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Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: St

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staberio – Ossia: Grice e Staberio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STABERIO The gens Staberia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the final decades of the Republic, but they never achieved much importance. The most illustrious of the Staberii may have been the Grammarian Staberius Eros, though he was a freedman. One of this family served as a military tribune in the time of Vespasian, but none of the Staberii obtained any of the higher offices of the Roman state; the consul Marcus Pompeius Silvanus Staberius Flavianus belonged to the Pompeia gens, although he was probably descended from the Staberii through a female line.[1]  Origin The nomen Staberius is probably of Oscan origin. Chase classifies it among those names that did not originate at Rome, but were of Oscan, Umbrian, or Picentine derivation.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Staberius, a wealthy man whose will stipulated that his heirs should have the amount of their inheritance engraved upon his tombstone; otherwise, they were to exhibit games featuring a hundred pairs of gladiators, and such other entertainment as dictated by a certain Arrius, and purchase as much grain as was grown in Africa. Horace gives Staberius as an example of the madness of the covetous.[3][4][5][6] Lucius Staberius, prefect of Apollonia under Pompeius in 48 BC, during the Civil War. When Caesar's forces approached the city, the populace determined to welcome him, forcing Staberius to abandon his position.[7][8][9][10][11] Quintus Staberius, mentioned by Cicero in 45 BC as the owner of land in which he was interested at Pompeii or Nola in Campania.[12][13] Staberius Eros, a grammarian of considerable repute, highly praised by Fronto.[14][15] Pliny the Elder notes in Natural History that he was "our first grammarian", a slave brought by ship from overseas, and "recommended to notice [by his] literary honours" [16] Titus Staberius T. f. Secundus, a military tribune with the Legio VII Gemina in Germania Inferior during the reign of Vespasian. According to a military diploma from AD 78, he had been prefect of a cohort of soldiers from Chalcedon in Africa, and prefect of a Moesian cavalry wing.[17][18] See also List of Roman gentes References These citations utilize abbreviations whose expansions can be found in the Bibliography below.   Eck, "M. Pompeius Silvanus", p. 266.  Chase, pp. 128, 129.  Horace, Satirae, ii. 3. 84 ff.  Porphyrion, Commentarii in Horatium.  PW, "Staberius", No. 1.[dead link]  PIR, S. 584.  Caesar, De Bello Civili, iii. 12.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 54.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 898 ("Staberius"[dead link][clarification needed]).  PW, "Staberius", No. 2.[dead link]  Broughton, vol. II, p. 283.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xiii. 8.  PW, "Staberius", No. 3.  Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis, 13.  PW, "Staberius", No. 4.[dead link]  Pliny, Natural History, Natural History, Rackham, Jones, & Eichholz translation, Book 35, paragraph LVIII https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Natural_History_(Rackham,_Jones,_%26_Eichholz)/Book_35#:~:text=Staberius%20Eros  CIL XVI, 23.  PW, "Staberius", No. 5. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum. Gaius Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Civili (Commentaries on the Civil War). Quintus Horatius Flaccus (Horace), Satirae (Satires). Pomponius Porphyrion, Commentarii in Q. Horatium Flaccum (Commentaries on Horace). Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Illustribus Grammaticis (On the Illustrious Grammarians). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Werner Eck, "M. Pompeius Silvanus, consul designatus tertium: Ein Vertrauter Vespasians und Domitians", in Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, vol. 9 (1972). Category: Roman gentes And for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staberio – Ossia: Grice e Staberio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STABERIO For the Staberii, there are really two outstanding candidates:  Staberius Eros, the grammarian and former slave. The rich Staberius of Horace's satire, who wanted the amount of his fortune engraved on his tomb. [GREXv3 | Word]  For a Grice-Speranza vignette, I would choose the second. Why? Because he is obsessed with a distinction Grice would immediately recognize:  the difference between value and what is communicated as valuable.  Horace presents Staberius as a man who believes wealth acquires meaning only when publicly known. His will reportedly demanded that the size of the inheritance be inscribed on his monument, and imposed extravagant penalties if the heirs refused. [GREXv3 | Word] Grice e Staberio: De Divitiis et Significatione STABERIVS. In monumento scribatur quantum reliqui. (Let it be written on my tomb how much I have left.) HERES. Cur? (Why?) STABERIVS. Ut omnes sciant. (So that everyone may know.) HERES. Ergo pecunia non satis est? (Then the money itself is not enough?) STABERIVS. Non, nisi cognoscatur. (No, not unless it is known.) GRICE. Non divitias tantum desideras, sed recognitionem divitiarum. (You desire not merely wealth, but recognition of wealth.)     The communicated fact becomes part of the value itself.   That is wonderfully Gricean. A treasure hidden forever and a treasure publicly acknowledged may have identical economic value, but quite different social significance. Staberius' behavior implies:  "It is not enough that I be rich."  What he means is:  "Others must know that I was rich."  The inscription is a communicative act directed beyond death. But the satiric Staberius is more distinctive.  Dry Speranzian formula  The Sinnii ask what words mean. The Staberii ask what wealth means. Horace's Staberius wished his fortune to be carved on his tomb. Grice would observe that the mere possession of money did not satisfy him. What he sought was publicity. The fortune was the dictum; the admiration was the implicatum. [GREXv3 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staberio – Ossia: Grice e Staberio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STABERIO The alternative: Staberius Eros One could also make a strong case for Staberius Eros. He is described as a grammarian of considerable reputation, praised by Fronto, while Pliny the Elder mentions him as an important grammarian who had originally come as a slave from overseas. [GREXv3 | Word] For a Gricean, Eros would raise questions about:  grammar versus meaning, education, authority in interpretation,  very much like our earlier discussion of Sinnius Capito. And for Eros, Grice assumes that his forte was Hellenisms -- since Grice cannot think of a Roman-speaking, Latin-speaking Roman having become a slave and coming to Rome from overseas to teach letteratura -- in this case, most like grammatikhe teknhe is meant? Thanks--what sources in Fronto and Pliny the Elder does the gens entry in wiki give? Thaks For the Staberii, I actually think your instinct is right: if Grice were choosing, he might well prefer Staberius Eros over Horace's miserly Staberius. The gens entry cites two ancient sources for Eros:  Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis 13. [en.wikipedia.org] Pliny the Elder, Natural History 35. [en.wikipedia.org], [attalus.org]  As for Fronto, the Wikipedia-style gens entry says Eros was "highly praised by Fronto," but in the bibliography you supplied there is no direct Fronto citation. The ancient references explicitly listed are Suetonius and Pliny; the Fronto notice seems to come through later prosopographical scholarship rather than from a citation given in the entry itself. [en.wikipedia.org] What does Pliny say? The gens entry summarizes Pliny as calling Eros:  "our first grammarian"  and says that he had been  "a slave brought by ship from overseas"  and later became distinguished through his literary attainments. [en.wikipedia.org] Now to your Gricean point. I agree that "grammaticus" here almost certainly should not be understood as a mere schoolmaster teaching declensions. In the first century AD, grammatica still stood very close to the Greek γραμματικὴ τέχνη:  textual criticism, literary interpretation, linguistic scholarship, canonical authors, Greek and Latin culture.  Your inference about Hellenism is therefore plausible, though we should mark it as interpretation rather than source-based fact. If Pliny's report is correct that Eros was brought "from overseas," a Greek-speaking or Hellenized background would fit very naturally with what we know of Roman grammatical education. But neither the gens entry nor the sources quoted there explicitly state that he taught Greek. [en.wikipedia.org] A Speranzian vignette might go: EROS. Grammaticus sum. (I am a grammarian.) DISCIPULUS. Ergo verba doces? (So you teach words?) EROS. Immo auctores. (On the contrary, I teach authors.) GRICE. Ergo non grammatica tantum. (Then not grammar alone.) EROS. Sed litteratura. (But literature.) That, I think, gets at your point perfectly. For a Roman of Eros' stature, grammatica is not the later schoolroom subject. It is much closer to the whole Alexandrian-Hellenistic enterprise of interpreting texts, deciding usage, preserving the canon, and explaining culture through language. In that sense Eros stands nearer to Sinnius Capito than to the anonymous corrector of the Appendix Probi. Now, if Pliny's is 'noster primus grammaticus' that is a pretty ironic twist -- meaning: 'who taught us Greek' -- perhaps he is using 'noster' to mean Pliny himself in the majestic -- "We are not amused"? Thanks That's a very nice Gricean suspicion, but I think we have to be careful. The phrase attributed to Pliny is not, in the source material we retrieved, quoted in full Latin context. What we have is the gens-entry summary that Pliny called Staberius Eros:  "our first grammarian"  and described him as a slave brought from overseas who achieved distinction through literary accomplishments. [arachne.dainst.org] The crucial question is what noster means. There are at least three possibilities: 1. "Our" = Roman This is the interpretation I would regard as the default. Pliny frequently uses noster to mean:  "Roman", "of our people", "among us."  Thus:  primus grammaticus noster  could mean something like:  "the first notable grammarian among Romans."  or  "our first Roman grammarian."  Not first chronologically, but first in some line of Roman grammatical culture.  2. "Our" = Pliny's generation Less likely, but possible. Latin noster can sometimes mean:  "belonging to our age", "of our time."  That would yield:  "the leading grammarian of our generation."  But I'd want the actual Pliny text before defending this.  3. The "royal we" interpretation The least likely, in my view. The majestic plural ("We are not amused") is a very different phenomenon. When Pliny says noster, he is usually identifying a community:  Romans, compatriots, contemporaries,  rather than speaking of himself in grand style. So I would hesitate to take:  noster grammaticus  as  "my grammarian."   Your Greek hypothesis What I do find attractive is another point you raise. If Eros was brought:  trans mare, from overseas,  and became a celebrated grammaticus, then a Greek or Hellenized background would fit naturally with what we know of Roman education. [arachne.dainst.org] Indeed, a Roman hearing:  grammaticus  in the first century often thought of someone deeply immersed in Greek learning. Not merely:  declensions, conjugations,  but:  Homer, philology, literary criticism, textual scholarship, Alexandrian methods.  In that world, saying  noster grammaticus  might itself carry a nice implicature:  "Though foreign-born, he has become one of ours."  That, of course, is not what the words literally say. It is exactly the sort of social implicature a Roman author might expect a cultivated reader to draw. A Speranzian epigram: EROS. Ex transmarinis veni. (I came from overseas.) PLINIVS. Noster est. (He is one of ours.) GRICE. Non de origine loquitur sed de adscriptione. (He is speaking not about origin but about belonging.) That would be a very Roman use of noster indeed. Well, not 'one of us' Recall that in those days, grammar was taught by nannies and paidagogoi -- our first paidagogos may not mean -- and indeed seems quite the opposite in 'meaning' -- to 'one of us'? Thanks Where in NH does he quote him and where in Sveto? Thanks Quite. I think your objection is a good one. If Pliny really says something like noster grammaticus, it need not mean:  "one of us"  in the cultural or ethnic sense. In the educational world of the late Republic and early Empire, the grammaticus was very often:  Greek, eastern, imported, formerly enslaved, professionally engaged to teach elite Roman children.  So a phrase like noster grammaticus could easily mean:  "the grammarian associated with our side of things," "our grammarian," "a grammarian in our tradition,"  without implying Roman origin. In fact, if Eros was, as the tradition says, brought trans mare and became a celebrated grammarian, the phrase may almost work against the idea of ethnic belonging. A Roman could perfectly well say "our grammarian" of a Greek pedagogue. The parallel is your excellent example:  noster paedagogus  does not naturally mean:  "a man ethnically one of us."  It means:  "the pedagogue attached to our household or our educational world."  And of course grammaticus in this period is closer to γραμματικός than to a modern grammar teacher.  As for the sources: The gens entry gives: Suetonius  Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis 13. [arachne.dainst.org]  This is the principal ancient notice on Staberius Eros. The gens entry's citation points specifically to chapter 13. [arachne.dainst.org] Pliny the Elder The gens entry cites:  Pliny the Elder, Natural History Book 35, paragraph LVIII (58). [arachne.dainst.org], [cil.bbaw.de]  Unfortunately, the search result I retrieved contains the beginning of Book 35 but not the chapter 58 passage itself. So I can verify the location cited by the gens entry:  Natural History 35.58. [arachne.dainst.org]  but I cannot responsibly quote the Latin without retrieving that specific section. What I'd really like to see is the exact Latin around the alleged:  noster primus grammaticus.  Because for a Gricean reading, everything turns on whether Pliny wrote:  noster grammaticus primus grammaticus primus noster grammaticus or something subtler.  The force of noster cannot be settled without the actual sentence. And I rather suspect, as you do, that the phrase may be institutional or educational rather than ethnic. The irony would then be that Rome's "first grammarian" was not Roman at all, but a transported foreign slave who helped teach Romans what litteratura was. does this help. Grice notes that it was indeed noble of Eros not to charge on occasion -- he reminds him of the grammar school boys of England! Thanks Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 9 siti According to the surviving ancient sources, nobody is recorded as having taught Latin to Staberius Eros; rather, he is celebrated for being self-taught. He began his life as a foreign slave brought to Rome, purchased his own freedom with his personal savings, and ultimately became recognized as Rome's very first formal Latin grammarian. Instead of being a student of Latin, he is famous for teaching it to some of Rome's most prominent historical figures. Wikisource.org +2 The details regarding his background, education, and arrival in Rome from your cited sources are detailed below: 1. Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis, 13 Suetonius highlights that Staberius Eros was a self-taught, formerly enslaved person who purchased his freedom and went on to teach prominent figures, including Brutus and Cassius. The University of Chicago +1 2. Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, 35.199 Pliny includes Staberius Eros in a list of notable individuals, along with Publilius of Antioch (mimic stage) and Manilius Antiochus (astronomy), who were all imported on the same ship, marking him as the first to establish formal Latin grammar studies in Rome. If you are researching early Roman education, would you like me to find details on how Publilius Syrus or Manilius Antiochus (his shipmates) received their training once they arrived in Rome? L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte The complete original Latin texts and English translations for both passages regarding Staberius Erosare detailed below. 1. Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis, 13 This passage confirms his status as a slave bought with his own money (suomet aere emptus) and freed due to his love of learning. Latin Text: "Staberius Eros suomet aere emptus de catasta et propter litterarum studium manumissus, docuit inter ceteros Brutum et Cassium. Sunt qui tradant tanta eum honestate praeditum, ut temporibus Sullanis proscriptorum liberos gratis et sine mercede ulla in disciplinam receperit." [2.2.1] English Translation (Loeb Classical Library / J.C. Rolfe): "Staberius Eros, bought with his own money from the slave-platform and set free because of his love of learning, taught among others Brutus and Cassius. Some say that he was a man of such honorable character that during the times of Sulla he received the children of the proscribed into his academy for free, without any fee whatsoever." [1.2.3] 2. Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, 35.199 Pliny mentions Staberius in his broader discussion of chalk or gypsum (creta), which was used to whiten the feet of foreign slaves being sold at auction in Rome. Latin Text: "Pedibus albatis venales ex transmarinis adduxere principes ... Publilium Antiochum mimicae scaenae conditorem et Staberium Erotem conditorem grammaticae." English Translation (Loeb Classical Library / H. Rackham): "The first who were brought over from across the sea for sale with whitened feet were the leading figures ... Publilius of Antioch, the founder of the mimic stage, and Staberius Eros, the founder of Latin grammar." [1.3.4] Would you like me to pull up citations regarding how Sulla's proscriptions impacted the school of Staberius Eros or how Roman slaves managed to accumulate their own savings (peculium) to buy their freedom? Yes, this helps a lot, and it actually corrects part of my earlier hesitation. The source you quote from Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis 13, is very revealing:  Staberius Eros suomet aere emptus de catasta et propter litterarum studium manumissus... "Staberius Eros, bought with his own money from the slave-platform and set free because of his love of learning..." [arachne.dainst.org]  and later:  ...docuit inter ceteros Brutum et Cassium. "...he taught, among others, Brutus and Cassius." [arachne.dainst.org]  Most strikingly:  Sunt qui tradant tanta eum honestate praeditum, ut temporibus Sullanis proscriptorum liberos gratis et sine mercede ulla in disciplinam receperit. "Some say that he was of such integrity that during Sulla's proscriptions he admitted the children of the proscribed to his school free of charge." [arachne.dainst.org]  That is exactly the trait Grice would have admired: not merely litterae, but moral seriousness. The Pliny passage The material you quote attributes to Pliny the Elder, Natural History 35.199, something like:  Publilium Antiochum mimicae scaenae conditorem et Staberium Erotem conditorem grammaticae.  That is very different from "our first grammarian." The key word is:  conditor  which means:  founder, establisher, originator.  So the stronger interpretation is not:  "our grammarian,"  nor even:  "our first grammarian,"  but rather:  "the founder of grammar [studies]" in some recognized Roman sense. [arachne.dainst.org]  If that wording is accurate, then your point becomes even more compelling. What sort of "grammar"? Surely not elementary parsing. By the late Republic, when Eros taught figures such as Brutus and Cassius, grammatica meant something much closer to Greek γραμματική τέχνη:  literary education, exegesis of poets, textual criticism, lexical scholarship, cultural transmission.  In modern terms, Eros looks less like a schoolmaster and more like a professor of classics. A Gricean irony The truly fascinating feature is that Eros was apparently:  imported as a slave, emancipated through learning, remembered as a founder of Roman grammatical culture, teacher of Roman aristocrats. [arachne.dainst.org]  So the Romans who conquered the Mediterranean ended up being educated by a man brought to Rome in chains. That is almost paradoxical. ER0S. Servus adveni. (I arrived as a slave.) ROMANI. Nos doce. (Teach us.) GRICE. Qui discipulus videbatur, magister factus est. (He who seemed a pupil became the teacher.) And on your earlier point: I agree that noster here, if present in the actual Plinian context, need not mean "one of us" ethnically at all. In the educational sphere, "our grammarian" could perfectly well designate the grammarian who educated Romans, regardless of where he was born. That would fit the ancient world much better than a modern national reading. The point by Grice on 'gratis sine mercede' was slightly ironic -- "it only occurred during Sulla and for the proscribed who could hardly _live_ to think of paying a fee for their 'liberos' -- Grice is amused by 'he paid for his own freedom' -- "Things were THAT easy, there would have been no slavery then and for a few years since" -- the point about 'Teach' us is indeed the slogan: the victors learned from the defeated -- but as Winkelman notes in his study of hellenism: this came with a price and a prize -- it was a country that had lost her 'freedom' and the 'teaching' (or paidagogia) was a way of paying their way in the land of the conqueror. Thanks Grice thinks that grammar is 'there in the brain' so if this man was 'conditore' grammaticae -- as Romulus was conditore di Roma -- Pliny is speaking VERY metaphorically! Thanks Yes, and I think Grice's irony is very much in the right spirit here. Take the Suetonian notice:  Sunt qui tradant tanta eum honestate praeditum, ut temporibus Sullanis proscriptorum liberos gratis et sine mercede ulla in disciplinam receperit.  The rhetorical force is the praise:  "he accepted the children of the proscribed into his school free of charge."  But Grice naturally asks:  Who, exactly, was in a position to pay?  The children's fathers had been proscribed, their property confiscated, and in many cases their lives destroyed. So "gratis et sine mercede" is morally admirable, but it is also tinged with a certain irony: the circumstance itself made fee-paying problematic. Likewise with:  suomet aere emptus de catasta "bought with his own money from the slave-platform."  Grice's joke is a good one:  If slaves routinely had enough money to buy themselves from the auction-block, slavery was a remarkably self-liquidating institution.  Of course the historical explanation is the peculium, the savings a slave might accumulate while remaining legally unfree. But the phrase still sounds paradoxical because ownership and self-purchase sit uneasily together.  The deeper point concerns Pliny's phrase:  conditor grammaticae.  I agree with you that this is highly metaphorical. Pliny is not saying that Eros invented language, nor that he created grammar in the modern linguistic sense. As Grice would insist:  grammar was already there.  Indeed, if one takes a Gricean or Chomskyan line, grammar is not an institution that can be founded like a colony. One can found:  Rome, a school, a tradition, a discipline,  but not grammar itself. Hence Pliny's conditor must be understood culturally rather than ontologically. Just as:  Romulus = conditor Romae  does not mean he created stones, roads, or Latin, so:  Eros = conditor grammaticae  means something like:  founder of the Roman grammatical tradition, organizer of grammatical study, inaugurator of a recognized discipline.  The metaphor is institutional.  And I very much like your Winkelmannian point about Hellenism. The old slogan:  Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit "Captive Greece captured her savage conqueror"  is true, but incomplete. The Greek intellectual triumph occurred after a military and political defeat. Many of the teachers, grammarians, rhetoricians, pedagogues, and philosophers who transformed Roman culture arrived under conditions of dependency:  slaves, freedmen, clients, immigrants.  So Eros becomes a symbolic figure. He arrives in Rome as property. He becomes the instructor of the elite. A Gricean epigram might be: ROMANVS. Vicimus. (We conquered.) EROS. Docebo. (I shall teach.) ROMANVS. Quis igitur vicit? (Then who won?) That is precisely the ambiguity that makes Roman Hellenism so fascinating. Pliny's conditor grammaticae is not literally the founder of grammar. Rather, he becomes a founder of a Roman cultural practice through which the conquered helped educate the conquerors.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staio – Ossia: Grice e Staio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STAIO. The gens Staia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned by ancient writers, but a number are known from inscriptions. The most illustrious of the Staii was Lucius Staius Murcus, governor of Syria in 44 BC, and a military commander of some ability who served under several leading figures of the period.[1][2]  Origin The nomen Staius is of Oscan origin, and belongs to a large class of gentilicia formed using the suffix -aius. The first of the Staii appearing in history was a Samnite, as were many of the other Staii known from inscriptions.[3][4] The nomen is frequently confused with that of Statius.  Praenomina The earliest Staii bore Oscan praenomina, such as Minatus and Ovius, but in subsequent generations they bore praenomina more typical at Rome, including Numerius and Tiberius. In imperial times, the chief names used by the Staii were Lucius, Marcus, and Gaius, the most common praenomina at all periods of Roman history. They occasionally used other common names, such as Publius, Gnaeus, and Sextus.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Minatus Staius,[i] a Samnite general during the Third Samnite War, who was captured and sent to Rome in 296 BC.[5][6] Minatus Staius Ov. f., named in an inscription from Delos in Achaia, dating to the third quarter of the second century BC.[7] Tiberius Staius Min. l., a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Delos, dating from 125 BC.[8] Staia Ov. f., named in a sepulchral inscription from Cumae in Campania, dating from the first half of the first century BC.[9] Lucius Staius Sex. f. Murcus,[ii] one of Caesar's legates during the Civil War. He served in the African War, and was probably Praetor in 45. The following year, he was sent as proconsul to Syria, where he and Quintus Marcius Crispus defeated the Pompeian Quintus Caecilius Bassus. He later served under Gaius Cassius Longinus and Sextus Pompeius, who betrayed and murdered him about 39.[10][11][12][13][14][15][1][2][16] Staius Esdragassi f. Vobenatis, a prefect in the Trumplinian cohort serving under the tribune Gaius Vibius Pansa in 43 BC, was buried at Trumplini in Venetia and Histria, with a monument from his wife, Messava. Lucius Staius L. f., buried at Saepinum in Samnium, along with his wife, Herennia, and daughter, Staia, in a tomb dating to the latter half of the first century BC.[17] Staia M. f., the mother of Gaius Paccius Balbus, who had been praetor and proconsul, according to an inscription dating from the reign of Augustus.[18] Numerius Staius N. f., the patron of Numerius Staius Cosmus, a freedman who built a family sepulchre at Casilinum in Campania for his patron, the freedwoman Staia Dynamis, and his daughter, Staia Cosmilla, dating to the first century BC, or first century AD.[19] Numerius Staius N. l. Cosmus, a freedman who dedicated a family sepulchre at Casilinum for himself, his patron, Numerius Staius, daughter, Staia Cosmilla, and the freedwoman Staia Dynamis.[19] Staia N. l. Dynamis, a freedwoman buried at Casilinum, in a family sepulchre built by Numerius Staius Cosmus for himself, his daughter, Staia Cosmilla, Staia Dynamis, and his patron, Numerius Staius. Staia N. l. Cosmilla, a freedwoman buried at Casilinum, in a family sepulchre built by her father, Numerius Staius Cosmus, for his daughter, the freedwoman Staia Dynamis, and his patron, Numerius Staius.[19] Marcus Staius M. f. Rufus, one of the municipal duumviri jure dicundo at Pompeii in Campania, circa AD 3.[20] Staius, tribune of a cohort in the Praetorian Guard in AD 24, was dispatched to the neighbourhood of Brundisium, where he took custody of Titus Curtisius, a discontented ex-soldier who had sought to instigate a slave revolt, and delivered him to Rome.[21][22][23] Staia Ampliata, named in a bronze inscription from Matrice, dating from the first half of the first century.[24] Staia P. l. Felicula, a freedwoman named in an inscription from Rome, dating to the first half of the first century.[25] Staia L. l. Quarta, a freedwoman buried at Venafrum in Samnium, along with Gaius Laelius, in a tomb dating to the first half of the first century.[26] Marcus Staius Tyrannus, named in a sepulchral inscription from Rome, dating to the first half of the first century.[27] Marcus Staius Flaccus, one of the municipal duumvirs at Nola in Campania in AD 31.[28] Staia Secundilla, dedicated a tomb at Abellinum in Campania, dating to the early or middle part of the first century, for herself, her daughter, Annia Tertulla, and Avillius Anthus.[29] Gaius Staius C. l. Felix, a freedman at Rome, who together with the freedwoman Pomponia Prima, made an offering to the gods of the underworld, dating between AD 14 and 50.[30] Staia, mentioned in a first-century dedicatory inscription from Luceria in Apulia.[31] Staia L. l., a freedwoman buried in a first-century tomb at Casinum, together with the freedmen Petillius Herma and Lucius Petillius Hilarus.[32] Lucius Staius L. l. Apollonius, a freedman buried in a first-century tomb at Venafrum.[33] Staia Apricula, buried in a first-century tomb at Venafrum, aged twenty-four.[34] Marcus Staius M. Ɔ. l. Lygdamus Apollinaris, a freedman who donated fifteen thousand sestertii to the Seviri Augustales at Luceria during the first century.[31] Numerius Staius N. l. Remissus, a freedman named in a first-century inscription from Aeclanum in Samnium.[35] Titus Staius M. f. Titinius, buried in a first-century tomb at Bovianum Vetus in Samnium, dedicated by his son, Staius Titinius.[36] Staius T. f. M. n. Titinius, dedicated a first century tomb at Bovianum Vetus for his father, Titus Staius Titinius.[36] Lucius Staius Proculus, named in an inscription from Pompeii in Campania.[37] Marcus Staius Pietas, a priest of Ceres, named in an inscription from Teanum Sidicinum, dating between AD 20 and 70.[38] Staia M. f., the daughter of Marcus Staius Pietas, the priest of Ceres, named in an inscription from Teanum Sidicinum, dating between AD 20 and 70.[38] Staia L. l. Quinta, a freedwoman named in an inscription from the sanctuary of Diana at Aricia in Latium, dating to the middle part of the first century.[39] Staia Ɔ. l. Salvia, a freedwoman named in a sepulchral inscription from Casilinum, dating to the middle or latter part of the first century, along with the freedmen Gaius Epillius Alexander, a materiarius (woodsman or woodworker), and Gaius Epillius Felix.[40] Staia Daphne, buried at Rome in a second- or early third-century tomb dedicated by her husband, whose name has not been preserved.[41] Gaius Staius C. l. Hilarus, buried at Bovianum Undecimanorum in Samnium, in a first- or second-century tomb dedicated by his mother, whose name has not been preserved.[42] Marcus Staius Felix, dedicated a tomb at Teanum Sidicinum in Campania, dating between AD 70 and 200, for his freedwoman, whose name has not been preserved.[43] Sextus Staius Modestus, dedicated a second-century tomb at Tegianum in Lucania for his daughter, Staia Casta, and his wife, Antonia Apollonia.[44] Staia Sex. f. Casta, the daughter of Sextus Staius Modestus and Antonia Apollonia, was buried at Tegianum, aged twenty-two, in a second-century sepulchre dedicated by her parents. Her mother is also buried there.[45][44] Staius Fructio, dedicated a second-century monument at Bovianum Undecimanorum for his wife, whose name has not been preserved.[46] Staia Justa, dedicated a second-century tomb at Cales in Campania for her husband of eleven years, Marcus Ennius Cerealis, one of the Seviri Augustales of that city, aged thirty-one years, five months.[47] Marcus Staius Cosmus, buried at Aeclanum in Samnium during the middle portion of the second century.[48] Staia Procula, along with her sons, Raius Proculus and Raius Clemens, dedicated a tomb at Terventum in Samnium, dating to the second century, or the early part of the third, for her husband, Marcus Raius Fronto, aged sixty-eight.[49] Staius Silvanus, dedicated a tomb at Rome, dating to the late second century, for his wife, Venuleia Vitulia.[50] Staia Thisbe, the wife of Gaius Numisius Elenchus, with whom she dedicated a late second-century tomb at Aufidenia in Samnium for their son, Gaius Numisius Elenchus, aged five.[51] Lucius Staius L. l. Repentinus, a small child buried at Rome, aged two, in a tomb dating to the late second or early third century.[52] Lucius Staius L. f. Herodotus, made an offering to Silvanus at the site of modern Monte Rocchetta, formerly part of Venetia and Histria, dating between the late second and middle of the third century.[53] Staia Quartilla, buried at Atina in Lucania, aged thirty-five years, eleven months, and eighteen days, with a monument from her husband, Antonius Felicianus, dating from the late second century, or the first half of the third.[54] Lucius Staius L. f. Scrateius Manilianus, one of the municipal duumvirs at Beneventum in Samnium in AD 231.[55][56] Staia Grumentina, buried in a third-century tomb at Atina, with a monument from her husband, Gaius Apidius Faustus.[57] Staia, buried at Rome in a tomb dedicated by Simplicius, her husband of thirty years, and dating to the latter half of the fourth century.[58] Undated Staii Staia, a woman buried at Rome.[59] Staius Primus, a veteran named in an inscription from Brixia in Venetia and Histria.[60] Marcus Staius Achilleus, one of the Seviri Augustales, dedicated a tomb for Sextus Sammius Firminus at the present site of Jongieux, formerly part of Gallia Narbonensis.[61] Marcus Staius Aeschinus, buried at Lugdunum in Gallia Lugdunensis.[62] Publius Staius Agathopus, together with Lucius Passienus Eros, dedicated a sepulchre at Rome for themselves and their families.[63] Lucius Staius L. l. Antigonus, a freedman at Narbo in Gallia Narbonensis, who dedicated a sepulchre for Staia Do[...].[64] Gnaeus Staius Cn. l. Castus, a freedman buried in a family sepulchre at Rome, along with Gnaeus Staius Servius, Staia Thalea, and Staia Maxima.[65] Staia Do[...], buried at Narbo, in a tomb dedicated by Lucius Staius Antigonus.[64] Staius Eudromus, buried at the present site of Conjux, formerly part of Gallia Narbonensis, with a monument from his wife, Amatia Marcella.[66] Publius Staius Eutychianus, made a donation to Jupiter at Pagus Veianus in Samnium.[67] Staius Felix, buried at Compsa in Samnium, with a monument from his wife, Herennia Secunda.[68] Lucius Staius L. f. Herodotus, buried at Beneventum, aged five years, eight months, and fifteen days, with a monument from hs brother, Lucius Staius Rutilius Manilius.[69] Staia Hilaritas, dedicated a monument at Larinum in Samnium to her son, Staius Maximianus.[70] Staius Justinus, buried at Casinum, in a tomb dedicated by his wife, Aemilia Tertia.[71] Staia Lycaethis, dedicated a tomb at Rome for her sister, Philete.[72] Staia Cn. l. Maxima, a freedwoman buried in a family sepulchre at Rome, along with Gnaeus Staius Servius, Staia Thalea, and Gnaeus Staius Castus.[65] Staius Maximianus, buried at Larinum, aged eighteen, with a monument from his mother, Staia Hilaritas.[70] Publius Staius P. l. Meridianus, a freedman buried at Ebora in Lusitania.[73] Staia Musa, along with her son-in-law, Fructus, dedicated a monument at Rome to her daughter, Staia Verula.[74] Lucius Staius L. f. Nema, buried at Pisaurum in Umbria, along with Teia Galla.[75] Staia Nysias, the wife of Gaius Staius Priscus, with whom she dedicated a tomb at Ostia in Latium for their son, Gaius Staius Victor.[76] Staia M. f. Prisca, named in an inscription from Rome.[77] Gaius Staius Priscus, along with his wife Staia Nysias, dedicated a tomb at Ostia for their son, Gaius Staius Victor.[76] Lucius Staius L. f. Rutilius Manilius, dedicated a tomb at Beneventum to his young brother, Lucius Staius Herodotus.[69] Staius Saecillus, named in a sepulchral inscription from Brixia.[78] Staia Saturnina, named in a sepulchral inscription from Vienna in Gallia Narbonensis.[79] Gnaeus Staius Cn. l. Servius, a freedman buried in a family sepulchre at Rome, along with Staia Thalea, Staia Maxima, and Gnaeus Staius Castus.[65] Staia Cn. l. Thalea, a freedwoman buried in a family sepulchre at Rome, along with Gnaeus Staius Servius, Staia Maxima, and Gnaeus Staius Castus.[65] Staia Verula, buried at Rome, with a monument from her mother, Staia Musa, and husband, Fructus.[74] Gaius Staius C. f. Victor, an infant buried at Ostia, aged one year, ten months, and eleven days, with a monument from his parents, Gaius Staius Priscus and Staia Nysias.[76] Footnotes  His correct nomenclature is not certain; in different editions of Livy, his name is given alternately as Staius or Statius Minatius or Minacius. Both Statius and Minatus are Oscan praenomina; Statius is also a gentile name, as is Staius. Pauly-Wissowa regards Minatus Staius as the most likely possibility, in part because a later inscription mentions a person with precisely this name.  Frequently given as "Statius". See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1121 ("L. Statius Murcus")  PW, "Staius", No. 2.  PW, "Staius".  Chase, p. 120.  Livy, x. 20.  PW, "Staius", No. 1.  CIL III, 7128.  CIL I, 3433.  Camodeca, "Nuove iscrizioni da Cumae", p. 65.  Caesar, De Bello Civili, iii. 15, 16.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xii. 2, Philippicae, xi. 30, Epistulae ad Familiares, xii. 11, 12, Epistulae ad Brutum, ii. 3.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 119, iii. 77, 78, iv. 58, 59, 74, 82, 86, 99, 115, 117, v. 2, 8, 25, 50, 70.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 69, 72, 77.  Cassius Dio, xlvii. 27, 30, 33, 35, 36, 47, xlviii. 18, 19.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xiv. 272, 279, 280, Bellum Judaïcum, i. 219, 224.  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 281, 290, 301, 306, 329, 348, 362, 373, 382.  CIL IX, 946.  AE 2013, 317.  CIL X, 4353.  CIL X, 817.  Tacitus, Annales, iv. 27.  PIR, S. 586.  PW, "Staius", No. 3.  CIL II, 04975,60.  CIL VI, 33652.  CIL X, 4954.  CIL VI, 26737.  CIL X, 1233.  AE 1981, 234.  CIL VI, 5008.  CIL IX, 816.  AE 1988, 235.  CIL X, 4994.  CIL X, 4995.  CIL IX, 1311.  CIL IX, 2791.  CIL IV, 91.  CIL X, 4794.  CIL XIV, 4203.  CIL X, 3965.  CIL MMVIII, 208.  CIL IX, 6702.  CIL X, 4816.  CIL X, 314.  CIL X, 313.  CIL IX, 6701.  CIL X, 4647.  CIL IX, 1169.  CIL IX, 2617.  CIL VI, 28511.  CIL IX, 2815.  AE 1986, 64.  AE 1981, 240.  CIL X, 365.  CIL IX, 1655.  PW, "Staius", No. 4.  Inscriptiones Italiae, iii. 1, 174a.  ICUR, ii. 4682.  CIL VI, 26739.  CIL V, 4988.  AE 1945, 72.  CIL XIII, 2277.  CIL VI, 7257.  CIL XII, 5145.  CIL VI, 26736.  CAG, 73, p. 153.  CIL IX, 1498.  AE 1997, 377.  CIL IX, 1971.  CIL IX, 6251.  CIL X, 5289.  CIL VI, 26738.  CIL II, 120.  CIL VI, 26740.  EDCS 105.  EDCS 774.  CIL VI, 38930.  Inscriptiones Italiae, x. 5, 799.  AE 1959, 140. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Brutum, Epistulae ad Familiares, Philippicae. Gaius Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Civili (Commentaries on the Civil War). Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Roman History. Flavius Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae (Antiquities of the Jews), Bellum Judaïcum (The Jewish War). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Giovanni Battista de Rossi, Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romanae Septimo Saeculo Antiquiores (Christian Inscriptions from Rome of the First Seven Centuries, abbreviated ICUR), Vatican Library, Rome (1857–1861, 1888). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). La Carte Archéologique de la Gaule (Archaeological Map of Gaul, abbreviated CAG), Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1931–present). Inscriptiones Italiae (Inscriptions from Italy), Rome (1931-present). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Giuseppe Camodeca, "Nuove iscrizioni funerarie latine di epoca tardorepubblicana da Cumae" ("New Latin Funerary Inscriptions from Late Republican Cumae"), in Colonie e municipi nell'era digitale, pp. 47–70, Tivoli (2017). Manfred Clauss, Anne Kolb, Wolfgang A. Slaby, & Barbara Woitas, Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss/Slaby (EDCS), University of Zürich. Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staio – Ossia: Grice e Staio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STAIO. For the Staii, there are several good candidates:  Minatus Staius, the Samnite general captured in 296 BC. Lucius Staius Murcus, Caesar's legate and later governor of Syria. The unnamed Staius, praetorian tribune who suppressed an incipient slave revolt under Tiberius. Marcus Staius Pietas, priest of Ceres, whose cognomen is itself philosophically suggestive.  But for a Grice-Speranza vignette, I would choose Lucius Staius Murcus. The gens entry identifies him as one of Caesar's legates, later governor of Syria, then an associate successively of Cassius and Sextus Pompeius, before being betrayed and murdered. [GREXv3 | Word] Why Murcus? Because his career revolves around a Gricean problem:  What does political loyalty mean when allegiances keep changing?  In the civil wars, the same action can be described in incompatible ways:  fidelity, prudence, opportunism, treason.  The facts remain; the description changes. Grice e Staio Murco: De Fide MURCVS. Caesarem secutus sum. (I followed Caesar.) INTERROGATOR. Postea Cassium. (Afterwards Cassius.) INTERROGATOR. Deinde Sextum Pompeium. (Then Sextus Pompeius.) MURCVS. Ita. (Yes.) INTERROGATOR. Cui ergo fidelis eras? (To whom, then, were you loyal?) MURCVS. Quaestio difficilis est. (It is a difficult question.) GRICE. Idem factum diversas descriptiones recipit. (The same action admits different descriptions.)  This is very Gricean because the disagreement is not over what happened. The parties may agree perfectly on the chronology. The dispute concerns:  How should the acts be characterized?  A favorite Gricean theme is that communication often turns on the description under which something is presented. Murcus, by contrast, lived through the greatest Roman crisis of allegiance, where every statement of loyalty invited reinterpretation. Dry Speranzian formula  The Spurinnii teach Grice about warnings; the Staii teach him about loyalty. Lucius Staius Murcus served Caesar, Cassius, and Sextus Pompeius. The historical facts are easy enough to state. The difficulty lies in deciding what they mean. Grice would remind us that political life is often a contest not over events, but over the descriptions under which they are understood. [GREXv3 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staio – Ossia: Grice e Staio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STAIO. A close second: Marcus Staius Pietas I confess another temptation is Marcus Staius Pietas, priest of Ceres. [GREXv3 | Word] His cognomen, Pietas, is almost irresistible. PIETAS. Pietas vocor. (I am called Pietas.) AUDITOR. Ergo pius es? (Then you are dutiful?) PIETAS. Nomen est; probatio deest. (It is a name; the proof is lacking.) This resembles our discussion of Clemens, Felix, and other Roman cognomina that function almost as standing conversational implicatures.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Staio – Ossia: Grice e Staio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STAIO. Why not Minatus Staius? The Samnite general is historically important, but we know little beyond capture and defeat. The communicative interest is thinner. [GREXv3 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stallio – Ossia: Grice e Stallio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STALLIO. The gens Stallia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. Hardly any members of this gens are mentioned by ancient writers, but a number are known from inscriptions.[1]  Origin The nomen Stallius seems to be of Oscan derivation, as most of the Stallii found in inscriptions came from Campania and adjoining regions in southern Italy. The first of the Stallii appearing in history bore the distinctly Oscan praenomen Sthenius.[2]  Praenomina Besides the early instance of Sthenius, the Stallii mentioned in epigraphy all bore very common praenomina, including Gaius, Marcus, Quintus, Publius, and Lucius.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Sthenius Stallius, a general of the Lucanians against Thurii in 285 BC. He may be the same person as Statius Statilius, said by Valerius Maximus to have been the Lucanian General defeated and captured by the consul Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, when he relieved the siege of Thurii in 282, but this is not certain.[2][3][4] Stallia, made an offering to the Dius Pater at Casilinum in Campania during the first half of the first century BC.[5] Gaius Stallius, a Roman architect, who along with his brother, Marcus, and the Greek architect Menalippus, rebuilt the Odeon of Pericles at Athens after it was destroyed in the First Mithridatic War.[6][7][8][9] Marcus Stallius, a Roman architect, who rebuilt the Odeon of Pericles at Athens, together with his brother, Gaius, and the Greek architect Menalippus.[6][7][8][9] Gaius Stallius, surnamed "Hauranus", describes himself as an Epicurean in a sepulchral inscription from Neapolis in Campania, dating to the third quarter of the first century BC.[10][11] Publius Stallius Agatho, appointed to a public office in AD 2 by a decree of the decurions at Pompeii in Campania.[12] Quintus Stallius Q. f. Clemens, buried at the present site of Rionero in Vulture, formerly part of Samnium, in a first-century tomb dedicated by his grandmother, Anicia Venusta, for her daughter, Equitia Tertulla, and grandson, Clemens.[13] Lucius Stallius Secundus, a freedman, and one of the Seviri Augustales at Tragurium in Dalmatia, who together with his wife, Stallia Callirhoe, made an offering to the Magna Mater, during the first century, or the first half of the second.[14] Stallia Callirhoe, a freedwoman, and the wife of Lucius Stallius Secundus, with whom she made an offering to the Magna Mater at Tragurium during the first or second century.[14] Marcus Stallius C. f., buried at Casinum, with a monument from his wife, Luta Numisia.[15] Publius Stallius Felix, named in a pottery inscription from Pompeii.[16] Stallia Haphe Ɔ. l., a freedwoman named in an inscription from Pompeii.[17] Marcus Stallius M. l. Philotimus, a freedman buried at Rome, together with Seppia Nice, perhaps his wife.[18] Quintus Stallius Clarus, together with his wife, Hosidia Fortunata, sister, Thisbe, and sons Auctus and Naius, dedicated a second-century tomb at Cluviae in Samnium for his son, Marcius Stallius Nepos.[19] Marcus Stallius Q. f. Nepos, buried at Cluviae, aged twenty-five years, ten months, and fifteen days, in a second-century tomb dedicated by his parents, Quintus Stallius Clarus and Hosidia Fortunata, aunt Thisbe, and brothers Auctus and Naius.[19] Stallius Nepos, dedicated a tomb at Cluviae, dating to the second century or the first half of the third, to his wife, Brinnia Procula, aged twenty years and twenty-three days.[20] See also List of Roman gentes References  PW, "Stallius".  Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis, xxxiv. 32.  Valerius Maximus, i. 8. § 6.  PW, "Stallius", No. 4.  AE 2010, 323.  Böckh, Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum, 357.  Rochette, Lettre à M. Schorn, p. 407, 2nd Ed.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 898 ("C. and M. Stallius").  PW, "Stallius", Nos. 1 & 2.  CIL X, 2971.  PW, "Stallius", No. 3.  CIL X, 884.  CIL IX, 655.  CIL III, 2676.  AE 1971, 113.  CIL X, 08067,14.  Borelli, Un Impegno per Pompei, 21 OS.  CIL VI, 26742.  CIL IX, 6964.  CIL IX, 2969. Bibliography Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). August Böckh et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum (The Body of Greek Inscriptions), Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften (1828–1877). Desiré-Raoul Rochette, Lettre à M. Schorn, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris (1832). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Licia Vlad Borelli, Un Impegno per Pompei, Mailand (1983). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stallio – Ossia: Grice e Stallio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STALLIO. For the Stallii, I think the most Gricean figure is neither the Lucanian general nor the municipal officials, but Gaius Stallius Hauranus, who explicitly describes himself as an Epicurean in his funerary inscription from Naples. The gens entry singles him out for that rare philosophical self-identification. [GREXv3 | Word] Why choose him? Because here, for once, we have a Roman telling us not merely who he was, but how he wished to be understood. Grice e Stallio Epicureo: De Professione Philosophiae HAVRANVS. Epicureus sum. (I am an Epicurean.) INTERROGATOR. Quid significat? (What does that mean?) HAVRANVS. Non satis est nomen dare. (It is not enough to give a name.) INTERROGATOR. Ergo quid professus es? (Then what have you professed?) HAVRANVS. Modum vivendi. (A way of life.) GRICE. Professio philosophica plus quam descriptio est. (A philosophical profession is more than a description.)     To call oneself an Epicurean is partly to state a fact and partly to align oneself with a tradition.   This seems richer than most epitaphic formulas. When someone says:  "I am an Epicurean"  the utterance carries a whole cloud of implications:  attitudes toward pleasure, fear of death, the gods, friendship, tranquility.  The word does much more work than a mere label. A Gricean would ask:  What did Stallius expect his readers to infer from the single word Epicureus? But philosophically, Hauranus is more explicit.  A very Speranzian twist After our discussion of Staberius Eros, there is an irony here. Eros represents:  grammar, paideia, literary culture.  Hauranus represents:  philosophy openly avowed.  One teaches the canon. The other advertises his school. Grice might have preferred the latter because the inscription is almost a conversational act directed toward posterity:  "Before you ask who I was, know that I was an Epicurean."  Dry Speranzian formula  The Staberii teach Rome how to read; the Stallii tell Rome how to live. Gaius Stallius Hauranus calls himself an Epicurean. Grice would note that this is not merely self-description. It is an instruction to the reader about how the life ought to be interpreted. [GREXv3 | Word] Strictly, Grice disliked Walter Pater's Marius The Epicurean -- "Surely the name of the philosophical movement is "The Garden" -- Grice is opposing the tendency by philosophers to name -isms after people. Grice always spoke of criticism, not Kantianism, and the Lycaeum, not Aristotelianism, and the Academy, not Platonism, and the Porch. Epicureus is L'orto -- HORTUS -- and we should check with Lidell and Scott if they have the same as they do for 'porticus' to mean 'stoicus' thanks Yes, and this is a very Gricean protest. Grice often distrusted the tendency to turn a living inquiry into an -ism attached to a founder's name. Instead of:  Aristotelianism, Platonism, Kantianism,  he preferred to think in terms of:  the Lyceum, the Academy, the Porch (Stoa), the Garden (Kēpos).  The institutional and conversational setting mattered as much as the founder. For the Stoics, the evidence is clear: the school's name comes from the Stoa Poikile, the "Painted Porch," where Zeno of Citium taught. The school came to be called "Stoic" because its members were associated with the Stoa. [en.wikipedia.org], [rep.routledge.com], [iep.utm.edu] So:  Στοά = Porch, Colonnade  and  Στωικός = the man of the Porch, the Porch-philosopher.  In fact, sources note that the school was initially associated with Zeno and later became known as the Stoics because of the Stoa itself. [rep.routledge.com], [iep.utm.edu] Your suggestion about the Epicureans is therefore very much to the point. The parallel would be:                          SchoolPlaceStoicsStoa (Porch)EpicureansKēpos / Hortus (Garden)PeripateticsLyceumAcademicsAcademy Historically we call one group "Epicureans," but the institutional counterpart to "Stoics" would indeed be something like:  "the Garden"  rather than "Epicureanism." The contrast is already visible in Hellenistic Athens: the Porch versus the Garden. One modern summary even frames the opposition explicitly as "Stoa vs Garden." [hoity.net] As for Liddell-Scott, your instinct is correct. A Greek lexicon will naturally define:  στοά = porch, colonnade, portico  and from the philosophical usage derive:  Στωικός = Stoic philosopher,  ultimately because the philosophers met in that particular stoa. The philosophical sense is secondary to the architectural one, not vice versa. The historical evidence for the naming from the Painted Stoa is explicit. [en.wikipedia.org], [rep.routledge.com], [iep.utm.edu] A very Speranzian formulation would be:  The Academy is named for a place, the Lyceum for a place, the Porch for a place, and the Garden for a place. The modern passion for "-isms" obscures the fact that philosophy originally occurred somewhere before it became something. But people who die don't know -- a tutee of Grice, Ackrill, buried at Oxford, reads in epitaph: "Aristotelian." Does this read 'Epicureanus'? we should check with Hortus Liddell Scott to see if there is a ref. to the phil. school. Usually, Urmson slumped them as 'eudaemonism' or 'hedonism' but there is a difference. Literally, 'Epicureanus' cannot be but 'related to Epicurus' a rigid designator alla Kripke -- when philosophers should be able to get to the concept. Thanks Yes, this is a point Grice would have enjoyed pressing. The adjective Ἐπικούρειος / Epicureus is, grammatically speaking, a relational adjective:  "of Epicurus," "belonging to Epicurus," "connected with Epicurus."  Taken literally, it is indeed rather like:  Aristotelian, Platonic, Kantian.  In a Kripkean mood, Grice could say that the name picks out a historical individual, and the adjective denotes some connection with that individual. It does not by itself tell us what the doctrine is. That is why your comparison with Ackrill's epitaph is apt. To call someone "an Aristotelian" identifies him through a relation to Aristotle; it does not yet identify the philosophical content. One still has to ask:  Which Aristotle? The logician? The biologist? The metaphysician? The ethicist?  The same objection applies to "Epicurean."  What is striking about the Greek schools is that many were originally identified by place:  Ἀκαδημία (Academy) Λύκειον (Lyceum) Στοά (Porch) Κῆπος (Garden)  Whereas modern historians usually replace these with:  Platonism Aristotelianism Stoicism Epicureanism  The transformation is from a place-name to a founder-name. Grice's complaint would be that something gets lost. The Garden was not merely a doctrine but a way of life, a community, an institution, almost a conversational setting.  As for the lexicographical question, the evidence for the Porch is explicit: the Stoics received their name from the Stoa Poikile, the Painted Porch where Zeno taught. [cil.bbaw.de], [archive.org], [archive.org] The analogous question for κῆπος ("garden") is whether Greek lexica register its special philosophical association with Epicurus' school. I have not verified the relevant Liddell–Scott–Jones entry, so I should not claim more than this: historically, Epicurus' school was known as The Garden, and ancient authors frequently refer simply to "those from the Garden" (οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κήπου). That is actually much closer to the Academy, Lyceum, and Porch model than to the modern "-ism" vocabulary.  A very Gricean contrast might be: Historian. "Epicureanism." Grice. "The Garden." Historian. "Why?" Grice. "Because doctrines do not converse; philosophers do. And they converse somewhere." That gets at the point nicely: Epicureus tells us whose school; The Garden tells us what kind of philosophical institution it was. and since is is a ROMAN, not Hellenistic, GENS, perhaps we should check with Liddell Scott for 'hortus'? Thanks Yes, and in fact the Lewis & Short entry for hortus gives exactly the sort of evidence you are looking for. Under hortus it includes the phrase:  horti Epicuri,  and glosses it:  "the gardens of Epicurus, in which Epicurus taught." [archli.com], [cld.bbaw.de]  The citations listed are from Cicero:  De Finibus 5.1.3 De Natura Deorum 1.33.93 Ad Atticum 12.23.2 [archli.com], [cld.bbaw.de]  What's striking is that Lewis & Short treat this under the ordinary word hortus, not under some abstract noun corresponding to "Epicureanism." [archli.com], [cld.bbaw.de] That tends to support your Gricean point. For the Stoics, the school-name is derived from the Stoa (Porch), where Zeno taught. [cil.bbaw.de], [archive.org], [archive.org] For Epicurus, Roman authors can simply refer to:  horti Epicuri,  the Garden of Epicurus. [archli.com], [cld.bbaw.de] So if Grice objects to "-isms," he is in good classical company. The ancient way of speaking often remained local and institutional:  Academy Lyceum Porch Garden  rather than  Platonism Aristotelianism Stoicism Epicureanism  at least as primary designations. And your Kripkean point is nicely made. Strictly speaking:  Epicureus = "Epicurus-related."  That tells us a historical connection, not a doctrine. The doctrine has to be recovered from what happened in the Garden. A Gricean epigram might be: HISTORICUS. Epicureanism. GRICE. Hortus. HISTORICUS. Cur? GRICE. Quia nomen magistri designat hominem; hortus indicat conversationem. ("Because the master's name designates a person; the Garden indicates the conversation.") And that is especially apt in a discussion triggered by a Roman gens: the Romans themselves often spoke of Epicurus' gardens (horti Epicuri) rather than treating the school merely as an abstraction. [archli.com], [cld.bbaw.de] Especially since Grice rightly believes Cicero's point was actually to give it a sort of landmark status and Romans competed over its possession. We should check for singular 'hortus' since Epicurus couldn't have tended BUT ONE hortus! Thanks Yes, and I think this is where your Gricean suspicion becomes philologically fruitful. The Lewis & Short entry gives:  horti Epicuri, "the gardens of Epicurus, in which Epicurus taught." [arachne.dainst.org]  But that phrase alone does not settle the question. Latin very often uses the plural horti where English might expect "estate," "grounds," "park," or "garden property." In fact, the same Lewis & Short entry immediately cites:  Horti Caesaris Horti Maecenatis Horti Agrippinae,  all as named properties. [arachne.dainst.org] So when Cicero says:  horti Epicuri  he may not be thinking botanically at all. He may be referring to a famous establishment, almost a proper place-name. That fits your point rather well. For Cicero, "the Garden" is not merely where Epicurus planted vegetables. It is a philosophical landmark, much as:  the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa,  are landmarks. And the Romans were perfectly capable of turning such places into cultural trophies. One is reminded of Cicero's tendency to visit, identify, and philosophically appropriate Greek sites. The name of the place becomes part of the argument.  A Gricean reconstruction might be: HISTORICUS. "Epicureanism." CICERO. "Horti Epicuri." GRICE. "Excellent. Now we have a place rather than an ism." The difference is important. "Epicureanism" sounds like a doctrine. "The Garden" sounds like an institution, a community, a conversation, a way of life.  As to the singular hortus, I think you're asking exactly the right philological question. Since Epicurus taught in a specific place, one naturally wonders whether the earliest references use:  κῆπος (Garden)  in the singular, and whether Latin authors ever say:  hortus Epicuri  rather than the more familiar horti Epicuri. The Lewis & Short evidence I found records only the plural phrase horti Epicuri and does not mention a singular philosophical usage. [arachne.dainst.org] So at the moment I can only say:  Lewis & Short explicitly attest horti Epicuri. [arachne.dainst.org] The entry does not explicitly mention hortus Epicuri. [arachne.dainst.org]  And philosophically, I rather like your conclusion:  the Garden is not primarily a doctrine named after Epicurus; Epicurus becomes the identifier of a place where a certain kind of philosophical conversation occurred.  That sounds much closer to Grice's way of thinking about philosophical traditions than the later habit of manufacturing "-isms." does this help? And what does the inscription read, and where is it -- the epitaph? thanks de Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 8 siti The Latin term hortus (singular, basic garden/vegetable plot) and its plural horti (large, luxurious suburban estates) refer to distinct physical locations in the specific classical citations from Cicero: dokumen.pub 1. De Finibus 5.1.3 — The Academy in Athens The Location: Just outside the Dipylon Gate in Athens, Greece. Context: Cicero sets this philosophical dialogue at the famous Academy of Plato. In this specific passage, the characters walk out to the Academy in the quiet afternoon. As they look at the empty spaces, they explicitly mention how looking at these horti (the surrounding groves and landscaped grounds) brings back intense memories of Plato and the great philosophers who walked there. 2. De Natura Deorum 1.33.93 — The Garden of Epicurus in Athens The Location: Inside the city walls of Athens, Greece (near the Dipylon Gate, between the Agora and the Academy). Context: Cicero uses horti to refer directly to the "Garden of Epicurus" (instituit Athenis Epicurus... in ipsa urbe, as Pliny later notes). In this passage, Cotta mocks the famous "license that prevailed in the Garden of Epicurus" (licentia quam in hortis celebrabat), where even the courtesan Leontium was emboldened to write philosophical refutations against Theophrastus. The University of Chicago +2 3. Ad Atticum 12.23.2 — Rome's Trans-Tiberin Suburban Properties The Location: The right bank of the Tiber River (Trastevere/Janiculum hill area, Rome). Context: Writing in 45 BCE following the devastating death of his daughter Tullia, Cicero writes to Atticus about his desperate search to buy a specific plot of horti (suburban pleasure gardens). He wants this property specifically to build a permanent shrine (fanum) in her memory. In this exact line, he asks Atticus: "I should like you to write and tell me for what day the gardens (horti) are advertised for sale". The Latin Library +1 Would you like the exact Latin text passages alongside these English translations, or are you looking for details on Cicero's negotiation for those Transtiberine properties? L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte 11 siti The famous Garden of Epicurus—known in Greek as Ho Kepos (ὁ κῆπος)—was originally owned by Epicurushimself, who purchased it around 307/306 BCE for 80 minae. He later left it to his school’s successors in his will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy +2 Centuries later, during the Roman era, prominent Romans did legally own it. By Cicero's time, the property had fallen into the hands of a Roman aristocrat named Caius Memmius (the very man Lucretius dedicated De Rerum Natura to). Memmius wanted to tear down Epicurus' old house to build a mansion, prompting a frantic letter from Cicero to prevent the destruction of the historical site. Later, the Roman Emperor Hadrian and his wife Plotina granted special legal permissions to the Epicurean succession regarding the ownership and inheritance of this specific property. Location in Athens The property was located just outside the Northwest city walls of Athens, along the Dromos (the main road running from the Dipylon Gate to Plato's Academy). It sat near the canalized Eridanus River, which supplied the lush water needed for irrigation. Today, this corresponds roughly to the modern Metaxourgeio neighborhood (specifically near Marathonos 61, where ancient seated statues of Epicurus were unearthed). Pliny the Elder: Textual Account Pliny the Elder discusses the exact origin of this urban garden style in his Naturalis Historia (Book 19, Chapter 19, Section 50-51). He famously labels Epicurus the "Master of Leisure" (otii magister), crediting him with introducing country-style gardens directly into city living. Loeb Classical Library +1 Latin Text "...iam quidem hortorum nomine in ipsa urbe delicias agros villasque possident. primus hoc instituit Athenis Epicurus otii magister; usque ad eum moris non fuerat in oppidis habitari rura." English Translation (Loeb Classical Library) "...Nowadays indeed under the name of gardens people possess the luxury of regular farms and country houses actually within the city. This practice was first introduced at Athens by that connoisseur of luxurious ease [master of leisure], Epicurus; down to his day the custom had not existed of having country dwellings in towns." Would you like to explore the letters between Cicero and Memmius regarding the near-destruction of Epicurus' house, or see more on how Hadrian's lawsaltered the ownership of the Garden? Yes, it helps, and it actually strengthens your Gricean reading. The crucial thing is that Cicero's use of horti Epicuri need not be botanical at all. The evidence you've assembled points in the opposite direction: by the late Republic the Garden had become a lieu de mémoire, almost a philosophical monument. Lewis & Short cite:  horti Epicuri "the gardens of Epicurus, in which Epicurus taught" [arachne.dainst.org]  But the same entry also groups it with:  Horti Maecenatis Horti Caesaris Horti Agrippinae [arachne.dainst.org]  These are not vegetable patches. They are estates, landmarks, named cultural spaces. So Grice's point would be:  Cicero is referring less to cabbages than to a philosophical address.  Just as "the Academy" does not primarily mean a grove of olives.  The really nice evidence is the Pliny passage you quote:  primus hoc instituit Athenis Epicurus otii magister ("Epicurus, the master of leisure, first established this at Athens.")  Here Epicurus appears not as founder of a doctrine but as founder of a particular way of inhabiting space: bringing the country estate into the city. Your quotation explicitly places Pliny's discussion under hortorum nomine ("under the name of gardens"). That is very concrete. And this aligns beautifully with the Greek:  ὁ Κῆπος "The Garden"  which was the regular name of the school.  On the singular/plural point, I think you are asking exactly the right question. Historically there was one school:  ὁ Κῆπος "The Garden."  But Latin frequently uses:  horti  for an estate or grounds. So the plural does not necessarily imply many gardens. It may simply be the conventional Roman way of referring to a landed property. In fact, the very phrase  horti Epicuri  may tell us more about Roman habits of speaking than about Epicurus' original institution.  And philosophically I think Grice has the better instinct. If one says:  "Epicureanism"  the hearer receives:  a founder's name, an -ism.  If one says:  "The Garden"  the hearer receives:  a location, a community, a style of life, a conversation.  The latter is much closer to what the school originally was. As Grice would put it:  "Epicureus tells you whose. Hortus tells you where. Philosophy begins with the latter."  And that is why the comparison with the Porch is so apt.  Stoic = from the Stoa. [thelatinlibrary.com], [loebclassics.com] Epicurean = from Epicurus. But the ancient institutional counterpart was the Garden.  Grice's complaint is that posterity remembered the man and forgot the place where the conversation occurred. funerary inscription from Napoli, 'Epicureanus'? for our hero of this gens? Thanks Yes. In fact the inscription is especially interesting because it does not seem to say merely Epicureus ("an Epicurean"), but:  Stallius Gaius has sedes Hauranus tuetur, ex Epicureio gaudivigente choro. [laudatorte...ogspot.com], [wiki.eagle...network.eu]  A translation often given is:  "Gaius Stallius Hauranus occupies/guards this dwelling, a member of the joy-flourishing Epicurean choir (or band)." [wiki.eagle...network.eu], [laudatorte...ogspot.com]  The inscription is catalogued as:  CIL X 2971 = CLE 961, from Neapolis (Naples). [wiki.eagle...network.eu], [laudatorte...ogspot.com]  The text was reportedly found near Santa Maria della Sanità in Naples in 1685. [jstor.org] What is especially relevant to your Gricean point is the form:  Epicureio (in the phrase ex Epicureio ... choro) [hairesis.msh-lse.fr], [laudatorte...ogspot.com]  That adjective is literally:  "Epicurean," "of Epicurus," "connected with Epicurus."  Hence your objection. Strictly, Epicureius/Epicureus identifies a relation to a person, not the content of a doctrine. Hence Grice's dislike of "-isms" and person-derived labels. One might think that the genuinely institutional designation ought to be something like:  ex Horto, "from the Garden,"  parallel to:  Stoicus ← from the Stoa (Porch). [thelatinlibrary.com], [loebclassics.com]  In fact, one modern discussion of the inscription explicitly notes that Epicureius here is being used as a philosophical designation and compares it with labels such as Stoicus. [laudatorte...ogspot.com] The really amusing Gricean twist is that our man does not advertise himself primarily as:  philosopher,  but as belonging to a  gaudivigens chorus, a "joy-flourishing band." [laudatorte...ogspot.com], [laudatorte...ogspot.com]  Which is almost exactly the stereotype that Cicero's opponents enjoyed attaching to the Garden. So if Grice had seen the stone, I suspect he would have remarked:  "Observe that he does not say ex Horto Epicuri but ex Epicureio choro. The master has replaced the place."  And that is precisely the transformation from Garden to Epicureanism that bothered him. Well, as stabula augea and equus seii seianus -- here it is strictly 'chorus epicureanus' nor 'epicuri' -- which is logical seeing that Stallio knew that the real Epicurus was long gone! Thanks Exactly. Philologically, that's the interesting point. The epitaph does not say:  ex choro Epicuri  ("from the choir/band of Epicurus"), which would define the group through personal attachment to the historical founder. Instead it says:  ex Epicureio gaudivigente choro [arachne.dainst.org], [archive.org]  That is, the adjective is Epicureius/Epicureius, qualifying chorus. So the structure is analogous to:  chorus Pythagoreus chorus Stoicus schola Academica  rather than a direct genitive of the founder's name. And your observation is very sensible:  Stallius knew perfectly well that Epicurus was dead centuries earlier.  The epitaph presents membership in an ongoing community or tradition, not discipleship in the literal sense. In that respect the adjective behaves much as:  Stoicus  does. A Stoic in the first century AD was not claiming to sit physically beneath Zeno in the Painted Stoa; he belonged to a continuing school named after its origin. [topostext.org] One might put the Gricean contrast this way:                  HistoricalInstitutionalEpicuri discipulusEpicureiusdisciple of Epicurusmember of the Epicurean tradition The epitaph chooses the second. And there is another subtle point. The inscription does not even foreground philosophy as such. What it foregrounds is:  gaudivigens chorus "the joy-flourishing Epicurean band." [arachne.dainst.org]  The social body comes first; the founder is present only through the adjective. Grice would probably enjoy the irony. Philosophers speak of "Epicureanism" as though a doctrine were derived from a person. But Stallius' epitaph suggests something closer to:  a living fellowship, a tradition, a chorus.  In that sense, the inscription is already one step away from the historical Epicurus and one step toward what Grice preferred to call a philosophical conversation. and the adj. epicureus is midway between genitive epicuri ad perhaps an ian form epicureanus? cf. equus seianus -- the proverb about the horse owned y seius? Thanks Yes, I think that's a very nice way of putting it. There is a spectrum:                      FormForceEpicuridirect genitive, "of Epicurus"Epicureus / Epicureiusadjectival, "Epicurean," "belonging to the Epicurean tradition"Epicureanuswould be an even more developed relational adjective, rather like later formations in -ianus The epitaph's  ex Epicureio ... choro [archive.org]  is already one step removed from the historical individual. It points to a recognized school or body rather than to personal discipleship. Your comparison with equus Seianus is illuminating. There the adjective:  Seianus  means roughly  "Seius-related," "belonging to Seius,"  without requiring that Seius be present. The horse becomes proverbial under a derived adjectival label. The owner recedes; the type remains. Likewise:  Epicureius chorus  does not mean:  "the chorus currently assembled around Epicurus."  Epicurus has been dead for generations. Rather, the adjective has become institutionalized. It denotes participation in a continuing tradition. This is exactly why Grice would dislike reducing everything to a founder's proper name. A proper name is, in Kripkean terms, a rigid designator of an individual. But philosophical schools survive their founders. Hence:  Epicuri hortus originally points to Epicurus' actual property.  whereas  Epicureius chorus points to a continuing community identified by a tradition, not by an ongoing personal relation to Epicurus. [archive.org]  Indeed, one might say that the adjective performs a conceptualizing function. It transforms:  Epicurus (a person)  into  Epicureian/Epicurean (a type of life, school, or discourse).  Grice's objection would be that philosophers then forget the intermediate stage and begin to speak as though "Epicureanism" were itself the primary reality. Whereas historically the sequence is something like:  Epicurus → Garden → community → Epicurean adjective → Epicureanism.  And the Naples epitaph is fascinating precisely because it captures a middle stage:  not Epicuri chorus, but Epicureius chorus. [archive.org]  The man is not claiming to belong to Epicurus; he is claiming to belong to an Epicurean fellowship. Grice would probably regard that as a philosophically more sophisticated description.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stallio – Ossia: Grice e Stallio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STALLIO. A close second The brothers Gaius Stallius and Marcus Stallius, who helped rebuild the Odeon of Pericles at Athens together with the Greek architect Menalippus, are also attractive. [GREXv3 | Word] That story embodies the cultural exchange you were just discussing:  Romans rebuilding an Athenian monument with a Greek architect.  A conqueror preserving the culture of the conquered.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stallio – Ossia Grice e Stallio: gl’ortelani di Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Napoli). Filosofo italiano. He follows the doctrine of the Garden. Gaio Stallio Aurano. Aurano. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aurano. Gaio Stallio Aurano (Napoli, Campania): gl’ortelani di Roma. He follows the doctrine of the Garden. GRICEVS: Avrane, si doctrina Horti sequenda est, num in Roma etiam ortolani philosophantur inter porros et rosam? AVRANVS: Ita vero, Grice, nam in horto meo etiam porrus ataraxiam docet, si eum non nimis serio spectes. GRICEVS: Ego autem timeo ne, dum voluptatem quaerimus, incepimus disputare de definitione “voluptatis” et hortus statim evanescat. AVRANVS: Noli metuere, quia Epicureus, si disputatio nimis crescit, simpliciter sedet, edit olivam, et vincit tacendo. Stallio Aurano, Gaio (XXX). Dicta.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stasea – Ossia: Grice e Stasea: la ragione conversazionale a Roma, o della virtù. Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Stasea (Napoli, Campania) la ragione conversazionale a Roma, o della virtù. A comparison between Grice and Stasea brings out two complementary but differently articulated conceptions of how reason governs meaning in human interaction. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning analyzes communication as a cooperative, inferential practice in which speakers rely on shared rational expectations to convey more than they explicitly say; virtue, in this framework, appears implicitly as intellectual honesty, interpretive charity, and responsiveness to reasons that justify conversational moves. Stasea, by contrast, stages the problem of reason at Rome through the ethical vocabulary of the Lyceum, focusing on virtue understood not as a socially coded role (the Roman vir) but as a stable disposition of character (andreia) embedded in moral life. His resistance to the Stoic claim that virtue alone suffices for happiness parallels Grice’s resistance to overly reductive accounts of meaning: both insist that normative structures—ethical in Stasea, pragmatic in Grice—cannot be collapsed into single austere principles without loss. Where Grice makes explicit the rational norms that license implicature and interpretation across linguistic exchanges, Stasea practices a form of philosophical conversational reason that attends to how words like virtus shift their force in a new civic and cultural context, generating predictable misunderstandings and figurative slippages. In this sense, Stasea exemplifies a historically early awareness of what Grice later theorizes: that meaning is governed not just by lexical content, but by rational habits, expectations, and background forms of life that shape what is reasonably inferred from what is said. The first lizio to take up residence at Rome. He defends the position that virtue (andreia) is not sufficient for happiness – a position on which some Lizians were prepared to compromise, in order to achieve a conciliation with the ethics of the Portico.  Keywords: Lizio.   GRICEVS: Salvē, Stasea! Rumor est tē prīmum Lȳceum Rōmae incolere. Dīc mihi: quōmodo virtūs in urbe nostrā tractātur? STASEA: Salvē, Grice! Ego quidem virtūtem (ἀνδρείαν) tuērī soleō; sed fateor: nōn ipsa sōla ad fēlīcitātem satis est. Sunt quī ex Lȳceō ad quandam cum Porticū compositiōnem inclinent—modo pāx philosophica maneat. GRICEVS: Bene. (Interim, dum per Forum eō, saepe audio quendam dīcere virum ubi Graecus dīceret ἀνήρ—ac nescio quōmodo syllaba illa una, vir, omnia iam absolvere vidētur.) Sed pergē: quid Rōmānī ex virtūte intellegunt? STASEA: Inplicaturam perspicācissimam, Grice! Nam intellexī quid subesset: Rōmānī, cum audīunt ἀνδρείαν, statim ad virum (quasi ad togām et munus) currunt; ego autem ad mōrem atque habitum animī spectābam. Itaque “virtūs” dīcō—nē verba mea per Forum volitent, ipsō sensū relicto. This Stasea came from Naples, so Grice and Speranza are not expecting tria nomina -- Grice in fact think Stasea was a Greek man -- the first "Aristotelian' to settle at Rome -- is there indication of gentilicium here: Stasea? No secure gentilicium is visible in Stasea. If the figure you mean is the Peripatetic usually known simply as Staseas, or in Latinised form Stasea, the name looks Greek, not Roman gentilicial. In other words, Stasea is very likely a personal Greek name, not the sort of Roman nomen that would point to a gens in the way Statilius points to gens Statilia or Terentius to gens Terentia. So Grice’s instinct is broadly sensible. A man from Naples in that period may perfectly well be local to Italy without being “Roman” in the naming sense. Naples remained heavily Greek in culture and language for a very long time, and a philosopher arriving at Rome from Naples under a Greek name would not surprise anyone. That does not make him less Italy-based geographically, but it does make him much less likely to carry a Roman gentilicium. And this is exactly where one must not confuse place with onomastics. A philosopher can be active in Italy, even born in Italy, and yet bear a Greek single name because he belongs to the Greek-speaking intellectual world of Magna Graecia or the wider Hellenised Mediterranean. Naples is a prime case for that. So no, there is no obvious indication that “Stasea” itself is a gentilicium. It is much more naturally read as a Greek personal name. If he had possessed a Roman gens-name, our sources may simply not preserve it, but nothing in the surviving form forces us to posit one. That also means one should be cautious with the phrase “the first Aristotelian to settle at Rome.” It is entirely plausible that an early Peripatetic teacher at Rome was Greek or Greek-speaking, and in that case a name like Stasea fits the pattern rather well. Roman aristocrats often imported Greek philosophy before they produced many conspicuously Roman-named philosophers of their own. So Grice’s larger sociological rule is not foolish: many early philosophical teachers at Rome were indeed Greek or Hellenised intellectuals rather than men presented to us under full Roman tria nomina. But one must not leap from that to “therefore he had no proper civic standing” or anything of the sort. It only means that the philosophical traffic into Rome was at first largely Greek in language, school tradition, and personnel. So the compressed answer is this. No clear gens is indicated by the name Stasea. The name looks Greek, not gentilicial. A philosopher from Naples under that name is very plausibly a Greek or Hellenised intellectual active in Italy rather than a Roman identified by nomen and gens. That is entirely compatible with his being based in Naples and later present at Rome. If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can try to identify the exact Greek form of the name and the ancient source in which Stasea is mentioned. Or I can give you a short note on why Naples so often produces “Italian” philosophers with Greek names and no visible Roman gentilicium.Stasea (a. u. c. DC). Dicta. Roma

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statilio – Ossia: Grice e Statilio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATILIO -- Titus Statilius Taurus, consul in 37 and 26 BC, from Promptuarii Iconum Insigniorum, by Guillaume Rouille (1518?-1589). The gens Statilia was a plebeian family of Lucanian origin at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the third century BC, when one of them led the Lucanian assault on the city of Thurii, and another commanded an allied cavalry troop during the Second Punic War; but at Rome the Statilii first come to attention in the time of Cicero, at which point they held equestrian rank. The first of the family to attain the consulship was Titus Statilius Taurus in 37 BC, and his descendants continued to fill the highest offices of the Roman state until the time of Marcus Aurelius.[1]  Origin The nomen Statilius belongs to a class of gentilicia ending in the suffix -ilius, derived from other names ending in the diminutive suffix -ulus.[2] Statilius is a derivative of the common Oscan praenomen Statius, the diminutive of which may have been Statulus. The same praenomen also gave rise to the Statia gens.[3]  Praenomina The earliest Statilii bore common Oscan praenomina, such as Sthenius (or Statius) and Marius. In the late Republic, we find Lucius and Quintus, both among the most common praenomina throughout all periods of Roman history. The consular families from the first centuries of the Empire used Titus to the exclusion of all other regular praenomina, although two of the Statilii Tauri exchanged their original praenomina for the names Sisenna and Taurus. In the case of Taurus, the name was simply the cognomen of the family used as a praenomen, while Sisenna commemorated the descent of the family from the Cornelii Sisennae, a noble family of the Republic, through a female line.  Branches and cognomina The most important branch of the Statilii bore the cognomen Taurus, referring to a bull, and belonging to a large class of surnames derived from the names of animals and everyday objects.[4] This family remained prominent from the end of the Republic to the reign of Claudius, and its name appears on coins of the era.[1]  Corvinus, borne as a surname by one of the consular Statilii, was inherited from his grandfather, Marcus Valerius Messalla Corvinus, consul in 31 BC, a descendant of the illustrious house of the Valerii Messallae, and of Marcus Valerius Corvus, who obtained his cognomen when, as a young soldier, he defeated a giant Gaul in single combat, with the apparently divine intervention of a raven, or corvus.[5][6][7]  A later family of the Statilii bore the cognomina Maximus and Severus, both common surnames throughout Roman history. Titus Statilius Maximus Severus Hadrianus, consul in AD 115, was the descendant of wealthy Syrian colonists.[8] Maximus, the superlative of Magnus, "great", could have described someone of great stature or high achievement, but was more often used to designate the eldest of several brothers.[9] Severus was used to describe someone whose manner was "stern" or "serious".[9]  Members  Titus Statilius Taurus built the first stone amphitheatre built at Rome. It stood from 30 BC to the Great Fire in AD 64. This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Sthenius or Statius Statilius,[i] the leader of the Lucanians against Thurii early in the third century BC. At Rome, the tribune of the plebs Gaius Aelius passed a measure condemning Statilius, for which he was honoured by the Thurians.[10][11][12] Marius Statilius, the leader of a Lucanian cavalry troop, serving under the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus in 216 BC, during the Second Punic War. After Paullus and his army were destroyed at the Battle of Cannae, Statilius questioned his devotion to the Roman cause, until reassured by the praises of Quintus Fabius Maximus.[13][14][15][16] Lucius Statilius, an eques, and one of Catiline's conspirators, was imprisoned along with several of his colleagues in the Tullianum, where they were strangled on the orders of Cicero.[17][18][19] Statilius, an actor of mean ability, with whom Cicero contrasts Quintus Roscius.[20] Lucius Statilius, one of the augurs, mentioned by Cicero in 45 BC.[21] Statilius, a disciple of Cato the Younger, alongside whom he wished to perish by his own hand during the Civil War. He was saved by his friends, and after the death of Caesar, joined the army of the Liberatores, falling in battle at Philippi.[22] Quintus Statilius, was elected tribune of the plebs for 29 BC, but removed from office by Octavian, when he was reducing the numbers of the senate.[23][24] Statilius Capella, an eques from Sabratha in Africa, whose mistress, Flavia Domitilla, became the wife of Vespasian.[25][26] Titus Statilius Crito, better known as Criton of Heraclea, the physician of Trajan, whom he accompanied to Dacia. In addition to works on medicine, cosmetics, and perhaps also cookery, he wrote a history of the Dacians and Getae, known as the Getica, which probably formed part of the basis for Trajan's De Bello Dacico, now lost, along with all of Criton's works, except for fragments and quotations preserved by other writers.[27][28] Statilius Secundus, governor of an uncertain province, received a rescript from the emperor Hadrian, concerning whether and how to punish soldiers whose prisoners had escaped their custody.[29][30] Statilius Cassius Taurinus, inducted into the Arval Brethren in AD 155.[31][32] Statilius Attalus, physician to the emperor Marcus Aurelius. Statilius Corfulenus, a senator who proposed honours for the emperor Clodius Albinus, and who was derided in a letter from Septimius Severus for doing so.[33][34] Titus Statilius Barbarus, consul suffectus in AD 198 or 199. He had been a decemvir stlitibus judicandis, quaestor, praetor, and governor of Thracia. After his consulship, he was governor of Germania Superior.[35][36][37][38] Titus Statilius Silianus, a member of the Arval Brethren during the early third century.[39][40] Statilius Ammianus, governor of Roman Egypt AD 271–273.[41] Statilius Flaccus, the author of several epigrams in the Greek Anthology.[42][43][44][45] Statilius Maximus, a grammarian, and the author of De Singularibus apud Ciceronem, together with commentaries on Cato and Sallust. His work is repeatedly quoted by Charisius.[46] Statilii Tauri  Statilia Messalina, Roman Empress from AD 66 to 68. 17th century woodcut, unknown artist. Titus Statilius T. f. Taurus, consul suffectus in 37 BC, afterward commanded Antony's fleet in the war against Sextus Pompeius. After securing Africa, he was granted a triumph in 34. He led Octavian's army at the Battle of Actium in 31, and held the consulship a second time in 26. He was Praefectus Urbi in 16 BC. He built the first stone amphitheatre at Rome, which stood from 30 BC until the Great Fire in AD 64.[47][48][49][50][51][52][53] Titus Statilius T. f. T. n. Taurus, triumvir monetalis at an uncertain date, died before achieving higher office.[54] Titus Statilius T. f. T. n. Taurus, consul in AD 11.[55][56] Statilia T. f. T. n., daughter of Titus Statilius Taurus, the consul of 37 and 26 BC, married Lucius Calpurnius Piso, consul in 1 BC. She is probably the Statilia who reportedly reached the age of ninety-nine, and died during the reign of Claudius.[57][58][59] Titus Statilius T. f. T. n. Sisenna Taurus, or Sisenna Statilius Taurus, consul in AD 16. He was a member of the College of Pontiffs, and when at Rome, lived in the house once owned by Cicero, and originally built for Marcus Livius Drusus on the Palatine Hill.[60][61][62][63] Titus Statilius T. f. T. n. Taurus, consul in AD 44, and proconsul of Africa from AD 51 to 53. At the instigation of Agrippina, he was accused, apparently without evidence, of extortion and divination, and took his own life rather than face what he believed would be inevitable condemnation. He was the builder of the Horti Tauriani.[64][65] Titus Statilius T. f. T. n. Statilius Corvinus, also known as Taurus Statilius Corvinus, was consul in AD 45. The following year, he was among those who conspired against the emperor Claudius. He may have been put to death, but his fate is uncertain; some of the conspirators were exiled.[66][67][7][68] Statilia T. f. T. n. Corvinus, the sister of Corvinus. Statilia T. f. T. n. Messalina, probably the daughter or niece of the consul Corvinus, her first husband was Marcus Julius Vestinus Atticus, consul in AD 65, whose destruction Nero wrought because not because of any wrongdoing, but because Atticus was too astute to be deceived by the emperor. Messalina became Nero's mistress, and then his third wife, after the death of Poppaea Sabina. Messalina was one of the few who survived the downfall of Nero. Otho, who had lost his wife to Nero, promised to marry her, but he fell in the year of the four emperors.[69][70][71] Titus Statilius T. f. Taurus, mentioned in several inscriptions dating around AD 140, appears to have been a military tribune in the Legio XXII Primigenia, and was buried at Mogontiacum in Germania Superior, aged thirty-six, with a monument from his freedman, Statilius Fortunatus.[72][73] Statilii Optati Titus Statilius T. l. Optatus, a freedman buried at Rome during the first half of the first century, aged twenty-six, was probably part of the household of Titus Statilius Taurus Corvinus, since a Corvinus is mentioned in the same inscription.[74] Titus Statilius Optatus, praefectus annonae in the late first or early second century, had been a military tribune with the Legio VI Victrix and the Legio VI Ferrata, and prefect in charge of the census in Britain and Gaul.[75][76] Statilius T. f. Homullus, the elder son of Titus Statilius Optatus, who along with his brother, Optatus, dedicated a late first- or early second-century monument at Rome to their father.[75][77] Statilius T. f. Optatus, the younger son of Titus Statilius Optatus, joined with his brother, Homullus, in dedicating a monument to their father.[75][78] Statilii Maximi et Severi Titus Statilius Maximus Severus Hadrianus, governor of Thracia from AD 112 to 115, and consul suffectus from February to April, 115, replacing Marcus Pedo Vergilianus, who was killed in an earthquake at Antioch.[79][80][81] Titus Statilius T. f. Maximus, consul in AD 144, and governor of Asia from 157 to 158.[82][83] Titus Statilius Julius Severus, or Lucius Julius Statilius Severus, consul in an uncertain year, was governor of Moesia Inferior from AD 159 to 160.[84][85][86] Titus Statilius Severus, consul in AD 171.[87][88][89] See also List of Roman gentes Notes  Sthenius (or Stenius) in Pliny, Statius in Valerius Maximus. Both were regular Oscan praenomina. References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 901 ("Statilia Gens").  Chase, pp. 122, 123.  Chase, pp. 131, 136, 137.  Chase, pp. 112, 113.  Livy, vii. 26.  Dionysius, xv. 1.  Suetonius, "The Life of Claudius", 13.  Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand, p. 319.  Chase, p. 111.  Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis, xxxiv. 6. s. 15.  Valerius Maximus, i. 8. § 6.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 187.  Livy, xxii. 42, 43.  Frontinus, Strategemata, iv. 7. § 36.  Plutarch, "The Life of Fabius Maximus", 20.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 251.  Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 17, 43, 46, 47, 55.  Cicero, In Catilinam, iii. 3, 6.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 4.  Cicero, Pro Roscio Comoedo, 10.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xii. 13, 14.  Plutarch, "The Life of Cato the Younger", 65, 66, 73.  Cassius Dio, lxii. 42.  PIR, S. 589/  Suetonius, "The Life of Vespasian", 3.  PIR, S. 592.  Galen, De Compositione Medicamentorum Secundum Locos Conscriptorum, i. 3, vol. xii. De Compositione Medicamentorum per Genera, ii. 11, vi. 1, vol. xiii.  PIR, S. 596.  Callistratus, Digesta, xlviii. 3. § 12.  PIR, S. 607.  CIL VI, 2086.  PIR, S. 593.  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Clodius Albinus", 12.  PIR, S. 594.  AE 2007, 1257.  CIL VI, 41197.  PIR, S. 591.  Leunissen, Konsuln und Konsulare, p. 156.  CIL VI, 2086, CIL VI, 2104, CIL VI, 2105, CIL VI, 2106.  PIR, S. 612.  Guido Bastianini, "Lista dei prefetti d'Egitto dal 30a al 299p", Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 17 (1975), p. 317  Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca, vol. iv, p. 495.  Brunck, Analecta Veterum Poetarum Graecorum, vol. ii, p. 262.  Jacobs, Anthologia Graeca, vol. ii, p. 238, vol. xiii., p. 955.  PIR, S. 596a.  Charisius, Ars Grammatica, pp. 175, 176, 192 et alibi, ed. Putschius.  Appian, Bellum Civile, v. 97–99, 103, 105, 109, 118, Bella Illyrica, 27.  Cassius Dio, xlix. 14, 38, l. 13, li. 20, 23, liii. 23, liv. 19, lxii. 18.  Plutarch, "The Life of Antony", 65.  Tacitus, Annales, iii. 72, vi. 11.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 127.  Suetonius, "The Life of Augustus", 29.  PIR, S. 615.  PIR, S. 616.  Cassius Dio, lvi. 25.  PIR, S. 617.  Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis, vii. 49. s. 48.  Seneca the Younger, Epistulae, lxxvii.  PIR, S. 620.  Cassius Dio, lvii. 15.  Tacitus, Annales, ii. 1.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 14.  PIR, S. 613.  Tacitus, Annales, xii. 59.  PIR, S. 618.  Cassius Dio, lx. 25.  Phlegon, Peri Thaumasion, 6.  PIR, S. 595.  Tacitus, Annales, xv. 68.  Suetonius, "The Life of Nero", 35, "The Life of Otho", 10.  PIR, S. 625.  CIL III, 6025, CIL XIII, 6817, CIL XIV, 246.  PIR, S. 619.  CIL VI, 6273.  CIL VI, 41272.  PIR, S. 606.  PIR, S. 597.  PIR, S. 605.  Cassius Dio, lxviii. 24, 25.  Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten", pp. 112–115.  PIR, S. 604.  AE 1910, 203.  PIR, S. 603.  CIL III, 12371, CIL III, 12513.  AE 1987, 879, AE 1980, 797.  PIR, S. 598.  CIL VI, 1978.  PIR, S. 610.  Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand, pp. 176–191. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, In Catilinam, Pro Quinto Roscio Comoedo. Gaius Sallustius Crispus (Sallust), Bellum Catilinae (The Conspiracy of Catiline). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Roman History. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger), Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium (Moral Letters to Lucilius). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Sextus Julius Frontinus, Strategemata (Stratagems). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Phlegon of Tralles, Peri Thaumasion (The Book of Marvels). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War), Bella Illyrica (The Illyrian Wars). Aelius Galenus (Galen), De Compositione Medicamentorum Secundum Locos Conscriptorum (On the Composition of Medications According to the Place Prescribed), De Compositione Medicamentorum per Genera (On the Composition of Medications According to their Kind). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Lives of the Emperors). Flavius Sosipater Charisius, Ars Grammatica (The Art of Grammar). Digesta, or Pandectae (The Digest). Johann Albert Fabricius, Bibliotheca Graeca, sive Notitia Scriptorum Veterum Graecorum (The Greek Library, or Knowledge of Ancient Greek Writers), Christian Liebezeit & Theodor Christoph Felginer, Hamburg (1718). Analecta Veterum Poetarum Graecorum (Fragments by Ancient Greek Poets), Richard François Philippe Brunck, ed., Bauer and Treuttel, Strasbourg (1772–1776). Anthologia Graeca sive Poetarum Graecorum Lusus, ex Recensione Brunckii (The Greek Anthology, or Works of the Greek Poets, or the Collection of Brunck), Friedrich Jacobs, ed., Dyck, Leipzig (1794). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Géza Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand unter der Antonien (The Consulate and Senatorial State under the Antonines), Rudolf Habelt, Bonn (1977). Werner Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten der senatorischen Statthalter von 69/70 bis 138/139" (Annual and Provincial Fasti of the Senatorial Governors from AD 69/70 to 138/139), in Chiron, vol. 12 (1982). Paul M. M. Leunissen, Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von Commodus bis Severus Alexander (Consuls and Consulars from the Time of Commodus to Severus Alexander), Brill (1989). Categories: Roman gentesStatilii And from THIS gens? thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statilio – Ossia: Grice e Statilio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATILIO – For the Statilii, there are many distinguished candidates, but the first-best Grice-Speranza figure, in my view, is not the consul, the empress, or the conspirator. It is Titus Statilius Crito, physician to Trajan, historian of the Dacians, writer on medicine, cosmetics, and perhaps cookery. The gens article explicitly identifies him as Trajan's physician and the author of works now largely lost. [GREXv3 | Word] Why Crito? Because he stands at the intersection of three Gricean themes:  expert testimony, technical language, lost texts.  Grice e Statilio Critone: De Auctoritate CRITO. Medicus sum. (I am a physician.) AUDIO. Cur tibi credam? (Why should I believe you?) CRITO. Quia scio. (Because I know.) AUDIO. Sed ego nescio an scias. (But I do not know whether you know.) GRICE. Hic oritur quaestio auctoritatis. (Here arises the question of authority.)     Most communication depends upon trust in expertise.  A patient cannot independently verify every medical claim. A reader of history cannot independently verify every source. A hearer therefore relies upon the speaker's authority. That is exactly the communicative situation in which Crito operated. Dry Speranzian formula  The Staberii teach Rome how to read; the Stallii tell Rome how to live; the Statilii teach Rome whom to trust. Titus Statilius Crito healed emperors and wrote books. Grice would observe that most of what we know comes not from direct inspection but from the testimony of experts. The philosophical question is not merely whether Crito knew, but how his readers came to know that he knew. [GREXv3 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statilio – Ossia: Grice e Statilio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATILIO – Why not Titus Statilius Taurus? The obvious historical choice would be Titus Statilius Taurus, double consul and builder of the first permanent stone amphitheatre at Rome. [GREXv3 | Word] He is certainly the most famous Statilius. But philosophically he is less interesting. The amphitheatre is a monument. Crito is a transmitter of knowledge. Grice cared far more about the latter.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statilio – Ossia: Grice e Statilio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATILIO – An alternative candidate: Statilius Maximus There is also Statilius Maximus, the grammarian cited by Charisius and author of linguistic studies including De Singularibus apud Ciceronem. [GREXv3 | Word] That is extremely tempting after our discussion of Staberius Eros. A grammarian who studies Cicero is almost automatically Gricean territory. But we know little of his personality. A close second, however, would unquestionably be Statilius Maximus, the grammarian. Were Grice choosing on purely professional grounds, he might very well prefer the grammarian to the physician. this compares to this studyon IL NEOLOGISMO in PLINIO GIOVANE (ref?). Does this help below? Thanks Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 8 siti The phrase refers to "De Singularibus apud Ciceronem", a lost ancient Roman grammatical treatise written by the 2nd-century AD grammarian Statilius Maximus. Wikipedia +1 Your query contains a couple of typos: "spudorato" is a garbled version of the Latin word apud (meaning "in" or "in the works of"), and "ciceronem" is the accusative form of Cicero. The complete, corrected Latin title of the work is De singularibus apud Ciceronem quoque positis, which translates into English as "On the Unique Words Also Found in Cicero" (or "On the Hapax Legomena in Cicero"). Hypotheses – Academic blogs +1 Key Information Overview The Author: Statilius Maximus, an Antonine-era Roman grammarian who specialized in textual criticism and archaic or rare vocabulary. The Content: The book was a specialized lexical compilation examining hapax legomena (words or singular grammatical forms used only once) or rare expressions appearing in the speeches and letters of Marcus Tullius Cicero and Cato the Elder. The Connection to Charisius: The text itself is lost to history, but we know it existed because it is repeatedly cited and preserved in fragments by the 4th-century AD Latin grammarian Flavius Sosipater Charisius in his work Ars Grammatica. The Transmission: Specifically, sections of Statilius's book were adapted into a chapter on adverbs by another ancient grammarian, Julius Romanus, whose material was then copied directly into the surviving pages of Charisius. Hypotheses – Academic blogs Would you like me to look up the specific grammatical fragments or rare words (such as saepenumero) that Statilius Maximus criticized Cicero for using, as recorded in Charisius's text? Brill L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte 7 siti The surviving fragments of Statilius Maximus's lost work, De singularibus apud Ciceronem, reveal that his "censure" (notatio) focused heavily on Cicero's unusual adverb usage, archaic doublets, and single-occurrence vocabulary choices. Hypotheses – Academic blogs +1 When the 3rd-century grammarian Julius Romanus (and subsequently Charisius in his Ars Grammatica) preserved these notes, they often defended Cicero or exposed flaws in Statilius's rigid theories. Hypotheses – Academic blogs +1 The specific fragments and linguistic anomalies scrutinized by Statilius include the following key examples: 1. Saepenumero (Oftentimes / Repeatedly) The Criticism: Statilius Maximus famously censured Cicero for using the compound adverb saepenumero. Statilius argued that compounding saepe (often) and numero (by number) was redundant or improper formal Latin grammar. The Irony: As Julius Romanus mockingly points out in the text of Charisius, saepenumero appears dozens of times across Cicero’s most celebrated speeches and letters. Romanus actively used the word himself in his opening sentence just to playfully flout Statilius’s rule. Brill +1 2. Ostiatim and Vicatim (Door-to-door / Street-by-street) The Criticism: Statilius flagged Cicero’s use of distributive adverbs ending in -tim, specifically targeting ostiatim (from house to house) and vicatim (from village to village). Statilius believed these were grammatically flawed or colloquial. The Counter-Argument: The text notes that Statilius criticized these words "unknowingly" (Statilius Maximus notat nesciens). The ancient commentators argued he missed the morphological rule: just as continuo transitions into the frequentative continuatim, nouns like ostium and vicus can legitimately take the frequentative adverbial suffix -tim. Cambridge University Press & Assessment 3. Stomachose (Peevishly / Angrily) The Criticism: Statilius marked the adverb stomachose as an irregular or unacceptable anomaly in Cicero's prose. The Context: Cicero utilized this expressive adverb (derived from stomachus, meaning stomach or pride/bile) to describe speaking or acting with irritation. It is heavily documented in his personal correspondence, such as his letters to Atticus. 4. Reduplicated Verb Perfects (Memordii) The Criticism: Though not strictly limited to adverbs, fragments trace Statilius tracking down Cicero’s historical use of archaic reduplicated perfect tense verbs, such as memordii (instead of momordi for "I bit"), pepugi ("I pricked"), and spepondi ("I promised"). The Context: While classical standards shifted these forms, Statilius noted that both Marcus Tullius Cicero and Gaius Julius Caesar occasionally wrote these archaic variants in early drafts or specific legal arguments. Would you like to examine how other Roman grammarians, like Marcus Valerius Probus or Gellius, viewed Cicero's grammar compared to Statilius's strict criticisms? Hypotheses – Academic blogs +1 Yes, this helps enormously, because it makes Statilius Maximus far more interesting from a Gricean perspective than the bare gens entry suggests. The gens article only tells us that he was a grammarian whose work De Singularibus apud Ciceronem was cited by Charisius. [GREXv3 | Word] What you've added is the picture of a grammarian engaged in something very specific: collecting and criticizing unusual or singular usages in Cicero. The title itself is worth lingering over:  De singularibus apud Ciceronem "On singular/unique forms in Cicero."  Here apud Ciceronem does not mean "at Cicero's house," of course, but:  "in the works of Cicero."  A modern equivalent might be:  "Rare lexical items in Cicero."   Grice would have loved the irony Your examples are delightful. If Statilius criticizes:  saepenumero  while later grammarians point out that Cicero uses it repeatedly, then the question becomes:  Is grammar describing usage, or legislating usage?  That is a deeply Gricean issue. Grice was always suspicious of philosophers who confused:  how people ought to speak, with how competent speakers actually speak.  One can imagine: STATILIVS. Cicero peccavit. (Cicero made an error.) GRICE. Quotiens? (How many times?) STATILIVS. Saepe. (Often.) GRICE. Fortasse ergo non peccavit. (Perhaps then he did not err.)  The title and the "neologism" question Your mention of studies on neologism in Pliny the Younger is very relevant. Statilius Maximus appears interested not merely in vocabulary but in what later linguists would call:  marked forms, rare forms, innovations, singularities of usage.  If Cicero writes:  ostiatim, vicatim, stomachose,  the interesting question is not:  "Is this word in the dictionary?"  but  "How does a speaker license a new form?"  That is very close to Grice's interest in linguistic creativity.  A Gricean reformulation The older grammarian asks:  Is this form correct?  Grice asks:  Can a competent hearer understand it?  For example:  stomachose  may be unusual, but if the derivation is transparent and the communicative intention obvious, then understanding succeeds. The form works.  Why Statilius Maximus now becomes my preferred Statilius Earlier I suggested Titus Statilius Crito. But given these details, I would revise the judgment. The most Gricean Statilius is probably:  Statilius Maximus, grammarian and critic of Cicero. [GREXv3 | Word]  Because he forces us to ask:  What makes a word acceptable?   Authority?   Frequency?   Analogy?   Understanding?  Those are precisely the sorts of questions that eventually lead from grammar to philosophy of language. Dry Speranzian formula  The Staberii taught literature; the Statilii taught vigilance about words. Statilius Maximus read Cicero searching for singular forms. Grice would reply that language is not a museum of approved specimens. The real question is whether speaker and hearer succeed in their common enterprise. A word may be singular, unusual, or even new, and still communicate perfectly well. [GREXv3 | Word] can we check for author who wrote on NEOLOGISMI PLINY -- in this way, this statilius CRICIISED CICERO but the later sources come to Cicero's rescue -- the sapenum seem to be objected on Griceian grounds: redundant or overinformative -- the others are less clear -- it should be noted that perhaps the book was NOT titled thus, and that he did write on singularibus and voce rari (I forget the latin) in Cicero but also focused on Caesar and Brutus, etc -- his point seem to be anti-canonical, as finding mistakes in Cicero -- and attempting a more purist way. See if you can check the italian author on Plinio. It also relates to 'statilica accusatio' -- a lawyer's creative use as criticised by Labeone – thanks This helps a great deal, and it actually sharpens the comparison between Statilius Maximus and studies of neologism in Pliny the Younger. First, the Italian author you were trying to recall is:  Santi Consoli, Il neologismo negli scritti di Plinio il giovane. Contributo agli studi sulla latinità argentea (Palermo, 1900). [archive.org], [catalog.ha...itrust.org]  The title is attested in multiple catalogues and reprints. [archive.org], [books.google.com], [catalog.ha...itrust.org] Now the really interesting contrast. Consoli on Pliny vs. Statilius on Cicero Consoli's project is essentially:  "Which words are new in Pliny?"  That is descriptive. Statilius Maximus seems to have been doing something rather different:  "Which words in Cicero are singular, anomalous, rare, suspicious, or open to criticism?"  At least from the fragments that survive through Charisius, Statilius often appears less interested in celebrating Cicero than in catching him out. In that sense he is almost anti-canonical. The funny thing is that later grammarians repeatedly rescue Cicero from Statilius. Your example of saepenumero is particularly Gricean. Statilius reportedly objects to it as a compounded form. Later authorities point out that Cicero uses it repeatedly and naturally. Thus the issue becomes:  Is the form redundant?  A Gricean might initially sympathize:  saepe = often numero contributes another notion of repetition  Hence the suspicion of pleonasm, excessive explicitness, or what Grice would call overinformativeness. But usage defeats theory. If competent speakers understand it and Cicero repeatedly uses it, then the grammarian's prohibition begins to look artificial. The other examples The forms:  ostiatim vicatim stomachose  are even more interesting. Here the later grammarians seem to defend them by appeal to productive word-formation. In modern terms, the argument is:  "You may not have seen the word before, but the morphological rule licenses it."  That takes us very close to Grice's notion that language is not a finite stock of approved expressions. A speaker can create a form and still be perfectly understood. The title problem I also think you are right to be cautious about the title. The gens article merely says:  De Singularibus apud Ciceronem [GREXv3 | Word]  but that may be only the portion known through later excerpts. Your suggestion that Statilius treated:  rare words, singular usages, Cicero, Caesar, Brutus,  and other authorities would fit much better with the surviving reports than imagining a tiny monograph devoted solely to one Ciceronian phenomenon. The "Statilian accusation" I particularly like your connection with the statilica accusatio. Even if the contexts are different, there is a similar intellectual posture:  noticing an oddity, indicting it, construing it as an error.  Where a Labeo or a later grammarian may reply:  no, this is authorized by usage, or by analogy, or by competent practice.  That is exactly the old conflict between:  linguistic purism, and living language.  A Gricean verdict might be:  Statilius treats Cicero as though grammar legislates language. Cicero's defenders treat language as the source from which grammar must be inferred.  And that is why Statilius Maximus turns out to be a far more interesting figure than a mere compiler of curiosities. He is one of those ancient grammarians who tried to hold even Cicero accountable to a theory of correctness, only to find later scholars appealing to actual linguistic practice against him. Grice thinks it was sputatilica -- can you check that? But it does not relate to Cicero -- his -tim examples are examples of as you say, ANALOGY -- and doesn't the critics say that Stat. himself uses 'saepenum' rather than just Cicero? Thanks Ah! This is excellent, because it lets us disentangle two different issues that I had allowed to drift together. 1. It is indeed sputatilica, not "statilica" The passage is from Cicero's Brutus (§260), where Sisenna is mocked for using bizarre vocabulary. Cicero reports that in a lawsuit Sisenna described certain accusations as:  sputatilica  whereupon the prosecutor Gaius Rusius quipped:  "Sputa I understand, but tilica I do not understand!" [loebclassics.com]  The joke is precisely that Sisenna mistakes obscurity for elegance. Cicero's conclusion is devastating:  some people think that correct speech is unfamiliar speech. [loebclassics.com]  That is very close to Grice's outlook. Novelty by itself is not a conversational virtue.  2. Statilius Maximus is a different phenomenon Statilius is not the inventor of sputatilica. Rather, he belongs to the later grammatical tradition that scrutinizes canonical authors for unusual forms. What is striking is that later grammarians repeatedly defend Cicero against Statilius. As you rightly note, the controversy over:  saepenumero  isn't mainly about analogy. It is a different objection. The reports suggest that Statilius regarded it as somehow improper or excessive, while later authorities point out that Cicero uses it repeatedly and perfectly naturally. And yes, I believe your recollection is correct: one of the amusing features of the tradition is that the critic himself appears not always to observe the rigid standards he imposes. The surviving notices repeatedly emphasize the irony that forms condemned by Statilius are abundantly attested in respected authors.  3. The -tim forms are another matter The examples  ostiatim vicatim  are much more clearly defended by analogy. The argument of the later grammarians is not:  "Cicero uses them frequently."  but rather:  "the word-formation itself is legitimate."  That is, if Latin can form distributive/frequentative adverbs in a certain way, these examples are licensed whether or not one has seen them before. This is a much more productive and generative conception of language. Grice would probably side with the defenders here. The hearer who knows the rule can understand the innovation.  4. Statilius seems anti-canonical I think this is exactly right. He does not behave like a reverential Ciceronian. Instead he behaves almost like a prosecuting attorney against the canon. His procedure is:  identify an oddity, classify it, challenge it.  Then later grammarians come along and say:  "Not so fast."  This is why he is philosophically interesting. He resembles those linguistic purists who think language should conform to a theory, whereas Cicero's defenders appeal to actual usage.  5. A very Gricean contrast One could contrast Sisenna and Statilius: Sisenna  strange words are good because they are strange.  Cicero laughs. [loebclassics.com] Statilius  strange words are bad because they are strange.  Later grammarians object. Grice  neither conclusion follows.  The question is:  Does the expression succeed communicatively?  That is why Cicero's own attitude in the Brutus passage is so appealing to a Gricean. He rejects the view that correctness consists in unfamiliarity. [loebclassics.com] And one suspects he would have been equally suspicious of the opposite dogma: that unfamiliarity automatically entails error. Gricechecked and sees that Julianus defends saepenum by saying that 'sapenum Cicero' uses it -- flouting the criticism by Stat. One wonders what audience STat. was having since everybody seems to have WORSHIPPED CICERO -- perhaps he was being controversial on purpose -- in any case he seems to have grounded his crticisms in THEORY seeing that his crticis rely on theory to 'save' Cicero? Thanks I think that's exactly the puzzle. From the material you've reconstructed, Julius Romanus (preserved through Charisius) does not merely say:  "Cicero used saepenumero."  He seems almost to brandish the fact that Cicero used it, thereby turning Statilius' criticism against him. And that raises the obvious question:  Who was Statilius writing for?  If your highest authority is Cicero, then a book devoted to objecting to Cicero's usages is almost a provocation. That is why I think your suggestion that Statilius was deliberately controversial is plausible. There is a parallel with the anecdote in Cicero's Brutus about Sisenna and sputatilica. Cicero mocks those who think that correctness consists in unusuality. [GREXv3 | Word] Statilius may represent a different tendency:  correctness consists in conformity to an abstract linguistic standard,  even when Cicero himself departs from it. What fascinates me is that, as you say, the defenders of Cicero also appeal to theory. That is the really subtle point. A simplistic picture would be:              StatiliusCicero's defendersTheoryUsage But the -tim examples suggest something more complicated. When later grammarians defend:  ostiatim, vicatim,  they are not merely saying:  "Cicero wrote it."  They are saying:  "The form is licensed by analogy."  That is a theoretical argument. So the dispute is not:  theory versus usage.  It is:  one theory versus another theory.  Statilius seems to have a restrictive theory. The defenders have a productive theory. The defenders say, in effect:  if the language permits the formation, and competent speakers understand it, then the form is legitimate.  That is much closer to a Gricean perspective. For Grice, linguistic regularities are not museum laws. They are resources speakers deploy in communication. So when Statilius attacks saepenumero, he may be reasoning:  "This is redundant."  And one could even formulate that in Gricean terms, as a violation of economy or excess explicitness. But Romanus' response is devastating:  Cicero says it, repeatedly.  That forces a theorist to explain why competent speakers repeatedly accept a supposedly defective form. In that sense, Statilius becomes very interesting. He is not merely a pedant. He is trying to derive correctness from principles. The irony is that his opponents rescue Cicero by appealing both to usage and to better principles. Which is why I suspect Grice would have found Statilius admirable even while disagreeing with him. He is one of those grammarians who thought that language required explanation, not merely citation of authorities. The trouble is that the explanation repeatedly collided with Cicero. Yes, I think Julianus's irony is to start the response to 'Stat. by stating that 'Indeed, sapenenumero Cicero uses 'sapenenumero' -- and he rightly does so since the meaning is clear from the context -- (although it may be a flout of 'be brief'). Apparently, Stat thinks 'num.' or 'saep' is just enouh -- cf. English, "a number of times," 'several' a couple times, etc -- oftentimes, why not just 'often'? the -tim is frequentative, and stomachosus is adj from noun -- now Caesar and Brutus may be easier targets because neither wrote a treatise on De Oratore! Thanks I think that's very well seen, and it makes Statilius much more attractive as a philosophical grammarian than as a mere pedant. The way you reconstruct the saepenumero dispute is exactly how I would read it. Statilius' objection seems theoretical:  saepe already means "often"; numero adds an idea of repeated instances; therefore the compound is pleonastic.  A modern Gricean might even formulate the charge as:  Why say saepenumero if saepe will do?  That sounds almost like an appeal to economy. But then Julius Romanus (through Charisius) appears to answer with delicious irony:  "Indeed, Cicero uses saepenumero..."  and thereby immediately undercuts the criticism. The irony is that the defender does not begin with theory. He begins with Cicero. And in Roman grammatical culture that is nearly a trump card.  The interesting thing is that the defense can then become Gricean. One can say:  the meaning is perfectly clear, hearers understand it, no confusion arises.  In that case the burden falls back on Statilius. Why prohibit a form that functions successfully? In Gricean terms:  successful communication becomes evidence against the prohibition.   The -tim examples are different. There I think you are right that the later grammarians defend them not by authority but by analogy.  ostiatim vicatim  are generated according to a recognizable morphological pattern. So the defense is:  if the pattern exists, the form is licit.  That is a much more productive conception of language.  And stomachose is different again. As you note:  stomachosus (adj.) → stomachose (adv.)  is morphologically straightforward. The objection cannot be merely that it is "new." The form is transparently interpretable. And that is exactly the sort of thing Grice liked to point out:  language users routinely understand expressions they have never previously encountered.   I especially like your observation about Caesar and Brutus. Cicero is a difficult target because he had effectively become:  the norm of prose Latin.  To criticize Cicero is to challenge the canon itself. Caesar and Brutus are safer objects of grammatical policing because they lack Cicero's quasi-sacred status as author of De Oratore and model of eloquence. So one begins to suspect that Statilius' project was genuinely provocative. Not:  "Look how perfect Cicero is,"  but rather:  "Even Cicero can be corrected."  That is a remarkably bold position in the Roman grammatical tradition. And perhaps that explains why later grammarians seem so pleased whenever they can rescue Cicero at Statilius' expense. The controversy itself was probably part of the attraction. Grice believes Julianus is punning on use/mention. Stat: is focusing on a singularibus 'sapenum' and Julianus repartee" "No, no singularibus, Cic uses 'sapenenumero ' saepenumero' -- repeatedly. Thanks -- analogy with 'oftentimes/often? Thanks Yes! That strikes me as a very Gricean reading of the exchange. Statilius' project is de singularibus. He is hunting for exceptional, anomalous, or suspicious forms. So he points to:  saepenumero  as an item worthy of censure. Then Julianus/Romanus' reply can be read as a kind of pragmatic counter-move:  "Indeed? But Cicero uses saepenumero."  The force of the reply is not merely:  "Cicero once used it."  Rather:  "Your alleged singulare is not singular at all."  In modern Gricean terms, there is almost a use/mention oscillation going on. Statilius is mentioning the word as an object of criticism:  "saepenumero (the word) is defective."  Romanus replies by shifting attention to use:  "But Cicero uses saepenumero."  And not accidentally, but repeatedly. So the "singular form" becomes a recurring communicative practice.  The comparison with English often and oftentimes is excellent. A purist might say:  often is enough; oftentimes is redundant.  But speakers continue to use oftentimes because it contributes something:  rhythm, emphasis, distributive force, stylistic coloring.  Likewise:  saepe = often  while  saepenumero ≈ often and repeatedly, time after time.  Even if the difference is not strictly semantic, speakers evidently felt a distinction. A Gricean would say that the extra material must justify itself pragmatically. And Cicero apparently thought it did.  The irony is that Statilius seems to reason:  redundancy → fault.  Whereas Romanus reasons:  successful and repeated use by Cicero → evidence of legitimacy.  That is why the debate is so interesting. It is not really about one adverb. It is about two conceptions of language:  Statilius: correctness derives from prior principles. Romanus: recurrent successful usage is itself evidence about the principles.  That is very close to Grice's attitude toward ordinary language philosophy: before condemning an expression, ask why competent speakers keep using it. So your formulation is neat:  Statilius: "This singulare is faulty." Romanus: "Singulare? Cicero uses it saepenumero."  The joke practically writes itself. Grice thinks Julianus's irony is self-referential use/mention like 'heterological': "Cicero uses indeed 'sapenumero' saepenumero.' The first occurrence is MENTION -- the second use? Thanks and this in a response aimed at having caught Cicero using a singularibus (singulare) -- the word 'sapennumero' however is used sapenumero [no quotations here, since the word is USED by Julianus]. It would be: "Shakespeare uses 'oftentimes' once." Julianus: "Not at all, Shakespeaere uses the redundant 'oftentimes' oftentimes." Thanks Yes, I think this is exactly the sort of thing that would delight Grice. Your reconstruction is subtler than the usual account. The ordinary reading is:  Statilius: "saepenumero is an objectionable form." Julianus/Romanus: "But Cicero uses it."  But the de singularibus background makes a stronger reading possible. Statilius is effectively saying:  "Here is a singulare."  That is, he is mentioning the word as an object of scrutiny. Then Julianus replies:  Cicero saepenumero saepenumero utitur.  or something pragmatically equivalent:  "Cicero uses 'saepenumero' saepenumero."  The first occurrence is mentioned. The second is used. That is precisely the kind of use/mention crossing that Grice loved to exploit in discussing self-reference, quotation, and metalinguistic phenomena. Your Shakespeare analogy is excellent:  Critic: "Shakespeare uses the word 'oftentimes' once." Reply: "Not at all. Shakespeare uses 'oftentimes' oftentimes."  The first oftentimes is mention. The second oftentimes is use. And the reply simultaneously reports and exemplifies the phenomenon. It is half argument and half demonstration.  The irony becomes even better in the context of singularibus. Statilius' claim is implicitly:  This is an oddity.  Julianus' answer is:  An oddity? Cicero uses it repeatedly.  In effect:  What you call a singulare is not singular.  The word chosen to illustrate exceptionality turns out to exemplify repetition. That is an almost epigrammatic refutation.  And I suspect Grice would have enjoyed the comparison with heterological. The point is not that saepenumero generates a paradox like "heterological." Rather, it is self-applicative in a gentler way:  The critic alleges that saepenumero is a singular occurrence. The defender shows that saepenumero occurs saepenumero.  The word's semantic content ("repeatedly", "time and again") becomes part of the argument about its frequency. Very elegant. Indeed, the repartee almost sounds as if a Roman ordinary-language philosopher had composed it:  Statilius: Singulare est. Julianus: Minime; Cicero saepenumero saepenumero dicit.  ("Not at all; Cicero says saepenumero repeatedly.") That would be a wonderfully Gricean defense of ordinary usage against theoretical purism.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statilio – Ossia: Grice e Statilio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATILIO – A delightful secondary possibility I am also tempted by Marius Statilius after Cannae. The tradition says that after the catastrophe he doubted whether the Roman cause was worth supporting until reassured by the praise of Quintus Fabius Maximus. [GREXv3 | Word] That creates a beautiful conversational problem:  How can praise restore commitment?  A few words alter a person's practical outlook. Very Gricean indeed.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statilio – Ossia: Grice e Statilio: la ragione conversazionale a Roma -- ogni uomo  è  stolto o pazzo. Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Statilio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale a Roma -- ogni uomo  è  stolto o pazzo. A comparison between Grice and Statilio highlights two sharply contrasting but structurally related ways in which reason governs what is said, implied, and understood. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as a cooperative rational practice: even blunt or pessimistic utterances presuppose shared norms of interpretation, such that hearers are entitled to ask how disjunctions, negations, or exaggerations are meant to be taken, and to determine whether implications are exclusive, inclusive, literal, or satirical. Statilio’s famous dictum that all men are fools or mad operates at the opposite extreme of explicit normativity, using radical brevity and satirical compression as a philosophical stance. Yet precisely because of this extremity, his remark relies entirely on implicature: the force of “or” does not lie in its truth‑functional structure, but in the audience’s rational capacity to infer whether it is meant exclusively, inclusively, or rhetorically, and to grasp the satirical intention behind the aphorism. Where Grice makes such mechanisms explicit—analyzing how ordinary speakers exploit logical particles to generate meaning beyond what is said—Statilio exploits them without analysis, turning conversational ambiguity into a weapon of moral critique. Both assume that rational hearers will reconstruct intention rather than cling to literal semantics; the difference is that Grice aims to stabilize and explain this inferential practice, while Statilio deliberately destabilizes it, trusting that conversational reason will still do the work of interpretation even when meaning is thrust at the edge of nihilism and farce. Amico di Porzio CATONE. L’orto. Satura e farsa filologica. Penna. Secondo un'ipotesi allettante, con S., amico di CATONE e morto a Filippi con BRUTO. In questo contesto forse non è del tutto inutile notare che una filosofia è presente. S. being sollicited by BRUTO to make one of that noble band, who struck the god-like stroke for the liberty of Rome, refuses to accompany them, saying, that: all men are fools, or mad, and do not deserve that a wise man should trouble his head about them. Keywords: ‘All men are fools, or mad’ -- Giardino, horti epicuri – hortus epicuri. Garden. Friend of Catone Minore and Marco Bruto and a staunch opponent of Giulio Cesare.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Statiliō. Audio tē apud hortōs Catōnis illud iactāre: omnis homo stultus aut furiosus est. Nimis breve—ideo periculosum. STATILIO: Salvē, Grice. Brevitas sapit. Sed quid in eō tibi periculosum vidētur? GRICEVS: Hoc tantum rogāre ausim: cum dīcis stultus aut furiosus, “aut” tuum estne ita positum ut alterum excludat, an ut interdum (praesertim in hominibus) uterque simul admittatur—quasi “aut” sit etiam? STATILIO: Implicaturam commodissimam, Grice! Nam Brutus “aut” meum audīvit quasi exclusivum: “elige, stulte an furiose.” Ego vero sciebam (ne dicam) multōs in urbe nostrā ambō esse: ita “aut” saepe apud nos latet inclusive, et satira mea, uno vocabulo, geminam miseriam capit. Grice and Speranza are surprised that among such patricians as Brutus and Portius, Startilius appears to have no gens? Yes, and in this case the surprise is unnecessary. Statilius already is the gens-marker. If the man is called Statilius, then one is not dealing with a figure who “has no gens,” but with someone identified precisely by a nomen that points to the gens Statilia. The form is not like a bare Greek single name, nor like a nickname floating free of Roman family structure. It is, on the face of it, a Roman gentilician name. So the dry correction is simple. Grice and Speranza should not be surprised that Statilius “appears to have no gens,” because Statilius is exactly what gives him one. Now, one must still be cautious, because ancient citation is often abbreviated. A person may be referred to only by nomen, only by cognomen, or by whatever part of the name the source found most useful. But in this case the surviving name does not point to namelessness or bastardy; it points to gens Statilia. And no, the absence of a fuller three-part label would not imply bastardy. Roman society did not operate by the childish rule “no visible gens-name, therefore illegitimate.” That is not how the evidence works. Men appear under shortened or partial names for all sorts of reasons: literary habit, epistolary convenience, source loss, school usage, political prominence under one element of the name, or because the surviving tradition preserves only that much. None of that yields a verdict on legitimacy. As for the company he keeps, that too should not mislead. Brutus and Porcius Cato are indeed very grand Republican names, and standing beside them can make a less familiar name look socially thin. But that is only a trick of comparative fame. Statilius is not thereby nameless. He is simply less immediately canonical to a modern reader than Brutus or Porcius. There is also a good Roman point here. Not every philosopher, political companion, or morally coloured anecdotal figure in Roman history belongs to one of the marquee textbook gentes. Some belong to less celebrated but perfectly respectable families. The gens Statilia itself is certainly real and known, even if not one of the handful schoolboys chant first. Later imperial Rome gives us well-attested Statilii, which is enough to show that the nomen is fully Roman and not some suspicious residue. So the compressed answer is this. Yes, the natural gens here is gens Statilia. No, Statilius does not lack a gens. And no, the fact that the sources may not preserve praenomen and cognomen does not make him a bastard. It only means that the tradition has preserved him under the name-element thought sufficient for recognition. If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can give you a short note on the gens Statilia itself, with other known members and its general standing. Or I can try to identify which Statilius your anecdote is most likely referring to in the Brutus–Cato circle, and whether the source preserves more than the nomen. And can you name other members of that gens -- the etymology seems to mean something like 'who stays in his place'? Yes, other members of the gens Statilia can be named, and the family is real enough even if it is not one of the schoolroom giants. The best-known Statilii for many readers are from the early imperial period. Titus Statilius Taurus is the obvious one: a prominent general and statesman under Augustus, consul and conqueror in the old Roman style, and probably the single most famous bearer of the nomen. There is also a later Titus Statilius Taurus, his descendant, and the family remains visible in the Julio-Claudian world. Statilia Messalina, Nero’s wife, belongs to the same broader family network and shows that the Statilii had serious standing in the imperial aristocracy. So the gens is by no means a ghost. If one wants the driest list of recognisable names, one may start with these. Titus Statilius Taurus, the Augustan general and consul. Another Titus Statilius Taurus in the next generations. Statilia Messalina, empress as Nero’s wife. And then a number of other Statilii and Statiliae scattered through senatorial and prosopographical records. As to the etymology, your guess is tempting but should be handled carefully. Statilius does look as though it could be connected with the Latin root of stare, “to stand,” and one might be tempted to hear something like “the one who stands fast” or “the one who stays put.” But with Roman gentilicia one should be very cautious about turning surface resemblance into confident meaning. Many nomina are old formations whose exact semantic force had long ceased to be alive even for Romans themselves. So “who stays in his place” is not absurd as a loose imaginative gloss, but it is too neat to be treated as secure etymology. A safer dry formula would be this. Statilius is plausibly connected with the stare family of forms, and so may carry an old sense in the orbit of standing, being set, standing firm, or being established. But to translate it confidently as “one who stays in his place” would go beyond what one ought to assert without stronger linguistic evidence. And in any case, Roman names often outlive their transparent meanings. Even if the root once had something to do with standing, the nomen by historical times functions primarily as a family marker, not as a live descriptive label. So the compressed answer is this. Yes, gens Statilia had other important members, especially the Augustan Titus Statilius Taurus and the imperial Statilia Messalina. And yes, the name may well be related to stare, but the gloss “who stays in his place” is better treated as a suggestive paraphrase than a philologically secure translation. If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can give you a compact family note on the Statilii from Augustus to Nero. Or I can give you a dry philological note on the likely formation of Statilius from the stare-stat- root and why one should not over-translate Roman nomina. J. L. Austin used to say, "all swans are white" since black swans in Austrlalia is given for granted. Epimenides the liar is a different matter. But Statilio seems like: Brutus and Porzio: Come with us, Statilie. Statilius: No -- all men are mad or fools. Omnis homo lunaticus vel stultus. The implicature seems to be: except me. Was the paradoxical implicature -- or saving implicature -- the point the sophisma is quotable? Yes, I think that is very likely the point of why the saying was memorable. Not in the strict liar-paradox sense, perhaps. It is not quite Epimenides. Statilius is not saying, flatly, every man is mad or foolish, and therefore I too am mad or foolish, and therefore my sentence collapses. The anecdotal force is subtler and more Roman. The natural uptake is exactly as you say: all men are mad or fools, except, by obvious practical reservation, the speaker who has risen above them enough to judge them so. That is the saving implicature. It rescues the utterance from self-destruction by letting the hearer supply a tacit rider: all ordinary political men, all those bustling about in public life, all those for whose sake Brutus wants action, are mad or foolish. Not I, who see through it. And that tacit self-exemption is precisely what makes the saying quotable. If Statilius had included himself without remainder, the line would be merely self-cancelling gloom. If he had openly said all men except me, the line would be pompous and clumsy. Its charm lies in leaving the exemption unspoken and forcing the hearer to recover it. That gives it a very Roman satirical economy. The sentence wears the costume of universal moral judgement, but its sting lies in the speaker’s implied superiority. He is too wise to trouble himself with the republic because the republic is composed of fools and lunatics. The implied corollary is that the wise man will not join their frenzy, even when the frenzy calls itself liberty. So I would put it this way. The saying is memorable because it hovers between three readings at once. One, the broad Cynic-Stoic moralism that mankind is generally deranged. Two, the political refusal: these people are not worth my involvement. Three, the unspoken self-exception: I, the speaker, stand far enough above the mass to diagnose it. That third element is not a formal paradox, but it is the crucial conversational and rhetorical point. Without it, the line dies. With it, the line becomes an aphorism. And there is another Roman feature. The aut in such a sentence need not be pressed too hard as exclusive. As you suggested earlier, the force may even be cumulative: many are both foolish and mad. The disjunction gives neat form; the satire does the rest. It compresses a whole moral anthropology into one dry refusal. So yes: the quotability lies in the saving implicature, the tacit except me, or at least except the very few wise enough not to be drawn in. That is what lets the line function not as a logical embarrassment but as an aristocratic piece of contempt. If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can give you a very short Gricean analysis of the exact implicature structure of the remark. Or I can place it against the Stoic paradoxes and show why it sounds Stoic without being a literal school paradox in the stricter sense. Now Grice would think (x)Hx --> Lx v Sx -- where H is homo, L lunaticus, s stultus -- but what were the adjectives used -- and did he use omnis homo -- sic in singular -- because 'every' allows singular for the dilemma, whereas 'all' rarely does ("all man" archaic). Do we have a passage or more than one where the oratio recta is reported? And is plays well as a second conversational move, not requring any response by Brutus either than 'Whatever' -- but what would be the immediate understood pre-conversationl move: "Will you come and join us in killing the caesar, Statilie'? Yes. We do have a source, and it gives you almost exactly the conversational setup you are imagining. The key witness is Plutarch, in the Life of Brutus. There the figure is Statilius the Epicurean, and the reported wording is not “omnis homo stultus aut furiosus,” but a prose summary to the effect that it did not become a wise and sensible man to throw himself into turmoil and peril for the sake of feeble and foolish folk. [lexundria.com], [classics.mit.edu] So the sharp first correction is this. The quotable line in the source is not, as far as this evidence shows, a neat universal formula in oratio recta such as “every man is mad or foolish.” What we have is Plutarch’s indirect report of Statilius saying that a wise and sensible man should not put himself at risk for weak and foolish people. That is close in spirit to your reconstruction, but less aphoristic and less paradoxically universal. [lexundria.com] And yes, the pre-conversational move is almost exactly what you guessed. Plutarch says that Brutus, before the conspiracy, tested some of his friends by a roundabout philosophical discussion. In that discussion Favonius answered that civil war was worse than illegal monarchy, while Statilius answered that a wise man should not be thrown into danger for the sake of feeble and foolish folk. That is, in effect, the philosophical prelude to “Will you join us?” without yet saying so bluntly. [lexundria.com], [classics.mit.edu] So the implied conversational sequence is very plausible: first move, by Brutus, something like: what should a wise man do under tyranny, civil danger, and public corruption? second move, by Statilius: he should not endanger himself for a lot of weak and foolish people. only then does the practical implication emerge: then you will not join the enterprise against Caesar. [lexundria.com], [classics.mit.edu] That is why the saying was quotable. Not because of a liar-style paradox in the strict sense, but because it works as a philosophical refusal disguised as a general maxim. It is a second conversational move that is sufficient unto itself. It closes the invitation without needing much reply. Brutus can perfectly well hear it as: “No, and here is my reason.” [lexundria.com], [classics.mit.edu] On the grammar point, your instinct about singular and universal form is right as a matter of Latin style, but here we must be cautious because the source before us is not giving a polished Latin aphorism. In a sharpened Latin paraphrase one could certainly imagine something like “sapiens non debet se in discrimen dare propter homines infirmos et stultos,” where the plural “homines infirmos et stultos” would suit the source better than “omnis homo.” The singular universal “omnis homo” would be the more sententia-like version, but that appears to be your elegant reconstruction, not Plutarch’s wording. [lexundria.com] And that also means the adjectives are not securely “lunaticus” and “stultus.” In the source as summarised, the pair is closer to weak and foolish, not mad and foolish. The stronger Stoic ring “all fools are mad” belongs elsewhere, notably in the Stoic paradox tradition represented by Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum, where one of the canonical theses is indeed that all fools are mad. That may well be why later memory or free reconstruction drifts from Statilius’s weak-and-foolish people into a more Stoic “all men are mad or fools.” But that drift should not be mistaken for the primary source. [en.wikipedia.org], [lexundria.com] So the dry conclusion is this. The source does not give us a neat direct-speech Latin maxim of the form “omnis homo lunaticus vel stultus est.” What it gives us is Plutarch’s indirect report that Statilius the Epicurean, when tested by Brutus, said that a wise and sensible man ought not to plunge into danger for the sake of weak and foolish folk. And yes, the implied first move is very likely just what you suggest: an oblique invitation to join the anti-Caesar cause, framed as a philosophical question. [lexundria.com], [classics.mit.edu] If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can give you a very tight quasi-Ciceronian Latin reconstruction of the exchange, clearly marked as reconstruction rather than source. Or I can show how Statilius’s reply differs in ethical flavour from Favonius’s answer in the same Plutarch passage. [lexundria.com] Well, but implicature is cancellable, and if Brutus had already heard Favonius ("civil war is worse than illegal monarchy") Statilius comes out as rather polite, for he may mean: "A wise man as YOU SHOULD BE, BRUTUS, should not throw himself into turmoil and peril for the sake of feeble and foolish folk." Do we have Plutarch latin or Greek for this? After all Brutus was asking for philosophical advice from philosophers, and Statilius's utterance may have this 'embracing' effect: 'This is what a wise man does -- and I expect you wish to be counted as one, Brutus.' -- But the way Plutarch recounts the scene may differ, if he adds 'stage directions' as it were -- like the marked implicature that Statilius was OBVIOUSLY meaning Brutus and his band to be referred by these 'feeble and foolish folk' -- Latin, or Greek for that? Yes. On the text we actually have, your softer and more courteous reading is perfectly possible, and perhaps even preferable. The source is Plutarch, in the Life of Brutus. The crucial Greek scene is that Brutus, before openly recruiting, tested certain friends “by a roundabout philosophical discussion.” In that setting Favonius said civil war was worse than illegal monarchy, while Statilius said that it did not befit a wise and sensible man to throw himself into turmoil and peril for the sake of feeble and foolish folk. [loebclassics.com], [lexundria.com] The Greek, as preserved in the Loeb Classical Library, is enough to support that much. What matters for your question is that Plutarch does not, in the wording we have before us, add an explicit stage direction saying that Statilius was “obviously” referring to Brutus and his band as the weak and foolish people. That stronger sting is not stated by Plutarch; it is a possible uptake, not an explicit authorial gloss. [loebclassics.com], [lexundria.com] And that is exactly why your cancellability point is good. Because the line is reported in this indirect and philosophically framed way, the implicature can remain relatively open. One hearing is the harsh one: “your conspirators are feeble and foolish folk, and I will not risk myself for them.” Another hearing, as you suggest, is more embracing and almost advisory: “a wise and sensible man, such as you ought to be, should not throw himself into turmoil and peril for the sake of weak and foolish people.” On that reading the “feeble and foolish folk” are not primarily Brutus and the conspirators, but the Roman masses, the common political object, or the unworthy public for whom one is being asked to hazard oneself. [lexundria.com] That is not only possible; it suits the dramatic setting rather well. Brutus is consulting philosophers in philosophical form. A philosopher’s answer, to remain philosophically respectable, need not be a crude rebuff. It may instead cast the refusal as counsel of wisdom: do not sacrifice yourself for a public not worth the wise man’s peril. In that version Statilius is not calling Brutus a fool, but trying to keep him from behaving like one. [lexundria.com] Indeed, the very shape of Plutarch’s account encourages that. He says Brutus had earlier put such men to a “similar test” by discussing matters philosophically and at a distance. The whole point of that method is that direct commitment remains deniable while one’s ethical-political instincts are sounded out. So Statilius’s answer belongs to a field of prudent indirection, not to blunt direct speech. [loebclassics.com], [lexundria.com] If you want the Greek flavour, the important point is this: the source gives us Plutarch’s narrative report, not a polished lapidary maxim in direct quotation. The standard English rendering in Bernadotte Perrin is: it did not become a wise and sensible man to be thrown into turmoil and peril for the sake of feeble and foolish folk. That wording itself leaves open whether the “feeble and foolish folk” are the intended liberandi, the Roman populace, political men generally, or the proposed associates in action. Plutarch does not nail it down for us. [loebclassics.com], [lexundria.com] So I would put it this way. The harsher anti-conspiratorial implicature is available, but not forced. The more charitable and philosophically urbane reading is also available, and perhaps better fits the decorum of a philosophical test-question. Statilius may very well be saying to Brutus, sotto voce and under cover of generality: a wise man should not fling himself into danger for an unworthy public. That is not a liar-paradox. It is counsel with tact, and the tact is precisely what makes the saying quotable. [lexundria.com] If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can reconstruct the likely Greek sense more philologically, with attention to the moral force of “wise and sensible man” and “feeble and foolish folk.” Or I can give you a short Gricean note on how the same reported sentence sustains both the harsh and the courteous implicature without Plutarch deciding between them. [loebclassics.com]Statilio (a. u. c. DCCXII). Dicta. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statio – Ossia: Grice e Statio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATIO The gens Statia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the early decades of the Republic, but the name does not appear again in history until the time of Cicero. The Statii remained relatively undistinguished until the reign of Trajan, when Lucius Statius Aquila was raised to the consulship.[1]  Origin The nomen Statius is of Oscan origin, and most of the Statii appearing in history before the late Republic were from Samnium or Lucania. Statius is a patronymic surname, derived from the Oscan praenomen Statius, without any change in morphology.[1][2]  Praenomina The Statii used only the most common of praenomina: Lucius, Gaius, Marcus, Publius, Quintus, Titus, and Sextus, of which the first five were the most abundant at all periods of Roman history. Of these, the Statii used primarily Lucius, Gaius, and Marcus.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Titus Statius, tribune of the plebs in 475 BC, along with his colleague, Lucius Caedicius, brought Spurius Servilius Structus to trial for his conduct of the battle against the Veientes at the Janiculum as consul the previous year. Servilius spoke vigorously in his defense, and with the support of his colleague, Aulus Verginius Tricostus, he was acquitted.[3][4][5][6] Statius, one of the Samnite generals during the Social War, was afterward given Roman citizenship and admitted to the Roman Senate. Because of his wealth, he was proscribed by the triumvirs in 43 BC, though he was then eighty; after opening his doors and dispersing his fortune to all takers, he set his house alight, and perished; the fire then spread to adjacent parts of Rome. Some scholars identify him with Gaius Papius Mutilus, but others reject this identification.[7][8][9] Statius, a freedman of Quintus Tullius Cicero, whom his brother Marcus felt too self-important, and too free with his opinions.[10][11] Sextus Statius, a merchant recommended by Pompeius for a prefecture by Cicero when the latter was proconsul of Cilicia in 51 BC. Cicero declined to appoint Statius on principle, and anticipated Pompeius' dissatisfaction with his choice.[12][13] Statius Sebosus, a geographer whose work was cited by Pliny the Elder. He might be the same Sebosus mentioned by Cicero as a friend of Catulus.[14][15][16][17] Statia Q. f. Quinta, the wife of Gaius Papirius Masso, whose public career is recorded in an inscription dating between the death of Caesar and the Battle of Actium. He had been a military tribune, plebeian aedile, quaesitor judex, and curator frumenti.[18][19][20] Lucius Statius, a maker of amphorae, whose works made their way to Rome, Gaul, Spain, and Africa. He may be the same potter whose mark is found on the remains of some statuary from Pompeii.[21] Lucius Statius Ursulus, a native of Tolosa in Gallia Narbonensis, was a teacher of rhetoric in the time of Nero.[22][23] Statius Proxumus, a tribune in the Praetorian Guard during the reign of Nero, and one of those secretly plotting the emperor's murder in AD 65, was sent to arrest and slay Plautius Lateranus, the consul designate, whose role in the conspiracy had been discovered. To his credit, Lateranus went to his death without exposing his executioner's role in the affair. At some point, Statius' participation was discovered, but he was pardoned. Tacitus implies that he vainly put an end to his own life, or in some way met his end through his own foolishness.[24][25][26] Statius Domitius, or Domitius Statius, a tribune in the Praetorian Guard, who was removed from his position because he was suspected of being a participant in the Pisonian conspiracy.[27][28][29] Statius Murcus, or perhaps Staius Murcus, like Caesar's legate, was one of two soldiers sent by Otho in AD 69 to kill Galba's heir, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Licinianus.[30][31][32][33] Statius Sabinus, a friend of Pliny the Younger, and perhaps a relative, for both were among the heirs of a certain Sabina. Statius asked Pliny for advice concerning a slave named Modestus, whom Sabina apparently intended to order manumitted in her will, but on consulting with experts Pliny found that Sabina's intention had no legal effect. He nonetheless advised, and trusted that Statius would agree, that if they were worthy of Sabina's trust, then they should carry out her intention by freeing Modestus.[34][35][36] Lucius Statius Aquila, consul in AD 116, during the reign of Trajan.[37] Gaius Statius Capito Arrianus, one of the sons of senatorial families appointed to assist the Arval Brethren in AD 117. He was probably the same as Lucius Statius Capito, named in the same position for 118, and the brother of Gaius Statius Cerealis, who performed the same function in 120.[38][39][40] Gaius Statius Cerealis, one of the sons of senatorial families appointed to assist the Arval Brethren in AD 120. He was probably the brother of Gaius Statius Capito Arrianus, who performed the same function in 117.[41][42][43] Gaius Statius Capito, the owner of a brickworks in the time of Hadrian, might be the same person as Gaius Statius Capito Arrianus, or perhaps his father.[44][40] Statius Valens, said by Lampridius, one of the writers of the Historia Augusta, to have written a life of Trajan. He is not mentioned by any other source.[45][46][47] Lucius Statius Quadratus, consul in AD 142. He was proconsul of Asia about 155, and presided over the trial of Polycarp, the Bishop of Smyrna.[48][49][50][51][52] Publius Statius P. f. Paullus Postumius Junior, followed a distinguished career during the middle portion of the second century, serving as a military tribune in the Legio VII Gemina, quaestor in Africa, tribune of the plebs, praetor, and governor of Bithynia and Pontus and Hispania Baetica.[53][54][55] Marcus Statius M. f. Priscus Licinius Italicus, governor of Dacia, then consul in AD 159. He was subsequently governor of several other provinces, including Moesia Superior, Britannia, and Cappadocia. He successfully led the Roman forces against the Parthians, capturing Artaxata. After he warned Marcus Aurelius of the revolt of Avidius Cassius, Statius was appointed governor of Syria.[56][57][58][59] Statius Rufinus, who had undertaken the construction of a theatre at Gabii in Latium, was sentenced to three years' exile by the praefectus urbi, in during the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus.[60][61][62] Statia Agrippina, the wife of Modius Justus, the governor of Numidia in AD 171, should perhaps be read Statilia Agrippina.[63][64][65] Publius Statius Julianus Paelignianus, a man of senatorial rank, named in an inscription from Brixia in Venetia and Histria, dating to the late second or early third century.[66][67][68] Statius Longinus, a man of consular rank, was governor of Moesia Inferior under Macrinus. He is named on a number of coins from Nicopolis on the Ister. He might be the same as Marcus Statius Longinus.[69][70] Marcus Statius Longinus, a man of senatorial rank, named among the patrons of Canusium in AD 223. He might be the same person as the former consul who was governor of Moesia Superior under Macrinus.[71][72][73] Marcus Statius Longinus Junior, probably the son of Marcus Statius Longinus, was also listed among the senatorial patrons of Canusium in AD 223.[71][74][75] Marcus Statius Patruinus, listed among the senatorial patrons of Canusium in AD 223, was probably the brother or son of Marcus Statius Longinus.[71][76][77] Lucius Statius L. f. Prosper Julianus, a man of senatorial rank, was decemvir stlitibus judicandis, and patron of the colony at Praeneste in Latium, where he presented an offering to Jupiter Arcanus at some point in the third century.[78][79][80] Statius Julianus, an eques who served as curator rei publicae at Caesena in Cisalpine Gaul during the reigns of Probus or Carus.[81][82] Statius Rufinus, praefectus urbi of Rome from 13 April 308 to 30 October 309. Statius Tullianus, the author of several books on the meaning of words. His period when he lived is uncertain, but certainly no later than the first half of the fourth century.[83] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 901 ("Statia Gens").  Chase, pp. 136–138.  Livy, ii. 52.  Dionysius, ix. 28–33.  PW, "Statius", No. 4.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 28.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 25.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 901 ("Statius", No. 3).  PW, "Statius", No. 1.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, ii. 18, 19, vi. 2, xii. 5, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, i. 2, 3, Epistulae ad Familiares, xvi. 16.  PW, "Statius", No. 2.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, vi. 1.  PW, "Statius", No. 3.  Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis, vi. 29. s. 35, 31. s. 36, ix. 15. s. 17.  Solinus, 52.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, ii. 14, 15.  PW, "Statius", No. 28.  CIL VI, 1481.  PW, "Statius", No. 33.  PIR, S. 646.  PW, "Statius", No. 31.  Suetonius, De Claris Rhetoribus, p. 99 (ed. Reifferscheid).  PIR, S. 644.  Tacitus, Annales, xv. 50, 60, 71.  PW, "Statius", No. 20.  PIR, S. 639.  Tacitus, Annales, xv. 71.  PW, "Statius", No. 8.  PIR, S. 629.  Tacitus, Historiae, i. 43.  Plutarch, "The Life of Galba", 27.  PW, "Statius", No. 15.  PIR, S. 634.  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, iv. 10.  PW, "Statius", No. 27.  PIR, S. 642.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244.  CIL VI, 2076, CIL VI, 2078.  PW, "Statius", No. 6.  PIR, S. 627.  CIL VI, 2080.  PW, "Statius", No. 7.  PIR, S. 628.  PW, "Statius", No. 5.  Aelius Lampridius, "The Life of Severus Alexander", 48.  PW, "Statius", No. 30.  PIR, S. 643.  CIL XIV, 67.  PW, "Statius", No. 21.  PIR, S. 640.  Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand unter der Antonien, p. 214 ff., 323.  Syme, "The Proconsuls of Asia under Antoninus Pius", p. 280.  CIL V, 4129, CIL V, 4337, CIL V, 4359, CIL V, 8882.  PW, "Statius", No. 17.  PIR, S. 636.  Cassius Dio, lxxi. 2, 23.  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Antoninus Pius", 9, "The Life of Lucius Verus", 7.  PW, "Statius", No. 18.  PIR, S. 637.  Digesta, l. 12, 8.  PW, "Statius", No. 25.  PIR, S. 641.  CIL VIII, 2746.  PW, "Statius", No. 32.  PIR, S. 645.  CIL V, 4358.  PW, "Statius", No. 11.  PIR, S. 630.  PW, "Statius", No. 12.  PIR, S. 631.  CIL IX, 338.  PW, "Statius", No. 13.  PIR, S. 632.  PW, "Statius", No. 14.  PIR, S. 633.  PW, "Statius", No. 16.  PIR, S. 635.  CIL XIV, 2937.  PW, "Statius", No. 19.  PIR, S. 638.  CIL XI, 556.  PW, "Statius", No. 10.  PW, "Statius", No. 29. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Claris Rhetoribus (On the Eminent Orators). Lucius Cassius Dio (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Gaius Julius Solinus, De Mirabilis Mundi (On the Wonders of the World). Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Lives of the Emperors). Digesta, or Pandectae (The Digest). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Géza Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand unter der Antonien (The Consulate and Senatorial State under the Antonines), Rudolf Habelt, Bonn (1977). Ronald Syme, "The Proconsuls of Asia under Antoninus Pius", in Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, No. 51 (1983). Categories: StatiiRoman gentes and from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statio – Ossia: Grice e Statio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATIO For the Statii, I think the first choice is actually not the consul Lucius Statius Aquila, nor even the geographer Statius Sebosus, but Statius Sabinus, the correspondent of Pliny the Younger. The reason is that his surviving anecdote is almost a miniature exercise in Gricean pragmatics. The gens entry reports that Sabinus asked Pliny's advice concerning a slave, Modestus, whom the testatrix Sabina had apparently intended to free, although her expression of intent lacked legal force; Pliny advises carrying out the intention anyway. [GREXv3 | Word] This is pure Grice. Grice e Staio Sabino: De Voluntate et Significatione SABINA. Modestus liber esto. (May Modestus be free.) IVRISCONSULTVS. Non satis dixit. (She did not say it correctly.) PLINIVS. Intelleximus tamen quid voluerit. (We nevertheless understood what she intended.) GRICE. Inter quid dictum sit et quid significatum sit discrimen est. (There is a difference between what was said and what was meant.)  What fascinates me is that the legal question and the Gricean question diverge. The jurist asks:  Was the formula effective?  Pliny asks:  What was the intention?  The former concerns validity. The latter concerns meaning. Pliny's recommendation, as summarized in the gens entry, is effectively:  even if the legal speech act failed, the communicative intention succeeded. [GREXv3 | Word]  That could almost have come from a lecture on speaker's meaning. A Speranzian formula  The Statilii criticize words; the Statii interpret intentions. Statius Sabinus asked whether a dead woman's wish could be honored although it lacked legal force. Grice would note that the problem is perennial: a hearer may perfectly recover what a speaker meant even when the formal act misfires. The law asks whether the words worked; philosophy asks whether the intention was understood. [GREXv3 | Word]  And that is why, among the Statii, Sabinus seems to me the most Gricean figure of all.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statio – Ossia: Grice e Statio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATIO A close second: Statius Tullianus There is another very attractive candidate:  Statius Tullianus, author of books on the meanings of words. [GREXv3 | Word]  Had more survived, he might rival Statilius Maximus. A lexicographer is always potentially Gricean. But we know almost nothing beyond the title and subject matter. what are the sources for Tullianus? Thanks The frustrating answer is: the gens article is actually quite thin on Statius Tullianus. It gives only:  "Statius Tullianus, the author of several books on the meaning of words. His period when he lived is uncertain, but certainly no later than the first half of the fourth century." [GREXv3 | Word]  The article itself does not provide the title of the work, nor any quotation. What I suspect is happening is that Tullianus is known only through later lexical traditions, perhaps through citations in works such as Festus or related antiquarian lexica concerned with verborum significatio ("the meaning of words"). The search results I found concern the broader tradition of Verrius Flaccus' and Festus' De verborum significatione, but they do not explicitly connect Tullianus to those texts. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] So, at the moment, I can state only:  The gens article says Tullianus wrote books on the meaning of words. [GREXv3 | Word] The article does not identify the ancient source from which this information comes. [GREXv3 | Word] I have not found, from the materials currently available, the precise passage preserving his name.  On your larger point: I think the contrast between Statilius Maximus and Tullianus is illuminating.  Statilius Maximus attacks allegedly defective usages in Cicero. The defenders (Julianus/Romanus via Charisius) rescue Cicero partly by authority ("Cicero uses it repeatedly") and partly by analogy. Tullianus, from what little survives, looks more like a semantic antiquarian, concerned with what words mean rather than with prosecuting authors.  And I very much like your use/mention reading of the saepenumero dispute. Statilius treats 'saepenumero' as a singulare to be discussed; Julianus answers that Cicero uses saepenumero saepenumero. The defense simultaneously mentions the word and uses it, which gives the reply much of its wit. If you'd like, I can try to track down the exact Prosopographia Imperii Romani or Pauly–Wissowa entry behind "Statius Tullianus" and see whether it identifies the ancient source. does this help -- they two sources seem to focus on just one lexeme -- and it's nomen res thanks Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 6 siti Statius Tullianus was a minor Roman grammarian and lexicographer active no later than the first half of the fourth century AD. He is primarily known for a lost grammatical/etymological work titled De vocabulis rerum (On the Names of Things). Wikipedia +1 Because his work survives only in fragments, there are exactly two known ancient citations of his name and text preserved by later Classical commentators. Both the original Latin text and their English translations are detailed below. 1. Macrobius, Saturnalia (Book III, 8.6) In this passage, Macrobius references the first book of Tullianus' De vocabulis rerum to debate the Etruscan versus Latin etymology of the sacred word camillus (a ritual servant or attendant). L'Agenda des Médiévistes +1 Latin Source Text "Statius Tullianus de vocabulis rerum libro primo ait dixisse Callimachum apud Tuscos Camillum appellari Mercurium, quo vocabulo significant deorum praeministrum, ... Romani quoque pueros et puellas nobiles et investes camillos et Camillas appellabant, flaminicarum et flaminum praeministros." Istituto Nazionale di Studi Etruschi ed Italici English Translation "Statius Tullianus, in the first book of On the Names of Things, states that Callimachus said Mercury is called 'Camillus' among the Etruscans, a term by which they mean a servant of the gods... The Romans also used to call noble, pre-pubescent boys and girls camilli and camillae, the attendants of the Flamines and Flaminicae." 2. Servius Auctus / Scholia Danielis, In Aeneidem (Book XI, 543) The expanded Carolingian-era commentary on Virgil's Aeneid (commonly known as the Scholia Danielis or Servius Auctus) references Statius Tullianus regarding the naming of the mythical Volscian warrior Camilla. Latin Source Text "Statius Tullianus 'de vocabulis rerum' dicit, Tuscos 'camillum' dicere Mercurium... alii dicunt hanc Camillam non a matre Casmilla, sed quasi deae Dianae ministram a poeta nominatam: unde et Statius Tullianus ait..." English Translation "Statius Tullianus in On the Names of Things says that the Etruscans call Mercury 'camillus'... others say that this Camilla was not named after her mother Casmilla, but rather named by the poet as a servant of the goddess Diana: whence also Statius Tullianus states..." Fragmentary Context & Identification The Work: His single identified treatise, De vocabulis rerum, belonged to a long lineage of antiquarian and lexicographical works (such as those by Varro) designed to preserve archaic sacred vocabulary, names, and cultural origins. Distinction: In classical cataloging, it is crucial not to confuse him with his far more famous namesake, the imperial epic poet Publius Papinius Statius (author of the Thebaid and Silvae). Poetry In Translation +1 Scholarly Registry: He is officially recorded under the same biographical details in the Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (PLRE), Volume I. If you are tracking down fragments of lost Roman grammarians, would you like me to find the Teubner or fragments compilation text (such as Funaioli's Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta) where these specific quotes are officially indexed? Yes, this helps a great deal, and in fact it makes Statius Tullianus far more interesting than the gens article suggested. What the material identifies is not merely "books on the meaning of words," but a work called:  De vocabulis rerum ("On the Names of Things"). [GREXv3 | Word]  That title is philosophically delicious. Notice that it is not:  De rebus (On Things),  nor  De vocibus (On Words),  but  De vocabulis rerum,  which sits precisely at the interface between names and things. [GREXv3 | Word] A Gricean immediately hears echoes of:  word and object, meaning and reference, nomen and res.  Indeed, your slogan:  nomen / res  may be exactly the right way to approach Tullianus.  The two surviving citations According to the material you found, Tullianus is cited in only two surviving places:  Macrobius, Saturnalia 3.8.6. The expanded Servius commentary on Vergil (Servius Auctus), Aeneid 11.543. [GREXv3 | Word]  Remarkably, both citations concern essentially the same lexeme:  camillus. [GREXv3 | Word]  That is exactly the sort of antiquarian lexical problem Roman grammarians adored.  Why this is Gricean The question is not merely:  What does camillus mean?  but:  Why is this object or person called camillus?  That is already a question about naming. The fragments reportedly connect:  Etruscan usage, Mercury, ritual attendants, Vergil's Camilla. [GREXv3 | Word]  So Tullianus is tracing a chain:  word → usage → institution → cultural meaning.   A contrast with Statilius Maximus This is where the comparison becomes particularly interesting. Statilius Maximus asks:  Is this word-form legitimate?  Tullianus asks:  Why is this thing called by this word?  The first is grammatical criticism. The second is lexical-antiquarian semantics.  Grice's likely preference I suspect Grice would actually prefer Tullianus. For Grice, the crucial problem is rarely:  Is saepenumero correct?  The deeper problem is:  How does a speaker get from a word to a thing?  So a book called  De vocabulis rerum  sounds almost proto-philosophical. One can imagine: TVLLIANVS. Vocabulum quaero. (I seek the name.) GRICE. Rem quaeris per nomen. (You seek the thing through the name.)  And there is a final irony. Statilius Maximus hunts "singular" words in Cicero. Tullianus, from the evidence you found, seems to spend pages discussing a single word:  camillus. [GREXv3 | Word]  So both men are obsessed with lexical particulars. But Statilius prosecutes them. Tullianus investigates them. If I had to choose a Gricean hero among the two, I would now lean toward Statius Tullianus, because De vocabulis rerum sounds almost like a Roman ancestor of the question:  "What is the relation between a name and the thing it names?" [GREXv3 | Word] The use of 'vocabulum' seems metaphorical: cows have 'voices', too -- and the idea of 'Fido'-Fido theory of meaning (Ryle) haunts vocabulum -- res --. Assuming it need not be a nomen or a verbum -- what is the 'res' behind say, 'ad'? Thanks Yes, and I think this is exactly where a Gricean begins to get nervous about De vocabulis rerum. The title sounds innocent:  vocabulum → res  But that can easily slide into what Gilbert Ryle mocked as the Fido-Fido theory:  "Fido" means Fido, therefore every meaningful expression must stand to some thing as a name stands to its bearer.  The danger is that one starts looking for a res corresponding to every expression whatever. For:  camillus → a ritual attendant, Mercurius → a god, Roma → a city,  the game is easy enough. But what is the res behind:  ad ?  Or:  et si non quamquam ?  There is no obvious object standing there waiting to be named.  This is why I would hesitate to translate vocabulum too narrowly as "noun" or even "name." In antiquarian and grammatical Latin it can often mean something closer to:  expression, designation, term.  The title De vocabulis rerum therefore need not commit Tullianus to a naïve naming theory. Still, the temptation is there.  A Gricean reconstruction might be: TVLLIANVS. Quae res est huius vocabuli? (What thing corresponds to this expression?) GRICE. Depende. (It depends.) TVLLIANVS. Quid de "ad"? (What about "ad"?) GRICE. Nulla res particularis. (No particular thing.)  The interesting move is that for Grice, and indeed for much later philosophy of language, the meaning of:  ad  is not a thing but a contribution to the way an utterance is understood. Its role is functional rather than referential. Compare:  Caesar → refers to a person. equus → refers to a horse. ad → helps organize relations between what is referred to.  So the question:  "What is the res of ad?"  may be a category mistake. That is precisely the lesson learned after the collapse of the Fido-Fido picture.  And this brings us back to why camillus was such an attractive word for Tullianus. A word like camillus encourages antiquarian etymology because there really is an associated institution, role, and cultural object. A preposition like:  ad  resists that treatment. Its meaning appears not in an object but in its use. Which is why Grice would probably say that Tullianus' title is safest when read as:  De vocabulis rerum nominandarum  ("terms for naming things") rather than as a universal theory of meaning. Otherwise one quickly finds oneself asking:  What is the thing corresponding to and?   What is the thing corresponding to if?   What is the thing corresponding to ad?  And there lies the road from Roman antiquarianism to Ryle's parody of the Fido-Fido theory. Yes, vox translates, say, Aristotle's Peri herm. 'phone' -- so not just 'noun.' So 'ad' is a vox significativa -- and it may be co-related to res -- say, Cicero venit ad Rubicon. Thanks Exactly. And this is where the Roman grammatical tradition is subtler than the caricature of a simple nomen ↔ res theory. As you note, vox is the standard Latin rendering of Aristotle's φωνή in Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας (De Interpretatione). A vox significativa need not be a noun at all. It is simply a meaningful linguistic item. So:  Cicero = vox significativa equus = vox significativa ad = vox significativa  The difference is not whether they signify, but how they signify. Aristotle himself distinguishes names and verbs from syncategorematic expressions. The Latin tradition had to cope with the fact that not every meaningful word corresponds to an independently nameable thing. Your example is excellent:  Cicero venit ad Rubiconem.  What is the res corresponding to ad? A crude Fido-Fido theorist would be forced to look for some peculiar object "the ad." But a more sophisticated grammarian might say:  ad signifies a relation or orientation toward a thing.  The res is not an object alongside Cicero and the Rubicon. Rather, it is the directedness expressed in the whole phrase:  ad Rubiconem.  In medieval terms, one would later say that ad has a significatio, but not the same mode of signifying as a substantive noun. That is why De vocabulis rerum is such an intriguing title. If Tullianus was really interested in words like camillus, he could remain comfortably in the realm of lexemes denoting persons, offices, rites, and institutions. [GREXv3 | Word] But once one asks:  What is the res signified by ad?  one is no longer doing antiquarian lexicography. One has stumbled into philosophy of language. A Gricean version might run: TVLLIANVS. Quae res est "ad"? (What thing is "ad"?) GRICE. Nulla talis res est. (There is no such thing.) TVLLIANVS. Ergo quid significat? (Then what does it signify?) GRICE. Modum quo res inter se conectuntur. (The way in which things are connected.) That is very close to the transition from ancient lexicography to modern philosophy of meaning: moving from  "What thing does this word name?"  to  "What contribution does this word make to what is communicated?" Does this help? Thanks Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza  6 siti  Statius Tullianus was a minor Roman grammarian and lexicographer active no later than the first half of the fourth century AD. He is primarily known for a lost grammatical/etymological work titled De vocabulis rerum (On the Names of Things).   Wikipedia  +1 Because his work survives only in fragments, there are exactly two known ancient citations of his name and text preserved by later Classical commentators. Both the original Latin text and their English translations are detailed below.  1. Macrobius, Saturnalia (Book III, 8.6) In this passage, Macrobius references the first book of Tullianus' De vocabulis rerum to debate the Etruscan versus Latin etymology of the sacred word camillus (a ritual servant or attendant).   L'Agenda des Médiévistes  +1 Latin Source Text "Statius Tullianus de vocabulis rerum libro primo ait dixisse Callimachum apud Tuscos Camillum appellari Mercurium, quo vocabulo significant deorum praeministrum, ... Romani quoque pueros et puellas nobiles et investes camillos et Camillas appellabant, flaminicarum et flaminum praeministros."   Istituto Nazionale di Studi Etruschi ed Italici English Translation "Statius Tullianus, in the first book of On the Names of Things, states that Callimachus said Mercury is called 'Camillus' among the Etruscans, a term by which they mean a servant of the gods... The Romans also used to call noble, pre-pubescent boys and girls camilli and camillae, the attendants of the Flamines and Flaminicae." 2. Servius Auctus / Scholia Danielis, In Aeneidem (Book XI, 543) The expanded Carolingian-era commentary on Virgil's Aeneid (commonly known as the Scholia Danielis or Servius Auctus) references Statius Tullianus regarding the naming of the mythical Volscian warrior Camilla.  Latin Source Text "Statius Tullianus 'de vocabulis rerum' dicit, Tuscos 'camillum' dicere Mercurium... alii dicunt hanc Camillam non a matre Casmilla, sed quasi deae Dianae ministram a poeta nominatam: unde et Statius Tullianus ait..." English Translation "Statius Tullianus in On the Names of Things says that the Etruscans call Mercury 'camillus'... others say that this Camilla was not named after her mother Casmilla, but rather named by the poet as a servant of the goddess Diana: whence also Statius Tullianus states..." Fragmentary Context & Identification The Work: His single identified treatise, De vocabulis rerum, belonged to a long lineage of antiquarian and lexicographical works (such as those by Varro) designed to preserve archaic sacred vocabulary, names, and cultural origins.  Distinction: In classical cataloging, it is crucial not to confuse him with his far more famous namesake, the imperial epic poet Publius Papinius Statius (author of the Thebaid and Silvae).   Poetry In Translation  +1 Scholarly Registry: He is officially recorded under the same biographical details in the Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (PLRE), Volume I.  If you are tracking down fragments of lost Roman grammarians, would you like me to find the Teubner or fragments compilation text (such as Funaioli's Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta) where these specific quotes are officially indexed? Copilot said: Copilot Yes, it helps, and it confirms that Statius Tullianus is much more specific than the gens article made him appear.  What emerges from the fragments is that his work was apparently called:  De vocabulis rerum ("On the Names/Terms of Things") attalus  and that the two surviving citations both revolve around a single word:  camillus. attalus  The first fragment, preserved by Macrobius, explicitly reads:  Statius Tullianus de vocabulis rerum libro primo ait dixisse Callimachum apud Tuscos Camillum appellari Mercurium... attalus  The second, in the expanded Servian commentary, likewise begins:  Statius Tullianus de vocabulis rerum dicit, Tuscos camillum dicere Mercurium... attalus  That is important philosophically.  Tullianus is not compiling a dictionary in the modern sense. He seems to be asking:  Why is this thing called by this particular word?  In other words, the focus is not merely on the vox, but on the relation:  vocabulum ↔ res. attalus  Now your Gricean objection is exactly the right one.  A title like De vocabulis rerum can seduce one into a crude naming theory:  every meaningful expression corresponds to a thing.  But the moment one asks:  What is the res for ad?  the theory begins to creak.  For camillus, the "thing" may be:  a cult-attendant, Mercury under an Etruscan designation, the ritual role associated with camilli. attalus But for:  ad  there is no obvious object.  Yet ad is still a meaningful vox significativa, as in Aristotle's account of language.  So Grice would probably distinguish:  Expression                             Candidate res Camillus                    ritual attendant Mercurius    deity Cicero                    person ad                        not a thing, but a relation or mode of connection Thus:  Cicero venit ad Rubiconem.  The word ad contributes perfectly well to meaning, even though there is no independent object called "the ad."  That is why Grice would say that Tullianus' title is most illuminating when taken as an antiquarian investigation of how terms attach to institutions, offices, and cultural realities, rather than as a universal theory that every meaningful word names a thing.  And, interestingly, the surviving fragments themselves support that reading: both are obsessed not with abstract grammar but with a culturally loaded term, camillus, and the institution behind it. attalus

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statio – Ossia: Grice e Statio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATIO A third candidate: Statius Sebosus The geographer Statius Sebosus, cited by Pliny the Elder, also has appeal. [GREXv3 | Word] Geography constantly raises questions of testimony:  How do we know what lies beyond direct experience?  A Grice favorite. But again the evidence is scant.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statio – Ossia: Grice e Statio -- GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATIO Why not the conspirators? You might think of:  Statius Proxumus, Statius Domitius, the elderly Samnite senator who burned himself rather than submit to the proscriptions. [GREXv3 | Word]  Historically they are dramatic. Philosophically, however, they tell us less about language and communication.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statinio – Ossia: Grice e Statinio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATINIO The gens Statinia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned by ancient writers, but several are known from inscriptions, several of which are from Aquileia in Venetia and Histria.  Origin The nomen Statinius belongs to a class of gentilicia derived from other names ending in -inus, using the gentile-forming suffix -inius.[1] In this case, the nomen is probably derived from the Oscan praenomen Statius, and is cognate with the nomina Statius and Statilius.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Publius Statinius, named in a second-century plaster inscription from Curia Raetorum in Raetia.[3] Sextus Statinius Aplinis, buried at Rider in Dalmatia, aged eighty, in a tomb dating from the first century, or the first half of the second.[4] Marcus Statinius Dorus, made an offering to Luna and Mars on behalf of Fruticia Thymele, who made a reciprocal offering to the Magna Mater and Ceres, recorded in two inscriptions from Aquileia in Venetia and Histria, dating to the last quarter of the first century, or the first quarter of the third.[5] Statinia M. l. Phaenusa, a freedwoman buried at Aquileia during the second century, or the latter half of the first.[6] Statinia Phoebe, buried at Poetovio in Pannonia Superior, with a monument from her husband, Gaius Caecina Florus, dating from the first half of the second century.[7] Statinia Prima, buried in a third-century sepulchre at Rome, aged twenty years, six months, and nineteen days, with a monument from her husband, the freedman Marcus Aurelius Primus.[8] Statinia Strategis, buried in a first-century tomb at Aquileia, with a monument from her son, Gaius Plenius Strato, one of the Seviri Augustales.[9] Statinia Thymele, dedicated a second-century tomb at Aquileia for her husband, the freedman Lucius Acestius Saturninus, one of the Seviri Augustales.[10] See also List of Roman gentes References  Chase, pp. 125, 126.  Chase, pp. 136, 137.  AE 2001, 1556.  CIL III, 2790.  CIL V, 794, CIL V, 796.  Inscriptiones Aquileiae, ii. 2490.  AIJ, 405.  AE 1982, 110.  CIL V, 1007.  CIL V, 965. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Viktor Hoffiller and Balduin Saria, Antike Inschriften aus Jugoslawien (Ancient Inscriptions from Yugoslavia, abbreviated AIJ), vol. 1: Noricum und Pannonia Superior, Zagreb (1938). Giovanni Battista Brusin, Inscriptiones Aquileiae (Inscriptions of Aquileia), Udine (1991–1993). Category: Roman gentes And for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statinio – Ossia: Grice e Statinio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATINIO For the tiny gens Statinia, I think the most Gricean candidate is neither the obscure Publius Statinius nor the long-lived Sextus Statinius Aplinis, but the pair:  Marcus Statinius Dorus and Fruticia Thymele,  because the entry explicitly records reciprocal dedications between them at Aquileia. Dorus made an offering to Luna and Mars on behalf of Thymele, while Thymele made a reciprocal offering to Magna Mater and Ceres. [GREXv3 | Word] That word "reciprocal" is the key. Grice e Statinio Doro: De Reciprocitate DORVS. Pro te dono. (I make an offering on your behalf.) THYMELE. Et ego pro te. (And I for you.) INTERROGATOR. Cur? (Why?) GRICE. Quia communicatio saepe mutua est. (Because communication is often mutual.)     An utterance invites a response.  The interesting thing is that these inscriptions are not merely isolated acts. They form a pair. One act seems to call forth another. [GREXv3 | Word] That is almost conversational in structure:              SpeechReply"For you""And for you" A Gricean might see here the social analogue of the Cooperative Principle: meaning emerges not from a solitary performance but from an exchange. Why not the others? Most of the remaining Statinii are known only from a single funerary notice or dedication. The reciprocal offerings at Aquileia are unusual because they exhibit a kind of dialogue preserved in stone. [GREXv3 | Word] Dry Speranzian formula  The Statilii argue about words; the Statinii answer one another. Marcus Statinius Dorus and Fruticia Thymele exchanged reciprocal offerings at Aquileia. Grice would observe that communication is rarely a one-sided affair. The significance of an act often lies in the response it elicits. [GREXv3 | Word]  And there is a final Gricean touch: unlike Statilius Maximus' criticism of saepenumero, here we are not dealing with a word answered by another word, but an act answered by another act. In Austinian language, one might almost say that the second dedication is the uptake of the first.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statinio – Ossia: Grice e Statinio – GREX griceiana – verbalia: STATINIO A second possibility The other attractive figure is Statinia Thymele, who dedicated a tomb for her husband Lucius Acestius Saturninus. [GREXv3 | Word] That would yield our familiar theme:  the dead no longer speak; the inscription speaks for them.  But we have encountered that motif many times.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statorio – Ossia: Grice e Statorio – Grex griceiana – verbalia – Statorio -- The gens Statoria was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the time of the Second Punic War. None of them ever attained any of the higher offices of the Roman state.[1]  Origin The nomen Statorius is derived from Stator, an epithet of Jupiter and Mars. Chase classifies it among those gentilicia that either originated at Rome, or cannot be shown to have come from anywhere else.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Quintus Statorius,[i] a centurion serving under the proconsuls Publius and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio in Spain in 213 BC, during the Second Punic War. Statorius was dispatched as an envoy to the Numidian king Syphax, whose soldiers he trained in Roman tactics. On a subsequent occasion, he accompanied Gaius Laelius on an embassy to Syphax, but as Statorius was known to the Numidians, Laelius pretended he was a slave, caning him to maintain the disguise.[3][4][5][6] Gaius Statorius C. f., a native of Brundisium in Calabria, who was one of the first emissaries sent to Delphi after the liberation of Aetolia in 191 BC.[7] Gaius Statorius C. f. Rufus, named in an inscription from Amiternum in Sabinum.[8] Statorius Victor, a native of Corduba in Hispania Baetica, was an orator mentioned by Seneca the Elder, his fellow townsman.[9][10][11][12] Statoria M. f. Marcella, buried at Rome between AD 92 and 106, was the wife of Gaius Minicius Fundanus, consul in 107. Their daughter, Minicia Marcella, was buried in an adjacent tomb, aged twelve years, eleven months, and seven days.[13][14] See also List of Roman gentes Notes  Called Lucius by Frontinus. References  PW, "Statorius".  Chase, p. 131.  Livy, xxviii. 48, xxx. 28.  Frontinus, Strategemata, i. 1. § 3.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 903 ("Statorius").  PW, "Statorius", No. 3.  PW, "Statorius", No. 1.  CIL IX, 4486.  Seneca the Elder, Suasoriae, 2.  PIR, S. 647.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 903 ("Statorius Victor").  PW, "Statorius", No. 4.  CIL VI, 16631, CIL VI, 16632.  PIR, S. 648. Bibliography Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Elder), Suasoriae (Rhetorical Exercises). Sextus Julius Frontinus, Strategemata (Stratagems). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Category: Roman gentes And for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statorio – Ossia: Grice e Statorio – Grex griceiana – verbalia – Statorio – For the Statorii, the obvious Gricean hero is surely Quintus Statorius, the centurion whom the Scipios sent to the Numidian king Syphax. According to the tradition, Statorius not only served as envoy and military instructor, but on a later embassy Gaius Laelius disguised him as a slave because the Numidians already knew him. To maintain the deception, Laelius publicly beat him with a cane. [GREXv3 | Word] This is a gift to a philosopher of communication. Grice e Statorio: De Simulatione LAELIVS. Servus est. (He is a slave.) NUMIDAE. Videtur servus. (He appears to be a slave.) STATORIVS. Legatus sum. (I am an envoy.) GRICE. Aliud est quid sis, aliud quid significes. (It is one thing what you are, another what you signify.)  The entire episode turns on a distinction Grice would love:  the difference between identity and evidence.  Statorius is not a slave. Yet all the publicly available evidence is arranged so that observers infer:  "slave."  The caning is especially interesting. It is not merely punishment. It is a communicative act intended to generate an inference. [GREXv3 | Word] In modern Gricean language, Laelius manufactures a context in which the audience naturally concludes:  "No Roman envoy would be treated like that."  Hence:  "This man must really be a servant."  The success of the embassy depends on the hearers drawing precisely the wrong conclusion. Why not Statius Sabinus? Because that was the previous gens. Here the beauty lies in deliberate deception rather than interpretation of intentions.  Dry Speranzian formula  The Statilii argue about words; the Statorii exploit appearances. Quintus Statorius was disguised as a slave on a diplomatic mission, and his companion reinforced the disguise by beating him in public. Grice would observe that communication depends not only on what is said, but on what evidence an audience is given. Successful deception is often successful inference. [GREXv3 | Word]  And there is a final irony. Statorius was originally sent to teach the Numidians Roman military methods. Later he succeeded by teaching them something false. The instructor became a lesson in misdirection. [GREXv3 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Statorio – Ossia: Grice e Statorio – Grex griceiana – verbalia – Statorio – A second candidate One might choose Statorius Victor, the orator from Corduba mentioned by Seneca the Elder. [GREXv3 | Word] An orator is always tempting for Grice. But we know too little about him.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stefani – Ossia: Grice e Stefani: la ragione conversazionale del “senso composto” – semantica filosofica – la scuola di Pergola. Note su De sensu composito et diviso. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Paolo Godi Stefani (Pergola, Pesaro e Urbino, Marche): la ragione conversazionale del “senso composto” – semantica filosofica. A comparison between Grice and Paolo Godi Stefani reveals a deep structural affinity between medieval semantic theory and modern pragmatics, despite their very different vocabularies and aims. Stefani’s sustained analysis of sensus simplex, compositus, divisus, and depositus belongs to a tradition in which meaning is treated as something systematically constructed by the intellect through grammatical, logical, and dialectical operations; sense is not merely given but articulated through formal relations such as supposition, composition, and division. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning reappears at a different level of abstraction but with a comparable ambition: to show how what is meant emerges from structured rational operations that go beyond surface expressions. Where Stefani uses diagrams and figures to model how propositional sense is built and decomposed within philosophical grammar, Grice uses inferential principles—cooperation, rational expectation, and implicature—to explain how speakers construct complex meanings from simpler utterances in conversation. Both reject the idea that meaning resides wholly in isolated words or sentences; for Stefani, sense depends on logical articulation within a proposition, while for Grice it depends on the rational reconstruction of intentions within a communicative exchange. The difference lies in orientation rather than substance: Stefani formalizes sense within a scholastic semantic architecture, whereas Grice relocates that same constructive rationality into the dynamics of everyday speech. In this way, Grice’s conversational pragmatics can be seen as a modern, dialogical re‑deployment of the very concerns that animated Stefani’s medieval semantics of the sensus compositus. Grice: “I may well say that my idea of a propositional complex owes much to Stefani’s obsession with ‘sensus’ simplex or ‘divisus, and ‘sensus compositum’ –“ “The opposite of ‘com-posito’ is de-posito, though!” Grice: “I like his diagrammes; The Boedlian has loads of his mss!” Grice: “He has a figure for the ‘figura quadrata,’ Grice: “He has a figure for ‘suppositio.’” È il più famoso esponente di una famiglia marchigiana di insegnanti – Lepori -- e nacque a Pergola, nelle Marche.  Il cognome è incerto. Secondo Segarizzi il riferimento al fratello Alvise quale figlio di Antonio de Stefani da la Pergola, in un documento, ne indicherebbe l’appartenenza alla famiglia Stefani, ma il raffronto con altri documenti induce invece a credere che «de Stefani» si riferisca al nome del nonno -- Nardi. La scarsezza di notizie biografiche su S., molto ammirato, da origine anche all’ipotesi che gli attribuiva il cognome di un altro Paolo dalla Pergola, il Godi -- Segarizzi. Errata risulta quindi la congettura di Cicogna, che attribuisce a Godi l’influenza di S. sul vetraio muranese Angelo Barovier, suo discepolo, a proposito della tecnica di coloritura del vetro -- Mariacher.  Avviato forse alla carriera ecclesiastica nella nativa Pergola, si trasferì ben presto a Venezia, dove se non il padre Antonio, certamente il nonno Stefano, medico e figlio di maestro Giovanni – Piana --, dov avere dimorato stabilmente, insieme agli altri due figli -- Luchino, «rector scholarum» a S. Giovanni Nuovo, e Pietro, che pure ci è noto come «magister». Con lo stesso titolo di «magister» è ricordato anche il fratello di Paolo, Alvise, che insegn in diverse scuole veneziane -- Lepori.  S. assunse l’insegnamento di filosofia alla Scuola di Rialto e ne tenne ininterrottamente la cattedra.  senso semplice, senso composito, senso deposito, senso diviso, dialetttica, grammatica filosofica, semantica filosofica, loquenza. G: S. You have brought Pergola into Oxford again. S: You asked for it, sir. Besides, it keeps you humble. G: Nothing keeps me humble. Recite the Gellius line. S: Hor! the one you like. G: The one that does not translate itself by repeating the same English word. S: Hor? sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. G: Better: give it with its frame. S: Horum versuum sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. G: Good. Now. What is he doing with sensus. S: He is not talking about eyesight. G: Thank you. He is saying: this is what these verses come to, and here is how they are put together. Sensus and ordo. S: Which is already a hint to Pergola, sir. Ordo becomes “scope,” as the moderns would say. G: Yes. And Pergola says sensus compositus, sensus divisus. S: Which I hate. G: You hate it because it sounds like sense-perception with a scholastic moustache. S: It sounds like someone took a word that meant “feeling” and forced it to do logic. G: Latin is not so squeamish. Now. Give me your protest in one sentence. S: Why didn’t Stefani just say “scope indicating device” and be done with it. G: Because he lived before your devices existed, and because he is writing for people who thought sensus was the dignified way to speak about “what the utterance amounts to.” S: But why sensus at all, sir, if you say what matters is what you mean, not what words mean. G: Good. Now we are at the lesson. Pergola’s sensus is not the word’s meaning floating free. It is the reading a competent interpreter assigns to an utterance when deciding what the speaker could reasonably be taken to be saying. S: That is you smuggling “speaker” into Pergola. G: I am not smuggling; I am expanding. Medieval logicians often treat “sensus” as “what is to be understood.” They sometimes talk as if the proposition has it. But the practical work is: which construal is the right construal for what the author is doing. S: Like Gellius: horum versuum sensus, I think, is. G: Exactly. He is performing an author-centred reconstruction. He is not worshipping the string. Now, your other dislike: compositus and divisus. S: It sounds like carpentry. G: It is logical carpentry. One can build a proposition so that the operator governs the whole, or so that it governs the term-by-term distribution. Two readings, one utterance. S: And he calls those readings sensus. G: Yes. Which is why I like your Gellius quote. It gives you a pre-scholastic, non-technical way to hear sensus as “intended import.” S: Then you want me to accept that sensus compositus is shorthand for “the reading on which the operator has wide scope.” G: Precisely. S: And sensus divisus is the other scope. G: The reading on which the operator is distributed over the subject or term, yes. S: But why not just call them readings. G: Because “reading” is your English convenience. Pergola’s Latin convenience is sensus. He is already in the business of interpretation. S: Yet you keep telling me your business is what the utterer means. G: And I keep telling you that utterer’s meaning requires public criteria for recovery. Pergola is supplying a formal method for deciding which propositional content is at stake when grammar underdetermines scope. S: So his “sensus” is a tool for recovering what the utterer meant at the level of logical form. G: Yes. Not at the level of irony or implicature, but at the level of “what proposition are we even evaluating.” S: Then he is upstream of you. G: Upstream in one respect. He is handling structural ambiguity. I handle it too, but I also want to explain how, after you settle the structure, you still routinely mean more than the settled structure explicitly states. S: And you warn against multiplying senses. G: I warn against multiplying lexical senses. Pergola is not multiplying lexemes. He is distinguishing two construals of one utterance under two scope assignments. S: So he is not guilty of polysemy. G: He is guilty only of terminology. S: Then why do you let him keep the term sensus. G: Because it tells you something about the tradition’s self-understanding. They thought of scope ambiguity as a kind of “sense-ambiguity” in the discourse sense of sensus, not in the eyeball sense. S: So we should not translate sensus by “sense.” G: Exactly. We should translate it, in metalanguage, as “import” or “interpretation” or “what it comes to.” S: Horum versuum sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. G: Yes. There the ordo already hints that the “what it comes to” depends on arrangement. That is Pergola’s whole obsession: composition and division change what the proposition comes to. S: And his dates, sir. G: Early fifteenth century. Call it around 1420 in our fiction, because you like round numbers. S: And he’s in Venice. G: In Venice, teaching at Rialto, drawing his diagrams, writing as if the world could be tamed by figures. S: And you like his diagrams. G: I like anything that forces an interpreter to be explicit about what they are taking the speaker to be doing. That is the moral common ground between us. S: But then you suddenly become the philosopher of perception. G: Because “sensus” keeps wanting to slide back into perception. And that is the punchline: the same Latin word that names bodily sensation also names “the point of the passage.” S: And that bothers you. G: It should bother you. It is a reminder that understanding is not disembodied. You hear a sentence. You see a line. You recover its import. The body is the channel, the mind is the organiser. S: So Pergola’s sensus has a ghost of sentio in it. G: Perhaps. But in logic it is domesticated: sensus is what you take the utterance to come to, once you have sorted the structure. S: And you, sir, want what I take you to mean. G: Exactly. Now, let us stage the contrast. S: You will ask me: is sensus compositus the “sentence meaning.” G: And you will answer no. It is a candidate reading of the utterance, a candidate propositional content. S: And then you will ask: where is the utterer. G: And you will answer: the utterer is in the choice of one reading over the other, and in the context that makes one reading reasonable and the other perverse. S: And then you will add implicature. G: And you will groan. S: I will, sir. G: Because you want logic to stop after it has cleaned the surface. S: I want it to stop before it begins calling itself sensus. G: Too late. Latin has done that already. S: Then the Gellius quote is our alibi. It shows a respectable author using sensus as “what this comes to.” G: Exactly. And because he pairs it with ordo, he also shows that the “what it comes to” is tied to arrangement, not to naked words. S: So we can rescue Pergola from the charge of confusing perception with scope. G: Yes. And we can rescue you from the charge of thinking “scope” is a modern invention. S: And the conclusion. G: The conclusion is simple. Pergola’s sensus compositus/divisus is a discipline of construing an utterance so that its propositional import is determinate. My distinction between utterer’s meaning and sentence meaning is a discipline of not mistaking the public vehicle for the private act. The two disciplines meet at one point: both insist that interpretation is not automatic, but a rational reconstruction constrained by publicly shareable norms. S: And your punchline, sir. G: My punchline is that if Pergola had written “scope indicating device,” nobody in Venice would have understood him, and if I write “sensus,” nobody in Oxford will forgive me.Grice: Caro Stefani, ogni volta che mi immergo nei tuoi diagrammi, mi sento come se stessi visitando la mostra delle "figure quadrate" a Oxford! Ma dimmi, il “senso composto” si mangia con forchetta o cucchiaio? Perché a Vadum Boum, il mio tutee Strawson sarebbe capace di decomporlo pure in una zuppa!  Stefani: Ah, Grice, se Strawson ha davvero scomposto il “senso composto”, allora spero almeno che abbia lasciato qualche briciola di “suppositio” per il dessert! Ma tu, con la tua implicatura raffinata, mi insegni che anche la semantica filosofica può essere digerita con gusto.  Grice: Beh, Stefani, tra un “sensus simplex” e un “compositum”, ho dovuto più di una volta decomporre tutto per i barbari di Vadum Boum… Strawson in primis! E ogni volta mi chiedo: sarà “de-posito” o solo una pausa per prendere fiato? In fondo, il vero senso è sempre quello che si nasconde tra le righe… e tra le risate!  Stefani: Decomporre! Implicatura più bella non c’è, Grice! Se anche la grammatica filosofica si divide, almeno ci resta la loquenza per ricomporre tutto… magari davanti a una tavola marchigiana. E ricordati: ogni senso, anche diviso, trova la sua unità quando si conversa con un amico! Stefani, Paolo Godi (1420). De sensu composito et diviso. Venezia.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stefanini – Ossia: Grice e Stefanini: la ragione conversazionale dell’inter-personalismo contro l’idealismo filosofico – filosofia fascista – veintennio fascista. Note su La filosofia dell’esperienza. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Luigi Stefanini (Treviso, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale dell’inter-personalismo contro l’idealismo filosofico. A comparison between Grice and Luigi Stefanini brings into focus two different but intersecting ways of grounding meaning in reason while resisting solipsistic or overly abstract accounts of thought. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as an inherently normative, interpersonal enterprise: meaning arises not from isolated mental contents but from rational expectations shared between speakers engaged in a cooperative practice, where intentions are inferred and adjusted in light of the other. Stefanini’s inter‑personalismo, developed in explicit opposition to both idealism and the dominant philosophies of the Fascist period, likewise rejects the self‑enclosed subject, insisting that being itself is personal and that whatever is not immediately personal functions as a medium of manifestation and communication between persons. Where Grice analyzes, in a technical and often minimalist way, the conversational mechanisms that allow one person to mean something to another—implicature, reciprocity of reason, mutual recognition—Stefanini supplies a metaphysical and ethical backdrop in which interpersonal relation is ontologically primary. Grice is wary of Italian personalism insofar as it risks collapsing interpersonal rationality into an exaltation of the person as a substantive entity, preferring instead an account of interpersonalism without personalist metaphysics, grounded in public norms of reasoning. Yet Stefanini’s insistence that truth, value, and action unfold only within the io–tu relation anticipates Grice’s conviction that meaning cannot be reduced to inner representation or abstract ideal structures. The contrast is thus one of level and emphasis: Stefanini frames conversational reason within a philosophy of being‑as‑personal and other‑oriented, while Grice offers a formal, pragmatically neutral account of how rational agents, as agents among others, actually succeed in meaning things to one another through conversation. – filosofia fascista – veintennio fascista –Grice: “La ragione conversazionale dell’inter-personalismo contro l’idealismo filosofico – filosofia fascista – veintennio fascista. Italians are obsessed with personalismo; I am with interpersonalismo!” Keywords: inter-personalismo, io e l’altro, l’altro da me, altro da se, alterita, other-love, self-love. “L’essere è personale.” “Tutto ciò che non è personale nell’essere ri-entra nella produttività della persona, come mezzo di manifestazione della persona e di *comunicazione* o conversazione *tra* due persone,” “La mia prospettiva filosofica. Nacque secondo-genito di quattro fratelli. Il padre Giovanni gestiva una tintoria, la madre, Lucia De Mori, è diplomata maestra ma si dedica interamente alla famiglia.  S’impegna nell’associazionismo cattolico: fonda il circolo San Liberale, nucleo del movimento cattolico trevigiano dopo lo scioglimento dell’Opera dei congressi. È nominato presidente della federazione diocesana e fonda il mensile Il foglio per promuovere la cultura religiosa e trattare temi politico-sociali, con particolare attenzione al nascente sindacalismo cattolico. La pubblicazione è sospesa, quando S., in attrito con il vescovo di Treviso Longhin, si dimise da presidente della federazione. Conseguita la maturità presso il liceo classico Canova -- ove ha come docente di filosofia Rotta, futuro professore all’Università cattolica di Milano --, si iscrive al corso di laurea in filosofia a Padova, partecipando alle iniziative del circolo universitario cattolico Zanella. Si laurea con una tesi sull’Action di Blondel, avendo come relatore Aliotta, che aveva appena iniziato il suo breve periodo padovano, e inizia a insegnare. Richiamato alle armi, è ferito da una scheggia di granata sul Sass de Stria e conclude il servizio militare con il grado di capitano. inter-personalismo, io e l’altro, l’altro da me, altro da se, alterita, other-love, self-love. Grice: Stefanini, ti confesso che il Sass de Stria mi ricorda i miei giorni contro il Hun e compagnia bella! Se solo avessero discusso di filosofia anziché lanciare granate, avremmo potuto fondare il circolo “Personalisti del fronte”. Grice: D’altronde, la mia “Personal identity” (come dicono gli inglesi) mi perseguita; però, se devo seguire il tuo esempio, caro Luigi, forse dovrei correggere e parlare di “Identità interpersonali”, all’italiana! Stefanini: Implicatura interpersonale se mai ce n’è una, Grice! Qui da Treviso è tutta una questione di io, tu e l’altro da sé… perfino le tintorie dialogano tra loro, altro che idealismo solitario! Stefanini: Se l’essere è personale, allora la vera conversazione filosofica è quella che passa il testimone da una persona all’altra: altro che “personal identity”, qui si lavora in squadra. Vieni a Treviso, ti mostro come si conversa tra filosofi… e tra tintori! Without preamble or ps supply a 100-move conversation between G. and S. as they prepare to engage in a joint seminar on the philosophy of action, as they discuss Stefani 'azione' and how it correpnds to what G. and T. have as 'act,' 'actum' 'acting' -- as they discuss the particular circumstances that led Stefani to chose that topic back in 1914, and the consequences -- but emphasis on conceptual intricacies. you can use passage below as basis. G.: We ought to begin by deciding whether we mean to talk about action, an act, the actum, or acting. S.: Which is already four seminars, and not one. G.: Quite. But Thomson will want the distinctions clean before he lets us darken them again. S.: And Stefanini gives us azione, which appears simpler until one notices that Italian philosophy can make a single noun do the work of an entire English gerundive household. G.: Exactly. Azione is hospitable in a way English is suspiciously not. It can mean deed, act, acting, conduct, operation, practical initiative, and almost the whole metaphysical dignity of a person in motion. S.: Whereas in English, once you say act, you have already half-invited trouble. G.: More than half. “An act” sounds completed, individuated, countable. “Acting” sounds processual. “Action” floats ominously above them both, as if it were the philosophical umbrella beneath which each may sue for shelter. S.: And actum? G.: Ah yes. The scholastic ghost that one ought not to invoke before lunch. Actum is useful precisely because it sounds as if someone has already done the deed and left us only the corpse. S.: So we should ask what Stefanini wanted by choosing azione in 1914. G.: Yes. The year matters. One cannot write on action in 1914 and pretend one is merely polishing vocabulary in a monastery. S.: Because 1914 is already pressure, mobilisation, Catholic activism, Blondel, modern crisis, and then very quickly war. G.: Exactly. And the thesis on Blondel’s Action is not innocent of that whole atmosphere. It is a title about philosophy, but also about practical life, decision, will, and the insufficiency of purely spectator theories of thought. S.: Then Stefanini begins from Action because Blondel had already made “action” into a site of rebellion against static intellectualism. G.: Quite. Blondel says, in effect, that willing outruns what reflective thought can stabilise, and that the life of action reveals demands that theory alone cannot satisfy. S.: Which sounds dangerous to idealists and suspiciously attractive to Catholics. G.: Very good. Dangerous to idealists because action refuses to be a mere shadow of contemplation, attractive to Catholics because it lets one talk about transcendence through lived insufficiency rather than through scholastic deduction alone. S.: And Stefanini, still young, under Aliotta, chooses to engage that. G.: Or is chosen by the problem as much as he chooses it. The personal and institutional setting matters. Padua, Aliotta, Blondel, Catholic associationism, and then the increasingly unavoidable fact that Europe is moving from words to shells. S.: Which gives azione an urgency that “agency” in English rather lacks. G.: Agency is a bureaucrat’s action. Azione has blood in it. S.: You say that because English philosophy overdomesticates the topic. G.: Often. We ask whether a man raised his arm intentionally. Stefanini’s world asks what it is to live as a person whose being unfolds only through action and relation. S.: Then when he says azione, the word already leans toward personhood. G.: Precisely. And that is where I begin to become both sympathetic and cautious. S.: Because of personalism. G.: Because of personalism, yes. The moment Italians say persona, one fears that a perfectly good interpersonal structure will be burdened with too much metaphysical upholstery. S.: Yet Stefanini’s action is not merely the person preening in motion. G.: No. To be fair, his whole inter-personalismo is meant to resist the self-enclosed subject. Action is not a monadic emanation. It is an opening toward the other. S.: Then perhaps azione in Stefanini corresponds less to “an act” than to the enacted interval between I and thou. G.: Very good. That is exactly the better line. S.: Whereas Thomson and you, in an Oxford joint seminar, are likelier to begin with the question what makes a bodily movement count as an action. G.: Yes. We are apt to ask when behaviour becomes something done, under what descriptions, with what intention, and with what relation to reasons. S.: So your action is analytically decomposed, while his azione is existentially thick. G.: Nicely put. We dissect; he inhabits. S.: Though you would protest that reasons too are lived. G.: Naturally. I should protest that the analytic distinctions are not anti-vital. One cannot understand action by declaring it thick and then refusing to say where the thickness lies. S.: Then let us say what lies in azione. Will, decision, relation, manifestation of the person, and perhaps a certain refusal of contemplation as sovereign. G.: Yes. Add also the Blondelian sense that action reveals deficits in merely discursive adequacy. One wills more than one can account for; one acts under pressures that theory later tries, usually too late, to recapture. S.: That begins to sound almost like your later point that meaning outruns saying. G.: There is a structural affinity, yes. Just as what is meant may exceed what is said, what is enacted may exceed what is first reflectively grasped. S.: So we might say in the seminar that Stefanini’s azione is to conduct what your implicature is to utterance. G.: Dangerous, but tempting. One must not make every Italian into a pragmatist in disguise. S.: Still, the parallel is there. G.: Yes. In both cases the overt vehicle does not exhaust the rational content at work. Action, like utterance, is underdescribed by its surface event. S.: Then Thomson will ask what the surface event is. G.: He always does. He wants the bodily movement, the occasion, the circumstances, the descriptions under which it falls, and the conditions under which one description rather than another is relevant. S.: While Stefanini would ask whether those descriptions have forgotten the person. G.: Exactly. And there the seminar becomes interesting. S.: Then how should we stage it? G.: I begin with the Oxford puzzle. Suppose a man raises his arm. Is that an act? Only if done under a description, with intention, in a context where reasons attach. S.: And I reply with Stefanini: the arm is only the visible ripple of a deeper azione in which the person manifests himself toward a world and an other. G.: Good. Then Thomson says we must not smuggle metaphysics in before distinguishing arm-raising from signalling, swearing an oath, hailing a cab, or striking a child. S.: And Stefanini would say that those descriptions are not merely linguistic conveniences but practical determinations of the person’s being-in-relation. G.: Excellent. That would bring the room alive. S.: Especially if Hare looks worried. G.: Hare always looks worried when ontology starts dressing as moral phenomenology. S.: And you? G.: I look polite and begin separating what is useful from what is upholstered. S.: Very Oxford. G.: Entirely. Now, we must also mention 1914 more explicitly. Stefanini’s title is not a tranquil postscript. It is written on the edge of mobilisation, though the actual wound on Sass de Stria comes later. S.: But the war retrospectively stains the topic. G.: Yes. Once one knows that he will be called to arms, wounded by shrapnel, and leave the front a captain, one cannot read azione as a merely classroom noun. S.: So action acquires literal battlefield credibility. G.: Or danger. One must avoid making him sound as if war vindicated the thesis. But the biographical pressure matters. The philosophy of action is not being written in a century that can still pretend that action means only ethical initiative in the abstract. S.: Then the consequences of choosing action as a thesis subject are double. It ties him to Blondel and personalism, but also to an era in which action is no longer conceptually innocent. G.: Exactly. Thought after 1914 cannot speak of action as though action were a clean counterword to speculation. It now means mobilisation, sacrifice, command, obedience, damage, and the body under force. S.: Which perhaps explains why later personalism needs communication and relation, not just willing. G.: Very good. If action were left merely voluntarist, it would become too available to darker politics. S.: Such as those of the ventennio. G.: Precisely. Stefanini’s interpersonalism later resists that by insisting that being itself is personal and that what is non-personal enters as medium of manifestation and communication between persons. S.: So action is not command from a solitary ego, but relational disclosure. G.: That is the charitable Stefaninian line, yes. S.: And the Gricean line? G.: That rational agency is already interpersonal at the level of reasons. One acts not in splendid solitude but under descriptions, norms, expectations, and recognitions that are often public. S.: So you do not need metaphysical personalism to get interpersonal action. G.: Exactly. That is one of the points worth making. I do not deny the importance of the other; I only deny that one must inflate the person into a metaphysical absolute to secure it. S.: Then perhaps the seminar should contrast interpersonalismo with personalismo. G.: Yes. With the warning that the former is a structural necessity for reason, whereas the latter is often an ontological temptation. S.: That sounds like a sentence Thomson will underline. G.: He will underline it only if he thinks he can later divide it. S.: Which he can. G.: Unfortunately, yes. S.: Let us go back to the English. If Stefanini says azione, what do we say? Action or act? G.: Both, depending on what we are after. If we want the thick philosophical noun, action. If we want the individuated item, an act. If we want the process or mode, acting. If we want scholastic completion, actum. S.: Then azione corresponds most naturally to action, but with more existential charge. G.: Precisely. “Action” in English is often too abstractly nominal or too cleanly analytic. Azione in that milieu still carries the practical weight of living deed and personal initiative. S.: Could one render it as praxis? G.: Only if one wishes to invite a different party and perhaps never get rid of them. Praxis is too historically marked in another way. S.: Fair. So action it is. But then what of actum? G.: Actum may be useful when distinguishing the done from the doing. There is a difference between the action as occurring and the act as accomplished under some completed description. S.: So if Stefanini emphasises azione, he may be privileging the living performance over the finished deed. G.: Yes. That is quite plausible. The deed deadened into record is already too late for the philosophical pressure he wants. Blondel’s action is always larger than any single completed item. S.: Which means the actum is almost a betrayal of azione. G.: A useful betrayal, but still a betrayal. S.: Then Thomson will insist that we need betrayals of that sort if we are ever to know what to say about responsibility. G.: Quite. Without individuated acts, law, blame, praise, and description collapse into vaporous existential weather. S.: And Stefanini would reply that responsibility itself belongs to the personal relation, not first to legal atomism. G.: Very good. That is the seminar in embryo. S.: Then how much of Blondel do we need? G.: Enough to show that Action is not merely a topic but a method. Blondel does not simply say action exists; he uses action to expose the insufficiency of detached intellectualism. S.: Which would have appealed to a young Catholic in Padua. G.: Enormously. Especially one active in associations, already wary of merely academic idealism, and formed amid practical religious culture. S.: Yet later he resists fascist idealism too. G.: Yes, which is another consequence worth noting. The early concern with action does not end in sheer activism. It gets rerouted through the person and the interpersonal relation. S.: So action becomes medium, not idol. G.: Precisely. That is the best way to save him from the century. S.: And you would add that in ordinary conversation action and meaning are interlaced anyway. G.: Yes. Much of what we do conversationally is action by saying, showing, implying, declining, consenting, refusing, warning, inviting, all under public norms of intelligibility. S.: So a philosophy of action that ignores communicative action is incomplete. G.: Very much so. If Stefanini helps us see that action is relational and manifestative, then he comes nearer to my own concerns than the idealists ever did. S.: But you still refuse “being is personal.” G.: I refuse it as unnecessary metaphysical inflation. I am happy to say that many central forms of reason, agency, and meaning are interpersonal without thereby making being itself a personal substance. S.: That distinction should probably come early in the seminar. G.: Yes. Before anyone mistakes sympathy for surrender. S.: Should we mention his father’s tintoria? G.: Only if tactfully. It is tempting to say that manifestation, medium, and communication between persons sound unusually apt in the household of a dyer. S.: You are too pleased with that. G.: I am never pleased beyond reason. S.: That is false on the face of it. G.: Good. Keep some spirit for the room. Now, Aliotta. Do we bring him in? S.: We must, at least as supervisor and context. He had just begun his brief Paduan period, and the thesis was written under that eye. G.: Yes. Which means Stefanini’s Action is not only Blondelian but also filtered through local academic politics. S.: So once again, a thesis-title is never just a thought-title. G.: Exactly. It is an institutional object as well. We should say that outright. S.: And the war? G.: Mention it not as a romantic vindication, but as the historical sharpening of what “action” would soon come to cost. S.: So the line might be: in 1914, action could still be chosen as a philosophical problem; within a few years it would become an unavoidable biographical and collective ordeal. G.: Very good. That is almost too good for a joint seminar. S.: You may spoil it in delivery. G.: I probably shall. Now, let us rehearse the central conceptual distinction once more. Action as event, act as countable item, acting as process, actum as the done. S.: And azione spanning all four while leaning toward the lived and relational. G.: Exactly. That will be our first board sketch. S.: Then the second will be personalismo versus interpersonalismo. G.: Yes. With a dotted line from Stefanini’s ontological personalism to my more modest pragmatics of persons among others. S.: And Thomson? G.: Thomson will ask for examples and distinctions, which is his proper office. S.: Arm-raising, promising, warning, refusing, marching, praying? G.: Good. Add perhaps saluting and obeying, because 1914 and after make those examples less innocent than one would like. S.: That will darken the room. G.: Philosophy of action ought to darken the room occasionally. S.: And then lighten it with distinctions. G.: Precisely. Otherwise one has only atmosphere. S.: You really do distrust atmosphere. G.: Only when it starts calling itself depth. S.: Then our closing move should be what? G.: That Stefanini’s azione reminds us that action cannot be reduced to bare movement, because it is always already tied to person, meaning, and relation; but that analytic philosophy reminds Stefanini that relation without act-description risks becoming devotional weather. S.: That is severe. G.: It is meant to be balanced. Each side saves the other from a characteristic vice. S.: Stefanini saves you from bloodlessness. G.: And Thomson and I save him from sacral fog. S.: Perfect. G.: Nothing is ever perfect. S.: Joint-seminar perfect, then. G.: That is a lower and perhaps safer standard. S.: One last thing. Do we call the seminar “Action and the Person” or “Azione and Act”? G.: “Azione and Act” is better. It announces the friction immediately. S.: And the subtitle? G.: “On Stefanini, Blondel, and the English Habit of Dividing What the Italians Prefer to Live.” S.: That is very nearly rude. G.: Then it is a proper beginning. S.: Dry enough? G.: Sufficiently Paduan, with one shell-burst in reserve.Stefanini, Luigi (1914). L’azione: saggio critico sulla filosofia di M. Blondel. sotto Aliotta. Padova.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stefanoni – Ossia: Grice e Stefanoni: Marconimania -- implicatura e ragione: there St. John mingles with his friendly bowl, the feast of reason, an the life of soul -- filosofia italiana – P. G. R. I. C. E. – philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Note su La scienza della ragione. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Luigi Stefanoni (Milano, Lombardia): Marconimania -- implicatura e ragione: there St. John mingles with his friendly bowl, the feast of reason, an the life of soul -- A comparison between Grice and Luigi Stefanoni shows a convergence on reason as the organizing principle of meaning, even though they operate in different philosophical registers and political contexts. Stefanoni’s La scienza della ragione treats language, concepts, and even dictionary entries as answerable to rational scrutiny, rejecting lexical authority when it obscures intellectual clarity; his early rationalism, shaped by Mazzini and later radicalized through secular and anti‑religious currents in post‑Unification Milan, frames reason as a public, educative force circulating through communication and culture. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning can be read as a restrained but technically precise heir to this impulse: where Stefanoni attacks dictionaries in the name of reason, Grice famously “gives a hoot” about them when they misrepresent how meaning actually works in use. Both locate rationality not in static definitions but in active practices—Stefanoni in philosophical lexicography and civic discourse, Grice in conversational exchange governed by intentions, categories, and ends. Stefanoni’s enthusiasm for modern media and communication—what one might anachronistically call a Marconimania of reason—anticipates Grice’s view that meaning is something transmitted, inferred, and negotiated rather than simply encoded. The key difference is methodological: Stefanoni advances a programmatic rationalism aimed at reforming culture and language from without, while Grice builds a micro‑theory of interpersonal reasoning from within ordinary conversation. Yet in both, reason is not solitary or introspective but social, animated by exchange, and most fully realized in the shared “feast of reason” that conversation makes possible. -- filosofia italiana – P. G. R. I. C. E. – philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Grice: “I love S.. I regard him as the frist Italian philosophical lexicographer! Marsoli quotes Ranzoli in passing. And Ranzoli disparages S.. But I prefer Stefanoni to Ranzoli. Ranzoli tends to lean towards the pompous, whereas only in S. you would find things like: ‘this word should be extracted from all dictionaries!”  Nasce da Alessandro e da Maria Colombo. È rapito fin dalla fede di MAZZINI  e parte volontario al seguito di GARIBALDI  nella campagna. Subito dopo l’unificazione comincia a collaborare con il periodico repubblicano L’Unità italiana, ma ben presto i rapporti con MAZZINI  si complicano a causa dell’attrazione di S. per le correnti razionaliste e anti-religiose che in quegli anni cominciano a lambire le file dell’area democratica. Al pensiero del filosofo razionalista Franchi fa infatti riferimento la opera importante di S., intitolata La scienza della ragione e pubblicata con un certo clamore a Milano. L’autore vi fa aperta professione di a-teismo, delineando i contorni di una pur vaga e semplicistica filosofia materialistica.  Se però S. riconosce in Franchi il proprio maestro in filosofia, in politica il punto di riferimento rimane Mazzini, come risultava evidente dal saggio Mazzini. Note storiche -- Milano. Un segno di continuità nel solco di MAZZINI  è anche Le due repubbliche e il due dicembre -- Milano --, nonché l’attenzione verso la questione polacca, testimoniata dall’opuscolo su Nullo, pubblicato a pochi mesi di distanza dall’uccisione del patriota democratico per mano dei russi -- Nullo martire in Polonia. Notizie storiche, Milano.  Il dissidio con Mazzini si aggrava quando S. si impegna in prima persona nella fondazione a Milano di una Società di liberi pensatori. L’iniziativa, tenacemente avversata dal maestro, provoca la rottura fra i due. Grice’s hoot and the dictionary.  Grice: Stefanoni, permettimi di inaugurare la nostra conversazione con un verso che adoro: “There St. John mingles with his friendly bowl, the feast of reason, and the flow of soul.” Una citazione che non manca mai di portare un sorriso nei circoli filosofici… e magari qualche brindisi! Grice: Ma, sai, in fondo il vero “friendly bowl” non sarà mica la nostra implicatura filosofica? Forse il festino della ragione è proprio quando ci scambiamo idee tra un bicchiere e l’altro, lasciando che la conversazione fluisca più libera della logica formale. Stefanoni: Caro Grice, se il “friendly bowl” è davvero la nostra implicatura, allora la filosofia italiana dovrebbe servire piatti e ragioni in porzioni doppie! E chissà, forse persino Mazzini avrebbe voluto unirsi alla tavolata. Stefanoni: Bellissima implicatura, Grice! Credo che nel tuo “feast of reason” ci sia più anima che in tutti i dizionari filosofici messi insieme… e se qualcuno osa estrarre qualche parola, che almeno sia per aggiungere un po’ di sapore alla conversazione! So apparenty Stefanoni as per passage below -- wrote Gli spagnoli in Italia" as metonymic so please provide 100-move conversation between G. and S. as they analyse fictional fragments from the novel, especially the dialogical parts -- so for every dyad between one move in SPANISH and answer by the Italian as to what that does mean and the Spaniard doing his best to make himself understood, have G. ask S. to traspose the metonymy and then provide a dyad between an AUSTRIAN asking an Italian some command in German, and hte Italian again wondering what that does mean, and the German struggling with making himself understood -- provide as many dyads as you need to complete the 100 moves -- thank you -- no preamble or ps -- thank you G.: Let us begin with the title itself, Gli spagnoli in Italia. Metonymy before plot. S.: Yes. “The Spaniards” are not merely persons from Spain. They are domination, command, accent, mishearing, military presence, administrative pressure, and the whole theatre of a foreign power trying to make itself understood where it is not loved. G.: Good. So the national label stands for a regime of interaction. S.: Exactly. A metonymy of power disguised as ethnography. G.: Then every little dialogue in such a book is already political. S.: Necessarily. Even when it seems comic. G.: Especially then. Let us fabricate a small fragment. A Spaniard says, “Anda, mujer, trae vino.” What does that mean, beyond the obvious imperative? S.: It means, first, “Bring wine,” and second, “I assume my words travel farther than your dignity.” G.: Good. The Italian woman answers, “Che vuol dire, andate? Vuol che me ne vada?” What is she doing? S.: She literalises the phonetic confusion and converts his command into a question about motion. She means, “Your language has not yet earned obedience here.” G.: Is that implicature particularised? S.: Entirely. Without the social scene, it is only a misunderstanding. G.: And his next move? He tries: “No, no, vino, bere, capisci?” What does that do? S.: He descends from command to pantomime. He means, “I am reduced to the level of shared bodily necessities.” G.: Good. Now transpose the metonymy. Give me an Austrian in Lombardy. S.: Very well. The Austrian says, “Komm, bring Wasser, schnell.” The Italian replies, “Come? Vuol che venga io, o che venga l’acqua?” He means, “Your empire arrives, but your syntax does not.” G.: Excellent. And the Austrian’s struggle? S.: “Nein, nein, acqua, subito, presto.” Which means not merely “water at once,” but “authority survives translation only by becoming ridiculous.” G.: Splendid. Another Spanish dyad. A soldier says, “Silencio, por el rey.” What is implied? S.: That silence is owed not to the room but to sovereignty. The king enters as warrant for muting others. G.: The Italian answer? S.: “Per il re? E il re sa che volete il silenzio qui?” She means, “Distance weakens authority when named too explicitly.” G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. The wit depends on local irreverence. G.: The Spaniard tries again. S.: “El rey manda en todo.” He means, “Do not separate me from the larger machine.” The Italian replies, “Allora mandi lui, ché voi non bastate.” She means, “Metonymy may be answerable by a better one.” G.: Very good. Now the Austrian version. S.: The officer says, “Ruhe, im Namen des Kaisers.” The Italian says, “In nome suo o nel vostro?” He means, “Names travel more easily than legitimacy.” G.: And the German repair? S.: “Der Kaiser, capite, il Kaiser, comando.” The struggle means, “Power hopes that repetition can substitute for intelligibility.” G.: Good. Another Spanish fragment. A friar or official says, “Es costumbre.” What does that mean? S.: Literally, “It is the custom.” Implicaturally, “Do not inspect the thing too closely.” G.: And the Italian reply? S.: “Di chi? Vostra o nostra?” which means, “Custom is local until empire says otherwise.” G.: Is that generalized or particularized? S.: The appeal to custom often carries a generalized implication of closure. But the retort is particularised by conquest. G.: Good. Then his attempt to explain? S.: “En España se hace así.” He means, “Elsewhere has become superior.” The Italian answers, “Siamo in Italia, non altrove.” She means, “Geography is the first resistance to metonymy.” G.: Very nice. Austrian analogue. S.: “So macht man in Wien.” The Italian says, “Ma il riso qui non viene da Vienna.” He means, “Local life does not wait for imperial grammar.” G.: Better and better. Now let us intensify the linguistic confusion. A Spaniard says, “Mañana pagarás.” The Italian hears “mangiare” in the first syllable. What happens? S.: The Italian replies, “Mangiare sì, pagare poi si vede.” He means, “If your language slips, I shall improve the economics of the exchange.” G.: Excellent. The Spaniard? S.: “No, mañana, domani.” Which means, “Temporal control requires lexical repair.” G.: And the deeper metonymy? S.: Empire must always translate itself into tomorrow. G.: Lovely. Now the Austrian. S.: “Morgen zahlst du.” The Italian hears only the tone of future coercion and says, “Domani è una bella parola per chi ha già preso oggi.” He means, “The occupier loves futurity because he has spent the present.” G.: That is almost too good. S.: Stefanoni permits some flourish. G.: We must not flatter him excessively. Now consider a Spanish gentleman attempting politeness. “Señora, si no es molestia...” What is he doing? S.: He veils command in civility. The implicature is, “Since I have said if it is no trouble, you must treat the trouble as unreal.” G.: Italian reply? S.: “La molestia c’è; la cortesia è vedere se la meritate.” She means, “Politeness is not acquittal.” G.: Particularised? S.: Strongly. The entire force lies in the social imbalance. G.: Austrian version. S.: “Gnädige Frau, wenn es erlaubt ist...” The Italian says, “Permesso non è comprensione.” He means, “Courtesy does not naturalise foreign rule.” G.: Good. Now a Spaniard asks directions. “¿Dónde está la plaza?” Purely practical, it seems. S.: Nothing is purely practical under occupation. G.: Exactly. The Italian answer? S.: “Quale? Qui le piazze cambiano nome secondo chi passa.” She means, “Space itself is politically unstable.” G.: The Spaniard clarifies. S.: “La plaza mayor, la principal.” He means, “I seek the organising centre.” The Italian answers, “Principale per voi, forse.” She means, “Centres are perspectival.” G.: Excellent. Austrian transposition. S.: “Wo ist der Hauptplatz?” The Italian says, “Dipende da chi conta.” He means, “Topography has become jurisdiction.” G.: Good. Another. A Spaniard says, “Habla claro.” What does that implicate? S.: That prior speech has been unsatisfactory and that clarity will now be defined by him. G.: Italian response? S.: “Chiaro per voi o per me?” He means, “There is no neutral plainness under unequal power.” G.: Generalized tendency? S.: Yes. “Speak clearly” often implies blame for prior opacity. But here the metalinguistic asymmetry makes it particularised. G.: Austrian version. S.: “Sprich deutlich.” The Italian replies, “Si capisce sempre meglio nella propria lingua.” He means, “Clarity is local before it is universal.” G.: Good. Let us fabricate a scene of tax collection. Spaniard: “Paga por orden.” What is the implicature? S.: That order itself legitimates extraction. G.: Italian answer? S.: “Ordine vostro, disordine nostro.” He means, “Administration is metonymy from the collector’s side.” G.: And the Spaniard’s repair? S.: “La ley es la ley.” Which means, “I have reached the point at which tautology replaces persuasion.” G.: Excellent. Austrian transposition? S.: “Zahlen, es ist Gesetz.” The Italian says, “La legge arriva sempre con stivali stranieri?” He means, “Law here wears boots before reasons.” G.: Very good. Now a more domestic scene. Spaniard in a kitchen: “Pan.” He wants bread. S.: The Italian answers, “Pane c’è; lingua no.” He means, “Material supply exceeds mutual understanding.” G.: And the Spaniard elaborates? S.: “Sí, pane, pan, dame.” Which means, “Empire survives by pidgin.” G.: Austrian analogue. S.: “Brot.” The Italian says, “Brutto? No, il pane è buono.” He means, “Phonetic misunderstanding is the commoner’s revenge.” G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. It is wit made out of accidental sound, sharpened by political circumstance. G.: Another Spanish dyad, but now with military order. “A la derecha.” What happens? S.: The Italian, feigning confusion, asks, “Alla diritta di chi?” He means, “Even direction requires a sovereign point of view.” G.: The Spaniard? S.: “Derecha, destra, así.” He gestures. Which means, “Command finally trusts the body when language fails.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Rechts!” The Italian says, “A destra vostra o destra nostra?” He means, “Orientation itself is occupied.” G.: Splendid. Now let us ask what sort of implicatures dominate these scenes. S.: Mostly particularised conversational implicatures, though some are loaded by politeness or by the social script of domination. G.: Any conventional implicature? S.: Hardly any in your strict sense. The force does not come from stable particles so much as from local negotiation. G.: Any presupposition worth saving? S.: Only the dull ones. Commands presuppose some uptake relation; titles presuppose rank; but the fun is in the implicatures. G.: Good. Another fragment. Spaniard: “Por favor.” Is that enough to civilise a command? S.: Never. The Italian says, “Il favore vien dopo il perché.” He means, “A please without explanation remains conquest in gloves.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Bitte.” The Italian replies, “Prima il senso, poi la grazia.” He means, “Politeness does not precede understanding.” G.: Excellent. Now a Spanish officer tries to reassure. “No tengas miedo.” What is implied? S.: That fear is already present, perhaps deservedly. G.: Generalized? S.: Yes. Reassurance often implicates the existence of the very state it denies. G.: Italian answer? S.: “La paura viene da chi la nomina troppo presto.” He means, “Your comfort arrives carrying its own indictment.” G.: Austrian transposition. S.: “Keine Angst.” The Italian says, “Chi la porta, l’angoscia, se non chi entra armato?” He means, “The vocabulary of calm is suspect in a uniform.” G.: Good. Another. Spaniard seeking obedience from a child: “Buen muchacho.” What does that do? S.: It rewards submission in advance. The implicature is, “Be as I have already labelled you.” G.: Italian reply by the child’s mother? S.: “Buono è chi ascolta la madre, non il primo straniero.” She means, “Moral categories remain domestically owned.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Braver Junge.” The mother says, “Bravo per casa, non per caserma.” He means, “The household redraws the adjective.” G.: Very good. Now a scene of confession or clerical exchange. Spaniard says, “Dios lo quiere.” What is implicated? S.: That argument is now to be closed by transcendence. G.: Italian answer? S.: “Dio vuole molte cose; qui però parlate voi.” He means, “Do not recruit heaven to do the work of your tongue.” G.: Austrian equivalent? S.: Perhaps not theological but imperial: “So will es der Kaiser.” The Italian replies, “L’imperatore vuole in tedesco; noi soffriamo in italiano.” He means, “The sentence already contains the asymmetry.” G.: Excellent. Now let us consider whether Stefanoni’s metonymic title licenses a broad transposition to Austrians. S.: It does, because “Gli spagnoli” names a historical occupying type rather than a mere passport. G.: Good. So “the Spaniard” is a mobile figure of foreign command, misheard civility, and embarrassed coercion. S.: Exactly. Which is why the Austrian dyads are not treason to the title but commentary on its principle. G.: Very nice. Another Spanish fragment. “Entiendes?” What is the implicature? S.: That failure of understanding, if it occurs, will be placed on the hearer. G.: Generalized? S.: Fairly. “Do you understand?” often carries blame in advance. G.: Italian answer? S.: “Capire sì; obbedire è altra grammatica.” He means, “Comprehension and consent are different verbs.” G.: Austrian transposition? S.: “Verstehst du?” The Italian says, “Intendere non è inchinarsi.” He means exactly the same, but with more spinal dignity. G.: Splendid. Now a Spaniard attempts a gift. “Toma, para ti.” What is implied? S.: That benevolence may purchase the translation that force could not secure. G.: Italian reply? S.: “Il dono parla più chiaro del comando, ma non cambia lingua.” He means, “Material generosity does not naturalise dominion.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Nimm, für dich.” The Italian says, “La mano capisce; il cuore fa i conti.” He means, “Gratitude is not annexation.” G.: Very good. Now a scene of romantic or gallant misfire. Spaniard says, “Hermosa.” What happens? S.: The Italian woman asks, “Hermosa o rumorosa?” She means, “You will not master me by imported adjectives.” G.: The Spaniard? S.: “Bella, bella.” Which means, “When empire flirts, it quickly becomes dictionary work.” G.: Austrian transposition? S.: “Schön.” The woman says, “Suona duro per voler essere dolce.” He means, “Language itself betrays the courtship.” G.: Excellent. Now let us ask: are these mostly failures of semantics or successes of pragmatics? S.: Successes of pragmatics under failing semantics. The misunderstanding becomes productive. G.: Good. Another. Spaniard at market: “Cuánto?” The Italian seller replies, “Quanto per voi o quanto per noi?” What is implicated? S.: That prices are political under occupation. G.: The Spaniard’s repair? S.: “Precio, costo, dinero.” Which means, “Commerce is the emergency language of empire.” G.: Austrian analogue? S.: “Wie viel?” The seller says, “Dipende da che uniforme porta la domanda.” He means, “The price rises with the boot.” G.: Very good. Now a Spaniard says, “Amigo.” What is that doing? S.: It tries to erase hierarchy by lexical warmth. The implicature is, “Let us pretend this relation is voluntary.” G.: Italian answer? S.: “Amico si diventa, non si comanda.” He means, “Friendship resists administrative issuance.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Freund.” The Italian says, “Gli amici arrivano a piedi, non in colonna.” He means, “Marching formation spoils intimacy.” G.: Excellent. Any conventional implicature there? S.: No. The warmth is lexical, but the political sting is entirely contextual. G.: Good. Another. Spaniard says, “Es por tu bien.” Generalized? S.: Deeply. “It is for your good” almost always implies paternal authority and suppressed dissent. G.: Italian reply? S.: “Il mio bene lo riconosco quando non mi viene imposto.” He means, “Benevolence is least credible when compulsory.” G.: Austrian transposition? S.: “Zu deinem Besten.” The Italian says, “Il bene con accento straniero costa doppio.” He means, “Benefaction and burden travel together.” G.: Splendid. Now a Spanish official says, “Todos hacen así.” What is the implicature? S.: That conformity has already been achieved, so resistance becomes eccentricity. G.: Italian answer? S.: “Tutti chi? Voi contate presto.” He means, “Occupiers numerate too quickly.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Alle machen so.” The Italian says, “Tutti è una parola grande in una bocca forestiera.” He means, “Universality spoken by strangers sounds like inventory.” G.: That is very good. Now, are any of these not conversational implicatures but rather politeness-based or authority-based non-conventional implications? S.: Certainly. The imported honorifics, the deferential formulas, the “please” and “good fellow” and “friend” cases often rely as much on social ritual as on cooperative maxims. G.: Good. So not everything interesting is strictly my own preserve. S.: A sentence your disciples should embroider on cushions. G.: They would get the stitching wrong. Another dyad. Spaniard: “Rápido.” Italian answer? S.: “Presto, ma per chi aspetta o per chi ordina?” He means, “Speed serves different masters.” G.: Austrian? S.: “Schnell.” Italian: “La fretta arriva sempre con gli ordini.” He means, “Urgency has uniform.” G.: Good. Now let us end with a larger question. What is Stefanoni’s title implying by saying Gli spagnoli in Italia instead of, say, Occupation in Lombardy? S.: That foreign rule is best shown not in constitutional prose but in the friction of mouths, accents, orders, repairs, domestic wit, and small mistranslations. G.: So the metonymy is justified by dialogue. S.: Entirely. The empire enters by dyad. G.: Very good. Then one last transposition. Spaniard says, “Aquí mando yo.” Italian answer? S.: “Qui, forse; ma il qui passa.” He means, “Local command is temporally thinner than it sounds.” G.: Austrian version? S.: “Hier befehle ich.” Italian: “Il qui di oggi domani è un altro qui.” He means, “Occupation always mistakes present location for permanent grammar.” G.: Excellent. And the final lesson? S.: That misunderstanding under domination is never merely comic; it is the smallest theatre in which power, wit, compliance, and resistance rehearse each other. G.: Dry enough? S.: Sufficiently Milanese, with foreign boots on the floor.Stefanoni, Luigi (1859). Gli spagnoli in Italia.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Steio – Ossia: Grice e Steio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Steio -- The gens Steia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned by ancient writers, but several are known from inscriptions, and at least some of them were of senatorial rank. A large number of the Steii settled in the provinces of Africa and Numidia.[1]  Origin The nomen Steius resembles names belonging to a large class of gentilicia formed using the suffix -eius, which was typical of Oscan gentes.[2] However, because the nomen is so short, this resemblance may be superficial, with ei belonging to the root, rather than being part of a gentile-forming suffix. Besides the African colonials, all of the known Steii lived at or in the immediate vicinity of Rome, in Latium, suggesting that the family might be of Latin origin.  Praenomina The Steii known from inscriptions used only the most common praenomina, including Lucius, Gaius, Marcus, and Publius, with no obvious preference.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Lucius Steius, a military tribune in the Legio IX Hispana, was appointed one of the legates for taking the census under Trajan. He was subsequently proconsul of an uncertain province.[3][4] Lucius Steius Aemilianus, a Roman senator, and the wife of Annia Alexandria, according to a third-century inscription from Rome.[5][6][7] Publius Steius Capianus, buried at Thugga in Africa Proconsularis, aged seventy-five.[8] Steia Chreste, named in a funerary inscription from Rome.[9] Steius Cilio, a soldier mentioned in an inscription from Castellum Dimmidi in Numidia.[10] Steia Decumina, a girl buried at Rome, aged ten years, three months, and six days, with a monument from her father, Steius Valerianus.[11] Steia Donatula, buried in a second- or third-century tomb at Ammaedara in Africa Proconsularis, aged fifty, with a monument from her husband, Titus Lartius Quintulus.[12][13] Gaius Steius F[...], buried at Masculula in Africa Proconsularis, aged fifty-five years, three days.[14] Marcus Steius Faustus, buried at Masculula, aged twenty, along with his mother, Minucia Prima, aged forty-five.[15] Publius Steius Felix, the former master of Steia Fortunata, at some point in the first or second century.[16] Steia Fortunata, the house-slave of Publius Steius Felix, became the wife of Sextus Gavius, to whom she was married for twenty-one years, and the mother of Sextus Gavius Scantianus, who along with his father dedicated a monument at Portus in Latium in his mother's memory, dating to the second century, or the latter half of the first.[16] Lucius Steius Lucanus, buried at Thugga, aged eighty.[17] Steia Olympias, buried at Ostia in Latium, during the latter half of the second century.[18] Marcus Steius Priscus, together with his wife, Lollie Isias, dedicated a tomb at Ostia to their son, Marcus Steius Rogatus.[19] Steia Privata, buried at the site of modern Belab, formerly part of Africa Proconsularis, aged seventy-five, next to Publius Marius, aged eighty, perhaps her husband.[20] Marcus Steius M. f. Rogatus, buried at Ostia, aged eleven years, nine months, and twenty-five days, with a monument from his parents, Marcus Steius Priscus and Lollia Isias.[19] Gaius Steius C. f. Sabinianus, a soldier in the Legio III Augusta, buried at Lambaesis in Numidia, aged twenty-five, with a monument from his brother, Gaius Julius Pontius.[21] Publius Steius Valens, a soldier in the century of Caesernius Senecio, serving in the fifth cohort of the vigiles at Rome in AD 210.[22] Steius Valerianus, dedicated a tomb at Rome for his daughter, Steia Decumina.[11] See also List of Roman gentes References  PIR, vol. III, pp. 271, 272.  Chase, pp. 120, 121.  CIL VIII, 5355.  PIR, S. 649.  CIL VI, 1341.  PW, "Steius".  PIR, S. 650.  MAD, 1175.  CIL VI, 26833.  Picard, Castellum Dimmidi, 32.  CIL VI, 26834.  CIL VIII, 11582.  ILAfr, 162,64.  CIL VIII, 20329.  CIL VIII, 20325.  CIL XIV, 1641.  CIL VIII, 27215.  ILOP, 40.  CIL XIV, 1640.  CIL VIII, 27434.  CIL VIII, 3247.  CIL VI, 1057. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Gustav Wilmanns, Inscriptiones Africae Latinae (Latin Inscriptions from Africa, abbreviated ILAfr), Georg Reimer, Berlin (1881). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). Gilbert-Charles Picard, Castellum Dimmidi, Paris (1948). M. Khanoussi, L. Maurin, Mourir à Dougga: Receuil des inscriptions funéraires (Dying in Dougga: a Compendium of Funerary Inscriptions, abbreviated MAD), Bordeaux, Tunis (2002). Alfredo Marinucci, Diseicta Membra. Iscrizioni Latine da Ostia e Porto, 1981–2009 (Scattered Limbs: Latin Inscriptions from Ostia and Portus, 1981–2009, abbreviated ILOP), Rome (2012). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Steio – Ossia: Grice e Steio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Steio -- For the Steii, I am tempted to choose not the senator Lucius Steius Aemilianus nor the military tribune Lucius Steius, but Steia Fortunata, because her inscription preserves a remarkable shift of social identity: she is explicitly described as the former house-slave of Publius Steius Felix, later the wife of Sextus Gavius, and mother of Sextus Gavius Scantianus, who helped commemorate her. [GREXv3 | Word] Why is this Gricean? Because the inscription quietly raises a question about description and identity. Grice e Steia Fortunata: De Descriptis INTERROGATOR. Quis fuit Fortunata? (Who was Fortunata?) RESPONSOR. Serva. (A slave.) ALIUS. Uxor. (A wife.) ALIUS. Mater. (A mother.) GRICE. Eadem persona est. (It is the same person.)  The interesting point is that all these descriptions are true. Yet none of them is identical with the person. A Gricean immediately hears an anticipation of the distinction between:  the individual, and the various descriptions under which the individual is presented.  The same person can be:  slave,  and later  wife,  and later  mother.  The reference remains stable while the descriptions change.  This is a familiar Gricean theme because it touches the contrast between:  whom we are talking about,  and  how we happen to characterize that person.  One could almost reformulate it in Russellian language:  the descriptions vary; the referent remains. But Fortunata is more human and more philosophically suggestive.  Dry Speranzian formula  The Statilii criticize words; the Steii remind us that no description exhausts a person. Steia Fortunata appears in an inscription first as a former slave, then as a wife and mother. Grice would observe that descriptions may change while reference remains constant. The same individual survives through many vocabularies. [GREXv3 | Word]  And perhaps that is the most Gricean lesson of all: people are not identical with the predicates attached to them. The inscription records changing descriptions; it commemorates one person.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Steio – Ossia: Grice e Steio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Steio -- A close second Another attractive candidate is Lucius Steius, military tribune and census legate under Trajan. The census is fundamentally an exercise in classification: assigning persons to official descriptions and categories. [GREXv3 | Word] That would yield a nice vignette about bureaucratic language and social identity.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stella – Ossia: Grice e Stella: la ragione conversazionale dell’ iustum/iussum, o la causa dell’anormale come l’ implicatura d’Honorè. Note sulla Tesi. Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università del Sacro Cuore, Milano. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Federico Stella (Sernaglia, Treviso, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale dell’ iustum/iussum, o la causa dell’anormale come l’ implicatura d’Honorè. A comparison between Grice and Federico Stella brings out a shared commitment to reason as the governing principle of meaning and responsibility, though articulated at different levels of analysis. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning locates rationality in the inferential practices of ordinary conversation, where implicature arises from the recognition of speakers’ intentions under shared norms of cooperation and alethic reason, as elaborated in Aspects of Reason. Stella, trained in Treviso and Milan and shaped by legal philosophy under Crespi, approaches a closely related problem from the side of jurisprudence: how we rationally connect descriptions of human action to judgments of responsibility. In his work on causal explanation and the structure of criminal liability, Stella insists that responsibility can be ascribed only where conduct is subsumed under a covering law capable of explaining the causal nexus between action and outcome, thus respecting the rule of “beyond reasonable doubt.” Where Grice analyzes the implicatures involved in saying that someone acted intentionally, responsibly, or negligently, Stella examines the juridical counterpart of those implicatures, showing how descriptions of action implicitly commit us to judgments about causation, fault, and normativity. The parallel with H. L. A. Hart and Honoré is evident in both: Hart’s analysis of responsibility and Honoré’s interest in the “cause of the abnormal” find in Grice an account of the conversational logic that underwrites such descriptions, and in Stella a doctrinal reconstruction of how those same rational commitments become codified in law. In this sense, Stella can be seen as extending Gricean conversational rationality into the institutional domain of law, where the distinction between iustum and iussum is no longer merely conversationally implicated but juridically enforced, while remaining grounded in the same ideal of reason as the measure of human action. Grice: “What is it with Italian philosoophers that they are all into what at Oxford we would call jurisprudence? It seems like all Italian philosophers are like Italian versions of H. L. A. Hart!”. Keywords: Grice, implicature della descrizione d’azione umana, H. L. A. Hart, Honoré, J. L. Austin, responsibity, aspets of reason, alethic reason. Studia a Treviso e Milano, sotto CRESPI. Insegna a Catania e Milano. I suoi saggi si diregeno su alcune tipologie di reati, successivamente sugl’elementi strutturali del reato.  Il suo contributo filosofico più noto, presso gl’operatori del diritto penale e la comunità accademica, è “La spiegazione causale dell’azione umana” (Milano), in cui  ricostruisce il problema del nesso di causalità prospettando il criterio della sussunzione sotto una *legge* come strumento per la soluzione di casi dubbi. Solo mediante una legge di copertura, atta a spiegare il rapport causale fra la condotta dell’attore ed il effetto e possibile formulare un giudizio sulla responsabilità dell’attore. Ad es., solo dopo aver dimostrato, sulla base di una legge, che l'ingestione di un determinato farmaco determina casualmente malformazioni del feto, e possibile imputare alla ditta produttrice il reato di lesioni gravissime, colpose o dolose. In difetto di questa spiegazione causale non puo formularsi alcuna responsabilità a regola di giudizio dell'"oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio" trovasse applicazione anche in un processo. Il principio venne accolto in tema di nesso causale dalla corte suprema di cassazione, anche a sezioni unite. Oggi è norma codicistica. Dirige riviste giuridiche di diritto penale ed è fra i curatori di raccolte normative di largo successo presso la comunità forense. implicature della descrizione d’azione umana, H. L. A. Hart, Honoré, J. L. Austin, responsibity, aspets of reason, alethic reason.  Grice: Caro Stella, ogni volta che passo per Sernaglia mi chiedo: quanti filosofi veneti ci vogliono per distinguere tra “iustum” e “iussum”? O forse, qui da voi, basta un po’ di buona conversazione per risolvere tutto con eleganza giuridica! Stella: Ah, Grice, qui a Sernaglia il giusto e il comandato si inseguono come il cane e la sua ombra, ma ti confido che, a differenza dei tuoi studenti a Vadum Boum, noi il latino lo pronunciamo con tutte le consonanti… almeno, quasi sempre. Grice: Beh, Stella, ricordo che il mio allievo Strawson, nei corridoi del Vadum Boum, aveva la curiosa abitudine di far sparire la “t” in “IVSTVM”, così che il nostro “giusto” diventava subito “comandato”, senza nemmeno una geminazione di troppo. Ma su queste sottigliezze, meglio tacere: sai, non vorrei sollevare un caso davanti alla Cassazione latina… Stella: Erudita implicatura, Grice! Noi che amiamo la buona educazione classica teniamo sempre lo sguardo fisso verso Bononia, mentre i barbari non saprebbero neppure dove puntare l’ago della bussola… un po’ come gli occhi dei buoi che attraversano il tuo guado, Grice! Stella, Federico (1958). Tesi. Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stellini – Ossia: Grice e Stellini: la ragione conversazionale dell’ortu morum. Note su Della felicità. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Jacopo Stellini (Cividale del Friuli, Udine, Friuli, Friuli-Venezia Giulia): la ragione conversazionale dell’ortu morum – A comparison between Grice and Jacopo Stellini brings into focus two historically distant but structurally allied conceptions of reason as something enacted in practice rather than merely posited in theory. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats rationality as immanent in ordinary interaction, where meanings, implicatures, and normative commitments arise through cooperative exchanges guided by shared expectations of relevance, truthfulness, and intelligibility. Stellini, writing in the eighteenth century, approaches reason from the moral–historical side, yet his De ortu et progressu morum likewise understands moral life as something cultivated, transmitted, and stabilized through social practices, education, and refined conversation. For Stellini, mores are not abstract rules imposed from above but habits that grow, like an ortus morum, through rhetoric, pedagogy, and exemplarity; moral reason is inseparable from the conversational and institutional contexts in which virtues are formed and sustained. In this sense, Stellini anticipates a Gricean insight: that much of what matters normatively is conveyed not by explicit principles but by what is tacitly shown, modeled, and implied in discourse and conduct. Where Grice analyzes how speakers mean more than they say through implicature, Stellini traces how societies become more or less moral through the gradual, conversational transmission of opinions and practices pertaining to conduct. The difference lies in level and aim rather than structure: Grice offers a micro‑theory of rational communication, while Stellini provides a moral genealogy of rational cultivation; yet both converge on the idea that reason is not merely possessed but exercised, and that its primary habitat is the shared life of conversation. Nasce da Mattia Rodaro, e da Adriana Piccini. Il cognome S., usato spesso anche dal padre, deriva dal nome della nonna Stella Rotar. Della famiglia non si sa molto. Mattia è sarto come la moglie. S. ha due sorelle: Maddalena, sposa di Muschione -- la cui figlia, Adriana, commissiona con il marito Peretti un ritratto del filosofo -- e Stella. Studia presso i padri somaschi di Cividale con il maestro di retorica Leonarducci; vestì l’abito religioso ed entra a Venezia nella congregazione con i voti solenni. Oltre a teologia con Visconti, studia ebraico -- con Birone -- , greco – con Patrussa --, latino e matematica nel seminario patriarcale di Venezia. Dall’anno dell’ordinazione sacerdotale, è maestro di retorica ai chierici della Casa della Salute a Venezia ed insegna presso l’Accademia dei nobili alla Giudecca; Emo, senatore e mecenate, lo prende allora come consigliere ed educatore dei figli Pietro, Alvise e Angelo.  A seguito della morte di Giacometti, con la prolusione Oratio habita in Gymnasio Patavino -- pubblicata dal seminario --  entra come professore ordinario di filosofia morale a Padova.  Piccolo, brutto della bruttezza di Socrate – Mabil --, oppresso da fastidi di stomaco e intestino, senza denti, pur non dotato di particolari doti oratorie riusciva ad appassionare studenti e uditori – fra cui anche Casanova – che accorreno alle sue lezioni. Trascorse la sua esistenza fra l’Università e le mura del convento di S. Croce. Sebbene schivo e non desideroso di onori, conosce fama e successo, come testimoniano anche gli elogi scritti immediatamente e ancora qualche decennio dopo la morte; è uomo coltissimo, di garbata conversazione e curioso di diverse discipline, dalla musica, alla filologia alle scienze che studia con passione, come risulta anche dalle lettere. La sua opera più importante, De ortu et progressu morum atque opinionum ad mores pertinentium specimen –dalla nonna Stella – Modaro. Liceo.  Grice: Caro Stellini, ho finalmente avuto modo di leggere il tuo “De ortu et progressu morum”; devo confessare che, tra gli orti friulani e quelli filosofici, la differenza sta tutta nel profumo, ma la saggezza è la stessa! Stellini: Ah, Grice, lei sa sempre cogliere il senso delle cose! In effetti, il mio orto morum nasce più dal tentativo di coltivare le virtù che i cavoli, ma la fatica è simile, glielo assicuro! Grice: Ebbene, se parliamo del mos dell’ortolano, mi verrebbe da dire che, più che discutere di grandi principi morali, il vero lavoro sembra essere la potatura… e magari una buona concimazione. Ma, si sa, certe cose si capiscono senza dirle apertamente! Stellini: Implicatura ingegnosissima, Grice! Non a caso dicono che nel mio orto filosofico cresceva più saggezza che insalata. E anche se il mio stile non era quello di Casanova, almeno qualche germoglio di virtù l’ho saputo coltivare tra i miei studenti… e qualche dente in meno non ha mai impedito una buona conversazione! Stellini, Jacopo (1740). Della felicità. Venezia: Pasquali.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stellio – Ossia: Grice e Stellio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stellia. The gens Stellia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned in history, but a few are known from inscriptions.  Origin The nomen Stellius is derived from the Latin Stella, a star, which sometimes appears as a cognomen, in its original form, or in the derivative form Stellio.[1][2] It belongs to a large class of gentilicia derived from the names of familiar objects.[3]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Stellia Agathe, dedicated a tomb at Casinum in Latium for her husband, Cornelius Phoebus.[4] Stellius Novellus Amaranthus, dedicated a tomb at Messana in Sicilia for his son, Cytisus, aged ten.[5] Gaius Stellius C. f. Primigenius, dedicated a tomb at Saepinum in Samnium for his friend, Gaius Neratius Primio.[6] Quintus Stellius Q. f. Vopiscus, made an offering to Diana Lucifera at Philippi in Macedonia, dating between the first and third centuries.[7] See also List of Roman gentes References  Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, s.v. stella.  "Arruntius Stella", Tacitus, Annales, xiii. 22; Statius, Silvae, i. (dedicatio). Martial, Epigrammata, v. 21. C. Afranius Stellio, Livy, xxxix. 23, 25, xliii. 18, 19.  Chase, p. 112.  CIL X, 5291.  Bitto, Le Iscrizioni Greche e Latine di Messina, 16.  CIL IX, 6637.  AE 1934, 52. Bibliography Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Publius Papinius Statius, Silvae. Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Irma Bitto, Le Iscrizioni Greche e Latine di Messina (The Greek and Latin Inscriptions of Messina), Università degli Studi di Messina (2001). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stellio – Ossia: Grice e Stellio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stellia. For the tiny gens Stellia, I would choose Gaius Stellius Primigenius, who dedicated a tomb for his friend, Gaius Neratius Primio, at Saepinum. The entry explicitly identifies the beneficiary not as a relative but as a friend. [GREXv3 | Word] That may seem slight evidence, but philosophically it is the most interesting thing in the whole gens. Grice e Stellio: De Amicitia INTERROGATOR. Cui monumentum fecisti? (For whom did you build the monument?) PRIMIGENIVS. Amico. (For a friend.) INTERROGATOR. Cognato? (A kinsman?) PRIMIGENIVS. Non. (No.) INTERROGATOR. Cur igitur? (Then why?) GRICE. Quaedam relationes non sanguine sed voluntate constituuntur. (Some relationships are constituted not by blood but by choice.)  What attracts me here is that Roman inscriptions overwhelmingly commemorate:  parents, children, spouses, patrons, freedmen.  But here the defining term is:  amicus. [GREXv3 | Word]  That immediately raises a conversational problem. When someone says:  "He was my friend,"  what information is conveyed? The expression is famously elastic. It can mean:  intimate companion, political ally, social acquaintance, patronal connection.  The hearer must infer the intended strength of the relation from context. That is a very Gricean situation.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stellio – Ossia: Grice e Stellio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stellia. A second candidate A close runner-up is Quintus Stellius Vopiscus, who made an offering to Diana Lucifera. [GREXv3 | Word] The epithet Lucifera ("light-bringing") naturally invites questions about metaphor, religious language, and naming. But the inscription tells us little else.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stellio – Ossia: Grice e Stellio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stellia. A third possibility One could also play with the nomen itself:  Stellius ← stella ("star"). [GREXv3 | Word]  A Gricean might ask whether the name merely identifies a person or carries descriptive associations. We have already encountered this issue with Clemens, Severus, Spurius, and other names that tempt hearers into drawing inferences.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stenio – Ossia: Grice e Stenio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stenio -- The gens Stenia or Stennia, occasionally spelled Sthenia, was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Hardly any members of this gens are mentioned in ancient writers, but a large number are known from inscriptions.  Origin The nomen Stenius is simply a gentilicial form of the Oscan praenomen Sthenius, and is thus a patronymic surname.[1][2] In a few inscriptions it occurs as Sthenius, but in most examples the 'h' is omitted. Many of the Stenii found in epigraphy came from Samnium and adjacent, Oscan-speaking regions of central and southern Italy.[2]  Praenomina The Stenii used a variety of common praenomina, chiefly Lucius, Gaius, Publius, and Gnaeus. At least two of them bore the more distinctive praenomen Numerius, which was common in gentes of Oscan origin, but relatively scarce at Rome.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Stenia, the wife of Aulus and mother of Marcia, named in an inscription from Clusium in Etruria.[3] Sthenius, a noble citizen of Thermae Himeraeae in Sicilia, who espoused the side of the Marians during the war with Sulla. When Sulla's general, Pompeius, proposed to punish the city, Sthenius saved his fellow citizens by taking full responsibility, and was pardoned. Later, when Thermae was plundered by Verres, Sthenius intervened; Verres then charged him with various crimes, for which the punishment was death; but he was protected, and served as a witness at Verres' trial.[4][5][6] Gaius Stenius, named in a sepulchral inscription from Aufinum in Sabinum, dating to the late first century.[7] Numerius Stenius M. f., one of the magistri of Mercury, Apollo, and Neptune at Ortygia in Achaia, who made an offering to Hercules in 113 BC.[8][9] Lucius Stennius Anneius Africanus, a child buried at Beneventum in Samnium, aged eleven years, eight months, and eleven days, with a monument from his parents, dating from the second century, or the first half of the third.[10] Quintus Stenius Augurinus, an eques at Patavium in Venetia and Histria.[11] Stenius Callicras Gaudentius, buried at Clusium, aged seventy-two years, eight months, and ten days, along with his wife, Lucia Fonteia Concordia, aged seventy, in a tomb dedicated by their children, grandchildren, and freedmen.[12] Publius Stennius Candidus, an infant buried at Carthage in Africa Proconsularis, aged eight months, eight days.[13] Stenius Castelanius Aureolus, buried in a fourth-century tomb at Rome, along with his wife, Florentia.[14] Lucius Stennius Clementius, one of the patrons of a guild at Ostia in Latium, in AD 262. Also named among the patrons was a Lucius Stennius Secundus.[15] Titus Stennius T. f. Co[...]mo, buried in a third-century tomb at Telesia in Samnium, aged twenty-one, with a monument from his father, Titus Stennius Severus.[16] Lucius Sthenius Creticus, dedicated a sepulchre for himself and his family at Salona in Dalmatia, dating to the first century, or the first half of the second.[17] Gaius Stennius Crispus, a priest in the service of Jupiter Optimus Maximus at Neapolis in Campania, during the middle portion of the second century.[18] Lucius Stenius Cytisus, the freedman of Silvinus, was one of the Seviri Augustales at Casinum in Latium, named in an inscription dating to the first or second century, along with Rubria Arura, perhaps his wife.[19] Gnaeus Stennius Cn. f. Egnatius Primus, the son of Gnaeus Stennius Egnatius Rufus, was one of the quattuorvirs at Acerrae in Campania, whose donation of one hundred sestertii was recorded in an inscription dating to the early or middle part of the third century.[20] Gnaeus Stennius Egnatius Rufus, the father of Gnaeus Stennius Egnatius Primus, the quattuorvir at Acerrae.[20] Stennia Faustina, dedicated a monument at Asseria in Dalmatia to her brother, Titus Publicius Saturninus, dating to the early or middle part of the second century.[21] Stenius Felix, named among the wealthy inhabitants of Ligures Baebiani in Samnium, whose estate was valued at two hundred thousand sestertii in AD 101.[22] Stenius Flavianus, a member of a veterans' association at Lambaesis in Numidia.[23] Stenius Fortis, a freedman who dedicated a tomb at Salona for the freedwoman Lupula, dating to the third century, or the late second.[24] Stenia Fortunata, buried at Rome, with a monument from her husband, Gaius Valerius Polybius.[25] Publius Stennius Gemellus, a soldier in the fifth cohort of the Praetorian Guard, dedicated a second-century tomb at Rome for his fellow soldier, the eques Lucius Antonius Satinus, aged twenty-four years, having served for eight years.[26] Stenius Hermes, buried at Salona, in a tomb dedicated by his wife, Charite, dating from the third century, or the latter half of the second.[27] Publius Stenius P. l. Hylas, a freedman buried in a first-century tomb at Obulco in Hispania Baetica.[28] Gaius Stenius Jan[...], a maker's mark found on a piece of pottery from Lugdunum in Gallia Lugdunensis.[29] Stenius Lupulus, dedicated a tomb at Salona to his wife, Julia Fabrica, dating to the third century, or the latter half of the second.[30] Marcus Stennius Marcellinus, a member of the senate of Cumae in Campania in AD 251.[31] Stennia Potita, buried at Cirta in Numidia, along with Lepidius Nampulus, in the sepulchre of the Lepidii, dating to the middle of the third century.[32] Stenia C. f. Prima, buried in a family sepulchre at Minturnae in Latium, along with Gaius Stenius Primus, probably her father.[33] Stenia C. f. Primula, named in a sepulchral inscription from Aquinum in Latium.[34] Gaius Stenius Primus, buried in a family sepulchre at Minturnae, along with Stenia Prima, probably his daughter.[33] Stennia Pyramis, the wife of Lucius Stennius Silvester, with whom she dedicated a second-century tomb at Telesia for their son, Lucius Stenius Rufinus.[35] Stenius Quartio, named in an inscription from Tubernuca in Africa Proconsularis.[36] Lucius Stenius L. f. Rufinus, a young man of equestrian rank, buried at Telesia, aged sixteen years, six months, and nine days, in a second-century tomb dedicated by his parents, Lucius Stennius Silvester and Stennia Pyramis.[35] Publius Stenius Rufus, a decurion named in a first-century inscription from Rome, along with the freedwoman Plosurnia Salvilla.[37] Publius Stenius P. l. Salvius, a freedman named in an inscription from Luceria in Apulia, dating from the first half of the first century.[38] Numerius Stenius Saturninus, named along with his wife, Petronia Philsia, in an inscription from Beneventum, dating from the early or middle part of the first century.[39] Stenia Secunda, buried in a third century tomb at Puteoli in Campania, aged forty-four years, ten months, and ten days, with a monument from her husband, whose name has not been preserved.[40] Lucius Stennius Secundus, one of the patrons of a guild at Ostia in AD 262. Also among the patrons was a Lucius Stennius Clementius.[15] Stenia Secura, buried at Salona, in a tomb built by her husband, Lucius Publicius Trophimus, dating to the third century, or the latter half of the second.[41] Gnaeus Stenius Securus, buried at Tragurium in Dalmatia, with a monument from Stenia, perhaps his daughter, dating from the third century, or the latter half of the second.[42] Stenia Severa, buried in a third-century tomb at Ammaedara in Africa Proconsularis, aged forty, with a monument from her husband, Allius Fortunatus. Titus Stennius Severus, dedicated a third-century tomb at Telesia for his son, Titus Stennius Co[...]mo.[15] Lucius Stenius Silvanus, named in a testamentary inscription from Casinum, dating to AD 65 or 66.[43] Lucius Stennius Silvester, one of the Seviri Augustales at Telesia, together with his wife, Stennia Pyramis, dedicated a second-century tomb for their son, Lucius Stennius Rufinus.[35] Sextus Stenius Stratus, one of the Seviri Augustales at Narona in Dalmatia, honoured in an inscription dating to the first or second century.[44] Stenius Tacitus, buried at Salona, in a tomb built by his wife, Byrria Lupula, dating to the third century, or the latter half of the second.[45] Lucius Stenius L. l. Thelgo, a freedman buried in a first-century tomb at Casinum.[46] Stenia Tyche, buried at Salona, along with her husband, Lucius Aselius Halemus, in a tomb dedicated by their daughter, Aselia Lucida, dating to the third century, or the latter half of the second.[47] Sthenia Veneria, buried at Clusium, aged twenty-seven, with a monument from her husband, Gaius Sentius Aulax, to whom she had been married for five years, six months, and four days.[48] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Latin Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 904 ("Stenius or Sthenius").  PW, "Stenius".  CIL XI, 2364.  Plutarch, "The Life of Pompeius", 5.  Cicero, In Verrem, II. 83–118, 147, III. 18, 41, IV. 41, V. 109, 128.  PW, "Stenius", No. 2.  CIL IX, 7508.  CIL I, 2504.  PW, "Stenius", No. 3.  CIL IX, 1973.  CIL IX, 2856.  CIL XI, 2538.  ILAfr, 412,84.  ICUR, i. 470.  CIL XIV, 5357.  CIL IX, 6457.  CIL III, 2536.  AE 2006, 312.  AE 1971, 95.  CIL X, 3759.  CIL III, 9941.  CIL IX, 1455.  CIL VIII, 2626.  AE 1999, 1227.  BCAR, 1925-298.  CIL VI, 2556.  CIL III, 2351.  CIL II, 5056.  CAG, lxix. 2, p. 625.  CIL III, 8543.  CIL X, 3699.  CIL VIII, 7543.  CIL X, 6050.  RAL, 1971-424,8a.  CIL IX, 6439.  CIL VIII, 24088.  CIL VI, 10387.  CIL IX, 889.  CIL IX, 1926.  CIL X, 2974.  CIL III, 2537.  CIL III, 9720.  CIL X, 5171.  ILJug, ii. 654.  CIL III, 8548.  CIL X, 5292.  CIL III, 8894.  CIL XI, 2451. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Verrem. Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Giovanni Battista de Rossi, Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romanae Septimo Saeculo Antiquiores (Christian Inscriptions from Rome of the First Seven Centuries, abbreviated ICUR), Vatican Library, Rome (1857–1861, 1888). Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale in Roma (Bulletin of the Municipal Archaeological Commission of Rome, abbreviated BCAR), (1872–present). Gustav Wilmanns, Inscriptiones Africae Latinae (Latin Inscriptions from Africa, abbreviated ILAfr), Georg Reimer, Berlin (1881). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). Rendiconti della Classe si scienze morali, storiche e filologiche dell'Academia dei Lincei (Reports of the Class of Moral, Historical and Philological Sciences of the Accademia dei Lincei, abbreviated RAL), G. Bardi, Rome (1922–1940). La Carte Archéologique de la Gaule (Archaeological Map of Gaul, abbreviated CAG), Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1931–present). Anna and Jaroslav Šašel, Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMXL et MCMLX repertae et editae sunt (Inscriptions from Yugoslavia Found and Published between 1940 and 1960, abbreviated ILJug), Ljubljana (1963–1986). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stenio – Ossia: Grice e Stenio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stenio – For the Stenii, I think the choice is clear:  Sthenius of Thermae, the Sicilian notable defended by Cicero in the Verrines and also mentioned by Plutarch. [GREXv3 | Word]  Unlike many of these gentes, here we have not merely an inscriptional shadow but a genuine personality, and a highly Gricean one. Grice e Stenio: De Testimonio The story, as summarized in the gens entry, is that Sthenius intervened against the depredations of Verres, was then charged with capital crimes, escaped conviction, and later appeared as a witness against Verres. [GREXv3 | Word] That makes him a figure of testimony. VERRES. Mentitur. (He is lying.) STHENIVS. Testor. (I bear witness.) IVDEX. Cui credendum est? (Whom should one believe?) GRICE. Testimonium non est res visa a iudice, sed relata ab homine. (Testimony is not something seen by the judge, but reported by a person.)  This is a deeply Gricean situation. Most of what courts know, and indeed most of what people know generally, depends not on direct observation but on:  someone's saying that something happened.  The philosophical problem therefore becomes:  When is a speaker to be believed?  That is much closer to Grice's interests than military exploits or municipal offices.  Why Sthenius is especially attractive The Verres case is full of communicative themes:  accusation, defence, credibility, witness testimony, public reputation.  Sthenius' problem is not merely proving facts. It is persuading others that his account of the facts should be accepted. [GREXv3 | Word] In Gricean language, the issue is not simply:  What was said?  but:  Is the speaker trustworthy? A close second Another interesting candidate is:  Statius Tullianus's near-namesake world of lexicography and vocabulis rerum.  But among the Stenii, no one rivals Sthenius in philosophical interest.  Dry Speranzian formula  The Statilii dispute usages; the Statorii manipulate appearances; the Stenii teach the philosophy of testimony. Sthenius of Thermae stood against Verres and later appeared as a witness. Grice would observe that civilization depends less upon what each person sees than upon what speakers successfully induce others to believe. Testimony is communication under risk. [GREXv3 | Word]  And there is an additional irony that Grice would appreciate:  Sthenius survives historically largely because Cicero chose to talk about him.  The witness himself becomes known to posterity through another witness.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sterlich – Ossia: Grice e Sterlich: la ragione conversazionale dei georgofili – la scuola di Chieti. Note sul Dialogo di fra Cipolla e la Nanna. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Romualdo de Sterlich (Chieti, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale dei georgofili. Grice and Romualdo de Sterlich converge on the idea that meaning in conversation is fundamentally governed by reason, but they articulate this insight from distinct historical and conceptual vantage points. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning is explicitly analytical: he treats conversation as a rational, goal-directed activity structured by shared expectations of cooperation, where what is meant often exceeds what is literally said because speakers calculate their contributions against norms of rational relevance, sufficiency, truthfulness, and clarity. Meaning, for Grice, is therefore inseparable from the speaker’s intention to be intelligible to a rational interlocutor, and from the hearer’s capacity to recognize that intention by reasoning about what it would make sense to say in the circumstances. Sterlich, by contrast, embodies an Enlightenment, civic-humanistic version of conversational reason. In his cultural practice—the public library at Chieti, the circulation of forbidden books, and the Dialoghi di fra’ Cipolla e la Nanna—conversation is reason-governed not by formal maxims but by the social exercise of critical judgement against dogma, censorship, and intellectual superstition. Sterlich’s dialogical writing presupposes interlocutors who can follow irony, polemic, and indirectness, and who understand that rational exchange often operates obliquely under conditions of constraint; in this sense, his dialogues rely on something close to Gricean implicature avant la lettre. Where Grice abstracts reason as a quasi-logical principle underwriting intelligible talk, Sterlich stages conversational reason as a historically situated practice of Enlightenment resistance, in which meaning emerges through shared rational competence, cultural literacy, and the willingness to draw inferences beyond the explicit word. The affinity lies in their shared conviction that conversation is not mere talk but a rational enterprise; the difference lies in Grice’s formal reconstruction of that enterprise and Sterlich’s lived, polemical enactment of it within the public sphere of eighteenth-century Italian Illuminismo. Nato da Rinaldo e da Margherita Alfieri, dopo i primi studi in casa è mandato a Napoli, dove frequenta il collegio dei nobili e la scuola privata di Serao, noto professore. Abbiamo anche notizia di suoi studi a Roma. Essendo figlio unico è indotto a sposarsi e a seguire gli affari della sua famiglia.  Tornato a Chieti, vi intraprese una vivace attività di promozione culturale. Crea infatti una biblioteca aperta al pubblico che nella Chieti ha un'importanza notevole, sia per il numero dei volumi, sia per la tempestività con cui veniva aggiornata e per il valore delle opere che vi si trovavano.  Ricca di classici latini, la biblioteca è ben fornita di autori della letteratura italiana. Numerose erano poi le opere di storia, di filosofia, i dizionari enciclopedici; numerosissimi i giornali. Presenti anche molte opere scientifiche, soprattutto di medicina, di cui S. è un ottimo cultore. La caratteristica più importante, però, che fa di questa biblioteca un momento di rottura con la cultura circostante, è la presenza delle opere degli illuministi. La biblioteca S. divenne uno dei centri più attivi del rinnovamento della cultura abruzzese. In essa si forma una generazione di filosofi che danno un contributo politico notevole nel periodo delle riforme prima e della rivoluzione dopo. Ma l'attività culturale di S. e il ruolo che anda acquistando la biblioteca non passarono inosservati ai gesuiti: lo attaccano pubblicamente accusandolo di empietà e di possedere libri proibiti. S. non si fa intimorire. Anzi, per controbattere le accuse, compose i Duedialoghi di fra' Cipolla e la Nanna, che circolarono manoscritti a Chieti suscitando molte polemiche. Una copia è mandata a Firenze a Lami per la pubblicazione, che fu però bloccata dalla censura. I Dialoghi restarono così inediti tra le carte di Lami, a cui F. Fontani -suo biografo - li attribuì. Anche manoscritti, hanno comunque una notevole diffusione.  illuminismo.  Grice: Mi permetta una curiosità, caro Sterlich: come pronuncia esattamente il suo cognome? Soprattutto l’ultima parte, che mi sembra poco italiana!  Sterlich: Ah, è una domanda che mi fanno spesso! Si pronuncia “Ster-lich”, con la “ch” finale un po’ dura, quasi tedesca. In famiglia scherziamo sempre su quanto suoni strano qui in Abruzzo.  Grice: Capisco, dev’essere stato un nome che ha incuriosito molti, specie tra i georgofili e gli intellettuali della sua biblioteca a Chieti! E ha portato fortuna, direi, se penso al fermento culturale che ha contribuito a creare.  Sterlich: La ringrazio, professore! In fondo, anche un cognome “fuori dal coro” può essere uno stimolo alla conversazione e all’apertura verso idee nuove. Come diceva mio padre, “la diversità è la ricchezza che fa crescere la cultura.” So as per passage below -- let us have a 100-move conversation between G and S as they analyse this 'dialogo di fra Cipolla e la Nana' -- with G. asking always for the implicature -- either by Cipolla or La Nana -- and S. often dodging the question, and then G inquiring if it's a conventional implicature, or sometimes if it is a non-conventional yet NOT conversational (e. g. relying on politeness) implicature, or a mere entailment, or -- God forbid -- a presupposition -- the wit is on La Nana -- and G. is interested in S. judging which implicatures are PARTICULARISED and which are NOT PARTICULARISED -- "or generalised, if you want" -- thanks -- no preamble or ps -- thanks G.: Let us begin, if we must, with Fra Cipolla’s first opening to La Nanna. What is the implicature? S.: That he means to patronise her before he has properly earned the right, which is the oldest clerical sport. G.: That is social diagnosis, not implicature. Is it conventional, conversational, or merely your Abruzzese irritation speaking? S.: Conversational, then. He says one thing in the tone of guidance and means another in the posture of superiority. G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. Without the relation between friar and woman, and without the local asymmetry, it evaporates. G.: Good. Now La Nanna’s reply. She appears submissive. Is she? S.: Not in the least. Her politeness is a blade wrapped in linen. G.: Then what is implicated? S.: That she understands his game before he has finished setting the board. G.: Again particularised? S.: Yes, because it depends upon her over-obedient wording and the hearer’s awareness that she is not, in fact, simple. G.: So not conventional implicature. S.: No. No one gets that merely from a lexical particle or connective. G.: You are learning. Now Fra Cipolla asks a question to which, on the surface, a plain answer would suffice. Why does La Nanna answer too fully? S.: Because excess itself is her irony. She gives more than is required in order to imply that his demand was already impertinent. G.: Quantity flouted, then. S.: Yes, though elegantly. G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. The same words in a catechism would be only tedious. G.: Very good. Now Cipolla’s next move: he pretends not to notice the rebuff. What is his implicature? S.: That he will continue to occupy the moral high ground even after losing it. G.: That sounds almost like Acito. But classify it. S.: Conversational, certainly. He says, in effect, “let us proceed calmly,” and means, “I refuse to acknowledge that you have struck me.” G.: Not entailment? S.: No. The literal content need not include any such refusal. G.: Presupposition? S.: I should hope not. G.: Hope is not enough. Why not? S.: Because nothing in the syntax requires that he has been struck and is now ignoring it. The force is pragmatic, not structural. G.: Good. Now La Nanna uses an honorific for him that is one degree too polished. Implicature? S.: That she is calling attention to the office only to expose the man beneath it. G.: Is that conventional? S.: No. Excessive respect does not always mean mockery. G.: So again particularised. S.: Yes. It depends on her timing, on what he has just said, and on the reader’s suspicion that she is cleverer than he would like. G.: “Than he would like” itself has an implicature. S.: You are impossible. G.: I am exact. Continue. Fra Cipolla invokes authority. Does that carry a conventional implicature? S.: Only in the weak sense that citing authority invites deference. G.: That is not my sense. Conventional implicature attaches stably to the form. Does his invocation of authority conventionally imply anything beyond explicit appeal? S.: Not beyond the ordinary air of “I need not argue further.” G.: Which is not bad. Then perhaps it is a socially sedimented but not strictly conventional implicature. S.: One of your intermediate shadows. G.: Civilisation lives in the shadows. La Nanna answers with a proverb. What is she doing? S.: She is moving from private reply to public wisdom. By speaking proverbially, she implies that his manoeuvre is not unique to him but belongs to a recognisable species of nonsense. G.: Excellent. Particularised or generalised? S.: Generalised, perhaps, if one allows that proverbs usually carry surplus moral uptake beyond their immediate literal fit. G.: Better: the reply has a generalisable implicatural tendency, though this instance is sharpened by the local target. S.: You always want both the knife and the anatomy of the knife. G.: Naturally. Now Cipolla laughs. Is the laugh itself an implicature? S.: Yes, but not a linguistic one. G.: Very good. Continue. S.: It implies either that he is above offence or that he has not understood the insult. La Nanna, naturally, counts on both readings damaging him. G.: Ah. Ambiguity by behaviour. Particularised? S.: Entirely. A laugh in another place might mean ease. Here it means self-defence disguised as ease. G.: And if a reader took it simply as ease? S.: Then that reader deserves the friar. G.: Excellent. Now La Nanna asks a question whose answer she clearly does not need. What is the implicature? S.: That she is forcing him to hear his own absurdity aloud. G.: Socratic, then. S.: Domestic Socratic, yes. Less elenchus in the agora than elenchus by the hearth. G.: And particularised? S.: Entirely. Such questions are weapons only under pressure. G.: Cipolla answers too quickly. What does haste implicate? S.: That he fears the shape of the question more than its content. G.: Not bad. Is that conversational implicature or merely psychological inference? S.: Both, if you insist on living dangerously. G.: I insist on distinctions. Which? S.: Conversational, because the pace of response belongs to the exchange and is interpretable under norms of poise, confidence, and relevance. G.: Good. Now she says “as everyone knows.” Is that conventional implicature? S.: It conventionally signals an appeal to common ground. G.: Better. And in this case? S.: In this case it also conversationally implies that he is threatening to place himself outside the company of the competent if he resists. G.: So we have a conventional function plus a particularised strategic use. S.: You look insufferably pleased. G.: I am. Fra Cipolla introduces a distinction. Real distinction or verbal one? S.: Mostly verbal. He wants the dignity of analysis without the labour of thought. G.: Implicature? S.: That the matter is subtler than La Nanna could perhaps grasp. G.: Which she immediately destroys. S.: Naturally. She accepts the distinction and redraws it in terms that make him sound even sillier. G.: Then her paraphrase carries what implicature? S.: That if his distinction is sound, it is sound only in the wrong universe. G.: Too elegant. Make it humbler. S.: Very well: she implies that his sophistication is a mere rewording of folly. G.: Excellent. Particularised? S.: Entirely. A paraphrase need not be insult; here it is. G.: Now, Cipolla appeals to piety. What is he counting on? S.: A non-conversational implicature of decorum, perhaps. That certain tones and subjects will check her wit. G.: Very good. Not conversational in the narrow sense because the force relies less on maxims than on politeness and shared devotional inhibition. S.: Exactly. He hopes sanctity will do what logic cannot. G.: And La Nanna? S.: She grants the pious frame while twisting its use. That is her chief talent. G.: So what is implicated by her pious concession? S.: That she is willing to speak within the sacred register, provided it is not monopolised by fools. G.: Better than many sermons. Particularised? S.: Yes. Her concession is strategic, not doctrinally exhaustive. G.: Cipolla then says something literally true but useless. Implicature? S.: That he wants the credit of truthfulness without the burden of relevance. G.: A classic clerical evasion. S.: Or academic. G.: You are improving. Is the useless truth itself an implicature trigger? S.: Only because irrelevance in context invites the search for ulterior point. G.: Precisely. Relevance flouted; implicature sought. Now La Nanna supplies the missing relevance herself. What does that imply? S.: That she can complete his reasoning better than he can, and that his sentence needed rescuing. G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. In another context it would be helpfulness; here it is domination. G.: Excellent. Now there is a moment where Cipolla says “I did not say that.” Is the implicature that he nearly did? S.: Yes. Or that he recognises the line of consequence from what he did say and retreats from it. G.: So denial here implies proximity. S.: Very much so. G.: Conventional? S.: No. Denials do not conventionally imply guilt, though conversational life often treats them as if they did. G.: Good. La Nanna then repeats his phrase with a slight shift of emphasis. What is the force? S.: She turns quotation into exposure. The repetition implies that his own words are enough to convict him if merely heard properly. G.: A nice example of mention becoming judgment. S.: Yes. She does not need to add content; arrangement suffices. G.: Suetonian of her. S.: Heaven help us. Now you are importing emperors into kitchens. G.: Philosophy improves kitchens. Cipolla says “you misunderstand me.” What is implied? S.: That he has lost control of the exchange and wishes to blame the hearer’s competence rather than his own expression. G.: And is that generalised? S.: Fairly. “You misunderstand me” often carries that implication in quarrels, tutorials, and marriages. G.: Very good. A generalized conversational implicature, then, though intensified here. S.: I knew you would like that. G.: Naturally. La Nanna answers, “on the contrary.” Conventional implicature? S.: Not in your strict sense. But it prepares a reversal. It signals that she is about to reclaim interpretive authority. G.: And what is the particularised implicature here? S.: That she understands him only too well, and that his complaint has merely furnished her next stroke. G.: Good. Cipolla then attempts compliment. Is compliment here mere compliment? S.: Of course not. He means to pacify, lower the temperature, and recover the relation of superior to inferior under the guise of admiration. G.: So the compliment has a conversational implicature of tactical appeasement. S.: Yes, and possibly one of condescension. G.: Which La Nanna hears. S.: Instantly. G.: Her reply is outwardly modest. What is she implying? S.: That if she is clever, he has been the schoolmaster of that cleverness by giving her so much nonsense to sharpen herself upon. G.: Excellent. Particularised? S.: Entirely. Modesty is rarely so industrious by accident. G.: Now a harder case. She says something which may simply entail the conclusion you are calling an implicature. How do we distinguish? S.: By asking whether the further point is logically required or merely rationally recoverable from the manner and context. G.: Good. Apply that here. S.: When she says, in effect, that words must fit things, the entailment is the obvious norm of apt speech. The implicature is that his words have not fitted anything for several turns. G.: Splendid. Cipolla invokes custom. What does custom do here? S.: It pretends to settle by inheritance what he cannot settle by argument. G.: So the appeal implicates “this is not for fresh scrutiny.” S.: Exactly. G.: Generalised? S.: Fairly. Appeals to custom often imply closure. G.: La Nanna counters with a more local custom. What is her move? S.: She provincialises his universality. She implies that his “everyone” means only his own tiny and interested circle. G.: Very good. That is a particularised correction of the common-ground claim. S.: And a socially cruel one. G.: Good cruelty is often diagnostic. Now Cipolla becomes vague. Why? S.: Because precision would expose him. G.: Implicature? S.: That vagueness is being used as a shelter, not as humility. G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. Vagueness can be innocent. Here it is evasive. G.: Now the old danger. Is any of this presupposition? S.: Almost certainly less than lazy analysts would claim. G.: One example, please. S.: When La Nanna says “even friars may forget themselves,” the presupposition is only that friars are a class of persons. The sting, namely that this friar has forgotten himself already, is implicature. G.: Excellent. You are not wholly lost. Cipolla then says “let us speak plainly.” What does that implicate? S.: That things have not gone plainly for him thus far. G.: Generalised? S.: Yes, often. “Let us speak plainly” usually implies that the prior discourse was obscured, evasive, or unsatisfactory. G.: And in this case? S.: It also particularly implies that he wishes to reset rules he has just been losing under. G.: Good. La Nanna answers with a plainness that over-fulfils the invitation. Implicature? S.: That she is willing to grant his maxim and show him he cannot bear its consequences. G.: Quantity and Manner cooperating vindictively. S.: If you like. G.: I do. Now there is a joke at his expense that depends on double meaning. Is the second meaning conventional implicature? S.: No. That would confuse lexical ambiguity with implicature. G.: Excellent. So what do we have? S.: An ambiguity exploited conversationally so that one reading remains decorous and the other devastating. G.: And the devastative force is particularised. S.: Entirely. The dictionary does not insult him; the occasion does. G.: Cipolla pretends to choose the innocent reading. S.: Which implies he has heard the wicked one. G.: Yes. Denial by selective uptake. Very useful. Now La Nanna leaves something unfinished. Aposiopesis. Implicature? S.: That she trusts the hearer to complete the indecency or the judgment without requiring her to soil her own mouth. G.: Excellent. Particularised? S.: Yes, though the device has a fairly stable general tendency toward insinuation. G.: So a generalisable implicature pattern realised in a particular scandal. S.: You make vice sound pedagogical. G.: It usually is. Now Cipolla asks whether she mocks him. Why ask? S.: Because to ask is already to acknowledge the suspicion while trying to retain procedural innocence. G.: Very good. And her answer? S.: If she says no too quickly, she implies yes by style. If she says no with solemnity, she may imply that only a fool would need to ask. G.: Which kind does she choose? S.: The second, naturally. She has standards. G.: High ones. Now classify the implicature in “only a fool would need to ask,” where the “only” is not said. S.: Conversational, particularised, sharpened by irony. G.: Not entailment? S.: No. Nothing in the literal negative forces that conclusion. G.: Excellent. Cipolla then uses a diminutive. What is he up to? S.: He is trying to miniaturise the dispute and, with it, her authority in it. G.: Good. Does the diminutive itself conventionally implicate diminution of seriousness? S.: Often, but not rigidly. It may express affection, contempt, condescension, or mere scale. G.: So in this context? S.: A non-conventional but socially legible implicature of condescension. G.: Very nice. La Nanna repeats the diminutive and makes it bite him instead. S.: Exactly. She domesticates his patronage and returns it with interest. G.: Particularised? S.: Entirely. G.: Now a more abstract question. Would you say the dialogue overall relies more on generalised or particularised implicature? S.: Overwhelmingly particularised. The wit lives in local pressure, local asymmetry, local knowledge. G.: Good. But some recurring forms? S.: Yes. Appeals to custom, demands for plain speaking, complaints of misunderstanding, strategic compliments, excessive respect, and over-informative answers all carry rather stable generalised tendencies. G.: Excellent. We are getting somewhere. Cipolla says something pious and La Nanna replies with a domestic example. Implicature? S.: That theology without household intelligence is not worth the oil in the lamp. G.: Very good. Particularised? S.: Yes, though the broader anti-abstraction sentiment may be common enough. G.: Is there anywhere in the dialogue where you would actually grant a presupposition of some philosophical interest? S.: Perhaps where a correction takes for granted a shared standard of apt speech. But even there, most of the fun lies not in what must be taken for granted, but in what may be inferred from strategic deviation. G.: So presupposition is the dull furniture; implicature the theatre. S.: In this dialogue, emphatically yes. G.: Now Cipolla says “as a matter of charity.” Implicature? S.: That he wishes to moralise the next move in advance so that resistance appears uncharitable. G.: Excellent. Generalised? S.: Fairly. Such prefacing often loads the moral dice. G.: La Nanna replies charitably indeed, but to his disadvantage. S.: Which is her genius. She takes the announced norm and fulfils it in the wrong direction for him. G.: What is implied by over-fulfilling a norm? S.: That the speaker invoking it did not understand its consequences. G.: Very nice. Now if I ask whether La Nanna’s wit depends upon flouting Quality, what do you say? S.: Rarely. She tends not to lie. Her power comes from saying true things too pointedly or from arranging them too well. G.: Excellent. So the main engines are Quantity, Relation, and Manner. S.: With politeness forever hovering like a second legal code. G.: A non-conversational yet non-conventional reservoir. S.: Yes. She can imply insult through perfect civility. G.: Which is always the best sort. Cipolla ends with some form of retreat. What is the implicature of a dignified retreat after defeat? S.: That one still claims authorship of the ending. He cannot win the exchange, so he means to close it as though closure were victory. G.: Generalised? S.: Often, yes. The defeated frequently mistake last word for best word. G.: And La Nanna’s final line? S.: Usually a line that appears to release him while in fact fixing the reader’s judgment forever. G.: What kind of implicature is that? S.: Particularised, devastating, and perhaps best left unreported in mixed company. G.: Cowardice. S.: Prudence. G.: Accetto again. S.: Civilisation again. G.: Very well. Then let us conclude. Fra Cipolla says much, means less than he hopes, and implies more than he intends. La Nanna says just enough, means exactly what she wants, and lets the implicature do the strangling. S.: That is about right. G.: And the dialogue overall? S.: A manual of enlightened pressure under social constraint. G.: Too grand. S.: A friar’s defeat by conversational intelligence, then. G.: Better. One final classification. La Nanna’s wit: conventional, conversational, or diabolical? S.: Predominantly conversational, occasionally politeness-based, never merely lexical, and only diabolical if one is a friar. G.: Dry enough? S.: Sufficiently Chietine, with one excellent woman in command.Sterlich, Romualdo de (1750). Dialogo di fra Cipolla e la Nanna. Chieti.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stertinio – Ossia: Grice e Stertinio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stertinio. A marble monument dedicated to Sol Invictus by Marcus Aurelius Stertinius, procurator of the camp, and two of his brothers-in-arms. Probably third century; from the collection of the Walters Art Museum. The gens Stertinia was a plebeian family of ancient Rome. It first rose to prominence at the time of the Second Punic War, and although none of its members attained the consulship in the time of the Republic, a number of Stertinii were so honoured in the course of the first two centuries of the Empire.[1]  Praenomina The main praenomina used by the Stertinii were Lucius, Gaius, and Marcus, the three most common of all praenomina. There are also instances of Quintus and Publius, which likewise were very common names.  Columbarium of the Stertinii Along the Via Labicana is the Columbarium of the Stertinii, a tomb discovered in 1912, containing various Stertinii, and members of their household, including freedmen and their wives.[2] The tomb had a capacity of at least one hundred and sixty niche burials, organized in a grid, each containing a cinerary urn. Beneath many of the niches were inscriptions identifying their occupants, freeborn Stertinii as well as their liberti, often buried side by side.[3]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Lucius Stertinius, proconsul in Hispania Ulterior in 199 BC. He returned in 196, and was appointed one of ten commissioners sent with Titus Quinctius Flamininus to settle the affairs of Greece following the Second Macedonian War. He brought fifty thousand pounds of silver from Spain, with which he erected two arches topped with gilt statues in the Forum Boarium, and a third in the Circus Maximus.[4][5][6][7] Gaius Stertinius, praetor in 188 BC, received the province of Sardinia.[8][9] Lucius Stertinius, quaestor in 168 BC.[10] Stertinius, a stoic philosopher, humorously described by Horace as the eighth of the Seven Sages.[11][12] Lucius Stertinius, the legate of Germanicus, defeated the Bructeri in AD 15, and recovered the standard of the nineteenth legion, lost by Publius Quinctilius Varus in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest. He then received the surrender of Segimerus, the brother of Segestes, and the following year defeated the Angrivarii, obtaining their submission.[13][12] Marcus Stertinius, father of Gaius Stertinius Maximus, the consul of AD 23.[14] Stertinius Maximus, a rhetorician mentioned by Seneca the Elder, perhaps the same as the consul of AD 23.[15][14] Gaius Stertinius M. f. Maximus, consul suffectus in AD 23.[16][14][17] Gaius Stertinius C. l. Orpex, a freedman of the consul Stertinius Maximus, was a scribe and secretary. He was buried at Ephesus in Asia, together with his wife, Stertinia Quieta, and three young children: Gaius Stertinius Marinus, Gaius Stertinius Asiaticus, and Stertinia Prisca.[18][17] Stertinia C. l. Quieta, freedwoman of the consul Gaius Stertinius Maximus, and wife of Gaius Stertinius Orpex, her conlibertus, with whom she was buried at Ephesus.[18] Gaius Stertinius C. f. Marinus, son of Gaius Stertinius Orpex and Stertinia Quieta, buried with his parents at Ephesus, age eight.[18] Gaius Stertinius C. f. Asiaticus, son of Gaius Stertinius Orpex and Stertinia Quieta, buried with his parents at Ephesus, age three.[18] Stertinia C. f. Prisca, daughter of Gaius Stertinius Orpex and Stertinia Quieta, buried with her parents at Ephesus, age eight.[18] Stertinia C. f. Maria, the daughter of Stertinius Orpex.[17] Quintus Stertinius, a Roman physician in the time of Claudius. He and his brother were retained by the emperor for the sum of five hundred thousand sestertii per annum, less than they might have received in private practice, with which they helped beautify the city of Neapolis. Pliny describes their accumulated fortune as thirty million sestertii.[19][12] Gaius Stertinius Xenophon, the brother of Quintus, was suspected of having poisoned Claudius. He died the same year, although whether he perished as a result of the belief in his guilt, or coincidentally, is unclear.[20][21] Marcus Stertinius Rufus, father of Marcus Stertinius Rufus, the councilor.[14] Marcus Stertinius M. f. Rufus, served on the council of Lucius Helvius Agrippa, proconsul of Sardinia in AD 69.[22][14] Lucius Stertinius Avitus, consul suffectus ex kal. Mai. in AD 92, under the emperor Domitian, apparently the same praised by Martial in the ninth book of his Epigrams.[23][24][25][26][27][28] Publius Stertinius Quartus, consul suffectus in AD 112, and afterward proconsul of Asia.[23][29][24][30][14] Lucius Stertinius Noricus, consul suffectus in AD 113.[23][24][29][30] Gaius Stertinius, father of Lucius Stertinius Quintilianus, the consul of AD 146.[31] Lucius Stertinius C. f. Quintilianus Acilius Strabo Gaius Curiatius Maternus Clodius Nummus, consul suffectus in AD 146.[31][32][14] Stertinia L. f. Cocceia Bassula Venecia Aeliana, perhaps the granddaughter of the consul Lucius Stertinius Noricus, was the wife of Quintus Camurius Numisius Junior, legate of the sixth legion in Britain, and probably consul in AD 161.[33][34] Marcus Aurelius Stertinius, procurator of a Roman camp, who with two of his brothers-in-arms, Hermioneus and Balbinus, dedicated a monument to Sol Invictus Mithras. His name, Marcus Aurelius, suggests that he had been granted Roman citizenship by a member of the Severan dynasty.[35] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, pp. 907, 908 ("Stertinius").  Borbonus, p. 198.  Borbonus, p. 70.  Livy, xxxi. 50, xxxiii. 27, 35.  Polybius, xviii. 31.  Gurval, p. 38.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 328, 331, 334, 337, 338.  Livy, xxxviii. 35.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 365.  Livy, xlv. 14  Horace, Satirae, ii. 3, 33, 296, Epistulae, i. 12, 20.  PIR, vol. I, p. 272.  Tacitus, Annales, i. 60, 71, ii. 8, 22.  PIR, vol. I, p. 273.  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae, 9.  Fasti Arvales, AE 1987, 163; 1991, 306; 1991, 307.  Tilborg, p. 88.  AE 1935, 169.  Pliny the Elder, xxiv. 5.  Tacitus, Annales, xii. 67.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 273, 274.  CIL X, 7852.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244, 245, 4531–4546, 5354, 5355.  Fasti Potentini, AE 1949, 23; 2003, 588; 2005, 457.  CIL XVI, 37.  Martial, Epigrammata, ix.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 272, 273.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", pp. 191, 218.  Smallwood, Principates of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.  Eck, Paci, & Serenelli, "Per una nuova edizione dei Fasti Potentini".  CIL X, 1486.  Klonnek, Jahr 146.  Birley, pp. 256, 257.  PIR, vol. I, p. 274.  CIL VI, 727. Bibliography Polybius, Historiae (The Histories). Quintus Horatius Flaccus (Horace), Satirae (Satires), Epistulae (Letters). Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Elder), Controversiae. Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Naturalis Historia (Natural History). Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). E. Mary Smallwood, Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian, Cambridge University Press (1966). Paul A. Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 186–220 (1981). Robert Alan Gurval, Actium and Augustus: The Politics and Emotions of Civil War, University of Michigan Press (1995), ISBN 0472084895. Sjev van Tilborg, Reading John in Ephesus, E. J. Brill, Leiden (1996), ISBN 9004105301. Werner Eck, Gianfranco Paci, and E. Percossi Serenelli, "Per una nuova edizione dei Fasti Potentini", in Picus, vol. 23, pp. 51–108 (2003). Anthony R. Birley, The Roman Government in Britain, Oxford University Press (2005). Dorian Borbonus, Columbarium Tombs and Collective Identity in Augustan Rome, Cambridge University Press (2014), ISBN 9781107031401. Martin Klonnek, Chronologie des Römischen Reiches 2 Jahrhundert – Jahr 100 bis 199 (Chronology of the Roman Empire: the Second Century), epubli GmbH, Berlin (2014). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stertinio – Ossia: Grice e Stertinio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stertinio. For the Stertinii, there are several excellent Gricean candidates, but one stands out immediately:  Stertinius the Stoic philosopher, whom Horace jokingly calls the eighth of the Seven Sages. [GREXv3 | Word]  That is pure Gricean material. Grice e Stertinio: De Sapientia The joke already contains a conversational implicature. If someone is called:  "the eighth of the Seven Sages"  the literal content is impossible. There cannot be an eighth member of a group of seven. The hearer is forced to infer:  "He thinks himself wise." "Others think him excessively philosophical." "The praise is ironic."  That is exactly the sort of thing Grice loved. STERTINIVS. Sapiens sum. (I am wise.) HORATIVS. Immo octavus ex septem sapientibus. (Indeed, the eighth of the Seven Sages.) GRICE. Quod dicitur non est quod significatur. (What is said is not what is meant.)  The point is that Horace's remark works only because the audience recognizes the impossibility of the literal meaning and searches for the intended one. That is almost a textbook conversational implicature. Dry Speranzian formula  The Statilii criticize language; the Stenii testify; the Stertinii philosophize. Horace's Stertinius was called the eighth of the Seven Sages. Grice would point out that nobody could understand the remark literally. The hearer succeeds because he recognizes the speaker's intention and reconstructs the irony. Wisdom begins where literalism ends. [GREXv3 | Word]  And I suspect Grice would especially enjoy Stertinius because he arrives already wrapped in a joke. Horace forces the audience to perform exactly the inferential work that Grice later made famous.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stertinio – Ossia: Grice e Stertinio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stertinio. A very close second: the physicians The brothers  Quintus Stertinius Gaius Stertinius Xenophon  are also fascinating. They were physicians attached to Claudius, and Pliny comments on their immense wealth. Xenophon was later suspected of poisoning Claudius. [GREXv3 | Word] A Gricean theme immediately emerges:  expert authority.  How does a patient know whether a physician is healing or harming? The same act can receive incompatible descriptions:  treatment, negligence, poisoning.  That is a problem of interpretation.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stertinio – Ossia: Grice e Stertinio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stertinio. The rhetorician There is also:  Stertinius Maximus, rhetorician mentioned by Seneca the Elder. [GREXv3 | Word]  Given our recent discussion of Statilius Maximus, this is tempting. A rhetorician is always near Grice's interests because rhetoric depends upon audience inference. But we know too little about him. what is Seneca source for rhetorician? Do we have Latin? The gens article's source is very specific:  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae, book 9. [GREXv3 | Word]  However, the search results I could verify do not contain the actual passage mentioning Stertinius Maximus; they confirm the existence and availability of Seneca's Controversiae but not the relevant line itself. [catalog.perseus.org], [classics.a...adsden.com] So, at present, I can safely say only:  The identification of Stertinius Maximus as a rhetorician rests on a citation to Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 9. [GREXv3 | Word] I have not yet located the Latin text of the passage itself in the searchable material I found. [catalog.perseus.org], [classics.a...adsden.com]  A small philological point, though: if the rhetorician is indeed the same person as the later consul of AD 23 (as the gens article tentatively suggests), then Seneca's notice would be particularly valuable, because it would give us a glimpse of a future senator and consul in the rhetorical schools. [GREXv3 | Word] Your instinct is sound that this is potentially much more interesting than the bare prosopographical notice. Seneca often preserves memorable sententiae, stylistic quirks, and rivalries among declaimers, so the exact Latin could tell us a great deal about how Stertinius Maximus was perceived. In short: the source is Seneca, Controversiae 9, but I have not yet been able to recover the exact Latin wording from the sources available to me. [GREXv3 | Word] Does this help re: Stertinius? Thanks Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 7 siti In Seneca the Elder's Controversiae, the rhetorician Stertinius Maximus is primarily referenced and discussed in Book 2 (specifically Controversiae2.1.36) rather than Book 9. Loeb Classical Library +1 However, Book 9 features a highly famous preface (Contr. 9. praef.) that critiques the exhibitionist nature of the declamation schools. If you are looking at Book 9 regarding contemporary figures, you may be thinking of Votienus Montanus. Below is the context, Latin text, and English translation regarding Stertinius Maximus as recorded by Seneca the Elder. Loeb Classical Library +2 The Context Stertinius Maximus (who became a suffect consul in 23 CE) was a Roman rhetorician and a close, longtime friend of the quick-witted declaimer Vallius Syriacus. Despite their twelve-year friendship, Stertinius turned on Syriacus and attacked him. Syriacus retaliated during a debate with a famous, stinging piece of repartee that Seneca the Elder deemed too brilliant to leave out of his collection. Loeb Classical Library +3 Latin Text (Contr. 2.1.36) Et in Stertinium Maximum, qui illum ex vetere amicitia lora laeserat, dixit: „Duodecim annis in contubernio tuo fui; dic quid in domo tua peccaverim. Sed hoc vestri generis est: libertatis finem putatis iniuriam; tamdiu vobis placemus, quamdiu utiles sumus.“ Has Syriaci sententias, quia cum magno plausu exceptae erant, cum in memoriam mihi redissent, praeterire non potui. English Translation “And against Stertinius Maximus, who had attacked him despite their being old friends, he [Syriacus] said: 'For twelve years I was in your circle; tell me what I did wrong in your house. But this is typical of your type: you call the ending of slavery an insult. We are to your liking only as long as we are of use to you.' I could not leave out these witticisms of Syriacus, received as they were with great applause, once I recalled them.” Loeb Classical Library +1 If you are looking for a different Stertinius—such as the general under Germanicus mentioned by Tacitus, the Stoic philosopher mocked by Horace, or the wealthy imperial physician under Claudius—or if you meant a different section of Book 9, let me know so I can track down the exact passage you need! Wikipedia +2 Yes, this helps a lot, and it corrects something important. The gens article merely cites:  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 9. [attalus.org]  But the material you've found points instead to:  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 2.1.36, where Stertinius Maximus appears in an anecdote involving the declaimer Vallius Syriacus. [GREXv3 | Word]  The Latin passage quoted is:  Et in Stertinium Maximum, qui illum ex vetere amicitia laeserat, dixit: "Duodecim annis in contubernio tuo fui; dic quid in domo tua peccaverim. Sed hoc vestri generis est: libertatis finem putatis iniuriam; tamdiu vobis placemus, quamdiu utiles sumus." [GREXv3 | Word]  Seneca then adds:  Has Syriaci sententias ... praeterire non potui. ("I could not pass over these sayings of Syriacus.") [GREXv3 | Word]  Now this is much more Gricean than a mere prosopographical notice. The key line is:  libertatis finem putatis iniuriam "You take the end of dependence/slavery to be an injury." [GREXv3 | Word]  That is an argument about how an act is described. Syriacus is saying, in effect:                      One descriptionAnother descriptionindependenceinsultliberationingratitudeno longer usefuloffensive The same event receives rival characterizations. That is precisely the sort of thing Grice noticed repeatedly:  disputes often concern not the facts but the description under which the facts are presented.  There is also a nice conversational irony in the phrase:  tamdiu vobis placemus, quamdiu utiles sumus "We please you only so long as we are useful." [GREXv3 | Word]  The utterance explicitly states a social rule while simultaneously accusing Stertinius of exemplifying it. One could almost say that Syriacus is performing a rhetorical implicature:  "You claim friendship; your behaviour reveals utility."  So I now think the rhetorician Stertinius Maximus is a stronger Gricean candidate than I first realized. Not because of anything he himself says, but because Seneca preserves a memorable exchange in which friendship, usefulness, offense, and freedom are all matters of interpretation rather than brute fact. [GREXv3 | Word] And yes, there is a faint parallel with our Statilius Maximus discussion: both figures end up involved in disputes where the central question is not merely what happened, but how it should be described. [attalus.org], [GREXv3 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stertinio – Ossia: Grice e Stertinio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Stertinio. A delightful minor irony The Columbarium of the Stertinii is itself rather Gricean. It buried freeborn Stertinii and freedmen side by side, with inscriptions identifying them. [GREXv3 | Word] The monument becomes a system of labels:  name → person,  very much the sort of nomen/res problem we were just discussing with Tullianus.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stertinio – Ossia: Grice e Stertinio: la ragione conversazionale del tutore di filosofia – Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Il Portico Tutore di Damasippo. Note su Dicta sub Porticu. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Stertinio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del tutore di filosofia. Portico. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and the figure of Stertinius, as reconstructed from Roman moral discourse and sharpened in the passage under the Portico, meet on the idea that conversation is an intelligible activity only insofar as it is guided by rational expectations shared by speaker and hearer. Grice makes this explicit and formal: conversational meaning depends on the speaker’s intention being recognizable by a rational interlocutor who assumes that what is said is said for a reason, in accordance with the purpose of the exchange. Stertinius, by contrast, operates within a Stoic and pedagogical setting where reason governs conversation not by articulated maxims but by ethical orientation: his talk under the Portico is directed at shaping judgment, officium, and animus, not at satisfying surface expectations or decorative understanding. The episode with Damasippus illustrates precisely the kind of rational failure Grice would later theorize: the pupil “hears” porticus and fixes on walls and adornment, missing the intended level of relevance, because he fails to reason correctly about what is being meant in that context. Stertinius thus presupposes a rational listener capable of abstracting away from literal or culturally salient associations and tracking the tutor’s purpose, much as Grice presupposes a cooperative hearer capable of inferring implicatures. Where Grice describes conversational reason as a general structure underlying meaning in all ordinary talk, Stertinius embodies it as a moral discipline, exercised in dialogue, vulnerable to misfire when ambition, vanity, or social distraction disrupt the rational uptake that conversation requires. Tutore di Damasippo. GRICEVS: Salvē, Stertinī. Audīvī tē adhūc Damasippō praeceptōrem esse—sub Porticū, ut aiunt: ego semper mirātus sum quam multum in illō “porticū” lateat. GRICEVS: Apud nōs, cum quis “porticum” laudat, saepe satis est dīcere porticum—nē addāmus quidnam coloris; sed spero Damasippum tuum ab illō genere ornātūs servāvistī, quod Graecī amant, Rōmānī autem (nisi fallor) rubōre tegunt. STERTINIVS: Heu, Grice: Damasippus “porticum” audīvit et statim ad parietēs spectāvit, quasi philosophia in pictūrā nāscerētur. Ego autem dē ratiōne, dē officiō, dē animō loquēbar. STERTINIVS: Inplicaturam callidissimam, Grice! Nōn negō: porticus illa Graecē dicitur Στοὰ Ποικίλη—id est “porticus picta”; sed totum hoc Damasippō super caput fuit: nihil nisi dē togā novā cōgitābat, et maxime utrum satis virīlis foret, cum eam primum sumeret. In Grice's dictionary, Stilione follows Stertinio. Since none has a gens, Grice concludes that philosophers for Ancient Romans did not belong in a gens, and were 'mainly Greek paidagogi' -- is that true? How come neither Stertinio or Stilione bear the name of a gens -- were they considered bastards? No. That conclusion is too quick, and the “bastards” inference is simply wrong. The first thing is onomastic. In Roman and late-antique usage, not every person is cited with a full three-part or gentile name every time he is mentioned. Very often a figure survives in our sources under one name only, or under what looks like one name only, because that is how the literary source chose to refer to him, or because the rest of the name was not preserved, or because the man was known by a cognomen, signum, ethnic, or professional designation. Absence of an explicit gens in the surviving label does not mean absence of family, legitimacy, or civic standing. Second, Roman philosophers were not “mainly Greek paidagogi,” though Greek teachers and intellectuals were certainly crucial in Roman philosophical life. Rome imported philosophy largely from Greece, and many philosophers active at Rome were Greek, Greek-speaking, freedmen, tutors, rhetors, visiting intellectuals, or school figures. But there were also Roman aristocrats, Roman senators, Roman equestrians, and Roman men of letters deeply engaged in philosophy. Cicero alone is enough to spoil any over-neat formula. Seneca spoils it again. So does Varro. So does Boethius much later. The correct formula is that Roman philosophy is heavily mediated by Greek paideia, not that philosophers in Rome therefore lacked gens or legitimacy. Now to your two names. Stertinius looks, in fact, rather as though it may itself preserve a gentilic or family formation. It is not a name that forces one to say, “Ah, nameless fellow, probably illegitimate.” Quite the reverse: it has the look of a Roman nomen or nomen-derived form. If a source gives simply Stertinius, that may be because the figure is cited by what is already his most useful identifying name. One should not expect every source to append praenomen, nomen, cognomen, tribe, and grandfather. Stilo, or Stilione depending on what figure is meant, requires equal caution. If you mean Aelius Stilo, for example, then the gens is right there: Aelius is the gentilicium, and Stilo is the cognomen or by-name. In that case the whole problem disappears at once. If instead you mean some later “Stilione” in Italianized form, one still cannot infer bastardy from abbreviated citation. One would first need the exact Latin name and source. And that is really the key point. Ancient sources are not modern identity cards. They mention people under the name useful for that context. A philosopher may appear as “Favorinus,” “Epictetus,” “Musonius,” “Stilo,” “Plotinus,” or “Porphyry” without the source thereby making a statement about legitimacy or gens. Very often it is simply the common learned designation. As for bastardy itself, Roman naming does not work that way. Illegitimacy did not produce a neat convention of “no gens-name, therefore bastard.” Names could be shortened, altered, adopted, Hellenised, Latinised, or source-dependent for many reasons: slavery, manumission, adoption, literary habit, school identity, geographical association, or simple abbreviation. To move from “only one name is given” to “he was considered a bastard” would be a philological howler. So the short dry answer is this. No, it is not true that Roman philosophers generally lacked gens because they were mostly Greek pedagogues. No, the fact that Stertinius or Stilo/Stilione is cited without an obvious full gentilician bundle does not imply bastardy. And yes, many philosophers in Rome were transmitted under abbreviated or school-use names, because ancient literary memory is selective and practical, not because Roman society stripped philosophers of family identity. If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only. I can disentangle the exact figures behind Stertinius and Stilo one by one, with proper Roman-name analysis. Or I can give you a compact note on how Roman and late-antique sources cite philosophers by praenomen, nomen, cognomen, ethnic, school-title, or single learned name, and why that so often confuses modern readers.Stertinio (a. u. c. DCLXXX). Dicta sub Porticu. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stlaccio – Ossia: Grice e Stlaccio – Grex griceiana – Stlaccio -- The gens Stlaccia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Hardly any members of this gens are mentioned in history, but a number are known from inscriptions. By the second century, some of the Stlaccii had reached senatorial rank.  Origin The nomen Stlaccius is of Oscan origin.[1][2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Gaius Stlaccius, a maker of amphorae whose workshop was along the Baetis in Hispania. Some of his pottery was found at the Baths of Diocletian, in Rome.[3][4][5] Decimus Stlaccius, named in an inscription from Delos, dating from the second century BC.[1] Marcus Stlaccius M. l, a freedman employed as a scriba at Rome about the middle of the first century BC.[6][1] Marcus Stlaccius M. f., sailed on one of Caesar's ships during the African War in 46 BC, and was captured, but subsequently freed.[1] Quintus Stlaccius, named in an inscription from Delos, dating from the second century BC.[1] Tertia Stlaccia, named in an inscription from Delos, dating from the second century BC.[1] Gaius Stlaccius C. l. A[...], a freedman at Neapolis in Campania, where he worked as a mensor sacomarius, or measurer of weights, together with Aulus Stlaccius Mario.[7][1] Marcus Stlaccius Albinus Trebellius Sallustius Rufus, one of the senatorial patrons of an order for the enlargement of a temple at Ostia in Latium in AD 142.[8][9][10] Lucius Stlaccius L. f. Macedo, a resident of Cyrene, mentioned in a decree of Augustus, dating to 6 or 7 BC, along with his brother, Aulus Stlaccius Maximus.[1] Aulus Stlaccius A. l. Mario, a freedman at Neapolis, where he worked as a mensor sacomarius, together with Gaius Stlaccius.[7][1] Aulus Stlaccius L. f. Maximus, a resident of Cyrene, mentioned in a decree of Augustus, along with his brother, Lucius Stlaccius Macedo.[1] Stlaccia Ɔ. l. Quinta, a wealthy freedwoman who dedicated a tomb at Rome for herself, her husband, and her dispensator, or steward, Salvius.[11][12] See also List of Roman gentes References  PW, "Stlaccius" 1.  Chase, pp. 127, 128.  EE, ix. 424, 100, 101  CIL XV, 3195, CIL XV, 2969.  PW, "Stlaccius" 3.  CIL VI, 33421.  CIL X, 1930.  CIL XIV, 246.  PW, "Stlaccius" 2.  PIR, S. 671.  CIL VI, 9364.  PIR, S. 672. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Wilhelm Henzen, Ephemeris Epigraphica: Corporis Inscriptionum Latinarum Supplementum (Journal of Inscriptions: Supplement to the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, abbreviated EE), Institute of Roman Archaeology, Rome (1872–1913). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). Category: Roman gentes And about THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stlaccio – Ossia: Grice e Stlaccio – Grex griceiana – Stlaccio – For the Stlaccii, I think the most Gricean figure is neither the senator nor the amphora-maker, but the wonderfully obscure pair:  Gaius Stlaccius and Aulus Stlaccius Mario,  who worked at Neapolis as mensores sacomarii, measurers or inspectors of weights. [GREXv3 | Word] Why? Because they are professionally concerned with a distinction that Grice loved:  appearance versus standard.  Grice e Stlaccio: De Mensura MERCATOR. Pondus est. (It weighs what it should.) MENSOR. Videamus. (Let us see.) MERCATOR. Nonne satis est quod videtur? (Is it not enough that it appears so?) MENSOR. Non quod videtur quaerimus, sed quid sit. (We seek not what appears, but what is.) GRICE. Communicatio mensuram requirit. (Communication requires standards.)  There is something deeply philosophical about weights and measures. All cooperative activity requires shared standards. When a merchant says:  "This is a pound,"  the utterance succeeds only because speaker and hearer accept a common measure. Grice's Cooperative Principle presupposes exactly this sort of background coordination. Dry Speranzian formula  The Statilii judge words; the Stenii judge testimony; the Stlaccii judge measures. The measurers of weights at Neapolis existed so that public transactions could rest on common standards. Grice would observe that conversation likewise depends upon standards shared by speaker and hearer. Before one can communicate truly, one must first agree on the scale. [GREXv3 | Word]  And there is a final irony. The grammarian asks whether a word is correctly formed. The mensor sacomarius asks whether a weight is correct. Both are, in their own way, guardians of standards.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stlaccio – Ossia: Grice e Stlaccio – Grex griceiana – Stlaccio -- A second candidate: Marcus Stlaccius the scriba Another attractive possibility is:  Marcus Stlaccius, the freedman employed as a scriba at Rome. [GREXv3 | Word]  A scribe lives by recording speech in writing. That immediately raises Gricean questions about:  spoken versus written communication, intention and record, permanence of meaning.  But we know almost nothing else about him.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stlaccio – Ossia: Grice e Stlaccio – Grex griceiana – Stlaccio -- A third possibility: Quinta I am also intrigued by:  Stlaccia Quinta, the wealthy freedwoman who erected a tomb for herself, her husband, and her steward (dispensator) Salvius. [GREXv3 | Word]  The dedicatory inscription functions as a statement about social identity and status, themes we encountered earlier with Steia Fortunata.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stlaccio – Ossia: Grice e Stlaccio – Grex griceiana – Stlaccio -- A linguistic temptation The nomen itself is curious. Unlike the elegant Stellius or Stertinius, Stlaccius preserves a distinctly Oscan flavor. The initial cluster Stl- looks almost resistant to ordinary Latin phonetic expectations. The name itself feels like evidence of linguistic diversity surviving inside Roman society. [GREXv3 | Word] A Gricean might enjoy that because it reminds us that linguistic norms are often local rather than universal.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Strabonio – Ossia: Grice e Strabonio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Strabonia. The gens Strabonia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned by ancient writers, but several are known from inscriptions.  Origin The nomen Strabonius belongs to a class of gentilicia derived primarily from cognomina ending in -o. The surname Strabo was originally applied to a person known for squinting, part of a large group of cognomina deriving from the physical traits and characteristics of an individual.[1]  Praenomina All of the Strabonii found in inscriptions bear common praenomina, including Gaius, Publius, Titus, and Quintus.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Strabonia, probably the mother of [...]ennius, a person buried at Perusia in Etruria.[2] Gaius Strabonius, dedicated a monument at Vazuanis in Numidia for his wife, Octavia Successa, aged seventy.[3] Strabonius Datianus, a soldier in the first urban cohort at Rome, mentioned in a monument from Tunes in Africa Proconsularis, dating from AD 230.[4] Strabonia Euphrosyne, dedicated a monument for her friend, Caesidia Ionis, at Vicohabentia in Cisalpine Gaul, dating to the late second or early third century.[5] Strabonia C. l. Eutychia, a freedwoman buried at Julia Concordia in Venetia and Histria, in a late first- or early second-century tomb dedicated by Vettia Anthis.[6] Publius Strabonius P. f. Eutychus, buried at Rome, along with his sisters, Vipsania Glypte and Munia Trophime, in a tomb built by their father, Publius Strabonius Primigenius.[7] Quintus Strabonius Honoratianus, buried at Bulla Regia in Africa Proconsularis.[8] Publius Strabonius Primigenius, dedicated a sepulchre at Rome for his children, Vipsania Glypte, Publius Strabonius Eutychus, and Munia Trophime.[7] Titus Strabonius Primigenius, together with his wife, Quinta Laodamia, dedicated a second-century tomb at Rome for their daughter, Strabonia Venusta.[9] Strabonia Prisca, the mistress of Clado, a slave named in an inscription from Alba Fucens in Sabinum.[10] Strabonia Secundilla, along with her daughter, Trebius Rufilla, dedicated a tomb at Trasacco in Sabinum to her husband, Gaius Trebius Optatus.[11] Gaius Strabonius C. l. Tremissus, a freedman named in an inscription from Ateste in Venetia and Histria.[12] Strabonia Venusta, dedicated a tomb at Rome for Titus Statilius Clarus, her husband of fourteen years.[13] Strabonia T. f. Venusta, buried at Rome, aged nine years, six months, in a second-century tomb dedicated by her parents, Titus Strabonius Primigenius and Quinta Laodamia.[9] Strabonia Victorina, buried at the present site of Lendava, formerly part of Pannonia Superior, aged thirty-nine, with a monument from her husband, Gaius Julius Severinus, a veteran of the Legio I Adiutrix. In an adjoining tomb was their friend, Gaius Ulpius Licinius.[14] See also List of Roman gentes References  Chase, pp. 109, 118, 119.  Supplementa Italica, xxx. 65.  CIL VIII, 17648.  AE 1984, 928.  AE 1985, 405.  CIL V, 8709.  CIL VI, 26880.  CIL VIII, 10585.  CIL VI, 26881.  CIL IX, 3984.  CIL IX, 3879.  AE 1997, 698.  CIL VI, 26757.  CIL III, 4148. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Supplementa Italica (Supplement for Italy), Unione Accademica Nazionale. René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Category: Roman gentes And about THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Strabonio – Ossia: Grice e Strabonio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Strabonia. For the Strabonii, the Gricean choice almost selects itself because the nomen itself invites a classic distinction between reference and description. The family name derives from Strabo, originally a nickname for a person who squinted. [GREXv3 | Word] That immediately recalls a theme we have already seen with Spurius, Clemens, Severus, and similar Roman names. Grice e Strabonio: De Nomine et Descriptione STRABONIVS. Strabo vocor. (I am called Strabo.) INTERROGATOR. Ergo strabus es? (Then you squint?) STRABONIVS. Nomen est. (It is a name.) GRICE. Aliud est referre, aliud describere. (It is one thing to refer, another to describe.)  The philosophical point is simple. Originally:  Strabo = "the squint-eyed one."  But once it becomes:  Strabonius  the descriptive force weakens and the referential force increases. A later Strabonius need not squint at all. The name now functions primarily as an identifier. This is very close to Grice's resistance to the idea that every proper name conceals a description. Dry Speranzian formula  The Strabonii teach Grice that a description may harden into a name. "Strabo" once described a physical characteristic. "Strabonius" became a family designation. What originally conveyed information later served mainly to identify a person. The history of the name illustrates the gradual triumph of reference over description. [GREXv3 | Word]  And Grice would surely enjoy the irony:  the descendants of "the squinter" may have had perfect eyesight, yet the name remained. That is good evidence that names are not merely concealed descriptions.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Strabonio – Ossia: Grice e Strabonio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Strabonia. A second candidate: Strabonia Euphrosyne Among the actual individuals, I would choose:  Strabonia Euphrosyne,  who erected a monument for her friend Caesidia Ionis. [GREXv3 | Word] Like our earlier discussion of Gaius Stellius Primigenius, this raises the question:  What exactly is communicated when someone is called a "friend"?  The inscription defines the relationship not through kinship but through voluntary association. [GREXv3 | Word] That is fertile Gricean territory because "friend" is heavily dependent on context and inference.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Strabonio – Ossia: Grice e Strabonio – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Strabonia. A third possibility There is also a nice Russellian example in:  Strabonia Venusta,  whose name appears in more than one inscription and for more than one individual. One is a child, another a wife commemorating a husband. [GREXv3 | Word] That reminds us that names alone do not always secure identification; context does much of the work.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Stucchi – Ossia: Grice e Stucchi: la ragione conversazionale della filosofia perenne di Pitagora, Cicerone, Ovidio, Virgilio, e Plinio  il creatore e Grice, la creazione delle creature -- la citta della verita perenne – Note su Philologica. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Guido Stucchi (Gubbio, Perugia, Umbria): la ragione conversazionale della filosofia perenne di Pitagora, Cicerone, Ovidio, Virgilio, e Plinio. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and Guido Stucchi’s conception of philosophia perennis intersect on the claim that meaningful discourse is sustained by rational intelligibility that transcends local idiom, historical contingency, and mere verbal display. Grice approaches this at the micro‑level of ordinary conversation: what a speaker means is constrained by what a rational hearer can infer under assumptions of cooperation, restraint, and mutual accountability, so that implication is always answerable to reason rather than to poetic excess. Stucchi, by contrast, works at a macro‑historical and metaphysical level, reading Pythagoras, Cicero, Ovid, Virgil, Pliny, and the wisdom of Rome as participating in a continuous rational order that manifests itself through time in different linguistic and cultural forms. Yet the comic exchange about creation and creatures reveals a shared discipline: Stucchi’s insistence that every utterance is only a trace pointing beyond itself mirrors Grice’s insistence that speakers should not say more (or less) than reason licenses, lest implication dissolve into mystification. Where Grice guards conversational meaning against inflation through explicit principles and maxims, Stucchi guards philosophical meaning against dispersion by anchoring it in perennial rational structures that remain intelligible across eras. In both, reason is not an ornament added to language but its governing condition: for Grice it governs what may be meant in talk, for Stucchi it governs what may count as true philosophy across the long conversation of Western thought. -- il creatore e Grice, la creazione delle creature -- filosofia umbra – la citta della verita perenne -- STEUCO (Stucchi), Guido (in religione Agostino). Secondo i riferimenti autobiografici disseminati nelle opere, nasce a Gubbio, allora sotto i Montefeltro, dall’agiata famiglia degli Stucchi. Il padre si chiama Teseo; uno dei fratelli, canonico della cattedrale, Francesco; un altro, magistrato della città, Mariotto. Mantenne il nome Guido fino a quando entra nel noviziato di S. Secondo, appartenente all’Ordine dei canonici agostiniani di S. Salvatore, prendendovi l’abito e assumendo il nome di Agostino -- Nicolai. Mentre infuria la guerra tra fiorentini e urbinati, e Leone X fulmina l’interdetto contro Gubbio, lascia la patria per passare a Bologna nel chiostro di S. Salvatore, centro del sapere dove aveva risieduto Codro, che, con Fabbri, vi aveva raccolto preziosi manoscritti fondando la biblioteca del convento. Come testimoniano gli atti del capitolo dell’Ordine, vi rimase, salvo una parentesi a Venezia -- Freudenberger. A Bologna completa gli studi di filosofia, frequenta i corsi di retorica ed ebraico all’Università, apprese i rudimenti dell’arabo e le lingue utili alla comprensione del testo biblico -- il greco da Petros Ypsila, l’ebreo e il caldeo da Giovanni Flaminio --, si interessò di fisica e matematica e si guadagna la stima dei superiori, che lo destinarono a insegnare filosofia. In anni in cui era vivo il magistero dell’aristotelico POMPONAZZI , S. traduce alcune pagine dei classici e si lega ad Amaseo, Calcagnini -- con il quale avrebbe intrattenuto una corrispondenza --, Grimani e Pio che, secondo alcuni biografi, alla morte gli avrebbe lasciato parte dei propri libri. Venne assegnato al convento di S. Antonio di Castello a Venezia, dove si recò passando per Ferrara. Qui divenne amico di Massari e arricchì la propria rete di rapporti. Crotone, i velini – I crotonensi --. Cicerone, ovidio, Virgilio, plinio, roma, aqua virgo.  Grice: Caro Stucchi, devo confessare che quando penso alla "filosofia perenne" e ai tuoi illustri riferimenti – Pitagora, Cicerone, Ovidio, Virgilio, Plinio – mi sento come un creatore che, tra una creatura e l’altra, si ritrova a Gubbio in cerca della verità eterna. Dimmi, come si convive con così tanti giganti sulle spalle, e pure con la pioggia umbra? Stucchi: Ah, caro Grice, Gubbio è proprio la città delle verità perenni – e anche dei temporali perenni! Ma ti dirò, convivere con Pitagora e Virgilio è un po’ come cenare con parenti che non smettono mai di filosofare: tra una metafora e una equazione, qui si medita persino sul brodo! Grice: Capisco, capisco... D’altronde, quando mi capita di creare qualche creatura, mi limito a implicare il creatore – per modestia, si intende. In fondo, la filosofia dalle tue parti ha sempre avuto un gusto speciale: come l’aqua virgo, che non disseta mai del tutto, ma lascia sempre il desiderio di un’altra verità. Stucchi: Bellissima implicatura, Grice! Hai colto il segreto dei filosofi di Gubbio: qui si crea, si traduce, si insegna, ma senza mai dire tutto – ogni creatura è solo una traccia, un invito a cercare il creatore dietro le quinte. E se la verità perenne si nasconde… almeno il brodo è sempre in tavola! Stucchi, Guido (1497). Philologica. Gubbio.