It has, I think, sometimes been supposed that one dogma which united us was that of the need to restrict philosophical attention to 'ordinary' language, in a sense which would disqualify the introduction into, or employment in, philosophical discourse of technical terminology or jargon, a restriction which would seem to put a stranglehold on any philosophical theory-construction. It is true that many, even all, of us would have objected (and rightly objected) to the introduction of technical apparatus before the ground had been properly laid; the sorry story of deontic logic shows what may happen when technologists rush in where a well-conducted elephant would fear to tread. We would also (as some of us did from time to time have objected to the covert introduction of jargon, the use of seemingly innocent expressions whose bite comes from a concealed technical overlay (as perhaps has occurred with words like "sensation' or 'volition'). But one glance at 'How to talk: Some Simple Ways', or at 'How to Do Things with Words' should be enough to dispel the idea that there was a general renunciation of the use of technical terminology, even if certain individuals at some moments may have strayed in that direction.