This suggests dropping the requirement (for speaker's meaning) that U should intend A's production of response to be based on A's recognition of Us intention that A should produce the response; it suggests the retention merely of conditions (1) and (2). But this will not do: there are examples which require this condition:

1. Herod, showing Salome the head of St. John the Baptist, can-not, I think, be said to have meant that St. John the Baptist was dead.
2. Displaying a bandaged leg (in response to a squash invitation).

In (b) the displayer could mean

(1)

that he cannot play squash

or (dubiously)

(2)

that he has a bad leg the bandages might be fake)

but not

(3) that his leg is bandaged.

The third condition seems to be required in order to protect us from counterintuitive results in these cases. Possible Remedies

(i) We might retain the idea that the intended effect or response (for cases of meaning that it is the case that —indicative type) is activated belief, retaining in view the distinction between reaching this state (1) from assurance-deficiency and (2) from attention-deficiency, and stipulate that the third condition (that U intends the response to be elicited on the basis of a recognition of his intention to elicit that response) is operative omly when U intends to elicit activated belief by eliminating assurance-deficiency, not when he intends to do so by eliminating attention-deficiency. This idea might be extended to apply to imperative types of cases, too, provided that we can find cases of reminding someone to do something (restoring him to activated in-tention) in which Us intention that A should reach the state is similarly otiose, in which it is not to be expected that A's reaching the activated intention will be dependent on his recognition that U intends him to reach it. So the definition might read roughly as follows (*, is a mood marker, an auxiliary correlated with the propositional attitude w from a given range of propositional attitudes):

"U means by uttering x that *P" = "U utters x intending

1. that A should actively & that p
2. that A should recognize that U intends (1) and (unless U intends the utterance of x merely to remedy attention-deficiency)
3. that the fulfillment of (1) should be based on the fulfillment of (2)."