"U meant by uttering x that up" is true iff

(3ф) (3/) (3c):

I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has would think that

1. x has f
2. fis correlated in way c with e-ing that p (3)
   (3¢'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has ' would think, via thinking (1) and (2), that U dis that p

(4) in view of (3), Us that p;

and

II. (operative only for certain substituends for "..")

U uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has $, he would via thinking (4), himself that p;

and

Ill. It is not the case that, for some inference-clement E, U intends x

to be such that anyone who has $ will both (1°) rely on E in coming to e that p (2')

think that (3ф'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has ' will come to 4- that p without relying on E.

Finally, there is the question of how this relates to the regresses which people have actually found: regresses, or prolongations of the set of conditions, which actually exist. Certain ingenious people, such as Strawson and Dennis Stampe, and ending up with Schitter, who moves so fast and intricately that one can hardly keep up with him, have produced counterexamples to my original interpretant in an analysis of meaning, counterexamples which are supposed to show that my conditions, or any expansion of them, are insufficient to provide an account of speaker meaning. The alleged counterexample is always such that it satisfies the conditions on speaker meaning as set forward so far, but that the speaker is nevertheless supposed to have what I might call a sneaky intention. That is, in the first and most obvious case, his intention is that the hearer should in fact accept p on such and such grounds, but should think that he is supposed to accept p not on those grounds but on some other grounds. That is, the hearer is represented, at some level or other of embedding, as having, or being intended to have, or being intended to think himself intended to have (or ...), a misapprehension with regard to what is expected of him. He thinks he is supposed to proceed in one way, whereas really he is supposed to proceed in another. I would then want to say that the effect of the appearance of a sneaky intention, the function that such a sneaky intention would have in the scheme I am suggesting, would simply be to cancel the license to deem what the speaker is doing to be a case of meaning on this particular occa-sion: that is, to cancel the idea that this is to be allowed to count as a sublunary performance, so to speak, of the infinite set of intentions which is only celestially realizable.

In a way, what this suggestion does, or would do if it were otherwise acceptable, is to confer a rationale upon a proposal which I actually did make in an earlier paper, to the effect that what was really required in a full account of speaker meaning was the absence of a certain kind of intention. This may very well be right, but the deficiency in that proposal was that it gave no explanation of why this was a reasonable condition to put into an account of speaker mean-ing. I think, if we accepted the framework I have just outlined, this arbitrariness, or ad honess, would be removed, or at least mitigated.