Is it in fact true that an ordinary use of language cannot be self-contradictory, unless the "ordinary use of language" is defined by stipulation as non-self-contradictory, in which case, of course, Malcolm's version of the appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against the philosopher's paradox? The following examples would seem to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. They are not, so far as 1 can see, technical, philosophical, poetic, figurative, or strained; they are examples of the sorts of things which have been said and meant by numbers of actual persons. Yet each is open, I think, at least to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is perhaps all one needs.

1. "He is a lucky person" ("lucky" being understood as disposi-tional). This might on occasion turn out to be a way of saying "He is a person to whom what is unlikely to happen is likely to happen."
2. "Departed spirits walk along this road on their way to Para-dise" (it being understood that departed spirits are supposed to be bodiless and imperceptible).
3. "I wish that I had been Napoleon" (which does not mean the same as "I wish I were like Napoleon"). "I wish that I had lived not in the XXth century but in the XVIlith century."
4. "As far as I know; there are infinitely many stars." Of course, 1 do not wish to suggest that these examples are likely in the end to prove of much assistance to the propounder of para-doxes. All I wish to suggest is that the principle "The ordinary use of language cannot be absurd" is cither trivial or needs justification.