44  *  A: quatuor mo-  dos considerari.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  in actu. Tertio, si sit diversitas ex parte mensu-  rae, puta loci vel temporis; non enim est con-  tradictio si dicatur, pluit in Gallia et non pluit in  talia; aut, pluit heri, hodie * non pluit. Quarto, si  sit diversitas ex habitudine ad aliquid extrinse-  cum; puta si dicatur, decem homines esse plures  9. Sunt autem et quaedam * alia in contradictio-  ne observanda ad hoc quod tollatur omnis diversi-  tas, praeter eam quae est affirmationis et negatio-  nis: non enim esset oppositio si non omnino idem  negaret negatio quod affirmavit affirmatio. Haec  autem diversitas potest secundum quatuor consi-  derari *. Uno quidem modo, secundum diversas  *  ABC: albus se-  cundum.  dentem  et non secundum  pedem.  partes subiecti: non enim est contradictio si dica-  tur, aethiops est albus dente et non est albus pede *.  Secundo, si sit diversus modus ex parte praedicati:  non enim est contradictio si dicatur, Socrates cur-  rit tarde et non movetur velociter; vel si dicatur,  ovum  est  animal in potentia et non est animal  x) Sunt autem et quaedam etc. Est lectio explicita codd. ABCE —  Piana et edd. Ven. totam hanc periodum sub alia forma exhibent, nempe:  «  Sunt autem et quaedam alia in contradictione observanda ad hoc quod  »  »  »  omnis diversitas quae est affirmationis et negationis habeatur: non  enim esset contradictio si non omnino idem negaret negatio quod affir-  matio affirmaret. » Lectio codd. est praeferenda. Vult enim s. Thomas  oppositionem inter propositiones contradictorias in eo sitam esse quod  idem omnino sit quod una propositio affirmat et quod altera negat; ergo  illud  idem nullam diversitatem pati debet, sed omnino immutatum per-  severare in utraque propositione, ut tota diversitas in affirmatione et  quoad domum, non autem quoad forum. Et haec  omnia designat cum subdit ?: Et quaecumque cae-  tera talium determinavimus, idest determinare con-  suevimus in disputationibus contra sophisticas im-  portunitates, idest contra importunas et litigiosas  oppositiones sophistarum, de quibus plenius facit  mentionem in 1 Elenchorum *.  negatione consistat ( Cf. lect. xr, nn. 4 et 7). — Cod. D quamvis in  aliqua parte corrupte, eamdem tamen lectionem aliorum codd. exhi-  bet: sunt autem...tollatur omnis aversitas et eam praeter quam est  affirmationis et negationis. In caeteris conformis est lectioni a nobis  adoptatae.  A) Haec omnia designat (Aristoteles) cum subdit; codd. D: cum  dicit. — Ed. Piana: haec omnia designantur cum subditur. — Immediate  supra cod. A: decem homines esse multos ut ad domum non coeant,  ut ad forum;  — BC: decem homines esse multos ut ad domum, non au-  tem ut ad forum,  κα: pluit heri hic,  hodie etc.  *  n: in libro Elen-  chorum.  CAP. VII, LECT. X  LECTIO DECIMA -  DE DIVISIONE PROPOSITIONUM EX PARTE SUBIECTI: DEQUE  OPPOSITIONE AFFIRMATIONIS ET NEGATIONIS IN PROPOSITIONIBUS  UNIVERSALIBUS ET IN INDEFINITIS -  ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ cà μὲν χαθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων, τὰ δὲ  4X ἕχαστον (λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων  *  45  1  Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum universalia, illa * Cap. vu.  vero  πέφυχε χατηγορεῖσθαι, xa ἕχαστον δὲ ὃ μή, οἷον  ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου: Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕχαστον)"  ἀνάγκη δὲ ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχει τι, ἢ μή, ὁτὲ μὲν  τῶν χαθόλου τινί, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν xa ἕκαστον.  Σ -  Ξ  *A:  quoniam ας  temPhilosophus.  * gc: eiusdem et  de.  * AB: hic intendit  consequenter di-  stinguere.  * A: vere.  "Edw μὲν οὖν χαθόλου ἀποφαίνηται ἐπὶ τοῦ καθόλου ὅτι  ὑπά χει τι; ἃ Uh, ἔσονται ἐναντίαι αἱ ἀποφάνσεις"  λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθόλου ἀποφαίνεσθαι καθόλου,  τ  τοῖον πᾶς ἄνηρωπος λευχός, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός.  Ὅταν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν χαθόλου μέν, μὴ καθόλου δέ, αὗται  μὲν οὐχ εἰσὶν ἐναντίαι" τὸ μέντοι δηλούμενα ἔστιν  εἶναι  ἐναντία ποτέ"  λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ καθόλου ἀποφαίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν χαθόλου;  οἷον ἔστι λευχὸς ἄνγηρωπος; οὐχ ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρω-  mo6* χαθόλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὡς χα-  θόλου κέχρηται τῇ ἀποφάνσει" τὸ γὰρ πᾶς οὐ τὸ  χαθόλου σημαίνει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι χαθόλου.  "Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καθόλου χατηγορεῖν τὸ χα-  θόλου  οὐχ  ἔστιν  ἀληθές:  οὐδεμία γὰρ κατάφασις  ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἐν ἡ τοῦ χατηγορουμένου καθόλου τὸ  χαθόλου κατηγορεῖται, οἷον ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πᾶν  ζῷον.  ΘΥΝΟΡΒΙΒ. — 1. Argumentum textus. — 2. Enunciationis subie-  ctum distinguitur secundum divisionem rerum, quarum quaedam  sunt universales, quaedam vero singulares.— 3. Obiectio contra  praefatam rerum divisionem.  — 4. Solvitur. Logicus dividit res se-  cundum quod referuntur ad intellectum, qui distinguit in re sin-  gulari id quod illi est proprium ab eo quod est illi et aliis com-  mune; et hoc dicit universale, illud singulare.— 5. Ad rationem  universalis requiritur ut essentia seu forma, quae dicitur univer-  salis, possit esse in pluribus, non autem quod sit actualiter in  pluribus. — 6. Quod significatur per nomen si est forma seu na-  tura individuata vel non individuabilis in materia, non est univer-  sale.— 7. Ratio universalis non a communicabilitate nominis pen-  satur, sed a communicabilitate rei. — 8. Concluditur divisio enun-  ciationis in universalem et singularem.— 9. In enunciationibus de  universali attendendum est ad modos diversos quibus aliquid prae-  dicatur de universali, sive prout accipitur a mente quasi separatum  a singularibus, sive prout est in singularibus.— Idem observandum  quoad enunciationes de singulari. — 10. Divisio enunciationis ex  parte subiecti (quae tertia addenda est duabus assignatis lect. vri,  nn. 2, 3) pertinet ad quantitatem seu extensionem propositio-  num.- rr. Textus subdivisio. - 12. Dictiones, quae appellantur  syncategorematicae, sunt ad designandum non quidem univer-  sale (infra n. 19.), sed modum quo praedicatum tribuitur subie-  cto  universali. - 13. Dictiones, omnis, nullus, adinventae sunt  pro totalitate designanda universalitatis subiecti; aliquis, quidam,  pro particularitate subiecti significanda in propositionibus affir-  mativis; in propositionibus negativis accommodatur dictio »0n  omnis. — 14. Corollarium. Ergo praedicatum tripliciter tribuitur  vel negatur subiecto universali ; nempe universaliter sumpto, par-  1l.  AN uia Philosophus * dixerat oppositionem  Ex affirmationis et negationis esse con-  SA tradictionem, quae est eiusdem de * eo-  wa dem, consequenter intendit distinguere *  diversas oppositiones affirmationis et negationis, ut  cognoscatur quae sit vera * contradictio. Et circa  hoc duo facit: primo, praemittit quamdam divisio-  nem. enunciationum necessariam ad praedictam  singularia (dico autem universale, quod de plu-  ribus natum est praedicari, singulare vero quod non,  ut homo quidem universale est, Plato ('Callias) vero eo-  rum, quae singularia sunt);  necesse est autem enunciare quoniam inest aliquid aut non,  aliquoties quidem eorum alicui, quae universalia sunt,  aliquoties autem alicui eorum, quae sunt singularia.  Si ergo universaliter enunciet de universali quoniam est,  aut non, erunt hae contrariae enunciationes; dico autem  de universali fieri enunciationem universalem; ut, omnis  homo albus est, nullus homo albus est.  Quando autem de universalibus non universaliter, non sunt  contrariae; quae autem significantur, est esse aliquando  contraria:  dico autem non universaliter enunciare de his quae sunt  universalia; ut, est albus homo; non est albus homo:  cum enim universale sit homo, non universaliter utitur  enunciatione; omnis namque non universale est, sed  quoniam universaliter significat.  In eo vero quod universale praedicant, id quod est uni-  versale, universaliter praedicari, non est verum; nulla  enim affirmatio vera erit, in qua de universali praedi-  cato universaliter praedicetur; ut, omnis homo est omne  animal.  ticulariter accepto, indefinite (nempe sine dictione) enunciato.—  15.  De subiecto individuo seu singulari potest quidem aliquid  diversa ratione praedicari, sed totum id quod de ipso praedicatur  refertur ad singularitatem ipsius.— 16. Corollarium. Ergo qua-  tuor  sunt modi enunciationis ad quantitatem ipsius pertinentes,  universalis, singularis, indefinitus, particularis, qui et disiuncti-  vus appellatur. — 17. Altera textus subdivisio.— 18. Contraria di- -cuntur quae maxime a se distant. Ergo contrariae sunt illae pro-  positiones quae maxime a se distant in affirmatione et negatione  modi quo praedicatum tribuitur et negatur subiecto. Scilicet pro-  positio negativa negat praedicatum de subiecto universaliter sum-  pto (nullum) quod de ipso pariter universaliter sumpto affirmat  propositio affirmativa (omne). — 19. Propositiones indefinitae non  sunt contrariae, quia in ipsis non exprimitur modus universa-  litatis, quo designetur extrema propositionum distantia.- 20. Et  tamen in propositionibus indefinitis contingit ea quae per propo-  sitiones significantur esse contraria: quod quidem non debet  impraesentiarum intelligi de contrarietate veritatis et falsitatis; —  21. neque de contrarietate praedicati;— 22. sed ratione signi-  ficati seu materiae, secundum quam propositio indefinita eam-  dem habet vim ac si subiectum esset affectum dictione universali,  omne, nullum.—23. Dictio determinativa ( omnis, aliquis) con-  venientius apponitur subiecto, ex quo sumitur quantitas proposi-  tionis, quam praedicato ; cui si apponatur, aut fit ad designandum  quod praedicatum est im plus, seu est magis universale quam  subiectum; aut non est expedita locutio; aut est quandoque falsa  propositio. - 24. Attamen signum universale negativum vel par-  ticulare affirmativum non repugnat veritati propositionis, si po-  natur ex parte praedicati.  differentiam oppositionum assignandam ; secundo,  manifestat propositum; ibi: δὲ ergo universali-  ler * etc. Praemittit autem divisionem enunciatio-  num quae sumitur secundum differentiam subie-  cti *. Unde circa primum duo facit: primo, dividit  subiectum enunciationum; secundo, concludit di-  visionem enunciationum ; ibi: Necesse est enun-  ciare * etc.  *  *  Infra, n. tr.  Codd. - p.: ex  parte — subiecti  (Ct. infra, n. 1o).  *  Infra, n. 8.  46  a  *  Cf. lib. IT, lect. 1,  n. 2.  *  Codd.   secun-  dum divisionem.  *  ABC omittunt a-  ptum ; et ita in-  fra.- Cf. text.  *  Comm. s. Th.  lect.  xiv. - Edit.  Didot, lib. VI,  cap. xiv.  *  *  e not. seq.  8  Codd. : zn uni-  versalíia.  *  BC: Ontnes res  sunt etc. - A: 0-  mnes esse partii-  culares.  *  Codd.- p: enim;  sed erronec.  *  *  Lect. i, n. 5.  Codd.-».: quod  cadit.  Y  vel aliquid loco nominis sumptum. Nomen * au-  tem est vox significativa ad placitum simplicis  intellectus, quod est similitudo rei; et ideo sub-  iectum enunciationis distinguit per divisionem *  rerum, et dicit quod rerum quaedam sunt univer-  salia, quaedam sunt singularia. Manifestat autem  membra divisionis dupliciter: primo quidem. per  definitionem, quia universale est quod est aptum *  natum de pluribus praedicari, singulare vero quod  non est aptum natum praedicari de pluribus, sed  de uno solo; secundo, manifestat per exemplum  cum subdit quod Aomo est universale, Plato au-  tem singulare.  3. Accidit autem dubitatio circa hanc divisio-  nem, quia, sicut probat Philosophus in VII Meta-  Physicae *, universale non est aliquid extra res  existens. Item, in Praedicamentis * dicitur quod se-  cundae substantiae non sunt nisi in primis, quae  sunt singulares δ. Non ergo videtur esse conveniens  divisio rerum per universalia * et singularia: quia  nullae res videntur esse universales, sed omnes  sunt singulares *.  4. Dicendum est autem quod hic dividuntur res  secundum quod significantur per nomina, quae  subiiciuntur in enunciationibus: dictum est autem *  supra * quod nomina non significant res nisi me-  diante intellectu; et ideo oportet quod divisio ista  rerum accipiatur secundum quod res cadunt * in  intellectu. Ea vero quae sunt coniuncta in rebus 7  «) SSubiectum autem enunciationis etc. De subiecto propositionis di-  citur quod debeat esse nomen vel aliquid loco nominis sumptum. Et  revera subiectum non est id quod affirmatur vel negatur de aliquo,  sed de quo aliquid affirmatur vel negatur (Qua de causa subiectum  dicitur pars materialis propositionis, praedicatum vero quasi pars for-  malis. — Infr. nn. 10 et 23. — Et quia radix quantitatis a materia desu-  mitur, propositionis quantitas, quae est eius extensio seu universalitas  vel particularitas, ex subiecto ipso diiudicatur. Inf. n. 10). Ergo quid-  quid significat aliquid quasi inhaerens alteri, uti sunt adiectiva, par-  ticipia, verba etc., subiecta esse non possunt propositionis, nisi suman-  tur in vi nominis, ut sic nempe significent non ut quid receptum et  inhaerens alteri, sed ut recipiens et cui aliquid inhaeret. Igitur subiectum  enunciationis est nomen vel aliquid loco nominis, hoc est vi nominis  sumptum. — Infra codd. ABC omittunt, ad placitum (Cf.lect.v, nn. 6, 11).—  Codd. ABCE: quae est similitudo rei.  B) Secundae substantiae non sunt nisi in primis, quae sunt singu-  lares. Ut perspicuitati consuleretur, substantiae dividebantur ab Aristo-  tele et postea a Scholasticis in substantias primas et substantias secundas.  Primae sunt res individuae, seu singulares, ut s. Thomas dicit; quarum  proprium est ut de subiecto non dicantur, et ita sint uni propriae ut  non possint esse in pluribus: non enim dicitur quod Petrus sit Paulus,  neque quod sint plures Petri vel Pauli natura, licet sint plures indi-  vidui qui w/o nomine appellentur: « Substantia (prima) inquit Aristo-  »  teles, quae. proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur, est quae neque  »  »  de subiecto dicitur, neque i» subiecto est; ut aliquis homo vel aliquis  equus » (Categor., cap. De substantia n. 1.— Ed. Didot c. rr, al. v).—  Substantiae vero secundae dicuntur naturae universales, quarum proprium  est ut possint esse in pluribus et de pluribus dici; sicut homo est in  omnibus et singulis individuis humanis, qui ideo sunt et vocantur /to-  mines, non quia habent idem nomen, sed quia revera habent eamdem  rem eodem nomine significatam, nempe humanam naturam: « Secundae  »  »  substantiae, iterum Aristoteles, dicuntur species, in quibus illae quae  principaliter substantiae dicuntur (nempe, primae) insunt » (Ib. n: 2).  Insunt non sicut superius in inferiori, nempe universale in singulari, sed  viceversa sicut inferius est in suo superiori, sicut pars subiectiva seu  specifica est in suo toto universali (Cf. Caietan. In praedicamenta, cap. 1,  8. Substantiae secundae). Hinc s. Thomas ad auferendam aequivocatio-  nem, mentemque Aristotelis patefaciendam, dicit: Secundae substantiae  non sunt nisi in primis.— Quod si quaeras, cur substantiae singulares  vocentur primae, ratio est in promptu. Nempe quia prius est res esse in  se, quam esse in cognitione nostra, quae a rebus ipsis causatur (Cf. lect. rrr,  .  n.  7); et quia res singulares sunt in seipsis, res vero universales in singu-  laribus mens separatim intelligit, quamvis separatae revera non sint; hinc  merito substantiae universales praesupponunt singulares, et istae primae,  illae secundae recte appellantur.  — De diversis modis quibus a philoso-  phis sumitur substantia videsis lib. VII Metaphys., lect. τι.  Duo distinguen-  2.  Subiectum autem enunciationis * est nomen  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  intellectus potest distinguere, quando unum eorum  non  cadit in ratione alterius. In qualibet autem re  singulari est considerare aliquid quod est proprium  illi rei *, in quantum est haec res, sicut Socrati vel  Platoni in quantum. est lic homo; et aliquid est  considerare in ea, in quo convenit cum aliis qui-  busdam rebus, sicut quod Socrates est animal, aut  homo, aut rationalis, aut risibilis, aut albus. Quan-  do igitur res denominatur ab eo quod convenit  illi soli rei in quantum est haec res, huiusmodi  nomen * dicitur significare aliquid singulare; quan-  do autem denominatur res ab eo quod est com-  mune sibi et multis aliis, nomen huiusmodi di-  citur  significare universale, quia scilicet nomen  significat naturam * sive dispositionem aliquam,  quae est communis multis. Quia igitur hanc di-  visionem dedit de rebus non absolute secundum  quod sunt* extra animam, sed secundum quod  referuntur ad intellectum, non definivit univer-  sale et singulare secundum aliquid quod pertinet  ad rem, puta si diceret quod universale extra ani-  mam ?, quod pertinet ad opinionem Platonis, sed  per actum animae intellectivae, quod est praedi-  cari de multis vel de uno solo.  5. Est autem considerandum quod intellectus  apprehendit rem intellectam secundam propriam  essentiam *, seu definitionem: unde et in ΠῚ De  anima* dicitur quod obiectum proprium intellectus  est quod quid est*. Contingit autem. quandoque  quod propria ratio alicuius formae intellectae * non  Immediate supra, universale non est etc., codd. nostri omnes legunt:  universale non est aliquid extra (mentem) in rebus subsistens (E, exi-  stens). Codd. autem ABC ita prosequuntur: et im Praedicamentis etc.  Sensus quidem sententiae satis intelligitur tum ex lectione Piana tum ex  lectione codd. Aristoteles enim contra Platonicos iugiter affirmat univer-  salia non esse substantias per se subsistentes extra animam et extra  singularia, sed in ipsis singularibus existentes: quae universalia non  habent nisi a mente quod accipiantur separatim a singularibus, in qui-  bus solummodo realiter existunt, ut in sequenti numero dicitur.  Y) Ea vero quae sunt coniuncta in rebus etc. Ad haec attendat no-  vitius. Dicit s. Thomas quod ea quae sunt in rebus coniuncta possunt  ab intellectu distingui, et ideo separatim intelligi quae separata non sunt;  sicut in homine animalitas et rationalitas sunt coniuncta, imo una ea-  demque res, nempe ipse /tomo, et tamen intellectus separatim intelligit  animalitatem et separatim rationalitatem. Ratio est quia secundum se  considerata constituunt obiecta quae separatim et independenter ab aliis  praeseferunt intelligibilitatem, et ideo ex se possunt terminare cognitionem  nostram. -- Et hinc habetur alterum assignatum a s. Thoma, quando sci-  licet haec separata consideratio eorum, quae in re sunt unum, haberi  possit, nempe cum unum eorum non cadit in ratione alterius; si enim  seu  caderet, non posset sine altero intelligi, ut patet, quia non haberet obie-  ctivitatem  formalitatem intelligibilem qua posset ex se et separa-  tim  ab  alio  concipi. Quoties igitur sine hac conditione distinguitur ,  distinctio vana erit subtilitas, — Sed si intellectus noster potest distinguere  ea quae sunt coniuncta in rebus, patet quod intellectus non debet affir-  mare ea esse distincta vel separata in seipsis. Affirmaret enim quod  non est, nempe seiuncta esse quae sunt revera coniuncta; proindeque  illa affirmatio esset falsa (Cf. s. Th. p. I, qu. rxxxv, artic. r, ad 1).  ὃ) Universale extra animam etc. Edd. Ven.: universale est extra  animam.  — Codd.: universale est extra singularia, quod pertinet (BE,  pertineret) ad opiniones platonicas. Magis expedita mihi videtur le-  ctio  et  Piana.  Declaratur enim definitio universalis tradita ab Aristotele  explicata superiori n. 2. Porro Aristoteles definiendo universale ait:  Dico  autem universale quod de pluribus natum est praedicari. Et  s. Thomas recte animadvertit quod Aristoteles non dicit: Dico autem  universale extra animam, quod esset universale secundum aliquid quod  pertinet ad rem, quasi universale quod de pluribus natum est  i  cari esset aliquid extra animam, sicut Platonici posuerunt; sed ait: Dico  autem universale, ut intelligeretur quod universale accipitur in hac de-  finitione secundum quod refertur ad intellectum, hoc est secundum  quod universale accipitur in singularibus ab intellectu separatim a singu-  laribus ipsis, in qua acceptione universale suscipere potest modos idos  praedicationis, de quibus infra n. 9 et in not. t. - Cod. A in fine legit: quod  est praedicare de multis etc.  — P. cum BCE et Ven. edd.: qui est prae-  dicari; — D: qui est praedicare (Cf. VII Metaphys. lect. xir).  €) Quod quid est. Est formula scholastica qua  designatur rei essentia,  dainresingulari.  *  Codd.- p.: quod  sit illi proprium.  *  Codd. - r.: loc  nomen.  *  Codd. - r.: quiz  significat nomen  huiusmodi natu-  ram.  *  Codd. :  stunt.  Plato.  A  exi-  Codd. : ratio-  nem.  *  Comm. s. Th.  lect. vui. - Edit.  Did. cap. iv.  ε  *aB:  vae.  intellecti-  CAP. VII,  repugnat ei quod est esse in pluribus, sed hoc  *  Codd.: sive il-  lud (c, id) sit  aliquid.  *  ABDE - P.: 24lu-  rae (Cf. VII Me-  Cc  Japhys. lect.xur). -  omittit  tum  naturae,tum ma-  feriae.  *  C.  Comment.  s.Th. in lib. VII  Metaphys. lect.  xitt.  * Codd.-».: quod.  * pc: determina-  ta.  *  4: est apta in.  * Commen. s. Th.  impeditur ab aliquo alio, sive sit aliquid * acciden-  taliter adveniens, puta si omnibus hominibus mo-  rientibus unus solus remaneret, sive sit propter  conditionem materiae *, sicut est unus tantum sol,  non quod repugnet rationi solari esse in pluribus  secundum conditionem formae ipsius, sed quia  non est alia materia susceptiva talis formae; et  ideo non dixit quod universale est quod praedi-  catur  de  pluribus, sed quod aptum natum est  praedicari de pluribus *.  6.  Cum autem omnis forma, quae nata est  recipi in materia quantum est de se, communi-  cabilis sit multis materiis; dupliciter potest con-  tingere quod id quod significatur per nomen, non  sit  aptum  natum praedicari de pluribus. Uno  modo, quia * nomen significat formam secundum  quod terminata * est ad hanc materiam, sicut hoc  nomen Socrates vel Plato, quod significat naturam  humanam prout estin hac materia. Alio modo,  secundum quod nomen significat formam, quae non  .est nata in * materia recipi, unde oportet quod per  se remaneat una et singularis; sicut albedo, si es-  set forma non existens in materia, esset una sola,  unde esset singularis: et propter hoc Philosophus  dicit in VII Metaphys. * quod si essent species re-  rum separatae, sicut posuit Plato, essent individua*.  7. Potest autem obiici quod hoc nomen Socrates  vel Plato est natum de pluribus praedicari, quia  nihil prohibet multos esse, qui vocentur hoc no-  mine. — Sed ad hoc patet responsio, si attendantur  verba Aristotelis. Ipse enim non divisit nomina  seu ratio, quam significat definitio (Cf. s. Th. lect. cit. ex III De anima),  et dicitur etiam quod quid erat esse et quidditas. Ratio harum dictionum  est philosophica: si enim quaeratur quid sit hoc vel illud? per vocabu-  lum quid intenditur a quaerente essentia, quam interrogando vult agno-  scere.  Hinc  nomen quidditatis. - Ex quibus intelligitur eodem sensu  penes Scholasticos usurpari dictiones, secundum propriam rationem, se-  cundum essentiam, secundum definitionem, secundum quidditatem, se-  cundum quod quid est etc., quae passim in eorum scriptis occurrunt.  t) Universale dicitur etc. Est lectio explicita codd. AC, et eam ado-  ptamus, quia germana est et vera. Cod. B habet lectionem fere identicam:  universale dicitur quod (quando) non solum nomen prout (potest) de  pluribus praedicari, sed id quod etc. — Obiectio est quod nomen alicuius  individui sit pluribus aliis individuis commune, ut nomen Socratis e. g. vel  Platonis; et ex hoc concluditur contra praedefinita, quod non solius uni-  versalis sit communicabilitas ad plura. — Respondetur autem quod Aristo-  teles non nomina, sed res dividit in universales et singulares; et ideo  si detur aliquod nomen, quo plura individua denominantur, quin tamen  sit pluribus communicabilis res significata per nomen illud, universale  proprie non habetur, sed solummodo habetur nomen aequivocum (Cf.  lect. v, n. 19, not. E). Haec est mens s. Thomae, et hanc mentem exhibet  oki nt lectio codd. ABC a nobis adoptata. Lectio Piana non dilucide  iunc exhibet sensum, nisi forte sit etiam aequivoca: universale non solum  dicitur quando nomen potest de pluribus praedicari, sed etiam quando  id etc. Imo, universale dicitur exclusive quando non solum nomen potest  de pluribus praedicari, sed id quod significatur per nomen etc.— D: uni-  versale dicitur non solum quando nomen potest de pluribus praedica-  ri, sed illud quod significatur etc. Prima pars convenit cum editione  Piana; sed secunda pars ob omissionem particulae etiam (quae requi-  reretur  si  prius legendum esset mon solum quando) indicat lectio-  nem codd. ABC.— Cod. E: universale dicitur quando in unum solum  (f. non solum) nomen potest de pluribus praedicari, sed etiam id quod  significatur etc. Quae lectio videtur favere magis lectioni codd., quam  Pianae.  7) Significabit naturam humanam etc. Ita codd. ACDE.  — Cod. B  post verba, in hac materia, omittit fere omnia, quae sequuntur, et habet  tantummodo haec verba: et sic eius alia significatio, non erit univer-  .sale sed aequivocum. Quod lectionis fragmentum satis est ut dicamus  lectionem codicis, a quo :excripsit amanuensis cod. B, fuisse identicam  cum lectione aliorum codd. Porro haec codd. lectio perspicua est, atque  respondet immediate praecedentibus : significat naturam humanam etc. -  P.: significabit aliud; et propter hoc non esset universale, sed aequi-  vocum. Forma aliquantulum diversa est a codd., sensus idem: qui tamen  LECT. X  47  in universale et particulare, sed res *. Et ideo in-  telligendum est quod universale dicitur * quando,  non solum nomen potest de pluribus praedicari,  sed  id, quod significatur per nomen, est natam  in pluribus inveniri; hoc autem non contingit in  praedictis nominibus: nam hoc nomen Socrates  vel Plato significat naturam humanam secundum  quod est in hac materia. Si vero hoc nomen im-  ponatur alteri homini significabit naturam huma-  nam " in alia materia; et sic eius erit alia significa-  tio; unde non erit universale, sed aequivocum.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Necesse est autem   enun-  ciare etc., concludit divisionem enunciationis ὅ.  Quia enim semper enunciatur aliquid de aliqua re;  rerum autem quaedam sunt universalia, quaedam  singularia; necesse est quod quandoque enuncie-  tur  aliquid inesse vel non inesse alicui universa-  lium, quandoque vero alicui singularium *. Et est  suspensiva constructio usque huc, et est sensus *:  Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum  etc.,  necesse est enunciare etc.  9. Est autem * considerandum quod de univer-  sali aliquid enunciatur quatuor modis. Nam uni-  versale potest uno modo considerari quasi sepa-  ratum a singularibus, sive per se * subsistens, ut  Plato posuit, sive, secundum sententiam Ari-  stotelis,  ctu.  secundum esse quod habet in intelle-  Et sic potest ei aliquid attribui dupliciter. —  Quandoque enim attribuitur ei sic considerato  aliquid, quod pertinet ad solam operationem in-  tellectus, ut si dicatur quod /homo est praedicabile  de multis, sive universale, sive species '. Huius-  determinatus magis est et enucleatior ex codd. quam ex Piana, quia  illud  significabit aliud per significabit naturam humanam in alia  materia, declaratur et determinatur.  0) Concludit divisionem enunciationis. Codd. : concludit ex praedictis  (DE ex praemisis) divisionem enunciationis. Et est melior lectio: nam  revera ex praemissis Aristoteles colligit divisionem enunciationis. — Infra  vero, non de aliquo cum P., sed cum eisdem codd. legimus, de aliqua  re:  sequitur enim, rerum autem etc.  t) Sive universale, sive species. Attendendum est ad hanc primam  considerationem wniversalis, de quo dicitur quod sit species vel genus,  seu praedicabile. Etenim esse praedicabile vel esse genus, vel esse spe-  ciem est ens rationis, hoc est a sola rationis consideratione additum  naturae universali, quatenus sub peculiari quodam modo res ab ipsa  ratione consideratur (Cf. supra n. 4); et ideo non extra rationem ullo  modo, sed in sola ratione existens, quia in sola ratione revera existit  natura universalis sub hoc respectu accepta. Sed aliud est natura secun-  dum se, obiective nempe accepta, aliud est modus intelligendi naturam:  quia illa et extra mentem est et a mente independens; modus autem  intelligendi nonnisi in mente et a mente est. Si quis ergo (ut conceptua-  listae faciunt) a modo intelligendi naturam ad naturam ipsam conclude-  ret, dicendo universale esse ens rationis, quia esse praedicabile seu ge-  nus vel species est ens rationis, erraret manifeste, confundendo id quod  in universali est subiectivum cum eo quod in ipso universali est obiecti-  vum. Et viceversa erraret si quis (ut ultra-realismus ratiocinatur) ab  eo quod esse naturae universalis existit extra mentem, inferret etiam  modum ipsius naturae universalis extra mentem existere. S. Thomas  recte sapienterque haec duo distinguit, nempe naturam et modum na-  turae additum, et iuxta hanc distinctionem, aut negat aut affirmat realem  extra mentem existentiam naturae, quae dicitur universalis (Cf. VII Me-  taphys. lect. xir). Quam s. Thomae distinctionem quidam (quos inter  auctor  recentissimus Historiae philosophiae scholasticae) non consi-  derantes, eum favisse dicunt aut realismo exaggerato, aut idealismo  seu  quam  utilia  conceptualismo. Sed falluntur. — Erunt fortassis qui haec subtilia  magis  censebunt, magisque apta ad ingenia exercenda  quam ad scientiam comparandam. At novitius recogitet scientiam no-  stram de universalibus esse; proinde universalia non perfunctorie sed  profunde scrutetur, ut veritatem circa ipsorum naturam et existentiam  dilucide percipiat, duce s. Thoma: fieri enim nequit ut vere philoso-  phetur, qui non recte de universalibus sentit.- Codd.: aut universale,  aut  enim  ditur  genus, aut species; sed haec lectio acceptari non potest. Genus  naturam  significat quae sub se habet species, in quas divi-  per superadditas differentias. Atqui homo concipitur quidem ut  *A:  res.  *  sed  9  ípsas  Codd.: univer-  sali... singulari.  *  Codd.:  ut  sit  sensus. Et me-  lius.  *  *  A:  famen.  c: sivesicut per  se  etc.  Plato.  Universale logi-  cum.  48  modi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens  eas  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  naturae intellectae, secundum quod comparat  ipsam ad res, quae sunt extra animam. - Quando-  que vero attribuitur aliquid universali sic consi-  '  Universale meta-  physicum.  derato, quod scilicet apprehenditur ab intellectu ut  unum, tamen id quod attribuitur ei non pertinet ad  actum intellectus, sed ad esse, quod habet natura  apprehensa in rebus, quae sunt extra animam,  puta si dicatur quod homo est dignissima crea- |  turarum. Hoc enim*convenit * naturae humanae  etiam secundum quod est in singularibus. Nam  quilibet homo singularis dignior est omnibus crea-  est divisio generis in species, quia sumitur secun-  dum differentiam praedicati ad quod fertur nega-  tio; praedicatum autem est pars formalis enun-  ciationis; et ideo huiusmodi divisio dicitur pertinere  ad qualitatem enunciationis, qualitatem, inquam,  essentialem, secundum quod differentia significat  quale quid ἢ. - Tertiaautem est huiusmodi divisio,  quae  sumitur  secundum  differentiam  subiecti ,  quod praedicatur de pluribus vel de uno solo,  et  *  ABC  homo  *  omittunt  ABCD: in ipsis  singul.  .  Universale zz szn-  gularibus, ratio-  ne naturae uni-  versalis.  *  ABC  quod.  omittunt  Universale Zz szz-  gularibus ratio-  ne singularis.  *  Codd.: aliquod  accidens indivi-  duale,utcum di-  citur etc.  Triplex  modus  praedicandi  singulari.  de  turis irrationalibus; sed tamen omnes homines sin-  gulares. non sunt unus homo * extra animam, sed  solum in acceptione intellectus; et per hunc modum  attribuitur ei praedicatum, scilicet ut un rei.  Alio autem modo attribuitur aliquid universali,  prout estin singularibus *, et hoc dupliciter. Quan-  doque quidem ratione ipsius naturae universalis,  puta cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod ad essentiam  eius pertinet, vel quod * consequitur principia es-  sentialia; ut cum dicitur, Aomo est animal, vel  homo est risibilis. - Quandoque autem attribuitur  ei aliquid ratione singularis in quo invenitur, puta  cum attribuitur ei aliquid quod pertinet ad actio-  nem individui; ut cum dicitur *, omo ambulat.  Singulari autem attribuitur aliquid tripliciter:  uno  ideo dicitur pertinere ad quantitatem enuncia-  tionis, nam et quantitas consequitur materiam *.  11. Deinde cum dicit: Sz ergo universaliter etc.,  ostendit quomodo enunciationes diversimode op-  ponantur secundum diversitatem subiecti. Et circa  hoc duo facit: primo, distinguit diversos modos  oppositionum in ipsis enunciationibus ; secundo,  ostendit quomodo diversae oppositiones diversi-  mode se habent ad verum et falsum; ibi: Quo-  circa, has quidem impossibile est * etc.  12.  Circa primum considerandum est quod  cum universale possit considerari in abstractione a  singularibus vel secundum quod est in ipsis * singu-  laribus, secundum hoc diversimode aliquid ei at-  *  Cf. supra, n.2,  not. X.  *  *  Lect. xt.  [psis ex anc.  ABCE : potest at-  tribui.  **  *  tribuitur *, ut supra dictum est **, Ad designandum ;  autem diversos modos attributionis inventae sunt  quaedam dictiones, quae possunt dici determina-  tiones vel signa, quibus designatur quod aliquid  de universali, hoc aut illo modo praedicetur. Sed  quia non est ab omnibus communiter * apprehen-  sum quod universalia extra singularia subsistant,  ideo communis usus loquendi non habet aliquam  dictionem * ad designandum illum modum prae-  Num. 9.  pc: non est com-  muniter ab ho-  minibus.  *  Codd. - r.: non  habet dictiones.  *  *  Codd. - p.: π6-  gative, et in prin-  Cipio omittit e£.  modo, secundum quod cadit in apprehen-  sione; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est singulare , vel  praedicabile de uno solo. Quandoque autem, ra-  tione naturae communis; ut cum dicitur, Socrates  est animal. Quandoque autem, ratione sui ipsius;  ut cum dicitur, Socrates ambulat.  Et totidem etiam modis negationes * variantur:  quia omne quod contingit affirmare, contingit *  ABC: dicitur de  eo.  Plato.  »  *  ADE:  etiam.  *  contingit  n  Pt  omittit  stere.  Lect. ix, n. 6.  dicandi, prout aliquid dicitur * in abstractione a  singularibus. Sed Plato, qui posuit universalia extra  singularia subsistere, adinvenit aliquas * determina-  tiones, quibus designaretur quomodo aliquid at-  tribuitur universali, prout est extra singularia, et  vocabat universale separatum  *  c:  dam ;  subsi-  separatim.  * -  Cf.lect.vri, n.2.  De  quarfa et  quinta divisione,  infra lect.xi,n.3.  *  Codd.:  unum  dividitur in sim-  plex et composi-  tum.  *  Cf. lect.vui,n.3.  negare, ut supra dictum est *.  10. Est autem haec tertia divisio enunciationis  quam ponit Philosophus. Prima namque fuit quod  enunciationum quaedam est una simpliciter, quae-  dam vero coniunctione una*. Quae quidem est di-  visio analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secun-  dum prius et posterius: sic enim unum dividitur  secundum prius in simplex et per posterius in  compositum  *. - Alia vero fuit divisio enunciationis  in affirmationem et negationem *. Quae quidem  natura  praedicabilis  de pluribus, et consequenter ut universalis; sed  genus esse non potest, cum alias species sub se non habeat, sed solum-  modo individua quibus natura humana communis est..Qua de causa a  Scholasticis homo dicebatur species specialissima.  x) Hoc enim convenit etc. Unus cod. E: hoc enim convenit na-  turae humanae, quae etiam secundum quod est in singularibus est  dignior omnibus irrationalibus creaturis, sed tamen etc.  X) Quale quid. Praedicari aliquid in quid est cum praedicatum alicui  subiecto tribuitur essentialiter, seu ut eius essentia vel de eius essentia ;  quia essentiam vult scire qui quaerit quid sit res (Cf. supra n. 5, nota c).  Praedicari in quale quid est cum praedicatum alicui subiecto essentialiter  quidem tribuitur (ergo in quid), sed modus qyo enunciatur praedicatum  est adiectivus seu per modum qualitatis (quale). Hinc quid respicit rem  praedicatam, quale respicit modum quo res ipsa praedicatur, Sicut, cum in  definitione hominis dicitur quod sit animal rationale, totum istud, quod  est species, complet quid seu essentiam hominis; animal enunciat quid  incompletum, nempe genus seu essentiam genericam hominis; denique  rationale est differentia, seu qualitas essentialis adiective enunciata (quale),  qua animal trahitur ad esse hominis et hominis essentia completur. -  Quod si tribuatur subiecto aliquid quod non est de constitutivo essentiae  eius neque ut genus, neque ut differentia, neque est species, dicitur hoc  aliquid praedicari de ipso subiecto in quale. Et hoc dupliciter: vel in  quale necessario, si id quod de re praedicatur ab ipsa rei essentia quodam-  modo fluere intelligatur, et ideo a re ipsa sit inseparabile ; quo sensu capa-  *  * subsistens extra sin-  gularia quantum ad speciem hominis, per se ho-  minem vel ipsum hominem et similiter ^ in aliis  universalibus. Sed universale secundum quod est  in singularibus cadit in communi apprehensione  hominum; et ideo adinventae sunt quaedam di-  Codd.:  desi-  nandum ; et in-  omittunt a/7-  quid.  ctiones ad. significandum * modum attribuendi ali-  quid universali sic accepto ἢ".  ;  citas sciendi praedicatur de homine; vel in quale contingenter, si id quod  praedicatur de re potest ab ipsa separari, salva eiusdem rei natura.  y) Per se hominem vel ipsum hominem et similiter etc. Ita codd. -  Piana: per se hominem et similiter etc. Supra s. Thomas dixit quod  Plato adinvenit non unam, sed aliquas determinationes. Revera utraque  denominatione Plato utebatur ad designandum universale tum extra  singularia tum extra mentem nostram existens. « Necesse est, inquit  »  »  in Timaeo, huiusmodi species (puta hominem , animal, ignem. etc.)  esse quae per se ipsae sint, χαθ᾽ αὑτὰ ταῦτα » (Ed. Marsilii Ficini,  Francofurti 1602, pag. 1061). Hinc tutissimum loquendi modum esse  ait huiusmodi species vere dici esse absolute (esse ignem, esse homi-  nemetc.); sensibilia vero ad earum similitudines facta, potius esse talia  quam esse, puta esse talem ignem, vel tale animal, vel talem homi-  nem, non autem ipsum ignem, neque hominem, neque animal etc.: μὴ  τοῦτο (πῦρ) ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον (lbid. pag. 1059). — Infra etiam cum  eisdem codd. legendum est: cadit in communi apprehensione hominum ;  non autem cum Piana: cadit in apprehensione hominum. Dictum est  enim supra quod non est ab omnibus communiter. apprehensum quod  universalia extra singularia subsistant; et ideo per oppositum. affirmatur  in communi apprehensione hominum esse universale quod est in singu-  laribus.  y) Universali sic accepto. Editio Piana, commate interposito, prose-  quitur immediate: sicut autem etc. - Codd. autem BC: universali sic ac-  cepto, ut supra dictum est. Qui secundum praedicta duplex est: quan-  y  CAP. VII,  *  Num. 9.  * AC: Sub eo con-  linetur.  **  *  Codd. cohae-  AC: alia vero;  B: alia vero est. - sup.n. 9, in  *  Num. cit.  13. Sicut autem supra dictum est *, quandoque  aliquid attribuitur universali ratione ipsius natu-  rae  eo  universalis; et ideo hoc dicitur praedicari de  universaliter, quia scilicet ei convenit secun-  dum totam multitudinem in qua invenitur; et ad  hoc designandum in affirmativis praedicationibus  adinventa est haec dictio, omnis, quae designat  quod praedicatum attribuitur subiecto universali  quantum ad totum id quod sub subiecto contine-  tur *. In negativis autem praedicationibus ** adin-  venta est * haec dictio, nullus, per quam significatur  quod praedicatum removetur a subiecto universali  secundum totum id quod continetur sub eo. Unde  nullus dicitur quasi non ullus, et in graeco dicitur, -  udis * quasi nec unus **, quia nec unum solum est  accipere sub subiecto universali a quo praedica-  tum non removeatur. - Quandoque autem attribui-  tur universali aliquid vel removetur ab eo ratione  particularis; et ad hoc designandum, in affirma-  tivis-.quidem adinventa est haec dictio, aliquis vel  quidam, per quam designatur quod praedicatum *  attribuitur subiecto universali * ratione ipsius parti-  cularis; sed quia non determinate significat fonmam  alicuius singularis, sub quadam indeterminatione  singulare designat; unde et dicitur individuum va-  gum. ln negativis autem non *st aliqua * dictio  posita, sed possumus accipere, non omnis; ut sicut,  nullus, universaliter removet, eo quod significat  quasi diceretur, non ullus, idest, non aliquis, ita  etiam, non omnis, particulariter removeat, in quan-  tum excludit universalem affirmationem.  14. Sic igitur tria sunt genera affirmationum  in quibus aliquid de universali praedicatur. - Una  quidem est, in qua de universali praedicatur ali-  quid universaliter; ut cum dicitur, omnis homo  est animal. - Alia *, in qua aliquid praedicatur de  universali particulariter; ut cum dicitur, quidam  homo est albus.- Tertia vero est, in qua aliquid  de universali praedicatur absque determinatione  universalitatis vel particularitatis; unde huiusmodi  enunciatio solet vocari indefinita. - Totidem autem  sunt negationes oppositae *.  15. De singulari autem quamvis aliquid diversa  ratione praedicetur, ut supra dictum est *, tamen  totum refertur ad singularitatem ipsius, quia etiam  natura universalis in ipso singulari individuatur ;  doque enim (C omittit enim) attribuitur aliquid universali etc. — Codd.  AD: universali sic accepto, ut supra dictum est, quod secundum prae-  dicta duplex est. Quandoque enim attribuitur aliquid universali etc. —  Cod. E iegit: universali sicut (corrupte pro sic) accepto ut dictum est  supra. Qui secundum praedicta duplex est. Quando enim attribuitur  aliquid universali etc. Nostram lectionem (quae est Piana, sed interpun-  ctione immutata) habent Venetae editiones 1526 et 1557. A qua revera  non dissentiunt lectiones citatae ex codd. In hoc enim n. 12, s. Thomas  I. dicit universale posse considerari dupliciter, nempe in abstractione a  singularibus et in ipsis singularibus; ex quo 2. infert ( Secundum hoc etc.)  quod secundum illam duplicem considerationem diversimode aliquid  universali tribuitur; 3. deinde dicit generice dari dictiones ad significan-  dos modos attribuendi aliquid universali (4d designandum etc.) ; 4. sed  penes usum loquendi communem hominum non habentur dictiones ad  designandum modum praedicandi de universali prout per se existere  dicitur in abstractione a singularibus (Sed quia etc.), quamvis Plato qui  posuit praefatam subsistentiam universalium, peculiares denominationes  adinvenerit (Sed Plato); 5. attamen penes usum loquendi hominum sunt  dictiones quibus significantur modi attribuendi aliquid universali, secun-  dum quod est in singularibus.  — Quibus positis, relictisque platonicis de-  nominationibus, Angelicus n. 13 declarat ex n. 9 qui sint isti modi, et  quae dictiones communes quibus praefati modi designantur. Porro pro-  cessus iste distincte traditur tum a Piana tum a codd.  Opp. D. TuowaE T. I.  LECT. X  et  49  ideo nihil refert quantum ad naturam singula-  ritatis  *, utrum aliquid praedicetur de eo ratione  universalis naturae; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est  omo , vel conveniat ei ratione singularitatis *.  16. Si igitur tribus praedictis enunciationibus  addatur singularis, erunt quatuor modi enuncia-  tionis ad quantitatem ipsius pertinentes, scilicet  universalis, singularis, indefinitus et particularis.  17. Sic igitur secundum has differentias Aristo-  teles assignat diversas oppositiones enunciationum *  adinvicem. Et primo, secundum differentiam uni-  versalium ad indefinitas ; secundo, secundum diffe-  rentiam universalium ad particulares; ibi: Opponi  autem affirmationem * etc.- Circa primum tria facit:  primo, agit de oppositione propositionum * univer-  salium adinvicem; secundo, de oppositione indefi-  nitarum; ibi: Quando autem in universalibus etc.;  *  tertio, excludit dubitationem; ibi: n eo vero quod etc.  18. Dicit ergo primo quod si aliquis enunciet  de subiecto universali universaliter, idest secun-  dum continentiam suae universalitatis, quoniam  est, idest affirmative, aut non est, idest negative,  erunt contrariae enunciationes; ut si dicatur, omnis  homo est albus, nullus homo est albus. Huius au-  tem ratio est, quia contraria dicuntur quae ma-  xime a se distant *: non enim dicitur. aliquid. ni-  grum ex hoc solum quod non est album, sed super  hoc quod est non esse album, quod significat com-  muniter remotionem albi, addit nigrum extremam  distantiam ab albo. Sic igitur id quod affirmatur *  per hanc enunciationem, omnis homo est albus,  removetur per hanc negationem, non omnis homo  est albus. Oportet ergo * quod negatio removeat  modum quo praedicatum dicitur de subiecto, quem  designat haec dictio, omnis. Sed super hanc re-  motionem addit haec enunciatio, nullus homo est  albus, totalem. remotionem, quae est extrema di-  stantia a primo ^; quod pertinet ad rationem con-  trarietatis.  Et ideo convenienter hanc oppositio-  nem dicit contrarietatem.  19. Deinde cum dicit: Quando autem etc., osten-  dit qualis sit oppositio affirmationis et negationis -  in indefinitis. Et primo, proponit quod intendit ;  secundo, manifestat propositum per exempla; ibi:  Dico autem non universaliter etc.; tertio, assignat  rationem manifestationis τ; ibi: Cum enim uni-  E) Attribuitur subiecto universali etc. Tres Ven. editiones saeculi XV,  et duae aliae saeculi XVI, legunt: aftribuitur subiecto universali ratione  ipsius particularis; unde dicitur individuum vagum. Cetera intermedia  omittuntur. Venetas editiones adhibuerunt editores Romani, quos sequuti  sunt tum editio Parisiensis, tum Veneta Opp. s. Thomae 1595, tum de-  nique Antuerpiensis. Germanam lectionem restituimus ex codd. Revera  quo pacto inferatur quod universale affectum signo particulari, aliquis,  quidam, vocetur individuum vagum non satis apparet in citatis editio-  nibus; sed illatio est manifesta ex data ratione, quae est in codicibus,  nempe quod universale tali signo affectum sub quadam indeterminatione  singulare designat; proindeque recte dicitur individuum vagum seu in-  determinatum.  o) Quae est extrema (cod. E, et edd. ac: in extrema) distantia a  primo. In edd. Piana et Ven. 1526, 1557 deest a primo, quod concorditer  habent codd. ét edd. Ven. saec. XV.— Propositiones enim contrariae desi-  gnant extremam distantiam inter affirmationem praedicati de toto (omnis)  subiecto, et remotionem . eiusdem praedicati ab eodem toto (nullus) sub-  iecto. — Omnes codices et edd. cit. legunt: quod pertinet ad rationem  contrarietatis. - P.: quod primo pertinet; et ita edd. Ven. 1526 et 1557;  sed videtur verbum. primo ex incuria fuisse transpositum a loco, ubi  immediate ante desideratur.  x) Assignat rationem manifestationis. Omnes codd. nostri habent  hanc lectionem, quam sufficimus Pianae et edd. Ven. saec. XV et XVI:  2  *  Codd.: differt  uantum ad ra-  ionem singula-  ritatis.  *  AC: Suae singus  laritatis.  *  Enunciationum  ex codd.  *  *  Lect. xr.  Propositionum  ex codd.  *  Cf.  V Physic.,  lect. i.  *  A:  ratio  affirmatur.  *  pc: enim.  quae  ἜΛΑΒΕ: et de.  Porphyrius.  *  A: significantur  communiter esse  contraria.  *  pc: manifestat  quod dixerat per  etc.  *  ABCE : ?ntelligit  hic de.  *  ABC: sed solum  de etc.- E: sed  solum de infini-  lis.  *  Codd. - p.: po-  nuntur.  ΚΑΒ: Sed signi-  Jicat modum.  ABCD : univer-  sali significat si-  mul.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  hic loquitur de veritate et falsitate enunciationum;  tum etiam quia hoc ipsum posset de * particula-  ribus enunciationibus dici.  21. Alii vero, sequentes Porphyrium, referunt  hoc ad contrarietatem praedicati *. Contingit enim  quandoque quod praedicatum negatur de subie-  cto  50  versale sit homo etc. - Dicit ergo primo quod quan-  do de universalibus subiectis affirmatur aliquid vel  negatur Ρ non tamen universaliter, non sunt con-  trariae enunciationes, sed illa quae significantur  contingit esse contraria *.  Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem non universali-  ler etc., manifestat per * exempla. Ubi consideran-  dum est quod non dixerat quando in universa-  libus particulariter , sed non universaliter. Non  enim intendit de * particularibus enunciationibus,  sed  de solis indefinitis *. Et hoc manifestat per  exempla quae ponit *, dicens fieri in universali-  bus  subiectis  non  universalem enunciationem ;  cum dicitur, es? albus homo, non est albus homo.  Etrationem huius expositionis* ostendit, quia homo,  qui subiicitur, est universale, sed tamen praedica-  tum non universaliter de eo praedicatur, quia non  apponitur haec dictio, omnis: quae non significat  ipsum universale, sed modum * universalitatis ,  prout scilicet praedicatum dicitur universaliter de  subiecto; et ideo addita subiecto universali, sem-  per significat * quod aliquid de eo dicatur univer-  saliter. Tota autem haec expositio refertur ad hoc  quod dixerat: Quando in universalibus non uni-  versaliter enunciatur, non sunt contrariae.  20. Sed hoc quod additur: Quae autem signi-  ficantur contingit esse contraria, non est exposi-  tum, quamvis * obscuritatem contineat; et ideo a  diversis diversimode exponitur. Quidam enim hoc  referre  voluerunt ad contrarietatem veritatis et  falsitatis, quae competit huiusmodi enunciationi-  bus. Contingit enim quandoque has simul esse  veras; homo est albus, homo non est albus; et  sic non sunt contrariae, quia contraria mutuo se  tollunt. Contingit tamen quandoque unam earum  esse veram et alteram esse falsam; ut cum dici-  tur, homo est animal, homo non est animal; et  sic ratione significati videntur habere quamdam  contrarietatem. - Sed hoc non videtur ad propo-  situm pertinere ", tum quia Philosophus nondum  assignat differentiam manifestiorem.— Lectio codd. indicatur ex his quae  infra in hoc numero habet s. Thomas exponendo verba illa Philosophi:  Cum enim universale sit etc. Dicit enim: Et rationem huius expositionis  ostendit, quia etc.  p) Affirmatur aliquid vel negatur. Ita edd. P. et Ven. - Codd. BC  DE habent, loco vel, particulam ef. Sensus idem est, dummodo vel  non pro disiunctione sed pro coniunctione sumatur: quia sermo est de  propositionibus contrariis, in quibus de uno eodemque subiecto non  disiunctive sed coniunctive affirmatur aliquid et negatur. -- Cod. A: quod  quando de universalibus substantiis affirmatur vel negatur aliquid. —  D: quod (sic corrupte pro quando) de universalibus subiectis et affirma-  tur et negatur. aliquid, — BCE: quod quando de universalibus subiectis  affirmatur et negatur aliquid.  c) Et rationem huius expositionis etc. — Codd. ABCD: et rationem  huius expositionis ostendit consequenter per hoc quod homo qui subii-  citur est universale, sed tamen praedicatum non universaliter enun-  ciatur de eo. Ven. edd. habent lectionem Pianam, sed quoad formam  propter hoc quod inest ei contrarium; sicut  si dicatur, homo non est albus, quia est niger;  et  sic id quod significatur per hoc quod dicitur,  non  est albus, potest esse contrarium. Non tamen  semper: removetur enim aliquid a subiecto, etiam  si contrarium non insit, sed aliquid medium in-  ter contraria; ut cum dicitur, aliquis non est albus,  esi  quia est pallidus; vel quia inest ei privatio actus  vel habitus seu potentiae; ut cum dicitur, aliquis  non  videns, quia est carens potentia visiva,  aut habet * impedimentum ne videat, vel etiam  quia non est aptus natus * videre; puta si dicatur,  lapis non videt. Sic igitur illa, quae significantur  contingit esse contraria, sed * ipsae enunciationes  non sunt contrariae, quia ut in fine huius libri  dicetur *, non sunt contrariae opiniones quae sunt  de contrariis, sicut opinio quod aliquid sit bonum,  et  illa quae est, quod aliquid non est bonum *.  22. Sed nec hoc videtur ad propositum Aristo-  telis * pertinere, quia non agit hic de contrarietate  rerum vel opinionum, sed de contrarietate enun-  ciationum: et ideo magis videtur hic sequenda ex-  positio Alexandri. Secundum quam dicendum est  quod in indefinitis enunciationibus non determina-  tur utrum praedicatum attribuatur subiecto univer-  saliter (quod faceret contrarietatem enunciationum),  aut  particulariter (quod non faceret contrarieta-  tem enunciationum); et ideo huiusmodi enuncia-  tiones indefinitae non sunt contrariae secundum  modum * quo proferuntur. Contingit tamen quan-  doque ratione significati eas habere contrarieta-  tem, puta, cum attribuitur aliquid universali ratione  naturae universalis *, quamvis non apponatur si-  gnum universale; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal,  lib. II, 8 Quando autem de universalibus etc., ed. cit. pag. 347. Ipse au-  tem  Boethius sequitur Porphyrium. Nos vero, inquit, dicimus non  quidem Alexandri sententiam abhorrere ratione, sed hanc Porphyrii  esse meliorem (pag. cit. et seq.). Ammonius quoque, op. et loc. cit. col. 2,  Porphyrio adhaeret: Quando autem contraria esse quae indicantur  possint, bene Porphyrius explicavit philosophus. Ex opposito s. Tho-  mas  Alexandri sententiam meliorem existimat, et merito, ut num. 22  ostenditur.  €) Quod aliquid non est bonum. Est lectio P. et edd. Ven.- Codd.:  quod aliquid sit malum. Quae lectio videtur indicata a contextu: Sunt  de contrariis. -  y) Indefinitae non sunt contrariae secundum modum εἴς. [τὰ legendum  est cum codd.— P. et edd. Ven.: indefinitae dicuntur secundum modum etc.  Vult enim s. Thomas (ut immediate explicat) propositiones indefinitas ex  modo quo enunciantur contrarias non esse; contrarias tamen quandoque  esse ratione materiae seu significati ipsarum. Porro hanc s. Doctoris  mentem reddunt codices nostri.  placet lectio codd.  1) Non est expositum, quamvis etc.: « Quomodo autem, inquit Am-  »  »  »  monius, non esse contrariae dicantur, sed contraria quandoque signi-  ficare, hoc Explanatoribus (Aristotelis) non parum iam exhibuit ne-  gotii » (In librum De interpretatione, sect. II, De propositionibus, 8. 1,  fol. 15, col. 1, ed. cit.). - Supra codd. ABC hoc modo legunt: tota autem  haec expositio refertur ad hoc solum (B omittit solum) quod dixerat:  Quando in universalibus non universaliter. Sed hoc quod additur,  non sunt contrariae, quae autem significantur (BC, significant) est  esse contraria, non est expositum, quamvis etc.  v) Sed hoc non videtur ad propositum pertinere. Ita codd. et omnes  Ven. edd. (Cf. n. 22).- P.: sed hoc non videtur ad propositam pertinere  veritatem. — Interpretatio in hoc numero recitata videtur esse Hermini,  ut  refert Boethius in secunda Editione super librum de Interpretatione,  Y) Cum attribuitur etc. Est lectio CDE quibuscum concordat A le-  gendo: cum illi (corrupte pro universali) aliquid attribuatur ratione na-  turae universalis,  — B et P.: cum attribuatur (P., ei) aliquid universaliter  ratione universalis. Quae lectio obscura est, vixque intelligibilis: quia  sermo est de propositionibus indefinitis, quae secundum modum quo  enunciantur non sunt universales, neque ideo contrariae, sed ratione si-  gnificati habent vim propositionum universalium, et ideo possunt esse  contrariae, Atqui dicendo, cum attribuatur ei aliquid universaliter, sup-  ponitur subiectum affectum signo universali (omnis, mullus); et ideo  non  amplius propositiones essent indefinitae, sicut indefinitae supponun  tur a s. Thoma; ac insuper verba immediate sequentia, quamvis non  apponatur signum universale, non haberent locum, quinimo exclude-  rentur a τῷ "universaliter attribuatur.— Quid sit autem attribui aliquid  universali ratione naturae universalis supra n. 9 explicatum est.  Ld  *A: praedicati  communiter.  * anc: labens.  *  Codd. : non est  natus.  *  pc: sed tamen.  * Cap. xiv et ul-  timo.  Supplem.  Caiet. lect. xur.  CAP. VII,  homo non est animal: quia hae enunciationes eam-  dem habent vim ratione significati; ac si dice-  retur, omnis homo est animal, nullus homo est  animal.  23. Deinde cum dicit: Zn eo vero quod etc.,  removet quoddam quod posset esse dubium. Quia  enim posuerat quamdam diversitatem in opposi-  tione enunciationum ex hoc quod universale su-  * BC: ex.  *Num. 10. -  .  * ABC.-P.:ufra.  pertinent.  * AC: famen.  *  Nempe magis  ntertule. -  *  .I,  num.  Pr e, s.  lect. 1.  mitur a * parte subiecti universaliter vel non uni-  versaliter, posset aliquis credere quod similis di-  versitas  nasceretur ex parte praedicati, ex hoc  scilicet  ^  quod universale praedicari posset et uni-  versaliter et non universaliter; et ideo ad hoc  excludendum dicit quod in eo quod praedicatur  aliquod universale, non est verum quod praedi-  cetur universale universaliter. Cuius quidem du-  plex esse potest ratio.  Una quidem, quia talis modus praedicandi vi-  detur repugnare praedicato secundum propriam  rationem quàm habet in enunciatione. Dictum est  enim supra * quod praedicatum est quasi pars  formalis enunciationis, subiectum autem est pars  materialis ipsius: cum autem aliquod universale  profertur universaliter, ipsum universale sumitur  secundum habitudinem quam habet ad singularia,  quae sub se continet; sicut et quando universale  profertur particulariter, sumitur secundum habi-  tudinem quam habet ad aliquod contentorum sub  se; et sic utrumque pertinet  ὩΣ  5.-  '  * ad materialem deter-  minationem universalis: et ideo neque signum  universale neque particulare convenienter additur  praedicato, sed magis subiecto: convenientius enim  dicitur, nullus homo est asinus, quam, omnis homo  est nullus asinus; et similiter convenientius dicitur,  aliquis homo est albus, quam, homo est aliquid  album. Invenitur autem * quandoque a philosophis  signum particulare appositum praedicato, ad in-  sinuandum quod praedicatum est zn plus * quam  subiectum, et hoc praecipue cum, habito genere,  investigant differentias completivas speciei, sicut  in II De anima * dicitur quod Anima est actus  quidam.  €) .Ex hoc scilicet etc.— A: ex hoc quod universale praedicari pos-  set universaliter et non universaliter.- E: ex hoc scilicet quod, et cae-  tera ut A. — BCD: ex hoc scilicet quod universale praedicari (D cor-  rupte, praedicamenti) posset vel universaliter vel non universaliter. De-  inde AE prosequuntur: et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit quod in eo  quod praedicatur aliquod (E, aliquid) universale non est verum quod  praedicetur  universale universaliter. - BCD: et ideo ad hoc exclu-  dendum subdit quod in eo quod praedicatur (BC, aliquod) universale  non est verum quod praedicetur (D, praedicatur) universale universaliter.  Et B prosequitur: cuius quidem ratio duplex est. Quia ergo codices  concordant, et mentem s. Thomae perspicue traducunt, ex ipsis confeci-  mus lectionem nostram atque suffecimus Pianae: ex hoc scilicet quod  universaliter praedicari posset vel non universaliter; et ideo ad exclu-  dendum dubitationem dicit quod in eo quod ponitur aliquod universale  praedicari, quod praedicetur universale universaliter, non est verum.  αα) Falsae essent si praedicatum etc. Ita codd. ABC; et omnes Ven.  edd., et optime, ut ipse contextus aperte indicat. -- Editio Piana: falsae  sunt (si omittitur) significatum etc.; quae lectio nonnihil habet obscu-  ritatis, ponendo significatum loco praedicatum. Codd. vero DE conve-  LECT. X  51  Alia vero ratio potest accipi ex parte veritatis  enunciationis; et ista specialiter habet locum in  affirmationibus quae falsae essent si praedicatum"  universaliter praedicaretur. Et ideo manifestans id  quod posuerat, subiungit quod Nulla affirmatio  est * in qua, scilicet vere, de universali praedicato  universaliter praedicetur, idest in qua universali  praedicato utitur ad universaliter praedicandum *;  ut  si diceretur, omnis homo est omne animal.  Oportet* enim,secundum praedicta, quod hoc prae-  dicatum animal, secundum singula * quae sub  ipso continentur, praedicaretur de singulis quae  continentur süb homine; et hoc non potest esse  verum, neque si praedicatum sit im plus quam  subiectum, neque si praedicatum sit convertibile  cum.  eo *. Oporteret enim quod quilibet unus  homo esset animalia omnia, aut omnia risibilia :  quae repugnant * rationi singularis, quod accipitur  sub universali. - Nec est instantia si dicatur quod  haec est vera, omnis homo est omnis disciplinae  susceptivus: disciplina enim non praedicatur de  homine, sed susceptivum disciplinae; repugnaret  autem veritati 51 diceretur, omnis homo est omne  susceptivum disciplinae.  24.  Signum autem universale negativum, vel  particulare affirmativum , etsi convenientius po-  nantur ex parte subiecti, non tamen repugnat  veritati  etiam  si  ponantur ex parte praedicati.  Contingit enim huiusmodi enunciationes in aliqua  materia esse veras: haec enim est vera, omnis  homo nullus lapis est; et similiter haec est vera,  omnis homo aliquod animal est. Sed haec, omnis  homo omne animal est, in quacumque materia  proferatur, falsa est. Sunt autem quaedam aliae  tales* enunciationes semper falsae; sicut ista, ali-  quis homo omne animal est ?' (quae habet eamdem  causam falsitatis cum hac, omnis homo omne ani-  mal est); et si quae aliae similes, sunt semper  falsae: in omnibus enim * eadem ratio est. Et ideo  per hoc quod Philosophus reprobavit istam, omnis  homo omne animal est, dedit intelligere omnes  consimiles esse improbandas.  niunt cum codd. citatis, nisi quod in cod. D loco praedicatum imperitus  amanuensis ponit erronee (et hoc fere semper) praedicamentum et  praestaretur loco praedicaretur, et in cod. E habetur erunt loco essent.  —  Ex praefatis autem codicibus adiecimus in principio eiusdem periodi  ratio; quod vocabulum in ed. Piana deest.  Denique notamus quod in  codd. ABCE legitur non, quae ratio specialiter, ut in P., sed et ista  specialiter etc. Lectioni Pianae suffecimus ef ista iuxta meliorum codd.  consensum. Debet tamen subintelligi ratio, nempe, et ista ratio.  88) Subiungit quod, nulla affirmatio est etc. — Lectio ista Piana con-  cordat cum lectione cod. A: subiungit quod, nulla affirmatio erit, in  qua scilicet vere praedicatur universaliter de universali praedicato ,  idest etc.; et est etiam lectio indicata a B: subiungit quod nulla est af-  Jirmatio in qua universale (sic) etc., idest in qua universali praedi-  cato utitur etc.— Cod. C: quod nulla affirmatio erit manifesta, scilicet  vera praedicetur universaliter de universali praedicato, idest etc. Le-  ctio intricata.  YY) Aliquis homo omne animal est etc. Est nostrorum omnium codd.  lectio, quam Pianae et edd. Ven. sufficimus: aliquis homo omne animal  est, et aliae similes sunt semper falsae etc.  τὸ τὴ  «x  9g  *  4:  ad verum  praedicandum.  *  Edd. ab : opor-  teret.  Ἔ: $ua singula-  ria.  *  Nempe  dem   eius-  quantitatis  seu universalita-  tis  cum  subie-  cto. - Quam sub-  iectum, et cum eo  ex cod. A;qui pro-  sequitur: qua o-  porteret quod.  *pgcE: quod re-  pugnat.  *  A:  Sunt quae-  dam tales.  TY  *  pc omittunt e-  nim.  52  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO UNDECIMA  DE OPPOSITIONE INTER PROPOSITIONES UNIVERSALES  ET PARTICULARES DEQUE MODO QUO SE HABENT AFFIRMATIO  ET NEGATIO OPPOSITAE AD VERUM ET FALSUM  ᾿Αντικεῖσθαι μὲν οὖν κατάφασιν ἀποφάσει λέγω ἀντιφα-  τικῶς τὴν τὸ καθόλου σημαίνουσαν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐ  καθόλου, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός" οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος  λευκός: οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος Aeuxóg: ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος  λευχός.  ᾿Εναντίως δὲ τὴν τοῦ καθόλου κατάφασιν, καὶ τὴν τοῦ  χαθόλου ἀπόφασιν, οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος Acuxóc, οὐδεὶς  ἄνθρωπος λευχός, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, οὐδεὶς ἄν-  θρωπος δίκαιος.  Διὸ ταύτας μὲν οὐχ οἷόντε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, τὰς δὲ  ἀντικειμένας αὐταῖς ἐνδέχεταί ποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ  ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι" οἷον οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός, καὶ  ἔστι τις ἄνθρωπος λευχός.  :  Ὅσαι μὲν οὖν ἀντιφάσεις τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶ χαθόλου,  ἀνάγκη τὴν ἑτέραν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἢ ψευδῆ. Καὶ ὅσαι  ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕχαστα, οἷον ἔστι Σωχράτης Acuxóc,  .  οὐχ ἔστι Σωχράτης λευχός.  Ὅσαι δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου μέν, μὴ καθόλου δέ, οὐχ ἀεὶ  ἡ μὲν ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ ψευδής" ἅμα γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστιν  Εἰ  εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευχός, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἔστιν  ἄνθρωπος λευχός: καὶ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος καλός, καὶ οὐκ  ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος χαλός.  γὰρ αἰσχρός χαὶ οὐ χαλός: χαὶ εἰ γίνεταί τι, καὶ  οὐχ  ἔστι.  Δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν ἐξαίφνης ἄτοπον εἶναι Sid τὸ φαίνεσθαι  σημαίνειν τὸ οὐχ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος Acuxóg ἅμα καὶ  ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός: τὸ δὲ οὔτε ταὐτὸν ση-  μαίνει, οὔθ᾽ ἅμα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.  SyNoPsis. — 1. Argumentum textus.- 2. Propositiones parti-  culares, proprie loquendo, non sunt oppositae, quia ex modo  seu vi enunciationis non habent quod affirmatio et negatio sint  de eodem subiecto.-3. Suppositis requisitis ad rationem oppo-  sitionis (lect.1x, nn. 8 et 9), oppositio inter propositionem univer-  salem et particularem est oppositio contradictoria; et ideo tales  propositiones dicuntur contradictoriae.- 4. Ratio est quia contra-  dictio est solummodo remotio affirmationis per negationem; uni-  versalis autem affirmativa removetur per solam negationem par-  ticularis; et particularis affirmativa removetur solum per univer-  salem negativam. — 5. Hinc contradictio non admittit medium,  quia inter affirmationem et negationem non datur medium;  sed contrarietas admittit medium, quia inter extreme distantes  propositiones  universales  dantur  propositiones particulares, —  x29 καὶ ostquam Philosophus determinavit de  *  Codd. - p.: hic  nunc.  *  Cf. lect.x, n. 17.  ** ABC.-P.: ποίαπ-  dum est.  *  Infra n. 5.  ὯΝ» oppositione enunciationum , compa-  EXN'rando universales enunciationes ad  indefinitas, hic * determinat de oppo-  sitione enunciationum comparando universales ad  particulares *. Circa quod considerandum est **  quod potest duplex oppositio in his notari: una qui-  dem universalis ad particularem, et hanc primo  tangit; alia vero universalis ad universalem, et  hanc tangit secundo; ibi: Contrariae vero etc. *  2. Particularis vero affirmativa et particularis  negativa, non habent proprie loquendo oppositio-  nem, quia oppositio attenditur circa idem subie-  ctum; subiectum autem particularis enunciationis  est  universale particulariter sumptum, non pro  *  Opponi itaque dico affirmationem negationi contradicto-  rie, quae universaliter significat, ei quae non universa-  liter; ut, omnis homo albus est, non omnis homo albus  est; nullus homo albus est, quidam homo albus est.  Contrarie vero universalem affirmationem et universalem  negationem; ut, omnis homo iustus est, nullus homo  iustus est.  vero  Quocirca has quidem impossibile est simul esse veras;  his  oppositas, contingit aliquando in eodem; ut,  non omnis homo albus est, et quidam homo albus est.  Quaecumque igitur contradictiones universalium sunt uni-  versaliter, necesse est alteram esse veram vel falsam.  Et quaecumque in singularibus sunt; ut, Socrates albus  est, non est Socrates albus.  Quaecumque autem universalium non universaliter, non  haec quidem semper vera est, illa vero falsa; simul  enim verum est dicere, quoniam est homo albus, et,  non est homo albus, et quoniam est homo pulcher, et,  non est homo pulcher.  Si enim foedus est, non est pulcher, et si fit aliquid, non-  dum est.  Videbitur autem subito inconveniens esse, idcirco quoniam  videtur significare, non est homo albus, simul etiam  quoniam nullus homo est albus; hoc autem neque  idem significat, neque simul necessario sunt.  6.Ergo propositiones contrariae non possunt esse simul verae,  quia contraria mutuo se expellunt; sed tamen earum contradi-  ctoriae, nempe media, quae sunt propositiones particulares,  possunt esse simul verae, quia, ut dictum est, proprie loquendo  non.  opponuntur. — 7. Propositiones. contradictoriae nequeunt  esse simul verae, nequeunt esse simul falsae; sed una earum  est  nes  necessario vera, altera est necessario falsa. — 8. Propositio-  indefinitae  licet  apparenter contradictoriae, tamen revera  tales non sunt vi propositionum, quamvis hoc contingat esse  vi  materiae seu subiecti, cui essentialiter praedicatum debet  convenire aut non convenire.— 9. Solvitur obiectio.— 10. Ex vi  propositionis veritas et falsitas in propositionibus indefinitis  est  sicut  bitatio.  aliquo.  in propositionibus particularibus.— r1. Excluditur du-  determinato singulari, sed indeterminate  pro quocumque *; et ideo, cum de universali par-  ticulariter sumpto aliquid affirmatur vel negatur,  ipse modus enunciandi non habet quod affirma-  tio et negatio sint de eodem: quod requiritur ad  oppositionem affirmationis et negationis, secun-  dum praemissa *.  3. Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio, quae uni-  versale significat, scilicet universaliter, opponitur  contradictorie ei, quae non significat universaliter  sed particulariter, si una earum sit affirmativa ,  altera vero sit negativa * (sive universalis sit affir-  mativa et particularis negativa, sive e converso *);  ut cum dicitur, omnis homo est albus, non omnis  homo est albus: hoc enim quod dico, non omnis,  *  Seq. c. vi.  * Lect. ix, n. 8.  *  anc:  et. altera  (5 sit) negativa.  *  ABc omittunt $i-  converso  e  ve  sed male.  CAP. VII, LECT. XI  *  galtivae.  Codd.- p.: ne-  *  Cf. lect. prae-  ced., n. 13.  *A: omittit ad  *p: per solam -  *  *  pra n. x  ABCD: negativa.  ABCD :  tivae.  *  g: et  rma-  ἡ  particu-  Muri τήν,  * Num. seq.  ponitur loco signi particularis negativi *; unde ae-  quipollet ei quae est, quidam homo non est al-  bus; sicut et nullus, quod idem significat ac si  diceretur, non ullus * vel non quidam, est signum  universale negativum. Unde hae duae, quidam  homo est albus (quae est particularis affirmativa),  nullus homo est albus (quae est universalis nega-  tiva), sunt contradictoriae.  4. Cuius ratio est quia contradictio consistit in  sola remotione affirmationis per negationem; uni-  versalis autem affirmativa removetur per solam  negationem particularis, nec aliquid aliud ex.ne-  cessitate ad hoc* exigitur; particularis autem affir-  mativa removeri non potest nisi per universalem *  negativam, quia iam dictum est * quod particula-  ris affirmativa * non proprie opponitur particulari  negativae *. Unde relinquitur quod universali affir-  mativae contradictorie opponitur particularis ne-  gaátiva, et particulari affirmativae universalis ne-  gativa.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Contrariae vero etc., tan-  git oppositionem universalium enunciationum *; et  dicit quod universalis affirmativa et universalis  negativa sunt contrariae; sicut, omnis homo est iu-  stus, nullus homo est iustus, quia scilicet univer-  salis negativa * non solum removet universalem  affirmativam, sed etiam designat extremam di-  stantiam, in quantum negat totum quod affirmatio  ponit *; et hoc pertinet ad rationem contrarietatis ;  et ideo particularis affirmativa et negativa * se  habent sicut medium inter contraria.  6. Deinde cum dicit :. Quocirca has quidem etc.,  ostendit quomodo se habeant affirmatio et negatio  oppositae ad verum et falsum. Et primo, quantum  ad contrarias; secundo, quantum ad contradicto-  rias; ibi: Quaecumque igitur contradictiones etc.* ;  a) Universalis negativa. Addimus vocabulum negativa ex codd. , quod  requiritur ad integritatem sententiae: illud autem desideratur in Piana;  sed certe est mendum typographicum.  — In numero praecedenti notavi-  mus in margine lectionem codd. ABCD: particularis negativa non pro-  prie opponitur particulari affirmativae: quae lectio nulla ratione discor-  data Piana, quam retinemus, sed quoad argumentandi formam melior  videtur. Datur enim ratio, quare particularis affirmativa removeri non  possit nisi per universalem negativam. Ratio vero est quia affirmativa  removeri debet per negativam; sed particularis affirmativa non potest  removeri per particularem negativam: nam particularis negativa non  proprie opponitur particulari affirmativae.  B) Simul possunt esse. Deest simul in Piana, sed adiicimus ex codd.  ACE.-—B omittit: in eodem, sed remotiones albi et nigri simul pos-  sunt esse.  Y  Duo determinantur in hoc numero: i. quod propositiones contrariae  non possunt esse simul verae; 2. quod propositiones subcontrariae, seu  particulares, seu mediae, possunt esse simul verae. Ex his sequitur quod  propositiones contrariae, vi propositionis, possunt esse simul falsae, quia  potest aliquod praedicatum falso affirmari et falso negari de subiecto  universaliter sumpto; sicut falsae sunt propositiones: omnes homines  sunt iusti; nullus homo est iustus. Dixi vi propositionis, quia ex vi  materiae propositiones contrariae possunt aequivalere contradictoriis. -  Sequitur secundo quod propositiones subcontrariae nequeunt esse si-  mul falsae: nam si, e.g., essent simul falsae: aliquis homo est iustus ;  aliquis homo non est iustus: falsae essent universales; omnis homo est  iustus; nullus homo est iustus. Quo posito, contradictoriae essent si-  mul falsae: quae est absurda illatio, ut probatur in sequenti numero.  y) Deinde cum dicit etc. In editionibus abc integer num. 7 omittitur,  quem cum codd. omnibus et Venetis edd. Peri hermeneias saeculi XVI  habet Piana. Qua autem ratione omittatur nescio, sed omittitur errore  plane manifesto. Etenim s. Thomas manifestans ordinem textus, pro-  ponit prius dicendum esse (n. 6): de veritate et falsitate in propositioni-  bus contrariis; deinde (n. 7 de veritate et falsitate in. propositionibus  contradictoriis; postea qu ) de veritate et falsitate in. propositionibus  non veré sed apparenter contradictoriis. Subtracto igitur num. 7, manca  esset expositio et Aristotelis textui haud adaequata.  9) Nec potest se in plus extendere nisi ut removeat affirmationem.  53  tertio, quantum ad ea quae videntur contradicto-  ria, et non sunt; ibi: Quaecumque autem in uni-  versalibus etc. ἢ — Dicit ergo primo quod quia uni-  versalis affirmativa et universalis negativa sunt  contrariae, impossibile est quod sint simul verae.  Contraria enim mutuo se expellunt. Sed particula-  res, quae contradictorie opponuntur universalibus  contrariis, possunt simul verificari in eodem; sicut,  non omnis homo est albus, quae contradictorie  opponitur huic, omnis homo est albus, et, quidam  homo est albus, quae contradictorie opponitur huic,  nullus homo est albus. Et huiusmodi etiam simile  invenitur in contrarietate rerum: nam album et  nigrum numquam simul esse possunt in eodem,  sed remotiones albi et nigri simul possunt esse ^:  potest enim aliquid esse neque album neque ni-  grum, sicut patet in eo quod est pallidum. Et si-  militer contrariae enunciationes non possunt si-  mul esse verae, sed earum contradictoriae, a  quibus removentur, simul possunt esse verae.  7. Deinde cum dicit 7: Quaecumque igitur con-  iradictiones etc., ostendit qualiter veritas et fal-  sitas  se  habeant in contradictoriis. Circa quod  considerandum est quod, sicut dictum est supra *,  in contradictoriis  * negatio non plus facit, nisi quod  removet affirmationem. Quod contingit dupliciter.  Uno modo, quando est altera earum universalis,  altera * particularis, ut supra dictum est **. Alio  modo, quando utraque est singularis: quia tunc  negatio ex necessitate refertur ad idem (quod non  contingit in particularibus et indefinitis), nec po-  test se in p extendere nisi ut removeat affir-  mationem ὃ, Et ideo singularis affirmativa semper  contradicit singulari negativae, supposita identitate  praedicati et subiecti. Et ideo dicit*quod, sive ac-  cipiamus contradictionem universalium universa-  Haec omnia desiderantur in edd. Piana, Venet. 1526 et 1595, Antuerpiensi  et  Paris.; ea tamen habent codd. Et recte. Duo enim in contradictoriis  requiruntur; unum quod affirmatio et negatio referantur ad idem ; et hoc  est commune cuilibet oppositioni proprie dictae; alterum quod negatio  non plus faciat nisi, quod removeat affirmationem , et viceversa, ut hic  s. Thomas dicit; et hoc proprium est oppositionis contradictoriae. Porro  utrumque recte affirmat Angelicus de propositionibus oppositis singula-  ribus; nempe quod et subiectum sit idem et quod negatio non plus se  extendat quam ut removeat affirmationem. Ex quo concludit quod singu-  idem  laris affirmativa semper contradicit singulari negativae, et viceversa, seu,  ut  sed melius expressum (Cf. praecedentem notam αἱ, habent  codd.: singularis negativa semper contradictoria est (B: contradicit)  (D, non recte: contraria est) singulari affirmativae etc.  t) Et ideo dicit etc.— Codex E: « Et ideo dicit quod, sive accipia-  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  mus contradictiones universalium universaliter sive singularium enun-  ciationum, necesse est semper quod una sit vera et altera falsa. Ne-  que enim contingit simul esse verum esse et non esse, neque simul  esse falsum: quia verum nihil est aliud quam cum dicitur esse quod  est,  vel non esse quod non est; et falsum nihil aliud esse videtur  quam dicere esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est, ut patet ex  IV Metaphys. » Eamdem lectionem ,, quamvis in nonnullis corruptam  exhibent.alii codd,  — Cod. A: et ideo dicit quod si non (corrupte pro  sive) accipiantur... Neque enim contingit..., neque simul esse verum  et falsum esse: quia etc.; - B: neque enim contingit simul verum esse  et non esse, neque simul est falsum simul et verum, nihil aliud est  quam cum dicitur etc. ; — C: necesse est quod una sit vera et altera sit  falsa... quia verum...: falsum quam videtur dicere esse quod non  est etc.;- D: neque enim contingit simul verum esse et non esse...  quod patet ex .X Metaphysic.  Porro si vel leviter inspiciantur huiusmodi lectiones, apparet eas. se-  rio esse considerandas. Etenim probandum est ex contradictoriis propo-  sitionibus, sive sint de universalibus sive de singularibus, alteram esse  necessario veram et alteram falsam. In Piana autem probatur. ex eo  quod non contingat huiusmodi propositiones contradictorias esse simul  veras  aut  simul falsas, quia verum nihil aliud est nisi quando dici-  tur esse quod est, aut etc. At in lectione codd., probatio quod una ex  propositionibus contradictoriis vera sit et altera falsa, deducitur imme-  *  *  *  Num. 8.  Num. 4.  ABCE: dM COM-  tradictione.  *  ABC: quod qui-  dem.. (4: uno qui-  dem)... quando  una  earum  est  universalis et al.  tera etc.  ἘΣ  Num. 3. - Di-  ctum est ex codd.  ὃ  54  *  Cf. lect.ix, nn. 2  et 3.  *  Cap. vit, n.  Comment.s.  5.-  Th.  lib. V, lect. 1x.  * Deinde cum di-  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  mativa, quam particularis affirmativa; et ideo in-  definitam affirmativam dicunt esse sumendam pro  particulari affirmativa: sed negativam universalem,  quae totum destruit, dicunt esse indigniorem * par-  ticulari negativa, quae destruit partem, sicut uni-  versalis corruptio peior est quam particularis ; et  ideo dicunt quod indefinita negativa sumenda est  ter, scilicet quantum ad unam earum, sive singu-  larium enunciationum, semper necesse est quod  una sit vera et altera falsa. Neque enim contin-  git esse simul veras aut simul falsas, quia verum  nihil aliud est, nisi quando dicitur esse quod est,  aut non esse quod non est *; falsum autem, quan-  do dicitur esse quod non est, aut non esse quod  est, ut patet ex IV Metaphysicorum *.  8. Deinde cum dicit *: Quaecumque autem uni-  cit ex codd.  *  Et ex codd.  ω  Ammonius.  *  E:  magis se  habet ad.  versalium etc., ostendit qualiter se habeant veritas  et  falsitas in his, quae videntur esse contradicto-  ria, sed non sunt. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo,  proponit quod intendit; secundo, probat proposi-  tum; ibi: Si enim turpis non probus 5 etc.; ter-  tio, excludit id quod facere posset dubitationem;  ibi: Videbitur autem subito inconveniens etc.- Circa  primum considerandum est quod affirmatio et ne-  gatio in indefinitis propositionibus videntur con-  tradictorie opponi propter hoc, quod est unum  subiectum non determinatum per signum particu-  lare, et ideo videtur affirmatio et negatio esse de  eodem. Sed ad hoc removendum Philósophus di-  cit quod quaecumque affirmative et negative di-  cuntur de universalibus non universaliter sumptis,  non semper oportet quod unum sit verum, et *aliud  sit falsum, sed possunt simul esse vera. Simul  enim est verum dicere quod Aormo est albus, et,  homo non est albus, et quod homo est probus, et,  homo non est probus?.  9. In quo quidem, ut Ammonius refert, aliqui Ari-  stoteli contradixerunt ^ ponentes quod indefinita  negativa semper sit accipienda pro universali ne-  gativa. Et hoc astruebant * primo quidem tali ra-  tione: quia indefinita, cum sit indeterminata, se  habet in ratione materiae; materia autem secun-  dum se considerata, magis trahitur ad*id quod  indignius est; dignior autem est universalis affir-  diate ex obiecto, nempe ex eo quod non contingat simul esse verum  esse et non esse etc. Quae ratio nonnisi implicite et consequenter da-  tur a Piana in verbis, quae et codices habent. Posito enim quod verum  non sit aliud nisi quando dicitur esse quod est etc., et supposito quod  esse simul et non esse eiusdem subiecti repugnet; manifestum est quod  non contingit simul esse verum esse et non esse etc. — Aegidius videtur  legisse non diversimode a Piana: « Dicit ergo Philosophus quod sive  »  accipiantur contradictiones universalium enunciationum sive singula-  »  »  rium; necesse est quod una sit vera et altera falsa, ita quod nun-  quam simul sint verae vel simul falsae » (In lib. I Peri herm., ed.  cit., fol. 54, col. 3).  t) Si enim turpis, non probus. Haec lectio Piana ea est quae datur  ab omnibus edd, Ven. et codd,  — Unus A: si enim turpis non est pulcher  (Cf. text.).  ἢ) Homo est probus et homo non est probus. Exemplum primum  est Aristotelis, sed alterum non est neque in textu Aristotelico, neque  in translatione latina quam textui adnectimus. Est tamen in translatione  qua utebatur Boethius (Cf. De interpretat., Ed. II, lib. II, pag. 351, ed. cit.),:  et in translatione textus quae in cod. A praemittitur Commentario s. Tho-  mae. En huius cod. translatio: « Simul enim verum est quoniam est  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  homo albus et non est homo albus; et est homo probus et non  est homo probus: si enim turpis est, non est probus; et homo pulcer  est, et non.  est homo pulcer. Si enim foedus et non est pulcer; et  si fit aliquid, non est. » Boethius loc. cit. legit: « Simul enim verum  est  dicere quoniam, est homo albus et non est homo albus, et est  homo probus et non est homo probus. Si enim turpis est, non pro-  bus est, et si fit aliquid, etiamnum non est. »  9) Aliqui Aristoteli contradixerunt etc. Eorum qui Aristoteli con-  tradixerunt neminem recenset nominatim Ammonius in sua Znterpreta-  tione in librum Peri hermeneias. Ait enim sect. II, 8, 1v: Zaec itaque sic  pronunciante Aristotele, reclamantibusque illi claris viris ac mihi vene-  ratione prosequendis, par utique fuerit etc. (fol. 16 verso, col. 2. — Ve-  netiis 1546). Boethius (Op. et loc. cit. pag. 352) recenset Syrianum neo-  platonicum: « Syrianus, inquit Boethius, nititur indefinitam negationem  »  »  vim definitae obtinere negationis ostendere; et hoc multis probare  nititur argumentis, Aristotele maxime reclamante; neque hoc tantum  pro universali negativa. Ad quod etiam inducunt *  quod philosophi, et etiam ipse Aristoteles utitur  indefinitis negativis pro universalibus; sicut dicitur  in libro Physic. * quod non est motus praeter res;  et in libro De anima *, quod non est sensus prae-  ter  quinque.  Sed istae rationes non concludunt *. Quod enim  primo * dicitur quod materia secundum se sumpta  sumitur pro peiori, verum est secundum senten-  tiam Platonis, qui non distinguebat privationem a  materia', non autem est verum secundum Aristo-  telem, qui dicit in lib. I Physic. * quod malum  et turpe et alia huiusmodi δα defectum pertinen-  tia  non  dicuntur  de materia nisi per accidens.  Et ideo non oportet quod indefinita semper stet  pro peiori.  Dato etiam quod indefinita necesse sit sumi  pro peiori, non oportet quod sumatur pro uni-  versali negativa; quia sicut in genere affirmatio-  nis, universalis affirmativa est potior particulari,  utpote particularem affirmativam continens; ita  etiam in genere negationum universalis negativa  potior est * Oportet autem in unoquoque genere  considerare id quod est potius in genere illo, non  autem id quod est potius simpliciter.  Ulterius etiam, dato quod particularis negativa  esset potior omnibus modis, non tamen adhuc  ratio sequeretur: non * enim ideo indefinita affir-  mativa sumitur pro particulari affirmativa, quia  sit indignior ?, sed quia de universali potest aliquid  »  »  »  suis, sed platonicis quoque aristotelicisque rationibus probare con-  tendit, eam quae dicit, non est homo iustus, huiusmodi esse, qualis  est ea quae dicit, »ullus homo iustus est. » — Infra legimus cum codd.  ABCD: ad quod etiam inducunt (illi nempe qui Aristoteli contradixe-  runt) quod etc.: quae est lectio perspicua. Eamdem indicat lectionem  cod. E: ad quod esse inducunt philosophi quod utuntur et etiam ipse  Aristoteles utitur. Placet, philosophi utuntur. - P.: ad quod etiam indu-  cuntur philosophi et ipse Aristoteles etc. — Immediate infra codd. BCD  melius habent: sicut cum dicitur (D, dicit) in libro Physic.— Porro  .  in fine huius numeri explicatur a s. Thoma quandonam utuntur philoso-  phi indefinitis negativis pro universalibus.  0 Non distinguebat privationem a materia. Plato in Timaeo de  materia prima loquens ait: Ex propria potentia recedit numquam ,  ix γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τοπαρὰπευν οὐχ ἐξίσταται δυμάμεως. Suscipit enim  semper omnia nec ullam unquam iis similem ullo pacto sibi formam  contrahit (Ed. cit. Marsilii Ficini, pag. 1060). Duo ergo sunt in conceptu  materiae, nempe ratio subiecti, quod cuncta recipit genera (75.), et ratio  privationis qua subiectum istud afficitur. Qua in re Aristoteles non con-  tradicit sed subscribit Platoni. Discrimen est quod ubi Plato conten-  dit materiam et privationem neque re neque ratione inter se' differre,  hoc  Aristoteles contra tuetur distinctionem non quidem realem sed rationis  inter materiam et privationem seu potentialitatem. Quid autem sequatur  ex  discrimine, quod prima fronte videri aliquibus potest nullius  momenti, demonstratur in libro primo Physicae auscultationis, seu Phy-  sicorum (Cf. ib. Comment. s. Th. lect. xvj.  x) Universalis negativa potior est. Ratio huius asserti non datur,  quia eadem est ac data pro enunciatione universali affirmativa. Sicut  enim haec continet particularem affirmativam, ita enunciatio universalis  negativa continet particularem negativam. — Codd. AC omittunt particu-  lari et legunt: potior, utpote affirmativam particularem continens ;  B autem legit: universalis affirmativa est potior; ita etiam etc.: nempe  omittit rationem a s. Thoma assignatam, cur universalis propositio  affir-  mativa sit potior affirmativa particulari.  X)  Quia sit indignior etc. Ita Piana et Ven. edd. cum cod. D.— Codd.  ABCE; quia sit dignior. Lectio P. est vera. Nam philosophi quos, hic  s. Thomas confutat, propositionem indefinitam affirmativam dicebant esse  *  A:  digniorem;  sed est error (Cf.  not. x).  *  p:  "  inducit.  "Lib. III, c. 1,  "Ed Comment.  8.  *  Thom. lect. 1.  Lib. III, c. 1, n.r. -Comment.s.Th.  Plato.  *  Cap. ix, nn. t,  . -  Comment.  s.Thom. lect.xv.  P.: in lib. Phys. --  ABC: ἐπ primo.  » ABCE omitt. ra-  0.-E: $  e-  tur duod dicunt  non etc.  CAP. VII,  *  Cf. lect. prae-  ced. n. 13.  U  *  .  Cf. supra n. 8,  not. 7.  *  affirmari ratione suiipsius, vel ratione partis con-  tentae sub eo *; unde sufficit ad veritatem | eius  quod praedicatum uni parti conveniat (quod de-  signatur per signum. particulare); et ideo veritas  particularis affirmativae sufficit ad veritatem in-  definitae affirmativae. Et simili ratione veritas par-  ticularis  tae  negativae,  negativae sufficit ad veritatem indefini-  quia similiter potest aliquid  ne-  gari de universali vel ratione suiipsius, vel ratione  suae partis ^.  Utuntur autem quandoque philosophi indefi-  nitis negativis pro universalibus in his, quae per  se removentur ab universalibus; sicut et utuntur  indefinitis  affirmativis  pro  universalibus in his,  quae per se de universalibus praedicantur.  10. Deinde cum dicit: Si enim turpis est * etc.,  probat propositum per id, quod est ab omnibus  concessum. Omnes enim concedunt quod indefi-  Anc: s/ parti- tjva-sit  Vera *.  cularis sit vera. -  101  ABEY.  nita affirmativa verificatur, si particularis affirma-  Contingit autem accipi duas affirma-  tivas indefinitas, quarum una includit negationem  alterius, puta cum sunt opposita praedicata: quae  7944.: potes. quidem oppositio potest contingere * dupliciter. -  a  *  A: uno  modo.  quidem  θυ  Uno modo *, secundum perfectam contrarietatem ,  sicut turpis, idest inhonestus, opponitur probo, idest  honesto, et foedus, idest deformis secundum cor-  pus, opponitur pulchro. Sed per quam rationem  ista affirmativa est vera, homo est probus, quodam  homine existente probo, per eamdem rationem  sumendam particulariter, pro universaliter, quia particularis propositio  affirmativa est indignior affirmativa universali, et indefinita stat pro indi-  gniori. Id patet ex supra dictis in hoc numero. Sed non quia propositio  affirmativa particularis indignior est universali, inquit s. Thomas, pro-  positio indefinita affirmativa sumenda est pro particulari, sed alia ra-  tione, nempe quia de universali. potest aliquid affirmari etc.  V) Quia similiter potest... vel ratione suae partis.— Edit. Piana ex  LECT.'XI  55  ista est vera, homo est turpis, quodam homine  existente turpi. Sunt ergo istae duae verae simul,  homo est probus, homo est turpis; sed ad hanc,  homo est turpis, sequitur ista, homo non est probus;  ergo istae duae sunt simul verae, homo est pro-  bus, homo non est probus: et eadem ratione istae  duae, homo est pulcher, homo non est pulcher. —  Alia.  autem.  oppositio attenditur secundum. per-  fectum. et imperfectum, sicut. 7overi opponitur  ad motum. esse, et fieri ad factum esse: unde ad  fieri sequitur non esse eius quod fit in. perma-  nentibus, quorum esse est perfectum; secus autem  est in successivis, quorum esse est imperfectum *.  Sic. ergo haec ' est. vera, homo est albus, quodam  homine existente albo; et pari ratione, quia qui-  dam homo fit albus, haec est vera, homo * fit  albus; ad quam sequitur, homo non: est albus.  Ergo istae duae sunt simul verae, homo est albus,  homo .non. est. albus.  11.  Deinde cum dicit: Videbitur. autem etc. ,  excludit id quod faceret dubitationem circa prae-  dicta; et dicit quod subito, id est primo aspectu  videtur  hoc  esse  inconveniens,  quod  dictum  quia hoc quod dico, homo non est albus,  videtur idem significare cum hoc quod est *, nul-  lus homo est albus. Sed ipse hoc removet di-  cens  quod neque idem significant neque ex  necessitate sunt simul vera *, sicut ex praedictis  manifestum est.  oscitantia typographi legit; vel rationis suae partis.- BCE: quia similiter  contingit aliquid negari (AE negare)... vel ratione suae partis. Et ita  A, nisi quod habet, ratione partis.— D: quia similiter potest aliquid ne-  gativam (corrupte pro negari)... vel ratione suae partis.— Supra legimus  cum codd.: sed quia... vel ratione partis contentae sub eo: nam haec  lectio .conformior est iis quae sequuntur. P.: sed quia... vel ratione con-  tenti sub eo.  *  Codd.:  quae  habent esse im-  perfectum.  *nc.-P.:  dam homo.  *  qui-  ABE: quod dico.  *  Simul ex ABE  (Cf. text.).  56  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DUODECIMA  QUOD UNI AFFIRMATIONI UNA SOLA NEGATIO OPPONITUR  "We d  Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ μία ἀπόφασις μιᾶς χαταφάσεώς ἐστι"  τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖ ἀποφῆσαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὅπερ κατέ-  σεν ἡ κατάφασις, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕχαστά τινος, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν καθόλου τινός, ἢ ὡς κα-  θόλου, ἢ ὡς μὴ καθόλου.  Λέγω δὲ; οἷον ἔστι Σωχράτης λευχός, οὐχ ἔστι Σωχρά-  τῆς λευχός. "Edw δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου τὸ αὐτό,  οὐχ ἡ ἀντιχειμένη, ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται ἐχείνης ἑτέρα. Τῇ δὲ,  πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός, ἡ, οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός"  τῇ δέ, τὶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός, ἡ, οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευ-  χός: τῇ δὲ; ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευχός, ἡ, οὐχ ἔστιν  ἄνθρωπος λευχός.  ᾽  ,  2  :  ,  £25  5 -]  Ὁ  τι  μὲν οὖν pio XO TO QE μιὰ ἀποφᾶσις ἀντίχειται  ἀντιφατικῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, εἴρηται: καὶ ὅτι  αἱ  ἐναντίαι ἄλλαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὖται: καὶ ὅτι  τίς  οὐ πᾶσα ἀληθὴς 7| ψευδὴς ἀντίφασις, καὶ διὰ  χαὶ πότε ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.  Μία δέ ἐστι κατάφασις xal ἀπόφασις ἡ ἕν καθ᾽ ἑνὸς  σημαίνουσα, Ti καθόλου ὄντος χαθόλου, ἢ μη ὁμοίως,  οἷον πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρω-  πος λευχός: ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευκός, οὐχ ἔστιν ἄνθρω-  πος Asuxóe* οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευχός" ἔστι τις ἄνθρω-  πος λευχός᾽ εἰ τὸ λευχὸν ἕν σημαίνει.  Εἰ δὲ δυοῖν ἕν ὄνομα κεῖται, ἐξ ὧν μή ἐστιν ἕν,  οὐ μία  κατάφασις, οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις μία"  οἷον, εἴ τις θεῖτο ὄνομα ἱμάτιον ἵππῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸ  ἔστιν ἱμάτιον Acuxóv , αὕτη οὐ μία κατάφασις, οὐδὲ  ἀπόφασις μία.  Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἔστιν ἵππος καὶ ἄν-  θρωπος λευχός “. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ εἰπεῖν,  ἔστιν ἵππος λευχός, x«i ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευχός. Εἰ  οὖν αὖται πολλὰ σημαίνουσι χαὶ εἰσὶ πολλαί, δῆλον  ὅτι χαὶ ἡ πρώτη ἤτοι πολλὰ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνει: οὐ  γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωρος ἵππος.  Ὥστε οὐδ᾽ ty ταύταις ἀνάγκη; τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ  ψευδῇ εἶναι ἀντίφασιν.  SyNoPsis. — 1. Argumentum et divisio textus.— 2. Unius af-  firmationis est una negatio sola, quamvis sint plura oppositio-  num genera.- 3. Ratio est, quia negatio ideo opponitur affirma-  tioni, quia negat idem, et eodem modo, quod affirmatio ponit,  et  4.  nihil aliud. Haec autem negatio non potest esse nisi una.—  Manifestatur exemplis de subiecto tum singulari, tum uni-  versali universaliter sumpto, tum universali particulariter sum-  pto, tum indefinito.— 5. Solvitur difficultas quoad propositiones  indefinitas, inter quas non est proprie oppositio, nisi quando af-  firmatio et negatio sunt circa idem, uti accidit quando propo-  sitio est in materia necessaria (Cf. lect. xu, n. 3), et ideo prae-  yostquam Philosophus distinxit diver-  γε: quomodo.  *  *  Infra n. 7.  Propositum de-  est in codd.  sos modos oppositionum in enuncia-  NB tionibus, nunc intendit ostendere quod  (di^yuni affirmationi una negatio opponitur,  et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quod uni af-  firmationi una negatio opponitur; secundo, osten-  dit quae * sit una affirmatio vel negatio; ibi: Una  autem affirmatio * etc. Circa primum tria facit:  primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat  propositum *; ibi: Hoc enim idem etc.; tertio, epi-  logat quae dicta sunt; ibi: Manifestum est ergo etc.  «) Οὐδὲν... etc. ἢ ἔστιν ἵππος καὶ ἄνθρωπος λευχός. Ita Theodorus  Waitz (Aristotel. Organon., pars prior, Lipsiae 1844, pag. 129), quem  sequitur Didot. In editione stereotypa, Lipsiae 1872, et in antiquioribus  editionibus legitur: Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ εἰπέϊν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄν-  : Manifestum est autem. quoniam una negatio unius affir-  mationis est:  hoc enim idem oportet negare negationem quod affirmavit  affirmatio, et de eodem, vel de aliquo singularium, vel  de aliquo universalium, vel universaliter, vel non uni-  versaliter.  Dico autem, ut est, Socrates est albus, non est Socrates al-  bus. Si autem aliud aliquid de eodem, vel de alio idem,  non opposita erit, sed ab ea diversa. Huic autem quae  est,  omnis homo albus est, contradicit illa, quae est:  non omnis homo albus est, illi autem quae est, aliquis  homo albus est, illa quae est, nullus homo albus est;  ilii autem quae est, homo albus est, illa quae est,  homo albus non est.  Quod igitur una affirmatio uni negationi opponitur con-  tradictorie, et quae sunt hae, dictum est; et quod sunt  aliae contrariae, et quae sunt hae, dictum est; et quod  non omnis vera vel falsa contradictio, et quare et quando  vera vel falsa.  * Una autem affirmatio et negatio est, quae unum de uno  significat, vel cum sit universale universaliter vel non  universaliter ut, omnis homo albus est, non omnis  homo albus est, nullus homo albus est, quidam homo  albus est, si album unum significat.  Si vero duobus unum nomen positum est, ex quibus non  est unum, non est una affirmatio vel negatio;  ut, si quis ponat hoc nomen tunica homini et equo et dicat,  tunica est alba, haec non est una affirmatio nec una  negatio.  Nihil enim differt haec, quam dicere, est homo albus et  est  equus albus. Si ergo hae multa significant et sunt  plures, manifestum est quoniam et prima multa vel  nihil significat: neque enim aliquis est homo equus.  Quare nec in his necesse est hanc quidem contradictionem  veram esse, illam vero falsam,  dicatum per se convenit subiecto, vel quando subiectum est  singulare.- 6. Epilogus.— 7. Unitas affirmationis vel negationis,  sine qua non datur oppositio, requirit unitatem significationis ,  seu rei significatae tum ex parte subiecti tum ex parte praedicati;  sive haec unitas sit universalis, sive particularis, sive indefinita.-  8. Non sufficit autem unitas nominis; excepto casu in quo prae-  dicatum referatur ad vocem.- 9. Res declaratur exemplis et ra-  tione probatur.— 10. Corollarium. In affirmationibus et negatio-  nibus aequivoci subiecti non oportet unam esse veram et alte-  ram falsam, quia negatio et affirmatio possunt non esse circa  idem.  2. Dicit ergo primo, manifestum esse quod unius  affirmationis est una negatio sola. Et hoc quidem  fuit necessarium hic dicere *: quia cum posuerit  plura oppositionum genera, videbatur quod uni  affirmationi duae negationes opponerentur; sicut  huic affirmativae, omnis homo est albus, videtur,  secundum praedicta, haec negativa opponi, nullus  homo est albus, et haec, quidam homo non est  albus. Sed si quis recte consideret huius * affirma-  tivae, omnis homo est albus, negativa * est sola  ista, quidam homo non est albus, quae solummodo  θρωπος καὶ ἵππος λευχός. Quae autem sequuntur, Τοῦτο etc. usque ad  λευχός inclusive, omittuntur in versione latina: quinimo ex duabus sen-  tentis efficitur hoc modo una: Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπέϊν, ἔστιν  ἵππος λευχός, καὶ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος λευχός.  *  *  *  *  Seq. c. vir.  ABE: dici,  Codd.- r.: huic.  ABC: "tegatio.  CAP. VIII, LECT. XII  *  BCDE.- P.: deQui-  pollentia.- A: in  sua aequipollen-  tia.  subiectum  est  57  universale indefinite sumptum et .  dicit quod isti. affirmationi, omo est albus, op-  ponitur tanquam propria eius negatio illa quae  est, non est homo albus? .  *  Cf. lect. prae-  ced., n. 9.  *  *  Lect. ix, n. 8.  g: sed negatio  diversa.  *  Cf. lect. x, n.13.  removet ipsam, ut patet ex sua aequipollenti*, quae  est, non omnis homo est albus. Universalis vero ne-  gativa includit quidem in suo intellectu negationem  universalis affirmativae, in quantum includit par-  ticularem negativam *, sed supra hoc aliquid addit,  in quantum scilicet importat non solum remotio-  nem universalitatis, sed removet quamlibet par-  tem eius. Et sic patet quod sola una est negatio  universalis affirmationis: et idem apparet in aliis.  3. Deinde cum dicit: ZZoc enim etc., manifestat  propositum: et primo, per rationem; secundo, per  exempla; ibi: Dico autem, ut est Socrates albus.  Ratio autem sumitur ex hoc, quod supra dictum  est * quod negatio opponitur affirmationi, quae est  eiusdem de eodem: ex quo hic accipitur 7 quod  oportet negationem negare illud idem praedicatum,  quod affirmatio affirmavit et de eodem subiecto,  .  sive illud subiectum sit aliquid singulare, sive ali-  quid universale, vel universaliter, vel non uni-  versaliter sumptum ; sed hoc non contingit. fieri *  nisi uno (modo, ita scilicet ut negatio neget id  quod affirmatio posuit, et nihil aliud; ergo uni  affirmationi opponitur una sola negatio.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem, ut est. etc.,  manifestat propositum per exempla. - Et primo, in  singularibus: huic enim affirmationi, Socrates est  albus, haec sola opponitur, Socrates non est albus,  tanquam eius propria negatio. Si vero esset aliud  praedicatum vel aliud subiectum, non esset ne-  gatio opposita, sed omnino diversa *; sicut ista,  Socrates non est musicus, non opponitur ei quae est,  Socrates est albus; neque etiam illa quae est, Plato  est albus, huic quae est, Socrates non est albus.  Secundo, manifestat idem quando subiectum  affirmationis est universale universaliter sumptum;  sicut huic affirmationi, omnis homo est albus, oppo-  nitur sicut propria eius negatio ?, non omnis homo  est albus, quae aequipollet particulari negativae.  Tertio, ponit exemplum quando affirmationis  subiectum est universale particulariter sumptum:  et  dicit quod huic affirmationi, a/iquis homo est  albus, opponitur tanquam eius propria negatio,  nullus homo est albus. Nam nullus dicitur, quasi  non  ullus, idest, non aliquis *.  Quarto, ponit exemplum quando affirmationis  B) Sola una est negatio universalis affirmationis: et idem apparet  in aliis.- Affirmationis esse legendum indicatur ab his quae praemissa  sunt in principio huius numeri, et ita revera legunt codd. omnes. Edit.  Piana habet affirmativae. - Codex D plura hic interserit; legit enim: ef  sic patet quod sola una (negatio unius est affirmationis. Supple in  eodem genere; ut in contrarie oppositionis (sic) ad li omnis opponitur  nullus; in. contradictionis (sic) autem, ad li omnis opponitur quidam  non, vel non omnis, quod idem) est negatio universalis affirmationis ; et  idem apparet in aliis (Fol. 216 vers., col. 1). — Etiam praecisione facta  a repetitione verborum , negatio unius est affirmationis, et a confusione  qua haec omnia congeruntur, facile intelligitur ex verbo, Supple, ea quae  intra parenthesim clausimus non esse textus s. Thomae sed alicuius  adnotatoris, quae postea indoctus amanuensis ex margine textui inseruit.  y) Ex quo hic accipitur. Lectio est codd. ACD, quae vera videtur.  Edit. Piana: in quo hic accipit, sed non bene; ut patet ex processu argu-  mentativo s. Thomae. — BE: ex quo hic accipit. — Infra vero cum codd.  legimus: negare illud idem praedicatum etc.— P.: negare idem prae-  dicatum... sit aliquid singulare, sive aliquid universale, sive aliquid  universale universaliter vel non universaliter sumptum. Et ita Ven. edd.  9) Opponitur sicut propria eius negatio. lta legimus cum codd.  ACDE. Minus bene ed. Piana habet: opponitur eius propria negatio. —  Cod. B: sicut propria negatio. Et ita infra (Quarto ponit) tum B tum C.—  Supra vero (ante Secundo etc.) codd. ABCE habent: sicut ista, Socrates  non est musicus, non opponitur ei quae est, Socrates (B erronee, non  Opp. D. Tnuowax T. I.  5.  Sed videtur hoc esse contra id, quod supra  dictum est * quod negativa indefinita verificatur  simul cum indefinita affirmativa; negatio autem  non potest verificari simul cum sua opposita af-  firmatione, quia non contingit de eodem affir-  mare et negare.  Sed ad hoc dicendum quod oportet quod hic  dicitur intelligi quando negatio ad idem refertur  quod affirmatio continebat; et hoc potest esse du-  pliciter: uno modo, quando affirmatur aliquid inesse  homini ratione sui ipsius (quod est per se de eodem  praedicari), et hoc ipsum negatio negat; alio modo,  quando aliquid affirmatur de universali ratione sui  singularis, et pro eodem de eo * negatur.  6. Deinde cum dicit: Quod igitur una affir-  malio * etc., epilogat quae dicta sunt, et concludit  manifestum esse ex praedictis quod uni affirma-  tioni opponitur una negatio; et quod oppositarum  affirmationum et negationum aliae sunt contra-  riae, aliae contradictoriae; et dictum est quae sint  utraeque. Tacet autem de subcontrariis, quia non  sunt recte oppositae, ut supra dictum est*. Dictum  est  etiam quod non omnis contradictio * est vera  vel falsa; et sumitur hic large contradictio pro  qualicumque oppositione affirmationis et negatio-  nis: nam in his quae sunt vere contradictoriae  semper una est vera, et* altera falsa. Quare autem  in quibusdam oppositis hoc non verificetur, di-  ctum est supra *; quia scilicet quaedam non sunt  contradictoriae, sed contrariae, quae possunt simul  esse falsae. Contingit etiam * affirmationem et ne-  gationem non proprie opponi; et ideo contingit  eas esse veras simul. Dictum est autem * quando **  altera semper est vera, altera autem falsa, quia  scilicet in his quae vere sunt contradictoria.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Una autem affirmatio etc.,  ostendit quae sit affirmatio vel negatio una. Quod  quidem iam supra dixerat *, ubi habitum est quod  una est enunciatio, quae unum significat; sed quia  enunciatio, in qua aliquid praedicatur de aliquo uni-  versali universaliter vel non universaliter, multa 5  est) est albus; neque etiam ista (BCE, illa) Plato non est albus: cae-  teris omissis. Item cod. D: sicut ista... Socrates est albus, neque quae  est illa quae est, Plato non est albus. Omnes igitur isti codices habent  in sensu negativo exemplum de Platone, et omittunt verba: huic quae  est, Socrates non est albus. Genuina mihi videtur lectio codd. ABCE.  Est enim probandum per exempla de singularibus quod uni affirmationi  non opponitur nisi una negatio. Et probatur hoc modo. Sit propositio  affirmativa, Socrates est albus; ei non opponitur ista, Socrates non est  musicus, quia non est de eodem praedicato; sed neque etiam ei oppo-  nitur ista: Plato non est albus, quia non est de eodem subiecto. Porro  hoc totum magis breviter et dilucide quam Piana traditur a citatis codd.:  sicut ista, Socrates non est musicus, non opponitur ei quae est, So-  crates est albus; neque etiam ista, Plato non est albus.  c) Deinde cum dicit: Quod igitur una affirmatio. — Codd. ABC:  deinde cum dicit: manifestum est ergo. Haec lectio non est conformis  versioni quae textui adnectitur, sed est tamen ea ipsa quae habetur in  versione quae est in cod. A, et in cod. Ragusino, quem penes me habeo, in  quo est antiqua versio Organi Aristotelis. S. Thomas horum codd. lectione  usus est, ut patet ex n. 1.— Textus habet Quod igitur etc. : Ὅτι piv οὖν etc.  t) Praedicatur de aliquo universali universaliter vel non universa-  liter, multa etc.- Codd. ACDE: praedicatur de aliquo universali univer-  saliter multa sub se continet, intendit ostendere quod hoc non impedit  unitatem (C de) enunciationis. — Cod. B: praedicatur de aliquo uni-  versali multa sub se continet, intendit ostendere quod hoc non impedit  8*  *  Codd. - r. erro-  nee:  anon  est albus.  *  homo  Lect. xr, n. 8,  seq.  *  *  *  p: de eodem.  Lect. x1, n. 2.  Ib. n. 8, seq. -  Aerronee: quod  omnís contradi-  ctio.  *  *  *  Et ex codd.  [b. n. 6.  Codd. - ».: au-  tem.  51b. It. 7.  **  ABCE.-P.: Quod.  *  Lect. vill, n. 13,  seq.  58  sub se continet, intendit ostendere quod per hoc  non impeditur unitas enunciationis. Et circa hoc  duo facit: primo, ostendit quod unitas enunciationis  non impeditur per multitudinem, quae continetur  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  genus et differentia, quae sunt partes definitionis:  sive sint partes integrales alicuius compositi *, sicut  ex  *  ABCD: Sub uno  universali.  ** Nempe univo-  ca ratio | Cf.lect.  V,n.19;et  lect. vIII,  n.  *  6j.  Nempe zomine  aequivoco (Conf.  ib.].  ** Primo ex codd.  * ACE : aut etiam. -B:  .  Qut et. - D:  Qut. -Sequens et-  iam omitt. a C  *  pc: non est ho-  mo  albus;  sed  non bene.-4: qui-  dam homo mon  est albus.  *  Codd.- ».: sub-  divisa.  *  Codd. - p. : sub  uno communi.  *  Ex dictis ex nc  D. - A: €x dictis  manifestum.- €:  ex  praedictis.  *  Codd.-».: sub  universali.  *  Codd. - r.: mul-  ta differentia.  *  gc:  sicut  ge-  nus et differentia  sunt partes etc.  süb universali  *,  cuius ratio una est **; secundo,  ostendit quod impeditur unitas enunciationis per  »multitudinem, quae continetur sub sola nominis uni-  tate *; ibi: Si vero duobus etc. - Dicit ergo primo **  quod una est affirmatio vel negatio cum unum si-  gnificatur de uno, sive illud unum quod subiicitur  sit universale universaliter sumptum sive non sit  aliquid tale, sed sit universale particulariter sum-  ptum. vel * indefinite, aut etiam si subiectum sit  singulare. Et exemplificat de diversis: sicut uni-  versalis ista affirmativa est una, omnis homo est  albus; et similiter particularis negativa quae est  eius negatio, scilicet non est omnis homo albus *.  Et subdit alia exempla, quae sunt manifesta. In  fine autem apponit quamdam conditionem, quae  requiritur ad hoc quod quaelibet harum sit una,  si scilicet album, quod est praedicatum, significat  unum: nam sola multitudo praedicati impediret  unitatem enunciationis. Ideo autem universalis pro-  positio una est, quamvis sub se multitudinem sin-  gularium comprehendat, quia praedicatum non  attribuitur multis singularibus, secundum quod  sunt in se divisa *, sed secundum quod uniuntur  in uno communi *.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Si vero duobus etc., osten-  dit quod sola unitas nominis non sufficit ad uni-  tatem enunciationis. Et circa hoc quatuor facit:  primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, exempli-  ficat; ibi: Ut si quis ponat etc.; tertio, probat; ibi:  Nihil enim differt etc.; quarto, infert corollarium ex  dictis *; ibi: Quare nec in his etc.- Dicit ergo primo  quod si unum nomen imponatur duabus rebus, ex  quibus non fit unum, non est affirmatio una. Quod  autem dicit, ex quibus non fit unum, potest intelligi  dupliciter. Uno modo, ad excludendum hoc quod  multa continentur sub uno universali *, sicut Aomo  et  equus sub animali: hoc enim nomen animal  significat utrumque, non secundum quod sunt  multa et differentia * ad invicem, sed secundum  quod uniuntur in natura generis. - Alio modo, et  melius, ad excludendum hoc quod ex multis par-  tibus fit unum, sive sint partes rationis, sicut sunt *  unitatem de enunciationibus. Et de enunciationibus certe scribere volebat  amanuensis cod. C. — Lectio codd. ACDE quoad suam primam partem vi-  detur indicata a prima thesi, quae pro responsione ad dubium propositum  immediate subnectitur, nempe quod unitas enunciationis non impeditur  per multitudinem quae continetur sub uno universali, vel sub universali,  ut ipsamet Piana legit. Hinc in lectione Piana: praedicatur de aliquo uni-  versaliter vel non universaliter etc. subintelligitur, universali, nempe ,  praedicatur de aliquo universali universaliter etc., ut supra n. 3 dictum  est, et in hoc ipso n. iterum ponitur (Cf. lect. vir, n. 16): nisi enim subintel-  ligatur, propositio posset habere hunc sensum in secunda parte disiunctio-  nis: de aliquo... vel non universaliter (et ideo etiam singulariter) multa  sub se continet, Q 10d est falsum,— Quoad vero alteram partem (intendit  ostendere etc.) lectio codd. potest adoptari, sed potest etiam retineri Piana.  x) Tunica est alba. Codd. ACE addunt immediate: vel tunica non  est alba, quae verba non habentur neque in ed. Piana, neque in codd.  BD. Porro lectio, quam cum hisce codd., P. et Ven. edd. conservamus,  est omnino conformis textui Aristotelis; sed ea quae adduntur ab ACE  continent exemplum de negata unitate propositionis etiam negativae et  subintelliguntur ex his quae immediate sequuntur, non est affirmatio una,  neque negatio una. — Codex E. habet: neque negatio una; et est optima  lectio, quam sequor loco Pianae et aliorum codd.: neque negatio: sermo  enim impraesentiarum est non de enunciatione simpliciter affirmativa vel  negativa, sed de unitate affirmationis et negationis (Cf. text. Aristot. ).  lapidibus et lignis fit domus. Si ergo * sit tale  praedicatum quod attribuatur rei, requiritur ad  unitatem enunciationis quod illa multa quae signi-  ficantur, concurrant * in unum secundum aliquem  dictorum modorum; unde non sufficeret sola uni-  tas vocis. Si vero sit tale praedicatum quod refe-  ratur ad vocem, sufficiet unitas vocis; ut si dicam,  canis est: nomen.  9. Deinde cum dicit: Ut si quis ponat etc., exem-  plificat quod dictum est, ut si aliquis hoc nomen  tunica  imponat ad significandum hominem et  equum: et sic, si dicam *, £unica est alba ", non  est affirmatio una, neque negatio una.  Deinde cum dicit: Nhi] enim differt etc., probat  quod dixerat tali ratione. Si funica significat homi-  nem et equum, nihil differt si dicatur, tunica est  alba, aut si dicatur, homo est albus, et *, equus est  albus; sed istae *, homo est albus, et equus est albus,  significant-multa et sunt plures enunciationes; ergo  etiam ista, unica est alba, multa significat. Et hoc  si significet * hominem et equum ut res diversas: si  vero significet hominem et equum ut componen-  tia unam rem ^, nihil significat, quia non est ali-  qua res quae componatur ex homine et equo.  Quod autem dicit quod non differt dicere, fu-  nica est alba, et, homo est albus, et, equus est albus,  non est intelligendum quantum ad veritatem et  falsitatem. Nam haec copulativa, omo est albus  et equus est albus, non potest esse vera nisi utraque  pars sit vera: sed haec, /unica est alba, praedicta  positione facta *, potest esse vera etiam altera exi-  stente falsa *; alioquin non oporteret distinguere  multiplices propositiones ad solvendum rationes  sophisticas. Sed hoc est intelligendum quantum  ad unitatem et multiplicitatem *. Nam sicut cum  dicitur, homo est albus et equus est albus, non  invenitur aliqua una res cui attribuatur praedica-  tum; ita etiam nec cum dicitur, funica est alba.  10.  Deinde cum dicit: Quare nec in his etc.,  concludit ex praemissis quod nec in his affirma-  tionibus et negationibus, quae utuntur subiecto  aequivoco, semper oportet unam esse veram et  aliam falsam, quia scilicet negatio potest aliud ne-  gare quam * affirmatio affirmet.  0) Ut componentia unam rem etc. Ita legunt codd.; et est praefe-  renda haec lectio Pianae, utpote unam rem. Optime enim concordat  lectio codd. cum iis quae sequuntur: "on est aliqua res quae compo-  natur ex homine et equo.— Supra cod. A habet: ergo etiam ista, tu-  nica est alba, si album multa significat. Et hoc etc.  t) Quia scilicet negatio potest... quam etc. — Unus cod. B: quia sci-  licet negatio non potest... quam etc. Sed est lectio falsa: tunc enim  propositionum unam oportet esse veram, alteram falsam, quando affirma-  tio et negatio sunt circa idem (Cf. lect. ix, n. 8 seq.); at ubi propositionum  subiectum sit nomen aequivocum, ut hic supponitur, affirmatio et negatio  possunt cadere supra diversas subiecti significationes; proinde non opor-  tet ut una propositio sit vera et altera falsa. — Codex E immediate post  illa verba a/firmatio affirmet, addit: Explicit liber primus periarme-  nias. — Incipit liber secundus periarmenias. Utrum id quod dictum est  supra de oppositione enunciationum et de earum veritate et falsitate  inveniatur in omnibus enunciationibus (fol. 223 verso, col. 1).— Cur haec  apponatur adnotatio non facile dixeris, et amanuensis ipse ignorabat. Nam  in fine lect. xv, qua revera terminatur primus liber Peri hermeneias, iuxta  positam a Scholasticis huius Operis divisionem, iterum, sui immemor,  amanuensis scribit:- Explicit expositio primi libri periarmenias, ubi  agitur de enunciatione simpliciter considerata. — Incipit expositio se-  cundi libri. Ubi agitur de enunciatione secundum quod diversificatur  per aliquid. sibi additum (fol. 229 vers., col. 2).  *  Codd.- p.: com-  positionis.  *  Codd.-».: sí  vero.  *  ABE. -P.: CHf-  rant.- c inepte:  continent. - p er-  ronee:  contra-  ria.  *  AC: ut si sic di-  catur.  *  *  A:  AC:  duae.  *  "  vel.  sed istae  Codd. - ».: et  hoc significat.  *ACE. - BP.: fd-  tione. - Si tunica  eyed significa-  ret  hominem et  equum,ut suppo-  situm est supra.  *  ABCD: vera; sed  80.  *  Codd. : multi-  tudinem.  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  LECTIO DECIMATERTIA  DE VERITATE ET FALSITATE IN OPPOSITIS PROPOSITIONIBUS  SINGULARIBUS DE FUTURO IN MATERIA CONTINGENTI  "Ezi μὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ γενομένων ἀνάγκη τὴν κα-  τάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ εἶναι: καὶ  ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν χα όλου ὡς καθόλου ἀεὶ τὴν μὲν dX,  τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ὥσπερ  εἴρηται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν χαθόλου μιὴ καθόλου λεχϑ)έντων  οὐκ ἀνάγχη. Εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτων. ' Ext δὲ τῶν  καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ μελλόντων οὐχ ὁμοίως.  *  *  [n his ergo et quae sunt et quae facta sunt necesse est af-  firmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse. In  universalibus quidem universaliter, semper hanc quidem  veram, illam vero falsam et in his quae sunt singula-  ria; quemadmodum dictum est. In his vero, quae in  universalibus non universaliter dicuntur, non est ne-  cesse. Dictum est autem et de his. In singularibus vero  et  E  E  4dp πᾶσα κατάφασις καὶ ἀπέφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής,  χαὶ ἅπαν ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχξιν"  δ᾽  e  EN  P  ΔΟΡῚ:  ES  ἢ  “ῬΑ  Y  ὥστε εἰ ὁ μὲν φήσει ἔσεσ)αί τι, ὁ δὲ μὴ φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ   ποῦτο; δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγχη ἀληθεύειν τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν,  εἰ πᾶσα χχτάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.  "Auge γὰρ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις"  εἰ vae ἀχηθὲς εἰπεῖν, ὅτι λευχόν, ἢ ὅτι οὐ λευχόν ἔστιν,  SAN  ἀνάγκη εἶναι λευχὸν ἢ οὐ λευχόν. Καὶ εἰ ἔστι λευχὸν  ἢ οὐ λευχόν, ἀληθὲς ἦν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι" καὶ εἰ peri  ὑπάρχει, ψεύδεται" καὶ εἰ ψεύδεται, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.  futuris non similiter.  Nam si omnis affirmatio vel negatio vera vel falsa est, et  omne necesse est vel esse vel non esse:  quare si hic quidem dicat futurum aliquid, ille vero non  dicat hoc idem ipsum, manifestum est quoniam ne-  cesse  matio  est  vel  verum dicere alterum ipsorum, si omnis affir-  negatio vera vel falsa est. Utraque enim  non erunt simul in talibus;  nam si verum est dicere quoniam est album vel non al-  bum, necesse est esse album vel non album; et si est  album vel non album, verum est affirmare vel negare;  Ὥστε ἀνάγχη, ἢ τὴν κατάφασιν, ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν  ἀληθῇ εἶναι, ἢ ψευδῆ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα οὔτε ἐστὶν, οὔτε  γίνεται, οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης, οὔθ᾽, ὁπότερ ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ  ἔσται, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντα, καὶ οὐχ  ὁπότερ ἔτυχεν" ἢ γὰρ ὁ φὰς ἀληθεύσει, ἢ ὁ ἀποφάς"  ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο, ἢ οὐχ ἐγίνετο" τὸ γὰρ ὁπό-  τερ ἔτυχεν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὕτως, ἢ μηὴ οὕτως, ἔχει  ἢ ἕξει.  Ἔτι, εἰ ἔστι λευχὸν νῦν, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν πρότερον,  ὅτι ἔσται λευκόν: ὧστε ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν, ὁτιοῦν  τῶν γενομένων ὅτι ἐστὶν 7 ἔσται" Εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς  ἦν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται, οὐχ οἵἷόντε τοῦτο μὴ  εἶναι, οὐδὲ μὴ ἔσεσθαι" ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷόντε jo γενέσθαι,  ἀδύνατον e γενέσθαι: ὃ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι,  ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι: ἅπαντα οὖν τὸ ἐσόμενα ἀναγκαῖον  γενέσται. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὁπότερ ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τύχης  ἔσται: εἰ  γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὐχ ἐξ ἀναγχης.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ "ὡς οὐδέτερόν γξ ἀληθὲς ἐνδέχεται λέ-  γειν, οἷον, ὅτι οὔτε ἔσται; οὔτε οὐχ ἔσται  ὁ  πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, οὔσης τῆς χαταφάσεως ψευδοῦς, ἡ  ἀπόφασις οὐχ ἀληθής" καὶ ταύτης ψευδοῦς οὔσης.  τὴν κατάφασιν συμβαίνει μὴ ἀληθῆ εἶναι.  Καὶ πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ὅτι λευκὸν καὶ έγα,  δεῖ ἄμφω ὑπάρχειν' εἰ δὲ ὑπάρξει εἰς αὔριον, ὑπάρξει εἰς  αὔριον" εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔσται μήτε μὴ ἔσται εἰς αὔριον,  οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν οἷον ναυμαχία" δέοι γὰρ  ἂν υμήτε γενέσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον, μήτε μὴ γενέσθαι.  SyNoPsis. — 1. Argumentum textus.— 2. Iterantur tres divi-  siones propositionum secundum unitatem, qualitatem et quanti-  tatem.— 3. His adduntur quarta divisio secundum tempus, prout  nempe propositio est de praesenti, vel de praeterito, vel de fu-  turo; et quinta secundum materiam, seu secundum habitudinem  praedicati ad subiectum, ex qua diversa habitudine "propositio  est vel in materia necessaria sive naturali, vel in materia impos-  sibili sive remota , vel in materia possibili sive contingenti.- 4. In  enunciationibus de praesenti vel de praeterito, necesse est ut af-  firmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera vel falsa, quando propo-  sitiones contradictorie opponuntur (Nempe quando praedicatum  universaliter enunciatur de subiecto universali, vel praedicatur  aliquid de subiecto singulari; non autem quando praedicatum  non universaliter enunciatur de subiecto universali). — 5. Idem  dicendum est, spectata materia, quoad enunciationes, quae sunt  de futuro, dummodo sint de universalibus vel universaliter vel  non universaliter sumptis. — 6. Quaestio: utrum in enunciatio-  nibus singularibus de futuro in materia contingenti necesse sit  quod determinate una oppositarum sit vera et altera falsa.—  et  si non est, mentitur; et si mentitur, non est. Quare  necesse est, aut affirmationem aut negationem veram  esse  vel falsam. Nihil igitur neque est, neque fit, neque  a  ex  casu, neque ad utrumlibet, nec erit, nec non erit; sed  fecessitate omnia et non utrumlibet: aut enim qui  se  dicit verus est, aut qui negat; similiter enim vel fieret  vel non fieret; utrumlibet enim nihil magis sic vel non  sic  habet aut habebit.  Amplius, si est album nunc, verum erat dicere prius, quo-  niam erit album, quare semper verum fuit dicere quod-  libet eorum, quae facta sunt, quoniam est vel erit. Quod  si semper verum fuit dicere quoniam est vel erit, non  potest hoc non esse vel non futurum esse; quod autem  non potest non fieri, impossibile est non fieri, et quod  impossibile est non fieri, necesse est fieri; omnia ergo,  quae futura sunt, necesse est fieri. Nihil igitur utrum-  libet, neque casu erit: nam si casu, non ex necessitate.  At vero neque quoniam neutrum verum est contingit di-  cere, ut quoniam neque erit neque non erit:  primum enim cum sit affirmatio falsa, erit negatio non  vera: et cum haec sit falsa, contingit affirmationem esse  non veram.  Ad haec si verum est dicere, quoniam album est et ma-  gnum, oportet esse utrumque; si vero erit cras, oportet  esse  cras; si autem neque erit neque non erit cras,  non erit utrumlibet, ut navale bellum: oportebit enim  neque fieri navale bellum, neque non fieri.  7. Solvitur quaestio negative, quia secus omnia essent ex ne-  cessitate. — 8. Processus rationis aristotelicae, ex qua concluditur  triplex genus contingentium excludi ex opposita solutione quae-  stionis. — 9. Declaratur quod dictum est de triplici genere contin-  gentium, quae proveniunt ex casu, ex electione et ex naturd.—  De eo quod est ex electione, scilicet aequaliter se habens ad  esse  et  ad  non  esse, non potest determinate dici neque quod  erit, neque quod mon erit: secus non haberetur indifferentia  ad utrumlibet; et consequenter non haberetur electio.— το. Alia  ratione confirmatur esse impossibile non fieri, quae futura sunt, et  ideo omnia ex necessitate evenire, si ex propositionibus singula-  ribus de futuro una esset determinate vera et altera falsa. Ratio  est, quia ista duo sunt incompossibilia, quod aliquid vere dica-  tur  esse  et  quod mon sit. Si ergo ponitur verum esse id quod  dicitur de praesenti vel de futuro, non potest esse quin illud sit  praesens vel futurum. Sed quod non potest non fieri, necesse est  fieri. Ergo omnia quae futura sunt necesse esset fieri, seu omnia  ex necessitate evenirent. — 11. Dilucidatur eadem ratio declarando  quomodo futura sunt in causis: nempe in causa agente ex ne-  *  Cap. ix.  60  cessitate; in causa  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  inclinata  ad  effectum determinatum, a quo  tamen producendo potest impediri; in causa indifferente et non  determinata potius ad unum quam ad aliud.— 12. At vero, ex  his non sequitur quod falsae sint propositiones de singularibus  zm  ABC  *  ostendit.  omittunt  Q9»)  y ostquam Philosophus determinavit de  JSyoppositione enunciationum et ostendit *  xxAgquomodo dividunt verum et falsum  p^oppositae enunciationes; hic inquirit  de  quodam quod poterat esse dubium, utrum  scilicet  id quod dictum est similiter inveniatur  in omnibus enunciationibus vel non. Et circa hoc  *  *  *  *  A: ponit  Num. 7.  A: circa quod.  a  Lect. vir, nn.  9,3; et lect. x;  n.  IO.  *  Codd.:  autem.  *  ACDE.- BP. CTTO-  nee: qualitatem.  *  *  Lect. vii, n. 8.  ABC: sed casus  verbi  etc.  lect.v, n.12.).  *  *  *  A:  dicitur.  A: risibilis.  A:  tur.  *  func.  AB: "ec per se  insit subiecto,nec  per serepugnet,  dicetur (B, dici-  tur).  *  ABCE.- P.: 6Ή11|71--  cationis.  duo facit: primo, proponit * dissimilitudinem ; se-  cundo, probat eam; ibi: Nam si omnis affirma-  lio * etc.  2. Circa primum * considerandum est quod Phi-  losophus in praemissis triplicem divisionem * enun-  ciationum assignavit, * quarum prima fuit ssecandum  unitatem enunciationis, prout scilicet enunciatio est  una  simpliciter vel coniunctione  tertia  ( Cf.  dice-  una; secunda  fuit secundum qualitatem, prout scilicet enunciatio  est affirmativa vel negativa; tertia * fuit secundum  quantitatem , * utpote quod enunciatio quaedam est  universalis, quaedam particularis, quaedam inde-  finita et quaedam singularis.  3. Tangitur autem hic quarta divisio enunciatio-  num secundum tempus. Nam quaedam est de prae-  senti, quaedam de praeterito, quaedam de futuro;  et haec etiam divisio potest accipi ex his quae supra  dicta sunt: dictum est enim supra * quod necesse  est  omnem enunciationem esse ex verbo vel ex  casu verbi; verbum autem est quod consignificat  praesens tempus; casus autem verbi * sunt, qui con-  significant tempus praeteritum vel futurum. Potest  autem accipi quinta divisio enunciationum secun-  dum materiam, quae quidem divisio attenditur  secundum habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum:  nam si praedicatum per se insit subiecto, dicetur *  esse enunciatio 7n materia necessaria vel naturali;  ut  cum dicitur, Aomo est animal, vel, homo est  risibile *. Si vero praedicatum per se repugnet  subiecto quasi excludens rationem ipsius, dicetur *  enunciatio esse in materia impossibili sive remota;  ut  cum dicitur, omo est asinus. Si vero medio  modo se habeat praedicatum ad subiectum, ut  scilicet nec per se repugnet subiecto, nec per se  insit, dicetur * enunciatio esse in maleria possibili  sive contingenti.  4. His igitur enunciationum * differentiis conside-  ratis, non similiter se habet iudicium de veritate  et  falsitate in omnibus. Unde Philosophus dicit,  ex  praemissis concludens, quod n his quae sunt,  idest  in  propositionibus de praesenti, ef zn his  quae facta sunt, idest in enunciationibus de prae- -  a) Triplicem divisionem. Ita edd. P. et Ven. 1526; at tum hic tum  in sequentibus non divisionem, sed differentiam habent edd. Venetae  saeculi XV et codd. Et, differentiam. legendum esse videtur ex seq. n. 4.  8) Ita in futuris sicut etc. - Cod. A corrupte legit: ita ut in futu-  ris sit vel in praeteritis vel in praesentibus. — Et infra (In contingenti etc.)  cum  cod. B: sicut in praesentibus vel (et vel habet C) praeteritis. De-  nique addit: in indefinitis utraque pars eius est vera (sed eius expungitur,  et in marzine poni videtur simul)... (n. 6) est quaedam similitudo (et ite-  rum similitudo, infra n. 10.) At similitudo est lectio erronea, ut patet ex  contextu. — Codex vero B, ob recursum eorumdem verborum, in praesen-  tibus vel praeteritis, omittit verba, in indefinitis etc. et prosequitur: ne-  cesse est quod altera etc., ut in 6  futuris in sensu coniunctivo, nempe quod utraque haec propositio  sit falsa, hoc erit et hoc non erit: primo quidem quia sunt con-  tradictoriae, quae non possunt esse simul falsae; deinde quia  secus  tolleretur id quod est ad utrumlibet.  terito, necesse est quod affirmatio vel negatio de-  terminate sit vera vel falsa. Diversificatur tamen  hoc, secundum diversam quantitatem enunciatio-  nis; nam in enunciationibus, in quibus de univer-  salibus subiectis aliquid universaliter praedicatur,  necesse est quod semper * una sit vera, scilicet af-  firmativa vel negativa, et altera falsa, quae scili-  cet  ei opponitur. Dictum est enim supra * quod  negatio enunciationis universalis in qua aliquid  universaliter praedicatur, est negativa non univer-  salis, sed particularis, et e converso universalis  negativa non est directe negatio universalis affir-  mativae, sed particularis; et sic oportet, secundum  praedicta, quod semper una earum * sit vera et  altera falsa in quacumque materia. Et eadem ratio  est  in enunciationibus singularibus, quae etiam  contradictorie opponuntur, ut supra habitum est *.  Sed in enunciationibus, in quibus aliquid praedi-  catur de universali * non universaliter, non est ne-  cesse quod semper una sit vera et altera sit falsa,  quia possunt ambae esse simul verae, ut supra  ostensum est *.  5.  Et hoc quidem ita se habet * quantum ad  propositiones, quae sunt de praeterito vel de prae-  senti: sed si accipiamus * enunciationes, quae sunt  de futuro, etiam similiter se habent quantum ad  oppositiones, quae sunt de universalibus vel uni-  versaliter vel non universaliter sumptis. Nam in  materia necessaria omnes affirmativae determina-  te sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut 7 in praeteritis et  praesentibus; negativae vero falsae. In materia  autem impossibili, e contrario. In contingenti vero  universales sunt falsae et particulares sunt verae,  ita in futuris sicut in praeteritis et praesentibus.  In  indefinitis autem, utraque simul. est vera in  futuris sicut in praesentibus vel praeteritis.  6. Sed in singularibus et futuris est quaedam  dissimilitudo.  Nam in praeteritis et praesentibus  necesse est quod altera oppositarum determinate  sit vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia; sed  in singularibus quae sunt de futuro hoc non est  necesse, quod una determinate sit vera et altera  falsa. Et hoc quidem dicitur * quantum ad mate-  riam contingentem: nam quantum ad materiam *  necessariam et impossibilem similis ratio est in  futuris singularibus, sicut in praesentibus et prae-  teritis. Nec tamen Aristoteles mentionem fecit de  materia contingenti, quia illa proprie ad singula-  ria pertinent " quae contingenter eveniunt, quae  p) Jlla proprie ad singularia pertinent etc.  — A : illa proprie.., se-  cundum universalium rationem. - Notandum quod nihil est adeo contin-  gens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat, ut s. Thomas ait p. I,  qu. Lxxxvi, artic. 1r. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est, Socratem currere, in  se  quidem contingens est, quia Socrates et poterat non currere et po-  test a cursu  ideo.  cessare, Sed habitudo cursus ad motum non est contin-  gens, sed necessaria: necessarium est enim Socratem moveri si currit;  et  supposito, quod Socrates currat, non potest non verificari re-  latio illa necessaria et universalis, non secus ac generis ratio necessario  verificatur in speciebus, et ratio speciei in individuis. Hinc contingentia  dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo secundum quod contingentia  sunt; alio modo secundum quod in eis aliquid necessitatis invenitur  *  p  omittit sem-  per ; 8 omitt. ze-  cesse est..., us-  ue ad universa-  ;ter praedicatur  inclusive.  *  Lect. xt, n. 3,  seq.  *  Codd.- ».: quod  una earum sem-  per.  *  Lect. xt, n. 7.  *aBCp:  de uni-  versalibus ctc.  *  *  ]b. n. 8.  c: et haec qui-  dem ita se ha-  bent.  *  ABC.- P.: acci-  pimus:  61  non ita sit in re, sicut ipse affirmat vel negat; et  e  *  A: intentio, sci-  licet.  *A:in enuncia-  tionibus de futu-  ro  de singulari-  bus.  *  ag: et allera sit  falsa.  *  A:  utrumque ,  scilicet  a  *  ABC  opposi-  — ^ determinate est vera vel falsa ita in singularibus  et futuris sicut in aliis, consequens est quod omnia  necesse sit vel determinate esse vel mon esse.  Deinde cum dicit: Quare si hic quidem etc.  vel, si itaque hic quidem, ut habetur in graeco ?,  probat consequentiam praedictam. Ponamus enim  quod sint duo homines, quorum unus dicat aliquid  erronee :  negativis (Cf. le-  ct.xt, n. 8, seqq.).  AND  ὅδ: 4  *  2  *  ETC  mA  EP,  IIT  TM  TRAE]  Cf. lect. 1x, nn.  et &  Est  POTETE  EUH,  T  NE  NM  TRE  UR  Ae  e  PRIN  y  DUE  τ  ex codd.  converso, si non est ita in re * sicut ipse affir-  mat vel negat, sequitur quod affirmans vel ne-  gans mentiatur *.  8. Est ergo processus huius rationis talis. Si  necesse est quod omnis affirmatio vel negatio in  singularibus et futuris sit vera vel falsa, necesse  lio  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  autem per se insunt vel repugnant, attribuuntur  singularibus secundum universalium rationes.  Circa hoc igitur versatur tota praesens intentio *:  Utrum in enunciationibus singularibus de futuro *  in materia contingenti necesse sit quod deftermi-  nate una oppositarum sit vera et altera falsa *.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Nam si omnis affirma-  etc., probat praemissam differentiam. Et circa  hoc duo facit: primo, probat propositum ducendo  ad inconveniens; secundo, ostendit illa esse im-  possibilia quae sequuntur; ibi: Quae ergo contin-  gunt inconvenientia* etc.- Circa primum duo facit:  primo, ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non  semper potest determinate attribui veritas alteri op-  positorum; secundo, ostendit quod non potest esse  quod utraque * veritate careat; ibi: 47 vero neque  quoniam * etc.- Circa primum ponit duas ratio-  nes, in quarum prima ponit * quamdam cofisequen-  tiam, scilieet quod si omnis affirmatio vel negatio  est quod omnis affirmans vel negans determinate  dicat verum vel falsum. Ex hoc autem sequitur  quod omne necesse sit esse vel non esse. Ergo,  si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit  vera, necesse est omnia determinate esse vel non  esse. Ex hoc * concludit ulterius quod omnia sint  ex * necessitate. - Per quod triplex genus contin-  gentium excluditur.  9. Quaedam enim contingunt ut* in pauciori-  bus, quae accidunt a casu vel fortuna. Quaedam  vero se habent ad utrumlibet *, quia scilicet non  magis se habent ad unam partem, quam ad aliam,  et ista procedunt ex electione. Quaedam vero eve-  niunt ut in pluribus; sicut hominem canescere in  senectute, quod causatur ex natura. Si autem  omnia ex necessitate evenirent, nihil horum con-  tingentium esset. Et ideo dicit nihil est quantum  esse  futurum, puta quod Socrates curret, alius  vero dicat hoc idem ipsum non esse *- futurum;  supposita praemissa positione, scilicet quod in sin-  gularibus et futuris contingit alteram esse veram,  scilicet vel affirmativam vel negativam, sequetur  quod necesse sit quod * alter eorum verum dicat,  non autem uterque: quia non potest esse quod in  singularibus propositionibus futuris * utraque sit si-  mul vera, scilicet affirmativa et negativa: sed hoc  habet locum solum in indefinitis *. Ex hoc au-  tem quod necesse est alterum eorum verum di-  cere, sequitur quod necesse sit determinate vel  esse vel non esse. Et hoc probat consequenter:  quia ista duo se convertibiliter consequuntur ",  scilicet quod verum sit id quod dicitur, et quod  ita sit in re. Et hoc est quod manifestat conse-  quenter ^ dicens quod si. verum est dicere quod al-  bum sit, de * necessitate sequitur quod ita sit in re;  et.si verum est negare, ex necessitate sequitur  quod ita non sit. Et e converso *: quia si ita est  in re vel non est*, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit  verum affirmare vel negare. Et eadem etiam con-  vertibilitas apparet in falso: quia, si aliquis menti-  tur  falsum dicens, ex necessitate sequitur quod  (Cf. loc. cit., et ib. Commentar. Card. Caietani). Quaestio igitur quae im-  praesentiarum movetur a s. Thoma, ut ipse explicite - declarat, est de  rebus  contingentibus futuris prouti sunt contingentes, non autem de  earum rationibus universalibus, secundum quas in ipsis contingentibus  est  aliquid necessarium.  — Manifestum est autem quod vis quaestionis  tota est in adverbio determinate, cum inquiritur de veritate propositio-  num singularium de futuro in materia contingenti.  9) Vel, si itaque hic quidem, ut habetur in graeco. Ergo in graeco  exemplari quo utebatur, inquit Theodorus Vaitz, s. Thomas legebat non  ὥστε εἰ, sed εἰ γὰρ; quae est lectio codd. biblioth. Laurentianae et Mar-  cianae, uti refert laudatus Auctor (Op. cit. p. I, pagg. 129 in. notis, et 339  in scholiis).  —In cod. A legitur: deinde cum. dicit: si hic quidem etc.  vel, si itaque haec, ut habetur in. graeco.—B: deinde cum dicit, si ita-  que hic, probat etc. — D: si hic quidem... vel si itaque hic quidem. — E:  si hic quidem... vel si itaque hoc quidem.— C habet integram lectionem  Pianam, quam retinemus.  5  t) Sequetur quod necesse sit quod etc. Ita edit. Piana cum. Ὁ. --  ad ipsam permanentiam eorum quae permanent  contingenter; neque fit quantum ad productionem  eorum  quae  contingenter causantur; zéc casu  quantum ad ea quae sunt * in minori parte, sive  in  paucioribus; nec utrumlibet quantum ad ea  quae se habent aequaliter ad utrumque, scilicet  esse  non  vel non esse, et ad neutrum horum sunt de-  terminata: quod significat cum subdit, nec erit,  nec  erit.  De eo enim quod est magis determinatum ad  unam partem possumus determinate verum di-  cere  quod hoc erit vel non erit, sicut medicus  de convalescente vere dicit, is£e sanabitur, licet  forte ex aliquo accidente eius sanitas impedia-  tur.  est  Unde et Philosophus dicit in II. De genera-  tione * quod futurus quis incedere, non incedet.  De eo enim qui habet propositum determinatum  ad incedendum, vere potest dici quod zpse ince-  det, licet per aliquod accidens impediatur eius in-  cessus. Sed eius quod est ad utrumlibet proprium  quod, quia non determinatur magis ad unum  quam ad alterum, non possit de eo determinate  dici, neque quod erit, neque quod non erit. Quo-  modo autem sequatur quod nihil sit ad ufrum-  libet ex praemissa hypothesi, manifestat subdens  quod, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate  Codd. ABCE legunt: sequetur de necessitate quod etc.; et est idem  sensus, uti patet.  C) In singularibus propositionibus futuris. In codd. deest futuris:  quod quidem non solum non est necessarium apponere, sed videtur  etiam superfluum: nam generica est hoc loco sententia expressa (nempe  non posse oppositas propositiones de singularibus esse simul veras), ad  probandum quod immediate supra dictum est, scilicet quod neque etiam  oppositae enunciationes de singularibus et futuris possunt esse simul verae.  ἢ) Ista duo se convertibiliter consequuntur etc. Ita recte codd. — Edit.  Piana omittit se, et non examussim reddit sensum de mutua consequu-  tione propositionum et rerum, quam s. Thomas inculcat. - Cod. B: ef  ex  hoc probat consequenter quod ista duo se convertibiliter sequun-  tur.  — Cod. C: et. hoc probat consequenter quod etc.  8) Et hoc est quod manifestat consequenter etc. Haec lectio est  codd,  — Edd. P. et Ven.: et hoc est quod manifestat consequenter di-  cens: Nam si verum est dicere etc. Nam si verum est dicere quod  album sit, ex necessitate etc.  — Codd. AC: dicens quia si verum etc.  *  sit.  A: SE nOn ila in  re  * ACDE. - BP.: ?/187i-  titur.  *Bc: ex hoc ergo.  *  A: Sunt de.-BCE:  sint de.  *  Ut omittitur ab  ACE.  * pg: utrumque, et  ita infra.  *  *  Sunt ex codd.  De generatio-  ne et corruptio-  216 cap. xi, n. I.-  Comment. s. Th.  lect. xr.  ae  62  sit vera, oportet quod vel ille qui affirmat vel  ille qui negat dicat verum; et sic* tollitur id quod  est  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  quod non potest non fieri idem significat cum  eo  ad utrumlibet: quia, si esset aliquid ad utrum-  libet, similiter se haberet ad hoc quod fieret vel  non fierel*, et non magis ad unum quam ad al-  terum.  Est autem considerandum quod Philosophus  non  *  Supra in hoc  ipso num.  excludit hic expresse contingens quod est ut  in pluribus, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia  tale contingens non excludit quin altera opposi-  tarum enunciationum determinate sit vera et al-  tera falsa, ut dictum est *. - Secundo, quia remoto  contingenti quod est in paucioribus, quod a casu  accidit,  in  removetur  per  consequens  contingens  quod est ut in pluribus: nihil enim differt? id quod  est  est  quod est impossibile non fieri. Et quod im-  possibile  non  fieri  idem significat cum eo  quod est necesse fieri, ut in secundo plenius di-  cetur ^, Sequitur ergo ex praemissis quod omnia,  quae futura sunt, necesse est fieri. Ex quo sequi-  tur ulterius, quod nihil sit neque ad utrumlibet  neque a casu, quia illud quod accidit a casu non  est  ex  necessitate, sed ut in paucioribus; hoc au-  tem relinquit * pro inconvenienti; ergo et primum  est  falsum, scilicet quod omne quod est verum  esse, verum fuerit determinate dicere esse fu-  turum ἢ.  11.  Ad  cuius  *  p:  relinquitur.  *p: fuit verum  determinate esse  evidentiam considerandum est f"wrwm.  quod cum verum hoc significet ut dicatur aliquid  esse  quod est, hoc modo est aliquid verum, quo  habet esse. Cum autem aliquid est in. praesenti  habet esse in seipso, et ideo vere potest dici de  eo  quod est: sed quamdiu aliquid est futurum,  *  Cf. sup., n. 6. -  Anc  :  simitudi-  nem,sed erronee.  pluribus ab eo quod est in paucioribus,  nisi quod deficit in minori parte.  10. Deinde cum dicit: Amplius si est album etc.,  ponit secundam rationem ad ostendendum prae-  dictam dissimilitudinem *, ducendo ad impossibile.  Futurum non est  in seipso sed ali-  qualiter  causa.  "  in  sua  ABE,-P. : Qulem.  Cf. not. f.  "Βα:  de prae-  senli, antea ve-  rum fuerit.  *  Codd. : quae  iam facta sunt.  *  *  BC. - P.: quod.  AD: impossibi-  lia.- &: compos-  sibilia.  *  Esse deest in  ABC: imo ina de-  sunt etiam szgni-  Jicatione  sed est mendum.  nondum est in seipso, est tamen * aliqualiter in  sua causa: quod quidem contingit tripliciter. - Uno  modo, ut sic sit in sua causa ut ex necessilate ex ea  proveniat; et tunc determinate habet esse in sua  causa; unde determinate potest dici de eo quod  erit. - Alio modo, aliquid est in sua causa, ut quae  habet inclinationem ad suum effectum, quae ta-  men iZmpediri polest; unde et hoc determinatum  est in sua causa, sed mutabiliter; et sic de hoc  vere  dici potest, hoc erit, sed non per omnimo-  dam certitudinem. - Tertio, aliquid est * in sua causa  pure in potentia, quae etiam * non magis est de-  terminata ad unum quam ad aliud; unde relinqui-  tur  Si enim similiter se habet veritas et falsitas in  praesentibus et futuris, sequitur ut quidquid ve-  rum est de praesenti, etiam fuerit verum * de fu-  turo, eo modo quo est verum de praesenti. Sed  determinate nunc est verum dicere de aliquo sin-  gulari quod est album; ergo primo, idest ante-  quam illud fieret album, erat verum dicere quo-  niam hoc erit album. Sed eadem ratio videtur  esse in propinquo et in remoto; ergo si ante unum  diem verum fuit dicere quod hoc erit album,  sequitur quod semper fuit verum dicere de quo-  libet eorum, quae * facta sunt, quod erit. Si autem  semper est verum dicere de praesenti quoniam est,  vel de futuro quoniam * erit, non potest hoc non  esse  veri ;  vel non futurum esse. Cuius consequentiae  ratio patet, quia ista duo sunt incompossibilia *,  quod aliquid vere dicatur esse *, et quod non sit.  Nam hoc includitur in significatione veri, ut sit  id quod dicitur. Si ergo ponitur verum esse id  quod dicitur de praesenti vel de futuro, non po-  test  esse quin illud sit praesens vel futurum. Sed  t) Oportet quod vel ille qui affirmat vel ille qui negat dicat verum;  et sic etc. Exponit hic s. Doctor verba illa Aristotelis: ἢ γὰρ ὁ φὰς  ἀληθεύσει, ἢ ὁ ἀποφάς" ὁμοίως γὰρ etc. Porro Waitz lectioni ἀληθεύσει  (verum dicet) praefert ἀληθεύει (verum dicit). « Namque, ait, si legimus  »  Vv  ἀληθεύσει, non ex animo Aristoteles defendere videbitur sententiam,  uam ut refutaret veram esse posuit et suam fecit. Futurum tempus  ἀληθεύσει non aliter videtur explicari posse quam ita, ut Aristoteles di-  vy  vvv  cat: - Si igitur ponimus praestitutum esse quid verum sit in rebus futu-  ris, quid falsum (quod equidem non concedo), aut qui affirmat, aut qui  negat recte dicet, hoc est aut affirmantem aut negantem recte dicere  concedendum erit. — Quoniam autem habuimus tempus praesens vs. 3  »  »  οἵ 5, quod longe maiorem vim habet, idem hic quoque retinere non du-  bitavimus » (Aristotelis Organon graece, Ed. cit., pag. 340). Ut ut sit  de hac subtili interpretatione Waitz, mens Aristotelis manifesta est in  utraque lectione, consentiente eodem Auctore. — Tum Boethius tum  s. Thomas legunt ἀληθεύει.  x) Ad hoc quod fieret vel non fieret. Ita codd. omnes.  — Ed. Piana  cum Venetis edd.: ad hoc, fieri vel non fieri. Haec lectio sustineri  potest; sed quia prima et magis expedita est quoad formam, et aucto-  ritate nititur codd. sufficitur Pianae.  — Cod. A omittit illa verba: quia si  esset aliquid ad utrumlibet. Sed est mendum manifestum.  )) Nihil enim differt etc. — Codd. ABC: im hoc enim (A: nmihil  etiam; C corrupte: in hic) differt id quod est in pluribus ab eo quod  est semper et ex (A, de) necessitate, quod deficit in minori (A, in  minori corrigitur in maiori) parte. Quae lectio non est acceptanda. As-  signatur enim a s. 'Thoma ratio cur, remoto contingenti quod est ut in  paucioribus, removeatur contingens quod est ut in pluribus: quae ra-  tio est convenientia inter utrumque contingens. Extra igitur rem est le-  ctio codd. ABC, per quam contingens non cum contingenti, sed cum  necessario comparatur.  quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum  determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit  vel non sit ".  12. Deinde cum dicit: A4 vero neque quoniam etc.,  ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in sin-  gularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo,  proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est  verum dicere* quod in talibus alterum opposito-  rum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum  9) Ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Cum Commentaria sua in II lib.  non compleverit 85. Thomas, lector inveniet in supplemento Caietani,  lect. x, quae in s. Doctore desunt. — Post illa verba, quin illud sit prae-  sens vel futurum, cod. B prosequitur: sed quia non potest non fieri  impossibile idem significat etc. Et cod. C: sed quod non potest non fieri  et quod impossibile est non fieri. Evidenter in hac secunda lectione de-  siderantur verba idem significat. Lectio autem cod. B est intricata et  absurda.  v) Sed quod sit vel non sit. Hanc lectionem omnium nostrorum  codd. et ed. a sufficimus lectioni Pianae: meque quod sit vel non sit,  nempe, futurum. Sensus editionis Pianae est quod futurum, de quo est  sermo, neque est determinate futurum, neque est determinate non futu-  rum. Sensus codd. est quod futurum ipsum aut est futurum, aut non est  futurum. Quod in sensu indeterminato seu disiunctivo et vi propositionis  est verissimum, quia inter est futurum et non est futurum non datur  medium. Nihilominus si membra disiunctionis absolute sumantur dici ne-  quit quod alterutrum sit determinate futurum, vel quod sit determinate  non futurum, ut editio Piana significat (Cf. lect. xv, n. 4). — Lectio tamen  codd. magis placet ratione contextus; quia revera cum iam praemissum  immediate fuerit quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate  dici quod sit futurum, inutile est repetere neque quod sit; sed incul-  canda est veritas propositionis hypotheticae disiunctivae quod sit vel non  sit, quam in n. seq. cum Aristotele late probat s. Thomas.  E) Quod sicut non est verum dicere etc. Ita legunt codd. DE — Cod. A  legit: quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppo-  sitorum, nec si dicamus etc. — Codd. BC: quod sicut non est verum  (B non verum) dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum,  ut si dicamus etc. Vitiosae lectiones, quae tamen innuunt eam, quam  integre exhibent codd. DE. — P. et Ven. edd.: quod mon est verum  dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum non sit verum, ut si di-  "ΒΟ: ΖΩ͂  d au-  tem est et omit-  tunt ferto.  *  Codd. omittunt  etiam. - ABCE in-  fra:  quam ad al-  terum.  *g: non contin-  p:  git vere dicere.  *  μὲ  .  dicamus.  scilicet  * Etnihil...non  esse  quod est.  Omnia omittun-  tur in cod. 4, sed  est mendum.  "i  m  Ὁ,  TM  oe  S  ET  RET  ΥΥΤΥ  dicere  *  63  possibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique op-  positorum.  Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: Adhuc si verum  est etc. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid,  sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere  quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utra-  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  quod non utrumque sit verum ; ut si  quod dicamus *, neque erit, neque non erit; secun-  do, ibi: Primum enim cum sit etc., probat propo-  situm duabus rationibus.  Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio  dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex defini-  tione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam  esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil  aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non  esse quod est *; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio  sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed  secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est  falsa, qua dicitur, Aoc erit; nec tamen negatio est  vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione  non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est im-  que * esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: se-  quitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod  erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens  quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit  neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra  rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod  est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum *; ut na-  vale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc  sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis.  camus quod neque erit, neque non erit. Haec lectio Piana nulla ra-  tione sustineri potest, quia contradicit eis, quae s. Thomas praemiserat  ac  probaverat supra quoad primam partem, et quoad alteram partem  probatin  hoc numero. Dixerat enim supra n. 7 quod Aristoteles primo  ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate  attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; et ad hoc probandum ordinantur ra-  tiones, quas s. Thomas late exponit eodem m. 7 et seqq. Secundo di-  xerat ab Aristotele ostendi quod non potest esse quod in singularibus  et futuris utrumque oppositorum veritate careat; et hoc probatur in hoc  numero 12. Porro lectio codd. DE hanc divisionem servat, et adaequate  ac  ex ordine exhibet. At in Piana verba, nom est verum dicere quod in  talibus (nempe singularibus futuris) alferum oppositorum non sit ve-  rum contradicunt thesi probatae in numeris praecedentibus, scilicet quod  non est verum quod in singularibus futuris alterum oppositorum sit  determinate verum; deinde contradicunt thesi enunciatae et probatae in  hoc numero, nempe veritatem non omnino deesse in singularibus futuris  utrique oppositorum. Ergo de veritate in ordine ad utrumque opposito-  rum sermo est, cum tamen Piana nonnisi de veritate unius oppositorum  (alterum oppositorum ) mentionem faciat, redeundo nempe ad primam  thesim. Denique quae sequuntur (uf si dicamus etc.) sunt perspicua  quidem in codd., sed in Piana vix ac né vix quidem locum habent:  etenim propositio neque erit, neque non erit, est de sensu coniunctivo,  de  utroque nempe oppositorum, et tamen Piana praemittit sensum  disiunctivum, videlicet alterum oppositorum.  *  *  AE: utrumque.  ABC erronee: ad  alterum; etomitt.  cras erit vel non  erit.  64  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DECIMAQUARTA  ITERUM DE PROPOSITIONIBUS SINGULARIBUS DE FUTURO  IN MATERIA CONTINGENTI  DE CONTINGENTIA IN REBUS DEQUE CONTINGENTIAE RADICIBUS  Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτε-  ρα; εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως χαὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ  τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου, 7 ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντιχειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν  ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν εἶναι  ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις, ἀλλο πάντα εἶναι͵ καὶ γίγνεσθαι  ἐξ ἀνάγκης" ὦστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι dv, οὔτε  πραγματεύεσθαι" ὡς ἐοὶνν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται  τοδί’ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐχ ἔσται τοδί.  Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι  τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι: ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης  ἔσεσθαι, ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἣν εἰπεῖν τότε.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ποῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντί-  γὰρ  φασιν, ἢ μὴ εἶπον’ δῆλον Y3o ὅτι οὕτως ἔ ει τὸ πράγ-  μᾶάτα; κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι, ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ.  οὐδὲ  διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται  ἢ οὐχ ἔσται οὐδ᾽ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν  ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ. Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕ-  τως εἶχεν͵ dios τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον  Ἣν  τοῦτο γενέσθαι, χαὶ ἕχαστον τῶν γενομένον ἀεὶ  οὕτως εἶχεν, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. Ὅ τε γορ  ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ olóves μη γενέσθαι,  χαὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.  Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα - ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν  ἐσομένον xal ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, xal ἀπὸ τοῦ  πρᾶξαί τι,  Ξ  xal ὅτι ὅλος ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν  εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως" ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸ  εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι χαὶ τὸ  μὴ γενέσθαι:  καὶ πολλο ἡμῖν δῆλα ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον τουτὶ  τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθήναι, xxl οὐ δια-  τμηθήσεται, ἀλλ ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται" ὁμοίως  δὲ xal τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε  τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴ γε μὴ δυνατὸν  ἦν τὸ μὴ διατυιηθῆναι"  ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι χατὰ δύναμιν  λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα  ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  ὁπότερ ἔτυχε, xal οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις 7 ἡ  ἀπόφασις ἀληθής; τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μέν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ  πολὺ θάτερον' οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται γενέσται καὶ  θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Textus argumentum, et partitio.—- 2. Si oppo-  sitarum enunciationum de futuro contingenti in singularibus una  esset determinate vera, et altera determinate falsa, sequeren-  tur tria inconvenientia: 19, omnia essent ex necessitate; conse-  quenter 29, non oporteret de aliquo consiliari; 39, omnes actiones  humanae quae sunt propter aliquem finem essent superfluae. —  3. Probatur huiusmodi inconvenientia sequi; et primo ex vi enun-  ciationum; — 4. Secundo ex parte rei enunciatae.- 5. Quae qui-  dem inconvenientia admitti nequeunt; et primo, quia auferunt  libertatem humanam.- 6. Deinde, quia in aliis rebus tollunt na-  turam potentialitatis, seu. contingentiae.— 7. Totum declaratur  exemplis sensibilibus.- 8. Reiectis quibusdam falsis sententiis, sta-  tuitur necessarium esse illud quod in sua natura determinatum  est  solum ad esse; impossibile quod est determinatum solum ad  non esse; possibile quod neque ad esse neque ad non esse est de-  terminatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad aliud, sive  aequaliter ad utrumque: quo casu possibile magis proprie dicitur  contingens ad utrumlibet.- 9. Possibilitas, seu potentia passiva  materiae ad utrumque non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi  addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determi-  *  Quae ergo contingunt inconvenientia haec sunt et ptanda. As-  signatur enim a s. 'Thoma ratio cur, remoto contingenti quod est ut in  paucioribus, removeatur contingens quod est ut in pluribus: quae ra-  tio est convenientia inter utrumque contingens. Extra igitur rem est le-  ctio codd. ABC, per quam contingens non cum contingenti, sed cum  necessario comparatur.  quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum  determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit  vel non sit ".  12. Deinde cum dicit: A4 vero neque quoniam etc.,  ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in sin-  gularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo,  proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est  verum dicere* quod in talibus alterum opposito-  rum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum  9) Ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Cum Commentaria sua in II lib.  non compleverit 85. Thomas, lector inveniet in supplemento Caietani,  lect. x, quae in s. Doctore desunt. — Post illa verba, quin illud sit prae-  sens vel futurum, cod. B prosequitur: sed quia non potest non fieri  impossibile idem significat etc. Et cod. C: sed quod non potest non fieri  et quod impossibile est non fieri. Evidenter in hac secunda lectione de-  siderantur verba idem significat. Lectio autem cod. B est intricata et  absurda.  v) Sed quod sit vel non sit. Hanc lectionem omnium nostrorum  codd. et ed. a sufficimus lectioni Pianae: meque quod sit vel non sit,  nempe, futurum. Sensus editionis Pianae est quod futurum, de quo est  sermo, neque est determinate futurum, neque est determinate non futu-  rum. Sensus codd. est quod futurum ipsum aut est futurum, aut non est  futurum. Quod in sensu indeterminato seu disiunctivo et vi propositionis  est verissimum, quia inter est futurum et non est futurum non datur  medium. Nihilominus si membra disiunctionis absolute sumantur dici ne-  quit quod alterutrum sit determinate futurum, vel quod sit determinate  non futurum, ut editio Piana significat (Cf. lect. xv, n. 4). — Lectio tamen  codd. magis placet ratione contextus; quia revera cum iam praemissum  immediate fuerit quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate  dici quod sit futurum, inutile est repetere neque quod sit; sed incul-  canda est veritas propositionis hypotheticae disiunctivae quod sit vel non  sit, quam in n. seq. cum Aristotele late probat s. Thomas.  E) Quod sicut non est verum dicere etc. Ita legunt codd. DE — Cod. A  legit: quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppo-  sitorum, nec si dicamus etc. — Codd. BC: quod sicut non est verum  (B non verum) dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum,  ut si dicamus etc. Vitiosae lectiones, quae tamen innuunt eam, quam  integre exhibent codd. DE. — P. et Ven. edd.: quod mon est verum  dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum non sit verum, ut si di-  "ΒΟ: ΖΩ͂  d au-  tem est et omit-  tunt ferto.  *  Codd. omittunt  etiam. - ABCE in-  fra:  quam ad al-  terum.  *g: non contin-  p:  git vere dicere.  *  μὲ  .  dicamus.  scilicet  * Etnihil...non  esse  quod est.  Omnia omittun-  tur in cod. 4, sed  est mendum.  "i  m  Ὁ,  TM  oe  S  ET  RET  ΥΥΤΥ  dicere  *  63  possibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique op-  positorum.  Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: Adhuc si verum  est etc. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid,  sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere  quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utra-  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  quod non utrumque sit verum ; ut si  quod dicamus *, neque erit, neque non erit; secun-  do, ibi: Primum enim cum sit etc., probat propo-  situm duabus rationibus.  Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio  dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex defini-  tione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam  esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil  aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non  esse quod est *; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio  sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed  secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est  falsa, qua dicitur, Aoc erit; nec tamen negatio est  vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione  non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est im-  que * esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: se-  quitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod  erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens  quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit  neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra  rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod  est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum *; ut na-  vale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc  sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis.  camus quod neque erit, neque non erit. Haec lectio Piana nulla ra-  tione sustineri potest, quia contradicit eis, quae s. Thomas praemiserat  ac  probaverat supra quoad primam partem, et quoad alteram partem  probatin  hoc numero. Dixerat enim supra n. 7 quod Aristoteles primo  ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate  attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; et ad hoc probandum ordinantur ra-  tiones, quas s. Thomas late exponit eodem m. 7 et seqq. Secundo di-  xerat ab Aristotele ostendi quod non potest esse quod in singularibus  et futuris utrumque oppositorum veritate careat; et hoc probatur in hoc  numero 12. Porro lectio codd. DE hanc divisionem servat, et adaequate  ac  ex ordine exhibet. At in Piana verba, nom est verum dicere quod in  talibus (nempe singularibus futuris) alferum oppositorum non sit ve-  rum contradicunt thesi probatae in numeris praecedentibus, scilicet quod  non est verum quod in singularibus futuris alterum oppositorum sit  determinate verum; deinde contradicunt thesi enunciatae et probatae in  hoc numero, nempe veritatem non omnino deesse in singularibus futuris  utrique oppositorum. Ergo de veritate in ordine ad utrumque opposito-  rum sermo est, cum tamen Piana nonnisi de veritate unius oppositorum  (alterum oppositorum ) mentionem faciat, redeundo nempe ad primam  thesim. Denique quae sequuntur (uf si dicamus etc.) sunt perspicua  quidem in codd., sed in Piana vix ac né vix quidem locum habent:  etenim propositio neque erit, neque non erit, est de sensu coniunctivo,  de  utroque nempe oppositorum, et tamen Piana praemittit sensum  disiunctivum, videlicet alterum oppositorum.  *  *  AE: utrumque.  ABC erronee: ad  alterum; etomitt.  cras erit vel non  erit.  64  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DECIMAQUARTA  ITERUM DE PROPOSITIONIBUS SINGULARIBUS DE FUTURO  IN MATERIA CONTINGENTI  DE CONTINGENTIA IN REBUS DEQUE CONTINGENTIAE RADICIBUS  Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτε-  ρα; εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως χαὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ  τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου, 7 ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντιχειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν  ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν εἶναι  ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις, ἀλλο πάντα εἶναι͵ καὶ γίγνεσθαι  ἐξ ἀνάγκης" ὦστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι dv, οὔτε  πραγματεύεσθαι" ὡς ἐοὶνν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται  τοδί’ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐχ ἔσται τοδί.  Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι  τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι: ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης  ἔσεσθαι, ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἣν εἰπεῖν τότε.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ποῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντί-  γὰρ  φασιν, ἢ μὴ εἶπον’ δῆλον Y3o ὅτι οὕτως ἔ ει τὸ πράγ-  μᾶάτα; κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι, ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ.  οὐδὲ  διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται  ἢ οὐχ ἔσται οὐδ᾽ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν  ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ. Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕ-  τως εἶχεν͵ dios τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον  Ἣν  τοῦτο γενέσθαι, χαὶ ἕχαστον τῶν γενομένον ἀεὶ  οὕτως εἶχεν, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. Ὅ τε γορ  ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ olóves μη γενέσθαι,  χαὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.  Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα - ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν  ἐσομένον xal ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, xal ἀπὸ τοῦ  πρᾶξαί τι,  Ξ  xal ὅτι ὅλος ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν  εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως" ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸ  εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι χαὶ τὸ  μὴ γενέσθαι:  καὶ πολλο ἡμῖν δῆλα ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον τουτὶ  τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθήναι, xxl οὐ δια-  τμηθήσεται, ἀλλ ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται" ὁμοίως  δὲ xal τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε  τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴ γε μὴ δυνατὸν  ἦν τὸ μὴ διατυιηθῆναι"  ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι χατὰ δύναμιν  λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα  ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  ὁπότερ ἔτυχε, xal οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις 7 ἡ  ἀπόφασις ἀληθής; τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μέν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ  πολὺ θάτερον' οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται γενέσται καὶ  θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Textus argumentum, et partitio.—- 2. Si oppo-  sitarum enunciationum de futuro contingenti in singularibus una  esset determinate vera, et altera determinate falsa, sequeren-  tur tria inconvenientia: 19, omnia essent ex necessitate; conse-  quenter 29, non oporteret de aliquo consiliari; 39, omnes actiones  humanae quae sunt propter aliquem finem essent superfluae. —  3. Probatur huiusmodi inconvenientia sequi; et primo ex vi enun-  ciationum; — 4. Secundo ex parte rei enunciatae.- 5. Quae qui-  dem inconvenientia admitti nequeunt; et primo, quia auferunt  libertatem humanam.- 6. Deinde, quia in aliis rebus tollunt na-  turam potentialitatis, seu. contingentiae.— 7. Totum declaratur  exemplis sensibilibus.- 8. Reiectis quibusdam falsis sententiis, sta-  tuitur necessarium esse illud quod in sua natura determinatum  est  solum ad esse; impossibile quod est determinatum solum ad  non esse; possibile quod neque ad esse neque ad non esse est de-  terminatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad aliud, sive  aequaliter ad utrumque: quo casu possibile magis proprie dicitur  contingens ad utrumlibet.- 9. Possibilitas, seu potentia passiva  materiae ad utrumque non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi  addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determi-  *  Quae ergo contingunt inconvenientia haec sunt et ptanda. As-  signatur enim a s. 'Thoma ratio cur, remoto contingenti quod est ut in  paucioribus, removeatur contingens quod est ut in pluribus: quae ra-  tio est convenientia inter utrumque contingens. Extra igitur rem est le-  ctio codd. ABC, per quam contingens non cum contingenti, sed cum  necessario comparatur.  quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum  determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit  vel non sit ".  12. Deinde cum dicit: A4 vero neque quoniam etc.,  ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in sin-  gularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo,  proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est  verum dicere* quod in talibus alterum opposito-  rum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum  9) Ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Cum Commentaria sua in II lib.  non compleverit 85. Thomas, lector inveniet in supplemento Caietani,  lect. x, quae in s. Doctore desunt. — Post illa verba, quin illud sit prae-  sens vel futurum, cod. B prosequitur: sed quia non potest non fieri  impossibile idem significat etc. Et cod. C: sed quod non potest non fieri  et quod impossibile est non fieri. Evidenter in hac secunda lectione de-  siderantur verba idem significat. Lectio autem cod. B est intricata et  absurda.  v) Sed quod sit vel non sit. Hanc lectionem omnium nostrorum  codd. et ed. a sufficimus lectioni Pianae: meque quod sit vel non sit,  nempe, futurum. Sensus editionis Pianae est quod futurum, de quo est  sermo, neque est determinate futurum, neque est determinate non futu-  rum. Sensus codd. est quod futurum ipsum aut est futurum, aut non est  futurum. Quod in sensu indeterminato seu disiunctivo et vi propositionis  est verissimum, quia inter est futurum et non est futurum non datur  medium. Nihilominus si membra disiunctionis absolute sumantur dici ne-  quit quod alterutrum sit determinate futurum, vel quod sit determinate  non futurum, ut editio Piana significat (Cf. lect. xv, n. 4). — Lectio tamen  codd. magis placet ratione contextus; quia revera cum iam praemissum  immediate fuerit quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate  dici quod sit futurum, inutile est repetere neque quod sit; sed incul-  canda est veritas propositionis hypotheticae disiunctivae quod sit vel non  sit, quam in n. seq. cum Aristotele late probat s. Thomas.  E) Quod sicut non est verum dicere etc. Ita legunt codd. DE — Cod. A  legit: quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppo-  sitorum, nec si dicamus etc. — Codd. BC: quod sicut non est verum  (B non verum) dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum,  ut si dicamus etc. Vitiosae lectiones, quae tamen innuunt eam, quam  integre exhibent codd. DE. — P. et Ven. edd.: quod mon est verum  dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum non sit verum, ut si di-  "ΒΟ: ΖΩ͂  d au-  tem est et omit-  tunt ferto.  *  Codd. omittunt  etiam. - ABCE in-  fra:  quam ad al-  terum.  *g: non contin-  p:  git vere dicere.  *  μὲ  .  dicamus.  scilicet  * Etnihil...non  esse  quod est.  Omnia omittun-  tur in cod. 4, sed  est mendum.  "i  m  Ὁ,  TM  oe  S  ET  RET  ΥΥΤΥ  dicere  *  63  possibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique op-  positorum.  Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: Adhuc si verum  est etc. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid,  sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere  quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utra-  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  quod non utrumque sit verum ; ut si  quod dicamus *, neque erit, neque non erit; secun-  do, ibi: Primum enim cum sit etc., probat propo-  situm duabus rationibus.  Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio  dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex defini-  tione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam  esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil  aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non  esse quod est *; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio  sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed  secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est  falsa, qua dicitur, Aoc erit; nec tamen negatio est  vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione  non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est im-  que * esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: se-  quitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod  erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens  quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit  neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra  rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod  est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum *; ut na-  vale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc  sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis.  camus quod neque erit, neque non erit. Haec lectio Piana nulla ra-  tione sustineri potest, quia contradicit eis, quae s. Thomas praemiserat  ac  probaverat supra quoad primam partem, et quoad alteram partem  probatin  hoc numero. Dixerat enim supra n. 7 quod Aristoteles primo  ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate  attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; et ad hoc probandum ordinantur ra-  tiones, quas s. Thomas late exponit eodem m. 7 et seqq. Secundo di-  xerat ab Aristotele ostendi quod non potest esse quod in singularibus  et futuris utrumque oppositorum veritate careat; et hoc probatur in hoc  numero 12. Porro lectio codd. DE hanc divisionem servat, et adaequate  ac  ex ordine exhibet. At in Piana verba, nom est verum dicere quod in  talibus (nempe singularibus futuris) alferum oppositorum non sit ve-  rum contradicunt thesi probatae in numeris praecedentibus, scilicet quod  non est verum quod in singularibus futuris alterum oppositorum sit  determinate verum; deinde contradicunt thesi enunciatae et probatae in  hoc numero, nempe veritatem non omnino deesse in singularibus futuris  utrique oppositorum. Ergo de veritate in ordine ad utrumque opposito-  rum sermo est, cum tamen Piana nonnisi de veritate unius oppositorum  (alterum oppositorum ) mentionem faciat, redeundo nempe ad primam  thesim. Denique quae sequuntur (uf si dicamus etc.) sunt perspicua  quidem in codd., sed in Piana vix ac né vix quidem locum habent:  etenim propositio neque erit, neque non erit, est de sensu coniunctivo,  de  utroque nempe oppositorum, et tamen Piana praemittit sensum  disiunctivum, videlicet alterum oppositorum.  *  *  AE: utrumque.  ABC erronee: ad  alterum; etomitt.  cras erit vel non  erit.  64  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DECIMAQUARTA  ITERUM DE PROPOSITIONIBUS SINGULARIBUS DE FUTURO  IN MATERIA CONTINGENTI  DE CONTINGENTIA IN REBUS DEQUE CONTINGENTIAE RADICIBUS  Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτε-  ρα; εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως χαὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ  τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου, 7 ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντιχειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν  ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν εἶναι  ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις, ἀλλο πάντα εἶναι͵ καὶ γίγνεσθαι  ἐξ ἀνάγκης" ὦστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι dv, οὔτε  πραγματεύεσθαι" ὡς ἐοὶνν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται  τοδί’ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐχ ἔσται τοδί.  Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι  τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι: ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης  ἔσεσθαι, ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἣν εἰπεῖν τότε.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ποῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντί-  γὰρ  φασιν, ἢ μὴ εἶπον’ δῆλον Y3o ὅτι οὕτως ἔ ει τὸ πράγ-  μᾶάτα; κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι, ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ.  οὐδὲ  διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται  ἢ οὐχ ἔσται οὐδ᾽ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν  ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ. Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕ-  τως εἶχεν͵ dios τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον  Ἣν  τοῦτο γενέσθαι, χαὶ ἕχαστον τῶν γενομένον ἀεὶ  οὕτως εἶχεν, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. Ὅ τε γορ  ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ olóves μη γενέσθαι,  χαὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.  Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα - ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν  ἐσομένον xal ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, xal ἀπὸ τοῦ  πρᾶξαί τι,  Ξ  xal ὅτι ὅλος ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν  εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως" ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸ  εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι χαὶ τὸ  μὴ γενέσθαι:  καὶ πολλο ἡμῖν δῆλα ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον τουτὶ  τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθήναι, xxl οὐ δια-  τμηθήσεται, ἀλλ ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται" ὁμοίως  δὲ xal τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε  τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴ γε μὴ δυνατὸν  ἦν τὸ μὴ διατυιηθῆναι"  ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι χατὰ δύναμιν  λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα  ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  ὁπότερ ἔτυχε, xal οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις 7 ἡ  ἀπόφασις ἀληθής; τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μέν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ  πολὺ θάτερον' οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται γενέσται καὶ  θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Textus argumentum, et partitio.—- 2. Si oppo-  sitarum enunciationum de futuro contingenti in singularibus una  esset determinate vera, et altera determinate falsa, sequeren-  tur tria inconvenientia: 19, omnia essent ex necessitate; conse-  quenter 29, non oporteret de aliquo consiliari; 39, omnes actiones  humanae quae sunt propter aliquem finem essent superfluae. —  3. Probatur huiusmodi inconvenientia sequi; et primo ex vi enun-  ciationum; — 4. Secundo ex parte rei enunciatae.- 5. Quae qui-  dem inconvenientia admitti nequeunt; et primo, quia auferunt  libertatem humanam.- 6. Deinde, quia in aliis rebus tollunt na-  turam potentialitatis, seu. contingentiae.— 7. Totum declaratur  exemplis sensibilibus.- 8. Reiectis quibusdam falsis sententiis, sta-  tuitur necessarium esse illud quod in sua natura determinatum  est  solum ad esse; impossibile quod est determinatum solum ad  non esse; possibile quod neque ad esse neque ad non esse est de-  terminatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad aliud, sive  aequaliter ad utrumque: quo casu possibile magis proprie dicitur  contingens ad utrumlibet.- 9. Possibilitas, seu potentia passiva  materiae ad utrumque non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi  addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determi-  *  Quae ergo contingunt inconvenientia haec sunt et ptanda. As-  signatur enim a s. 'Thoma ratio cur, remoto contingenti quod est ut in  paucioribus, removeatur contingens quod est ut in pluribus: quae ra-  tio est convenientia inter utrumque contingens. Extra igitur rem est le-  ctio codd. ABC, per quam contingens non cum contingenti, sed cum  necessario comparatur.  quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum  determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit  vel non sit ".  12. Deinde cum dicit: A4 vero neque quoniam etc.,  ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in sin-  gularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo,  proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est  verum dicere* quod in talibus alterum opposito-  rum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum  9) Ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Cum Commentaria sua in II lib.  non compleverit 85. Thomas, lector inveniet in supplemento Caietani,  lect. x, quae in s. Doctore desunt. — Post illa verba, quin illud sit prae-  sens vel futurum, cod. B prosequitur: sed quia non potest non fieri  impossibile idem significat etc. Et cod. C: sed quod non potest non fieri  et quod impossibile est non fieri. Evidenter in hac secunda lectione de-  siderantur verba idem significat. Lectio autem cod. B est intricata et  absurda.  v) Sed quod sit vel non sit. Hanc lectionem omnium nostrorum  codd. et ed. a sufficimus lectioni Pianae: meque quod sit vel non sit,  nempe, futurum. Sensus editionis Pianae est quod futurum, de quo est  sermo, neque est determinate futurum, neque est determinate non futu-  rum. Sensus codd. est quod futurum ipsum aut est futurum, aut non est  futurum. Quod in sensu indeterminato seu disiunctivo et vi propositionis  est verissimum, quia inter est futurum et non est futurum non datur  medium. Nihilominus si membra disiunctionis absolute sumantur dici ne-  quit quod alterutrum sit determinate futurum, vel quod sit determinate  non futurum, ut editio Piana significat (Cf. lect. xv, n. 4). — Lectio tamen  codd. magis placet ratione contextus; quia revera cum iam praemissum  immediate fuerit quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate  dici quod sit futurum, inutile est repetere neque quod sit; sed incul-  canda est veritas propositionis hypotheticae disiunctivae quod sit vel non  sit, quam in n. seq. cum Aristotele late probat s. Thomas.  E) Quod sicut non est verum dicere etc. Ita legunt codd. DE — Cod. A  legit: quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppo-  sitorum, nec si dicamus etc. — Codd. BC: quod sicut non est verum  (B non verum) dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum,  ut si dicamus etc. Vitiosae lectiones, quae tamen innuunt eam, quam  integre exhibent codd. DE. — P. et Ven. edd.: quod mon est verum  dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum non sit verum, ut si di-  "ΒΟ: ΖΩ͂  d au-  tem est et omit-  tunt ferto.  *  Codd. omittunt  etiam. - ABCE in-  fra:  quam ad al-  terum.  *g: non contin-  p:  git vere dicere.  *  μὲ  .  dicamus.  scilicet  * Etnihil...non  esse  quod est.  Omnia omittun-  tur in cod. 4, sed  est mendum.  "i  m  Ὁ,  TM  oe  S  ET  RET  ΥΥΤΥ  dicere  *  63  possibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique op-  positorum.  Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: Adhuc si verum  est etc. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid,  sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere  quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utra-  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  quod non utrumque sit verum ; ut si  quod dicamus *, neque erit, neque non erit; secun-  do, ibi: Primum enim cum sit etc., probat propo-  situm duabus rationibus.  Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio  dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex defini-  tione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam  esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil  aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non  esse quod est *; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio  sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed  secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est  falsa, qua dicitur, Aoc erit; nec tamen negatio est  vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione  non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est im-  que * esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: se-  quitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod  erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens  quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit  neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra  rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod  est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum *; ut na-  vale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc  sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis.  camus quod neque erit, neque non erit. Haec lectio Piana nulla ra-  tione sustineri potest, quia contradicit eis, quae s. Thomas praemiserat  ac  probaverat supra quoad primam partem, et quoad alteram partem  probatin  hoc numero. Dixerat enim supra n. 7 quod Aristoteles primo  ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate  attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; et ad hoc probandum ordinantur ra-  tiones, quas s. Thomas late exponit eodem m. 7 et seqq. Secundo di-  xerat ab Aristotele ostendi quod non potest esse quod in singularibus  et futuris utrumque oppositorum veritate careat; et hoc probatur in hoc  numero 12. Porro lectio codd. DE hanc divisionem servat, et adaequate  ac  ex ordine exhibet. At in Piana verba, nom est verum dicere quod in  talibus (nempe singularibus futuris) alferum oppositorum non sit ve-  rum contradicunt thesi probatae in numeris praecedentibus, scilicet quod  non est verum quod in singularibus futuris alterum oppositorum sit  determinate verum; deinde contradicunt thesi enunciatae et probatae in  hoc numero, nempe veritatem non omnino deesse in singularibus futuris  utrique oppositorum. Ergo de veritate in ordine ad utrumque opposito-  rum sermo est, cum tamen Piana nonnisi de veritate unius oppositorum  (alterum oppositorum ) mentionem faciat, redeundo nempe ad primam  thesim. Denique quae sequuntur (uf si dicamus etc.) sunt perspicua  quidem in codd., sed in Piana vix ac né vix quidem locum habent:  etenim propositio neque erit, neque non erit, est de sensu coniunctivo,  de  utroque nempe oppositorum, et tamen Piana praemittit sensum  disiunctivum, videlicet alterum oppositorum.  *  *  AE: utrumque.  ABC erronee: ad  alterum; etomitt.  cras erit vel non  erit.  64  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DECIMAQUARTA  ITERUM DE PROPOSITIONIBUS SINGULARIBUS DE FUTURO  IN MATERIA CONTINGENTI  DE CONTINGENTIA IN REBUS DEQUE CONTINGENTIAE RADICIBUS  Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτε-  ρα; εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως χαὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ  τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου, 7 ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντιχειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν  ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν εἶναι  ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις, ἀλλο πάντα εἶναι͵ καὶ γίγνεσθαι  ἐξ ἀνάγκης" ὦστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι dv, οὔτε  πραγματεύεσθαι" ὡς ἐοὶνν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται  τοδί’ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐχ ἔσται τοδί.  Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι  τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι: ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης  ἔσεσθαι, ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἣν εἰπεῖν τότε.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ποῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντί-  γὰρ  φασιν, ἢ μὴ εἶπον’ δῆλον Y3o ὅτι οὕτως ἔ ει τὸ πράγ-  μᾶάτα; κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι, ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ.  οὐδὲ  διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται  ἢ οὐχ ἔσται οὐδ᾽ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν  ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ. Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕ-  τως εἶχεν͵ dios τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον  Ἣν  τοῦτο γενέσθαι, χαὶ ἕχαστον τῶν γενομένον ἀεὶ  οὕτως εἶχεν, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. Ὅ τε γορ  ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ olóves μη γενέσθαι,  χαὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.  Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα - ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν  ἐσομένον xal ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, xal ἀπὸ τοῦ  πρᾶξαί τι,  Ξ  xal ὅτι ὅλος ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν  εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως" ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸ  εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι χαὶ τὸ  μὴ γενέσθαι:  καὶ πολλο ἡμῖν δῆλα ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον τουτὶ  τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθήναι, xxl οὐ δια-  τμηθήσεται, ἀλλ ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται" ὁμοίως  δὲ xal τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε  τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴ γε μὴ δυνατὸν  ἦν τὸ μὴ διατυιηθῆναι"  ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι χατὰ δύναμιν  λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα  ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  ὁπότερ ἔτυχε, xal οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις 7 ἡ  ἀπόφασις ἀληθής; τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μέν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ  πολὺ θάτερον' οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται γενέσται καὶ  θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Textus argumentum, et partitio.—- 2. Si oppo-  sitarum enunciationum de futuro contingenti in singularibus una  esset determinate vera, et altera determinate falsa, sequeren-  tur tria inconvenientia: 19, omnia essent ex necessitate; conse-  quenter 29, non oporteret de aliquo consiliari; 39, omnes actiones  humanae quae sunt propter aliquem finem essent superfluae. —  3. Probatur huiusmodi inconvenientia sequi; et primo ex vi enun-  ciationum; — 4. Secundo ex parte rei enunciatae.- 5. Quae qui-  dem inconvenientia admitti nequeunt; et primo, quia auferunt  libertatem humanam.- 6. Deinde, quia in aliis rebus tollunt na-  turam potentialitatis, seu. contingentiae.— 7. Totum declaratur  exemplis sensibilibus.- 8. Reiectis quibusdam falsis sententiis, sta-  tuitur necessarium esse illud quod in sua natura determinatum  est  solum ad esse; impossibile quod est determinatum solum ad  non esse; possibile quod neque ad esse neque ad non esse est de-  terminatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad aliud, sive  aequaliter ad utrumque: quo casu possibile magis proprie dicitur  contingens ad utrumlibet.- 9. Possibilitas, seu potentia passiva  materiae ad utrumque non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi  addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determi-  *  Quae ergo contingunt inconvenientia haec sunt et ptanda. As-  signatur enim a s. 'Thoma ratio cur, remoto contingenti quod est ut in  paucioribus, removeatur contingens quod est ut in pluribus: quae ra-  tio est convenientia inter utrumque contingens. Extra igitur rem est le-  ctio codd. ABC, per quam contingens non cum contingenti, sed cum  necessario comparatur.  quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum  determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit  vel non sit ".  12. Deinde cum dicit: A4 vero neque quoniam etc.,  ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in sin-  gularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo,  proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est  verum dicere* quod in talibus alterum opposito-  rum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum  9) Ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Cum Commentaria sua in II lib.  non compleverit 85. Thomas, lector inveniet in supplemento Caietani,  lect. x, quae in s. Doctore desunt. — Post illa verba, quin illud sit prae-  sens vel futurum, cod. B prosequitur: sed quia non potest non fieri  impossibile idem significat etc. Et cod. C: sed quod non potest non fieri  et quod impossibile est non fieri. Evidenter in hac secunda lectione de-  siderantur verba idem significat. Lectio autem cod. B est intricata et  absurda.  v) Sed quod sit vel non sit. Hanc lectionem omnium nostrorum  codd. et ed. a sufficimus lectioni Pianae: meque quod sit vel non sit,  nempe, futurum. Sensus editionis Pianae est quod futurum, de quo est  sermo, neque est determinate futurum, neque est determinate non futu-  rum. Sensus codd. est quod futurum ipsum aut est futurum, aut non est  futurum. Quod in sensu indeterminato seu disiunctivo et vi propositionis  est verissimum, quia inter est futurum et non est futurum non datur  medium. Nihilominus si membra disiunctionis absolute sumantur dici ne-  quit quod alterutrum sit determinate futurum, vel quod sit determinate  non futurum, ut editio Piana significat (Cf. lect. xv, n. 4). — Lectio tamen  codd. magis placet ratione contextus; quia revera cum iam praemissum  immediate fuerit quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate  dici quod sit futurum, inutile est repetere neque quod sit; sed incul-  canda est veritas propositionis hypotheticae disiunctivae quod sit vel non  sit, quam in n. seq. cum Aristotele late probat s. Thomas.  E) Quod sicut non est verum dicere etc. Ita legunt codd. DE — Cod. A  legit: quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppo-  sitorum, nec si dicamus etc. — Codd. BC: quod sicut non est verum  (B non verum) dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum,  ut si dicamus etc. Vitiosae lectiones, quae tamen innuunt eam, quam  integre exhibent codd. DE. — P. et Ven. edd.: quod mon est verum  dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum non sit verum, ut si di-  "ΒΟ: ΖΩ͂  d au-  tem est et omit-  tunt ferto.  *  Codd. omittunt  etiam. - ABCE in-  fra:  quam ad al-  terum.  *g: non contin-  p:  git vere dicere.  *  μὲ  .  dicamus.  scilicet  * Etnihil...non  esse  quod est.  Omnia omittun-  tur in cod. 4, sed  est mendum.  "i  m  Ὁ,  TM  oe  S  ET  RET  ΥΥΤΥ  dicere  *  63  possibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique op-  positorum.  Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: Adhuc si verum  est etc. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid,  sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere  quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utra-  CAP. IX, LECT. XIII  quod non utrumque sit verum ; ut si  quod dicamus *, neque erit, neque non erit; secun-  do, ibi: Primum enim cum sit etc., probat propo-  situm duabus rationibus.  Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio  dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex defini-  tione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam  esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil  aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non  esse quod est *; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio  sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed  secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est  falsa, qua dicitur, Aoc erit; nec tamen negatio est  vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione  non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est im-  que * esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: se-  quitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod  erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens  quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit  neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra  rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod  est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum *; ut na-  vale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc  sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis.  camus quod neque erit, neque non erit. Haec lectio Piana nulla ra-  tione sustineri potest, quia contradicit eis, quae s. Thomas praemiserat  ac  probaverat supra quoad primam partem, et quoad alteram partem  probatin  hoc numero. Dixerat enim supra n. 7 quod Aristoteles primo  ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate  attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; et ad hoc probandum ordinantur ra-  tiones, quas s. Thomas late exponit eodem m. 7 et seqq. Secundo di-  xerat ab Aristotele ostendi quod non potest esse quod in singularibus  et futuris utrumque oppositorum veritate careat; et hoc probatur in hoc  numero 12. Porro lectio codd. DE hanc divisionem servat, et adaequate  ac  ex ordine exhibet. At in Piana verba, nom est verum dicere quod in  talibus (nempe singularibus futuris) alferum oppositorum non sit ve-  rum contradicunt thesi probatae in numeris praecedentibus, scilicet quod  non est verum quod in singularibus futuris alterum oppositorum sit  determinate verum; deinde contradicunt thesi enunciatae et probatae in  hoc numero, nempe veritatem non omnino deesse in singularibus futuris  utrique oppositorum. Ergo de veritate in ordine ad utrumque opposito-  rum sermo est, cum tamen Piana nonnisi de veritate unius oppositorum  (alterum oppositorum ) mentionem faciat, redeundo nempe ad primam  thesim. Denique quae sequuntur (uf si dicamus etc.) sunt perspicua  quidem in codd., sed in Piana vix ac né vix quidem locum habent:  etenim propositio neque erit, neque non erit, est de sensu coniunctivo,  de  utroque nempe oppositorum, et tamen Piana praemittit sensum  disiunctivum, videlicet alterum oppositorum.  *  *  AE: utrumque.  ABC erronee: ad  alterum; etomitt.  cras erit vel non  erit.  64  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DECIMAQUARTA  ITERUM DE PROPOSITIONIBUS SINGULARIBUS DE FUTURO  IN MATERIA CONTINGENTI  DE CONTINGENTIA IN REBUS DEQUE CONTINGENTIAE RADICIBUS  Τὰ μὲν δὴ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτε-  ρα; εἴπερ πάσης καταφάσεως χαὶ ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἐπὶ  τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων ὡς καθόλου, 7 ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽  ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἀντιχειμένων εἶναι τὴν μὲν  ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ, μηδὲν δὲ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχεν εἶναι  ἐν τοῖς γινομένοις, ἀλλο πάντα εἶναι͵ καὶ γίγνεσθαι  ἐξ ἀνάγκης" ὦστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι dv, οὔτε  πραγματεύεσθαι" ὡς ἐοὶνν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται  τοδί’ ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐχ ἔσται τοδί.  Οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι  τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι: ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης  ἔσεσθαι, ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἣν εἰπεῖν τότε.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ποῦτο διαφέρει, εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντί-  γὰρ  φασιν, ἢ μὴ εἶπον’ δῆλον Y3o ὅτι οὕτως ἔ ει τὸ πράγ-  μᾶάτα; κἂν μὴ ὁ μὲν καταφήσῃ τι, ὁ δὲ ἀποφήσῃ.  οὐδὲ  διὰ τὸ καταφαθῆναι ἢ ἀποφαθῆναι ἔσται  ἢ οὐχ ἔσται οὐδ᾽ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν  ὁποσῳοῦν χρόνῳ. Ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ οὕ-  τως εἶχεν͵ dios τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον  Ἣν  τοῦτο γενέσθαι, χαὶ ἕχαστον τῶν γενομένον ἀεὶ  οὕτως εἶχεν, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. Ὅ τε γορ  ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ olóves μη γενέσθαι,  χαὶ τὸ γενόμενον, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται.  Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα - ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῶν  ἐσομένον xal ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, xal ἀπὸ τοῦ  πρᾶξαί τι,  Ξ  xal ὅτι ὅλος ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μη ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν  εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως" ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸ  εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι χαὶ τὸ  μὴ γενέσθαι:  καὶ πολλο ἡμῖν δῆλα ἐστιν οὕτως ἔχοντα, οἷον τουτὶ  τὸ ἱμάτιον δυνατόν ἐστι διατμηθήναι, xxl οὐ δια-  τμηθήσεται, ἀλλ ἔμπροσθεν κατατριβήσεται" ὁμοίως  δὲ xal τὸ μὴ διατμηθῆναι δυνατόν" οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπῆρχε  τὸ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸ κατατριβῆναι, εἴ γε μὴ δυνατὸν  ἦν τὸ μὴ διατυιηθῆναι"  ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι χατὰ δύναμιν  λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην. Φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα  ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν  ὁπότερ ἔτυχε, xal οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἡ κατάφασις 7 ἡ  ἀπόφασις ἀληθής; τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον μέν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ  πολὺ θάτερον' οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται γενέσται καὶ  θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή.  SvNoPsis. — 1. Textus argumentum, et partitio.—- 2. Si oppo-  sitarum enunciationum de futuro contingenti in singularibus una  esset determinate vera, et altera determinate falsa, sequeren-  tur tria inconvenientia: 19, omnia essent ex necessitate; conse-  quenter 29, non oporteret de aliquo consiliari; 39, omnes actiones  humanae quae sunt propter aliquem finem essent superfluae. —  3. Probatur huiusmodi inconvenientia sequi; et primo ex vi enun-  ciationum; — 4. Secundo ex parte rei enunciatae.- 5. Quae qui-  dem inconvenientia admitti nequeunt; et primo, quia auferunt  libertatem humanam.- 6. Deinde, quia in aliis rebus tollunt na-  turam potentialitatis, seu. contingentiae.— 7. Totum declaratur  exemplis sensibilibus.- 8. Reiectis quibusdam falsis sententiis, sta-  tuitur necessarium esse illud quod in sua natura determinatum  est  solum ad esse; impossibile quod est determinatum solum ad  non esse; possibile quod neque ad esse neque ad non esse est de-  terminatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad aliud, sive  aequaliter ad utrumque: quo casu possibile magis proprie dicitur  contingens ad utrumlibet.- 9. Possibilitas, seu potentia passiva  materiae ad utrumque non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi  addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determi-  *  Quae ergo contingunt inconvenientia haec sunt et huius-  modi alia, si omnis affirmationis et negationis, vel in  his quae de universalibus dicuntur universaliter, vel in  his quae sunt singularia, necesse est oppositarum hane  quidem veram esse, illam vero falsam: nihil autem  utrumlibet esse in his, quae fiunt, sed omnia. esse et  fieri ex necessitate: quare non oportebit, neque con-  sulere, neque negotiari, quoniam si hoc facimus, erit  hoc, si vero non hoc, non erit.  Nihil enim prohibet in millesimum annum hunc quidem  dicere hoc futurum esse, illum vero non dicere: quare  ex  necessitate erit quodlibet eorum: quod tunc ab eo  verum erat dicere.  At  vero  neque hoc differt, si aliquis dixerit contradictio-  nem vel non dixerit; manifestum est enim quoniam sic  se  habent res, etiam si non hic quidem affirmaverit,  ille vero negaverit; non enim propter negare vel affir-  mare erit vel non erit, nec in millesimum annum ma-  gis quam in quantolibet tempore. Quare si in omni  tempore sic se habeat, ut unum diceretur vere, necesse  erat hoc fieri, et unumquodque eorum quae fiunt, sic  semper se habere, ut ex necessitate fieret. Quando enim  vere dicit quis quoniam erit, non potest non fieri: et  quod factum est, verum erat dicere semper quoniam erit.  Quod si haec non sunt possibilia (videmus enim esse prin-  cipium futurorum, et ab eo quod consultamus atque:  agimus aliquid;  et  ac  quoniam est omnino in his, quae non semper actu sunt,  possibile esse et non esse similiter, in quibus utrumque  contingit esse et non esse, quare fieri et non fieri:  multa nobis manifesta sunt sic se habentia, ut quoniam  hanc vestem possibile est incidi et non incidetur, sed  prius exteretur: similiter autem et non incidi possibile  est:  non enim esset eam prius 'exteri, nisi possibile  esset non incidi:  quare et in aliis fiendis quaecumque secundum potentiam  huiusmodi dicuntur), manifestum est quoniam non omnia  ex  necessitate,  vel  utrumlibet, et non magis vel affirmatio vel erit negatio  vera: alia vero magis quidem et in pluribus alterum:  sed contingit fieri et alterum, alterum vero minime.  nata ad unum. — ro. Quidam considerantes solummodo causam  determinatam ad unum, exinde fatalismum intulerunt. — Fata-  lismus stoicorum.- 11. Principia stoicorum refelluntur: - 19, Prin-  cipium quod, omne quod fit causam habet, est verum de eo quod  est per se, non autem de eo quod est per accidens, quia proprie  non est ens; 29, Non est verum quod, posita causa sufficienti ,  necesse est effectum poni, nisi sit causa necessaria quae ab effe-  ctu producendo non possit impediri. — 12. Si utrumque stoico-  rum principium esset verum, infallibiliter sequeretur omnia ex  necessitate contingere.— 13. Solvitur obiectio. - Id quod est per  accidens reducitur ad id quod est per se, non quasi per se sit  aut per se fiat, sed quia accidit ei quod per se est aut per se  fit. — 14. Refellitur fatalismus ex influentia corporum caelestium.  —Quia nulla vis corporalis potest agere per se nisi in rem corpo-  ream, impossibile est quod directe intellectus, seu ratio et voluntas  subdantur virtuti caelestium corporum. — 15. Effectus per accidens  et  casualis secundum se et respectu causae immediatae , non est  talis respectu causae intellectivae praeordinantis. — 16. Ex hoc  infertur omnia, etiam quae videntur fortuita et casualia, reduci in  ordinem divinae Providentiae.- 17. Error quod Providentia divina,  *  sunt  vel  fiunt;  sed  alia  quidem  Seq. c. rx.  CAP. IX, LECT. XIV  seu infallibilitas divinae cognitionis et efficacia divinae voluntatis  inducant in rebus necessitatem.—- 18. Error iste procedit ex eo quod  cognitio Divini intellectus et operatio divinae voluntatis pensantur  65  contingentiam , quae respicit ordinem causae ad suum effectum. --  22. Similiter voluntas divina, extra ordinem entium existens, est  causa profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias. Ergo est  ad modum eorum quae in nobis sunt, scilicet ad modum opera-  tionis et cognitionis humanae. — το. Quia cognitio nostra cadit sub  ordine temporis vel per se vel per accidens, ideo sub nostra co-  gnitione cadunt res sub ratione praesentis, praeteriti et futuri;  €t  consequenter cognoscimus praesentia ut actu. existentia, prae-  terita ut memorata, futura cognoscimus certitudinaliter in causis,  si in ipsis sint totaliter determinata ita ut ex necessitate eve-  niant, per coniecturam in causis naturalibus quidem sed non  ita totaliter determinatis ut non possint impediri; ea autem igno-  ramus penitus futura quae sunt omnino in potentia in causis  non determinatis potius ad unum quam ad aliud.—- 20. Ex op-  posito quia Deus est omnino extra ordinem temporis, uno in-  tuitu aeternitatis videt futura in seipsis, et non successive.— 21. Et  haec certitudo et infallibilitas divinae cognitionis non tollit a rebus  *  :  *  Lect. praeced.  Lect. xt, n.7;  lec. nn.  et  4,  5.  ἢ εὐβκυξ τα  tia quae dixerat.  *  |  ,  pc: ostendit es-  se.  * Lect. xv.  * Bc: proponit.  * Num. seq.  * Num. 5.  *  Bc: ex  'aemis-  sis rationibus.  *anc: erit  id quod  etc.- p: erit tdem  quod etc.  stenderat superius * Philosophus du-  AY  /  z^  cendo ad inconveniens quod non est  P similiter verum vel falsum determinate  9in altero oppositorum in singularibus  et füturis, sicut supra de aliis enunciationibus dixe-  rat *; nune autem ostendit inconvenientia ad quae  adduxerat* esse impossibilia. Et circa hoc duo facit:  primo, ostendit * impossibilia ea quae sequeban-  tur; secundo, concludit quomodo circa haec se  veritas habeat; ibi: Zgifur esse quod est* etc.  2. Circa primum tria facit: primo, ponit * incon-  venientia quae sequuntur; secundo, ostendit haec  inconvenientia ex praedicta positione sequi; ibi:  Nihil enim prohibet * etc.; tertio, ostendit esse im-  possibilia inconvenientia memorata; ibi: Quod si  haec possibilia non sunt * etc.- Dicit ergo primo, ex  praedictis rationibus * concludens, quod haec in-  convenientia sequuntur, si ponatur quod necesse sit  oppositarum enunciationum alteram determinate  esse  veram et alteram esse falsam similiter in  singularibus sicut in universalibus, quod scilicet  nihil in his quae fiunt sit ad utrumlibet, sed omnia  sint et fiant ex necessitate. Et ex hoc ulterius in-  ducit alia duo inconvenientia. Quorum primum  est  quod non oportebit de aliquo consiliari: pro-  batum est enim in III Efhicorum * quod consi-  lium non est de his, quae sunt ex necessitate , sed  solum de contingentibus, quae possunt esse et non  esse.  Secundum inconveniens est quod omnes  actiones humanae, quae sunt propter aliquem fi-  nem  (puta negotiatio, quae est propter divitias  acquirendas), erunt superfluae: quia si omnia ex  necessitate eveniunt, sive operemur sive non ope-  remur erit quod * intendimus. Sed hoc est contra  intentionem hominum, quia ea intentione videntur  consiliari et negotiari ut, si haec faciant, erit talis  finis, si autem faciunt aliquid aliud, erit alius finis.  «) Civitas talis subverteretur. — Cod. A: rex Carulus interficeretur.  Curiosa sane variatio.  B) Necesse est quod alter eorum etc. Est lectio ABE. — Piana et Ven.  edd.: necesse est quod ambo determinate verum dixerint ; ergo necesse  fuit quodlibet eorum ex necessitate evenire. Quae lectio et est contra  intentum s. Thomae et contra veritatem. Vult enim s. Thomas cum Ari-  stotele probare quod si ponatur oppositarum enunciationum non utramque,  sed alteram esse determinate veram, alteram determinate falsam (n. 2),  sequeretur omnia ex necessitate evenire. Ergo ambo determinate verum  dixerint est omnino contra intentum.  — Sed est etiam contra veritatem.  Arguitur enim ex hypothesi quod affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit  vera; recteque infertur in hypothesi quod alter eorum (qui in exemplum  adducuntur) determinate debuerit dicere verum; et consequenter ex neces-  sitate evenire illud quod dixerit. — Si non alter eorum, sed ambo legamus,  sequeretur quod ambo verum dixerint; ergo ex necessitate evenirent ea  Opp. D. Tnowazs T. I.  causa tum necessitatis , tum contingentiae, quae sunt differentiae  entis, et distinctionis utriusque, quae cernitur in rebus secundum  rationem proximarum causarum. Quae omnia dici nequeunt neque  de voluntate humana, neque de aliqua alia causa creata. Hinc  voluntas divina est efficacissima, et quatenus est efficacissima et  indeficiens, effectus quos vult contingenter evenire contingenter  eveniunt.—  23. Aliam radicem contingentiae (ex hoc quod sumus  consiliativi)  nonnulli  subvertere nisi sunt, volentes ostendere  quod voluntas in eligendo movetur ex necessitate a suo obiecto,  quod est appetibile.— 24. Quinimo, quia consilium , quod prae-  cedit  electionem, est de obiectis quae contingenter sunt cum  ultimo fine connexa, ideo contingenter movent voluntatem, non  autem ex necessitate; et consequenter libertas humana integra  consistit.  3. Deinde cum dicit: Nzhil enim prohibet etc.,  probat quod dicta inconvenientia consequantur  ex  dicta positione. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo,  ostendit praedicta inconvenientia sequi, quodam  possibili posito; secundo, ostendit quod eadem in-  convenientia sequantur * etiam si illud non ponatur;  ibi: A£ nec hoc differt * etc. - Dicit ergo primo, non  esse * impossibile quod. ante mille annos, quando  nihil apud homines erat praecogitatum, vel prae-  ordinatum de his quae nunc aguntur, unus dixe-  rit quod Aoc erit, puta quod civitas talis subver-  teretur *, alius autem dixerit quod Aoc non erit.  Sed si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate  est vera, necesse est quod alter eorum ^ determi-  nate verum dixerit; ergo necesse fuit alterum eo-  rum ex necessitate evenire; et eadem * ratio est  in omnibus aliis; ergo omnia ex necessitate eve-  niunt.  4. Deinde cum dicit: 4£ vero neque hoc dif-  fert etc., ostendit quod idem sequitur si illud pos-  sibile non ponatur *. Nihil enim differt, quantum  ad rerum existentiam vel eventum, si uno affir-  mante * hoc esse futurum, alius negaverit vel non  negaverit; ita enim se habebit res si hoc factum  fuerit, sicut si hoc* non factum fuerit. Non enim  propter nostrum affirmare vel negare mutatur cur-  sus rerum, ut sit aliquid vel non sit: quia veritas  nostrae * enunciationis non est causa existentiae  rerum, sed potius e converso. Similiter etiam non  differt quantum ad eventum eius quod nunc agi-  tur, utrum fuerit affirmatum vel negatum ante  millesimum annum vel ante quodcumque tempus.  Sic ergo, si in quocumque tempore praeterito ,  ita se habebat veritas enunciationum, ut necesse  esset quod alterum oppositorum vere diceretur;  et  ad hoc quod necesse est aliquid vere dici se-  quitur quod necesse sit illud esse vel fieri; con-  quae dixerint. Et quia ea quae ex hypothesi dicuntur sunt contradictoria;  sequeretur ex necessitate quod evenirent contradictoria, ut nempe, sistendo  in exemplo, necessario civitas talis subverteretur et simul necessario civi-  tas talis non subverteretur. Quod absurdum offenditur in lectione Piana  et Ven. edd.: necesse fuit quodlibet eorum etc.— Cod. C mutilus hoc loco  est: necesse est quod alter eorum ex necessitate evenire; nempe ex re-  cursu eiusdem vocabuli (eorum) amanuensis scribit non determinate ve-  rum etc., sed ex necessitate etc.; et intermedia omittit, sine quibus caetera  significatione carent. Attamen recte legit cum codd. cit: quod alter eorum.  —  Denique cod. D consentit cum aliis, nisi quod et ipse corrupte legit: sed  si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate est vera, necesse est quod  alterum eorum ex necessitate evenire. Vides necesse est quod suspensum  esse, quia amanuensis distractus sumit alterum eorum pro alter eorum, et  ideo utramque partem sententiae pervertit. Nihilominus germanam simul  lectionem indicat: quae proinde uniformiter exhibetur ab omnibus codd.  9*  *  *  *  c:  sequuntur.  Num. seq.  ABCE. - P.:  esset, -  est.  *  4:  D:  non  non  sed eadem.  *  Cf. num. praec.  τα:  ad  cursum  rerum extra cau-  sam vel eventum,  si unus affirma-  erit.  *  Hoc ex ACDE.  Cursus  rerum  non mutatur pro-  ie nostrum af-  firmare  vel  gare.  B  omittit  strae,  recte.  sed  ne-  xo-  non  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  *  A erronee pror-  sus:  quod non  ex  *  etc.  Cf. lect. praec.,  nn. 7, i1.  *  Codd. - p.: e-  rant.  *  *  *  *  *  Num. 7.  Num. seq.  a: scilicet quód.  p: sint.  vmotus ad a-  gendum habent.  66  sequens est quod unumquodque eorum quae fiunt,  sic se habeat ut ex * necessitate fiat. Et huiusmodi  consequentiae rationem assignat per hoc, quod si  ponatur aliquem vere dicere quod hoc erit, non  potest  non futurum esse. Sicut supposito quod  sit homo, non potest non esse animal rationale  mortale. Hoc enim significatur, cum dicitur aliquid  dici, scilicet quod ita sit ut dicitur *. Eadem  vere  autem habitudo est eorum, quae nunc dicuntur,  ad ea quae futura sunt, quae erat * eorum, quae  prius dicebantur, ad ea quae sunt praesentia vel  praeterita; et ita omnia ex necessitate acciderunt,  et  accidunt, et accident, quia quod nunc factum  est 7, utpote in praesenti vel in praeterito existens,  semper verum erat dicere, quoniam erit futurum.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Quod si haec possibilia non  sunt etc., ostendit praedicta esse impossibilia: et  primo, per rationem; secundo, per exempla sensi-  bilia; ibi: Et multa nobis manifesta * etc. Circa pri-  mum duo facit: primo, ostendit propositum in re-  bus humanis; secundo, etiam in aliis rebus; ibi: Ef  quoniam est omnino * etc. Quantum autem ad res  humanas ostendit esse impossibilia quae dicta sunt,  per hoc quod homo manifeste videtur esse princi-  pium eorum futurorum ?, quae agit quasi dominus  existens suorum actuum, et in sua potestate ha-  bens agere vel non agere; quod quidem principium  si remoóveatur, tollitur totus ordo conversationis  humanae, et omnia principia philosophiae mora-  lis. Hoc enim sublato non erit aliqua utilitas per-  suasionis, nec comminationis, nec punitionis aut  remunerationis *, quibus homines alliciuntur ad  bona et retrahuntur a malis, et sic evacuatur tota  civilis scientia. Hoc ergo Philosophus accipit pro  principio manifesto quod * homo sit principium  futurorum; non est autem futurorum principium  nisi per hoc quod consiliatur etfacit aliquid: ea  enim quae agunt absque consilio non habent do-  minium sui actus, quasi libere iudicantes de his  quae sunt * agenda, sed quodam naturali instinctu  moventur ad agendum *, ut patet in animalibus  brutis. Unde impossibile est quod supra conclu-  Y) Quia quod nunc factum est etc. — Codd. ABCE: quia quod nunc  factum est, utpote in praesenti vel (C vel in) praeterito etc. — D: quia  quod nunc factum est in praesenti vel praeterito etc. - P.: quia quod  nunc factum est in praesenti,.in praeterito etc.  9) Principium eorum futurorum etc.— Codd.: principium quorumdam  futurorum. Non indeterminate loquitur s. Thomas de futuris quorum  homo est principium , sed determinate specificat quae sint huiusmodi  futura, nempe ea, quae homo agit quasi dominus existens suorum  actuum. — Caeterum sententia eadem est in utraque lectione, forma ali-  quantulum diversa. Alterutra ergo pro lubito utatur lector.  €) Nec punitionis aut remunerationis. Ita codd. BCD. — E. omittit haec  verba, sed nec habet lectionem Pianam: mec permutationis aut remu-  nerationis. Vocabulum permutatio irrepsit ex typographorum incuria,  non secus ac amanuensi cod. A. excidit rememorationis quo (sic) loco  remunerationis. Patet legendum esse cum codd. ABCD, punitionis, ex  suo opposito quod sequitur, remunerationis. Hinc in Summa theologica,  p. I, qu. rxxxni , artic. 1: « Homo est liberi arbitrii: alioquin frustra essent  »  consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae. » -  Notet autem novitius argumenta ista ad demonstrandum liberum in  homine arbitrium, quod est dominium propriorum actuum, esse a poste-  riori seu ex effectibus ducta; a priori enim loquendo, et causam liberi  arbitrii assignando, necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii ex hoc ipso  quod rationalis est, ut s. 'Thomas habet loc. cit. Sed de his alibi.  t) Natura possibilitatis. Ita Piana cum codd, AC. — Cod. B : vera  natura possibilitatis; - D: vera possibilitas; - E: materia possibilitatis.  Quae ultima lectio non est acceptanda, quia licet falsa non sit (materiae  enim nomen latissime patet in sensu analogico, ut dictum est lect. vi,  in notis x et vy), tamen materia vel materia possibilitatis videtur locum  sum est quod non oporteat nos negotiari * vel con-  siliari, Et sic etiam impossibile est illud ex quo  sequebatur, scilicet quod omnia ex necessitate  eveniant.  6. Deinde cum dicit: Ef quoniam est omnino etc.,  ostendit idem etiam in,aliis rebus. Manifestum est  enim etiam in rebus naturalibus esse quaedam,  quae non semper actu sunt; ergo in eis contin-  git esse  et non esse: alioquin vel semper essent,  vel semper non essent. Id autem quod non est,  incipit esse aliquid per hoc quod fit illud; sicut  id quod non est album, incipit esse album per  hoc quod fit album. Si autem non fiat album *  permanet non ens album. Ergo in quibus contin-  git esse et non esse, contingit etiam fieri et non  fieri. Non ergo talia ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt,  sed est in eis natura possibilitatis 5, per quam se  habent ad fieri et non fieri, esse et non esse.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Ac multa nobis manife-  sia  etc., ostendit propositum per sensibilia exem-  pla. Sit enim, puta, vestis nova *; manifestum est  quod eam possibile est incidi, quia nihil obviat  incisioni,  nec ex parte agentis nec ex parte pa-  tientis. Probat autem quod simul cum hoc quod  possibile est eam incidi, possibile est etiam eam  non incidi", eodem modo quo supra* probavit duas:  indefinitas oppositas esse simul veras, scilicet per  assumptionem contrarii. Sicut enim possibile est  istam vestem incidi, ita possibile est eam exteri,  idest vetustate corrumpi; sed si exteritur non in-  ciditur; ergo utrumque possibile est, scilicet eam  incidi et non incidi. Et ex hoc universaliter con-  cludit quod in aliis futuris, quae non sunt in actu  semper, sed sunt in potentia, hoc manifestum est  quod non omnia ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt,  sed eorum quaedam sunt ad utrumlibet, quae non  se habent magis ad affirmationem "^ quam ad ne-  gationem; alia vero sunt in quibus alterum eorum  contingit ut in pluribus, sed tamen contingit etiam  utin paucioribus quod altera pars sit vera, et non  alia, quae scilicet contingit ut in pluribus *.  8. Est autem * considerandum quod, sicut Boe-  non habere in casu nostro. Bona est lectio cod. D, sed non melior  Piana; optima mihi videtur lectio cod. B.  7) Possibile est etiam (BC omittunt etiam) eam non incidi. - Ama-  nuensis cod. A ex recursu verbi incidi, omittit haec verba, quae con-  stituunt  alteram partem sententiae s. Thomae, ut patet ex probatione,  quae statim subiungitur: Sicut enim etc.  0) Magis ad affirmationem etc. Est lectio codd. ABDE et substi-  tuenda Pianae: magis in affirmatione quam in negatione. — Cod. C:  magis ad affirmationem vel negationem.  t) Quae scilicet contingit ut in pluribus. Codd. BCDE hanc perspi-  cuam proferunt lectionem quam adoptamus loco Pianae. Haec siquidem  negationem introducit et legit: quae scilicet non contingit ut in pluribus  sit.  Quae lectio, uti iacet, et est illogica et contra mentem s. Thomae.  Comparat enim s. Thomas propositionem quae vera est ut in pluribus  cum  propositione quae est vera μὲ in paucioribus, quaeque proinde.  contingit ut sit vera, altera sibi opposita ( quae nempe contingit uf in  pluribus) existente falsa, Dixi, uti iacet, propter verba et mon alia,  quae concorditer habent tum codd. tum edd. P, et Venetae omnes. Vi  enim illorum verborum pronomen relativum sequens (quae scilicet etc.)  videtur referri ad propositionem designatam per et non alia; quae pro-  positio, ut est manifestum, est de his quae contingunt ut in pluri-  bus. Praefata verba (et non alia) si deessent, perspicua esset Piana,  nempe: alia vero sunt in quibus alterum eorum... quod altera pars  sit vera, quae scilicet non contingit ut in pluribus sit. — Eorumdem  codd. et ed. a auctoritate omittimus sit quod in Piana legitur, quodque  non perspicuitati confert ullo modo. — Codex A legit: sed tamen contingit  etiam ut in. pluribus, omissis caeteris intermediis, ut in paucioribus etc.  At errat: nam omittendo quae omittit, primam partem. sententiae ( alia  *  B. -  P.t agere  (Cf. supra, n. 2).  *Aomittit album.  *. Codd.: sit enim  una vestis nova.  7  *  Lect. xt, n. 10.  t  * ABCE: est autem  hic. - n: hoc.  Boethius.  -—  thius  λ  Diodorus.  V  Stoici.  *  p. - p.: πος.  *  Codd. - p-: di-  cunt.  esse  CAP. IX, LECT. XIV  eo  67  hoc loco. Assignat enim: rationem possibilitatis et  contingentiae, in his quidem quae sunt a nobis  ex  dicit hic in Commento *, circa possibile et  necessarium diversimode aliqui sunt opinati. Qui-  dam enim distinxerunt ? ea secundum eventum, si-  cut Diodorus ^, qui dixit illud esse impossibile quod  nunquam erit; necessarium vero quod semper erit;  possibile vero quod quandoque erit, quandoque  non erit. Stoici vero distinxerunt haec * secundum  exteriora prohibentia. Dixerunt * enim necessarium  illud quod non potest prohiberi quin sit ve-  rum; impossibile vero quod semper prohibetur a  veritate; possibile vero quod potest prohiberi vel  *  E: éncompetens  et inconveniens.  y  ?  *g: sed potius  quia  Boethius.  AD:  ES  ec)  qui-  dem Boethius...  Philo.  —  non prohiberi. Utraque autem distinctio videtur  esse  incompetens *. Nam prima distinctio est a  posteriori: non enim ideo" aliquid est necessarium,  quia semper erit; sed potius ideo semper erit,  quia est necessarium: et idem patet in aliis. Se-  cunda autem assignatio est ab exteriori et quasi  per accidens: non enim ideo aliquid est necessa-  rium, quia non habet impedimentum, sed quia *  est necessárium, ideo impedimentum habere non  ᾿  potest. Et ideo alii melius ista distinxerunt secun-  dum naturam rerum, ut scilicet dicatur illud ne-  cessarium, quod in sua natura determinatum est  solum ad esse; impossibile autem quod est deter-  minatum solum ad non esse; possibile autem quod  ad neutrum est omnino determinatum, sive se  habeat magis ad unum quam ad alterum, sive  se  habeat aequaliter ad utrumque, quod dicitur  contingens ad utrumlibet. Et hoc est quod Boe-  thius * attribuit Philoni *.  Sed manifeste haec est sententia Aristotelis in  vero etc.) bis ponit, et alteram eiusdem sententiae partem (sed ta-  men etc.) omittit, ut ex contextu est per se manifestum.  x) Sicut Boethius dicit hic in Commento etc. Quae ex hoc Auctore  citantur a s. Thoma de opinionibus Diodori, Stoicorum et Philonis quoad  naturam necessarii, impossibilis et possibilis habentur in eius secunda  Ed. De interpret. lib. Ill, De futuris contingentibus, super illa verba  Aristotelis: Ef quoniam est omnino... Ac multa nobis manifesta etc.  (p. 373, seq.).  X) Quidam enim distinxerunt. lta codd. BCE. — Edit. Piana cum  codd. AD legunt: quidam enim dixerunt. Et ita infra codd. BCE non  Stoici vero dixerunt, sed distinxerunt habent. Denique tertio loco non  ista (P. ita) dixerunt, cum CP., sed ista distinxerunt legendum est  consequenter cum ADE. Quae ultima lectio suadet etiam supra legen-  dum esse cum tribus codd. praecitatis. Adde quod infra, codd. et Piana  consentientibus, s. Doctor subiungit: ufraque autem distinctio vide-  tur etc.  8) Sicut Diodorus etc. « Ille enim, inquit Tullius, id solum fieri  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  posse dicit, quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum; et, quidquid  futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse, et, quidquid non sit futurum,  id negat fieri posse... Placet igitur Diodoro, id solum fieri posse quod  aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit. Qui locus attingit hanc quae-  stionem: Nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit: et, Quidquid fieri possit,  id aut esse iam aut futurum esse: nec magis commutari ex veris in  falsa ea posse, quae futura sunt, quam ea, quae facta sunt: sed in  factis immutabilitatem apparere; in futuris quibusdam, quia non ap-  pareat (al. apparent), ne inesse quidem videri » ( De fato, cap. vi  et IX, nn. 13 et 17.— Opp. tom. IX, pag. 287, seq. — Lypsiae 1849). Ex  his  apparet possibile a Diodoro verbis quidem poni, re autem tolli:  nam 51. possibile numquam erit, est impossibile; si autem erit aliquando,  est necessarium. Atqui utrum futurum sit vel non sit, non ex se (sicut  in iis quae necessaria videntur), sed ex eventu possumus decernere, ita  Scilicet ut futurum fuisse vel secus, et ideo necessarium vel impossi-  bile, ex eo quod factum vel non factum est intelligere debeamus. Ante  ergo eventum possumus dicere quod possibile quandoque erit, quan-  doque non erit, non in se, sed quoad nostram cognitionem, quia nempe  immutabilitas facti non apparet.  v) Non enim ideo aliquid etc. Suppleo ideo ex omnibus nostris  codd., quod desideratur in ed. Piana.. Et hinc statim habes: sed potius  ideo semper etc. Et infra: secunda autem assignatio..... non enim  ideo etc.  E) Et hoc est quod Boethius attribuit Philoni. « 'Tres sunt, inquit  »  »  Boethius, sententiae de possibilitate. Philo enim dicit possibile esse  quod natura propria enunciationig suscipiat veritatem, ut cum dico, me  quod sumus consiliativi, in aliis autem ex  eo quod materia est in potentia ad utrumque op-  positorum.  9. Sed videtur haec ratio non esse sufficiens.  Sicut enim in corporibus corruptibilibus materia  invenitur in potentia se habens ad esse et non  esse, ita etiam in corporibus caelestibus invenitur  potentia ad diversa ubi, et tamen nihil in eis eve-  nit contingenter, sed solum ex necessitate. Unde  dicendum est quod possibilitas materiae ad utrum-  que, si communiter loquamur, non est sufficiens  ratio contingentiae, nisi etiam addatur ex parte  potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determi-  nata ad unum; alioquin si ita sit determinata ad  unum quod impediri non potest *, consequens est  quod ex necessitate reducat in actum potentiam  passivam * eodem modo.  10.  Hoc igitur quidam attendentes posuerunt  quod potentia, quae est in ipsis rebus naturali-  bus, sortitur necessitatem ex aliqua causa deter-  minata * ad unum quam dixerunt fatum. Quorum  Stoici posuerunt fatum in quadam serie, seu con-  nexione * causarum, supponentes quod omne quod  in hoc mundo accidit habet causam *; causa au-  tem posita, necesse est effectum poni. Et si una  causa per se non sufficit, multae causae ad hoc  concurrentes accipiunt rationem unius causae suf-  ficientis; et ita concludebant quod omnia ex ne-  cessitate eveniunt.  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  hodie esse Theocriti Bucolica relecturum, hoc si nihil extra prohibeat  quantum in se est potest veraciter praedicari. Eodem autem modo idem  ipse Philo necessarium esse definit, quod cum verum sit, quantum in se  est, nunquam possit susceptivum esse mendacii; non necessarium autem  idem esse determinat, quod, quantum in se est, possit suscipere falsita-  tem. Impossibile vero secundum propriam naturam, nunquam possit  suscipere veritatem. Idem tamen ipse et contingens et possibile unum  esse  confirmat » (Op. et loc. cit. pag. 373). Vult autem Boethius sen-  tentiam Philonis -Larissensis , quamvis verbis discrepet, revera tamen  cum Diodori sententia convenire: « Ille enim ( Diodorus) arbitratus est,  »  »  »  »  inquit, si quis in mari moreretur, eum in terra mortem non. potuisse  suscipere: quod neque Philo, neque Stoici dicunt. Sed quanquam ista  non dicant, tamen si unam partem contradictionis eventu necessitatis  metiuntur, idem cum Diodoro sentire coguntur » (Ib. pag. 374). Quo  autem pacto haec Philonis sententia conveniat cum sententia Diodori,  qui necessitatem ab eventu metiebatur, ut dictum est in not. y, haud  satis apparet. Etenim, sistendo in Philonis verbis a Boethio citatis, pos-  Sibile Philo dixit quod quantum in se est potest veraciter praedicari;  at  potest etiam impediri quominus veraciter de facto praedicetur (ut,  in exemplo de lectione Bucolicorum, si aliquid extra prohibeat). Ergo  possibile, de quo loquitur Philo dicens illud esse idem ac contingens,  potest fieri, quantum in se est, et potest, quantum in se est, etiam  non fieri; quod idem est ac dicere quod possibile quantum in se est  ad neutrum est determinatum. Quod ipsemet magis aperte declarat cum  ait non necessarium esse id quod quantum in se est potest suscipere  falsitatem , nempe potest esse et non esse. ldem patet ex notionibus  necessarii  et impossibilis. Necessarium  est  quod quantum in se est  numquam potest susceptivum esse mendacii, nempe quod in sua natura  determinatum est solum ad esse; impossibile est quod secundum | pro-  priam naturam nunquam potest suscipere veritatem, videlicet quod est  determinatum solum ad non esse. Ergo recte s. Thomas ait quod hoc  quod Boethius attribuit Philoni est manifeste sententia Aristotelis in hoc  loco, vel, in hoc libro, ut habet cod. A. - Addendum quod, iuxta Boethium:  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  Universaliter dicere est, quaecunque neque semper sunt, neque semper  non sunt, sed aliquoties sunt, aliquoties non sunt, ea per hoc ipsum quod  sunt et non sunt, habent aliquam ad contraria cognationem. Haec au-  tem impossibilium. et necessariorum media sunt. Impossibile enim  nunquam esse potest; necessarium nunquam non esse; inter haec  propria quorundam natura est, quae horum utrorumque sit media,  quae et esse scilicet possit et non esse. Ergo hoc nunc dicit (Aristote-  les nempe) : Videmus, inquit, in his etc. » (Ib. pag. 374). Haec ergo, ex-  ponente Boethio, est opinio Aristotelis cui Boethius subscribit, sed quae  est  etiam opinio Philonis supra recitata.  .  *  *  B; non posset.  ABC:  passivam.  scilicet  *.c verius: deter-  minante.  Stoici.  *  Codd.- .: com-  mixtione.  *  A:  supponentes  omne ... habere  causam.  68  Commen.s.Th.  *  lect. τπ.- Ed. Did.  lib. V, cap. ui.  Plato.  *In  :  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  Multa enim hic fiunt ex intellectu et voluntate,  quae per se et directe non subduntur virtuti cae-  lestium corporum: cum enim intellectus * sive ratio  et  voluntas quae est in ratione 7, non sint actus  organi corporalis, ut probatur in libro De anima *,  11. Sed hanc rationem solvit Aristoteles in VI  Metaphysicae * interimens utramque propositio-  num assumptarum. Dicit enim quod non omne  quod fit habet causam, sed solum illud quod est  per se. Sed illud quod est per accidens non habet  causam; quia proprie non est ens, sed magis ordi-  natur cum non ente, ut etiam Plato dixit *. Unde  Sophista.  *  p: est musicum.  Posita causa suf-  ficienti  non  necesse effectum  poni.  *p: mecesse sit.  *  ABCE: Cuius effe-  ctus.- Ὁ habet la-  cunam.  *gc  omittunt  praedictarum.  *BP.- A: SiC u-  numquodque es-  set, sed falso.-pc:  et sic inde  quo-  usque ; etmelius.  τὰ habet lacun.  *  AC. - P.: deve-  niet.  *Dicentes ex ACD.  *p: ad  *  p  non recte: ad  causam per se.  *  p:  effectus...  referri.  *  Cap. ut, n. 12.  Comment.  lect. vr.  **  s. Th.  Lect. ni: Ed.  Did. lib. IV, c. it,  n.  8.  esse  est,  musicum habet causam, et similiter esse al-  bum; sed hoc quod est, album esse * musicum, non  habet causam: et idem est in omnibus aliis huius-  modi. Similiter etiam haec est falsa, quod posita  causa etiam sufficienti, necesse est * effectum poni:  non  enim omnis causa est talis (etiamsi sufficiens  sit) quod eius effectus * impediri non possit; sicut  ignis est sufficiens causa combustionis lignorum, sed  tamen per effusionem aquae impeditur combustio.  12.  Si  autem utraque propositionum praedi-  ctarum * esset vera, infallibiliter sequeretur omnia  ex necessitate contingere. Quia si quilibet effectus  habet  causam, esset effectum (qui est futurus  post quinque dies, aut post quantumcunque tem-  pus) reducere in aliquam causam priorem: et sic  quousque esset * devenire ad causam, quae nunc  est  tem  in praesenti, vel iam fuit in praeterito; si au-  causa posita, necesse est effectum poni, per  ordinem causarum deveniret * necessitas usque ad  ultimum effectum. Puta, si comedit salsa, sitiet:  si siliet, exibit domum ad bibendum: si exibit do-  mum, occidetur a latronibus. Quia ergo iam co-  medit salsa, necesse est eum occidi. Et ideo Aristo-  teles ad hoc excludendum ostendit utramque prae-  dictarum propositionum esse falsam, ut dictum est.  13. Obiiciunt autem quidam contra hoc, dicen-  tes * quod omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquid  per se, et ita oportet effectum qui est per accidens  reduci in * causam per se. - Sed non attendunt quod  id quod est per accidens reducitur ad per se *, in  quantum accidit ei quod est per se, sicut musicum  accidit Socrati, et omne accidens alicui subiecto per  se existenti, Et similiter omne quod in aliquo ef-  fectu est per accidens consideratur circa aliquem  effectum per se: qui quantum ad id quod per se  est habet causam per se, quantum autem ad id  quod inest ei per accidens non habet causam per  se,  sed causam per accidens. Oportet enim effe-  ctum proportionaliter referre * ad causam suam, ut  in II Physicorum * etin V Methaphysicae** dicitur.  14. Quidam vero non attendentes differentiam  effectuum per accidens et per se, tentaverunt re-  ducere omnes effectus hic inferius provenientes  in aliquam causam per se, quam ponebant esse  virtutem caelestium corporum ^in qua ponebant fa-  tum, dicentes nihil aliud esse fatum quam vim  positionis syderum. Sed ex hac causa non potest  provenire necessitas in omnibus quae hic aguntur.  0) Quam ponebant virtutem esse caelestium corporum etc. Ita codd.  quorum lectionem anteponimus Pianae: « Quam ponebant virtutem esse  »  »  caelestium corporum, in qua ponebant fatum, quam vim positionis sy-  derum appellabant. »  z) Voluntas quae est in ratione.  — Codd. ABC omittunt verba, quae  est in ratione; sed ea retinemus cum P. et aliis codd.  luntas  — Quamvis vo-  simpliciter et communiter accepta appetitum rationalem desi-  gnet, tamen latiori significatione etiam pro appetitu animali usurpatur,  ut  ipsemet Angelicus innuit II, Dist. xxxix, qu. II, artic. I1 ad 1: non  impossibile est quod directe subdantur * intellectus  seu ratio et voluntas virtuti caelestium corporum:  nulla enim vis corporalis potest agere per se, nisi  in rem corpoream. Vires autem sensitivae in quan-  tum sunt actus organorum corporalium per ac-  cidens  subduntur actioni caelestium corporum.  Unde Philosophus in libro De anima * opinionem  ponentium voluntatem hominis subiici motui caeli  adscribit his, qui non ponebant intellectum differre  a sensu. Indirecte tamen vis caelestium corporum  redundat ad intellectum et voluntatem, in quantum  scilicet intellectus et voluntas utuntur viribus sen-  sitivis.  Manifestum autem est quod passiones vi-  rium sensitivarum non inferunt necessitatem ra-  tioni  et voluntati.  Nam continens habet pravas  concupiscentias, sed non deducitur *, ut patet per  Philosophum in VII Ethicorum *. Sic igitur ** ex  virtute caelestium corporum non provenit necessi-  tas in his quae per * rationem et voluntatem fiunt.  Similiter nec in aliis * corporalibus effectibus re-  rum corruptibilium, in quibus multa per accidens  eveniunt. Id autem quod est per accidens non  potest reduci ut in causam per se in aliquam vir-  tutem naturalem, quia virtus naturae se habet ad  unum; quod autem est per accidens non est unum;  unde et supra dictum est * quod haec enunciatio  non est una, Socrates est albus musicus, quia non  significat unum. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in libro  De somno et vigilia * quod multa, quorum si-  gna praeexistunt in corporibus caelestibus , puta  in imbribus et tempestatibus, non eveniunt, quia  scilicet impediuntur per accidens. Et quamvis illud  etiam impedimentum secundum se consideratum  reducatur in aliquam causam caelestem; tamen  concursus horum, cum sit per accidens, non potest  reduci in aliquam causam naturaliter agentem.  15. Sed considerandum est quod id quod est  per accidens potest ab intellectu accipi ut unum,  sicut album esse musicum, quod * quamvis secun-  dum se non sit unum, tamen intellectus ut unum  accipit, in quantum scilicet componendo format  enunciationem unam. Et secundum hoc contingit  id, quod secundum se per accidens evenit et casua-  liter, reduci in aliquem intellectum praeordinan-  tem; sicut concursus duorum servorum ad certum  locum est per accidens et casualis quantum ad  eos, cum unus eorum ignoret de alio; potest tamen  esse per se intentus a domino, qui utrumque mittit  ad hoc quod in certo loco sibi occurrant *.  16. Et secundum hoc aliqui posuerunt omnia  quidem quatenus appetitus sensitivus est in brutis, sed quatenus est  in homine et est potentia in eadem essentia animae rationalis radicata,  et ideo rationis moderamini subiecta (Cf. III, Dist. xvi, qu. r, artic. 1, Ad  secundam quaestionem dicendum etc.). Dico radicata: nam proprie, seu  formaliter, appetitus animalis, sicut caeterae facultates sensitivae, est  in organo animato tanquam in proprio subiecto immediato. At voluntas,  proprie dicta, nempe appetitus rationalis, est facultas essentialiter inorga-  nica consequens apprehensionem rationis, et, sicut ratio ipsa, a sola animae  essentia fluit etin sola essentia animae est immediate, ut in suo subiecto.  *  A:  nam intel-  lectus... cum non  sit actus.  π  *  III, cap.tv, n.4 ;  cap.v,n.r.- Com-  ment.  s.  lect. vir.  *  Thom.  c: - P. $ubda-  tur.  *  III. cap.  seq. -  ΠΙ, n. 5  Comment.  $. ?in. lect. rv.  *  A: non deduci-  lur ad malum.  * -  Cap.t(a/. n] n.6.  Comment.s.Th.  lect. 1.  "* e: sicut igitur.  *A: sec  *  ABD:  Azec  si-  militer etiam. - €  cohaerenter  ad  praeced. sicut i-  gitur: Sic etiam  in aliis.  *  *  Lect. v, n. it.  De divinatione  per  somnium ,  Cap. τι.  *  Quod omittitur  a BC.  *  ABCE: COMCUF-  rant (n. dubius).  CAP. IX,  δ  σ  τα:  Dei.  *  intelligere  T  p: comprehen-  unt.  v  quaecumque in hoc mundo aguntur, etiam quae  videntur fortuita vel casualia, reduci in ordinem  providentiae divinae, ex qua dicebant dependere  fatum. Et hoc quidem aliqui stulti negaverunt ^,  iudicantes de intellectu divino ad modum intel-  lectus nostri, qui singularia non cognoscit *. Hoc  autem est falsum: nam intelligere divinum * et velle  eius  est ipsum esse ipsius *. Unde sicut esse eius  sua virtute comprehendit omne illud quod quo-  cumque modo est, in quantum scilicet est per parti-  cipationem ipsius; ita etiam suum intelligere et  suum intelligibile comprehendit  * omnem cognitio-  nem et omne cognoscibile; et suum velle et suum  volitum comprehendit omnem appetitum et omne  appetibile quod est bonum; ut, scilicet ex hoc  ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadat sub eius  cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat  sub eius voluntate: sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens,  aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse  perfecte- comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum  agens.  17. Sed si providentia divina sit per se causa  omnium quae in hoc mundo accidunt", saltem  bonorum, videtur quod omnia ex necessitate ac-  cidant. Primo quidem ex parte scientiae eius: non  enim potest eius scientia falli; et ita ea quae ipse  scit, videtur quod necesse sit evenire. Secundo  ex  parte voluntatis: voluntas enim Dei inefficax  9) Et hoc quidem aliqui stulti negaverunt. Duo hic distinguenda sunt.  Primum est quod omnia quae quocumque modo in hoc mundo aguntur,  etiam quae videntur fortuita vel casualia, reducuntur in ordinem Provi-  dentiae divinae; et hoc est quod s. Thomas dicit ab aliquibus stultis ne-  gari. -- Aliud est quod ex divina Providentia sequatur fatum, non quidem  sano sensu acceptum, ut infra explicabimus, sed quatenus deteriori sen-  su  sumitur utnecessitas in causis secundis omnibus. Providentia autem  divina non infert fatum seu necessitatem rebus provisis, ut nn. seqq. late  et solide demonstrat Angelicus.  Notandum insuper quod illi qui liberum nominis arbitrium fato subii-  ciebant, non  una  ratione  naturam fati ponebant. Alii enim fatum  appellabant vim positionis siderum , ex quorum positione et pote-  state  decerni  autumabant qualis quisque homo concipitur, nascitur,  vivit, et quid ei proveniat boni quidve mali accidat. — Alii vero non  astrorum  constitutionem , sicuti est cum quidque concipitur vel na-  scitur, sed omnium connexionem seriemque causarüm, qua fit omne  quod fit, fati nomine appellabant. Quorum sententia, si causarum haec  connexio talis ponatur ut voluntatibus nostris necessitatem inferat, non  differt a prima sententia quoad fati naturam, quamvis seriem causarum  substituat positioni potestatique siderum. Utrumque errorem s. Thomas  n.  14 et seqq. refutat.  — Alii causarum connexionem non recusabant, sed  ipsum causarum ordinem et connexionem subiiciebant Dei summi volun-  tati et potestati; at hi bifariam dividendi sunt. Quidam enim quamvis  praescientiae voluntatique divinae causas creatas, earumque connexio-  nes subiicerent, tamen aut ab hac subiectione eximebant voluntatem hu-  manam, aut nihil esse in potestate nostra nullumque esse hominis arbi-  trium sub praescientia et voluntate Dei effutiebant. Hunc errorem refutat  s. Thomas n. 18 et seqq. Quidam denique utrumque eligunt, utrumque  confitentur, nempe praescientiam divinam nostrarum actionum atque ef-  ficaciam infinitam divinae voluntatis et una simul integram perfectamque  hominis libertatem. Et vere sic est, ut a s. Thoma hic probatur.- Quia  tamen haec divinae Providentiae ordinatio a nonnullis aut fatum appel-  labatur, aut ab ipsa fatum seu causarum secundarum connexio (quae  nihil humanae officeret libertati) pendere dicebatur, ne ex vocabulo aequi-  voco error obreperet, Ordinem causarum ubi voluntas Dei plurimum  potest, neque negamus, neque fati. vocabulo nuncupamus , ait s. Augu-  stinus in V De civitate Dei, cap. 1x, n. 3. Quod si propterea aliquid quis-  quam fato tribuit, quia ipsam Dei voluntatem vel potestatem fati no-  mine  appellat, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat (Ib. cap. 1). De  his fuse ipsemet s. Augustinus (Op. et lib. cit.).  σὴ Singularia non cognoscit, nempe directe et primo; nam indirecte  et  quasi per quandam reflexionem intellectus noster intelligit etiam  aliquo modo singularia, ut s. Thomas docet expresse p. I, qu. rxxxvi,  artic. I. Sed quia haec cognitionis indirectae notio non est necessaria in  praesenti quaestione, ideo eam praetermittit s. Doctor.  τὴ Intelligere divinum et velle eius est ipsum esse ipsius, nempe  Dei.— 1. ergo intelligere et intelligibile divinum comprehendit omnem  cognitionem et omne cognoscibile; 2. ergo velle et volitum divinum com-  LECT. XIV  69  esse non potest; videtur ergo quod omnia quae  vult, ex necessitate eveniant.  18. Procedunt autem hae obiectiones ex eo quod  cognitio divini intellectus et operatio divinae volun-  tatis pensantur ad modum eorum, quae in nobis  sunt, cum tamen multo dissimiliter se habeant *.  19.  vel  Nam primo quidem ex parte cognitionis  scientiae considerandum est quod ad cogno-  scendum ea quae secundum ordinem temporis  eveniunt, aliter se habet vis cognoscitiva, quae  sub ordine temporis aliqualiter continetur, aliter  illa  quae  loci:  totaliter  est  extra  ordinem temporis.  Cuius exemplum conveniens accipi potest ex or-  dine  nam  secundum Philosophum in IV  Physicorum *, secundum prius et posterius in ma-  gnitudine est prius et posterius in motu et per  consequens in tempore. Si ergo sint multi homi-  nes per viam aliquam transeuntes, quilibet eorum  qui sub ordine transeuntium continetur habet co-  gnitionem de praecedentibus et subsequentibus *,  in quantum sunt praecedentes et subsequentes;  quod pertinet ad ordinem loci. Et ideo quilibet  eorum videt eos, qui iuxta se sunt et aliquos eo-  rum qui eos praecedunt; eos autem qui post se  sunt videre non potest. Si autem esset aliquis *  extra totum ordinem transeuntium, utpote in ali-  qua excelsa turri constitutus, unde posset totam  viam videre 7, videret quidem simul omnes in via  prehendit omnem appetitum et omne appetibile; 3. ergo quidquid est co-  gnoscibile cognoscitur a Deo; 4. ergo quidquid est bonum cadit sub  divina voluntate; 5. ergo quidquid est ens a virtute activa Dei attingitur.  Istae illationes, quas infert Angelicus, logice connectuntur principio quod  intelligere et velle Dei sunt ipsum esse ipsius.  v) Causa omnium quae in hoc mundo accidunt etc. — Cod. A: causa,  sine qua in hoc mundo non accidunt aliqua. Eadem est sententia. — Alii  codd. habent lectionem Pianam. —Infra vero (et ita ea quae ipse scit etc.)  cod. B absurde legit: et ita essentia, quae ipse sit, videtur necesse sic  evenire.  9) Procedunt autem hae obiectiones etc. Hisce paucis verbis s. Tho-  mas veluti digito indicat radicem errorum omnium, qui de scientia et  voluntate Dei in ordine ad humanam libertatem àb hominibus exco-  gitati sunt. Quae s. Thomae sententia in re gravissima est manifesta ,  si principia alibi declarata in mentem revocemus. Dictum est enim quod  ens, de Deo praedicatum et de creaturis in propositionibus, Deus est  ens, creatura est ens, non univoce dicitur de uno et de aliis, sed  solummodo analogice (lect. v, n. 19, nota ξ). Quae veritas ut etiam vo-  cabulo ipso indicaretur in scientia theologica, Scholastici dicebant Deum  esse super-ens, super-essentiam etc.: ut nempe hoc modo ratio entis de  Deo asserta ostenderetur diversa a ratione entis creaturis tributa. Sed  quod dicitur de ente, idem omnino dicendum est de aliis quae tum Deo,  tum creaturis tribuuntur: absurdum enim esset ponere quod ratio entis  non univoca, sed solummodo armaloga est Deo et creaturis, et simul as-  serere quod ratio causae, cognitionis etc. tum Deo tum creaturis sit  univoca: ratio enim entis et ratio causae sunt realiter una eademque res  in Deo. Sicut ergo Deo ratio entis convenit modo convenienti eius divi-  nae naturae, [ἃ modo convenienti divinae naturae convenit Deo cognitio  intellectus et operatio voluntatis. Quod si quaeras in quo consistat huius-  modi modus? respondeo in infinitate. Deus est ens a se, et ideo infini-  tus et simplicissimus, ita ut quidquid in Deo est, sit infinita simplicissima  divina essentia. Ergo sicut Deus est sua essentia modo infinito, ita est  sua  cognitio et sua operatio modo infinito, hoc est infinite excedens  modum essentiae, cognitionis et operationis hominis et cuiuslibet crea-  turae, quae nonnisi limitato modo sibique convenienti et est et cognoscit  et  operatur. Quae cum ita sint, nemo non videt non posse sine errore  argui ex modo essendi, cognoscendi et operandi in creaturis, modum es-  sendi, cognoscendi et operandi in Deo sive in seipso, sive in operibus crea-  tis  trio  quae ratione carent, sive denique in creaturis quae libero arbi-  sunt  rerum  praeditae: nam si quis hoc modo argueret, Deum intra genus  creatarum coarcfaret, proindeque Deum ipsum negaret. Porro  hoc ipsum faciunt, qui ex divina Providentia, nempe ex Dei infallibili  praescientia et efficacissima operatione inferre conantur fatali necessi-  tati causas creatas liberas esse obnoxias.  X) Unde posset totam viam videre etc.- Cod. A legit: « Unde posset tota  »  »  »  via inde videri, quemadmodum simul omnes in via existentes non sunt  in ratione praecedentis vel subsequentis (in comparatione scilicet ad  eius intuitum), sed simul omnes videret nisi quomodo unus eorum  *  Cap. xt (a7. xvi)  n. 3, seq. - Com-  ment. s.Th. lect.  xvi.  Βα:  tibus.  succeden-  * Aliquis ex codd.  70  existentes, non sub ratione praecedentis et subse-  quentis (in comparatione scilicet ad eius intuitum),  sed simul omnes videret, et quomodo unus eorum  alium praecedit. Quia igitur cognitio nostra cadit  sub ordine temporis, vel per se vel per accidens  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  et  eius differentias. Sunt autem differentiae entis pos-  sibile et necessarium; et ideo ex ipsa voluntate  divina originantur necessitas et contingentia in re-  bus  distinctio  *  4:  unde anima  componendo.  *  Cap. vi, τν 3  56}: - Comment.  s.  Th. lect. xr.  *  AC: eveniant ; -  à : eveniunt.  Y  utriusque secundum rationem  proximarum causarum: ad effectus enim *, quos  voluit necessarios esse, disposuit causas necessa-  rias; ad. effectus autem, quos voluit esse contin-  (unde et anima in componendo * et dividendo ne-  cesse habet adiungere tempus, ut dicitur in III  De anima*); consequens est quod sub eius cogni-  futuri.  tione cadant res sub ratione praesentis, praeteriti  et  Et ideo praesentia cognoscit tanquam  actu existentia et sensu aliqualiter perceptibilia ;  praeterita autem cognoscit ut memorata; futura  autem non cognoscit in seipsis, quia nondum sunt,  sed cognoscere ea potest in causis suis: per cer-  titudinem quidem, si totaliter in causis suis sint  determinata, ut ex quibus de necessitate evenient *;  per coniecturam autem, si non sint sic determi-  nata  in  quin impediri possint, sicut * quae sunt ut  pluribus; nullo autem modo, si in suis causis  sunt omnino in potentia non magis determinata  ad unum quam ad aliud, sicut quae sunt ad utrum-  libet. Non enim est aliquid cognoscibile secundum  quod est in potentia, sed solum secundum quod  est in actu, ut patet per Philosophum in IX Me-  gentes, ordinavit causas contingenter agentes ,  idest potentes deficere. Et secundum harum con-  ditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel neces-  sarii vel contingentes, quamvis omnes dependeant  a  voluntate  divina, sicut a prima causa, quae  transcendit ordinem. necessitatis et contingentiae.  Hoc autem non potest dici de voluntate hu-  mana, nec de aliqua alia causa: quia omnis alia  causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel con-  tingentiae; et ideo oportet quod vel ipsa causa  *  ABC:  aulem;  sed non recte.  Causae  genter  contin-  agentes  possunt deficere.  possit deficere, vel effectus * eius non sit contin- Jur  gens, sed necessarius. Voluntas autem divina in-  deficiens est; tamen non omnes effectus eius sunt  necessarii, sed quidam contingentes.  23. Similiter autem aliam radicem contingen-  tiae, quam hic Philosophus ponit ex hoc quod  sumus consiliativi, aliqui subvertere nituntur, vo-  *  Commen.s.Th.  lect. x. - Ed. Did.  lib. VIII, cap.1x,  n.6.  *  ABC: lofum tem-  poris decursum.  c:  unumquod-  que ut est in.  *  ABCD  et  Ven.  edd. - p.: si. -E:  sicul; sed errore  manifesto.  traphysicae *.  20.  Sed Deus est omnino extra ordinem tem-  poris, quasi in arce aeternitatis constitutus, quae  est tota simul, cui subiacet totus temporis decursus  secundum unum et simplicem eius intuitum; et  ideo uno intuitu videt omnia quae aguntur secun-  dum temporis decursum *, et uuumquodque secun-  dum. quod est in * seipso existens, non quasi sibi  futurum quantum ad eius intuitum prout est in  solo ordine suarum causarum (quamvis et ipsum  ordinem causarum videat), sed omnino aeterna-  liter sic * videt unumquodque eorum quae sunt  in quocumque tempore, sicut oculus humanus vi-  det Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua.  21.  Ex hoc autem quod homo videt Socratem  sedere, non tollitur eius contingentia quae respicit  lentes ostendere  quod voluntas in eligendo ex  necessitate movetur ab appetibili. Cum enim bo-  num sit obiectum voluntatis, non potest (ut vide-  tur) ab hoc divertere * quin appetat illud quod :  sibi videtur bonum; sicut nec ratio ab hoc potest  divertere quin assentiat ei quod sibi videtur ve-  rum. Et ita videtur quod electio consilium con-  sequens ^ semper ex necessitate proveniat; et sic  omnia, quorum nos principium sumus per con-  silium et electionem, ex necessitate provenient *.  24.  attendenda est circa bonum,  A:  diverti, et  ita infra.  ω  Mery : proveni-  Sed dicendum est quod similis differentia 7^  sicut circa verum.  Est autem quoddam verum, quod est per se no-  tum, sicut prima principia indemonstrabilia * , qui-  | : Coda.-  P. ex er-  de-  bus ex necessitate *intellectus assentit; sunt autem mum.  quaedam vera non per se * nota, sed per»alm me  s  *  ABCE. - DP. : V'£-  rissime. - ABc:et  tamen.  *  *  A: sunt.  A  vel.  omitt.  sunt  Horum autem duplex *est conditio: quaedam enim er se.  ex  necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita sci- πάρει, "dms  licet quod non possunt esse falsa, principiis exi- -  stentibus veris, sicut sunt omnes conclusiones de- |  ordinem causae ad effectum; tamen certissime *  et infallibiliter videt oculus hominis Socratem sede-  re dum sedet, quia unumquodque prout est in se-  ipso iam determinatum est. Sic igitur relinquitur,  quod Deus certissime et infallibiliter cognoscat  omnia quae fiunt * in tempore; et tamen ea quae  in tempore eveniunt non sunt vel * fiunt ex neces-  sitate, sed contingenter.  Similiter ex parte voluntatis divinae diffe-  rentia est attendenda. Nam voluntas divina est  intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, velut  causa quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes  »  na  «  »  »  alterum praecedit. » — Quae lectio intricata est, ac vix intelligibilis: Pia-  optima est, et indicatur in p. 1 Summ. th., qu. xiv, artic. xi ad 3:  Sicut ille qui vadit per viam non videt illos qui post eum veniunt;  sed ille qui ab aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes  transeuntes per viam. » Codd. BCDE habent lectionem Pianam; nisi  quod D legit: μὲ posset tota via videri.... et non sub ratione prae-  cedentis. — E: unde posset tota via videri..... vel subsequentis. Et, tota  via videri legunt etiam codd. BC. — Constat ergo quod tota via videri  est  lectio uniformis codd.; ideoque haec pars, attenta codd. auctoritate,  suffici posset rationabiliter Pianae. Cum hac tamen stant Venetae edi-  tiones.  Y) Quin impediri possint, sicut etc.  — Cod. A habet: ut ex quo de  necessitate eveniat; coniectura, si non sit sic determinata, quin impe-  monstrationum. Et huiusmodi veris ex necessitate Í  assentit intellectus, postquam perceperit ordinem |  eorum ad principia, * non autem prius. Quaedam “ coaa.-».:prin-  autem sunt *, quae non ex necessitate consequun- "5c: sunt »era  tur  ex principiis, ita scilicet quod possent* esse aps: fuae (5  falsa principiis existentibus veris; sicut sunt opina- 5 Ir ΑΔΕ "dus  bilia, quibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus, me  uamvis ex aliquo motivo * magis inclinetur in ΑΙ ΩΣ aquo  appetitu mo vo.  diri possit, sicut etc. — E. legit: quin impediri possit, in caeteris concordat  cum Piana, quam tamen non adoptamus ubi legit, quin impediri non  possint, sed in hoc codd. ACE sequimur: nam quin impediri non pos-  sint est lectio non acceptanda. Vult enim s. Thomas affirmare quod fu-  turum cognoscitur in causa solummodo per coniecturam si causa a pro-  ducendo effectu possit impediri, esto in pluribus non impediatur. Quam  sententiam non solum non significat lectio Piana et cod. D, sed omnino  oppositam exprimere videtur. Ob eamdem assignatam rationem repro-  bamus lectionem cod. B: quam impediri possit.  «) Electio consilium consequens, seu electio, quae est actus liber.  tatis, ad consilium, quo de agendis aut omittendis ratio in semetipsa de-  liberat, sequitur. Unde non est admittenda lectio edit. Pianae, electio  consilii consequens.  — Codd. et edd. Venet. legunt consilium.  CAP. IX, LECT. XIV  *  Cap. ix, n  Comment. s  Ject. xv.  unam partem quam in aliam. Ita etiam est quod-  dam bonum quod est propter se appetibile, sicut  felicitas, quae habet rationem ultimi finis; et huius-  modi bono ex necessitate inhaeret voluntas: na-  turali enim quadam necessitate omnes appetunt  esse felices. Quaedam vero sunt bona, quae sunt  appetibilia propter finem, quae comparantur ad  finem sicut conclusiones ad principium, ut pa-  ἦν tet per Philosophum in II Physicorum *. Si igitur  essent aliqua bona, quibus non existentibus, non  posset aliquis esse felix, haec etiam essent ex ne-  cessitate  appetibilia et maxime apud eum, qui  LEeda.-»:rer- talem ordinem perciperet *; et forte talia sunt esse,  "Sun  ex codi.  pipere et intelligere et si qua alia sunt * similia.  Sed particularia bona, in quibus humani actus  consistunt, non sunt talia, nec sub ea ratione ap-  aa) Nec sub ea ratione apprehenduntur ut sine etc. lta codd. B  CE; et optime. — Piana, comprehenduntur. — Cod. A: nec sub eadem  —Tratione apprehenduntur, nec sine etc. Adoptamus apprehenduntur ex  codd. cit. — Quoad media, circa quae cadit consilium s. Thomas duo di-  stinguit, nempe quod non sint talia, quibus non existentibus, homo feli-  citatem non consequeretur; et deinde quod neque ut talia a ratione ipsa  apprehendantur. Voluntas enim sequitur rationis iudicium: nam nihil  volitum quin praecognitum, ut fert commune adagium. Quocirca si ratio  apprehenderet media ut talia, sine quibus finis volitus non obtineretur,  quamvis talia in se non sint, voluntas ex ipsa appetitione finis traheretur ad  illa acceptanda media. Et ideo haberetur non consilium neque electio, sed  necessitas, non quidem obiective et absolute, sed subiective et hypothetice.  B3) Quamvis videantur logici negotii modum excedere. Revera quae  hic de radicibus contingentiae adserta sunt ad metaphysicam proprie  pertinent, si haec obiecta in se considerentur (Cf. s. Th in VI Metaphys.  lect. zr); sed tamen ad logicam etiam aliquo modo pertinent, et in ea  pertractari si non absolute debent, saltem possunt: « Ea quae huius libri  »  »  »  series continebit exponere, altioris pene tractatus est, quam ut in logica  disciplina conveniat disputari; sed quoniam, ut saepe dictum est, ora-  tionibus sensa proferuntur, quibus subiectas res esse manifestum est,  silii,  quod  71  prehehduntur ut sine ^* quibus felicitas esse non  possit, puta, comedere hunc cibum vel illum,  aut abstinere ab eo: habent tamen in se unde  moveant appetitum, secundum aliquod bonum  consideratum in eis. Et ideo voluntas non ex ne-  cessitate inducitur ad haec eligenda. Et propter  hoc Philosophus signanter radicem contingentiae  in his quae fiunt a nobis * assignavit ex parte con-  quae sunt ad finem et  tamen non sunt determinata. In his enim in qui-  bus media sunt determinata, non est opus con-  Silio, ut dicitur in ΠῚ Ethicorum *.  Et haec quidem dicta sunt ad salvandum ra-  dices contingentiae, quas hic Aristoteles ponit,  quamvis videantur logici negotii modum exce-  dere f£.  »  »  non est dubium quin quod in rebus sit, idem saepe transferatur ad vo-  ces. » Haec Boethius in exordio tertii libri (Ed. sec.) De interpretatione,  pag. 357. Et Ammonius: « Videtur quidem hoc logicum esse quod ab  »  »  Aristotele nunc agitatur theorema; re autem vera ad partes omnes phi-  losophiae necessarium est » (In lib. Peri hermenias, sect.ll, S. vi,  fol. 19 vers., col.  1). Sed conclusionem s. Thomae novitius meditetur.  Sapienter enim s. Thomas, quia commentatoris officium exsequitur altis-  Simas quaestiones metaphysicas perstringere atque definire non recusat,  ut Aristotelis doctrinam de propositionibus quoad futura contingentia et  libera declaret; sed modeste tamen addit huiusmodi quaestiones videri  logici negotii modum excedere. Quae ultima verba dictando forte prae  mente sententiam magistri sui b. Alberti Magni habebat sapientissimus et  ideo modestissimus discipulus. Ait enim b. Albertus: « Quaerunt etiam hic  »  »  »  »  »  »  quidam de necessitate ordinis causarum, de fato, de fortuna, de consilio,  de casu, dé certitudine divinae providentiae in singularibus et voluntatis  contingentibus. Sed de his hic quaerere stultum est: quia quaestiones  istae ex istius scientiae principiis (cum logica procedat ex communibus,  quae in pluribus vel in omnibus inveniuntur) non possunt determinari:  ista autem determinari volunt ex propriis » (Peri hermenias lib. I, tract.v,  cap. vir).  ax  A: sunt a nobis  vel fiunt.  est  eorum  *  Cap. nit (a£. v)  s T - Comment.  h. lect. vit.  ββ  72  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I  LECTIO DECIMAQUINTA  EX MODO QUO VERITAS SE HABET CIRCA RES  CONCLUDITUR QUALITER VERITAS SE HABEAT CIRCA PROPOSITIONES  T  e  ο.  aT m- *  o Ca -.  ὁ ὄν, ὅταν ἡ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν μὴ εἶναι,  &8.3  τὸ  γάγχη" οὐ μὴν οὔτε τὸ ὃν ἅπαν ἀνάγκη  μὴ ὃν μὴ εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι  εἶναι ἐξ ἀνάγχης, ὅτε ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς  ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.  Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος" εἶναι μὲν ἢ y  εἶναι ἅπαν, ἀνάγκη: καὶ ἔσεσθαί Ye ἢ μή; οὐ μέντοι  διελόντα γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον. Λέγω δὲ οἷον  ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔσεσθαι ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μη ἔσεσθαι"  οὐ  μέντοι ἔσεσθαί γε PA CI ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον,  οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι" γενέσθται μέντοι, ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι,  ἀναγκαῖον.  Ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεῖς, ὥσπερ τὰ πράγματα,  δῆλον ὅτι, ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥστε, ὁπότερ ἔτυχε, καὶ  τἀναντία ἐνδέχεσθαι, ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν  ἀντίφασιν. Ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ οὖσιν, ἢ  μὴ ἀεὶ μὴ οὖσιν. Τούτων γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν θάτερον  μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ  μέντοι τόδε T τόδε, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότερ ἔτυχε" xal μᾶλλον  μὲν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἑτέραν, οὐ μέντοι ἤδη ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ"  ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἀνάγκη, πάσης καταφάσεως xxi  ἀποφάσεως τῶν ἀντιχειμένων τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ, τὴν  δὲ ψευδῇ εἶναι. Οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων, οὕτως  ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντον μέν, δυνατῶν δὲ εἶναι ἢ  Um εἶναι, ἀλλ ὥσπερ εἴρηται.  SxNoPsrs. — Argumentum et divisio textus. — 2. Necessitas in  rebus, alia est absoluta, alia est ex suppositione; idem dicendum  de impossibilitate.— 3. Necessitas et veritas in rebus per compa-  rationem ad illarum oppositas sequuntür leges contradictionis:  quia scilicet sicut impossibile est contradictoria simul esse vera  vel falsa, ita impossibile est rem neque esse neque non esse. Con-  sequenter necesse est, disiunctive loquendo , rem vel esse vel  non esse. Disiunctive, inquam, non tamen divisim: quia si di-  ostquam Philosophus ostendit esse  7impossibiliaa  ea,  *  A:  impossibili-  tatibus.  *  *  p: et quia iam.  A: hic procedit  ordine  conver-  $0.- BCD omitt.  nunc et hic.  quae  ex  praedictis  Érationibus sequebantur; hic, remotis  impossibilibus *, concludit veritatem.  duo facit: quia enim argumentando ad  impossibile, processerat ab enunciationibus ad res,  et iam * removerat inconvenientia quae circa res  sequebantur; nunc, ordine converso *, primo osten-  dit qualiter se habeat veritas circa res; secundo,  *  A:  qualiter se  habeant res cir-  ca  *  etc.  Num. 4.  *  BE.-A: T$S.- P.:  ea  (Cf. n. 3).  *  Num. 3.  qualiter se habeat veritas circa * enunciationes; ibi:  Quare quoniam orationes verae sunt* etc. Circa  primum duo facit: primo, ostendit qualiter se ha-  beant veritas et necessitas circa res absolute con-  sideratas; secundo, qualiter se habeant circa eas *  per comparationem ad sua opposita; ibi: ΕἾ in  contradictione eadem ralio est * etc.  2. Dicit ergo primo, quasi ex praemissis con-  «) Impossibile est etc. Ita codd. et edd. Ven.- Editio Piana: im-  possibile dum est, illud simul etc. Revera illud dum est superfluum vi-  detur, quia praemittitur si aliquid est, et. apponitur simul, sicut revera  est apponendum, ut repugnantia inter esse et »t0n-esse in aliquo identico  subiecto valere possit et affirmari.  *]gitur esse quod est, quando est, et non esse quod non  est, quando non est, necesse est: sed non omne quod  est, necesse est esse, nec omne quod non est, necesse  est  non  esse:  non enim idem est, omne quod est ne-  cessario esse, quando est, et simpliciter esse ex neces-  sitate. Similiter autem et in eo quod non est.  Et in contradictione eadem ratio est. Esse quidem vel non  esse  omne necesse est; et futurum esse vel non esse;  non tamen contingit dividentem dicere alterum neces-  sarium. Dico autem, ut necesse est quidem esse futu-  rum  bellum navale cras vel non futurum esse: sed  non futurum esse cras bellum navale necesse est vel  non futurum esse; futurum autem vel esse vel non  esse  necesse est.  Quare quoniam similiter orationes verae sunt quemadmo-  dum et res, manifestum est quoniam quaecumque sic  se  habent ut utrumlibet sint, et contraria ipsorum con-  tingant, necesse est similiter se habere et contradictio-  nem. Quod contingit in his quae non semper sunt, et  non semper non sunt. Horum enim necesse est alteram  partem contradictionis veram esse vel falsam, non ta-  men hoc vel illud sed utrumlibet, et magis quidem  alteram veram, non tamen iam veram vel falsam:  quare manifestum est quoniam non est necesse omnis affir-  mationis et negationis oppositarum hanc quidem ve-  ram, illam vero falsam esse. Neque enim quemadmo-  dum in his quae sunt, sic se res habet etiam et in his  quae non sunt, possibilibus tamen esse vel non esse,  sed quemadmodum dictum est.  visim loquamur non necesse est rem esse absolute, sicut non ne-  cesse est rem absolute non esse. — 4. Quia ergo propositiones se  habent ad veritatem sicut res ad esse et ad mon esse, idem iudi-  cium ferendum est de veritate et necessitate propositionum in  comparatione ad earum oppositas, quod est de veritate et necessi-  tate rerum per comparationem ad earum oppositas.- 5. Conclusio.  Non est necesse in omni genere affirmationum et negationum  oppositarum alteram determinate esse veram et alteram falsam.  cludens, quod si praedicta sunt inconvenientia, ut  scilicet omnia ex necessitate eveniant, oportet di-  cere ita se habere circa res, scilicet quod omne *  quod est necesse est esse quando est, et omne  quod non est necesse est non esse quando non  est. Et haec necessitas fundatur super hoc prin-  cipium; Zmpossibile est simul esse et non esse: si  enim aliquid est, impossibile est * illud simul non  esse; ergo necesse est tunc illud esse. Nam im-  possibile non esse idem significat ei quod est ne-  cesse esse, ut in Secundo * dicetur. Et similiter, si  aliquid non est, impossibile est illud simul esse;  ergo necesse est non esse, quia etiam idem si-  gnificant ^. Et ideo manifeste verum est quod  omne quod est necesse est esse quando est; et  omne quod non est necesse est non esse pro  illo tempore * quando non est: et haec est neces-  B) Quia etiam idem significant. Vult Angelicus dicere quod sicut  impossibile est non esse idem significat ac necesse est esse; ita impos-  sibile est esse idem significat ac necesse est non esse.— Codd AD: quia  hoc etiam idem significat. — BCE: quia haec etiam idem significant.  Haec ultima lectio mihi magis arridet quam Piana et aliorum codd.  *  Seq. c. ix-  *A: ut omne.  *  A  omittit  illo pae" "  CAP. IX, LECT. XV  sitas  non  absoluta, sed ex suppositione. Unde  non potest simpliciter et absolute dici quod omne  quod est, necesse est esse, et omne quod non  est, necesse est non esse: quia non idem signifi-  DU, αβώς,  "^4... cant quod omne ens, quando est", sit ex necessitate,  et  quod omne ens simpliciter sit ex necessitate ;  nam primum significat necessitatem ex supposi-  tione, secundum autem necessitatem absolutam.  Et quod dictum est de esse, intelligendum est  similiter de on esse; quia aliud est simpliciter  ex  tate  *  Conf. lect. xui  text.Arist.  et n.4.  *  p:  fierent; - c:  necessitate non esse, et aliud est ex necessi-  non esse quando non est. Et per hoc vide-  tur Aristoteles excludere id quod supra dictum  est *, quod si in his, quae sunt, alterum determi-  nate est verum, quod etiam antequam fieret *  alterum determinate esset futurum.  3. Deinde cum dicit: Ef in contradictione etc.,  ostendit quomodo se habeant veritas et necessi-  * ABC: se habeat  veritas circa  res.  tas  circa res * per comparationem ad sua oppo-  βία: εἴ dicit quod eadem ratio est in. contradi-  ctione, quae est in suppositione. Sicut enim illud ?  quod non.est absolute necessarium, fit necessa-  rium ex suppositione eiusdem, quia necesse est  esse quando est; ita etiam quod non est in se ne- -  *  Cf. lect.  cessarium absolute * fit necessarium per disiun-  ctionem oppositi, quia necesse est de unoquoque  quod sit vel non sit, et quod futurum sit aut non  XI, n. 7.  ^  "tI  3  |  :  sit, et hoc sub disiunctione: et haec necessitas fun-  datur super hoc principium quod, Zmpossibile est  contradictoria simul esse vera vel falsa *. Unde im-  Y) Non idem significant quod omne ens, quando est etc. Per haec  verba Angelicus sapienter designat differentiam. essentialem quae est  inter id quod contingenter existit et id quod necessario existit, etiamsi  contingens, dum existit, hoc est ex suppositione, rationem aliquam induat  necessitatis (Cf. lect. xir, not. y). Notat igitur Caietanus (in p. I, qu. xiv,  artic. xuz, 8. Adverte hic etc., ubi etiam citat hunc locum Peri herme-  neias) quod in ente contingente duo sunt distinguenda, nempe natura  contingentiae et status contingentiae. Ratio huius distinctionis in eo est  quod contingentia et necessitas sunt differentiae non accidentales sed  essentiales rerum, quibus aut contingentia convenit aut necessitas : unum-  quodque enim ens in sua natura aut contingens est aut necessarium.  Sed cum natura sit a seipsa inseparabilis, ubicumque ipsa invenitur de-  bet inveniri vel contingentia si contingens est, vel necessitas si est neces-  saria; sicut quocumque modo ponatur homo, ponitur rationalitas. Con-  tingens autem aut est in actu seu praesens, aut est in potentia seu  futurum. Ergo tum in actu tum in potentia consideratum ens contingens  naturam contingentiae eamdem retinet, ita ut ex hoc capite non differat  ens contingens in actu et ipsum ens contingens in potentia. Sed differunt  tamen: non enim existere actuale entis contingentis dici potest idem  ac non—existere actuale seu existere potentiale eiusdem. Ergo eadem per-  severante natura contingentiae in contingente tum actuali tum potentiali,  est diversus in uno et in altero status contingentiae (potest enim una  eadem natura, sua ratione salva, diversos habere status), quatenus nempe  in uno est status contingentiae in natura contingentis determinati ad  unam contradictionis partem, quae est actualis existentia et non—existen-  tia potentialis; in altero vero est status contingentiae in natura contin-  :  gentis indeterminati ad alteram contradictionis partem, et ideo est status  indeterminationis ad existendum in causa non determinata potius ad ef-  fectum producendum quam non producendum. — Hinc infertur quod ens  contingens iam determinatum seu actualiter existens est semper et essen-  tialiter natura sua contingens, sed tamen, quia quando est, necessario  est, ex hac suppositione status contrahit quamdam necessitatem suae  praesentiae. Contra ens contingens futurum, seu in potentia, neque na-  tura sua neque ratione status habet necessitatem, sed est ex utroque  capite contingens.  — Ulterius infertur quod contingens in statu possibilitatis  et  contingens in statu actualitatis tripliciter differunt ratione status: —  15, differentia quoad fempus, quia existens in actu est praesens, existens  in potentia est futurum ; — 25, differentia quoad contingentiam, quia exi-  stens in actu est determinatum ad unum, nempe ad existentiam, existens  in potentia (in causa nempe non necessario agente) ad utramque partem  contradictionis se habet, nempe ad existere vel non existere; — 39, diffe-  rentia quoad cognitionem, quia existens in actu potest subdi infallibili  et certae cognitioni, existens autem in potentia nonnisi cognitione con-  iecturali  dignoscitur. Quae omnia tum in praesenti lectione tum in  praecedenti (n. 19, seq.) Angelicus docet, nec non in cit. loc. Summae  theolog.  Opp. D. Tuoxaz T. I.  73  possibile est neque esse neque non esse; ergo  necesse est velesse vel non esse. Non tamen si  divisim alterum accipiatur, necesse est illud esse  absolute. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum: quia  necessarium est navale bellum esse futurum cras  vel non esse; sed non est necesse navale bellum  futurum esse cras; similiter etiam non est ne-  cessarium non esse futurum, quia hoc pertinet  ad necessitatem absolutam; sed necesse est quod  vel sit futurum cras vel non sit futurum: hoc enim  pertinet * ad necessitatem quae est sub disiunctione.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Quare quoniam etc. ex  eo  quod se habet ὃ circa res, ostendit qualiter se  habeat circa orationes. Et primo, ostendit quo-  modo uniformiter se habet in veritate * orationum,  sicut circa esse rerum * et non esse; secundo, fina-  liter concludit veritatem totius dubitationis; ibi:  Quare manifestum * etc. - Dicit ergo primo quod,  quia hoc modo se habent orationes enunciativae  ad veritatem sicut et res ad esse vel non esse (quia  ex  eo  quod res est vel non est, oratio est * vera  vel falsa), consequens est quod in omnibus rebus  quae ita se habent ut sint ad utrumlibet, et quae-  cumque ita se habent quod contradictoria * eorum  qualitercumque contingere possunt, sive aequaliter  sive alterum ut in pluribus, ex necessitate sequitur  quod etiam similiter se habeat contradictio * enun-  ciationum. Et exponit * consequenter quae sint illae  res, quarum contradictoria contingere queant *; et  dicit huiusmodi esse quae neque semper sunt,  9) Sicut enim illud etc. Perspicua est lectio ista, quam, uno voca-  bulo immutato, ut in fine dicam, habet P. cum cod. D.— Variat quoad  formam, quamvis non quoad sensum cod. A: «Sicut enim aliquid quod  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  non est absolute necessarium fit verum ex suppositione eiusdem, quando  necesse est esse quando est; ita etiam quod non est in se necessa-  rium absolute, fit necessarium per diversitatem oppositi, quia necesse  est de unoquoque quod sit vel quod (et ita BC) non sit; et hoc sub  disiunctione: et haec necessitas fundatur super hoc principium, scilicet  quod impossibile est contradictoria simul esse falsa. Unde impossibile  est non (et ita BC, corrupte pro neque) esse, neque non esse; ergo  necesse est jam esse, vel non esse. » — Quae lectio imperitiam ama-  nuensis prodit: sed corruptiones de facili apparent.—E vero legit: sicut...  necesse est esse quando est... quia necesse est de unoquoque verum esse  quod sit vel quod non sit; ac omittit cum ABC, et quod futurum sit  aut non sit.. vera vel. In caeteris tum E tum BC ut Piana. Et cum  Piana legit omnino cod. D, nisi quod semel et iterum non sub disiun-  ctione sed sub distinctione corrupte habet. — Addo denique lectionem  necesse est esse quando est, quam codd., excepto D, habent, esse ado-  ptandam loco Pianae; mecesse est esse quod est; quia illa magis probat  necessarium ex suppositione. Hinc s. Thomas p. 1, qu. xiv, artic. xm  ad 2, expresse citando hunc Peri hermeneias locum, ait: Omne quod  est, dum est, necesse est esse, ut dicitur in I Peri herm. (Cf. num.  praeced.).  t) Hoc enim pertinet. Supra Angelicus dixit in significatione causali:  quia hoc pertinet etc. Unde et hic etiam orationis processus particulam  causalem postulat, ut nempe legamus: /toc enim pertinet, sicut re-  vera legunt codices omnes.  — Piana: et πος pertinet.  t) Ex eo quod se habet etc. lta cum editione Piana codd. BC  et Ven. edd.  »  »  qualiter uniformiter se habet in veritate orationum sicut circa esse re-  rum. » Lectio erronea: confundit enim (ex recursu eiusdem verbi,  ostendit) argumentum generale cum primo membro divisionis: Et primo  ostendit etc.  »  »  Quare quoniam etc. ostendit quomodo se habet veritas ex eo quod  se  habet circa orationes. » — Absurdus est etiam cod. D: Deinde cum  dicit: φῇ oris etc., habet in veritate orationum sicut contra esse rerum.  Secundo finaliter.  — Verum et in Piana aliquid deesse videtur. Quodnam  est enim subiectum illud de quo, ex eo quod se habet circa res, ostendit  qualiter se habeat circa orationes? Subiectum illud est veritas, ut n. 1  dictum est; at probabile est non subintelligendum relictum sed explicite  fuisse positum a s. Thoma ut subiectum thesis de qua nunc est dicturus,  cum illud expresse posuerit in eodem numero primo, ubi facilius sub-  intelligi poterat. Et revera veritas ponitur in lectione cod. A.— Forte  igitur lectio germana est: ex eo quod veritas se habet circa res, ostendit  qualiter se habeat circa orationes; vel: ex eo quod se habet circa res,  ostendit qualiter veritas se habeat circa orationes.  *mp:  circa veri-  tatem.  *Rerum ex codd.,  qui omittunt ef  non esse.  *  *  *  *  Num. seq.  pp:  p:  dicitur.  contraria.  ABC: Circa con-  tradictionem.  *  * -  — Cod. E habet: « Ex eo quod se habet circa res ostendit  — Sed intricata etiam est lectio cod. A: « Deinde cum dicit:  10*  A:  ostendit.  p: contraria...  BC: queunt.  74  sicut necessaria, neque semper non sunt, sicut  impossibilia, sed quandoque sunt et quandoque  non sunt. Et ulterius manifestat quomodo similiter  se  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. I, CAP. IX, LECT. XV  ex  5. Deinde cum dicit: Quare manifestum est etc.,  concludit principale intentum et dicit manifestum  esse  habeat in contradictoriis enunciationibus; et  dicit quod harum enunciationum, quae sunt de  contingentibus, necesse est quod sub disiunctione  altera pars contradictionis sit vera vel.falsa; non  tamen haec vel illa determinate, sed se habet ad  utrumlibet. Et si contingat quod altera pars con-  tradictionis magis sit vera, sicut accidit in con-  tingentibus quae sunt ut in pluribus, non tamen  ex  hoc  necesse  est  quod ex necessitate altera  earum determinate sit vera vel falsa.  ἢ) Non contingit in futuris quae possunt esse et non esse. — Non abs  re.erit nonnulla hic addere in defensionem Aristotelis. Dubium gene-  rale  turo  propositum erat: Utrum in enunciationibus singularibus de fu-  in materia contingenti necesse sit quod determinate una oppo-  sitarum sit vera, et altera falsa (lect. xit, n. 6). Cui dubio responsum  est  negative. Ratio indirecta fuit quod, posita determinatione veritatis in  alterutra ex praefatis enunciationibus, contingentia et libertas omnino  tollerentur; ratio vero directa quia non eodem modo se habet veritas in  futuris necessariis et contingentibus: quia illa sunt determinata ad esse  in suis causis, sed contingentia futura neque in se, quia non sunt, ne-  que in suis causis, quae se habent ad utrumlibet, sunt magis determi-  nata ad statum existentiae, quam ad statum non-existentiae (Cf. supra  not. y). Quam Aristotelis doctrinam amplectitur omnino s. Thomas,  eamque tanta luce evidentiae perfundit commentando, ut dubium omne  excludat.  Nihilominus nonnulli Aristotelem accusarunt de laesa divina prae-  scientia quoad futura contingentia et libera. Aiunt enim: id quod non est  determinate verum vel falsum, non est determinate cognoscibile (quia co-  gnoscibilitas sequitur entitatem rei). Sed, iuxta Aristotelem, in futuris  contingentibus neutrum oppositorum est determinate verum vel falsum.  Ergo Aristoteles per hanc suam doctrinam, qua tendit ad tuendam liber-  tatem hominis, negat Deo scientiam futurorum contingentium, et ut ho-  mines faciat liberos, facit sacrilegos, sicut de Tullio s. Augustinus dixit  (De civitate Dei, lib. V, cap. 1x, n. 2).  Quid Aristoteles senserit de Deo, eiusque scientia, providentia, cae-  terisque attributis non quaerimus; impraesentiarum quaestio tota consistit  in hoc: utrum ex praecitata solutione ad propositum dubium de enuncia-  tionibus singularibus de futuro contingenti inferri possit negatio divinae  eorumdem futurorum praescientiae. Porro haec illatio absolute neganda  est. Nam s. Thomas praefati dubii solutionem Aristotelicam (quam Boe-  thius — Ed. II De interpret., pag. 375 — dicit firmissima et validissima ar-  gumentatione constitutam) amplectitur ac defendit, imo retinet ac probat  quod si secus esset, nempe si altera ex propositionibus de futuris liberis  esset determinate vera, omnia ex necessitate fierent, et actum esset tum  de  contingentia rerum, tum maxime de libertate humana. Imo, addo,  ipsa  libertas  divina in discrimen vocaretur: non enim libertas divina  est ad oppositum eius, quod ex vi obiectiva propositionis (puta: triangulus  habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis) est determinate verum. Et  nihilominus sanctus Doctor praescientiam futurorum liberorum strenue  propugnat (Cf. lect. xiv, n. 20 seq.). Signum est ergo quod ex indeter-  minatione utriusque partis contradictionis in futuris liberis haud sequi-  tur  negatio divinae praescientiae, sed utraque coexistit (Cf. Ammonium  in Peri herm., sect. II, De propositionibus ex subiecto tantum et prae-  dicato compositis, S vni, fol. 20. — Ed. cit.). — Deinde noto quod Aristo-  teles loquitur hoc loco de indeterminatione veritatis in utraque parte con-  tradictionis quoad praedicta futura, tum considerata forma propositionis  disiunctivae, tum considerata natura eorumdem futurorum: quo sensu af-  praedictis quod non est necesse in omni -  genere affirmationum et negationum oppositarum,  alteram determinate esse veram et alteram esse  falsam: quia non eodem modo se habet veritas  et  falsitas in his quae sunt iam de praesenti et  in his quae non sunt, sed possunt esse vel * non  esse.  Sed hoc modo se habet in utrisque, sicut  dictum est, quia scilicet in his quae sunt necesse est  determinate alterum esse verum et alterum fal-  sum: quod non contingit in futuris quae possunt  esse et non esse". Et sic * terminatur primus liber.  firmat  et  merito illam indeterminationem esse omnino certam. Atqu'  manifestum est alteram contradictionis partem haud cognosci neque a  nobis neque a Deo, nisi secundum illam obiectivitatem vel veritatem ,  quam ex se habet. Quoad se autem habet veritatem et obiectivitatem  solummodo indeterminate. Ergo nonnisi indeterminate altera contradi-  ctionis pars de futuro contingenti est cognoscibilis et cognoscitur: si secus  esset,  nempe si ut determinatum cognosceretur quod determinatum  non  est, mens in sua cognitione falleretur.  Sed, dicitur in allegata obiectione, id quod non est determinate ve-  rum vel falsum, non est determinate cognoscibile. Et hoc concedimus,  quia est propositio evidens ex terminis. Cum autem subsumitur, oppo-  sitorum futurorum liberorum neutrum iuxta Aristotelem esse determinate  verum vel falsum; et id etiam concedimus, dummodo sistatur in sola  consideratione naturae et obiecti propositionis singularis de futuro con-  tingenti, ut hic supra explicatum est. Quo posito, negamus consequens '  et  consequentiam eiusdem obiectionis. Et revera id quod est indeter-  minate verum, procul dubio non potest cognosci ut verum determinate.  Sed id quod est quoad se indeterminate verum, potest aliunde habere  de  futuris  determinationem; sicut studere vel non studere est quid indeterminatum ;  et tamen alterutrum potest determinari quoad me ex mea voluntate. Ita  est  contingentibus in ordine ad divinam cognitionem. Illa  sunt tum ex se tum in suis causis proximis indeterminate futura vel  non futura; et tamen Deus futurá libera determinate cognoscit, non quasi  determinate ex se vel ex causis proximis sint, sed quia cum determina-  bilia sint, determinantur a Deo, qui, ut audivimus a s. Thoma, est per  se  causa omniüm quae in hoc mundo accidunt, et, extra ordinem entium  existens, est causa profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias  (lect. xiv, n. 22). Ut Aristoteles iure accusaretur de laesa divina prae-  scientia futurorum, probandum esset futura libera, antequam fiant, ab ipso  fuisse asserta indeterminata in seipsis et in causis proximis (quod est  verum) et indeterminabilia atque indeterminata alio quovis modo. Sed  de hac secunda parte non tractat ipse in praesenti; quia nonnisi de pro-  positionibus, spectatis ipsarum natura et obiecto, illi est sermo: nempe,  ut brevius dicam, loquitur de determinatione in priori sensu quam me-  rito negat; non loquitur de determinabilitate neque de determinatione  in altero sensu, quia non est ad propositum. Ad rem Sylvester Maurus:  «  »  »  »  »  »  »  Quaeritur an haec Aristotelis doctrina sit vera, vel erronea et contra  fidem?  — Respondeo, quod si ita intelligatur, ut neget solum propo-  sitiones de futuro contingenti habere de praesenti veritatem determi-  natam naturaliter in rebus creatis, est vera; si autem ita intelligatur,  ut  neget tales propositiones habere veritatem determinatam etiam in  scientia  divina,  atque in supernaturalibus revelationibus, est falsa,  contra fidem, et impia » (Aristotelis opera... illustrata, tom. I, De  interpretatione, lib. 1, cap. vi, pag. 79, seq. - Romae 1668). Huius Au-  ctoris sententiae est subscribendum; at non de propositionibus de futuro  contingenti in ordine ad scientiam divinam, sed de eisdem propositio-  nibus in seipsis consideratis loquitur manifeste Aristoteles hoc loco.  *  *  p: et non esse.  7  AC: et in hoc.  ARISTOTELIS PERI HERMENEIAS  LIBER II  20...  Ll  LECTIO PRIMA  IN  ,  DE DISTINCTIONE ET ORDINE SIMPLICIUM ENUNCIATIONUM,  QUIBUS NOMEN FINITUM VEL INFINITUM PONITUR TANTUM  EX PARTE SUBIECTI  "m  ΄  Ἐπεὶ δέ ἐστί τι χατά τινος ἡ κατάφασις σημαίνουσα,  LÀ  τ  »  b  δ  »  ποῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἢ ὄνομα ἢ τὸ ἀνώνυμον. ἕν δὲ δεῖ  εἶναι, καὶ καθ᾽ ἑνός, τὸ ἐν τῇ καταφάσει:  ^  *  ,  ,  ,  ^  *  Ὁ  Α  (τὸ δὲ ὄνομα εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἀνώνυμον πρότερον' τὸ γὰρ  οὐχ  ,  ἄνθρωπος ὄνομα μὲν οὐ λέγω, dXX ἀόριστον  ὄνομα: ἕν γάρ πως σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον" ὥσπερ  M  ,  *  »  (€  »  NR  GPS  —-  χαὶ τὸ οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, οὐ ῥῆμα, ἀλλ' ἀόριστον. ῥῆμα)"  * Quoniam autem est affirmatio de aliquo significans aliquid,  hoc autem oportet esse vel nomen vel innominatum;  unum autem oportet esse et de uno id quod est in  affirmatione ;  (nomen autem dictum est etinnominatum prius; non homo  enim nomen quidem non dico, sed nomen infinitum:  unum enim significat quodammodo et infinitum nomen;  quemadmodum et non currit non verbum dico, sed  infinitum verbum);  ,  ᾽  ἔσται πᾶσα χατάφασις χαὶ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἐξ  ῥήματος, ?» ἐξ ἀορίστου ὀνόματος καὶ  ἤλνευ δὲ ῥήματος οὐδεμία χατάφασις οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις" τὸ  ὀνόματος καὶ  tob,  ῥήματος.  γὰρ ἔστιν, ἢ ἔσται, 7 ἦν, 7 γίνεται, ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα  τοιαῦτα, ῥήματα ἐκ τῶν χειμένων ἐστί: προσση-  μαίνει γὰρ χρόνον.  Ὥστε πρώτη ἔσται χατάφασις χαὶ ἀπόφασις τὸ ἔστιν  ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Εἶτα, ἔστιν οὐχ ἄν-  «x06, οὐχ ἔστιν οὐχ ἄνθρωπος. Πάλιν. ἔστι πᾶς  νθρωπος, οὐχ ἔστι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος" ἔστι πᾶς οὐχ  ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν  ἐχτὸς δὲ χρόνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστίν.  SywoPsrs. — 1. Argumentum huius secundi libri est enun-  ciatio, secundum quod diversificatur per aliquid sibi additum. —  Divisio. — 2. Subiectum affirmationis est nomen vel innomina-  tum, idest infinitum nomen. — 3. Nomen infinitum significat  unum non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum significat  formae alicuius negationem, quam ut ens aliquod ratio conside-  rat, quamvis non sit. -- 4. Ex quo infertur duplicem esse modum  affirmationis et negationis: quaedam enim constant ex nomine  proprie dicto et verbo; quaedam vero constant ex nomine im-  erit omnis affirmatio et negatio vel ex nomine et verbo,  vel ex infinito nomine et verbo.  Praeter verbum autem nulla affirmatio vel negatio est. Est  cnim vel erit, vel fuit, vel fit, vel quaecumque alia hu-  iusmodi verba, ex his sunt, quae sunt posita: consigni-  ficant enim tempus.  Quare prima erit affirmatio et negatio, est homo, non est  homo. Deinde, est non homo, non est non homo.  Rursus, est omnis homo, non est omnis homo: est  omnis non homo, non est omnis non homo. Et in ex-  trinsecis temporibus eadem est ratio.  proprie dicto, seu ex nomine rfinito et ex verbo. — 5. Differentia  enunciationum non potest sumi ex parte verbi. Nam in enun-  ciationibus verbum infinitum fit verbum negativum, et ideo red-  dit  parte  negativas ipsas enunciationes. — 6. Distinguuntur enuncia-  tiones in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum ponitur solum  ex  subiecti; et hoc tripliciter: secundum affirmationem  et  subiectum  negationem ; secundum subiectum finitum vel infinitum ;  secundum  universaliter  situm.  a5 30stquam Philosophus * in primo li-  à  τὰν  ΡΥ  ΙΗ  ΉΤΟ  Wiebro determinavit de enunciatione  Psimpliciter considerata; hic deter-  157594 minat de enunciatione, secundum  3/2854 quod diversificatur per aliquid sibi  vel  non  universaliter  falsum in enunciatione affirmativa vel negativa;  tertio, ipsa oppositio unius enunciationis ad aliam.  Dividitur ergo haec pars in tres partes: in prima *,  ostendit quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc quod  aliquid additur ad dictiones in subiecto vel prae-  dicato positas; secundo, quid accidat enunciationi  Se Ta  Ὁ  m τ  *  qui-  Lib. I, lect. 1,  n. 6.  *p: per quam.  ὙΠ’  ex  3»—""additum. Possunt autem tria in  enunciatione considerari: primo *, ipsae dictiones,  quae praedicantur vel subiiciuntur in enunciatione,  quas supra distinxit per nomina et verba *; secundo,  ipsa compositio, secundum quam * est verum vel  hoc quod aliquid additur ad determinandum  veritatem vel falsitatem compositionis; ibi: Hs vero  determinatis * etc.; tertio, solvit quamdam dubita-  tionem circa oppositiones enunciationum prove-  a) Postquam Philosophus etc. Uti praemonuimus in praefatione, opus  περὶ ἑρμηνείας unico libro apud graecos absolvitur, sed a sequioribus  Scriptoribus latinis in duos libros fuit distributum. Ratio vero huius  divisionis  ex  natura  enunciationis (quae est totius operis subiectum)  petitur; scilicet, quia enunciatio et simpliciter consideranda est, et se-  cundum quod diversificatur per aliquid sibi additum, recte ab enun-  ciatione posteriori sensu accepta secundi libri sumitur exordium. - Quar-  tum  librum sui commentarii in idem περὶ ἑρμηνείας opus exorditur  Boethius, eamdem divisionem sequutus; sed alia est partitio quam se-  quitur Ammonius. Ipse enim ea quae in' hac s. Thomae lectione prima  exponuntur sectioni secundae suae interpretationis adnectit, eamdemque  absolvit, « Hactenus, inquiens, Aristoteles propositionum ex subiecto  praedicatoque consistentium commentationem provexit; quamobrem nos  quoque de iis quae sequuntur ab alio exorsi principio dicamus.» Ter-  tiam vero sectionem a primis verbis Ὄταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι etc. sequentis le-  ctionis exorditur: « Caput Libri tertium hinc auspicatur, inquit, quod de  iis esse propositionibus diximus quae ex tertio appraedicato componun-  tur » (Ed. cit., fol. 23 col. 4, et fol. 24 col. 1).  *  :  po-  Cap. x.  καὶ in prima Ar t-  stoteles.  *  Lect. vii.  *  tes.  ABC: provenien-  "Lect. xn.  *  Cf. lib. I, lect.  IV, D. 13.  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  Lect. v.  Lect. n.  Infra n. 6.  Num. 5.  Num. 3.  Num. 4.  pc: resumit er-  Ὁ primo illud...  *  Lib.I, lect.virr,  n. I9 seq.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  tero praedicantur *, consequens est ut illud, de quo  aliquid dicitur, pertineat ad nomen; nomen autem  est  vel finitum vel infinitum; et ideo, quasi con-  cludens subdit quod quia affirmatio significat ali-  quid de aliquo, consequens est ut hoc, de quo  significatur 7, scilicet subiectum affirmationis, sit  vel nomen, scilicet finitum (quod proprie dicitur  nomen, ut in Primo dictum est*), velin nominatum,  idest infinitum nomen: quod dicitur innomina-  tum, quia ipsum non nominat aliquid cum ali-  qua * forma determinata, sed solum removet de-  terminationem formae. Et ne aliquis diceret *  quod id quod in affirmatione subiicitur est simul  nomen  et  subdit  innominatum , ad hoc excludendum  quod :d quod est, scilicet praedicatum ὃ,  in affirmatione, scilicet una, de qua nunc loqui-  mur *, oportet esse unum et de uno subiecto **; et  sic oportet quod subiectum talis affirmationis sit  |  76  nientem * ex eo, quod additur aliquid simplici enun-  ciationi; ibi: Utrum autem contraria est affirma-  Ho* Εἴς.  Est autem considerandum quod additio facta  ad praedicatum vel subiectum quandoque tollit  unitatem enunciationis, quandoque vero non tol-  lit, sicut additio negationis infinitantis * dictionem.  Circa primum ergo duo facit: primo, ostendit quid  accidat enunciationibus ex additione negationis in-  finitantis dictionem; secundo, ostendit quid accidat  circa enunciationem ex additione tollente unitatem;  ibi: Αἱ vero unum de pluribus * etc. Circa primum  duo facit: primo, determinat de enunciationibus  simplicissimis, in quibus nomen finitum vel infini-  tum ponitur tantum ex parte subiecti; secundo,  determinat de enunciationibus, in quibus nomen  finitum vel infinitum ponitur non solum ex parte  subiecti, sed etiam ex parte praedicati; ibi: Quan-  do autem est tertium adiacens * etc. Circa primum  duo facit: primo, proponit rationes quasdam distin-  guendi tales enunciationes; secundo, ponit earum  distinctionem et ordinem; ibi: Quare prima est af-  firmatio * etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit  rationes distinguendi enunciationes ex parte no-  minum; secundo, ostendit quod non potest esse ?  eadem ratio distinguendi ex parte verborum; ibi:  Praeter verbum autem * etc. Circa primum tria  facit: primo, proponit rationes distinguendi enun-  ciationes; secundo, exponit quod dixerat; ibi: No-  men aulem dictum est * etc.; tertio, concludit in-  tentum; ibi: Erit omnis affirmatio * etc.  2.  Resumit ergo illud *, quod supra dictum est **  de definitione affirmationis, quod scilicet affirma-  tio est enunciatio significans aliquid de aliquo; et,  quia verbum est proprie nota eorum quae de al-  8) Secundo ostendit quod non potest esse etc. Ita legit et optime  cod. C.— Piana: secundo quod non potest etc. — Cod. A: secundo ostendit '  quando potest esse etc. Quae lectio falsa est: numero enim 5, in quo agi-  tur de hoc membro subdivisionis, ostenditur differentias enunciationum  sumi non posse ex parte verborum. Sed et cod. B erronee legit: se-  cundo quando potest esse eadem oratio distinguendi etc.  Y) De quo significatur. Est lectio codd. ABC, quam adoptamus loco  edd. P. et Ven.: de quo significatur aliquid de aliquo. Placeret quidem  conservare aliquid, quamvis non necessarium, cum de facili subintelli-  gatur; sed non potest admitti lectio, de aliquo. Sermo est de subiecto,  (ut, hoc..., scilicet subiectum), de quo aliquid significatur; at dici ne-  quit siné confusione quod, subiectum sit id de quo significatur aliquid  de aliquo: nam dicendo, de quo significatur aliquid, designatur subie-  ctum; addendo autem, de quo significatur aliquid de aliquo, videtur  aut idem repeti, aut indicari praedicatum.  9) Scilicet praedicatum. Haec lectio codd. CE indicatur ex sequen-  tibus, oportet esse unum et de uno subiecto: dici enim de subiecto est  proprium praedicati. — Piana: scilicet primum.  €) Sit vel nomen, vel nomen infinitum. Cum hac lectione Piana con-  cordat lectio codd. ABC.— D legit: sit vel nomen finitum vel nomen infini-  tum: quae lectio est magis explicita, adiecto vocabulo finitum. Attamen  vocabulum istud non necesse est apponi, quia de facili supponitur.  Dictum enim est paulo supra quod nomen finitum dicitur proprie no-  men. — E: vel non sit nomen vel nomen infinitum. Negatio apposita  error est.  t) Ipsum non ens dicitur ens etc. Animadvertat novitius non ens  dici ens non simpliciter sed secundum quid, hoc est non ratione sui, sed  ratione entis cuius non-enms est negatio. Contra sophistam, qui im non  entis tenebris aufugit, et diuturna consuetudine tenebris illis offundi-  tur  (pag. 177) disserit Plato in libro, cui SSophista titulus est. Ibi pro-  bandum assumit quod, non ens velut imaginando esse, revera non ens  dicimus (pag. 178) atque inter alia haec habet: « Quod enim non pul-  »  »  »  »  »  chrum ubique pronunciamus, hoc non ab alio quoquam alterum est,  quam a pulchri natura.. Revera sequitur »om pulchrum esse aliquid,  quandoquidem est illud cui opponitur... Eademque erit de caeteris  ratio, postquam alterius ipsius natura e genere entium esse appa-  ruit..  Oportet audacter iam dicere, quod »on ens, firmiter naturam  vel nomen, vel nomen infinitum *.  3. Deinde cum dicit: Nomen autem etc., expo-  nit quod dixerat, et dicit quod supra * dictum est  quid sit nomen, et quid sit innominatum, idest  infinitum nomen: quia, non homo, non est nomen,  sed est infinitum nomen, sicut, 0n currit, non est  verbum, sed infinitum verbum. Interponit autem  quoddam, quod valet ad dubitationis remotionem,  videlicet  quod nomen infinitum. quodam modo  significat unum. Non enim significat simpliciter  unum, sicut nomen finitum, quod significat unam  formam generis vel speciei aut etiam individui,  sed in quantum significat negationem formae ali-  cuius *, in qua negatione multa. conveniunt, sicut  in quodam uno secundum rationem. Unum enim *  eodem modo dicitur aliquid, sicut et ens; unde  sicut ipsum non ens dicitur ens *, non quidem  »  »  »  »  suam habet (τὸ μὴ ὃν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον), quemad-  modum magnum erat magnum, pulchrumque erat pulchrum, ac etiam  non  magnum et non pulchrum. Eodemque pacto non ens, secundum  idem erat, et est non ens species una multis aliis entibus adnumerata »  ( Pag. 180.— Ed. cit. Marsilii Ficini.- Cf. ib. Parmenides, pag. 1122 eq)  Quia vero s. Thomas IV Metaphys. citat, ex prima eius lectione  clarabimus  formam illam loquendi, qua sophistice abutisur idealismus  sive speculativus sive criticus. — Ens igitur multipliciter dicitur, quamvis  omne ens dicatur per respectum ad unum primum (Cf. lib. I, lect. v,  not. f). Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse,  sicut substantiae, quae principaliter et per prius entia dicuntur. Alia  vero dicuntur entia, quia sunt passiones sive proprietates substantiae,  sicut propria sive per se accidentia uniuscuiusque substantiae, ut capa-  citas sciendi in homine, gravitas in corporibus etc. Quaedam autem  dicuntur entia, quia sunt via ad substantiam, sicut motus et generationes,  quae ordinantur ad productionem substantiae, sicut ad naturalem ter-  minum. Alia autem entia dicuntur, quia sunt corruptiones substan-  tiae: corruptio enim est subiecti quod corrumpitur via ad sn esse, sicut  generatio est via ad esse substantiae, ut dictum est. Et quia corruptio  terminatur ad privationem, sicut generatio ad formam, convenienter  ipsae etiam privationes formarum substantialium esse dicuntur. Et ite- -  rum qualitates vel accidentia quaedam dicuntur entia, quia sunt activa  vel generativa substantiae, vel eorum quae secundum aliquam habitu-  dinem ad substantiam dicuntur. Item negationes eorum quae ad sub- .  stantiam habitudinem habent, vel etiam ipsius substantiae esse dicuntur;  unde dicimus quod non-ens est non-ens: quod non diceretur nisi ne-  gationi aliquo modo esse competeret.  Sciendum tamen, addit s. Thomas, quod praedicti modi essendi ad  quatuor possunt reduci. Nam unum eorum, quod. est ens. debilissimum,  est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio: quas dicimus in ra-  tione esse, quia ratio de eis negotiatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum  de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid (secundum quid autem differant ne-  gatio et privatio, cf. lib. I, lect. 1v, not. i). Aliud huic proximum in  debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia  dicuntur: habent enim aliquid admistum de. privatione et negatione.  Nam motus est actus imperfectus. Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil  habet de non-ente admistum, habet tamen essé debile, quia non est  *  Cf. lib. I, lect.v,  n. 4. - ABCE: di-  cuntur.  *  *  Lect. 1v, n. 13.  aac: ab aliqua. -E:  quia  per-  ipsum nonnomi-  natur aliquid ab  aliqua.  *  A:  ne  credat.  *  A:  aliquis  ὃ  loquitur.  *""comittit sub-  iecto.  *  *  Lib. I, lect. iv.  Cf. lect. cit., n.  13.  PCoad.- P.: du-  tem.  t  CAP. X, LECT. I  77  sive utamur * negativa particula ut infinitante ver-  * Ed. Did. lib.lII,  cap.ir, n.2.- Com-  ment. s. Th. lect. 1  *  Codd.:  affirma-  lionum. an  * A: scilicet quod.  »  *Letmn.6.  bum vel ut faciente negativam enunciationem ;  et ideo accipitur semper in simpliciori intellectu *,  prout est magis in promptu. Et inde est quod  non  diversificavit  simpliciter, sed secundum quid, idest secundum  rationem, ut patet in IV Metaphysicae *, ita etiam  negatio est unum secundum quid, scilicet secun-  dum rationem. Introducit autem hoc, ne aliquis  dicat quod affirmatio, in qua subiicitur nomen  infinitum, non significet unum de uno, quasi no-  men infinitum non significet unum.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Erit omnis affirmatio etc.,  concludit propositum scilicet quod duplex est mo-  dus affirmationis *. Quaedam enim est affirmatio,  quae constat ex nomine et verbo; quaedam au-  tem est quae constat ex infinito nomine et verbo.  Et hoc sequitur ex hoc quod supra dictum est  quod * hoc, de quo affirmatio aliquid significat, vel  est nomen vel innominatum. Et eadem differen-  tia potest accipi ex parte negationis, quia de quo-  affirmationem per hoc, quod  sit ex verbo vel infinito verbo, sicut diversificavit  per hoc, quod est ex nomine vel infinito nomine.  Est autem considerandum * quod in nominibus  et in verbis praeter differentiam finiti et infiniti est  differentia recti et obliqui. Casus enim nominum,  etiam verbo addito, non constituunt enunciationem  significantem verum vel falsum, ut in Primo ha-  bitum est *: quia in obliquo nomine non includitur  ipse rectus, sed in casibus verbi includitur ipsum  verbum praesentis temporis. Praeteritum enim et  futurum, quae significant casus verbi *, dicuntur  in Primo habitum est *.  *  Lect. tv. n. 15.  AB: CORSighifi-  *  cant.- E: stgnifi-  cunque contingit affirmare, contingit et negare, | per respectum ad praesens. Unde si dicatur, Aoc erit, ἐπὴν LaMpUt P  ut  idem est ac si diceretur, hoc est futurum; hoc fuit, ἴοοῖ.ν, π. 1}. 0  B.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Praeter verbum etc., osten- | hoc est praeteritum. Et propter hoc, ex casu verbi  —  dit quod differentia enunciationum non potest sumi | et nomine fit enunciatio. Et ideo subiungit quod  | "pr ἴξιν, €X Parte verbi ". Dictum est enim supra * quod, | sive* dicatur est, sive erit, sive fuit, vel quaecum- Rip sd  TS  praeter verbum nulla est affirmatio vel negatio. | que alia huiusmodi verba, sunt de numero prae- se  . fa6:«wem;-s Potest enim * praeter nomen esse aliqua affirma- | dictorum verborum, sine quibus non potest fieri  tio vel negatio, videlicet si ponatur loco nominis | enunciatio: quia omnia consignificant tempus *, et  infinitum nomen: loco autem verbi in enuncia-  tione non potest poni infinitum verbum, duplici  ratione. - Primo quidem, quia infinitum verbum  alia * tempora dicuntur per respectum ad praesens.  6. Deinde cum dicit: Quare prima erit affirma-  lio etc., concludit ex praemissis distinctionem enun-  ciationum in quibus nomen finitum vel infinitum  ponitur solum ex parte subiecti, in quibus triplex  differentia intelligi potest: una quidem, secundum  affirmationem et negationem ; alia, secundum sub-  iectum finitum et infinitum; tertia, secundum sub-  constituitur per additionem infinitae particulae ,  .  .  quae quidem addita verbo per se dicto, idest extra  enunciationem posito, removet ipsum absolute,  sicut addita nomini, removet formam nominis ab-  solute: et ideo extra enunciationem potest accipi  verbum infinitum * per modum unius dictionis,  iectum universaliter, vel non universaliter posi-  *  Cf. lib. I, lect.v,  n. 12,  *  pg: et ita alia.  *Gtlibl key, Sicut et nomen infinitum *. Sed quando negatio ad- | tum *. Nomen autem finitum est ratione prius '4mcsunptum.  .  5  n. 1I.  να...  RR  5  5  .  5  5 - -  5  5 -  5  ditur verbo in enunciatione posito, negatio illa | infinito "sicut affirmatio prior est negatione *; unde Ὁ ΕΣ WE EC IH  removet verbum ab aliquo, et sic facit enuncia- | primam affirmationem ponit, /o7o est, et primam v" n. 3.  Moers  ?  tionem negativam: quod non accidit ex parte no-  minis. Non enim enunciatio efficitur negativa nisi  ΤΑΣ  διάνε ewe.  per hoc  P  7  2  gd  negationem, omo non est. Deinde ponit secun-  dam affirmationem, non homo est, secundam au-  * quod negatur compositio, quae impor- | tem negationem, non homo non est. Ulterius au-  fur negtbiii tatur in verbo: et ideo verbum infinitum in enun- | tem ponit illas enunciationes in quibus subiectum  C.  9:  Pe  .  E  ;  ;  :  2  ciatione positum fit verbum negativum. - Secun- | universaliter ponitur, quae sunt quatuor *, sicut —— οὐρα  do, quia in nullo variatur veritas enunciationis,  per se, sed in alio; sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae pro-  prietates. Quartum autem genus est, quod est perfectissimum, quod  Scilicet habet esse in natura absque admistione privationis, et habet esse  firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens et non in alio, sicut sunt  substantiae. Et ad hoc (nempe ad substantiam), sicut ad primum et  principale omnia alia referuntur: nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur  esse, in quantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes dicuntur  esse, in quantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum;  privationes autem et negationes dicuntur esse, in quantum removent  aliquid trium praedictorum.  Dixi quod praefata loquendi forma abutitur idealismus. Quia enim  negationes quasi entia concipiuntur a mente nostra et ratio de eis nego-  tiatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, idealismus speculativus, quem Hegel  finxit, transtulit huiusmodi negationes ad ordinem realitatis, voluitque a  non esse sicut et ab esse sumendas esse differentias, quibus res omnes  fiunt, ordinantur et distinguuntur ad invicem. Logique de Hégel tra-  duite... par A. Vera. Ed. II, Paris 1864, chap. xir, pag. 112 seq. in textu  et  in nota, et pag. 408.  — Ex opposito, idealismus criticus, duce Kantio,  (Cf. Critique de la raison pure..., retraduite par J.Tissot, tom.l, pag. 62, -  et  deinceps per totum istud opus. Paris 1845) nonnisi realitatem con-  tingentem extra nos ponit, sed obiecta universalia et relationes neces-  sarias atque universales ipsorum contingentium (Cf. lib. I, lect.xrr, not. y),  non secus ac negationes, privationes etc., fieri a mente nostra et in mente  nostra tantum existere contendit; subdens quod mens actu spontaneo  quidem existimat obiecta huiusmodi habere extra nos realitafém, sed  reflexio scientifica corrigit (verius corrumpit) primaevum et spoentaneum  assertum rationalis naturae.- Idealismus igitur totus fundatur in confu-  et  illae in quibus est subiectum non universaliter -  sione entis rationis cum ente reali, non satis discernens in cognitione  nostra quid ponatur a mente et quid sit a rebus.  ἢ) Non potest sumi ex parte verbi. Unus cod. B immediate prose-  quitur: e£ hoc sequitur ex hoc quod supra dictum est. Dictum est  enim etc. Quam lectionem, cum ea caeteri codd. nostri careant, non  admittimus, quamvis illam absonam a contextu non dicamus. Revera  quae hoc loco dicuntur, quasi corollaria sunt eorum quae sunt prae-  missa in lect. vir, lib. I.  0) In simpliciori intellectu. Cod. D: in simpliciorem intellectum ; - codd.  ABCE: secundum simpliciorem intellectum. Et hanc meliorem puto le-  ctionem.  — Cod. A infra: per hoc quod sit ex verbo finito vel infinito  verbo, sicut diversificavit per hoc quod est ex nomine finito vel infi-  nito  (Cf. not. 8). Integram lectionem Pianam habent codd. CDE, imo  et  »  »  »  »  cod. B, nisi quod in fine legit ex nomine, vel infinito.  t) Est autem considerandum etc. Codd. ABC: « Est autem conside-  rapdum quod in omnibus verbis praeter differentiam finiti et infiniti, et  differentiam (BC, est differentia) recti et obliqui, nomini et verbo addita  (B, in omni etiam verbo addito;—- C, nomini verbo addito) non con-  stituunt enunciationem » etc. Quae lectiones intricatae sunt, nec quid  enuncient dici perspicue potest. Lectionem Pianam habent codd. DE.  x) Nomen autem finitum est ratione prius infinito. Codd.: nomen  autem finitum est naturaliter prius infinito. Quae lectio posset acceptari.  Asserit enim s. Thomas nomen finitum esse prius infinito, sicut pro-  bavit  in primo libro de affirmatione respectu negationis (lect. vr n. 3).  Ibi autem dixit affirmationem esse priorem negatione tum ex parte vo-  cis, tum ex parte intellectus, tum ex parte rei, sicut compositio est za-  turaliter prior divisione, et habitus est naturaliter prior privatione.  tuor.  78  positum. Praetermisit autem ponere exemplum  de enunciationibus, in quibus subiicitur singulare,  ut, Socrates est, Socrates non est, quia singulari-  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  quodammodo eamdem vim habet cum subiecto  universali, non * universaliter sumpto. Non ponit  autem aliquam differentiam ex parte verbi, quae  posset * sumi secundum casus verbi, quia sicut  *  termittit.  Codd.- p.: in-  bus nominibus non additur aliquod signum. Unde  in huiusmodi enunciationibus non potest .omnis  differentia inveniri. Similiter etiam praetermittit *  exemplificare de enunciationibus, quarum subie-  cta particulariter ponuntur, quia tale subiectum  *  Unus 4 omittit  non.  *  ipse dicit, in extrinsecis temporibus , idest in  praeterito et in futuro, quae circumstant praesens,  est eadem ratio sicut et in praesenti, ut iam di-  ctum est.  AB : possit.  CAP. X, LECT. II  LECTIO SECUNDA  DE NUMERO ET HABITUDINE INTER SE SIMPLICIUM ENUNCIATIONUM  DE TERTIO ADIACENTE, IN QUIBUS PRAEDICATUR VERBUM ZS7  ET SUBIICITUR NOMEN FINITUM  NON UNIVERSALITER SUMPTUM  Ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσχατηγορῆται, ἤδη διχῶς  λέγονται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις.  Λέγω δὲ οἷον ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος, τὸ ἔστι τρίτον  φημὶ συγκεῖσθαι ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἐν τῇ καταφάσει:  ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο τέτταρα ἔσται ταῦτα, ὧν τὰ μὲν δύο  πρὸς τὴν κατάφασιν χαὶ ἀπόφασιν ἕξει χατὰ τὸ στοι-  79  * Quando autem est tertium adiacens praedicatur, dupliciter  tunc dicuntur oppositiones.  Dico autem, ut est iustus homo, est tertium adiacere no-  men vel verbum in affirmatione:  quare quatuor erunt illae, quarum duae quidem ad affir-  mationem et negationem sese habent secundum conse-  |.  χοῦν, ὡς αἱ στερήσεις" τὰ δὲ δύο οὔ.  Λέγω δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἔστιν ἢ τῷ δικαίῳ προσχείσεται ἢ τῷ  οὐ δικαίῳ" ὥστε xal ἡ ἀπόφασις. Τέτταρα οὖν ἔσται.  Νοοῦμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τῶν ὑπογεγραμμένων" ἔστι - δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος" ἀπόφασις τούτου; οὐχ ἔστι δίκαιος  .  ἄνθρωπος" ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος: τούτου ἀπό-  φάσις, οὐχ ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος. Τὸ γὰρ ἔστιν  ἀνταῦθα, καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἕστι, τῷ δικαίῳ προσχείσεται  χαὶ τῷ οὐ δικαίῳ. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς  ᾿Αναλυτικοῖς εἴρηται, οὕτω τέταχται.  ΘΥΝΟΡΒΙΒ. — 1. Argumentum textus et eius divisiones. 2. De  duplici significatione verbi est in propositione; sumitur enim vel  secundum se et ut principale praedicatum, et significat existere in  rerum natura; vel ut copula et adiacens seu coniunctum princi-  pali praedicato et significat coniunctionem huius praedicati cum  subiecto. In hoc secundo casu verbum est dicitur tertium in pro-  positione, non quasi sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia  dictio adiacens principali praedicato, et cum ipso constituens unum  praedicatum propositionis; quae hac de causa dicitur propositio  de zertio adiacente.— 3. Propositionum quarum verbum est con-  stituit principale praedicatum, ita ut nomen ponatur solum ex  parte subiecti, una est tantum oppositio, eodem subiecto exi-  stente; sed in aliis propositionibus, in quibus verbum 651 adiacet,  oportet esse duas oppositiones.— 4. Ipsum est quamvis possit dici  etiam nomen, sicut quaelibet alia dictio, tamen magis dicitur ver-  bum, quia dictio, quae consignificat tempus communiter dicitur  verbum.—- 5. Numerus et ordo simplicium enunciationum de tertio  adiacente.- 6. De differentia enunciationum, secundum quod prae-  eg ostquam Philosophus distinxit enun-  S)ciationes, in quibus nomen finitum  EN vel infinitum ponitur solum ex parte  quaedam quae circa eas dubia esse possent ; ibi:  Quoniam vero contraria est * etc. Circa primum  duo facit: primo, agit de enunciationibus in quibus  nomen praedicatur * cum hoc verbo, est; secundo,  de enunciationibus in quibus alia verba ponuntur;  ibi: Zn his vero in quibus * etc. Distinguit autem hu-  huismodi enunciationes sicut et primas, secundum  triplicem differentiam ex parte subiecti conside-  ratam: primo namque, agit de enunciationibus in  quibus subiicitur nomen finitum non universaliter  sumptum; secundo, de illis in quibus subiicitur  |.  δὴ) Tertio exemplificat. Codd. BDE: exemplificat quasi in figura; et  revera sic esse legendum persuadent ea quae infra, n. 14, hac de re de-  clarantur. — A omittit verba: fertio exemplificat; ibi: intelligimus vero.  quentiam, ut privationes, duae vero minime.  Dico autem quoniam est aut iusto adiacebit, aut non iusto,  quare etiam negationes. Quatuor ergo sunt.  Intelligimus vero quod dicitur ex his quae subscripta sunt,  est iustus homo, huius negatio est, non est iustus  homo: est non iustus homo, huius negatio est, non  est non iustus homo, est enim hoc loco, et non est  iusto, et non iusto adiacet. Haec igitur quemadmodum  in resolutoriis dictum est, sic sunt disposita.  dicatum est nomen finitum, infinitum et privativum: unde habentur  propositiones simplices, infinitae et privativae.— 7. Refutatur in-  terpretatio litterae Aristotelis data ab Hermino.- 8. Alia quorum-  dam antiquorum interpretatio non admittitur. — 9. Ammonii in-  terpretatio. Quaedam praenotantur de virtualitate enunciationum,  et  de maiori vel minori extensione propositionum ad invicem  comparatarum. — 10. Propositiones affirmativae et negativae ^a]  nitae se habent secundum consequentiam ad propositiones affir-  mativas et negativas simplices, sicut duae propositiones privati-  vae se habent ad ipsas simplices. — 11. At propositiones simplices  non se habent ad infinitas in consequendo, sicut ad istas se ha-  bent privativae.— 12. Simplicior et melior interpretatio Porphyrii.  Própositiones simplices et propositiones infinitae ita se habent  ad invicem, ut ad unam affirmativam consequatur alterius ne-  gativa; sed non viceversa ad negativam sequitur affirmativa. Et  idem dicendum est de simplicibus et de privativis. — 13. Expli-  catur  numerus praedictarum enunciationum. — 14. Schema. —  15. Conclusio.— Dubium circa litteram Aristotelis.  nomen finitum universaliter sumptum; ibi: Simi-  liter autem se habet* etc.; tertio, de illis in quibus  subiicitur nomen infinitum; ibi: Aliae autem ha-  bent ad id quod est non homo * etc. Circa primum  tria facit: primo, proponit diversitatem opposi-  tionis talium enunciationum; secundo, concludit  earum numerum et ponit earum habitudinem; ibi:  Quare quatuor * etc.; tertio, exemplificat *; ibi: Zn-  lelligimus vero ἢ εἴς. Circa primum duo facit: primo,  proponit quod intendit; secundo, exponit quod-  dam quod dixerat; ibi: Dico autem * etc.  2.  Circa primum duo oportet intelligere: primo  quidem, quid est hoc quod dicit *, est tertium   ad-  iacens praedicatur. Ad cuius evidentiam conside-  randum est quod hoc verbum est quandoque 3 in  enunciatione praedicatur * secundum se; ut cum  dicitur, Socrates est: per quod nihil aliud intendi-  mus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum  natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se,  B) Quod hoc verbum xsr quandoque etc. Haec lectio, quam habent  codd., anteponitur lectioni Pianae: quod quandoque in enunciatione  praedicatur ksr secundum etc.  *  *  *  *  *  Seq. c. x.  Lect. nr.  Lect. πὶ,  Num. 5.  α  Num. 14.  *  *  *  Num. 4.  p:  dicit quod.  8  AE : ponitur.  8o  quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi coniun-  ctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum  ve  non  enim;  sed non recte.  *  p:  nibus  liter.  *A:  enunciatio-  universa-  homo  est,  homo non est ...  *  A: existente ἢ-  nito.  *  *  *  Cf. lect. v, n. 15.  A: idest, est.  ADE: COnSigni-  Jicans.  *  ACDE. - P.: &X-  emplificat,  sed  non bene,sicut B,  excludat - (Conf.  n. 13).  subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est albus, non *  est  natura,  intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in  rerum  sed  ut  attribuat  ei  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  sunt * oppositiones, quando est tertium adiacens '  praedicatur , cum * omnis oppositio sit inter duas  enunciationes, consequens est quod sint quatuor  enunciationes illae in quibus es, tertium adiacens,  praedicatur, subiecto finito non *universaliter sum-  pto. Deinde cum dicit: Quarum duae quidem etc.,  ostendit habitudinem praedictarum enunciationum  ad invicem; et dicit quod duae dictarum enun-  ciationum se habent ad affirmationem et nega-  tionem secundum consequentiam, sive secun-  dum correlationem, aut analogiam, ut in graeco  albedinem  mediante hoc verbo, est; et ideo in talibus, est,  praedicatur ut adiacens principali praedicato. Et  dicitur esse tertium, non quia sit tertium ? prae-  dicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enun-  ciatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit  unum praedicatum, ut sic enunciatio dividatur in  duas partes et non in tres.  3. Secundo, considerandum est quid est hoc,  quod dicit quod quando est, eo modo quo dictum  est, tertium adiacens praedicatur, dupliciter dicun-  tur oppositiones. Circa quod considerandum est  quod in praemissis enunciationibus *, in quibus no-  men ponebatur solum ex parte subiecti, secun-  dum quodlibet subiectum erat una oppositio; puta  Si subiectum erat nomen finitum non universa-  liter sumptum, erat sola una oppositio, scilicet  est homo, non est homo *. Sed quando est tertium  adiacens praedicatur, oportet esse duas oppositio-  nes eodem subiecto existente * secundum differen-  tiam nominis praedicati, quod potest esse finitum  vel infinitum; sicut haec est una oppositio, omo  est iustus, homo non est iustus: alia vero opposi-  tio est, homo est non iustus, homo non est non  iustus. Non enim negatio fit nisi per appositio-  nem negativae particulae ad hoc verbum est, quod  est  nota praedicationis.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem, ut est iustus etc.,  exponit quod. dixerat, es? tertium adiacens, et di-  cit quod cum dicitur, Lomo est iustus, hoc ver-  bum est, adiacet, scilicet praedicato, tamquam  terium nomen vel verbum in affirmatione. Po-  test  enim ipsum esf, dici nomen, prout quaelibet  dictio nomen dicitur *, et sic est terum nomen,  idest * tertia dictio. Sed quia secundum commu-  nem  usum loquendi, dictio significans * tempus  magis dicitur verbum quam nonien, propter hoc  addit, vel verbum , quasi dicat, ad hoc quod sit  tertium , non refert utrum dicatur nomen vel  verbum.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Quare quatuor erunt etc.,  concludit numerum enunciationum. Et primo, po-  nit conclusionem numeri; secundo, ponit earum  habitudinem; ibi: Quarum duae quidem etc.; tertio,  rationem numeri explicat *; ibi: Dico autem quo-  niam est etc.- Dicit ergo primo quod quia duae  Y) Et dicitur esse tertium non quia sit tertium etc. Ita códd. AC  DE. — Cod. B non recte: ef cum dicitur etc. — Edit. Piana nec ipsa bene:  et non dicitur esse tertium quia sit tertium etc.- Quoad ea vero quae  hic asseruntur, quod nempe enunciatio non dividatur in tres partes, quae  sint subiectum, verbum seu copula et praedicatum, quia verbum cum  praedicato constituunt unum praedicatum, recolat novitius quae in li-  bro I, lect. v, n. 4 dicta sunt; videlicet quia verbum semper se tenet ex  parte praedicati.  ὃ) Aut analogiam, ut in graeco habetur. Xixótyoc, quo vocabulo uti-  tur Aristoteles, ordo est latine. Cur autem s, Thomas maluerit vertere  χατὰ τὸ στοιχοῦν, secundum consequentiam sive secundum correlationem  aut analogiam , quam secundum ordinem, ex dicendis erit manifestum.  t) Quod quia breviter et obscure dictum est etc. Boethius De in-  terpretatione Edit. II, lib. IV, De enunciationibus infinitis, 8. Quando au-  tem est testium, pag. 388 hunc Aristotelis locum explicaturus praemittit :  «  Quare idcirco quatuor istae erunt, quarum quidem duae ad affirma-  B: primo, cum  duae sint.  *  *  A: et cum.  A: Jinito exi-  stente, non ta-  men.  habetur ?, sicut privationes; aliae vero duae mini-  me.  Quod quia breviter et obscure dictum est *,  diversimode a diversis expositum est.  6. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod  tripliciter nomen potest praedicari in * huiusmo-  di enunciationibus. Quandoque enim praedicatur  nomen finitum, secundum quod assumuntur duae  enunciationes, una affirmativa et altera negativa,  scilicet tomo est iustus, et homo non est iustus;  quae dicuntur simplices. Quandoque vero prae-  dicatur nomen infinitum, secundum quod etiam  assumuntur duae aliae, scilicet homo. est non iu-  stus, homo non .est non iustus; quae dicuntur in-  finitae. Quandoque vero praedicatur nomen pri-  vativum *, secundum quod etiam sumuntur duae  aliae, scilicet hoino est iniustus, homo non est in-  iustus; quae dicuntur privativae.  7. Quidam ergo sic exposuerunt, quod duae  enunciationes earum, quas praemiserat scilicet  illae, quae sunt de infinito praedicato, se habent  ad affirmationem et negationem, quae sunt de  praedicato finito secundum consequentiam vel  analogiam, sicut privationes, idest sicut illae, quae  sunt de praedicato privativo *. Illae enim duae,  quae sunt de praedicato infinito, se habent se-  cundum consequentiam ad illas, quae sunt de fi-  nito praedicato secundum transpositionem quan-  dam, scilicet affirmatio ad negationem et negatio  *  *  In ex Βα.  Cf. lib. I, lect.  Iv, D. 13.  :  ad affirmationem. Nam Aomo est non iustus, quae  est affirmatio de infinito praedicato, respondet se-  cundum consequentiam negativae * de praedicato  '»c  finito, huic scilicet homo non est iustus. Negativa ^.  vero  ἙΝ ὡς etc-  de infinito praedicato, scilicet homo non est  non  iustus,  affirmativae  de  finito  praedicato ,  huic scilicet Aomo est iustus. Propter quod Theo-  phrastus vocabat eas, quae sunt de infinito prae-  dicato, transpositas. Et similiter etiam affirmativa  de privativo praedicato respondet secundum con-  sequentiam negativae de finito praedicato, scilicet  »  »  »  tionem sese habent secundum consequentiam, ut" privationes , duae  vero minime, diligentius exponamus. Locus enim magna brevitate con-  Strictus est, et nimia subtilitate ac obscuritate difficilis. »" Ammor  quoque, De interpretatione, sect. ΠῚ, 8$. 1, Quando autem etc.: «  »  inquit, obscure hic admodum sunt, ac per aenigmata... Atrae  »  »  »  vocem, ut Lycophronis utar verbis, imitatür (Aristoteles), nec. parum  explanatoribus facessit negotii, quidnam pauca haec verba  (quarum  duae quidem etc.) sibi velle existimabimus » (fol. 24 col. Mere  col. 1). Quae omnia aut falsa aut exaggerata videntur Theodoro W.  «  Vs, inquit, 23 et 24 quantum vexaverint interpretes videre licet e ex  »  »  »  Ammonio, qui in re desperata lamentationibus Aristotelem persequitur.  Plana erunt omnia, si locum Analyticorum bene perspexerimus...,  ubi haec uberius exponuntur » ( Aristotelis Organon, graece, par. 1,  pag. 344, ed. cit.).— Vereor ego tamen .  e  magni viri et in libris Aristotelis versatissimi |  clamant, Sed de his infra, not. p...  tn  et perspicua quae  ia et perobscura pro-  Theophrastus.  CAP. X,  haec, homo: est iniustus, ei quae est, homo non est  iustus. Negativa vero affirmativae, scilicet haec ὃ,  homo non est iniustus, ei quae est, homo est iustus.  Disponatur ergo in figura. Et in prima quidem linea  ponantur illae, quae sunt de finito. praedicato ,  scilicet homo est iustus, homo non. esi iustus. In  secunda. autem linea, negativa de infinito praedi-  cato sub affirmativa de finito et affirmativa sub  negativa. In tertia vero, negativa " de privativo  praedicato similiter sub affirmativa de finito et  affirmativa sub negativa: ut patet in subscripta  figura.  *  Propp. simpli-  ces.  *Propp infinitae.  * Propp. privati-  vae.  *BC. - P.: Sunt,  scilicet de.  * Loc. cit. in su-  periori nota  c.  Homo. est iustus *. Homo non est iustus.  Homo non est non iustus *. Homo est non  iustus.  Homo non est iniustus *. Homo est iniustus.  Sic ergo duae, scilicet quae sunt de infinito  praedicato, se habent ad affirmationem et nega-  tionem de finito praedicato, sicut privationes, id-  est sicut illae quae sunt de privativo praedicato.  Sed.  duae aliae quae sunt de * infinito subiecto,  scilicet on homo est iustus, non homo non est  iustus, manifestum est quod * non habent similem  consequentiam. Et hoc modo exposuit Hermi-  nus * hoc quod dicitur, Duae vero, minime, re-  ferens hoc ad illas quae sunt de infinito subiecto.  Sed hoc manifeste est contra litteram. Nam  cum praemisisset quatuor enunciationes, duas sci-  licet de finito praedicato et duas de infinito, sub-  iungit quasi illas subdividens, quarum duae qui-  dem etc. Duae vero, minime; ubi datur intelligi  quod utraeque duae intelligantur in praemissis. Illae  autem quae sunt de infinito subiecto non inclu-  duntur in praemissis, sed de his postea dicetur.  Unde mánifestum est quod de eis nunc non lo-  quitur.  8. Et ideo, ut Ammonius dicit *, alii aliter expo-  suerunt, dicentes quod praedictarum quatuor pro-  positionum duae, scilicet quae sunt de infinito  praedicato, sic se habent ad affirmationem et ne-  gationem, idest ad ipsam speciem affirmationis  et negationis, ut privationes, idest ut * privativae af-  firmationes seu negationes *. Haec enim affirmatio,  homo est non iustus*, non est simpliciter affirmatio,  sed secundum quid, quasi secundum privationem  t) Negativa vero affirmativae, scilicet haec etc. — Immediate prius.  dictum est quod affirmativa de praedicato privativo respondet secundum  consequentiam negativae de finito praedicato. Hic ergo dicitur quod  negativa privativa respondet secundum consequentiam affirmativae sim-  plici; nempe, homo non est iniustus, xespondet secundum consequentiam  propositioni, homo est iustus. ldeo corrigenda est lectio Piana, quae  habet: megativae vero privativae, scilicet, homo non est iustus, ei quae  est, homo est iustus.  — Codd. ABC: negativa vero affirmativae  scilicet  haec (B omittit haec). Et AB exemplum. habent hoc modo: homo non  est iustus, ei quae est, homo est iustus.-  CD: homo non est iniustus,  ei quae est, homo est iustus.  Ἢ) In tertia vero, negativa etc. Haec omnia usque ad sub negativa,  et  consequenter in figura apposita propositiones, homo non est iniu-  ea  stus, homo est iniustus, desiderantur in cod. D, Piana et Venetis edd.;  sed  restituimus ex codd. ABCE. Manifeste enim eadem supponit  expressa s. Thomas in iis quae concludit: Sic ergo duae, scilicet etc.  Codd. AB habent quae addidimus ex aliis codd., praeter figuram, quam  non solum ex parte, ut Piana, sed integram omittunt, licet eam cum aliis  codd. promittant: ut patet in subscripta figura. — In cod. C ipsamet  figura describitur in margine inferiori, et inter unam et alteram pro-  Opp. D. Tuowaz T. I.  LECT. 1l  81  affirmatio; sicut homo mortuus non est homo  simpliciter, sed secundum privationem; et idem  dicendum est de negativa, quae est de infinito  praedicato. Duae vero, quae sunt de finito. prae-  dicato, non se habent ad speciem affirmationis  et  negationis secundum privationem, sed simpli-  citer. Haec enim, homo est iustus, est simpliciter  affirmativa, et haec, homo non est iustus, est sim-  pliciter negativa. - Sed nec hic sensus convenit  verbis Aristotelis. Dicit enim infra: Haec igitur  quemadmodum in. Resolutoriüis * dictum est, sic sunt  disposita; ubi nihil invenitur ad hunc sensum per-  tinens. Et ideo Ammonius ex his, quae in fine  I Priorum * dicuntur de propositionibus, quae  sunt de finito vel infinito vel privativo praedi-  cato, alium sensum accipit.  non  9. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod,  sicut ipse dicit, enunciatio aliqua virtute se habet  ad illud, de quo totum id quod in enunciatione  significatur vere praedicari potest: sicut haec enun-  ciatio, homo est iustus, se habet ad omnia illa,  de quorum quolibet vere * potest dici quod est  homo iustus; et similiter haec enunciatio, homo  est iustus, se habet ad omnia illa, de quorum  quolibet vere dici potest quod mon est homo  iustus.  Secundum ergo hunc modum loquendi, mani-  festum est quod simplex negativa in plus * est  quam affirmativa infinita, quae ei correspondet.  Nam, quod sit homo non iustus, vere potest dici  de * quolibet homine, qui non habet habitum iu-  stitiae; sed quod non sit homo iustus, potest dici  non solum de homine non habente habitum iu-  stitiae, sed etiam de eo qui penitus non est homo:  haec enim est vera, /ignum non est homo iustus;  tamen haec est falsa, /jignum est homo non iu-  stus. Et ita negativa simplex est in plus quam af-  firmativa infinita; sicut etiam animal est in plus  quam homo, quia de pluribus verificatur *.  Simili etiam ratione, negativa simplex est in  plus quam affirmativa privativa: quia de eo quod  non  est homo non potest dici quod sit Aomo in-  iustus. - Sed affirmativa infinita est in plus quam  affirmativa privativa: potest enim dici de puero  et  de quocumque homine nondum habente ha-  bitum virtutis aut vitii quod sit omo non iustus,  non tamen de aliquo eorum vere dici potest quod  positionem  apponuntur  notationes  illae,  quas  nos  apposuimus in  margine.  9) Herminus. Opinio recitata est Hermini, uti refert Boethius op. et  loc. cit. in superiori nota c.- Ed. Piana corrupte habet Hormelius;- Cod.  B  minus corrupte legit 7Jormenius; - D, Hermenis; — E, Ormenius; —  Cod. C recte legit Herminus.  — Cod. A erronee ponit, Ammonius: hu-  ius enim philosophi sententia exponitur n. 9.- De hac vero Hermini ex-  positione loquens, Boethius loc. cit. concludit nihilo magis ante expositio-  nem Hermini quam post expositionem obscurum esse, quod illustrandum  ex  Aristotele ipse Herminus susceperat. Qui sint illi; quorum inter-  pretatio exponitur sequenti n. 9, Ammonius non dicit.  t) Homo est non iustus. lta P. cum BE et omnibus edd. Ven.-—  A erronee: homo est iustus; - C: homo est iniustus. - Infra ed. Piana,  Venetas sequens edd., confuse admodum exprimit mentem s. Thomae,  legendo: « Et idem dicendum est de affirmativa et de negativa, quae sunt  »  »  de finito praedicato, quod non se habent ad speciem affirmationis et  negationis secundum privationem, sed simpliciter. » Inintelligibilia haec  sunt, et in aperta contradictione cum toto contextu et cum exemplo  (haec enim, homo etc.) immediate addito. Genuinum textum restituimus  ex codd. ABE et C, a quo praebetur in sua integritate lectio s. Thomae.  ει  *  Nempe in Aza-  lyticis prioribus.  Ammonius.  *  *  Cap. ult.  A omittit, vere;  sed non bene, ut  patet infra.  *  In plus, nempe,  est magis univer-  salis quam etc.  *  Codd. - p.: dici  quod de.  *  c:  verificatur  quam homo.  82  sit homo iniustus. - Affirmativa vero simplex in  minus est quam negativa infinita: quia quod non  sit  dici  homo non iustus potest dici non solum de  homine iusto, sed etiam de eo quod penitus non  est homo. - Similiter etiam negativa privativa in  plus est quam negativa infinita. Nam, quod non  sit homo iniustus, potest dici non solum de ho-  mine habente habitum iustitiae, sed de eo quod  penitus non est homo, de quorum quolibet potest  quod mon sit homo non iustus: sed ulterius  potest dici de omnibus hominibus, qui nec ha-  bent habitum iustitiae neque habent habitum in-  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  convertitur; ita etiam negativa simplex "sequitur  ad privativam affirmativam, quae est in minus,  et  iustitiae.  10.  His igitur visis, facile est exponere prae-  sentem  litteram  hoc  modo.  Quarum, scilicet  quatuor enunciationum praedictarum, duae qui-  dem, scilicet infinitae, se habebunt ad affirma-  lionem et negationem , idest ad duas simplices,  quarum una est affirmativa et altera negativa, se-  cundum  *  Cf. n. praeced.  consequentiam , idest in modo conse-  quendi ad eas, ut privationes, idest sicut duae  privativae: quia scilicet, sicut ad simplicem affir-  mativam sequitur negativa infinita, et non con-  vertitur (eo quod negativa infinita est in plus *),  ita etiam ad simplicem affirmativam sequitur ne-  gativa privativa, quae est in plus, et non con-  vertitur.  Sed sicut simplex negativa sequitur ad  infinitam affirmativam, quae est in minus, et non  x) Jta etiam negativa simplex etc.  — Codd. ACD: ita etiam ad ne-  gativam simplicem sequitur privativa affirmativa. — B habet lacunam,  omittit enim: ita etiam negativa, usque ad non convertitur inclusive. —  Pianam lectionem refert cod. E: ita etiam simplex negativa sequitur  privativam affirmationem quae est minimus (sic corrupte pro in minus).  Venetae edd. stant cum Piana et cum veritate: falsa enim est lectio  quam exhibent tres praecitati codices. Nam imprimis sententia Ammonii  est quod propositiones infinitae se habent ad simplices, sicut ad istas se  habent privativae. Unde ad affirmativam simplicem sequuntur negativa  infinita et negativa privativa; e converso autem negativa simplex sequitur  tum ad affirmativam infinitam, tum ad affirmativam privativam. Porro  haec proportio Ammonii destruitur si admittatur lectio codd. ACD. Patet  etiam falsum esse quod ad negativam simplicem sequatur privativa af-  firmativa; sed oppositum verum est. Non valet enim illatio: homo non  est  iustus  gnata  est  (negativa simplex); ergo homo est iniustus: et ratio assi-  in  superiori numero. At recte arguitur: homo est iniustus  (affirmativa privativa); ergo homo non est iustus.  ^) Non ita se habent. Ita codd.  — Piana autem: ifa se habent, sed  erronee. Exponit enim s. Thomas ex Ammonio illud, minime, introductum  a  Philosopho, nempe quod propositiones simplices non ita se habent  ad propositiones infinitas, sicut ad eas se habent propositiones privativae.  u) Simplicior et magis conveniens litterae Aristotelis est etc. Prae-  stat ob oculos iterum ponere textum Aristotelicum controversum et ad-  dere schemata diversarum eius interpretationum, quas s. Thomas expo-  suit. Textus est: « Quare quatuor erunt illae (duae nempe propositiones  »  »  »  »  simplices, seu finitae, quia finiti praedicati, duae vero infinitae, seu  infiniti praedicati. — Cf. seg. n. 13), quarum duae quidem ad affir-  mationem et negationem sese habent secundum consequentiam, ut  privationes; duae vero minime. »  Interpretatio Hermini.  Pans PnIMA, — Duae quidem infiniti praedicati, inquit, se habent ad af-  firmationem et negationem finitarum propositionum, sicut ad  eas se habent propositiones privativae: quatenus scilicet a) ex  finita affirmativa sequitur negativa infiniti praedicati, sicut se-  quitur negativa privativa; et similiter B) negativa finita sequitur  tum ex affirmativa infinita, tum ex affirmativa privativa. Hinc  SCHEMA I.  a  1  2  , Fin. affirm.  Negativ. infin.  ) Fin. affirm.  Negativ. privat.  Homo est iustus;  ergo  Homo non est non iustus.  Homo est iustus;  ergo  Homo non est iniustus.  non convertitur. Ex quo patet quod eadem est  habitudo in consequendo infinitarum ad simplices  quae est etiam privativarum.  11.  Sequitur, duae aulem, scilicet simplices,  quae relinquuntur, remotis duabus, scilicet infi-  nitis, a quatuor praemissis, minime, idest non  ita se habent ? ad infinitas in consequendo, sicut  privativae se habent ad eas; quia videlicet, ex  una parte simplex affirmativa est in minus quam  negativa infinita, sed negativa privativa est in plus  quam negativa infinita: ex alia vero parte, ne-  gativa simplex est in plus quam affirmativa infi-  nita, sed affirmativa privativa est in minus quam  infinita affirmativa. Sic ergo patet quod simplices  non ita se habent ad infinitas in. consequendo,  sicut privativae se habent ad infinitas.  12.  Quamvis autem secundum hoc littera Phi-  losophi subtiliter exponatur, tamen videtur esse  aliquantulum expositio extorta. Nam littera Phi-  losophi videtur sonare diversas habitudines non  esse  attendendas respectu diversorum; sicut in  praedicta expositione primo accipitur similitudo  habitudinis ad simplices, et postea dissimilitudo *  habitudinis respectu infinitarum. Et ideo simpli-  cior et magis conveniens litterae Aristotelis ^ est  expositio Porphyrii quam Boethius ponit; secun-  τοῦ  1  2  ^, Affirm. infin.  Negativ. fin.  ) Affirm. priv.  Negativ. fin.  Homo est non iustus ;  ergo  Homo: non est iustus,  Homo est iniustus ;  ergo  Homo non est iustus.  Pans ALTERA. - Duae vero minime, nempe negativa infiniti subiecti non  sequitur ad affirmativam finitam, nec negativa finita sequitur  ad aífirmativam infiniti subiecti.  SCHEMA Il.  |o,  2  Affirmat. fin.  Negativ. infin. subiecti  ) Affirmat. infin. subiecti  Negat. fin.  Homo est iustus;  non sequitur: ergo  Non homo. non est iustus.  Non homo est iustus;  "on sequitur: ergo  Homo non est iustus.  Merito reiicitur haec interpretatio, quia transit ab infinitate  praedicati ad infinitatem subiecti.  Interpretatio aliorum  ex Ammonio.  Pans PRIMA.  — Duae propositiones infiniti praedicati se habent ad pro-  positiones finitas, quoad speciem affirmationis et negationis,  Sicut ad istas se habent propositiones privativae; quatenus  nempe propositio infinita affirmativa, non secus ac affirma-  tiva privativa, est affirmatio non simpliciter sed secundum  quid; et similiter infinità negativa et negativa privativa sunt  negationes secundum quid, et non simpliciter.  Pans ALTERA. -- Duae vero minime, nempe propositio finita affirmativa  est simpliciter affirmatio; et negativa finita est simpliciter  negatio.  SCHEMA  1  ;, Homo est iustus  :  ( affirmativa simpliciter  Homo est iustus ^ ἢ Gfmativae secundum quid  2  ) Homo non est iustus -  —  ( negativa simpliciter  Homo non est iniustus ἑ "eBativae secundum quid  *  ABCE.- P.: $inti-  litudo.- n: simi-  litudinis.  v  Porphyrius.  Boethius.  CAP. X, LECT. Il  dum quam: expositionem attenditur similitudo et  * ABcomiíttunt se-.  cundum   conse-  83  affirmationem et negationem; ut scilicet ad unam  affirmativam sequatur alterius negativa. Nam ad  quentiam.  dissimilitudo secundum consequentiam * affirmati-  varum ad negativas. Unde dicit: Quarum, scilicet  quatuor praemissarum, duae quidem, scilicet af-  firmativae, quarum una est simplex et alia infi-  nità, se habebunt secundum consequentiam ad  Haec interpretatio non est ad propositum, quia Aristoteles non lo-  quitur hic de propositionibus affirmativis aut negativis simpliciter vel  secundum quid, sed de ordine (xarà τὸ στοιχοῦν) propositionum ad  invicem secundum consequentiam.  Interpretatio Ammonii.  Pans ῬΕΙΜΑ. - Duae propositiones infiniti praedicati se habent ad pro-  positiones finitas, sicut ad istas se habent propositiones pri-  vativae, ita scilicet ut a) ad affirmativam finitam consequa-  tur tum propositio negativa infiniti praedicati, tum negativa  privativa; et viceversa D) negativa finita sequatur tum ex  affirmativa infiniti praedicati tum ex affirmativa privativa.  SCHEMA I.  ÉCubacuetr T  I  2  Ι  2  a  Homo est iustus;  ergo  Homo non est non iustus.  Homo est iustus;  ergo  Homo non est iniustus.  β  Homo est non iustus ;  ergo  Homo non est iustus.  Homo est iniustus ;  ergo  Homo non est iustus.  Pans aL.TERA.-Duae vero minime, nempe a) ad infinitam affirmativam  sequitur negativa finita, sed non sequitur affirmativa priva-  tiva; item 8) negativa infinita sequitur ex affirmativa finita,  sed non sequitur ex negativa privativa. Idest duae finitae  non se habent ad infinitas secundum consequentiam, sicut  ad infinitas se habent privativae.  SCHEMA II.  α  I  2  Homo est non iustus;  sequitur: ergo  Homo non est iustus;  sed ex  Homo est non iustus;  non sequitur: ergo  Homo est iniustus.  ad  affirmativam simplicem sequitur negativa infinita;  et  affirmativam infinitam sequitur negativa  simplex. Duae vero, scilicet negativae, minime,  idest non ita se habent ad affirmativas, ut scilicet  8  I  2  Homo est non iustus ;  ergo  Homo non est iustus.  Homo est iniustus ;  ergo  Homo non est iustus.  Pans ALTERA.- Duae vero minime, scilicet negativae non ita se habent -  ad affirmativas, ut scilicet ex illis sequantur affirmativae ,  sicut ex affirmativis sequuntur negativae.- Et similiter est  de finitis et de privativis.  SCHEMA II.  a  1  2  2  ; Homo non est iustus (sive, Non est homo iustus);  non sequitur: ergo  Homo est non iustus (sive, Est homo non iustus).  Homo non est iustus ;  non sequitur: ergo  Homo est iniustus.  8  Homo non est non iustus (sive, Non est homo non iustus);  non sequitur: ergo  Homo est iustus  Homo non est iniustus;  non sequitur  : ergo  Homo est iustus.  (sive, Est homo iustus).  "Theodorus Waitz, praemissis quae in superiori nota e transcripsi-  mus, ita immediate prosequitur: « Res sic se habet χαταὶ τοὶ στοι-  οὖν, secundum seriem, quam illae enunciationes faciunt, hoc est, xac"  ἀκολουθίαν, secundum ordinem, quo 'altera alteri consequitur eaque con-  tinetur. lam in Analyticis (Prioribus, cap. ultim.) hoc tradit. Sit A τὸ εἶναι  ἴσον, Β τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἴσον, Γ' τὸ εἶναι μὴ ἴσον, Δ τὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ἴσον. In his  igitur B consequens est τοῦ D', et A consequens τοῦ A. Deinde docet,  si Ὑ sit τὸ εἶναι ἄνισον et ὃ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄνισον, item esse B. conse-  quens τοῦ y, et ὃ consequens τοῦ A: est igitur quod nostro loco dicit  τὰ μὲν δύο (D et A) πρὸς τὴν κατάφασιν (A) καὶ ἀπόφασιν (B) ἕξει  κατὰ τὸ στοιχοῦν (namque B consequens est τοῦ Γ΄, εἴ A consequens  τοῦ Α) ὡς αἱ στερήσεις (y et ὃ: nam etiam B consequens est τοῦ  et  ὃ consequens τοῦ A). Ut signis mathematicis utar, est proportio N  γ,  Bey: B et Δ: A—9: A. Nam ut I est antecedens τοῦ B, sic etiam y  (ἢ στέρησις) est antecedens τοῦ B, et ut Δ est consequens τοῦ A, sic  etiam à (ἣ στέρησις) est consequens toU A. Addit τὰ δὲ δύο oU: nam  A et Β non eamdem rationem habent ad Δ et I', quam habent ὃ et y  ad Δ et I', quod ut demonstremus non opus est.» Expositionem ergo  Ammonii sequitur Waitz, cuius eadem verba in conclusione sunt, ac ea  Homo est iustus ;  sequitur: ergo  Homo non est non iustus;  sed ex  2  Homo non est iniustus ;  non sequitur  Homo non est non iustus.  Interpretatio Porphyrii, Boethii et s. Thomae.  Pans ΡῬΕΙΜΑ. - Duae quidem scilicet affirmativae (finita et infinita) se  habent secundum consequentiam ad affirmationem et nega-  tionem, ut scilicet a) ad affirmativam simplicem sequatur  negativa infinita, et 8) ad affirmativam infinitam sequatur  negativa simplex seu finita. - Et similiter est de privativis  ad finitas propositiones quoad ordinem consequendi.  SCHEMA I.  a  I  2  Homo est iustus ;  ergo  Homo non est non iustus.  Homo est iustus ;  ergo  Homo non est iniustus.  quae habet s. Thomas in fine n. 11; sed magis placet expositio Por-  phyrii quia simplicior et magis conveniens litterae Aristotelis.  Etenim Ammonius legit Aristotelem hoc modo: « Quare quatuor  erunt illae, quarum duae quidem ad affirmationem et negationem sese  habent secundum consequentiam, ut privationes; duae vero minime »  nempe, duae vero non sese habent secundum consequentiam ut priva-  tiones.  (Cf. op. cit. De interpret. sect. III, 8. 1, fol. 25, col. 2). - S. Thomas  cum Porphyrio et Boethio legit: « Quare quatuor erunt illae, quarum duae  quidem ad affirmationem et negationem sese habent secundum consequen-  tiam  ut privationes; duae vero minime » nempe, duae vero mon sese  habent secundum consequentiam ad affirmationem et negationem. — Ari-  stoteles autem sese remittit ad librum Priorum analyticorum. Porro lib.T,  cap. ult, Aristoteles probat quod a) ex affirmatione praedicati finiti sequi-  tur negatio praedicati infiniti; sed B) ex negatione praedicati infiniti non  valet consequentia ad affirmationem praedicati finiti. Insuper probat quod a)  ex affirmatione praedicati infiniti sequitur negatio praedicati finiti; sed £)  non sequitur affirmatio infiniti praedicati ex negatione praedicati finiti. Ad-  dit: Similiter autem se habent et privationes ad categorias hac dispositione:  Ομοίως δ᾽ ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ στερήσεις πρὸς τὰς κατηγορίας ταύτῃ τῇ θέσει  (loc. cit. n. 7). Supra ostendit quod negativae propositiones consequuntur  ex affirmativis, sed quod affirmativae non consequuntur ex negativis. Di-  cendo igitur Aristoteles: Similiter, ' Ouotoc, se habent privationes ad  categorias, πρὸς τὰς κατηγορίας, vult inter simplices et privativas propo-  sitiones in ordine ad consequentiam vel non consequentiam, eamdem  legem vigere, quae data est quoad finitas et infinitas, ut scilicet ex affir-  mativis sequantur negativae, sed ex negativis non sequantur affirmativae.  Dilucide ac solide hac de re in I Priorum, cap. ultim., et in II Peri herm.,  cap. 1, agit Sylvester Maurus, qui interpretationi s. Thomae adhaeret.  84  ex  '"Bg:  utrumque  sensum se etc.  ΤῊΝ,  ΡῈ  negativis sequantur affirmativae, sicut ex af-  firmativis sequebantur negativae. - Et quantum ad  utrumque similiter se * habent privativae sicut in-  finitae.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  Et quia in neutra harum negatio apponitur δά  verbum, consequens est quod utraque sit affirma-  tiva. Omni autem affirmationi opponitur negatio,  ut  supra  in Primo ostensum est *. Relinquitur  ergo quod praedictis duabus enunciationibus affir-  mativis respondent duae aliae negativae *. Et sic  consequens est quod sint quatuor simplices enun-  13. Deinde cum dicit: Dico autem quoniam etc.,  manifestat quoddam quod supra dixerat, scilicet  quod sint quatuor praedictae enunciationes: lo-  quimur enim nunc * de enunciationibus, in quibus  hoc verbum esf solum praedicatur " secundum  quod est adiacens alicui nomini finito vel infi-  nito: puta secundum quod adiacet zuso; ut cum  dicitur, homo est iustus, vel secundum quod adia-  cet non iusto; ut cum dicitur, homo est non iustus.  v) Solum praedicatur etc. lta P. cum cod. B. — Codd. alii: »on  solum praedicatur, sed (A, adiacet; BCD, secundum adiacens; E, sed est  adiacens) alicui nomini etc. Venetae edd. bc et alia 1526 legunt cum  Piana,  sed ed. a habet lectionem codd.: nom solum praedicatur sed  adiacens alicui nomini etc. - Verbum in propositionibus semper se tenet  ex  parte praedicati (lib. I, lect. v, n..4); sed supra n. 2 dictum est  quod verbum est potest dupliciter praedicari: vel enim verbum (651)  in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se, ita ut sit principale praedi-  catum;  vel  contra, verbum (est) non est principale praedicatum sed  huic iungitur ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, et ideo simul cum no-  mine praedicato facit unum praáedicatum. In primo casu propositio di-  citur  de  secundo adiacente; in altero autem est propositio de fertio  adiacente. Atqui in hoc numero 13 est sermo de solis propositionibus  de tertio adiacente; ergo verbum Est solum praedicatur secundum quod  est  adiacens alicui nomini finito vel infinito: quae est lectio Piana.  Nihilominus, quamvis verbum esf praedicetur secundum quod est adia-  cens, praedicatur tamen, quia verbum se tenet ex parte praedicati, ergo  in propositionibus de tertio adiacente verbum Est non solum praedicatur,  sed adiacet, seu est adiacens alicui nomini finito vel infinito: quae est  lectio indicata a codicibus et ab ed. a. Quapropter utraque lectio bona .  est, quamvis melior videatur lectió cod. A, vel cod. E; attamen cum  codd.  praecitati haud concorditer legant, retineo Pianam quoadusque  ali codd. quaestionem solvant.  0) Ex sequenti subscriptione. Cod. A: per subscriptam figuram; ac  omittit postea omnia quae sequuntur usque ad finem, et contra prose-  quitur hoc modo: func sequitur illa pars, Quoniam etc. — Porro  hoc  fragmentum non esse opus s. Thomae lector thomista ex se  cognoscet, quin multis indigeamus verbis ad id suadendum. Sed nec  est immediata prosequutio Commentarii textus Aristotelis: nam verba  textus immediata illis quae ultimo commentatus est s. Thomas sunt: .Si-  militer autem se habent etc., ut videre est in sequenti prima lectione  Caietani; at verba, Quoniam vero contraria ,etc., illa sunt, quibus ipse  Caietanus suam quartam exorditur lectionem. En igitur specimen huius  fragmenti « Tunc sequitur illa pars, Quoniam vero contraria, in quo  »  »  »  »  »  verificat quoddam circa universales (propositiones) de subiecto finito.  Et dividitur in duas: primo, in prima verificat quoddam quantum ad  oppositionem; in secunda cum dicit, Sequitur vero etc., verificat aliud  quoddam. quantum ad contraria. Quia dictum est superius quod non  similiter sunt angulares verae in universalibus et indefinitis, ad huius  verificationem docet quae possunt simul esse verae et quae non. Dicit  enim quod contrariae non possunt simul esse verae; et ideo dictum  est superius angulares non contingere simul esse veras, scilicet con-  trarias; subcontrariae possunt esse verae aliquando: et dicit aliquando,  quia in naturali materia non possunt simul esse verae. Vel potest  haec pars continuari ad id quod immediate antecedit: quia supra ali-  quantulum fecit mentionem de universalibus et indefinitis, dicens quod  non  differunt nisi in signo; sed ut ne crederetur quod non differant  in veritate, hoc removet dicens quod contrariae non possunt simul  esse verae, sed subcontrariae bene possunt simul esse verae et con-  trariae.  vv  y»vvyvo  vw  vov  v  »  »  — Quia non dixerat superius de consequentia sive convenien-  tia istarum enunciationum, nunc vero docet eam dicens » etc.  Cod. B fol. 270 vers., col. 2: « Deinde cum dicimus: Zntelligimus  vero quod dicitur etc., manifestat quiddam, quod supra dictum est per  quamdam figuralem descriptionem. Dicit. » — Postea vero diverso atra-  mento, et, ut videtur, diversa manu ita prosequitur: « Zntelligimus vero  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  quod dicit, manifestat quod supra dictum est in quadam fieurali descri-  ptione dicens quod illud, quod supra dictum est, possumus intelligere ex:  his quae supra scripta sunt in fieura. Et proponit primo affirmativam  simplicem quae est: Est iustus homo: cuius negatio est: Non est iustus  homo: quae ponenda est in eadem linea cum prima. Deinde proponit  affirmativam infinitam quae tollenda est sub praemissa nevcativa 'sim-  plici, hanc scilicet: Est non iustus homo; cuius neeationem subiungit,  quae est: Non est nom iustus homo; quae in eadem linea ponetur  sub affirmativa simplici. Et erit figura talis:  »  »  Est iustus homo  Non est non iustus homo  Non est iustus homo  Est non iustus homo.  [n hac figura manifestum est quod sunt quatuor enunciationes: in  »  quarum duabus affirmativis hoc verbum .Est affirmativum adiacet  ciationes.  14. Deinde cum dicit: Zntelligimus vero etc.,  manifestat quod supra dictum est per quandam  figuralem descriptionem. Dicit enim quod id, quod  in supradictis dictum est, intelligi potest ex se-  quenti subscriptione *. Sit enim quaedam qua-  iusto et non iusto; in aliis autem negativis hoc ipsum Est negativum  adiacet eisdem; et sunt dispositae in figura, sicut dictum est in Re-  solutoriis, scilicet in fine primi Priorum. Secundo Aristoteles disponit  hanc figuram et ostendit quod ad unam affirmationem sequitur alte-  rius negatio et non convertitur. Considerandum est autem quod in  consequentiis harum enunciationum ad invicem, quarum quasdam as-  serit Aristoteles, quasdam autem negat, non est intelligendum quod  in enunciationibus illis, homo sit subiectum, iustum autem et non iu-  stum praedicatum (sic enim non solum ad unam affirmationem se-  queretur alterius negatio, sed e contrario, sicut in figura (vel, infra)  patebit: quod tamen negat hic Aristoteles); sed quod tota enunciatio  (e. g. est homo iustus) locum praedicati habebit respectu alicuius  subiecti. Quod accipi potest, sicut exposuit hunc locum Ammonius et  similiter  Boethius: quia sicut dictum est, enunciatio aliqua virtute se  habet ad id de quo totum quod in ipsa figura vere enunciari potest  ( Cf. supra n. 9); et istam sententiam manifeste ponit Aristoteles in  fine primi Priorum. In hoc autem loco dicit se habere eamdem sen-  tentiam  viv  vuv  wvyvwvvnvy  www  quam ibi. Deinde cum dicit: Similiter autem se habent,  agit de enunciationibus.,. Quoniam vero contraria est. Postquam Phi-  losophus distinxit enunciationes et oppositiones earum et consequen-  tias; in ista parte manifestat quaedam, quae possunt esse dubia circa  ea quae dicta sunt; et dividitur in tres partes. In prima primo manife-  uvtvwvnvnovuevetvntviueu  stat quoddam prius dictum de veritate quarumdam enunciationum » etc.  Haec additio alia est ab ea, quam cod.. E habet ex Roberto de Vul-  garbia, ut statim dicam.  Cod. C. explicit hoc modo: « Deinde cum dicit: Zntelligimus vero etc.,  «  »  manifestat per quamdam figuralem descriptionem. Dicit enim quod id  quod supra dictum est, intelligi potest. » - Hic sistit et nulla alia verba  addit.  Cod. D integram praebet lectionem Pianam, quae est etiam Ven.  edd., sed corrupte concludit:... « Aristoteles nomina exemplis nomina-  »  »  tur, ut ostenderetur in quibuscunque nominibus ponantur exempla si-  militer se habent» etc.  — Quibus ultimis verbis, similiter se habent,  prosequitur immediate textus Aristotelis, ut dictum est in principio huius  annotationis.  Cod. E desinit ut Piana, atque immediate addit: Jucusque scri-  psit sanctus Thomas de Aquino Ordinis predicatorum. Ea vero quae  secuntur scripsit fr. Robertus de Vulgarbia Ordinis eorumdem Pre-  dicatorum. Porro quae ex codice A transcripsimus leguntur in cod, E  fol. 233 vers. col. 2 ante medium; et ideo pertinent ad supplementum  Roberti de Vulgarbia, quod a verbis, Similiter autem se habent etc.  incipit et ad finem secundi libri deducitur in eodem cod. E.— Addo etiam  ex  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  »  hoc cod. specimen principii huius supplementi: « Similiter autem  se habet etc. In hac parte multiplicat oppositionem in universalibus;  et  primo dicit in quo conveniunt universales cum infinitis, quia in  multitudine oppositionum. In secundo, Sed tantum non universaliter,  docet in quo differunt ab infinitis, quia in compossibilitate angulorum  et  ordinatarum in figura... Deinde igitur haec recapitulat concludens  duas esse oppositiones, quarum una est in universalibus et alia in  infinitis, vel quarum una est de praedicato finito; alia de praedicato  infinito. Sequitur illa pars: Aliae vero; in qua multiplicat oppositio-  nem et in his, in quibus sumitur subiectum finitum et praedicatum  infinitum. Dicit ergo quod aliae enunciationes » etc.  Robertus de Vulgarbia desideratur in diligentissimo Echardo. Attenta  antiquitate huius supplementi (uti constat ex cod. A) posset quispiam  rationabiliter dubitare num Robertus de Vulgarbia idem sit ac Robertus  Kilwardbius, cuius agnomen incredibile est quantum fuerit a scriptori-  bus corruptum. Alii enim Bilibri, alii Canvilvertim, alii Ridverbium vo-  cant, alii insuper Kiliurlh, Kulverbi, Kilibardby, De Valleverbi etc. eum  nuncupant, ut videre est apud laudatum Echardum (Scriptores Ord.  Praed.ad ann. 1279.tom. I. pag. 374 seqq.). Inter alia plurima Kilwardbius  scripsit Annotationes in librum Aristotelis De interpretatione; sed utrum  ex hisce annotationibus excerptum fuerit supplementum quod habetur in  cod. E, et partim in cod. A, et consequenter utrum Kilwardtius sit idem  ac  in  De Vulgarbia, est i pgs definienda ab eruditis. Opus Kilwardbii  librum περὶ ἑρμηνείας recensetur in catalogo mss. Angliae (Lon-  dini,  1699); sed a nostris Religiosis frustra hucusque praefatum opus  in Angliae bibliothecis quaesitum est.  Ι  In Praefatione mentionem etiam fecimus alterius supplementi quod  in duabus Venetis edd. ab habetur, atque monuimus ab ed. a vocari  *  Lect. ix, n. 6.  *Aomittit zega-  tivae.  .  CAP. X, LECT. il  drata figura, in cuius uno angulo describatur  haec enunciatio, homo est iustus, et ex opposito  describatur eius negatio quae est, homo non est  15.  85  Ultimo autem concludit quod praedictae  enunciationes disponuntur secundum ordinem con-  iustus; sub quibus scribantur duae aliae infinitae,  scilicet  homo est non iustus; homo non est non  iustus.  Homo est  iustus  dup  sa4Avgjn  2vj1sod  wuo21auins  Homo non est  non iustus  Homo non  angulares contrapositae  est iustus  Sup  sov  avj1sod  wue21auiqns  Homo est  angulares contrapositae  non iustus  In qua descriptione apparet quod hoc verbum  est, affirmativum vel negativum, adiacet iusto et  non  iusto. Et secundum hoc diversificantur qua-  —tuor enunciationes.  supplementum Gratiadei, sed ab ed. b dici illud supplementum ex Com-  mentariis eiusdem Gratiadei in libros Aristotelis fuisse excerptum. No-  ster Echardus (Scriptores Ordin. Praedic. ad ann. 1341, tom. 1, pag.603)  habet n. 6: « Simlerus in Bibl. Gesneri aucta addit scripsisse (/Gratia-  »  deum), Supplementum commentariorum s. Thomae Aquinatis in li-  »  »  »  »  »  »  brum 2 Perihermenias Aristotelis. Item in Sectam Hebraicam, et  nominatum etiam loannem Baptistam Gratiadei. Penes quem fides,  nam horum nulla mihi aliunde memoria: Possevinus enim qui horum  meminit, videtur Simlerum solum excepisse. Erit nostrorum italorum  diligentiae  haec ex veteribus monumentis comprobare, et in rem lit-  terariam aperire. » Scriptoris eruditissimi et prudentissimi satis pos-  sum  facere votis. Prae oculis habeo codicem bibliothecae Palatinae  Vindebonensis (n. 2350), in quo fol. 1 recto, in principio col. 1 legitur:  Incipit Scriptum super totam artem veterem, editum a fratre Gra-  tiadeo Esculano Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum. Et fol. 58 recto,  col. 2: Explicit Scriptum super totam artem veterem editum a ma-  gistro Gratiadeo Esculano Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum. Huius  Scripti Gratiadei duas Venetas editiones 1481, 1493, recenset praelau-  datus Echardus loc. cit. Porro in nostro codice fol. 42 recto, col.2:  Incipit scriptum super librum peryermenias editum a fratre Gratiadeo  Esculano. Primus liber.— Fol.51, col. 3: Explicit scriptum ( super ) pri-  mum librum peryermenias secundum fratrem Gratiadeum Esculanum.  Incipit scriptum super secundum librum, secundum eumdem dictum.  In hoc'secundo libro, ante medietatem secundae lectionis, legitur: « De-  »  »  inde cum dicit: Similiter autem se habent, distinguit enunciationes,  quae accipiunt pro subiecto nomen finitum » etc. (fol. 51 verso,  col. 2). -- Et in fine lectionis octavae (in ed. Ven. b lect. vii) et ultimae:  «  »  »  Sed non similiter contingit utramque esse veram. Idcirco ratione ta-  lium contrariatur falsum falso; sed numquam contrariatur verum vero. —  Explicit scriptum » etc. (fol. 58, recto, col. 2). Et ita praecitatae Venet.  edd. ab.  — Non est ergo hoc supplementum novum opus Gratiadei, ut  Simlerus affirmat, sed est excerptum ex .Scripto eiusdem Gratiadei in  totam artem veterem.  x) Alia littera habet. « Quandoquidem autem scriptum in pluribus  »  »  »  esse aiunt exemplaribus, ipsum esf vel homini vel non homini adhae-  surum, sciendum est, quando ita legatur verbum /t0mo, id quod Por-  phyrius philosophus tradit, non tamquam subiectum sed velut prae-  sequentiae, prout dictum est in Resolutoriis, idest  in I Priorum *.  Alia littera habet τ: Dico autem, quoniam EST  non  aut homini aut non homini adiacebit, et in figura,  EST, hoc loco homini et non homini adiacebit *.  Quod quidem non est intelligendum, ut Aomo,  et  homo accipiatur * ex parte subiecti, non  enim nunc agitur de enunciationibus quae sunt  de  infinito  subiecto.  Unde oportet quod omo  et non homo accipiantur ex parte praedicati. Sed  quia Philosophus exemplificat* de enunciationibus  in quibus ex parte praedicati ponitur zustum et non  iustum, visum est Alexandro, quod praedicta lit-  tera sit corrupta. Quibusdam aliis videtur quod  possit sustineri et quod signanter Aristoteles no-  mina in exemplis variaverit, ut ostenderet quod  non differt in quibuscunque  * nominibus ponantur  exempla *.  »  »  dicatum nos pro iusto vel albo acceptum esse dicturos; ut in pro-  positione, Callias homo: est, pronunciante.» Haec Ammonius, in lib,  Peri herm. sect. III, 8. t, fol. 25, col. 4. - Quamvis autem omnes codices  habeant δικαίῳ pro ἀνθρώπῳ et οὐ δικαίῳ pro οὐχ ἀνθρώπῳ, nihilomi-  nus Theodorus Waitz in Opere pluries a nobis citato, Aristotelis Orga-  non graece, suae Editioni inseruit lectionem ἀνθρώπῳ et οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ,  quam antiquiorem putat tum quia in multis libris eam extare Ammonius  tradit, tum quia, inquit, Boethius et ipse eamdem habuit, et Herminum,  Porphyrium et Alexandrum habuisse auctor est, tum denique propter  ipsam difficultatem, quam haec eadem lectio (ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐχ ἀνθρώπῳ)  prae se fert, quaeque movit Alexandrum ut reiiceret ἀνθρώπῳ et corri-  geret per διχαίῳ. Sed et idem auctor contendit non esse subscribendum  Ammonio et Boethio, qui tenent nihil interesse num legatur διχαίῳ an  ἀνθρώπῳ (Op. cit., p. I, pag. 345): et ratio quam assignat illa est, quam  in praecedenti nota retulimus ex cod. B: Considerandum est autem etc.  Piana editio Venetam 1526 sequuta infra legit: et in figura, est,  hic loco homini et non homini adiacebit iusto et non iusto. Quae lectio  est inintelligibilis, ut minus dicam. Litterae enim diversitas, de qua est  sermo, in eo consistit quod lectioni, Aoc loco iusto et non iusto, sufficitur,  hoc loco homini et non homini. Venetae edd. seculi XV nec non cod. D  lectionem a nobis adoptatam habent.  9) Ponantur exempla. Quaeri hoc loco potest de vero fine huius  lectionis et commentarii s. Thomae in librum Peri hermeneias. Codices  enim melioris notae, nempe ABC, non ultra principium n. 14 hanc se-  cundam lectionem extendunt. Ex opposito stant omnes editiones Vene-  tae  et codd. DE, qui licet sint inferiores codd. ABC, nihilominus quia  illorum amanuenses imperitos se produnt, non certe ex proprio ingenio  sed ex aliis codicibus excripserunt quae in praefatis numeris 14 et 15  continentur. Addendum quod codd. ipsi ABC non sunt inter se con-  cordes: nonnulla enim, quamvis minima, habet C. quae omittuntur a B;  nec cum illis concordat cod. A: imo BC indicant aliqua desiderari. Prae-  terea distinguens in primo numero partes huius lectionis, s. Thomas  adnumerat etiam Zntelligimus vero etc. Difficile autem persuadetur quod  ipse pauca illa verba quae nn. 14 et 15 habentur non addiderit, quibus  textus Aristotelis integer exponitur. Caeterum videant eruditi, si forte ad  manus habuerint alios melioris notae codices, quid hac de re sit defi-  nitive sentiendum.  *  *  Cap. ult.  π  p:  et in figura  hoc loco est ho-  mini... adiacet.  *  *  p.-P.: accipitur.  p.- P.: explicat.  Alexander.  *  p.- P.: quibus-  dam.  e  »  88 τα HOPES tyi - 2 id oe  ME ME 2 FT 5 : à ra - T  2gtot iba ἢ bong th Ord yb δ δ. 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JREA 2 E gne Me ce bale: Dl ?  US X an WICH τῇ giis i Ls. e erotioh sess Ais fiol i f b  "ant ig MUN til S p. 30 597g Zn ts δ aneios Je ii E ow! V euis Mer Anis à de  δὰ H^ 1 ἡ βου) 5.3 yw utin HS ARTS da omi ; DE METUIT HEN  Ed: m wrern ben Y totleit ui store Todos I ocu e , ΟΕ restat θα Jac «3 Aes ten ard ἀρὴν feu iter ὁ" etia rU ur went cod) dat m" τῇ 8^ anle dh ἘΠῚ : ἊΣ Ἐπ τ : ΦΙΠΠΉΜΟΊ ny reet siegt fé As Hntiludetha (piter am of fcn ποι ηαχὰν iw « i M ἥν 3 1 £1 rds y Line a ccs δ᾽ im P - e eA pe y afe  EA. LE umen e xg f my m puc  ze *  a id " 23 PET  ; me 3  * D ra 5 "  D “μα ἂ 3 "  XY s ,  Js d . - * 2 νοι  v ?  . ^  bI Bs "y ^ p  UNE FIN ᾽ν d api odii  n " ΡῈ vd : ᾿ T hut  É : eim! A tss : i ARCA PORA W — ] : yp e^ VM xa Me 5 τ ipa τῶ, eiie : NL REL Toti Pali uf ἢ  Y *  THOMAE DE VIO CAIETANI  ORDINIS PRAEDICATORUM  S. R.  IN  E. CARDINALIS  COMMENTARIA  RELIQUUM LIBRI SECUNDI PERI HERMENEIAS  AD LECTOREM  Humano: capiti cervicem. nitor. equinam  Addere: da veniam, si nova monstra iuvant.  —H—  LECTIO TERTIA  (Cano. CarrTANt lect. 1).  ^  DE NUMERO ET HABITUDINE ENUNCIATIONUM IN QUIBUS PRAEDICATUR VERBUM EST  ET SUBIICITUR NOMEN FINITUM UNIVERSALITER SUMPTUM, VEL NOMEN INFINITUM, ET IN QUIBUS  PRAEDICATUR VERBUM: ADIECTIVUM  Ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει κἂν καθόλου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἦ ἡ κατά-  φάσις" olov, πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος: ἀπόφασις  τούτου, οὐ πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος: πᾶς ἔστιν  ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίκαιος, οὐ πᾶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος οὐ δί-  χαιὸς.  Πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως τὰς κατοὸ διάμετρον ἐνδέχεται συνα-  ληθεύειν: ἐνδέχεται δὲ ποτέ.  Αὗται μὲν οὖν δύο ἀντίκεινται,  ἴλλλαι δὲ δύο πρὸς τὸ οὐχ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ὑποκείμενόν  τι  προστεθέν- ἔστι δίκαιος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ἔστι  δίχαιος οὐχ ἄνθρωπος" ἔστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐχ ἄνθρω-  πος, οὐχ ἐστιν οὐ δίκαιος οὐχ ἄνθρωπος. '  Πλείους δὲ τούτων οὐχ ἔσονται ἀντιθέσεις.  Αὗται δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνων αὐταὶ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς ἔσονται, ὡς  ὀνόματι τῷ οὐχ ἄνθρωπος χρώμεναι.  "Eg ὅσων δὲ τὸ ἔστι pod ἁρμόττει, olov ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνει  καὶ βαδίζει, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ οὕτω. τιθέ-  μενον, ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ ἔστι προσήπτετο; olov, ὑγιαίνει  à  πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; οὐχ ὑγιαίνει πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὑγιαίγει  πᾶς οὐχ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὑγιαίνει πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος.  Οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λεχτέον' ἀλλὰ τὸ οὔ,  τὴν ἀπόφασιν, τῷ ἄνθρωπος προσθετέον" τὸ γὰρ πᾶς  οὐ τὸ καθόλου σημαίνει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καθόλου.  ᾿  Δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦδε, ὑγιαίνει ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὑγιαίνει ἄν-  θρωπος" ὑγιαίνει οὐχ ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὑγιαίνει οὐχ ἄν-  θρωπος. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐχείνων διαφέρει τῷ μὴ καθόλου  εἶναι. Ὥστε τὸ πᾶς, ἢ οὐδείς, οὐδὲν ἄλλο προσση-  μαίνει; ἢ ὅτι χαθόλου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἢ κατάφασιν 7)  ἀπόφασιν.  :  Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τὰ αὐτὰ δεῖ προστιθέναι"  * Similiter autem se habent, et si universalis nominis sit af-  firmatio; ut est, omnis homo iustus est; negatio huius,  non omnis est homo iustus, omnis est homo non iustus,  non omnis est homo non iustus.  Sed non similiter angulares contingit veras esse; contingit  autem aliquando.  Hae igitur duae oppositae sunt.  Aliae  autem duae ad id quod est, non homo, quasi ad  subiectum aliquod additum; ut, est iustus non homo,  non est iustus non homo; est non iustus non homo,  non  est non iustus non homo.  Plures autem his non erunt oppositae.  Hae autem extra illas, ipsae secundum se erunt, ut nomine  utentes eo, quod est non homo.  In his vero, in quibus, est, non convenit ut in eo. quod  est valere vel ambulare, idem faciunt sic positum, ac  si, est, adderetur, ut, sanus est omnis homo, non sanus  est  nus  omnis homo; sanus est omnis non homo, non sa-  est  omnis non homo.  Non enim dicendum est, non omnis homo; sed, non, ne-  gationem ad id quod est homo addendum est; omnis  enim non universalem significat, sed quoniam univer-  saliter.  Manifestum est autem ex eo quod est, valet homo, non  valet homo; valet non homo, non valet non homo.  Haec enim ab illis differunt, eo quod universaliter non  sunt. Quare omnis vel nullus nihil significant aliud, nisi  quoniam universaliter de nomine, vel affirmant vel  negant.  Ergo et caetera eadem oportet apponi.  *  Seq. cap. x.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  ostquam Philosophus α distinxit enun-  ciationes in quibus subiicitur nomen   in-  finitum non universaliter sumptum, hic  S  *  Ed. c: indefi-  nitas.  *  *  Num. 4.  Num. 8.  intendit  distinguere enunciationes , in  )quibus subiicitur nomen finitum univer-  Csaliter sumptum. Et circa hoc tria facit:  primo, ponit similitudinem istarum enun-  ciationum ad infinitas * supra positas; secundo, ostendit  dissimilitudinem earumdem; ibi: Sed non similiter * etc. ;  tertio, concludit numerum oppositionum inter dictas enun-  ciationes; ibi: Hae duae igitur  2.  *  Lib. II, lect. ui,  n. 5.  Ammonius.  Porphyrius.  *  Lect. xi, n. 5,  seq.  *  Ed. c: quam su-  ra  posuimus.  orphyrius.  et  * etc. Dicit ergo primo quod:  similes sunt enunciationes, in quibus est nominis univer-  saliter sumpti affirmatio.  Quoad primum notandum est quod in enunciatio-  nibus indefinitis supra positis * erant duae oppositiones et  quatuor enunciationes, et affirmativae inferebant negati-  vas, et non inferebantur ab eis, ut patet tam in exposi-  tione Ammonii, quam Porphyrii. Ita in enunciationibus  in quibus subiicitur nomen finitum universaliter sumptum  inveniuntur duae oppositiones et quatuor enunciationes:  affirmativae inferunt negativas et non e contra. Unde  similiter se habent enunciationes supradictae, sj nominis  in subiecto sumpti fiat affirmatio universaliter. Fierit enim  tunc quatuor enunciationes: duae de praedicato finito,  scilicet omnis bomo est iustus, et eius negatio quae est,  non ommis bomo est iustus; et duae de praedicato infini-  to, scilicet omnis bomo. est non iustus, et eius negatio quae  est, non omnis bomo est non iustus. Et quia quaelibet affir-  matio cum sua negatione unam integrat oppositionem,  duae efficiuntur oppositiones, sicut et de indefinitis di-  ctum est. Nec obstat quod de enunciationibus universali-  bus  loquens particulares inseruit; quoniam sicut supra  de  indefinitis  et  suis  negationibus sermonem fecit, ita  nunc de afhrmationibus universalibus sermonem faciens  de earum negationibus est coactus loqui. Negatio siqui-  dem universalis affirmativae non est universalis negativa,  sed particularis negativa, ut in I libro habitum est *  3. Quod autem similis sit consequentia in istis et supra-  dictis indefinitis patet exemplariter. Et ne multa loquendo  res  clara prolixitate obtenebretur, formetur primo figura  de indefinitis, quae supta posita est * in expositione Por-  phyrii, scilicet ex una parte ponatur affirmativa finita, et  sub ea negativa infinita, et sub ista negativa privativa.  Ex altera parte primo negativa finita, et sub ea affirma-  tiva infinita, et sub ea affirmativa privativa. Deinde sub  illa figura formetur alia figura similis illi universaliter: po-  natur scilicet ex una parte universalis affirmativa de prae-  dicato finito, et sub ea particularis negativa de praedicato  infinito, et ad complementum similitudinis sub ista particu-  laris negativa de praedicato privativo; ex altera vero parte  ponatur primo particularis negativa de praedicato infinito,  Quibus ita dispositis, exerceatur consequentia semper in  ista proxima figura, sicut supra in indefinitis exercita est:  sive sequendo expositionem: Ammonii, ut infinitae se ha-  beant ad finitas, sicut privativae se habent ad ipsas finitas ;  finitae autem non se habeant ad infinitas medias, sicut pri-  vativae se habent ad ipsas infinitas: sive sectando expo-  sitionem Porphyrii, ut affirmativae inferant negativas, et  non e contra. Utrique enim expositioni suprascriptae de-  serviunt figurae, ut patet diligenter indaganti. Similiter  ergo se habent enunciationes istae universales ad inde-  finitas in tribus, scilicet in numero propositionum, et nu-  mero oppositionum, et modo consequentiae.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Sed non similiter angulares etc., po-  nit.  ctas  dissimilitudinem inter istas universales et supradi-  indefinitas, in hoc quod angulares non similiter con-  tingit veras esse. Quae verba primo exponenda sunt se-  cundum eam, quam credimus esse ad mentem Aristo-  telis, expositionem; deinde secundum alios. Angulares  ex  enunciationes in utraque figura suprascripta vocat eas  quae sunt diametraliter oppositae, scilicet affirmativam  finitam  uno  angulo, et affirmativam infinitam sive  privativam ex alio angulo: et similiter negativam fini-  tam ex uno angulo, et negativam infinitam vel privati-  vam ex alio angulo.  5. Enunciationes ergo in qualitate similes angulares  vocatae, eo quod angulares, idest diametraliter distant,  dissimilis veritatis sunt apud indefinitas et universales.  Angulares enim indefinitae tam in diametro affirmatio-  num, quam in diametro negationum possunt esse simul  verae, ut patet in suprascripta figura indefinitarum. Et  hoc intellige in materia contingenti. Angulares vero in  figura universalium non sic se habent, quoniam angu-  lares secundum diametrum affirmationum impossibile est  esse  simul veras in quacumque materia. Angulares au-  tem secundum diametrum negationum quandoque pos-  sunt esse simul verae, quando scilicet fiunt im materia  contingenti : in materia enim necessaria et remota * impos-  sibile est esse ambas veras. Haec est Boethii, quam veram  credimus, expositio.  6. Herminus * autem, Boethio referente, aliter expo-  nit. Licet enim ponat similitudinem inter universales et  indefinitas quoad numerum enunciationum: et. oppositio-  num, oppositiones. tàmen aliter accipit in universalibus  et  aliter in indefinitis. Oppositiones siquidem. indefini-  tarum  infinitas  numerat sicut et nos numeravimus, alteram sci-  licet inter finitas affrmativanr et negativam, et alteram  inter  affirmativam et negativam, quemadmo-  dum nos fecimus. Universalium vero non sic nume-  rat oppositiones, sed alteram sumit inter universalem  affirmativam finitam et particularem negativam finitam,  scilicet.  Ammonius.  Porphyrius.  *  Cf. lib. 1, lect.  xut, n. 3.  Boethius.  *Edd.  Herme-  nius, Cf. lib. IL,  lect. n, not. 0. .  omnis bomo est iustus , hon omnis bomo est iustus ,  et  sub ea universalis affirmativa de praedicato finito, et  ,Sub ista universalis affirmativa de praedicáto privativo,  LI  hoc modo:  Figura indefinitarum  Homo est iustus  Homo non est non iustus  Homo non ést iniustus  Homo non est iustus  Homo est non iustüs  Homo est iniustus  Figura universalium  Omnis homo est iustus  —  Non omnis homo est non iustus  Non omnis homo est non iustus — Omnis homo est iüstus  Nón omfis homo est iniustus. — — 'Ornnis homo est iniustus  a) Postquam Philosophus. Hoc supplementum ad commentaria s.Tho-  mae in secundum librum Peri hermeneias, quod Caietanus complevit  anno  1496, impressum est eodem anno in ed. Veneta c Peri herme-  neias et Posteriorum analyticorum. Quocirca dd istam exegimus prae-  et  alteram inter eamdem universalem affirmativam fini-  «tam et universalem affirmativam infinitam, scilicet omnis  bomo est iustus, omnis bomo est non iustus. Inter has enim  est contrarietàs, inter illas vero contradictio. - Dissimilitu-  dinem etiam universalium ad indefinitas aliter ponit. Non  enim nobiscum fundat dissimilitudinem inter angulares  universalium et indefinitarum supra differentia quae est  inter angulares universalium affirmativas et negativas, sed  supra differentia quae est inter ipsas universalium an-  gulares inter se ex utraque parte. Format namque talem  figuram, in qua ex una parte sub universali affirmativa  finita, universalis affirmativa infinita est; et ex alia parte  cipue hanc nostram eiusdem supplementi editionem. — Editio praefata c  incipit: « Deinde cum dicit: Similiter autem se habent etc., intendit  »  distinguere enunciationes in quibus subiicitur nomen finitum univer-  »  saliter sumptum, οἵ circa hoc tria facit » etc.  CAP. X, LECT. III  sub particulari negativa finita, particularis negativa infi-  nita ponitur; sicque angulares sunt disparis qualitatis, et  similiter indefinitarum figuram format hoc modo:  ut  89  ly bae demonstret enunciationes finitas et infinitas  quoad praedicatum sive universales sive indefinitas, et  tunc est sensus, quod hae enunciationes supradictae ha-  bent duas oppositiones, alteram inter affirmationem fi-  Omnis homo  est iustus  1  o  E  S  Ξ  8  o  1  Omnis homo est  non iustus  Homo est  justus  ESSEEE ENS:  Homo est  non iustus  Non omnis homo -  » -  Contradictoriae -  e  fe  *  s  4?  9,  *  $  «Ὁ  9  ἢ *,  9  οι  ἊΨ  Contradictoriae -  $9  ὸ  .*  EM  ?,  Ὁ  IX  x :  ?  e  ^e,  *  ]  est iustus  [  o  A  H  E  δ  s  F1  ys r  Non omnis homo  ἴ  est non iustus  Homo non est  justus  Homo non est  non iustus  Quibus ita dispositis, ait in hoc stare dissimilitudinem ,  quod angulares indefinitarum mutuo se invicem compel-  lunt ad veritatis sequelam, ita quod unius angularis ve-  ritas suae angularis veritatem infert undecumque incipias.  Universalium vero angulares non se mutuo compellunt ad  *Par.  fo  et Ven.1557:  *  1557  Edd. Ven.  c et  1526 omitt. nom,  sed erronee.  —. Herminus.  IT  ante  EXPERS,  Mrd  ope  UR  Me  RN  EE  NRI  EET  Rer  METCUNERE  veritatem,  sed ex altera parte necessitas deficit illationis. *  Si enim incipias ab aliquo universalium et ad suam an-  gularem procedas, veritas universalis non * ita potest esse  simul cum veritate angularis, quod compellit eam ad ve-  ritatem: quia si universalis est vera, sua universalis con-  traria erit falsa: non enim possunt esse simul verae. Et  si ista universalis contraria est falsa, sua contradictoria  particularis, quae est angularis primae universalis assum-  ptae, erit necessario vera: impossibile est enim contradi-  ctorias esse simul falsas. Si autem incipias e converso ab  aliqua. particularium et ad suam angularem procedas, ve-  ritas particularis ita potest stare cum veritate suae an-  gularis, quod tamen non necessario infert eius veritatem:  quia licet sequatur: Particularis est vera; ergo sua univer-  salis. contradictoria est falsa; non tamen sequitur ultra :  Ista. universalis contradictoria est falsa; ergo sua univer-  salis contraria, quae est angularis particularis assumpti,  est vera. Possunt enim contrariae esse simul falsae.  7.  Sed. videtur expositio ista deficere ab Aristotelis  mente quoad modum sumendi oppositiones. Non enim in-  tendit hic loqui de oppositione quae est inter finitas et infi-  nitas, sed de ea quae est inter finitas inter se, et infinitas  inter se. Si enim de utroque modo oppositionis exponere  yolumus , iam. non duas, sed tres oppositiones invenie-,  mus; primam inter finitas, secundam inter infinitas, ter-  tiam .quam ipse Herminus dixit inter finitam et infini-  tam. Figura etiam quam formavit, conformis non est ei,  quam Aristoteles in fine I Priorum formavit, ad quam nos  remisit, cum dixit: Haec igitur quemadmodum in. Resolu-  loris dictum. est, sic sunt. disposita. In. Aristotelis namque  figura, angulares sunt affirmativae aflirmativis, et nega-  tivae negativis.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Hae igitur duae etc., concludit nu-  merum propositionum. Et potest dupliciter exponi; pri-  mo, ut ly bae demonstret universales, et sic est sensus,  quod. hae universales finitae et infinitae habent duas oppo-  sitiones, quas supra declaravimus; secundo, potest exponi  Opp. D. Tnuowar T. I.  nitam  et  eius  negationem, alteram inter affirmationem  infinitam et eius negationem. Placet autem mihi magis  secunda expositio, quoniam brevitas cui Aristoteles stu-  debat, replicationem non exigebat, sed potius quia enun-  ciationes finitas et infinitas quoad praedicatum secundum  diversas quantitates enumeraverat, ad duas oppositiones  omnes reducere, terminando earum tractatum, voluit.  9. Deinde cum dicit: Aliae autem ad id quod est etc.,  intendit declarare diversitatem enunciationum de tertio  adiacente, in quibus subiicitur nomen infinitum. Et circa  hoc tria facit: primo, proponit et distinguit eas; secundo,  ostendit quod non dantur plures supradictis; ibi: Magis  autem * etc.; tertio, ostendit habitudinem istarum ad alias ;  ibi: Hae autem extra* etc. Ad. evidentiam primi adverten-  dum est tres esse species enunciationum de inesse, in qui-  bus explicite ponitur hoc verbum est.- Quaedam sunt, quae  subiecto sive finito sive infinito nihil habent additum ultra  verbum, ut, homo est, non bomo est.- Quaedam vero sunt  quae subiecto finito habent, praeter verbum, aliquid ad-  ditum sive finitum sive infinitum, ut, bomo est iustus,  bomo est non iustus.- Quaedam autem sunt quae subiecto  infinito, praeter verbum, habent aliquid additum sive fini-  tum sive infinitum, ut, non bomo est iustus, non bomo est  non iustus. Et quia de primis iam determinatum est, ideo  de ultimis tractare volens, ait: Aliae autem sunt, quae  habent aliquid, scilicet praedicatum, additum supra ver-  bum est, ad id quod est, mon bomo, quasi ad subiectum,  idest ad subiectum infinitum. Dixit autem quasi, quia si-  cut nomen infinitum deficit a ratione nominis *, ita deficit  a ratione subiecti. Significatum siquidem nominis infiniti  non  proprie substernitur compositioni cum praedicato  quam importat, esf, tertium adiacens. Enumerat quoque  quatuor enunciationes et duas oppositiones in hoc ordi-  ne,  sicut et in superioribus fecit. Distinguit etiam istas  ex  finitate vel infinitate praedicata. Unde primo, ponit  oppositiones inter affirmativam et negativam habentes  subiectum infinitum et praedicatum finitum, dicens: Ut,  non bomo est iustus, non bomo non est iustus. Secundo, ponit  oppositionem alteram inter affirmativam et negativam, ha-  bentes subiectum infinitum: et praedicatum infinitum, di-  cens : Ut, non bomo est non iustus, non bomo non est non iustus.  το. Deinde cum dicit: Magis autem. plures etc., osten-  dit quod non dantur plures oppositiones enunciationum  supradictis. Ubi notandum est quod enunciationes de in-  esse, in quibus explicite ponitur hoc verbum «est, sive se-  cundum, sive tertium adiacens, de quibus loquimur, non  possunt esse plures quam duodecim supra positae; et con-  sequenter oppositiones earum secundum affirmationem  et  negationem non. sunt nisi sex. Cum enim in tres or-  dines divisae sint enunciationes, scilicet in illas de se-  cundo adiacente, in illas de tertio. subiecti finiti, et in  illas de tertio subiecti infiniti, et in quolibet ordine sint  quatuor enunciationes; fiunt omnes enunciationes duode-  |  cim, et oppositiones sex. Et quoniam subiectum earum  in quolibet ordine potest quadrupliciter quantificari, sci-  licet universalitate, particularitate, et singularitate, et in-  definitione; ideo istae duodecim multiplicantur in qua-  draginta octo. Quater enim duodecim quadraginta octo  faciunt. Nec possibile est plures his imaginari. Et licet  Aristoteles nonnisi viginti harum expresserit, octo in primo  ordine, octo in secundo, et quatuor in tertio, attamen per  eas  reliquas voluit intelligi. Sunt autem sic enumerandae  et ordinandae secundum singulos ordines, ut affirmationi  negatio prima ex opposito situetur, ut oppositionis in-  i2 *  *  *  *  Num. seq.  Infra num. Π.  Cf. lib.I. lect.iv,  n. 13.  SPEO  9o  tentum clarius videatur. Et sic contra universalem afhr-  mativam non est ordinanda universalis negativa, sed par-  ticularis negativa, quae est illius negatio; et e converso,  contra particularem affirmativam non est ordinanda par-  ticularis negativa, sed universalis negativa quae est eius  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  negatio. Ad clarius autem intuendum numerum, coordi-  nandae sunt omnes, quae sunt similis quantitatis, simul  in recta linea, distinctis tamen ordinibus tribus supradictis.  Quod ut clarius elucescat, in hac subscripta videatur  figura:  Primus  Socrates est  Quidam homo .est  Homo est  Omnis homo est  —.  —  —  —  Socrates  non est  Quidam homo non est  Homo non est  Omnis homo non est  e  —  —  —  Ordo  Non Socrates est  Quidam non homo est  Non homo est  Omnis non homo est  Secundus Ordo  Socrates est iustus  Quidam homo est iustus  Homo. est iustus  Omnis homo est iustus - - - -  Socrates non est iustus  Quidam homo non est iustus  Homo non est iustus  —  — --  Socrates est non iustus  Non Socrates non est  —  —  —  —  —  Quidam non homo non est  Non homo non est  Omnis non homo non est  Socrates non est non iustus  Quidam homo est non iustus — — Quidam homo non est non iustus  Homo est non iustus  —  Omnis homo non est iustus  Non Socrates est iustus  Quidam non homo est iustus  Non homo est iustus  Omnis non homo est iustus - -  Non Socrates non est iustus  Quidam non homo non est iustus  Non homo non est iustus -—  Tertius  —  —  —  Omnis homo est non iustus  Ordo  Non Socrates est non iustus  —  —  Homo non est non iustus  Omnis homo non est non iustus  Non Socrates non est non iustus  Quidam non homo est non iustus — Quidam non homo non est non iustus  Non homo est non iustus  —  Omnis non homo non est iustus  —  Quod autem plures his non sint, ex eo patet quod non  contingit pluribus modis variari subiectum et praedica-  tum penes finitum et infinitum, nec pluribus modis va-  riantur finitum et infinitum subiectum. Nulla enim enun-  ciatio de secundo adiacente potest variari penes praedi-  catum finitum vel infinitum, sed tantum penes subiectum  quod sufficienter factum apparet. Enunciationes autem de  tertio adiacente quadrupliciter variari possunt, quia aut  sunt subiecti et praedicati finiti, aut utriusque infiniti,  aut subiecti finiti et praedicati infiniti, aut subiecti infi-  niti et praedicati finiti. Quarum nullam praetermissam  esse superior docet figura.  11. Deinde cum dicit: Hae autem extra illas etc., osten-  dit habitudinem harum quas in tertio ordine numeravi-  mus ad illas, quae in secundo sitae sunt ordine, et dicit  quod istae sunt extra illas, quia non sequuntur ad illas,  nec e converso. Et rationem assignans subdit: Ut momine  ulenles 60 quod est non bomo, idest ideo istae sunt extra  illas, quia istae utuntur nomine infinito loco nominis,  dum omnes habent subiectum infinitum. Notanter autem  dixit enunciationes subiecti infiniti uti ut nomine, infi-  nito nomine, quia cum subiici in enunciatione proprium  sit nominis, praedicari autem commune nomini et verbo,  omne subiectum enunciationis ut nomen subiicitur.  12. Deinde cum dicit: In bis vero in quibus est etc.,  determinat de enunciationibus in quibus ponuntur verba  adiectiva. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, distinguit eas; se-  *  *  Num. 13.  Num. 16.  cundo, respondet cuidam tacitae quaestioni ; ibi: Non enim  dicendum est * etc.; tertio, concludit earum conditiones; ibi:  Ergo et caetera eadem * etc. Ad evidentiam primi resumendum  est, quod inter enunciationes in quibus ponitur es? secun-  dum adiacens, et eas in quibus ponitur es! tertium adia-  cens talis est differentia quod in illis, quae sunt de se-  cundo adiacente, simpliciter fiunt oppositiones; scilicet ex  parte subiecti tantum variati per finitum et infinitum; in his  vero, quae habent est tertium. adiacens dupliciter fiunt op-  positiones, scilicet et ex parte praedicati et ex parte su-  biecti, quia utrumque variari potest per finitum et infi-  nitum. Unde unum ordinem tantum enunciationum de  secundo adiacente fecimus, habentem quatuor enunciatio-  nes diversimode quantificatas et duas oppositiones. Enun-  ciationes autem de tertio adiacente oportuit partiri in duos  ordines, quia sunt in eis quatuor oppositiones et octo  enunciationes, ut supra dictum est.- Considerandum quo-  que est quod enunciationes, in quibus ponuntur verba  adiectiva, quoad significatum aequivalent enunciationibus  Non homo non est non iustus  Omnis non homo est non iustus — Omnis non homo non est non iustus  de tertio adiacente, resoluto verbo adiectivo in proprium  participium et es/, quod semper fieri licet, quia in omni  verbo adiectivo clauditur verbum substantivum. Unde idem  significant ista, omnis bomo currit, quod ista, omnis bomo  est  currens. Propter quod Boethius vocat enunciationes  cum verbo adiectivo de secundo adiacente secundum vo-  cem, de tertio autem secundum potestatem, quia potest  resolvi in tertium adiacens, cui aequivalet. Quoad nume-  rum autem enunciationum et oppositionum, enunciationes :  verbi adiectivi formaliter sumptae non aequivalent illis de  tertio adiacente, sed aequivalent enunciationibus, in quibus  ponitur esf secundum adiacens. Non possunt enim fieri  oppositiones dupliciter in enunciationibus adiectivis, scili-  cet ex parte subiecti et praedicati, sicut fiebant in substan-  tivis de tertio adiacente, quia verbum, quod praedicatur  in adiectivis, infinitari non potest. Sed oppositiones adie-  ctivarum fiunt simpliciter, scilicet ex parte subiecti tan-  tum variati per infinitum et finitum diversimode quanti-  ficati, sicut fieri didicimus supra in enunciationibus sub-  stantivis de secundo adiacente, eadem ducti ratione, quia  praeter verbum nulla est affirmatio vel negatio *, sicut prae-  ter nomen esse potest. Quia autem in praesenti tracta-  tu non de significalionibus, sed de mumero enunciationum  et  oppositionum sermo intenditur, ideo Aristoteles de-  terminat diversificandas esse enunciationes adiectivas se-  cundum modum, quo distinctae sunt enunciationes in  quibus ponitur es? secundum adiacens. Et ait quod in his  enunciationibus, in quibus non contingit poni hoc ver-  bum est formaliter, sed aliquod aliud, ut, currit, vel, ambu-  lat, idest in enunciationibus adiectivis, idem faciunt quo-  ad numerum oppositionum et enunciationum sic posita,  scilicet nomen et verbum, ac si est secundum adiacens sub-  iecto nomini adderetur. Habent enim et istae adiectivae,  sicut illae, in quibus ponitur es/, duas oppositiones tantum,  alteram inter finitas, ut, omnis bomo currit, omnis bomo mon  currit, alteram inter infinitas quoad subiectum, ut, omnis  non bomo currit, omnis non bomo mon currit.  ip  13. Deinde cum dicit: Non enim dicendum est etc., re-  spondet tacitae quaestioni. Et circa hoc facit duo: primo,  ponit solutionem quaestionis; deinde, probat eam; ibi:  Manifestum est autem* etc. Est ergo quaestio talis: Cur ne-  gatio infinitans numquam addita est supra signo univer-  sali aut particulari, ut puta, cum vellemus infinitare istam,  omnis bomo currit, cur non sic infinitata est, om omnis  bomo currit, sed sic, omnis non bomo currit? Huic nam-  que quaestioni respondet, dicens quod quia nomen infi-  *  Cf. lib. I, lect.  vit , n. 9.  * Num. 44.  CAP. X, LECT. IIl  nitabile debet significare aliquid universale, vel singula-  re; omnis autem et similia signa non significant aliquid  universale aut singulare, sed quoniam. universaliter aut  particulariter; ideo non est dicendum, mom ommis bomo,  si infinitare volumus (licet debeat dici, si negare quan-  titatem enunciationis quaerimus), sed negatio infinitans  ad ly homo, quod significat aliquid universale, addenda  est, et dicendum, omnis non bomo.  14. Deinde cum dicit: Manifestum est autem. ex eo quod  est εἴς.» probat hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod omnis  et similia non significant aliquod universale, sed quoniam  universaliter tali ratione. Illud, in quo differunt enun-  ciationes praecise differentes per habere *et non habere  ly omnis, est non universale aliquod, sed quoniam umi-  91  particularitatis absolute, sed applicatum termino distri-  buto. Cum enim dico, omnis bomo , ly omnis denotat uni-  versitatem applicari illi termino /omo, ita quod Aristo-  teles dicens quod omnis significat quoniam universaliter,  per ly quoniam insinuavit applicationem universalitatis  importatam in ly ommis in actu exercito, sicut et in T  per  Posteriorum , in. definitione scire applicationem causae no-  tavit  illud verbum quoniam, dicens: Scire est rem  per causam cognoscere, et quoniam. illius est causa.- Ratio au-  tem  versaliter; sed illud in quo differunt enunciationes prae-  cise  differentes per habere et non habere ly ommis, est  significatum per ly omnis; ergo significatum per ly  ommis est non aliquid universale, sed quoniam universa-  liter. Minor huius rationis, tacita in textu, ex se clara est.  Id enim in quo, caeteris paribus, habentia a non haben-  tibus aliquem terminum differunt, significatum est illius  termini. Maior vero in littera exemplariter declaratur sic.  Illae  οὐ  τὸ.  νιν.  OG  REIR  RN  enunciationes, bomo currit, et omnis bomo currit,  praecise differunt ex hoc, quod in una est ly omnis, et  in altera non. Tamen non ita differunt ex hoc, quod una  sit universalis, alia non universalis. Utraque enim habet  subiectum universale, scilicet ly bomo, sed differunt, quia  in ea, ubi ponitur ly omnis, enunciatur de subiecto uni-  versaliter, in altero autem. non universaliter. Cum enim  dico, bomo currit, cursum attribuo homini universali, sive  communi, sed non pro tota humana universitate; cum  autem dico, ommis bomo currit, cursum inesse homini  pro omnibus inferioribus significo.- Simili modo decla-  rari potest de tribus aliis, quae in textu adducuntur,  Scilicet, bomo non currit, respectu suae universalis uni-  versaliter, omnis bomo mon currit: et sic de aliis. Relin-  quitur ergo, quod, omnis et nullus et similia signa nullum  universale significant, sed tantummodo significant, quo-  niam universaliter de homine affirmant vel negant.  I$. Notato hic duo: primum est quod non dixit  omnis et nullus significat universaliter , sed quoniam uni-  versaliter; secundum est, quod addit, de homine affr-  mant vel negant.- Primi ratio est, quia signum distribu-  tivum non significat modum ipsum universalitatis aut  secundi insinuat differentiam inter terminos cate-  gorematicos et syncategorematicos. Illi siquidem ponunt  significata supra terminos absolute; isti autem ponunt '  significata sua supra terminos in ordine ad praedicata. Cum  enim dicitur, bomo albus, ly albus denominat hominem  in seipso absque respectu ad aliquod sibi addendum. Cum  vero  dicitur, ommis bomo, ly omnis etsi hominem distri-  buat, non tamen distributio intellectum firmat, nisi in  ordine ad aliquod praedicatum intelligatur. Cuius signum  est, quia, cum dicimus, omnis bomo currit, non intendimus  distribuere hominem pro tota sua universitate absolute,  sed in ordine ad cursum. Cum autem dicimus, albus  bomo currit, determinamus hominem in seipso esse album  et non in ordine ad cursum. Quia ergo ommis et nullus,  sicut et alia syncategoremata, nil aliud in enunciatione  faciunt, nisi quia determinant subiectum in ordine ad prae-  dicatum, et hoc sine affirmatione et negatione fieri nequit;  ideo dixit quod nil aliud significant, nisi quoniam uni-  versaliter  de  nomine, idest de subiecto, affirmant vel  negant, idest affirmationem vel negationem fieri deter-  minant , ac per hoc a categorematicis ea separavit. Potest  etiam referri hoc quod dixit, affirmant vel negant, ad ipsa  signa, scilicet omnis et nullus, quorum alterum positive  distribuit, alterum removendo.  16. Deinde cum dicit: Ergo et caetera eadem etc., conclu-  dit adiectivarum enunciationum conditiones. Dixerat enim  quod adiectivae enunciationes idem faciunt quoad opposi-  tionum numerum, quod substantivae de secundo adiacente;  et  hoc declaraverat, oppositionum numero exemplariter  subiuncto. Et quia ad hanc convenientiam sequitur con-  venientia quoad finitationem praedicatorum, et quoad di-  versam subiectorum quantitatem, et earum multiplicatio-  nem ex ductu quaternarii in seipsum, et si qua sunt huius-  modi enumerata; ideo concludit: Ergo et caetera, quae in illis  servanda erant, eadem, idest similia istis apponenda sunt.  92  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  LECTIO QUARTA  (Can. CarkTANI lect. 11).  NONNULLAE CIRCA EA QUAE DICTA SUNT DUBITATIONES MOVENTUR AC SOLVUNTUR  ᾿Επεὶ δὲ ἐναντία ἀπόφασίς ἐστι τῇ, ἅπαν. ἐστὶ ζῷον  δίκαιον, ἡ σημαίνουσα ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι ζῷον δίκαιον,  αὗται μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτε ἔσονται οὔτε ἀλη-  θεῖς ἅμα οὔτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, αἱ δὲ ἀντικείμεναι  ταύταις ἔσονταί ποτε, οἷον, οὐ πᾶν ζῷον δίκαιον,  xai  ἔστι τι ζῷον δίχαιον.  ᾽᾿Ακολουθοῦσι δὲ αὑται, τῇ μὲν πᾶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δίχαιός  ἐστιν, ἡ, οὐδείς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος: τῇ δὲ ἔστι  τις  ἄνηρωπος δίκαιος, ἡ ἀντιχειμένη, ὅτι οὐ πᾶς  ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν οὐ δίκαιος" ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινα.  Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕχοστον εἰ ἀληθές  ἐρωτηθέντα ἀποφῆσαι, ὅτι καὶ χαταφῆσαι ἀληθές"  οἷον, ἄρά γε Σωχράτης σοφός; οὔ. Σωχράτης ἄρα οὐ  σοφός. ᾿Επὶ δὲ τῶν καθόλου οὐχ ἀληθὴς ἡ ὁμοίως  λεγομένη: ἀληθὴς δὲ ἡ ἀπόφασις, οἷον, ἀρά γε πᾶς  ἄνθρωπος σοφός; οὔ: πᾶς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος οὐ σοφός"  τοῦτο γὰρ ψεῦδος: ἀλλὰ τὸ, οὐ πᾶς ἄρα, ἄνθρωπος  σοφός, ἀληθές" αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀντικειμένη, ἐχείνη  δὲ ἡ ἐναντία.  Αἱ  δὲ χατὰ τὰ ἀόριστα ἀντιχείμεναι ὀνόματα καὶ ῥή-  ματα,  ὥσπερ  οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄνθρῳπος καὶ μὴ δίκαιος,  ἀποφάσεις ἄνευ ὀνόματος χαὶ ῥήματος δόξειαν  ἂν εἶναι" οὐχ εἰσὶ δέ. " Acl 12e ἀληθεύειν ἀν ἄγχη ἢ  ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν’ ὁ δ᾽ εἰπὼν, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος,  οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰπόντος, ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ  ἧττον ἠλήθευχέ τι ἢ ἔψευσται, ἐὰν μή τι προστεθῇ.  Σημαίνει δὲ τὸ, ἔστι πᾶς οὐχ ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος, οὐδε-  μιᾷ ἐκείνων ταὐτόν’ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀντιχειμένη ταύτῃ, ἡ)  οὐχ ἔστι πᾶς οὐκ ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος"  τὸ δὲ, πᾶς οὐ δίκαιος οὐχ ἄνθρωπος, τῷ, οὐδεὶς δίκαιος  οὐχ ἄνθρωπος, ταὐτὸν σημαίνει.  Μετατιθέμενα δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὸ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν  Εἰ  σημαίνει, olov, ἔστι λευχὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος  λευχός.  γὰρ Xj τοῦτό ἐστι, τοῦ αὐτοῦ πλείους ἔσονται ἀπο-  φάσεις" ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέδεικτο, ὅτι μία μιᾶς" τοῦ μὲν γάρ;  ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἀπόφασις τὸ οὐχ ἔστι λευχὸς  ἄνθρωπος" τοῦ δὲ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος Acuxóc, εἰ μηὴ ἡ  αὐτή ἐστι τῇ, ἔστι λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἔσται ἀπόφασις  ἤτοι τὸ οὐχ ἔστιν οὐχ ἄνθρωπος λευχός, ἢ τό, οὐχ  ἔστιν  φασις  ἄνγηρωπος λευκός. ᾿Αλλ’ ἡ ἑτέρα  μέν ἐστιν ἀπό-  τοῦ, ἔστιν οὐχ ἄνθρωπος λευχός" ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ  τοῦ, ἔστι λευχὸς ἄνθρωπος" ὥστε ἔσονται δύο μιᾶς.  Ὅτιμεὲν οὖν μετατιθεμένου τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ῥήμα-  τος ἡ αὐτὴ γίνεται κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, δῆλον.  enunciationum, hic intendit removere quae-  dam dubia circa praedicta. Et circa hoc  2facit sex secundum numerum. dubiorum,  quae suis patebunt locis. Quia ergo supra  dixerat quod. in universalibus non similiter contingit an-  gulares esse simul veras, quia affirmativae angulares non  possunt esse simul verae, negativae autem sic; poterat  quispiam dubitare, quae est causa huius diversitatis. Ideo  nunc illius dicti causam intendit assignare talem, quia,  scilicet,  *  Cf. lib. I, lect.ix,  n. s et lect. xt,  n.  6.  *Cflib.Llec.x,  angulares affirmativae sunt contrariae inter se;  contrarias autem in nulla materia contingit esse simul  veras *. Angulares autem negativae sunt subcontrariae  illis oppositae; subcontrarias autem contingit esse simul  veras *. Et circa haec duo facit: primo, declarat condi-  n. P: CU*C-3- tones contrariarum et subcontrariarum ; secundo, quod  angulares affirmativae sint contrariae et quod angulares  *  Quoniam vero contraria est negatio ei quae est, omne  animal est iustum, illa quae significat quoniam, nullum  animal est iustum; hae quidem manifestum est quoniam  nunquam erunt, neque verae simul, neque in eodem  ipso; his vero oppositae erunt aliquando: ut, non omne  animal iustum est, et, aliquod animal iustum est.  Sequuntur vero eam quae est, omnis homo est non iu-  stus, illa quae est, nullus homo est iustus; illam vero  quae est, aliquis homo iustus est, opposita, quoniam,  non  omnis est homo non iustus. Necesse est enim ali-  quem esse.  Manifestum est autem etiam, quod in singularibus si est ve-  rum interrogatum negare, quoniam et affirmare verum  est. Ut, putasne Socrates sapiens est? non. Socrates igitur  non  sapiens est. In universalibus vero non est vera,  quae similiter dicitur: vera autem negativa est. Ut, pu-  tasne omnis homo sapiens est? non; omnis igitur homo  non  sapiens est: hoc enim falsum est: sed, non igitur  omnis homo sapiens est, vera est. Haec enim opposita  est; illa vero contraria.  Illae vero secundum infinita contraiacentes sunt nomina vel  verba, ut in eo quod est, non homo, vel, non iustus,  quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo esse videbuntur.  Sed non sunt. Semper enim vel veram esse vel falsam  necesse est negationem; qui vero dixit, non homo, nihil  magis quam qui dicit, homo, sed etiam minus verus vel  falsus fuit, si non aliquid addatur.  Significat autem, est omnis non homo iustus, nulli illarum  idem; nec huic opposita ea quae est, non est omnis  non homo iustus:  illa vero, quae est, omnis non iustus non homo est, illi  quae est, nullus est iustus non homo, idem significat.  Transposita vero nomina et verba idem significant, ut, est  albus homo, et, est homo albus.  Nam si hoc non est, eiusdem multae erunt negationes;  sed ostensum est, quod una unius est: eius enim quae  est, est albus homo, negatio est, non est albus homo:  eius vero quae est, est homo albus, si non eadem est  ei  quae est, est albus homo, erit negatio, vel ea quae  est, non est non homo albus, vel ea quae est, non est  homo albus. Sed altera quidem est negatio eius, quae  est, est non homo albus; altera vero eius quae est, est  homo albus. Quare erunt duae unius. Quod igitur  transposito nomine vel verbo, eadem sit affirmatio vel  negatio, manifestum est.  negativae sint subcontrariae; ibi: Sequuntur vero * etc.-  Dicit ergo resumendo: quoniam in Primo dictum est quod  enunciatio negativa contraria illi affirmativae universali,  scilicet, omne animal estiustum, est ista, nullum animal est  iustum ; manifestum est quod istae non possunt simul,  idest in eodem tempore, meque im eodem ipso, idest de  eodem subiecto esse verae. His vero oppositae, idest  subcontrariae inter se, possunt esse simul verae aliquando,  scilicet  in  materia contingenti, ut, quoddam animal est  iustum, non omne animal est iustum *.  2. Deinde cum dicit: Sequuntur vero etc., declarat quod  angulares affirmativae supra positae sint contrariae, ne-  gativae vero subcontrariae. - Et primum quidem ex eo  quod universalis affirmativa infinita et universalis nega-  tiva simplex aequipollent; et consequenter utraque earum  est  contraria universali affirmativae simplici, quae est  altera angularis. Unde dicit quod hanc universalem nega-  *  *  Seq. c. x.  Num. seq.  Cf. lib. I, lect  *  citt.  CAP. X, LECT. IV -  tivam finitam, wullus bomo est iustus, sequitur aequipollen-  ter illa universalis affirmativa infinita, omnis bomo est non  iustus.  Secundum vero declarat ex eo quod particularis  affirmativa finita et particularis negativa infinita aequipol-  lent. Et consequenter utraque earum est subcontraria par-  ticulari negativae simplici, quae est altera angularis, ut in  figura supra posita inspicere potes. Unde subdit quod  illam párticularem   affirmativam finitam, aliquis bomo est  iustus, opposita sequitur aequipollenter (opposita intel-  lige non istius particularis, sed illius universalis affir-  mativae infinitae), mom ommis bomo est mom iustus. Haec  enim est contradictoria eius. Ut autem clare videatur  quomodo supra dictae enunciationes sint aequipollentes,  formetur figura quadrata, in cuius uno angulo ponatur  universalis negativa finita, et sub ea contradictoria par-  ticularis affirmativa finita; ex alia vero parte locetur uni-  versalis affirmativa infinita, et sub ea contradictoria parti-  cularis  negativa infinita, noteturque contradictio inter  angulares et collaterales inter se, hoc modo:  Nullus homo  T»  "poil  .  est iustus  e  Ξ  2  E  E  d  25  o  Quidam homo  i  est lustus  Omnis homo  Aequivalentes  e  o  C  o  ΝᾺ  .  SU  o  “πᾶ  ὁ  S  ow  [73  Aequivalentes  t  est non justus  e  n  (  T  [i  E"  ξ -—  $  E  o  Non omnis homo  "  est non iustus  His siquidem sic dispositis, patet primo ipsarum uni-  versalium mutua consequentia in veritate et falsitate, quia  si altera earum est vera, sua angularis contradictoria est  falsa; et si ista est falsa, sua collateralis contradictoria,  quae est altera universalis, erit vera, et similiter procedit  quoad falsitatem particularium. Deinde eodem modo ma-  nifestatur mutua sequela. Si enim altera earum est vera,  sua angularis contradictoria est falsa, ista autem existente  falsa, sua contradictoria collateralis, quae est altera parti-  cularis erit vera; simili quoque modo procedendum est  quoad falsitatem.  3. Sed est hic unum dubium. In I enim Priorum, in  fine, Aristoteles ex proposito determinat non esse idem  iudicium de universali negativa et universali affirmativa  infinita. Et superius in hoc Secundo *, super illo verbo:  Quarum duae se babent secundum consequentiam, duae vero  minime, Ammonius, Porphyrius, Boethius et sanctus Tho-  mas  dixerunt quod negativa simplex sequitur affirmati-  vam infinitam, sed non e converso.  Ad  hoc dicendum est, secundum Albertum, quod  negativam finitam sequitur affirmativa infinita subiecto  constante; negativa vero simplex sequitur affirmativam  absolute.  Unde utrumque dictum verificatur, et quod  inter eas est mutua consequentia cum subiecti constantia,  et  SS. Thomas.  * Nempe in pri-  mo modo primae  gue eros»  syllogis-  quod inter eas non est mutua consequentia absolute.  Potest dici secundo, quod supra locuti sumus de infinita  enunciatione quoad suum totalem significatum ad formam  praedicati reductum; et secundum hoc, quia negativa fini-  ta est superior affirmativa infinita, ideo non erat mutua  consequentia: hic autem loquimur de ipsa infinita forma-  liter sumpta. Unde s. Thomas tunc adducendo Ammonii  expositionem dixit, secundum hunc modum loquendi:  negativa simplex, in plus est quam affirmativa infinita.  'Textus vero I Priorum ultra praedicta loquitur de  finita et infinita in ordine ad syllogismum. Manifestum  est autem quod universalis affirmativa sive finita sive  infinita non concluditur nisi in primo primae *. Univer-  93  salis autem negativa quaecumque concluditur et in se-  cundo primae, et primo et secundo secundae.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Manifestum est autem. etc., mo-  vet secundum dubium de vario situ negationis, an sci-  licet  quoad veritatem et falsitatem differat praeponere  et postponere negationem. Oritur autem haec dubitatio,  quia dictum est nunc quod non refert quoad veritatem  si dicatur, ommis bomo est non iustus, aut si dicatur, omis  bomo non est iustus; et tamen in altera postponitur ne-  gatio, in altera praeponitur, licet multum referat quoad   affirmationem et negationem. Hanc, inquam, dubitationem  solvere  intendens cum distinctione, respondet quod in  singularibus enunciationibus eiusdem veritatis sunt sin-  gularis negatio et infinita affirmatio eiusdem, in univer-  salibus autem non est sic.  Si enim est vera negatio ipsius universalis non oportet  quod sit vera infinita affirmatio universalis. Negatio enim  universalis est particularis contradictoria, qua existente  vera, non est necesse suam subalternam, quae est con-  traria suae contradictoriae esse veram. Possunt enim duae  contrariae esse simul falsae. Unde dicit quod in singula-  ribus enunciationibus manifestum est quod, si est verum  negare interrogatum, idest, si est vera negatio enunciatio-  nis singularis, de qua facta est interrogatio, verum etiam  est affirmare, idest, vera erit affirmatio infinita eiusdem  singularis. Verbi gratia: putasne Socrates estsapiens ? Si vera  est ista responsio, z/.9 ; - Socrates igitur non sapiens est, idest,  vera erit ista affirmatio infinita, Socrates est non sapiens.  In universalibus vero non est vera, quae similiter dicitur,  idest, ex veritate negationis universalis affirmativae in-  |  terrogatae non sequitur vera universalis affirmativa infi-  nita, quae similis est quoad quantitatem et qualitatem  enunciationi quaesitae; vera aulem est eius negatio, idest,  sed ex veritate responsionis negativae sequitur veram esse  eius, scilicet universalis quaesitae negationem, idest, par-  ticularem negativam. Verbi gratia: putasne omnis bomo est  sapiens? Si vera est ista responsio, non; - affirmativa si-  milis interrogatae quam quis ex hac responsione inferre  intentaret est illa: igitur omnis bomo est non sapiens. Haec  autem non sequitur ex illa negatione. Falsum est enim  hoc, scilicet quod sequitur ex illa responsione; sed. infe-  rendum est, igitur non ommis bomo sapiens est.- Et ratio  utriusque est, quia haec particularis ultimo illata est op-  posita, idest contradictoria illi universali interrogatae quam  respondens falsificavit; et ideo oportet quod sit vera. Con-  tradictoriarum enim si una est falsa, reliqua est vera. Illa  vero, scilicet universalis affirmativa infinita primo illata,  est  contraria illi eidem universali interrogatae. Non est  autem opus quod si universalium altera sit falsa, quod  reliqua sit vera. In promptu est autem causa huius diver-  sitatis inter singulares et universales. In singularibus enim  varius negationis situs non variat quantitatem enunciatio-  nis; in universalibus autem variat, ut patet. Ideo fit ut  de se patet.  non sit eadem veritas negantium universalem in quarum  altera praeponitur, in altera autem postponitur negatio,  ut  5. Deinde cum dicit: ΠΙᾺ vero secundum. infinita. etc. ,  solvit tertiam dubitationem, an infinita nomina vel verba  sint negationes. Insurgit autem hoc dubium, quia di-  etum est quod aequipollent negativa et infinita. Et rursus  dictum est nunc quod non refert in singularibus prae-  ponere et postponere negationem: si enim infinitum no-  men est negatio, tunc enunciatio, habens subiectum infi-  nitum vel praedicatum, erit negativa et non afhrmativa.  Hanc dubitationem solvit per interpretationem,  pro-  bando quod nec nomina nec verba infinita sint negatio-  nes, licet videantur. Unde duo circa hoc facit: primo, pro:  ponit solutionem dicens: Illae vero, scilicet dictiones, con-  PCT  94  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  iraiacenies: verbi gratia: mom bomo, et, bomo non iustus et  iustus.  Vel sic: Illae vero, scilicet dictiones, secundum infi-  nita, idest secundum infinitorum naturam, iacentes contra  nomina et verba. (utpote quae removentes quidem nomina  et verba significant , ut som bomo et mon iustus et mon  currit, quae opponuntur contra ly bomo, ly iustus et ly  currit), illae, inquam, dictiones infinitae videbuntur prima  facie  esse  quasi negationes sine nomine et verbo ex eo  quod comparatae nominibus et verbis contra quae iacent,  ea  removent, sed non sunt secundum veritatem. Dixit  sine nomine et verbo quia nomen infinitum, nominis na-  tura caret, et verbum infinitum verbi natura non possidet.  Dixit quasi, quia nec nomen infinitum a nominis ratione,  nec verbum infinitum a verbi proprietate omnino semota  sunt.  Unde, si negationés apparent, videbuntur sine no-  mine et verbo non omnino sed quasi.  Deinde probat distinctiones infinitas non esse negatio-  nes tali ratione. Semper est necesse negationem esse ve-  ram vel falsam, quia negatio est enunciatio alicuius ab  aliquo; nomen autem infinitum non dicit verum vel fal  sum; igitur dictio infinita non est negatio. - Minorem  declarat, quia. qui dixit, mom bomo, nihil magis de ho-  mine dixit quam qui dixit, bomo. Et quoad significatum  quidem clarissimum est: non bomo, namque, nihil addit  supra hominem, imo removet hominem. Quoad veritatis  vero vel falsitatis conceptum, nihil magis profuit qui  dixit, non bomo, quam qui dixit, bomo, si aliquid aliud  non  addatur, imo minus verus vel falsus fuit, idest  magis remotus a veritate et falsitate, qui dixit, wom bomo,  quam qui dixit, homo: quia tam veritas quam falsitas  in  compositione consistit; compositioni autem vicinior  est  dictio finita, quae aliquid ponit, quam dictio infinita,  quae nec ponit, nec componit, idest nec positionem nec  compositionem importat.  6. Deinde cum dicit: Significat autem. etc., respondet  quartae dubitationi, quomodo scilicet intelligatur illud  verbum supradictum de enunciationibus habentibus su-  biectum infinitum: Hae autem. extra. illas, ipsae secundum  se  erunt. Et ait quod intelligitur quantum ad significati  consequentiam, et non solum quantum ad ipsas enuncia-  tiones formaliter. Unde duas habentes subiectum infini-  tum, universalem scilicet affirmativam et universalem ne-  gativam adducens, ait quod neutra earum significat idem  alicui illarum, scilicet habentium subiectum finitum. Haec  enim  universalis  affirmativa, omnis nom bomo est iustus,  nulli habenti subiectum finitum significat idem: non enim  significat idem quod ista, omnis bomo est iustus ; neque quod  ista, omnis bomo est non iustus. Similiter opposita negatio et  universalis negativa habens subiectum infinitum, quae est  contrarie opposita supradictae, scilicet omnis non bomo non  est iustus, nulli illarum de subiecto finito significat idem. Et  hoc clarum est ex diversitate subiecti in istis et in illis.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Illa vero quae est etc., respon-  det quintae quaestioni, an scilicet inter enunciationes de  subiecto infinito sit aliqua consequentia. Oritur autem  dubitatio haec ex eo, quod superius est inter eas ad in-  vicem assignata consequentia. Ait ergo quod etiam inter  istas  est  consequentia. Nam universalis affirmativa de  subiecto et praedicato infinitis et, universalis negativa de  subiecto infinito, praedicato vero finito, aequipollent. Ista  namque, omnis non bomo est mon iustus, idem significat  illi;  cium  nullus non. bomo est iustus. Idem autem est iudi-  de particularibus indefinitis et singularibus simi-  libus supradictis. Cuiuscunque enim quantitatis sint, sem-  per affirmativa de utroque extremo infinita et negativa  subiecti quidem infiniti, praedicati autem finiti, aequipol-  lent, ut facile potes exemplis videre. Unde Aristoteles uni-  versales exprimens, caeteras ex illis intelligi voluit.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Transposita vero nomina. etc.,  solvit sextam dubitationem, an propter nominum vel ver-  borum transpositionem varietur enunciationis significatio.  Oritur autem haec quaestio ex eo, quod docuit transpo-  sitionem negationis variare enunciationis significationem.  Aliud enim dixit significare, ommis bomo mon est iustus,  et  aliud, non omnis bomo est iustus. Ex hoc, inquam, du-  bitatur, an. similiter contingat circa nominum transpo-  sitionem , quod ipsa transposita enunciationem varient,  sicut negatio transposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo,  ponit solutionem dicens, quod transposita nomina et  verba idem significant: verbi gratia, idem significat, est  albus homo, et, est bomo albus, ubi est transpositio nomi-  num. Similiter transposita verba idem significant, ut, est  albus bomo, et, bomo albus est.  9. Deinde cum dicit: Nam si boc mon est etc., probat  praedictam solutionem ex numero negationum contradi-  ctoriarum ducendo ad impossibile, tali ratione. Si hoc non  est, idest si nomina transposita diversificant enunciatio-  nem, eiusdem affirmationis erunt duae negationes; sed  ostensum est in I libro *, quod una tantum est nega-  tio unius affirmationis; ergo a destructione consequentis  ad destructionem antecedentis transposita nomina non  variant enunciationem. Ad probationis autem consequen-  tiae claritatem formetur figura, ubi ex uno latere locentur  ex  ambae suprapositae affirmationes, transpositis nominibus ;  et  altero contraponantur duae negativae, similes illis  quoad terminos et eorum positiones. Deinde, aliquantulo  interiecto spatio, sub affirmativis ponatur affirmatio infi-  niti subiecti, et sub negativis illius negatio. Et notetur  contradictio inter primam affirmationem et duas nega-  tiones primas, et inter secundam aflirmationem et omnes  tres  negationes, ita tamen quod inter ipsam et infimam  negationem notetur contradictio non vera, sed imagi-  naria. Notetur quoque contradictio inter tertiam affirma-  tionem et tertiam negationem inter se. Hoc modo:  Est albus  homo  Est homo  albus  Est non  homo albus  His ita dispositis, probat consequentiam Aristoteles sic.  Illius affirmationis, est albus bomo, negatio est, mom est  albus bomo ; ilius autem secundae affirmationis, quae  est, est bomo albus, si ista affirmatio non est eadem illi  .  supradictae affirmationi , scilicet, est albus bomo, propter  *  Non est albus - -  Coníradictoriae —  e  o  C  o cn  —"  s  *  nalf  e  bi  7.  dde  Kn  Gontradictoriae -  EN -  “Ὁ  36  b"  Contradictoriae -  homo  Non est homo  albus  Non est non  homo albus  Lect. xir.  CAP. X,  nominum transpositionem, negatio erit altera istarum,  scilicet aut, non est non bomo albus, aut, non est bomo al-  bus. Sed utraque habet affirmationem oppositam alia ab  illa assignatam, scilicet, est bomo albus. Nam altera qui-  dem dictarum negationum, scilicet, nom est mon bomo al-  bus, negatio est illius quae dicit, est mom bomo albus;  alia vero, scilicet, »on est bomo albus, negatio est eius  affirmationis, quae dicit, est albus bomo, quae fuit prima  affirmatio. Ergo quaecunque dictarum negationum affe-  ratur contradictoria illi mediae, sequitur quod sint duae  unius, idest quod unius negationis sint duae affirma-  tiones, et quod unius affirmationis sint duae negationes:  quod est impossibile. Et hoc, ut dictum est, sequitur stante  hypothesi erronea, quod illae affBrmationes sint propter  nominum transpositionem diversae.  10.  Adverte hic primo quod Aristoteles per illas duas  negationes, non est non bomo albus, et, non est bomo albus,  sub  disiunctione sumptas ad inveniendam negationem  |  *  Lect. xi, n. 5  "seq.  e  ΤΡ)  DOR  illius affirmationis, est bomo albus, caeteras intellexit, quasi  diceret: Aut negatio talis affirmationis acceptabitur illa  uae est vere eius negatio, aut quaecunque extranea nega-  tio ponetur; et quodlibet dicatur, semper, stante hypothesi,  sequitur unius affirmationis esse plures negationes, unam  verae quae est contradictoria suae comparis habentis no-  mina transposita, et alteram quam tu ut distinctam acce-  ptas, vel falso imaginaris; et e contra multarum affirma-  tionum esse unicam negationem , ut patet in apposita  figura, Ex quacunque enim illarum quatuor incipias, duas  sibi oppositas aspicis. Unde notanter concludit indeter-  minate: Quare erunt duae unius.  11.  Nota secundo quod Aristoteles contempsit pro-  bare quod contradictoria primae affirmationis sit contra-  dictoria secundae, et similiter quod contradictoria secun-  dae affirmationis sit contradictoria primae. Hoc enim ac-  cepit tamquam per se notum, ex eo quod non possunt  simul esse verae neque simul falsae, ut manifeste patet  praeposito sibi termino singulari. Non stant enim simul  aliquo modo istae duae, Socrates est albus bomo, Socrates non  est bomo albus. Nec turberis quod eas non singulares pro-  posuit. Noverat enim supra dictum esse in Primo * quae  LECT. IV  95  affirmatio et negatio sint contradictoriae et quae non, et  ideo non fuit sollicitus de exemplorum claritate.  Liquet ergo ex eo quod negationes affirmationum de  nominibus transpositis non sunt diversae quod nec ipsae  affirmationes sunt diversae et sic nomina et verba trans-  posita idem significant.  I2.  Occurrit autem dubium circa hoc, quia non vi-  detur verum quod nominibus transpositis eadem sit af-  firmatio. Non enim valet: omnis bomo est animal; ergo  omne animal est bomo. Similiter, transposito verbo, non  valet: bomo est amimal rationale; ergo bomo animal ratio-  nale est, de secundo adiacente. Licet enim nugatio commit-  tatur, tamen non sequitur primam.  Ad hoc est dicendum quod sicut in rebus naturalibus  est  duplex transmutatio, scilicet localis, scilicet de loco  ad locum, et formalis de forma ad foit? ita in enun-  ciationibus est duplex transmutatio, situalis scilicet, quando  terminus praepositus postponitur, et e converso, et for-  malis, quando terminus, qui erat praedicatum efficitur  subiectum , et e converso vel quomodolibet, simplici-  ter etc.- Et sicut quandoque fit in naturalibus transmu-  tatio  pure localis, puta quando res transfertur de loco  ad locum, nulla alia variatione facta; quandoque autem  fit transmutatio secundum locum, non pura sed cum  variatione formali, sicut quando transit de'loco frigido  ad  locum calidum: ita in enunciátionibus quandoque  fit transmutatio pure situalis, quando scilicet nomen vel  verbum solo situ vocali variatur; quandoque autem fit  transmutatio situalis et formalis simul, sicut contingit  cum  praedicatum fit subiectum, vel cum verbum ter-  tium adiacens fit secundum. - Et quoniam hic intendit Ari-  stoteles de transmutatione nominum et verborum pure si-  tuali, ut transpositionis vocabulum praesefert, ideo dixit  quod transposita nomina et verba idem significant, insi-  nuare volens quod, si nihil aliud praeter transpositionem  nominis vel verbi accidat in enunciatione, eadem manet  oratio.- Unde patet responsio ad instantias. Manifestum  est namque quod in utraque non sola transpositio fit, sed  transmutatio de subiecto in praedicatum, vel de tertio adia-  cente in secundum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad similia.  TIUS  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  LECTIO QUINTA  (Cann. CargraNr lect, ui).  DE MULTIPLICITATE ENUNCIATIONUM IUXTA QUOSDAM MODOS, QUIBUS NON UNAM,  SED PLURES ESSE CONTINGIT UNAM ENUNCIATIONEM.  ^"  B  Té δὲ ἕν κατὰ πολλῶν ἢ πολλὰ καθ᾽ ἑνὸς χαταφάναι  ἢ ἀποφάναι, ἐὰν uw ἕν τι ἡ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν δη-  λούμενον, οὐχ ἔστι κατάφασις μία οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις.  Λέγω δὲ ἕν οὐχ ἐὰν ὄνομα ἕν ἢ κείμενον, pm ἦ δὲ  ἕν  τι  ἐξ ἐχείνων, olov, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ  ζῷον καὶ δίπουν καὶ ἥμερον, ἀλλὰ x«l ἕν τι γίνεται  ἐκ τούτων’ Ex δὲ τοῦ λευχοῦ, xai τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,  καὶ τοῦ βαδίζειν, οὐχ ἕν: ὥστε οὔτε ἐὰν ἕν τι x&v.  τούτων καταφήσῃ τις; μία κατάφασις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ  μὲν μία, καταφάσεις δὲ πολλαί: οὔτε ἐὰν καθ’ ἑνὸς  ταῦτα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως πολλαί.  Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἐρώτησις ἡ διαλεχτιχὴ ἀποχρίσεώς ἐστιν αἴτη-  σις) ἢ τῆς προτάσεως, ἢ θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντι-  '  φάσεως; ἡ δὲ πρότασις ἀντιφάσεως μιᾶς μόριον, οὐκ  ἂν εἴη ἀπόχρισις μία πρὸς ταῦτα" οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώ-  τῆσις  μία, οὐδὲ ἐὰν ἡ ἀληθής"  εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν. "Apa δὲ δῆλον  ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐρώτησίς ἐστι διαλεκτική, Δεῖ  dp δεδόσθαι ix τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἑλέσθαι, ὁπότερον  βούλεται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μόριον ἀποφήνασθαι. ᾿Αλλὰ  εἴ  τὸν  ἐρωτῶντα προσδιορίσασθαι, πότερον τόδε  ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἢ οὐ τοῦτο.  jtem enunciationis unius provenientem ex  additione negationis infinitatis, hic intendit  D determinare quid accidat enunciationi ex hoc  quod additur aliquid subiecto vel praedi-  cato tollens eius unitatem. Et circa hoc duo facit: quia  *  *  *  Lect. seq.  Num. 4.  Lect. vri, n. 12  seq.  Porphyrius.  primo, determinat diversitatem earum ; secundo, conse-  quentias earum; ibi: Quoniam vero baec quidem * etc. Circa  primum duo facit: primo, ponit earum diversitatem;  secundo, probat omnes enunciationes esse plures; ibi:  Si ergo dialectica * etc.- Dicit ergo quoad primum, resumendo  quod in Primo dictum fuerat *, quod affirmare vel negare  unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno, si ex illis pluribus:  non fit unum, non est enunciatio una affirmativa vel ne-  gativa. Et declarando quomodo intelligatur unum debere  esse subiectum aut praedicatum, subdit quod unum dico non  si nomen unum impositum sit, idest ex unitate nominis ,  sed ex unitate significati. Cum enim plura conveniunt  in uno nomine, ita quod ex eis non fiat unum illius  nominis significatum, tunc solum vocis unitas est. Cum  autem unum nomen pluribus impositum est, sive par-  tibus subiectivis, sive integralibus, ut eadem significatione  concludat, tunc et vocis et significati unitas est, et enun-  ciationis unitas non impeditur.  2.  Secundum quod subiungit: Ut bomo est fortasse ani-  mal et mansuelum et bipes obscuritate non caret. Potest enim  intelligi ut sit exemplem ab opposito, quasi diceret: unum  dico non ex unitate nominis impositi pluribus ex quibus  non fit tale unum, quemadmodum homo est unum quod-  dam ex animali et mansueto et bipede, partibus suae de-  finitionis. Et ne quis crederet quod hae essent verae defi-  nitionis nominis partes, interposuit, fortasse. Porphyrius  autem, Boethio referente et approbante, separat has textus  particulas, dicens quod Aristoteles hucusque declaravit  enunciationem illam esse plures, in qua plura subiiceren-  tur uni, vel de uno praedicarentur plura, ex quibus non  fit unum. In istis autem verbis: Ut bomo est fortasse etc.,  *  At vero unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno affirmare,  vel negare, si non sit unum aliquid quod ex pluribus  significatur, non est affirmatio neque negatio una. Dico  autem unum, non si unum nomen positum sit, non sit  autem unum aliquid ex illis, ut homo est fortasse et ani-  mal et bipes et mansuetum, sed ex his unum fit, ex  albo autem et homine et ambulare, non est unum; quare  nec  si unum aliquid de his affirmet aliquis, erit affir-  matio una: sed vox quidem una, affirmationes vero  multae, nec si de uno ista, sed similiter plures,  Si ergo dialectica interrogatio responsionis est petitio vel  propositionis vel alterius partis contradictionis, propo-  sitio vero unius contradictionis est pars, non erit una  responsio ad haec. Neque enim interrogatio una, nec  si  sit vera.  Dictum est autem de his in Topicis. Simul autem mani-  festum est, quod nec hoc ipsum, quid est, dialectica in-  terrogatio est. Oportet enim datum esse ex interrogatione  eligere, utram velit contradictionis partem enunciare: sed  oportet interrogantem determinare utrum hoc sit homo,  an  non hoc.  intendit declarare enunciationem aliquam esse plures, in  qua plura ex quibus fit unum subiiciuntur vel praedican-  tur; sicut cum dicitur, bomo est animal et mansuetum.| et  bipes, copula interiecta, vel morula, ut oratores faciunt.  Ideo autem addidisse aiunt, fortasse, ut insinuaret hoc  contingere posse, necessarium autem non esse.  3. Possumus in eamdem Porphyrii, Boethii et AI-  berti sententiam incidentes subtilius textum introducere,  ut  quatuor hic faciat.  Bs  Et primo quidem, resumit quae sit enunciatio in com-  muni dicens: Enunciatio plures est, in. qua unum de pluribus,  vel plura de uno. enunciantur. Si tamen ex illis pluribus non  fit unum, ut in Primo * dictum et expositum fuit.  Deinde dilucidat illum terminum de uno, sive unum,  dicens: Dico autem unum, idest, unum nomen voco, non  propter unitatem vocis, sed significationis, ut supradi-  ctum est.  Deinde tertio, dividendo declarat, et declarando divi-  dit, quot modis contingit unum nomen imponi pluribus  ex quibus non fit unum, ut ex hoc diversitatem enuncia-  tionis multiplicis insinuet. Et ponit duos modos, quorum  prior est, quando unum nomen imponitur pluribus ex  quibus fit unum, non tamen in quantum ex eis fit unum.  Tunc enim, licet materialiter et per accidens loquendo  nomen imponatur pluribus ex quibus fit unum, formaliter  tamen et per se loquendo nomen unum imponitur plu-  ribus, ex quibus non fit unum: quia imponitur eis non  in quantum ex eis est unum, ut fortasse est hoc nomen,  bomo, impositum ad significandum animal et mansuetum  et bipes, idest, partes suae definitionis, non in quantum  adunantur in unam hominis naturam per modum actus  et  potentiae, sed ut distinctae sint inter se actualitates.  Et insinuavit quod accipit partes definitionis ut distinctas  per illam coniunctionem, et per illud quoque * adversative  additum: Sed si ex bis unum fit, quasi diceret, cum hoc  tamen stat quod ex eis unum fit. Addidit autem, fortasse,  quia hoc nomen, bomo, non est impositum ad signifi-  *  Cap. xr.  Porphyrius.  Boethius. -  Albertus.  *  *  .  Lect. cit.  Ed.  quoque.  c  omittit  CAP. XI, LECT. V  candum partes sui definitivas, ut distinctae sunt. Sed si  impositum esset aut imponeretur, esset unum nomen  pluribus impositum ex quibus non fit unum. Et quia  idem iudicium est de tali nomine, et illis pluribus; ideo  similiter illae plures partes definitivae possunt dupliciter  accipi. Uno modo, per modum actualis et possibilis, et  sic unum faciunt; et sic formaliter loquendo vocantur  plura, ex quibus fit unum, et pronunciandae sunt con-  tinuata oratione, et faciunt enunciationem unam dicendo,  animal rationale mortale currit. Est enim ista una sicut  et  ista, bomo currit. Alio modo, accipiuntur praedictae  definitionis partes ut distinctae sunt inter se actualita-  tes, et sic non faciunt unum: ex duobus enim actibus  ut  sic, non fit unum, ut dicitur VII Metaphysicae ; et  sic faciunt enunciationes plures et pronunciandae sunt  vel cum pausa, vel coniunctione interposita, dicendo,  bomo est animal et mansuetum. οἱ bipes ; sive, bomo est  animal, mansuetum, bipes, rethorico more. Quaelibet enim  istarum est enunciatio multiplex. Et similiter ista, Socra-  tes est bomo , si homo est impositum ad illa, ut distin-  ctae  —  *  *  Pm  E  WC  acm  οὐ  ORI  οτὔὖὦο  UPS  δ...  δου,  Lect. xit, n. 9.  Num. 8.  RESP  actualitates sunt, significandum. Secundus autem  modus, quo unum nomen impositum est pluribus ex qui-  bus non fit unum, subiungitur, cum dicit: Ex albo au-  tem et bomine. et ambulante etc., idest, alio modo hoc fit,  quando unum nomen imponitur pluribus, ex quibus non  potest fieri unum, qualia sunt: bomo, album, et am-  bulans. Cum enim ex his nullo modo possit fieri aliqua  una natura, sicut poterat fieri ex partibus definitivis, clare  liquet quod nomen aliquod si eis imponeretur, esset no-  men non unum significans, ut in Primo dictum fuit * de  hoc nomine, íumica, imposita homini et equo.  4. Habemus ergo enunciationis pluris seu multiplicis  duos modos, quorum, quia uterque fit dupliciter, effi-  ciuntur quatuor modi. Primus est, quando subiicitur vel  praedicatur unum nomen impositum pluribus, ex quibus  fit unum, non in quantum sunt unum; secundus est,  quando ipsa plura ex quibus fit unum, in quantum sunt  distinctae actualitates, subiiciuntur vel praedicantur; ter-  tius est, quando ibi est unum nomen impositum pluribus  ex quibus non fit unum; quartus est, quando ista plura ex  quibus non fit unum, subiiciuntur vel praedicantur. Et  notato quod cum enunciatio secundum membra divisionis  ilius, qua divisa est, in unam et plures, quadrupliciter  variari poss't, scilicet cum unum de uno praedicatur, vel  unum de pluribus, vel plura de uno, vel plura de pluri-  bus; postremum sub silentio praeterivit, quia vel eius  pluralitas de se clara est, vel quia, ut inquit Albertus,  non intendebat nisi de enunciatione, quae aliquo modo  una est, tractare. Demum concludit totam sententiam ,  dicens: Quare nec si aliquis affirmet unum. de bis pluribus,  erit affirmatio una secundum. rem: sed vocaliter quidem erit  una, significative autem non una, sed multae fient affirma-  liones. Nec si e converso de uno ista plura. affrmabuntur, fiet  affirmatio una. Ista namque, bomo est albus, ambulans et  musicus, importat tres affirmationes, scilicet, bomo est al-  bus et est ambulans et est musicus, ut patet ex illius con-  tradictione.  Triplex enim negatio ili opponitur corre-  spondens triplici affirmationi positae.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Si ergo dialectica etc., probat a  posteriori supradictas enunciationes esse plures. Circa  quod duo facit: primo, ponit rationem ipsam ad hoc pro-  bandum per modum consequentiae; deinde probat ante-  cedens dictae consequentiae; ibi: Dictum est autem de  his* etc. Quoad primum talem rationem inducit. Si in-  terrogatio dialectica est petitio responsionis, quae sit pro-  positio vel altera pars contradictionis, nulli enunciationum  supradictarum interrogative formatae erit responsio una;  ergo nec ipsa interrogatio est una, sed plures. Cuius ra-  Opp. D. Tnowas T. I.  9y  tionis primo ponit antecedens: Si ergo etc. Ad huius intel-  ligendos terminos nota quod idem sonant enunciatio, in-  terrogatio et responsio. Cum enim dicitur, caelum est  animatum , in quantum enunciat praedicatum de subiecto,  enunciatio vocatur; in quantum autem quaerendo propo-  nitur, interrogatio; ut vero quaesito redditur, responsio ap-  pellatur. Idem ergo erit probare non esse responsionem  unam, et interrogationem non esse unam, et enunciatio-  nem non esse unam. Adverte secundo interrogationem  esse  duplicem. Quaedam enim est utram partem contra-  dictionis eligendam proponens; et haec vocatur dialectica,  quia dialecticus habet viam ex probabilibus ad utramque  contradictionis partem probandam. Altera vero determi-  natam ad unum responsionem exoptat; et haec est inter-  rogatio demonstrativa, eo quod demonstrator in unum  determinate tendit. Considera ulterius quod interrogationi  dialecticae dupliciter responderi potest. Uno modo, con-  sentiendo interrogationi, sive affirmative sive negative;  ut  si quis petat, caelum est animatum? et respondeatur ,  est; vel, Deus non movelur? et respondeatur, mon: talis  responsio vocatur propositio. Alio modo, potest respon-  deri interimendo; ut si quis petat, caelum est animatum,  et  respondeatur, non; vel Deus non movetur? et respon-  deatur, movetur: talis responsio vocatur contradictionis  altera pars, eo quod affirmationi negatio redditur et ne-  gationi affirmatio. Interrogatio ergo dialectica est petitio  annuentis responsionis, quae est propositio, vel contradi-  centis, quae est altera pars contradictionis secundum supra-  dictam Boethii expositionem.  6. Deinde subdit probationem consequentiae, cum ait:  Propositio vero unius contradictionis est etc. Ubi notandum  est  quod si responsio dialectica posset esse plures, non  sequeretur quod responsio enunciationis multiplicis non  posset esse dialectica; sed si responsio dialectica non  potest esse nisi una enunciatio, tunc recte sequitur quod  responsio enunciationis pluris, non est responsio diale-  ctica, quae una est. Notandum etiam quod si enunciatio  aliqua plurium contradictionum pars est, una non esse  comprobatur: una enim uni tantum contradicit. Si autem  unius solum contradictionis pars est, una est eadem ra-  tione, quia scilicet unius affirmationis unica est negatio,  et e converso. Probat ergo Aristoteles consequentiam ex  eo quod propositio, idest responsio dialectica unius con-  tradictionis est, idest una enunciatio est affirmativa vel  negativa. Ex hoc enim, ut iam dictum est, sequitur quod  nullius enunciationis multiplicis sit responsio dialectica ,  et  consequenter nec una responsio sit. Nec praetereas  quod cum propositionem, vel alteram partem contradi-  ctionis, responsionemque praeposuerit dialecticae inter-  rogationis, de sola propositione subiunxit, quod est una;  quod ideo fecit, quia illius alterius vocabulum ipsum  unitatem praeferebat. Cum enim alteram contradictionis  partem audis, unam affirmationem vel negationem statim  intelligis.  Adiunxit autem antecedenti ly ergo, vel insinuans hoc  esse  aliunde sumptum, ut postmodum in speciali expli-  cabit, vel, permutato situ, notam consequentiae huius in-  ter antecedens et consequens locandam, antecedenti prae-  posuit; sicut si diceretur, si ergo Socrates currit, movetur ;  pro eo quod dici deberet, si Socrates currit, ergo. movetur.  Sequitur deinde consequens: Nom erit una responsio  ad boc ; et infert principalem conclusionem subdens, Quod  neque  una  erit interrogatio etc. Si enim responsio non  potest esse una, nec interrogatio ipsa una erit.  7. Quod autem addidit: Nec si sit vera, eiusmodi est.  Posset aliquis credere, quod licet interrogationi pluri non  possit dari responsio una, quando id de quo quaestio  fit non potest de omnibus illis pluribus affirmari vel ne-  Boethius.  13*  TAS  98  gari (ut cum quaeritur, canis est animal? quia non potest  vere de omnibus responderi, est, propter caeleste sidus,  nec vere de omnibus responderi, som est, propter canem  latrabilem, nulla possit dari responsio una); attamen quan-  do id quod sub interrogatione cadit potest vere de omnibus  affirmari aut negari, tunc potest dari responsio una; ut  si  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  nec  ipsa quaestio quid est, est interrogatio dialectica:  verbi gratia; si quis quaerat, quid est amimal? talis non  quaerit dialectice. Deinde subiungit probationem assum-  pti, scilicet quod ipsum quid est, non est quaestio dia-  lectica; et intendit quod quia interrogatio dialectica optio-  nem respondenti offerre debet, utram velit contradictionis  quaeratur, camis est substantia? quia potest vere de  omnibus responderi, esí, quia esse substantiam omni-  bus canibus convenit, unica responsio dari possit. Hanc  erroneam existimationem removet dicens: Nec si sit vera,  idest, et dato quod responsio data enunciationi multiplici  de omnibus verificetur, nihilominus non est una, quia  unum non significat, nec unius contradictionis est pars, sed  plures responsio illa habet contradictorias, ut de se patet.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Dictum est autem de bis in To-  picis etc., probat antecedens dupliciter: primo, auctoritate  eorum quae dicta sunt in Topicis; secundo, a signo. Et  circa hoc duo facit. Primo, ponit ipsum signum, dicens:  Quod similiter etc., cum auctoritate Topicorum, manifestum  est, scilicet, antecedens assumptum, scilicet quod dialectica  interrogatio est petitio responsionis affirmativae vel ne-  Quoniam nec ipsum quid est, idest ex eo quod  gativae.  partem, et ipsa quaestio quid est talem libertatem non  proponit (quia cum dicimus, quid est animal? responden-  tem ad definitionis assignationem coarctamus, quae non  solum ad unum determinata est, sed etiam omni parte  contradictionis caret, cum nec esse, nec non esse dicat);  ideo  ipsa quaestio quid est, non est dialectica interro-  gatio. Unde dicit: Oportet enim ex data, idest ex propo-  sita interrogatione dialectica, hunc respondentem eligere  posse utram velit contradictionis partem, quam contra-  dictionis utramque partem interrogantem oportet determi-  nare, idest determinate proponere, hoc modo: Utrum. boc  animal sit bomo an mon: ubi evidenter apparet optionem  respondenti offerri. Habes ergo pro signo cum quaestio  dialectica petat responsionem propositionis , vel alterius  contradictionis partem, elongationem quaestionis quid est  a  quaestionibus dialecticis.  CAP. XI, LECT. VI  LECTIO SEXTA  (Canp. CargTANr lect. 1v)  EX. ALIQUIBUS DIVISIM. PRAEDICATIS DE SUBIECTO SEQUITUR ENUNCIATIO. DE EISDEM  CONIUNCTIM IN EODEM SUBIECTO, EX ALIQUIBUS AUTEM NON SEQUITUR  "Excel δὲ τὰ μὲν κατηγορεῖται συντιθέμενα, ὡς ἕν τὸ πᾶν  κατηγόρημα τῶν χορὶς κατηγορουμένων; τὰ δ᾽ οὔ:  τίς ἡ διαφορά; κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀληθὲς εἰ-  πεῖν καὶ χωρὶς ζῷον, καὶ χωρὶς δίπουν, καὶ ταῦτα  ὡς fv καὶ  ἄνθρωπον, καὶ λευκόν, καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ὡς ἕν.  *  99  Quoniam vero haec quidem praedicantur composita, ut ' Seq. c. x.  unum omne praedicatum fiat eorum quae extra prae-  dicantur, alia vero non; quae differentia est? De ho-  mine enim verum est dicere, εἴ extra animal, et extra  bipes; et haec ut unum: et, hominem, et, album; et  'AXX  οὐχί; εἰ ὀκυτεὺς καὶ ἀγαθός, xal σκυτεὺς  ἀγαθός.  Εἰ γάρ, ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω,  πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ἔσται. Κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ᾿ἀνθρώπου  καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ λευχόν- ὥστε xal τὸ  «muy. Πάλιν, εἰ τὸ λευκὸν αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἅπαν, στε  ἔσται ἄνθρωπος λευχὸς λευχός, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπει-  gov. Καὶ πάλιν μουσικός, λευχός, βαδίζων" καὶ ταῦτα  πολλάκις πεπλεγμένα εἰς ἄπειρον. "Ect, εἰ ὁ Zoxpd-  τῆς  τῆς  Σωχράτης καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ Σωχράτης Σωχρά-  ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ δίπους" καὶ ἄν-  θρωπος ἄνθρωπος δίπους" Ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἴ τις ἁπλῶς  φήσει τὰς συμπλοχοὶς γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ συμβαίνει λέ-  εἰν  Τῶν  ἄτοπα, δῆλον. Ὅπως δὲ θετέον, λέγωμεν νῦν.  αὐτοῦ  δὴ κατηγορουμένων καὶ ἐφ᾽ οἷς χατηγορεῖσθται  συμβαίνει, ὅσα μὲν λέγεται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ κατὰ  τοῦ  ἢ  θάτερον xavd θατέρου, ταῦτα οὐχ  ἔσται ἕν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος λευχός ἐστι xxl μουσιχός.,  ἀλλ᾽  οὐχ ἕν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μουσικόν" συμβεβηκότα  γὰρ ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ. Οὐδ᾽ εἰ τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν  ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ὅμως οὐχ ἔσται τὸ μουσικὸν λευκὸν  ἕν  cv  χατὸὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τὸ μουσικὸν λευχόν"  ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ λευχὸν μουσικὸν ἕν τι.  Διὸ οὐδ᾽ ὁ σχυτεὺς ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸς, ἀλλὰ ζῷον δίπουν.  οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.  Ἔτι οὐδ᾽ ὅσα ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ. Διὸ οὔτε τὸ λευ-  κὸν πολλάχις, οὔτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ξῷόν ἐστιν  ἢ δίπουν" ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ζῷον καὶ  τὸ δίπουν.  vá  aJ  yostquam declaravit diversitatem multiplicis  enunciationis, intendit determinare de earum  consequentiis. Et circa hoc duo facit, secun-  dum duas dubitationes quas solvit. Secunda  incipit; ibi: Verum autem est dicere * etc. Circa  primum tria facit: primo, proponit quaestionem; secundo  ostendit rationabilitatem quaestionis; ibi: Si enim quo-  niam * etc.; tertio, solvit eam ; ibi: Eorum igitur ** etc. Est  ergo dubitatio prima: Quare ex aliquibus divisim prae-  dicatis de uno sequitur enunciatio, in qua illamet unitae  praedicantur de eodem, et ex aliquibus non. Unde haec  diversitas oritur? Verbi gratia; ex istis, Socrates est ami-  mal et est bipes ; sequitur, ergo Socrates est. animal. bipes ;  et similiter ex istis, Socrates est bomo et est albus; sequitur,  ergo Socrates est bomo albus. Ex illis vero, Socrates est bonus,  et.  est.  citbaroedus ; non sequitur, ergo est bonus citbaroedus.  Unde proponens quaestionem inquit: Quoniam vero baec,  scilicet praedicta, ita praedicantur composita, idest con-  iuncta, ut unum sit praedicamentum quae extra praedi-  cantur, idest, ut ex eis extra praedicatis unite fiat praedi-  catio, alia vero praedicata non sunt talia, quae est inter  differentia; unde talis innascitur diversitas? Et subdit exem-  pla iam adducta, et ad propositum applicata: quorum  primum continet praedicata ex quibus fit unum per se,  haec  est  ut  et  unum.  Sed non  si  citharoedus (coriarius)  bonus, etiam citharoedus ('coriarius) bonus.  Si enim quoniam utrunque, verum, esse oportet et simul  utrunque multa inconvenientia erunt. De homine enim  verum est et hominem, et album dicere; quare et  omne. Rursus si album, et omne. Quare erit homo  albus albus; et hoc in infinitum. Et rursus musicus  albus ambulans; et haec eadem frequenter implicita in  infinitum. Amplius si Socrates, Socrates est, et homo;  et  Socrates Socrates homo; et si homo et bipes, erit  homo homo bipes. Quod igitur si quis simpliciter dicat  complexiones fieri, plurima inconvenientia contingere  manifestum est. Quemadmodum ponendum est nunc  dicimus.  Eorum igitur quae praedicantur, et de quibus praedicari  accidit quaecumque secundum accidens dicuntur, vel de  eodem, vel alterum de altero, haec non erunt unum; ut,  homo albus est et musicus; sed non est unum album  et  musicum; accidentia enim sunt utraque eidem. Nec,  si album, musicum verum est dicere, tamen non erit  musicum album unum aliquid: secundum accidens enim  album musicum dicetur; quare non erit album musi-  cum unum aliquid.  Quocirca nec citharoedus (coriarius) bonus simpliciter; sed  animal bipes: non enim sunt secundum accidens.  Amplius nec quaecunque insunt in alio. Quare neque al-  bum frequenter dictum, neque homo homo animal est,  vel bipes; insunt enim in homine animal et bipes.  scilicet, animal et bipes, genus et differentia; secundum  autem praedicata ex quibus fit unum per accidens, sci-  licet, bomo albus; tertium vero praedicata ex quibus neque  unum per se neque unum per accidens inter se fieri se-  quitur; ut, cilbaroedus et bonus, ut declarabitur.  2.  Deinde cum dicit: Si enim quoniam etc., declarat  veritatem diversitatis positae, ex qua rationabilis redditur  quaestio: si namque inter praedicata non esset talis di-  versitas, irrationabilis esset dubitatio. Ostendit autem hoc  ratione ducente ad inconveniens, nugationem scilicet. Et  quia nugatio duobus modis committitur, scilicet explicite et  implicite; ideo primo deducit ad nugationem explicitam,  secundo ad implicitam; ibi: Amplius, si Socrates etc. Ait  ergo quod si nulla est inter quaecumque praedicata diffe-  rentia, sed de quolibet indifferenter censetur quod quia  alterutrum separatum dicitur, quod utrumque coniunctim  dicatur, multa inconvenientia sequentur. De aliquo enim  homine, puta Socrate, verum est separatim dicere quod,  homo est, et albus est; quare et omne, idest et coniun-  ctim dicetur, Socrates est homo albus. Rursus et de eodem  Socrate potest dici separatim quod, est homo albus, et  quod, est albus; quare et omne, idest, igitur coniunctim  dicetur, Socrates est homo albus albus: ubi manifesta est  nugatio. Rursus si de eodem Socrate iterum dicas sepa-  100  ratim quod, est homo albus albus, verum dices et congrue  quod est albus, et secundum hoc, si iterum hoc repetes  separatim, a veritate simili non discedes, et sic in infini-  tum sequetur, Socrates est homo albus, albus, albus in in-  finitum. Simile quod ostenditur in alio exemplo. Si quis  de Socrate dicat quod, est musicus, albus, ambulans, cum  possit et separatim dicere quod, est musicus, et quod,  est  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  accidens enumerasset, unico tamen exemplo utrumque  membrum explanavit, ut insinuaret quod distinctio illa  non erat in diversa praedicata per accidens, sed in eadem  diversimode comparata. Album enim et musicum, com-  parata ad hominem, sub primo cadunt membro; com-  albus, et quod, est ambulans; sequetur, Socrates est  musicus, albus, ambulans, musicus, albus, ambulans. Et  quia pluries separatim, in eodem tamen tempore, enun-  ciari potest, procedit nugatio sine fine.  Deinde deducit ad implicitam nugationem, dicens,  cum  de  Socrate vere dici possit separatim quod, est  homo, et quod, est bipes, si coniunctim inferre licet,  sequetur quod, Socrates sit homo bipes. Ubi est impli-  cita nugatio. Bipes enim circumloquens differentiam ho-  minis actu et intellectu clauditur in hominis ratione. Unde  ponendo loco hominis suam rationem (quod fieri licet,  ut  docet Aristoteles II Topicorum), apparebit manifeste  nugatio. Dicetur enim: Socrates est homo , idest, animal  bipes, bipes. Quoniam ergo plurima inconvenientia se-  quuntur si quis ponat complexiones, idest, adunationes  praedicatorum fieri simpliciter, idest, absque diversitate  aliqua, manifestum est ex dictis. Quomodo autem facien-  dum est, nunc, idest, in sequentibus dicemus. Et nota  quod iste textus non habetur uniformiter apud omnes  quoad verba, sed quia sententia non discrepat, legat qui-  cunque ut vult.  3. Deinde cum dicit: Eorum igitur etc., solvit propo-  sitam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, respon-  *  *"  Num. 11.  Num. 7.  det instantiis in ipsa propositione quaestionis adductis;  secundo, satisfacit instantis in probatione positis; ibi:  Amplius nec quaecumque * etc. Circa primum duo facit:  primo namque, declarat veritatem ; secundo, applicat ad  propositas instantias; ibi: Quocirca * etc. Determinat ergo  dubitationem tali distinctione. Praedicatorum sive subie-  ctorum plurium duo sunt genera: quaedam sunt per ac-  cidens, quaedam per se. Si per accidens, hoc dupliciter  contingit, vel quia ambo dicuntur per accidens de uno  tertio, vel quia alterum de altero mutuo per accidens  praedicatur. Quando illa plura divisim praedicata sunt  per accidens quovis modo, ex eis non sequitur coniun-  ctim praedicatum; quando autem sunt per se, tum ex  eis sequitur coniuncte praedicatum. Unde continuando  se  de  ad praecedentia ait: Eorum. igitur quae praedicantur, et  quibus praedicantur , idest subiectorum , quaecumque  dicuntur secundum accidens (et per hoc innuit oppositum  membrum, scilicet per se), vel de eodem , idest acciden-  taliter  concurrunt ad unius tertii denominationem, vel.  alterutrum. de altero, idest accidentaliter mutuo se deno-  minant (et per hoc ponit membra duplicis divisionis),  ba:c, scilicet plura per accidens, mom erunt unum, idest  non inferent praedicationem coniunctam.  4. Et explanat utrumque horum exemplariter. Et primo,  primum, quando scilicet illa plura per accidens dicuntur  de tertio, dicens: Ut si bomo albus est et musicus. divisim.  Sed non est idem, idest non sequitur adunatim, ergo bomo  est  musicus albus. Utraque enim sunt accidentia eidem  tertio.  Deinde explanat secundum, quando solum illa  plura per accidens de se mutuo praedicantur, subdens:  Nec si album. musicum. verum est dicere, idest, et etiamsi  de se invicem ista praedicantur per accidens ratione sub-  iecti in quo uniuntur, ut dicatur, bomo est albus, et est  musicus, el album est musicum, non tamen sequitur quod  album musicum unite praedicetur, dicendo, ergo bomo est  albus musicus. Et causam assignat, quia album dicitur de  musico per accidens, et e converso.  $. Notandum est hic quod cum duo membra per  parata autem inter se, sub secundo. Diversitatenr ergo  comparationis pluralitate membrorum, identitatem autem  praedicatorum unitate exempli astruxit.  6. Advertendum est ulterius, ad evidentiam divisionis  factae in littera, quod, secundum accidens, potest dupli-  citer accipi. - Uno modo, ut distinguitur contra perseita-  tem posterioristicam , et sic non sumitur hic: quoniam  cum dicitur plura praedicata secundum accidens, - aut  ly secundum accidens determinaret coniunctionem inter se,  et  ma  sic manifeste esset falsa regula; quoniam inter pri-  praedicata, animal bipes, seu, animal rationale, est  praedicatio secundum accidens hoc modo (differentia  enim in nullo modo perseitatis praedicatur de genere, et  tamen Aristoteles in textu dicit ea non esse praedicata  per accidens, et asserit quod est optima illatio, est amimal  et bipes, ergo est animal bipes); - aut determinaret coniun-  ctionem illarum ad subiectum, et sic etiam inveniretur fal-  sitas in regula: bene namque dicitur, paries est coloratus, et  est visibilis, et tamen coloratum visibile non per se inest pa-  rieti. - Alio modo, accipitur ly secundum accidens, ut distin-  guitur contra hoc quod dico, ratione sui, seu, non propter  aliud, et sic idem sonat, quod, per aliud: et hoc modo  accipitur hic. Quaecunque enim sunt talis naturae quod  non ratione sui iunguntur, sed propter aliud, ab illatio-  ne  coniuncta deficere necesse est, ex eo quod coniuncta  illatio unum alteri substernit, et ratione sui ea adunata de-  notat ut potentiam et actum. - Est ergo sensus divisionis,  quod praedicatorum plurium, quaedam sunt per accidens,  quaedam per se, idest, quaedam adunantur inter se ratione  sui, quaedam propter aliud. Ea quae per se uniuntur  inferunt coniunctum, ea autem quae propter aliud, ne-  quaquam.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Quocirca nec. citbaroedus etc., ap-  plicat declaratam veritatem ad partes quaestionis. Et pri-  mo, ad secundam partem, quia sclicet non sequitur: est  bonus et est citharoedus; ergo est bonus citharoedus, di-  cens: Quocirca nec citbaroedus bonus etc.; secundo, ad aliam  partem quaestionis, quare sequebatur: est animal et est  bipes; ergo est animal bipes: et ait: Sed animal bipes etc.  Et subiungit huius ultimi dicti causam, quia, animal bipes,  non sunt praedicata secundum accidens coniuncta inter  se  rum  aut in tertio, sed per se. Et per hoc explanavit alte-  membrum primae divisionis, quod adhuc positum  non fuerat explicite. Adverte quod Aristoteles, eamdem  tenens  sententiam de citharoedo et bono et musico et  albo, conclusit quod album et musicum non inferunt  coniunctum praedicatum; ideo nec citharoedus et bonus  inferunt citharoedus bonus simpliciter, idest coniuncte.  Est autem ratio dicti, quia licet musica et albedo dissi-  miles sint bonitati et arti citharisticae in hoc, quod bo-  nitas nata est denominare et subiectum tertium, puta ho-  minem et ipsam artem citharisticam (propter quod falsitas  manifeste cernitur, quando dicitur: est bonus et citharoe-  dus; ergo bonus citharoedus ), musica vero et albedo sub-  iectum tertium natae sunt denominare tantum, et non se  invicem (propter quod latentior est casus cum procedi-  tur:  est albus et est musicus; ergo est musicus albus),  licet, inquam, in hoc sint dissimiles, et propter istam  dissimilitudinem processus Aristotelis minus sufficiens vi-  deatur; attamen similes sunt in hoc quod, si servetur  identitas omnimoda praedicatorum quam servari oportet,  si illamet divisa debent inferri coniunctim, sicut musica  non denominat albedinem, neque contra, ita nec bonitas,  CAP. XI, LECT. VI  de qua fit sermo, cum dicitur, bomo est bonus, denominat  artem citharisticam, neque e converso. Cum enim bo-  num sit aequivocum, licet a consilio, alia ratione dicitur  de perfectione citharoedi, et alia de perfectione hominis.  Quando namque dicimus, Socrates est bonus, intelligimus  bonitatem moralem, quae est hominis bonitas simpliciter  (analogum siquidem simpliciter positum sumitur pro po-  tiori); cum autem infertur, citharoedus bonus, non boni-  101  9. Nec obstat quod album faciat unum per accideüs  cum homine: non enim dictum est quod unitas per ac-  cidens aliquorum impedit ex diversis inferre coniunctum,  sed quod unitas per acccidens aliquorum ratione tertii  tantum est illa quae impedit. Talia enim quae non sunt  unum per accidens nisi ratione tertii, inter se nullam ha-  tatem moris sed artis praedicas: unde terminorum iden-  titas non salvatur. Sufficienter igitur et subtiliter Aristo-  teles eamdem de utrisque protulit sententiam, quia eadem  est haec, et ibi ratio etc.  8. Nec praetereundum est quod, cum tres consequentias  adduxit quaestionem proponendo, scilicet; est animal et  bipes; ergo est animal bipes: et, est homo et albus; ergo  est  homo albus: et, est citharoedus et bonus; ergo est  bonus citharoedus; et duas primas posuerat esse bonas,  tertiam vero non ; huius diversitatis causam inquirere vo-  lens, cur solvendo quaestionem nullo modo meminerit  secundae consequentiae, sed tantum primae et tertiae.  Indiscussum namque reliquit an illa consequentia sit bona  —-an  ve,  SUB -w  mala. - Et ad hoc videtur mihi dicendum quod ex his  paucis verbis etiam illius consequentiae naturam insi-  nuavit. Profundioris enim sensus textus capax apparet  cum dixit quod, non sunt unum album et musicum etc., ut  scilicet non tantum indicet quod expositum est, sed etiam  eius causam, ex qua natura secundae consequentiae elu-  cescit. Causa namque quare album et musicum non in-  ferunt coniunctam, praedicationem est, quia in praedica-  tione coniuncta oportet alteram partem alteri supponi,  ut  potentiam actui, ad hoc ut ex eis fiat aliquo. modo  unum, et altera a reliqua denominetur (hoc enim vis  coniunctae praedicationis requirit, ut supra diximus de  partibus definitionis); album autem et musicum secundum  se  non faciunt unum per se, ut patet, neque unum per  accidens. Licet enim ipsa ut adunantur in subiecto uno  sint unum subiecto per accidens, tamen ipsamet quae  adunantur in uno, tertio subiecto, non faciunt inter se  unum per accidens: tum quia neutrum informat alterum  (quod requiritur ad unitatem per accidens aliquorum inter  se, licet non in tertio); tum quia non considerata subiecti  unitate, quae est extra eorum rationes, nulla remanet inter  ea  unitatis causa. Dicens ergo quod album et musicum  non sunt unum, scilicet inter se, aliquo modo, causam  expressit quare coniunctim non infertur ex eis praedica-  tum. Et quia oppositorum eadem est disciplina, insinuavit  per illamet verba bonitatem illius consequentiae. Ex eo  enim quod homo et albus se habent sicut potentia et actus,  (et ita albedo informet, denominet atque unum faciat cum  homine ratione sui), sequitur quod ex divisis potest inferri  coniuncta praedicatio; ut dicatur: est bomo et albus; ergo  δὲ bomo albus. Sicut per oppositum dicebatur quod ideo  musicum et album non inferunt coniunctum praedicatum  quia neutrum alterum informabat.  bent unitatem; et propterea non potest inferri coniun-  ctum, ut dictum est, quod unitatem importat. Illa vero  quae sunt unum per accidens ratione sui, seu inter se, ut,  bomo albus, cum coniuncta accipiuntur, unitate necessaria  non carent, quia inter se unitatem habent. Notanter autem  apposui ly tantum : quoniam si aliqua duo sunt unum per  accidens, ratione tertii subiecti scilicet, sed non tantum ex  hoc habent unitatem, sed etiam ratione sui,ex hoc quod  alterum reliquum informat, ex istis divisis non prohibetur  inferri coniunctum. Verbi gratia, optime dicitur: est quan-  tum et est coloratum; ergo est quantum coloratum: quia  color informat quantitatem.  IO.  Potes  autem credere quod secunda illa conse-  quentia, quam non explicite confirmavit Aristoteles re-  spondendo, sit bona et ex eo quod ipse proponendo  quaestionem asseruit bonam, et ex eo quod nulla istantia  reperitur. Insinuavit autem et Aristoteles quod sola talis  unitas impedit illationem coniunctam, quando dixit quae-  cunque secundum. accidens dicuntur vel de eodem vel alteru-  trum. de altero. Cum enim dixit, secundum. accidens de eo-  dem , unitatem eorum ex sola adunatione in tertio posuit  (sola enim haec per accidens praedicantur de eodem,  ut  dictum est); cum autem addidit, vel alterutrum de al-  tero, mutuam accidentalitatem ponens, ex nulla parte in-  ter se unitatem reliquit. Utraque ergo per accidens ad-  ducta praedicata, in tertio scilicet vel alterutrum, quae im-  pediant illationem coniunctam, nonnisi in tertio unitatem  habent.  11. Deinde cum dicit: Amplius nec etc., satisfacit instan-  tiis in probatione adductis, et in illis in quibus explicita  committebatur nugatio, et in illis in quibus implicita; et  ait quod non solum inferre ex divisis coniunctum non  licet quando praedicata illa sunt per accidens, sed mec  etiam quaecunque insunt im alio: idest, sed nec hoc licet  quando praedicata includunt se, ita quod unum includa-  tur in significato formali alterius intrinsece, sive explicite,  ut  album in albo, sive implicite, ut animal et bipes in  homine. Quare neque album frequenter dictum divisim  infert  coniunctum, neque bomo divisim ab animali vel  bipede enunciatum, animal bipes *, coniunctum cum ho-  mine infert; ut dicatur, ergo Socrates est bomo bipes, vel ani-  mal bomo. Insunt enim in hominis ratione, animal et bi-  pes actu et intellectu, licet implicite. Stat ergo solutio  quaestionis in hoc, quod unitas plurium per accidens in  tertio tantum et nugatio, impediunt ex divisis inferri con-  iunctum ; et consequenter , ubi neutrum horum inven'tur,  licebit inferre coniunctum.  divisis  ex  quando divisae sunt simul verae de eodem etc.  Et  hoc  intellige  *  vel bipes.  Ed. c: animal  102  ᾿  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  LECTIO SEPTIMA  (Can. CargTAN: lect. v)  AN EX ENUNCIATIONE HABENTE PLURA PRAEDICATA CONIUNCTIM INFERRE LICEAT  ENUNCIATIONEM QUAE EADEM PRAEDICATA DIVISIM CONTINET  ᾿Αληθὲς δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν χατὰ τοῦ τινὸς χαὶ ἁπλῶς, οἷον  τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον, 5 τὸν τινὰ λευχὸν ἀν-  θρωπον ἄνθρωπον. λευκόν: οὐχ ἀεὶ δέ.  ᾽Αλλ᾽  ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῷ προσχειμένῳ τῶν ἀντιχειμένων τι  ἐνυπάρχῃ; ᾧ ἕπε ται ἀντίφασις, οὐχ ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ  y: 930oc, οἷον τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν"  ὅταν δὲ Un ἐνυπάρχῃ; ἀληθές.  "H ὅταν μὲν ἐνυπάρχῃ, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀληθές: ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυ-  πάρχῃ, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ, Ὅμηρός ἐ ἐστί τι, οἷον  ποιητής" ἄρ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἔστιν, ἢ 00;  χατὰ cup ps βηχὸς γὰρ “κατηγορεῖται τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ  ἔστι" ὅτι 12e ποιητής ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ κα-  τηγορε εἴται χατὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ ἔστιν.  Ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις κατηγορίαις μήτε ἐναντιότης ἔνε στιν, Hu  λόγοι ἀντ᾽ ὀνομάτων λέγονται; καὶ xa ἑαυτὸ χα-  τηγορῆται; χαὶ μὴ κατὰ “συμβεβηκός , ἐπὶ τούτων  τὸ τὶ χαὶ ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς ἔσται εἰπεῖν.  "  Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐχ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὄν τι’  δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ  i» ὩΣ secundam dubitationem. Et circa hoc tria fa-  *  *  *  Num.seq.  Num. 17.  Num. 8.  Ξ  ys do solvit eam; ibi: Sed quando in adiecto * etc.,  tertio, ex hoc excludit quemdam errorem; ibi:  Quod autem non est* etc. Est ergo quaestio: an ex enuncia-  tione habente praedicatum coniunctum, liceat inferre enun-  ciationes dividentes illud coniunctum; et est quaestio: con-  traria superiori. Ibi enim quaesitum est an ex divisis infe-  ratur coniunctum; hic autem quaeritur an ex coniuncto  sequantur divisa. Unde movendo quaestionem dicit: erum  aulem. aliquando est dicere de aliquo et. simpliciter, idest di-  visim, quod scilicet prius dicebatur coniunctim, ΜῈ quem-  dam hominemalbum esse bominem, aut quoddam album ho-  minem. album esse, idest ut ex ista, Socrates est. bomo albus,  sequitur divisim, ergo Socrates est bomo, ergo Socrates est albus.  Non autem. semper, idest aliquando autem ex coniuncto  non inferri potest divisim; non enim sequitur, Socrates est  bonus citbaroedus, ergo est bonus. Unde haec est differentia,  quod quandoque licet et quandoque non. Et adverte quod  notanter  adduxit  exemplum de homine albo, inferendo  utramque partem divisim, ut insinuaret quod intentio  quaestionis est investigare quando ex coniuncto potest  utraque pars divisim inferri, et non quando altera tantum.  2. Deinde cum dicit: Sed quando in adiecto etc., solvit  quaestionem. Et duo facit: primo, respondet parti negati-  vae  quaestionis, quando scilicet non licet; secundo, ibi:  Quare in quantiscumque * etc., respondet parti affirmativae,  quando scilicet licet. Circa primum considerandum quod  quia dupliciter contingit fieri praedicatum coniunctum, uno  modo ex oppositis, alio modo ex non oppositis, ideo duo  facit: primo, ostendit quod numquam ex praedicato con-  iuncto ex oppositis possunt inferri eius partes divisim;  secundo, quod nec hoc licet universaliter in praedicato  coniuncto ex non oppositis, ibi: Pel etiam quando etc. Ait  ergo quod quando in termino adiecto inest aliquid de  numero oppositorum, ad quae sequitur contradictio inter  * Verum autem est dicere de aliquo et simpliciter; ut aliquem ' Sea. c. xr.  hominem hominem, aut aliquem album hominem , ho-  hominem album: non autem semper.  Sed quando in adiecto aliquid quidem oppositorum insit,  quod consequitur contradictio, non verum sed falsum  est; ut, hominem mortuum, hominem dicere: quando  autem non insit, verum est.  Aut quando insit quidem, semper non verum est: quando  vero non insit , non semper verum est; ut, Homerus  est  aliquid, ut poeta: utrum igitur est, an ergo etiam  est; non?  Secundum accidens enim praedicatur, est, de Homero;  (quoniam est enim poeta), sed non secundum se praedi-  catur de Homero ipsum est.  Quare in quantiscunque praedicationibus neque contrarietas,  [aliqua aut nulla oppositio] inest, si definitiones pro no-  minibus dicantur, et secundum se praedicantur et non se-  cundum accidens, in his aliquid et simpliciter verum  erit dicere.  Quod autem non est, quoniam opinabile est, non est verum  dicere esse aliquid: opinio enim eius non est, quoniam  est, sed quoniam non est.  ipsos terminos, »on verum. est, scilicet inferre divisim, sed  falsum. Verbi gratia cum dicitur, Caesar est bomo mortuus,  non sequitur, ergo est bomo: quia ly mortuus, adiacens ho-  mini, oppositionem habet ad hominem, quam. sequitur  contradictio  inter  hominem et mortuum: si enim est  homo, non est mortuus, quia .non est corpus inanimatum;  et si est mortuus, non est homo, quia mortuum est corpus  inanimatum. Quando autem mon inest, scilicet talis. op-  positio, verum est, scilicet inferre divisim. Ratio autem  quare, quando est oppositio in adiecto, non sequitur il-  latio divisa est, quia alter terminus ex adiecti oppositione  corrumpitur in ipsa enunciatione coniuncta. Corruptum  autem seipsum absque corruptione non infert, quod il-  latio divisa sonaret.  3. Dubitatur hic primo circa id quod supponitur,  quomodo possit vere dici, Caesar est bomo mortuus , cum  enunciatio non possit esse vera, in qua duo contradi-  ctoria  simul de aliquo praedicantur. Hoc enim est pri-  mum principium. Zomo autem et mortuus, ut in littera  dicitur, contradictoriam oppositionem includunt, quia in  homine includitur vita, in mortuo non vita. - Dubitatur  secundo circa ipsam consequentiam, quam reprobat Ari-  stoteles: videtur enim . optima. Cum enim ex enuncia-  tione praedicante duo contradictoria possit utrumque in-  ferri (quia aequivalet copulativae), aut neutrum, (quia  destruit seipsam), et enunciatio supradicta terminos op-  positos contradictorie praedicet, videtur sequi utraque  pars, quia falsum est neutram sequi.  4. Ad hoc simul dicitur quod aliud est loqui de duo-  bus terminis secundum se, et aliud de eis ut unum stat  sub determinatione alterius. Primo namque modo, bomo  et  moriuus, contradictionem inter se habent, et impossi-  bile est quod simul in eodem inveniantur. Secundo au-  tem modo, bomo et mortuus, non opponuntur, quia homo  transmutatus iam per determinationem corruptivam im-  portatam in ly mortuus, non stat pro suo significato se-  cundum se, sed secundum exigentiam termini additi, a  CAP. XI,  quo suum significatum distractum est. Ad utrunque au-  tem insinuandum Aristoteles duo dixit, et quod habent  oppositionem quam sequitur contradictio, attendens signi-  ficata eorum secundum se, et quod etiam ex eis forma-  tur una vera enunciatio cum dicitur, Socrates est bomo mor-  iuus,  attendens coniunctionem eorum alterius corrupti-  vam. Unde patet quid dicendum sit ad dubitationes. Ad  utramque siquidem dicitur, quod non enunciantur duo  contradictoria simul de eodem, sed terminus ut stat sub  distractione *, seu transmutatione alterius,cui secundum se  *  Ed. c: distin-  clione.  esset contradictorius.  5. Dubitatur quoque circa id quod ait: /mest aliquid  oppositorum quae consequitur contradictio; superflue enim vi-  detur addi illa particula, quae consequitur contradictio. Omnia  enim opposita consequitur contradictio, ut patet discurren-  do in singulis; pater enim est non filius, et album non ni-  grum, et videns non caecum etc.  Et ad hoc dicendum est quod opposita possunt du-  pliciter accipi: uno modo formaliter, idest secundum sua  significata; alio modo denominative, seu subiective. Verbi  gratia, pater et filius possunt accipi pro paternitate et  filiatione, et possunt accipi pro eo qui denominatur pater  vel filius. Rursus cum omnis distinctio fiat oppositione  aliqua, ut dicitur in X Metapbysicae , supponatur omnino  distincta esse opposita. Dicendum ergo est quod, licet ad  omnia opposita seu distincta contradictio sequatur inter  se  formaliter sumpta, non tamen ad omnia opposita se-  quitur contradictio inter ipsa denominative sumpta. Quam-  vis enim pater et filius mutuam sui negationem inferant  inter se formaliter, quia paternitas est non filiatio, et fi-  liatio  est non paternitas; in relatione tamen ad denomi-  natum, contradictionem non necessario inferunt. Non  enim sequitur, Socrates est pater; ergo mon est filius; nec e  converso. Ut persuaderet igitur Aristoteles quod non quae-  cunque opposita colligata impediunt divisam illationem  (quia non illa quae habent contradictionem annexam for-  maliter tantum, sed illa quae ,habent contradictionem et  formaliter et secundum rem denominatam), addidit: quae  consequitur contradictio, in tertio scilicet denominato. Et  usus est satis congrue vocabulo, scilicet, consequitur : con-  tradictio enim ista in tertio est quodammodo extra ipsa  opposita.  6. Deinde cum dicit: Vel etiam quando est etc., decla-  rat quod ex non oppositis in tertio coniunctis secun-  dum unum praedicatum, non universaliter possunt in-  ferri partes divisim. Et primo, hoc proponit quasi emen-  dans quod immediate dixerat, subiungens: Vel etiam quan-  do est, scilicet oppositio inter terminos coniunctos, falsum  est semper, scilicet inferre divisim ; quasi diceret : dixi quod  quando inest oppositio, non verum sed falsum est inferre  divisim; quando autem non inest talis oppositio, verum  est inferre divisim. Vel etiam ut melius dicatur, quod  quando est oppositio, falsum est semper, quando autem  non inest talis oppositio, non semper verum est. Et sic  modificavit supradicta addendo ly semper, et, nom semper.  Et subdens exemplum quod non semper ex non oppo-  sitis sequatur divisio, ait: Ut, Homerus est aliquid ut poeta;  ergo eliam. est? Non. Ex hoc coniuncto, est poeta, de Ho-  mero enunciato, altera pars, ergo Homerus est, non se-  quitur; et tamen clarum est quod istae duae partes col-  ligatae, est et poeta, non. habent oppositionem, ad quam  sequitur contradictio. Igitur non semper ex non oppo-  sitis coniunctis illatio divisa tenet etc.  .  7. Deinde cum dicit: Secundum. accidens etc., probat  hoc, quod modo dictum est, ex eo quod altera pars istius  compositi, scilicet, est, in antecedente coniuncto praedica-  tur  de  Homero secundum accidens , idest ratione alte-  rius, quoniam, scilicet poeta, praedicatur de Homero, et  LECT. VII  103  non praedicatur secundum se ly est de Homero; quod ta-  men  infertur, cum concluditur: ergo Homerus est. - Con-  siderandum est hic quod ad solvendam illam conclusionem  negativam , scilicet, - non semper ex non oppositis con-  iunctis  infertur divisim, - sufficit unam instantiam suae  oppositae universali affirmativae afferre. Et hoc fecit Ari-  stoteles adducendo illud genus enunciationum, in quo  altera pars coniuncti est aliquid pertinens ad actum ani-  mae.  Loquimur enim modo de Homero vivente in poe-  matibus suis in mentibus hominum. In his siquidem  enunciationibus partes coniunctae non sunt oppositae in  tertio, et tamen non licet inferre utramque partem divi-  sim. Committitur enim fallacia secundum quid ad sim-  pliciter. Non enim valet, Caesar est laudatus, ergo. est: et  simile  est  de esse in effectu dependente in conservari.  Quomodo autem intelligenda sit ratio ad hoc adducta  ab Aristotele in sequenti particula dicetur.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Quare in quantiscunque etc., re-  spondet parti affirmativae quaestionis, quando scilicet ex  coniunctis licet inferre divisim. Et ponit duas conditio-  nes  oppositas supradictis debere convenire in unum, ad  hoc ut possit fieri talis consequentia; scilicet, quod nulla  inter partes coniuncti oppositio sit, et quod secundum  se  praedicentur. Unde dicit inferendo ex dictis: Quare in  quantiscunque praedicamentis, idest praedicatis ordine quo-  dam adunatis, meque contrarietas aliqua, in cuius ratione  ponitur contradictio in tertio (contraria enim sunt quae  mutuo se ab eodem expellunt), aut universaliter nulla op-  positio inest, ex qua scilicet sequatur contradictio in ter-  tio, si. definitiones pro. nominibus sumantur. Dixit hoc, quia  licet in quibusdam non appareat oppositio, solis nomini-  bus positis, sicut, bomo mortuus, et in quibusdam ap-  pareat, ut, vivum mortuum; hoc tamen non obstante,  si, positis nominum definitionibus loco nominum, oppo-  sitio appareat, inter opposita collocamus. Sicut, verbi gra-  .tia, bomo mortuus , licet oppositionem non praeseferat ,  tamen si loco hominis et mortui eorum definitionibus  utamur, videbitur contradictio. Dicemus enim corpus ani-  matum rationale, corpus inanimatum irrationale. In quan-  tiscunque, inquam, coniunctis nulla est oppositio, ef se-  cundum se, et non secundum | accidens. praedicantur , in. bis  verum. erit. dicere et. simpliciter , idest divisim quod fuerat  coniunctim enunciatum.  9. Ad evidentiam secundae conditionis hic positae,  nota quod ly secumdum se potest dupliciter accipi: uno  modo positive, et sic dicit perseitatem primi, secundi,  universaliter, quarti modi; alio modo negative, et sic  idem sonat quod non per aliud. - Rursus considerandum  est  quod cum Aristoteles dixit de praedicato coniuncto  quod, secundum se praedicetur, ly secundum. se potest ad  tria referri, scilicet, ad partes coniuncti inter se, ad totum  coniunctum respectu subiecti, et ad partes coniuncti re-  spectu subiecti. Si ergo accipiatur ly secumdum se posi-  tive, licet non falsus, extraneus tamen a mente Aristo-  telis reperitur sensus ad quodcunque illorum trium re-  feratur.  Licet  enim valeat, est bomo risibilis , ergo. est  bomo et est risibilis, et, est animal rationale, ergo est ani-  mal et est rationale; tamen his oppositae inferunt similes  consequentias. Dicimus enim, est albus musicus, ergo est  musicus et est. albus: ubi nulla est perseitas, sed est con-  iunctio per accidens, tam inter partes inter se, quam inter  totum et subiectum, quam etiam inter partes et subie-  ctum. Liquet igitur quod non accipit Aristoteles ly secun-  dum se positive, ex eo quod vana fuisset talis additio, quae  ab oppositis non facit in hoc differentiam. Ad quid enim  addidit, secundum se, et non, secundum accidens, si tam  illae quae sunt secundum se, modo exposito, quam illae  quae  sunt secundum accidens ex coniuncto, inferunt di-  104  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  visum? - Si vero accipiatur secundum se, negative, idest,  non per aliud, et referatur ad partes coniuncti inter se,  falsa invenitur regula. Nam non licet dicere, est bonus  cilbaroedus ; ergo est. bonus et citlbaroedus ; et tamen ars  citharizandi et bonitas eius sine medio coniunguntur. Et  similiter contingit, si referatur ad totum coniunctum re-  spectu  subiecti, ut in eodem exemplo apparet. Totum  enim hoc, citbaroedus bonus, non propter aliud convenit  homini; et tamen non infert, ut dictum est, divisionem.  Superest ergo ut ad partem coniuncti respectu subiecti  referatur, et sit sensus: quando aliqua coniunctim prae-  dicata, secundum se, idest, non per aliud, praedicantur, idest,  quod utraque pars praedicatur de subiecto non propter  alteram, sed propter seipsam et subiectum, tunc ex con-  Averroes.  Boethius.  * Ed. c: idest, ne-  gative.  *  Ed. c: opinio-  nem.  iuncto infertur divisa praedicatio.  το. Et hoc modo exponunt Averroes et Boethius; et  vera invenitur regula, ut inductive facile manifestari po-  test, et ratio ipsa suadet. Si enim partes alicuius coniuncti  praedicati ita inhaerent subiecto quod neutra propter al-  teram insit, earum separatio nihil habet quod veritatem  impediat divisarum. Est et verbis Aristotelis consonus  sensus iste. Quoniam et per hoc distinguit inter enun-  ciationes  ex  quibus coniunctum infert divisam praedica-  tionem, et eas quibus haec non inest consequentia. Istae  siquidem ultra habentes oppositiones in adiecto, sunt  habentes praedicatum coniunctum, cuius una partium al-  terius est ita determinatio, quod nonnisi per illam subie-  ctum respicit, sicut apparet in exemplo ab Aristotele ad-  ducto, Homerus est poeta. Est siquidem ibi non respicit  Homerum ratione ipsius Homeri, sed praecise ratione  poesis relictae; et ideo non licet inferre, ergo Homerus  est. Et simile est in negativis. Si quis enim dicat, Socrates  non  est  paries, non licet inferre, ergo Socrates mon est,  eadem ratione, quia esse non est negatum de Socrate,  sed de pariete in Socrate.  11. Et per hoc patet qualiter sit intelligenda ratio in  textu superiore adducta. Accipitur enim ibi, secundum se  negative *, modo hic exposito, et secundum accidens, idest  propter aliud. In eadem ergo significatione est usus ly  secundum. accidens, solvendo hanc et praecedentem quae-  stionem: utrobique enim intellexit secundum accidens,  idest, propter aliud, coniuncta, sed ad diversa retulit. Ibi  namque ly secundum. accidens determinabat coniunctionem  duorum praedicatorum inter se; hic vero determinat par-  tem coniuncti praedicati in ordine ad subiectum. Unde  ibi, album et musicum, inter ea quae secundum accidens  sunt, numerabantur; hic autem non.  12. Sed occurrit circa hanc expositionem * dubitatio non  parva. Si enim ideo non licet ex coniuncto inferre divisim,  quia altera pars coniuncti non respicit subiectum propter  se, sed propter alteram partem (ut dixit Aristoteles de  ista enunciatione, Homerus est poeta), sequetur quod num-  quam a tertio adiacente ad secundum erit bona consequen-  tia: quia in omni enunciatione de tertio adiacente, est respi-  cit subiectum propter praedicatum et non propter se etc.  13. Ad huius difficultatis evidentiam, nota primo hanc  distinctionem. Aliud est tractare regulam, quando ex tertio  adiacente  infertur  secundum et quando non, et aliud  quando ex coniuncto fit illatio divisa et quando non. Illa  siquidem est extra propositum, istam autem venamur.  Illa compatitur varietatem terminorum, ista non. Si nam-  que unus terminorum, qui est altera pars coniuncti, se-  cundum significationem seu suppositionem varietur in  separatione, non infertur ex coniuncto praedicato illud-  met divisim, sed aliud. - Nota secundo hanc propositio-  nem: Cum ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum, non  servatur identitas terminorum. Liquet ista quoad illum  terminum, es/. Dictum siquidem fuit supra a sancto Tho-  ma *, quod aliud importat est secundum adiacens, et aliud  est tertium adiacens. Illud namque importat actum essendi  simpliciter, hoc autem habitudinem inhaerentiae vel iden-  titatis  praedicati ad subiectum. Fit ergo varietas unius  termini cum ex tertio adiacente infertur secundum, et  consequenter non fit illatio divisi ex coniuncto. - Unde  praelucet responsio ad obiectionem, quod, licet ex tertio  adiacente quandoque possit inferri secundum, numquam  tamen ex tertio adiacente licet inferri secundum tamquam  ex  coniuncto divisum, quia inferri non potest divisim ,  cuius altera pars ipsa divisione perit. Negetur ergo con-  sequentia obiectionis et ad probationem dicatur quod,  optime concludit quod talis illatio est illicita infra limites  illationum , quae ex coniuncto divisionem inducunt, de  quibus hic Aristoteles loquitur.  I4. Sed contra hoc instatur. Quia etiam tanquam  ex  per  coniuncto divisa fit illatio, Socrates est albus, ergo est,  locum a parte in modo ad suum totum, ubi non  fit varietas terminorum. - Et ad hoc dicitur quod licet  homo albus sit pars in modo hominis (quia nihil minuit  de hominis ratione albedo, sed ponit hominem simplici-  ter), tamen est album non est pars in modo ipsius est, eo  quod pars in modo est universale cum conditione non  minuente, ponente illud simpliciter. Clarum est autem  quod album minuit rationem ipsius esf, et non ponit  ipsum simpliciter: contrahit enim ad esse secundum quid.  Unde apud philosophos, cum fit aliquid album, non di-  citur generari, sed generari secundum quid.  15. Sed instatur adhuc quia secundum hoc, dicendo,  est animal, ergo est, fit illatio divisa per eumdem locum.  Animal enim non minuit rationem ipsius est. - Ad hoc  est  dicendum quod ly est, si dicat veritatem propositio-  nis, manifeste peccatur a secundum quid ad simpliciter.  Si autem dicat actum essendi, illatio est bona, sed non  est  de tertio, sed de secundo adiacente.  16. Potest ulterius dubitari circa principale: quia se-  quitur, est quantum coloratum, ergo est quantum, et, est. co-  loratum ; et tamen coloratum respicit subiectum mediante  quantitate: ergo non videtur recta expositio supra addu-  cta. - Ad hoc et similia dicendum est quod coloratum non  ita inest subiecto per quantitatem quod sit eius determi-  natio et ratione talis determinationis subiectum denomi-  net, sicut bonitas artem citharisticam determinat ; cum di--  citur, est citbaroedus bonus; sed potius subiectum ipsum  primo coloratum denominatur, quantum vero secundario  coloratum. dicitur, licet color media quantitate suscipia-  tur. Unde notanter supra diximus, quod tunc altera pars  coniuncti praedicatur per accidens, quando praecise de-  nominat subiectum, quia denominat alteram partem. Quod  nec in hac, nec in similibus instantiis invenitur  17. Deinde cum dicit: Quod autem non est etc., exclu-  dit quorumdam errorem qui, quod "on est, esse tali syl-  logismo concludere satagebant: Quod est, opinabile est.  Quod non est, est opinabile. Ergo quod non est, est. - Hunc  siquidem processum elidit Aristeteles destruendo primam  propositionem, quae partem coniuncti in subiecto divisim  praedicat, ac si diceret: est opinabile, ergo est. Unde as-  sumendo subiectum conclusionis illorum ait: Quod autem  non est; et addit medium eorum, quoniam opinabile est; et  subdit maiorem extremitatem, »om est verum dicere, esse  aliquid. Et causam assignat, quia talis opinatio non pro-  pterea est, quia illud sit, sed potius quia non est.  pere — —  *  et im.  Lib. II, lect. 1  CAP. XII, LECT. VIII  LECTIO OCTAVA  (Canp. CareTANt lect. v1)  DE PROPOSITIONIBUS MODALIBUS EARUMQUE INTER SE OPPOSITIONE  Τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, σχεπτέον ὅπως ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀπο-  φάσεις χαὶ χαταφάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, αἱ τοῦ δυνα-  τὸν  εἶναι καὶ μὴ δυνατόν, χαὶ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ  ἐνδεχόμενον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου τε καὶ ἀναγκα-  (ou*  ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίας τινάς.  Εἰ γὰρ τῶν συμπλεκομένων αὗται ἀλλήλαις ἀντίχεινται  ἀντιφάσεις, ὅσαι χατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τάτ-  *  105  :  His vero determinatis, considerandum est quemadmodum  se se habent negationes et affirmationes ad se invicem;  quae sunt de possibili esse et non possibili, et de con-  tingenti, et de impossibili, et necessario; habent enim  aliquas dubitationes.  Nam si eorum, quae corpplectuntur, illae sunt sibi invicem  oppositae contradictiones, quaecunque secundum esse  τονται, οἷον τοῦ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ  εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, οὐ τὸ εἶναι μιὴ ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοῦ  εἶναι λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸ, p εἶναι λευκὸν ἄνθρω-  πον,  ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ εἶναι μὴ λευχὸν ἄνθρωπον" εἰ γὰρ  — χατὰ παντὸς ἡ κατάφασις ἢ ἡ ἀπόφασις, τὸ ξύλον  ἔσται ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν εἶναι μιὴ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰ δὲ  τοῦτο οὕτως, καὶ ὅσοις τὸ εἶναι μὴ προστίθεται, τὸ  αὐτὸ ποιήσει τὸ ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶναι λεγόμενον, οἷον τοῦ,  ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει, οὐ τὸ οὐχ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζει, ἀπό-  φάσις ἔσται, ἀλλὰ «0, οὐ βαδίζει ἄνθρωπος- οὐδὲν  dg  διαφέρει εἰπεῖν, ἄνθρωπον βαδίζειν, ἢ ἄνθρωπον  ζαλζοντα εἶναι. Ὥστε, εἰ οὕτως πανταχοῦ, καὶ τοῦ  υνατὸν εἶναι ἀπόφασις ἔσται τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι,  ἀλλ᾽  οὐ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι.  Δοχεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ δύνασθαι χαὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι: πᾶν  do τὸ δυνατὸν τέμνεσθαι ἢ βαδίζειν, καὶ μὴ βα-  ίζειν xa μὴ τέμνεσϑαι δυνατόν: λόγος δέ, ὅτι ἅπαν  τὸ οὕτω δυνατὸν οὐχ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥστε ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ  'χαὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις: δύναται γὰρ καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν τὸ  βαδιστικόν, καὶ μὴ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ὁρατόν. ᾿Αλλὰ μιὴν  ἀδύνατον χατὸὺ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀληθεύεσθαι τας ἄντι-  χειμένας φάσεις. Οὐχ ἄρα τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀπό-  ασίς ἐστι τὸ, δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι.  Συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ φάναι xal ἀποφάναι  ἅμα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ μὴ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ  εἶναι τὰ προστιθέμενα γίνεσθαι φάσεις καὶ ἀποφά-  σεις.  Εἰ οὖν ἐχεῖνο ἀδύνατον, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη αἱρετόν.  gj  ostquam determinatum est de enunciationi-  Sybus, quarum partibus aliud additur tam rema-  MZ'nente quam variata unitate, hic intendit de-  clarare quid accidat enunciationi, ex eo quod.  aliquid additur, non suis partibus, sed com-  positioni eius. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, determinat de  E" Eest. x.  .  —  *Num. 7.  *Ed. c: et  sibili.  oppositione earum ; secundo, de consequentiis; ibi: Conse-  quentiae vero* etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit  quod intendit; secundo, exequitur; ibi: Nam si eorum * etc.  Proponit ergo quod iam perspiciendum est, quomodo se  pos-  i  habeant affirmationes et negationes enunciationum de *  possibili et non possibili etc. Et causam subdit: Habent enim  multas dubitationes speciales. - Sed antequam ulterius pro-  cedatur, quoniam de enunciationibus, quae modales vo-  cantur, sermo inchoatur, praelibandum est esse quasdam  modales enunciationes, et qui et quot sunt modi reddentes:  propositiones modales; et quid earum sit subiectum et  quid praedicatum ; et quid sit ipsa enunciatio modalis ;  quisque sit ordo earum ad praecedentes; et quae necessi-  tas sit specialem faciendi tractatum de his.  Ὶ  2.  Quia ergo possumus dupliciter de rebus loqui;  uno modo, componendo rem unam cum alia, alio modo,  compositionem factam declarando qualis sit, insurgunt  duo enunciationum genera; quaedam scilicet enunciantes  Opp. D. Tgowaz T. I.  »  et  non esse disponuntur, ut eius quae est, esse homi-  nem, negatio est, non esse hominem, non autem ea  quae  est, esse non hominem: et eius, quae est, esse  album hominem, ea quae est, non esse album hominem,  sed non ea quae est, esse non album hominem (5i énim  de  omni aut affirmatio aut negatio est, lignum erit  verum dicere esse non album hominem): quod si hoc  modo et in quibuscunque esse non additur, idem fa-  ciet quod pro esse dicitur; ut eius, quae est, homo  ambulat, non haec, ambulat non homo, negatio erit, sed  haec, non ambulat homo. Nihil enim differt dicere ho-  minem ambulare, vel hominem ambulantem esse. Qua-  're si hoc modo ubique, et eius, quae est, possibile esse,  negatio erit possibile non esse, sed non ea quae est, non  possibile esse.  Videtur autem idem posse et esse et non esse. Omne enim  quod est possibile dividi, vel ambulare, et non ambu-  lare, et non dividi possibile est. Ratio autem est, quo-  niam omne quod sic possibile est, non semper in actu  est; quare inerit ipsi etiam negatio: potest enim et non  ambulare quod est ambulativum, et non videri quod est  visibile. At vero impossibile est de eodem oppositas veras  esse  affirmationes et negationes. Non igitur eius quae  est, possibile esse, negatio est haec, possibile non esse.  Contingit autem ex his, aut idem affirmare et negare simul  de eodem, aut non secundum esse vel non esse, quae  opponuntur, fieri affirmationes et negationes. Si ergo  illud impossibile est, hoc erit magis eligendum.  aliquid inesse vel non inesse alteri, et hae vocantur de  inesse, de quibus superius habitus est sermo; quaedam  vero enunciantes modum compositionis praedicati cum  subiecto, et hae vocantur modales, a principaliori parte  sua, modo scilicet. Cum enim dicitur, Socratem currere est  possibile, non enunciatur cursus de Socrate, sed qualis sit  compositio cursus cum Socrate ἢ, scilicet possibilis. Signan-  ter autem dixi modum compositionis, quoniam modus in  enunciatione positus duplex est. Quidam enim determinat  verbum, vel ratione significati ipsius verbi, ut Socrates  currit velociter , vel ratione temporis consignificati , ut  Socrates currit hodie; quidam autem determinat composi-  tionem ipsam praedicati cum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur,  Socratem. currere est possibile. In illis namque determinatur  qualis cursus insit Socrati, vel quando; in hac autem, qualis  sit coniunctio cursus cum Socrate. Modi ergo non illi qui  rem verbi, sed qui compositionem determinant, modales  enunciationes reddunt, eo quod compositio veluti forma  totius totam enunciationem continet.  3. Sunt autem huiusmodi modi quatuor proprie lo-  quendo, scilicet possibile et impossibile, necessarium et  contingens.-Verum namque et falsum, licet supra compo-  sitionem cadant cum dicitur, Socratem currere est uerum, vel  hominem. esse quadrupedem est. falsum , attamen modificare  14 *  *  *  Cap. xit.  Ed. c: de So-  crate.  106  *  Ed. c et 1526.  promitur.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  facit: primo, movendo quaestionem arguit ad partes; se-  proprie non videntur compositionem ipsam. Quia modi-  ficari proprie dicitur al'quid, quanlo redditur aliuale, non  quando fit secundum suam substantiam. Compositio au-  tem quando dicitur vera, non aliqualis propon'tur *, sed  quod est: nihil enim aliud est dicere, Socratzm currere. est  erum, quam quod compos:tio cursus cum Socrate est. Et  similiter  quando  est  falsa,  nihil aliud dicitur, quam  quod non est: nam nihil aliud est dicere, Socratzm cur-  rere est falsum, quam quod compositio cursus cum Socrate  non  est. Quando vero compositio dicitur possibilis aut  contingens, iam non ipsam esse, sed ipsam al'qualem  esse  dicimus: cum s'quidem dicitur, Socratzm currere est  possibile, non substantificamus compositionem cursus cum  Socrate, sed qual'ficamus, asserentes illam esse possibilem.  Unde Aristoteles hic modos proponens, veri et falsi  nullo modo meminit, licet infra verum et non verum in-  ferat, propter causam ibi assignandam.  4. Et quia enunciatio modalis duas in se continet com-  positiones, alteram inter partes dicti, alteram inter di-  ctum et modum, intelligendum est eam compositionem  modificari, idest, quae est inter partes dicti, non eam quae  est  inter modum et dictum. Quod sic perpendi potest.  Huius enunciat'on's modalis, Socratzm esse album est. possi-  bile, duae sunt partes ; altera est, Socratzm esse album, altera  est, possibile. Prima dictum vocatur, eo.quod est id quod  dicitur per eius indicativam, scilicet, Socrates est a!bus: qui  enim profert hanc, Socratzs est albus, nihil aliud dicit nisi  Socratem esse album: secunda vocatur modus, eo quod  modi adiectio est. Prima compositionem quandam in se  continet ex Socrate et albo; secunda pars primae opposita,  compos'tionem aliquam sonat ex dicti compos:tione et  modo. Prima rursus pars, licet omnia habeat propria, sub-  iectum scilicet, et praedicatum, copulam et compositio-  nem, tota tamen subiectum est modalis enunciationis; se-  cunda autem est praedicatum. Dicti ergo compositio su-  biicitur et modificatur in enunciatione modali. Qui enim  dicit, Socratem esse album est possibile, non significat qualis  est  se,  coniunctio possibilitatis cum hoc dicto, Socrat»m esse  album, sed insinuat qualis sit compositio partium dicti  inter  scilicet  albi  cum Socrate, scilicet quod est  compositio possibilis. Non dicit igitur enunciatio modalis  aliquid inesse, vel non inesse, sed dicti potius modum  enunciat. Nec proprie componit secundum significatum,  quia compositionis non est compositio, sed rerum com-  positioni modum apponit. Unde nihil aliud est enuncia-  tio modalis, quam enunciatio dicti modificativa.  5. Nec propterea censenda est enunciatio plures mo-  dalis, quia omnia duplicata habeat: quoniam unum mo-  dum de unica compositione enunciat, licet illius compo-  sitionis plures sint partes. Plura enim illa ad dicti com-  positionem concurrentia, veluti plura ex quibus fit unum  subiectum concurrunt, de quibus dictum est supra quod  enunciationis unitatem non impediunt. Sicut nec cum  dicitur,  domus est: alba, est enunciatio multiplex, licet  domus ex multis consurgat partibus.  6. Merito autem est, post enunciationes de inesse, de  modalibus tractandum, quia partes naturaliter sunt toto  priores, et cognitio totius ex partium cognitione dependet;  et specialis sermo de his est habendus, quia proprias habet  difficultates. Notavit quoque Aristoteles in textu multa.  Horum ordinem scilicet, cum dixit: His vero determinatis etc.  modos qui et quot sunt, cum eos expressit et inseruit;  variationem eiusdem modi, per affirmationem et negatio-  nem, cum dixit: Possibile et non possibile, contingens et  non  conlingens; necessitatem cum addidit: Habent enim  multas dubitationzs proprias etc.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Nam si eorum etc., exequitur  tractatum de oppositione modalium, Et circa hoc duo  cundo, determinat veritatem ; ibi: Contingit autzm * etc. Est  autem dubitatio: an in enunciationibus modalibus fiat con-  tradictio negatione apposita ad verbum dicti, quod dicit  rem; an non, sed potius negatione apposita ad modum qui  qualificat. Et primo, arguit ad partem affirmativam, quod  scilicet addenda sit negatio ad verbum ; secundo, ad partem  negativam, quod non apponenda sit negatio ipsi verbo;  ibi: Vid»tur autzm * etc.  8. Intendit ergo primo tale argumentum; si comple-  xorum contradictiones attenduntur penes esse et non esse  (ut patet inductive in enunciationibus substantivis de se-  cundo adiacente et de tertio, et in adiectivis), contradictio-  nesque omnium hoc modo sumendae sunt, contradictoria  huius, possibile esse, erit, possibile mon esse, et non illa, non  possibile esse. Et consequenter apponenda est negatio ver-  bo, ad sumendam oppositionem in modalibus. Patet con-  sequentia, quia cum dicitur, possibile esse, et, possibile  non esse, negatio cadit supra esse. Unde dicit: Nam si  eorum, qua» complectuntur, idest complexorum, illae sibi in-  vicom. sunt oppositae contradictionzs, quae secundum esse vel  non esse disponuntur, idest in quarum una affirmatur esse,  et in altera negatur.  9.  Et subdit inductionem, inchoans. a secundo adia-  cente: ut, eius enunciationis quae est, esse hominem, idest,  bomo est, negatio est, non esse hominem, ubi verbum ne-  gatur, idest, bomo non est; et non est eius negatio ea quae  est, esse non hominem, idest, non bomo est: haec enim  non  est  quae  negativa, sed affrmativa de subiecto infinito,  simul est vera cum illa prima, scilicet, homo est.  ro. Deinde prosequitur inductionem in substantivis de  tertio adiacente: ut, eius quae est, esse album hominem,  idest, ut, illius enunciationis, homo est albus, negatio  est, non esse album hominem, ubi verbum negatur, idest,  homo non est albus; et non est negatio illius ea, quae  est, esse;non album hominem, idest, homo est non al-  bus. Haec enim non est. negativa, sed affirmativa de prae-  dicato infinito. - Et quia istae duae affirmativae de prae-  dicato finito et infinito non possunt de eodem verificari,  propterea quia sunt de praedicatis oppositis, posset ali-  quis credere quod sint contradictoriae; et ideo ad hunc  errorem tollendum interponit rationem probantem quod  hae duae non sunt contradictoriae. Est autem ratio ta-  lis.  Contradictoriorum talis est natura quod de omnibus  aut dictio, idest affirmatio aut negatio verificatur. Inter  contradictoria siquidem nullum potest inveniri medium;  sed hae duae enunciationes, scilicet, est bomo albus, et,  est bomo mon albus, sunt contradictoriae per se; ergo sunt  talis naturae quod de omnibus altera verificatur. Et sic,  cum de ligno sit falsum dicere, est homo albus, erit  verum dicere de eo, scilicet ligno, esse non album ho-  m'nem, idest, lignum est homo non albus. Quod est ma-  nifeste falsum: lignum enim neque est homo albus, neque  est  homo non albus. Restat ergo ex quo utraque est  simul falsa de eodem, quod non sit inter eas contradictio:  Sed contradictio fit quando negatio apponitur verbo.  1r.  Deinde prosequitur inductionem in enunciatio-  nibus adiectivi verbi, dicens: Quod si boc modo, scilicet  supradicto, accipitur contradictio , et. im   quantiscunque  enuncialionibus esse non ponitur explicite, idem faciet! quo-  ad oppositionem sumendam, id quod pro esse ;dicitur (id-  est  verbum adiectivum, quod locum ipsius esse tenet,  pro quanto, propter eius veritatem in se inclusam, copu-  lae officium facit), ut eius enunciationis quae est, bomo  ambulat, negatio est, non ea quae dicit, mom bomo ambu-  lat (haec enim est affirmativa de subiecto infinito), sed  negatio illius est, bomo non ambulat ; sicut et in illis. de  verbo substantivo, negatio verbo addenda erat. Nihil enim  *  *  Num. 14.  Num. 13.  CAP. XII, LECT. VIII  differt dicere verbo adiectivo, homo ambulat, vel substan-  tivo, homo est ambulans.  12. Deinde ponit secundam partem inductionis dicens:  Et si boc modo in omnibus sumenda est contradictio, sci-  licet; apponendo negationem ad esse, concluditur quod  et  eius enunciationis, quae dicit, possibile esse, negatio  est, possibile non esse, et non illa quae dicit, non possi-  bile esse. Patet conclusionis sequela: quia in illa, possibile  non esse, negatio apponitur verbo; in ista autem non.  Dixit  autem in principio huius rationis: Eorum quae  complectuntur , idest complexorum, contradictiones fiunt  secundum esse et non esse, ad differentiam incomple-  xorum quorum oppositio non fit negatione dicente mon  107  non semper actu est, sequitur quod sit possibile non esse.  Quod enim non semper est, potest non esse. Bene ergo in-  tulit Aristoteles ex his duobus: Quare inerit 'etiam negatio  possibilis et non solum affirmatio; potest igitur et non. am-  bulare, quod est ambulabile, et non. videri, quod est visibile.  Maior vero subiungitur, cum ait: 4t vero impossi-  bile est. de eodem. veras esse contradictiones. Infertur quo-  que ultimo conclusio: Nom est igitur ista (scilicet, possi-  bile non esse) negatio ilius, quae dicit, possibile esse:  quia sunt simul verae de eodem. - Caveto autem ne ex isto  textu putes possibile, ut est modus, debere semper accipi  pro possibili ad utrumlibet: quoniam hoc infra declara-  bitur esse falsum; sed considera quod satis fuit inten-  esse,  sed ipsi incomplexo apposita, ut, homo, et, non bomo,  legit, et, non legit.  153.  Deinde cum dicit: Videtur autem. idem. etc., arguit  ad quaestionis partem negativam (scilicet quod ad sumen-  dam contradictionem in modalibus non addenda est ne-  gatio verbo), tali ratione. Impossibile est duas contradi-  ctorias esse simul veras de eodem; sed supradictae, scili-  cet, possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, simul verificantur  de eodem; ergo istae non sunt contradictoriae: igitur con-  tradictio modalium non attenditur penes verbi negatio-  nem. Huius rationis primo ponitur in littera minor cum  sua probatione; secundo maior; tertio conclusio.  Minor quidem cum dicit: Videtur autem. idem. possibile  esse, el, non possibile esse. Sicut verbi gratia, omne quod est  possibile dividi est etiam possibile non dividi, et quod est  possibile ambulare est etiam possibile non ambulare. Ra-  tio autem. huius minoris est, quoniam omne quod sic pos-  sibile est (sicut, scilicet, est possibile ambulare et dividi),  non semper actu esi: non enim semper actualiter ambulat,  qui ambulare potest; nec semper actu dividitur, quod  dividi potest. Quare inerit etiam negatio possibilis, idest, ergo  non solum possibilis est affirmatio, sed etiam negatio  eiusdem. - Adverte quod quia possibile est multiplex, ut  infra dicetur, ideo notanter Aristoteles addidit ly sic, as-  sumens, quod sic possibile est, nom semper actu est. Non  enim de omni possibili verum est dicere quod non semper  UTE.  TNT  ΞΜ  D  —  »w  actu  est, sed de aliquo, eo scilicet quod est sic * possi-  bile, quemadmodum ambulare et dividi. Nota ulterius  quod quia * tale possibile habet duas conditiones, scilicet  quod potest actu esse et quod non semper actu est, se-  quitur necessario quod de eo simul est verum dicere,  possibile esse, et, non esse. Ex eo enim quod potest actu  esse, sequitur quod sit possibile esse; ex eo vero quod  denti declarare quod in modalibus non sumitur contra-  dictio ex verbi negatione, afferre instantiam in una mo-  dali, quae continetur sub modalibus de possibili.  14. Deinde cum dicit: Contingit autem unum ex bis εἴς.»  determinat veritatem huius dubitationis. Et quia duo  petebat, scilicet, an contradictio modalium ex negatione  verbi fiat an non, et, an potius ex negatione modi; ideo  primo, determinat veritatem primae petitionis, quod sci-  licet contradictio harum non fit negatione verbi; secundo,  determinat veritatem secundae petitionis, quod scilicet fiat  modalium contradictio ex negatione modi; ibi: Est ergo  negatio * etc. - Dicit ergo quod propter supradictas rationes  evenit unum ex his duobus, quae conclusimus determi-  nare, aut idem ipsum, idest, unum et idem dicere, id-  est affirmare et negare simul de eodem: idest, aut quod duo  contradictoria simul verificantur de eodem, ut prima ratio  conclusit; aut affirmationes vel negationes modalium, quae  opponuntur contradictorie, fieri nom secundum. esse vel non  6556, idest, aut contradictio modalium non fiat ex nega-  tione verbi, ut secunda ratio conclusit. Si ergo illud est  impossibile, scilicet quod duo contradictoria possunt simul  esse  vera de eodem, boc, scilicet quod contradictio mo-  dalium non fiat secundum verbi negationem, erit magis  eligendum. Impossibilia enim semper vitanda sunt. Ex ipso  autem modo loquendi innuit quod utrique earum aliquid  obstat.  Sed quia primo obstat impossibilitas quae acce-  ptari non potest, secundo autem nihil aliud obstat nisi  quod negatio supra enunciationis copulam cadere debet,  si negativa fieri debet enunciatio, et hoc aliter fieri po-  test  quam negando dicti verbum, ut infra declarabitur;  ideo hoc secundum, scilicet quod contradictio modalium  non fiat secundum negationem verbi, eligendum est: pri-  mum vero est omnino abiiciendum.  *  Lect. seq.  108  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  LECTIO NONA  (Canp.. CargrANr lect. vi)  DE NEGATIONE APPONENDA NON VERBO SED MODIS IN CONTRADICTIONIBUS  PROPOSITIONUM MODALIUM  .  '  Ἔστιν ἄρα ἀπόφασις τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν  εἶναι.  Ὁ  χαὶ  δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχόμενον  εἶναι" καὶ 13e τούτου ἀπόφασις τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον  εἶναι,  ἐπὶ  τῶν  ἄλλων  δὲ  ὁμοιοτρόπως, οἷον  ἀναγκαίου τε καὶ ἀδυνάτου.  Γίνεται γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι  προσθέσεις,) τὰ δ᾽ ὑποχείμενα πράγματα, τὸ  μὲν  λευχόν, τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος: οὕτως ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν εἶναι  xai μὴ εἶναι, ὡς ὑποχείμενον γίνεται, τὸ δὲ δύνα-  σθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι, προσθέσεις διορίζουσαι, ὥσπερ  ἐπ᾽  ἐχείνων τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ ἀληθὲς xa τὸ  ψεῦδος, ὁμοίως αὖται ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι δυνατὸν χαὶ εἶναι  οὐ δυνατόν.  Τοῦ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἀπόφασις οὐ τὸ οὐ δυνατὸν  εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὐ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ δυνατὸν  εἶναι οὐ τὸ δυνατὸν  μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ  μιὴ δυνατὸν  εἶναι. Διὸ καὶ Hs Pp μὰ ἂν δόξειαν ἀλλήλαις αἱ τοῦ  δυνατὸν εἶναι χαὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι’ τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δυ-  νατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι" οὐ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεις ἀλλήλων  αἱ τοιαῦται, τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι"  * Est ergo negatio eius quae est, possibile esse, ea quae est ' Seq. cap. xir.  non possibile esse. Eadem quoque ratio est et in eo  quod est contingens esse: etenim negatio eius est, non  contingens esse; et in aliis quoque simili modo, ut in  necessario et impossibili.  Fiunt enim quemadmodum in illis, esse et non esse, appo-  sitiones, subiectae vero res, hoc quidem album, illud  vero homo: eodem quoque modo hoc in loco, esse qui-  dem et non esse, ut subiectum fit, posse vero et con-  üngere appositiones sunt, determinantes (quemadmo-  dum in illis esse et non esse) veritatem et falsitatem,  similiter hae in eo quod est, esse possibile et esse non  possibile.  Eius vero, quae est, possibile non esse, negatio est non ea  quae est, non esse, sed ea quae est, non possibile; et  eius quae est, possibile esse, non ea quae est, possi-  bile  non  esse,  sed ea quae est, non possibile esse.  Quare et sequi sese invicem videbuntur, possibile esse  et  possibile non esse. Idem enim possibile esse et non  esse.  ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι χαὶ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι οὐδέ-  ποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἅμα ἀληθεύονται" ἀντίκεινται  Te, οὐδέ γε τὸ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι χαὶ οὐ δυνατὸν  pen εἶναι οὐδέποτε ἅμα ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀληθεύονται.  Ὁμοίως δὲ xài τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀπόφασις οὐ τὸ  ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι"  τοῦ δὲ ἀναγχαῖον μὴ εἶναι, τὸ per ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι.  Καὶ τοῦ al θελα εἶναι οὐ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι,  ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι: τοῦ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι  τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναί.  Καὶ καθόλου 3£, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὸ μὲν εἶναι καὶ μὴ  εἶναι δεῖ τιθέναι, ὡς τὰ ὑποκείμενα, κατάφασιν δὲ  Non enim contradictiones sunt sibi invicem hu-  iusmodi, possibile esse et possibile non esse; sed pos-  sibile esse et non possibile esse, nunquam simul sunt  in eodem verae sunt: opponuntur enim : neque ea quae .  est, possibile non esse et non possibile non esse, nun-  quam simul in eodem verae sunt. Similiter autem et  eius. quae est, necessarium est, negatio non est quae  est, necessarium non esse, sed ea quae est, non ne-  cessarium esse; eius vero quae est, necessarium non  esse, ea quae est, non necessarium non esse. Et eius  quae est, impossibile esse, non ea quae est, impossibile  non esse, sed haec, non impossibile esse; eius vero  quae est, impossibile non esse, ea quae est, non im-  possibile non esse.  A  Universaliter vero, quemadmodum dictum est, esse quidam  et  xal  ἀπόφασιν ταῦτα ποιοῦντα πρὸς τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ  εἶναι συντάττειν. Καὶ ταύτας οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι τὰς  ἀντικειμένας  φάσεις" δυνατόν, οὐ δυνατόν" ἐνδεχό-  μενον;  οὐχ ἐνδεχόμενον: ἀδύνατον, οὐχ ἀδύνατον,  ἀναγκαῖον, οὐχ ἀναγκαῖον" ἀληθές, οὐχ ἀληθές.  qpeterminat ubi ponenda sit negatio ad assumen-  ΞΔ  dam modalium contradictionem. Et circa hoc  (ἡ  [quatuor facit: primo, determinat veritatem  I. summarie; secundo, assignat determinatae ve-  ritatis rationem, quae dicitur rationi ad oppo-  *  *  *  *  Num. seq.  Num. 4.  Num. 5.  Ed. c: et verba  non addenda in  ea  declar.  situm inductae; ibi: Fiunt enim * etc.; tertio, explanat eam-  dem veritatem in omnibus modalibus; ibi: Eius vero * etc.;  quarto, universalem regulam concludit; ibi: Universaliter  vero * etc. Quia igitur negatio aut verbo aut modo appo-  nenda est, et quod verbo non addenda est *, declaratum  est per locum a divisione; concludendo determinat: Es!  ergo negatio eius quae est possibile esse, ea quae est non pos-  sibile esse, in qua negatur modus. Et eadem est ratio in  enunciationibus de contingenti. Huius enim, quae est,  contingens esse, negatio est, non contingens esse. Et in  alis, scilicet de mecesse et impossibile idem est iudicium.  2.  liones  Deinde  etc.,  cum  subdit  dicit:  Fiust  enim in illis apposi-  huius veritatis rationem talem. Ad  sumendam contradictionem inter aliquas enunciationes  et  non esse oportet ponere quemadmodum subiecta ,  negationem vero et affirmationem haec facientem, ad  esse  non esse apponere. Et has oportet putare esse  oppositas dictiones: possibile non possibile; contingens  non  contingens; impossibile non impossibile; necessa-  rium non necessarium; verum non verum.  oportet ponere negationem super appositione, idest con-  iunctione praedicati cum subiecto; sed in modalibus ap-  positiones sunt modi; ergo in modalibus negatio ap-  ponenda est modo, ut fiat contradictio. Huius rationis,  maiore subintellecta, minor ponitur in littera per se-  cundam similitudinem ad illas de inesse. Et dicitur quod  quemadmodum in illis enunciationibus de imesse appo-  sitiones,  idest praedicationes, sunt esse et non esse,  idest verba significativa esse vel non esse (verbum enim  semper est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur), sub-  iective vero appositionibus res sunt, quibus esse vel non  esse  apponitur, ut album, cum dicitur, album est, vel  homo, cum dicitur, homo est; eodem modo hoc in loco  in modalibus accidit: esse quidem subiectum fit, idest di-  ctum  sunt.  significans esse vel non esse subiecti locum tenet ;  contingere vero et posse oppositiones, idest modi, praedicatio-  nes  Et quemadmodum in illis de inesse penes esse  et non esse veritatem vel falsitatem determinavimus, ita  in istis modalibus penes modos. Hoc est enim quod sub-  CAP. XII, LECT. IX  dit, determinantes, scilicet, fiunt ipsi modi veritatem, quem-  admodum in illis esse et non esse, eam * determinat.  109  negatio, possibile non esse, sit illa, non possibile non  esse:  :  Mu praeced.  —  3. Et sic patet responsio ad argumentum in opposi-  tum primo adductum *, concludens quod negatio verbo  apponenda sit, sicut illis de inesse. Dicitur enim quod cum  modalis enunciet modum de dicto sicut enunciatio de  inesse, esse vel esse tale, puta esse album de subiecto,  eumdem locum tenet modus hic, quem ibi verbum; et  consequenter super idem proportionaliter cadit negatio  hic et ibi. Eadem enim, ut dictum est, proportio est modi  ad dictum, quae est verbi ad subiectum. - Rursus cum ve-  ritas et falsitas afhrmationem et negationem sequantur,  penes idem. attendenda est affirmatio vel negatio enun-  ciationis, et veritas vel falsitas eiusdem. Sicut autem in  enunciationibus de igesse veritas vel falsitas esse vel non  esse consequitur, ita in modalibus modum. Illa namque  modalis est vera quae sic modificat dictum sicut dicti  compositio patitur, sicut illa de imesse est vera, quae sic  significat esse sicut est. Est ergo negatio modo hic ap-  ponenda, sicut ibi verbo, cum sit eadem utriusque vis  quoad veritatem et falsitatem enunciationis.  7 Adverte quod modos, appositiones, idest, praedica-  tiones vocavit, sicut esse in illis de inesse, intelligens per  modum totum praedicatum enunciationis modalis, puta,  est possibile. In cuius signum modos ipsos verbaliter pro-  tulit dicens: Contingere vero et posse appositiones sunt. Con-  tingit enim et potest, totum praedicatum modalis continent.  4. Deinde cum dicit: Eius vero quod est possibile est  non esse etc. , explanat determinatam veritatem in omnibus  modalibus, scilicet de possibili, et necessario, et impossi-  bili. Contingens convertitur cum possibili. Et quia qui-  libet modus facit duas modales affirmativas, alteram ha-  bentem dictum affirmatum *, et alteram habentem dictum  negatum; ideo explanat in singulis modis quae cuiusque  affirmationis negatio sit. Et primo in illis de possibili. Et  quia primae affirmativae de possibili (quae scilicet habet  dictum affirmatum) scilicet possibile esse, negatio assi-  gnata fuit, non possibile esse; ideo ad reliquam affirmati-  vam de possibili transiens ait: Eius vero, quae est possi-  bile non esse (ubi dictum negatur) megatio est mom possi-  bile non esse. Et hoc consequenter probat per hoc quod  contradictoria huius, possibile non esse, aut est, possi-  bile esse, aut illa, quam diximus, scilicet, non possibile  non esse. Sed illa, scilicet, possibile esse, non est eius  contradictoria. Non enim sunt sibi invicem contradicentes,  possibile esse, et, possibile non esse, quia possunt simul esse  verae. Unde et sequi sese invicem putabuntur: quoniam,  ut supra dictum fuit, idem est - possibile esse, et - non  esse, et consequenter sicut ad, posse esse, sequitur, posse  non esse, ita e contra ad, posse non esse, sequitur, posse  esse.  Sed contradictoria illius, possibile esse, quae non  potest simul esse vera est, non possibile esse: hae enim,  ut dictum est, opponuntur. Remanet ergo quod huius  neret.  hae namque simul nunquam sunt verae vel falsae.  Dixit quod possibile esse et non esse sequi se invicem puta-  buntur, et non dixit quod se invicem consequuntur: quia  secundum veritatem universaliter non sequuntur se, sed  particulariter tantum, ut infra dicetur; propter quod pu-  tabitur quod simpliciter se invicem sequantur. Deinde de-  carat hoc idem in illis de necessario. Et primo, in affir-  mativa habente dictum affirmatum, dicens: Similiter eius  quae est, necessarium. esse, megatio non est ea, quae dicit  necessarium. mon esse, ubi modus non negatur, sed ea quae  est, non necessarium. esse. Deinde subdit de affirmativa de  necessario habente dictum negatum, et ait: Eius vero, quae  est,  necessarium. mom esse, megatio est ea, quae dicit, mon  necessarium.  mon.  esse.  Deinde transit ad illas de impossi-  bili, eumdem ordinem servans, et inquit: Et eius, quae  dicit, impossibile esse, negatio non est ea quae dicit, impossi-  bile non esse, sed, non impossibile esse: ubi idm modus ne-  gatur. Alterius vero afhrmativae, quae est, impossibile non  es$e,  negatio est ea quae dicit, won impossibile non esse. Et  sic semper modo negatio addenda cst.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Unmiversaliter vero etc., concludit  regulam universalem dicens quod, quemadmodum dictum  est, dicta importantia esse et non esse oportet ponere in  modalibus ut subiecta, negationem vero et affirmationem  hoc, idest contradictionis oppositionem, facientem, opor-  tet apponere tantummodo ad suum eumdem modum, non  ad diversos modos. Debet namque illemet modus negari,  qui prius affirmabatur, si contradictio esse debet. Et exem-  plariter: explanans quomodo hoc fiat, subdit: Et oportet  putare bas esse oppositas dictiones, idest affirmationes et  negationes in modalibus, possibile et non possibile, contin-  gens et mon contingens. Item cum dixit negationem alio  tantum modo ad modum apponi debere, non exclusit  modi copulam, sed dictum. Hoc enim est singulare in  modalibus quod eamdem oppositionem facit, negatio mo-  do addita, et eius verbo. Contradictorie enim opponitur  huic, possibile est esse, non solum illa, non possibile est  esse, sed ista, possibile non est esse. Meminit autem  modi potius, et propter hoc quod nunc diximus, ut sci-  licet insinuaret quod negatio verbo modi postposita, modo  autem praeposita, idem facit ac si modali verbo prae-  poneretur, et quia, cum modo numquam caret modalis  enunciatio, semper negatio supra modum poni potest.  Non autem sic de eius verbo: verbo enim modi carere  contingit modalem, ut cum dicitur, Socrates currit necessa-  rio; et ideo semper verbo negatio aptari potest. - Quod  autem in fine addidit, verum et non verum, insinuat, prae-  ter  quatuor praedictos modos, alios inveniri, qui etiam  compositionem enunciationis determinant, puta, verum et  non verum, falsum et non falsum: quos tamen inter  modos supra non posuit, quia, ut declaratum fuit, non  proprie modificant.  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  LECTIO DECIMA  (Canp. CareTANI lect. vir)  DE PROPOSITIONUM MODALIUM CONSEQUENTIIS  Καὶ αἱ ἀκολουθήσεις δὲ κατὰ λόγον γίνονται οὕτω τι-  θεμένοις:  τῷ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι  εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ἐχείνῳ ἀντιστρέφει,  καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδύ-  νατον εἶναι χαὶ τὸ Un ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι" τῷ δὲ δυ-  νατὸν μὴ εἶναι χαὶ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀναγ-  καῖον μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ  μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ y ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι τὸ ἀναγ-  χαῖον νὴ Ξἶναι xa τὸ ἀδύνατον εἰναι; τῷ δὲ μὴ δυ-  γατὸν  μὴ εἶναι, xal μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον [um εἰναι τὸ  ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι. Θεω-  ρείσθω δὲ ἐκ ἧς ὑπογραφῆς ὡς λέγομεν,  LN  ΄  δυνατὸν εἶναι,  ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι;  3  ͵  3  οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι,  οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι;  δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι,  ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι;  οὐχ  αδυνατον μὴ εἰναι»  οὐχ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι,  οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι.  οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι.  ἀδύνατον εἶναι.  ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι.  οὐ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι.  οὐχ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι.  ἀδύνατον Un εἶναι.  ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι.  *  Consequentiae vero secundum rationem fiunt cum ita 'Cap.xm.  ponuntur illam enim quae est, possibile esse, sequitur  illa quae est, contingit esse, et haec illi convertitur, et,  non  impossibile esse et non necessarium esse; illam  vero  non  quae est, possibile non esse, et, contingens non  esse, ea quae est, non necesse non esse, et, non impos-  sibile  esse:  illam autem quae est, non possibile  esse, et, non contingens esse, ea quae est, necessarium  non  esse, et impossibile esse: illam vero quae est, non  possibile non esse, et, non contingens non esse, ea quae  est, necesse est esse, et, impossibile non esse. Conside-  retur autem ex subscriptione quemadmodum dicimus:  Possibile est esse,  Contingens est esse,  Non impossibile est esse,  Non necessarium est esse,  Possibile est non esse,  Contingens est non esse,  Non impossibile est non esse,  Non possibile est esse.  Non contingens est esse.  Impossibile est esse.  Necessarium est non esse.  Non possibile est non esse.  Non contingens est non esse.  Impossibile est non esse.  Non necessarium est non esse, Necessarium est esse.  Τὸ  μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀδύνατον τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ  χαὶ δυνατῷ καὶ οὐχ ἐνδεχομένῳ καὶ μὴ δυνατῷ ἀχο-  λουθεῖ μὲν ἀντιφατικῶς, ἀντεστραμμένως δέ: τῷ μὲν  γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἡ ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἀκο-  λουθεῖ, τῇ δὲ ἀποφάσει ἡ κατάφασις. Τῷ γὰρ οὐ  δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι: κατάφασις γὰρ τὸ  ἀδύνατον εἶναι, τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀπόφασις.  δ"  δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον πῶς, ὀπτέον. Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὐχ οὕ-  ,  ε:ὰ  e  H  ,  τως  σεις  γάρ  ,  ἔχει, ἀλλ᾽  χωρίς"  ἐστιν  »  αἱ  ,  ἐναντίαι ἕπονται" αἱ δ᾽ ἀντιφά- -  kJ  ἀπόφασις τοῦ ἀνάγχη μὴ εἶναι τὸ οὐχ  ἀνάγκη εἶναι: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀληθεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ  M] -  5  ,  ,  ὁ  Ζ  »  IB  ,  ,  5  αὐτοῦ ἀμφοτέρας" τὸ qup ἀναγκαῖον μη εἶναι οὐχ  ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.  ὅτι  Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως τοῖς  ἑτέροις,  ἐναντίως τὸ ἀδύνατον τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ  ἀποδίδοται, τὸ αὐτὸ δυνάμενον. Εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον  εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο οὐχ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἶναι"  εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἀνάγχη εἶναι: ὥστε  εἰ  ἐχεῖνα ὁμοίως τῷ δυνατῷ καὶ μή, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐναν-  τίας, ἐπεὶ οὐ σημαίνει γε ταὐτὸν τό τε ἀναγκαῖον  xai τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀντεστραμ-  μένως.  ᾿  ἀδύνατον οὕτως κεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ ἀναγκαίου ἀντιφά-  PS  ;  Ξ  σεις; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δυνατὸν εἶναι" εἰ  N  γὰρ μή; ἡ ἀπόφασις ἀκολουθήσει: ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ φά-  ναι  ἢ ἀποφάναι: ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι, ἀδύνατον  εἶναι:  ἀδύνατον ἄρα εἶναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὅπε  ἄτοπον. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ οὐχ ἀδύ-  νατον εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖ, τούτῳ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον  εἶναι:  docs συμβαίνει τὸ ἀναγχαῖον εἶναι μὴ ἀναγ-  xatov εἶναι, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀχολουθεῖ τῷ δυνα-  τὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγχαῖον μὴ εἶναι: τῷ μὲν γὰρ  duo. ἐνδέχεται συμβαίνειν, τούτων δὲ ὁπότερον ἂν  ἀληθὲς ἥ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐκεῖνα ἀληθῆ. "Apa γὰρ δυ-  γατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι" εἰ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναι 7) μὴ  Hae igitur, impossibile, et, non impossibile, eam quae est,  contingens, et possibile, et non contingens, et non possi-  bile sequuntur quidem contradictorie, sed conversim.  Eam enim quae est, possibile esse, negatio impossibilis  sequitur, quae est, non impossibile esse: negationem  vero affirmatio. Illam enim, non possibile esse, ea quae  est, impossibile esse: affirmatio enim est, impossibile  esse; non impossibile vero, negatio.  Necessarium autem quemadmodum se habeat, consideran-  dum est. Manifestum est autem quod non eodem modo  se  habet, sed contrariae sequuntur, contradictoriae au-  tem sunt extra.  Non enim est negatio. eius, quae est, necesse non esse,  ea  quae est, non necesse esse: contingit enim veras esse  utrasque in eodem: quod enim est necessarium non  esse, non est necessarium esse.  Causa autem huius est, cur non sequitur necessarium cae-  teris similiter: quoniam contrarie, impossibile esse, ne-  cessario redditur idem valens. Nam quod impossibile  esse, necesse hoc non quidem esse, sed potius non  esse: quod vero impossibile non esse, hoc necessarium  esse. Quare si illa similiter sequuntur possibile, et, non  possibile: haec ex opposito: quoniam non significant  idem necessarium et impossibile; sed (ut dictum est)  conversim.  Aut certe impossibile est sic poni necessarii contradictiones.  Nam quod necessarium est esse, possibile est esse: nam  si non, negatio consequetur: necesse est enim aut affir-  mare, aut negare. Quare si non possibile est esse, im-  possibile est esse. Igitur impossibile est esse quod ne-  cesse est esse: quod est inconveniens. At vero illam  quae est, possibile esse, non impossibile esse, sequitur:  hanc vero, ea quae est, non necessarium est esse; quare  contingit quod necessarium esse, non necessarium esse:  quod est inconveniens.  At  vero  neque necessarium esse, sequitur eam quae est,  possibile esse, neque ea quae est, necessarium non esse.  Illi enim utraque contingit accidere: harum autem utra-  libet vera fuerit, non erunt illa vera: simul enim possi-  bile esse, et, non esse. Si vero necesse esse, vel non esse,  CAP. XIII,  εἶναι, οὐκ ἔσται δυνατὸν ἄμφω. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὸ  οὐχ ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι.  Τοῦτο γὰρ ἀχηθὲς xxl xxcvd τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. Καὶ  qde αὕτη γίνεται ἀντίφασις τῇ ἑπομένῃ τῷ οὐ δυ-  νατὸν εἰναι" ἐχείνῳ vp ἀχολουθεῖ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶνα!:  xal ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι, οὐ ἡ ἀπόφασις τὸ οὐχ ἀναγ-  καῖον μὴ εἶναι.  ᾿Ακολουθοῦσί τε ἄρα xal αὐται αἱ ἀντιφάσεις χατὰ τὸν  εἰρημένον τρόπον, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβαίνει τι-  θεμένων οὕτως.  I.  y ERN  S  (Q9  ;  Jo lium, hic determinare intendit de consequen-  D^ tradit veritatem; secundo, movet quandam  dubitationem circa determinata; ibi: Dubita-  *  *  *  Lect. seq.  Num. 5.  dun  bit autem * etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ponit conse-  quentias earum secundum opinionem aliorum; secundo,  examinando et corrigendo dictam opinionem, determinat  veritatem ; ibi: Ergo impossibile * etc.  2. Quoad primum considerandum est quod cum quili-  Lect. praeced. bet modus faciat duas affirmationes, ut dictum fuit *, et  un  '  *Lect. xi.  *  Ed.  c  τος quabus-affirmationibus opponantur duae negationes, ut  etiam dictum fuit in Primo * ; secundum quemlibet modum  fient quatuor enunciationes, duae scilicet affirmativae et  duae negativae. Cum autem modi sint quatuor, effcien-  tur sexdecim modales: quaternarius enim in seipsum du-  ctus sexdecim constituit. Et quoniam apud omnes, quae-  libet cuiusque modi, undecumque incipias, habet unam  tantum cuiusque modi se consequentem, ideo ad assi-  gnandas consequentias modalium, singulas ex singulis  modis accipere oportet et ad consequentiae ordinem in-  ter se adunare.  3. Et hoc modo fecerunt antiqui, de quibus inquit  Aristoteles: Consequentiae vero. fiunt secundum infrascriptum  ordinem, antiquis ita. ponentibus. Formaverunt enim qua-  omittit  se.  Averroes.  tuor ordines modalium , in quorum quolibet omnes quae  se * consequuntur collocaverunt. - Ut autem confusio vi-  tetur, vocetur, cum Averroe, de caetero, in quolibet modo,  affirmativa de De et modo, affirmativa simplex ; afhr-  mativa autem  de  modo et negativa de dicto, affirmativa  declinata; negativa vero de modo et non dicto, negativa  simplex; negativa autem de utroque, megativa d:clinata:  ita quod modi affirmationem vel negationem simplicitas,  dicti vero declinatio denominet. - Dixerunt ergo antiqui  quod affirmationem simplicem de possibili, scilicet, possi-  bile est esse, sequitur affirmativa simplex de contingenti,  Scilicet, contingens est esse (contingens enim convertitur  cum possibili); et negativa simplex de impossibili, scilicet,  non  impossibile esse; et similiter negativa simplex de  necessario, scilicet, non necesse est esse. Et hic est pri-  mus ordo modalium consequentium se. - In secundo au-  3 QE ecaftema- feih dixerunt quod affirmativas * declinatas de possibili  et contingenti, scilicet, possibile non esse, et, contingens  non esse, sequuntur negativae declinatae de necessario  et impossibili, scilicet, non necessarium non esse, et, non  impossibile non esse.- In tertio vero ordine dixerunt  quod negativas simplices de possibili et contingenti, scili-  cet, non possibile esse, non contingens esse, sequuntur  afBrmativa declinata de necessario, scilicet, necesse non  esse, et affirmativa simplex de impossibili, scilicet, im-  possibile esse. - In quarto demum ordine dixerunt quod  negativas declinatas de possibili et contingenti, scilicet,  non possibile non esse, et, non contingens non esse, se-  quuntur affirmativa simplex de necessario, scilicet, necesse  esse, et affirmativa declinata de impossibili, scilicet, im-  possibile est non esse.  4. Consideretur autem ex subscriptione appositae figu-  rae, quemadmodum dicimus, ut clarius elucescat depictum.  LECT. X  111  non erit possibile utrunque. Relinquitur ergo non neces-  sarium non esse, sequi eam quae est, possibile est esse.  Haec enim vera est, et de necesse esse. Haec enim fit con-  tradictio eius, quae sequitur illam quae est, non pos-  sibile esse: illam enim sequitur ea quae est, impossibile  esse,  cesse  et,  necesse non esse, cuius negatio est, non ne-  non esse.  Sequuntur igitur et hae contradictiones secundum prae-  dictum modum: et nihil impossibile contingit sic po-  sitis.  CONSEQUENTIAE ENUNCIATIONUM MODALIUM SECUNDUM  QUATUOR ORDINES AB ANTIQUIS POSITAE ET ORDINATAE  :.  Primus Ordo  Possibile est esse  Contingens est esse  Non impossibile est esse  Non necessarium est esse  Tertius Ordo  Non possibile est esse  Non contingens est esse  Impossibile est esse  Necessarium est non esse  Secundus Ordo  Possibile est non esse  Contingzens est non esse  Non impossibile est non esse  Non necessarium est non esse  Quartus Ordo  Non possibile est non esse  Non contingens est non esse  Impossibile est non esse  Necesse est esse  5. Deinde cum dicit: Ergo impossibile et non impossibile etc.,  examinando dictam op'nionem, determinat veritatem. Et  circa hoc duo facit: quia primo examinat consequentias  earum de impossibili; secundo, illarum de necessario; ibi:  Necessarium. autem * etc. Unde ex praemissa op' nione con-  cludens et approbans, dicit: Ergo ista, scilicet, impossibile,  et, non impossibile, sequuntur illas, scilicet, contingens et  possibile, non contingens, et, non possibile, sequuntur, in-  quam, coniradictoriz, idest ita ut contradictoriae de im-  possibili contradictorias de possibili et contingenti conse-  quantur, sed comversim, idest, sed non ita quod affirmatio  affirmationem et negatio negationem sequatur, sed con-  versim, scilicet, quod affirmationem negatio et negationem  affirmatio. Et explanans hoc ait: lllud enim quod est possi-  bile esse , idest affirmationem possibilis negatio sequitur  impossibilis, idest, non impossibile esse; negationem vero  possibilis affirmatio sequitur impossibilis. Illud enim quod  est, non possibile esse, sequitur ista, impossibile est esse ;  haec autem, scilicet, impossibile esse, affirmatio est; illa  vero, scilicet, non possibile esse, negatio est; hic s'qui-  dem modus negatur; ibi, non. Bene igitur dixerunt an-  tiqui in quolibet ordine quoad consequentias illarum de  impossibili, quia, ut in suprascripta figura apparet, semper  ex  affirmatione possibilis negationem impossibilis, et ex  negatione possibilis affirmationem impossibilis inferunt.  .6. Deinde cum dicit: Necessarium autem. etc., intendit  examinando determinare consequentias de necessario. Et  circa hoc duo facit: primo examinat dicta antiquorum ;  secundo, determinat veritatem intentam; ibi: 4t vero neque  necessarium * etc. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo, de-  clarat quid bene et quid male dictum sit ab antiquis in hac  re. - Ubi attendendum est quod cum quatuor sint enuncia-  tiones de necessario, ut dictum est, differentes inter se  sécundum quantitatem et qualitatem, adeo ut unam in-  tegrent figuram oppositionis iuxta morem illarum de in-  e$$£; duae earum sunt contrariae inter se, duae autem  illis contrariis contradictoriae, ut patet in hac figura.  Necesse  esse  Non necesse  non esse  Necesse  Contrariae  e  2  $3,  €  S  S  [2  «9  o  x  o  *o  "v.  Subcontrariae  non esse  e  e  δ  Non  fiecesse esse  *  *  Num. seq.  Num. 1.  112  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. Il  Quia ergo antiqui universales contrarias bene intu-  lerunt ex aliis, contradictorias autem earum, scilicet par-  ticulares, male intulerunt; ideo dicit quod considerandum  restat de his, quae sunt de necessario, qualiter se habeant  in consequendo illas de possibili et non possibili. Mani-  festum est autem ex dicendis quod non eodem modo istae  de necessario illas de possibili consequuntur, quo easdem  sequuntur illae de impossibili. Nam omnes enunciationes  de impossibili recte illatae sunt ab antiquis. Enunciationes  autem de necessario non omnes recte inferuntur: sed duae  earum, quae sunt contrariae, scilicet, necessé est esse, et,  necesse est nom esse, sequuntur, idest recta consequentia  *  Cf. supra, n. 4.  Boethius.  Averroes.  deducuntur ab antiquis, in tertio scilicet et quarto ordine *;  reliquae autem duae de necessario, scilicet, non necesse  non esse, et, non necesse esse, quae sunt contradictoriae  supradictis, sunt extra consequentias illarum, in secundo  scilicet et primo ordine. Unde antiqui in tertio et quarto  ordine omnia recte fecerunt; in primo autem et in se-  cundo peccaverunt, non quoad omnia, sed quoad enun-  ciationes de necessario tantum.  7. Secundo cum dicit: Non enim est negatio eius etc.,  respondet cuidam tacitae obiectioni, qua defendi posset  consequentia enunciationis de necessario in primo ordine  ab antiquis. facta. Est autem obiectio tacita talis. Non  possibile esse, et, necesse non esse, convertibiliter se  sequuntur in tertio ordine iam approbato; ergo, possibile  esse, et, non necesse esse, invicem se sequi debent in pri-  mo ordine. Tenet consequentia: quia duorum convertibi-  liter se sequentium contradictoria mutuo se sequuntur; sed  illae duae tertii ordinis convertibiliter se sequuntur, et  istae duae primi ordinis sunt earum contradictoriae; ergo  istae primi ordinis, scilicet, possibile esse, et, non necesse  esse, mutuo se sequuntur. - Huic, inquam, obiectioni re-  spondet Aristoteles hic interimendo minorem quoad hoc  quod assumit, quod scilicet necessaria primi ordinis et  necessaria tertii ordinis sunt contradictoriae. Unde dicit:  Non enim est negatio eius quod est, necesse mon esse (quae  erat  esse,  in  tertio  ordine), illa quae dicit, mom mecesse est  quae sita erat in primo ordine. Et causam subdit,  quia contingit utrasque simul esse veras in eodem; quod  contradictoriis repugnat. Illud enim idem, quod est neces-  sarium non esse, non est necessarium esse. Necessarium  siquidem est hominem non esse lignum et non necessa-  rium est hominem esse lignum. Adverte quod, ut infra  patebit, istae duae de necessario, quas posuerunt antiqui.  in primo et tertio ordine, sunt subalternae (et ideo sunt  simul verae), et deberent esse contradictoriae; et ideo  erraverunt antiqui.  8. Boethius autem et Averroes non reprehensive le-  gunt tam hanc, quam praecedentem textus particulam,  sed narrative utranque simul iungentes. Narrare enim  aiunt Aristotelem qualitatem suprascriptae figurae quoad  consequentiam illarum de necessario, postquam narravit  quo modo se habuerint illae de impossibili, et dicere  quod secundum praescriptam figuram non eodem modo  sequuntur illas de possibili illae de necessario, quo se-  quuntur illae de impossibili. Nam contradictorias de pos-  sibili contradictoriae de impossibili sequuntur, licet con-  versim; contradictoriae autem de necessario non dicuntur  sequi illas contradictorias de possibili, sed potius eas  sequi dicuntur contrariae de necessario: non inter se  contrariae, sed hoc modo, quod affirmationem possibilis  negatio de necessario sequi dicitur, negationem vero pos-  sibilis non affirmatio de necessario sequi ponitur, quae sit  contradictoria illi negativae quae ponebatur sequi ad pos-  sibilem, sed talis affirmationis de necessario contrario. -  Et quod hoc ita fiat in illa figura ut dicimus, patet ex  primo et tertio ordine, quorum capita sunt negatio et affir-  matio possibilis, et extrema sunt, non necesse esse, et,  necesse non esse. Hae siquidem non sunt contradicto-  riae.  Non enim est negatio eius, quae est, necesse non  esse, non necesse esse (quoniam contingit eas simul ve-  rificari de eodem), sed illa scilicet, necesse non esse, est  contraria contradictoriae huius, scilicet, non necesse esse,  quae est, necesse est esse.  Sed quia sequenti litterae magis consona est introdu-  ctio nostra, quae etiam Alberto consentit, et extorte vi-  detur ab aliis exponi ly contrariae, ideo prima, iudicio  meo, acceptanda est expositio et ad antiquorum repre-  hensionem referendus est textus.  9. Tertio cum dicit: Causa autem cur etc., manifestat  id quod praemiserat, scilicet, quod non simili modo ad  illas de possibili sequuntur illae de impossibili et illae  de necessario. Antiquorum enim hoc peccatum fuit tam  in  primo quam in secundo ordine, et quod simili modo  intulerunt illas de impossibili et necessario. In primo si-  quidem ordine, sicut posuerunt negativam simplicem de  impossibili, ita posuerunt negativam simplicem de neces-  sario, et similiter in secundo ordine utranque negativam  declinatam * locaverunt. Hoc ergo quare peccatum sit,  et  causa autem quare necessarium som sequitur possibile,  similiter,  idest, eodem modo cum caeteris, scilicet, de im-  possibili, est, quoniam impossibile redditur idem valens ne-  cessario, idest, aequivalet necessario, comtrarie, idest, con-  trario modo sumptum, et non eodem modo. Nam si, hoc  esse  est  impossibile, non inferemus, ergo hoc esse est  necesse, sed, hoc non esse est necesse. Quia ergo im-  possibile et necesse mutuo se sequuntur, quando dicta eo-  rum contrario modo sumuntur, et non quando dicta eo-  rum simili modo sumuntur, sequitur quod non eodem  modo ad possibile se habeant impossibile et necessarium,  sed contrario modo. Nam ad id possibile quod sequitur  dictum affirmatum de impossibili, sequitur dictum nega-  tum de necessario; et e contrario. Quare autem hoc ac-  cidit infra dicetur. Erraverunt igitur antiqui quod similes  enunciationes de impossibili et necessario in primo et in  secundo ordine locaverunt.  ro.  Hinc apparet quod supra posita nostra expositio  conformior est Aristoteli. Cum enim hunc textum indu-  xerit ad manifestandum illa verba: Manifestum. est autem.  quoniam non eodem modo, etc., eo accipiendo sunt sensu  illa verba, quo hic per causam manifestantur. Liquet au-  tem quod hic redditur causa dissimilitudinis verae inter  necessarias et impossibiles in consequendo possibiles, et  non dissimilitudinis falso opinatae ab antiquis: quoniam  ex  vera  causa  nonnisi verum concluditur. Ergo repre-  hendendo antiquos, veram dissimilitudinem inter necessa-  rias, et impossibiles in consequendo possibiles, quam non  servaverunt illi, proposuisse tunc intelligendum est, et  nunc  eam manifestasse. Quod autem dissimilitudo illa,  quam antiqui posuerunt inter necessarias et impossibiles,  sit falso posita, ex infra dicendis patebit. Ostendetur enim  quod contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de neces-  sario sequuntur conversim; et quod in hoc non differunt  ab his quae sunt de impossibili, sed differunt in hoc quod  modo diximus, quod possibilium et impossibilium se con-  sequentium dictum est similiter, possibilium autem et ne-  cessariorum, se invicem consequentium dictum est con-  trarium, ut infra clara luce videbitur.  11. Quarto cum dicit: Aut certe impossibile est etc., mani-  festat aliud quod proposuerat, scilicet, quod contradicto-  riae de necessario male situatae sint secundum conse-  quentiam ab antiquis, qui contradictiones necessarii ita  ordinaverunt. In primo ordine posuerunt contradictoriam  negationem, necesse esse, idest, non necesse esse; et in se-  cundo contradictoriam negationem, necesse non esse, idest,  Albertus.  *  Ν  Cf. supra, n..3.  CAP. XIII,  non  necesse  non  esse.  Et probat hunc consequentiae  modum esse malum in primo ordine. Cognita enim ma-  litia primi, facile est secundi ordinis agnoscere defectum.  Probat autem hoc tali ratione ducente ad impossibile. Ad  necessarium esse sequitur possibile esse: aliter sequere-  tur non possibile esse, quod manifeste implicat; ad pos-  sibile esse sequitur non impossibile esse, ut patet; ad non  impossibile esse, secundum antiquos, sequitur in primo  ordine non necessarium esse; ergo de primo ad ultimum,  ad necessarium esse sequitur non necessarium esse: quod  est  inconveniens, quia est manifesta implicatio contradi-  ctionis. Relinquitur ergo quod male dictum sit, quod non  necessarium esse consequatur in primo ordine. Ait ergo  et  certe  impossibile est poni sic secundum consequen-  tiam, ut antiqui posuerunt, necessarii contradictiones, id-  est illas duas enunciationes de necessario, quae sunt ne-  gationes contradictoriae aliarum duarum de necessario.  Nam ad id quod est, necessarium esse, sequitur, possibile  est esse: nam si non, idest quoniam si hanc negaveris  consequentiam, negatio possibilis sequitur illam, scilicet,  necesse esse. Necesse est enim de necessario aut dicere,  idest affirmare possibile, aut negare possibile: de quo-  libet enim est affirmatio vel negatio vera. Quare si dicas  quod, ad necesse esse, non sequitur, possibile esse, sed, non  possibile est esse; cum haec aequivaleat illi quae dicit, im-  possibile est esse, relinquitur quod ad, necesse esse, sequi-  tur, impossibile esse, et idem erit, necesse esse et impos-  sibile esse: quod est inconveniens. Bona ergo erat prima  illatio, scilicet, necesse est esse, ergo possibile est esse.  Tunc ultra. Illud quod est, possibile esse, sequitur, non  impossibile esse, ut patet in primo ordine. Ad hoc vero,  scilicet, non impossibile esse, secundum antiquos eodem  primo ordine, sequitur, non necesse est esse (quare con-  tingit de primo ad ultimum); ad id quod est, necessarium  esse, sequitur, non necessarium esse: quod est inconve-  niens, immo impossibile.  12. Dubitatur hic: quia in I Priorum dicitur quod ad  possibile sequitur non necessarium, hic autem dicitur  oppositum. Ad hoc est dicendum quod possibile sumi-  tur dupliciter. Uno modo in communi, et sic est quod-  dam superius ad necessarium et contingens ad utrun-  que, sicut animal ad hominem et bovem; et sic ad pos-  sibile non sequitur non necessarium, sicut ad animal non  sequitur non homo. Alio modo sumitur possibile pro  una parte possibilis in communi, idest pro possibili seu  contingenti, scilicet ad utrunque, scilicet quod potest esse  et  non esse; et sic ad possibile sequitur non necessarium.  Quod enim potest esse et non esse, non necessarium est  esse, et similiter non necessarium est non esse. Loqui-  mur ergo hic de possibili in communi, ibi vero in speciali.  13. Deinde cum dicit: 4f vero neque necessarium etc.,  determinat veritatem intentam. Et circa hoc tria facit: pri-  mo, determinat quae enunciatio de necessario sequatur ad  possibile; secundo, ordinat consequentias omnium moda-  lium; ibi: Sequuntur enim etc. Quoad primum, sicut duabus  viis reprehendit antiquos, ita ex illis duobus motivis in-  tentum probat. Et intendit quod, ad possibile esse, sequitur,  non necesse non esse. - Primum motivum est per locum  a divisione. Ad, possibile esse, non sequitur (ut probatum  est), non necesse esse, at vero neque, necesse esse, neque,  necesse non esse. Reliquum est ergo ut sequatur ad eam,  non necesse non esse: non enim dantur plures enuncia-  tiones de necessario. Huius communis divisionis primo  proponit reliqua duo membra excludenda, dicens: At vero  neque necessarium. esse, neque necessarium. nom esse, sequitur  ad, possibile non esse ; secundo probat hoc sic. Nullum for-  male consequens minuit suum antecedens: tunc enim op-  positum consequentis staret cum antecedente; sed utrun-  Opp. D. Tnuowar T. I.  LECT. X  113  que horum, scilicet, necesse esse, et, necesse non esse, mi-  nuit possibile esse; ergo, etc. Unde, tacita maiore, ponit  minoris probationem dicens: Illi enim, scilicet, possibile  esse, utraque, scilicet,esse et non esse, contingit accidere;  horum autem, scilicet, necesse esse et necesse non esse,  utrumlibet verum fuerit, non erunt illa duo, scilicet, esse  et  non esse, vera simul in potentia. Et primum horum  explanans ait: cum dico, possibile esse, simul est possibile  esse et non esse. Quoad secundum vero subdit. Si vero  dicas, necesse esse vel necesse non esse, non remanet  utrunque, scilicet, esse et non esse, possibile: si enim ne-  cesse est esse, possibilitas ad non esse excluditur; et si  necesse  est  non  esse,  possibilitas ad esse removetur.  Utrunque ergo istorum minuit illud antecedens, possibile  esse, quoniam ad esse et non esse se extendit, etc. Tertio  subdit conclusionem: relinquitur ergo quod, non neces-  sarium non esse, comes est ei quae dicit, possibile esse;  et  consequenter haec ponenda erit in primo ordine.  14. Occurrit in hac parte dubium circa hoc quod dicit  quod, ad possibile non sequitur necessarium, cum superius  dixerit quod ad ipsum non sequitur non necessarium. Cum  enim necessarium et non necessarium sint contradictoria  opposita, et de quolibet sit affirmatio vel negatio vera, non  videtur posse evadi quin ad possibile sequatur necessarium,  vel, non necessarium. Et cum non sequatur necessarium,  sequetur non necessarium, ut dicebant antiqui. - Augetur et  dubitatio ex eo quod Aristoteles nunc  * usus est tali ar-  gumentationis modo, volens probare quod ad necessarium  sequatur possibile. Dixit enim: Nam si non negatio possibilis  consequatur. Necesse est enim aut dicere aut negare.  15. Pro solutione huius, oportet reminisci habitudi-  nis quae est inter possibile et necessarium, quod scilicet  possibile est superius ad necessarium, et attendere quod  superius potestate continet suum inferius et eius opposi-  tum, ita quod neutrum eorum actualiter sibi vindicat, sed  utrunque potest sibi contingere; sicut animali potest ac-  cidere homo et non homo: et consequenter inspicere de-  bes quod, eadem est proportio superioris ad. habendum  affirmationem et negationem unius inferioris, quae est ali-  cuius subiecti ad affirmativam et negativam futuri contin-  gentis. Utrobique enim neutrum habetur, et salvatur po-  tentia ad utrumlibet. Unde, sicut in futuris contingentibus  nec affirmatio nec fiegatio est determinate vera, sed sub  disiunctione altera est necessario vera, ut in fine Primi *  conclusum est; ita nec affirmatio nec negatio inferioris  sequitur determinate affirmationem vel negationem supe-  rioris, sed sub disiunctione altera sequitur necessario.  Unde non valet, est animal, ergo est homo, neque, ergo  non est homo, sed, ergo est homo vel non est homo. -  Quia ergo possibile superius est ad necessarium , ideo  optime determinavit Aristoteles neutram contradictionis  partem de necessario determinate sequi ad possibile. Non  tamen dixit quod sub disiunctione neutra sequatur; hoc  enim est contra illud primum principium: de quolibet est  affirmatio vera vel falsa.  Ad id autem quod additur, ex eadem trahitur radice  responsio. Quia enim necessarium inferius est ad possibile,  et  inferius non in potentia sed in actu includit suum  superius, necesse est ad inferius determinate sequi suum  superius: aliter determinate sequetur eius contradicto-  rium. Unde per dissimilem habitudinem, quae est inter  necessarium et possibile et non possibile, ex una parte,  et  inter possibile et necessarium et non necessarium, ex  altera parte, ibi optimus fuit processus ad alteram contra-  dictionis partem determinate, et hic optimus ad neutram  determinate.  16. Oritur quoque alia dubitatiuncula. Videtur enim  quod Aristoteles difformiter accipiat ly possibile in prae-  py) *  "ES ἃ:  nunc.  *  Lect. xin.  nunc  114  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  cedenti textu et in isto. Ibi enim accipit ipsum in com-  muni, ut sequitur ad necessarium; hic videtur accipere  ipsum specialiter pro possibili ad utrumlibet, quia dicit  quod possibile est simul potens esse et non esse.  Et ad hoc dicendum est quod uniformiter usus est  possibili. Nec eius verba obstant: quoniam et de possibili  in communi verum est dicere quod potest sibi utrun-  que accidere, scilicet, esse et non esse: tum quia quid-  quid verificatur de suo inferiori, verificatur etiam de suo  superiori, licet non eodem modo; tum quia possibile in  communi neutram contradictionis partem sibi determinat,  et consequenter utranque sibi advenire compatitur, licet  non asserat potentiam ad utranque partem, quemadmo-  dum possibile ad utrunque.  17. Secundum motivum ad idem, correspondens tacitae  obiectioni antiquorum quam supra exclusit, addit cum sub-  dit: Hoc enim verum est etc. Ubi notandum quod Aristoteles  sub illa maiore adducta pro antiquis (scilicet, convertibi-  liter se consequentium contradictoria se mutuo conse-  quuntur), subsumit minorem: sed horum convertibiliter se  sequentium in tertio ordine (scilicet, non possibile esse et  necesse non esse), contradictoria sunt, possibile esse et non  necesse non esse (quoniam modi negatione eis opponun-  quuntur, scilicet, possibile esse, et, non necesse non esse, .  tamquam contradictoria duorum se mutuo consequentium.  18. Deinde cum dicit: Sequuntur enim. etc., ordinat  omnes  consequentias modalium secundum opinionem  propriam; et ait quod, hae contradictiones, scilicet, de ne-  cessario, sequuntur illas de possibili, secundum modum  praedictum et approbatum illarum de impossibili. Sicut  enim contradictorias de possibili contradictoriae de impos-  sibili sequuntur, licet conversim; ita contradictorias de pos-  sibili contradictoriae de necessario sequuntur conversim:  licet in hoc, ut dictum est, dissimilitudo sit quod, con-  tradictoriarum de possibili et impossibili similiter est di-  ctum, contradictoriarum autem de possibili et necessario  contrarium est dictum, ut in sequenti videtur figura:  CONSEQUENTIAE ENUNCIATIONUM MODALIUM SECUNDUM  QUATUOR ORDINES AB ARISTOTELE POSITAE ET ORDINATAE.  Primus Ordo  Possibile est esse  Contingens est esse  Non impossibile est esse  Non necesse est non esse  .  Secundus Ordo  Possibile est non esse  Contingens est non esse  Non impossibile est non esse.  Non necesse est esse  tur); ergo istae duae (scilicet, possibile esse et non necesse  non esse) se consequuntur et in primo locandae sunt or-  dine. Unde motivum tangens ait: Hoc enim, quod dictum  est, verum est, idest verum esse ostenditur, et de necesse non  esse, idest, et ex illius, scilicet, non necesse non esse, oppo-  sita, quae est, necesse non esse. Vel, boc enim, scilicet, non  necesse non esse, verum est, scilicet, contradictorium illius  de necesse non esse. Et minorem subdens ait: Haec enim,  scilicet, non necesse non esse, fit contradictio eius, quae  convertibiliter sequitur, non possibile esse. Et explanans  hoc in terminis subdit. Illud enim, non possibile esse,  quod est caput tertii ordinis, sequitur hoc de impossibili,  scilicet, impossibile esse, et haec de necessario, scilicet, ne-  cesse non esse, cuius negatio seu contradictoria est, non  necesse non esse. Et quia, caeteris paribus, modus negatur,  et illa, possibile esse, est (subauditur) contradictoria illius,  scilicet, non possibile; igitur ista duo mutuo se conse-  Tertius Ordo  Non possibile est esse  Non contingens est esse  Impossibile est esse  Necesse est non esse  Quartus Ordo  Non possibile est non esse  Non contingens est non esse  Impossibile est non esse  Necesse est esse  Ubi vides quod nulla est inter Aristotelem et anti-  quos differentia, nisi in duobus primis ordinibus quoad  illas  de  necessario.  Praepostero namque situ usi sunt  antiqui, eam de necessario, quae locanda erat in primo  ordine, in secundo ponentes, et eam quae in secundo po-  nenda erat, in primo locantes. Et aspice quoque quod  convertibiliter se consequentium semper contradictoria se  consequi ordinavit. Singulis enim tertii ordinis singulae  primi ordinis contradictoriae sunt; et similiter singulae  quarti ordinis singulis, quae in secundo sunt, contradi-  ctoriae sunt. Quod antiqui non observarunt.  CAP. XIII, LECT. XI  LECTIO UNDECIMA  (Canp. CarerANr lect. 1x)  AN AD ILLUD QUOD EST, NECESSARIUM ESSE, SEQUATUR ID QUOD EST, POSSIBILE ESSE?  ᾽Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις εἰ τῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ δυνατὸν  εἶναι  ἕπεται.  Εἴ τε γὰρ μὴ ἕπεται, ἡ ἀντίφχοσις  ἀχολουθήσει, τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι" καὶ εἴ τις ταύτην  μὴ φήσειεν εἶναι ἀντίφασιν, ἀνάγκη λέγειν τὸ δυνα-  τὸν μὴ εἶναι: ἅπερ ἄμφω ψευδῇ κατὰ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖον  115 -  * Dubitabit autem aliquis, si ad illud quod est, necessarium  esse, illud quod est, possibile esse, sequatur. Nam si  εἶναι.  ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν πάλιν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι δοχεῖ δυνατὸν τέμνεσθαι  καὶ μὴ τέμνεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι καὶ μιὴ εἶναι, ὥστε ἔσται  τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐνδεχόμενον po εἶναι: τοῦτο δὲ  ψεῦδος.  3  ἢ  ε  Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ βαδίζειν  xxi τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύναται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ὧν οὐκ  ος͵ ἀληθές" πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατα λόγον δυνατῶν,  οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαντικὸν καὶ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄλογον.  Αἱ μὲν οὖν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων  καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ δ᾽ ἄλογοι οὐ πᾶσαι, ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ  εἴρηται, τὸ πῦρ οὐ δυνατὸν θερμαίνειν καὶ μή, οὐδ᾽  ὅσα ἄλλα ἐνεργεῖ ἀεί. "ἔνια μέντοι δύναται xal τῶν  χατὰ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις ἅμα τὰ ἀντιχείμενα δέ-  ἕξασται. ᾿λλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τούτου χάριν εἴρηται, ὅτι  οὐ πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὐδ᾽ ὅσαι λέ-  γονται χατὸὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἴδος.  mew  [TAS  TA  necesse. Et duo facit: quia primo dubitatio-  nem absolvit; secundo, ex determinata quaestione alium or-  *  *  Wr  ed  Ὁ TE  ϑ,  να  MPPT  T  Lect. seq.  Num. 5.  dinem earumdem consequentiarum modalibus statuit ; ibi:  Et est fortasse * etc. Circa primum duo facit: primo, movet  quaestionem; secundo, determinat eam; ibi: Manifestum  est * etc. Movet ergo quaestionem: primo dicens: Dubitabit  autem. aliquis si ad id quod est. necesse esse sequatur. possibile  &5$£; et secundo, arguit ad partem affirmativam subdens:  Nam si non sequatur, contradictoria eius. sequetur, scilicet  non possibile esse, ut supra deductum est: quia de quolibet  est  affirmatio vel negatio vera. Et si quis dicat hanc, sci-  licet, non possibile esse, non esse contradictoriam illius,  scilicet, possibile esse, et propterea subterfugiendum velit  argumentum, et dicere quod neutra harum sequitur ad  necesse esse; talis licet falsum dicat, tamen concedatur  sibi, quoniam necesse erit ipsum dicere illius contradi-  ctoriam fore, possibile non esse. Oportet namque aut  non possibile esse aut possibile non esse, esse contradi-  ctoriam, possibile esse; et tunc in eumdem redibit errorem,  quoniam utraeque, scilicet, non possibile esse et possibile  non esse, falsae sunt de eo quod est, necesse esse. Et  consequenter ad ipsum neutra sequi potest. Nulla enim  enunciatio sequitur ad ilam, cuius veritatem destruit.  Relinquitur ergo quod, ad necesse esse sequitur possibile  esse. .  2.  Tertio, arguit ad partem negativam cum subdit: 4  vero rursus etc., et intendit talem rationem. Si ad necesse  esse  sequitur possibile esse, cum ad possibile sequatur  possibile non esse (per conversionem in oppositam qua-  "litatem, ut dicitur in I Priorum, quia idem est possibile  esse  et  non 6556), sequetur de primo ad ultimum quod  necesse esse est possibile non esse: quod est falsum ma-  nifeste.  Unde oppositionis hypothesim subdit: 44: vero  non sequatur, contradictio sequetur, quae est, non pos-  sibile esse: et si quis hanc non dicat esse contradictio-  nem, necesse est dicere, possibile non esse: quae utrae-  que falsae sunt de necesse esse.  At vero rursus idem videtur esse possibile aliquid incidi  et non incidi, et esse et non esse: quare erit necesse  esse, contingens non esse. Hoc autem falsum est.  Manifestum est autem quod non omne possibile, vel esse,  vel ambulare, etiam opposita potest; sed est in qu:bus  non sit verum. Primum quidem in his quae non secun-  dum rationem possunt; ut ignis calefactibilis est, et ha-  bet vim irrationalem. Quae igitur secundum rationem  potestates  sunt,  eaedem plurium etiam contrariorum  sunt. Irrationales vero non omnes: sed (quemadmodum  dictum est) ignem non esse possibile calefacere et non;  neque quaecunque alia semper agunt. Alia vero possunt,  et  secundum irrationales potestates simul opposita su-  scipere. Sed hoc huius gratia: dictum est, quoniam non  omnis potestas oppositorum susceptiva est, neque quae-  cunque secundum eamdem speciem dicuntur.  rursus videtur idem possibile esse et non esse, ut domus, et  possibile incidi et. non. incidi, ut vestis. Quare de primo  ad ultimum necesse esse, erit contingens non esse. Hoc  autem est falsum. Ergo hypothesis illa, scilicet, quod pos-  sibile sequatur ad necesse, est falsa.  3. Deinde cum dicit: Manifestum. est. autem. etc., re-  spondet dubitationi. Et primo, declarat veritatem simpli-  citer; secundo, applicat ad. propositum; ibi: Hoc igitur  possibile*  etc. Proponit ergo primo ipsam veritatem decla-  randam, dicens: Manifestum est autem, ex dicendis, quod non  omne possibile esse vel ambulare, idest operari: idest, non  omne possibile secundum actum primum vel secundum  ad opposita valet, idest ad opposita viam habet, sed est  invenire aliqua possibilia, in quibus non sit verum di-  cere  quod possunt in opposita. Deinde, quia possibile  a  potentia nascitur, manifestat qualiter se habeat potentia  ipsa ad opposita: ex hoc enim clarum erit quomodo pos-  sibile se liabeat ad opposita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo  manifestat hoc in potentiis eiusdem rationis; secundo,  in his quae aequivoce dicuntur potentiae; ibi: Quasdam  vero potentiae * etc. Circa primum tria facit: quia primo  manifestat qualiter potentia irrationalis se habeat ad op-  posita; et ait quod potentia irrationalis non potest in  opposita.  4. Ubi notandum est quod, sicut dicitur IX Metapbys.,  potentia activa, cum nihil aliud sit quam principium quo  in aliud agimus, dividitur in potentiam rationalem et ir-  rationalem. Potentia rationalis est, quae cum ratione et  electione operatur; sicut ars medicinae, qua medicus co-  gnoscens quid sanando expediat infirmo, et volens applicat  remedia. Potentia autem irrationalis vocatur illa, quae non  ex ratione et libertate operatur, sed ex naturali sua dispo-  sitione; sicut calor ignis potentia irrationalis est, quia  calefacit, non ut cognoscit et vult, sed ut natura sua  exigit. Assignatur autem ibidem duplex differentia pro-  posito deserviens inter istas potentias.- Prima est quod  activa potentia irrationalis non potest duo opposita, sed  *  *  *  Seq. c. xut.  Lect. seq.  Lect. seq.  RN"  116  est  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  determinata ad unum oppositorum, sive sumatur op-  positum contradictorie sive contrarie. Verbi gratia: calor  non potest calefacere et non calefacere, quae sunt con-  tradictorie opposita, reque potest calefacere et frigefacere,  quae sunt contraria, sed ad calefactionem determinatus  est.  Et hoc intellige per se, quia per accidens calor fri-  gefacere potest, vel resolvendo materiam caloris, humidum  scilicet, vel per antiperistasin contrarii. Et similiter potest  non calefacere per accidens, scilicet si calefactibile deest.  Potentia autem rationalis potest in opposita et contra-  dictorie  et  contrarie.  Arte  siquidem medicinae potest  medicus adhibere remedia et non adhibere, quae sunt  contradictoria; et adhibere remedia sana et nociva, quae  sunt  contraria. - Secunda differentia est quod potentia  activa irrationalis, praesente passo, necessario operatur,  deductis impedimentis: calor enim calefactibile sibi prae-  sens calefacit necessario, si nihil impediat; potentia autem  rationalis, passo praesente, non necessario operatur: prae-:  sente  siquidem. infirmo, non cogitur medicus remedia  adhibere.  É  5. Dimittantur autem metaphysico harum differen-  tiarum rationes et ad textum redeamus. Ubi narrans quo-  modo se habeat potentia irrationalis ad oppositum, ait:  Et primum quidem, scilicet, non est verum dicere quod  sit potentia ad opposita in his quae. possunt non secundum  rationem , idest, in his quorum posse est per potentias  irrationales; ut ignis calefactivus est, idest, potens calefacere,  et babet vim, idest, potentiam istam irrationalem. Ignis si-  quidem non potest frigefacere; neque in eius potestate  est calefacere et non calefacere. Quod autem dixit primum  ordinem, nota, ad secundum genus possibilis infra dicen-  dum, in quo etiam non invenitur potentia ad opposita.  6. Secundo, manifestat quomodo potentia rationalis  se habeat ad opposita, intendens quod potentia rationalis  potest in opposita. Unde subdit: Ergo potestates secundum  rationem, idest rationales, ipsae eaedem sunt contrariorum,  a  non solum duorum, sed etiam plurimorum, ut arte medi-  cinae medicus plurima iuga contrariorum adhibere potest,  et  multarum operationum contradictionibus abstinere  potest. Praeposuit autem ly ergo, ut hoc consequi ex dictis  insinuaret: cum enim oppositorum oppositae sint proprie-  tates, et potentia irrationalis ex eo quod irrationalis ad  opposita non se extendat; oportet potentiam rationalem  ad opposita viam habere, eo quod rationalis sit.  7. Tertio, explanat id quod dixit de potentiis irra-  tionalibus, propter causam infra assignandam ab ipso; et  intendit quod illud quod dixit de potentia irrationali ,  scilicet quod non potest in opposita, non est verum uni-  versaliter, sed particulariter. - Ubi nota quod potentia  irrationalis dividitur in potentiam activam, quae est prin-  cipium faciendi, et potentiam passivam, quae est princi-  pium patiendi: verbi gratia, potentia ad calorem dividitur  in posse calefacere, et in posse calefieri. In potentiis acti-  vis irrationalibus verum est quod non possunt in opposita,  .ut declaratum est; in potentiis autem passivis non est  verum. Illud enim quod potest calefieri, potest etiam fri-  gefieri, quia eadem est materia, seu potentia passiva con-  trariorum , ut dicitur in II De caelo et mundo, et potest  non calefieri, quia idem est subiectum privationis et for-  mae, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et propter hoc ergo expla-  nando, ait: Irralionales vero potentiae mom omnes a posse  in opposita excludi intelligendae sunt, sed illae quae sunt  quemadmodum potentia ignis calefactiva (ignem enim  non posse non calefacere manifestum est), et universali-  ter, quaecunque alia sunt talis potentiae, quod semper  agunt, idest quod quantum est ex se non possunt non  agere, sed ad semper agendum ex sua forma necessi-  tantur. Huiusmodi autem sunt, ut declaravimus, omnes  potentiae activae irrationales. Alia vero sunt talis con-  ditionis  quod  etiam  secundum irrationales potentias ,  scilicet passivas, simul possunt in quaedam opposita, ut  aer  potest calefieri et frigefieri.  Quod vero ait, simul, cadit supra ly possunt, et non  supra ly opposita; et est sensus, quod simul aliquid habet  potentiam passivam ad utrunque oppositorum, et non  quod habeat potentiam passivam ad utrunque opposito-  rum simul habendum. Opposita namque impossibile est  haberi simul. Unde et dici solet et bene, quod in huius-  modi est simultas potentiae, non potentia simultatis. Irra-  tionalis igitur potentia non secundum totum suum ambi-  tum a posse in opposita excluditur, sed secundum partem  eius, secundum potentias scilicet activas.  8. Quia autem videbatur superflue addidisse differen-  tias inter activas et passivas irrationales, quia sat erat pro-  posito ostendisse quod non omnis potentia oppositorum  est; ideo subdit quod hoc idcirco dictum est, ut notum  fiat quoniam nedum non omnis potestas oppositorum est,  loquendo de potentia communissime, sed neque quaecun-  que potentiae dicuntur secundum eamdem speciem ad  opposita possunt. Potentiae siquidem irrationales omnes  sub una specie irrationalis potentiae concluduntur, et ta-  men non omnes in opposita possunt, sed passive tantum.  Non supervacanea ergo fuit differentia inter passivas et  activas irrationales, sed necessaria ad declarandum quod  non omnes potentiae eiusdem speciei possunt in opposita.  Potest etly boc demonstrare utranque differentiam, scilicet,  inter rationales et irrationales,et inter irrationales activas et.  passivas inter se; et tunc est sensus, quod hoc ideo fecimus,  ut ostenderemus quod non omnis potestas, quae scilicet  secundum eamdem rationem potentiae physicae dicitur,  quia scilicet potest in aliquid ut rationalis et irrationalis,  neque etiam omnis potestas, quae sub eadem specie con-  tinetur, ut irrationalis activa et passiva sub specie irra-  tionalis, ad opposita potest.  CAP. XIII, LECT. XII  LECTIO DUODECIMA  (Canp. CargrANI lect. x)  DECLARATIS POTENTIIS QUAE AEQUIVOCAE DICUNTUR, SUMITUR RATIO ZMPOSSIBILIS  AD DETERMINANDUM QUODNAM EX POSSIBILIBUS AD NECESSARIUM SEQUATUR  '  *  ,  ΄  ΄  Ν  b  Ἔνιαι δὲ δυνάμεις ὁμώνυμοί εἰσι. Τὸ γὰρ δυνατὸν οὐχ  ἁπλῶς λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἀληθὲς ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ  *  117  ,  Quaedam vero potestates aequivocae sunt. Possibile enim * Sea. c. xu. :  non  L4  ὄν,  1  olov  ^  à  *  L]  δυνατὸν  e  f.  δίζε  e  (Q  δίζε  ^  ὶ e  NI  ῥαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ὅλως δυ-  ,  "^  ,  νατὸν εἶναι ὅτι ἤδη ἔστι xav ἐνέργειαν ὃ λέγεται  E  ^  εἰ  ,  i  εἶναι δυνατόν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐνεργήσειεν ἄν, οἷον δυνα-  [i  *  τὸν εἶναι βαδίζειν ὅτι βαδίσειεν ἄν.  Καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς κινητοῖς ἐστὶ μόνοις ἡ δύναμις,  ἐκείνη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀχινήτοις, Γλμφω δὲ ἀληθὲς  εἰπεῖν τὸ μὴ ἀδύνατον εἶναι βαδίζειν ἢ εἶναι, xai  τὸ βαδίζον ἤδη καὶ ἐνεργοῦν καὶ τὸ βαδιστιχόν.  Τὸ μὲν οὖν οὕτω  δυνατὸν οὐχ ἀληθὲς χατο τοῦ ἀναγ-  χαίου ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θάτερον δὲ ἀληθές. “Ὥστε ἐπεὶ  7 τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ καγόλου ἕπεται, τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγχης ὄντι  ἕπεται τὸ δύνασθαι εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι πᾶν.  Καὶ ἔστι δὴ ἀρχὴ ἴσως τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαϊον  πάντων ἢ εἶναι ἢ μιὴ εἶναι, καὶ τἄλλα ὡς τούτοις  ἀχολουθοῦντα ἐπισκοπεῖν δεῖ.  Φανερὸν δὴ ix τῶν εἰρημένων. ὅτι τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὃν  χατ᾽  ἐνέργειάν ἐδτιν, ὥστε εἰ πρότερα τὰ ἀίδια, καὶ  ἡ ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως προτέρα.  οὐσίαι, τὰ  Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ δυνάμεως ἐνέργειαί εἰσιν, olov αἱ πρῶ-  ται  δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως, ἃ τῇ μὲν φύσει  πρότερα, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ ὕστερα, vd δὲ οὐδέποτε ἐνέρ-  γειαί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις μόνον.  3  ntendit declarare quomodo illae quae aequi-  UP vocae dicuntur potentiae, se habeant ad oppo-  E. sita. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, declarat  £j)  *  Num. 3.  naturam talis potentiae; secundo, ponit diffe-  rentiam et convenientiam inter ipsas et supra-  dictas, ibi: Et baec quidem* etc. Ad evidentiam primi adver-  tendum est quod V et TX Metapbys., Aristoteles dividit po-  tentiam in potentias, quae eadem ratione potentiae dicuntur,  et in potentias, quae non ea ratione qua praedictae poten-  tiae nomen habent, sed alia. Et has appellat aequivoce  potentias. Sub primo membro comprehenduntur omnes  potentiae activae, et passivae, et rationales, et irrationales.  Quaecunque enim posse dicuntur per potentiam activam  vel passivam quam habeant, eadem ratione potentiae sunt,  quia scilicet est in eis vis principiata alicuius activae vel  passivae. Sub secundo autem membro comprehenduntur  potentiae mathematicales et logicales. Mathematica po-  tentia est, qua lineam posse dicimus in quadratum, et eo  quod in semetipsam ducta quadratum constituit. Logica  potentia est, qua duo termini coniungi absque contradi-  ctione in enunciatione possunt. Sub logica quoque po-  tentia continetur quae ea ratione potentia dicitur, quia est.  Hae vero merito aequivoce a primis potentiae dicuntur,  eo quod istae nullam virtutem activam vel passivam prae-  dicant; et quod possibile istis modis dicitur, non ea ratione  possibile appellatur quia aliquis habeat virtutem ad hoc  agendum vel patiendum, sicut in primis. Unde cum po-  tentiae habentes se ad opposita sint activae vel passivae,  istae quae aequivocae potestates dicuntur ad opposita non  se  habent. De his ergo loquens ait: Quaedam vero pote-  states aequivocae sunt, et ideo ad opposita non se habent.  2. Deinde declarans qualis sit ista potestas aequivoce  dicta, subdit divisionem usitatam possibilis per quam hoc  simpliciter dicitur: sed hoc quidem, quoniam ve-  rum est, quod in actu est; ut possibile ambulare, quo-  niam ambulat iam, et omnino possibile esse, quoniam  iam est in actu, quod dicitur esse possibile: illud vero,  quoniam actu esse posset; ut possibile ambulare, quo-  niam ambulabit.  in  Et haec quidem in mobilibus solis est potestas, illa vero  et  immobilibus. Utrunque vero verum est dicere,  non impossibile esse ambulare vel esse, et quod iam  ambulat et agit, et ambulativum.  Hoc igitur possibile non est verum de necessario dicere  simpliciter, alterum autem verum est. Quare quoniam  partem universale sequitur, illud quod ex necessitate  est,  consequitur posse esse, sed non omne.  Et est fortasse quidem principium, quod necessarium est,  et  quod non necessarium est, omnium vel esse, vel non  esse:  et  oportet.  alia, veluti horum consequentia, considerare  Manifestum est autem ex his quae dicta sunt, quod id  quod ex necessitate est, secundum actum est: quare si  priora sunt sempiterna, et quae actu sunt potestate  priora sunt.  ^  Et haec quidem sine potestate actus sunt, ut primae sub-  stantiae: alia vero cum potestate, quae natura quidem  priora sunt, tempore vero posteriora. Alia vero num-  quam actus sunt, sed potestates tantum.  scitur, dicens: possibile enim non uno modo dicitur, sed  duobus. Et uno quidem modo dicitur possibile eo quod  verum est ut in actu, idest ut actualiter est; ut, possibile  est ambulare, quando ambulat iam: et omnino, idest uni-  versaliter possibile est esse, quoniam est actu iam quod  possibile dicitur. Secundo modo autem possibile dicitur  aliquid non ea ratione quia est actualiter, sed quia forsitan  aget, idest quia potest agere; ut possibile est ambulare,  quoniam ambulabit. Ubi advertendum est quod ex divi-  sione bimembri possibilis divisionem supra positam po-  tentiae declaravit a posteriori. Possibile enim a potentia  dicitur: sub primo siquidem membro possibilis innuit po-  tentias aequivoce; sub secundo autem potentias univoce,  activas  scilicet et passivas. Intendebat ergo quod quia  possibile dupliciter dicitur, quod etiam potestas duplex  est. Declaravit autem potestates aequivocas ex uno earum  membro tantum, scilicet ex his quae dicuntur possibilia  quia sunt, quia hoc sat erat suo proposito.  3. Deinde cum dicit: Et baec quidem etc., assignat diffe-  rentiam inter utranque potentiam, et ait quod potentia  haec ultimo dicta physica, est in solis illis rebus, quae  sunt  mobiles ; illa autem est et in rebus mobilibus et  immobilibus. Possibile siquidem a potentia dictum eo  quod possit agere, non tamen agit, inveniri non potest  absque mutabilitate eius, quod sic posse dicitur. Si enim  nunc potest agere et non agit,si agere debet, oportet quod  mutetur de otio ad operationem. Id autem quod possi-  bile dicitur eo quod est, nullam mutabilitatem exigit in  eo  quod sic possibile dicitur. Esse namque in actu, quod  talem possibilitatem fundat, invenitur et in rebus neces-  sariis, et in immutabilibus, et in rebus mobilibus. Possi-  bile ergo hoc, quod logicum vocatur, communius est illo  quod physicum appellari solet.  '  118  4. Deinde subdit convenientiam inter utrunque possi-  bile, dicens quod in utrisque potestatibus et possibilibus  verum est non impossibile esse, scilicet, ipsum ambulare,  quod iam actu ambulat seu agit, et quod iam ambulabile  est; idest, in hoc conveniunt quod, sive dicatur possibile  ex  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  CONSEQUENTIAE ENUNCIATIONUM MODALIUM  SECUNDUM QUATUOR ORDINES ALIO CONVENIENTI SITU  AB ARISTOTELE POSITAE ET ORDINATAE:  Primus Ordo  eo  *  Cf. lect. praec.  n. 5.  quod actu est, sive ex eo quod potest esse, de  utroque verificatur non impossibile; et consequenter ne-  cessario verificatur possibile, quoniam ad non impossibile  sequitur possibile. Hoc est secundum genus possibilis, re-  spectu cuius Aristoteles supra dixit: Et primum quidem * etc.,  in quo non invenitur via ad utrunque oppositorum, hoc,  inquam, est possibile quod iam actu est. Quod enim tali  ratione possibile dicitur, iam determinatum est ex eo  quod actu esse suppositum est. Non ergo possibile omne  ad utrunque possibile est, sive loquamur de possibili phy-  sice, sive logice.  5. Deinde cum dicit : Sic igitur possibile etc., applicat de-  terminatam veritatem ad propositum. Et primo, conclu-  dendo ex dictis, declarat habitudinem utriusque possibilis  ad necessarium, dicens quod hoc ergo possibile, scilicet  physicum quod est in solis mobilibus, non est verum dicere  Necesse est esse  Non possibile est non esse  Non contingens est non esse  Impossibile est non esse  Tertius Ordo  Non. necesse est esse  Possibile est non esse  Contingens est non esse  Non impossibile est non esse  Secundus Ordo  Necesse est non esse  Non possibile est esse  Non contingens est esse  Impossibile est esse  Quartus Ordo  Non necesse est non esse  Possibile est esse  Contingens est esse  Non impossibile est esse  Vides autem hic nihil immutatum, nisi quod neces-  sariae quae ultimum locum tenebant, primum sortitae  sunt. Quod vero dixit fortasse, non dubitantis, sed absque  determinata ratione rem proponentis est.  et  praedicare de necessario simpliciter: quia quod sim-  pliciter necessarium est, non potest aliter esse. Possibile  autem physicum potest sic et aliter esse, ut dictum est.  Addit autem ly simpliciter, quoniam necessarium est mul-  tiplex. Quoddam enim est ad bene esse, quoddam ex  suppositione: de quibus non est nostrum tractare, sed  solummodo id insinuare. Quod ut praeservaret se ab illis  modis necessarii qui non perfecte et omnino habent ne-  cessarii rationem , apposuit ly simpliciter. De tali enim  necessario possibile physicum non verificatur. Alterum  autem possibile logicum, quod in rebus immobilibus inve-  nitur, verum est de illo enunciare, quoniam nihil neces-  *  c  *  Lect. praeced.  a  Cf. lect. praec.  n. I.  *  Num. seq.  sitatis adimit. Et per hoc solvitur ratio inducta * ad par-  tem negativam quaestionis. Peccabat siquidem in hoc, -quod ex necessario inferebat possibile ad utrunque quod  convertitur in oppositam qualitatem.  6. Deinde respondet quaestioni formaliter intendens  quod affirmativa pars * quaestionis tenenda sit, quod sci-  licet ad necessarium sequitur possibile; et assignat cau-  sam.  Quia ad partem subiectivam sequitur constructive  suum totum universale; sed necessarium est pars subie-  ctiva possibilis: quia possibile dividitur in logicum et  physicum, et sub logico comprehenditur necessarium ;  ergo ad necessarium sequitur possibile. Unde dicit: Quare,  quoniam partem, scilicet subiectivam, suum totum univer-  sale sequitur, illud quod ex necessitate est, idest necessa-  rium, tamquam partem subiectivam, consequitur posse  esse, idest possibile, tamquam totum universale. Sed mon  omnino, idest sed non ita quod omnis species possibilis  sequatur; sicut ad hominem sequitur animal, sed non  omnino, idest non secundum omnes suas partes subiecti-  vas sequitur ad hominem: non enim valet: est homo, ergo  est animal irrationale. Et per hoc confirmata ratione ad-  ducta ad partem affirmativam, expressius solvit rationem  adductam ad partem negativam, quae peccabat secundum  fallaciam consequentis, inferens ex necessario possibile,  descendendo ad unam possibilis speciem, ut de se patet.  7. Deinde cum dicit: Et est fortasse quidem etc., ordinat  easdem modalium consequentias alio situ, praeponendo  necessarium omnibus aliis modis. Et circa hoc duo facit:  primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, assignat causam  dicti ordinis; ibi: Manifestum est autem* etc. Dicit ergo: Et  est fortasse principium omnium enunciationum modalium vel esse  vel non esse, idest, affirmativarum vel negativarum, necessa-  rium et non necessarium. Et oportet considerare alia, sci-  licet, possibile contingere et impossibile esse, sicut borum,  scilicet, necessarii et non necessarii, consequentia, hoc modo:  8. Deinde cum dicit: Manifestum est autem. etc., in-  tendit assignare causam dicti ordinis. Et primo, assignat  causam, quare praeposuerit necessarium possibili tali ra-  tione. Sempiternum est prius temporali; sed necessarium  dicit sempiternitatem (quia dicit esse in actu, excludendo  omnem mutabilitatem, et consequenter temporalitatem ,  quae sine motu non est imaginabilis), possibile autem  dicit temporalitatem (quia non excludit quin possit esse  et  non esse); ergo necesse merito prius ponitur quam  possibile. Unde dicit, proponendo minorem: Manifestum  est autem ex bis quae dicta sunt etc., tractando de necessario:  quoniam id quod ex necessitate est, secundum actum est  totaliter, scilicet quia omnem excludit mutabilitatem et  potentiam ad oppositum: si enim mutari posset in oppo-  situm aliquo modo, iam non esset necessarium. - Deinde  subdit maiorem per modum antecedentis conditionalis :  Quare si priora sunt sempiterna temporalibus etc. - Ultimo  ponit conclusionem: et quae actu sunt omnino, scilicet  necessaria, priora sunt potestate, idest possibilibus, quae  omnino actu esse non ponunt, licet compatiantur.  9. Deinde cum dicit: Et bae quidem etc., assignat cau-  sam totius ordinis a se inter modales statuti, tali ratione.  Universi triplex est gradus. Quaedam sunt actu sine pote-  illae  state, idest sine admixta potentia, ut primae substantiae, -  non  quas in praesenti diximus primas, eo quod  principaliter et maxime substent, sed illae quae sunt pri-  mae, quia omnium rerum sunt causae, Intelligentiae sci-  licet. - Alia sunt actu cum possibilitate, ut omnia mobi-  lia, quae secundum id quod habent de actu sunt priora  natura seipsis secundum id quod habent de potentia, li-  cet e contra sit, aspiciendo ordinem temporis. Sunt enim  secundum id quod habent de potentia priora tempore  seipsis secundum id quod habent de actu. Verbi gratia,  Socrates prius secundum tempus poterat esse philoso-  phus, deinde fuit actualiter philosophus. Potentia ergo  praecedit actum secundum ordinem temporis in Socrate,  ordine autem naturae, perfectionis et dignitatis e con-  verso  contingit. Prior enim secundum dignitatem, idest  dignior et perfectior habebatur Socrates cum philosophus  actualiter erat, quam cum philosophus esse poterat. Prae-  posterus est igitur ordo potentiae et actus in unomet,  utroque ordine, scilicet, naturae et temporis attento, - Alia  vero nunquam sunt actu sed potestate tantum, ut motus,  tempus, infinita divisio magnitudinis, et infinita augmenta-  tio numeri. Haec enim, ut IX Metapbys. dicitur, nunquam  exeunt in actum, quoniam eorum rationi repugnat. Nun-  quam enim aliquid horum ita est quin aliquid eius ex-  pectetur, et consequenter nunquam esse potest nisi in po-  tentia. Sed de his alio tractandum est loco.  9. Nunc haec ideo dicta sint ut, inspecto ordine uni-  versi, appareat quod illum imitati sumus in nostro ordi-  CAP. XIII, LECT. XII  ne.  Posuimus siquidem primo necessarium, quod sonat  actu esse sine potestate seu mutabilitate, imitando primum  gradum universi. - Locavimus secundo loco possibile et  contingens, quorum utrunque sonat actum cum possibi-  litate, et sic servatur conformitas ad secundum gradum  universi. - Praeposuimus autem possibile et non contin-  gens, quia possibile respicit actum , contingens autem  secundum vim nominis respicit defectum causae, qui ad  potentiam pertinet: defectus enim potentiam sequitur; et  ex hoc conforme est secundae parti universi, in qua actus  est prior potentia secundum naturam, licet non secundum  tempus.- Ultimum autem locum impossibili reservavimus,  eo  quod sonat nunquam fore, sicut et ultima universi  pars dicta est illa, quae nunquam actu est. Pulcherrimus  igitur ordo statutus est, quando divinus est observatus.  IO. Quia autem suppositae modalium consequentiae  nil aliud sunt quam aequipollentiae earum, quae ob va-  rium negationis situm, qualitatem, vel quantitatem, vel  utranque mutantis, fiunt; ideo ad completam notitiam  consequentium se modalium, de earum qualitate et quan-  titate pauca admodum necessaria dicenda sunt. Quoniam  igitur natura totius ex partium naturis consurgit, scien-  dum est quod subiectum enunciationis modalis et dicit  esse vel non esse, et est dictum unicum, et continet in  se subiectum dicti; praedicatum autem modalis enuncia-  tionis, modus scilicet, et totale praedicatum est ( quia  explicite vel implicite verbum continet, quod est semper  nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur: propter quod  Aristoteles dixit quod modus est ipsa appositio), et conti-  net in se vim distributivam secundum partes temporis.  Necessarium enim et impossibile distribuunt in omne tem-  pus vel simpliciter vel tale; possibile autem et contingens  pro aliquo tempore in communi.  11. Nascitur autem ex his quinque conditionibus du-  plex in qualibet modali qualitas, et triplex quantitas. - Ex  eo  enim quod tam subiectum quam praedicatum moda-  lis verbum in se habet, duplex qualitas fit, quarum altera  vocatur qualitas dicti, altera qualitas modi. Unde et supra  dictum est* aliquam esse: affirmativam de modo et non  de dicto, et e converso. - Ex eo vero quod subiectum  modalis continet in se subiectum dicti, una quantitas  consurgit, quae vocatur quantitas subiecti dicti: et haec  distinguitur in universalem, particularem et singularem,  Sicut et quàántitas illarum de inesse. Possumus enim di-  cere, Socratem, quemdam hominem, vel omnem ho-  minem, vel nullum hominem, possibile est currere. -  Ex eo autem quod subiectum unius modalis dictum unum  *  Ed. c: scilicet  omne dictum cu-   tusque  E  isttus  modalis  re  ,  est  universa-  lis, scilicet di-  ctum .  est, consurgit alia quantitas, vocata quantitas dicti; et  haec unica est singularitas: secundum * omne enim di-  ctum cuiusque modalis singulare est istius universalis,  scilicet  dictum. Quod ex eo liquet quod cum dicimus,  hominem esse album est possibile, exponitur sic, hoc  dictum, hominem esse album, est possibile. Hoc dictum  autem singulare est, sicut et, hic homo. Propterea et dici-  tur quod omnis modalis est singularis quoad dictum, licet  quoad subiectum dicti sit universalis vel particularis. - Ex  eo autem quod praedicatum modalis, modus scilicet, vim  distributivam habet, alia quantitas consurgit vocata quan-  titas modi seu modalis; et haec distinguitur in universa-  lem et particularem.  12. Ubi diligenter: duo attendenda sunt. Primum est  quod hoc est singulare in modalibus, quod praedicatum  simpliciter quantificat propositionem modalem, sicut et  simpliciter qualificat. Sicut enim illa est simpliciter affir-  mativa, in qua modus affirmatur, et illa negativa, in qua  modus negatur; ita illa est simpliciter universalis cuius  modus est universalis, et illa particularis cuius modus est  particularis. Et hoc quia modalis modi naturam sequitur.  119  Secundum attendendum (quod est causa istius primi )  est, quod praedicatum modalis, scilicet modus, non habet  solam habitudinem praedicati respectu sui subiecti, sci-  licet esse et non esse, sed habitudinem syncategorema-  tis distributivi, sed non secundum quantitatem partium  subiectivarum ipsius subiecti, sed secundum quantitatem  partium temporis eiusdem. Et merito. Sicut enim quia  subiecti enunciationis de inesse propria quantitas est pe-  nes  divisionem vel indivisionem ipsius subiecti (quia  est nomen quod significat per modum substantiae, cuius  quantitas est per divisionem continui: ideo signum quan-  tificans in illis distribuit secundum partes subiectivas), ita  quia subiecti enunciationis modalis propria quantitas est  tempus (quia est verbum quod significat per modum  motus, cuius propria quantitas est tempus), ideo modus  quantificans distribuit ipsum suum subiectum, scilicet, esse  vel non esse, secundum partes temporis. Unde subtiliter  inspicienti apparebit quod quantitas ista modalis proprii  subiecti modalis enunciationis quantitas est, scilicet, ipsius  esse vel non esse. Ita quod illa modalis est simpliciter  universalis, cuius proprium subiectum distribuitur pro  omni tempore: vel simpliciter, ut, hominem esse animal  est necessarium vel impossibile; vel accepto, ut, hominem  currere hodie, vel, dum currit, est necessarium vel im-  possibile. Illa vero est particularis, in qua non pro omni,  sed aliquo tempore distributio fit in communi tantum;  ut, hominem esse animal, est possibile vel contingens. Est  ergo et ista modalis quantitas subiecti sui passio (sicut  et universaliter quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae), sed de-  rivatur a modo, non in quantum praedicatum est (quod, ut  sic, tenetur formaliter), sed in quantum syncategorematis  officio fungitur, quod habet ex eo quod proprie modus est.  13. Sunt igitur modalium (de propria earum quan-  titate loquendo) aliae universales affirmativae, ut illae de  necessario, quia distribuunt ad semper esse; aliae univer-  sales negativae, ut illae de impossibili, quia distribuunt ad  nunquam esse; aliae particulares affirmativae, ut illae de  possibili et contingenti, quia distribuunt utrunque ad  aliquando esse; aliae particulares negativae, ut illae de  non necesse et non impossibili, quia distribuunt ad ali-  quando non esse:sicut in illis de inesse, omnis, nullus,  quidam, non omnis, non nullus, similem faciunt diversi-  tatem. Et quia, ut dictum est, haec quantitas modalium  est  inquantum modales sunt, et de his, inquantum  huiusmodi, praesens tractatus fit ab Aristotele; idcirco  aequipollentiae, seu consequentiae earum, ordinatae sunt  negationis vario situ, quemadmodum aequipollentiae il-  larum de inesse: ut scilicet, negatio praeposita modo faciat  aequipollere suae contradictoriae; negatio autem modo  postposita, posita autem dicti verbo, suae aequipollere  contrariae facit; praeposita vero et postposita suae subal-  ternae, ut videre potes in consequentiarum figura ultimo  ab Aristotele formata. In qua, tali praeformata oppositio-  num figura, clare videbis omnes se mutuo consequentes,  secundum alteram trium regularum aequipollere, et con-  sequenter, totum primum ordinem secundo contrarium,  tertio contradictorium, quarto vero subalternum.  Necesse  esse  o  qd  Ε  S  s  E  ὦ  ri  Possibile  esse  Impossibile -  e  Contrariae -  eo  E  δα  ES  x  ο -  x9  9  ?  .  [d  x  Se,  ἢ  ᾿ς 6  Subcontrariae -  esse  uU  g&  z  E  $  B  E  Contingens  non essc  vtt  120  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  LECTIO DECIMATERTIA  (Cann. CargTANI lect. xi)  CONTRARIETAS IN ANIMI OPINIONIBUS CONSTITUITUR EX ALIQUA  VERI FALSIQUE OPPOSITIONE.  Πότερον δὲ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἡ κατάφασις τῇ ἀποφάσει ἢ  ἡ κατάφασις τῇ χαταφάσει, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῷ λόγῳ;  ὁ λέγων ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ οὐδεὶς ἄνθρω-  πος δίκαιος ἢ τὸ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῷ πᾶς ἄν-  θρωπος ἄδικος, οἷον ἔστι Καλλίας δίκαιος, οὐχ ἔστι  Καλλίας δίκαιος, Καλλίας ἄδιχός ἐστι" ποτέρα δὴ  Εἰ  ἐναντία τούτων ;  γὰρ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ ἀχολουθεῖ τοῖς ἐν τῇ δια-  νοίᾳ, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐναντία δόξα ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον ὅτι  πᾶς ἄνθρωπος δίκαιος τῇ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἄδικος, καὶ  ἐπὶ  τῶν  ἐν τῇ φωνῇ καταφάσεων ἀνάγχη ὁμοίως  ἔχειν. Εἰ δὲ ped ἐχεῖ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα ἐναντία  ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἡ κατάφασις τῇ καταφάσει ἔσται ἐναν-  vla, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ εἰρημένη ἀπόφασις. Ὥστε σχεπτέον ποία  δόξα ἀληθὴς ψευδεῖ δόξη ἐναντία. πότερον ἡ τῆς  ἀποφάσεος ἢ ἡ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι δοξάζουσα. Λέγω  δὲ ὧδε. Ἔστι τις δόξα ἀληθὴς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγα-  θόν, ἄλλη δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ψευδής, ἑτέρα δὲ ὅτι  χακόν. Ποτέρα δὴ τούτων ἐναντία τῇ ἀληθεῖ; xal  εἰ ἔστι μία, x40 ' ὁποτέραν ἡ ἐναντία:  μὲν δὴ τούτῳ οἴεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὡρίσθαι,  τῷ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, ψεῦδος" τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι  ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῦ καχοῦ ὅτι κακὸν ἡ αὐτὴ ἴσως καὶ  ἀληθὴς ἔσται εἴτε πλείους εἴτε μία ἐστίν. ᾿Εναντία  δὲ ταῦτα. ÀAXA' οὐ τῷ ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ  μᾶλλον τῷ ἐναντίως.  Εἰ δὴ ἔστι μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν δόξα, ἄλλη  δ᾽ ὅτι οὐχ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἄλλο τι ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει  οὐδ᾽ οἷόντε ὑπάρξαι, τῶν μὲν δὴ ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν  θετέον, οὔτε ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν τὸ μιὴ ὑπάρχον δοξαάζου-  σιν,  οὔθ᾽  ὅσαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον (ἄπειροι γὰρ  ἀμφότεραι, καὶ ὅσαι ὑπάρχειν δοξάζουσι τὸ μὴ ὑπάρ-  yov, καὶ ὅσαι μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχον);  SEN  ene ostquam determinatum est de enunciatione se-  (Q5) (oy cundum quod diversificatur tam ex additione  facta ad terminos, quam ad compositionem  S. Thomas.  *  *  *  Num. 5.  Num. 8.  Lect. seq.  J7  eius, hic secundum divisionem a s. Thoma in  principio huius Secundi factam, intendit Ari-  stoteles tractare quandam quaestionem circa oppositiones  enunciationum provenientes ex eo quod additur aliquid sim-  plici enunciationi. Et circa hoc quatuor facit: primo, movet  quaestionem; secundo, declarat quod haec quaestio depen-  det ab una alia quaestione praetractanda; ibi: Nam si ea, quae  sunt in voce * etc.; tertio, determinat illam aliam quaestio-  nem; ibi: Nam arbitrari * etc.; quarto, redit ad responden-  dum quaestioni primo motae; ibi: Quare si in opinione* etc.  Quaestio quam movere intendit est: utrum affirmati-  vae  enunciationi contraria sit negatio eiusdem praedi-  cati, an affirmatio de praedicato contrario seu privativo?  Unde dicit: Utrum contraria est affirmatio. negationi. con-  tradictoriae, scilicet, et universaliter oratio affirmativa ora-  tioni negativae; ut, affirmativa oratio quae dicit, omnis  bomo est iustus, illi contraria sit orationi negativae, nullus  bomo est iustus, aut illi, omnis bomo est iniustus, quae  est affirmativa de praedicato privativo? Et similiter ista  affirmatio, Callias est iustus, est ne contraria illi contradi-  ctoriae negationi, Callias non est iustus, aut illi, Callias est  iniustus, quae est affirmativa de praedicato privativo?  *  Utrum autem contraria est affirmatio negationi, aut af-  firmatio affirmationi et oratio orationi, quae dicit, quod  omnis homo iustus est, ei quae est, nullus homo iustus  est; aut, omnis homo iustus est, ei quae est, omnis  homo iniustus est; ut, Callias iustus est, Callias iustus  non  est, Callias iniustus est; utra harum contraria est?  Nam s. a, quae suntin voce, sequuntur ea, quae sunt in  intellectu, illic autem contraria est opinio contrarii ,  ut  quod, omnis homo iustus est, ei quae est, omnis  homo iniustus est, et etiam in his, quae,sunt in voce,  affirmationibus, necesse est similiter se se habere. Quod  si neque illic contrarii opinatio contraria est, nec affir-  matio affirmationi contraria erit; sed ea quae dicta est  negatio. Quare  considerandum est quae opinio vera  opinioni falsae contraria est, utrum negationis, an ea,  quae contrarium esse opinatur. Dico autem hoc modo.  Est quaedam opinatio vera boni, quod bonum est ;: alia  vero, quod non bonum, est falsa; alia vero, quod ma-  lum: utra harum contraria verae? et si est una, secun-  dum quamnam contraria est?  Nam arbitrari contrarias opiniones definiri, eo quod con-  trariorum sunt, falsum est: boni enim, quod bonum est,  et mali, quod malum est, eadem fortasse opinio est et  vera, sive plures,sive una sit. Sunt autem ista contra-  ria. Sed non eo quod contrariorum sint contraria :sunt  sed magis eo quod contrarie.  Si ergo est boni quidem, quod est bonum, opinio, alia au-  tem quod non est bonum: est vero aliquid aliud quod  non est, neque potest esse: aliarum quidem nulia po-  nenda est, neque quaecunque esse, quod non est, opi-  nantur, neque quaecunque non esse quod est (infinitae  enim utraeque sunt, et quae esse opinantur quod non -  est, et quae non esse quod est).  2. Ad evidentiam tituli huius quaestionis, quia hacte-  nus indiscusse ab aliis est relictus, considerare oportet  quod cum in enunciatione sint duo, scilicet ipsa enunciatio  seu significatio et modus enunciandi seu significandi, du-  plex inter enunciationes fieri potest oppositio, una ratione  ipsius enunciationis, altera ratione modi enunciandi. Si  modos enunciandi attendimus, duas species oppositionis  in latitudine enunciationum inveniemus, contrarietatem  scilicet et contradictionem. Divisae enim superius sunt  enunciationes oppositae in contrarias et contradictorias.  Contradictio inter enunciationes ratione modi enunciandi  est quando idem praedicatur de eodem subiecto contradi-  ctorio modo enunciandi; ut sicut unum contradictorium  nil ponit, sed alterum tantum destruit, ita una enunciatio  nil asserit, sed id tantum quod altera enunciabat destruit.  Huiusmodi autem sunt omnes quae contradictoriae vo-  cantur, scilicet, omnis bomo est iustus, non omnis bomo est  iustus, Socrates est iustus, Socrates nom est iustus, ut de se  patet. Et ex hoc provenit quod non possunt simul verae  aut falsae esse, sicut nec duo contradictoria. Contrarietas  vero inter enunciationes ratione modi enunciandi est quan-  do idem praedicatur de eodem subiecto contrario modo  enunciandi; ut sicut unum contrariorum ponit materiam  sibi et reliquo communem in extrema distantia sub illo  |  genere, ut patet de albo et nigro, ita una enunciatio ponit  *  Y  Cap. xiv.  CAP. XIV,  subiectum commune sibi et suae oppositae in extrema  distantia sub illo praedicato. Huiusmodi quoque sunt  omnes illae quae contrariae in figura appellantur, scili-  cet, omnis bomo est iustus, omnis bomo non. est iustus. Hae  enim faciunt subiectum, scilicet hominem, maxime distare  sub iustitia, dum illa enunciat iustitiam inesse homini,  non quocunque modo, sed universaliter; ista autem enun-  ciat iustitiam abesse homini, non qualitercunque, sed uni-  versaliter. Maior enim distantia esse non potest quam ea,  quae est inter totam universitatem habere aliquid et nul-  lum de universitate habere illud. Et ex hoc provenit quod  non possunt esse simul verae, sicut nec contraria pos-  sunt eidem simul inesse; et quod possunt esse simul  falsae, sicut et contraria simul non inesse eidem possunt.  *  Ed. c: posita  sunt.  Si vero ipsam enunciationem sive eius significationem  attendamus secundum unam tantum oppositionis speciem,  in tota latitudine enunciationum reperiemus contrarieta-  tem, scilicet secundum veritatem et falsitatem: quia dua-  rum enunciationum significationes entia positiva * sunt,  ac  per hoc neque contradictorie neque privative opponi  possunt, quia utriusque oppositionis alterum extremum  est formaliter non ens. Et cum nec relative opponantur,  ut clarum est, restat ut nonnisi contrarie opponi possunt.  3. Consistit autem ista contrarietas in hoc quod dua-  rum enunciationum altera alteram non compatitur vel in  veritate vel in falsitate, praesuppositis semper conditio-  nibus contrariorum, scilicet quod fiant circa idem et in  eodem tempore. Patere quoque potest talem oppositio-  nem esse contrarietatem ex natura conceptionum animae  componentis et dividentis, quarum singulae sunt enuncia-  tiones. Conceptiones siquidem animae adaequatae nullo  alio modo opponuntur conceptionibus inadaequatis nisi  contrarie, et ipsae conceptiones inadaequatae, si se mutuo  expellunt, contrariae quoque dicuntur. Unde verum et  falsum, contrarie opponi probatur a s. Thoma in I parte,  qu. xvii *. Sicut ergo hic, ita et in enunciationibus ipsae  significationes adaequatae contrarie opponuntur inaede-  quatis, idest verae falsis; et ipsae inadaequatae, idest fal-  sae, contrarie quoque opponuntur inter se, si contingat  quod se non compatiantur, salvis semper contrariorum  conditionibus. Est igitur in enunciationibus duplex con-  trarietas, una ratione modi, altera ratione significationis,  et unica contradictio, scilicet ratione modi. Et, ut con-  fusio vitetur, prima contrarietas vocetur contrarietas mo-  dalis, secunda contrarietas formalis. Contradictio autem  non ad confusionis vitationem quia unica est, sed ad pro-  prietatis expressionem contradictio modalis vocari potest.  Invenitur autem contrarietas formalis enunciationum inter  omnes contradictorias, quia contradictoriarum altera al-  teram semper excludit; et inter omnes contrarias moda-  liter quoad veritatem, quia non possunt esse simul verae,  licet non inveniatur inter omnes quoad falsitatem, quia  possunt esse simul falsae.  4. Quia igitur Aristoteles in hac quaestione loquitur  de contrafietate enunciationum quae se extendit ad con-  trarias modaliter, et contradictorias, ut patet in principio  et in fine quaestionis (in principio quidem, quia proponit  utrasque contradictorias dicens: Affirmatio negationi etc.;  et contrarias modaliter dicens: Ef oratio orationi etc., unde  et exempla utrarunque statim subdit, ut patet in littera.  In fine vero, quia ibi expresse quam conclusit esse con-  trariam affirmativae universali verae dividit, in contrariam  modaliter universalem negativam, scilicet, et contradicto-  riam: quae divisio falsitate non careret, nisi conclusisset  contrariam formaliter, ut de se patet), quia, inquam, sic  accipit contrarietatem, ideo de contrarietate formali enun-  ciationum quaestio intelligenda est. Et est quaestio valde  subtilis, necessaria et adhuc nullo modo superius tacta.  Opp. D. Tuowaz T. I.  LECT. XIII  121  Est igitur titulus. quaestionis; utrum affirmativae ve-  rae  contraria formaliter sit negativa falsa eiusdem prae-  dicati, aut affirmativa falsa de praedicato privativo, vel  contrario? Et sic patet quis sit sensus tituli, et quare non  movet quaestionem de quacunque alia oppositione enun-  ciationum (quia scilicet nulla alia in eis formaliter inve-  nitur), et quod accipit contrarietatem proprie et strictis-  sime, licet talis contrarietas inveniatur inter contradicto-  rias modaliter et contrarias modaliter.  Ὁ  Dictum vero fuit a s. Thoma * provenire hanc dubi-  tationem ex eo quod additur aliquid simplici enunciationi,  quia si tantum simplices, idest, de secundo adiacente  enunciationes attendantur, non habet haec quaestio radi-  cem. Quia autem simplici enunciationi, idest subiecto et  verbo substantivo, additur aliquid, scilicet práedicatum,  nascitur dubitatio circa oppositionem, an illud additum'  in contrariis debeat esse illudmet praedicatum, negatione  apposita verbo, an debeat esse praedicatum contrarium  seu  privativum, absque negatione praeposita verbo.  5. Deinde cum dicit: Nam siea etc., declarat unde  sumenda sit decisio huius quaestionis. Et duo facit: quia  primo declarat quod haec quaestio dependet ex una alia  quaestione, ex illa scilicet: utrum opinio, idest conceptio  animae, in secunda operatione intellectus, vera, contraria  sit opinioni falsae negativae eiusdem praedicati, an falsae  afürmativae contrarii sive privativi. Et assignat causam,  quare illa quaestio dependet ex ista, quia scilicet enun-  ciationes vocales sequuntur mentales, ut effectus adae-  quati causas proprias, et ut significata signa * adaequata,  et consequenter similis est in hoc utraque natura. Unde  inchoans ab hac causa ait: Nam si ea quae sunt in voce  sequuntur ed, quae sunt in anima, ut dictum est in prin-  cipio I libri, et illic, idest in anima, opinio contrarii  praedicati circa idem subiectum est contraria illi alteri,  quae affirmat reliquum contrarium de eodem (cuiusmodi  sunt istae mentales enunciationes, omnis bomo est iustus ,  omnis bomo est iniustus); si ita inquam est, etiam et in his  affrmationibus quae sunt in voce, idest vocaliter sum-  ptis, necesse est similiter se habere, ut scilicet sint con-  trariae duae affirmativae de eodem subiecto et praedicatis  contrariis. Quod si neque illic, idest in anima, opinatio  contrarii praedicati, contrarietatem inter mentales enun-  ciationes constituit, nec affirmatio vocalis affirmationi vo-  cali contraria erit de contrario praedicato, sed magis affir-  mationi contraria erit negatio eiusdem praedicati.  6. Dependet ergo mota quaestio ex ista alia sicut effe-  ctus ex causa. Propterea et concludendo addit secundum,  quod scilicet de hac quaestione prius tractandum est, ut  ex  causa cognita effectus innotescat dicens: Quare conside-  randum est, opinio vera cui opinioni falsae contraria est: utrum  negationi falsae am certe ei affirmationi falsae, quae contra-  rium esse opinatur. Et ut exemplariter proponatur, dico  hoc modo: Sunt tres opiniones de bono, puta vita: quae-  dam enim est ipsius boni opinio vera, quoniam bonum  est, puta, quod vita sit bona; alia vero falsa negativa,  scilicet, quoniam bonum non est, puta, quod vita non sit  bona; alia item falsa affirmativa contrarii, scilicet, quoniam  malum est, puta, quod vita sit mala. Quaeritur ergo quae  harum falsarum contraria est verae?  7. Quod autem subdidit: Et si est una, secundum quam  contraria est, tripliciter legi potest. Primo, dubitative, ut  Sit pars quaestionis; et tunc est sensus: quaeritur quae  harum falsarum contraria est verae: et simul quaeritur,  si est tantum una harum falsarum secundum quam fiat  contraria ipsi verae: quia cum unum uni sit contrarium,  ut  dicitur in X Metaphysicae, quaerendo quae harum sit  contraria, quaeremus etiam an una earum sit contraria. -  Alio modo, potest legi adversative, ut sit sensus: quae-  16 *  *  Supra lect. 1,  n. I.  *  Ed. c: singula.  122  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  ritur quae harum sit contraria; quamquam sciamus quod  non utraque sed una earum est secundum quam fit con-  trarietas. - Tertio modo, potest legi dividendo hanc par-  ticulam, Et si est una, ab illa sequenti, secundum quam  contraria est; et tunc prima pars expressive, secunda vero  Boethius.  dubitative legitur; et est sensus: quaeritur quae harum  falsarum contraria est verae, non solum si istae duae  falsae inter se differunt in consequendo, sed etiam si  utraque est una, idest alteri indivisibiliter unita, quaeritur  secundum quam fit contrarietas. Et hoc modo exponit  Boethius, dicens quod Aristoteles apposuit haec verba  propter contraria immediata, in quibus non differt con-  trarium a privativo. Inter contraria enim mediata et im-  mediata haec est differentia, quod immediatis a prwativo  contrarium non infertur. Non enim valet, corpus colorabile  est non album, ergo est nigrum: potest enim esse rubrum.  In immediatis autem valet; verbi gratia: amimal est mon  sanum, ergo infirmum ; numerus est non par, ergo impar.  Voluit ergo Aristoteles exprimere quod nunc, cum quae-  rimus quae harum falsarum, scilicet negativae et affirma-  tivae contrarii, sit contraria affirmativae verae, quaerimus  universaliter sive illae duae falsae indivisibiliter se sequan-  tur, sive non.  8. Deinde cum dicit: Nam arbitrari, prosequitur hanc  secundam quaestionem. Et circa hoc quatuor facit. Primo,  declarat quod contrarietas opinionum non attenditur penes  contrarietatem materiae, circa quam versantur, sed potius  penes oppositionem veri vel falsi; secundo, declarat quod  non penes quaecunque opposita secundum veritatem et  falsitatem est contrarietas opinionum; ibi: Si ergo boni etc.;  tertio, determinat quod contrarietas opinionum attenditur  penes per se primo opposita secundum veritatem et fal-  sitatem tribus rationibus; ibi: Sed im quibus primo falla-  cia etc.; quarto, declarat hanc determinationem inveniri  in omnibus veram; ibi: Manifestum. est igitur etc.  Dicit ergo proponens intentam conclusionem, quod  falsum est arbitrari opiniones definiri seu determinari de-  bere contrarias ex eo quod contrariorum obiectorum sunt.  Et adducit ad hoc duplicem tationem. Prima est: opi-  niones contrariae non sunt eadem opinio; sed contrario-  rum eadem est fortasse opinio; ergo opiniones non sunt  contrariae ex hoc quod contrariorum sunt. - Secunda est:  opiniones contrariae non sunt simul verae; sed opiniones  contrariorum, sive plures, sive una, sunt simul verae  quandoque; ergo opiniones non sunt contrariae ex hoc  quod contrariorum sunt.- Harum rationum, suppositis  maioribus, ponit utriusque minoris declarationem simul,  dicens: Boni enim, quoniam bonum est, et mali, quoniam  malum est, eadem forlasse opinio est, quoad primam. Et  subdit esse vera, sive plures sive una sit, quoad secun-  dam.  Utitur autem dubitativo adverbio et disiunctione,  quia non est determinandi locus an contrariorum eadem  sit opinio, et quia aliquo modo est eadem et aliquo modo  non. Si enim loquamur de habituali opinione, sic eadem  est; Si autem de actuali, sic non eadem est. Alia siqui-  dem mentalis compositio actualiter fit, concipiendo bo-  num esse bonum, et alia concipiendo malum esse malum,  licet eodem habitu utrunque cognoscamus, illud per se  primo, et hoc secundario, ut dicitur IX Metaphysicae. -  Deinde subdit quod ista quae ad declarationem mino-  rum sumpta sunt, scilicet bonum et malum, contraria  sunt  ac  etiam  contrarietate sumpta stricte in moralibus,  per hoc congrua usi sumus declaratione. Ultimo in-  ducit conclusionem. Sed non in eo quod contrariorum  opiniones sunt, contrariae sunt, sed magis in eo quod  contrariae, idest, sed potius censendae sunt opiniones  contrariae ex eo quod contrarie adverbialiter, scilicet con-  trario modo, idest vere et false enunciant. Et sic patet  primum.  9. Si ergo boni etc. Quia dixerat quod contrarietas opi-  nionum accipitur secundum oppositionem veritatis et fal-  sitatis earum, declarat modo quod non quaecunque se-  cundum veritatem et falsitatem oppositae opiniones sunt  contrariae, tali ratione. De bono, puta, de iustitia, quatuor  possunt opiniones haberi, scilicet quod iustitia est bona,  et quod non est bona, et quod est fugibilis, et quod est  non appetibilis. Quarum prima est vera, reliquae sunt  falsae. Inter quas haec est diversitas quod, prima negat  idem praedicatum quod vera affirmabat ; [secunda affirmat  aliquid aliud quod bono non inest; tertia negat id quod  bono inest, non tamen illud quod vera affirmabat. Tunc  sic.  Si omnes opiniones secundum veritatem et falsita-  tem sunt contrariae, tunc uni, scilicet verae opinioni non  solum multa sunt contraria, sed etiam infinita: quod est  impossibile, quia unum uni est contrarium. Tenet con-  sequentia, quia possunt infinitae imaginari opiniones fal-  sae  de una re, similes ultimis falsis opinionibus adductis,  affirmantes, scilicet ea quae non insunt illi, et negantes  ea  quae illi quocunque modo coniuncta sunt: utraque  namque indeterminata esse et absque numero constat.  Possumus* enim opinari quod iustitia est quantitas, quod  est relatio, quod est hoc et illud; et similiter opinari quod  iustitia non sit qualitas, non sit appetibilis, non sit ha-  bitus.  Unde ex supradictis in propositione quaestionis,  inferens pluralitatem falsarum contra unam veram, ait:  Si ergo est opinatio vera boni, puta iustitiae, quoniam est  bonum; et si est etiam falsa opinatio negans idem, scili-  cet, quoniam mon est quid bonum; est vero et tertia opi-  natio falsa quoque, affirmans aliquid aliud inesse illi, quod  non inest nec inesse potest, puta, quod iustitia sit fugi-  bilis, quod sit illicita; et hinc intelligitur quarta falsa  quoque, quae scilicet negat aliquid aliud ab eo quod vera  opinio affirmat inesse iustitiae, quod tamen inest, ut puta  quod non sit qualitas, quod non sit virtus; si ita inquam  est, nulla aliarum falsarum ponenda est contraria opinioni  verae. Et exponens quid demonstret per ly aliarum, sub-  dit: Neque quaecumque opinio opinatur esse quod mom est,  ut tertii ordinis opiniones faciunt: meque quaecumque opi-  Et  nio opinatur non. esse quod est, ut quarti ordinis opiniones  significant.  causam subdit: Infimitae enim utraeque  sunt, el quae esse opinantur quod mom est, el quae mon esse  quod est, ut supra declaratum fuit. Non ergo quaecun-  que opiniones oppositae secundum veritatem et falsita-  tem contrariae sunt. Et sic patet secundum.  d. c et 1557:  po  ssum  CAP. XIV, LECT. XIV  LECTIO DECIMAQUARTA  (Cann. CarkrANI lect. xi1)  ILLA VERI FALSIQUE OPPOSITIO, QUAE OPINIONUM CONTRARIETATEM CONSTITUIT,  EST OPPOSITIO SECUNDUM AFFIRMATIONEM ET NEGATIONEM EIUSDEM DE EODEM.  ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅσαις ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπάτη. Αὐται δέ εἰσιν ἐξ ὧν αἱ -  αἱ  t  ,  γενέσεις" ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων δὲ αἱ γενέσεις, ὥστε  χαὶ  ,  ^  ,  *  E  ἀπάται.  Ei οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν xal ἀγαθὸν xal οὐ χαχόν ἐστι; xad  τὸ μὲν καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, τὸ δὲ χατὰ συμβεβηκός (συμβέ-  βηκε γὰρ αὐτῷ οὐ καχῷ εἶναι), μᾶλλον δὲ ἑκάστου  ,  *  123  Sed in quibuscunque fallacia est. Hae autem sunt ex his * Seq.c.xiv.  ex quibus sunt generationes: ex oppositis vero genera-  tiones sunt: quare etiam fallacia.  Si ergo quod bonum est, et bonum, et non malum est;  et  ἀληθὴς ἡ καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, καὶ ψευδής, εἴπερ καὶ ἀληθής.  Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐχ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ  ὑπάρχοντος, ψευδής, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι χακὸν τοῦ κατὰ  συμβεβηκός. “Ὥστε μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ψευδής τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  ἡ τῆς ἀποφάσεως, ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου δόξα. Διέψευ-  σται δὲ μάλιστα περὶ ἕκαστον ὁ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔχων.  δόξαν: τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν πλεῖστον διαφερόντων  περὶ τὸ αὐτό. Εἰ οὖν ἐναντία μὲν τούτων ἡ ἑτέρα;  ἐναντιωτέρα δὲ ἡ τῆς ἀποφάσεως, δῆλον ὅτι αὑτὴ  ἂν εἴη ἐναντία. Ἢ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμ.-  πεπλεγμένη ἐστί: xol γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγχη  ἴσως ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτόν.  hoc quidem secundum se, illud vero secundum ac-  cidens (accidit enim ei non malum esse); magis autem  in unoquoque vera est, quae secundum se est etiam fal-  sa,  est  falsa  siquidem et vera. Ergo ea quae est, quoniam non  bonum quod bonum est, eius, quae secundum se  est;  eius,  quae  illa  vero  quae  est,  quoniam malum est,  est secundum accidens. Quare magis erit  falsa de bono ea, quae est negationis opinio, quam  ea, quae est contrarii. Falsus autem est maxime circa  singula, qui habet contrariam opinionem: contraria enim  sunt eorum, quae plurimum circa idem differunt. Si  igitur harum contraria est altera, magis vero negatio-  nis  est  contraria; manifestum est quoniam haec erit  contraria. Illa vero quae est, quoniam malum est, quod  bonum est, implicita est. Etenim quoniam non bonum  Ἔτι δέ, εἰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως δεῖ ἔχειν, καὶ  ταύτῃ ἂν δόξειε καλῶς concava ἢ γὰρ πανταχοῦ  τὸ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἢ οὐδαμοῦ. Ὅσοις δὲ μή ἐστιν  ἐναντία, περὶ τούτων ἔστι μὲν ψευδὴς ἡ τῇ ἀληθεῖ  ἀντικειμένη, οἷον ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐχ ἄνθρωπον οἰό-  μενος ον  Ei  οὖν  ἄλλαι αἱ τῆς ἀποφάσεως.  αὗται ἐναντίαι. xal αἱ  :  Ἔτι ὁμοίως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ τοῦ  ^  ,  μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐχ ἀγαθόν, xad πρὸς ταύταις ἡ τοῦ  ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι  ἀγαθόν. Τῇ οὖν τοῦ μηὴ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐχ ἁ αθὸν  ἀληθεῖ οὔσῃ δόξῃ τίς ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐναντία ; οὐ γὰρ δ᾽ὴ ἡ  λέγουσα ὅτι Xa dv ἅμα γὰρ ἄν ποτε εἴη ἀληθής,  s? hail δὲ ἀληθὴς ἀληθεῖ ἐναντία. Ἔστι γάρ τι  μὴ ἀγαθὸν χακόν, ὥστε ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι.  Οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἡ ὅτι οὐ κακόν: ἀληθὴς γὰρ καὶ αὕτη" ἅμα  γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἂν εἴη. Λείπεται οὖν τῇ τοῦ μὴ  ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι οὐχ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντία ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ  ὅτι ἀγαθόν" ψευδὴς γὰρ αὕτη. Ὥστε χαὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγα-  θοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἀγαθὸν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἀγαθόν.  V  Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν διοίσει οὐδ᾽ ἂν καθόλου τιθῶμεν  τὴν κατάφασιν: ἡ γὰρ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐναντία  ἔσται, οἷον τῇ δόξῃ τῇ Sobakoóon, ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἂν dj  ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἡ ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγα-  0óv: Ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὅτι ἁ αθόν, εἰ χαθόλου τὸ  ἀγαθόν, ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ ὅτι ὃ ἂν ἡ ἀγαθὸν δοξαζούσῃ  ὅτι ἀγαθόν" τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ ὅτι πᾶν ὃ  ἂν fj ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστι. 'Ομοίως $: xal ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ  ἀγαθοῦ.  “Ὥστε εἴπερ ἐπὶ δόξης οὕτως ἔχει; εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ  καταφάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις σύμβολα τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,  δῇλον ὅτι χαὶ καταφάσει ἐναντία μὲν ἀπόφασις ἡ  περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χαθόλου, οἷον, τῇ ὅτι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν  ἀγαθόν, ἢ ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός, ἡ ὅτι οὐθὲν  ἢ οὐδείς, ἀντιφατικῶς $n ἢ οὐ πᾶν ἢ οὐ πᾶς.  est, necesse est forte idem ipsum opinari.  Amplius si etiam in aliis similiter oportet se habere, et  hoc modo videbitur bene esse dictum. Aut enim ubique  ea, quae est contradictionis, aut nusquam. Quibus vero  non est contrarium , de his quidem est falsa ea, quae  est verae opposita; ut qui hominem non putat esse ho-  minem, falsus est. Si ergo hae contrariae sunt, etiam aliae  quae sunt contradictiones.  Amplius similiter se habet opinio boni, quoniam bonum  est, et non boni, quoniam non bonum est. Et praeter  has boni, quoniam non bonum est, et non boni quo-  niam bonum est. Illi ergo quae est, non boni quoniam  non bonum est; verae opinationi quaenam est contra-  ria? non enim ea, quae dicit quoniam malum est: si-  mul enim aliquando verae erunt. Nunquam autem vera  verae  est  contraria: est enim quidquam non bonum  malum. Quare contingit simul esse veras. At vero nec  illa, quae est, quod non malum: vera enim et, haec: si-  mul enim et haec erunt. Relinquitur ergo, ei, quae est  non-bonum, quoniam non bonum est, contraria ea,  quae est, non boni, quoniam bonum est. Falsa enim  haec. Quare et ea, quae est boni, quoniam non bonum  est, ei, quae est boni, quoniam est bonum.  Manifestum est autem quoniam nihil interest nec si uni-  versaliter ponamus affirmationem. Universalis enim ne-  gatio contraria erit; ut opinioni, quae opinatur, quo-  niam omne .quod est bonum, bonum est, ea quae est,  quoniam nihil horum quae bona sunt, bonum est. Nam  ea  quae est boni quoniam bonum est, si universaliter  sit bonum, eadem est ei quae opinatur, quod quidquid  bonum est, quoniam bonum est. Hoc autem nihil dif-  fert ab eo quod est, quod omne quod est bonum, bo-  num est. Similiter autem et in non bono.  Quare si in opinione sic se habet; sunt autem hae quae  sunt in voce affirmationes et negationes notae eorum  quae sunt in anima; manifestum est quoniam affirma-  tioni contraria quidem negatio est, quae de eodem uni-  versaliter; ut ei, quae est, quoniam omne bonum bo-  num est, vel quoniam omnis homo bonus, ea quae est,  quoniam nullum vel nullus: contradictorie autem quae  est, quod non omne aut non omnis.  124  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἀληθῇ ἀληθεῖ οὐχ ἐνδέχεται ἐναν-  τίαν εἶναι οὔτε δόξαν οὔτε ἀπόφασιν. ᾿Εναντίαι μὲν  γὰρ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἀντικειμενα περὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐνδέχεται  τὸν  ἀληθεύειν  αὐτόν:  x s οὐχ ἐνδέχεται τὰ  ἐναντία ὑπαάρχειντῷ αὐτῷ.  uia subtili indagatione ostendit quod nec ma-  teriae contrarietas, nec veri falsique qualis-  τῷ  hcunque oppositio contrarietatem opinionum  ZA constituit, sed quod aliqua veri falsique oppo-  77  sitio id facit, ideo nunc determinare intendit  qualis sit illa veri falsique oppositio, quae opinionum con-  trarietatem constituit. Ex hoc enim directe quaestioni sa-  tisfit. Et intendit quod sola oppositio opinionum secundum  affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem etc. con-  stituit contrarietatem earum. Unde intendit probare istam  conclusionem per quam ad quaesitum respondet: Opi-  niones oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem  eiusdem de eodem sunt contrariae; et consequenter illae,  quae sunt oppositae secundum aflirmationem contrario-  rum praedicatorum de eodem, non sunt contrariae, quia  Manifestum est autem, quoniam et veram verae non con-  tingit esse contrariam, nec opinionem nec contradictio-  nem. Contrariae enim, quae circa opposita sunt; circa  eadem autem contingit verum dicere eumdem; simul  autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria.  et  illi inter quos est primo fallacia, quia utrobique ter-  mini sunt affirmatio et negatio.  ἡ  4. Deinde cum dicit: Si ergo quod bonum est etc., in-  tendit probare maiorem principalis rationis. Et quia iam  declaravit quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt  affirmatio et negatio, ideo utitur, loco maioris probandae,  scilicet,  opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia, sunt  contrariae, sua conclusione, scilicet, opiniones. opposi-  tae  secundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem sunt  contrariae.  Aequivalere enim iam declaratum est. Fecit  autem hoc consuetae brevitati studens, quoniam sic pro-  cedendo, et probat maiorem, et respondet directe quae-  stioni, et applicat ad propositum simul. Probat ergo loco  maioris conclusionem principaliter intentam quaestionis,  hanc, scilicet: Opiniones oppositae secundum affirma-  sic affirmativa vera haberet duas contrarias, quod est  impossibile. Unum enim uni est contrarium.  2.  Probat autem istam conclusionem tribus rationi-  bus. -Prima est: opiniones in quibus primo est fallacia  sunt contrariae; opiniones oppositae secundum affirmatio-  nem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt in quibus  primo est fallacia; ergo opiniones oppositae secundum  affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem sunt con-  trariae. - Sensus maioris est: opiniones quae primo ordine  naturae sunt termini fallaciae, idest deceptionis seu erro-  ris, sunt contrariae: sunt enim, cum quis fallitur seu errat,  duo termini, scilicet a quo declinat, et ad quem labitur. -  Huius rationis in littera primo ponitur maior, cum dici-  tur: Sed in. quibus primo fallacia est ; adversative enim con-  tinuans sermonem supra dictis, insinuavit non tot enume-  ratas opiniones esse contrarias, sed eas in quibus primo  fallacia  est  modo exposito. Deinde subdit probationem  minoris talem: eadem proportionaliter sunt, ex quibus  sunt generationes et ex quibus sunt fallaciae; sed genera-  tiones sunt ex oppositis secundum affirmationem et nega-  tionem; ergo et fallaciae sunt ex oppositis secundum affir-  mationem et negationem. Quod erat assumptum in mi-  nore. Unde ponens maiorem huius prosyllogismi, ait: Haec  autem , scilicet fallacia, est ex bis, scilicet terminis, propor-  tionaliter tamen, ex quibus sunt et generationes. Et subsumit  minorem: Ex oppositis vero, scilicet secundum affirmatio-  nem et negationem, et generationes fiunt. Et demum con-  cludit: Quare etiam fallacia, scilicet, est ex oppositis secun-  dum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem.  3. Ad evidentiam huius probationis scito quod idem  faciunt in processu intellectus cognitio et fallacia seu  error, quod in processu naturae generatio et corruptio.  Sicut namque perfectiones naturales generationibus acqui-  runtur, corruptionibus desinunt; ita cognitione perfectio-  nes intellectuales acquiruntur, erroribus autem seu dece-  ptionibus amittuntur. Et ideo, sicut tam generatio quam  corruptio est inter affirmationem et negationem, ut pro-  prios terminos, ut dicitur V Pbysic.; ita tam cogno-  scere  aliquid, quam falli circa illud, est inter affirma-  tionem et negationem, ut proprios terminos: ita quod  id ad quod primo attingit cognoscens aliquid in secunda  operatione intellectus est veritatis affirmatio, et quod per  se  primo abiicitur est illius negatio. Et similiter quod  per se primo perdit qui fallitur est veritatis affirmatio, et  quod primo incurrit est veritatis negatio. Recte ergo dixit  quod iidem sunt termini inter quos primo est generatio,  tionem  et  negationem eiusdem sunt contrariae; et non  illae, quae sunt oppositae secundum contrariorum affr-  mationem de eodem. Et intendit talem rationem. Opi-  nio vera et eius magis falsa sunt contrariae opiniones;  'oppositae secundum affirmationem et negationem sunt  vera  et  eius  magis falsa; ergo opiniones oppositae se-  cundum affirmationem et negationem sunt contrariae.  Maior probatur ex eo quod, quae plurimum distant circa  idem sunt contraria; vera autem et eius magis falsa  plurimum distant circa idem, ut patet. Minor vero proba-  turex eo quod opposita secundum negationem eiusdem  de  eodem est per se falsa respectu suae affirmationis  verae. Opinio autem per se falsa magis falsa est qua-  cunque alia. Unumquodque enim quod est per se tale,  magis tale est quolibet quod est per aliud tale.  5. Unde ad suprapositas opiniones in propositione  quaestionis rediens, ut ex illis exemplariter clarius inten-  tum ostendat, a probatione minoris inchoat tali modo.  Sint quatuor opiniones, duae veraé, scilicet, bonum est  bonum, bonum non est malum, et duae falsae, scilicet,  bonum non est bonum, et, bonum est malum. Clarum est  autem quod prima vera est ratione sui, secunda autem est  vera secundum accidens, idest, ratione alterius, quia sci-  licet non esse malum est coniunctum ipsi bono: ideo enim  ista est vera, bonum non est malum, quia bonum est  bonum, et non e contra; ergo prima quae est secundum  se  vera, ést magis vera quam sécunda: quia in uno-  quoque genere quae secundum se est vera est magis  vera.  sunt,  Illae  autem duae falsae eodem modo censendae  quod scilicet magis falsa est, quae secundum se  est falsa. Unde quia prima earum, scilicet, bonum non est  bonum, quae est negativa, est per se et non ratione al-  terius falsa, relata ad illam affirmativam, bonum est bo-  num; et secunda, scilicet, bonum est malum, quae est  affirmativa contrarii, ad eamdem relata est falsa per acci-  dens, idest ratione alterius (ista enim, scilicet, bonum  est malum, non immediate falsificatur ab illa vera, scilicet  bonum est bonum, sed mediante illa alia falsa, scilicet,  bonum non est bonum); idcirco magis falsa respectu affir-  mationis verae est negatio eiusdem quam affirmatio con-  trarii. Quod erat assumptum in minore.  6. Unde rediens ad supra positas (ut dictum est) opi-  niones, infert primas duas veras opiniones dicens: Si ergo  quod bonum. est et bonum est et. mon. est malum; et hoc qui-  dem, scilicet quod dicit prima opinio, est verum secun-  dum se, idest ratione sui; illud vero, scilicet quod dicit  CAP. XIV,  ecunda opinio, est verum secundum accidens, quia acci:  it, idest, coniunctum est ei, scilicet bono, malum non  esse. In unoquoque autem ordine magis vera est illa quae  secundum se est vera. Etiam igitur falsa magis est quae  secundum se falsa est: siquidem et vera huius est natu-  rae, ut declaratum est, quod scilicet magis vera est, quae  secundum se est vera. Ergo illarum duarum opinionum  falsarum in quaestione propositarum, scilicet, bonum non  est bonum, et, bonum est malum, ea quae est dicens,  quoniam non est bonum quod bonum est, idest negativa,  scilicet, bonum non est bonum, est consistens falsa se-  cundum se, idest, ratione sui continet in seipsa falsitatem;  illa vero reliqua falsa opinio, quae est dicens, quoniam  malum est, idest, affirmativa contraria, scilicet, bonum  est malum, eius, quae est, idest, illius affirmationis di-  jd.  * Ed.  e et  CTS  "ENT  S. Thomas.  TRENT  ἀπ᾿  557  1557:  j  centis, bonum est bonum, secundum accidens , idest, ra-  tione alterius falsa est.  Deinde subdit ipsam minorem: Quare erit magis falsa  de bono, opinio negationis, quam contrarii. Deinde ponit ma-  iorem dicens quod, semper magis falsus circa singula est ille  qui babet contrariam opinionem, ac si dixisset, verae opinioni  magis falsa-est contraria. Quod assumptum erat in maiore.  Et eius probationem subdit, quia contrarium est de num?ro  eorum. quae. circa idem. plurimum differunt. Nihil enim plus  differt a vera opinione quam magis falsa circa illam *.  7. Ultimo directe applicat ad quaestionem dicens:  Quod si (pro, quia) barum falsarum, scilicet, negationi  eiusdem et affirmationis contrarii, altera est contraria ve-  rae affirmationi, opinio vero contradictionis, idest, nega-  tionis eiuslem de eodem, magis est contraria secundum  falsitatem, idest, magis est falsa, manifestum est quoniam  haec, scilicet opinio falsa negationis, erit contraria affir-  mationi verae, et e contra. Illa vero opinio quae est di-  cens, quoniam malum est quod bonum est, idest, affir-  matio contrarii, non contraria sed implicita est, idest, sed  implicans in se verae contrariam, scilicet, bonum non est  bonum. Etenim necesse est ipsum opinantem affirmatio-  nem contrarii opinari, quoniam idem de quo affirmat  contrarium non est bonum. Oportet siquidem si quis  opinatur quod vita est mala, quod opinetur quod vita  non sit bona. Hoc enim necessario sequitur ad illud, et  non e converso; et ideo affirmatio contrarii implicita di-  citur. Negatio autem eiusdem de eodem implicita non  est.- Et sic finitur prima ratio.  .  8. Notandum est hic primo quod ista regula generalis  tradita hic ab Aristotele de contrarietate opinionum, quod  Scilicet contrariae opiniones sunt quae opponuntur se-  cundum affirmationem et negationem eiusdem de eodem,  et in se et in assumptis ad eius probationem proposi-  tionibus scrupulosa est. Unde multa hic insurgunt dubia.-  Primum est quia cum oppositio secundum affirmationem  et negationem non constituat contrarietatem sed contra-  dictionem apud omnes philosophos, quomodo Aristoteles  opiniones oppositas secundum affirmationem et negatio-  nem ex hoc contrarias ponat. Augetur et dubitatio quia  dixit quod ea in quibus primo est fallacia sunt contraria,  et  tamen subdit quod sunt oppositae sicut termini gene-  rationis, quos constat contradictorie opponi. Nec dubita-  tione caret quomodo sit verum id quod supra diximus  ex  intentione s. Thomae, quod nullae duae opiniones  opponantur contradictorie; cum hic expresse dicitur ali-  quas opponi secundum affirmatiónem et negationem.  Dubium secundo insurgit circa id quod assumpsit,  quod contraria cuiusque verae est per se falsa. Hoc enim  non videtur verum. Nam contraria istius verae, Socrates est  albus, est ista, Socrates non. est albus, secundum   deter-  minata; et tamen non est per se falsa. Sicut namque sua  opposita affirmatio est per accidens vera, ita ista est  LECT. XIV  125  per accidens falsa. Accidit enim isti enunciationi falsi-  tas.  Potest enim mutari in veram, quia est in materia  contingenti.  Dubium est tertio circa id quod dixit: Magis vero con-  tradictionis est contraria. Ex hoc enim videtur velle quod  utraque, scilicet, opinio negationis et contrarii, sit con-  traria verae affirmationi; et consequenter vel uni duo po-  nit  contraria, vel non loquitur de contrarietate proprie  sumpta: cuius oppositum supra ostendimus.  9. Ad evidentiam omnium, quae primo loco adducun-  tur, sciendum quod opiniones seu conceptiones intelle-  ctuales, in secunda operatione de quibus loquimur, pos-  sunt tripliciter accipi: uno modo, secundum id quod sunt  absolute; alio modo, secundum ea quae repraesentant  absolute; tertio, secundum ea quae repraesentant, ut sunt  in ipsis opinionibus. Primo membro omisso, quia non  est  praesentis speculationis, scito quod si accipiantur se-  cundo modo secundum repraesentata, sic invenitur inter  eas et contradictionis, et privationis, et contrarietatis op-  positio. Ista siquidem mentalis enunciatio, Socrates est  videns, secundum id quod repraesentat opponitur illi, So-  crates non est videns, contradictorie; privative autem illi,  Socrales est caecus; contrarie autem illi, Socrates est luscus ;  si accipiantur secundum repraesentata. Ut enim dicitur  ἴῃ  Postpraedicamentis , non solum caecitas est privatio  visus, sed etiam caecum esse est privatio huius quod est  esse videntem, et sic de aliis. - Si vero accipiantur opi-  niones tertio modo, scilicet, prout repraesentata per eas  sunt in ipsis, sic nulla oppositio inter eas invenitur nisi  contrarietas: quoniam sive opposita contradictorie sive  privative sive contrarie repraesententur, ut sunt in opi-  nionibus, illius tantum oppositionis capaces sunt, quae  inter duo entia realia inveniri potest. Opiniones namque  realia entia sunt. Regulare enim est quod quidquid con-  venit alicui secundum esse quod habet in alio, secundum  modum et naturam illius in quo est sibi convenit, et non  secundum quod exigeret natura propria.Inter entia autem  realia contrarietas sola formaliter reperitur. Taceo nunc de  oppositione relativa. Opiniones ergo hoc modo sumptae,  si oppositae sunt, contrarietatem sapiunt, sed non omnes  proprie contrariae sunt, sed illae quae plurimum differunt  circa idem veritate et falsitate. Has autem probavit Ari-  stoteles esse opiniones affirmationis et negationis eiusdem  de eodem. Istae igitur verae contrariae sunt. Reliquae vero  per reductionem ad has contrariae dicuntur.  IO. Ex his patet quid ad obiecta dicendum sit. Fate-  mur enim quod affirmatio et negatio in seipsis contradi-  ctionem constituunt; in opinionibus vero existentes con-  trarietatem inter illas causant propter extremam distan-  tiam, quam ponunt inter entia realia, opinionem scilicet  veram et opinionem falsam circa idem. Stantque ista duo  simul quod ea, in quibus primo est fallacia, sint opposita  ut  termini generationis, et tamen sint contraria utendo  supradicta distinctione: sunt enim opposita contradictorie  ut termini generationis secundum repraesentata ; sunt au-  tem contraria, secundum quod habent in seipsis illa con-  tradictoria.  Unde plurimum differunt. - Liquet quoque  ex hoc quod nulla est dissentio inter dicta Aristotelis et  s. Thomae, quia opiniones aliquas opponi secundum affir-  mationem et negationem verum esse confitemur, si ad  repraesentata nos convertimus, ut hic dicitur.  1I.  Tu autem qui perspicacioris ac provectioris in-  genii es compos, hinc habeto quod inter ipsas opiniones  oppositas quidam tantum motus est, eo quod de affr-  mato in affirmatum mutatio fit: inter ipsas vero secundum  repraesentata, similitudo quaedam generationis et corru-  ptionis invenitur, dum inter affirmationem et negationem  mutatio clauditur. Unde et fallacia sive error quandoque  S. Thomas.  RI ERIS  126  et motus et mutationis rationem habet diversa respiciendo,  quando scilicet ex vera in per se falsam, vel e converso,  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. II  Secundum autem dictum simpliciter verum est, quoniam  quis mutat opinionem ; quandoque autem solam muta-  tionem imitatur, quando scilicet absque praeopinata ve-  ritate ipsam falsam offendit quis opinionem; quandoque  vero motus undique rationem possidet, quando scilicet ex  vera affirmatione in falsam circa idem contrarii affirmatio-  nem transit. Quia tamen prima ut quis fallatur radix est  oppositio affirmationis et negationis, merito ea in quibus  primo est fallacia, sicut generationis terminos opponi dixit.  12. Ad dubium secundo loco adductum dico quod  peccatur ibi secundum aequivocationem illius termini per  se falsa, seu per se vera. Opinio enim et similiter enuncia-  tio potest dici dupliciter per se vera seu falsa. Uno modo,  in seipsa, sicut sunt omnes verae secundum illos modos  perseitatis qui enumerantur I Posteriorum , et similiter  falsae secundum illosmet modos, ut, bomo non est animal.  Et hoc modo non accipitur in hac regula de contrarie-  tate  opinionum et enunciationum opinio per se vera aut  falsa, ut efficaciter obiectio adducta concludit. Si enim ad  contrarietatem opinionum hoc exigeretur non possent esse  opiniones contrariae in materia contingenti: quod est  falsissimum. Alio modo potest dici opinio sive enunciatio  per se vera aut falsa respectu suae oppositae. Per se vera  quidem respectu suae falsae, et per se falsa respectu suae  verae. Et tunc nihil aliud est dicere, est per se vera respe-  ctu illius, nisi quod ratione sui et non alterius verificatur  ex falsitate illius. Et similiter cum dicitur, est per se falsa  respectu illius, intenditur quod ratione sui et non alterius  falsificatur  ex  illius  veritate. Verbi gratia; istius verae,  Socrates currit, non est per se falsa, Socrates sedet, quia  falsitas eius non immediate sequitur ex illa, sed mediante  ista  alia falsa, Socrates non currit, quae est per se illius  falsa, quia ratione sui et non per aliquod medium ex illius  veritate falsificatur, ut patet. Et similiter istius falsae, So-  crates est. quadrupes, non est per se vera ista, Socrates  est  bipes, quia non per seipsam veritas istius illam fal-  sificat, sed mediante ista, Socrales mon est quadrupes,  quae est per se vera respectu illius: propter seipsam enim  falsitate istius verificatur, ut de se patet. Et hoc secundo  modo utimur istis terminis tradentes regulam de con-  trarietate opinionum et enunciationum. Invenitur siqui-  dem sic universaliter vera in omni materia regula dicens  quod, vera et eius per se falsa, et falsa et eius per se vera,  sunt contrariae. Unde patet responsio ad obiectionem,  quia procedit accipiendo ly per se vera, et per se falsa  primo modo.  13. Ad ultimum dubium dicitur quod, quia inter opi-  niones ad se invicem pertinentes nulla alia est oppositio  nisi contrarietas, coactus fuit Aristoteles (volens termi-  nis specialibus uti) dicere quod una est magis contraria  quam altera, insinuans quidem quod utraque contrarie-  tatis.  oppositionem habet respectu illius verae. Deter-  minat tamen immediate quod tantum una earum, scili-  cet negationis opinio, contraria est affirmationi verae. Sub-  dit enim: Manifestum est quoniam. baec contraria erit. Duo  ergo dixit, et quod utraque, tam scilicet negatio eiusdem  quam affirmatio contrarii, contrariatur affirmationi verae,  et quod una tantum earum, negatio scilicet, est contraria.  Et utrunque est verum. Illud quidem, quia, ut dictum  est, ambae contrarietates oppositione contra affirmatio-  nem moliuntur; sed difformiter, quia opinio negationis  primo et per se contrariatur, affirmationis vero contrarii  opinio secundario et per accidens, idest per aliud, ra-  tione scilicet negativae opinionis, ut declaratum est: sicut  etiam in naturalibus albo contrariantur et nigrum et ru-  brum, sed illud primo, hoc reductive, ut reducitur sci-  licet ad nigrum illud inducendo, ut dicitur V Pbysicor.  simpliciter contraria non sunt nisi extrema unius latitu-  dinis, quae maxime distant; extrema autem unius distan-  tiae non sunt nisi duo. Et ideo cum inter pertinentes ad se  invicem opiniones unum extremum teneat affirmatio vera,  reliquum uni tantum falsae dandum est, illi scilicet quae  maxime a vera distat. Hanc autem negativam opinionem  esse probatum est. Haec igitur una tantum contraria est  illi, simpliciter loquendo. Caeterae enim oppositae ratione  istius contrariantur, ut de mediis dictum est. Non ergo  uni plura contraria posuit, nec de contrarietate large lo-  quutus est, ut obiiciendo dicebatur.  14. Deinde cum dicit: Amplius si etiam etc., probat idem,  scilicet quod affirmationi contraria est negatio eiusdem,  et  non affirmatio contrarii secunda ratione, dicens: Si in  aliis materiis oportet opiniones se habere similiter, idest,  eodem modo, ita quod contrariae in aliis materiis sunt  affirmatio et negatio eiusdem; et hoc, scilicet quod dixi-  mus de boni et mali opinionibus, videtur esse bene dictum,  quod scilicet contraria affirmationi boni non est affir-  matio mali, sed negatio boni. Et probat hanc consequen-  tiam subdens: Aut enim ubique, idest, in omni materia,  ea  quae est contradictionis altera pars censenda est con-  traria suae affirmationi, aut nusquam, idest, aut in nulla  materia. Si enim est una ars generalis accipiendi contra-  riam opinionem, oportet quod ubique et in omni materia  uno et eodem modo accipiatur contraria opinio. Et con-  sequenter, si in aliqua materia negatio eiusdem de eo-  dem affirmationi est contraria, in omni materia negatio  eiusdem de eodem contraria erit affirmationi. Deinde in-  tendens concludere a positione antecedentis, affirmat an-  tecedens ex sua causa, dicens quod illae materiae quibus  non  inest  contrarium, ut substantia et quantitas, qui-  bus, ut in Praedicamentis dicitur, nihil est contrarium. De  his quidem est pér se falsa ea, quae est opinioni verae  opposita contradictorie, ut qui putat hominem, puta So-  cratem non esse hominem, per se falsus est respectu pu-  tantis, Socratem esse hominem. Deinde affirmando ipsum  antecedens formaliter, directe concludit intentum a posi-  tione antecedentis ad positionem consequentis dicens: Si  ergo bae, scilicet, affirmatio et negatio in materia carente  contrario, sunt contrariae, et omnes aliae contradictiones  contrariae censendae sunt.  15. Deinde cum dicit: Amplius similiter etc., probat idem  tertia ratione, quae talis est: Sic se habent istae duae opi-  niones de bono, scilicet, bonum est bonum, et, bonum non  est bonum, sicut se habent istae duae de non bono, sci-  licet, non bonum non est bonum, et, non bonum est bo-  num. Utrobique enim salvatur oppositio contradictionis.  Et primae utriusque combinationis sunt verae, secundae  autem falsae. Unde proponens hanc maiorem quoad pri-  mas veras utriusque combinationis ait: Similiter se babet  opinio boni, quoniam bonum est, et non boni quoniam mon  est bonum. Et subdit quoad secundas utriusque falsas: Et  super bas opinio bomi quoniam mon est bonum, et. non boni  quoniam .est bonum. Haec est maior. Sed illi verae opi-  nioni de non bono,scilicet, non bonum non est bonum,  contraria non est, non bonum est malum, nec bonum  non est malum, quae sunt de praedicato contrario, sed  illa, non bonum est bonum, quae est eius contradictoria ;  ergo et illi verae opinioni de bono, scilicet, bonum est  bonum, contraria erit sua contradictoria, scilicet, bonum  non est bonum, et non affirmatio contrarii, scilicet, bo-  num est malum. Unde subdit minorem supradictam di-  cens: Illi ergo verae opinioni non boni, quae est dicens quo-  niam scilicet non bonum non est bonum, quae est. contraria.  Non enim est sibi contraria ea opinio, quae dicit affirma-  tivae praedicatum contrarium, scilicet, quod non bonum  CAP. XIV, LECT. XIV  est malum: quia istae duae aliquando erunt simul verae.  Nunquam autem vera opinio verae contraria est. Quod  autem istae duae aliquando simul sint verae, patet ex  hoc quod quoddam non bonum malum est: iniustitia  enim quoddam non bonum est, et malum. Quare con-  tingeret contrarias esse simul veras: quod est impossi-  bile. At vero nec supradictae verae opinioni contraria est  illa opinio, quae est dicens praedicatum contrarium ne-  gativae, scilicet, non bonum non est malum, eadem ra-  tione, quia simul et hae erunt verae. Chimaera enim est  quoddam non bonum, de qua verum est simul dicere  quod non est bona, et quod non est mala. Relinquitur  ergo tertia pars minoris quod ei opinioni verae quae,  est dicens quoniam non bonum non est bonum, contra-  ria est ea opinio. non boni, quae est dicens quod est  bonum, quae est contradictoria ilius. Deinde subdit  127  mativae quae est, omne bonum est bonum, vel, omnis  homo est bonus, contraria est universalis negativa, ea  scilicet, nullum bonum est bonum, vel, nullus homo est  bonus: singula singulis referendo. Contradictoria autem  negatio, contraria illi universali affirmationi est, aut, non  omnis homo est bonus, aut, non omne bonum est bonum,  singulis singula similiter referendo. - Et sic posuit utrun-  que divisionis membrum, et declaravit.  18. Sed est hic dubitatio non dissimulanda. Si enim  affirmationi universali contraria est duplex negatio, uni-  versalis scilicet et contradictoria, vel uni duo sunt con-  traria,  vel  contrarietate large utitur Aristoteles: cuius  oppositum supra declaravimus. -- Augetur et dubitatio:  quia in praecedenti textu dixit Aristoteles quod, nihil  interest si universalem negationem faciamus ita contra-  riam universali affBrmationi, sicut singularem singulari.  conclusionem intentam: Quare et ei opinioni boni, quae  dicit bonum est bonum, contraria est ea boni opinio,  quae dicit quod bonum non est bonum, idest, sua con-  tradictoria. Contradictiones ergo contrariae in omni ma-  teria censendae sunt.  16. Deinde cum dicit: Manifestum est igitur etc., decla-  rat determinatam veritatem extendi ad cuiusque quanti-  tatis opiniones. Et quia de indefinitis, et particularibus, et  singularibus iam dictum est, eo quod idem evidenter  apparet de eis in hac re iudicium (indefinitae enim et  particulares nisi pro eisdem supponant sicut singulares,  per modum affirmationis et negationis non opponuntur,  quia simul verae sunt); ideo ad eas, quae universalis  quantitatis sunt se transfert, dicens, manifestum esse quod  nihil interest quoad propositam quaestionem, si univer-  saliter ponamus affirmationes. Huic enim, scilicet, univer-  sali affirmationi, contraria est universalis negatio, et non  universalis affirmatio de contrario; ut opinioni quae opi-  natur, quoniam omne bonum est bonum, contraria est,  nihil horum, quae bona sunt, idest, nullum bonum est  bonum. Et declarat hoc ex quid nominis universalis affir-  mativae, dicens: Nam eius quae est boni, quoniam bonum  est, si universaliter sit bonum : idest, istius opinionis univer-  salis, omne bonum est bonum, eadem est, idest, aequiva-  lens, illa quae opinatur, quidquid est bonum est bonum;  et consequenter sua negatio contraria est illa quam dixi,  nihil horum quae bona sunt bonum est, idest, nullum bo-  num est bonum. Similiter autem se habet in non bono:  quia affirmationi universali de non bono reddenda est  negatio universalis eiusdem, sicut de bono dictum est.  17. Deinde cum dicit: Quare si in opinione sic se ba-  /-* Cf. lect. prae-  ced. n. 1, 5 seqq.  *  *  Num. 2r.  Cf. lect. prae-  ced. n. 5, seqq.  aee  Ὑ  I  eu  ER  CP  πο  INCUBE  FRE  bet etc. , revertitur ad respondendum quaestioni primo  motae *, terminata iam secunda, ex qua illa dependet. Et  circa hoc duo facit: quia primo respondet quaestioni; se-  cundo, declarat quoddam dictum in praecedenti solu-  tione; ibi: Manifestum est autem quoniam * etc. Circa pri-  mum duo facit. Primo, directe respondet quaestioni, di-  cens:  Quare si in opinione sic se' babet contrarietas, ut  dictum est; et affirmationes et negationes quae sunt in  voce, notae sunt eorum, idest, affirmationum et negatio-  num quae sunt in anima; manifestum. est. quoniam. affir-  mationi, idest, enunciationi affirmativae, contraria erit  negatio circa idem , idest, enunciatio negativa eiusdem de  eodem, et non enunciatio affirmativa contrarii. Et sic patet  responsio ad primam quaestionem, qua quaerebatur, an  enunciationi affirmativae contraria sit sua negativa, an  affirmativa contraria ἢ. Responsum est enim quod nega-  tiva est contraria.  Secundo, dividit negationem contrariam affirmationi,  idest, negationem universalem et contradictoriam, dicens:  Universalis, scilicet, negatio, affirmationi contraria est etc.  Ut exemplariter dicatur, ei enunciationi universali affir-  Et ita declinari non potest quin affirmationi universali  duae sint negationes contrariae, eo modo quo hic loqui-  tur  de contrarietate Aristoteles.  I9. Ad huius evidentiam notandum est quod, aliud est  loqui de contrarietate quae est inter negationem alicuius  universalis affirmativae in ordine ad affirmationem contrarii  de eodem, et aliud est loqui de illamet universali nega-  tiva in ordine ad negationem eiusdem affrmativae con-  tradictoriam.  Verbi gratia: sint quatuor enunciationes,  quarum nunc meminimus, scilicet, universalis affirmativa,  contradictoria, universalis negativa, et universalis affir-  matio contrarii, sic dispositae in eadem linea recta: Omnis  bomo est iustus, non omnis bomo est iustus, omnis bomo non  est iustus, omnis bomo est iniustus: et intuere quod licet  primae omnes reliquae aliquo modo contrarientur, magna  tamen  differentia  est  inter primae et cuiusque earum  contrarietatem. Ultima enim, scilicet affirmatio contrarii,  primae contrariatur ratione universalis negationis, quae  ante ipsam sita est: quia non per se sed ratione illius  falsa est, ut probavit Aristoteles, quia implicita est*. Tertia  autem, idest universalis negatio, non per se sed ratione  secundae, scilicet negationis contradictoriae, contrariatur  primae eadem ratione, quia, scilicet, non est per se falsa  illius affirmationis veritate, sed implicita: continet enim  negationem contradictoriam, scilicet, nom ommis bomo est  iustus, mediante qua falsificatur ab affirmationis veritate,  quia simpliciter et prior est falsitas negationis contradi-  ctoriae falsitate negationis universalis:  totum  namque  compositius et posterius est partibus. Est ergo inter has  tres falsas ordo, ita quod affirmationi verae contradictoria  negdtio simpliciter sola est contraria, quia est simpliciter  respectu illius per se falsa; affirmativa autem contrarii  est  per accidens contraria, quia est per accidens falsa;  universalis vero negatio, tamquam medium sapiens utri-  usque extremi naturam, relata ad contrarii affirmationem  est  per se contraria et per se falsa, relata autem ad ne-  gationem contradictoriam est per accidens falsa et con-  traria. Sicut rubrum ad nigrum est album, et ad album  est nigrum, ut dicitur in V Physicorum. Aliud igitur est  loqui de negatione universali in ordine ad affirmationem  contrarii, et aliud in ordine ad negationem contradicto-  riam.  Si  enim primo modo loquamur, sic negatio uni-  versalis per se contraria et per se falsa est; si autem  secundo modo, non est per se falsa, nec contraria affir-  mationi.  20.  Quia ergo agitur ab Aristotele nunc quaestio ,  inter affirmationem contrarii et negationem quae earum  contraria sit affirmationi verae, et non agitur quaestio  ipsarum negationum inter se, quae, scilicet, earum con-  traria sit illi afhrmationi, ut patet in toto processu quae-  stionis;  ideo  Aristoteles indistincte dixit quod utraque  negatio est contraria affirmationi verae, et non affirmatio  *  Cf.supra n. 4,  seqq.  E  128  contrarii. Intendens per hoc declarare diversitatem quae  PERI HERMENEIAS LIB. IIl, CAP. XIV, LECT. XIV:  21.  est  inter  affirmationem contrarii ét negationem in hoc  quod verae aífirmationi contrariantur, et non intendens  dicere quod utraque negatio est simpliciter contraria. Hoc  enim in dubitatione non est quaesitum, sed illud tan-  tum.- Et similiter dixit quod nihil interest si quis ponat  negationem universalem: nihil enim interest quoad hoc,  quod affirmatio contrarii ostendatur non contraria affir-  mationi verae, quod inquirimus. Plurimum autem inte-  resset, si negationes ipsas inter se discutere vellemus  quae earum esset affirmationi contraria.- Sic ergo patet  quod subtilissime Aristoteles locutus de vera contrarie-  tate enunciationum, unam uni contrariam posuit in omni  materia et quantitate, dum simpliciter contrarias con-  tradictiones asseruit.  Deinde cum dicit: Manifestum est autem etc., resu-  mit quoddam dictum ut probet illud, dicens: Manifestum  est autem. ex dicendis quod mom contingit veram. verae con-  trariam esse, nec in opinione mentali, mec in contradictione,  idest, vocali enunciatione. Et causam subdit: quia con-  traria sunt quae circa idem opposita sunt; et consequen-  ter  enunciationes et opiniones verae circa diversa con-  trariae esse non possunt. Circa idem autem contingit  simul omnes veras enunciationes et opiniones verificari,  sicut et significata vel repraesentata earum simul illi in-  sunt: aliter verae tunc non sunt. Et consequenter omnes  verae enunciationes et opiniones circa idem contrariae  non sunt, quia contraria non contingit eidem simul in-  esse.  Nullum ergo verum sive sit circa idem, sive sit  circa aliud, est alteri vero contrarium.  Et sic finitur expositio huius libri Perihermenias. Anno Nativitatis Dominicae 1496, in Festo Divi Thomae  Aquinatis. Cui sit honor et gloria, eo quod dederit opus a se inceptum, tanto tempore incompletum, perfici. When he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc., he returns to a statement he has already made in order to prove it. It is evident, too, from what has been said, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, i.e., in vocal enunciation. He gives as the cause of this that contraries are opposites about the same thing; consequently, true enunciations and opinions about diverse things cannot be contraries. However, it is possible for all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing to be verified at the same time, inasmuch as the things signified or represented by them belong to the same thing at the same time; otherwise they are not true. Consequently, not all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing are contraries, for it is not possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, no true opinion or enunciation, whether it is about the same thing or is about another is contrary to another. The third part is the second difference, i.e., by convention, namely, according to human institution deriving from the will of man. This differentiates names from vocal sounds signifying naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the vocal sounds of brute animals. Then Aristotle says, ‘by convention’ is added because nothing is *by nature* a name, etc. Here Aristotle explains the third part of the definition. The reason it is said that the name signifies by convention [ad placitum ex institutione], he says, is that no name exists naturally. For it is a name because it signifies; it does not signify naturally however, but by institution [ex institutione]. This Aristotle adds when he says, but it is a name when it is *made* a sign, i.e., when it is imposed to signify. For that which signifies naturally is not made a sign, but is a sign naturally. he explains this when he says: for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes designate, etc., i.e., since they cannot be signified by letters. He says sounds rather than vocal sounds because some animals—those without lungs—do not have vocal sounds. Such animals signify proper passions by some kind of non-vocal sound which signifies naturally. But none of these sounds of the brutes is a name. We are given to understand from this that a name does not signify naturally.] Aquino. Keywords: Peri hermeneias, de interpretation, Austin/Grice, “De interpretation” nota, notare, notante, notato, denotato – denotare -- Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Aquino: grammatici speculative, per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia. Refs.: Grice, “Intentionality in Aquino,” Speranza, “Grice and Aquino on the taxonomy of intentions.” Aquino.

 

Grice ed Arangio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del colloquio – la scuola di Napoli – filosofia napoletana – filosofia campanese -- filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza, pel Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice, The Swimming-Pool Library  (Napoli). Filosofo napoletano. Filosofo campanese. Filosofo italiano. Napoli, Campania. Grice: “We have Flores, we have Ruiz, we have Enriques – reminds me of Alan Montefiore! I like Vladimiro Arangio – my favourite is by far his philosoophising on Socrates’s ‘Sofista’ – he distinguishes between what he calls ‘Socratic dialogue’ (mine) and ‘dialogo sofistico’!” -- Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz (Napoli) filosofo, grecista e accademico italiano. Fu i