EXAMPLES DIRECTED TOWARD SHOWING THE THREE-PRONG ANALYSANS ToO STRONG

Let us (for simplicity) revert to the original analysans of "U means something by uttering x," and abbreviate

"U utters x intending A: (1) to produce r

1. to think U intends A to produce r
2. to think U intends the fulfillment of (1) to be based on the fulfillment of (2)"

to "U utters x M-intending that A produce r."

Confession (some cases):

Mother: "It's no good denying it: you broke the window,

didn't you?"

Child: "Yes, I did."

Here the child knows his mother already thinks he broke the window; what she wants is that he should say that he did. Perhaps the M-intended effect, then, is that the mother should think the child willing to say that he did (what does "say" mean here-how should it be explicated?); or that the mother should think the child willing not to pretend that he did not break the window (not to say things or perform acts intended to induce the belief that the child did not break the window). (Confession is perhaps a sophisticated and ritual case.)

So the definition might read roughly as follows:

(*4 is a mood marker, an auxiliary correlated with the propositional attitude 4 from a given range of propositional attitudes)

"U means by uttering x that *4p" = "U utters x intending

(1) that A should actively 4 that p

2) that A should recognize that U intends (I

nd unless U intends the utterance of x merely to remedy atter

tion-deficiency)

(3) that the fulfillment of (1) should be based on the fulfillment of (2)."

This remedy does not, however, cope with (1) the "examinee" example, (2) the "confession" cases, or (3) the countersuggestible

man.