GRICE ITALICO A/Z C5

 

 

Grice e Capocasale: l’implicatura conversazionale dei segni di dialettica – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza  (Montemurro). Filosofo italiano. Grice: “You gotta love Capocasale; my favourite is his ‘corso filosofico,’ which the monks rendered as ‘CVRSVS PHILOSOPHICVS,’ almost alla Witters! Capocasale multiplies the principles of reason – I thought there was just one – On top, he uses the trouser-word, ‘vero,’ – so he thinks he is philosophising about the ‘vero principio della ragione,’ or its plural! In fact, he is philosophising about conversational implicature!” Figlio di Lorenzo e Maria Lucca, sin da ragazzino aiuta il padre nel suo mestiere di fabbro ferraio. Nel tempo libero si dedica alla filosofia, mostrando grande attitudine nella filosofia romana antica in particolare. Con la morte del padre, avvenuta quando C. aveva 15 anni, visse tra Corleto Perticara, Stigliano e San Mauro Forte, procurandosi da vivere come insegnante privato, dedicandosi contemporaneamente allo studio della filosofia e del diritto.  Dopo esser stato governatore baronale di Sarconi, incarico ottenuto appena ventenne, lasciò la Basilicata per trasferirsi a Napoli, conseguendo la laurea in giurisprudenza. Dopo gli studi universitari, insegnò filosofia nella scuola dallo stesso fondata a Napoli. Vestì l'abito talare e fu nominato da Ferdinando IV precettore di logica e di metafisica all'Napoli.  Perse tale incarico con l'arrivo di Giuseppe Bonaparte: sotto il suo governo gli fu concessa solamente la docenza privata. Con la restaurazione, Ferdinando IV lo nominò vescovo di Cassano. C., tuttavia, preferendo l'insegnamento, rinunciò alla carica, così come fece più tardi con l'incarico di pari grado conferitogli per la diocesi di Sora-Aquino-Pontecorvo. Sempre nell'ateneo partenopeo ebbe la cattedra di diritto di natura e delle genti: i suoi teoremi, di stampo lockiano, ebbero una certa risonanza, tanto da essere citati da filosofi come Fiorentino, Gentile e Garin.  Alcuni suoi discepoli divennero importanti personalità culturali del tempo come Francesco Iavarone, Quadrari, Scorza, Arcieri e Mazzarella. Sempre fedele alla monarchia borbonica, si schierò contro le insurrezioni carbonare. Precettore del futuro re delle Due Sicilie: Ferdinando II. Fu inoltre membro di varie Accademie come la Parmense, la Fiorentina, la Cosentina, l'Augusta di Perugia, Aletina e Renia di Bologna, degli Intrepidi di Ferrara, de' Nascenti e degli Assorditi di Urbino, dei Filoponi di Faenza. Altre opere:“Divota novena del gloriosissimo taumaturgo S. Mauro” (Roma); “Esercizio di divozione verso il glorioso confessore S. Rocco” (Napoli); “Cursus philosophicus” (Napoli); “Saggio di politica privata per uso dei giovanetti ricavata dagli scritti dei più sensati pensatori” (Napoli); “Catechismo dell'uomo e del cittadino” (Napoli); “Codice eterno ridotto in sistema secondo i veri principi della ragione e del buon senso” (Napoli); “Saggio di fisica per giovanetti” (Napoli); “Istituzioni elementari di matematica” (Napoli); “Corso filosofico per uso dei giovanetti”.  Dizionario biografico degl’italiani -- un filosofo lucano alla corte dei Borboni. Quoniam PHILOSOPHIA est scientia quae viam ad felicitatem sternit. Ea vero rationis solius ductu cognoscitur, ac demostrationis ope vernm investigat. In vero autem inveniendo methodus utramque facit paginam. Patet primum FILOSOFI studium esse debere, intellectum, sive facultatem cogitandi, ad veritatem methodice investigandam, ac di iudicandam aptum reddere, eumque mediis opportunis acuere, vel, si morbo aliquo laboret, salutaribus eidem mederi remediis. Et quia veritas per demonstrationem invenitur et iudicatur. Demonstratio vero methodo perficitur. Liquet, ei necessarium esse, mentem quoque ad demonstrationem, ac methodum ad sue facere, ut in eo habitum adquirat, in quo FILOSOFI scientia consistit. Quamvis vero omnes homines naturali quodam verum cognoscendi, iudicandi, rationes denique conficiendi facultate praediti sint, eaque a multis usu, atque exercitatione ad summum usqne perfectionis gradum sit redacta: quum tamen plurimis erroribus sint obnoxii, nisi facultatem illam regulis quibusdam certis, at que indubiis dirigant, disciplina aliqua in veniatur, oportet, quae regulas ac praecepta tradat, quibus naturalis illa cogitandi vis augeatur, perficiatur, et ad veritatis investigationem in offenso pede dirigatur. Naturalis haec percipiendi, iudicandi, ratiocinandi que vis LOGICA NATURALIS appellatur, quae qunn in casuum similium observatione, adeoqne in sola praxi consistat, non solum erroribus est obnoxia sed rerum causas et rationes ignorans, confusam tantummodo cognitionem, non vero scientiam producere potest. Ex quo legitime fluit LOGICAE ARTIFICIALIS necessitas. Disciplina haec vulgo LOGICA ARTIFICIALIS appellatur, quam definimus per doctrinam, qua regulae traduntur, quibus, humana mens in cognoscenda, et di iudicanda veritate dirigatur. Vocatur haec a  non nullis PHILOSOPHIA RATIONALIS, ARS COGITANDI, et kat i Sony LOGICA. Logicae Prolegomena quae tantum abest, ut essentialiter a Naturali differat, ut sit potius distincta eiusdem explicatio, adeoque tanto illa praestantior quanto distincta cognitio praestat confusae. Ex quo patet, FILOSOFI sola Logica naturali esse non posse contentum, sed ei colendam esse artificialem. Quandoquidem autem Logica artificialis leges explicat naturalem iudicandi facultatem dirigentes: sequitur ut eas ex mentis humanae natura deducat, adeoque mentis operationes prius, carum que naturam distincte explicare; deinde vero eam in veritatis investigatione, atque examine veluti manuducere debeat: uno verbo, ut prima theoriam, deinde praxin ostendat. Vltro ergo mihi sese offert genuina Logicae divisio, in THEORETICAM ET PRACTICAM. Atque hinc est, cur opusculum hoc in duas partes distribuerimus. In quarum prima de mentis operationibus. In altera de legitimo carum usu, quantum satis erit, tractabimus. Quoniam autem humana mens triabus modis res cognoscit; vel enim eas tan tummodo percipit, vel de iis iudicium profert, vel denique rationes conficit. De tribus his mentis operationibus priore parte agemus. Quumque veritates vel per se pateant, vel per rationem et meditationern inveniantur, vel denique ex aliorum scri Prolegomena. ptis hauriantur: inventae vero cum aliis communicentur. De omnibus his parte secunda non nulla haud proletaria monebimus. Experientia namque constat, nos omnis cognitionis expertes in mundum prodire (quidquid pro ideis innatis Platonici, et Cartesiani clamitent), atque primo res simpliciter perei pere, earumque ideas adquirere, deinde binas inter se conferre, tandem eas cum aliqua tertia idea comparare, indeque novas veritates deducere. Mentis actio, qua res aliquas sensibus obvias percipit, aut ab iis abstrahendo novas imagines sibi format, PERCEPTIO, sive idea dicitur: quum hinas ideas invicena confett, IVDICIVM: dum vero eas cum aliis comparat, atque inde novas veritates elicit RATIOCINIVM nominatur. Nec aliae attente consideranti mentis operationes occurrere pote runt. Scholion. De Logicae utilitate non est, quod plura dicamus. Quamvis enim quam plurimi eam scriptis suis ad astra tulerint; quisque tainen in se huiusmodi periculum facere poterit: nam quidquid ex recta ratione capiet emolumenti, id omne huic disciplinae se debere, aperto cognoscet. Prima mentis hnmanae operatio est SIMPLEX PERCEPTI, sive NOTIO sive NOTA sive SIGNUM, quam definimus per simplicem rei alicuius re-praesentationem in mente factam praesentationem autem intelligunt ad curatio res assimilationem eorum, quae sunt extra ens, in eodem. Dici quoque solet idea, conceptus, vel sim. Per rea plex apprehensio, ut scholis placuit. Sunt, qui perceptionem ab idea distinguendam putant, atque illam esse aiunt, mentis actionem in obiecto percipiendo. Hanc vero ipsam abiecti imaginem menti percipienti obviam, Sunt, qui eas terminis tantum differre docent. Quidquid id est, nobis placuit perceptionem cum idea confundere. Ad eoque nusquain hic de huiusmodi distinctione sermo cadet. Ideam alii definiunl per imaginem menti obversantem. Buddeus Phil. instrum. cum observ. alii per exemplar rei in cigitante. Hollmannus Log. Sed hae, aliaeqne definitiones eodem redeunt. Repraesentationis vox absque definitione ad sumi poierat, quum sit cuique nota. Sed ut methodici rigoris amatoribus non nihil daremus eam ita explicavimus, sequuti Baumeisterum Quoniam itaque notio est rei re-praesentatio. In omni autem re-praesentatione duo considerarida veniunt, nem, pe modus re-praesentandi, et obiectum, sive res ipsa quae re-praesentatur: liquet, in qualibet idea itidem duo animadverti posse, scilicet percipiendi modum, et obiecta nempe res perceptas; quorum ille FORMA, haec MATERIA idearum recte dicuntur. Si ergo ideae ad formam referantur consideratio illa dicetur FORMALIS. Si vero ad materiam, OBIECTIVA, vel Realis appellabitur, Et quia utroque respectu ideae inter se differunt: de formali ac materiali earum differentia diversis sectionibus agemus. MATE B nos De formali idearum differentia Experi Xperientia abunde constat quaedam ita percipere, ut ca ab aliis inter noscere possimus, quaedam vero non ita. Re-praesentatio illa quae sufficit ad rem perceptam ab aliis dignoscendam, idea di citur CLARA; OBSCURA contra, quae ad eam discernendam est insufficiens. Vnde idea recte dividitur in claram et obscuram E. Rosae ideam claram habes, ei eam a lilio, hiacynto, aliisque floribus distinguere scias, et quoties cumque tibi occurrit, eam dem agnoscas; contra si arborem peregrinam videas, eamque a reliquis plantis discernere nequeas, arboris illius ideam habes obscuram. Huiusmodi sunt ideae infantum recens natorum, hominum bene potorum, eorumqne, qui lethargo oppressi reperiuntur. CLARITAS enim Physicis est ille lucis effectus, cuius operes externas circa nos positas alias ab aliis distingnere possumus; contra vero OBCVRITAS est claritatis absentia, scilicet tenebrarum eftectus: nam quun tenebrae in lucis privatione consistant, haec vero obiecta externa distinguere faciat. Deficiente luce, deficit distinctionis facilitas: adeoque obscuritas in distinguendi impotentia sita est. Quum res existentes innumeris determinationibus et circumstantiis involutae observentur. Hae vero, nisi attente consideranti, sensuumqne aciem ad obiecta convertenti, innotescere non possint, ut experientia patet: recte infertur eo clariorem fieri ideam, quo plura possunt in obiecta distingui; adeoque ad claram idean adquirendam requiri sensus cum attentione coniunctos, qua deficiente, ideas fieri deteriores Esenplo sit hono in maxima distantia constitutus, qnem qui vilet, primo dubius hae ret, utrum corp is quidlibet sit, an vivens; deinde in obiectum illud oculorun aciem attente convertens, a motu animal esse comperit, sed cuiusnam speciei, nescit; propius vero accedenten, ho nisen distinguit; tandem ex corporis habiti, facie, aliis que circumstantiis Titium agnoscit. Vides quan attente spectator consideraverit, ut Titium cognosceret! Quem admodun ideae meliores funt, si ex obscuris clarae evadant, ex confusis distin ctae, ex inadaequatis adaequatae: ita deterio res redduntur, si ex claris fiant obscurae ex distinctis confusae ex adaequatis inadaequatae. Quia vero ab attentione penlet claritas idearum, eaque gralus habet, nec semper, aut in omnibus eadem est: liquet res alias aliis clarius a no 7 38 Logic. Pars 1. bis percipi posse, ideoque obscuritatem dari non modo ABSOLVTAM sed RELATIVAM. Hinc obscuritatis caussam plerumquc in hominibus, raro in re percepta quaeren dam esse; ac proinde praecipitanter iu dicare illos, qui absolute obscura esse di cunt, quae eorum superant captum: quo ut quae ignorant (ut Aesopica vul pes ) exsecrentur. * Obscuritas vel absoluta est, vel relativa. Illa habetur quum res percepta ab aliis prorsus internosci' non potest; haec autem, quando rem qampiam aliqui subobscure, quidam clar re, clarius alii percipiunt. Quod quum acci dit, illorum claritas respectu maioris horum claritatis est obscuritas relativa. fit Quoniam autem ad idearum clarita tem utramque facit paginam attentio, qua deficiente deteriores fiunt: con Sequens est ut obscurae eyadant perce ptiones, si alicui meditationi defisi alia percipiamus, vel si unico actu plura aut animo subiiciamus, denique si ab una perceptione ad aliam celerrime transeamnus. Et quia adfectus attentionem turbant, ut cxperientia docet: infertur menten adfectibus agitatam ad ideas cla ras vel numquam, vel raro admodum per, venire. Adfectus enim sunt motus quidam vehementiores appetitus sensitivi ex idearum obscuritate, et confusione orti, de quibus abunde in Psy chologia disseremus, adeoque iis praedominan tibus nullae, nisi obscurae confusaeve ideae haberi possunt. Si namque in ideis claritas et distinctio adesset, nullis adfectibus animus ve xaretur. Hinc ergo est, ut a Philosophis ad fectus inter errorum caussas enumerentur. Exemplo sit homo ira aestuans, qui donec ea agitatur, nec res clare percipere, nec perce ptionum suarum conscius esse potest. Vid. Seneca de Ira, et apud Virg. Aen. Furor, iraque mentem prae cipitant.Vides hinc, obscuritatis caussas easdem esse, quae attentionem turbant vel minuunt: nem pe distractionem, obiectorum multipli citatem, praeproperam festinationem, denique adfectuum praedominium. Quae omnia mentem frustra fatigant, et ad proficiendum în studiis ineptam reddunt. Sed quia Philosophus non solis stare sensibus; rerum autem latebras et recessus idest caussas et rationes inve stigare debet: per se patet 10. eum claris notionibus adquiescere non pos adeoque il. in distinctarum et adae quatarum perceptionum statu versari debe re ut infra dicemus. se; Clarae namque ideae attento sensuum usu ad Logic. Pars I. quiruntur; sensus autem, ut mox adparebit, res tantummodo exsistentes confuse repraesentant', in quarum cognitione nullum ra tio habet exercitium: nihil ergo Philosophus age Tet; nec hihim quidem in scientia proficeret si claris dumtaxat ideis contentus rationem ne gligeret, nec in caussarum inve stigatioue adlaboraret. Eadem experientia docet, nos re rum quas clare percipimus, vel notas sive characteres quibus ab aliis discer nuntur, distincte nobis sistere posse, eo rum scilicet ideam claram nabere; vel characteres illos invicem non posse digno sive ipsos obscure percipere. Re praesentatio clara' notarum obiecti, quod percipimus, idea dicitur DISTINCTA: repraesentatio contra notarum obscura, vo catur idea CONFUSA. Idea clara proin de merito dividitur in distinctam, et con fusan. seere 8 Si quis invidiam novit esse taedium ob alterius felicitatem, illius characteres sibi clare sistit, adeoque invidiae ideam habet distin ctam. Si vero coloris nigri notas distinguere nequeat, licet eum ab aliis coloribus discer nat, ejusdem ideam habet confusam: uti sunt omnes ideae colorum, saporum, sonorum, odo rum, etc., quorum characteres prorsus igno ramus. Distinctio haec a Cartesio, et Leibniz E. Cap. I. De Ideis. 41 tio inventa fuit: alii namque grammatica vo cum significatione decepti, ideas claras'ét di stinctas obscuras et confusas 'unum idemque esse docebant. Quum idea distincta sit notio clara notarum; ad claritatem autem notionum permultum conferat attentio: consequens est ut clarae ideae di stinctae fiant potissimum attentione, qua deficiente, etiamsi distinctae sint, confu sae evadant. Et quia singulae notae peculiaribus gaudent nominibus, qui bus exprimuntur: infertur CRITERIVM ideae distinctae id esse, si cogitala nostra aliis.cxponere, atque con is com municare queainus; oppositum autem ess: indicium ideae confusae. Hinc idcas confusas aliis referre volentes, objecta, quae confuse percepimus, ipsis ostendere, vel cum alia re, de qua ideam habent claram, comparare debemus. * Res clarior fiet exemplis supra allatis. Qui notionem invidiae habet distinctam, is eam verbis explicare poterit: quod recte ex sequetur, si notas, quib:is a:lfectuš iste ab aliis distinguitur, eau neret. Contra ei, quo modo coloris albi aut rubri nolas proferet, ut cum aliis eius notionenı corninunicet? Pro cul dubio, ut ab illo intelligatur, colorem illum, aut rem quampiar confuse perceptam, ipsius oculis admovere, vel cum alia re iarna nota conferre oportebit, sicque in altero con fusa quoque idea orietur. Hinc est, ut colo rum ideas coeco nato nullo modo explicarc possimus, isque visu carens nullam, nequi dem obscuram, umquam huiusmodi notionem adquirere queat. Porro rei, cuius distinctam habe mus ideam, vel omnes novimus characte res ad eam in statu quolibet agnoscendam sufficientes, et tunc idea distincta erit COMPLETA; vel quosdam tantum eosque insufficientes, eaqne INCOMPLETA dicetur. * Idea ergo distincta dispescitur in completam, et incompletam. Sic invidiae idea iam tradita completa est: adsunt enim notae sufficientes ad eam in statu quolibet internoscendam. Si ve ro hominem cum Platone definires per ani mal bipes implume, notionem haberes incom pletam: * hae namque notae non sufficiunt ad hominem semper ab aliis rebus discernendum, ut ostendit Diogenes Cynicus, dum hanc Pla tonis sententian irridendo improbavit. Nec eam postea coinpletam reddere potuerunt Platonis discipuli, addito latorum unguium charactere: nusquam enim homines a simiis discernere illa nota valebat. Laert. Lib. VI. cap. 2. segm. 40. ** Licet duo clarissimiViri Leibnitius, et Wol. Cap. 1. de Ideis. 43 fius semper et ubique in eamdem sententiam ierint: in hoc tamen hic ab illo discessit. Quumque Leibnitius omnem ideam distinctam completam esse docuerit: Wolffins contra eam in completam, et incompletam dividi debere, docuit et demonstravit. a Denique eadem experientia edocti scimus, nos quaedam ita percipere, ut non solum eorumdem characteres singilla tim agnoscamus, sed et novas characte rum notas enumerare queamus;. quorum dam vero solis distinctis ideis adquiescere. Quum notarum characteristicarum notione gaudemus distincta; idea totalis erit ADAEQUATA; quum antem notas neb; confuse repraesentamus, idea oritur INA DAEQUATA. Quo fit, ut distinctam ideam rursus dividanius in adaequatam, et inadaequatam. E. g. Si quis invidiae notas rursus evolvat, sciatque taedium esse sensum imperfectionis, et felicitatem determinet per siatum durabilis gaudii: is invidiae idlea adaequata gandebit. Si vero in solis invidiae characteribus ail juie scat: nec ulterius in iis evolvendis progredia tur, tunc ideam habebit inadaequitam. Ob servandum tamen, quod quo novas notas, donec fieri possit, invenire liceat, eo adaequatior evadet notio. Hanc porro doctrinam Leibnitio debemus, qui eam in Actis Erud. Acad. Lips. semper 44 Logic. proposuit, eumque suo more sequutus est Wolffius Logic. ANALYSIS IDEARUM est formas tio idearum adaequatarum. Quumque idea fiat adequatioi, si novos semper cha racteres invenire liceat: patet eo adaequatiorem fieri notionem, quo longius eius analysis procedere. Quoniam vero ob sensuura limites non possumus plura distincte percipere: infertur 16. nos in notionum analysi" in infinitum progredi non posse: ideoque quum ad notas vel simplices, vel cuique claras perven. tum fuerit uiterius eam instituere prohi bemur. Notionum analysis Medicoruin anatomiae simi lis est. Quemadinodum enim Medici corpus humanum in partes dividunt, easque depuo in alias aliasque particulas resolvunt, donec ad exilissima tandem filamenta perveniant, om nes interim earum connexiones, structuram, et proprictates attente perscrutantes: ita et Phi Josophi idearum noías singillatim perquirunt, easque iterum atque tertio in novas notas mente resolventes, minima quacque adcurate contemplantur. Sicuti ergo Medicis, quum ad indivisihiles particulas pervenerint, eas in novas rursus se care non licet: Philosophis etiam ea facultas Cap. I. De Ideis. 45 ademta est in analysi notionum, si vel ad simplicia et indivisibilia, vel ad clara et evi dentia fuerit pervenlum, vel finis obtentus sit, ob quem fuerat analysis instituta. SECTIO II. De obiectiva, sive materiali idearum differentia. 28. Haecaec de divisione idearum formali. Ad, materialem, sive obiectivam quod at tinet, primo res, quas nobis repraesen {are possumus, vel sunt exsistentes, vel proprietates iis communes. Quidquid exsi stit dicitur INDIVIDVVM, sive RES SINGULARIS: individuum autem defiuiri po test id, quod est omnimode determina tum. Repraesentatio ergo individui vo catur idea SINGULARIS sive INDIVI DVALIS. E. g. “Socrates”, “Plato”, Aristoteles, Caius, Titius, haec dumus, haec mensa, hic liber quem legis, sunt individua, quia in unoqucque eorum adsunt tales circumstaniiae et detern ina tiores, ut Socrates sit Socrates, et non Plato, Caius sit praecise Caius, et non alius: ita ut si aliqua earum desit, desinant esse quae prius erant. Hinc individuum idem est cum uno mathemat.co, quod concipitur tanquam individuum in se, et ab aliis separatum. Iu re igitur individuum res singularis; ideoque eius perceptio singularis pariter adpellatur. Quamvis autem individua sint omni mode determinata hoc est innumeris circumstantiis involuta), quae efficiunt, ut ea longe inter se differant: bent tamen aliquas determinaliones, in quibus perpetuo conveniunt. Harum de terminationum complexus aliam ideam su periorem constituit, quae SPECIES dicitur. Non iniuria ergo species a recentio. ribus definitur per similitudinem indivi duorum. Determinationis vocabulum, licet barbariem redoleat, iure tamen hic a nobis adhibetur, et quia civitate donatum, et oh termini pu rioris deficientiam. Absque definitione por, ro sumitur utpote experientia seusuque com muni satis notum; eius vero completam no tionem dabimus in Ontologia, ubi methodici rigoris amatóribus abunde satisfiet. E. g. Socrates, Plato, Caius, Titius, licet aetate, ingenio, roribus, conditione, habitu, ceterisque inter se multum distent, habent tamen commuue corpus organicum, et animain ratione praeditam. Duae hae de terminationes speciem constituunt, qnae ho m, dicitur. Hinc vides, haec omnia individua in eo siunilia esse, quod sint homincs. Si plurium specierun pariter cir cumstantias consideremus videbimus eas in plurimis toto, ut aiunt, coelo differre; in aliquibus vero perpetuo similes esse. Atque hae determinaciones, in quibus spe. cies, licet diversissimae, perpetuo conve. niunt, novam ideam, eamque supremam, constituunt, quae GENVS vocatur. Genus ergo recte definitur per similitudinem specierum. E. g. “homo”, “equus”, leo, canis, quantumli bet in tot determinationibus invicem diffe rant, habent tamen in vita et sensione con venientiam. His circumstantiis conflatur genus, cui animalis nomen inditum. Observes ita que, omnes illas species in hoc esse per petuo similes, quod animalia nominentur, adcoque legitimam esse definitionem generis traditam, 31. Quum genus sit similitudo specie rum (S. 30. ), idque constituatur a com plexu circumstantiarum, in quibus species perpetuo conveniunt; in speciebns autem aliae determinationes exsistant, quibus il lae inter se differunt: sequitur 1, ut non abs se harum proprietatuin di versificantium summa a Philosophis voce tur DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA * E. g. Invidia et commiseratio id habent commune, quod sint taedium. En genus. In eo ve ro differuut, quod invidia sit taedium ob alte rius felicitatem; commiseratio vero ob infelici tatem. Id ipsum constituit differentiam specificam. 32. Repraesentatio, quae exhibet pro prietates rebus exsistentibus communes, di citur idea VNIVERSALIS. Et quia notio nes generum et specierum determinationes continent pluribus speciebus vel individuis communes: infertur ideas generum et specierum esse universa Jes. Rursus quoniam hae ideau couficiun tur, si determinationes aliquas ab aliis se paratas consideremus; unum vero sine altero considerare dicitur AB STRAHERE; liquido patet 3. ideas uni versales esse quoque ABSTRACTAS. Hinc est, ut vulgo dicatur, ideas esse vel concretas, in quibus omnes simul adsunt de terminationes; vel abstractas, quae aliquas tantum exhibent mentis abtractione ab aliis seiunctas: quod idem est, ac si dicas, omnes ideas vel singulares esse, vel universales. Ex dictis porro consequitur 4. ideas universales non exsistere, nisi in singula ribus, nempe speciem ac genus nusquam inveniri, nisi in individuis; adeoque 5. plus esse in individuis, quam in specie; plus quoque in speciebus, quam in genere.  Ex quo patet 6. quam scite Logici pro puntiaverint: Notionis extensionem esse in retione inversa comprehensionis. * Regula haec aliter ab aliis enunciatur, sci licet: Ono maiorem habet idea comprehensio nein, eo minorem habet extensionem, ct con tra. Comprehensio dicitur complexus determi dationum, quae ideam aliquam constituunt. Ex tensio vero est consideratio subiectorum, qui bus delerminationes illae tribui possunt. Vid. la Logique, ou l'art de penser. Quum ergo individuum omnimodas determina tiones complectatur, ad unum tantum subiectum extenditur; genus vero paucissimas comprehendens circumstantias ad plu rima subiecta referri, nemo non videt. Posita igitur regulae illius veritate, nullo negotio intelligitur 7. nec ab individuo ad speciem, neque a spe cie ad genus umquam posse duci conclu sionem; ac proinde 8. non licere generi tribui, quod speciei convenit, aut ab illo removeri, quod huic repugnat; contra vero a genere ad speciem, atque ab hac ad individuum bene concludi, ideoque individuo dandum, quod speciei convenit, pariterque speciei tribuendum esse quidquid generi convenire observatur. Et recte ! nam nam in individuo comprehensio maior est, extensio minor, quam in specie, ut et in hac relate ad genus. Quidquid ergo de individuo enunciatur, eius proprietates differentiales; si ita loqui fas sit, respicit, quae in speciem non ingrediuntur: ac proin de de hac enunciari nequit. Eodem modo, quae de specie dicuntur, differentiam tantum specificam spectant: genus autem proprieta tes multis speciebus communes continet; adeo que speciei attributa nullo modo cum genere coniungi possunt. Res clarior fiet exemplo. Socrates est individuum, in quo omnimoda invenitur determinatio; id vero sub hominis specie comprehenditur. De So crate' recte enunciabis, quod fuerit philoso phus, quia attributum hoc ei convenit ob scientiam, qua praeditus erat, quaeque inter Socratis proprielátes individuales enumeratur. Possesne id de specie, idest de homine pronuntiare? Minime quidem: in determinationibus enim hominis specificis non scientia, sed scientiae capacitas, nempe ra tio ', invenitur. Contra hanc regulam peccare solent susurrones quidam, qui vitia vel de fectus in aliquo, vel aliquibus individuis for san occurrentia toti speciei, coelui, vel clas si imputare non erubescunt. Quum enim genus in specie, species pariter in individuo, contineatur): quidquid generi conyepit, cum specie coniungi; et quik uid speciei convenit, de individuo quo cap. de Ideis que enunciari debet aeque, ac ab his removeri quod ab illis discrepat.E. g. Animal sentit, ergo homo sentit: homo est intelligens, quia libet igitur homo intelligens est etc. Res exsistentes rursus vel inira nos sunt vel extra nos. Prioris classis sunt omnes animae actiones; posterioris vero obiecta quaecumque sensibus nostris obyer santia, vel mutationes in corpore humano ciusque organis supervenientes. SENSV INTERNO percipiuntur, sive REFLEXIONE, hae contra SENSIBVS EXTERNIS. Liquet ergo 10, ideas omnes singulares sola sensionc adquiri * Illae * Intra nos sunt affectus, et cogilationes vo strae, quae interno sensu, conscientia refle xione (haec opinia idem significant ) perci piuntur. E. g. si quis tristitiam, vel metum sentiat, ciusque idcam sibi formet, hanc sensu intern:), sive conscientia, nempe atlen tione ad proprias actiónes adplicatà, adqui sivisse dicitur. Extra nos porro sunt omnia alia obiecta etsistentia sensibus obvia. Sic in deas omnes singulares, quaecumque illae sint, sensibus percipi, nemo ignorat: superfluun enim ' esset id ' exemplis illustrare. Cuilibet autem de plebe noturn est, exter sensus quinque numerari, visum nein pe, auditum, olfactnm, gustum, et tactum, nos. iisque totidem organa esse destinata; visui scilicet cculum, auditui aurem, olfactui na res, gustui linguam, tactui denique specia tim manus, generaliter vero totam corporis humani superficiem. 36. Quum ergo res exsistentes sensibus percipiantur; ideoque ideae sin gulares sensione adquirantur; ex singula ribus vero universales sola mentis abstra ctione formentur: liquido infer tuir 11. omnes ideas vel SENSIÚNE, vel ABSTRACTIONE fieri dooque adeo esse ideas adquirendi mcdos. ** * nem * Et hoc est, quod a multis docelur, omnes ideas partim SENSIONE, partim ABSTRACTIONE, partim CONSCIENTIA, vel REFLEXIONE adquiri. Vid. Heinec. Logic.Nos enim sensio cum conscientia et reflexione confundi debere. Addunt alii tertium adhuc ideas formandi modum ARBITRARIAM scilicet COMBINATIONEM, veluti quum quis ideam hominis cum idea equi componit, novamque Centauri notionem conficit: cuius census sunt etiam notiones montis aurei, intellectus perfectissimi etc., quae nihil aliud revera sunt, nisi ice rum prius sensione adquisitarum combinatiores ab intellectu, vel phaniasia in unum redactae, pro quarum veritate generalem tradunt regulam: Si ideae arbitrio coniunctae sibi con tradixerint, impossibiles sunt, adeoque fal sae (quae alio nomine CHIMERICAE, a Scola sticis ENTIA RATIONIS vocantur ); si vero inter se non repugnent, pro possibilibus, adeoque pro veris sunt habendae. TITIAS esse. Ex quibus omnibus plane consequi tur 12. recte adfirmari a Philosophis, i deas omnes ex earum origine vel ADVEN. vel FACTITIAS. * INNA TAE namqne ab omnibus negantur, quid quid de iis praedicent Plato, Cartesius eorumque asseclae, quorum tamen au ctoritas tanta non est, ut eorum insomniis a sanioris Philosophiae cultoribus praebea tur adsensus, ut in Psychologia distinctius adparebit. Per adventitias enim intelligunt notiones sen sique adquisitas: per fictitias vero illas quae vel abstractione vel arbitraria combinatione fiunt. Plato namque animas humanas ab aeterno praeexsistentes posuit singulas singula astra inhabitantes, qnibus Deus monstruvii universi naturam, ac leges frtales edixit: sed quum a diis inferioribus Dei ministris mones 'vocat in corpora fatali necessitate inclusa fuissent eo rum omnium, aeternis ideis prius e rant intuitae, statim ob quos dae. quae in Jitas, non nisi longo sensuum usu, àc nedita tione pristipam cognitionem recuperare. Plat. in Timaeo. Hinc vulgatum eius effatum: Stu et discere idem esse, ac reminisci. CICERONE – TUSCUL. QUAEST. Illas ergo ideas, quas antea habebant, vocavit innatas. Sed quum id purum putumque sit Platonis som nium, nequaquam erimus de eo refutando solliciti. Cartesius hoc nomine donavit facul tatem homini competentem omnia intelligibilia videndi. Respons, ad art. 14: progranm. ann. Sed pèr hanc rectam rationem intelligi, quisque videt, quam proin de ideam adpellare est potentiam cum actu confundere. Cartesiani denique per ideas in natas intellexerunt axiomata quaedam eviden tia, quae ab ipsa cogitaudi facultate ortum ducunt, veluti: totum csse maius qualibet sui parte; non posse idem simul csse, et non esse ctc. At quis rerum omnium ignarus iguo rat, haec esse pura judicia, quae a termino runi illorum relatione, ac ab ideis totius et partis, exsisteniiue et non exsistentiae, sen su et abstractione prius adquisitis immediate pendent? Quae quum ita sini, ideas invatas nullo modo dari posse, merito concludimus. 38. Ideae praeterea sunt aliae SIMPLICES, a quibus nihil mente abstrahere pos sumus, aliae COMPOSITAE, bus per mentis abstractionem plura divi dere, atque invicem separare licet. in qui Ex quo necessaria consequutione conficitur 13. simplices ideas claras esse, at confu sas; compositas vero etiam distinctas. Tales sunt ideae omnes colorum, sonorum saporum, voluptatis, taedii, quas ideo aliis explicare non possumus, nec illarum chara cteres invicem discernere, ut ita üs'definien dis omnino incapaceś simus. ** Sic in idea mensae cuiusdam separatim con siderare possum matericm, formam, figuram, colorem, magnitudincm, et id genus alia. His addunt aliqui ideas ASSOCIATAS, si ve coniunctas, eas scilicet, quae ita simul a nobis adquisitae sunt, ut quum una nobis occurrit, altera quoque menti obversetur: veluti si rosain olim videns odoris simul no tionem accepi, quotiescumque odorem illum sentio, rosae etiam idea menti fit praesens.Denique quuin vel substantias, vel modos, vel relationes pobis repraesentare queamus, ideae sunt vel SVBSTANTIARVM, vel MODORVM, vel RELATIONVM. Per SVBSTANTIAM intelligimus ens, cui atiributa ei accidentia tan quam subiecto,: veluti inhaerere concipiuntur, MODI sunt adfectiones, et attributa substantiis inhaerentia, a quibus + D4 56 Log. Pars I. sola mentis abstractione separantur. RELATIONVM denique ideae sunt, quarum unius consideratio alterius considerationem includit ita, ut haec sine illa non possit intelligi. figura, Veluti diximus, ut nostram imbecillitatem adivemus: id enim in substantiis creatis lo cum habet, non autem in increata, in qua nulla inter essentiam et attributa, nec inter ipsa attributa realis distinctio dari potest, ut in Theologia naturali demonstratum ibimus. MODI vero sunt vel INTERNI, si in ipsa substantia. occurrant, ut dimensio, color etc. in corpore; vel EXTERNI, si in hominis mente sint, et tamen substantiae tribuantur, veluti quum dicimus- virtutem ma sni aeslimatam, quae tamen aestimalio est in hominum opinione. Relationes sunt ideae omnes quantitatum, item Patris, Domini, Regis, et cetera id ge pus. Videatur abunde ea in re Clericus in Logic, et in Arta Grit. Ex quibus plane colligitur 14. nas in substantiis nihil aliud cognoscere, nisi mo dos, ips4s vero substantias prorsus ignora re; idcoque  substantiarum ideas esse in relatione ad mentem nostram omnino sed tantummodo abstractas et confuses, ram intelligibiles;. quinisomo ló. rerun natu eo magis agaosci, quo plures modi nobis innotescunt; maximam adhiben dam esse cautionem in perpendendis re lationibus, ne vel earum fundamentum non recte considerantes, vel absolute de relativis ideis enunciantes, praecipitantiae errorisque arguamur, * Quantum haec doctrina roboris habeat in se dandis hominum adfectibus, dici profecto, non potest. Exemplo sit is, qui se paupe rem esse dolet, quia divitum opes non ha bet, et id absolute profert. Si vero relationis pondus expendat, observetque alterum omnia bus necessariis rebus egentem: declamare de sinet, quia sibi tantum superflua desunt. Be ne ergo Seneca in Troad. Est mi ser nemo, nisi comparatus, Schol. Explicatis iam notionum diffe rentiis, ad huius doctrinae usuin acMilanius, quem paucis, iisque perutilibus, include mus regulis. Quisquis ergo Philosophiae operam navas si solidae cognitionis es cupidus, sequentes animo infigito. CANONES. i. Curato, ut rerum, quas pertra ctare cupis ', claram semper et distin ctam cognitionem adquiras: attentionem proinde, quae ad idearum perfectionem utramque facit paginam, in omni re adhibeto. Quoniam vero Matheseos studium mirifice at tentionem acuit: hinc est, ut hodie studio rum initium a Mathesi capiatur, exemplo Platonis., qui neminem erudiendum suscipie bat, nisi Geometria instructum. 2. In studendo praeproperam vitato festinationem; praecipue in primis scien tiarum principiis diu haereto, nec, nisi iisiprobe intelleétis, ad cetera pergito. Quantum enim festinatio idearum claritati osobsit, diximus in. 21. adeoque in adole. soentibus naturalis illa festinatio, et praeci pitantia caute est obtundenda, ne superficia rie discant et errores saepe labantur. Vnde VERVLAMIVS opportune docuit: Ius venum ingeniis, non plumas vel alas, sed plumbum el punderą auditinus. Caveio, ne nimia rerun varietate mentem obruas, neve plura semel simul que addiscenda putes. - Panca discito, eaque bune digesta contemplator. * Quum eaim attentio ad plura dividitur, minor fit atque inepia: proindeque ideae deteriores fiant: ita ut de iis perbelle dicat Seneca Ep. 2.: Nusquam est, qui ubique est. Qua de re Plinius VII. ep.9. praeclaram il lud monitum studiosae iuventuti perutile prae buit: Non multa 7, sed multum. to 3 * AC 4. Priusquam ulterius progrediaris ad idearum tuarum relationem attendi si qua sitt:: ne relativa pro absolu tis accipiens in errores incidas, 5. Mentis solitudinem, animique tran quillitaiem amato; ne affectibus attentionem iurbes, iran, tristitiam, an liaque pathemata; adeoque sodalitates, compotationes., spectacula fugito. ** * Bene monuit Ovidius Tristium l. v. 30. Carmina proveniunt animo dédlicta serenos Comessationibus enim corporis inertia aus getur, mens obstupescit et habetatur, ani mus ad voluptates inclinatur s spectaculis ve vero attentio distrahitur, i sensimqué a studüs animus avertitur, quo fit, ut aut nullae ad quirantur ideae, vel saltem obscurae, a qui bus errores ortum ducere infra docebimus. aut mie 6. Quae legisti, audivisti > ditatus es, ita familiaria tibi reddito, ut eorum notas aliis indicare queas. Ea proinde vel in chartam coniicito, te ipsum saepe examinaudo, idcarum tuarum distinctionem experitor. vel * Stilum CICERONE vocat oplimum, et praest an tissimum dicendi effectorem, et magistrum. De Orat. Notum est vulgatum illud; docendo disci mus. Rationem huius canonis invenies supra.  nes, utpote rei immaterialis a stiones, nullo modo sensibus percipiuntur: ea non nisi signis, quae in sensus incur ruot;; abis potefieri possunt. SIGNUM enim est, res quaedam sensibilis quae praeter sui notionem excitat in mente ideam alterius rei, Sed quum ideae ng  ** strae ordinario vel voce, vel scripto patefiant: binc prioris gencris signa VOCES, posterioris TÈRMINI, ntraqne vero VERBA dicuntur. Hinc verba per idearum nostrarum signa recte definiuntur, ut et voces signa quaedam sono articulato prolata, mentis nostrae conceptus indicantia. Signa quidem generatim appellantur, quia praeter soni vel scripturae; nationum nostrarum ideam in audientibus vel legentibus excitant. E. g. Lacrimae sunt signum tristitiae: quia quum hominem videmus lacrimantem, illico eum tristitia adfectum esse cogitamus. Fumus quoque est SIGNVM ignis, quia eo viso non solum fumi, sed ignis etiam notionein ad quirimus. Quae de signorum diversitate Scha Jastici docent  utpote ad rem impertinentia, praetermittimus: astin Ontologia quaedam observatu digna obiter attingemus. Cave tamen credas, voces esse SIGNA conceptuum necessaria. Quum enim eaedem res non iisdem vocibus a diversis gentibus exprimatur: liquet, tas ab hominum ARBITRIO pena der, adeoque esse SIGNA conceptuum arbistraria. Cuique vero notum est, ad sona nar ticulatum sex requiri, nempe PVLMONES, qui follis vice funguntur, ORGANUM VOCIS scilicet trachea, eique apposita larynx cum suis apparatibus; LINGVA, cuius vis Braliones vocem prae ceteris articulatam red dunt; PALATVM, nempe fornicem, ubi lingua stras vid rationes exercet; quatuor DENTES incisores dicti, quibus sibilantes litterae efformantur, et in quos nedum lingua, sed et labia vibrant; ac denique LABIA, quae in se invicem et in dentes, inpingunt, ut fu sjus coram ostendemus. Ex qua definitione patet verba et voces inter se differre: quum verba et iam scripto, voces autem non nisi sono articulato proferri possint. Nos ideo voces adhibere, ut ab aliis intelligamur; proindeque. Iita loquendum, easque vo ces adhibendas esse, ut alii, quibuscum loquimur, mentem nostram intelligere pos sint; adeoque non licere terminis in anibus vet notionem deceptricem continentibus uti; sed tantum ii, qui ali quam notionem habent adlixam; quitinimo, singulis terminis eamdem semper ideam, eamque claram, respondere debere; ideo que cos, qui vel obscuram, vel non semper eamdem exprimunt notionem, om nino esse proscribendos. Alterius vero mentem intelligere dicimur quum, terminis easdem notiones adggimus, quas loquens cum iis coniunxit. mus TERMINUS INANIS dicitur, qui nulla, habet notionem sibi coniunctam: adeoque nis hil, praeter solam soni ideam, excitare potsest: quapropter vocari solet vor mente case' sâ, vel sonus sine menie, a Scholasticis terminius insignificativus. Talis est versus ille, quemia Nimiodo prolatum in infimo Tartari aditu fingit Dyinus Poeta Etruscus: Raphel mai umech zabi alini. ALIGHERI Inf. cant: Quoties autem vocem proferentes, aliquid cogitare videinur, quum tamen nihil cogita puldaunque sententiam cum ea donium ginius: tunc terninus ille NOTIONEM DECEPTRICIM continere dicitur. Huiusmodi sunt casus Epicuri, sensibilitas physica Hel yetii, historia e rationis penu depromta Boulangeri et Rousseau, quorum analysin cora, et in Metaphysica conficiemus. Si nam que vox aliqua vel non eamdem seniper, vel obscuram notionem habeat adfi xam. In primo casu auditor dubius haerebit, quamnam cum ea loquens, coniunxerit ideam, adeoque cui non intelligent. In secundo ves ro, quomodo mentem eius poterit intelligere, qui se non intelligit TERMINVS CLARVS est, qui claram coiitinet notionem, OBSCVRYS, qui eamdem habet obscuram. Terminusi qui eamdem semper exprimit ideam, FIXVS vel DETERMINATV; qui vero incon der stantem vagunite tabet significatum, VAGVS aut INDETERMINATVS dicitur, Plurės autem termini eandem rem significantes, SYNONYMA, sive termini synonymici. adpellantur, Scolasticis eum adpellare placuit univocum, sive unicam rem indicantem, ut ignis, aqua, A Scholis dicitur “aequivocus”, hoc est plura aeque significans. E. g. Cultus varios habet significatus: saepe enim pro adoratione Deo debita: quandoque pro honore: nonnumquam pro corporis, vel animi decore; non raro quo que pro telluris cultura accipitur, Tales sunt gladius, ensis, qui idem ar morum genus exprimunt. Eos e Scholis qui dam vocant “paronymos”, id quod ad intelligendas barbaras huiusmodi loquutiones breviter adnotavimus. Non heic inquirere licet: utrum in quolibet idiomate revera dentur synonyma? quaestio namque haec ad philologiam pertinent. Philosophia contra in exprimendis animae cogitationibus usum loquendi servat, et colit, quem penes arbitrium est, et ius, et norma loquendi (Horat. De Art. Poet.). Terminus CONCRETVS est qui qualitatem expriinit sabiecto inhaerentem, ABSTRACTUS vero qui qualitatem illam a subiecto separatam indicat, Terminus PROPRIVS dicitur, quando rem exprimit, cui significandae est destinatus; IMPROPRIVS vero, sive METAPHORICVS ad rem aliam indicandam transferatur ob quamdam similitudinem. si Sic “pius” est terminus concretus, “pietas” terminus abstractus, Concretus porro a Wolffio dicitur, qui notionem exprimit concretam (sive singularem); abstractus contra, qui ideam continet abstractam (sive universalem ).  Haec autem omnia idem significant. E. g. Vox oculis proprie sumitur, si organum visui destinatuin indicet. Ubi vero Cicero Corinthum Graeciae oculum adpellat, eius uippe ornamentum ac pracsidium: improprie sive metaphorice vocem illam usurpat, Hinc vide, voces improprias esse vagas et indeterminatas. USVS LOQVENDI est significatio vocum in communi sei mone propria. At quoniam in familiari sermone voces aliquae occurrunt quas intelligimus quidem, li, cit ad notiones ipsis adiixas animum non hae voces dicuntur termini FAMILIARES, et ad usum loquendi non advertamus pertinent, Si quis ergo oculi vocem ad significandum organum sensorium visui destinatum usurpet, is loquendi usum servabit. Tales sunt voces omnes, quas frequentissime proferimus, ac memoriae mandavimus: ees enim intelligimus, sed usu et consuetudine adeo familiares evaserunt, ut eas proferentes ad sensum notionesque ipsis adfixas nusquam attendamus. Patet igitur Philosophum servare debere usum loquendi, adeoque terminis claris, fixis, atque in sensu proprio usurpatis ei utendum esse. Quod idem est, ac si dicas a terminis vagis, obscuris, impropriis, et familiaribos esse abstinendum: aliter enim non intelligeretur. Hic porro. Ex pluribus vocibus inter se apte connexis oritur SERMO, sive ORATIO sive PROPOSITIO. Definitur autem sermo per nexium plurium terminorum mentis nostrae conceptıbus exprimendis idoneum. а Logicis dispesci solet in CIVILEM, et TECHNICVII, sive eruditim, quorum ille in vita civili ab omnibus; hic in coinmunicandis ideis ad disciplinas pertinentibus, vocabulorum technicorum pe, ab eruditis adhibetur. Nisi enim ideis nostris explicandis sit idoneus, non sermo, sed confusus inanium vocum cumulus dici poterit. Dicuntur autem verba, vel voces technicae, quae ideas scientificas quibusdam disciplinis peculiares, usu annuente, exprimunt: cuiusmo di non pauca occurrunt in qualibet disciplina. Schol. Quae hactenus de vocibus dicta sunt, inania faere evaderent, nisi doctrinae usum auditoribus nostris ostenderenus. Quae igitur de iis observanda putamus paucis, isque tam familiari quain erudito sermoni inservientibus, complectemur re gylis. Philosophus ergo noster scquentes observet CANONES. Antequam oum aliis congrediaris, tecum attente perpendeto, quid cogites: Cogitationes porro tuas totidem vocibus exprimilo, quot ideas hubes. Quantum adiumenti adfcrat hic canon adolescentibus, ia promtu est. Quun enim fis familiarissima sit inanis illa et garrnia loquacitas, fua fit, at persaepe in te veritatis notam incurant des alimchanab inconsiifera to loquendi puriniz násvatur; facile parei, cur qui cogitationibus suis atteindlit', nulla, nisi benedigestum, emitiere posse verbum. Caveto, ne ideam soni habens, rei quoque notionem habere te credas; aut voces coniunctas intelligere quas disiunctas intelligis. Falluntur enim persaepe homines, quum ter minos inanes, et notionem deceptricem con. tinentes effutiunt, in quibus solam ideam $ 9. ni habent, et nihil cogitantes aliquid se cogitare creduat. E. g. Idea materiae et idea cogitationis possibiles sunt, pariterque voces, quibus illae exprimuntur singulae intelliguntur. Coaiunclae vero impossibiles evadunt, atque adeo intelligi nequeunt. Ecquis enim materiam cogitantem exsistere posse imquam probavit? Vid. Inst. nostr. Meiaph.   eas 3. sum loquendi semper servato, nec novas temere cudito voces: quod si ad id quandoque necessitate cogaris, adcurate definito, ne obscurus fias. In hanc regulam peccatur, si quando vocabula technica, utut civitate donata, furene novitatis amore mutantur; iis novae voces substituuntur, quamvis rem, de qua a gitur, adcurate exprimant. Et si houe termini philosophici, reiecta barbarie, pristinae restituuntur puritati, ea non novatio dicen et proda est, sed renovatio, idest vocum ad pro prium avitumque decus restitutio Peregrina vocabula Latino, vel Italico sermoni ne iminisceto, nisi vel Tocendi, vel amici cuiusdam oblectandi caussa: alias eniin in paedantismum Empinges. Vid. Heineccium in Fundam. Stil. cultior. Id vero egisse Ciceronem ex eiusdem scriptis didacticis, et Epistolis ad Atticum abunde colligitur. Quum eniin paedantismus sit inanis glorio lae cupiditas in minotüs, ineptisque rebus sectandis quaesita; paedagogi vero, a quibus hoc nomen obvenit, id quoque habeant in vitio, qnod singulis verbis latinas interse runt phrases ac textos: ideo hanc notain incurruut quicumque, vel ad ostentandam e ruditionis niultiplicitatem, vel ob nimium tem poribus inserviendi studium, nullum, nisi pe regrino sale conditum, queunt formare ser monem. Si aliis displicere non vis, quoties cumque loqui oportuerit, modesto vultu atque amoeno fuam proferto sententiam: ne docere ex cathodrá potius, quam veruin dicere, videaris. 7Est et haec paedagogorum nota, qui pueris in docendo imponere adsueti, inagisiral e illud supercilium ubique servant, seque invisos au dientibus, maximo veritalis detrimento, red dunt. Vid. Buddei Oratio de bonarum littera rum decrcinento nostra aetate non tenere me tucndo. Dea rei distincia completa verbis expressa dicitur DEFINITIO. Res vero ipsá, sive definitionis obiectum, vocatur DEFINITVM. Ordo igitur po stálat, ut post'ideas earumque signa; bre vein de ddinitionibus tractationem hic sub iungamus, Quid sit idea distincta, et qua ratione ad quiratur, dixiinus supra. seq. De idea completa cousule, quae breviter do cuimus g. 25; diffusius enim hic, quae de illa dici merentur, enodabimus.Quemadmodum antem idea voce prolata di citur terminus, isque clarus si claram expri mat notionem; ad exprimendam, vero ideami distinctain, sive ' emuinerando; il dias characteres, non uno, sed pluribus claris opus est termiuis: ita complexus ille yocum, Cap. De definitionilus.hoc est idea distincta completa sermone expli cata, definitio dici consuevit; adeoque non abs re tractatus bic doctrinain sequitur ter minorum.  eas ** ne . Ex qua definitione consequitur 1. in definitione notas et characteres enume rari oportere, qui sulliciant ad definiturn in statu quolibet agnoscendum, et ab aliis rebus distinguenduin; notas tales esse debere, ut nulli, nisi so li definito in tota eius extensione, conve niant; quare 3. merito a Logicis ad firmari, definitionem neque latiorem que angustiorem sno definito, sed ipsi aco, qualem esse debere, ut sibi invicem sub stilui possint. Id autem, per quod res ab aliis rebus distin guitur, eius essentia a Metaphysicis adpellari consuevit: inde ergojest, ut definitionem Lo gici esse dicant orationem, qua rci essentia explicatur. Quia vero per extensionem intelligimus quod cuinque subiectum, cui determinationes ideam aliquam constituentes tribui possunt; perinde est, ac si dicas, definitionis notas tales esse debere, ut omnibus subiectis, spe ciebus nempe, et individuis sub definito con tentis conveniant. Porro inter characteres il los insunt proprietates genericae, et specifi Si cae, quae integram definili essentiam expo. nunt, et repraesentant. Non iniuria igitur adfirmari solet, definitionem ex genere et differentia specifica constare debere. Si namque definitio talis non sit, ut possit definito substitui, vel (ut aliis placet ) cam eo reciprocari, vel illo latior, vel angustior erit, adeoque deficiens. Substitutio autem in co consistit, ut definitio pro subiecto, defini tum pro attributo, et contra, adsumi possit. E. g. Spiritus est substantia intellectu et vo luntate praedita: contra vero substantia intel lectu et voluntate praedita dicitur spiritus. Ex eodem quoque fluit 4 in defini tionem ingredi non posse, nisi ea, quae Jei perpetuo et constanter insunt, idest ATTRIBUTA, vel ESSENTIALIA; proin deque locum in ea non habere ACCIDENTIA, seu MODOS. Quaenam sint essentialia, et attributa, pate bit in Ontologia. Id unum hic notasse sull ciet, tam essentialia, quam attributa rei cou stanter ac immutabiliter inesse: nam attributa sunt eiusmodi characteres, quorum ratio suf ficiens cur rei insint, in eiusdem essentia et natüra continctur: ut sunt tria latera et tres anguli in triangulo. Quoniam vero definitio est idea rei distincta; haec autem est no  nec tio clara notarum): sequitur ut ea vocibus claris sit exponenda, obscuri quidquam continentibus; ideoque 7. nec vagis, nec metaphoricis nec negativis terminis in illa sit locus. Imo vero 8. eam in vitio poni perspicuum est, si sit IDENTICA vel CIRCVLVS in definiendo committatur. Si tameu termini definitionem ingredientes ob scuri quid habere videantur, prius adcurate definiantur, ut claritatem adquirant. Sic in vidiae definitionein supra allatam nemini proferre licebit, nisi prius taedii si gnificatus alia definitione sit determinatus. Terminis negativis concipitur definitio > si explicet quid res non sit: ut si dicas, invi dia non est commiseratio. Hinc vides, eam esse vagam et indeterminatam, adeoque defi niti ideane inde oriri confusissim un, quod est contra definitionis indolem: Exceptio tantum datur in rebus contradicto riis nullun inedium adinittentibus, quarum una recte definita, altera negativis terminis explicari potest. Sic ens simplex non immeri to dicitur quod partibus caret, substantia, quae non exsistit in alio, tamquam in subie Definitio identica est, quae idlem per idem explicat, cuiusmodi suut nonnullae Scholarum cio etc. definitiones quas confusiones rectius dixeris. Exemplo sit quantitatis definitio ab iis allata per accidens, a quo res dicitur quanta. Quid, quaeso, haec verba significant, nisi quod quantitas sit quantitas? Cui vero usui definitiones istae esse possint, tironibus ipsis iudicandum relinquimus. Circulus enim Geometris est figura plana linea curva in se redeunte terminata: in defi niendo ergo circulus committitur, si in evol vendis definitionis characteribus, eorumque novis definitionibus formandis, in aliquam ipsarum definitum ingrediatur. Tunc enim per definitum explicaretur id, per quod defini lum ipsum explicari deberet; adeoque res re diret ad definitionem idemlicam, quae in vi to posita est. Illa notas et characteres e numerat sufficientes, quibus definitum ab aliis rebus in siatu quocumque discerni possit; haec autem rei definitae genesin et originem exponit, ** unde et GENETICA dicitur. * Per definitionem nominalem veteres intelligc bant grammaticam vocis explicationem, qua vel radix sive origo nominis investigabatur, et tunc Etymologia dicebatur: vel multiplex eiusdem significatio, eoque casu Homonymia; De definitionibus. 25 vel denique plures voces eumdem sensum ha bentes, et Synonymiae nomine veniebat. Quae enim nobis nominalis est, realis inter illos audiebat. ** Nominalis ergo est definitio spiritus, si eum definiveris per substantiam intellectu et volun tate praeditam: realis autem, si invidiam definias per taedium ob alterius felicitatem: in ea enim eiusdem caussa et origo explica tur. Vides hinc, nominales definitiones esse arbitrarias: reales contra necessarias. > 53. Si vero idea rei distincta quidem sit sed incompleta: tunc non definitio, sed DESCRIPTIO nominatur; adeoque in descriptione accidentia qnoque locum inve piunt, qnae quum in individuis tantum concreta observentur, hinc est, ut res sin gulares describantur, abstractae vero deti niantur; ** proinde illae Oratorun et Poe tarum hae Philosophorum propriae sint. Descriptio itaque, licet plures enumeret no tas; quam definitio, eas tamen ad rem in sta tu quolibet agnoscendam exhibet insufficien tes. Tales notae non exsistunt, nisi in rebus singularibus;, utpote omnimode determinatis: universales namque ab iis mentis abstractione erguntur, paucio resque adeo, ac sufficientes ipsis distinguendis continent characteres. Inde ergo fit, ut ha definiri possint, illae tantum describi. Intelligitnr hinc: cum generum et specierum definitiones apud Philosophos inveniamus, in dividuorum nihil nisi meras descriptiones Poetis ac Oratoribus familiares, et si ab his definitiones proferri videmus, eas vel incom pletas novimus, vel magno verborum ambitu expressas, ubi accidentia attributis, caussas effectibus permixta observamus, quas tamen Philosopho imitari nefas erit, quippe cui idearum analysis, essentiae rerum investiga. tio, verborum praeterea praecisio in deliciis esse debent. Schol. Superest, ut quae studiosae iu ventuti utilitatem adferre possunt, ea pau eis exponamus regulis huius doctrinae usum continentibus. Philosophiae igitur initiatus, si quid a studiis suis commodi percipere cupit, sequentes animo imbibat CANONES. Definitiones, utpote rei naturam et essentiam explicantés, ciim cura disci to, ' ạtque teneto. ' Iudicium porro cum m moria coniungito: ideoque aliorum definitionibus ne adquiescito; sed ope rum dato, ut eas intelligas, et ad tru tiram revoces. re Sunt enim, qui soli memoriae consulentes, quidquid in aliorum scriptis repererint, id omne discunt, ac turpe putant ab eo discedere. Hinc fit, ut si memoriae pondus inutile au feras, nihil, praeter arroquarov quoddam, maneat. Homunciones isti memoriae dumtaxat exercendae intenti, iudicii vero prorsus ex pertes, libros quosvis sine delectu memoriae mandare adsueti, innumeris snnt expcsiti er roribus; quotcnmque eorum oculis subiiciun tur. Ne igitur adolescentes, qui memoriam tantum in Scholis huc usque exercuerunt, eamdem premant viam, sibique pessime cou sulant: visum est, cautionem hanc eo neces sariam, quo prima scientiarum hic funda menta sternuntur, ipsis suggerere et inculca re, ut iudicium excolentes in aliorum senten tiis ad examen rcvocandis, et ad eruendas inde propria meditatione veritates apti red dantur. ver  In legendis Auctorum libris, prum phrasiumque lenociniis ne conti eto: sed ut sententiam ipsis subiectam lare, ac distincte intelligas, pro vi ili curato. Ita vitabitur stupida illa aliorum sententiis adquiescendi consuetudo, quae in caussa fuit, ut liberculi aliquot ex transmontanis, transma rinisque regionibus huc appulsi stilo quodam auribus pruriente tot incautos captarint adolescentes, quos inter crassae incredulitatis te nebras errabundos non sine magno dolore vi demus. Hi namque culpabili ignorantia verbis tantummodo adquiescentes, nec sententias in tellexerunt, nec eas ad trutinam revocare sunt ausi, iudicandi quippe facultate destituti. 3. Rerum, quas nondum distincte in telligis, definitiones proprio marte con ficito, ut ex iteratis' actibus, continua que exercitatione habitum in eo adqui ras. Res quidem non parvi momenti erit, multun que laboris impendendum, pauco forsan aut irrito eventu. Animo tamen non deficiant a: dolescentes: ab exiguis enim initiis maxima procedunt, atque experientia tandem, qui sit huius canonis fructus, addiscent. Poterit autem quisque imitando incipere, experiundo prosequi, ac notionum analysi sednlam na vans operam felici demum exitu proficere. Vi de quae docebimus infra. Caveto, ne res omnes definiri pos. vel debere, credas; * aut definitio nes verbis diversas re quoque differre putes. Videantur interim a nobis ante dicta G. 27. Gap. III. De definitionibus. 79 ¥ Si namque dantur synonyma, verba nempe et phrases eumdem habentes significatum, quidni definitiones illae verbis diversae synonymicis erunt expressae terminis, adeo que re unum idemque significare poterunt? 5. Si e Philosopho Orator aliquan dofieri cupis, definitiones pro definitis adhibeto: tunc enim auditorum animos inani verborum ambitu non fatig abis solidaeque doctrinae clarissimum dabis indicium. Exemplo sit elegantissima M. Ant. Mureti pe riodus Part. I. Orat. 1. ubi de laudibus Theo logiae acturus, amplificat syllogismun quam brevissimum has continentem propositiones: Facultas hominem Deo con ugens est omnium praestantissima. Egpyas a eius talis est. Nam si eorum omnium, quae in hac inmensa re rum universitate cernuntur, unumquodque per ficiendi sui desiderio tenetur; et animus no ster ad similitudinem Divinitatis effictus tan to perfectior est, quanto propius ad illud, a quo ductus et propagatus est, exemplar ac cedit: dubitari profecto non potest, quia ea sit omnium praestantissima facultas, quae, quoad eius fieri potest, cum humanis divi na copulando, mortalitatem nostram, quantum illius imbecillitas patitur, Divinae natura e ar ctissima colligatione devincit. Vides hic Theologiae definitionem, oratorio licet more pro latam, multum orationi pulchritudinis ac di gnitatis adferre. 6. Definitionem tuam, si ab aliis di stingui exoptas, efformare curato; id que obtinebis, si intellectuales morales que virtutes tibi comparare studueris. * Hi namque definitionis characteres esse de bent. Quod ni facias in vulgi turba confu sus eris, nomenque tuum in tenebris, ob scurumque manebit ila, ut vel patrio, vel alio adpellativo nomine indigitari debeas. Notional Otionum analysin in adaequatarum idearum formatione consistere, snpra iam ostensum est. Porro in hac o peratione ideam aliquam in partes, sive notas dividi, hasque rursus in alias disper tiri, quisque novit qui earum naturam habet exploratam. Tunc igitur idea illa ut totum consideratur, characteres autem ut eius partes: adeoque non abs re analysis idearum verbis expressa DIVISIO nominatur, quae recte definitur, quod sit to tius in partes resolutio. Quum autem in divisione novae notarum de finitiones suppeditentur: iure doctrinam hanc definitionibus subiungimus. Quoniam vero quidlibet ut totum considerari potest: variae totius relationes sunt enatae. Et quidem 1. totum essan tiale quod constat ex partibus ad ajus essentiam pertinentibus, totum integra le, compositum nempe ex corporibus, quorum snmma eius integritatem constituit, genus, quod plures species suo ambitu comprehendit, 4. subiectum, quod plura accidentia sustinet, accidens quod pluribus subiectis inhaerere potest, 6. caus sa, quae plures producit 7 effectus, qui a pluribus potet procedere caussis. Quidquid tandem pro ratione obiectorum, circa ' quae versatur in tot partes distribui potest, quot sunt objecta. Inde ergo est, ut va riae a Logicis tradantur divisionis species veluti TOTIVS sive essentialis, sive in tegralis, in suas partes, GENERIS in suas species subordinatas, SVBIECTI in sua Accidentia in suos effectus, EFFECTVS CAVSSAE, ACCIDENTIS in sua snbiecta, rei in suas caussas, denique caiusvis per sua OBIECTA. Primae classis est haec: Homo dividitur in animam et corpus; vel as dividitur in duo decim uncias. Secundae: Animal dividitur in hominem, et brutum. Tertiae: Homo est, vel doctus vel indoctus. Quartae: Bonum est. vel animi, vel corporis. Quintae: Philoso phiae dogmata alia intellectuin instruunt, a. lia voluntatem dirigunt. Sextae: Veritatis impugnatio, vel ab ignorantia, vel a malitia procedit. Septimae denique: Philosophia theo retica alia circa res corporeas, alia circa incorporeas et intellectuales versatur. Totum illud, quod in divisionem cadit, DIVISUM; partes vero, in quas dispertitur, MEMBRĀ DIVIDENTIA no minantur. Sin membra haec in novas rur sus partes resolyamus., SVBDIVISIO di citar. * * E. g. Homo dividitur in partes suas essentia les animam nempe et corpus; hoc autem in caput, truncum o et artus reliquos. En subdivisionem, Ex membrorum itidem dividentiam numero nova quoque divisionis oritur dif ferentia. Si namque duo fuerint membra Cap. IV. De divisionibus. 83 dichotomia sive DIMEMBRIS; si tres? trichotomia seu TRIMEMBRIS; quatuor tetrachotomia hoc est QVA TRIMEMBRIS divisio, appellabitur. SI Sic bimembris erit divisio lineae in rectam, et curvam, trimembris trianguli in aequila terum, isosceles, et scalenum; quatrimembris denique parallelogrammi in quadratum, rc ctanguluin, rhombum, et rhomboidem., 58. Quoniam divisio est totius in par tes resolutio; totum autem ae quale partibus simul sumtis esse debet: consequens est 1. ut membra dividentia simul totum adaequare debeant divisum adeoqne nec plus illo, nec minus compre hendant; ut non sibi coincidant, sed repugnent, sintque per novas definitiones, easque oppositas, distincta;  ut ex ipsa rei dividendae natura petantur, scili cet in tot membra totum dividatur, capax est; 4. denique ut ad confusio nem vitandam prius idea totalis ab am biguitate liberetur, posteaque divisio insti tuatur. i quot Contra hanc regulam peccant, qui angulum dividunt in rectilineum et curvilineum, vel qui lineam esse aiunt, vel rectam, vel curvam & derari potest: vel mixtam. In primo enim casu membra di videntia simul sunt diviso minora; in se cundo autem eodem maiora. Huic quoque regulae adversantur ii, qui bo. num dividunt in honestum, utile, et iucundum: haec enim membra simul in uno coexistere debent, ut genuinam boni denominationem tue ri possit: adeoque non sunt repugnantia. Peccant etiam ii, qui licet totum in membra opposita distribuant, ea tameu definitionibus non repugnantibus determinant, ut quum cns in simplex et compositum diviserunt, et hoc esse dicunt, quod partibus constat: illud contra definiunt per id, in quo nihil consi Repréhensionem ergo.eruditorum merito incurrunt Ramistae, qui tam superstitiose di.chotomiis adhaerent, ut in plura membra totum dividere irreligiosum putent. Nec ali ter iụdicandum est de iis, qui nimiae mem brorum multiplicitatis sunt amatores. Idem enim vitii, inquit Seneca, habet nimia, quod nulla divisió. Ep. Quum autem divisiones et subdi visiones potionum analysin contineant, haec autem in idearum adaequa tarum formatione consistat, ideo que ad maiorem distinctionem in nobis producendam sit comparata: sequitur 5. ut divisionibus aeque, ac subdivisionibus, quae iisdem ' reguntur regulis, omnia vi tentur, quae confusionem adferre possunt; proindeque 6. liquido patet, non licere p? as ter necessitatem subdivisiones multiplicare, ne memoria fatigetur, ac intellectui veių. ti tenebrae offundantur, Schol. Haec de divisione. Ad hujus porro doctrinae usum nunc transeamus quem paucissimis inde nascentibus include mus regulis. Logicae itaque Tiro utilissi mos aeque, ac necessarios hosce discat CANONES, In dividendo subdividendove non aliorum systemata, sed naturam tantum consulito. Confusionem aeque, ac tae dium vitare curato. Hoc namque modo nec Ramistarum supersti tiosa restrictio, nec Scholasticorum nimia di visionum membrorumque multiplicatio locum habebit. Natura enim omnium optima, et ad curatissima est magistra. Divisiones ne per saltum facito. * Ordinem ac seriem in unaquaque re ser vato. Dicitur autem civisio per sattum, quae ordi... nem non scrval, et in qua ea, quae in sub divisione cxprirai deberent, comprehendun tur: e.g. si ideam diviseris in claram et ina daequatam, divisionem conficies per saltum; inadaequatam enim quae in subdivisionem ingredi deberet in divisione locum habere observas. Series ergo atque ordo ne pertur betur, quisque in studia incumbens cavere stu deat. CAPVT QUINTVM De iudiciis, et propositionibus, 6o. Hactenus de ideis, earumque ana lysi, quantum instituti brevitas tulit, actum. Eas vero si comparemus, scilicet si duas ideas inter se coniungamus vel separemus, alia mentis oritur operatio, quae IVDI CIVM adpellatur. Est autem iudicium duarum idearum comparatio earumque relationis perceptio. Iudicium porro ver bis expressum dicitur PROPOSITIO vel ENUNCIATIO. E. g. Si ideam spiritus cum idea indestructibi litaiis conferas, videasque unam alteri conve nire, tunc spiritum esse indestructibilem ndi cas: contra, si indestructibilitatis ideam cor De iud. et prop. separas: haec poris notioni non convenire observes,corpus non esse indestructibile colligis. In primo ca su ideas coniungis; in altero mentis operatio, qua earum relationem ex pendis, iudicii nomine venit. ** Nonnulli discrimen inter haec duo nomina statuunt: ut prius locum inveniat, si in syllo gismo spectetur; posterius vero, si extra id inveniatur. Sed in re tam parvi momenti diu immorari, foret ineptum. Quoniam iydicium duas ideas compa rat, et si verbis exprimatur, propositio di citar; idearum vero signa sunt voces seu termini: liquet, quam libet enunciationem duobus constare termi nis, quorum ille, cui aliquid convenire vel discrepare ennuciatur, SVBIECTVM; is vero, qui subiecto tribuitur vel ab eo removetur, ATTRIBVTVM vel PRAEDICATVM nomiuatur, qui duo simul pro positionis EXTREMA dici consueverunt. Quumque eorum nexus verbo substanti vo exprimatur: merito vox illa ex hoc verbo desumta, quae propositionis extrema coniungit, COPVLA vocatur. E. g. In hac propositione, “Deus est aeternus,” Deus est subiectum, quia ipsi tribuitur aeternitas; aeternus dicitur attributum, quia Deo convenire enunciatur; vox deniqne “EST”, quae duo haec extrema coniungit, atque unum al teri convenire indicat, copula, hoc est coniunctio, adpellatur. Hinc ergo colligitur, quain cumque propositionem SUBIECTO, COPVLA, et ATTRIBVTO constare debere, ut enunciatio LOGICA PERFECTA dici pos sit. Si namque horum aliquis lateat, CRYPTICA, vel IMPERFECTA dicilur, quia naturalis compositio crypsi aliqua tegitur: id autem accidit, quum verbuin aliquod copulae et attributi vices sustinet e. g. Deus mundum creavit: idem enim esset ac dicere: Deus est Creator mundi. Est et alia propositionum crypticarum species, iu quibus sub uno verbo tota enunciationis latet compositio per ellyp sin eruenda: ut in illis: veni, vidi, vici: hic namque tres iusunt enunciationes ex iis dem verbis repetendae, nempe: “Ego fui-ve nens, ego fui videns, ego fui vinccns.”  QvanVandoquidem in qualibet idearum comparatione sex potissimum con fiderari possunt, scilicet: materia, sive ideae quae comparantur; forma, seu comparatio ipsa; qualitas comparationis; eiusdem quantitas; objectum, 6. denique evidentia relationis: ideo sub totidem adspectibus propositiones intueri possumus; videlicet, ratione MATERIAE, FORMAE, QVALITATIS, QVANTITATIS, OBIECTI, et  EVIDENTIAE. Quamvis autem hunc ordinem divisionis natura suppeditet: liceat nobis in hac tractatione qualitatem ante omnia perpendere, utpote quae in aliis distributionibus usui esse debet; quaque postposita, nonnulla obscuritate laborarent. Propositionis QVALITAS consistit in extremorum combinatione tione. Quum ea coniungimus, scilicet prae vel separa dicatum subiecto convenire enunciamus ADFIRMARE dicimur; NEGARE contra, si illa seiungamus, seu unum ab altero discrepare pronuntiemus. Recte igitur omnis propositio, si qualitatem spectes, dividitur in AIENTEM et NEGANTEM. E. g. Quum dico, “Mundus est contigens”, praedicatum cum subiecto coniungo, adeoque de mundo adfirmo esse contingentem. Quando vero enuncio, “Mundus NON est aeternus”, extrema seiung, idest aeternitatem a mundo removeo et hoc est quod dicitur negare. Ex quo vides, negationem (“NON”) copulae praepositam reddere propositionem negantem: quod si non copulam, sed terininorum ali quem, vel eius partem negatio afficia, non negans, sed INFINITA orietur enunciate. E. g. Marcus Aurelius Romano Imperio pote ral non nocere, quia Philosophus. Distinctio haec aliter ab aliis enunciatur, scilicet in adfirmativam et negativam. Vtrum que apte. 64. Si ad propositionum materiam attendamus, eae sunt vel SIMPLICES, vel COMPOSITAE. SIMPLEX enunciatio dicitur, cuius termini plures non sunt sed unuin habet subiectum, et unum prae dicatum; COMPOSITA vero, quae plura > Cap. V. De iud. et prop 91 continet vel subiecta, vel attributa; eaque est vel EXPLICITA, si compositio sit mania festa, vel IMPLICITA, Scholastico nomine EXPONIBILIS, si compositionem habeat latentem, et paullo obscuriorem. Addunt alii enunciationem COMPLEXAM eamque haberi aiunt, quoties terminus ali. quis propositionem contineat incidentem sibi adnexam, quae, licet ad essentiam proposi tionis non pertineat, ad eam tamen intelli gendam plurimum confert, exprimiturque per pronomen relativum QVI. E. g. Plato, qui divinus fuit dictus, ideas innatas admisit. Propositio illa, qui divinus fuit dictus, in, çidens est. Sed distinctio haec in Logica aut parvi, aut nullius fere est momenti. Simplex ergo erit propositio: Deus est ae. ternus, iten que: aer est gravis. *** In quo vero consistat palens, vel latens compositio, ex sequentibus abande patebit, ubi de explicitarum implicitarum que enuncia tionum speciebus sermo erit. Id porro sedulo observandum, in compositis non unam, sed plures contineri enunciationes, id quod ex earum analysi poterit elucescere. EXPLICITA enunciatio dividitor in CONDITIONALEM; CONIVNСТАМ; DISCRETAM; CAVSSALEM; DISIVNCTAM et RELATAM. Conditionalis, alio nomine hypothetic, est, quae praedicatum habet subiecto tributum sub aliqua conditione: e. g. “Si mundus est ens contingens, non exsistit a se” -- in qua prima pars conditionem, altera propositionem continet. De hac autem observandum. I. conditio existentiam non largitur: visi enim veritatem adquirat, enunciatio vera esse non potest. Sic si dicas, “Si navis ex Asia venerit, centum tibi me daturum promitio”: promissio vera non erit, nisi navis ex Asia redux fuerit; 2. conditio impossibilis habet vim negandi. Et -recte: nam conditio impossibilis numquam in exsistentem abire poterit; adeoque enunciatio nullibi veritatem adquiret. Vnde idem est di cere: si digito Coelun tetigeris, centum ti bi dabo, ac si diceres: numquam tibi dabo centum: conditio namque impossibilis est. Coniuncta, sive copulativa dicitur, in qua termini ita connectuntur, ut de pluribus su biectis idem attributum; vel plura altributa de eodem subiecto enuncientur. E. g. “Iustitia et prudentia sunt virtutes”; “Deus est aeternus et omnipotens”.  Disiuncta, vel disiunctiva est, in qua uni subiecto plura tribuuntur praedicata, vel u Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 93 num attrubutum pluribus subiectis, ut plu ribus unum, vel uni plura conveniant, licet indeterminate. E. g. Aut doctus eris, aut in doctus. Quae de hac observari merentur, con fer in S. 58. cur Caussalis est, in qua ratio additur, praedicatum subiecto tribuatur. E. g. Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus: Politicas quia prudentiae regulas tradit, sedulo exco lenda, 1 Discreta dicitur, quae duo de eodem s biecto judicia continet qualitate diversa: ut illud Horatii. Coelum, nou animum mutant, qui trans mare currụnt. Item illud Terent. andr. 1. SC. 2. Davus sum, non Oedipus. Relata, seu relativa est, cuius una pars ab altera vim sunnit, ad eamque refertur  ut il lud Virgilii Georg. et quantum vertice ad auras Aetherias, tantum radice in Tartara tendit. IMPLICITAE vero species sunt EXCLVSIVA;  EXCEPTIV;  COMPARATA RESTRICTIVA: licet alii quoque inceptivas, desitivas, et 'reduplicativus adiungant. Exclusiva est, in qua sensus duplicatur per particulas exclusivas solum, tantum, dumta xat etc., estque vel exclusi praedicati, e. g. oculus tantummodo videt. Exceptiva est, in qua particulae exceptivae praeter, nisi, et similes, sensum multiplicant. E. g.: “Omne ens, praeter Deum, est contingens.” Comparata cicitur propositio, vel particu la quaedam comparativa relationem adferat inter subiectum et praedicatum, ita ut ge mipus inde emergat sensus e. g., “ira est amore validior.  Restrictiva denique est, quae multiplicem continet sensum per particulas restrictivas. quatenus, in quantum, quoad etc. geminatum. E. g.: Ilomo, quoad corpus ', est mortalis. INCEPTIVAS vocant, quae actionem aliquam in principio enunciante, ut: successio temporum a creatione incoepi; DESITIVAS, inquibus ejus cessatio et finis praedicatur, ut: tutela pubertate finitur: REDVPLICACIVAS denique, in quibus subiectum geminalum at liud iudicium continet tacitum. E. g. “Corpus, qua corpus est, a spiritu differt. Sed de his plura coram. Si enunciationis FORMAM spectemus, erit NECESSARIA, CONTINGENS (fortuitam Cicero adpellat), POSSIBILIS, IMPOSSIBILIS: in quibus si necessita, contingentia, possibilitas etc. reticeantur, ABSOLVTAE dicentur; si vero exprimantur, MENTALES. Necessariam dicimus, cuius extrema ita contiunguntur, ut aliter se habere non possint. E. g. “Circulus est rotundus”. Contingens est, cuius termini nullam neces sariam habent connexionem, sed ita cohaerent, ut aliter esse queant. E. g.: “Crastinus dies erit serenus”.  Possibilem vocamus, in qua attributum sn biecto non repugnat, ut cera liquescit. Impossibilis dicitur proposition, cuius termini inter se repugnant, ut, “Circulus est quadratus”. Ratione OVANTITATIS enunciatio dividitur in VNIVERSALEM, si attri butum subiecto in tota huins 'extensione conveniat; PARTICVLAREM, si ad aliquas tantum species, ant individua in subiecti notione contenta extendatur; denique SINGVLAREM, si individuum subiecto exprimatur, Addunt alii inde finitam, sed eam non esse ab universali dstinctam, infra abunde patebit. in. Alia universalem vocant propositionem, qua ratio sufficiens, cur praedicatum subie cio tribuatur, latet in ipsa subiecti natura, scilicet, si praedicatum sit attributum essentiale subiecti. Ita haec enunciatio, “Homo est libertatis capax”, est universalis tum quia subiectum in tota eius extentione sumitur nullus enim homo invenietur, nullus enim homo invenietur, cui libertate careat; tum quia ratio sufficiens, cur libertas homini trihuitur, latet in ipsa hominis ESSENTIA et natura, hoc est, ut Scolastici aiunt, rationalitate. Signum universitatis in aiente propositione est “OMNIS” (italiano: “ogni”); in negante NVLLVS. Quae de universalitate metaplıysica et morali Philosophi docent, ea hic persequi brevitas non patitur, sed in ipsis praelectionibus aliqua no tabimus. Particularem propositionem alii esse dicunt, in qua ratio sufficiens; cur praedicatum subiecto naturam est repetenda; E. g. “quidam homines sunt crudili”. Vides hic subiectum non in tota sua extensione accipi, sed ad aliqua tantum individua extendi, ita ut ratio sufficiens, cur homini eruditio tribuatur hominis naturam inveniatur, scilicet in studio aique exercitatione. Particularitatis nota est QUIDAM, ALIQVIS; in negante vero additur particula NON.  E. g., Livius Romanorun historiam ad sua usque tempora scripsit. En propositionem singularem: subiectum enim est terminus singularis. 6g. Ex quibus omnibus consequitur v. ad essentiam propositionis universalis non reqniri notam uuiversitatis, sed eam pro lubitu exprinii vel' omitti posse; INDEFINITAM dici propositionen in qua pota reticetur ac proinde recte a Philosoplus adfirmari, propositiones in definitas aequipollere universalibus; qui nimmo, signum universale numquam efficere posse, ut enunciatio talis evadat; falli ergo eos, qui universalem propositio hem defipiunt per eam, cuius subiectum signo aificitur universali; particula rem facile in universalem commutari pos se, si subiecto addatur ratio suficiens, cur ei convcniat allributum, Ecquis enim propositionem hanc: “Omnis homo est doctus”, ideo universalem esse aufirmabit, quia signo universali subiectum adficintur? Hinc si propositionem universalem particularibus, vel particularem universalibus terminis signisque exprimamus a veritate deficiet, ut suo loco dicemus. Sumas e. g. hanc propositionem: “Quidam homo est philosophus”, habes propositionem particularem. Adde snbiecto caussam, cur de homine esse philosophum enunciatur. scilicet scientiam; eamque sequenti modo exprimito: “Omnis homo scientia praeditus est philosophus”, ex particulari in universalem abibit. Mirum quantum transmulalio ist haec in scientiis prodest. Ab ea enim pendet propositiomm analysis; puta earumdem resolutio in hypothesin ct thesin. Nobis in secunda part, ubi de experientia sermo erit, huius modi commutationis usus erit obiter attingen dus. Iuvat hic compendii loco addere, veteres harum propositionum differentiam quatuor vocalibus indicasse: “A”, “E”, “I” et “O”, id quod se quentibus expressere versiculis: Asserit “A”, negat. “E”, verum universaliter ambae. Asserit I, negat O, sed particulariter ambo: De rat. et Syll. De propositionibus mathematicae methodo inservientibus. Ostrema enunciationum divisio quae earum obiectum, et evidentiam res spicit, ea est, quae in recentioribus Phi osophorum et Mathematicorun scriptis pas sim observatur peculiaribus desiguala nominibus, quaeque a nobis ideo distincte tradenda, quia me!l dun mathematicas in hisce justitutionibus sequi statuimus. Ratione ilaque OBIECTI pto positio est vel THEORETICA, in qua a liquid de subiecto enuncialur, vel PRACTICA, quae aliquid fieri posse aut debere adfirmat. Sic propositio theoretica est haec, “Omnes ro dii eiusdem circuli sunt aequales”. Practica vero: “Quovis centro et intervallo circulus describi potest. Vides hinc, theoreticam propossitionem veritatis alicuius enunciationem; pra cticam vero operationis faciendae expositiouera continere, Quo ad EVIDENTIAM enunciatio vel talis est, ut extremorum nexus per se clare pateat, vel quae demonstratione in digeat. Illa INDEMONSTRABILIS, haec DEMONSTRABILIS dici consuevit. Quibus enodatis, ad peculiaria propositionum nomina explicanda transcamus. Indemonstrabilis ergo est enunciation, “Totum sua parte maius est”. Demonstrabilis. contra haec: “Scientia Philosopho est necessaria”, ea enim ex collatione definitionum scientiae et philosophi debet demonstrari. Propositio indemonstrabilis theoretica dicitur AXIOMA. Si vero practica fuerit, POSTVLATVM vocalır.  E.g. “Totum est aequale omnibus suis partibus simul sumti”. D. de Tschirnausen axioma vocat quamcumque propositionem ab unica definitione immediate deductam; Euclides au tem illam, quae primo intuitu ab unoquoque perspici potest. Res eo redit, ut axioma vo cemus enunciationem per se claram, adeoque demonstratione non indigentem, sive a defini tione, sive aliunde evideutiam suam repetat: ac proinde nostra definitio utramque amplectitur sententiam, ut diffusius coram ostendemus. ** E. g Quovis centro ac quovis intervallo cir culum describere. Coguita enim circuli defini tione, postulati huius veritasan. scitur, Cap. V. De iud. et prop. IOL Enunciatio theoretica demonstrabilis THEOREMA vocatur; practica contra dicitur PROBLEMA. In Theoremate ergo propositionis veritas ex plurium definitionum collatione demonstrari debet. E. g., “Deus est aeternus” Huius enim demonstratio ex definitionibus Dei, et aeter ni inter se collatis peti debet. Hinc est, ut duabus illud constet partibus, nempe enunciatione, qua veritas șive propositio theoretica enunciatur, et demonstratione, qua ea dein confirmatur: ideoque in fine demonstra tionis addi solet Q. E.'D., hoc est, “quod erat demonstrandum.” Quum Problema sit propositio practica, pa lam est, illud tribus absolvi, propositione sci licet, quae quid faciendum proponit, solutione, quae modum, quo fieri potest, ostendit, et demonstratione, quae rem bene processis se concludit, addends, “Q. E. F”. idest, “quod erat faciendum”. Sic problema est haec enunciatio: Commiserationem in altero excitare. COROLLARIVM, sive CONSEOTARIVM dicitnr quaevis enunciatio, quae ab alia immediate, et necessariae consequutione oritur. E. g. Cuum demonstraveris propositionem E T. hanc: Nihil est sire ratione sufficiente, per teris inde eruere corollarium; Ergo, id omne, quod ratione sufficiente destituitur, nec est, nec esse potest.  SCHOLION, seu SCHOLIVM, est oratio, qua illustratur quidquid in propositione obscurum videbatur. In eo igitur doctrinae usus exponitur, historia narratur, auctorum sententiae referuntur aliorum obiectiones proponuntur et refelluntur, ce teraque observatu digna enucleantur: ut videre est in omnibus Mathematicorum, et Philosophorum recentium scriptis.  LEMMA est proposititio ex aliena disciplina desumta, quae tamen ad demon strandum aliquid in doctrina, quam tra ctamus in subsidium adhibetur. Ita Aritmetici in costructione quadratornm et cuborum lemmata ab Algebra muluantur, ut est propositio illa: Cuiuscumque numeri bi partiti quadratum aequatur quadratis parti una cum facio dupli partis unius in al teram lucti. um Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 103 S E C T10 lll. De propositionum adfectionibus. HaecAec de enunciationum diversitate. Superest, ut de earum adfectionibus pau ca dicamus, de quibus quamplurima in Scholis praecipiuntur laboris quidem plena, vtilitatis autein expertia. Ad propositionum adfectiones referuntur: OPPOSITIO,  SVBALTERNATIO, CONVERSIO, et AEQVIPOLLENTIA. OPPOSITIO est duarum proposi tionum inter se pugnantium collatio: estque vel CONTRARIA, si earura utra que sit universalis in qua propositio nes ambae possunt esse falsae, sed non ambae verae; vel CONTRA-DICTORIA, si etiam quantitate differant, *** in qua enunciationum illarum necessario una ve ra esse debet, altera falsa; vel deni que SVBCONTRARIA, si ambae sint par ticulares, **** in eaque propositiones am bae verae, at non ambae falsae esse possunt. * Sic oppositae sunt hae propositiones: Omnis E 4 spiritus cogitat; nullus spiritus cogitat: pu. gnant enim inter se, quum de eodem subie cto idem una adfirmet, altera neget. ** E. g. Omnis homo est ratione praeditus: nullus homo est ratione praeditus, quarum una vera est, altera falsa. Possunt tamen da ri casus, in quibus ambae falsae sint, veluti huum unirersaliter enunciatur, quod particu lariter proferri debebat. E. g. Omnis homa est eruditres: nullus homo est eruditus. Om nibus enim tribuere quod quibusdam tan tum convenit, est falsum dicere dicere, ut infra videbimus. *** Ita propositiones: Omnis spiritus cogitats quidain spiritus non cogitat, sunt contradi ctoriae, earum enim una universaliter ait, al. tera particulariter negat. Iure igitur exclusa altera includitur, et contra: nam falsum est a quibusdam removere quod omnibus con renit, vel aliquibus tribuere quod nulli com petit. ***** Talis est sequens oppositio Quidam ko mines sunt divites: quidam homines non sunt divites: Vides hic ambas propositiones veras esse. Quod si dicas: quidam homo est liber: quidam homo non est liber, quum haec falsa sit, altera vera esse debet. Rationem eius re gulae, ne longius provehamur, coram dabi una, mus. 7SVBALTERNATIO est duarum Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 105 propositionum sola quantitate differen tium, sed eosdem terminos habeniium mutua quaedam relatio. Vniversalis enun ciatio SVB-ALTERNANS; particularis vero SVB-ALTERNATA, a Logicis dici con suevit. * De qua adfectione duo notanda occurrunt: 1. Veritatem subalternantis veritas quoque subalternatae consequi tur, non contra **. 2: Falsitas propo sitionis ' subalternatae falsitatem etiam subalternantis arguit, non autem con tra. E. g. Duarum propositionum:, Omnis homo est eruditionis capax; quidam, homo est eruz ditionis capax, illa subalternans, haec subal ternata dicitur. ** Sic quum ia superaddito exemplo verum sit, omnes homines doctrinae esse capaces, verum quoque erit, quosdam homines doctrinae capa ces esse. Ratio huius regulae est. Contrariae ambae verae esse non possunt (S. 78. ). Si ergo 'subalternans vera sit; eius contrará falsa erit. Quum autem huic contradıcat subalterna ta, et in contradictoriis necessario una sit, altera falsa (C. eod. *** ), liquet subal ternatan necessario verum esse debere; alias, enim in contradictione falsitas ex utraque par te daretur, quod est absurdu:n. Contra ea si verum est, quosdam hom nºs esse eruditos vera E 5 106 Logica Pars. I. cui quum non certe infertur omnes homines eruditos esse. *** Si namque subalternata est falsa, eius con tradictoria vera erit; sit contraria subalternans, haec non poterit non esse falsa, adeoque subalternae falsitatem necessario sequi. E.g.Falsum est, aliquem spiri tum esse mortalem: falsum qnoque erit, omnem spiritum esse mortalem. At şubalternantis fal sitas non ita subalternatae falsitatem includit. Quum enim in subalternante, utpote univer sali, subiectum in tota sua extensione suma tur ($. 68. ), poterit attributum aliquod extra subiecti naturam rationem sui habere sufficientem, adeoque aliquibus tantum spe ciebus, aut individuis conveniens propositio piem efficere particularem (f. eod. *** ). Fal sa in hoc casu' erit subalternáns, non vero subalternata. Hinc si falsuin est, omnes homi nes ésse doctos, non ita falsum erit, quosdam homines esse doctas. CONVERSIO est mutua extremorum salva enunciationis veritate, substitutio Ea fit tribus modis, scilicet 1. SIMPLICITER, quum eadem qualitas et quantitas manet; 2. per ACCIDENS, quin quan titas sola mutatur; 3. denique per CONTRA-POSITIONEM, quum salva pro, positionis quantitate, terminis additur ne galio, qua fit, ut enunciatio lex determi pata in infinitam abeat. Cap. V. De iud. et prop: 107 * Scholerum est ha ec doctrina a nobis recensi ta in gratiam eor um, qui huiusmodi loquite tiones scire cupiu nt; sed non caret sua uti litate; imo haud raro est necessaria, Sim plex igitur est conversio: Omnis spiritus est substantia cogitans: omnis substantia cogi tans est spiritus. E. g. Omnis doctus est homo, copyertitur per accidens hoc modo: ergo quidam homo est doctus. *** Sic: Quidam homo non est. pius, per con trapositionem convertitur: ergo quoddam non pium est homo. Sed quorsum haec? ais. Con fer, Dan. Richterum diss. de convcrs. propo • sition. Halae 1740 AEQUIPOLLENTES denique dicun tur enunciationes, quae verbis licet di versae, cumdem tamen sensum habent. * Duae ergo propositiones synonymicis termia nis expressionibusque prolatae aequipollentes sunt, nempe eumdem valorem habentes. Ego Omne animal vivit et sentio: nihil tam ani manti proprium est, quam vita et sensie. Quae de his postremis propositionum adfectionibus laboriosius a Scholasticis traduntur, tempus terendum potius, quam ad rationein excolendam sunt adcommodata. Nobis haec tantum notasse sufficiet. Schol. Quae de iudiciis, ac propositio nibus cupidae iuventuti observanda arbitra. mur, ea paucis exponenda supersunt. Qua propter tironi Philosopho sequentes tenea di sunt CANON ES, 1, Q Voniam iudicia sunt sapientiae, vel stultitiae fidelia indicia, par cius iudicato ne aliis sis ludibrio teque in errorem temere coniicias. 4 * Sensus namque communis a iudicandi peritia scientiam hominis metiri solet. Ea de re quum de alterius sapientia vel stultitia iudicium proferre volumus eum criterio pollentem pel carentem adpellamus. 2. De nuila re, nisi cuius adaequa tam, aut saltem distinctam habes ideam, iudicium proferto, tuum. Idearum enim confusio praeiudiciorum mater est fera cissima. * Quum enim rerum, de quibus iudicare volu mus, distinctatu vel adaequatam habemus ide am: tunc eas undequaque cognoscimus, re lationesque perpendimus; adeoque termino rum nexibus optime coguitis, recte iudiça þimus, Cap. V. De ind. et prop. 109 4. In vel tuo i quocumque iudicio vel alieno caussam et rationem atten te perspicito, cur tales ideae tali modo coniungantur vel scparentur, nec alio. * * Etenim infra abunde patebit, verae prope, sitionis criterium esse, si ratio sufficiens ad. sit, cur praedicatum subiecto tribuatur, vel ab eo removeatur. Tali ergo ratione perspem cta, non poterit iudicium non esse verum; ac proinde errandi metus procul aberit. 4. Praecipitantiam fugito: ideoque in iudicando tardus, in enunciando tardior esto, ne levitalis errorisve arguaris. Me mento Augustini praeclarum illud: ver IA BIS AD LIMAM, SEMEL AD LINGUAM, Ne cit enim, monente Horatio, vox missa Leverti. Notum est responsum illud nescio cui num quam loquuto, ac pro sapiente seinper habi. to, datum, postquam semel toqui voluit: Si tacuisses, Philosophus mansisses. 51. De moribus, et viia hominum num uam iudicato. Nemo enim alterius in er est a Deo constituius: > Hinc sapientissimum illud Servatoris nostri 110 Logica Pars. I. monitom gauctiope muniiuin habemus Matth. VII. 1. Nolite iudicare, ut non iudicemini. Qua vero ratione praeceptum istud homini bus inculeatum sit, ostendemus in Iure Naturae. Quoniam duarum idearum convenien tia, aut discrepantia non semper unica intuitu aguosci potest, adeoque dan tur veritates demonstrabites(s 71. ); de monstratio autem ratiociniorum serie absol vitur: ordinis ratio postulat, ut de ratiocinatione verba faciamus. Est vero RATIOCINATIO, sive RATIOCINIVM, actio mentis, qua ex duobus iudiciis no tionein communem habentibus tertium eli citur; vel practice est duarum idearum cum teriia comparatio', earumque rela tionis. deductio. Ratiocinium porro verbis expressa dicitur SYLLOGISMVS. * Quando igitur mens de veritate iudicii alicu ius nouduin certa, eius extrema, sive ideas confert cum idea aliqua tertia, et ab earum convenientia vel discrepantia, tertium elicit Cap. IV. De rat. et Syll. III iudicinm: tunc ratiocinatur, hoc est rationes conficit, ut veritatem inveniat. E. g. Ut sciat, an aer sit gravis comparat ideam aeris, et ideam gravis; cum tertia idea corporis, ob servatque, num inter eas adsit convenientia: qua comperta, duas illas ideas inter se quo que convenire concludit hoc modo: Omne corpus est grave: Aer est corpus; Ergo aer est gravis. En ratiocivium. Quod si verbis exprimatur, erit syllogismus. 83. Experientia teste scimus, duas ide as cum tertia triplici modo comparari pos se: vel enim cum illa conveniunt, vel u na convenit, altera discrepat, vel ambae ab ea discrepant. In primo casu elicitur ter tium iudicium aiens, in secundo negans, in tertio vero nihil exsurgit. Totum ergo ratiocinii pondus duobus his axiomatis con tinetur: nempe 1. Quae conveniunt cum aliquo tertio ea conveniunt inter se: 2. Quorum unum tertio cuidam convenit, alterum autem ab eo discrepat, illa in ter se quoque discrepant * Primum axioma est ratio sufficiens syllogismi aientis ut videre, est in exemplo supra al lato; alterum negantis: e g. Qui Deo servit non servit Mammonae: sed Christianus Deo. 1. servit: ergo Christianus non servit Mamm onae. Vides hic duaru n idearum Christiani et Mam monae servientis., alteram convenire cnm ter tia Deo serviendi, alteram vero ab ea di screpare: unde infertur a se invicem discrepare. 84. Ex quibus rebus clare consequitur 1. in omni ratiocinatione tres tantummodo ideas esse debere, adeoque 2. in omni syllogismo tres tantuin terminus; * unde 3. si plures ad sint tirinini; guain tres, syllogisuum es se falsum. ** Quumque tres ideae totidem combinationes adinittant (per exper. ): sequitur 4: ratiocinium tria quoque iudicia continere; ac proinde 5. syllogismum tres, nec plures, enunciationes admittere) Advertendum hic, tam terminos, quani pro positiones syllogismums, componentes y pecu liaribus a Logicis ' donata fuisse nominibus. Et ut a teruninis incipiamus, praedicatum tertiae propositionis,, quae principalis dici potest, MATOR adpellatur, subiectum eiusdeni, MINOR; {erminus vero, qui tertiam ideanı ex. primit, quique rationem continet suffizientem couvenientiae, vel repugnantiae termini ma ioris cum minore, MEDIUS voćatur. E pro, Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 113 > positionibus etiam illa, in qua medius cum maiore confertur, MAIOR, vel PROPOSITIO simpliciter; illa, in qua medius cum minore comparatur, MINOR vel ASSUMPTIO; ambae vero PRAEMISSAE dicuntur, propositio denique, quam principalem supra, adpellavimus CONCLUSIO COMPLE xto, a Scholasticis CONSEQUENTIA nos minantur. Sic in primo exemplo gravis est terminus maior, aer minor, cor pus est terminus medius, adeoque prima pro positio est maior, altera minor, tertia con clusio. * Solet enim quandoque quartus irreperę ter. minus, et syllogismum corrumpere, idque raro patenter; nam saepius in termino aliquo, vel compositione latet. Fieri hoc potest 1. per aequivocationem, ut fi terminuin aliquiem yagnum adhibeas in sensu diverso: eg: Vilpes habet qualuorpedes, Herodes est vulpes; er go Herodes habet quatuor pedes. In quo ob servas vocem vulpes prino proprie; secundo vero metaphorice suintam; 3. per supposi tionis mutationem, ut si idem terminus ma terialiter in una, formaliter in premissarum altera sumatır. E. g. Iinne ens est generis neutrius: femina est ens, ergo fernina est ge neris ncutrius, in quo nocens in miori gran. matice; in minori philosophice anceptum est; 3. per confusionem termini abstracti cum con creto. E.g. Omnis prudentia est habitus bo nus: Titius est prudens: ergo Titius est ha bitus bonus. Tres ergo enuuciationes syllogismi materia dici possunt: forma namque legibus absolvi tur, quas infra 'exibebimus. 85. Quamvis vero ratiocinium tam fa cilis exequutionis primo intuitu videatur: difficilis tamen admodum est termini me dii, qui communis idearum mensura est inventio. Sed ut omois difficultas evanescat, experientiam philosophiae matrem consule re decet. Ea enim duce discimus, mentem postrani in ratiocinando duplieem ingredi viam: vel enim notionum alteram ad pro prium genus, vel speciem revocat, et quid quid his convenit, illi quoque tribuit, vel definitionis characteres evolvit, eosque al. teri convenire observans definic tum quoque coniungit. Duplex ergo est medium inveniendi methodus: altera sub iectum ad genus, vel speciem, sub qua continetur, reducendi, eique tribuendi, vel adimendi quidquid ideae genericae con vepit, vel ab ea discrepat; altera attributi definitionem cum subiecto comparandi, et ab eorum convenientia vel discrepantia, praedicati quoque cum subiecto coniunctio nem eruendi. cum ea Cap. IV. De rat. et Syll. Exemplo sit sillogismiis supra adductus. Scire cupis, aer sit gravis? Reduc subiectum sub genere corporis, et vide, utrum huic conveniat gravitas, eam de aere quoque enunciabis, ita ratiocinando. Quodlibet corpus est grave, aer est corpus: ergo aer est gravis. Haec erit prima medium inveniendi methodus. Rursum gravitatis defi nitionem evolve, eiusque characteres, nem pe corporum inferiorum pressionem confer cum aere. Quumque ei conveniant, attribu tum cum subiecto coniunges hoc modo: Quidquid corpora inferiora premit, est grave: Aer premit corpora inferiora: Ergo aer est gravis Habes hic alteram medium inveniendi me thodum. Eodemque modo in aliis ratiociniis investigando procedes: quod si adcurate ser ves, numquam tua te fallet ratiocinatio. 86. Ex hoc principio fluunt sequentes regulae ratiocinii fundamentales. I. Quid quid convenit generi vel speciei, conve nit etiam omnibus speciebus, et indivi duis eorum ambitu conteniis. 2. Quid quid repugnat vel generi specici, repugn it omnibus quoque speciebus, et individuis sub iisdem contentis. * 3. Cui convenit  definitio, convenit pariter definitum: ac proinde 4. a quo discrepat definitto, di screpat etiam definitum. * Vides ergo ideam mediam semel universaliter sumi debere, quia ideam universalem, ge. mus nempe vel speciem, exhibet. Quod si bis particulariter sumeretur, ratiocininm vi tio laboraret, ut infra dicetur. Quumque praedicatum tam latc pateat, quam subiectum cui tribuitur, ut cuique manifestum est: li quet, propositionem, in qua medius vicem praedicati sustinet, particularem esse. Debet ergo medius terminis universaliter sumi in ea propositione, cuius subiectum constituit Et quoniam propositio, in qua subiectum in tota sua extensione sumitur, est universalis: liquido infertur, saltem unam praemissaram esse debere universalem. Variae syllogismorum figurae Scho lasticis fuere in deliciis, quas barbaris ali quot vocabulis, versibusque distinguere consueverunt. Nos, missis futilibus tracla tionibus, regulas quasdam Tironibus ma xime inservituras, quibus syllogismi leges breviter exponuntur, hic subiiciinus, quas. sequcntes exhibent. Cap. IV. De rat. et Syll. 119 CANONES. In syllogismo non plures termini sunto, quamtres. Si quartus irrepserit, vitiosusiesto. Est lex eo magis observanda, quo omnia sophismata, si bene perpendantur, contra illam peccare observamus. Ecquid enim sunt fallaciae tanto labore a Scholis evolutae, an liquitatis, amphboliae, dictionis composi tionis, divisionis, caussae, dicti simpliciter, con e juentis, accidentis, cetera, nisi syllogi smi e quatuor terminis conflati, in quibus quarins cryptice latet? Veritas hace altcate consideranti baud aegre patescet. Vide quae de quatuor terminis diximus g. Medius terminus numquam conclu sionem ingreditor. Monstruosuin enim es set, caussam in effectus constitutionem immisceri.: * → Intellectus enim in ratiocinando vice Mathe matici fungitur. Quia vero Mathematicus dua rum magnitudinuin aeqnalitatem ex cniusdam tertii adplicatione cognoscit, nec, nisi in comparatione, mensuram adhibet: ita et in tellectus in ratiocinando ex duobus indiciis 118 Logica Pars. I. * tertium ervit, in quod medium comparatio nis ingredi, valde foret absurdum. Vitiosum ergo esset ita raziocinati: Omnis bonus Phi losophus est homo: Titius est bonus Philo sophur: ergo Titius est bonus homo. Medius Damque terminus ex parte in conclusionem irrepsit. 4. Non esto plus minusve in conclu sione, ac fuit in praemissis, ne quatuor inde éxoriantur termini. Si nanque praemissae sunt veluti comparatio nes duarum magnitudinum cụm tertio eisdem adplicato, scilicet mersura: iudicium ex comparatione ipsa procedens, perfecte com parationibus ipsis convenire debet. Quando vero in conclusione plus minusve continetur, quam in praemissis, idem esset, ac si dice res productum maius vel minus esse altero, quod ex iisdem factoribus est ortum Plus cotineret conclusio, si ita diceres: Qui alium l'aesit, puniendus est: Cajus alterum laesit: Cajus ergo morte puniendus est. Minus con tra, si sic ratiocinaris: Qui furium commi sit, restitutioni et poenac subiacet: Titius fur tum commisit: tius restitutioni subiacet. 4. Ex puris particularibus, vel ne gantibus (praemissis ) nihil sequi, ius estc. Cap. V. De rat. et Syll. 119 * Diximus enim f. 86. *, praemissarum unam saltem esse debere universalem: unde si am hae essent particulares, impingeretur in regulam 1.1. S. cit.; si vero ambae negantes, tunc duarum idearum neutra cum tertia conveniret, adeoque nihil sequeretur per S. 83. Falsum ergo esset dicere: Quidam bo mines suni doeti: quidam homines sunt in docti: ergo quidam docti sunt indocti. Item Nullus impius salvatur: nullus impius est pius: ergo nullns pius salvatur. 5. Conclusio partem sequatur debilio rem, probe curato, ne in superiora pecces. * Pars debilior est propositio particularis, vel negativa. Si ergo una praemissarum fuerit particularis, conclusio quoque particnlaris, conclusio quoque particularis esse debet, alias plus esset in conclusione, quam in praemissis; quod est contra regulam 3.: si vero una praemissarum fuerit negans con clusio adfirmans contra regulam 2. In hoc eniin casu extremorum conclusionis unum cum medio convenit, alterum ab eo discre pat; adeoque ea inter se quoque discrepare concludendum est; quare conclusio negans esse dcbet. Quae de diversis syllogismorum figuris regulae vulgo traduntur, eae ad rem non faciunt; ac proinde a nobis tuto prae terinittuntur, 120 Logita Pars. I. CAPVT SEPTIMVM. De aliis ratiocinandi modis. 38. Sunt et aliae ratiocinandi formae, quae licet a syllogismo diversae adpareant syllogismum tamen continent vel 1. CRYPTICVM, vel 2., COMPOSITVM, vel 3. MVLTIPLICEM. De his obiter praesenti ca pite agemus. SYLLOGISMUS CRYPTICVS est, in quo forma ordinaria (*. 71 * ) quo modolibet périurbatur, aut occultatur. CRYPSIS ergo inducitur i. per ordinis perturbationem, *. 2. per propositionum aequipollentiam per propositionis alicuius omissionem, quo casu dicitur ENTHYMEMA, 4. denum per contractionem. * Ordo perturbatur, ai quando propositiones transponuntnr: ut si prino conclusionen vel minorem, de nde maiorein vel conclusio riem ponas. E. g. Quum ira sit adfectus minor ), debei omnino compesci (conclusio); omnis namque adfectus est compesccn dus (maior ). ܪ Cap. VII. De aliis rat. " modis. 121 ** E: 8. Adfectus est attentionem turbare. Quum ergo ira sit molus vehementior appe tus sensitivi ': infertur, in iracundo attcntio nem mirifice perturbari. *** ENTHYMEMA igitur est syllogismus dua bus constans propositionibus, quarum prima ANTECEDENS altera dicitur CONSEQUENS. In hac argumentandi forma praemise sarum aliqua reticetur, speciatim vero illa, quae cuique patet, ut: omnis adfectus tur bat attentionem: ergo ira turbat attentionem. Minor deest, utpote quae ab audiente sup pleri potest. Eodem modo et maior retice ri, minor contra exprimi solet: e. g. ir & est adfectus: ergo estcompescenda. SYLLOGISMUS CONTRACTUS dicitur in quo solus maior cum medio termino pro punijatur, relicto iniuore cum omni combi patione. Talis est Cartesii syllogismus. Cogi 10, ergo sum: ubi eogito est medius, est terminus maior; adeoque minor, scilicet ego, cum tota propositionum connexione reticetur: integrum enim ratiocinium lioc,mo do exponendum erat: Quid juid cogitat,exsistit ego cogiio: ego igitur exsisto. SYLLOGISMVS COMPOSITVS est, in quo adest aliqua' propositio composiía, estoque vel HYPOTHETICVS; * vel CO PULATIVUS, ** vel DISIVNCTIVVS, vel tandem ex hoc primoque coalescens, qui proprio nomine vocatur DILEMMA. Tom. I. F. Sun: Hypotheticus, sive conditionalis est, eut ius maior est propositio hypothetica: é g. Si homo est rationalis, sequi tnr, ut sit libertatis capax: atqui est ratio nalis; ergo est capax liberatis De hoc te nenda regula: Adfirmata conditione, adfir matur conditionatum; et negato conditionato, negatur conditio. Quum enim in hypothesi contineatur ratio sufficiens veritxtis proposi tionis, adfirmata caussá adfirmatur effectus contra vero negato effectu, eius quoque caus sa negari debet.. ** Copulativus, sive coniunctus est, qui malo. iorem habet duas simul propositiones coniun gentem, et negantein, quarum unam minor adfirmat, alteram conclusio negat. E. g. Non potest anima sinni aeternum vivere, et cum corpore perire, atqni aelernum vivit: ergo non perit cum corpore. ** Disiunctivas est cuius propositio maior est dis iunctiva. E. &. Aut anima cst ens ' simple: aut compositum: sed non est cns compositum, ergo est simplex. Notanda crgo regula: Ad firmato uno disi!ınctionis membro, reliqua negantur; ct negatis rcliyuis, unuin ad fir tur. Confer tamen quae de disiunctivis pro positionibus diximus. Si ergo in maiori propositio bypothetica cum disiunctiva copuletur, DILEMMA con surgit quod argumentatio bicornis vel crocodilina vocari solet. Id vero definitur: Syllogismus hypotheticus, cuius mai oris ' al 7 Cap. VII. De aliis rat. mo dis. Tera pars est disiunctiva, quae in minore negatur, et in conclusione totum destruitur. E. g. Si ens simplex naturaliter cx alio en te oritur tunc aut ex alio simplici, aut e composito oriri debet: sed neque ex alio ente simplici, neque c composito oriri potest: ergo naturaliter ex alio ente non potest orlum du cere. Mirificum est Dilemma AVGVSTINI Tract. 1. in Joann, quo Arianorum errorem circa Verbi aeternitatem egregie confutarit Huc referenda quae diximus de divisione MVLTIPLICEM SYLLOGISMVM, licet imperfecte exhibent 1. EPICHERE MA, in quo alterutri, vel utrique prae missarum probatio additur; * 2 PROSYLLOGISMVS, in quo ' prioris syllogismi conclusio posterioris eidem iuncti maiorem constituit POLYSYLLOGISMUS, qui plurium syllogismorum connexionem contínet, e SORITES, qui plures ita connectit propositiones, ut prioris aliribu tudi si ! posterioris subicctum. EPICHEREMA ergo rsl syllogisms. cuius praemissis compendii caussa ralio Quirlitur Exemplum habes iu Cic. pro Sex Rusc. MAI. Vt quis parricidii sit suspectus, is sce lestissimus ét audacissimus sit, oporlei. RATIO est enim crimen horrendum. NIIN. Sex Roscius non est talis PROB. Non est audax, non luxuriosus mon avarus. 124 Loigica Pars. I. CONCL. Non ergo est parricidii suspectus. ** In PROSELLOGISMO itaque duo adsunt syllogismi coniuncti, quorum posterior ma iorem habet in prioris conclusione contentam: quapropter eius minor SVBSVNTA vocatur MAI. Omnis spiritus est ens simplex, MIN. Anima humana est spiritus: CONCL. Ergo anima humana estens simplex. MIN. SVBSVMTA. Atqui ens simplex est indestructibile. CONCL. Ergo anima humana est indestructibilis. Si prosyllogismus uiterius procedat, aliae que minores subsumtae et conclusiones snb inugantnr, dicetur polysyllogismus, hoc est plurium syllogismorum connexio legitime fa cta. Exemplum habebis infra Part. II. Cap.3. Sect. 2. ubi demonstrationis specimen dabimus. SORITES a Cicerone de Divin. Lib II. cap. 4. acervalis dictus, est plurium propos sitionum cumulus ita connexarum, ut unius praedicatum sit alterius subiectum, adeoque tot syllogismos continet, quot sunt propo sitiones, demptis duabus, eodem fere modo, quo polygonum aa Geometris per diagonales in tot triangula resolvi potest, quot sunt la tera demtis duobus. Haec autem argumenta tio nisi cautiones quedam adhibeantur ad fallendum aptior est. Cautiones istae funt. 1. Nulla praemissarum diibia sit, aut falsa: > 1 Cap. VII. De aliis rał. modis. 123 coram. ex falso enim antecedente non potest verum consequens oriri.2. Non insint in Sorite duae propositiones negantcs. Hoc enim casu in eius resolutione aderit syllogismus ambas praemis sarum negantes habens, quem vitio laborare supra observavimus (F. 87. can. 4. ). En Soritis exemplum. Quodlibet corpus est ali quo loco: quod est in uno loco, potest etiam esse in alio: quod potest esse in alio loco, potest rnutare locum: quod potest mutare lo cum, est mobile: ergo quodlibet corpus est mobile. Eius vero analysis rationem reddemus 92. Syllogismo, eiusque speciebus. e diametro opponitur INDVCTIO, quse vere ac proprie dici potest argumentatio a posteriori, quippe quae a singularibus ad particularia, alquc ab bis ad universa lia procedit. Haec autem syllogismo prior est: nam quum ope experientiae praemis sas conficiat, indeque conclusiones eliciat universales, hac vero syllogismi praemissas constituant, utpote qui ab universalibus ad particularia, vel ab his ad singularia gra dum facit: hunc sine illa construi non posse, quisque videt, INDVCTIO itaque est argumentatio, in qua quiquid de singulis speciebus vel individuis speciation praedicatur, generatim quoque de toto genere vel speeie enunciatur; adeoque in ea tot minores adsunt, quot species vel in F 3 dividua exprimuntnr. E. g. aurum, argentuan orichalcum, cuprum, stannum, plumbun, ferrum, igni inieclun liquefiunt: ergo omne metallum igni ni ectum liquefit. Ad inductio nem ergo duo requiruntur, 1. plena partium enumeratio, 2. ut quod inferioribus tribuitur, ile superiori pariter enuncietur. Si ergo par tes omnes enuncientur, inductio dicelur com pleta, sin aliquae tantum, incompleta erit: si denique una dumtaxat fars proponatur, EXEMPLUM adpellabitur, quod tamen ad oratores non ad Philosophos pertinet, quum sit contra 34. S. n. 6. ** Ex iis enim, quae diximus Cap. 1., liquet, ideas universales abstractionis ope a singulari bus erui. Eodem modo Par. 11. Cap. 4. Sect. I. ostendemus, indicia universalia a sin gularibus abstrahendo confici. Id vero est, quod Inductionem constituit. Quum autein praemissarum syllogismi saltem una debeat es se universalis, patet, In ductionem syllogismo principia praestruere: adeoque illo priorem esse. Schol. De hụius doctrinae usu tandem pauca delibare juvabit. Quae de universa hac tractatione homini philosopho servanda sunt, qui sequuntur, exponunt. Cap. VII. De aliis rat, modis.127 CANONES, QVandaquidem ratiocinando veritas + vi. innotescit, principia prius con siderato num solida sint et indubia. Propositiones deinde ad trutinam revo cato, ac denique eurum connexionem adcurate perpendilo, ne in quolibet r'a riocinandi modo fallaris: “. Quum enim syllogismus materia et forma con siet: illan vero propositiones, hanc propo sitionum connexio, lioc est syllogismi "leges constituant; cuiuslibet autem rei bonitas materiae soliditate ac formae aptitudine absolvatur: patet; Philosophum de utraque sollicitum esse debere, ut ratioci. nia sua tulo proferre possit. 2. Quoniam omnis argumentatio ad unum redit syllogismum, id agito, ut huius leges nocturna diurnaque manu verses: alioquin loqui scies, non ratio cinari. Exploratum namque est, quamcumque ar gumentationem syllogismuni esse vel crypti cum ", vel compositum, vel multiplicem: nisi ergo syllogismi probe gnaa rus, nulliusmodi argumenta poterit quisque proferre. Qua de remiramur, viros alioquin F4 doctissimos, et de Philosophia optime atque abunde meritos, syllogismo fuisse adeo in fensos, ut eum inutilem, immo nullins bo ni effectorem esse clamitarint. Infra vero ab unde patebit, scientificam methodum sola syllogismorum concatenatione absolvi: unde evidenter proseguisque deducet, syllogismum homini philosopho esse omnino necessarium Videatur Wolffius in Log. Germ. S. III. seq., ubi mathematicas demonstrationes absque illo fieri non posse, experiundo ostendit 3. Si cum alio res tibi fuerit, omnia eius argumenta in syllogismos resolvito: tunc enim clare perspicies, cunctane re. cte procedant, an aliquis lateat error, an sub ambagibus fallacia occultetur. Varii namque sunt fallcndi inodi a Scholasti cis magno labore evoluti, qui tamen si ad sillogismum eiusque leges, tamquam ail ly, dium lapidem, exigantur, oppido evanescent, Ut hoc exempli loco addamus, si soriten duas propositiones negantes habentem in syl logismos resolvas: 'nonne statim patescet do lus, quum tres negantes propositiones in ra tiocinio, adeoqoe contra quartam eiusdem " legem peccatum esse, observabis. Praeclaro igitur hoc duce uti nolle idem esset, ac in. ventis frugibus, glandibus vesci. Hucusque usque satis satis.dede mentis mentis ope ope rationibus actum. Quum autem Logicae sit non contentiones nequicquam fovere, sed hominum vitae consulere, atque intel lectum in veritatis investigatione dirigere: doceamus, oportet, qua ratio ne tribus hisce mentis operationibus in cognoscendo diiudicandoque vero recte uti debeamus. Quod ut commodius effici pos sit, pauca quaedam de veritate generatim spectata, eiusque genuina tessera, hic prae mittemus, VERITAS est, vel METAPHYSICA, quum ens aliquod actu exsistens suam habet essentiam; vel ETHICA quando quilibet sermo interno sensųi, F 5 130 Logica Pars. II. scilicet conscientiae, respondet; ** vel denique LOGICA, si cogitationes nostrae obiectis suis sint conformes. Quia vero hic cum Metaphysica atque Ethicą nihil no bis est negotii, de veritate logica verba tantummodo faciemus. Metaphysice ergo verum dicitur quidquid om nibus gaudet proprietatibus, quae ad con stituendam eius essentiam sunt necessariae: adeoque huic falsum opponi nequit, qoia es: sentia entis est necessaria et immutabilis ut in Metaphysica fusius docebimus, ac proin de nequit ens exsistere, et sua simul essen. tia carere. Ita aurum est verum aurum, qu pin omnia auri adsunt requisita. At non_da tur, inquies, falsum aurum? Minime. Tunc enim non aurum, sed cuprum, orichalcum, aliudve, aut e pluribus metallis revera mi xtum erit. Illud autem verum aurum iudica. re, est nubem po lunone amplecti, atque a veritate Logica aberrare. ** Verę loqui dicimur, quum secundum cong scientiam loquimur, idest dicimus quae trinsechs sentimus. Atque ḥaec veritas dicitur moralis sive ethica, cui opponitur falsilo suium, quod est sermo contra concientiam prolatus, de in Moralibus agemus. quo 93. VERITATIS LOGICAE vocabulo itelligimus convenientiam cogitationum no strarum cum rebus ipsis, Quumquç no. De ver. eiusq. crit. 131 stra congitandi facultas tribus tantum mo dis sese exserat, vel in ideis forinandis vel in iudiciis eruendis vel denique in rationibus conficiendis (S. 15. ): liquet, logicam veritatem vel in ideis, vel in iu diciis, vel in ratiocinatione reperiri. * Hac definitione veritatem abstracto modo con sideramus: concreto namque definiri posset per cogitationem obiecto suo consentaneam. Porro veritasa Logicis dispescitur in FORMALEM, et OBIECTIVAM. Illa est, cuius obiea ctum extra nos vel non existit vel non tale ut a mente nostra concipitur: quales sunt veritates omnes purae geometricae; haec ve ro, cuius obiectum extra nos realiter exsistit. Ham alii INTERNAM hanc EXTERNAM adpellare consueverunt. Illa est clara, distin cta, et indeficiens, quippe qua mens de se suisque operationibus iudicat, haec vero ob scura, dubia, et fallibilis: non enim per eam, scire possumus, utrum cogitatioues nostrae obiectis suis extra nos positis conveniant necne? adeoque quum veritatem habemus in ternam, de reali extra nos obiecti exsistentia iudicare non possumus; quum contra veritatis externae compotes certi simus obiectum in cogitatione exsistens extra eamdem etiam rea liter existere. 96 IDEA VERA dicitur, si quando nca bis rem, uti in seu est, repraesentemus: *verum est lyDICIVM, siconiungenda co 2 F 6 132 pulemus, separanda seinngamus; 've rum itidem RATIOCINIVŇ, si ' neque in materia, neque in forma peccaverit, * Idea ergo singularis ($. 28. ) vera est, si quando eius obiectum extra nos realiter exsi stat, eoque modo, quo nobis illud reprae sentamus: vera pariter dici debet idea uni versalis, dum compositio vel abstractio a re rum natura non recedit, ita ut characteres illam comitantes simul in uno inveniri pos sint. Vides hinc, ideas deceptrices, chimae ricas, aliasque obiectis suis nullo modo re spondentes dici non posse veras. Advertas - tamen, absolutam obiecti deficientiam, vel ideae ab eo discrepantiam veritati nocere. Si namque obiectum non sit evidens, nec ideae characteres eum eo conferre queamus; con tra vero sufficientibus indiciis de eius verita te certi simus: notionem illam deceptricem vel terminum eam exprimentem inanem ad pellare, est contra Logicae regulas, ac pri ma cognitionis humanae principia tnrpissime peccare. In hunc errorem incidunt quicum que de mysteriis Sanctae Religionis sermonem instituentes, aliquam credentibus notam inu rere conantur, quod vocabula mente cassa proferant e id quod alibi diffuse enodabimus. ** Nimirum si de re quapiam aliquid adfirme mus vel negernus, quod adfirmari aut negari oporteret: veluti quum soli spendorem iri, buimus vel tenebras ab removemus? tunc judícia nostra veritate gaudebunt, f 2 2 eo 2 Cap. I. De ver. eiusq. crit. 133 *** Ratiocinationis, sive syllogismi materiam es se tres illas propositiones, e quibus confla tur; formam vero leges. (S. 87. ) expositas, supra docuimus (6- 84.** ). Si ergo pro positiones fuerint verae: leges autem adcuras te servatae, ratiocinium non poterit non es se verum: quia, quum qualis est caussa, ta lis esse debeat effectus, non potest ex veris praemissis falsa legitime fluere conclusic. Ex quo liquido colligi potest, eum, qui prae missas concessit, non posse negare conclusio nem ex iis legitimo nexu fluentem. Cave tas men, ne ex conclusione, licet evidenter ex praemissis deducta, de hárum veritate audeas áudicare: potest enim conclusio vera legitime ex falsis ambabus oriri praemissis. Talis es, set sequens syllogismus: Omnis virtus est fugienda: Avaritią est virtus; Ergo avaritia est fugienda, Vides hic veram conclusionem legitime ex fal sis praemissis deductam. Possesne conclusionis veritate praemissarum quoque veritatem ar 97. Quoniam iudicium verbis expres sumi propositio dicitur (§. 60. ): evi dens est. propositionem dici veram, quae adfirmanda adfirmat negandaque ne gat, servata ubique quantitate. * Sed quia non omnium cnunciationum veritas, nec ab omnibus distincte perspicitur: criterium aliquod inveniatur, oportet, ad quod guere? 134 Logica Pars. I1. tamquam ad lydium lapidem, propositio nem quamcuinque exigentes, eius verita tem dignoscere queamus. ** • Veluti quum particulariter enunciatur de su biecto quidquid extra illius naturam; vel uni versaliter quidquid in eius essentia rationem habet sufficientem. Vid. supra Part. I. Cap. 5. Sect. 1.. 68. ** Hoc autem criterium exsistere debet quo propositiones veras a falsis, a phanta smatis, realitates ab insomniis discernere pos simus: alias enim homo in perpetua illusia ne versaretur, id quod est Divinae sapientiae, homini, ipsiqne humanae menti iniurium. Quia de te Philosophi omnes in eo consenserunt, li cet in adsignanda illa tessera in contrarias partes opinando ierint, res 98. CRITERIVM VERITATIS est ra tio quaedam sufficiens, per quam intel. ligitur cur praedicatum subiecto tribua tur, vel ab eo removeatur. * Nimirum ut cogitationum nostrarum cum obiectis suis conformitatem perspicere possimus in 93. ), eiusmodi characteres in promtu haberi de bent, quibus attributi cuin subiecto con venientia vel discrepantia ita determinetur, nt mens adquiescat, nec ullus de earum veritate supersit dubitanli locus. Qua propter characteres illi REQVISITA ad peritatein recte dicuntur, *** Cap. I. De ver. eiusq. crit. 135 Variae de veritatis criteriis omni aetate fuere Philosophorum opiniones, exceptis Academi cis, üsqne, qui Scepticismum ad furorem usque provehere ausi, atque a Pyrrkone Pyr. rhonistarum nomine insigniti, nihil a nobis vere sciri posse, temerario ausu adfirmarunt, quorum insania comploranda potius esset, quam confutanda. PLATO yeri tesseram es se statuit, evidentiam intelligibilem aeterna rum idearum mentibus participatarum; EPI CURUS fidem sensuum. ARISTOTELES medium inter hos iter tenens, utramque evi dentiam veri criterium posuit: illam nempe in intelligibilibus; hanc in iis, quae sensi bus percipiuntur. STOICI, secundum Laer, tium, veri indicinm aibeant comprehensibilcm phantasiam hoc est, evidentiam &maginationum; CARTESIUS cum recentioribus, elaram, et distin ctam perceptionem: in Medit. 4.; MALEBRANCHIUS cam evidentiam, quam inter na animi coactio sequitur, ut ei adsensum denegare nequeamus. Lib.I.de inquir. verit. LEIDNIȚIUS in triplici evia dentia, intellectus, sensus et auctoritatis criterium illud posuit. Quae vero de his ob servari merentur, in ipsis praelectionibus ex ponemus. In hac ergo propositione: Aer est gravis, qualitas attributi, hoc est gravitas, per no tionem aeris determinatur: in hac enim inest ratio sufficiens cur ipsi illam tribuatur. Quum enim aer corpora inferiora premat; idque > 136 Logica Pars. U. ad costituendam gravitatis notionem requira tur: clare patescit, aerem esse gravem, adeo que propositionem esse veram. Et hoc est, quod Wolffius, criterium verae proposi, tionis ésse determinabilitatem attributi per notionem subiecti. 7 *** E. In hac propositione: Caius est invia dus, requisita ad veritatem sunt invidiae cha racterés alibi enumerati, qni in Caio deprehenduntur, quique rationem con tinent sufficientem, cur Caio to invidum es se tribuatur, Quum igitur veritatis criterium in ratione sulficiente consistat, et a requisitorum collectione constituatur sequitur 1. ut inter veritatis crite ria adnumerari debeant quaecumqne iis de terminationibus praedita sunt, ut a mente, quamvis invita, adsensum extorquere pos sint. At quia experientia quotidiana docet, mentem nostram non convinci, nisi ' sen suun testimonio in rebus sensibilibus, * in tellectus evidentia in intelligibilibus, auctoritatis deuique pondere in iis, quae neque sensu, nec ratione percipi possunt: liquet 2. criteria illa pro rerum di. versitate tria statuenda #Y *** esse, intellectus sensuum et auctoritatis EVIDENTIAM. nempe, Cap.II. De ver. eiusq. crit. 137 * Per res sensibiles intelligimus non modo cor poreas quae sensibus exsternis, sed et ipsas animae actiones, quae sensu interno perci piuntur. Quum igitur:Naturae sa pientissimus Auctor hominem conscientia, sen suque cum omnibns organis instruxerit, ut: omnium cogitationum suarum obiecta distin gueret, eorumque conscius esset: non ab re vera esse pronuntiamus, quae internus eter nique sensus ita se habere testantur. ** Et quidem omnium axiomatum evidentia a primo cognitionis humanae principio, nempe non posee idem simul esse et non esse, ori ginem suam repetit; hoc vero principium in timo sensu cunctis innotescit. Quaecumque porro propositiones a veritatibns evidentibus legitimo nexu deducuntur eamdem evidentiam adquirunt, quam illae habebant, id quod ra tione duce ac demonstratioris ope conficitur quibus intellectus convincitur,et mens adquie scit: evidens ergo est, veritates tam demon strabiles, quam indemonstrabiles ad Logicae reguias cxactas revera exsistere, ab homini bus certo cognosci posse, earumque criterium in intellectus adquiescentia reponi debere nempe ut Malebranchius ait, iu ea 'eviden ' tia, qnae internam producit coactionem, at que a mente adsensum extorquet. Huiusmodi sunt propositiones humanum ca ptum superantes, nobisque ideo imperviae, quae quum ab Ente intelligentissimo tantum agnosci possint, revelatae tandem addiscun tur, fidemque mereatur: quum entis illius perfectiones sint infinitae, nec de illarum 2 I veritate addubitari sinant. Eiusdem commatis sunt facta, sive propositiones singulares, quae in locis temporibusve remotis extiterunt, qnae que nec. sensibus, nec ratione a nobis una quam erui possunt, quidquid contra dicat D. Rousseau Disc. sur l ' inegalité parmi les ho mm.; sed sensibus olim ab adstantibus coaevis que percepta, ab his vero vel scriptis vel per manus tiadita ad. nos pervenerunt: ct quia narrantium auctoritas suspecta non est, certitudinem, aut saltem probabilitatem in mente producunt. Vides hinc, sententiam nostram in intelli gibilibus rationem, in sensibilibus experien liam, in factis rebusve humanum captum ex superantibus auctoritatem commend.ve; adec que eamdem asse cuin Cartesiana, Malebran chiana, et Leibnitiana. Sed quia tessera haec certitudinem potius, mentis scilicet nostrae statum, quam rei veritatem respicit, de ea, quam producit, evidentia plura infra, ubi de veritate certa sermo erit, haud spernen da dicemus. Interim confereudus Io.And. Osiander Diss. de Crit. Verit. Tubingae 1748. FALSITAS veritati opposita est di screpantia cogitationum nostrarum ab obiectis. Quumque oppositorum contrariae sint adfectiones, patet, falsitatem vel in ideis, vel in judiciis, vel in ratiociniis reperi ii; * adeoque FALSITATIS CRITERIVM esse manifestum rationis illius sufficientis defectum. Cap. I. De ver. eiusq. Falsa ergo est idea, quum aliter se habet a re repraesentata; falsum iudicium aiens., si quando subiecto non conveniat attributum, negans vero quoties boc illi conveniat; adeo que falsa propositio, quae neganda adfirmat, adfirmandaque negat, vel quae universaliter enunciat quod particulariter enunciari debe. bat; falsum denique ratiocinium, quod in materia vel forma peccat: i illa, quando propositiones sunt falsae; in bac vero, quum syllogismi leges, violatae sunt. ** Propositionis falsae rera tessera est, si non modo desit ratio sufficiens, cur praeuicatum subiecto tribuatur, vel non; verum adsit rl tio, cur contrariuin enuncietur: tunc enim subiecti notio determinal qualitatem attribu ti oppositi. Porro in ratiociniorum forma fal sitas esse potest vel patens, vel latens. Si vitinn sit manifestum, dicuntur PARALOGISMI; si vero crypsi aliqua tegatur, vo cantur SOPHISMATA A Scholasticis am bo vocantur FALLACIAE. Paralogismus est sequens: Omne homicidium est vitandum, nullum furtum est homicidium ergo nullum furtum est vitandum. In co enim aperto peccalum est colra Can. 4.6. 87.: me dius enim terminus his particulariter sumtus est. Sophisma contra crii, si sie ratiocinabea ris: Populus ex terra crescit: mulliluilo ko. 140 Logica Pars. II. minum est populus: ergo multitudo hominum ex terra crescit: quatuor namque termini ir repsere per aequivocationem termini populus, qui in maiori arborem, in minori hominum multitudinem siguificat. ** Plurima de fallaciis ad nauseam usque a Scho laflicis tradita invenientur, qui tamen tot tan tisque tractationibus nullum fecerunt operae pretium. Quia vero in huiusmodi failaciis, fi ve dictionis, five (ut ipsi aiunt) extra di ctionem, vitium plerumque latet in quarto termino cryptice tecto: Auditorum nostro rum mentes non ultra fatigabimus: attamen, si sapient, syllogismi leges memoriae inscul pent, et ad terminorum numerum semper animum adverlut. Quibens relligiose servatis, aut nihil scimus, aut numquam, neque de cipi ratiocinando, nec alios deçipere pote runt. Schol. De huius tandem docirinae usu opus cst, ut aliqua addamus. Ea paucis iisquo baud spernendis comprehendemus regulis. Qui ergo Philosophi nomen adse qui cupit, hos probe teneat. Cap. 1. De ver. eiusq. crit. CANONE S. I Dea, quae characteres continet si * bi invicem repugnantes, deceptrix est: imaginaria vero, qua ob similitudinem quampiam nobis fingimus quod non est, ut quasi per imagniem oculis obiectum praesens sistamus. ** * Hae igitur ideae proprie loquendo non falsae, sed potius impossibiles dici possunt, quia nihil sumt: ut ' idea circuli quadrati, ligni ferrei, creaturae infinitue', ec. ** Vocantur istae a Wolffio vicariae realium, quia earum vices gerunt, ut si memoriam ti bi rapraesentes per receptaculum idearumi: licet enim nulla adsit analogia inter spiritum el corpus, atque adeo inter eorum proprie lates: ob similitudinem tamen, quod, sicut in receptaculo plura servamus, quae inde, quum opus fuerit, depromiinus, ila memoria plures ideas, quae tamdiu latuere nobis sug gerit, memória ipsam veluti receptaculum nobis sistinus 2. De eo, cuius clare et distincte ra tionem perspicis sufficientem, tuto adfir mato: negalo vero, quod eidem pari ratione refragari cognoscis. Si eam non adhuc nosti: licet pro incerto haberi 142 Logica Pars. II. ſas sit, ne temere iudicato, donec veri tatis eius, falsitatisve criterio polleas. Hoc quidem modo vitari poterit audax illa in iudicando praecipitaptia, quae incautos maxime adolescentes quamplurimis subjicit erroribus. Hi ramque sola suarum virium praesumtione freti iudicia sua nec rationc ful ciunt, nec ad criterium aliquod exigunt; quo fit, ut ea praecipitanter nimis prouentiare adsueti, ratione tandem destituantur, et quid quid in buccam venerit effutiant. 5. Si diu in veritate invenienda fru. stra taboraveris, examen reintegrato. Si ne id qutdem profuerit, ne rem pro falsa, aut impossibili venditato, nitam ridiculus sis, qui mentem tuam veri ful sigue mensurani esse existimes. * * Perutilem harc cautionem inculcat Genu eusis noster, quae dici non potest, quanto sit omuibus adiumento. Quum enim obscurilas plerumque sit relativa, eiusque caussa in - bo mirum n.entibus, raro in re percepta, sit quaerenda (S. 20. ): nullum est huiusmo di iudicium, quod non ex praecipitantia fluat. Qui enim ita se gerunt, ni mia de in tellectus sui viribus praesamtione laborant, idque agunt, perinde ac si supremum persprie caciae cognitionisge gradum obtineant, cui an tefcratur remo, pauci pares putentnr. In hanc rigrilam offendunt quicumque mundi creatio Cap. II De ign. et er. cor. caus. 143 nem iu tempore, aliasve doctrinas, quas intellectu adsequi nequeunt, proimpossibi libus venditant, ut fusius in Metaphysica docebimns. Id vero quam ridiculum sit, nemo non videt. De ignorantia et errore, eorumque caussis. A Ctio mentis, qua verum (S. 94. ) agnoscit, resque sibi re praesentat ac percipit, COGNITIO adpellatur. Eius vero absentia dicitur IGNORANTIA, quae definiri pot est per statum mentis cognitione desti tulae. * Sic e g. qui disciplinae alicuius veritates ac praecepta novit, eaque mente tenet, illius cognitione gaudet: contra vero, si ea cogni lione sit 'destitutus, disciplinam illam igno rare diciiur. 103. Experientia quisque sna it aliena doceri potest, hominnm plerosque nihil aut minipium admodum in rebus cogno scere; plurima quoque nesciri ab iis, qui acriori se praeditos ingenio jactant: cos vero, qui doctissimorum virorum nomine gaudent, quo longius sua sese exserit co gnitio, eo plurima se ignorare comperient. 144 Logic. Pars II. * Ex innumerabili rerum, quae sciri possunt, puniero ingenii cuiuscumque vires superante, domesticaque experientia fluxit mos ille lau dabilis ad utilium rerum cognitionem ani mum adplicandi, neglectis iis, quae ad cu iusqne statum minime pertinentes, inter su ferflua et inuțilia referuntur. Recte namque observaverat Seneca necessaria a nobis igno rari, quia superflua discimus. Id ipsum er go argumento est, homines, postquam ad sublimiorem, ut aiunt, cognitionis apicem pervenerint, quamplurima adhuc habere, quorum nulla se gaudere cognitione animad vertant, illoruinqe esse admodum ignaros. 104. Ex quo patet 1. omnes homines in stalu verae ignorantiae versari, ac ne minem un quani reperiri posse, qui omui moda rerum cognitione praeditum se tuto adfirmet: quapropter oportere 2. ordine na in studiorum curriculo servari, ut primo necessaria * deinde ütilia, postremo iu cunda discantur; adeoque 3. eruditorum reprchensionem merito incurrere eos, qui neglecta hac methodo ad superfluarum re rum siudiuin animum adplicant, param curantes ea, quae ad interni extervique status suiperfectionem sunt necessaria. Necessaria dicuntur, quae Dei suique cogni tionem spectant, item quae facultatem quam quisque profitetur, postremo quae ad socie tatis commoda promovenda pertinent. Cap. II. De ign. et er. eor. cans. 1.45 ** Suo itaque officio deesset Medicus, si ne glecta medendi arte, eruditioni, hoc est quid quid extra Medicinae ambitum est, operam daret. Ignorantiam quoque suam magis pro moreret Legisperitus, si pro legum codici bus, medicos aliosve sibi inutiles libros evol veret. Alque utinam nostro hoc aevo Lit teratores isti extra aleam aberrantes defide, rarentur ! 105. Ad ignorantiae porro caussas de tegendas nobis lucem quam maximam ail fert experientia. Ea enim duce scimus igno rantain oriri a 1. DEFECTV IDEARVM, non solum in iis rebus, quae nostrum si perant captum, sed etiam in iis, quae iu jus limites von excedunt, 2. MENTIS IMBECILLITATE, sive impotentia co gnoscendi idearum nostrarum relationem, LABORIS IMPATIENTIA, qua fit, ut attentio minuatur, ideaeque fiant deterio res, STVDIORVM CONFVSIONE, MEMORIA vel nimia, vel labili, 6. denique SVBSIDIORVY INOPIA. (t ) Impotentia haec ab idearum mediarum defe ctu pendet: quo fit, ut communi illa defi ciente mensura, nec conferre inter se nolis nec propterea vertalem delegere quaemus. (ones T. 1.  ** Confusio studiorum habetur, vel quia fine attentione aut ordine fiunt, vel quia plurima eodem tempore cursimque discuntur: ex quo pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sen sus. Hinc nimia illa sciolorum turba, solis frontispiciis praefationibusque furfuroscrum, nostram invasit aetatem, ** Nimia namque memoriae praestantia laboris impatientiam, adeoque ignorantiam parit; illius vero infidelitas cognitionis defectum au get. Ecqua enim cognitio ei, qui unam al teramve propositionein memoria retinere non valet? (+ ) Subsidiorum nomine veniunt Magistri, si ve viventes illi sint, sive mortni, scilicet li bri. Ex horum enim defecte lici non po test, quot sublimia vilescant ingenia, quae vel mechanicis adeo artibus, aut otio et libidi ni se addicunt. Elegantissimum est Alciati em blema, quo ingenia ista iuveni euidam com parat, cuius sinistra manus duabus alis in Coclum tollitur, dextera vero ingenti pon dere impedita deorsum fertur. Cujus em blematis dilucidationem reddemus Dolendum autem magnopere est, quod si quando iuvenes isti litterario furfure vix in crustati Rempublicam invadunt, societatis perturbatores, bilingues, susurrones, ad pessima demum et turpissima quaeque, (si paucos excipias ) parati evadunt. 106. Haec de ignorantia. Quando au tem propositicni verre dissensim, falsae contra adsensum praebemus, tunc ERRA coram Cap. II De ign. et ei. cor. caus. 147 RE dicimur, sive judicia confundere. Qua propter ERROR definiri potest, quod sit confusio iudiciorun. Error autem in iu dicando commissus PRAEIVDICIVM * adpellatur, quod esse dicimus iudicium erroneum praecipitanter et sine maturi tale latum. Dicitur vero praeiudicium, vel quia sanae mentis praevenit iudicium, vel quia praema ture et fine criterio profertur. Talia sunt pleraque vulgi praeiudicia, veluti: discum solis diametrum habere circiter bipalmarein: cometas esse bellorum caussas: et alia eius modi. 107. Quum praejudicium sit iudicium erroneum; error vero confusio iudiciorun: evidens est s. praeiudicia na sci ex idearum ob curitate et confusione, adeoque 2. eorum originem ab intellectus corruptione unice esse petendam. Equidem sunt plerique, qui praeiudiciorum originem a voluntaté repetunt, eamque pri us emendandam esse aiunt; ii tamen io to aberrant coelo: voluntariam namque praeiudiciis adhaesionem vel negligen liam animum ab iis liberandi, pro praeiudia ciis venditant. Si vero rem probe per penderint videbunt, ea, quae voluntatis vitia asserunt, ab intellectus vitiis vel imagin natione pendere: et si qui méntem obun brant ad feclus, appetitus quippe sensitiyi * * 7 G 2 148 Logica Pars. It. ** vehementiores molus, non aliunde, quam ah ideis obscuris et confusis ortum trahunt. Qua de re legatur Syrbius in Phil. rat p: 5. 108. Duo intérim sunt praeiudiciorum genera, AVCTORITATIS scilicet, et NIMIAE CONFIDENTIAE. * Illa sunt, quae nostris viribus parum confisi, nimi aque oscitantia laborantes ab aliorum, quorum apud nos plurimum valet ancio ritas, scriptis vel sententiis kausta adopta mus, eaque pro sanctis habenda puta mus; hec vero, quae nostris viribus niinium fidentes, quamquam praecipitan ter et sine meditatione prolata., tainquam vera lamen adsumunus illis firmiter achae remus, et proeiis, veluti pro aris et fo. cis, pugnamus. * Addunt alii praeiudicia AETATIS. At quum illa non sint, nisi opiniones praeconceptae a nutricibus parentibus, atque magistris a teneris, ut aiunt, unguiculis haustae: ea ad auctoritatis praeiudicia referri, nemo non ri det. Illustris VERULAMIUS de augm. scient V. 4. praeiudicia,, quae iilola vocat, in quatuor dividit classes, quarum prima am plectitur idola tribus, scilicet quae in ipsa hamana natura fundata sunt; altera idola specus, hoc est hypotheses a nobis ipsis provenientes; tertia i: lola fori, idest prae concept as opiniones, quae ab hominum com mercio mabant; quarta denique idola the *** Cap. II. de ign. et er. eor. caus. 149 atri, videlicet erronea iudicia, quae ex Phi losophorum sententiis bauriuntur. Quae 0 mnia ad duas, quas retulimus, classes com mode referri possunt, ut coram ostende mus. * Auctoritatis praeiudicia sunt ea, quae a nu tricibus, magistris (vivis illis mortuisve ), aut populo haurimus: eiusmodi sunt opinio pes omnes aliquibus civitatibus, familiis, vel.: sectis familiares, quarum cultores illis, tam quam glebae, adscripli, nulloque utentes iu dicio, eas, tamquam oracula, pronuntiant seque inde dimoveri non patiuntur. Curio sissima est Galilaei narratio in Systemate co smico, de viro quodam nobili Peripatheticae philosophiae addicto, qui qunm Venetiis in domo cuiusdam Medici sectionem anatomicam perfici vidisset, in qua maximam nervorum stirpem e cerebro exeuntem, per cervicem transire, per spiralem distendi, ac postea per totum corpus divaricari observasset, nec, nisi tenue filamentum, funiculi instar, ad cor pertingere, a Medico rogatus, adhuc in Aristotelis sententia manere vellet rumque originem a corde repelere? non sine magno adstantium risu respondit: Equide:n ita aperte rem oculis subiecisti, ut nisi tex tus. Aristotelicus aperto nervos corde deducens obstaret, in sententiam tuam per tracturus me fueris. Quis, quaeso, haec au diens a risu ' temperaret? *** Vocari quoque solent praeiudicia receptae hypotheseos, novitatis, similia: ut sunt sy nervo e G 3 750 Logica Pars 11. MAE, stemata omnia ab eruditis inventa, quibus tam acriter inhaerent, ut uullum sit rationis pondus, quo ab opinione sua dimoveri pa tiantur. 109. De errorum caussis, restat, ut paulo ca addamus, Eae vel REMOTAE sunt quae mentem ad errores ac praeiudicia praeparant et disponunt; vel " PROXI., quae mentem ipsam ad iudicio rum confusionem impellunt, erroresque producunt. Remotae rursus in generales dividuntur, et speciales. Caussae generales sunt ATTENTIONIS DEFÈCTVS, qui ideas reddit deteriores ADFECTVS, quos attentionem turbare, idearumque obscuritatem parere supra ob. Servavimus, SCIENDI LIBRO ciun ralurali corporis inertia, COMPENDIA et DICTIONARIA disciplinarum, in quibus nulla idearum analysis reperitur MALVS vocabulorum VSVS, quo fit, ut auctorum sensus non intelligatur denique LIBERTAS PHILOSOPHANDI. Praeiudiciorum cnim origo ab idearum ob scuritate repetenda est, idearum vero obscuritatem pariunt attentionis defe clus et adfectus er his ergo caussis praeiudicia nasci, quisque intelligit. Quainvis enim corporis inertia laboris impa Cap. 11. De ign. et er. Cor. caus. ¥ tientiam creet, adeoque ignorantiae tantum Caussa esse possit (* 105. ): cum sciendi tamen libidine conjuncta errorum genitrix est: etenim sciendi pruritus efflcit, ut intellectus tali cupiditate ductus intra ignorantiae fuae te niebras consistere nolit, opportunisque prae • diis vacuus ea investiget, quibus par non est, ac proinde in plurimos lahatur errores. ** Libertas enim philosophandi iuxto maior in receptas hypotheses illidit; nimis autem con etricia in auctoritatis praeiudicia nos urget, sel saltem crassam parit ignorantiam. 110. Speciatim autem AVCTORITA TIS praeiudicia oriuntur harum trium abaliqua EDVCATIONE, scilicet, CONVERSATIONE [conversazione], et CONSVETVDINE; ut et praeiudicia NIMIAE CONFIDENTIAE aa nimia INGENII FIDUCIA. Et ut de educatione quaedam singularia attingamus, id sedulo notandum: praeiu dicia, quae ab ca procedunt, tribus cha racteribus optime distingui, temporis BREVITATE, 2. loci RESTRICTIONE, cognitionis DEFECTV. Qui quidem characteres si desint, propositio non in ter praeiudicia, sed inter veritates com muni hominum consensione probat as est referenda. Quot mala hominibus adferat educatio, vix dici potet. Parentes enim tantum abest, ut puerorum intellectum perficere eorumquemor is mederi curent, ut potius eorum aninum maximis praeiudiciis, anilibus fabeliis, erro neisque opinionibus imbuant. De magistrorum educatione nihil dicemus, ab iis enim quam multa hauriuntur praeiudicia, quum iuvenes in magistrorum verba iurantes quaeuis eo run effata sancta esse putent, ac de illis veluti de Religione, dimicent ! Conversatio cuin libris et eruditis, consuetudo cum po pulo quot foveant errores, quum res sit me ridiana luce clarior, in ea explicanda nihil immorabimur Legatur interim Tullius Tuscul quaest. Lib. III. cap. 1. Qui nimium suo indulget ingenio, fieri non potest, quin in errores incidat, el pacdın tismum vel contradictionis spirituin induat, quae duo vitia aliorum aversionem odiuinque conciliant. Praeterquam quod novitatis studi um quanta hominibus mala produxerit, ii sciunt, qui Ecclesiae vel litterarum vices er annalibus didicerunt. *** Nimirum educationis praeiudicia tantisper in animo sedent, donec ad maturitatem ra tionisque perfectionem sit perventum; nou sunt ubique earlem, sed quamvis in cuius cumque Regionis gentibus praeiudicia sedeant, diversa tamen pro educationis morumque di versitate inveniuntur; rudium tandem von eti am sapientum mentes occupant ita, ut dum illi inter praeconceptas opiniones erroresque iacent, hi eorum insipientiam ac ignorantiam destruere nullo modo valentes vel rideant, vel de ea conquerantur. Cap. II, De ign. ei er. eor. caus. 253 mus Omnes illae, quas recensuimus caussae praeiudiciorum remotae sunt; pro Xima namque est PRAECIPITANTIA. Quae quum ita sint, optimum, idqne uni cum, ad praeiudicia vitanda remedium est iudicium suspendere, seu DUBITARE: est: enim DUBITATIO « prudens iudicii su spensio. Tanc autem iudicium suspendi quum propositionein aliquam nec adfirmamus neque negamus. * Cave la nen credas, ad praeiudicia vitandą conferre Scepticismum, vel Pyrrhonismum insanam nempe illum de onnibus dubitandi miorem, quo hodiernos incredulitatis fauto. res uii, non sine dolore videmus. Stolidi tas enim, nedum temeritas infanda foret sine sufficienti ratione dubitare. Sobriam quip pe ac prudentem commendamus dubitationem eo fine institutam, ut suspendatur iu licium, donec mens ad ideas distinctas clarasve per veniat. ** Totum hoc de rebus intra rationis fines ex sistentibus, nullaque evidentia suffultis est intelligendum. Etenim quae Divina auctorita te nituntur, aut mathematica gaudent eviden tia de illis dubitare, impium; de his ve ro, foret adprime stullum. Schol. Espositis mentis humanae imbe. cillitate et vitiis, reliquum est jis praebeanius medelam. Quamvis Feromul, 7 ut aptam ti philosophicarum rerum Magistri, inter quos Nicolaus Malebranchius, et Antonius Genuensis, quamplurima ad id remedia. proposuerint, quibus vel minimum quidem addere, non opis est nostrae; licebit ta men, ad Auditorum nostrorum instructio nem, si plura n quimus, eadem saltem ab ipsis tradita paucis repetere. Quisquis ergo ignorantiam errorenive yitare cupis, hos menti infigito CANONES. MEREntem sedulo studio attentio ne, meditatione ab obscuritate et confusione liberato. * In hoc enim in. tellectus perfectio sita est, a qua exsu lant ignorantia et praeiudicia. * Ut id consequantur adolescentes, prae ocnlis habeant quae in prima harum Institutionum parte observavimus, ea praecipue, quae de ideis cap. 1. Schol. adnotavimus. 2. Ad studia praeiudiciis liber ac do cilis, uti modo in lucem editis infans, accedito. Magistrum eligito optimum ab eoque necessaria atque utilia disci io, nihil verens ab eius, qui te ad sa pientiam manuducit, prius ore pendere: Cap. II. De ign, et er. eor. caus. 155 ut praecepta demum, quum te ignoran tia deseruerit ad examen revocare possis. * In Magistrorum electione magna cautio adhi benda est: abea namque pendet cognitionum nostraram soliditas et rectitudo. Ad eorum dotes praecipue attendendum, de quibus ideo pauca inferius delibabimus. 3. Methodum ubique atque ordinem cordi habeto. In studiis eapraecedant per quae sequentia intelliguntur. Ex hujus canonis neglectu oritur studiorum confusio, quam ignorantiae caus sam haud postremam esse, experientia sensusque com munis evidenter ostendit Auctoritati nec nihil, nec multum deferto. Nimia namque aliis adhaesio servum pecus; sensus vero communi ne glectus audacem efficit, omniaque sibi permittentem. 5. De iis, quae vel Divina auctori tate, vel maxima evidentia destituta sunt, prudenter dubitato, donec certus fias. Rectam rationem prius, sensum dein de optimorum communem consulito. Quae captum vero tuum superant ne perqui rito, nisi prius opportunis mediis probę fueris instructus. * G6 156 Logica Pars. II. * Si vero captum humanum superent, ca non investigare omnino, recta ratio docet. 6. Laboris patiens, memoriae ac per spicaciae tuae ne nimis fidens esto. Me mento Poetae illud: ABSQUE LABO RE.NEMO MUSARUM SCANDIT AD ARCEM. Vides hinc, quam immerito a nostrae aetatis adolescentibus voluptati ac vanitati deditis laboremque horrentibus cognitio studiorum que felix exitus expectetur. Compendia et dictionaria, quippe quae nihil solidi profundique continent, ne multum amato. Paucos habeto libros, eosque lectissimos. * Cum lectione me ditationem semper coniungito  Non nostrum est praeceptum, sed Senecae, qui ut facilem Lucilio suo viam ad virtutem aperiret, librorum paucitatem diserte com mendat his verbis: Cum legere non possis quantum habueris, sat est habere quantum legas. Ep. 2. Vide quae diximns Part. I. 8. Poetas caute legito, ne inanibus fabellis animunı imbuas. Populum, utpo te pessimi argumentum, ut anguem fu gito. Senecam audito dicentem: SANA TIMUR, SIMODO SEPAREMUR A ÇOETU, cap. 1. Schol. Cap. II. De ign. et er. cor. caus. 157 Ad poetas quod attinet, eorum lectionem adolescentibus vel omnino interdicendan, vel arctissimis includiendam cancellis cuperernus, quippe qui vivida phanthasia pollentes ima ginationi retinere potius, quam laxare debent habenas: id quod ia legendis Poetis contra evenit. Populi porro damna paucis expressit idem Seneca, quum ait: Inimica est mullorum convcrsatu. Ep. 7. De Veritate ceria, melliisque ad cam perveniendi. $ 12. sis ad veritatis investigationem gradum faciamus. VERITAS vel CERTA est, si in ea adsint omnia veritatis requisita, ut nulla nobis de illa re maneat suspicio aut dubium, vel PROBABILIS, si propius ad certitudinem acce dat, nempe quum non omnia insunt re quisita. De illa nunc, de hac subsequen ti Capite agemus. CERTITUDO est mentis status veritati adensum ita praebentis ut nulla de opposito adsit sollicitudo Ex consequitur i, ut si quam minima adsit suspicio non certitudo, sed INCERTITUDO vocetur. Et quia non idem est om. nibus mentis status, sequitur 2. eamdem evunciationem uni certam esse posse, al teri incertam. Tandem quoniam quisque mentis suae statum agnoscit, consequens est 3. ut nemo aliorum certitudinis sed suae tantum iudex esse possit. * Quia omne, quod verum est, vel absolute et in se tale est vel in relatione ad mentem, quae non semper terminorum nexum distincte percipit: ideo Philosophi certitudinem divide bant in OBIECTIVAM et FORMALEM, il lamque esse, aiebant, nexum propositionis in trinsecum, hanc mentis nostrae statum respi cere. Nos illam proprie VERITATEM, hanc CERTITUDINEM adpellamus. E. 8. Axioma; Totum est maius sua parte, si absolute et in se spectetur, VERUM dicitur, si vero ad men tem referatur, CERTUM est, quia talia ad sunt indicia, ut ipsi absque ulla oppositi formi dine adsensuin praestemus. Quoniam indicia ad certitudinem ducentia trium generum esse possunt, sci licet vel absolute infallibilia vel dalis tantum permanentibus caussis naturalibus, vel denique sccundum huinanae prudentiae leges: evidens est 4. triplicem etiam esse certitudinem, METAPHYSICAM nempe yel MATIEMATICAM, quae illis; PHY. Cap. 111. De veritate certa etc. 159 SICAM, quae istis; MORALEM tandem, quae his fulcitur indiciis, quaeque alio no mine FIDES HUMANA adpellatur. * Primi generis sunt axiomata, aliaeque pro positiones nullis obnoxiae vicibus;alterius haec propositio: corpus non suffultum cadt: pos fremi vero haec: Augustus fuit primus Ro manorum Imperator. 115. Experientia abunde constat, men tem nostram non statim, nec semper, quod verum est, certo cognoscere- Via ergo quaedam ipsi monstranda est, qua tuto ad certitudinem perveniat: eaque, pro certitudinis varietate, diversa est; spe ciatim vero triplex, EXPERIENTIA sci licet, RATIO seu DEMONSTRATIO, et AUCTORITAS, de quibus singillatim, et quantum res ipsa furet, breviter agemus. Uidquid a nobis sciri potest, vel singulare est vel universale (S. 26. seqq. ); itemque vel effectus, vel caussa. Singulares porro ideas sensibus ad quirimus; universales' vero in 160 Logica Pars II. tellectus abtractione conficimus. Rursus quaelibet caussa effecluin salte in natura, praecedit, ut in Metaphysica do. cebimus. Duae igitur cognoscendi viae no bis aperiuntur, altera, quae a singulari bus ad universalia; itemque ab effectibus ad caussas ascendit, nemp: a sensibus, si ve experientia incipit; ideoqne dicitur co gnitio a posteriori: altera, quae ab uni versalibus ad particularia, a caussis ad ef fectus rationis ope descendit descendit,, ac proinde vócatur cogniíio a priori. De illa nunc; de hac sequenti sectione agemus. Omue itaque, quod experientiae ope scimus, dicitur COGNITIO A POSTERIORI. Est autem EXPERIENTIA cognitio adqui sita ex attentione ad obiecta sensibus obvia, Sic per experieutiam novi'nus aquam made. facere, ignem col fucere, ceram igni admo tam liquefieri, ct id genus alia. 117. Quum experientia sit in rebus sen sibus obviis; sensibus auien percipianlur les exisientes sive indiviadua: patet 1. a uobis res tan tum singulars experimento addisci, * extra eas nsilium alind esse experientiae obiectum, adeoque 3. eam in abstractiş 2 2. Cap. Ill. de Veritate certa ctc. 161 sensus et universalibus locum non habere, licet haec ab ipsa deriventur. Igi tur 4. qui demonstrationem aliqu am posteriori conficere vult, is casum singu larein, allegare debet, dummodo experien tia non sit cuivis obvia; 5. denique, ex perientia non datur in iis, quorum n ullam habenius ideam. * Quoniam vero est vel internus, vel externus experientia quoque est vel INTERNA, vel EXTERNA. Illa habetur qnum nobis ipsis attendentes aliquid in anima nostra contingere percipimus: e. g quoties nobis malum aliquod repraesentamus; toties taedio nos adfici animadvertimus; haec ve ro, si res in organis nostris mutationem pro ducentes percipimus: ut si manu igui admota, calorem igui inesse observemus. "Experientia rursus dividitur in VVLGAREM, quae mnibus aeque patet, ut calor ignis, et ERVDITAM, quae speciali studio, atque adhi bitis necessariis mediis cooficitur, arleoque so lis innotescit eruditis, ut ' aeris gravitas, elasticitas ctc. 118. Habitus, sive promtitudo aliorum vel propria esperimenta colline andi, et ex iis conlusiones elicianendi, dicitur ARS EXPERIVNDI. Quae quidem ab experientia tam longe distat, quantum ba bitus dfert ab actu. * Non ergo sufficit unam alteramye experientiam peragere, aut aliquot instrumenta s ertractan. 162 Logica Pars II. di peritiam habere, ut experiundi arte prae ditus quis dici possit, sed opus est habitn longa exercitatione adquisito, non solum res experimento subiiciendi, sed propria aliorum que experimenta ad critices regulas exigendi, atque ex iis conclusiones scientificas, sive corolla ria legitimo rationis usu deducendi 119. Quoniam experientia sensibus ni titur; ad sensionem autem duo requiruntur, scilicet mutatio in or ganis sensoriis ab externis obiectis produ cta, et repraesentatio in anima huic obie cto conformis (ut in Psychologia ostende mus ): consequens est 6. ut sensus, po sitis ad sentiendam requisitis quam fallant; * proindeque 7. nos non & sensibus, sed a iudicio, quod ani ma praccipitanter fert super experientia, persaepe falli. Rinc. 8. cautiones quaedam ad errorem hunc vitandum adhibendae > num sunt. et Requisita ad sentiendum tria sunt, orga norum sensoriorum sanitas 2. attentio, 3. justa obiecti distantia. Quotiescumque ve ro de visu agitur, et quartum requisitum adesse debet, nempe èiusdem mcdii in ter obiectum et organum interpositio. Quum enim in visione radii lucis in corporum superficiem incidentes reflectantur, et in acre prius, deinde in oculi humoribus ac lente cristalli ua refracti ad retinam usque pertingaat, u Cap. 111. De Veritatė certa etc. 163 hi motum in nervo optico, quod sensationis caput est, producunt: si partim in aere partim in aqua aliove densiori medio obie clum ponatur, non eadem erit lucis refra ctio, adeoque non idem locus obiecti parti ' bus adsignabitur: unde fit, ut illud fractum vel recurvum adpareat. Si ergo neglecto hoc requisito adparentiam illam pro realitate sumamus, non sensuum, sed judicii defectú id provenire, fatendum est. Cautiones, quas inculcamus sunt 1. ut sior gana sensoria paullo debiliora fuerint, debi tis armentur instrumentis, 2. ut obiecta in iusta ab organis distantia posita attente ob serventur 3. ad tot sensus, ad quot redi gi possunt, redigantur. Si cautiones istae adhibeantur nullus in percipiendis rebus sensibilibus irrepere poterit error: si vero quae dicta sunt probe attendantur, non in surgent amplius difficultates, nec erunt qui vetustissimam cipionis in aqua fracti, turris que emimus rotundae adparentis cantilenam ad nauseam usque repetentes, sensuum fal laciam ulterius inculcare velint. 120. Quia vero per experientiam sin gularia tantum cognoscimus sequitur ut VITIVM SVBREPTIONIS incurrant ii, qui ea, quae minime ex perti sunt, vel quae imaginationi aut ra tiociniis experientia deductis debentur, pro experientia obtrudunt. * Tales sunt, qui pliaenomeni alicuius caussam raperientia constare adserdut. Veluti si quis 164 Logica Pars II. ferrum a magnete altrahi videns, experien. tia compertum esse diçat, ex magnete efflu - via exire ferrurn attrahendi vim habentia, vitium subreptionis incurret. Quum ergo res singulares tantum modo experiamur; earum ve ro repraesentatio dicatur idea singularis: recte infertur 10. notiones expe rientiae ope immediate formatas esse ideas singulares, ut et 11. singularia iudicia ipsis innixa. * Quumque his nova deducta iudicia non nisi ratiocinationis ope eruan tur: evidens est 12. haec nova iu dicia di ci non posse singularia, sed DIANOETICA sive ratiocinantia.Vocantur huiusmodi iudicia INTVITIVA, quia in his, quae in rei cuiusdain notione comprehensa intuemur, eidem tribuimus: ut ignis est rulidus: aqua madefacit. Scholastici ea vocabant discursiva: ratioci nium namque ab iis dicebatur discursus. E. g. ignis est cctivus: vapor est elasticus. Quandoquidem indicia intuitiva conficiuntur tribuendo rei quidquid in ipsi us potione comprehenditur: sequilur. 13. ut ea conficianlur accipiendo rem perceptam pro subiecto, eique tribuen I 22. Cap. III De Veritate certa ete. 165 do quidquid attente consideranti in ipsa occurrit, vel ab ca removendo quod in aliis, non etiam in illa observatur. * remove * In primo casu habebis iudicium aiens, in secundo negans. E. g. Ignem percipis eique calorein inesse observas. Sume ergo ignem. pro subiecto, calorem pro attributo, et ha bebis iudicium aiens: ignis est calidus. Contra quia alias observasti aquam madefa cere, id vero in igne non intueris: ab igne hoc attributum, eritque indiciun negans: ignis non adefacit. 123. Quemadmodun autem enunciatio. nes particulares in universales comunitari possunt: ita, quamvis notiones et iudicia ab experientia deducta sint singularia, commode tamen in u niversalia transmulari possunt, si regulae sequenies exacte servcolur. 12. Quoniain individua'sunt omnimo de determinata ($. 18., et variis circum stantiis involuta: 14. at tente separari a re percepta debent acci dentia sive modi ab attributis essentialibus, quibus tantumu modo est attendendun: 15. allributa haec essentialia onipibus speciebus vel individuis 166 Logica Pars II. convenientia abstractionis ope retinenda, atque inde notae characteristicae depro mendae sunt, quae ad rem illam ab a liis discernendam sulliciant. Hi quidem ermut characteres definitionis a posteriori ex in dividuis casibus eruendae. 125. Vt antem operatio recte procedat, oportet 16. tot facere iudicia intuitiua quot res ipsa percepta suppeditat, 17. ac cidentia omittere, 18. attributa, quae non seinper eadem sunt, determinationis bus particularibus liberare, ac tandem 19. plura ea in re adducere exempla magna pe sollertia attendere in quibus perpcluo conveniant, aut inter se discrc pent. * E. g. Vt scias quid sit commiseratio, ob serva casum aliquem, in quo videas te, aut alium alterius commiseratione percelli. Ad duc et aliam huius modi speciem, aut plu res etiam, si id res exigat, videtoque cir cumstantias, quae sunt perpetuo similes. Hoc modo in notescet tibi commiserationis idea universalis, cuius notae definitionem suppe ditabunt realem, commiserationem nempe es. se tacdinm ob alterius infelicitateir. Conf Wolfi. Log. Lat. §. 492. 126. Nunc quo modo iudicia universa lia a posteriori coulcianlur, observemus. Cap. III. De Veritate certa etc. 167 Quia ab experientia oriuntur iudicia intuitiva: videatur primum, num praedicatum sit attributum rei perceptae essentiale: quo casu enunciatio erit uni versalis ($. 68* ). Deinde experientiam multoties repetendo dispiciatur, utjum at tributum illud rei perceptae perpetuo et costanter insit. Quod si non semper illud inveniatur, investiganda est ratio, cur in ea aliquando deprehendatur, eamque biecto addendo, indiciuin enascetur uni versale (5. 69. ): * Ita e. g. esperientia novimus, igni semper calorem inesse, ceram autem non seinper es se liquidam. Iudicium ergo ignein esse cali dum erit universale: at non universaliter ius ferre poterimus ceram esse liquidam;sed opor tet invenire rationem cera aliquando liguescat, quae quun sit in igne, cui tunc admovetur, hac subiecto addita, universalis orietur ennnciatio: cera igni admota li quescit. cur > 1 127. Philosophus interim in rerum ca ussis et rationibus investigandis studiose versatus regulas quasdam sequa tur oportet, ut veriiates ex experientia de ducere queat. llae regulae sunt: 1. Si in obiecto aliquo mutatio observetur, qun ties obiecto alteri iungitur, idquc con 168 Logica Pars I. stanter: tunc hoc esse illius caussano 3 tuto concludi potest. * 2. Si duo vel plura, licet perpetuo, coexsistere wel se mutuo sequi observeniur, sta tim inferre licet, unum esse alterius ca ussam, nisi prius recta rario sic esse convicerit. non * Id clare patet exemplo cerae liquentis igni, aut solis radiis admotae. ** Si ergo bellum simul cum cometa existat, vel eumdem sequatur: praecipitantia erit iu dicare, hunc esse caussam illius. 21. 128 Ex quibus omn: bus clare deducitur 20 propositiones ex experientia legitime uistitala confectas esse certo veras; quouicumque sensioni omnibus requisitis in stuctae convenit, pro certo haberi, adeo. que 22. et definitiones experientiae adiu mento legitime efformatas, et 23. axio mata vel postulata ex his de ducta itidem certitudine pollere.  Rationem definivimus per facile tum distincte perspiciendi. Il la ergo utimur si qnando enunciationem, de cuius veritate iudicium ferre volumus, ita cuin aliis connectimus, ut inde ter minorum nexus ctare perspiciatur: id ve. ro est, quod dicimus COGNITIONEM A PRIORI. Connexio isthaec vocatur DEMONSTRATIO, cuius est veritates ex certis principiis per legitimam ratioci nandi seriem eriiere (š. cod. ). SERI ES porro RATIOCINÀNDI habetur, si ex pluribus syllogismis invicem connexis conclusio prioris sit praemissa sequentis ut inox adparebit: qni quidem SYLLOGIS MI CONCATENATI dicuntur. 130. Ex quibus nullo negotio sequitue 1. in omni demonstratione duo requiri, nempe principia demonstrandi certa it in: dubia, eorumqne cum conclusione coone xionem. Et quia experientiae rite institu definitiones, axiomata et postulata T. 1. tae, 2 > H 170 Logic. Pars II. certitudine gaudent (s. 128. ): infertur 2. ea ad eiusmodi principia esse referen da, proindeque 3. illum adserta sua nou demonstrare, qui ea ex incertis dubiisque principiis deducit. 131. Quia vero duplex cognitio datur, a priori scilicet, sive per rationem; et a posteriori, seu per expe rientiam: sequitur hiec 4. duplicem quoque dari demonstrationem, earoque vel A PRIORI confici vel A PO. STERIORI: illam haberi, quando veri tatem aliquam a principiis legitime connexis deducimus, vel effectum per suas caussas probamus; si quando eam ex experientia reete institu ta, vel caussam per suos effectus demon stramus. ** Quum ergo a priori demonstrare volumus, principia statuamus necesse est, antequam ad syllogismorum concatenationem deveniamus. Id darius fiet exemplo. Ponamus hanc proposi tionem: Deus caret adfectibus. Eam a prio. ri sic demonstrabimus. DEFINITIONES. 1. Deus estens perfectissimun. 2. Intellectus perfectissimus est, qui omnia * hanc vero, sibi distinctissime repraesentat, 3. Appetitus sensitivus est. qui oritur ex idea boni confusa. 4. A'fectus sunt motus vehementiores appe 1. tu sensitivi. Cap. II!. De Veritate certa etc. 1. ): sed era mo AXIOMATA. 1. Ens perfectissimum gaudet in tellectu perfectissimo. 2. Distinctissima omnium repraesentatio ex cludit quamcumque idearum confusionem. THEOREMA. Deus caret adfectibus. DEMONSTRATIO. 1. Ens perfectissimum in tellectu gaudet perfectissimo (ax. Deus cst ens perfectissimum (def. 1. ); go Deus gaudet intellectu perfectissimo. 2. Quicumque intellectu gaudet perfectissi omnia sibi distinctissime repraesentat. Deus vero gaudet intellectu perfectissimo (num. 1. ): onania ergo sibi distinctissime repraesentat. 3. Qui omnia sihi distictissime rapraesentat, ideis caret confusis (ax. 2. ): at Deus om niasibi distinctissime repraesentat. (num. 2 ): ergo Deus caret ideis confusis. 4. Ab ideis boni confusis oritur appeti !us ser sitivus (def.?. ): quuin ergo Deuts careat idcis confusis (num.' 3. ); liquet, eum care re quoque appetitus sensitivi. 5. Qui appetău caret sensitivo, is caret adfe clibus (def. 4. ): atqui Deus carct appetitie sensitivo (num. 4. ): ergo Deus caret adfe ctibus. Vides hic syllogismorum connexione a principiis ceriis deducta confectam esse demonstratio nem. ** A posteriori demonstratur animae in nobis exsistentia hoc modo. EXPER. Si nobis ipsis attendamus, obserica biinus, aliquid in nobis esse, cuius ope nosa H 2 172 Logic. Pars. II. metipsos ab aliis rebus extra nos positis, inter eas vero alias ab aliis distinguiinus, boc est nostri rerumque extra nos positarum conscii sumus. DEFINITIO. Id. ipsum, quod nobis sui rerumque extra se positarum est conscium, dicitur anima. TIIEOREMA. Exsistit in nobis anima. DEMONSTRATIO. Experientia enim constat, aliquid in nobis esse nostri rerumque extra nos positarum conscium: id ipsiin autem est quod dicitur anima (per defin. ): e: c sistit ergo in nobis anima. Demonstratio iterum est, vel D. RECTA sive Ostensiva * vel INDIRE DIRECTA seu apogogica. **. Illa est qua ex notione subiecti colligitur eius nexus cum attributo; haec autem in qua oppositum tamquam verum assumen tes, conclusionem falsam inde deduci mus, ut propositionis nostrae veritas elucescat. Directa ergo erit demonstratio, si ordinem sequatur hactenus explicatum ($. 131., si ve a priori sil, sive a posteriori: ut videre est in superadductis exemplis ($: 131 " ); ** Indirecta demonstratio vocari quoque solet redactio ad impossibile vel ard absurdum, quia oppositam propositionem ut veram alla sumens, ex ea absurdum aliquod, sive cou clusionem impossibilem, eruit. Talis crit de monstralio scyueas. THEOREMA. Nibil est sine ratione sufficiente. DEMOSTRATIO. Ponamus aliquid esse sine ratione sufficiente. Ratio ergo, cur id sit aut fiat, erit in nihilo: adeoque nihilum ex sistet simul, et non exsistet. Essistet, quia aliter non posset esse caussa alterius: non exsistet, quia aliter non esset nihilum. Quod quum contradictionem involvat, sitque ideo impossibile: ergo nihil est sine ratione suffi ciente. 133. Ex hactenus dictis patet 1. quam cumque propositionem legitime demonstra tam esse certo veram idest certitudine gaudere metaphysica, proindeqne 2. de inonstrationem csse viam ad certitudinem perveniendi praestantissimam. Quumque ex perientiae et demonstraționis excellentiam ostenderimus: ' recie concludi mous 3. veritatem certain dici. dubia ' sensione, vel evidenti principio ni titur, dummodo in demonstrando CIRCU LUS non irrepscrit. In hoc vitiuni incurrunt ii, qui propositio nem probantem demonstrant per propositio nem probandam: quia in tali casu idem per idem demonstratur. Huic adfiuis est illa, quae a Scholasticis adpellari solet PETITIO PRINCIPII, nempe quum principium de monstrandi vel nullum est, vel nulla certi tudine aut ' evidentia gaudet. Huiusmodi sunt pleraeque enunciationes Epicuraeorum, Pla quae in H 3 174 Logic. Pars Ir. quis tonicorum, Stoicorum, aliorumque, de bus in Metaphysica erit disserendi locus. 134. Quoniam autem in detegendis per demonstrationem veritatibus ordo, sive methodus requiritur: ne longius hic pro grediamur, de ea sequenti capite, prout res exegerit, breviter enodateque tracta bimus. R Elite ut de AVCTORI TATE pauca dieamns. Ea non scientiam, ut experientia et rutio; sed FIDEM parit. Est autem FIDES: ad sensus propositioni datus, alterius te stimonio itinixus. Ex quo patet, rationem fidei sufficientem esse narrantis auctorita tem. Quumque auctoritas vel Divina sit, vel humana: fides quoque in DIVINAM et HVMANAM recte dispertitur. 136. Ex qnibus liquido infertur 1. fidei fundamentum in eo consistere, ut narrans taliasit, qui nec falli nec tallere possit; ac proinde 2. eo firmiorem esse fidem quo certiores sumus de scientia et veraci tate narrantis. Et quia Deus est omniscius Gap. VI. De Veritate certa 175 et infinite verax, quippe in quem nulla cadere potest ' imperfectio (per princip; Theo. nat. ): evidens est 3. fidem Dic vinam parere certitudinem omni exceptione maiorem; pariterque 4. Dei loquentis au ctoritatem esse fundamentum veritatis com pletum, omnibusque numeris absolutum; adeoqu 5. debere nos Deo loquenti ad quiescere, nec umqnam Dei testimonio demonstrationem ullam opponere, utpote vel falsam prorsus, vel indigestam. * Non potest enim certitudo certitudini adver: sari, quia si id esset, tunc contrariarum propositionum utraqua vera esset, adeoque idem simul esset et non esset: quod quum repugnet, non potest ergo fidei Divinae demonstratio ulla obiici. Quumque Dei verbum sit fundamentum veritatis com pletum (num. 4. f. huius. ): patet, quam cumque demonstrationem ei adversantem esse falsam. Quandoquidem autem auctoritas humana fidem parit bumanam, et certitudinem moralem: de ea pauca adhuc addenda supersunt. Et primo quidem, quum fundamentum fidei sit opi nio, quam de narrantis scientia bitate habemus; eoque fir mior sit fides, quo certiores sumus de hu et pro H 4 196 Logic. Pars II. jasmodi dotibus (S. eod. ): liquet 6. l dem humanam parere in nobis certitudi Nem moralem completam, si non adsit ra tio, cur in narrante aut imperitiain, aut malitiam supponere possimus: veluti si evidentia scientiae probitatisque indicia de derit si nihil emolamenti ex iis, quae narrat, perceperit, si ' parratio rectae ra tioni non repugnet; si denique pro nar rationis suae veritate dimicaverit, vel per secntionem passus sit. * Deinde quoniam non omnes homines eadem praediti sunt scientia et probitate, nec de his semper certo iudicare possumus, quum id io so la opinione versetur: exsurgit hinc probabi litas, de qua paullo post praecepta dabimus. * Postremâ haec conditio maius certitudini mo rali pondus adiungit: si vero deficiat, liu modo priores adfint circumstantiae, certilu do vim suam non amittit.. Schol. Nunc in eo sumus, ut explica tae doctrinae usum paucis tradamus. Qua propter Philosophus noster hos, qui se quuntur, observet. CANON E S. AMD quidlibet erudite experiundum, nisi necessariis praemunitusa in strumentis me accedito. Si haec desint, Cap. III. De Veritate certa etc. 177 aliorum experimenta consulito, dummo do eorum integritatis scientiaeque con stiterit, atque inde tuas deducito con clusiones. Si per insrumenta liceat, aliorum experimenta ad examen revo cato ut sacriorem eorum ideam ad quiras, caussasque facilius investigare possis. * Et quidem experientia erudita instrumentis opus habet, sine quibus experimenta fieri nequeunt. Si ergo desint, observationes nul lae erunt: ac proinde aliorum experimenta consulenda, praemissis cautionibus, quae de eorum veritate dubitare non sinant. Hinc Physicis admodum necessarius est machina rum instrumentorumque apparatus, ut phaea nomena observari possint, a quibus ad caus sas proximas rationis ope concludendum est. 2. Ne phantasiae partus, aut ratiocim nia ex experimentis deducta pro expe rientia venditato ne subreptionis ar guaris. *. Quidquid enim imaginationi debetur, reale non est, sed phantasticum. At in experientia realis rerum exsistentia observatur; adeoque qui phantas mata pro rebus obtrudunt, su bripiendo a dsensum extorquere conantur: et tunc evenit, ut cum ratione experientia pu gnare videatue, de quo infra sermo erit. Quod sem el expertus es, ne teme? depromito, sed experimenta saepius H 5 178 Logic. Pars II. repetens, an costantia sint, observato; nec, nisi certior omnino factus, de iis enunciato. Saepe enim accidit, ut effectus aliqui a cir cumstantiis oriatur accidentalibus, vel caus sae cuidam externae debeantur. Repetenda er go experimenta, ut diiudicari possit, utrum principali, an accessorüs caussis, effectus il le tribuendus sit, adeoque non mirum, si facta semel observatione, effectus productio propriae caussae non tribuatur, 4. Demonstrationes non nisi certis in dubiisque principiis superstruito. Ratio ciniorum catenam ne interrumpito; sed sequentium veritas ex antecedentibus patefiat. * Eo namque modo habebitur legitima syllo gismorum concatenatio in qua demonstras tionis essentia sita est, ut supra diximus. Ne ciedito, quamcumque enuncia tionis probationem pro demonstratione sumi posse: qaamvis omnis demonstra tio sit probatio. Ex debilibus enim prae inissarum probationibus exilis enervisque exsurgit demonstratio cui nihil potest roboris accedere. * Nimiruni demonstrationis robur a praemis stabilitate, legitimaque connexione procedit, adeoque pro; earum firmitate con clusionis pondus augetur, vel minuitur. sarumriat, 6. Demonstratio, ut certitudinem ра talis esto, quae neque per mate riam, neque per formam ulla possit ra tione convelli. Iunc enim adsensum etiam ab invito, extorquebis. 7. Si metaphysicae certitudini expe rientia adversetur, haecfallax esto. Absurdum namque foret id exsistere, quod rectae rationi repugnat. * Eo namque casu duas habemus 'propositiones inter se contradicentes, alteram singularem, quae quidpiam exsistere pronuntiat, univers salem alteram, quae idem existere posse ne gat; adeoque duo haec enunciata inter se pugnantia ita comparata sunt, ut quod pri mum sensibus perceptum fuisse ait, illud alte rum solidis rationibus intrinsecus impossibile esse demonstrat. Quum itaque ab impossibi litate ad non exsistentiam conclusio duci pose sit (per princ, Ontol, ): recte colligitúc, in hac collisione rationem vincere, ac proinde experientiam dici debere fallacem, quippe non experientia, sed subreptionis vitium rea pse adpellanda. Et hoc universali omnium phi losophorum consensione pro inconcusso axiom mate habendum est: ut ita Genuensis noster praecipuum inter suos de veritatis criterio cả nones illum posuerit: Si intellig:bili evidentiae physica adversetur, FALLAX HABETVR PHYSICA, est enim haecminor, cui proii # 6 180 Logica Pars 11. + de vals dicere, quam de intelligibili subdubitan re, quae summa est, acmathematicam parit certitudinem, par est. Cui deinde subiungit: Fingamus (quaquam id falsum keputo, ma thematica evidentia demonstrari terram mye veri: si qui sensuum evidentiam reponeret, non esset audiendus, nisi matorem minori evi dentiae praeferre velimus. Art. Lozicocrit Lib. IIT. cap. 3. 15. can 1, Sed quid, in quies, alienam auctoritatem in re tam evi, denti confulere conaris? Nimirum quia canon bic a quibusdam, apud quos Genuensis no stri plurimum valet auctoritas, nigro lapillo notatus est: ut sciant sententiam nostram non singularem aut phantasticam, sed ratio De aç unanimi hominum ratione utentium consensione fultam. cum eius quoque Viri ipsis non suspecti adsertione congruere. 8. Nihil Divinae auctoritatį opponere fas esto, Quum Deum loquutum esse con stal, cuncta silento. Huic metaphisicą, certitudo numquam refragator: sed si per rationem liceat, demonstrationes ad calculum revocato; * vel si Dei vera bum explicatione egeat, Ecclesiam in, fallibilem eius interpretem con sulit o. * Referentes nồs ad ea, quae diximns, quia demonstratio Dei verbo repugnans fal sa est, dummodo intra rationis fines quaer stip sit rationes,iterum conficiautur, e de Cap. IX. De. Methodo. 181 monstrationes ad calculum revocentur, ut adpareat, undenam oppositio illa ortum duxe rit, principiisne dubiis et incertis,, an a defectu legitimae connexionis? * Ratio huius canonis haec est, Onnis lex eiusdem Legislatoris spiritu est explican da Si enim leges humanae difficultate aut: ob scuritate aliqua laborent, earum explic atio et interpretatio tantum a Legislatore, eius que Administris est petenda, non a pri vatis Doctoribus proprio marte cudenda. Quan to magis ergo Divina lex quae verbo Dei con tinetur, ab eo qui eiusdem Dei spiritu gau det est explicanda. Ecclesiam autem Dei spi șitum habere, patet ex ipsis Servatoris no stri verbis Matth. ult, ubi Apostolis ait Ec ce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consumationem saeculi. Et loan. XVI. 18. Cum, venerit ille Spiritus veritatis (Pa. raclitus ), docebit vos omnem veritatem. Quid quid ergo Ecclesia pronuntiat, assistente su premo animarum Pastore Christo, et docente Spiritu Sancto pronuntiat; adeoque per eana Deus ipse suum interpetatur verbum 182 Logica Pars. Į1. G A PUT QVARTV M De Methodo. 138. Vum in demonstrationibus con clusiones ex certis principiis per legitimam ratiociniorum seriem dedu ci debeant; illa vero series arglimentorum METHODVS dicatur: non abs re brevem hanc de metho do tractationem doctrinae de demonstrationis bus subiungiinus. 139. Quilibet experiundo agnoscere po - test, enunciationis cuiusvis veritatem du plici modo detigi posse, scilicet vel eam dividendo, et ope analyseosed prima simpliciaque principia perveniendo, vel componendo idest, principiis ad conclu siones sensim ac legitimo nexu progre. diupdo. Vnde clare patet, methodum esse vel ANALYTICAM sive divisionis, vel SYNTHETICAM seu compositionis. * Methodus ergo anulytica a principiatis ad principia, synthetica a principiis ad princi piata (uti Scholae aiunt ) procedit. Dla composita resolvit. haec simplicia componit, Rem exemplis illustrabimus. Ad demqnstran dam enunciationem alibi (S. 131, ) allatam? Deus earet adfectibus: analytice ita ratio cinabimur. 1. Quicumque caret appeti tusensitivo, caret @ap. IV. De Methodo, 183 etiam affectibus (per defin. aff. ): atqui Deus caret appetitu sensitivo; ergo Deus caret affectibus. a, Min. prob. Quicumque caret repraesentatio nibus confusis, caret quoque appetitu sensi tivo (per defin. app. ): Deus vero caret repraesentationibus confusis, ergo Deus ca. ret appetitu sensitivo. 3 Min prob. Quicumque omnia sibi distinctist sime repracsentat, repraesentationibus caret confusis (est axioma ): sed Deus omnia si bi distinctissime repraesentat: caret ergo repraesentationibus confasis. 4. Min. prob. intellectu gaudens perfcctissi mo omnia sibi distinctissime repraesentat (per defin. intell. Quum igitur Deus gau deat intellectu perfectissimo: omnia sibi distictissime repraesentat 5. Min. prob. Ens perfectissimum intellectu gaudet perfectissimo (est axioma ): Deus autem est ens perfectissimum (per defin. Dei ): ergo Deus gaudet intellectu perfe ctissimo Eamdem propositionem synthetice demonstravi mus ($. 131. * ). At in gratiam Tironum, quos ad Philosophiam manuducere instituimus, aliam adhuc dabimus demonstrationem, bre vem illam, at mathematico more confectam hoc modo: THEOREMA, Deus caret affectibus. DEMONSTRATIO. Est enim ens perfectism simum (defin. 1. ), cuius est intcllectu gaudere perfectissimo (ex 1. ), qmniaque 184 Logica Pars ir. sibi distinctissime repraesentare (defin. 2. ) id quod omnimodam ab eo idearum confu şionem excludit (ax. 2. ), Quum itaque ab idearun confusione pendeat appetitus sen sitivus (defin. 3. ) ', cuius vehementiores motus dicuntur affectus (defin. 3. ): iure colligitur, Deum omnino affectibus carere. Vides hic, quam bene monuerimus in fine primae partis, maximum atque insignem esse usum syllogismorum in conficiendis mathema ticis demonstrationibus: atque hinc patet, quam inepti ad demonstrandum sint ii, qui syllogisınıim eiusque leges negligunt, et igno rata vituperante 140. Quoniam methodus analytica a dif ficilibus ad facilia, a compositis ad sim. plicia progreditur (s. 139. ); synthetica vero a principiis ad conclusiones (S. eod. ) conséquens est 1. ut illa in veritate inve nienda, haec in alios docendo adhibeatur; * adeoque 2. eruditorum reprehensionem in currant qui ip docendo illam potius, quain hanc sequi amant. Et quia feracior illa est, haec sterilior **: novit quisque 3. docendi ordinem id exigere, ut post quan auditoribus synthetice veritas fuerit explanata, iisdem "analytice modus. indi cetur, quo fuit ab auctore inventa. Analyticam enim methodum in docendo ad bibere idem esset, aç opposita et difficili ti 9 Cap. IV. De Methodo. 185 rones ducere via, eosque ad veritatem vel numquam, vel raro admodum pervenire ** Feracior quidem est analytien methodus quia singula ad examen revocat, minuta quae que considerat, atque possibiles omnes fin git casus, inde ab hac quasi sylva conserta, enodatis extricatisque ambagibus, ad rem ipsam perveniat; synthetica vero sterilior, & generalibus namque principiis brevi atque ex pedita via pergit conclusiones. Eadem autem ratione illa difficilior, haec facilior est: adeoqne illa viatori tramitis inscio, qui di vinando et om nia tentando difficiliter quo tedebat pervenit: haec eidem perito similis, qui brevi apertaque via iter conficit, et finem ideo suum cito consequitur, 541. Iam ad melhodi leges, tum utri que communes cum alterotri peculiares, tradendas acMilanius. Eas aliquot complc clemur regulis; quarni quinque genera les, ceterae vero speciales sunt, analyticae praesertim methodo inserviturae. Quicum que igitur veram: methodum in veritatis investigatione cailere cupit, hos rigides servet. 186 Logica Pars. II. CANON E S. I. Q Votiescumque ad demonstrandum accedis, cur ato, ut a facilibus notisque incipias, indeque ad ignota et difficilia gradatim progrediaris. Prin cipia itaque solida, ideasque selig ito medias, atque ea semper cordi habelo * Est haec lex, quam inculcavimus ($. 130. ) et alibi retulimus. In -singulis ratiocinationis gradibus eamdem semper servato evidentiam, ut altei um ab altero derivari clare sentias. * * Ita vitabitur paedantismus, hoc est inutile illud memoriae pondus iudicio destitutum, et in minimis quibusque sectandis vanam quae ritans gloriolam, de quo vide supra Part. I. Cap. 3. Schol. Can. 4 3. Stilo utitor facili, ac naturali, non oratorio vel ampulloso. Verborum tantum, quantum ideis clare exprimen dis satis est adhibeto: nec, nisi in ideis claris, quidquam tentato. * Verborum enim copia ignorantiae confusioni sve indicium est: quae namque ignoramus vel confuse scimus, ea nimia verborum cir cuitione explicare cogimur. Cap. IV. De Methodo. Argumentum pertractanduſ ab am biguitate, si quafuerit, liberato prius; deinde in tot membra dividito, quot ca pax est: singula attente examinato ac definito: * omnia clarissimis explica to verbis, ac quaestione quam simplicis sime exprimito. * Prae oeulis tamen habeantur, quae de de finitionibus diximus Verba: quce obscuritatis aliquid habent, adcurata definitione dctermina to, in eoque semper sensu adhibeto. * Confer quae diximus SS. 5. 46. De methodo analitica livec habeto: 6. Ad veritatem inveniendam, quae stionemve solvendam, ne nudus princi. piorumque inscius accedito: num sorida cognitione ad id paratus advenias, se dulo perpendito. * Sinamque incapax principiisque destitutus rem aliquam adgrederis, fieri non poterit, quin inepta et ridicula effutias. Quaecumque cum proposita quae stione aliquam habent connexionem di 古 88 Logica Pars II. ligenter exquirito: omnes possibiles ti bifingito hypotheses: quaecumque ei lu men adferre possunt, ne rciicito sed Omnia simul colligito et comparato. 8. Principia quaeque atque ideas mutuo conferto: omnium relationes perpendito efinesque sectator, eaque, superflua de mendo in parvum referto numerum. Omnia deinde corrigito diuque considera to, ut tibi familiaria fiant. * Speciatim vero principiis diu haereto. Repetitione namque attentio renovatur ius ope ideas meliores fieri docuimus F. 19. Schol. Quas de syudetica methodo tradenda forent, ea partim a nobis incul. cata sunt, partim infra, ubi de modo alios docendi sormo erit, enodabuntur. Si quis autem metho dum hanc callere cupiat, is Christiani Wolf fii tractatum de methodo mathematica, universae Matheseos elementis * praemis-. sibi curet reddere familiare CU sum * Exstant haec 5. voluminibus in 4. excusa Ha lae Magdeburgicae. Cap. V. De Veritete Probabili. GA P VT QUIN T V M De Veritate probabili -542. o 142 Eritatein dici certam mnia adsunt requisita quamcum que oppositi formidinem excludentia, su pra docuimus. At intellectus nostri infirmitas persarpe impedimento est, quo minus nobis illa veritatis indicia pa. teant ita, ut veram absque ulla oppositi suspicione perspiciamus. Hinc ergo est, cur in praesenti capite de probabilitate, quantum satis erit, dicere instituerimus. Est autem PROBABILITAS status mentis ex indiciis insufficientibus verita ti adhaerentis, cum aliqua tamen op positi formidine, PROBABILIS ergo di cilur enunciatio in quc adest ratio in sufficiens, cur praedicatum subiecto tri bu atur. * Ita Cicero pro Milon. cap. 10 probabilibus argumentis probat, Clodium Miloni insidias struxisse. Ait enim: Clodium dixisse, Milo nem esse occidendum; 2. eum Miloni neces sarium iter Lanuvium facienti obviam ivisse, 3. idque itinere effecisse maxime expedito, et praeter consueludiuem; 4. servos cu: n les lis ante fundum suum collocasse. Probat id 190 Logica Pars I. esse > in quidem, sed probabiliter, insufficientibus quippe indiciis, adeo ut aliqua adhuc adsit oppositi formido. Ex quibus definitionibus clare de ducitur 1. eo probabiliorem esse proposi tionem, quo plura adsunt veritatis indicia 2. dici vero DVBIAM, si ex alterutra parte aequalia fuerint rationum momenta, adeoque 3. IMPROBABILEM qua paucissima inveniuntur; quibusque e contrario fortiora indicia opponuntnr; 4. omne probabile, esse quoque possibile, quamvis 5. non omne possibile dici pro babile possit. * Probabilitas enim supponit possibilitatem: quum enim probabilitas veritatis alicuius exsi sicntiam indicet, exsistere vero nequeat, cui deest possibilitas, liquet, tunc de pro. babilitate qnaestionem institui posse quum rei possibilitas firmata sit: ut ita qui eam esse im possibilem demonstravit, uihil aliud oneris habeat, omnemquede probabilitate contro versiai tollat. Possibilitas autem non infert probabilitatem: nam quum possibile sit, quod non involvit contradictionein (per princ. Onol. ), non ideo probabile dici potest, nisi quaedam adsint circumstantiae, quae id revera exsislere evincant. 145. Quia dantur enunciationes probabi les, sillogismus autem propositionibusconstat: liquet 6. Cap. V. De Veritate Probabili. 191 dari quoque syllogismum probabilem. Et quia couclusio sequidebet partem debiliorem; debilior vero est pro positio probabilis, prae certa: consequens est 7. ut conclusio sit probabilis, si alte rutra praemissarum talis sit. Sed quoniam conclusionis vis est aggregatum virium praemissarum (s. 82. seqq. ), infertur 8. ut si utraque praemissarum sit probabilis, conclusionis probabilitas minuatur pro sum ma graduum, quibus illae a certitudine recedunt. * Denique quum demonstra tiones coficiantur ex syllogismis concatena tis, quorum unus ab altero vim sumit: evidens est 9. integram de monstrationem, in qua vel una probabi lis propositio irrepsit, non esse, nisi 7 pro babilen. * Certitudo namque in philosophicis se habet, ut aeqealitas in mathematicis. Sicuti ergo ae qualitatis nulli sunt gradus, ita et certitudi nis. Probabilitas autem maior est vel minor provt minus magisve a certitudine recedit,ut et inaequalitas servata proportione. Ponamus ergo certitudinem constare gradibus 12. Si una prae missarum tantum certa sit, altera duobus gradibus ab ea recedat, habebimus conclu sionem probabilem duobus dumtaxat gradi 192 Logica Pars II. Io bus a certitndine distantem: tunc enim ma ior erit Ei, minor -, quibus addie tis, babetur in conclusione summa = 2. quae duobus tantum gradibus ab unitate, sive certitudine diftat. Ponamus porro prae missarum unam ita probabilem esse, ut duo bus gradibus a cerit udine deficiat, altera ve ro tribus; habebimus conclusionem sive summam fractorum et E quae quinque gradibus ab uuitate pe a certitudine recedit, quot deerant in am babus praemissis. Dem. 146. His generatim expositis, ad pro babilitatis species transeamus. Probabilitas recie dividitur ib HISTORICAM, PHYSICAM, POLITICAM, PRACTICAM, et HERMENEVTICAM. De singulis pau ca delibabimus. A probabilitate differt OPINIO, quae est propositio insnfficienter probata, scilicet a principiis nondum certis, et precariis dedu cta, quae ideo est mutabilis, ac proinde po test ut plurimum esse falsa: unde opinio di viditer in PROBABILEM, et IMPROBA, BILEM, prout principia sunt prout princi pia sunt probabilia, vel precaria, omni nem pe rationis auxilio destituta. Sap. 7. De Veritate probabili. He completanarratio eae De probabilitate historica. SISTORIA, est factorum fidelis et. Eius au ctores sunt homines: fidem ergo parit hu mapam. Homo vero factum aliquod fideliter et complete narrans, HISTORICUS vel TESTIS dicitur. Sed quia aliorum narrationes neque experientia, nec demonstratione ad examen revocari possunt ob vitae intellectusque nostri brevitatem mentisque imbecillitatem, nec de omnium probitate certo constare potest: quando ` id in sola opinione versetur, non certitudinem, sed probabilitatem in nobis gignunt. Quumque hominum aucto ritate freti adsensun historiae praebeamus: evidens est, historicae probabilitatis funda mentum esse fidem humanam. * Ut autem narratio historia dicatur, dcbet non modo esse fidelis, hoc est res clare, eoque, quo contigerunt, ordine narrare, sed completa etian ', omnia scilicet factorum adiuncta, circumstantias, relationes, caussas; et fines amplecti.Hinc Cicero Historici perinde, ac Oratoris dotes paucis expressit, nempe talem esse debere ne quid falsi dicere audeat ne quid veri non audeat.Quia fides aliorum testimonio in nititur, estque fundamentum pro babilitatis historicae; homines autem ob ignorantiam malitiamve, aut fal li aut fallere possunt, ut experientia testa tur: consequens est, ut ad adsequendam probabilitatem historicam cautiones quae dam adhibendae sint, quibus testium an ctoritas, factorum genuinitas, natrationuin qucque veritas dignoscatur. eam * Hinc ergo enata est ARS CRITĪCA, sive habitus aliorum auctoritatem ad trutinam re. vocandi, recte adhibendi, factaque scienter ac sine erroris nota dijudicandi:Tapinps 1 namque indicium notat. Et quamvis artis cri ticae officium, vulgarem sequuti opinionem, infra ad solum librorum examen atque in terpretationem restringamus; non ideo no bilissimam hanc artem cancellis adeo angu stis coarctare volumus; sed quidquid de usi auctoritatis, rernm gestarum examine ac in dicio dicenda sunt, ea ad artem criticam: pertinere, qnisque sciat: id quod semel pro sem per observandum. 119. Quia ergo in omni narratione tria considerari possunt; narrans nempe, bar ratiun, et ipsa narratio: hinc est, ut in fide humana ad tria potissimum attendi so leat, scilicet i. ad homines narrantes, ad res narratas, 3. ad modima parran di. * Ab hominibus nunc ordiamur. * Atque in his, quae sequuntur, regulis tam historicam, quam hermeneuticam probabilita tem respicientibus, nedum librorum genui nitatem integritatsmve expendentibus, gene rales totius críticae leges ad singulares spe cies et circumstantias adplicandae consistunt, in quibus addiscendis eo maiorem operam collocare debet, qui philosophi nomen tue ri cupit, quo frequentius in evolvendis li bris, factisque diiudicandis erit ei, re exi gente, versandum, Quoniam hominibus, licet eadem natura, non cadem tamen est perspicacia, mcrumque probitas, nec omnes iisden sensibus eamdein rem percipere possunt (per cxper. ); hoinnes autem factum aliquod narrantes testes vocantur 147. ): patet in quolibet teste tria concia derari posse, scilicet INTELLECTVM, VOLUNTATEM et SENSUS, Si intellectus spectetur, testesa sunt vel PRVDENTES ac PERSPICACES, yet RVDES et IGNARI; si VOLVNTAS,idem sunt vel NEVTRI PARTI, vel VNITANTVM faventes, itemque vel PROB!, vel IMPROBI; si denique SENSVS, sunt vel I 2 ATI 196 Logica Pars II. OCVLATI, qui factum quod narrant ocu lis perceperunt, vel AVRITI, qui illud ab aliis audiverunt; et hi denno vel Co AEVI sunt, qui eodem facti tempore vi xerunt, vel RECENTIORES qui id postea ab aliis acceperunt.  Sic Livius inter testes prudentes est referen dus: multo namque po!lebat iudicio. Idem tamen Romariorum parti favebat, quippe Romanus et ipse. Tandem factorum, quae sua aetate evenerunt, testis coaevus, eorum autem, quae ante conditam condendanıve urbem, ac per tot saecula ad sua usqne tem posa accidisse tradebantur, recentior dicen dus est. 152. Ex quibus omnibus patet 1. in fa cti alicuius narratione, quod attentionem iudiciumque requirit, homines prudentes et perspicaces rudioribus ignavisque esse antehabendos; promiscue vero se habe re in rebus solis sensibus, non etiam iu dicio, indigentibus, dummodo in illis af fectus partiumve studium non metuatur: tunc enim rudiorum testimonium proba bilius erit; 3. testes neutrales alterutri parti faventibus recie pracferri, nec non 4. oculatos auritis, 5. coaevos recentiori. bus,  inter auritos autem prudentes ru dioribus, eos tamen, ad quos ex oculato Cap. IV. De Veritate Probalili. 197 nullam esse, fide digno magnaque auctoritate pollente facti fama pervenit, ceteris incerto alio. quin rumore ductis esse anteferendos, ac denique 8. coaevi testimonium plurium contestium narratione augeri, cui nescio quidnam ad probabilitatem ultra deesse possit, 153. Quod altinet ad res ipsas narratas síve facta; observandumu 9. probabilitatem si circumstantiae adsint sibi invicem repugnantes;nihil enim impossibi le potest esse probabile (S. 144. ); 10. nullam quoque esse probabilitatem, si testis unicus factum aliqnod insolitum et mira bile narret: licet 11. probabilius id ha bendum sit, si a pluribus probatae fidei viris unico contesta narretur; 12. nulla itidem probabilitate gaudere, narrationem, quae claris rationibus -aperto repugnat; 13. non idem tamen dicendum de ea, quae moribus opinionibusque nostris ad versatur, *** nec 14. si caussa modusque ignoretur, aut vim artemque nostram su peret. Sic pleraque prodigià ab uno Livio narrata nullam merentur fidem, utpote omni proba bilitate destituta: veluti quod scribit Lib. 1. ca. 12. post pugnam Romanorum cum Albanis, Tullo ' Hostrilio Rege 1 factam, I 3 198 Logica Pars. II. in Monte Albano lapidibus pluisse; vel quando, Tarquinio Prisco regnante, Au guris Attii Nevii cotem novacula discissam refert Lib. I. cap. 25.: id enim mirabile quidem et insolitum, sed a Livio tantum relatum. Qua de re iure idem Historicus de his, fimilibusque factis improbabilibus vocabulo ferunt fidem suam sartam tectam servat, non modo singulorum narratione, sed et in historiae suae proaemio, ubi cas ideo nea adfirmare, nec refellere velle fatetur, ut potc poeticis magis decora fabulis, quam incor. ruptis rerum gestarum monumentis confirm mata. nempe Lu nam ** Huiusmodi sunt fabulae illae, quibus Mu hamedanum scatet Alkorauum, a Muhamede bifarian digito divisam partemque in vestis manicam delapsam iterum in coelum repositam; palmae eiulatus in eius absentia, et id genus alia. > *** Sunt enim, mores pro regionum ac tem porum varietate, varii. Quidquid ergo mori bus nostris turpe est, fortasse apud alias Gentes honestum erit, et quod nostro sae culo nefas habetur id licitum esse alio: tempore potuit. Quis enim ut cum Cornelio Nepote loquamur, non vitio verteret The bano Epaminondae, saltasse eumcommode scienterque tibiis cantasse? Et tamen haec aliaque nostris moribus indecora inter eius virtutes commemorantur. Nepos. in Proem. Cap. V. De Veritate probabili. 199 154 Quoad modum narraudi tandem, id sedulo advertendum, facta stilo simplici non oratorio aut poetico, narrari debere. Si itaque simpliciter atque historice nar ratio scripta legatur, maiorem meretur lidem, quam quae poeticis pigmentis aut oratorio fuco lasciviens aures demulcere conatur. SECTIO II. De Probabilitate physica, politica, et practica. 153.TJAEc de fide humana, quam qui ritatis praeiudicio occupatus conseri debet. Ad alteram nunc probabilitatis speciem ac Milanius, nempe PHYSICAM; quae ha betur, quum ex pluribus phaenomenis ad caussam aliquam physicani concludimus, cui illos tribuimus effectus. Gravesandius eas vocat hypotheses. 8 Probabile est, fluxum maris à lunae solisque attractione pendere: nam ex plurie. bus phaenomenis hanc illius caussam ess posse, compertum est. Ad physicam probabilitatem eruen dam quatuor adhibendae sunt cautiories: 1. ut phaenomenon adstumtum sit certum, eiusque distincta idea, aut clara saltem, habeatur, ne chimaeram pro re, aut nu bem pro Iunone amplectamur; 2. si phae nomenon illud sit ab alio relatum ad historicae probabilitatis regulas, tamquam ad lydium lapidem, exigatur: 3. eius porro caussae omnes pose sibiles investigentur, et.cum phaenomeno conferantur; ac denique 4. ex iis una plu resvc adsumantur, quae cum omnibus cir cumstantiis apte conveniant. * Quum autem doctrina haec ad Physicam fa cultatem pertineat: sufficiat de ea quaedam tantum hic notasse: commodius enim in Phi. sica tractabitur. POLITICA probabilitas ea est, qua ex alicujus personae phaenomenis in dolem animi arguimus. ' Quumque in ex propensiopuni signis ad ipsas propen siones concludamus: evidens est tracta tionem hanc ad Ethicam potius, quam ad Logicam pertinere: adeoque non mirum, si eam inoffenso pede oniittamus. ea Ut clarius politica probabilitas intelligi pos sit, sumamus e. g. aliquem, in quo vultus hilaritas, iocandi studium, corporis mobi litas, laboris impatientia, prodigalitas', in constantia, garrulitas etc. observentur: non ne eum statim voluptati deditum esse con Cap. V. De Veritate probabili. cludes: Haec erit probabilitas politica. Lega tur interim Cl. Heineccii dissertatio: Dein cessu animi indice. Quae de probabilitate PRACTICA dici inerentur, ea fusius persequuti sunt Andreas Rutigerus in Lib. de sensu peri et falsi. III. 8., et Ludovic. Mart. Kallius in Elementis Logicae probabilium Nos paucis rem expediemus. Eam Rudige rus vocat, qua ex physicis vel moralibus principiis futurum aliquem praedicimus even tum. Quod quum in practica casuum si milium expectatione consistat, eaque ex pectatio vocetur analogia evidens est practicam probabilitatem recte adpellari ARGUMENTUM AB ANALOGIA; id quod maximo apud Politicos usui esse solet. * * Politici namque in gubernandis rebus publi cis probe versati probabiliter unius aut alterius Regni praedicunt eversionem, propte rea quod aliae res publicae post easdem cir cumstantias subversae sint: adeoque a simi Jium casuum exspectatione practicam eruunt probabilitatem. CA habetur, quum a quibus dam in Auctoris scripto obviis eius sen. surn eruimus. Saepe enim accidit, ut in auctoris alicuius interpretatione quaedam occurrant, quae multiplicem sensum ad mittunt: tunc ex auctoris fine, verborum significatione, locorumque collatione pro babiliter colligitur, quidnam auctor ille voluerit intelligere, idque fit ope ARTIS HERMENEUTICAE, quae definiri potest per habitum Auctorum loca interpretan, di, sive eorum sensum eruendi. SENSUS AUCTORIS est ceptus, quem scriptor vel loquens vult in legentium auditorumve animis per ver ba produci. Auctorem ergo interpretari dicimur, qumun ex legitimis principiis eius sensus investigamus. Et quia ars hermes neutica est facultas auctorum loca inter pretandi; consequens est 1., ut eius sit genuinum auctoris sensum erue Te; adeoque 2. regnlae tradantur, opor tet, quarum ope sensus ille quam proba, bilius investigari possit, соп Cap. v. De Veritate,probabili. 203 Quumque in his regulis totius Hermeneuticae adeoque et Criticae artis leges Auctorum in terpretationem respicientes pofitae fint: non mirum, si a canonibus huic sectioni subii.. ciendis abstineamus, quippe qui superflui omnino forent, et loquacitatem potius, quam logicam praecisionem arguerent. Quoniam Scriptoris sensus perver ba significatur: colligitur in de 3. ut interpres linguam, qua scriptor conceptus suos expressit, eiusque idiotis, mos probe calleat: adeoque patet 4. falli eos, qui linguam illam ignorantes aliorum versionibus translationibusque fidunt; 5. ut ad scriptoris sectam, finem, affectus,mu nus, aetatem, gentis suae mores ' attendat: unde 6. integrum Auctoris systema prae oculis babeat, ac de eo secu dnm dome sticas notiones, non ex propriis opinioni bus, iudicium ferat., quid > * Praeclare id monet Clericus Arte Critica Part. Il Sect. 2. cap. 2. $. 7. et 8. Opor tct, inquit Vir eruditissimus, nostrarum opi nionum veluti oblivisci, el quaerere, veteres illi Magistri senserint non quod sentire dcbuisse nobis videniur, ut sape rent. 162. Ex eodem principio fluit 7 inter pretein affectibus, praeconceptisque opinionibns omnino vacuum esse debere; nee 8. Auctoris verba extra contextum legere aut considerare, sed antecedentia et con sequentia attente conferre: multoque ma gis y. loca parallela auctoris eiusdem sol licite comparare, ut quod obscuritatis ir, repserat, statim evanescat. Quumque ad cognitionis claritatem ac distinctionem om ne momentum ferat attentio (m. 19. ): sequitur 10. ut qui librum aliquem probe interpretari vult, eum attente atque ordi ne legat, et codicem habere ' curet quam emendatissimum. ' * Quantum ad librorum interpretationem con ferat editio, ratio in promptu est. Videmus enim, quam multis scateant erroribus edi tiones quaedam ab indoctis ignarisque con fectae typographis, ut Delio saepe notatore opus habeant. "Nitidissimae prae ceteris sunt editiones a Viris claris, qui id oneris susce perunt, effectae, quibus multum iure merita debet Respublica litteraria, Cop. V. De Veritate probabili. Uoniam magno Hermeneuticae adiumento est Ars Critica: non abs re fuerit, pauca de hac illustri arte haud contemnenda degustare. Quam bene de ea meritus sit Vir multiplici eruditione praeditus Ioannes Clericus, communi sa pientum consensu probatur. Nos eius du ctu regulas saltem generales nostris audi toribus trademus ut quantum fieri pote rit, libros genuinos a nothis, integros a corruptis discernere valeant. Res quidem foret laboris plenissima et satis prolixa, si Critices distincte praecepta trade re conaremus. Id adcurate cxsequutus est Clericus, quo'nemo elaboratius eam pertra ctare, operaeque pretium facere posset. Nos autem tironibus scribentes, notiones maxime genericas jis suppeditare adlaboramus; quia, quum perfectum fuerit ipsorum iudicium, et matura aetas, omnia, quae hoc super argu mento scienda forent, in eodem Clerico legent. ARS CRITICA est habitus libro Fum genuinitatem et integritatem diiudi, 20 Logica Pars I. Candi. * Quae definitio ut intelligatur, oportet claras notiones genuinitatis, et in tegritatis librorum in legentium animis excitare. * Notandum tamen hic Crilices vocabulum strictissimo iure usurpari', regulasque ea in re generales tironibus suppeditari: latiori Damque significatione tam historicam proba bilitatem, quam hermeneuticam amplectitur, de quibus per summa capita praecedentibus sectionibus sermonem instituentes praecepta, yeluti per lancem saluram, ex hibuimus. Earum. LIBER GENUINUS dicitur, qui ab eo, cuius nomen prae se fert,-. fuit exaratus; SUPPOSITUS autem, qui ab alio, quam cuius nomine insignitúr, scripius est. * Liber dicitur INTEGER, si tantum contineat, quantum Auctor in eo descripsit, CORRUPTUS vero al quid ab alio additub sit, vel demtum: speciatin Viro si additum INTERPOLATVS; sin den tuni, MVTILVS appel. latur. si 2 * Dici quoque solet spurius fictus vel fictitius: liniec vocabula ab aliis distinguantur. Sed non est idoneus huic quaestioni locus, Cap. V. De Veritate probabili. 2014 * Huius corruptionis quatuor caussas tradit Clericus: nempe Librarios (dictantes perin de, ac scribentes ), Criticos, impostores, tempus. Satis erit haec generatim scire guia singillatim percurrerenon vacat. 166. Criticae leges ab eodein Clerico de cem adisignantur. Eas nos sequentibus ex ponemius regulis, quas philosophus nos ter observabit. Sequantur ergo. CANONES t. " S " ppositum habeto librum, qui in vetuslis codicibus alii tribuitur Auctori; interpolatum, si in aliis de sideretur, quod in eo reperitur; muti lum denique, si quae in ipso desunt in antiquis codicibus inveniantur. 2. Si a veteribus quaedam a libro ali quo exarata sint, ea vero nunc in li eadem inscriptione. insignito deside rentur: aut alius esto, aili muiilus. Si aliter legantur, suspeciels. Si vero omnia aptu cohaereant, genuinus esto et inte ger, nisi alia adsit ratio dubitandi. 3. Liber, cuius nulla fit inentio in veteribus catalogis, aut a scriptoribus proxime sequentibus, plerumque fictus esto, cut saltem suspectus,. 209 Logica Pars I. > 4. Scriptá a veteribus diserte reiecta, aut in dubium vocata, nequit recentio, rum auctoritas, nisi gravissimis rationi. bus,, pro genuinis admittere. 5. Liber dogmata continens iis con trária, quae scriptor cuius nomen praefert, alibi constanter defendit, ut plurimum aut spurius esto, aut interpo latus. 6. Idem iudicium ferto de eo, in quo personae, facta, uut nomina com memorantur Auctore, cui tribuitur, recentiora. 7. Spurium quoque aut interpolatum iudicato librum in quo controversiae tractantur post Scriptoris tempora na tae, vel adest scriporis imitatio. 8. Talis quoque ut plurimum esto si fabulis scatens, aut ineptus, viro docto minimeque imperito tribuatur. 9. Liber stilo scriptus diverso a stilo Auctoris aut saeculi, in quo ille vixit, spurius esto, eiusque censendus, ius stilo est conformis. In. Vocabula recentiora Auctorem arguunto recentiorem, aut libri interpo Talioncm: in translatione vero, si ni hil est quod sapiet linguam, in qua scripsisse constat Auctorem, cui tribyi: utr, translatio non esto, cu * Cap. V. De Veritatc probabili. 209 * Pluribus hanc doctrinam persequi deberemus, idoneisque illustrare exemplis: sed res est maximi momenti, et nimis implicata, nec in stituti brevitas eam disquisitionem patitur. Quivero plura cupit, adeat Clericum in Ar te Critica, ubi plurima inveniet suo gustui. adcommodata. Id interim notasse sufficiet, in hisce omnibus ad praxin adplicandis ma gna cautione opus, esse ne in praecipitan tiam, adeoque in errores prono cursu la bamurSendus pecialior Logicae usus nunc evol vendus, nempe PRAXIS, qua mentis nostrae operationes sint in verita tis investigatione dirigendae.Veritas inveni tur vel proprio marte, sive per meditatio nem rite institutam; vel ab aliis inventa quaeritur et ud trutinam revocatur. Quia vero nec meditationi, nec bonae lectioni par est, qui hasce lautitias nondum degus tavit: Logicae est regulas suppeditare quibus mapuducti adolescentes et recte mea ditari, et libros cum fructu legere dis cant. Quumque nostrum sit auditorum nos trorum utilitati studere: de duobus his veri tatem inveniendi modis hoc capite agemns. MEDEDITATIO est conformis co gitationum nostrarum bonae methodi legibus adplicatio. Meditamur itaque, quum cogitationes nostra's bonae methodi legibus g. 138. seqq. ) ita dirigimus, ut veritates ex veritatibus, co gnitiones ex cognitionibus eruamus. Ex qua definitione sequitur 1. ait quantum diſfert regula ab eius adplica tione, tantum optima methodus a medi tatione distet,. meditaturus leges quibus bona methodus absolvitur (S. 141. ), callere debeat; adeome 3. eo felicius meditetur, quo exactius leges illas esequitur; nec non 3. aliquarum saltem veritatum debeat es se gnarus, ut ex ijs veritates aljas erue re legitime possit (S. 167. ). 5. Tirones ergo, aliique bonae methodi, veritaium que ignari ad meditandum sunt inepti. * Cui enim serei principium deest, nullo mo do seriem ipsam, hoc est veritatum catenam conficere potest. Pari modo qui concatenationis leges ignorat, quantumvis veritatum mente te *} Cap, VI. De Veritat. inquisitione. 211 neat, nec illas recte disponere, nec ordina tam seriem formare valet. 170. Quia ad bonam methodum requi ritur idearum claritas (5 141. cap. 3. ); ad claritatem autem confert attentio (S. 19. );consequens est 6. ut qui feliciter meditari vult, attenitonem praecipue colat; quin 7. et praeiudiciis liber et 8. certis indubiisqoe principiis (S. 131 ) praemunitus ad meditandum accedat. Quum que ad principia referantur praecipue de finitiones (f. eod. ): recte consequi tur 9. ut res de qua institui vult mcdi. tatio, edcurate definiatur, f. 141. cap. 5. ), ac inde novis definitionibus omnia dividantur. El * Serventur tamen, quae de definitionibus (Par. I. Cap. 3. ), et divisionihu:s (Cap. 4. ) docuimus, et quomodo definitiones ex ex perientia eruantur. quoniam inter principia etiam axiomata et postulata enumerantur (S. 130 ), eaque es definitionibus legitimue eruuntur: liquido infertur 10. medita turo innotescere quoque debere modum ex definitionibus axiomata eruendi, * ut om nes principiorum species probe tencat. Quonam autem modo ex unica definitione ar. iomata et postulata formentur, hic adden dum. Tribus quidem modis id effici posse certum est: scilicet PARTIS OMISSIONE, nempe quum genus vel differentiam specificam omittimus. E. g. ab hac definitio ne: Invidia est taedium ob alterius felicita tem, omitte genus, et habebitur axioma: Invidia respicit felicitatem alterius: omitte differentiam, eritque aliud axioma: Invidia est taedium 2. INVERSIONE, si definitio in definiti locum substituatur. E. g. Qui er alterius felicitate taedium percipit est invi. dus 3. CONVERSIONE, si aientes pro positiones in negantes convertamus E. g. Qui ex alterius felicitate non percipit taedium, -non esi invidus; vel eum, qui non est in vidus, alterius feliciiaiis non taedet. Postu lata eadein ratione conficiuntur, si nempe modus exprimatur, quo quid fieri potest: sed ea melius ex realibus, quam ex nomi nalibus definitionibus deducuntur. Sic ex ea dem definitione habebis postulatum: Invidia excitatur, si invido alterius felicitas reprae sentetur. 172. Praestructis ita principiis, opor tet il. ut ex eorum collatione THEO REMATA, vel PROBLEMATA compo nantur, j 12. et unde consequentiae im mediatae sese offerunt, COROLLARIA deducantur, vel 13. ubi maiori explicatio ni locus erit SCHOLIA subiungantur. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 213 Est enim Theorema propositio theoretica de monstabililis, demonstratio autem ex principiorum collatione conficitur, ut videre est in superioribus Cap 3. Sect. 2. et Cap. 4. Hoc modo ex principiis (§. 171. * confectis erui poterit theorema: Invidia oritur ab odio, et similia. Pari mo do quia Problema est propositio practica, eius solutio et demonstratio ex eorumdem principiorum collatione petitur. Ita ex eisdem principiis orietur problema: Juvidiam in altero excitare; cuius solutio haec erit Invidia ex odio nascitur. Fac er go ut is, in quo invidiam excitare vis, ala terum odio prosequatur, cuius inde felicita tem ei ostende: ex ea namque taedium per cipiet, adeoque in eo invidia excitabitur. Corrollaria vero tam ex indemonstrabilibus, quam ex demonstrabilibus enunciationibus des duci possunt. Sic ex superioribus axiomatis varia oriuntur corollaria, veluti ergo qui tae dii non est capax, invidus esse non potest: item ex postulato: ergo ubi non adest feli citatis repraesentatio, locum non habet invi dia ex secundo item theoremate ergo qui alterum amat, ei non invidet; atque ita porro. 173. Haec omnia vero praecepta, ut aemoriae infingantur, brevissimis ample temur regulis, quas, qui sequuntur, shibent 214 Logica Pars II. CANONES. ANicquam meditationem instituas, ipsam quantum natura ipsa fert, exa cte dividito. 2. Ex definitionibus axiomata, item postulata deducito, atque ab his per im mediatas consequutiones corollaria con ficito. 3. Plura principia vel antecedentes propositiones mutuo conferto, et sic theoremata vel problemata efformabis, ex quibus, quae haberi poterunt, erues consectaria. 4. Propositiones - inventas bona me thodo legitimoque nexu comparato, et id agito, ut omnia per demonstratio nes apte cohaereant. 1 * Ita novae orientur veritates, novaque semper ratiocinia fluent. Perinde ' vero est, qua met hodo ratiociniorum series in ordinem rediga tur, modo regulae alias ($. 141. ) propositae rite observeutur. Scol. Sint haee satis de meditatione, ei usque legibus, quae numerosias protra here non fert instituti compendium. Qui Cap. YI. Da Veritatis Inquisitione. 115. vero longius et distinctius meditandi re gulas vellet addiscere, ei Baumeisteri dis sertatio de arte meditandi attente legen da foret, eaque in syccuin et sanguinem vertenda. Interim ad auditorum nostrorum instructionem hic brevem subiicere praxin censuimus, quo facilius artem hanc per discere possint. Qua de re eruditissimiVic ri exemplopi addncemus pulcherrimum. Si quis AMICI characteres sit exploratu. rus, absque librornm auxilio, sequentem instituens meditationen, haec habibit. §. I. Ex casuum sin vularium observa tione g. 124. seq. ) critor Amici DEFI TIO: Amicus est persona, quae nos amat, f. II. Ad definitionis porro notas atten dens quisque videt, notionem amoris de. finitione indigere. Eodem igitur modo. hacc noya definitio eraalur. Sic. amare alierum nihil aliud significat, quam ex alterius felicitatc volup'atem percipere. 6. JIÍ. Ex his definitionibus eo, quo diximus, artificio axiomata de dacantur. Et quidem ex prima definitione (1. ) fiunt AXIOMATA. 1. Amicus al terum amat. 2. Qui alterum non amat non est amicus.3.Quicumque obligatur ad ali un amandum, ad amicitiam ei praestan 116 Logica Pars 11. dam obligantur.4. Vbi nullus amor, ibi nulla omicitia. 5. Quamdiu durat amor, tamdiu durat amicitia. 6. Qui efficit, ut ab alio ametur, eum sibi red dit amicum. Quidquid amorem in altero excitat amicitiam foret. 8. Quid quid amorem impedit, amicitiam tollit. Ex amoris defimtione ori untur sequentia. 1. Qui alinm amat, ex illius felicitate deleciatur. 2. Quicumque obligatur ad volupiatem ex aiterius fe licitate capiendan, obligatur ad alte rum amandum. 3. Qui iubet, ut volup tatem ex a terius felicitate capiamus, alterum, iubet, ! ť umemus. 4. Quid quid promovet voluptatem, ex alterius felicitate capiendain, promovet amo rem. 5. Qui illum impedit, hunc sis tit. V. Collatis inter se duabus illis de. finitionibus, nascitur. THEOREMA. Amicus alterius feli. citate delectatur. DEMONSTRATIO. Qui alterum a. mat, alterius felicitate delectatur (s. 1. ): amicus alteruu amat (§. III. cud 1. ); ergo amicus alte rius felicitaie delectatur. 5. VI. Ex quo inmediata consequutico ne cequentia fluunt, IV. AX Cop. IV. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 217 COROLLARIA. 1. Anicus ergo ex amatae personaefelicitate nullo taedio afficitur. 2. Sed potius ex eius infeli citate taedium sentit. S. VII. In quibus, quum taedii facta sit mentio, perapte addi potest. SCHOLION. Est autem invidus, qui, ex alterius felicitate taedium percipit misericors vero, quem alterius infelici. tatis taedet. $. VIII. Hinc ergo habentur THEOREMA I. Amicus non est in vidus. DEMONSTR. Invidus enim est, qili ob'alterius felicitatem taedio adficitur (S. VII. ): Quod quum in amico non reperiatur: amicus " go non est invidus. THEOREMA. Amicus est mise ' icors. DEMONSTR. Taedium enim percipit x personae amatae infelicitate ) $. II. or. 2: ): quod quum dicatur coinmise atio (5. VII. ): amicus ergo commi eratione tangitur erga personum ama zm. §. IX. Nova rursus inde sequenlur COROLLARIA. 1. Invidus ergo non si bonus amicus. 2. Qui ergo nescit Tom. 1. 218 Logica Pars. Ij. > novae r'e commiserari alterius vices, eumque ab infelicitate, dum potest, non vult eri pere, non se dicat amicum. 6. X. Si meditatio continuetur inde sequentur veritates. Et quidem defi niendo rursus notas voluptatis et felicita tis, maxima enunciationum seges adpare bit. Sint ergo. DEFINITIONES. Voluptas sive delectatio est sensus perfectionis. 2. For licitas est status durabilis gaudii.. XI. Ex quarum prima oriuntur AXIOMAT'A. 1. Delectutio ex aliqua supponit eius bonitatem ac per feciionem, earumque repraesentationem. 2. Quicumque obligatur ad sensum per fectionis in altero promovendum, obli gatur. ad voluptatem in eo excitandum. 3. Oui - iubet primum, praecipit secun dum. §. XII. Ex altera vero fluunt sequentia AXI. 1. Qui alterius felicitate dele ctatur, ex eius statu durabilis gaudii voluptatem capit. 2. Qui alterius statum durabilis gaudii promovet, eius felici tatem promovet. 3. Qui illud iubet, hoc quoque iubet. 4 Quicumque obligatur ad primum, obligatur ad secundum. 1. XIII. Conferantur definitiones cum antecedentibus, indeque nasceutur. Cap. VI. De Veritatis Inquisitione. THEOREMA I. Amicus alterius feli citatem sibi, tamquam bonum, reprae sentat. DEMONSTR. Alterius enim felicita te delectatur ($. V. ): quod quum fie ri nequeat, nisi illam sibi, iamquam bonum, repravsentet. Ergo amicus alterius felicitatem sibi tamquam bonum, repraesentat. THEOREMA II. Amicus delectatur alterius statu durabilis gaudii. DEMONSTR. Quum enim ex alterius felicitate delectetur; felicitas vero sit status durabilis gaudii (S. X. def. 2. ): ex hoc patet, amicum, quo que va luptatem percipere, THEOREMA. Amicus alterius gauuium durabile sibi, tamquam bonum repraesentat. DEMONSTR. Eius namque statu de lectatur (per theor. 2. ), quod fieri non potest, nisi id, tamquam bonum, sibi repraesentet. Ergo amicus alterius gaudiun durabile si bi, tamquambonum, repraesentat. §. XIV. SCHOLION. His praemissio succurrit lex appetitus, qua anima id, quod sibi, tamquam bonum repraesen tal, adpetit, et promovere studet. Plurimae hinc propositiones de duci poterunt. Et quidem THEOREMA. Amicus alterius felici tatem, idest gaudium durabile, adpe tit, et promovere studet. DEMONSTR. Omne, quod nobis, tamqnam bonum, repraesentamus, ad petimus et promovere studemus (XIV. ) amicus sibi alterius felicitatem statum que durabilis gaudii, tamquam bonum, repraeseníat: er go ea omnia adpeiit; et promovere stil det. *. XVI. Ex quo, sponte manant, COROLLARIA. Ergo amicus om nia cavet, quae alterum taedio affi ciunt 2. nec ullam omittit occasionem quai personae amatae iucunditatem et voluptatem promovere possit. S. XVII. Durabilis gaudii porro notio nem evolvendo occurret. DEFINITIO. Durabile gaudium est voluptas eminentior ex possessione ve iarum perfectionum grta. 9. XVI. Ex qua ultro sese off -rt. AXIOMA. Qui alterius gaudium du rabile promovet, eius quoque proinovet perfectiones. Atque inde exurget novum THEOREMA. Amicus alterius per fectiones promovet. DEMONSTR. Eius enim gaudium durabile promovet ($. XV. ), quod idem est ac promovere eius perfections.  F. XX. SCHOL. Est autem legis Natu rae iussum: Tuas aliorumque promove to perfectiones. S. XXI. Jude ergo oriuntur. COROLLARIA. 1. Amicus ergo legem Naturae observat 2. Nos ergo obligati sumus ad amicitiam colendam, 3. Adeoque,qui homines sibi reddit ini. micos Naturae legem violat. 4. Vo. luntati ergo Divinae: conveniens est, ut aliis simils amici. etc. Haec brevi meditatione compertae sunt veritates, Quod si modilatio aliquamdiu proferretur, dici non potest, quot novae propositiones exurgerent. Huic autem exer citationi si adolescentes adsueverint, aut nostra nos fallit opivio, aut sine multa lectione, brevi tempore, minimoque la bore Philosophi acutissimi evadent. K 3 2? 222 Logica Pars IT S E C T I O. II. De librorum lectione. Q" non 174 Vum intellectus noster arctis simis sit limitibus circumscrip tus, atque adeo veritatibus omnibus pro pria meditatione eruendis incapax:facile est and intelligendnm, cur aliorum scripta le genda sint, ut quae proprio marte possumus, ab alis detecta inueniamus. Sed quia non omnia ab omnibus adcurate scri pta, plerique etiam intellectus voluntatis vitio laborant, ideoque errare possunt: cautio quaedam adhibenda est in legendis eorum libris, ac proinde Lo gicae interest praecepta tradere, quibns in jis ad examen revocandis, dijudicandisqne veritatibus ab aliis inventis aut exaratis mens dirigatur: id quod in praesenti se ctione docendum. 175. LIBER est aut HISTORICVS, aut ŚCIENTIFICVS.Ille, in quo facta, seu enunciationes singulares; hic, in quo pro positiones universales et dogmata traduntor.* * Hac librorum divisione nulla alia exactior. Quorum eum librorum habemus notitiam, Cap. VI. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 223 nihil, nisi duorum, quae enunciavimus, ar gumentorum alterutrum esse potest obiectum Patet ergo ratio, cur libros omnes in histo ricos, et didacticos sive scientificos distri buerimus. 176. HISTORIA, quum sit rerum quae acciderunt fidelis narratio (S. 147. ), facta vero vel Naturae opera, vel Societatem vel fidelium communionem nempe Eccle siam, vel deniqne litterariam Rempublicain spectent, esse potest NATVRALIS, ClVILIS, ECCLESIASTICA, vel LITTERARIA. * Rursus quoniam omnium, aut quo rumdam, vel alicuius ex quatuor illis, fa cta refert, dividitnr in UNIVERSALEM, PARTICULAREM, et SINGULAREM. Jarum prima Naturae opera enumerat, altera hominum vices et facta commemorat, iertia Ecclesiae vicissitudines et annalia narrat, po strema vel disciplinarum et librorum, vel eru ditorum vitas et fata omnia refert. ** Historia Naturalis ergo erit VNIVERSA LIS, si omnia in ea Naturae opera eno dentur; PARTICVLARIS si alicuius tantum classis, veluti ex Regno vegetabili, fossili, ani mali etc. SINGVLARIS si alicuius tantummo do plantae, lapidis, metalli, aut viventis inventio, usus, incrementum etc, narrentur. K 4 224 Logica Pars II. civili, ecclesiastica, et litteraria, de quibus plura coram 177. Quia libri vel scripta ideo. legun tur ut veritates ab aliis inventae et dete ctae discántur (5. 274. ); ea vero verbis referta sunt, ut auctoris sensus intelliga. tur (§. 160. ), idest eaedem ideae ver bis adsignentur, quas Auctor cum iis con iunxit (S. eod. ): per se patet genera lis in legendo servandus. CΑΝΟΝ. IMN legendis, aliorum scriptis curato, uit easdem notiones cum verbis con iungas, quas Auctor voluit iisdem adfigi. 178. Ex quo legitima consequutione na scitur i. in cuiuscumque libri lectione at tendendum esse ad definitiones, quibus sin gularum significatio determinatur, vel and conceptum ab usu loquendi tributum 11s, quae sine definitione adsumuntur. Et quia claras ideas ac distinctas adquirere si ne attentione non possumus (9. 19. ): se quitur 2. ut ad id potissimum requiratur attentio, crebriorque repetitio, in libris praecipue historicis ut facta facilius me inoriae mandentur. * 9 Cap. VI. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 225 * Vide quae de attentione ac repetitione dixi mus in Part. I. cap. 1. Seol. can. ult. 179. Et quoniam in historia tria potis simum spectantur, nempe veritas, ordo ac finis, facile patet 3. in libris histori cis legendis attendi debere ' ad rerum sive factorum veritatem, ad eorum ordinem et legitimam seriem et ad finem an sci licet liber Auctoris scopo respondeat. > * Pro diiudicanda rerum VERITATE, bislo ricae probabilitatis regulae traditae sunt($.152. seqq. ). ORDO vero tuin in locorum, tuna in temporis circumstantiis consistit. Eius ergo legiiimitatem quoad loca suppeditat GEO GRAPHIA, circa teinporis autem seriem CHRONOLOGIA. FINIS demum ex üsdem scriptis abunde patebit, adeoque, an ei res pondeant, ex eorum lectione diiudicari pote rit Historiae nituralis finis est obiecta rario ra adcurate describere, phaenomeni alicuius cuncta notatıı digna, partiunqne nexum di stincte exponere; Civilis est politices civilis que prudentiae regulas exemplis et factis con firmare; Ecclesiasticae scopus est, statum Ecciesiae, incrementin, in file costantiain, in profligandis erroribus - prudentiam Su premi item Numinis, in ea conservanda au gondaque Providentiam, 2 gelis, ostendere; Litteraria? tandeſ, inveniendi arlena, quam EVRISTICAM vocant, aptis aliaque id K 5 226 Logica Pars II: subsidiis, et veritatum a veteribus invenla rum cognitione perficere. Cognito itaque libri scopo, restat ut attente legatur (S. 178. ) statimque innotescet, utrum suo fini respon deat. 1 180. De librorum scientificorum lectio ne sat erit, si pauca degustemus. Quo niam in scriptis didacticis methodus reqni rit, ut nullus adsumatur terminus, nisi notionem habeat sibi adiunctam, atque ut ea praemittantur, per quae sequentia in telliguntur: consequens est 4. ut in iis legendis singulae veritates prius in classes dispescantur, ibique videatur utrum ad principia an ad propositiones iu de deductis pertincant; deinde 5. ad sin gulas voces et notiones jis ab Auctore ad fixas attendatur; (ac deni que 6. ut legens veritates antecedentes si bi reddat familiares, nedum demonstratio nes in syllogismos resolvat, in quibus vi. deat, si quid doli contineatur. 181. In scriptorum porro didacticorum examine ad eorum dotes potissimum respi ciendum, de quibus sequenti capite age. mus. Id unum porro meminisse juvabit; ad illorum examen conficiendum requiri absolụtam et continuatam libri lectionem, Cap. VII. De l'erit. comm. 227 attenta mque veritatum earumque nexus con templationem: * quae omnia si desint, le ctio dicetur SUPERFICIARIA. * Ad id ergo ineptissimi videntur scioli quidam in sola romanensiiim fabellarum lectione ver sati, qui in dijudicandis per tabernas comoe diis scurrilibus, aut ephemeridibus omnia studia sua contulerunt; vel adolescentuli vo culis tantum, phrasibusque meinoriae infi gendis adsueti, qui vix e paedagogorum fe rula manum subduxerunt: " Requiritur autem laboris patientia, attentio, mens methodo ac meditationi adsuefacta, non vero in expen ex. dendis rerum corticibus solo sensuum et phan tasiae ductu exercita. OVampdoquidem a Platone * monitum non praeclare, non est no bis solum nati sumus, adeoque nec nobis sed aliorum commoda pro movere debemus: veritates a nobis dete ctas, vel quae ab aliis inven tae nobis ope lectionis innotuerunt, aliis proponere Natura obligamur. Qui vero verbis alium ad ignotarum veri talum cognitionem perducit, is eum Do 5 K 6 228 Logica Pars. Ir. CERE dicitur adeoque DOCTOR CO gnominatur. 7 * Ip Ep. ad Archytam Tarentium. Vid. Cic. de Fin. Lib. II. cap. 14. ** Latius hic patet docendi vocabulum, qu am a Cicerone de Offic. Prooem. usurpatur. Id ve ro ex definitione admodum completa prono, ut aiunt, alveo fluit. Ceterum in hoc usum loquendi sequuti sumus: vulgari namque ser mone tritum est, Magistrorum alios esse vi VOS, alios mortuos, qui Scriptorum vel Auctorum nomine distinguuntur, ita ut libros melonymicę magistros mortuos vulgo appel lent. 183. Et quoniam verba vel voce profe runtur, vel scripto exaranțur (S. 42. ): patet, duplicem esse docendi modum, vo ce scilicet, atque scriptis; adeoque MA GISTRUM dici debere, tam eum qui li þros in lucem edit, quam cum qui in A cademiis iuventutem instruit. Speciatim autem in sequentibus eum, qui scripta didactica (de quibus hic tantum ser mo est ) conficit, SCRIPTOREM vel AU. CTOREM; eum vero, qui adolescentes ro ce docet DOCENTEM, DOCTOREM, MAGISTRVM dicemus: idque ad evitan dam confusionem, atque inutilem verborum repetitionem. Sed quia doctrinam hanc in dus as dividere instituimus sectiones, nt de utri Cap. VII. De Verit. commun. 229 se esse usque virtutibus ac vitiis aliqua dicere posse mus: nunc, quae utrique communia sunt, dispiciemus. Ad calcem denique capitis quae dam de discentium dotibus ae naevis com pendii loco addemus. 184. Quia vero docents est, alios ad ignotaruin veritatum cognitiovem prducere; cognitio avlein debet certa et distincta eaque vel a posteriori vel a priori: consegucas esi 1. ut lectores vel auditores de veritatibus certi reddendi sint, adeoque 2, indiciis sufficientibus at que inf.l.bilibus ad veritatis cognitionem adducendi ($. 1: 4. ). quod ut fiat, 0 portet 5. ut docens ab iis intelligatur, ideoque 4. sit perspicuus, ad quod requiritur 5. ut artein, in qua versatur, distincte intelligat * ($. 24 ) 6. bonam methodum rigide servet (. 138. seqq. ), 7. et si quid implicatum confu suinque occurrat, distincte explicet. > * Criterium enim notionis distinctae est, si cum aliis eam possimus per verba communi Care: nisi ergo distincta artis suae docens cognitione gaudeat, fieri non potest, ut eius praecepta perspicue aliis proponere queat. CONVICTIO est actio, qua al terum de veritate certum reddimus. Quod quum fiat demoustrationis ope (. 133. ) quisque videt, convictionem sola demon stratione absolvi. * Ex quo liquet 8. do centem alios de veritate, quam docet, debere convincere, ** ac proinde 9. pro babilibus argumentis uti ei non licere: *** nisi res talis sit, ut sola probabilita te cognosci possit. * Quoniam ergo convictio demonstratione ab solvitur demonstratio vero est vel directa vel indirecta, vel a priori vel a poste riori: non abs re convictioni ea dem nomina, prout veritates demonstrantur, a Philosophis tributa sunt. ** Vt vero rationis pondus in convincendo ani mum sese insinuet, oportet, ut iHe sit atten tus, in demonstrationibus versatus, et talis; qui rationum momenta perpendere possit. Quapropter solidis demonstrationibus, non conviciis, irrisionibus, dictisque iniuriam in ferentibus ad veritatem est trahendus. Convi cia nanque odium iramque pariunt, et atten tionem turbant. *** Dici haec solet PERSUASIO, quae quum sit rationibus insufficientibus innixa, convi ctio dici nequit, quippe quae a convictione longe multumque distat. " Hinc vides, convictio sit Philosophcrum propria, perсиг Cap. VII. De Verit. commun. 231 suasio vero Oratorum, qui in investigatione verosimilium argumentorum versantur, quan tum sufficiat ad caussam probabilem redden dam, de quo conferendus est Cicero de In vent. cap. * 186. SOLIDITAS est completa artis, quam profitemur, methodique cognitio, Hinc ergo patet 10 maximam et praeci puam doceotium dotem esse soliditatem, adeoque 11. litteratos superficiarios es se ad scribendum aeque, ac docendum ineptos. * Vitium vero soliditati oppositum in speciali bus tractationibus infra explicabimus. Ad eas itaque progrediamur, SECTIO I. De Librorum dotibus. IBER, in quo veritates continen tur, SCIENTIFICVS dicitur, alio nomine SCRIPTUM DIDACTICVM. Eius dotes sunt SOLIDITAS, PERSPICVITAS, METHODVS, et SVFFICIENTIA. SOLIDITAS consistit in principio rum firmitate, ac deinonstrationum stabi 232 Logica Pars II. bilate. Solidus ergo dicitur liber 1. si eius dim principia certa fuerint atque indubia ($. 150. ), 3. si propositiones singulae rig de sini demonstratae, si bona me thodus in demonstrando adbibita  pec in demonstrando cir culus irrepserit. Si vero bonae methodi leges fuerint negle ctae, tunc liber SVPERFICIARVS dice tur. Huiusmodi vero libris Rempublicam ca rere litterariam, foret maguopere optandum. 189. PERSPICVITAS in verborum pro prietate, iustaque eorum cum ideis pro portione sita est. Verborum PROPRIETAS es'git, ut voces omnis secundum usum loquendi fixo sign ficatu adbibeantur, adcuratisque definitionibus deter spineniar. Iusta verborum cum ideis PROFORTIÓ requirit, ut liber non sit prolixior, nec brevior, quam scopo SIO conveniat. * Quemadmodum enim prolixitas verborum mul titudine mentem obruit: ita et nimia brevi tas Auctoris sensum occultat, adeoque am bae oliscuritatem pariunt, scilicet vitium per spicuitati oppositum Vid. Heinec. Fundam. Stili culiior. Part. S. cap. 2 §. 50. Cap. VII.De Verit. comm un. nexu 190. METHODVS in eo est ut veri tates ex veritatibus et principiata, ut aiunt, ex principiis legitimo et continuo sint deducta, nihilque confusionis vel perturbationis inveniatur; denique si ea praecesserint, per quae sequentia intel. ligi possunt. SVFFICIENTIA tandem id exigit, ut liber sit COMPLETVS, idest veritates et propositiones exhibeat Auctoris fin i suf ficientes: qui namque finem non ahso lvit, INCOMPLETVS adpellatur. * Longum valde foret, si sufficientiae particu lares characteres, hoc est fines lot tantorum que librorum percurrere vellemus. Sufficiat tamen generales eiusdem notas evolvisse: id enim ex attenta cuinsque libri lectione quisque poterit diiudicare. 192. SYSTEVIA est congeries verita tum inter se connexurum, et a prin cipiis suis legitime deductarum. Et quia id quatuor, quas recensuimus, dotibus absolvitur: hinc est, ut Logici dicant, librum quemcumque scien titicum systematice scribi oportere. * Non omnes tamen qui libros scribunt systema conficere possunt; sed ii tantum qui veritates a se detectas, et ad eumdem 234 Logica Pars IT. > scopum tendentes in libros referunt. Eorum autem, qui alienis laboribus insudant, alii sunt COMPILATORES, qui aliorum opera hinc inde dispersa colligunt, atque in lucem edunt, mulla ordinis habita ratione; E PITOMATORES qui brevius aliorum scripta prolixiora componunt. Et hi qui dem reprehensionem numquam, quandoque vero laudem (illi praecipue ) ab eruditorum universitate reportant. Sunt vero quidam, qui aliorum scripta suffurantes ea typis man dant, impudentique fronte suo nomine inscrie bunt, iique PLAGIARII nuncupantur. De his autem quidnam dicendum, sit, omnes no runt. SECTIO II. De Doctorum virtutibus et vitis. DOCTO OCTOR appellatur, qui alios voce ad rerum ignotarum co gnitionem perducit, vcos de veritatibus, qnas tradit, certos reddit, atque convincit. Eius virtutes partim ab inte !lectu, par tim a natura, partim a voluntate penden tes, sunt quatuor: ab intellectu SOLIDITAS, et in doendo PRUDENTIA; a na tura DOCENDI DONUM; a volnntate ve ro AMOR. De singulis pauca disquiremus. Cap. VII. De Verit. Commun. Ex doctoris definitione sequitur 1. ut generales docentis characte res possidere debeat is, qui doctoris munere fungi vult; adeoque 2. prima et praecipua eius virtus sit SOLIDITAS qua fit 3. ut res abstractas et intellectu difficiles exemplis illustret, at que propositionum omnium sive a se, si ve ab aliis enunciataruin analysin instituat. Nisi enim exemplis ac similitudinibus res dif ficiles illustrentur, aegre ab auditoribus au dietur, quibus abstrahendi ars vel ignota prorsus est, vel laboriosa: adeoque taedium concipientes attentione carebunt nihilque intelligentes doctorem fine suo frustrabunt. 195. Quia vero doctor auditores suos de veritate cerlos reddere debet (S. 184. ); ad certitudinem autem ducit demonstratio: consequens est 5. nt scientia praeditus, verborum facilitate in fructus ct ad rationem de omnibus red dendain promlus esse debeat. Et quia au ditores convincendi sunt, et ad hoc in eis attentio requiritur: patet 6. Doctorem DOCENDI DONO in. signitum esse debere, idest dicendi promti tudine et suavitate, quo deficiente, ad proprium munus obeundum ineptus erit. 236 Logica Pars II. parvum in eo 9 a do * Vt enim auditor sit attentus, cavere debet qui eum docet, ne taedio, eum adficiat. Tae dium autem haud excita bit, si verborum inopia, dicendi infelici tate, animique imbecillitate laboret. Eo nam que casu non modo attentionem minuet sed et illius ludibrio se exponet. Qui ergo se huiusmodi suavitate ac promtitudine senserit destitutum, ei auctores fuerimus, ut cendi munere se abstineat, si operae preti um perdere nolit. 196. Quoniam autem non eadein omni bus est adolescentibus perspicacia, que non tam voce, quam exemplo erudiuntur: liquido infertur 7. ut doctor facoltate gau deat doctrinas ad discentium captum ge niumgne adcommodandi. ac media ad fi nem rite disponendi, nec non 8. in ex sequendis praeceptis auditores manuducat, seque iis pracheat antecessorem: praecipue veio 9. si in moralibus vitaque civili ver setur institutic, animum ipse prius ad vir tutem instruat, ut ad hoc vivum exemplar omnes conformari studeant. * Et hoc est, quod dici soiet PRVDENTIA INDOCENDO. * Si namque docentis actiones a praeceptis dis crepent, nequicquam laborum suorum fru ctum exspectabit, et adolescentes exemplum potius malum, quam bonam vocem sequuti Cap. VII. De verit. commun. 237 nihil, praeter praeceptoris imitationem, prae se ferent: quum bene monuerit Iuvenalis: Omnes duciles sumus pravis ac turpibus imi tandis suos.Postrema doctoris virtus eaque magni momenti, est AMOR erga Quum enim in erudiendis pueris aut ado lescentibus permulta opus sit fidelitate inserviendi promtitudine, patientia patientia, et labore haec auien omma nisi ab iis, qui nos amant, sperare non possumus: recte infertur 10. doctorem sincero audi tores suos amore prosequi; adeoque 11. et studio; 7 commoda promoveadi adfcctum esse debere. eorum * Quam necessaria sit haec in doctore virtus, ex sequentibus alimde patebii. Si namque amor deficiat, et studium deerit disceniium utilitati inserviendi: ac proinde pro doctore exsurget mercenarius vel utilitati, vel existi mationi propriae consulens; et tanc nec morun ratio umquam habebitur, et omnes lucri fa cendi artes promovebuntur. Si haec omnia ponantor, habebimns magistrum, vel leo poribus inservientem, in muneris exercitio ne gligentem, timidum, sui dumtaxat studio abreptum, et ad vilissima quaeqne facilem; vel inaccessibilem, clatum, ' omnia sibi per mitientem, quandoque etiam garrulum, ét e cathedra, tamquam e suggestu, aliorum no mina lacerantem, quo tutius possit de suis virtutibus declamare. 198. Si virtutum quas recensuimus opposita evolvautur, illico doctorum vi tia ad parebunt, quae breviter enumera bimus. Eorum primum et praecipuum est IMPERITIA, idest artis methodique-igno. ratio. Huius effectus sunt 1. obscuritas, qua fit, ut talis doctor terminis inanibus, vagis obscuris, nec recte definitis sit con tentus, resque difficiles exemplis illustrare nequeat: 2. confusio quae methodi negli gentiam, analyseos ignorantiam, ac con vincendi impoientiam parit: 3. docendi ineptitudo; quum enim ars ignoratur et methodus, deficit prompitudo et suavitas, quibus ducendi donum absolvitur * (S. 95.): 4. molesta prolixilas, aut obscurabre vitas; ignorata namque arte vocabula quoque technica ignorantur, quo fit, ut vel inanibus circumloquutionibus, vel paucis et insufficientibus rei explicandae verbis uta tur: 5. superfluorum tractatio et necessa riorum omissio, quam veram ignorantiae causam esse ait Sencea (S. 103. * ): 6. ser monis barbarics, cui proxima est obscuri. tas et taediuin, adeoque ad minuendam ten dit attentionem. Non desunt equidem, qui naturali quodam suavitatis defectu laborantes nec genio, nec captui auditorum se accommodare sciunt, li cet doctissimi sint et omnimoda, eruditione praediti. Naturalis autem haec imbecillitas non inter vitia sed inter defectus est referen da, adeoque imperitia dici neqnit. Quamvis enim huiusmodi doctoribus lepor desit: me diorum tamen excogitatio aliaqne pruden tiae subsidia praesto sunt. Ineptitudinis ergo caussa non alia adsignari debet, quam impe ritia, scilicet soliditatis absentia. > 199. Alterum doctoris vitium a primo oilum ducens est IMPRVDENTIA in docendo, quae in caussa est, ut auditorum Caplui genioque se adcommodare, atque media ad finem ducentia excogitare, ac proinde animis morbo aliquo laborantibus mederi nesciat. Quae enim prudentia in imperito? Imprudentiae quoque debetur illa paedagogo rum imbecillitas, qua inter se invicem de futilibus inoptisque rebus decertantes, vel aliis invidentes discentium animos adversus aemulos stimulanti. et ad pueriles irrisiones dicacitatesque concitant: quo fit, ut ipsi in spretum et abietionem incidant, adolescentes contra pessimos, audaces, ridiculosque mo res induant. 240 Logica Pars II. 200. Ad voluntatis vitia, quae amorem excludunt, referuntur: AMBITIO, si ve nimia gloriae laudisque cupiditas, qua fit, ut vana eruditionis, autº eloquentiae ostentatione, nimioque sermonis fuco di sciplinarum praecepta non explicentur, sed implicentur, propriaeque existimationi potius, quam discentium utilitati doctores consulant. - 3. AVARITIA, quae omnia trabit commodum efficitque, ut sola sit utilitas iusti prope mater et aequi: VOLVPTATIS CONSECTATIO, quae ignaviam, laboris im pa tientiam oilierique neglectum parit, atque soliditatis defecium arguit, quum bene monterit Genuensis.noster: difficile esse reperire hominem vere doctum simul autem et mollem, ad suum > * * * * Inde quoque fluxit Cynicus iile mos, et ef fraenis alios lacerandi consuetndo, quae in caussa fuit, ut de quorumdam adolescentum petnlantia ad satyras proclivium emunctae nae ris homines conquesti · gint: videbant enim pravam consuetudinen a pessimo doctorum exemplo vatan in naturam paullatim ac cor ruptionem abituran Ex codem tandem fons te manat ctiam illa docentium praesumtio, qui, ne discipulus supra magistrum esse vie deatur, vel aliquot sublimiores doctrinas sla Cap. VII. De verit: commun. 241 bi solis reservant, vel sublimia auditornm in genia deprimunt ac despiciunt. Praeterquam quod ambitio in doctoribus novitatis amorem gignit, eosque opinionum singularium et ab surdarum, saepe etiam impietatis studiosos efficit: id quod maximo adolescentihus detri mento est, praecipue quum auctoritatis prae indicium altius in iis radices agat. Vid Hei nec. Ethic. l. 77. ** Quando quis avaritiae studet, non aliorum, sed sua tantum commoda promovet, idque per fas an nefas, nihil sua referre videtur. Hinc auditorum quosdam opibus pellantes, vel praeceptorum gratiam muneribus ementes reliquis praeferunt, eos seorsum instruunt, ac speciali cura in aliquibns reconditis rebus erudiunt, eaque praedilectione prosequuntur, ut se aliorum odio, invidiae vero illos expo nant, adeoque nihil neque hi pro. ficiant. *** Art. Logicocritic. Lib. I. cap. Voluptati nanque dediti plerumque sunt ignavi, desides, et laboris impatientes; atque inde fit, ut non satis praeparati ad doces dum accedcntes in lycaeo quidquid in buccain vererit effutiant, et quia ex abundantia cor dis, ut Servator ait, os loquitur, bonos persaepe mores verbis factisme corrumpant. Delicatuli isti suat etiam meticulosi, adeoque veritatem, quam alias intrepido vultu, si ri te munere suo fungi vellent, dicere debe ne aliorum indignationen incurruni Tom. I. L neque illi reni, ) 242 Logica Pars II. aut dissimulant, aut tegunt, aut (quod val de dolendum ) foede corrumpunt. Praeterea in huiusmodi hominibus ridicula quaedam et thrasonica reperitur ambitio, scilicet paedan tismus', quo furentes nusquam, nisi de suis rebus gestis plurima exaggeranti, auditorum, que risui se exponunt. 201 • Superest, ut doctrinae usum do etorumque officia exponamus, ut si qui munus hoc inire cupiunt, bene incipere, feliciusque prosequi possini. Quicunque cr go ad istruendam iuventutem animum ad. pellis, hos diligenter observato: CANON ES. Avditores eligito perspicaces, mui toque supientiae umore Nagrantes. Eo rum porro attentionem excitato sae pius, ac vitia, quibus eos laborare per cipis, prudenter sensimque corrigito. 2. Doctoris munus, nisi solida artis methodique cognitione imbutus, ne te mere suscipito: idque summa fidelitate, prucuttia, ac sincero erga discentes amore absolvito. 3. Adolescentes in moralibus civili Cap. VII. De Verit. comm. 243 busque disciplinis non tam voce, quam exemplis erudito. Evidentissimum numiz que, teste Augustino, docendi genus est subiectio exemplorum. 4. Religionis amorem, morumque in tegritatem in discentibus foveto, neque te illis familiarem nimis reddito, ne, excusso subiectionis fraeno, doctores parvipendentes nihil proficiant, et ad pessima quaeque praecipites ruant. "De Discentium dotibus ac naevisn's 202, Am de dotibus IAm vitiisque discça tium pauca apperidicis loco ad damus. Eorum est de veritatibus certos reddi; solidache imbui co gnitione, quae non nisi es claris distinctisque oritur notionibus. Ad claras vero ac distinctas ideas adquirendas requiritur attentio et libertas a praeiudiciis: Quidquid ergo attentionem tur bat, vel praeiudicia fovet, ab iis abesse debet. 203. Priina ergo et maxima discentium dos est BONA NENS, DOCILITAS, ATTENTIO sincerus erga stu. dia et docentes AMOR,  LABORIS PATIENTIA et otii fuga, + 6. de. nique ANIMI SOLITUDO. It * Bonae mentis vocabulo intelligimus non mo do naturalem ingenii perspicaciam, cuius de fectus hominem reddit cognitionis incapacem, verum etiam animum bene educatum vcrae que Relligionis amantem: quum Divino oracu lo monituin sit initiuin om nis sapientiae esse timorem Domini.  Hoc est libertas a praeiudiciis,ut supra di clum est, animique inclinatio ad quaecunque praecepta ediscenda, et ad pra xin adplicanda. ID adeo Si namque Doctores et studia amemus, his sedulam navamus operam, illosque atter te auscultamus: si vero amor hinc absit, taedium supervenit., attentio minuitur, que aut parum aut nihil in studiis profie mus. | Laboris enim impatientia ignorantiae cause est, ut dixiinus; quoniam veri tates vel propria meditatioue vel Aucts rum lectione inveniuntur, medtatio vero perinde ac lectio laborem cai gunt, ut ex superioribus abunde constat. De verit. eomm. 245 # Multitudo namque non modo praeiudicio rum fons est sed at tentionem quoque distrahit aut saltem mi nuit: adeoque solum oportet esse, qui sa pientiae sentit amorem. Ex iisdem principiis sponte manant discentium vitia, qualia sunt 1. Religionis spretus, quem conse quitur voluntaria praeiudiciis adhaesio, 2. mentis hebetudo, 3. attentionis distra ctio, 4. otium et laboris impatientia a dolescenlibus familiarissima, 4. aversio a studiis vel doctoribus, 6. denique spe ctaculorum, multitudinis, et sodalita tum amor, quo fit, ut attentio distraha tur ($. 40. Schol. Can. 5. ), et ad voluptatem inde ac perditionem praccipiti Cursu ruant. Schol. Quae de discentium officiis tra lendae forent regulae, eae ab eadem do trina huc usque exposita facile deduci po erunt. Quapropter hic a canonum addi tione con mode abstinemus. De litterario certamine. zv ERTAMINIS LITTERARII no Emine intelligimus quascumque disputationes, quae pro veritatis disquisitione vel diiudicatione instituuntur. Hae disceptationes similiter vel scriptis, vel vo. ce liont: et quidem SCRIPTO, vel alio rum errores confutamus, vel nosmet ab eorum imputationibus defendimus: VOCE autem rationes utrinque conficiuntur, et ad examen revocantur. Si ergo alterius errores scripto detegantur, actio haec dicilnr CONFITATIO; si pro positiones ab alterius impugnatione vindicentur, DEFENSIO, si denique coram disce platio instituatur, propio nomine DISPVTATIO adpellatur. De harum qualibet diversis sectionibus agemus qua alium erroris convincimus. Ex qua definitione patet 1. confutantem de Cdium erroris convincimus. Ex bere falsitatem propositionis, quam alter pro vera asseruit demonstrare, idque a priori vel a posteriori, directe aut apogogice indiciis sufficientibus, hoc est principiis demonstrandi certis ei utendum esse. Etquia eadem propositio non potest esse simul vera et falsa (alias in contradictionem inpingeretur ): evidens est. propositio nem legitime denionstratam confutari non posse, adeoque. eius demonstration, nem esse contrariae confutationem. Antequam vero confutatio instituatur opore tet STATVM QVAESTIONIS conficere, idest verum suctoris sensum intelligere, ut propositionem falsam ex ipsius auctoris men le demonstret. Eo enim ipso vitabitur LOGOMACHIA, qua propositio vera impetitur, cuius veritas, licet ab adversario sit cognita, aliis tamen verbis expriiuiiur et impugnatur, adeoquc insurgit quaestio de verbis. Vid. Weienfelsium de logomachiis eruditorum. Si vero indicia fuerint insufficientia, scilicet principia probabilia et precaria, tunc non con L'utilis, sed IMPVGNATIO dicetur. Impugnari tamen potest, nempe dubiis au dificultatibus quisbusdam subiici, ut eius veritas clarius elucescat, nec ulla remaneat op positi suspicio, id quod infra in Seet. 3. docebimus. Quoniam confutatio ost convictio; haec autein requirit, ut con vincendus sit attentus, nec adfectus in eo attentionem turbantes exciteptur: liquido infertur 5. confutantem ea omnia quae attentionem in altero per turbant, atque adfectus excitant, vitare debere; consequenter 6. a conviciis, ir risionibus, vel consequeniiis periculosis, quae confutandi famam laetlunt, abstinen dum esse. Sunt autem PERICVLOSAE huiusmodi CONSEQVENTIAE, quae non quidem ex genui no Auctoris sensi, sed ex confutantis opi nione eruuntur, quaeque non veritatis de fendendae gratia deducuntur, sed ut adver sarii fama in discrimen vocetur, isque alio rum ludibrio exponatur. Harum porro con sequentiaruin confectores proprio nomine CONSEQVENTIARII vocantur. 208. Qaum ergo consequentiae pericu losae aliorum odium Auctori concilient eique invidiam creent: non abs re a Philosophis argumenta ab invi L4 1 + Cap. ult. de titt. cerlamine. 249 * dia fuerunt appellatae. Ex quo patet ARGUMENTUM AB INVIDIA ductum in confutando sollicite esse vitandum; a deoque 8.non abs re consequentiarios a Wolfio PERSECUTORES cognominari. * Logic. Lat. pag. 752. Idque iure merito. Nam confutator vere dicitur, qui veritatem ab al terius paralogismis vindicare studet. At qui non veritatem, sed adversarii famam perse quitur, nullo inodo confutator dicendus est, sed alterius persecutor, quia id non rationis auxilio, sed invidiae stimulo perficit. Schol. Quoniam itaque in confutante solius veritatis amor exigitur: ut in con futatione nihil vel minimum peccetur, hos qui sequuntur, servare curato. CAN ONE S. I. A, D confutandum solo veritatis a more, non odio adversus alte rum ductus accedito. Adversarium soli dis rationibus non conviciis, dictisve famae nocentibus de errore et falsitate convincito. 2. Si obscuro impropriove stilo ad edəssarius scripsit, ut dictionem corriagat, seque intelligendum praestet, ad wertito. Si quid ab altero in demonstran do peccatum, sive principia falsa sint, sive connexio illegitima, cuncta distincte modesteque patefacito. Demonstrationis rigidus custos principiorum diligens investigator esto, ne tibi ab adversario nota inuratur. E tenim TURPE EST DOCTORI, QUUM CULPA RE DARGUIT IPSUM. DEFENSIO est propositionis ab alterius impugnatione vindi catio. Ex eadem ergo definitione sequitur 1. ut propositio legitime confutata defen din non possit, ut et 2. ad defensionem propositionis sufficiat eius veritatem solide demonstrare, aut 3. si de terminis tan tum quaestio sit, eos adcuratis definitio nibus determinare. Duobus vero modis defensio insti taitur. Vel enim propositionis veritatem ab alterius impugnatione vindicamus, vel Cap. ult. De litt. ccrtumine. 251 impugnantis errores itidem detegimus. Pri mae classis seripla dicuntur APOLOGE TICA; alterius vero POLEMICA vel E RISTICA. * jin, * Horum quidem scriptorum minorem num rum Respublica optaret litteraria. His nam que nec veritas invenitur, nec ratio perfici tur, sed contentiones animique perturbatio nes aluntur, nulla prorsus utilitate, magno autem Societatis, ac iuventutis studiosae malo.? 211. Defendenti ergo, ne a recto. aber ret, Sequentes proponimus., C ANONES. 1. PhoRopositionem a te légitime demon Stratam, aut notionem cum ver bis rite ' conjunctam ab alterius cuiusvis impugnatione ne defendito. Pro të nam que evidentia pugnabito?? 2. Eius, qui te maledictis conviciis que laesit, scriptis modesto respondeto silentio. * la cedendo victor abibis. * Si namque simili stilo, respondeas, nullum operae pretium facies, adversarii petulantiam temeritate lua iustificabis, inque idem vitium incides, quod in alio reprehendis. Quidquid ab altero tibi impugnari sentis, in eo tua versetur defensio. * Si vero argumentis ab invidia periculosis que consequentiis ab aliquo persecutore adfectus fueris, sat est eius malitiam et nocendi studium ostendere teque commiseratione potius, quam ira per citum perhibere. Si ergo deverborum sensu quaestio sit, eum te explicasse sufficiet: si principia impugna tor urgeat eorum certitudinem ostendas oportet: si in demonstrationibus te ar guere velit, earuin legitimam connexiouem prae oculis ponere; si vero aliqua consequen tia absurda tibi impPombaur, aut ipsius conse quentiae veritatem, aut eam ab adversario non recte deductam, demonstrare debebis. Quod si persecutor obscurae famae sit, te tacente veritas ipsa loqietur, tuaque mo destia impudeutem adversarium confusione " obruet. Ad veritatis tandem disquisitionem acMilanius, quae non scripto, sed voce fit, quaeque disputationis no. De litt. certaminemine venit. Est igitur DISPUTATIO -aru ritatis alicuius discussio voce facta. Ea tribus ' personis absolvitur, quarum una propositionem'impugnat, altera eamdem defendit, tertia vero huic suppetias fert. * Adeoque qui veritatem difficultatibus du bisque implicat, OPPONENS; qui vero eaka ab eiusmodi impugnatione vindicat, DEFENDENS, vel RESPONDENS; qui deni que huic aliquid adiumenti adfert, PRAESES aupellatur. Ex qua definitione liquet 1. di-, sputationem esse impugnationem proposi tionis veraen eiusque. defensionem; ideo que 2., utramque demonstratione absol vi, ut disputantium alteruter de veri tate convincatur; quare 3. quidquid ge neratim de convictione dictum, de disputatione etiam intelligatur, prae cipue vero 4. status quaestionis formandus  et 5. oportet, ut lingua loquantur clara et intelligbili, hoc est amboruin captui adcommodata 6. ut u trique nec animus nec lingua deficiat. Su per omnia autem 7 affectibus carcant, odio, praesertim et invidia, Non enim ad rixandum, sed ad disputandum. descendunt. At affectus convicia iniuriasque pariunt, quibus attentio turbatur (S. 207. ): ac proinde a disputantibus louge debent ab esse, ne ira odiove perciti tantum absit ut veritatem inveniant, ut potius.a convicis ad manus transeánt. Ex eadem definitione fluit 8. di sputantes debere in terminis contradicto. riis versari, hoc est ut idein ab uno a d. firmetur, ab altero negetur'. Et quia idem subiectum in contradictione requiritur; eruitur 9. disputantes debere in terminorum notionibus convenire: quapro pter 10 si verborum sensus- lateat, eorum explicationem a respondente peti posse, ut in claris distinctisque rebus incidat contro versia, ct ' sic logomachiae vitentur. Disputatio vel' ACADEMICA est, vel DIALECTICA. Illa continuato ac paene oratorio dicendi genere, haeć syllo gistico more conficitur. In illa opponens disscrtatione quadam propositionis veritatem impugnat, respondens contra eodemstilo obiectiones diluit, ihesiique defendit; in hoc vero syllogisniis aliisque ratiocinandi modis chunciationem opponens inpugnat, ' et ex Cap. ult. De litt. certamine. adverso respondens ratio cinia ad trutinam revocans propositiones veras concedit, falsas negat, dubiasque distinguit, eoque progre diuntur, donec ad principia perveniant.Addi potest methodus disputandi SOCRATI CA, quae Opponentis interrogationibus, et Defendentis responsionibus dialogico stilo ab solvitur. Sed quum ea iam pridem ab usu recesserit: ab eius explicatione merito ab stinemus: in ipsis tamen praelectionibus, quae de ill a dicenda forent, paucis expe diemus. Vides ergo methodum Academicam ad eru ditionis et eloquentiae ostentationem in Aca demiis prae se ferendam unice inventam esse. In disputando autem, quum homini pede stanti in uno ñec eruditio, nec verborum copia praesto esse possit, Dialectica metho dus merito praeterenda, Vtcumque vero disputatio instituatur invabit disputantiirin munera paucis expo nére: id quol sequentibus exequemur re gulis. Et primo quidem amborum, dein de opponentis; postremo respondentis mu nia recensebimus. Quisquis ergo ad dis putandum accedis, hos religiose castodito: Phim Rimum omnium controversiae sta tum conjici ! ). Nihil porro, nisi terminis claris fixisque expressum, in e am incidito. Obscura quaeque explica to. 2. Dispu'ans adfectibus vacuus, veria tatis tantum amans, eiusque invenienda cupidus esto. Cuncta modeste, suaviter, amice proferto. Convicia et dicta mor dacia, velut angiem, fugito. OPPONENTIS hae fere partes sunto. 3. Quacunque meihodo thesin aliquam adoriris, syllogisticam artem cuidi ha beto. Argumentu solida non sophismata ineptasve fallacias, proponito. Conclu sio thesi impugnatae semper e diametro contraria esto 4. Si quid a respondente tibi propo nitur explicandum, explicato: si vero probandum, tamdiu syllogismorum, au xilio probato, donec ad principia per veneris. Ad singula respondentis verba et distinctiones attendito. Si illa obscura sint, illi explicanda dato; si vero clara, Cap. ult. De litt. certamine. 257 novas exceptiones, prout res tulerit, contra formato. Praecipue videto, si ad versarium ex assertis suis convincere et refutare, proprioque, ut aiunt, gladio iu gulare possis Et hoc est, quod vocari solet ARGVMENTVM AD HOMINEM, de quo tamen videa tur lo. Lockius de intell. bum. IV. 17., qui eius insufficientiam in vero inveniendo et de bilitatem ostendit. Nos autem tantum in ex ercitationibus litterariis, quae coram fiunt id commendamus: de veri namque investiga tione fusius supra tractavimuis. RESPONDENS demum id sibi negotii sciat praecipue datum. Argumentum opponentis prius repe tito, deinde sedulo perpendito, num de bila gaudeat soliditate. Praenissarum quae tibi dubiae videbuntur, probatio nem postulato. Syllogismum in forma peccantem totum reiicito. Si haec bene processerit materiam ad examen reyocaio. Propo sitiones falsas negato, veras concedito, dubias vero distinguito: sed de omnibus rationem reddere memento., ne ridiculas, evadas. 258 Logic. Pars. ii. 本 Perridicula ergo est illa Scholasticorum regula: Semper nega, numquam concede raro distingue. Si namque casu neges, duo rum alterum exspectare debebis, vel ut ne gationis caussam adferas, vel ut lucem quo que neges meridianam: utrumque homini sen sibili acerbissimum.. 8. Si oppositae propositionis impossi bilitatem demostrare possis; nihil ultra oneris habebis. Si vero in auctoritate probatio ' versetur: sat erit adversarii te.ctus obscuros claris auctoritatibus re fellere. 9. Caveto, ne propositionem concedas, in qua adversarius struxit insidias: ne cx eius admissione incidas in laqucos. Schol. Ceterum disputandi regulac usu magis ct exercitio, quam praeceptis, ad discuntur '. Si tamen dicendum quod res est, in huiusmodi litterariis contentionibus von soliditas, sed promtitudo, immo ve ro impudentia valet et veritas amittitur potius, quam invenitur: Qua de re vide inus eruditos doctosque viros raro admodum ad disputandum descendere. Legatur Bud seus Obseru. in Plit. instrum. Pur: III. Cup. 3. g. 11. AN OUTLINE OF SEMATOLOGY;  OR, AN ESSAY TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A NEW THEORY OF GRAMMAR, LOGIC, AND RHETORIC. “Perhaps if words were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they  would afibrd us another sort of Logic and Cretic, than what we have been  hitherto acquainted w4th." — Locke.     LONDON :  JOHN RICHARDSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE. G WOODPALL, AHQEh COUBT, •KllfWl* tTRWT, LOWDON. I PUT not my name to these pages, nor shall  I, beyond this notice, speak in the first per-  son singular, but assume the pomp and cir-  cumstance of the editorial "we". Why I  choose for the present to remain unknown, I  leave the reader to settle as his fancy pleases.  He is at liberty to think that, being of no  note or reputation, and fearing for my book  the fate of George Primrose's Paradoxes, I do  not place my name in the title page, because  it would inevitably make that fate more cer-  tain. Or, if he chooses, he may imagine a  better motive. He may suppose me to be  the celebrated author of ***** *, with half  the alphabet in capitals at the end of my  name ; and that I prefer an incogfiito, lest  he, my " cotirteous reader", should relax the  rigour of examination, and receive as true,  on the authority of a name, a theory that  may be false. In the last chapter of Locke's Essay on the  Human Understanding , there is a threefold  division of knowledge into ^uo-t*^, TrpaxriK^,  and trtjfieiaTiK'^. If we might call the whole  body of instruction wliich acquaints ua with  TO. <f>v<TtKa by the name Physicology, and  that which teaches to -irpaKTixa by the name  Practkology, — all instruction for the use of  TO <7?j^aTo, or the signs of our knowledge,  might be called Sematology. Physicology, far more comprehensive than the  sense to wliich Physiology is fixed, would in this case  signify the doctrine of the nature of all things what-  ever which exist independently of the mind's concep-  tion of them, and of the human will ; which things in-  clude all whose nature we grow acquainted with by ex-  perience, and can know in no other way, and therefi>re  include the mind, and God ; since of the mind as well  as of sensible things we know the nature only by ex-  perience, and since, abstracted from Revelation, we  know the existence of a God only by experiencing His  providence, Practicology, the next division, is the  doctrine of human actions determined by the will to s  preconceived end, namely, something beneficial to in-  dividuals, or to communities, or the welfare of the  kJ The signs which the mind makes use of  in order to obtain and to communicate knowledge, are chiefly words; and the proper and  skilful use of words is, in different ways, the  object of, 1. Grammar, of 2. Logic, and of  3. Rhetoric. Our outline of Sematology  will therefore be comprised in three chapters, corresponding with these three divisions.   species at large. As to Sematology, the third division,  it is the doctrine of signs, showing how the mind operates by their means in obtaining the knowledge comprehended in the other divisions. It includes Metaphysics, when Metaphysics are properly limited to  things TB /*ETa Tct pi/fiKa, i. e. things beyond natural  things — things which exist not independently of the  mind's conception of them ; e. g. a line in the abstract,  or the notion of man generally: for these are merely  signs which the mind invents and uses to carry on a  train of reasoning independently of actual existences;  e. g. independently of lines in concrete, or of men individually and particularly. But as to the class of  signs which the former of these instances has in view,  and which are peculiar to Mathematics, there will be  no necessity, in this treatise, to make much allusion to  them: it is to the signs indicated by the other example  that reference will chiefly be made: for these are the  great instruments of human reason, and we believe  they have never yet had their suitable doctrine.  To ascertain the true principles of Grammar, the method often pursued will be adopt-  ed here j namely, to imagine the progress of  speech upward as from its first invention. As  to the question, whether speech was or was  not, in the first instance, revealed to man, we  shall not meddle with it : we do not propose  to inquire how the first man came to speak Beattie and Cowper, poets if not philosophers, ate  among those who insist that speech must have been  revealed. The former thus turns to ridicule the well   L   known passage in the Satires of Horace, Cvm prorepseruntf &c. lib. I. Sat 3* v. 99 : When men out of the earth of old  A dumb and beastly vermin crawled.  For acorns, first, and holes of shelter, •  They, tooth and nail, and bdter dceker,   B 2  4 ON CiSAUMAH. [CHAP. I.   but whether language is not a necessary effect  of reason, as well as its necessary instrument,  Fought fist to fist ; then with a club  Each learned hia brother brute to drub ;  Till more experienced grown, these cattle  Forged fit accoutrements for battle.  At last, (Lucretius Bays, and Creech,)  They set their wits to work on speech :  And that their thoughts might all have marks  To make them known, these learned clerks  Left ofi' the trade of cracking crowns,  And manufactured verba and nouns." Theory of Language, Part I.  Chap 6. (in a note.)  The other poet does not, on this occasion, appear in  metre, but is equally merry.   " I ta';e it for granted that these good men are phi-  Bophically correct in their account of the origin of  language ; and if the Scripture had left us in the dark  upon that article, I should very readily adopt their  hypothesis for want of better information. I should  suppose, for instance, that man made his first effort in  speech in the way of an interjection, and that ah ! or  oh ! being uttered with wonderful gesticulation and  variety of attitude, must have left hia powers of ex-  presdon quite exhausted ; that, in a course of time, he  would invent many names for many things, but first  for the objects of his daily wants. An apple would  consequently be called an apple ; and perhaps not     SECT. 1.] ON GRAMMAR. 5   growing out of those powers originally bestow-  ed on man, and essential to their further deve-  lopment.   many years would elapse before the appellation would  receive the sanction of general use. In this case, atid  upon this supposition, seeing one in the hand of  another man, he would exclaim, with a most moving  pathos, * Oh apple !' Well and good, — ' Oh apple,** is  a very affecting speech, but in the mean time it profits  him nothing. The man that holds it, eats it, and he  goes away with ' Oh apple!** in his mouth, and nothing  better. Reflecting on his disappointment, and that  perhaps it arose from his not being more explicit, he  contrives a term to denote his idea of transfer,, or  gratuitous communication, and the next occasion that  offers of a similar kind, performs his part accordingly.  His speech now stands thus — * Oh give apple ! ** The  apple-holder perceives himself called upon to part with  his fruit, and having satisfied his own hunger, is  perhaps not unwilling to do so. But unfortunately  there is still room for a mistake, and a third person  being present, he gives the apple to him. Again dis-  appointed, and again perceiving that his language has  not all the precision that is requisite, the orator retires  to his study, and there, after much deep thinking,  conceives that the insertion of a pronoun, whose office  shall be to signify, that he not only wants the apple to  be given, but given to himself, will remedy all defects; Now instead of taking it for granted, as  others have done who have pursued the method  proposed, that men sat down to invent the  parts of speech, because they found they had  ideas which respectively required them, we as-  sert that men have originally no such ideas as  correspond to the parts of speech. The im-  pulse of nature is, to express by some single  sound, or mixture of sounds (not divisible in-  to significant parts) whatever the mind is  conscious of; nor is there any thing in the na-  ture of our thoughts that leads to a different  procedure, till artificial language begins to be   he uses it the next opportunity, succeeds to a wonder,  obtains the apple, and, by his success, such credit to  his invention, that pronouns continue to be in great  repute ever afl^er. Now as my two syllable-mongers,  Beattie and Bl^r, both agree that language was  originally inspired, and that the great variety of  languages we find on earth at present, took its rise from  the confusion of tongues at Babel, I am not perfectly  convinced, that there is any just occasion to invent  this very ingenious solution of a diiEculty, which  Scripture has solved already."   Letter to the Rev. Wm. Unwin, April 5, \'J8i.      invented or imitated. Let us take, for our first  fact, the cry for food of a new-born infant: that  is an instinctive ciy, wholly unconnected, we  presume, with reason and knowledge. In proportion as the knowledge grows, that the want,  when it occurs, can be supplied, the cry be-  comes rational, and may at last be said to signify, " Give me food," or more at full," I want  you to give me food." In what does the rational cry, (rational when compared with the  instinctive cry,) differ from the still more rational sentence? Not in its meaning,but simply  thus, that the one is a sign suggested directly  by nature, and the other is a sign aijsing out of such art, as, in its first acquirement, (we are  about to presume,) nature or necessity gradually teaches our species. Now, that the artificial sign is made up of parts, (namely the  words that compose the sentence,) and that  the natural sign is not made up of significant  parts, we affirm to be simply a consequence of  the constitution of artificial speech, and not to follow from any thing in the nature of the communication which the mind has to make. The  natural cry, if understood, is, for the purpose  in view, quite as good as the sentence, nor  does the sentence, as a whole, signify any thing  more.Taking the words separately, there is  indeed much more contained in the sentence  than in the cry; namely, the knowledge of  what it is to give under other circumstances  as well as that of giving food ; — oi'Jbod un-  der other circumstances as well as that of being given to me; — of me under other circumsttances as well as that of wanting food:  but all this knowledge, in this and similar cases for which a cry might suffice, is unnecessary, and the indivisible sign, if equally  understood for the actual purpose, is, for  this purpose, quite adequate to the artificially  compounded sign. The truth is this, that every perception  by the senses, and every conception which  [By Conception I mean that power of the mind,  which enables it to fonn a notion of an absent object of  perception ; or of a sensation which it has formerly follows from such perception, as well as every  desire, emotion, and passion arising out of  them, is individual and particular; and if language had continued to be nothing more than  an outward indication of these its passive affec-  tions, it would have consisted of single indivi-  dual signs for single individual occasions, like  those which are originally prompted by nature. But it was impossible to find a new sign  for every new occasion, and therefore an ex-  pedient was of necessity adopted; which expedient, from its rudest to its most refined ration, will be found one and the same, — an  expedient of reason, and that through which  all the improvements of reason are derived.  The expedient is nothing more than this : —  when a new expression is wanted, two or more  signs, each of which has served a particular  purpose, are put together in such a manner as  to modify each other, and thus, in their united     fclt." — Dugald Stewart : I'hilos. of the Human Mind,  Vol. I. Chap. 3.  [capacity, to answer the new particular purpose  in view. In this manner, words, individually,  cease to be signs of our perceptions or con-  ceptions, and stand (individually) for what are  properly called notions', that is, for what the  mind knows ; — collectivelif, that is, in sen-  tences, they can signify any perception by the  senses, or conception arising from such per-  ception, any desire, emotion, or passion — in  short, any impression which nature would  have prompted us to signify by an indivisible  sign, if such a sign could have been found : —  but individually, (we repeat,) each word be-  longing to such sentence, or to any sentence,  is not the sign of any idea whatever which the  mind passively receives, but of an abstractiont   • Notio or notitia from «o«co, I knov. (It is a pity  we cannot trace the word to ado instead of noac.->.)  Note, Locke will be mucli more intelligible, if, in the  majority of places, we substitute " tlie knowledge of"  for what he calls " the idea of" His wide use of the  word idea has been a cause of the widest con&slon in  other writers.   t Home Tooke's doctrine is very different from     wliich reason obtains by acts of comparison and  judgment upon its passively-received ideas.   tbis. He says (Diversions of Purley [2d edit. 1798]  Vol. I. page 51,) " That the business of the mind, as  far as regards language, extends no further than to re-  ceive impressions, that is, to have sensations or feel-  ings"; — he affirms (pa££^im) that what iscalled abstrac-  tion has no existence in the mind, but belongs to lan-  guage only, and that " the very term metapht/sic is  nonsense "' {page 399). It is hoped that what follows in  the test will prove these opinions to be erroneous.  Could the proper name John, or any word being an artificial part of speech, have been invented, if the mind  had not exerte  d its active powers upon its passively r&-  ceived ideas ? For whatever ideas of this last kind we  have of John must be ideas arising out of particular  perceptions ; and ve must irame him to our minds  standing, or sitting, or walking; talking, or silent;  dressed or undressed, with other circumstances which  imagination can vary, but cannot set aside. It is only  by comparison that we know John to be independent  of all these, and the name is the effect of this know-  ledge, not the cause of it. The abstraction is not in  the word only ; for till we know that Jolm is separate  (abstract) from whatever circumstance the perception  of him includes, how can his name exclude it ? Neither  is the terra iiietaphysic nonsense when applied to this  The sentence " John walks " may express  what is actually perceived by the senses ;  or any other abstraction. For John separate from circumBtancea that must enter into an actual perception,  ifithe nameof anotion /iCTa^ua-ixii, i.e.outof nature, or of  which we have no example in external nature, though  it may esist in our minds, like a line in mathematics,  which is deifined as that which has length without  breadth, and which is therefore, for the same reason,  properly called a metaphysical notion, and pure  mathematics are justly considered a part of metaphysics.  It was because H. Tooke set out with these principles  thus fiindamentally erroneous, that he could not complete his system when he had brought it to ail but a  close. With admirable acuteness of inquiry, he had  tracedup every part of speech till he found it, originally,  either a noun or a verb, and he then left his book im-  perfect, because he could not, on the principles he had  started with, explain the difference bet ween these : — he  promised indeed to return to the inquiry, but he never  fiiliilled his promise for the best of reasons, that there  was no pushing it further in the way he had gone ; he  must have contradicted all his early premises to have  reached a true conclusion. The whole cause of his  error seems to havebeen a too unqualified understanding  of Locke's doctrine, that the mind has no innate ideas. but neither word, separately, can be said to  express a part of that perception, since the  perception is of John walkmg, and if we per-  ceive John separate from walking, then he is  not walking, and consequently it is another  perception ; and so if we perceive walking se-  parately from John, it must be that we perceive somebody else walking, and not him.  The separate words, then, do not stand for  passively received ideas, but for abstract notions ; — so far as they express what is pec- ij  ceived by the senses, they have no separate  meaning ; it is only with reference to the un-  derstanding that each has a separate meaning.  The separate meaning of the word John is a  knowledge (and therefore properly called a I  notion not an idea*) that John has existed and ]   Hence, TOOKE acknowledges nothing originally but ]  the senseB, and the experience of those senses, calling reason " the effect and result of those senses and that  experience." See Vol, II. page 16. " If indeed the word idea were uniformly employed  to signify what is here meant by notion, and nothing  else, little objection could be made: such use would  will exist, independently of the present perception, and the separate meaning of the word  •walks, is a linowledge that another may waik as  well as John. This is not an idea of John or an  idea of walking such as the senses give, or such  as memory revives : for the senses present no  such object as John in the abstract, that is,  neither walking, nor not walking; nor do they  furnish any such idea as that of •walking inde-  pendently of one who walks. There is then  a double force in these words, — their separate  force, which is derived from the understanding,  and their united force, by which, in this instance, they signify a perception by the senses.   nearly correspond in effect though not in theory, with  the old Platonic Bcnse, and in the Platonic sense  Lord Mooboddo constantly employs it in his work on  the "Origin and Progress of Language." But as Dr.  Reid observes, ** in popular language idea signifies  the same thing as conception, apprehension. To have  KD idea of a thing is to conceive it." This sense of  the word Dugald Stewart adopts. (Philos. of the  Human Mind, Vol. L Chap. 4. Sect. 2.) Locke, as  already intimated, uses the word in all the senses it  will bear. In otlier instances, the united significa-  tion of words may not be a perception of the  senses j but whatever may be their united  meaning, they will separately include know-  ledge not expressed by the whole sentence,  though, if the meaning of the sentence be ab-  stract, the knowledge included in the separate  words will be necessary to the knowledge ex-  pressed by the sentence. " Pride offends,"  is a sentence whose whole meaning is abstract;  but pride separately, and offends separately,  are still more abstract, and in using them to  form the sentence, we refer to knowledge be-  yond the meaning of the sentence as a whole,  namely, to pride under other circumstances  than that of offending, and to offending under  other circumstances than that of pride offending; and here, tlie knowledge referred to  seems necessary, in order to come at the knowledge expressed by the sentence. " John  walks," (or, according to our English idiom,  " John is walking,") is a perception by the  senses, and does not therefore depend on a knowledge of John, and of walking in the abstract ; (though to express the perception in  this way requires it;) but " Pride offends,"  does not express an individual perception, nor  would many individual perceptions of pride  offending give the knowledge which the sen-  tence expresses : we must have obser\'ed  what pride is, separately from its offending,  and we must have observed what offending is,  separately from pride offending, before we  can rationally understand, or try to make  known to others, that Pride offends. In this  DOUBLE force of words, by which they signify  at the same time the actual thought, and re-  fer to knowledge necessary perhaps to come  at it, we shall find, as we proceed, the ele-  ments, the true principles of Logic and of  Rhetoric; while in tracingthe necessity which  obliged men to signiiy in this manner even  tliose individual perceptions which nature  would have prompted them to make known  by a single sign, (if such sign could have been  found,) we shall ascertain the true principles   of Gkammau. The last mentioned subject  must occupy our first attention. 5. To get at the parts of speech on our hypothesis, we must consider them to be evolved  from a cry or natural word. Not that this  is the present principle on which words are  invented ; for art having furnished the pattern,  we now invent upon that pattern j but our  purpose is to consider how the pattern itself  is produced by the workings of the human  mind on its first ideas. Those ideas can be  none other than the mind passively receives  through the senses ; and perhaps the first active operation of the mind is to abstract (sepa-  rate) the subjects or exterior causes of sensa-  tion from the sensations themselves. When  we see, we find we can touch, or taste, or  smell, or hear ; and when the perception  through one of these senses is different, we  find a difference in one or more of the others.  We also recollect (conceive) our former per-  ceptions, and finding the actual sensations  not recoverable by an effort of the mind alone, we recognize the separate existence of the ma-  terial world. All this is Knowledge, acquired indeed so early in life, that its com-  mencing and progressing steps are forgotten ;  but we are nevertheless warranted in affirm-  ing that not the least part of it, is an original  gift of nature. Along with this knowledge  we acquire emotions and passions ; for to knoia  material objects, is to know them as causes of  pleasurable or painful sensation, and hence to  feel for them, in various degrees, and with  various modifications, desire and aversion, joy  and grief, hope and fear. And here, as the  same object does not always produce the same  emotion, or the same emotion arise from the  same object, we begin a new class of abstractions: we separate, mentally, the object from  the emotion or the emotion from the object:  we are enabled in consequence to abstract and  consider those differences in the objects, from  which the different effects arise, and to ascer-  tain, by trial, how far they yield to volition ope-  rating by the exterior bodily members, which  SECT. we have previously discovered to be subservient  to the will. In this new class of abstractions,  and the consequences which arise from them,  we shall find the beginning of that knowledge  which human reason is privileged to obtain,  compared with that which the higher orders  of the brute creation in common with man,  are able to reach j and from this point we  shall be able to trace how man becomes /ie'poyjr,  or divider of a natural word into parts of  speech *, while other animals retain unaltered  the cries by which their desires and passions  are first expressed.   6. As we are able to separate, mentally,  the object from the emotion, and to remem-  ber the natural cry after the occasion that  produced it ceases, the natural cry might re-  main as a sign either of the object or of the  emotiont. But this does not carry us beyond  Thia is the sense in which we choose to under-  stand the word, and not merely voice-dividing or ar-  ticulating.  f For instance, as, in the present state of language,  the exclamation of surprise ha-ha '. is either an inter-     to the mind which forms the abstraction, and  has the power to establish a sign (wliether  audible or not) to fix and remember it: — our  inquiry is, how a communication can be made  from mind to mind, when the signs which na-  ture furnishes are inadequate to the occasion.  And first be it observed, that only such occa-  sions must, at the outset, be imagined as do  but just rise above those for which the cries  of nature are sufficient: — we must not suppose a necessity for communicating those abstract truths which grow out of an improved  use of language, and which could not there-  fore yet have existence in the mind. And  we have further to observe that no communication can be made from one mind to  another, but by means of knowledge which  the other mind possesses; — the cries of na-  ture can find their way only into a conscious  breast, — that is to say, a breast that has known,  jection eignifyiDg that emotiou, or the n  so placed ae to give occasion to it.  or at least can know, the feelings which are  to be communicated, and is capable, therefore,  of sympathy or antipathy ; and knowledge  of whatever kind can be conveyed to another  mind only by appealing to knowledge which is  already there. To suppose otherwise, would  be to attribute to human minds what has been  imagined of pure spirits, — the power of so  mingling essences that the two have at once  a common intelligence. To human minds It  is certain that this way of communicating is  not given, but each mind can gain knowledge  only by comparing and judging for itself, and  to communicate it, is only to suggest the sub-  jects for comparison. Let us suppose that a  communication is to be made for which a na-  tural cry is not sufficient, — the difficulty, then,  can be met only by appealing to the knowledge which the mind to be informed already  possesses. The occasion will create some cry  or tone of emotion ; but this we presuppose  to be insufficient. It will however be under-  stood as far as the hearer's knowledge may enable him to interpret it — that is, he will  know it to be the sign of an emotion which  himself has felt, and he will think perhaps of  some occasion on which himself used it. But  the cry is to be taken from any former par-  ticular occasion, and applied to another; and  he who has the communication to make, will  try to give it this new application by joining  another sign, such as he thinks the hearer is  hkewise acquainted with. The natural cry  thus taking to its assistance the other sign, and  each limiting the other to the purpose in hand,  they will, in their united capacity, be an ex-  pression for the exigence, and will, to all in-  tents and purposes, be a sentence. In some cases, nature seems to furnish  an instinctive pattern for the process here described : —a man cries out or groans with pain ;  he puts his hand to the part affected, and we  at once interpret his cry more particularly  than we could have done without the latter  sign. In other cases, we are driven to the  same process not by an instinct, but by the ingenuity of reason seeking to provide that  which nature has not furnished. If a man  unskilled in language, or not using that which  his hearers understand, should try to make  known what art expresses by a sentence such  as " I am in fear from a serpent hidden there,"  his first effort would be the instinctive cry of  fear ; but aware that this could be particularly  interpreted only of a known, and not of an unknown occasion, he would, by an easy effiirt of  ingenuity, fix it for the present purpose by add-  ing a sign or name of the reptile, (for mimick-  ing the hiss of the reptile would obviously be  a name,) and by joining to both these a ges-  ticulative indication of place. The instinctive  cry thus newly determined and appUed, is a  sentence ; and however clumsy it may seem  when compared with the more complicated  one previously given, yet the art employed is  of the same kind in both. We leave the read-  er to smile at the example as he pleases, and  will join in his smile while he compares it with  that in the epistle of the poet in the note at   Sect. 1.; and, if he is disposed to smile again,  we will suppose another example : — Two men  going in the same direction, are stopped by  an unexpected ditch, and ejaculate the na-  tural cry of surprise ha-ha/ This is remem-  bered as the expression suited for that par-  ticular occasion; and the mind, the human  mind, seems to have the power of generalizing  it for every similar object. Suppose one of  these men finding another ditch very offensive  to his nose, signifies this sensation by screwing  up the part offended, an d uttering the nasal  interjection proper for the case ; — the interjection may not be sufficient j for the other  man may remain to  be informed of what his  companion knows, namely that the offence  proceeds from the ditch. To fix the meaning, therefore, of the interjection to the case  in hand, the communicator adds the former  natural cry in order to signify the ditch, and  the two signs qualifying each other, are a  sentence. 8. An artificial instrument as language is,  growing (as we suppoaej out of necessity, and  adapted at first to the rudest occasions ; per-  fected by degrees, and becoming more com-  plicated in proportion as the occasions grow  numerous and refined ; — such an instrument,  when we compare its earliest conceivable state  with that in which it  has received its iiighest  improvement, must appear clumsy and awk-  ward in the extreme. But in the very rude  state in which we here suppose it, the art em-  ployed is essentially the same as afterwards :  — two or more signs are joined together, each "  sign referring separately to presupposed know-  ledge, but in their united capacity communi- i  eating what is supposed to be unknown. Of  the signs used, that must be considered the ,  principal by which the speaker intimates the ,  actual emotion j the other signs, which do but j  fix its meaning, are secondary. Thereforej ;  though the appellation word (that is p^/io, i  dictum, or communication,) strictly belongs  to the whole expression or sentence, we may  reasonably give that appellation to the principal sign. According to this supposition,  the original verb was an expression equiva-  lent to what we now signify by I hunger, I  thirst, I am warm, I am cold, I see, I hear,  IJeel, &c., / am in pain, I am delighted, I am  angry, 1 love, I hate, I fear, I assent, I dis-  sent, I command, I obey, &c. Whether this  a priori conjecture has any facts in its favour,  is an inquiry suitable to the etymologist, but  fo reign to our purpose, because, whether true  or not, the general argument by which we in-  tend to prove the nature of the parts of speech,  will remain the same*.     " Vet it may be worth while to quote the coinci-  dent opinion of another writer. " It may be asked "  says Lord Monboddo, " what words were (irst invented.  My answer is, that if by words are meant what are  commonly called parts of speech, no words at all were  first invented ; but the first articulate sounds that were  formed denoted whole sentences ; and those sentences  expressed some appetite, desire, or inclination, relating  either to the individual, or to the common business  which I suppose must have been carrying on by a herd  of savages before language was invented. And in this    We have next to imagine the use of  any of the foregoing verbs in the third per-  son ; for that, it should seem, would be the  next step. In communicating that anothet-  hungers or thirsts, or sees or hears, or is angry  or pleased, &c., the difficulty would be to give  the word this new application, and a limiting  sign would, as usual, be necessary. A proper  name would be the sign required ; and if not  too great a tax upon fancy, we may conceive  the invention of these from the mimicking of a  man's characteristic tone, or his most frequent  cry ; not to mention the assistance of gesticu-  lative indication. But when verbs had thus  lost the reference which, at first we presume,  they always bore to the speaker, a sign,  whether a change of form, or a separate word,  would be wanted to bring them back to their  early meaning as often as occas ion required.  A gesticulative indication of the speaker and     way I believe language continued, perhaps for many  ages, before names were invented." — Origin and Pro-  grese of Language. Vol. I. Book 3. Chap. 1 1-  of the person spoken to, can easily be con-  ceived : how soon tliese would give place to  equivalent audible signs, the reader is left to  calculate j and as to the pronoun of the third  person, he may allow a longer time for its in-  vention, especially as even in the finest of lan-  guages, tliere is no word exactly answering to  ille in Latin and he in English.   10. We have suggested a clew to the in-  -yention of proper names, and (for the reader  jnust allow us much) we will suppose these,  L ^ far as need requires, to be invented. But  r piost of these, from the difficulty of inventing  a new name for every individual, would gra-  dually become common. If a man has called  I the animal he rides on by a proper appellation  I corresponding to horse, what shall he call  t Other animals that he knows are not the same;   and yet resemble? Because he is unprovided ..  r jwith a name for each individual, he will call'  I each of them horse*, and the name will then   " Compare Adam Smith, " Considerations con-  cerning the First Formation of Languages," appended no longer be proper but common. But the  same powers of observation which acquaint  us with the points of resemblance, likewise  show the points of difference, and when we  wish to distinguish the animals from each  other, how is this to be done ? The question  is easily answered when we have a perfect lan-  guage to refer to, but it was a real difficulty  when the expedient was first to he sought.  Yet the difficulty not unfrequently occurs  even in a mature state of language, and the  manner in which it is overcome, will enable  us to conceive how, in the rude state of Ian-  guage we are supposing, itwas universally met,  till the noun-adjective became a part of  speech*. Of two horses, we observe that one   to his work on the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As a  proof how prone we are to extend the appellation of  an individual to others, he remarks that " A child just  learning to speak, calls every person who comes to the  house its papa or its mamma ; and thus bestows upon  the whole species those names which it had been taught  to apply to two individuals."   ' The Mohegans " (an American tribe) " have     so has the colour of a chestnut, and the other is  variegated hke a pie ; and we call the former  a cfieslnut horse, and the other a pied or piebald  horse. Here we perceive are two nouns-sub-  stantive joined together to signify an indivi-  dual object, and employed, Ui their united ca-  pacity, to signify what would otherwise have  been denoted by an individual or proper name.  This, then, is their meaning, respectively,  as a single expression. In their abstract or  separate capacity, the one word denotes either  one or the other of the two animals without  reference to the difference between them : the  other word denotes, not a chestnut or a pi^  but that colour in a chestnut, and those varie-  gated colours in a pie, by which one of the  animals is distinguished from the other, and  these words are no longer nouns-substantive  DO adjectives in all their language. Although it may  at first seem not only singular and ciuious, but im-  possible that a language should exist without adjectives,  yet it is an indubitable fact," — Dr. Jonathan Edwards  — quoted by H. Tooke, Diversions of Purley, Vol. II.  p. 463.   but nouns-adjective *. And here the ques-  tion will naturally occur, how would a hearer  know when a noun was used substantively,  and when adjectively ? As this would often  be attended with doubt and ambiguity, the  necessity of the case would soon suggest  some slight alteration in the word as ofi;en as  it was used adjectively ; and the same all-  powerful cause would likewise, in time, dia-  tinguish adverbs from adjectives : for at first  an adjective would be used without scruple to  limit the verb, as to limit the substantive j since     • " The invention of the simplest nouns-adjective,*'  says Adam Smith, " must have required more meta-  physics than we are apt to be aware of." But the dif-  ficulty he imagines is done away by the hypothesis  suggested above ; and how near it is to the truth, will  fae conceived by calling to mind the ready use of al-  most any substantive as an adjective, as often as need  requires : e. g. a chestnut horse, a horse chestnut ; a  grammar school, a school grammar ; a man child, a  cock sparrow, an earth worm, an air hole, a (ireking,  a water lily ; not to mention the innumerable com-  pounds that are considered single words ; as, seaman^  Iiorsenian, footman, inkstand, coalhole, bookcase, Sic.     «t       this is often done even in the present state of  language j but the doubt whether it was to be  taken with the substantive or the verb* would  soon produce some general difference of form ;  and thus the adverb would be brought into  being as a distinct part of speech.   11. Still it would often happen, that in  endeavouring to limit a verb to the particular  communication in view, no substantive or pro-  noun joined to it, not even with the further  aid of an adjective or adverb joined to the  substantive or verb, would suffice ; and failing,  therefore, to convey the communication by  one sentence, it would become necessary to  add another to limit or determine the significa-  tion of the first. Now a qualifying sentence  thus joined, when completely understood in  connexion with that it was meant to qualify,  would be esteemed as a part of the same sen-  tence, and the verb, in the added sentence,     • E. g. whether " I love much society " is to be  understood / much-li/ve suciety, or, / Iwe 7iutch-  society.      would possibly then lose its force as the sign   of a distinct communication. This again, will  easily be understood by a reference to what  occurs in the present state of language. Look-  ing at the sentence, " In making up your par--  ty, except me," no one hesitates to call concept  a verb ; but in this sentence, *^ All were there,  except me," although the word except has pre^^  cisely the same meaning, yet, as we do not con^  sider the clause except TTie to be a distinct com-  munication, but only a qualification to suit the  whole sentence to the purpose in view, we call  except a preposition *, that is, a word put be^     * This solution of the difficulty in the invention  of prepositions, which seems so considerable to Adam  Smith, is suggested, as the reader will perceive, by  the etymological discoveries of Home Tooke, and will  receive complete confirmation by the study of his ad-  mirable work. Let it not be supposed, however, that  we have nothing to object to in the Diversions of  Purley : some ftmdamental principles we have already  marked for inquiry ; and on the point before us, we  have to observe on that curious way of thinking, which  leads him, because a word was once a verb or a noun.      fore another to join it to the sentence that  goes before.   12. But in thus qualifying sentence by sen-  tence, it may sometimes be necessary to use  three verbs, one of them being merely the sin-  gle verb that joins the two sentences together ;  as, " I was at the party, and (i. e. add, or join  this further communication) I was much de-  lighted." Sometimes a noun will be used in  this way ; as, " I esteemed him, because (i. e.  this the cause) I knew his worth." Any par-  ticular form of verb or noun used frequently  in this manner to join sentence to sentence,  will cease at last to be considered any thing  more than a conjunction *.   IS. As to the article, we have only to sup-  to esteem it always so ; on the same principle, no doubt,  that, because the word truth comes from he trou-eth or  thinkelh, a.aA a man's thoughts are always changing,  he denies that there is any such thing as eternal, im-  mutable truth.   * Again the reader is referred to the Diversions of  Purley, for a confirniation of this account of the birth  of conjuncticms.      pose some adjective used in a particular limit-  ing sense so frequently, that we at last regard  it as nothing more than a common prefix to  substantives : — as to a participle^ it is confess-  edly, when in actual use, either a part of the  verb, or a substantive, or an adjective : — and  as to an interjection^ this we have supposed to  be the parent word of the whole progeny ; and  if it is sometimes used among the parts of  an artificial sentence, it is only as a vibration  of the general tone of feeling that belongs to  the whole.   14. In this manner, or in a manner like  this in principle and procedure, would lan-  guage grow out of those powers bestowed on  man by his Creator, even though it had not  been directly communicated from heaven :-—  in this manner is the progress from natural  cries to artificial signs contemplated and pro-  vided for by the constitution of the human  mind; — in this manner would the parts of  speech be developed j and men placed in so-  ciety, and endowed with powers for observation, reflexion, comparison, judgment, would,  in time, become fiepoire^f or dividers of a na-  tural word into significant parts, with the  same kind of certainty that they become bipeds  or walkers on two legs* ; being bom neither  one nor the other.   * And according to Monboddo, with the same  certainty that they lose their tails; for when they  were mutu/m, et turpe pecus^ he appears to think  they might have been so appendaged ; nay, he knew a  Scotchman that had a tail, though he always took care  to hide it : (his lordship was surely in luck^s way to  find it out.) After all, it would be difficult to prove,  notwithstanding the authorities Monboddo quotes, that  herds of men were ever found destitute of language.  Leaving, therefore, the origin of the first language,  and the subsequent confiision or division of it precisely  as those two &ct8 stand in Genesis, all we mean to  assert in the text is this, — that if a number of children  having their natural faculties perfect, were suffered to  grow up together without hearing a language spoken,  they would invent a language for themselves : though,  for a long time, it might remain nothing better than  that of the Hurons described by Monboddo, (Origin  and Progress of Lang. VoL I. Book 3. Chap. 9.) in  which the parts of speech are scarcely evolved, from  the original elements, but what in a formed language     But the object of the foregoing at-  tempt, was not so much to trace the origin     is expressed by several words, is expressed by a sign  not divisible into significant parts. Thus, he says,  there is no word which signifies simply to cut, but many  that denote cuttingjish^ cutting wood^ cutting chaths,  cutting the heady the arm^ &c. And so of the language  throughout. More than one generation would be re-  quired, and very favourable stimulating circumstances,  to bring such a chaos of a language into form ; but  that the human mind has within itself the powers for  accomplishing it sooner or later, we see no cause to  doubt — These words, and the whole of the hypothesis  in the text above, were written before the third Volume  of Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind  had been seen. From that part which treats on Lan-  guage we quote the following passages :   ^^ That the human faculties are competent to the  formation of language, I hold to be certain.* Language in its rudest state would consist partly  of natural, partly of artificial signs ; substantives being  denoted by the latter, verbs by the former.*"   These are among the many passages which coincide  with the views opened in the previous hypothesis. It  is to be added, that D. Stewart considers the imperative  mood to be the first form in which the artificial verb  would be displayed.   and first progress of language, as to get at  the real ground of diflference among the se-  veral parts of speech. On this subject, there  prevails a universal misconception. Prom the  definitions and general reasoning in Gram-  mar ; — from the theories laid down in Logic ;  — and the basis on which the rules and prac-  tice of Rhetoric are presumed to stand, this  principle seems to be taken for granted, that  the parts of speech have their origin in the mind  independently of the outward signs, when, in  truth, they are uothing more than parts in the  structure of language ; contrivances adopted  at first on the spur of theoccasion, the shifts  and expedients to which a person is driven,  ■when not being able to lay bare his mind at  once according to his consciousness, he tries,  by putting such signs together as were used  for former occasions and therefore known as  regards them, to form an expression, which, as  a whole, will he a new one, and meet the pur-  pose in hand. True indeed it is, that these  very contrivances become, in their more refined use, the great instruments of hmnan rea-  son by which all improvement, all extensive  knowledge, is obtained; but we are not to  confound the instrument with the intelli-  gence that uses it/ nor to suppose that the  parts of which it is composed, have, of ne-  cessity, any parts corresponding with them in  the thought itself. It is not what a word signi-  fies that determines it to be this or that part  of speech, but how it assists other words in ma-  king up the sentence. If it is commissioned to  unite the whole by the reference immediate  or mediate which all the other words are to  bear to it, and to signify that they are a sen-  tence, that is, the sign of a purposed commu-  nication, then it is the verb : — if it has not  this power, (namely, of uniting the other words  into a sentence,) and yet is capable, in all other  respects, of standing as an independent sign,  (this sign not being the sign of a purposed  communication) then it is a substantive .-—if it  is the implied adjunct of a substantive, it is an  adjective or an article^ — if of a verb^ an adverb : — if we know it to be a word, which, in  a sentence, is fitted to precede a substantive,  (or words taken substantively) in order to con-  nect such substantive with -what goes before,  then it is a preposition : — and if it goes before,  or mingles in a sentence, in order to connect  it with another sentence, then it is a conjunc-  tion. These are the only real differences of  the parts of speech : — as to the meaning, that  does not of necessity differ because a word is  a different part of speech ; — the following  words, for instance, all express the same notion :   Add   Addition   Additional   Additionally   With*   Andt   * The imperative of the Saxon verb Jpi^an to join.   -|- The imperative of the Saxon verb ananab to add.   The place and ofHce of these six words in a sentence  would of course differ, and the sentences in which they  were respectively used would require a various arrange-  Our definitions reach the real differences  among these words, and they will be found  adequate to all differences, when, by the ob^  servation hereafter to be made, we are quali-  fied to make due allowance for the licences  assumed by the practical grammarian *• In   ment to meet the same purpose, but as to the meaning  of the words, it would be the same in whatever  sentence : e. g.   Add something to our bounty.   Make an addition to our bounty.   Give an additional something to our bounty.   Give additionally to our bounty.   Increase o ur bounty with the gift of something.   Consider our bounty and give likewise.  * To suit our definitions to an elementary grammar,  they must be quaUfied and circumstanced: — a verb,  for instance, must be shewn to be a word that is by  itself a sentence, as esurio ; or which signifies a  sentence, as I am hungry ; or which is fitted to sig-  nify a sentence, as am, lovest. A verb in the infinitive  mood, is a verb named but not used ; a8 to be, to love ;  or if used in a sentence, it is not the verb. A noun-  substantive is a name capable of standing independently,  but it cannot enter into a sentence except by being  connected directly or indirectly with a verb. The in-  flexion of a noun-substantive, as Mard, Mark'' 8^ is  the mean time, in order to throw as much  light as possible on the nature of the con-  nexion between thought and language, let us  look back a little on foregoing statements,  and partially anticipate those which are to be  opened more at full under the heads of Logic  and Rhetoric.   called a substantive, bnt in so calling it, we must say  a Bubstantive in the genitive, or other case. A noun-  adjective is a name not fitted to stand independently,  but to be joined to a noun-substantive, and so to form  with it one compound name. An adverb is a word not  fitted to stand independently, but to be joined to a verb,  and to form with it one compound verb, A preposition  ig a word governing as its object a substantive or pro-  noun in the manner of a verb, but not an obvious part  of a verb, nor capable, like a verb, of signifying a  sentence. The article, pronoun, participle, conjunc-  tion, and interjection, may be defined as usual. We  would suggest moreoverthat in an elementary grammar,  no definition, and no part of a definition, should  be brought forward, till absolutely required by the  examples that are immediately to follow it. In  teaching a child, it is the greatest absurdity in the  world to set out with general principles, when the  business is, to reach those principles by the eiiamina-  tion of particulars. It may be that the organs of sensation  are not all fully developed in a new-born in-  fant ; but if, for the sake of our argument, we  allow that they are so, this is as much as to  say, that our earliest sensations from the ob-  jects of the material world, are the same that  they are afterwards. But there must be this  most important difference, — that the early  sensations are -wilkoui knowledge, and the lat-  ter, with it. I know that the object which now  affects my sense of vision, is a being like my-  self, — I know him to be one of a great many  similar beings ; — I know him to be older or  younger than many of them, — to be taller or  shorter; — I know pretty nearly the distance  he is from me ; — 1 know that the particular  circumstances under which he is now seen,  are not essential to him, but that he may be  seen under other circumstances : — I know that  what now affects my sense of hearing, is the  cry or bark of a dog j — I know, although my  eyes are shut, that there are roses near me,  or something obtained from roses j — I knoie     u      that sometliing hard has been put into my  mouth ; — and now I know it to be part of an  apple. All the sensations by which the  various knowledge here spoken of is brought  before the mind, the new-born infant may  possibly be capable of; but as to the know-  ledge, there is no reason to believe he lias the  least portion of it. For the knowledge is  gained by experience, requiring and com-  prising many individual acts of observation,  comparison, and judgment j all which we  suppose yet to take place in the new-born  infant. Now, in looking back to what has  been said on the acquirement of language, we  find the effect of our progressing knowledge  to be this, that every sign arising out of a par-  ticular occasion, will lose that particular re-  ference in proportion as we find it can be used  on other occasions j and so all words will, at  last, in their individual capacity, become ab-  stract or general. This is as true of such  words as yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, .  bitter, sweet, and the like signs of what Locke    calls simple ideas as of any other * : for we  can evidently use these words on an infinity  of different occasions j and the power of so  using them is an effect and a proof of our  knowing that the different occasions on which  we use the same word, have a something in  common, or in some way resemble. But  while all words thus acquire an abstract or  general meanipg, every communication which  we purpose to make by their means, must, in  comparison with their separate signification,  be particular ; and our putting them together  in order to form a sign for the more particular  thought, will be to deprive them of the abstract  or general meaning which they had indi-  vidually. If this is the real nature of the  process, we are completely mistaken if we  suppose that every word in a sentence sig-  nifies a part of the whole thought, and that  the progression of the words is in corre-  spondence with a progression of ideas which  the mind first puts togetlier within, and then  * Vide Locke, Book II. Chap. 1. Sect. 3.    signifies without What deceives us into this  impression, is, that on considering each word  separately, each is found to have .1 meaning.  Let us try, however, whether the joining of  words into a sentence, does not take from them  the meaning they have separately. Put to-  gether the three words " My head aches,"  and we have an expression, namely the whole  sentence, which signifies what, from a want  of clearness in our remarks, may possibly be  the reader's present particular sensation: hut  my, separately, signifies the general knowledge  I have attained of what belongs to ine as dis-  tinguished from what belongs to another j a  knowledge which is not at all necessary (that  is, the ^'•CTJcra/ knowledge) to the sensation it-  self, nor even to the expression ofit, if we could  find any single sign in lieu of the three which  we have put together. Accordingly, the  word my, as soon as it is joined to the other  words, drops that meaning which it had  separately, and receives a particular limitation  from the word head, which word head is likewise limited by the word rrof ; and the more  particular meaning which both these receive  by each other, is limited to the particular oc-  casion by the word aches. Yet, it may perhaps  be thought, that in this, and in every other  sentence, each word, as the mind suggests it  to the lips, is accompanied by the knowledge  of its separate meaning, and that, in this  manner, if we use the word idea in the un-  restricted sense familiar to the readers of  Locke, each word may be said to represent an  idea. Without entirely denying the justice  of this view of the matter, we offer in its place  the following statement :   17. In forming a sentence for its proper  occasion, the knowledge of which each sepa-  rate word is fitted to be the sign, may, or  may not be in the mind of the speaker: it  may be entirely there, or only in part, or not  at all there ; that is to say, the speaker may  not know the separate meaning of a word,  but only the meaning it is to have in union  with the other words. And even if the speaker does know the full separate meaning  of each word, yet he is not under the neces-  sity of thinking of that separate meaning  every time he uses it : nor does he, in fact,  think of the separate meaning of words while,  in putting them together, his purpose is to ex.  press what has been often expressed before, but  only (and even then but partially and occa*  tonally) when he uses words to work out some  conclusion not yet established in his own mind,  or when a train of argument is required to  convince or persuade other minds. This  statement will of course require some con-  siderations in proof.   18. And first, as to the knowledge of  which each separate word is fitted to the sign,  it is to be observed that our knowledge grows  with the use of words, and therefore our firet  use of them is unaccompanied by that know-  ledge which we gain by subsequent use.  This is true, whether we invent words, or  adopt those already invented. In the rude  beginning of language, the first use of a word for head, would be a use of it for a particular  occasion, and the word would be particular or  proper. If the speaker used it with reference  to himself, it would signify what we now sig-  nify fay the two words my head ". By observ-  ation and comparison, he would find he could  extend the meaning of the word, and apply it  with reference to his neighbours as well as  himself, and it would then no longer be proper  but common ; that is to say, it would signify  a human head, and not mj/ head. Extending  his observations still more widely, he would ap-  ply it with reference to every other living crea-  ture, and it would accordingly then signify a /(u-  ing creature's head. Looking and comparing  still further, he would apply it with referenceto  every object, in which he discovered a part  having the same relation to the whole as the  head of a living creature has to its remaining  parts ; and the word would then, and not till  then, have its present meaning ; that is to   " Compare the characteristics of the Huron lan-  guage referred to in the note appended to Sect. 14.    say, in a separate unlimited state it would  signify neither my head, nor a human head,  nor a living creature's head, but the top,  chief part, beginning, supremacy of any  thing whatever. Nor is the process essentially  different in acquiring the use of words already  invented. A child does not at first put words  together, but, if his head aches, he will say  perhaps "head! head!" using the single  word in place of a sentence. At length he  will say mi/ head, and brother's liead, and  horse's head, and cradle's head. Still there  are other applications of the word to be  learned by use ; and it surely will not be  contended that any one knows the meaning  of a word beyond the cases to which he can  apply it. The knowledge which a separate  word is fitted to signify, may then be wholly  or may be partly in the mind of him who  uses it in a sentence ; and it is very possible  not to be there at all. A foreigner, for in-  stance, who had beard the phrase the head of  the army applied to the general-in-chief, would know the meaning of the phrase, but  might be quite ignorant of the meaning of  the separate words, or even that it was com-  posed of separable words : and probably most  people can look back to a time in early life,  when they were in the habit of using many a  phrase with a just application as a whole,  without being aware that it was reducible  into parts in any other way than as a poly-  syllabic word is reducible.   ig. But even when the speaker, in form-  ing a sentence, has previous possession of all  the knowledge of which each word is sepa-  rately fitted to be the sign, yet he does not in  general think of their separate meaning while  he is putting them together, but only of the  meaning he intends to express by the whole  sentence. For through the frequent use of  phrases and sentences whose forms are hence  become familiar, there is scarcely any senti-  ment, feehng, or thought, that suddenly arises  in the mind, that does not as suddenly sug-  gest an appropriate form of expression. This     [chap.   is manifestly the case with such sentences as  arc in constant use for common occasions :  these the speaker cannot be said to make,  they occur ready-made, and he pronounces  the words that compose them with as little  thought of their separate meaning as if he  had never known them separate. Even when  sentences ready-made do not occur, yet the  forms of sentences will occur, and the speaker  will, in general, do nothing more than insert  new words here and there till the sentence  suits his purpose. Thus he who had said  " My head aches," will recollect the form of  sentence when his shoulder aches, and in  using the sentence, will only displace head  for shoulder: or if his head " is giddy," he  will only displace aches for the two words  quoted, in order to say what he feels.   20. When indeed we use language for  higher occasions than the most ordinary in-  tercourse of life ; when by its means we pro-  secute our inquiries after truth, or use it dis-  cursively as an instrument of persuasion, then the operation itself is carried on by dwell-  ing on and enforcing the abstract mean-  ing of some of the words and some of the  phrases whUe in their progress towards form-  ing sentences, as of the sentences while in  their progress toward forming the whole ora-  tion or book. But in such cases, language  may more properly be said to help others to  come at our thoughts , than to represent our  thoughts : although it is likewise true, that  we could not ourselves have come at them  but by similar means. Independently of the  words, therefore, the thoughts would have  had no existence j neither should we have  proposed the inquiry after the truths we seek,  nor have imagined any thing in other minds,  by addressing which they could be influenced.  Still, however, in these higher uses of lan-  guage, (uses which are to be dwelt on more  at full in the chapters on Logic and Rhe-  toric,) there is the same difference between  words separately, and the meaning they re-  ceive by mutual qualification and restriction ;     «*    that is to say, in these higher uses of lan-  guage, 83 well as in those already remarked  upon, the parts that make up the whole ex-  pression, are parts of the expression in the  same manner as syllables are parts of a word,  but are 7tol parts of the one whole meaning in  any other way than as the instrumental means  for reaching and for communicating that  meaning. And suppose the communication  cannot be made but by more signs than use  will allow to a sentence, — suppose many sen-  tences are required — many sections, chapters,  books, — we affirm that, as the communica-  tion is not made till all the words, sentences,  sections, &c. are enounced, no part is to be  considered as having its meaning separately,  but each word is to its sentence what each  syllable is to its word ; each sentence to its  section, what each word is to its sentence ;  each section to its chapter what each sen-  tence is to its section, &c. Thus does our  theory apply to all the larger portions of dis-  course, and to the discourse itself, Aristotle's definition of a word, namely, ** a sound sig.  niiicant. of which no part is by itself signi^  ficant ;" * for if our theory- is true, the words  of a sentence, understood in their separate  ^rapacity, do not constitute the meaning of the  whole sentence, (i. e. are not parts of its  whole meaning,) and therefore, as parts of  that sentence, they are not by themselves  significant ; neither do the sentences of the  discourse, understood abstractedly, constitute  the meaning of the whole discourse, and  therefore, as parts of that discourse, they are  not by themselves significant : they are sig-  nificant only as the instrumental means for  getting at the meaning of the whole sentepce  or the whole discourse. Till that sentence  m oration is completed, the Word t is unsaid  which represents the speaker's thought- If   ♦ 4^6jvii (ni/xAVrixiii vi'; A*sf oj oOih B<rri xalP abrh arif/iotv-i   rikiv. De Poetic c. 20.   f In this wide sense of the expression is the Bible  called the Word of God. We shall distinguish the  term by capitals, as often as we have occasion to use it  with simitat comprehensiveness erf meaning.        it be asserted that the parallel does not hold  good with regard to such words as Aristotle  has in view, because, of words ordinarily so  called, the parts, namely the syllables, are not  significant at all, while words and sentences  which are parts of larger portions of dis-  course, are admitted to be abstractedly sig-  nificant, however it may be that their abstract  meaning is distinct from the meaning they re-  ceive by mutual limitation, — we deny the  fact which is thus advanced to disprove the  parallel : we affirm that syllables are signifi-  cant which are common to many words ; for  instance, common prefixes, as wn, mis, corif  dis, bi, tri, &c.; and common terminations,  as nesSjJul, hood, tion, fy, &c. j and so would  every syllable be separately significant, if it  occurred frequently in different combinations,  and we could abstract out of such combina-  tions the least shade of something common in  their application : nor is it peculiar to syllables  to be without signification individually; the  same thing happens to words when they are always combined in one and the same way in  sentences *. Conceiving, then, that we are  fully warranted in the foregoing statement, we  affirm it to be the true basis of Grammar, Lo-  gic, and Rhetoric. Leaving the latter two  subjects for their respective chapters, we pro-  ceed, in this chapter, with such further proofs  as may be necessary to confirm our position  as far as Grammar is concerned.   21. We have imagined the gradual de-  velopment of all the parts of speech recog-  nized by grammarians ; but no reference has  yet been made to the inflexions which some  of them undergo; nor to the diflference of  meaning they receive in consequence of such  inflexion ; nor to interchanges of duty among  the several parts of speech ; nor to pecu-  liarities of use, which so oflen take from them  their characteristic differences; nor to va-   " What separate meaning, for instance, is there,  now, in the words which compose such phrases as, by-  and'bij, goodJi'ye, ftatc-du-you-do, 8cc.     I ON GEAMMAB. t^CHAP. I.   riety of phrase in expressing the same mean-  ing j nor to the power which we frequently  exercise of making the same communication  by one or by several sentences ; nor, in  short, to the multitude of refinements which  grow out of an improving use of language,  many of which seem to confound and destroy  the definitions we obtain from the first and  simplest forms of speech. All these seeming  irregularities will, however, find a ready key  in the general principles we have ascertained.  For our general principles are these : i. That  two or more words joined together in order  to receive, by means of each other, a more  particular meaning, are, with respect to that  meaning, inseparable j since, if separated,  they severally express a general meaning not  included in the more particular one. Hence  it follows, that words may as easdy receive a  more particular meaning by some change of  form, as by having other words added to  them : nay, it seems more natural, when the  principle is considered, to give them a more particular meaninjj by a change of form than  fay any other way. — ii. That a word is tliis or  that part of speech only from the. office it  fulfils in making up a sentence. From this  principle it follows, that a word is liable to  lose its characteristic difference as often as it  changes the nature of its relation to other  words in a sentence ; and it also follows, that  every now and then a word may be used ia   L8ome capacity wliich makes it difficult to be  assigned to any of the received classes of  words. — iii. That since the parts of which a  sentence is composed denote general know-  ledge, distinct from the more particular mean-  ing of the whole sentence, it may be possible i  to work our way to a particular conclusion,  either in reasoning for ourselves or in per- j  auading others, by putting such words to-  gether as form a sentence, that, as a whole,  expresses the particular conclusion; but that  when, from the length of the process, this  cannot be accomplished in a single sentence,  we shall be obliged to work our way by many sentences, whicli will bear the same relation  to the conclusion implied by them as a whole,  as the parts of each sentence bear to what  the sentence expresses. From this principle  it follows, that using many or fewer sentences  to arrive at the same result, will frequently  be optional. The examination of these se-  veral consequences a Httle more in detail  with reference to the principles from which, i  they flow, will complete the chapter.  It is well known, that the inflexions  which nouns, verba, and kindred words are  liable to in many languages, are comparatively  unknown in English, the end being for the  most part attained by additions in the shape  of distinct words. Thusthe particular re-  lation of the word Marcus to the other words  in the sentence, which in Latin is made  known by altering the word into Marco, is  signified in English by the word io ; and to  MarcuSy esteeming the two words as one ex-  pression, is the same as Marco. So likewise  the word amo, which in English signifies /       Gl     l&ve, is adapted to a different meaning by  being changed into amabit, which in English  is to be signified by he mil love, the three  words, taken as a whole, being the same as  the single Latin word. Shall we call to Mar-  cus the dative case of Afarcus, and he will ,  love, the third person singular of the future  tense of / love, as Marco and amabit are re-  spectively called with reference to Marcus  and amo? or shall we parse (resolve into  grammatical parts) those English sentences,  and so deny, in our language, a dative case and '  a future tense ? It is evident that this is a  question which only the elementary grammar-  writer is concerned with : he may suit his own  convenience, and contend the point as he -I  pleases. Thus much is certain, and is quite  sufficient for our purpose, — that to Marcus ,  cannot be considered a dative case, nor he wiU ]  love a future tense, on any other principle than  the one it is stated to flow from, namely;  that marked i. in Sect. 21.   23. To the practical grammarian we may likewise frequently allow, for the sake of con-  venience, the continuing a word under its  usual denomination, when its office, and con-  sequently its character, are essentially changed.  He will love, taking the three words as one  expression, are a verb both on the principles  we have ascertained, and in the practice of  the elementary grammarian : but in parsing  tliis verb — this p^iio, dictum, communication,  01 sentence, — only one of the three words  can properly retain the denomination of verb,  viz. that word to which the others have a re-  ference, by which they hang together, and  are signified to be a sentence, namely, ■will.  As to the word love, which the practical  grammarian will tell us is a verb in the infi-  nitive mood, it does not in fact fulfil the  office of a verb, but of a substantive. But if,  by calling it a verb in the infinitive mood, its  character for practical purposes is con-  veniently marked, we may fairly leave the  matter as it stands. All we insist upon is,  that the doubtful character of the word is a     consequence of the principle marked ii. in  Sect 21."     I • Strictly, there is no verb but when a c  cation ib actually made ; and that word is then the  verb, which expreaseB the communicatioti, or which,  when several words are necessary, ie the sign of union  among the whole of them. A verb not actually in  use is acaptain out of commission, and if we still call  it a verb, it is by courtesy. Home Tooke never an-  swered his own question, " What is that peculiar dif-  ferential circumstance, which added to the definition  of a noun, constitutes a verb ?" (Diversions of Purley,  Vol. II. p. 514),) because he bad previously blinded  himself to the perception of what it is, by laying down  the principle already animadverted upon in a note ap^  ponded to Sect. 3., namely, that the business of the  mind, as far as regards language, extends no fiirther  than to receive impressions: the consequence of which  priuciple would be, (if it could have any consequence  at all,) that the first invented elements of speech were  nouns, or names for those impressions ; which accord-  ingly seems to be his notion, and that verba afterwards  arose from nouns, by assuming the difierential some^  thing that was found to be wanting. Our doctrine is,  that the original element of speech contained both the  artificial noun and the artiiicial verb ; that the mind  exerted its active powers in order to evolve the artir  ficial parts ; that the act of joining them together   It might also perhaps admit of dis-  pute, whether substantives in what are called  their oblique cases, do not, by being the ad-  juncts to other words, and taking a change  of form to signify their servitude, cease in  fact to be substantives, and merit no higher  name than adjectives or adverbs. But here  again we consult convenience by using the  descriptive title, a substantive in the geni-  tive, dative, accusative, or ablative case. We  only need insist, as philosophical inquirers,  that the definition of a substantive in Sect.  15., is not less correct, because it does not in-  clude a substantive in these oblique cases*.   i^ain, made them a verb ; but if the title was given to  one more than to the other, it was given to that which  arose most immediately from the occasion, and took  the other to fis or determine it ; and that subsequently  that word in a sentence came to be coneidcred the  verb, which joined the parts K^ether, and signified  them to be a sentence.   * The only oblique case in English substantives,  is the genitive terminating in 'fi or having only the  apostrophe, the s being elided. Grammarians, in-  deed, have found it necessary to allow an accusative. The very doubt itself which so often  arises, whether a word is this or that part of  speech, — the varying classification of the parts  of speech by different grammarians, — are cir-  cumstances entirely favourable to the theory  advanced, and adverse to any theory which  attempts to explain the parts of speech by a  reference to the nature of our thoughts in-  dependently of language. For if the parts of  speech had taken their origin from this cause*   because pronouns have it : for if  in the sentence Cas-  s-iua loved him, we put the noun where the pronoun  stands, and say, Casmus loved Brutus, it seems con-  venient to consider the noun to be in the same case  that the pronoun was in. On the same principle, the  substantives which, in the classical languages, have no  accusative distinct from the nominative, are neverthe-  less considered to have an accusative, because, lite  other substantives, they can be used objectively with  regard to verbs active and certain prepositions. On  the score of convenienee this must be allowed. But  when words are taken separately, (and this, by  the very delinttion of the word, is the business of  parsing,) it is evident that only those substantives  are, strictly speaking, in the accusative case, which,  when uaed as just staled, have a form to signify it.   surely we could never have been in doubt  either as to vskat, or koio many, they were.  But our theory accounts at once for the in-  certitude on these, and many other points.  We admit no original element of speech but  the VERB, or that one sign which denotes what  the speaker wishes to communicate. If no  one sign can be found adequate to the occa-  sion, then we must make up a sign out of two  or more. Now the division of a verb into  these parts of speech, is necessarily attended  by the consequence, that each part is insigni-  ficant of a communication by itself, and that  they signify it only by being joined together.  Supposing a sentence never consisted but of  two parts, the mere act of joining them to-  gether, would be sufficient to signify that  they were a sentence or verb. But the ne-  cessity or usage of speech being such, that  the hearer knows a sentence may consist of  two or of many words, how is he to be warned  that a sentence is formed, unless to certain  words is given the power of signifying a sentence, while to other words this power is de-  nied until associated with a word of the for-  mer class? Hence the distinction between  noun and verb ; a distinction arising out of  the necessities of speech, and not out of the  nature of our thoughts. The noun and the  verb, then, are the original parts of speech, the  verb beingthepreviouselementof both. But  as each derives its office and character solely  from an understanding between the speaker  and the hearer, a change of understanding  may make them change their offices, and so  the verb shall sometimes be a noun, and the  noun a verb. These changes occur in fact  so frequently, as to require no example.  Then, as we have seen, a noun will frequently  be used as the adjunct of another noun, and  so become an adjective j an adjective or other  word may be joined to a verb, and so become  an adverb j and any of these, by frequent use  in particular combinations, may acquire, or  seem to acquire, a new and peculiar office,  and so become articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. But who can ascertain that de-  gree of use, which, to the satisfaction of every  grammarian, shall fix them in their acquired  character • ? Nay, must not every such word,  of necessity, while in transitu, be at one period  quite uncertain in its character ? In this man-  ner do the effects arising out of such a theory of  the parts of speech as we have supposed, agree  with actual effects, and fully explain them.  26. Again, on any other hypothesis than  the one before us, what are we to think of  compounded nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs,  &c., of which all languages are full ? With-  out adverting to established compounds, such  as (to take the first that occur) husbandman.     * What, for instance, shnll we call the word fi/ce in  such phrases as like him, like me? Originally theword  unto intervening between it and the pronoun, govern-  ed the latter ; but unio cannot now be aid to govern  the pronoun, since it has been so long disused, as to be  no longer mtderstood. We miglit therefore say, that  like is a preposition governing the pronoun : — the  point perhaps is disputed ; — be it so : for this fact jugt  serves our argument.     :    m     worJcmanlike, waylay, browbeat, nevertheless ;  without bringing words from the ilUmitably  compounded Greek language, — we may refer  to such as are not established, but compounded  ibr the particular purpose ; as when Locke  speaksof '* Mr. 'Nev/ton'sjiever-enough-io be ad-  mired book," where the words in italic are an  adjective; and when some old lady pettishly  says to her grandchild " Don't dear Grand'  mother me i" v/here the whole sentence, ex-  cept the pronoun governed in the accusative,  is a verb. So in the phrases to fiAxov <rvvoia-eiv  7^ iroXei the being-about-to-be'prqfitable-to-t/ie-   Ci'/y,— and, TO Tct Tou iroXefiov raj^ii xal Kara   Kaipov Trpa.TTea$at, the completing-spcedili/'and-  seasonablif-the'lhings-for-the-war, we are war-  ranted in considering the whole of the words  following the article, to be, in each instance,  a noun-substantive. For these, and for every  other species of compound, the theory before  US at once accounts. For it shows that the  use of many words to form one sentence, arises  out of the necessities of language only, the na-      tiira] impulse of the mind being tomake its com-  munication by a single expression. Having  complied, then, with the necessities of lan-  guage, and rendered it capable of serving as  the interpreter of much more knowledge than  we could have attained without its help ; we  then return on our steps, and give a unity to  our expressions in every possible way.   27. The corruption of early phrases, by  which, in so many instances, they come under  the denomination of adverb, will be found  another obvious consequence of the present  theory, while they abundantly perplex the  grammarian who attempts to reconcile them to  any other system. "Omnis pars orationis"  says Servius, "quando desinit esse quod est,  migrat in adverbium." " I think" says Home  Tooke, " I can translate this intelligibly —  Every word, quando desinit esse quod est,  when a grammarian knows not what to make  of it, migrat in adverbium, he calls an ad-  verb."* What indeed can be made of such     ' Divctsioiia vi Puiky, Vol. I.     expressions as at all, by and by, to be sure, for  ever, long ago, no, yes. They are adverbs,  say the grammarians. But (to take the  phrases first) what are the words, individually,  of which the adverbs are composed? The  answer will be, they are prepositions, adjec-  tives, &c., which remain from the corruption  of regular phrases once in use. This is a true ,  account of the matter : — yet it leaves us still  to ask, what ai'e these single words, now that  the phrases which produced them exist no  longer in their original state. Let any gram-  marian, if he can, prove their right to the  name of any of the received parts of speech.  Our system, if it does not make a provision  tor them by a name for a new class of words,  at least shows the cause and the nature of their  difference. For according to our principles,  words have both a separate and a, joint signifi-  cation. But if words should be constantly     another place, he says " that this class of words, (ad-  verb,) is the common sink and repository of all hetero-  geneous, unknown corruptions."    occurring in particular combination, this ef-  fect will enaue, — that their separate significa-  tion in such hackneyed phrase, will at last be  quite unattended to, and their joint significa-  tion alone regarded ; — and such phrases will  then be as liable to be clipped in the currency  of speech, as any long word which is trouble-  some to be uttered at full : — thus will the re-  maining parts of the phrase be fixed for ever  in their joint, and lose for ever their separate  signification*. So much for the words com-  posing adverbial phrases. But what are we  to say for no, yes, which probably had the  same origin as the phrases ? These have not,  Hke the phrases, a compound form, nor do  they, like the phrases, always assist in making  up a sentence, but are frequently and proper-  ly pointed oft' by the full stop. Are we, un-  der such circumstances, to call them adverbs P  •• Yes." This is the answer our grammarians  make. But is there, in these words, any     • Thcwordtoas asignofthcinfiiiitivL'moodcumcs  onilcr this doicnption.    thing which gives them a just claim to be  ranked with any of the received classes of  words? " No." This is an assertion it would  be difficult to gainsay. For consider them  well, and we shall find, that, in their present  use, they are not j3ar/s of speech at all, except  with reference to the larger portions of dis-  course of which all the sentences are parts :  they are sentences ; and they afford a striking  example of what was intimated in the prece-  ding section, namely the tendency oflanguage,  in a mature state, to return on its early steps  as far as can be done without losing the ad-  vantages gained : for not only do we, when-  ever we can, bring the smaller parts of speech  into such union as to form larger parts, but  in some instances, (as in these last,) we come  round again to the simpHcity of natural signs.  28. This union of the smaller into larger  parts of speech, and the power we have to dis-  pose the same materials into more or fewer  sentences, will furnish further proofs, that the  present theory of language can alone be the true one. A proper examination of compound  sentences will show, that the grammatical  parts into which they are first resolvable, are  not the single words, but the clauses which  are formed by those words ; which clauses are  substantives, and verbs, and adjectives, and  adverbs, with respect to the whole sentence,  however they may, in their turn, be resolva-  ble into subordinate parts of speech bearing  the same or other names. To take the fol-  lowing as an example : " The sun which set  this evening in the west, will rise tomorrow  morning in the east." The two parts into  which this sentence is resolvable, are, to all  intents and purposes, a noun-substantive and  a verb, if considered with respect to the whole  sentence*. This is the first, or broadest ana-   * And HO may the two parts (technically called the  protasis and apodosis) of every periodic sentence be  considered : for every period, (TEfi'ofos, a circle,) is re-  solvable into two chief parts, the one assimilated to  the semicircle tending out, the other to the rendering-  in, or completing semicircle. These answering parts  ate commonly indicated in Greek by iJth — ft; in En- ]lysis. Then taking the former of these two  chief constructive parts, we shall find it re-  solvable into these two subordinate parts, viz.  the sun, a noun substantive, and w?iick set this  evening in the west, its adjunct or adjective : —  the latter chief constructive part being in the  same way resolvable into will rise, a verb, —  and, tomorrow morning in the east, its ad-  junct or adverb. Returning to the adjective  of the former chief constructive part, we shall   gUsh very frequently by as — so; though — yet, &c.  There may exist a doubt in most sentences so construct-  ed, whether the one part has a claim to be considered  tlie verb more than the other : each part is meant to be  insignificant by itself, and, {as was lately supposed of  the parts of speech in their early institution, before a  sentence was composed of more than two words,) they  Bifrnify a communication by the very act of being join-  ed together. Yet as the protasis is a clause in sus-  pense, and so resembles a substantive in the nomina-  tive case before the verb is enounced ; — as the apodo-  618 removes the suspense, and so resembles the verb in  its effect on tlie substantive ; — it seems that in con-  Hidering the protasis as a nominative case and the apo-  dosis aa its verb, we shall not be far from taking a ,  right view of the principle and procedure.     7find it, if separately viewed, to be a sentence  having its nominative which, its verb set, and  the latter having its adverb tins evening in the  ivest ; which adverb is resolvable into two  clauses of which the former consists of the de-  monstrative adjective this, and evening, a sub-  stantive used objectively with relation to the  preposition on understood •• The latter clause  in the west is nearly similar in its grammatical  parts ; but the preposition it depends upon, is  not understood. This subordinate or adjec-  tived sentence which we have thus taken to  pieces, (viz. which set this evening in the west,')  is however no sentence when considered with   " Or more properly this eeening is an adverb ; for a  word cannot justly be called understood, when its ab-  sence is not suspected till the grammarian informg us of  it : — on before euch phrases when the custom to omit  it had just begun, was indeed understood; it is now  understood no longer, and what remains of any such  phrase is an adverb. As the next clauses, in the tceat,  retains its preposition, we are at liberty to parse the  clause, instead of considering it, in the whole, as an  adverb attcndijig the verb set, though we are also ab  liberty to consider it in the latter way.     reference to the larger sentence of which it is  a grammatical part : but it might, if the  speaker had pleased, have been kept distinct,  and the same meaning have been conveyed by  two simple sentences, as by the one com-  pound one : e. g. " The sun set this evening  in the west : — It will rise tomorrow morning  in the east." Here, we have two sentences or  commuuications. But this is nothing more  than a difference in the manner of conveying  the thought, precisely analogous to the using  of two words that restrict each other, in place  of a single appropriate sign. In the instance  before us, the thought, whether expressed by  the one sentence or the two, is the same ; and  it is one and entire, whatever the expression  may be. For we must not confound the two  facts referred to in the sentences, with what  the mind thinks of the facts : — it is the con-  nexion of the facts that the speaker seeks to  make known. Yet he may imagine he can  best make it known by using the two sen-  tences ; for though, it is true, that while they  are in progress, they will be understood se-  parately, yet no sooner will they be com.  pleted, than the hearer will understand them  limited and determined the one by the other,  and no longer abstractedly as while they were  in progress. In this manner, in correspond-  ence with the principle stated Sect. 21 . iii., will  the same result be obtained by the two, as by  tlie one sentence.   29. This power, which exists in all lan-  guages, of expressing the same thought in a  variety of different ways, is, one would think,  a suiEcient proof, by itself; that thoughts and  words have not the kind of correspondence  whicli is commonly imagined : for if such cor-  respondence had existed, the same thoughts  would always have been expressed, if not by  the same words, yet by words of similar mean-  ing in the same order. Let us suppose that  tlie expressing a thought by several words,'  I had been, (which it is not,) a process analo-  gous to that of expressing the combined sounds  of a single word by several letters. There is  the more propriety in instituting tlie compa-  rison, because men were driven to the latter  expedient by a necessity similar to that which  drove them to the former. For, no doubt,  the first idea of the inventors of writing was,  to appropriate a character for every word ; and  we are told that, to this day, a practice near  to this prevails in China, But it was soon  found that the immense number of characters  this would require, must make the completion  of the design next to impracticable ; and the  expedient was at length adopted of spelling  words. By this expedient, twenty four cha-  racters, by their endless varieties of position  with each other, are capable of signifying the  multitude of words, and the innumerable sen-  tences, which constitute speech. The parts  of speech were set on foot by a similar urgency,  and in tlie same way. At first, every sound  was a sentence. But the communications  which the business of life required, far, far  outnumbered every possible variety of sound.  It was fortunate, therefore, when a necessity     eo     ON C   arose to give to some of the sounds a less par-  ticular application ; for then the requisite sign  was formed out of two or more sounds already  in use, and no new sound was required. So  far the parallel holds ; but it will go no further.  In the spelling of words by letters, the same  letters must always be used, — if not the same  characters, yet characters of the same power.  And it would have been the same in spelling  a thought by words, if the process had been  what it is commonly supposed to be :— that is  to say, the same thought would always have  been expressed by the same words, or if  the words had been changed, the change  must have been word for word, as in a  completely literal translation from one lan-  guage to another. How different this is  from fact, hardly needs further examples in  proof. Mr. Harris attempts to shew *, that     • Hermes, Book I. Chap. 8. We cordially agree  in Home Tooke's opinion of thia well-known work,  that it is " an improved compilation of almost all the  enors which grammarians liave been accumulating     S     tlic different forms or modes of sentences,  depend on the nature of our thoughts. That  the character of a thought has an influence in  determming our preference of this or that  mode of speech, needs not be questioned; but  all the modes of speech, are interchangeable  at pleasure, and therefore they cannot aub-  stantiallydepend on thenature of our thoughts.  An affirmative sentence, " 1 am going out of  town," ma be made imperative, " know,  that I am going out of town ;" or interrogative,  *' Is it necessary to say, that I am going out  of town ?" A negative sentence, " No man is  immortal," maybe made affirmative, "Every  man is mortal." It would waste time and  patience to multiply examples. The con-  clusion, then, is, that the parts of speech and   from the time of Aristotle, to our present days." Di-  versions of Furley, Vol. I. page 120. Vet occasionally,  when our etymologist runs a little bard on this Com-  piler of errors, the theory we advance, opposite as it ib  in its general tenor to all that the Hermes conttuns,  will be found to lend its author a lift. See the section  ensuing in the text.     the forms of sentences, are alike attributable  to the necessities and conveniences of lan-  guage, and not to the nature of our thoughts  independently of language. Perhaps by this  time it may almost seem that an opinion con-  trary to this has no defined existence, and that  the combat has been against a shadow. But  this is not true. If the opinion opposed to the  principles contended for, is seldom ^rwio%  expressed, it is nevertheless universally under-  stood — it is at the bottom of all the systems  of grammar, of logic, and of rhetoric, which  we study in our youth, and which we after-  wards make our children study ; and as it is  an opinion radically, essentially wrong, the  pains employed to overthrow it, cannot, if  successful, have been supeiHuous. In no  other way was a preparation to be made for  an outline of the higher departments of Sema-  tology.   30. New, however, as we believe our  theory to be, yet it is not without authorities in  its favour ; and with these we shall conclude the chapter. Harris, the author of" Hermes,"  in treating of connectives, stumbles unawares  on the fact, that a word which is significant  when alone, may he no significant part of  what is meant hy the expression it helps to  form. He makes nothing indeed of the fact,  further than to lay himself open to the ridicule  of Home Tooke for tKe inconsistent assertions  in which it involves him. " Having" says  Tooke *, "defined a word to he a sound significant, he (viz. Harris) now defines a pre-  position to be a word devoid of signification ;  and a few pages after, he says, ' prepositions  commonly transfuse something of their own  meaning into the words with which they are  compounded.' Now if I agree with him,"  continues Tooke, " that words ai'e sounds  significant, how can I agree that there are  sorts of words devoid of signification ? And if  I could suppose that prepositions are devoid  of signification, how could I afterwards allow,     ' Diversions of Purley, Vol. I. Cliap. 9.     9»    that they transfuse something of their own  meaning?" Yet with all this, Harris is right,  only that he is not aware of the principle,  which lies at the bottom of his own doctriue.  A preposition, as well as every other word,  is a sound significant j — it has an independent  abstract signification : but being joined into a  sentence, it is devoid of that signification it  had when alone : it has then transfused its  own meaning into the word with which It is  compounded, as that word has transfused its  meaning into the preposition — that is to say,  they have but one meaning between them.   31. But Dugaid Stewart, in his Philoso-  phical Essays, furnishes a direct, and a more  satisfactory authority in favour of the theory  we have advanced. " In reading " says he •,  " the enunciation of a preposition, we are apt  to fancy, that for every word contained in it,  there is an idea presented to the understand-  ing ; from the combination and comparison of  which ideas, results that act of the mind  • Philosophical Essays, Essay 5. Chap. I.     called judgment. So different is all this from  fact, that our words, when examined sepa-  rately, are often as completely insignificant aa  the letters of which they are composed, de-  riving their meaning solely from the connexion  or relation in which they stand to others." —  Again : " When we listen to a language which  admits of such transpositions in the arrange-  ment of words as are familiar to us in Latin,  the artificial structure of the discourse  suspends, in a great measure, our conjectures  about the sense, till, at the close of the  period, the verb, in the very instant of its  utterance, unriddles the jenigma. Previous  to this, the former words and phrases resemble  those detached and unmeaning patches of  different colours, which compose what op-  ticians call an anamorphosis ; while the effect  of the verb, at the end, may be compared to  that of the mirror, by which the anamorphosis  is reformed, and which combines these appa-  rently fortuitous materials, into a beautiful  portrait or landscape. In instances of this sort, it will generally be found, upon an  accurate examination, that the intellectual  act, as far as we are able to trace it, is  altogether simple, and incapable of analysis ;  and that the elements into which we flatter  ourselves we have resolved it, are nothing  more than the grammatical elements of  speech j — the logical doctrine about the com-  parison of ideas, bearing a much closer  affinity to the task of a school-boy in parsing  his lesson, than to the researches of philoso-  phers able to form a just conception of the  mystery to be explained." — Had this acute  philosopher brought these views of language  to the elucidation of Grammar, Logic, and  Rhetoric, and so have cleared them from the  incrusted errors of immemorial antiquity,  the reader's patience would not have been  tried by the chapter now finished and those  which are to follow.   Say, first, of God above, or man below.   What can we reason, but from what we know.   POPE.   1. In commencing this branch of Semato-  logy, it may be as well to define not only this  but the other branches, that their presumed  relation and difference may at once appear :   i. Grammar, then, is the right use of  words with a view to their several functions  and inflexions in forming them into sentences ;   ii. Logic is the right use of words with a  view to the investigation of truth ; and   iii. Rhetoric is the right use of words with  a view to inform, convince, or persuade *.   * This definition includes the poet^s use of words  as well as that of every other person, who, having one  or more of the purposes mentioned in view, speaks or     fts          2, The object of the present chapter  will be, to show that there is no art of Logic  (except sucli as is an imposition on the un-  derstanding but that which arises out of the  principles ascertained in the previous chap-  ter ; — that tliis, which is the Logic every man  uses, agrees with the definition in the previ-  ous section; —and that we cannot carry the  definition further, without transgressing a  clearly marked line which will usefidly distin-  guish between Logic and Rhetoric.   3. In affirming that there is no art of Lo-  gic but that which arises out of the use of  signs, we do not mean that reason itself is de-  writes skilfully. Should it be said, that the poet's end  is to delight, — we answer that he gains this end by in-  forming, convincing, or persuading. The true dis-  tinction between the poet and any other speaker or wri-  ter, lies iu the different nature of their thoughts, In  communicating his thoughts, the poet, like others who  are skilful in the use of words to inform, convince, or  persuade, is a rhetorician ; although, with reference to  the creative genius displayed, {iroix^n a jrcn'm,) and al-  so with reference to the added ornament of metre or  rhyme, we chU the result, a poem.         pendent on language. Reason must exist pri-  or to language, or language could not be in-  Vented or adopted. What we affirm is, that  prior to the use of words or equivalent signs,  »o art exists : the mind then perceives, as far  fts its powers extend, intuitively; and thus  working without media, it can no morye ope-  rate otherwise than as at first, than the eye  can see otherwise than nature enables it. The  mind can, however, invent the means to assist  its operations, as it has invented the telescope  to assist the eye ; the difference being, that  the telescope is not such an instrument as all  minds would invent, but the use of signs to  assist its operations, grows out of the human  mind by its very constitution, and the influ-  ence of society upon that constitution.   4. That writers on Logic do not in gene- '  ral view the matter in this light, is evident  from this, that they devote, or at least they  persuade themselves and their readers that  they devote, a great pait of their considera-  tion to the operations of the mind indepeud-     9entlyof language, which, for any practical end,  must evidently be nugatory on the supposi-  tion stated above ; since, if the mind, without  the aid of signs, can but operate as nature en-  ables it, all instruction concerning what the  mind does by itself*, will but be an attempt   * WattB Bays t&at " the design of Logic, b to  teaeli us the right use of our reason." Recurring to   our comparisDU in the previous section, this is as if any  one had proposed to teach the right use of the eye. It  is true indeed, a man may be taught a right use of the  eye, — that is, he may be taught to observe proper ob-  jects by its means ; and so may he be taught a right  use of reason by applying it to those things which are  conducive to his improvement and happiness. But all  this belongs to Morals not to Logic ; nor was this  Watts's meaning. He imagined a man could be tattght  how to use his reason independently of any considera-  tion of an instrument to work with ; as if any one had  offered to teach mankind how to sec with their eyes.  Now, there is nothing preposterous in offering to show  how a telescope is to be used in order to assist the  eye ; nor any thing preposterous in trying to show  how words may be used in a better manner than com-  mon custom instructs us, in order to assist the  mind. — Be it observed that the objection here made,  is to what was proposed to be done by Watts, and not to teach us that which every one does with-  out teaching, and which no teaching can  make us do better : but if, by the use of signs,  the mind can carry its natural operations to  things which it could not reach without signs,  the instruction of the logician should at once  begin by pointing out the use and the abuse  of signs. Now this is in fact the point at  which every teacher of logic does begin, how-  ever he may disguise the real proceeding from  himself, and whatever confusion he may throw  over his subject, by not knowing in what way  he is concerned with it. In pretending to  teach us the nature of ideas j logicians do no-  thing but teach us what knowledge we attain   to what he actually does, except so far as he has done  it amiss from setting out badly. What follows in the  text will explain this last observation.   Our illustration must not lead the reader to think  we are ignorant of the fact that men do learn to see,  that is, to correct, by experience and judgment, the im-  pression of objects on the retina. We take the matter  as commonly understood, namely, that men see correct-  ly by nature, which is near enough to the truth for our  present purpose.     by means of words-, and when Home Tooke  says of Locke's great work, that it is " merely  a grammatical Essay or Treatise on words," *  be comes so near the truth, that it is wonder-  ful he should have so wrongly interpreted  other parts of that philosopher's doctrine.  Putting a wrong construction on Locke's just  fundamental principle, that the mind has no  innate ideas, Tooke affirms that '* the busi-  ness of the mind, as far as it regards language,  extends no further than to receive impres-  sions, that is, to have sensations or feelings.  What are called its operations are merely the  operations of language." t This is palpably  absurd ; ftx how can language operate of it-     • Diversions of I'utley, Vol. I. page 31, note.   -j- Diversions of Purley, Vol. I. page 51. We have  already quoted this passage ; and perhaps more than  ontc : but it is hoped we need not apologise for the re-  petitions whicli may be found in this and the next  chapter. Our purpose is to trace Grammar, Logic, and  Rhetoric, to a common source, and in doing so, if they  really have an origin in common, we must necesEarily  traverse the same ground repeatedly to come at it          aelf? The mind must observe, compare, and  judge *, before it can invent or adopt the lan-  guage of art ; and having adopted it, every  use of it is an exercise of the reasoning facul-  ty, excepting only that kind of instinctive use,  in which some short sentence takes the place  of a natural ejaculation. Feelings or sensa-  tions we cannot help having ; but these do not  help us to language. This requires the ac-  tive powers of the mind ; and every word, in-  dividually, will accordingly be found the sign  of something we kno-w, obtained, as every  thing we know must be obtained, by previous  acts of comparison and judgment, involving,   * These powers of the mind are innate, — that is  to e&y, they belong to tlie mind by its constitution, al-  though sensation is the appointed means for first call-  ing them forth. It should seem as if Tooke thought  nothing was bom with man except the power to receive  senEStionB or feelings, and that reason comes from Un-  guage ; an opinion so preposterous that we can hardly  think him capable of it ; and yet, from what he says,  no other can be understood : — " Jleason,"" he says, " ia  the result of the senses, and of experience." Diver-  sions of Purley, Vol. 11, p^e 16.     J^    in every instance beyond that which sets the  sign on foot, an inference gained by the  use of a medium. And such, as we have seen,  are the necessities of speech, that tliey lead  us constantly to extend the application of  words ; which extension requires new acts of  comparison and judgment; and thus, by  means of words, (or signs equivalent to words,)  we are constantly adding to our knowledge,  still carrying the signs with us, to mark and  contain it, and to serve afterwards as the media  for reaching new conclusions. It is only ne-  cessary to read Locke's Essay with this ac-  count of the matter in view, to prove that it  is the true account j so readily will all that he  has said on ideas, yield to this simple inter-  pretation *, He who first made use of words     * " Read," saya Home Tookc, " the Essay on the  Underslnnding over with attention, and see whether  all that its immortal author has justly concluded, will  not hold equally true and clear, if we substitute the  composition, &c. of lerraa, wherever he has supposed a  composition, Sec. of ideas. And if that, upon strict  examination, appear to you to be the case, you will equivalent to yellow, white, heat, cold, soft,  hard, bitter, sweet*, used them, respectivelyy  to signify the individual sensation he was con-  scious of, and in that first use, the expression  must have been a sentence, or tantamount to  a sentence. By experience, he came to know  the exterior cause of that sensation, and after-  wards, by the same means, to know that other  need no other argument against the composition of  ideas : it being exactly similar to that unanswerable one  which Mr. Locke himself declares to be sufficient  against their being innate. For the supposition is un-  necessary : every purpose for which the composition  of ideas was imagined being more easily and naturally  answered by the composition of terms, whilst at the  same time it does likewise clear up many difficulties in  which the supposed composition of ideas necessarily in-  volves us." Diversions of Purley, Vol, I. page 38.  In this, and other passages, H. Tooke is very near  the trutli ; but he nevertheless misses it. " The com-  position, Sic. of terms "' in lieu of " the composition, &c.  of ideas," does not describe the actual process. But  Tooke, who discovers that Locke has started at a  wrong place, begins his own theory from a false found-4  ation.   • yide Locke, B. 2. ad initium : we have used  the examples before. Chap. I, Sect. 16.      ol^ects produced the same sensation. To  these several objects he would naturally apply  the expression (originally tantamount to a sen-  tence) by which he first signified the sensa-  tion ; and suppose those objects already pro-  vided with namesj the expression would, in  such pew application, be tantamount to a  name or noun-adjective. Thus in the several  instances, he would use two names for one  thing, in correspondence with our present  practice when we say, yclhw flower, yellow  sky, yellow earth, yellow skin. Such a proce-  dure is an effect and a proof of what the speak-  er has observed in common, and of what he  observes to be different, in the several ob-  jects; and this is a knowledge evidently ob-  tained from comparison and judgment exer-  cised on many particulars. The same know-  ledge enables us, when we please, to drop the  words which name the objects accojding to  their differences, and to retain only that which  signifies their similarity, and the name-adjec-  tiv e then becomes a name-substantive standing for the sensation itself whenever or how4  ever produced, and not standing for it in amy  particular case, until limited to do so by the  assistance of other words. Individually and  separately, then, these words^ viz. yellow;  white, heat, cold, soft, &c. are, to him who  has properly used them in particulars, tiie  eigns of the knowledge he ha^ gained by com^  paring those particulars :«^hey denote con-  clusions arising out of a rational process which  has been carried on by their means ; which  conclusion, as to the word^elloWf for instaop^  is this, — ^that there are » great mwy Qbjepte  which produce the same sensation, or a sensar  tion very nearly the same j*— ^(very nearly the  same, since yeU&w^ by all who have acquired  a full use of the word, is applied to different  shades of yellow j — ) and to understand the  word, is to have arrived at, or kno^ this cof^-  elusion.   5. The words so far referred to, are those  which denote what Locke calls simple ide^js.  Now, we may reasonably doubt wheth^ the mind could have obtained the knowledge,  which, as we have seen, is included even in  a word of this kind, if it had not been gifted  with the power of inventing a sign to assist  itself in the operation. That sign needs not  be a word, though words are the signs com-  monly used. He who remembers the sensa-  tion of colour produced by a crocus, is re-  minded of the crocus the next time he has  the same sensation from a different thing ;  and the crocus may become the sign of that  sensation arising from the new object, and  from every future one. And this is the way  in which the mind probably assists itself an-  tecedently to the use of language, or where,  (as in the case of the totally deaf *,) the use of     * Though long for a quotation, yet we cannot re-  sist transcribing, from a work by Dr. Watson, master  of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum, Kent Road, near  London, the following able remarks : — they will help  to shew how for superior are audible signs to every  other kind, and place in its proper light the misfor-  tune of being naturally incapable of them. He is  speaking of the comparative importance of the two  it, by the ordinary means of attainment, is  precluded. But for this power of the mind,   senBES, hearing and seeing. " Were the point," he  says, " to be determined by the value of the direct  sensations transmitted to the sensorium through each  of them, merely as direct sensations, there could not  be any ground for a moment's hesitation in pro. ,  nouncing the almost infinite superiority of the ej/e to ]  the ear. For what is the sum of that which we derive I  from the car as direct sensation P It is sound ; and  sound indeed admits of infinite variety ; but strip it of j  the value it derives Irom arbitrary associations, and it  is but a titillation of the organ of sense, painful or  pleasurable according as it is shrilly soft, rough, dis-  cordant, or harmonious, Sec. Should one, on tlic con-  trary, attempt to set forth the sum of the information we  derive from the eye " — independently of the aid derived  from arbitrary means — " it is so immense, that volumes  could not contain a full description of it ; so precious,  ' that no words short of those we apply to the mind itself,  can adequately express its value. Indeed, all lan-  guages bear witness to this, by figuratively adopting  visible imagery to signify the highest operations of in-  tellect. Expunge such imagery from any language,  and what will be left ! What, in this case, must be-  come of the most admired productions of human ge-  nius P Whence then (and the question is often asked) 1  does it arise, that those bom blind have such su-  h2    which seems pecuHai* to man, and is the  cause of language, (not the effect of it, as     perlority of imelligence over those bom deaf? Take,  it miglit be said, ii boy nine or ten years of age who  has never seen the light, and you will find him con-  versable, and ready to give long narratives of past oc-  currenceH, &c. Place by his side a boy of the same  age who baa had the misfortune to be bom deaf, and  observe the contrast. The latter is insensible to all  you say : he smiles, perhaps, and his countenance ie  brightened by tlie beams of ' holy light;' he enjoys  the face of nature; nay, reads with attention your  features ; and, by sympathy, reflects your smile or  your frown. But he remains mute : he gives no ac-  count of past experience or of future hopes. You at-  tempt to draw something of this sort from him : he  tries to understand, and to make himself understood ;  but he cannot. He becomes embarrassed : you feci  for him, and turn away from a scene so trying,  under an impression that, of these two children of mi^  fortune, the com])ari8on is greatly in favour of the  blind, who appears, by his language, to enter into all  your feelings and conceptions, while the unfortunate  deaf mute can hardly be regarded as a rational  being ; yet he possesses all the advantages of vi-  sual information. All this is true. But the cause  of this apparent superiority of intelligence in the blind,  is seldom properly understood. It is not that those    H. Tooke seems to tliiak,) we never should  have been able to arrange olyects in classes,   who are blind possess a greater, or anything like an  equai stock of materiak for mental op^adons, but bs-  cause they possess an invaluable etigine for forward-  ing those operotioiis, however scanty the materials to  operate upon — artificial language. Language is de-  fined to be the expression of thought ; so it is : but it  is, moreover, the medium of thinking. Its value U>  man is nearly equivalent to that of his reasoning fa-  culties: without it, he would hardly be rational. It  is the want of language, and not the want of hearing,  (unless as being the cause of the wont of language,)  that occasions that deficiency of intelligence or ine&.  pansion of the reasoning faculty, so observable in the  naturally deaf and dumb. Give them but language,  by which they may designate, compare, classiiy, an4  consequently remember, excite, and express their sen^  sations and ideas, — then they must surpass the origin<  ally and permanently blind in intellectual perspicuity  and correctness of comprehension, (as far as having  kctual ideas afiixed to words and phrases is concerned,)  by as much as the sense of seeing, furnishes matter for  mental operations beyond the sense of hearing, con-  Eidered as direct sensation. It is one thing to have a^  fluency of words, and quite another to have correct no-  tions or precise ideas annexed to them. But though  the car furnishes us only with the sensation of sound,  and reason on them when so arranged ; nor to  consider some common quality in many ob-  jects, separately from the objects themselves.  Every object might have produced the same  individual effect by the senses, which it now  produces, and have been recognized as the  same object when it produced the effect  again ; for all this happens to other animals,  as to man ; but to know a something in each  which is common to many, implies a remem-  brance of that something in the rest at the  time of perceiving each individually j and  how can this remembrance, (a remembrance   and sound, merely as such, can stand no comparlEOD  with the multiform, delightful, and important informa-  tion derived from visual imprestiioDS ; yet as sound  admits of such astonishing variety, (above all when  articulated,) and is associablc, at pleasure, in the mind  with our other sensations, and with our ideas," (notions,)  " it becomes the ready exponent or nomenclature of  thought ; and in this view is important indeed. It is  on thie account, chiefly, that the want of hearing is to  be deplored as a melancholy chasm in the human  frame.'" Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb,  not of the objects, but of a common some-  thing in all of them,) how can it be kept up,  but by a sign fitted to this duty ; which sign,  as just observed, may be either a word, or  one of the objects set up to denote the com-  mon characteristic, and retained in mind  Bolely for this purpose, in this representative  capacity ?   6. In proceeding from what are called by  Locke simple ideas to those he denominates [  complex, we shall find the account just given  equally applicable. The words he refers to .  under the threefold division of Modes, Sub-  stances, Relations, are, as our last examples,  signs of certain conclusions obtained from s  comparison of particulars. This is true even \  of a proper name ; for a proper name, as was '  shewn Chap. I. Sect. 3., does not denote an  individual as we actually perceive him, or as. J  we remember him at any one time ; but it J  denotes a notion, that is, a knowledge of him I  drawn out of, or separated from all our par- '     I04f oNr Lo&ic. [cHap. ii.   ticular perceptions *• For such an effect of  reason^ we have however nb certainty that  the superior powers of the huknan mind ar«  indispensable; nor is it eiisy to ascertaiq  any peculiar privilege it enjoys till we find  it rising from individuals to classes. As  soon as it sets up a sign to represent some  property, whether pure or mixed, which has  been observed iA many individuals,— or to re-   * It id aft efifect of reaisoiiing to know that a pa]>>  ticular act or situation, which enters into our percep-  tion or conception of an object, is not essential — to  know, for instance, tliat the act of walkiAg is ftot es-  iBentiAl to John. The reasoning by which «uch k^w-  ledge is acquired, occurs indeed so early, that the  operation is forgotten ; but there was a time when our  perceptions were without the knowledge, because they  had not been repeated i^ isu^ti^t hUtiibet to leHkbl^  the mind to make the BCcessary ootaipluidcms^ Th^  natives of the South Sea Islands^ when Cttptaia Cook  <8nd his companions first made their appearance among  them, took every sailor and his garments to be one  creature, and did not arrive at a different condhision,  but by o{>portuiiitte6 fdr comparicon.     present the whole class of individuals, so  classed because of the common property, — ^it  displays a power of assisting itself which we  have no cause to think any of the inferior  animals enjoy. To ahew how this takes place  in producing what Locke calls complex ideas,  and which he subdivides into Modes, Sub-  stances, Relations, would only carry us onc^  more over the ground we have so often cur-   Lsorily traversed. We should have to shew,  for instance, how some word, at first equiva-  lent to a sentence, by which a man expressed  his delight at a particular visible object, came  to be a name for the object ; how this name  beauly, came to be applied as a noun-adjec-  tive to the nouns-subatantive of other objects  producing the same or a similar emotion j  how, by the continued application of this  noun-adjective, we kept on comparing innu?  merable particulars, till our knowledge (no-  tion) included a very wide class of things  very different indeed in other respects, — nay^  including objects of other senses than sight—   but still, agreeing with each other in a certain  effect produced on the mind : and that then,  dropping the nouns-substantive of the nu-  merous individuals, we retained solely in con-  templation the noun beautiful or beauty, the  sign of the knowledge we had gained from  this extensive comparison— of the induction  derived from these numerous particulars *.   • Very few persons reach so wide a knowledge of  the subject as we here refer to, and books may be, and  have been written, to teach us how to apply the word  beautiful with taste, and critical — nay, moral pro-  priety. Having attained so far, we are not to suppose that  beautiful or beauty is a real existence independently  of the classification of objects we have thus established.  All we have learned is, to know the objects which pro-  duce a certain elfect ; to know why they produce it ; to  enjoy, it is probable, the pleasure of that effect with  higher relish ; and to be prepared, by means of the  classiUcation we have formed, to lise, in our reasonings  on the objects it contains, to higher truths, and still  more important conclusions. Now, if the reader would  see how a business so plain and simple, may appear  very complex and mysterious, let him consult  Plato  on the beautiful or t'o xayjtv, as he will find it treated,  for instance, in the dialogue called STMHOSION :  Let him admire as he will, (for who can help it. We should again have to shew, (to take  another instance,) how a word once expres-  sive of some sentiment or recognition of  which a horse was the subject, came to be  used as a name for that particular horse i  that the name came afterwards to be given to  another resembling creature, — thence to  another, — and to others, till the points of re-  semblance which led to this extension of the  word, could be found no longer *. We should   especially in company with Cicero, — witness his Errare  tnekercule malo cum Plaione, quam cum istia vere  sentire?) let him admire the sublimity which the  amiable and highly-gifted Athenian throws over his  doctrine ; but let him not be betrayed into an opinion,  that a speculation which is in the most exalted etriun  liipoeh'y, belongs to the sober, the undazzled, and tin-  dazzling views of philosophy.   • Compare Chap. I.Sect, 10. We may be per-  mitted once more to observe, that, with regard to sab-  stances at least, the sign of the class needs not be a  word : one individual set up for all, will equally serve  the purpose. Not that the boundaries of a class are  plain, till an accurate logic determines them ; but the  general differences (as of the horse, for instance) are  sufficiently obvious to prevent a person from being  likewise have toshew, (totake a third instance,)  how some word,-^originally equivalent, like  the others, to a sentence, — by which a man  expressed his gratitude for kind offices, might  come to be a name for every one to whom  gratitude for similar offices was due; and  how this ua.me,Jriend, applied at first only to     misled, who carries one individual in his mind ae the  eign of all he has seen, and all he calculates on seeing,  and reasonB on this one, with a conviction that the  reasoning includes all the others. The idea of an in-  dividual thing which is thus set up as the represent-  ative of a class, may perhaps, without impropriety, be  called a general idea ; and if Locke had never used  the expression but in subservience to such an cxplana-  uon, little or no exception could have been taken to  it. There is a passage (Essay on the Understanding,  Book III., Chap. 3. Sect. Jl.) which perfectly ac-  cords with the doctrine in the text, and proves that  though Locke had misled himself by setting out with  an opinion that the operations of the human under-  standing could be treated of independently of words,  he had more correct thoughts on the subject as he  proceeded. Another passage, giving a correct account  of abstraction with reference to language as the instru-  ment, will be found Book IL Chap. II- Sect. 9-     one who stood in this ration to the speaker,  came at last, by observing and comparing  other cases, to be applied to all who stood in  the same relation to any other person. We  should, in short, have to shew the same pro-  cess with regard to all the examples of modes,  substances, and relations, which Locke's Es-  say supplies; but with these brief hints to  guide him, the reader may be left, in other  instances, to trace the process for himsdf.  It will now be time, — still witii reference to  the principles ascertained in the last chapter,  —to examine some other points of doctrine in-  sisted upon by writers on Logic.   7. The operations of the mind necessary  in Logic are said to be three, viz. Percep-  tion or Simple Apprehension ; Judgment ;  and Reasoning. Under the first of these di-  visions, writers on Logic treat of ideas, or  the notions denoted by separate words, that  is, words not joined into sentences ; — under  the second, they give us separate sentences,  technically called propositions j — ^and under  the third, they shew how two propositions  may of necessity produce another, so that the  three shall express one act of reasoning. Now,  that perception, judgment, and reasoning,  are all essential to Logic, needs not be called  in question ; but if the theory we have before  us in this treatise be true, the common doc-  trine will appear, by the manner in which it ex-  emplifies these acts of the mind, to have com-  pletely confounded what really takes place, in  the preparation for, and in the exercise of this  art. What, in the first place, is perception but a  sensation or sensations from exterior objects  accompanied by a judgment ? Our earliest  sensations are unaccompanied by any judg-  ment upon them ; for we must have ma-  terials to compare in order to judge ; and  these materials, in the earliest period of our  existence, are yet to be collected. At length,  we can compare j and because we can com-  pare, we judge, and hence we come to know :  — " I know that the object which now affects  my sense of vision is a being like myself; I        know him to be one of a great many similar  beings j I know him to be older or younger,  &c. ; I know that what now affects my sense of =  hearing, is the cry or bark of a dog" •, &c.j  I could not know all this, if I had had no  means of judging ; and I can have no means  of judging which the senses do not originally  furnish or give rise to. Perceptiouj then,  (which in every case is more than mere sen-  sation,) always includes an act of judgment ;  and to treat of Perception and Judgment  under different divisions of Logic, must pre-  vent the proper understanding of both. In-  stead, however, of the term Perception, some  writers t use that of Simple Apprehension.  *' Simple apprehension," says Dr. "Wliately,  *' is the notion (or conception) of any object  in the mind, analogous to the perception of  the senses." t The examples appended to     • See Chap. I. Sect. 16.  of- Viz. Professor Duncan and Dr. Whately.  J Elements of Logic by Dr. Whately, Chap. II.  Part I. Sect. 1.      this definition, are, *'inan;" "horse;"  •'cards ;" " a man on horseback ;" " a pack  of cards." Now, if the notion or conception  of tliese, 13 analogous to the perception of  them by the senses, — then, as the perception  includes an act of judgment, so Ukewise  does the conception. But, in truth, the no-  tion corresponding to any of these expressions,  is very different from the perception of a  man, a horse, a man on horseback, &c. ;  and the word or phrase in a detached state  does not stand for a perception or concep-  tion inclusive only of an act of judgment,  but signifies an inference obtained by the use  of a medium, — in other words, a rational  conclusion. For in all cases, what gives the  name and character of rational to a proceed-  ing, is the use of means to gain the end in  view. When we perceive intuitively of two  men, that one is taller than the other, al-  though the judgment we form may be an  e0ect of reason, yet we do not describe it as  a rational process ; but if the investigator,  not being able to make a direct comparison  between them, introduces a medium, and by  its means infers that one is taller than the  other, then we say the conclusion has been  obtained by a process of reason *. So, in  applying a common name to two individuals  that are intuitively perceived to resemble,  we may be said to exert the judgment, and  nothing more ; but if we apply it to a third,  and a fourth, and a fifth, it is a proof that we  measure each by the common qualities ob-  served in the first two, and that we carry in  the mind a sign of those common qualities  (whether the name, or one of the former in-  dividuals) for the purpose of carrying on the  process. In this way, an abstract word or  phrase, let it signify what it will, provided it  be but abstract, is both the sign of some ra-     • Reasnn is the capacity for using mpdia of any  kind, and it consequent capacity for language : — the  term reasoning has reference to tlie act of thinking,  with the aid of media in order to reach a couclu-     tional conclusion the mind has already come  to, and the means of reaching other conclu-  sions : which statement is true even of a  proper name. For the name John, for in-  stance, underetood abstractedly, does not sig-  nify John as we now perceive him, or as we  have perceived him at any one time ; but it  signifies our knowledge of him separately  from any of those perceptions. But we could  not know of him separately from our percep-  tions, unless we had the power of setting up  some sign (whether the name or aught else)  of what was common to all those perceptions,  and comparing them all with that sign *.   • It is not meant that we could not know him  every time we perceived him, but that we could not  know of him separately from our perceptiong, if we bad  not the power spoken of in the text. It might be  curious to trace this distinction in the case of a dog.  A dog knowE his master every time he perceives him :  — when he does not perceive him, he is reminded of  his absence by some change in his sensations, — (smcU,  for instance, as well as sight, and perhaps some  others ;) he therefore seeks him, and irets if he cannot  find him. But abstracted from all perception, and     It appears, then, from what precedes,  that words and phrases which writers on  Logic give as examples of Perception or  Simple Apprehension distinct from Judg-  ment and from Reasoning, are no examples  at all of the first distinct i'rom the latter two ;  and equally groundless will appear that dis-  tinction which refers a proposition to an act  of judgment separate from reasoning. Not  that an act of reasoning takes place whenever  a proposition or sentence is uttered. For, as  we have seen in the previous chapter, (Sect.  19.) a speaker does not always think of the  separate meaning of the words when he utters  a sentence ; and if a sentence denotes, as a  whole, some sensation or emotion not de-  pendent on reason, (for instance, " My head  aches;" •' My eyes are delighted,") the ut-  tering of it as a whole, without attending to  the sqiarate words, will no moj'e express aa     from all notice by change of sensation, it will scarcely  be contended that a dog knows of his master, as a ra-  tionsl being knows of his absent friend.     act of reasoning, or even of judgment, than  would a natural ejaculation arising out of the  occasion, and used in place of the sentence.  But the following propositions, " Plato was a  philosopher;" "No man is innocent ;" which  are given in Watts's Logic as examples of the  act of the mind called Judgment, stand on a  different footing ; and we affirm that, being  used Logically, they involve not an act of  judgment merely, but express a conclusion  drawn from acts of reasoning.   9- Previously to shewing what has just  been asserted, let us distinguish a grammati-  cal, and an historical understanding of these  sentences ; for a mere grammatical under-  standing of them must be, and an historical  may be, essentially different from the logical  understanding of them. A grammatical un-  derstanding, for example, of the sentence,  Plato was a philosopher, is merely a recog-  nition of its correctness as a form of speech  without considering whether it conveys any  meaning or not ; and it would be grammatically understood if any words whatever were  substituted for those that compose the sen-  tence, provided they had a proper syntactical  agreement. An historical understanding im-  plies some concern with the meaning of the  sentence ; but this may be very different in  kind and degree, as depending on the know-  ledge whicli the mind is previously possessed  of. If the hearer did not know what Plato waa  previously to the communication, but knew the  meaning of the word philosopher, he would,  by the sentence, be informed what he was, If  he previously knew, from history, how Plato  lived, thought, and acted, but did not know  the meaning of the term philosopher, the ad-  ditional information conveyed to him by the  sentence, would be but little : he would be in-  formed. Indeed, that he was called a philoso-  pher, but why or wherefore, he could, for the  present, only guess. Let us suppose, however,  that before he comes to calculate why Plato is  called a philosopher, he had heard the word  plied to others : if he bad heard Socrates     m     [chap. II.     called a philosopher, and Confucius a philosopher, he would, on hearing Plato so called,  compafe the individuals in order to ascertain  some common qualities in all, of which the  word might be the sign, and getting these,  he would know or have a notion of the word  philosopher ; though the notion would pro-  bably undergo many modifications as otlier  individuals, Solomon, Seneca, Locke, Rous-  seau, Newton, were successively subjected to  the common sign : — for if the hearer fixes his  notion at once, many individuals will perhaps  be excluded from his class of philosophers,  which other people include under that term ;  and perhaps he will include many, which the  usage of the term excludes. In this way,  then, while our knowledge of what is included  in separate words or phrases is imperfect, we  may nevertheless have some understanding of  the sentences we hear or read ; and this his-  torical understanding suggests the reasoning  process just described, by which we get a  logical understanding of the separate words. But now to make a logical use of  tfaem in framing a proposition. We suppose  the preliminary steps, namely the knowledge  included in the separate words ; we suppose  it to be known, from history, how Plato lived,  thought, and acted ; we suppose it to be  known what is meant by philosopfier, by  having heard the word applied to many indi-  viduals i but we have not yet applied it to '  Plato ; in other words, we have yet to ascer-  tain whether Plato belongs to the class of in-  dividuals denominated philosophers. Writers  on Logic talk of a comparison of ideas for  this purpose, and of an intuition or judgment ;  but this, to say the best of it, is an imperfect  and bungled account of the matter. If, in-  deed, to know how Plato lived and acted can  be called an idea, it is necessary to have this  idea ; it is further necessary to have a clear  notion of the term philosopher, — if this again  can be called an idea: — and it is true enough  that in comparing Plato with this sign, we  judge or know their agreement intuitively. But out of this intuitive judgment an infer-  ence arises, and the sentence expresses that  inference : a comparison has been instituted  through the intervention of a medium, in  order to ascertain whether Plato is to be as-  signed to a certain class of individuals ; we  intuitively perceive his agreement with the  medium, and draw or pronounce our infer-  ence accordingly, — " Plato was a philoso-  pher." Nor is this the splitting of a hair,  but a real distinction, marked and determined  by that difference in the words so often  pointed out, when understood detachedly,  and when understood as a sentence. The  proposition, Plalu was a pJiilosopher, may be  understood as a whole, without making the  comparison in the mind between what Plato,  and what philosopher, abstractedly signify j  but this, with a full understanding of the  whole sentence, can be done only after the  comparison has once at least been effectually  made : — then indeed, when the comparison  has been made, and the inference drawn, the sentence which expresses that inference, be-  comes, like any single word, the sign of knowledge deposited in the mind, and, like  such single term, it is fitted to be an instru-  ment of new comparisons, and further con-  clusions.   11. Let us now take another proposition :  *' A philosopher, or every philosopher," (for  the meaning is the same,) " is deserving of  respect." This, hke the other, is an infer-  ence from a comparison which took place in  the mind ; previously to which comparison,  the notion or knowledge included in the word I  philosopher was obtained in the manner lately  described (Sect. 9.) : and the notion included  in the phrase to be deserving of respect was  similarly obtained, but independently of the  knowledge denoted by the other expression ;  — that is to say, the phrase deserving of re-  spect, was originally, we suppose, a sentence  applied to some one thing deserving of re-  spect J whence it was successively applied to  other things till a class was formed — in other  words, till a notion (knowledge) was esta-  blished in the mind of what things are de-  serving of respect. Now, the present ques-  tion is, whether a philosopher is deserving of  respect ? To determine this, we consider  what a philosopher is, (it is presupposed tliat  we have this knowledge,) and we then niea-  Bure our notion of a philosopher with our no-  tion of what is deserving of respect, and thus  £nd that a philosopher is to be admitted  among the things to which we had been ac-  customed to apply the designation deserving  qf respect : that is to say, we come to the  conclusion, that a philosopher is deserving of  respect. Here, therefore, as before, there has  been a reasoning process previously to the  proposition, and the proposition expresses the  inference from it. And the comparison  having once been made in this instance as in  the other, the sentence becomes, like any  single term, the sign of knowledge deposited  in the mind, and like such single term, is  fitted to be an instrument of new compsrisons, and further conclusions. Well then, we know  from reasoning these two things, that " Plato  IB a philosopher," and that " a philosopher is  deserving of respect." These are detached  WORDS* or sentences : but the mind, in com-  paring them, at once comes to the inference  that Plato is deserving of respect: and the  whole may be expressed in one sentence ;  thus ; " Plato, who is a philosopher, is deserv-  ing of respect j" where Plato-who-is-a-pJiiio-  sopher, is equivalent to a noun-substantive in  the construction of the whole sentence ; and,  deserving-qf-respect is equivalent to another ;  and thus the two, with the assistance of the  verb which signifies them to be a sentence,  are but one proposition. Here, as in the  former cases, a comparison has been made \ij.  means of the signs of deposited knowledge ^  for we knew that Plato was a phUosopher;  we knew a class of things or persons deserv-  ing of respect: — comparing our knowledge by   • See the second note (Aristotle's definition of a'  vord bcuig the first) appmded to Sect. 20. Chap. I.    ir.   means of the sign deserving-of-respect, the in-  ference follows, that " Plato, who is a philo-  sopher, is deserving of respect." And the  comparison having once been made in this  instance as in the others, the sentence be-  comes, like any single terra , the sign of know-  ledge deposited in the mind, and either in  this or any other equivalent form, is fitted to  be an instrument of new comparisons and  further conclusions. And in this manner are  we able, ad infinitum, to investigate new  truths by means of those already ascertained,  always making use of former words or their  equivalents, as the means of operation.   12. Now, so far as Logic is the art of in-  vestigating truth, (and we intend to show that  its office ought not to be considered of further  extent,) this is the whole of its theory. We  have defined it as the right use of words with  a view to the investigation of truth ; and the  way in which words are used for the purpose,  is that which has been described : — in brief,  they are used by the mind in making such comparisons as it cannot make intuitively. Of  two objects, or of a sensation or emotion  twcie experienced, we can intuitively judge  what there is in common between them;,  l< suppose a third object, or a sensation, &c«  thrice experienced, an intuitive judgment can  still be applied only to two at a time, and wei  can but know in this way what there is  common to every two. But if we set up tf  sign of what is common to two, we can compare  with the sign a third, and a fourth, and a  fifth, and judging intuitively how far it agrees  with the sign, we infer its agreement in thq  same proportion with the things signified,  In Logic, the sign used is always presumed  to be a word. Now, in our theory of Ian-  guage, every word was once a sentence ; and  every sentence which does not express the  full communication intended, but is qualified  by another sentence, or becomes a clause of a  larger sentence, is precisely of the nature of  any single word making part of a sentence *.  • See Chap. I. Sect. 28.     IM     I^CMAP. 11,     From the first moment, then, of converting  the expression used for a particular communi.  cation, into an abstract sign of the sentiment  or truth which that communication conveyed,  the mind came into possession of the instru-  mental means for furthering its knowledge :  and this means always remains the same in  kind, and is always used in the same way.  The word which once signified a present par-  ticular perception, ceased, through the ne-  cessities of language, to signify that percep-  tion in particular, and came to signify, in the  abstract, any perception of the same kind, or  the object of any such perception. In this  state, it no longer communicated what the  mind felt, thought, or discovered at the  moment, but was a sign of knowledge gather-  ed by comparisons on the past. By u«ng this  Bign, the mind was able to pursue its inves>  tigations, and every new discovery was de-  noted by a sentence which the sign helped to  form, its general application being limited to  the particular purpose by other signs. But if  one WORD"  ' may lose its particular pnrpose,  and become an abstract sign, so may another,  and be the means, in its turn, of prosecuting  further truths, and entering into the com-  position of new WORDS. Thus will the procesa  which constitutes Logic, be aiways found one  and the same in kind, having for its basis the  constitution of artificial language, such as it  was ascertained to be in the previous chapter.   H 13. Now of this Lc^ic, — the Logic, uni-   H versally, of ntpotres, or woKD-dividing men, —   H let the characteristics be well observed, in order   H to keep it clear from any other mode of using   H signs for the purpose of reasoning, to which   H the name of Logic is attributed. The Logic   H here described, is a use of words to regista-   H our knowledge as fast as we can add to it, by   H new examinations, and new comparisons of   I things } each new esamination, each new   H sen!     • The reader will bear in mind the comprehenBive  sense of the term which we have in view, when it is  printed in capitate.  comparison, being made with the help and  the advantage of our previous knowledge.  The reasoning takes place in the mind in such  a manner that it is not a comparison of terms,  but a comparison of what we newly observe,  with what we previously knew. Words indeed  are used, because without signs of one kind  or of another to keep before the mind the  knowledge already gained, we could compare  only individuals j but however words may in-  tervene, it is always understood that the mind,  at bottom, compares the things, A man  may be informed, that, " Plato who is a phi-  losopher, is deserving of respect;" that,  " William who is recommended to his service,  is an honest man ;" that, *• A particular tree  in his garden, is a mulberry tree ;" that,  " Stealing is a vice, and temperance is a  virtue ;" that, " Throughout the Universe, all  greater bodies attract the smaller ;" that, " A  triangle described within two circles in such  a manner that one of its sides is a radius of  both, and the others, radii of each circle respectively, is an equilateral triangle;" — a  man may be informed of these and similar  ^'things, and may entirely believe the inform-  ation; nay, hemayjustifiably believe it J for he  may know of those who give it, that their ho-  nesty is such, that they would not wilfully de-  ceive him ; that their intelligence and inform-  ation are such, that they are not likely to say  what they do not know to be true : but a man  can be said to know these things of his own  knowledge, and in this way to be convinced  of their truth, only by a process of reasoning  that musl take place within his own mind ; a  process which can take place only in a mind  by nature competent to it, and which requires,  in every case, its proper data or facts, aided,  it is true, by language, or by signs such as Ian-  guage consists of, to register each inference *,  • The necessity of language, as a means of in-  vestigation, applies not to our last example. The mincl  may investigate (though no one can demonstrate)  mathematical truths, with no other aid than visible  diagrams ; or even diagrams that are seen only by  " the mind's eye." and so to get from one inference to another,  and thus, ad infinitum^ toward truth. Be-  cause the several steps, leach of which is a  conclusion so far attained, cannot take place,  without the instrumentality of signs to assist  the mind, we consider the process an art ; and  if the signs used are words, the art is pro-  perly called Logic. But whatever aid the  reasoner may borrow from words, the only  true grounds of his knowledge are the facts  about which the reasoning is employed.  Without them, no comparison of the terms  can force any conviction further than that  the terms agree or disagree. He may be told  that — " Every philosopher is deserving of  respect,*' and that, — " Plato is a philosopher :**  but if he knows not what a philosopher is, or  what it is to be deserving of respect, the  comparison of the terms in order to draw a  conclusion from them, will be a mockery of  reason : — it will be reasoning indeed, but  reasoning without a rational end. And suppose  the knowledge to have been acquired of what  a philosopher is by the application of the word  to many particulars, and by a consequent  classification of them in the mind, — supposing  the knowledge of what is deserving of respect  to have been acquired in the same way, —  supposing the inquirer has learned from history  what Plato was in his opinions and manner of  life, — the conclusion takes place by a com-  parison of the thingSj by means indeed of  words, but not by any comparison of the terms  independently of the things ; nor is the con-  viction in the least fortified, or the process ex-  plained, bya demonstration that in reasoning  with the terms alone, independently of their  meaning, we get at the conclusion ; — by  shewing, for instance, that the terms which  include the facts, may be forced into cor-  respondence with the following ^nwwfa;  Every B is A :  C is B :  Therefore C is A.  Every philosopher — is— deserving of respect :   Plato — is— a philosopher :  Therefore Plato — ^is — deserving of respect. This way of drawing a conclusion from a  comparison of terms, is. properly speaking, to  reason or argue with words ; but in the Lo-  gic we have ascertained, every conclusion is  required to be drawn from a comparison of  the facts which the case furnishes ; and words  being used only for the purpose of registering  our conclusions, such Logic is properly de-  fined the art of reasoning by means of words.  The inquirer who seeks to know, of his own  knowledge—" Whether William who is re-  commended to his service, is an honest man",  — will gather facts of William's conduct by  his own observation ; and these he will com-  pare by the light of his previous notion (i. e.  knowledge) of what an honest man is : but  then he must have that previous notion, or he  cannot make the comparison ; and the notion  will have been gained by a process just like  that he is pursuing : and so downwards to the  original comparison of individiial tJujigs, from  which all knowledge begins. So again, if an  inquirer seeks to know that " a particular tree is a mulberry tree", — he must first know  what a mulberry tree is; and how can he  know this but by a comparison of different  trees? There must be some art employed to  classify the individual trees, otherwisehe could  never know more than the difference between  every two trees. By setting up one tree, or  some equivalent sign, as a word, to denote  the common qualities observed in many, he  comes to know what a mulberry tree is ; and  looking at the particular tree in question, he  sees that it has the common qualities indica-  ted by the sign, and infers that it is a mul-  berry tree. So likewise, if an inquirer seeks  to be convinced that " SteaUng is a vice",  or that "Temperance is a virtue", — he  must have such facts before him as will  enable him to come to a clear conclusion as  to what is vice, and what is virtue : and  this conclusion will either include or ex-  clude stealing with respect to his notion  of vice, and temperance with respect to his  notion of virtue, and he will consequently be convinceti or not convinced of tlie proposition  in question. So, once more, if an inquirer  desires to know, of his own knowledge,  *' Whether, throughout the universe, all  greater bodies attract the smaller", — he must  first observe certain facts from which the ge-  neral law may be assumed hypothetical ly : —  he must then ascertain what, according to  other notions gained from experience, would  be the effect throughout the universe of the  general law which he has so assumed ; and if  the effects arising out of the hypothesis cor-  respond with actual effects, and no other by-  pothesis to account for them can be framed,  he will have all the proof the subject permits,  and know of his own knowledge, as far as can  be known, the conclusion asserted. So, lastly,  if an inquirer seeks to be convinced that "a  triangle described within two circles in such  a manner that one of its sides is a radius of  both, and the others radii of each circle re-  spectively, is an equilateral triangle", — he  must first form within his mind the notions of a triangle, and of a circle, the latter of which he  will find can be conceived perfect in no other  way than in correspondence with this definition :  — "a plane figure bounded by one line called-  the circumference ; and is such that all straight  lines, (called radii,) drawn from a certain  point within it to the circumference, are equal  to one another. " Having formed this notionr^  he will find, by certain acts of comparison^  (which must take place within the mind, al-  though they may be attsisted by a* visible sign-J^  that the previous proposition is an inevitable  consequence of the notfon so formed, and his'  conviction: wiU be comffiete. If the convic-  tion, in the previous ifrstances, has not the  same force as iiti the last^ — ^if, in those instances,  the force may be diffident m. degree, while in  the last there can be no coD^victioa short of  lliat which iS' absolute an4- entire, the cause^  in not that the reasoning process^ is different  in kind, but that the facts or data about which"  it is' employed are dii&re»t. In the last in^  stance^ the reasoning is employed about notions, which admit uf being so defined, that  every mind capable of the reasoning at  once assumes them before the reasoning pro-  cess begins ; but in the other instances, the  facts or the notions may be attended by cause  for doubt. A man, if he have any notion of  a philosopher at all, cannot indeed but be  quite sure (consciously sure) of his own no-  tion of a philosopher j but how can he be sure  that others have the same notion, or even  quite sure that Plato had the qualities that  conform to his own notion ? In the same  way, he will be quite sure (consciously sure)  of his own notion of an honest man ; but he  may be deceived as to the facts which bring  William within that notion. He will be quite  sure (consciously sure) of the notion he has  in naming a tree a mulberry tree ; but that  notion may be totally unlike the notion which  other people entertain ; or if the general no-  tion agrees, he may mistake the characteristics  in the particular instance. He will be quite  sure (consciously sure) of his own notion of vice or of virtue, and whether it includes or  excludes this or that conduct, action, habit,  or quahtjr ; and in this case the conviction is  absolute and entire while the reasoner confines  himself to his own notion ; but the moment  he steps out of this, and begins to inquire  whether it agrees with that of others, he finds  cause to doubt. He must be quite sure (sen-  sibly sure) that bodies near above the earth's  surface have a tendency towards it ; and by  proper experiments he may convince himself  that all bodies without exception which are  so situated, have the same tendency. In sup- ,  posing the fact universal of the tendency of  smaller bodies to the greater, his conviction  of the consequences involved in that hypo-  thesis, must, as soon as he has mentally traced  them, be absolute and entire ; but he has yet to  find whether reality corresponds with the hy-  pothesis. The strongest proof of this will  be, the correspondence of the consequences of  the hypothesis with the phenomena of na-  ture, joined to the impossibility of forming     138 ON LOGIC. [chap. II.   another hypothesis which shall account for  these phenomena; and the doubt, if any,  will attach to that impossibility, and to the  accuracy of bis observatioda of the pheno*  rneoa* I^ then, there is roonr for doubt, and  cocise^aently for various degrees of assent, in  all the instances except m that whose facts or  data are notions which the mind is bound to  tstke up according to the definitions before it  enters on the argument, we are not to con-  clude that the reasoning process is different in  kind iti any of them ; since the difl^ence in  the facts or data about which the reasoning  process i& employed, fully accounts for the ab-  solute and entire conviction which takes place  in one instance, and the degrees of convictioti  which are liable to happen in such cases as^  the others.   14. But what IB a process or act of rea^  soning? Is it, abstractedly from the means'  u£^d to register its conclusions, and so pro-  ceed to new acts of the same kind, — ^is it aa  act which rules can teach, or any generalbsau-  tion make clearer, or more satisfactory than it  is originally ? We shall find, upon examina-  tioH, that any such pretence resolves itself in- i  to a mere verbal generalization, or the appli-  cation of the same act to itself; and that this  does in no way assist the act of reasoning, or  explain, or account for, or confirm it. A man  requires not to be told — *' It is impossible for  the same thing to be and not to be," in order  to know that himself exists ; he requires not  the previous axiom, " The whole is greater  than its part, or contains its part, " in order to  know that, reckoning his nose a part of his  head, his head is greater than his nose, or his  nose belongs to his head ; neither is the previous  axiom, " Things equal to the same, are equal  to one another", necessary to be enounced,  before he can understand, that if he is as tall  as his father, and his father as his friend, he  is as tall as his friend *. Whatever neatness of  arrangement a system may derive from being   • Compare Lofku's Essay, Book IV. ChajHeis 7  and 12.     1headed with such verbal generalizations, it is  manifest that they neither assist the reasoning  nor explain it : nor must a generalization of   , this kind be confounded with the enunciation  of what is called a law of nature*, — (the law  of attraction and gravitation for instance, — )  since this last is a discovery by a process of  experiment and reasoning, but a verbal gene-  ralization is no discovery at all ; — it is merely  a mode of expressing what is known by every   " rational mind at the very first opportunity for  exercising its powers. Or more properly  speaking, the laws of reasoning, which are  gratuitously expressed by what are called  axioms, are nothing else than a mode of de-   * See Whately's Logic, Chap. I. Sect. 4, where he  attempts to evade Dugald Stewart's oh^ection to the  Ariatotelian syllogism, that it is a demonstration of b  demoiigtration, by comparing the Dictum de omni et  de nullo to the enimciation of a law of nature. — It is  rather pleasant, in the first note of the Chapter referred  to, to hear the doctor running riot upon Locke's con-  fuinon of thought and common place declamation, be-  cause the latter had the sense to sec the futility and  puerility of the syllogism.     SECT. 14.] ON LOGIC. 141   scribing the constitution of a rational mind.;—*  they are identical with the capacity itself for  reasoning: to view them in any other light is  to mistake a circumlocution for the discovery  of a principle. And this kind of mistake  every one labours under who supposes that,  by any means whatever, an act of reasoning  is assisted or explained, accounted for, or con-  firmed. Nothing is more certain, than that if  two terijns agree with a third, they agree with  each other, — if one agrees and the other dis-  agrees, they disagree with each other: but  every other act of reasoning has a conclusion  equally certain (the facts or data about which  an act of reasoning is conversant being the  sole cause of any doubt in the conclusion*,)  and this or any other attempt at explaining or  accounting for the act, will therefore only   . * And note, that when people are said to draw a  wrong conclusion from facts, the correct account would  be, that they do not reason from them, but from some-  thing which they mistake for them, through their ina-  ability to understand, or their carelessness to the na-  ture of, the facts given.     I4!l     [chap. ir.     amount to the placing of one such act by the  side of another; as if any one should set a  pair of legs in motion by the side of another  pair, and call it an explanation of the act of  walking. Such would at once appear to be  the character of the Aristotelian Syllogism,  were it not for the complicated apparatus ac-  companying it ; an apparatus of distinctions  and rules rendered necessary by the nature of  the terms compared. For these terms being  obtained by the division of a sentence, are  such that they agree or disagree with each  other only in the sense they bore before the  division took place. Our theory makes this  plain; for it shows that words which form a  sentence limit and determine each other, and  thus have a different meaning from tliat which  belongs to them when understood abstracted-  ly. Therefore, though it may be true that  " Plato is a man deserving of respect, '  does not follow that " Plato " and " A maai  deserving of respect " shall agree togetiier as  abstract terms : accordingly the latter term  understood abstractedly, signifies any or every  man desei-ving of respect, and does not agree  with Plato. It must be obvious, then, that  terms obtained iirthis way, can be compared  with other terms similarly obtained, only un-  der the safeguard of certain rules. Such rules  are accordingly provided ; and tliat they may  not want the appearance of scientific general-  ization and simplicity, they are all referred to  one common principle, — the celebrated dic-  tum de omni et de nullo ; whose purport is,  that what is affirmed or denied of the whole  genus, may be affirmed or denied of every  species or individual under it ; — which indeed  is nothing more than a verbal generalization  of such a fact as this, that what is true of every  philosopher, is true of any one philosopher.  All tliese pretences to the discovery of a uni-  versal principle, do but leave us just where we  were, a few high-sounding empty words ex-  cepted; and this must ever be the case when  we seek to account for that which is, by the  constitution of things as far aa we can ascertain them, an ultimalefact. An act of reason-  ing is the natural working of a rational mind  upon the objects, whatever they may be, which  are placed before it, when, having formed one  judgment intuitively, it makes use of the re-  sult as the medium for reaching another: and  the pretence to assist or explain this operation  by the introduction of such an instrument as  the syllogism, is an imposition on the under-  standing.   15. This will more plainly appear when we  examine the real use, (if use it can be called,)  of the Aristotelian art of reasoning. It may  be described as the art of arguing unreason-  ably, or of gaining a victory in argument  without convincing the understanding. As  it reasons "with words, and not merely by  means of words, it fixes on expressions not on  things, and is satisfied with proving a conse-  quence, or exposing a non-sequitur in those,  without inquiring into the actual notions of  the speaker. " Do you admit " says a syllogi-  zer, " that every philosopher is deserving of respect? " " I do;" says the non-syllogi-  zing respondent. " And you admit, (for I  have heard you call him by the name,) that  Voltaire is a philosopher : you admit, there-  fore, that Voltaire is deserving of respect. "  Now, if the notion of the respondent is, that  Voltaire is not deserving of respect, here is a  victory gained over him in spite of his con-  viction. Arguing from the words, and allow-  ing no appeal from them when once conceded,  the conclusion is decisive*. But in looking  beyond the words to the things intended, we  shall find that the respondent either did not  mean every philosoplier, as a metaphysical,  but only as a moral universal, or else (and the  supposition is the more likely of the two) that  in calling Voltaire a philosopher, he called   • " If," says a. doughty Aristotelian doctor, " a  imiyeraity is charged with cultivating only the mere  elements of mathematics, and in reply a list of the  hooks studied there is produced, ^should even any one  of those books be not elementary," [" / day here on  my biynd,''] " the charge is in fiiirncss refuted."  Whately's Logic, Chap III. Sect. 18.    . II.   him so according to the custom of others, and  not according to his own notion. In a Logic  whose object is truth and not victory, the  business would not therefore end here. An  attempt would be made to change the notion  of the respondent (supposing it to be wrong)  by an appeal to things. His mind might in-  deed be so choked with prejudice as to be in-  capable of the truth ; but at least would the  only way have been taken to remove the one  and procure admission for the other. — To the  foregoing, let another kind of example be add-  ed : " Every rational agent is accountable ;  brutes are not rational agents ; therefore, they  are not accountable." * " Non sequitur*^  cries the Aristotelian respondent. The other  man, who reasons by means of words and not  merely mth words, is certain that the internal  process by which he reached the conclusion is  correct ; nor is he persuaded to the contrary,  or at all enlightened as to his fault, when he  is told that he has been guilty of an illicit pro-   ♦ From Whately's Logic, Chap. I. Sect. 3.  cess of the major. He is informed, however,  that his mode of reasoning finds a parallel in  the following example : " Every horse is an  animal ; sheep are not horses ; therefore they  are not animals.'* * But this he denies ; be-  <:ause he is sure that his mode of reasoning  would never bring him to such a conclusion  as the last. All this time, while the Aristo-  telian has the triumph of having at least  puzzled his uninitiated opponent, the real  cause of diflference is kept out of sight, name-  ly, that the one refers to that reasoning which  is conducted merely with words, and not by  means of words only, while the other refers to  that reasoning which looks to things, inatten-  tive perhaps, as in this instance, to the expres-  sions. If the latter had used no other ex-  pression than " Brutes are not rational agents ;  therefore they are not accountable ;•" — the as-  sertion and the reason for it, must have been  suffered to pass; but because another sen-  tence is prefixed to these two, and the whole   * Whately'*s Logic, Chap. I. Sect. 3.   l2     F   1    of them happen to make a violated syllogism,  the speaker is charged with having been guilty  of that violation, when in fact he has not at-  tempted to reason syllogistically at all ; i. e. to  draw his conclusion from a comparison of the  extremes with the middle, but from a judg-  ment on the facts of the case. In a Logic  which gets at its conclusions by jneans of  words, and not by the artifice we have just  referred to, an expression which does not  reach the full facts reasoned from, (every  rational agent, for instance, where it should  have been said none but a rational agent,J  would not be deemed an error of the rea-  soning, but a defect in the expression of the  reasoning.   ] 6. These examples will, it is hoped, be  sufficient to show the real worth of the Aris-  totelian syllogism, ft is indeed, as its advo-  cates assert, an admirable instrument of ar-  gumentation ; but of argumentation distinct  from the fair exercise of reason. It is a pro-  per appendage to the doctrine of ReaUsm,      SECT. 16.]]     149     and with that exploded doctrine it should long  ago have been suffered to sink. While ge-  nera and species were deemed real independ-  ent essences, to argue from words was con-  sistently supposed to be arguing from things :  but now that words are allowed to be only  counters in the hands of wise men, the Logic  of Aristotle, which takes them for money,  should surely be esteemed the Logic of fools".  The claim for its conclusions of demonstrative  certainty, rests solely on the condition that  words are so taken. Every conclusion from  an act of reasoning, would have that charac-  ter, if the notions about which it was employ-  ed were notions universally fixed and agreed  upon. In mathematics, this circumstance is  the sole ground of the peculiar certainty at-  tained. All men agree in the metaphysical  notion of a point, of a line, a superficies, a  circle, and so forth t : if all men necessarily     * " Words are the counters of wise men, but the  money of fools," — Hobbes.   f According tu Sugald Stewart, mathematical  agreed in the notion of who is a philosopher  and who is not, of what is vice and what is  virtuBj and so forth ; our conclusions on these  and similar subjects, would, as in mathematics,  be demonstrative : but till definitions can be  framed for Ethics in which men must agree,  there is little chance of erecting this branch  of learning, with any praciical benefit, into a  science, according to the notion insisted on  with some earnestness in Locke's Essay*,  lu Physics we can do more ; for men agree  pretty well as to what is a mulberry tree, and  what is a pear tree ; what is a beast, and what  is a bird ;— by experiment they can be shewn  what are the component parts of this sub-  stance, what the qualities of the other j and  so forth : so that here, our conclusions need   definitions are mci-e hypotheses. Do they not rather  describe notions of and relating to quantity, which, by  the congtitution of the mind, it must reach, if, setting  aside the sensible instances of a point, a line, a circle,  &c., it tries to conceive them perfect ?   * Book IV. Chap. III. Sect. 18,: and the same  book Chap. XII. Sect. 8.    not be wanting in all necessary certainty;  although, as that certainty depends on the  conformity between our notions, and the out*  ward or sensible objects of them, it will be of  a different kind from the certainty obtained  in meta-Phi/sicSj and therefore not called de-  monstrative. In the latter department, (Me-  taphysics,) the chain of evidence has its first  hold, as well as every subsequent link, in the  mind, and the mind cannot therefore but be  sure of the whole.   17. As we propose to limit the province  of Logic to the investigation of truth, the re-  marks and examples in the section preceding  the last (15.), might have been spared till we  come to consider Rhetoric, to which we in-  tend to assign, among its other ofiices, that  of proving truth. How far the form of ex-  pression which corresponds to the syllogism,  is calculated to be useful to a speaker or wri-  ter, may at that time draw forth another ob-  servation on the subject. Meanwhile we pro-  pose to exclude it entirely from Logic; and   in truth the common practice of manlcind out  of the schools, has never admitted it as an in-  strument either for the one purpose or the  other. Common sense has always been op-  posed to it ; and Logic is a word of bad reputa-  tion, because it is supposed to mean the art  of arguing for the sake of victory, and not for  the sake of truth. In vain have Locke,  Campbell, Reid, Stewart, and other sound  thinkers, endeavoured to clear the art from its  reproach by detaching the cause : the Aristo-  telian Syllogism has been repeatedly over-  thrown ; yet some one is ever at hand to set it  on its three legs again, and argue in defence  of the instrument of arguing : — some per-  tinacious schoolmaster may always be found  Who e'en though vanquished yet will ahgue still;  While words oflearncd length and thundering sound*.  Amaze the gazing rustics ranged around.     * Videlicet, Terms middle and extreme ; premiss  major and minor ,- quantity and quality of propositions ;  Universal affirmative ; Universal negative ; Particular  affirmative ; Particular negative ; Distribution and non-  distribution of terms; Undistributed middle; Illicit pro-     So much — (till, in the next chapter we come  to a parting word — ) so much for the Aris-  totelian Syllogism.   18. As to the Logic which we have en-  deavoured to ascertain, it is, we repeat it, the  Logic which all men learn, and all men ope-  rate with in gathering knowledge ; and the  only inquiries which remain are, i. Whether,  so far as we have gone, there is ground or ne-  cessity for principles and rules in the exercise  of Logic, as there is for grammar in speaking  a language; and ii. Whether we ought to  consider its limits as extending beyond the     cBss of the major ; Illicit piocese of the Tninor ; Mood  itnd figure— Barbsrs, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Cesare,  CameBtres, Festino, Baroko, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi,  Felapton, Bokardo, Feriso, Bramantip, Camenes, BU  maris, Fesapo, FrcBison ; Categoricals, Modals, Hypo-  theticals. Conditionals, Constructive form. Destructive  form, Oatcnsive reduction, Illatire conversion, &c. kc  &c. Well may we join with Mons. Jourdain —  " Voila dee mots qui sont trop rebarbatifs. Cette  logique ]& ne me rcvient point. Apprcnons autre chose  qui soit plus joli.'*    . [chap. II.   bounds proposed at tlie commencement ot*  this Chapter.   19. Though few persons would be dis-  posed to answer the former question in the  negative, yet an analogous case may induce a  moment's pause in our reply. At the conclu-  sion of the first note appended to Sect. 4.,  allusion was made to the fact, that men do  not see truly by nature, but acquire, through  judgment and experience, the power of know-  ing by sight the tangible qualities of objects  and their relative distances. Now, the in-  terference of rules, supposing them possible,  to assist this early discipline of the eye, would  be useless — perhaps raiscliievous : — why are  we to think differently of the discipline of the  mind, as regards the use of those signs which,  if our theory is true, are forced upon us at  first by an inevitable necessity ? Because the  art of seeing truly is necessary to the preserva-  tion of the individual ; and nature takes care,  therefore, that we do not teach ourselves im-  pertectly or erroneously ; but the conducting  of a train of reasoning with accuracy and pre-  cision into remote consequences, is unne-  cessary in a rude state of society j and man,  who is left to improve his physical and moral  condition, has the instrument of that improve-  ment confided to his own care, that he may  add to its powers, and form for himself rules  for using it with much more precision and  much more effect, than any random use of it  can be attended with. Accordingly, if we  look to that department of knowledge which  Locke calls ipvaiK^ * , we shall find that it owes  its existence to the accurate Logic by which  inquirers registered all their observations and  all their experiments, and by which they as-  cended from individuals to classes, till each  had comprehended in his scheme all he de-  sired to consider. Here then begins the pro-  per business of Logic as a system of instruc-  tion : it ought to lay open all the various me-  thods of arrangement and classification by     ' Vide the lutrixluction to this Treatise.       which science is acquired and enlarged ; and  if something may yet be done toward im-  proving these methods, it should open the  way to such improvement. The Aristotelian  rules for definition, which are a sound part of  Logic, should be explained and illustrated ;  and the nomenclatures invented by various  philosophers, particularly that which is used  in modern chemistry, should be detailed and  investigated.   SO. But if, by the application of a more  accurate Logic than belongs to a random use  of language, men have been able to accom-  plish so much in ^uo-ik^, it does not appear  that they have great cause to boast of their  success in the other department, namely  ■n-paKTiK-^. Do they act, whether as com-  munities or individuals, muck better with a  view to their real interests, than they did two  thousand years ago ? If improvement here,  as in the other department, is possible, how  is it to be accomplished ? We live in an at-  mosphere of passions, prejudices, opinions,     which mould our thoughts, and give a cer-  tain character and hue to all the objects of  them ; — these we do not examine, but take  them as they appear to us, and our reasonings  too often start from them as from first facts.  As to the process itself, — a process which  every individual conducts ■within his avra  mind according to the power which nature  gives him, — we affirm that it cannot be other  than it is, and that, provided it starts from  true data, it can never lead us wrong : but if  that is false which at the outset we take for  true, then indeed our conclusions may be  perniciously, ruinously erroneous. It is ac-  cordingly the business of the moralist to re-  move the false hue which habit, opinion, and  passion, cast over the surface of things ; and  it should be the business of the politician to  examine the principles on which the general  affairs of the world are conducted, and open  the eyes of mankind to their pernicious ten-  dency, if in the whole or in part they are per-  nicious. But neither the moralist nor the politician can come at the necessary truthis  intvitiveljf : they must use the mediaj and the  media consist in that use of words which con-  stitutes Logic, as we have described it. We  do not intend to say that language affords  the means of reaching equal results to every  person who makes the right logical use of it ;  for men's minds are very different in natural  capacity; and some are able to perceive  truths intuitively, which others attain only by  a slow process; as tall men can reach at  once, what short men must mount a ladder  to : but we do intend to say, that, let the  natural powers of any human mind be what  they will, there is no chance for it of any ex-  tensive knowledge, but through the employ-  ment of media to assist its natural operations ;  <and, we repeat it, the media which nature  suggests, and leaves for our industry to im-  prove, is language *. Well then, if our im-   * The reader does not understand us, if he  deems it an objection to our reasoning, that many  highly gifted men in point of understanding, do not provement in ntpaKrucrfj is, at this time of ^ay,  less than we might expect, is it not reason-  able to think that, with regard to this depart-  ment, we do not quite understand the instru-  mental means, and consequently do not ap-  ply them with complete effect ? Surely there  is some ground for such a suspicion, when we  find a doctor (of some repute we presume) in  one of our two great places of learning, de-  claring that '^ the rules of Logic have nothing  to do with the truth or falsity of the premises,  but merely teach us to decide (not whether  the premises are fairly laid down, but)   appear to have a skilful use of language. A man may  be rhetorically unskilful in language without being  logically so ; — he may be imable to convey to others  how and what he thinks ; but he may make use of  media in the most skilful manner to assist his own  thoughts. And if his capacity is such that he seei  many truths intuitively for which others require  media^ it is evident that he cannot convey those  truths to them till he has searched out the means.  The nature and the principle of such an operation be-  longs to our next chapter on Rhetoric.     fim         whether the conclusion fairly follows from  the premises." * We acknowledge that the  Logic to which this description applies, has  never been the Logic of mankind at large,  however it may have been the baby-game of  men in colleges ; but that the office of Logic  should be described so completely opposite  to what it really is, at a time when its proper  office and character ought to have been long  ago thoroughly understood, is not a little  surprising, and may reasonably warrant the  suspicion stated above. We have no doubt  our reader is by this time convinced, that  men who reason at all, do not want rules for  drawing their conclusions fairly, if we could  but get them to draw those conclusions from  right premises ; and that to get at right pre-  mises is every thing in Logic. For this end,  it is our business to set all notions aside that  have not been cautiously acquired ; and to  begin the formation of new ones at the point   * Whateiy'a Logic. Provinceof Reasoning, Cliap-  I. Sect. 1.     sf;ct. 20.]     IGI     where all genuine knowledge commences, —  the intuitive comparison of particulars or  single facts ; to make use of the knowledge  (notions) hence obtained as media for new  comparisons or judgments; and so on ad in-  Jinitum. Alas! it is but too certain, that  though we draw our conclusions faiily enough,  our premises, in a vast proportion of cases,  are laid down most foully, because they are  laid down by our ignorance, our passions,  and our prejudices ; and because language  itself, when its use is not guarded, is a means  of deception*.   • We arc somewhat backward in offering examples  of general remarks, such as is this last ; because it is  scarcely possible to be particular without touching on  questions in religion or politics that carry with them,  either way, a taint of parti zanshi p ; and we hold it to  be very impertinent in a writer on Logic, to turn  those general precepts for the discovery of truth  which he is bound to ascertain, into a particular chan-  nel in order to serve his own sect or party. What  business had Watts to exempliiy so many of hU  cautionary rules by the errors of Papistical doctrine,  at a time when its doctrine was a subordinate and     But can the assistance which lan-  guage is intended to furnish, be rendered such   party queBtioit, and be himself was a sectarian opposed  to it ? We trust that no exception of the same kind  can be taken {particularly as we give them only in a.  note) to two examples we are about to submit of  the remark in the text, that language itself may lie  the means of deceiving us into wrong premiseB : — they  are by no means singular, hut Guch as may he met  with every hour on almost every question. The  ph rase natural state is, as we all know, a very com-  mon expression, which we are much in the habit of  applying to things that have not been abused or per-  verted from the form or condition in which nature  first placed them. Now, because the same phrase  happens to be frequently applied to man in a rude  state of society, we start, in many of our reasonings,  with the notion, that in proportion as we have depart-  ed from such a state, we have perverted and abused  the purposes of nature ; when, in truth, it seems wiser  to inquire, whether we have yet reached the state  which nature means for creatures such as we are, and  whether she is not constantly urging us on to such an  unattained state. Our other example is of narrower in-  terest, and belongs to politics, or rather to what is  called political economy. The word price, in general  loose speaking, means that which is given (be it what  it may) to obtain some other thing ; but in a strict as to lead us to truth in spite of ignorance,  passion, and prejudice, and in spite of the  delusions of which it is itself the cause? Why  not, if the guarded and careful use of it, is  fitted to diminish these obstacles, and if we  do not look for the ultimate effects -faster  than, by the use of the means, the obstruc-  tions ^ive way ? Nor are mankind inattentive  to improve the means, nor are the means     and mercantile Bense, it has a uniform reference, direct  or indirect, to the quantity of precious metal given for  commodity ; inasmuch as gold and silver are the sole  universal medium of barter throughout the world, and  every promise to pay has reference to a certain quan-  tity of one or the other of these metals. These things  premised, it must be obvious that the phrase price of  gold, using price in a strict sense, is an abeurdity, and  could arise only from confounding the meaning which  prevails in ordinary speech with the meaning in which  the merchant uses it. What, then, are we to think of  an English House of Commons, which, some twenty  years ago, deputed to a committee the task of in-  quiring into the causes of the high price of bullion ?  Might not the committee, with as much reason, have  been deputed to inquire, why the foot rule was more  or less than a foot ?    without effect : for when we ask, whether their  moral and political condition is much ad-  vanced beyond what it was in the most pro-  mising state of the world in past days *, we do  not mean to deny what every one of common  knowledge and observation is aware of, that  it has advanced : all we urge is, that a sys-  tematic attention to the means of investigating  truth, might, peradventure, in politics and  morals, as it has in physics, have been at-  tended with effects more widely beneficial.  Neither do we afSrm that existing works on  Logic are destitute of many admirable pre-  cepts for investigating truth, although we  assert that the precepts are referred either   * Note, that it is unfair to fix on a particular part  of the world in proof of what it was in the whole. States  and cities may advance themselves for a time by a  partial policy which keeps others backward : but the  policy will fail in the end. By a natural course of  things the advanced state will merge in the mass and  improve it : and thus the world will keep on advancing,  although the spectator, who contemplates only the  particular state, will think it is retrograding.   to a false principle, or to no principle at all  fitted to unite them into one body of sys-  tematic instruction. The work lately referred  to *, fnrnishes, for instance, many excellent  precepts for avoiding errors in the use of  words, and for guarding against the snares of  sophistry; and if such precepts and such ex-  amples as it offers, distinct from the doctrine  of the syllogism, were industriously collected,  and brought forward in aid of the Logic  which all men learn and all men use, they  would be of inestimable value. A useful  system of Logic will guard our notions from  error not only while we think, but while we  are reasoned witht: for one chief way by  which truth enters the mind, is through the     * Viz, Whately's Logic.   + Our meaning will be understood ; but wc express  it by ii distinction which is grounded on no real dif-  ference. He who is reasoned with, if he understands  the ai^ument, is set a thinking ; and his agreeing or  disagreeing with the argument is the effect of his own  thoughts, however these may be set in motion, and  perhaps unreasonably influenced, by what he hears.  medium of language as employed by others :  and Logic should therefore arm us with all  possible means for coming at truth so offered,  through the various entanglements by which  the medium may be accompanied. Hence,  the various sophisms of speech accompanied  by their appropriate names, would still occupy  a place in such a Logic ; nay, for this purpose,  and for this alone, would the Aristotelian  doctrine of the syllogism deserve explanation ;  namely to understand how a conclusion drawn  from mere terms, may, as a conclusion from  them, be perfectly true and perfectly useless,  and thus to induce us to bottom all our  reasoning on things. — Having thus offered,  on the first of the questions proposed in Sect.  18, such observations in the affirmative as we  thought it required, we now proceed to the  second question.   22. That question was. Whether we ought  to consider the limits of Logic as extending  beyond the bounds proposed at the com-  mencement of this chapter : towards answering  which, we may first inquire how far other  views of it extend. By the Scotch metaphy-  sicians, and generally in the schools of North  Britain, the word Logic seems to be so used  as to imply the cultivation of the powers of  the mind generally, correspondently with  M'atts's definition of tlie purpose of Logic,  namely, " the right use of reason." " I  have always been convinced," says DugaJd  Stewart*, " that it was a fundamental error  of Aristotle, to confine his views to reasoning  or the discursive faculty, instead of aiming at  the improvement of our nature in all its parts."  And he then goes on to mention the following  as among the subjects that ought to be con-  sidered in a just and comprehensive system  of Logic. " Association of ideas ; Imagina-  tion ; Imitation j the use of language as the   GREAT INSTRUMENT OP THOUGHT ; and the   artificial habits of judging imposed by the  principles and manners in whicli we have     * Fhilotiuphical Essays.  Chap.    16s been educated." * Now if the threeibld di-  vision of human knowledge is a just one,  which, in the Introduction of this work, was     his     * io the same purpose,  Philosophy of the Humat     n the second volume of  Mind, (Chap. III. Sect.     S.) he speaks thu^     ' The following, (which     mention by way of specimen,) seem to be among the  most powerful of the causes of our felse judgments.  The imperfections of language both as an instru-  ment of thought, and as a medium of philosophical  communication. 2. The difficulty in many of our  most important inquiries of ascertaining the facts on  which our reasonings are to proceed. 3. The partial  and narrow views, which, from want of information,  or some defect in our intellectual comprehension,  we are apt to take of subjects which are peculiarly  complicated in their details, or which are connected  by numerous relations with other questions equally  problematical. And lastly, (which is of all perhaps  the most copious source of speculative error) the pre-  judices which authority and fashion fortified by early  impressions and associations, create to warp our  opinions. To illustrate these and other circumstances  by which the judgment is apt to be misled in the  search of truth, and to point out the most effectual  means of guarding against them, would form a very  important article in a philosophical system of Logic,"    borrowed from Locke,— namely into, it., the  knowledge of things tiiat are, — ii., of things  fitting to be rfonc, — and, Hi., of the means of  acquiring and improving both these branches  of knowledge;— it wUl at once appear that  all the subjects referred to in this enumeration  of Stewart's, except the fourth, which we print  in capitals, come under the denomination of  physica : — they are energies or tendencies of  the mind derived from nature, or habits  arising out of natural causes ; and they come  accordingly under the division of things ex-  isting in nature, which things, as they all  concern the mind, it is the business of the  Pliilosophy of the human mind to explortf:  but the fourth of the subjects mentioned in  the quotation from Stewart, viz •* the use of   LANGUAGE AS THE GREAT INSTRUMENT OF   THOUGHT," comes under the third of the  divisions laid down by Locke, and ought cer-  tainly to be distinguished from the other  subjects, because it is the means of becoming  acquainted with them : it is the instrument.     m  and they are among its objects. True, we  discover, as we proceed in the use of it, and  we are properly warned by those who have  used it before, that its efficacy is assisted or  impeded by extraneous causes, as well as by  defects in the instrument itself: similar dis-  coveries will be made, and similar warnings  must be given, in the practice of almost every  art: but these ought not to enter into the de-  finition of the art, although it will be proper  to bring them forward, incidentally, as we  open its rules. " A method of invigorating  and properly directing all the powers of the  mind is indeed," says Dr, Whately, " a most  magnificent object, but one which not only  does not fall under the province of Logic, but  cannot be accomplished by anyone science or  system that can even be conceived to exist.  The attempt to comprehend so wide a field is  no extension of science, but a mere verbal ge-  neralization, which leads only to vague and  barren declamation. In every pursuit, the  more precise aud definite our object, the more   likely we ai'e to obtain some valuable result j  if, like the Platonists, who sought after the  avTodyaSov, — the abstract idea of good, —  we pursue some specious but ill-defined  scheme of universal knowledge, we shall lose  the substance while grasping at a shadow, and  bewilder ourselves in empty generalities." *To these just remarks, we may add our ex-  pression of regret that Dugald Stewart never  had opportunity to do more than speak pro-  ^'^ectively of *' a just and comprehensive  system of Logic ;" " to prepare the way for  which, was," he says, " one of the main  objects he had in view when he first entered  upon his inquiries into the human mind."t  Had he himself completed such a design in-  stead of leaving it for others, we doubt not he  would have found the necessity of circura-  scribing Logic within the bounds we have  proposed, in order to give it existence as an     • Whately's Logic ; Introduction,  t Pliilos. Essays. Prelim. Diss. Chap. II.: in the  paragraph immediately following the last quotation.     fjtt ON LOGIC. [chap. U.   art distinct from the wide ocean of intellectual  philosophy.   23. But Dr. Whateiy, who deems, with  us, that every consideration of the mind con-  ducted without reference to its making use of  language as its instrument, lies out of the de-  partment of the teacher of Logic*, com-  pletely differs from us, as to the province of  the art. Of the question, " whether it is by  a process of reasoning that new truths are  brought to light," he maintains the negative t,  and consequently denies that investigation be-  longs to Logic. Afler what has been ad-  vanced in the former sections of this chapter,  we think it quite unnecessary to combat this  opinion here ; and as Dr. Whateiy concedes,  that " if a system could be devised to direct     • Dr. Whateiy defines Logic (Chap. II. Part I.  Sect. 2.) " the art of employing language properly for  the purpose of reasoning." But with him, reasoning  B argumentation.   t Whateiy "s Logic, Province of llcasoning, Chap.  II. Sect. 1.     ^     the. mind in the progress of inveBtigation ", it  might be " allowed to bear the name of Lo-  gic, since it would not be worth while to con-  tend about a name " *; — as, moreover, we  propose to comprehend under Rhetoric all  that belongs to the proving of truth — that is,  convincing others of it after we have found it  ourselves ; — we might be satisfied with stating  that this is the distribution we choose to  adopt, and there let the matter end. Be-  lieving, however, that our reasons will shew  this distribution to be not only useful, but al-  most indispensable, we proceed to offer them.  24, And first, that, so far as we have  gone, the art we have described ought to be  called Logic, we think will hardly now be de-  nied: — for we have proved that from be-'  ginning to end, it is a process of reason, that  is to say, a process to reach an end by mediae  and we have shown that the media are     • Whalely't* Logic, Province of Jteasoiiing, Chap.  II. Sect. 4.     Wi        words, (Xo'yoi.) If the term Logic is not pro-  perly applied to such an art as this, we know  not where an instance can be found of pro-  priety in a name. But shall we include the of-  fice of proving truth under this name, as well  as that of investigating it ? We answer, no, for  these two reasons : first that the things them-  selves are difierent, and ought therefore to be  assigned to different departments ; since it is  one thing to find out a truth, and another to  put a different mind in a posture for finding it  out likewise : And, second, that persuasion by  means of language, which is the recognized  office of Rhetoric, is not so distinct from con-  viction by means of language, as to admit of  our saying, precisely, where one ends, and the  other begins. That common situation in life.  Video meUora proboque, deteriora sequor,  proves indeed there are degrees of conviction  which yield to persuasion, as thei'e are other  degrees which no persuasion can subdue : yet  perhaps we shall hereafter be able to show,  that such junctures do but exhibit one set of  motives outweighing anol^ier, and that the ap-  plication of the term persuasion to the one set,  and of conviction to the other, is in many cases  arbitrary, rather than dictated by a corre-  spondent difference in the things. If, then, the  finding a truth, and the proving it to others,  ought to be assigned to different departments  of Sematology, why not, leaving the former to  Logic, consider the latter as appertaining to  Rhetoric, seeing that convincing is not always,  and on every subject, clearly distinguishable  from persuading, which latter is the acknow-  ledged province of Rhetoric ? Thus will ana-  ^5ii' uniformly belong to Logic, and synthesis  to Rhetoric. While we use language as the  medium for reaching further knowledge than  the notions (knowledge) we have already  gained, we shall be using it logically : when,  knowing all we intend to make known, we  employ it to put others in possession of the  same knowledge, we shall be using it rhetorically. As learners we are, according to  this distribution, to be deemed logicians }— .as     176     [chap, II.     teachers, rhetoricians. The two purposes are  quite distinct, though they are often con-  founded under the same name, reasoning ;  which sometimes means investigation, and  sometimes argumentation*, or a process with   • 111 spite of all we have said against taking up no-  tions from mere terms, (for " what's in a name ?") we  confeES a strong antipathy to the word argumentatmi.  It no sooner meets our eyes, than, fearing the approach  of some Docteur Pancrace, we instinctively put our  hands to our ears. " Voub voulez peut-etre savoir, si  la substance et Vaceident sont termes synonymes on  equivoques k I'egard de Tetre? Sganarelle. Point  du tout. Je... Pancrace. Si la lo^ que est un art, ou  une science.^ Sgan. Ce n'est pas cela. Je... Pancr.  Si elle a pour objet les trois operations de I'esprit, ou  la troieieme seulement ? Sgan. Non. Je... Poner. S'il  y a dix categories, ou s'il n'y en a qu'une ? Sgan.  Point. Je... Pancr. Si la conclusion est Vessence  du sylle^sme ? Sgan. Nenni. Je... Pancr. Si  fessence du bien est mise dans I'appetibilite, ou dans  la convenancc? Sgan. Non. Je... Pancr. Si le  bien se rcciproque avec la fin ? Sgan. He, non! Je...  Pancr. Si la fin nous pent emouvoir par son etre reel,  ou par son Stre intentionel ? Sgnn. Non, non, non,  non, non, dc par tons lea diables, non. (Moli&re's  Mariage Force.) We join in our friend Sganarelle'g    a view to proof: and the confusion is promoted by the circumstance, that the two pro-  cesses are often used in subservience to each  other. Thus, when a writer sits down to a  work of philosophical investigation, it is to be  expected that the general truths he designs to  prove, are already in his possession ; but he  has to seek the means of proving them. Now  in searching for these, it is not unlikely, that,  with regard to the detail, he will frequently  come to conclusions different from those he  was inclined to entertain, though the final re-  sult he had entertained may remain un-  changed. At one moment, therefore, he is a  logician, at another, a rhetorician. His reader,  on the other hand, is a logician throughout :  in following and weighing the arguments offer-  ed, he is an investigator of the truths which   deprecation, wishing to shun all argumentation, except  of that quiet kind which takes place when the talkers  on both sides are disposed to truth, ilot victory. If  the word conveyed to us the notion of so peaceable a  meeting, we should have no objection to it ; but we  have confessed our prejudice.    the other undertakes to prove. In this man-  ner may the same composition, accordingly  as it exercises the inquiring or the demon-  strating mind, be considered at one time with  reference to Logic, at another with reference  to Rhetoric. Still must it be admitted, that  to investigate and to prove are different  things ; and conceiving there is sufficient  ground for confining Logic to the former  office, we shall conclude our chapter as we  began it, by defining Logic to be the right  use of WORDS with a view to the investiga-  tion of truth.    Non posse Oratorem esse nisi viriim bonum.   AKG, CAP. I. LIB. XII. QtriN. 1N3.  In the chapter just finished, it was shown  that the use of language as a Logical instru-  ment, entirely agrees with the theory of Gram-  mar we ascertained in the first chapter, and  that, on no other principles than those which  arise from that theory, can Logic be pro-  fitably studied. We have now to show that  the use of language as a Rhetorical instrument  agrees with the same theory, and that the  view of the art hence obtained, lays open its  true nature, and the proper basis for its rules.  2. The language of cries or ejaculations,  which in the first chapter we started with,  may be called the Rhetoric of nature. To  this succeeds the learning of artificial lan-  guage ; and the process, whether of invention  or of imitation, brings into being the Logic  described in the preceding chapter. For  whether we invent a language, or learn a lan-  guage already invented, (presuming it to be  the first language we learn,) we must learn,  (if we do not learn like parrots,) the things of  which language is significant. All words  whatever, not excepting even proper names *,  express notions (knowledge) obtained from  the observation and comparison of many par-  ticulars ; and singly and separately, each word  has reference to the particulars from which  the knowledge has been gained. But it is by  degrees we reach the knowledge of which  each single word is fitted to be the sign. We  begin by understanding those sentences, or  single words understood as sentences>, that  signify our most obvious affections and wants,  and which, taking the place of our natural  cries, retain the tone of those cries as far as  the articulate sounds they are united with  permit. In all cases, as a sentence expresses   * Vide Chap. II. Sect. 7- ad fincm.    a particular meaning in comparison with the  general terms of which it is composed^ the  hearer may be competent to the meaning of  the sentence, who is not competent to the  full meaning of the separate words. A cry,  a gesture, may deprecate evil, or supplicate  good ; and a sentence which takes the place  of, or accompanies that cry or gesture, will,  as a whole, be quickly interpreted. But the  speaker and the hearer must have made con-  siderable progress in the acquirement of know-  ledge by means of language, before the one  can put together, and the other can separate^  understand, such words as, ^^ A fellow  creature implores"; "A friend entreats *\   It is by frequently hearing the same word in  context with others, that a full knowledge of  its meaning is at length obtained * ; but this  implies that the several occasions on which it   * Consult, on this subject, Chapter 4th of Du-  gald Stewart's Essay " on the Tendency of some late  Philological Speculations,^ being the fifkh of bis " Phi-  losophical Essays^.     [chap. hi.   is used, are observed and comjiared; it im-  plies, in short, a constant enlargement of our  knowledge by the use of language as an in-  strument to attain it.   3. But he who uses language as a logical,  will also use it, when need requires, as a rhe-  torical instrument. The Rhetoric of nature,  the inarticulate cries of the mere animal, he  will lay aside ; or at least he will employ them  (and he will then do so instinctively) only on  tliose occasions for which they are still best  suited, — for the expression of feelings re-  quiring immediate sympathy. On all other  occasions, he will use the Rhetoric by which  a mind endowed with knowledge, may expect  to influence minds that are similarly endowed ;  and our inquiry now is, how the effect is pro-  duced;— how, by means of words, (taking  words to be nothing else than our theory of  language has ascertained them to be,) — how,  by such means, we inform, convince, and  persuade.   4. According to our theory, wobds are to be considered as having a double capacity ;  in the first, as expressing the speaker's actual  thought ; — ^in the second, as being the signs  of knowledge obtained by antecedent acts of  judgment, and deposited in the mind ; which  signs are fitted to be the means of reaching  further knowledge. Now, when we use lan-  guage as a rhetorical instrument, we use it,  or at least pretend to use it, in order to make  known our actual thought, — in order that  other minds should have that information, or  be enlightened by that conviction, which we  have reached. Could this be done by a single  indivisible word — could we realize the wish  of the poet —   Could I embody and unbosom now   That which is most within me ; could I wreak   My thoughts upon expression, and thus throw   Soul, heart, mind, passions, feelings, strong or weak.   All that I would have sought, and all I seek,   Bear, know, feel, and yet breathe, into One Word*   Were this instantaneous communication with-  ♦ Byron's Childe Harold, Canto III. Stanza 97- in our power. Rhetoric would be a natural  faculty, not an art, and our inquiry into  its means of operation would be idle. But  getting beyond the occasions for which the  Rhetoric of nature is sufficient, and for which  those sentences are sufficient that serve the  most ordinary purposes of life, an instan-  taneous communication from mind to mind, is  impossible. The information, the conviction,  or the sensitive associations, which we have  wrought out by the exercise of our observing  and reasoning powers, can be given to another  mind only by giving it the means to work out  the same results for itself ; and, as a rhetorical  instrument, language is, in truth, much more  used to explore the minds of those who are  addressed, than to represent, by an expression  of correspondent unity, the thought of the  speaker ; — rather to put other minds into a  certain posture or train of thinking, than pre-  tending to convey at once what the speaker  thinks. Contrary as this doctrine will ap-  pe$ir to common opinion on the subject, a very little reflection will show that it must be true.  For a word can communicate to another mind  what is in the speaker's, only by having the  same meaning in the hearer^s : but if it have  the same meaning, then it signifies no more  than what the hearer knows already, or what  he has previously experienced. And this is  plainly the case with sentences (words) in  familiar use, which signify what all have at  times occasion to express, which are used  over and over again for their respective pur-  poses, and of which, while uttering or hearing  them, we do not attend to the meaning of the  separate words, but only to the meaning of  the whole expression *. Here, it is confessed,  the communication is made at once ; but then  it is a communication which the hearer is pre-  pared to receive, because he has himself used  the same expression for the same purpose.  What is to be done when the information or  the conviction is altogether strange to the  mind which is to receive it ? In this case the   ♦ Refer to Chap. I. Sect 19.     ON RHETOKIC. QCHAP. HI.     speaker will seek in vain, as in the first case,  for an expression previously familiar to the  hearer; and he will have to form an expres-  sion. But how shall he form it? As words  have the power of representing only what is  known on both sides, he must form it not  with signs of what is to be made known, but  of what is already known. In this way, he  may produce an expression — whether that  expression take the name of sentence, oration,  treatise, poem, &c. * — which, as a whole, de-  notes that which his mind has been labouring  to communicate — the information, the con-  viction, or the sensitive associations he is de-  sirous that others should entertain in common  with himself. The necessity of so protracted,  so artful a process, must be set down to the  hearer's account, not to the speaker's. The  latter is (or ought to be) in previous possession  of what he seeks to communicate — he has  been through the process, and reached the  result : but that result he cannot give at once  ' Compiirc Chap. I. Sect. 20.      and gratuitously to others : he can but lead  them to it, as he himself was led, by address-  ing what they already know or feel ; and his  skill in rhetoric will be the skill with which,  for this purpose, he explores their minds. It  will be a process of synthesis on his part, and  of analysis on theirs. He will form an ex-  pression out of WORDS which signify what  they already know, or what they have already  felt : and the separate understanding of these  on their part, will enable them to understand  his expression as a whole. This being the  theory of Rhetoric which grows out of our  theory of language, we now proceed to show  that the actual practice of every speaker, and  of every writer, is in accordance with it.   5. To begin with Description and Narra-  tion : — Is it not obvious, that, to procure in  another mind the idea of things unknown, we  proceed by raising the conception of those  that are known ? An object of sight which  the party addressed has never seen, we give  an idea of by allusions made iu various ways to objects he has seen :— or if, being new as a  whole, it is made up of parts not new, we give  the idea of the whole by naming the parts,  and their manner of union. An unknown  sound, or combination of sounds, an unknown  taste, smell, or feel, is suggested to another  mind by a comparison, direct or indirect,  with a known sound, taste, smell, &c. As to  conceptions purely intellectual, it is a proof  how little one mind can directly represent or  open, itself to another, that, in the first in-  stance, such conceptions can be made known  not by words that directly stand for them, not  by comparisons with things of their own  nature, but only by comparisons with affec-  tions and effects outwardly perceptible; as  would at once be obvious in tracing to their  origin all words that relate to the faculties and  operations of the mind *'y although it is true   * Thus afdrnvs^ amma^ +*'%»», originally signify  wind or breath : ^vfiog /Mevog^ mens^ impetuosity ; in-  tellect is from inter and lego, I collect from among ;  perception and oonceptUm are from capio I take, — a     that these words at last become well under-  stood names, that at once suggest their re«  spective objects, without bringing up the ideas  of the objects of comparison that once in-  tervened. In narration we proceed by similar  means. We presume the hearer to be ac-  quainted with facts or events of the same  kind as that which is to be made known,  though not with the particular event ; for we  \x%Q generalievmSy i. e. terms expressing kinds  or sorts, in order to form every more par-  ticular expression. If the hearer should be  unacquainted with facts or events of die same  kind, the communicator then has recourse to   use of the verb still common in such phrases as ^^ I  take in with my eye,'' and, " I take your meaning ;''  judgment is from jus dicere ; understanding suggests  its own etymology ; refleadon implies a casting or  throwing back again; imagination is from imago^  an image or representation; to thinks according to  Home Tooke, is from thing ; — " Res-^k thing (he says)  gives us refyr I am thinged,'' i. e. operated upon by  things. These are etymologies suggested by authori-  ties universally accessible ; — the curious in this depart-  ment of learning would be able to add much more.      circuitous comparisons. If nothing is pre-  viously known to wliich the action or event  can, however remotely, be compared, the  attempt to make it known must be as fruitless  as that of giving an idea of colours to one  bom blind, or of sounds to one born deaf*.   * Not without reason does the angel thus speak to  Adam in the Paradise Lost :  High matter thou enjoin'st me, O prime of men,   — and hard : for how shall I relate  To human sense the invisible exploits  Of warring spirits ?  And he proposes to overcome the difficulty in the only  way in which it can be concaved possible to be over-   — what surmounts the reach  Of human sense, I shall delineate so  By likening spiritual to corporal forms,  As may express them best.   Far. Lost. Book 5. 1. 5G3.  Still must the discourse of the Angel have been unin-  telli^ble to Adam : for the latter must be supposed  ignorant not only of the things to be illustrated, but  of far the greater part of the illustrations. There  was no keeping clear of this defect in the philosophy  of die jwem, if, in a poem, we arc to look for philoso-  phy. The discourse even of Adam and Eve, though   Thus, then, when we make use of  words in order to inform, we produce the  effect by adapting them to what the hearer  already knows. In using words in order to  convince and persuade, we produce the effect  in the same way. But to convince, it is ne-  cessary to inform — to acquaint the hearer  either with something he did not know before,  or with something he did not attend to ; and  the information is called the argument * or  proof. Thus the information that "Plato was  a philosopher," is an argument or proof that  he is deserving of respect: and the clear  testimony that " a man has killed another  maliciously," proves that the perpetrator is  guilty of murder. But why do we account  the information in the respective instances an  argument or proof of the conclusion ? For   Iieautifully fiimple, is tilled with alluaions to things  which the least philosophy will teach us they could not  be acquainted with.   * The word argument is commonly used iii the  sense we here assign to it ; though it is likewise often  used with » more coniprelicnBivc meaning.  no Other reason than this, that it is addressed  to a notion (knowledge) previously acquired  of what persons are deserving of respect, (in  the first instance,) and of what constitutes the  crime of murder, (in the second instance.)  Take away this previous knowledge, and the  information remains indeed, and may perhaps  be clearly understood, but in neither instance  can it lead the hearer to the conclusion, —  that is to say, it will not then be an argument  for the end in view : it will communicate,  perhaps, what it professes to make known, but  there the matter will end. In every process,  then, by which we propose to convince others  of a truth, there are three things implied or  expressed : i. that which we intend to prove  true, and which, if stated first, is called the  proposition, if last, the conclusion : ii. the in-  formation by which we try to prove it, and  which is accordingly called the argument or  pro of; iii. the previous notion (knowledge) to  which the information is addressed, and  which is frequently called the datum ; being that which is presumed to be already known,  and therefore conceded or given by the person  reasoned with ; on account of which, and  solely on this account, the information is  offered in the capacity of an argument or  proof. Now, here we have the parts of a  syllogism, (though in reversed order, viz. the  conclusion, the minor, the major,) and this  may serve to show, without having recourse  to the Aristotelian doctrine of the comparison  of a middle with extremes, why the form of a  syllogism, where necessary, must always be a  forcible way of stating an argument. For  first we state that which our hearer cannot  but. concede j (major ;) then we state that  which he did not know or attend to, in such  a way that he must receive it on our testi-  mony, or admit as evident as soon as it is  attended toj (minor;) and these two being  admitted, they are found to contain what we  proposed to prove: which we then draw  from them without the possibility of a rational  contradiction; (conclusion.) For example;   o    our hearer knows by experience what persons  are deserving of respect: he knows, then,  that   ** Every philosopher is deserving of respect.^   We then remind him of the fact which he has  learned from history, that   " Plato is a philosopher :''   Hence on his own knowledge we advance  the undeniable conclusion,   " Plato is deserving of respect''   Is this conclusion at all fortified — is the  process which led to it explained — by shew-  ing that a comparison of the terms independ-  ently of the things, produces the proposition  which expresses it ? Both the hearer and the  speaker must have the kno'wledgevfYiicYi the first  two propositions refer to, or the conclusion can-  not be drawn for any rational end : and if they  have the knowledge, they have the conclusion  in that knowledge. In convincing the hearer,  the speaker does nothing but remind him  that he (the hearer) has the necessary knowledge ; and the syllogism, we admit, puts the  matter home in a very forcible way : but that  is all : another form of speaking will oflen do  equally well : for instance, " Plato who is a  philosopher is deserving of respect." Whether  the truth is stated in this way, or in the for-  mer way, or in any other way, the extract-  ing of a middle and extremes out of the ex*  pression, and demonstrating that these agree  or disagree, is, we repeat it, a puerile addition  to the process that has previously taken place.  Again, with regard to the other example at  the beginning of the section: — Our hearer  knows, (suppose him to be a juryman,) either  of his own knowledge, or by the definition  laid down by the judge, that   ^^ Maliciously killing a man is murder.''^   This is the datum, or major. He receives in  charge, i. e. he is informed that A. B. killed a  man maliciously, which is tantamount to  saying that   " What A. B. did, is killing a man maliciously.*"   o 2     196 ON RHETORIC. [CHAP. Ill,   This information is to be the argument or  minor by which the conclusion is to be esta-  blished; but the juryman must be made sure  of its truth, — he must know it, — before he  can receive it in this capacity : — well, he is  made sure of its truth : — must he then go to  Aristotle, and be taught to compare the  middle with the extremes, in order to pro-  nounce his verdict that   " What A. B. did, is murder:''   that is, he is guilty of murder? Will he be  MORE satisfied with his own verdict, if he is  able to do so ? Common sense pronounces,  no. Let us, then, for ever have done with  the Aristotelian Syllogism ; admitting, how-  ever, in favour of the form of expression, that  to express (i.) the datum, — (ii.) the inform-  ation which, because it is addressed to the da-  tum, is an argument,— and (iii.) the conclusion  from them — in three distinct propositions, is a  very forcible way of stating a truth which we  have reason to believe our hearer is prepared to admit the moment it is so stated. But  the syllogism thus detached from the artifice  of comparing a middle with extremes, is only  one among the innumerable ways of express-  ing a truth, which the custom of language  permits, and is no more the invention of  Aristotle in particular, than any of those  other forms that might be used instead  of it *.   7. This brief notice of the syllogism in  addition to what was advanced in the last  chapter, occurs by the way : — ^the point we  had in hand, was, to show that in convincing  others by means of words, we adapt our words  to what they already know. And this must  be evident from what has preceded. For we  previously proved, that, in order to inform,   * Our observations on the syllogism are not meant  to call in question the intellectual capacity of the in-  ventor. For what we conceive to be a just estimate  of his merits, we refer to Dugald Stewart'^s Second  Vol. of the Philos. of the Human Mind, Chap. III.  Sect. 3., near the middle of the section.     we adapt our words to what our hearers al-  ready know ; and we have just shown that the  process of convincing them, is a process in  which we address some information to a pre-  existing notion. Let us now see how this  doctrine tallies with the terras of art which  are already in recognised use ; and, as occa-  sion may offer, let us inquire if there be any  difference, and what, between conviction and  persuasion.   8. That every argument used to influence  others, is considered to derive its efficacy  from some pre-existing notion, opinion, or rul-  ing motive, whether permanent or transitory,  in the hearer, is evident from the following  and similar expressions : argumentum ad Judi-  cium, by which we signify that our inform-  ation is addressed to such general principles of  judgment as mankind at large are guided by :  argumentum ad hominem, by which we imply  that we address those peculiar principles by  which the individual man is actuated. Again ;  argumentum ad vtrvcundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam, argumentum ad Jidem, argumcn-  tum ad passiones, all imply arguments (infoim-  ation) addressed to some partial motives of  judgment and action ; and in all these, the  conclusion arising out of the reasoning has  the same validity, as far as regards the mere  act of reasoning : it is the difference of the  data that makes it of very different value. A  conclusion from an argument addressed to  principles which all men recognise, is obvious-  ly a conclusion of universal force; but one  which arises from an argument addressed to  peculiar principles, can of course be convinc-  ing only to such as admit those principles.  So likewise a conclusion which arises from the  reverence entertained for the author of the  principles professed ; — or which follows in the  hearer's mind from his limited notions, and  would not follow if he were better inlorra-  ed ;— or which follows because of his faith,  and would not follow, if he had not that  iaith J— or because his passions are previously  disposed, and would not follow, if they were otherwise disposed: — in these and in similar  cases, the argument is valid, and therefore ef-  fective with respect to the minds for which it  is adapted, but addressed to other and more  general motives or knowledge, it may be no  argument at all *. Here, then, we may  perhaps see how the difference arises between  conviction and persuasion ; — mere persuasion  is conviction as far as it goes ; but it is con-  viction arising out of partial data : the person  persuaded is conscious that the reasoning  process itself is right, but he suspects —  perhaps more than suspects — tliat the data  which he has permitted his inclinations to lay   • Hence, what is Rhetoric at one tune and to one  set of auditors, may be none whatever at another time.  Who has not admired tlie Rhetoric of Marc Antony,  (the Hpeecb over Ciesar's body,) in Shakspeare's play  of Jnhua Caesar ? But why do we admire it F Is it  such Rhetoric as would persuade all people under the  circumstances supposed ? No. But it is just such  Rhetoiic as was fitted for the multitude under those  circumstances; and we admire the dramatist who so  completely suits the oration to the art of the speaker,  und the minds of those whom be has to operate upon.      down, are wrong: he perceives another con-  clusion from other and less suspicious data,  though he has not resolution enough to em-  brace it : so that the case we referred to in  the last chapter* as being so common in life,  Video meliora proboque^ deteriora sequor,  amounts to this, — that we are divided between  two conclusions, the one drawn from data  which we know to have the sanction of uni-  versal consent, the other from data supplied  by private motives. Thus, when Macbeth is  bunging in doubt between the suggestions of  duty and ambition t, the conclusion from each  source is reasonably drawn : but he is not  ignorant of the different value of the respec-  tive sources. He has nearly determined in  favour of the conclusion drawn from duty,  when his wife enters, who, by addressing con-  siderations (information, arguments,) to his  known sentiments of greatness and courageous   * Chap. II. Sect. 2+.   f Shakspcare's Macbetb, Act I. Scene 7-     daring, persuades him to murder Duncan and  seize the crown.   9. So much for the terms of art by which  we signify the quaUty of the arguments we  use, as depending on the known motives, or  information, or disposition, of the persons  addressed : which terms suit our theory so  well, that they seem to be invented for it.  Nest, for the terms by which the arguments  themselves are technically distinguished.  First, we have a distinction of them into Ex-  ternal and Internal. Now, according to our  theory, every argument consists of some in-  formation which we communicate to the per-  son reasoned with : — but this information  may be something that he could not possibly  have discovered by any consideration of the  subject itself J or it may be something that he  might have so discovered ; in which latter  case, our information will amount to nothing  more than making him aware of what he had  overlooked. The former, then, will be an ex-      temal argument or proof; the latter, an in-  temal argument. Of the former, the evidence  in a court of justice is an example ; as are al-  so proofs from history and other writings, and  irom the testimony of the senses. Of the lat-  ter kind, are all arguments from what are call-  ed the topica or loci communes : — for instance,  from the definition or conditions of a thing j  as when certain lines are inferred to be equal  to each other from their nature or conditions  as being radii of the same circle : — from  enumeration ; as when we prove that a whole  nation hates a man, by enumerating the  several ranks in it, who all do so : — from nota~  tion or etymology ; as when we infer that Lo-  gic has reference to the use of words in  reasoning, from its connexion with the Greek  Xt'yw I speak, and \6yoi a word :— from genus f  as when we prove that Plato is deserving of   respect, by showing that he is one of a getius  or kind that is deserving of respect : — from  species ; as when we infer the excellence of ^  virtue in general from that which we observe      eo*      [chap. lit.     in some particular act of virtue : — anil so like-  wise of the same kind, namely internal, are  aiguments from the other well known topics ;  (not to prolong the instances, which are easily  imagined ;) from cause, whether efficient, JiJial,  Jbrmal, or material; from adjuncts, antecedents,  consequences, contraries, opposiles, similitudeSy  dissimilitudes, things greater, less, or equal:  &c. The deriving of arguments from these  internal topics*, is nothing more, on the part  of the speaker, than turning a subject into  every point of view that may suggest a some-  thing relating to it, overlooked perhaps by  the hearer, and which, by being brought to  his notice, and addressed to his pre-existing  notions, may prove, or render probable, the  proposition in hand ; and according to the de-  gree of force which the argument carries, it is   • The reader needs not be reminded how largely  this subject of topics, (or places for finding the internal  or artiiicial proofs in contradiGtinction to the external or  artificial,) ia treated by the ancients : for instance, by  Aristotle, by Cicero, (vide the book called Topu-a,)  and by Quinctilian.     deemed an instrument of conviction or of  persuasion. An argument from defimlion ; — -  (for instance from the conditions of a problem  or theorem j as where lines are required to he  drawn which are to be radii of the same cir-  cle J ) which argument is addressed to a notion  assumed among the general conditions of the I  reasoning ; (for instance, that " a circle is suct]^ ]  a figure that all lines, (called radii,) drawn, j  from a certain point within it to the circum-  ference are equal " ;) — an argument so derived  and so addressed, is demonstrative of the pro-  position which it is brought to prove : (e. g^  that the lines are equal.) An argument froni[1  enumeration, — (for instance, from a statement 1  of the several ranks that are found in a n&- ]  tion,) addressed to a notion that the parta J  enumerated are all the parts, (for instance^ j  that the several ranks of people that hate A. j  B. comprise the whole nation,) is also de-  monstrative with respect to that notion ; but  if the enumeration should not comprehend all  the parts in the hearer's notion of the whole, or if the hearer should doubt whether his own  notion is sufficiently comprehensive, no ab-  solute conviction takes place. Still, the enu-  meration may induce belief, and will in such  case be said to persuade, though not to con-  vince. The same might be shown of the ar-  guments derived from all the other topics.  Entire conviction would follow from any of  them, if the hearer were fully satisfied both of  the truth of what is offered in the way of ar-  gument, and of the correctness of his own no-  tion to which the argument is addressed : but  greater or less degrees of doubt may accom-  pany each of these, and greater or less de-  grees of doubt will therefore attach to the  conclusions which flow from them. We may  moreover observe, that the truths a speaker  has in view, do not always stand in need of  demonstration : they are perhaps admitted al-  ready, but it may be that they do not suffici-  ently influence the hearer's sensibilities. The  object of an argument will then be, to awaken  those sensibilities, and with this effect its purpose wiU stop : as, for instance, when in or-  der to awaken sensibility to the frail nature  of man's existence, (not to demonstrate it,)  the speaker draws his argument from simili-  tude :   Ah ! few and full of sorrows are the days  Of mieerable man ! his life decays  Like that fair flower that with the sun's uprise  Its bud unfolds, and with the evening dies.   Here, the argument is obviously meant for  persuasion. There may, at the same time, be  an ultimate truth in view, which the speaker  designs to enforce when he has prepared the  mind for receiving it; and he will then employ  arguments of a different kind, and address  them to notions of universal dominion. — But  with regard to any of the arguments which,  in this brief review we have glanced at —  whether external or internal, whether demon-  strative, or only inducing belief, whether de-  signed to convince, or fitted but to per-  suade, — the process accords with the theory  assumed: — the speaker adapts words to knowledge the hearers have already attained, or  to feeliugs they have already experienced, in  order to conduct them to some discovery he  wishes them to make, or to some unexperienc-  ed train of thought conducive to such dis-  covery.   10. The assumption of this as the great  principle of the art, will, in the next place,  enable us to clear it from certain misdirected  charges to which it has always been liable.  The expedients which the orator employs,  the various tropes and figures of which his  discourse is made up, are apt to be looked  upon as means to dissemble and put a  gloss upon, rather than to discover his real  sentiments*. That, like all other useful   * We refer more especially to the following pas-  sage with which Locke concludes his Chapter ^^ on the  Abuse of Words ;^ being the 10th of his 3d book.  ^^ Since wit and &ncy find easier entertainment in the  world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative  speeches and allusion in language will hardly be ad-  mitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess  in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and de-     SECT. 10.] ON RHETORIC. 209   things, they ^re sometimes abused*, nobody   • E/ 3f, ort /jieyaKa jSxa\J/£(£v av b xi^f^^^°^ d^Uag  Tn roKzuTn ^uvifAEi tcHv Aoywv, touto re Jtoivov eo'ti Kara  ^ivruv Tuv ayaOav* Arist. Rhet. I. 1.     light than information and improvement, such orna-  ments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for  faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they  are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides  order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative ap-  plication of words eloquence hath invented, are for  nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the  passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so  indeed are perfect cheats : and therefore however  laudable or allowable oratory may rehder them in ha-  rangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in  all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly  to be avoided ; and where truth and knowledge are con-  cerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of  the language or the person that makes use of them.  What, and how various they are, will be superfluous  here to notice ; the books of rhetoric which abound in  the world, will instruct those who want to be informed :  only I cannot but observe how little the preservation  and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care  and concern of mankind ; since the arts of fallacy are  endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men will deny : but to consider them by their very  nature as instruments of deception, only  proves that the objector utterly misconceives  the relation between thought and language.  These expedients are, in fact, essential parts  of the original structure of language ; and  however they may sometimes serve the pur-  poses of falsehood, they are, on most occa-  sions, indispensable to the effective communi-  cation of truth. It is only by expedients  that mind can unfold itself to mind;— lan-  guage is made up of them ; there is no such  thing as an express and direct image of  thought. Let a man's mind be penetrated   love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that  powerftil instrument of error and deceit, has its esta-  blished professors, is publicly taught, and has always  been had in great reputation : and I doubt not but  it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me,  to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like  the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to suf-  fer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain  to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men  find pleasure to be deceived.'*'  with the clearest truth — let him burn to com-  luunicate the blessing to others ; — ^yet can he,  in no way, at once lay bare, nor can their  minds at once receive, the truth as he is con-  scious of it. He therefore makes use of ex-  pedients : — he conceals, perhaps, his final pur-  pose ; for the mind which is to be informed,  may not yet be ripe for it :— ^he has recourse  to every form of comparison, (allegory, simile,  metaphor*,) by which he may awaken pre-  disposing associations : — he changes one name  for another, (metonymy,) connected with  more agreeable, or more favourable associa-  tions : — he pretends to conceal what in fact  he declares ; — (apophasis ; — ) to pass by what   * In referring to these and other figures of speech,  it is impossible not to be reminded of Butler'^s distich,  that   All a rhetorician'^s rules   Teach nothing but to name his tools.   The fact is as the satirist states it. But then it is  something to a workman to have a name for his tools ;  for this implies that he can find them handily. — May  we add to our remark, that the world is scarcely yet in truth he reveals ; — (paraleipsis) he interrogates when he wants no answer ;— (ero-  tesis ; — ) exclaims, when to himself there can  be no sudden surprise;— (ecphonesis) he  corrects an expression he designedly uttered ;  — (epanorthosis) he exaggerates ;— (hyperbole) he gathers a number of particu-  lars into one heap; — (synathroesmus) he  ascends step by step to his strongest position ;  — (climax ) he uses terms of praise in a  sense quite opposite to their meaning ; — (ironia) he personifies that which has no life,  perhaps no sensible existence ; — (prosopopoeia) he imagines he sees what is not actually present ;— (hypotyposis) he calls upon aware how much it owes to such men as Butler, Moliere,  Shakspeare, Pppe ;r-^men who joined to other rich gifts  of intellect, that of plain sound sense, which enabled  them at once to see, in their true light, the vanities and  absurdities of (misqalled) learningp But for the histo-  rian of Martinus Scriblerus, his predecessors and suc-  cessors, the world might still be under the dominion of  a set of solemn coxcombs, whose whole merit consisted  in making small matters seem big ones, and themselves  to appear wiser than their neighbours.   the living and the dead ; — (apostrophe) all  these, and many more than these, are the ar-  tifices which the orator* employs ; but they  are artifices which belong essentially to lan-  guage ; nor are there other means, taking  them in their kind and not individually, by  which men can be effectually informedy or  perstuidedj or convinced. Could the prophet  at once have made the royal seducer of  Uriah's wife fully conscious of the sin he had  committed, he would not have approached  him with a parable t : that parable was the  means of opening his heart and understanding  to the true nature of his crime ; and it is a  proper instance of the principle on which all  eloquence proceeds. It is true, we do not   * We trust the reader scarcely needs to be remind-  ed, that the word Orator isused throughout this treatise,  in the comprehensive sense which includes all who  wield the implements of Eloquence. In modem times,  the influential orator is read not heard ; or if heard,  his hearers are few in number compared with his  readers.   t 2 Sam. 12.     now make use of parables fully drawn out ;  but all metaphorical expressions, all compa-  risons direct or indirect, are to the same pur-  pose ; namely, that of bringing the mind of  the hearer into a state or temper fitted for the  apprehension of truth. Nor, (we repeat,)  must it be thought that the means referred  to, (excepting some instances in bad taste,)  are ornaments superinduced on the plain mat-  ter of language, and capable of being detached  from it : they are the original texture of Ian-  guage, and that from which whatever is now  plain at first arose. All words are originally  tropes ; that is, expressions turned (for such is  the meaning of trope) from their first pur-  pose, and extended to others. Thus, when a  particular name is enlarged to a general one,  as our theory shows to have happened with  all words now general, the change in the first  instance was a trope. A trope ceases how-  ever to be one, when a word is fixed and re-  membered only in its acquired meaning ; and  in this way it is that all plain expressions have originated. In a mature language, a speaker  or writer may, therefore, if he pleases, avoid  figurative expressions. But the same neces-  sity, the same strong feelings, which originally  gave birth to language, will still produce new  figures, or lead the speaker to prefer those  already in use to plain expressions, if, by  the former, he can touch the chords, or awaken  the associations, that are linked with the truths  iie seeks to establish.  Our theory of language, and consequent theory of Rhetoric, will, in the next  place, no longer leave us to wonder at an ef-  fect, which Dr. Campbell has laboured to  account for with much ingenuity; namely,  that nonsense so often escapes being detect-  ed both by the writer and the reader*. For  according to our theory, words have a sepa-  rate and a connected meaning, each of which  is distinct from the other. Now, suppose a  succession of words to have no connected     Chap. VII.      See Philosophy of Rhetoric, Vol. II. Book II.      meaning, which is as much as to say, suppose  them to be nonsense ; yet, in their separate  capacity, they will nevertheless stand for  things that have been known and felt ; and  if both the speaker and the hearer shbuld be  satisfied with the vague revival of this know-  ledge and of these feelings, they will neither  of them seek for, and consequently will not  detect the absence of an ulterior purpose.  The effect which is produced by words thus  used, (or rather misused,) extends no further  than that produced by instrumental music,  and is of the same kind. For no one will  pretend that a piece of niusic expresses, or can  express, independently of words, a series of ra-  tional propositions ; yet it awakens some sen-  timents or feelings of a suflSciently definite cha-  racter to occupy the mind agreeably. Now  perhaps it is not an unwarrantable libel on  one half of the reading world, if we affirm,  that they read poetry and other amusing  composition for no further end, and with no  further effect, than the pleasure of such vague    Sentiments or feelings as spring from music :  and to such readers it is of little moment  whether the words make sense or not. Ac-  cordingly, when composition like the follow-  ing is put before them^ which presents striking  though incongruous notions, in words gram-  matically united, agreeably jingled, and having  a connexion, probably, with certain sensitive  associations, they are liable to read on, not  only without feeling their taste shocked, but  perhaps with some pleasure.   Hark ! I hear the strain erratic  Dimly glance from pole to pole ;   Raptures sweet and dreams ecstatic,  Fire my everlasting soul.   Where is Cupid's crimson motion,   Billowy ecstasy of wo ?  Bear me straight, meandering ocean,   Where the stagnant torrents flow.   Blood in every vein is gushing,  Vixen vengeance lulls my heart ;   See, the Gorgon gang is rushing !  Never, never let us part *.   * " Rejected Addresses ;^ the particular example     Nor is it in (pretended) poetry alone, that the  eflFect here alluded to tahes place. Bring to-  gether the rabble of a political party, and  place before them a favourite haranguer: — it  13 not by any means necessary that he should  make a speech which they understand, or even  himself: he has only to string, in plausible  order, the accustomed slang words of the  party, and to utter them with the usual fer-  vour ; the wonted huzzas will follow as a  matter of course, and fill each pause that the  speaker's art or necessity prescribes. And  BO likewise in an assembly of a different de-  scription, — the piously disposed congregation     above being in ridicule of Rosa Matilda's style. See  also Pope's " Song by a Person of Quality." The  reader whose taste is gratified by such composition as  is here caricatured, stands at the other extreme from  that mathematical reader, who returned Thomson's  Seasons to the lender with an expression of disgust,  that he had not been able to find a single thing proved  from the beginning to the end of the book. The  reader for whom the genuine poet writes, is equally  removed from each extreme.  of a conventicle : the good man whom they  are accustomed to hear has but to put to-  gether the words of familiar sound and evan-  gelical association — grace, and spirit, and  new light, regeneration and sanctification,  edification and glorification ; an inward call,  a wrestling with Satan, experience, new birth,  and the glory of the elect ; interweaving the  whole with unceasing repetitions of the sa-  cred name, accompanied by varied epithets of,  blessed, holy, and divine : and with no further  assistance than the appropriated tone and  frequent upturned eye, he will throw them  into a holy transport, and dismiss them, as  they will declare, comforted and edified.  This effect, which is apt to be attributed to  hypocrisy because the ordinary notions of  language suggest no cause for it, our theory  explains with no heavy scandal to the parties.   12. Concerning the elements of Rhetoric  ranged under the divisions of Invention and  Elocution, we have now made what remarks our object required. There yet remains one  division, namely, Pronunciation *; which will,  however, scarcely furnish occasion for extend-  ing our observations ; since our theory is not  in any peculiar manner concerned with it.  As we started with the Rhetoric of nature,  namely, tone, looks, and gesture, so we are at   * Disposition and Memory are in general adde4  to these three. " Omnis oratoris vis ac facnltas,'*^  says Cicero, ^^ in quinque partes est distributa ; ut  deberet reperire primum, quid diceret; deinde in-  venta non solum ordire, sed etiam momento quodam  atque judicio dispensare atque componere ; tiun ea de-  nique vestire, atque omare oratione ; post, memoria  sepire; ad extremum, agere cum dignitate et venustate.^  De Orat. 1. 31. As to two of these divisions, we have  no occasion to notice them, because there is nothing  in our theory of language which requires them to be  viewed in a new or peculiar light : — We may take oc-  casion to observe, before' concluding the note, that the  modem use of the term Elocution, assigns it to sig-  nify what the ancients denoted by Pronunciation or  Action : and Dr. Whately sanctions this modem sense  by adopting it in his Rhetoric. We have used it  in the foregoing page in the ancient sense : ^^ quam  Graeci f^aa-iv vocant,^ says Quinctilian, ^^ Latine  dicimus Elocutionem.'*'* Ins. viii. 1.    once ready to admit that these may, and  ought to accompany the language of art ; —  that they ought not to be absent even from  the recollection of him who writes, lest  his style be deficient in vivacity. In union  with these parts of Pronunciation, is that ele-  ment of artificial oral speech called Empha-  sis ; and it will be to our purpose to observe,  how very inadequate are the common notions  of language to account for the actual practice  of emphasis, as it may be observed in English  speech. The common view of words that  make up a sentence, is, that they respectively  correspond to ideas that make up the thought :  and therefore, in a written sentence, if we  would know the emphatic word, we are de-  sired to consider which word expresses the  most important idea*. Thus, when Dr.   * To this end some teacher of elocution (elocution  in the modem sense) somewhere says : ^^ If, in every  assemblage of objects, some appear more worthy of no-  tice than others ; if, in every assemblage of ideas,  which arc pictures of those objects, the same difference  Johnson was asked how we ought to pro-  nounce the commandment, ** Thou shalt not  bear false witness against thy neighbour/* he  gave as his opinion that not should have the  emphasis, because it seemed the most im-  portant word to the whole sense. But Garrick  influenced by no assumed theory, pronounced  according to the practice of English speech,  ** Thou shalt-not bear," * &c. There is in fact  no other rule than custom in English speech  for the accenting of words in a sentence, any  more than there is for accenting syllables in a  word. A peculiar or referential meaning  may indeed disturb the usual accent of a   prevail, — it consequently must follow, that in every  assemblage of words, which are pictures of these ideas,  there must be some that claim the distinction called  emphasis.^ All this ingenious parallel, with Aristotle^s  authority to back it, we affirm to be purely visionary,  and we hope the reader by this time thinks as^ we do.  Yet is the passage in entire accordance with the no-  tions of language that commonly — nay, it should  seem, universally prevail.   * The story is somewhere related by BoswelL  word : for instance, the common accent of  the word for^ve, will be displaced if the  word is pronounced referentially to a word  that has a syllable in common ; as in saying  to give and loj'drgive. And just so will it be  in a sentence which is pronounced refer-  entially to an antecedent or a subsequent  sentence, either expressed or understood :  which would be the case, if we pronounced tie  ninth commandment in contradiction to one  who had said "Thou shaltbear false witness,"  &C., for then we should accent it in Johnson's  way, and say " Thou shalt n6t bear," &c.  Now this is what is properly called emphasis,  namely, some peculiar way of accenting a  sentence in order to give it a referential mean-  ing. A sentence pronounced to have a plain  meaning has its customary accents, but no  emphasis. The commonest example will be  the best ; and therefore we will quote one  that may be found in every book in which  emphasis is treated of: "Do you ride to town to-day?" If this is pronounced without allusive meaning, ride, town, and day,  are equally accented by the custom of the  language, and there Is no emphasis properly  so called : which, by the way, is a pronunciation of the sentence that teachers of read-  ing, in their search after its possible oblique  meanings, forget to tell us of. Suppose we  give an emphasis to ride, then lide-to-toivn-to  day will be allusive to ■wdlk-to-town-to-day, as  we might accent the word intrinsical in the  mauner marked with a reference to the word  Extrinsical, although the plain accentuation is  intrinsical. So again to-loTvn-lo-day is allusive  to the-country-to-day, and to-town-to-ddy is al-  lusive to to-town-to-m6rrow ; as the word  powerless might be accented on the last syl-  lable with a view to poweiiful. That the ac-  tual practice of emphasis corresponds with  this account, the reader may satisfy himself  by observing the conversation of the well-  bred, — not their reading, for that is oflen  conducted on mistaken principles : — and we  scarcely need point out how completely this practice accords with our theory of language.  For with us, a sentence is a word, not more  resolvabie into parts that constitute its whole  meaning, than a word made up of syllables ;  and as with regard to a word of the latter de-  scription, the accent is determined to one syl-  lable by custom, but is disturbed and placed  on another syllable in making allusion to  another word having syllables in common ;  so with regard to a sentence (word) made up  of words, the accents are likewise determined  to certain words that usually bear Ihem, but  these accents are disturbed and placed on  other words in making allusion to a meaning  which has, orwhich, if expressed, would have,  words in common. And here, with this new  kind of proof in favour of our theory, and  with the last subject usually treated of in  Rhetoric, we might stop the hand that has  traced this OutHne. But there remain a few  remarks that could not be introduced earlier,  for which the patience of the reader is en-  treated a little longer. We may take the liberty in the first  place to observe, that, with regard to the  materials of Sematology which have been con-  sidered, our theory leaves them what they  were : it pretends only to show the true basis  on which they stand, and that the learned  distribution of them, is not that which accords  with the actual practice of mankind. Suppose  then, (if we may suppose so much,) that our  Grammars, our Books of Logic, and our In-  stitutes of Rhetoric, are to be altered in con-  formity with the views which have been  opened, the changes will not affect the detail,  but the general preliminary doctrine, and the  subsequent arrangement. As to doctrine,  the changes will mostly consist of omissions.  In Grammar, if we omit the common de-  finitions of the parts of speech *, and allow   * God help the poor children that are set to learn  these, and other of the definitions in elementary  grammars, particularly English grammars; for the  Latin ones are a little more sensible. That jumble of  a grammar that has the name of a Lindley Mturay in  the title page, after defining a verb to be ^^ a wend     the tyro to learn what they are by the parsing  of sentences — that is, to ascend from par-   ihat Bignifiea to be, to do, or to suffer," {as if no other  part of speech signified to be, to do, or to suffer,) —  after saying what is true enough, but cannot be under-  stood by a child till he has practically discovered it,  that " common names stand for kinds containing many  sorts, or for sorts containing many individuals under  them;" — with many like things, picked up from  Lowth and others, equally fitted for the instruction of  young minds; condescends to give a few plain di-  rections for knowing the parts of speech, such as the  tyro is likely to understand: but the author, as if  ashamed of having been intelligible, remarks that  " the observations wliich have been made to aid  learners in distinguishing the parts of speech from one  another, may afford them some small assistance ; but  it will certainly be mucli more instructive to distinguish  them by the definitions, and an accurate knowledge of  their nature" Now the observations referred to, are,  in fact, the only passages calculated to give a just un-  derstanding of the parts of speech ; the definitions  wliich the writer enhances, being founded in an es-  sentially wrong notion of the nature of grammar. It  is speaking to the purpose to tell the tyro that " a  substantive may be distinguished by its taking an  article before it, or by its making sense of itself;"^ that,  " an adjective may be known by its making sense with  ticulars to generals instead of descending  from generals to particulars, — there la nothing   the wortl thing, or any particular Gubstantive ;" that,  " a verb may be diBtinguishcd by its making sense  with any of the personal pronoiuiB ;" that, " a preposi-  tion may be known by its admitting after it a personal  pronoun in the objective case ;" and so forth. These  are not only plain directions for the purpose professed,  but they suggest the real differences among the parts  of speech; and if the compiler had condescended  throughout his book (or books, for there are appen-  dages) to adapt his explanations, in the same manner,  to the minds of those who were to be taught, he would  have avoided the errors of doctrine which he always  runs into when be attempts to give, what as the author  of an elementary grammar he has never any buaiiiesa  to give, namely a philosophical or general principle.  Moreover, in the arrangement of his materials, he  seems incapable of, ot at least is inattentive to, the  clearest and most necessary distinctions. Thus, (to  take at random two examples from liis book of ex-  ercises,) he gives the following as instances of bad  grammar : " Ambition is so insatiable, that it will  make any sacrifices to attain its objects." (12mo. edit,  p. 128.) " When so good a man as Socrates fell a  victim to the madness of the people, truth, virtue, re-  ligion, fell with him." (Ibid 116.) The former of  these sentences exemplifies the Logical fault, non-   in what remains that can be objected to : the  declining of nouns, the conjugatiiig of verbs,   scquitur, and the latter will advantageouBly receive  the Rheimcal ornament polysyndeton : but to give  them as instanccB of defective Grammar, b to blind  the learner to the nature of the art he is studying. —  The grammatical works wc are referring to, seem,  from the number of editions they have gone through,  to be in very general iise, or we should not have  deemed them worth so long a note. \Ve pass to a  remark on another grammatical work of very different  character and value, the Greek grammar of Matthise.  This work has justly won the approbation of the  learned throughout the world; but we conceive the  praise belongs to its elaborate detail, and not to such  principles as the following. " Every proposition, even  the simplest, must contain two principal ideas, namely  that of the Subject a thing or person, of which any  thing is asserted in the proposition, and that of the  I'redicate, that which is asserted of that person or  thing." (Matth. Gr. § 293.) To state our objections  to tliis passage is difficult, because we do not know how  the author or translator may define a propositic»i, or  what they may mean by the principal ideas in it.  Perhaps they may consider no expression a proposition  which does not consist of a subject and predicate. Wc  deny that, from the nature of the thought, any commu*  nication requires these grammatical parts, {they are     A    and the other business of the grammar-scliool,  we deem, as it has always been deemed, in-  dispensable. In Logic, if we omit ail that is  taught concerning ideas independently of  words ; if we omit what ia taught concerning  the two operations of the mind, Perception  and Judgment distinct from Reasoning, not  because those operations do not take place,  but because every single abstract word fully  understood, (and Logic begins with words,)  expresses a conclusion from a rational process  as efTectually as a syllogism ; and if we further  omit (and the omission is important) whatever  is peculiar to Aristotelian Logic ; — all that  remains will, on the principles we have had  before us, be essentially useful to the learner ;  namely, the precepts for accurate definition ;  the precepts against the assumption of un-  warranted premises j the precepts for guarding  against the false conclusions to which we are     merely g^rammalical,) though the necessities of lan-  guage in general prescribe them. See Chap. I. SecL  25. ; about the middle of the Section.    liable when we reason tvith words, and not  merely by means of words; the precepts for  guarding against being led away by true con-  clusions, when there may be conclusions like-  wise true and more important from other  data ; which data, with their conclusions, are,  kept out of sight by the art of the speaker, or .  the blindness of the inquirer*. In Rhetoric,  there is less to be omitted than in the other  branches ; but in this department, the general  views we have opened are important, because  they exhibit the art in connexion with a great  and worthy end; an end which, it should seem>  has not always been thought essential to it.     * We mean to say, that the7na(e)'taZsof acomplete  budy of ioEtructioD ia Logic already exist in Literature ;  but tliey esisE not in any one system. They are more-  over BO mingled with what is erroneous hi doctrine, that  the good is difficult to reach, without imbibing a great  many wrong notions that frustrate the practical benefit  How can it be otherwise, if what we have endeavoured  to prove, is true, that the principle of the Logic which  all men use and all men operate witli, has never yet  been cxpIaiRvd ?     For as Rhetoric is an instrumental art, we  are told that it ought to be considered ab-  stractedly from the ends which the speaker  or writer may propose in using it j and  Quinctilian who insists that the Orator, (that  is, of course, the consummate orator,) must be  a virtuous man, lias been classed with those  whom atraihevffla, and aXai^ovela have betrayed  ioto a wrong estimate of the art*. As we  think the good old Roman schoolmaster is  not quite beside the mark in his notion on  this point, we propose to inquire wliether  the placing of Rhetoric on the basis we have  ascertained, does not lead to the position he  so stoutly maintains. Now, the immediate  basis of Rhetoric is Logic ; and our remarks  will therefore begin with the latter.   14. Logic as well as Rhetoric is an in-  strumental art ; but if our definition is correct,  it is an instrument for the discovery of truth,  and it is then only perfect as an instrument  when it is completely adapted to that end.  • See Whately's Rhetoric. A great and worthy end is therefore essential  to Logic ; and a correspondent effect will  appear in those who have made a skilful use  of it. But the Logic we speak of, is that  which is applied to things, namely to Physicot  and Practica *; that is to say, which is em-  ployed to ascertain the constitution of the  world in which we Uve, and of ourselves who  live in it, and thence to deduce what we  ought to do: — but the examination of the  world, and of ourselves, and of our duties, is  the examination of particulars ; and our Logic  has recourse to universals for no other purpose  than to understand particulars the better. If  there is a Logic, which, resting in universals,  confers the power of talking learnedly and  wisely, yet leaves a man to act the part of an  Ignoramus and a fool in the commonest  concerns of life, this is not the Logic we have  had in view. There is indeed a learned ig-  norance, aa there is an ignorance from want  of learning ; there is also an ignorance from natural incapacity, and an ignorance from  superinduced insanity ; by any one of wliich  tbe mind may be prevented from reaching  truth. Not that in any case whatever the  reasoning process is wrong ; but if the  reasoning proceeds on wrong or insufficient  premises, which it will in any of these cases,  the conclusion will of course be wrong. Some  one has said that " the difference between a  madman and a fool is, that the former reasons  justly from false data, and the latter erro-  neously from just data." This is incorrectly  said : — the idiot who walks into the water  because he knows no better, is incapable of  the just datum, and therefore cannot be said  to reason from it : if he knew the datum,  namely that the water would drown him, he  would not walk into it ; but he does not  know this, and therefore he walks into it : in  doing which, he reasons, so far as his know-  ledge goes, as justly as the madman, who  walks into it because his disturbed fancy  makes him take it for a garden. Wlien the     SECT. 14.] ON RHETORIC. 235   road to truth is blocked up by either of these  two causes, namely irabeciUty or insanity.  Logic can do nothing ; but ignorance whether  from wrong learning or from want of learning,  is to be removed by the appUcation of ge-  nuine Logic to P/it/ska and Praclica. Still,  independently of tlie toil to be encountered,  there are obstructions and delusions which  are liable to turn the most ardent inquirer out  of the path. There may not be natural im-  becility, nor permanent insanity ; yet there  may be an habitual incapacity of judgment  from the influence of prejudice, and aa  occasional insanity of judgment from the in-  fluence of passion. But among other things  we learn in Pki/sica, these facts are to be  reckoned ; and the precepts which warn us of  them, are among the most important of those  which belong to Praclica. In the mean  time, that we may be induced to persevere in  the search after truth, till our real interests  become so plain that we cannot but embrace  them, we are not permitted to feel at ease   under the mists which passion and prejudice  create. The fool and the madman to whom  mists are reaUties, are satisfied in their judg-  ments; but it is not so with those who see  dimly through the fog, and suspect there may  be better paths than those they are pursuing.  This suspicion, as light breaks in, may at last  become conviction, strong enough to subdue  even the habit or inclination by which a  wrong path is made easy, and a departure  from it difficult. True, indeed, such over-  powering conviction may not reacii the ma-  jority of mankind at present: they may be  compelled, as heretofore, to wear out life in  struggles between right and wrong, between  inclination and duty, between future good  and present solicitation : but are we forbidden  to hope, for future generations, a gradual  alleviation of so painful a conflict, in propor-  tion as what is good and what is evil shall be  made plainer to the eye of reason • P At least   > * All vice is ignorance or habit. Who would not  take the best way of being happy, if he knew it — that may we affirm, that all learniag has, or ought  to have, this consummation in view.   is, knev it to conviction — and his habits did not prevent  him ? But he may discover the best way when hia  bahitE are fixed; as a miEerable dnmkard, who drinks  on to escape from utter dcepair, sees with bitter regrel  the happiness of a sober life. With a common notion  of learning and ignorance, an objector will demur to  our statement ; but such an objectot should be told,  that a man may have run the circle of the sciences aa  they are commonly taught, and yet remain in ignorance  of what is most important to be known. This is s  truth which not only Christian teachers, but the wise  among the heathen inculcate. In that admirable relic  of Socratic philosophy, £;EBHT02 niNAH, there  are, among the personifications, two that bear the  names of naiitia and "Htuimaihla, (Learning and  Counterfeit-learning,) by the latter of which is ligured  all that, independently of the knowledge which makes I  men permanently happy, passes under the name of I  learning. Now, in that knowledge which alone ia |  valuable, a man cannot be called learned, whose coik  viction is not strong enough to determine his practice.  The thirsty wight Tiho, in a state of profuse perspira*  tion, calls for a glass of iced-water, may know there is  danger in the draught : but if his knowledge is not  strong enough to prevent the act, what is its value ?—  at the moment, it is even worse than useless ; since   Such then is the aim and scope of Lo-  gic in relation to Physica and Pracika : it is   may be sufficient to disquiet the luxury of the draught,  though not sufficient to subdue the desire for it.  When Macbeth, (for the case is not dissimilar,)  resolves to gratify his ambition, he is not ignorant of  the danger he runs, and the secure happiness he leaves  behind him ; but he is so far ignorant as to prefer the  phantom of happiness to the reality. Yet he is not so  ignorant as his wife, and he reaps, in consequence, less  immediate gratification. Having once held the balance,  with some impartiality, between right and wrong, he is  incapable, even for a moment, of being a triumphant  villain. The crooked-baek Richard, (for having begun  our examples with Shakspeare, we will continue with  him,) is not so distracted by divided data. " Securely  privileged," says Mr. Foster, " from all interference of  doubt that can linger, or hiunanity that can soften, or  timidity that can shrink, he advances with a grim con-  centrated constancy through scene after scene of  atrocity, still fiilfilling his vow to ' cut his way through  with a bloody ase.' He does not waver while he  pursues his object, nor relent when he seizes it."  (Essays on Decision of Character, &c.) Yet both he  and Macbeth's wife at length get nervous in their  sleep : for so it is, that if one scruple of conscience lurk  in the soul, it will produce its effect sooner or later;  and tliat effect will begin when the bodily powers are  the means of discovering truth in botli these  departments. Now we assume, that the pro-  weakest; and as body and mind have a mutual in-  fluence, the former -will sicken and perpetuate the  horrors of the latter, unless, as with Richard, a violent  death intervene. The three wretches vc have thus  far referred to, have this in common, that they do not  embrace vice for its own sake, but as a means of reaching  the phantom of happiness that dances before them.  But there is a state of vice brought on by habit, in  which a man finds a pleasure in doing evil, and is in-  capable of any other pleasure. lago is our example —  a character which, it is to be feared, is by no means  out of life. Imagine a shrewd and selfish child per-  mitted from infancy to create for himself a satis-  faction in the disquietude of others — a little worrier of  defenceless creatures— a petty tyrant indulged in his  worst caprices ; — imagine such a one, as he grows up,  placed where his habits cannot be indulged but in  secret, and where those around him are such, that he  must, in his own mind, either hate them, or hate  himself: imagine all this, and lago will appear too  possible a character. Some critics have objected, that  there is no sufficient motive for the mischief he brings  on Othello, Desdemona, and Cassio. Can there be, to  Aim, a stronger motive, than that they arc noble-  minded, benevolent, and happy, and tacitly remind  him, at every instant, that he is in all respects a  per business of Rhetoric is to make truth  known when found j which assumption, if ad-  mitted, would at once establish our position ;  for to suppose a consummate orator would, in  such case, be to suppose one who is too fully  possessed of truth not to be led by it himself,  while acting as a guide to others. After ad-  mitting the assumption, it would signify little wretch? He knows and bitterly feels, tliat each  " hath a daily beauty in his life that makes him ugly-"  The only pleasure which habit has given him, in lieu  of those of which it has made him incapable, is, to  torture the beings that wound his self-love to the quick,  and to destroy the happiness he cannot partake in.  Such is the power of habit. Though the means, when  properly applied, of putting a human being in train to  become an angel, yet added to, and encouraging the  tendencies of his uninstructed nature, it will render him,  prematurely, a fiend. lago is utterly depraved — a be-  ing incapable of Paradise if placed in it — more odious  tlian Milton has been able to depict even Satan him-  self; for that majestic bdng, (the hero of the poem as  Drydeu truly says he is,) never appears " less than  arcliangel ruined. " The " demi-devil " of the dra-  matist, excels, in mental deformity, what the epic muse  has been able to conceive of " the author of all evil. "    to object the actual characters of those who  speak and write ; for they may be pretenders  in Rhetoric j or their advance in it, though  real, may be very inconsiderable toward the  perfection we are supposing. But it may be  said that the assumption begs the question,  and leaves us still to show that the office of leading men to truth is essential to Rhetoric,  in contradiction to those who view it as a mere  instrument equally fitted for the purposes of  truth and falsehood. Now, it must be con-  fessed, with regard to the means employed in  Rhetoric, that they frequently seem adapted  to the prejudices of men, — to meet rather than  to oppose their ignorance and their passions.  And if there were any way of conveying truth  at once into minds unfitted to receive it *, the     * It is a comiuoii thing to say of a person, that he  vtiU not be convinced. The fact generally stands  thus : we use arguments that convince ourselves, and  presume they are fitted to convince him, not knowing  or not observing, that all argument derives its force  &om the previous knowledge in the mind to which it  is addressed ; and that our hearer may have been so use of such means would be conclusive against  an honest purpose in the speaker. But the  instantaneous communication of truth, is, un-  der most circumstances, impossible ; and there-  fore we may next ask, what interest a writer  or speaker can have in an ultimate purpose to  deceive. The answer will be, — to serve one  or other of those partial purposes, of which  the common business of life, whether we look  into its private circles, or into the forum or  senate house, furnishes hourly examples. But  may we not describe all this as a conflict, in   educated as to render convicUon impoBsible by iuch  arguments as we offer him. Suppose, however, it be  true, that our hearer mill not be convinced, — thai is  to say, does not wish to be convinced, because his par-  ty perhaps, or his profession, or the career (be it what  it may) into which he has entered, does not agree witli  what is sought to be established : let us in candour  consider in such a case what a vantage ground we oc-  cupy, inasmuch as we see our own interest, temporal  or eterual, coupled with the proposition in view ; and  let us condescend, by the argumeittum ad homhiem,  to give him a similar advant^e, before we expect his  conviction from the argumentum ad judicium.     which each is eager to show just so much  truth as suits the present purpose, and to veil  the rest? And will not the whole of truth be  shown in this manner, as far at least as men  have discovered it, although not shown at  once ? Of these skirmishers that use the arms  ufiensive and defensive of the art, each takes  credit for a certain degree of skill j but among  them all, which is thg Orator? Is it not he  who soars above partial views and partial pur-  poses, who unites into one comprehensive  whole what others advocate in parts, who  teaches men to postpone petty for greater ad-  vantages, and to seek the welfare of the indi-  vidual in the happiness of the kind ? If, then,  the palm of eloquence is permanently his alone,  who contends for it in this manner, our chain  of argument will not want many links before  we reach the conclusion, that to undertake  the art on a valid principle, we must con-  sider its purpose to be that of leading men  to truth.   16. A Rhetoric growing out of the Logic of Aristotle *, which, as we have seen, is the  art of reasoning mlh words, and not merely  by means of words, may indeed well be sus-  pected as a specious and delusive art. Aim-  ing at plausibility alone, it gives the power of  talking largely without requiring the know-  ledge which grows up Irom experience in  particulars ; and thus we have statesmen,  who, if we listen to them, are capable of setting  the world in order, but know not how to re-  gulate their households ; we have financiers  ready to accept the control of a nation's     • Aristotle's own treatise on Rhetoric is a work  completely to its purpose ; that is to say, fitted to make  men prevailing speakers at the time in wliich he wrote,  by exhibiting comprehensively the bearings of the ques-  tions they would have to discuss, and the various kinds  of persons they would have to influence. It is indeed  remarkable how little Aristotle's other works are of a  piece with his Logic ; nor is it without some show of  reason that Dugald Stewart supposes he was aware of  its empty pretensions, and was too wise to be deceived  by it himself, though lie chose to impose it on others.  Sec Vol. II. of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,  Chap, III. Sect. 3.   wealth, that have never learaed to manage  their own estates; we have lawyers, whom  the simplest questions of right and wrong  would be sufficient to pei-ples * ; and priests  who, once a week, discourse " in good set  terms " to well dressed congregations, of vir-  tue and of vice, of this world and the next j but  who would be incapable of oifering, from their  own stores, a single argument fitted to deter  a plain thinking, ignorant man from vice, or  to stop the commission of a specific offence  by remonstrance adapted to the case. This  specious eloquence, however, like the Logic  from which it springs, has almost lost its re-  putation and influence: we now require from  speakers and writers more substantial recom-  mendations than the power of dwelling on  vague generalities ; and in proportion as   • But perhaps, with regard to lawyers, we are  requiring knowledge, which, as matters stand, would  be an incumbrance to them. A special pleader may  Bay, " what have I to do with simple right and wrong ?  My business is to see how the letter of the law can be  applied or evaded."     Mfi     genuine Logic enlarges the empire of truth,  will the necessity appear of seeking in an en-  lightened mind, and a heart kindled by active  philanthropy, for the true springs of eloquence. Thus will ambition be brought to  side with virtue} because there will be no  way of winning distinction, but by cultivating  the powers of language in subservience to  that knowledge, which gives a man the de-  sire and the faculty of beiug useful to others,  and governing himself.  To conclude ; — the theory which, in  this treatise, we have endeavoured to establiah  is this, — that we come at all our knowledge  by the use of media, which media are, chiefly,  words; and that, as the words procure the  notions, the notions exist not antecedently to  language : —that when, by these means, we  have gained knowledge, and try, by similar  means, to communicate it to others, we do  not, while the process is going on, represent  our own thoughts, but we set their minds a  thinking iu a particular train ; that our own thought 13 represented by nothing short of  the completely formed word, whose parts, if  any or all of them are separately dwelt upon,  are not parts of our thought, but signs of  knowledge which we and our hearers possess  in common, and which, by bringing their  minds into a particular attitude, enables them  to conceive our thought, when the whde  WORD that expresses it, is formed : — that i§  before this word is formed, there are parts by  which something is Communicated not known  before, yet, being communicated, it is still  but a part of the means toward knowing  something not yet communicated, and stiU,  therefore, the principle holds good, that we  are adding part to part of the whole word  which is to express something not yet communicated ; which word, even though it ex-  tend to an oration, a treatise, a poem, &c., is  as completely indivisible with respect to the  meaning conveyed by it as a whole, as is a  word which consists only of a single syllable,  or a single sound. If this doctrine truly de-  scribes the nature of the connexion between thought and language, we claim for it the  merit of a discovery, because the common  theory, that is, the theory which men are  presumed to act upon, and to which all pre-  ceptive works are adapted, — not the theory  which, unawares, they really act upon, — ex-  hibits that connexion in a very different light.  And, as a discovery, we are the more dis-  posed to urge attention to it, because our  soundest metaphysicians have expressed them-  selves as if there 'ooas something to be dis-  covered as regards the connexion we speak of,  before a system of Logic could be establisiied  on a just foundation. Locke says that when  he first began his discourse on the Under-  standing, and a good while after, he thought  that no consideration of language was at all  necessary to it. At the end of his second  book, he discovers, however, so close a con-  nexion between words and knowledge, that  he is obliged to alter his first plan ; and having  reached his concluding chapter, he speaks as  if he still felt that he had not yet ascertained  the full extent to which language is an instrument of reason. Dugald Stewart, too, from  whom, in the conclusion of our first chapter,  we quoted a passage which entirely agrees, so  far as it goes, with the views we have opened,   ' has the following remark in his last work, the  third volume of the Philosophy of the Human   ' Mind : " If a system of rational Logic should  ever be executed by a competent hand, this **  (viz. language as an instrument of thought)  '* will form the most important chapter."  Our doctrine is, that this will not merely form  the most important chapter, but that it wtU  be the only chapter strictly belonging to Jjo^ I  ^c ; and yet the theory we offer keeps deaf  of the extreme which betrayed Home Tooke,  who appears to consider reason as the result  of language. We pretend, then, to have inade  the discovery which Locke felt to be necessary,  and the nature of which Stewart more than i  conjectured j but oura is only " «?i Outline ; '*  and the system of rational Logic which the  Scotch metaphysician speaks of, yet remains to  be "executed by a competent hand:" — we  pretend but to have ascertained for it the  true foundation. — Something might be add-  ed on the importance which the subject de-  rives from the aspect of the times : for the  most careless observer cannot but remark,  how the rapid communication of knowledge  from mind to mind moulds and forms public  opinion ; and how the opinion of the many, ac-  quiring, day by day, a character and a weight  that never distinguished it before, threatens to  become the law to which not only individuals,  but governments, and eventually the common-  wealth of nations, must conform ; and hence we  might be led to urge that Philosophy cannot  be employed more opportunely, than in a new  examination of the instrument by which so  much has been, and so much more is likely  to he effected. The consideration is, how-  ever, too obvious not to have occurred to the  reader, and we therefore close our remarks.  At page 55, the assertione, that the words of a sentence, " as parts of that sentence'''', and the sentences  of a discourse, " na parts of that discourse"", are not  by themselves significant, would perhaps sound a little  less paradoxical, if, instead of each of the phrases quo-  ted, the reader were to substitute " as parts of that  completed expression ".   At page 88, supply the other parenthetical mark  after " imderstanding" in line 4.   At page 196, line 6, the question is asked, whether  the juryman must go to Aristotle, and be taught to  compare the middle with the extremes ? The reader  will observe that the example is already farced into a  form, namely that of a syllogism in barbara, which a  juryman untaught by Aristotle would probably never  think of giving it, the other way of speaking being by  far the more obvious, viz. To kill a man maliciously  is murder ; A. B. killed a man maliciously ; therefore  A. B. is guilty of murder. Here, instead of the Aria-  totclian names major and minor, we prefer calling the  first proposition the datum, and the second, with re-  ference to the datum it is addressed to, the argument ;  and the truth of the argument having been proved by  testimony, we atfirm that the conclusion is as evident  as a conclusion can be, and that the Aristotelian  formula is a needless and puerile addition to a process  already complete — a proof of what is proved : — it is a  use of language for the purpose of reasoning which  does not identify with, but goes beyond, and childishly refines upon that use of language in which the logic  of mankind at large consiets.   The doctrine of the whole work may receive some  light from the following way of stating it : — Man, in  common with other animals, derives immediately from  nature the power to express hie immediate, or, as they  are commonly called, his natural wants and feelings.  But he also possesses the power of inventing or learn-  ing a language which nature does not teach ; and it is  solely by the exertion of this power, which we call  reason, that he raises himself above the level of other  animals. By media such as artificial language consists  of, and only by such media, he acquires the knowledge  which distinguishes him from other creatures ; and  each advance being but the step to another, he is a  being indefinitely improveable. But if words are the  means of knowledge, it is an error to describe or con-  sider them in any other light ; and we accordingly  deem them not as, strictly speaking, the signs of  thought, but as the means by which we think, and set  others a thinking. This principle being admitted, renders unnecessary Locke's doctrine of ideas ; and Sematology stands opposed to, and takes the place of,  what the French call Idealogy,   With respect to these addenda, should the reader ask, whether they are to be esteemed a part of our  WORD, we answer in the affirmative. We imagined  our woED complete. If, on further consideration, we  had supposed so, we should not have added another  SYLLABLE. {^uT^Qh a ffvMMiiSavuv.)   G. WoedbUi Frlnlei, Angd Courl, SkJnnsi Street, Londoo.  Giuseppe Capocasale. Keywords: sematologia, la sematologia di Vico, dialettica, assoc: ‘a tear’ may be a sign of sadness – or love – (‘una furtiva lagrima – ‘m’ama’) but the kind of sign that an idea or conception of the soul, or ‘rivelazione’ of the animus -- are related with are arbitrario – ad placitum -- arbitrary, not necessarily a natural causal sign or nature. The correlation between the segnans and the segnato may be ‘imitativa’ or iconic, arbitrary, arbitraria, associative, associative, etc. A sign is not essentially connected with the purpose of communication (smoke means fire, spots mean measles, a tear means love). Grice is into ‘communication,’ not sign as such – a theory of communication, not a semeiotic. Capocasale does not expand on the intricacies of the cocodrile’s tears (fake tears – or Grice’s frown), because he is not interested, but it woud just take a footnote to his comment on ‘lacrima’ being a ‘signum’ traestitiae. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Capocasale” – The Swimming-Pool Library

 

Grice e Capocci: l’implicatura conversazionale del significare e santificare – il sacramento evangelico significa grazia e sanctifica grazia -- filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Viterbo). Filosofo italiano. Grice: “I like Capocci; he was a Griceian; he opposed Aquinas on the dependence of will and intellectus – surely they are independent, and possibly the will is more basic! La ‘volonta,’ as the Italians call it! -- “That’s how I shall call himothers favour “Giacomo da Viterbo.”” Essential Italian philosopher – Di famiglia nobile, studia a Viterbo. His monicker was ‘il dottore speculativo”. Insegna a Napoli. Il suo saggio più conosciuto, “De regimine christiano” Approfondisce i temi della teocrazia, e del potere temporale del cesare e il suo stato. Altre opere: “Quaestiones disputatae de praedicamentis in divinis”. “Summa de peccatorum distinctione” – “there are surely more than seven sins – Multiply sins beyond necessity --. Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani.Vi sono in cui Giacomo viene raffigurato con un'aureola – segno naturale accordo di Peirce del santo.Mariani identified two manuscripts containing a Summa de peccatorum distinctione: Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli, cod. vii G. 101 and Biblioteca di Montecassino, both of which ascribe the work to James. Ypma does not mention. Summa de peccatorum distinctione Fratris Jacobi de Viterbio Sacrae Theologiae Professoris, Fratrum Eremitarum Sancti Augustini, Archiepiscopi Neapolitani.  AMBRASI, La Summa de peccatorum distinctione del b. Giacomo da Viterbo dal ms. VII G 101... GUTIERREZ, De vita et scriptis Beati Iacobi de Viterbo, “ Analecta Augstiniana ”, XVI,Lectura super IV libros Sententiarum Quaestiones Parisius disputatae De praedicamentis in divinis Quaestione de animatione caeli Quaestiones disputatae de Verbo Quodlibeta quattuor Abbreviatio In Sententiarum Aegidii Romani De perfectione specierum De regimine christiano Summa de peccatorum distinctione Sermones diversarum rerum Concordantia psalmorum David De confessione De episcopali officio Like many of his contemporaries, James devotes serious attention to determining the status of theology as a science and to specifying its object, or rather, as the scholastics say, its subject. In Quodlibet III, q. 1, he asks whether theology is principally a practical or a speculative science. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, for an Augustinian, James responds that the end of theology resides principally not in knowledge but in the love of God. The love of God, informed by grace, is what distinguishes the way in which Christians worship God from the way in which pagans worship their deities. For philosophers—James has Cicero in mind—religion is a species of justice; worship is owed to God as a sign of submission. For the Christian, by contrast, there can be no worship without an internal affection of the soul, i.e., without love. James allows that there is some recognition of this fact in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, for the happy man would not be “most beloved of God,” as Aristotle claims he is, if he did not love God by making him the object of his theorizing. In this sense, it can be said that philosophy as well sees its end as the love of God as its principal subject. But there is a difference, James contends, in the way in which a science based on natural reason aims for the love of God and the way in which sacred science does so: sacred science tends to the love of God in a more perfect way. One way in which James illustrates the difference between both approaches is by contrasting the ways in which God is the “highest” object for metaphysics and for theology. The proper subject of metaphysics is being, not God, although God is the highest being. Theology, on the other hand, views God as its subject and considers being in relation to God. Thus, James concludes, “theology is called divine or of God in a much more excellent and principal way than metaphysics, for metaphysics considers God only in relation to common being, whereas theology considers common being in relation to God” (Quodl.). Another way in which James illustrates the difference between natural theology and sacred science is by using St. Anselm's distinction between the love of desire (amor concupiscientiae) and the love of friendship (amor amicitiae). The love of desire is the love by which we desire an end; the love of friendship is the love by which we wish someone well. The love of God philosophers have in mind, James contends, is the love of desire; it cannot, by the philosophers' own admission, be the love of friendship, for according to Aristotle, at least in the Magna Moralia, friendship involves a form of community or sharing between the friends that cannot possibly obtain between mere mortals and the gods. Now although James concedes that a “community of life” between God and man cannot be achieved by natural means, it is possible through the gift of grace. The particular friendship grace affords is called charity and it is to the conferring of charity that sacred scripture is principally ordered.Like all scholastics since the early thirteenth century, James subscribes to the distinction between God's ordained power, according to which “he can only do what he preordained he would do according to wisdom and will” (Quodl.) and his absolute power, according to which he can do whatever is “doable,” i.e., whatever does not imply a contradiction. Problems concerning what God can or cannot do arise only in the latter case. James considers several questions: can God add an infinite number of created species to the species already in existence (Quodl. I, q. 2)? Can he make matter exist without form (Quodl.)? Can he make an accident subsist without a substrate (Quodl.)? Can he create the seminal reason of a rational soul in matter (Quodl.)? In response to the first question, James explains, following Giles of Rome but against the opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent, that God can by his absolute power add an infinite number of created species ad superius, in the ascending order of perfection, if not in actuality, then at least in potency. God cannot, however, add even one additional species of reality ad inferius, between prime matter and pure nothingness, not because this exceeds his power but because prime matter is contiguous to nothingness and leaves, so to speak, no room for God to exercise his power (Côté). James is more hesitant about the second question. He is sympathetic both to the arguments of those who deny that God can make matter subsist independently of form and to the arguments of those who claim he can. Both positions can reasonably be held, because each argues from a different (and valid) perspective. Proponents of the first position argue from the point of view of reason: because they rightly believe that God cannot make what implies a contradiction, and because they believe (rightly or wrongly) that making matter exist without form does involve a contradiction, they conclude that God cannot make matter exist without form. Proponents of the second group argue from the perspective of God's omnipotence which transcends human reason: because they rightly assume that God's power exceeds human comprehension, they conclude (rightly or wrongly) that making matter exist without form is among those things exceeding human comprehension that God can make come to pass.Another question James considers is whether God can make an accident subsist without a subject or substrate. The question arises only with respect to what he calls “absolute accidents,” namely quantity and quality, as opposed to relational accidents—the remaining categories of accident. God clearly cannot make relational accidents exist without a subject in which they inhere, for this would entail a contradiction. This is so because relations for James, as we will see below, are modes, not things. What about absolute accidents? As a Catholic theologian, James is committed to the view that some quantities and qualities can subsist without a subject, for instance extension and color, a view for which he attempts to provide a philosophical justification. His position, in a nutshell, is that accidents are capable of existing independently if they are thing-like (dicunt rem). Numbers, place (locus), and time are not thing-like and are thus not capable of independent existence; extension, however, is and so can be made to exist without a subject. The same reasoning applies to quality. This is somewhat surprising, for according to the traditional account of the Eucharist, whereas extension may exist without a subject, the qualities, color, odor, texture, necessarily cannot; they inhere in the extension. James, however, holds that just as God can make thing-like quantities to exist without a subject, so too must he be able to make a thing-like quality exist without the subject in which it inheres. Just which qualities are capable of existing without a subject is determined by whether or not they are “modes of being,” i.e., by whether or not they are relational. This seems to be the case with health and shape: health is a proportion of the humors, and so, relational; likewise, shape is related to parts of quantity, without which, therefore, it cannot exist. Colors and weight, by contrast, are non-relational, according to James, and are thus in principle capable of being made to exist without a subject.The fourth question James considers in relation to God's omnipotence raises the interesting problem of whether the rational soul can come from matter. James proceeds carefully, claiming not to provide a definitive solution but merely to investigate the issue (non determinando sed investigando). The upshot of the investigation is that although there are many good reasons (the soul's immortality, its spirituality and its per se existence) to say that God cannot produce the seminal reason of the rational soul in matter, in the end, James decides, with the help of Augustine, that such a possibility must be open to God. Thus, it is true that in the order which God has de facto instituted, the soul's incorruptibility is repugnant to matter, but this is not so in absolute terms: if God can miraculously cause something to come to existence through generation and confer immortality upon it (James is presumably thinking of the birth of Christ), then he can make it come to pass that souls are produced through generation without being subject to corruption. Likewise, although it appears inconceivable that something material could generate something endowed with per se existence, it is not impossible absolutely speaking: if God can confer separate existence upon an accident—despite the fact that accidents naturally inhere in their substrates—then, in like manner, he can confer separate existence upon a soul, although it has a seminal reason in matter. Scholastics held that because God is the creative cause of all natural beings, he must possess the ideas corresponding to each of his creatures. But because God is eternal and is not subject to change, the ideas must be eternally present in him, although creatures exist for only a finite period of time. This doctrine of course raised many difficulties, which each author addressed with varying degrees of success. One difficulty had to do with reconciling the multiplicity of ideas with God's unity: since there are many species of being, there must be a corresponding number of ideas; but God is one and, hence, cannot contain any multiplicity. Another, directly related, difficulty had to do with the ontological status of ideas: do ideas have any reality apart from God? If one denied them any kind of reality, it was hard to see how they could function as exemplar causes of things; but to attribute full-blown essential reality to them was to run the risk of introducing multiplicity in God. One influential solution to these difficulties was provided by Thomas Aquinas, who argued that divine ideas are nothing else but the diverse ways in which God's essence is capable of being imitated, so that God knows the ideas of things by knowing his essence. Ideas are not distinct from God's essence, though they are distinct from the essences of the things God creates (De veritate). One can discern two answers to the problem of divine ideas in the works of James of Viterbo. At an early stage of his career, in the Abbreviatio in Sententiarum Aegidii Romani­—assuming one accepts, as seems reasonable, the early dating suggested by Ypma (1975)—James defends a position that is almost identical to that of Thomas Aquinas (Giustiniani). In his Quodlibeta, however, he moves to a position closer to that of Henry of Ghent. In the following I will sketch James' position in the Quodlibeta as it provides the most mature statement of his views. Although James agreed with the notion that ideas are to be viewed as the differing ways in which God can be imitated, he did not think that one could make sense of the claim that God knows other things by cognizing his own essence unless one supposed that the essences of those things preexist in some way (aliquo modo) in God. James' solution is to distinguish two ways in which ideas are in God's intellect. They are in God's intellect, firstly, as identical with it, and, secondly, as distinct from it. The first mode of being is necessary as a means of acknowledging God's unity; but the second mode of being is just as necessary, for, as James puts it (Quodl. I, q. 5, p. 64, 65–67), “if God knows creatures before they exist, even insofar as they are other than him and distinct (from him), that which he knows is a cognized object, which must needs be something; for that which nowise exists and is absolutely nothing cannot be understood.”  But James also thinks that the necessity of positing distinct ideas in God follows from a consideration of God's essence. God enjoys the highest degree of nobility and goodness. His mode of knowledge must be commensurate with his nature. But according to Proclus, an author James is quite fond of quoting, the highest form of knowledge is knowledge through a thing's cause. That means that God knows things through his own essence. However, he does so by knowing his essence as a cause, and that is possible only by knowing “something (aliquid) through a cause, not merely by knowing that which is the cause (i.e., God)”. Although James' insistence on the distinctness of ideas with respect to God's essence is reminiscent of Henry of Ghent's teaching, it is important to note, as has been stressed by M. Gossiaux (2007), that James does not conceive of this distinctness as Henry does. For Henry, ideas possess esse essentiae; James, by contrast, while referring to divine ideas as things (res), is careful to add that they are not things “in the absolute sense but only determinately,” viz., as cognized objects (Quodl. I, q. 5, p. 63, 60). Thus, divine ideas for James possess a lesser degree of distinction from God's essence than do Henry of Ghent's. Nevertheless, because James did consider ideas to be distinct in some sense from God, his position would be viewed by some later authors—e.g., William of Alnwick—as compromising divine unity. The concept of being, all the medievals agreed, is common. What was debated was the nature of the commonness. According to James of Viterbo, all commonness is founded on some agreement, and this agreement can be either merely nominal or grounded in reality. Agreement is nominal when the same name is predicated of wholly different things, without there being any objective basis for the application of the common name; such is the case -of equivocal names. Agreement is real in the following two cases: (1) if it is based on some essential resemblance between the many things to which a particular concept applies, in which case the concept applies to these many things by virtue of the self same ratio and is said of them univocally; or (2) if that concept is truly common to the many things of which it is said, although it is not said of them relative to the same nature (ratio), but as prior to one and posterior to the others, insofar as these are related in a certain way to the first. A concept that is predicated of things in this way is said to be analogous, and the agreement displayed by the things to which it applies is said to be an agreement of attribution (convenientia attributionis). James believes that it is according to this sense of analogy that being is said of God and creatures, and of substance and accident (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis I, q. 1, p. 25, 674–80). For being is said in a prior sense of God and in a posterior sense of creatures by virtue of a certain relation between the two; likewise, being is said first of substance and secondarily of accidents, on account of the relation of posteriority accidents have to substance. The reason why being is said in a prior sense of God and in a secondary sense of creatures and, hence, the reason why the ‘ratio’ or nature of being is different in the two cases is that being, in God, is “the very thing which God is” (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 1, p. 16, 412), whereas created being is only being through something added to it. From this first difference follows a second, namely, that created being is being by virtue of being related to an agent, whereas uncreated being has no relation. These two differences can be summarized by saying that divine being is being through itself (per se), whereas created being is being through another (per aliud) (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 1, p. 16, 425–6). In sum, being is said of God and creature, but according to a different ratio: it is said of God according to the proper and perfect nature of being, but of creatures in a derivative or secondary way.James' most detailed discussion of the distinction between being and essence occurs in the context of a question that asks if creation could be saved if being (esse) and essence were not different (Quodl. I, q. 4). His answer is that although he finds it difficult to see how one could account for creation if being and essence were not really different, he does not believe it is necessary to conceive of the real distinction in the way in which “certain Doctors” do. Which Doctors does he have in mind? In Quodl. I, q. 4, he summarizes the views of three authors: Godfrey of Fontaines, according to whom the distinction is only conceptual (secundum rationem); Henry of Ghent, for whom esse is only intentionally different from essence, a distinction that is less than a real distinction but greater than a rational distinction; and finally, Giles of Rome, for whom esse is one thing (res), and essence another. Thus, James agrees with Giles, and disagrees with Henry and Godfrey, that the distinction between being and essence is real; however, he disagrees with Giles about the proper way of understanding the real distinction.The starting point of his analysis is Anselm's statement in the Monologion that the substantive lux (light), the infinitive lucere (to emit light), and the present participle lucens (emitting light) are related to each other in the same way as essentia (essence), esse (to be), and ens (being). The relation of lucere to lux, he tells us, is the relation of a concrete term to an abstract one. To-emit-light denotes light as an act, just as to-be (esse) denotes essence from the point of view of an act. Now, a concrete term signifies more things than the corresponding abstract term, e.g., esse signifies more things than essence, for essence signifies only the form, whereas esse signifies the form principally and the subject secondarily. By ‘subject’ James means the actually existing thing, which he also calls the aggregate or supposit (Wippel 1981). Esse and essence thus signify the same thing principally, but differ in terms of what they signify secondarily. Although this difference is only conceptual in the case of God, it is real in the case of creatures. It is this difference that explains why one does not predicate to-emit-light (lucere) of light itself (lux) or being of essence: what properly exists is that which has essence, viz., the supposit. Esse denotes essence as existing in a supposit.The kernel of James' solution, then, lies in the distinction between what terms signify primarily and secondarily. To his mind, this is what makes his solution closer in spirit to Giles of Rome than to either Godfrey or Henry, without committing him to a conception of the distinction as rigid as that of Giles. The distinction is real for James, but in a qualified way (Gossiaux 1999). Because identity or difference between things is determined to a greater degree by primary rather than by secondary signification, it follows that essence and existence are primarily and absolutely the same (idem) and conditionally or secondarily distinct. Yet, although the distinction is conditional or secondary, it is nonetheless James devotes five of his Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis (qq. 11–15), representing some 270 pages of edited text, to the question of relations. It is with a view to providing a proper account of divine relations, he explains, that it is “necessary to examine the nature of relation with such diligence” (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 11, p. 12, 300–301). But before turning to Trinitarian relations, James devotes the whole of q.11 to the status of relations in general. The following account focuses exclusively on q. 11. James in essence adopts Henry of Ghent's “modalist” solution, which was to exercise considerable influence among late thirteenth-century thinkers (Henninger 1989), although he disagrees with Henry about the proper way of understanding what a mode is.The question boils down to whether relations exist in some manner in extra-mental reality or solely through the operation of the intellect, like second intentions (species and genera). Many arguments can be adduced in support of each position, as Simplicius had already shown in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories—a work that would have a decisive influence on James' thought. For instance, in support of the view that relations are not real, one may point out that the intellect is able to apprehend relations between existents and non-existents, e.g., the relation between a father and his deceased son; yet, there cannot be anything real in the relation given that one of the two relata is a non-existent. But if so, then the same must be true of all relations, as the intellectual operation involved is the same in all cases. Another argument concerns the way in which relations come to be and cease to be. This appears to happen without any change taking place in the subject which the relation is said to affect. For instance, a child who has lost his mother is said to be an orphan until the age of eighteen, at which point it ceases to be one, although no change has occurred: “the relation recedes or ceases by reason of the mere passage of time.”But good reasons can also be found in support of the opposing view. For one, Aristotle clearly considers relations to be real, as they constitute one of the ten categories that apply to things outside the soul. Furthermore, according to a view commonly held by the scholastics, the perfection of the universe cannot consist solely of the perfection of the individual things of which it is made; it is also determined by the relations those things have to each other; hence, those relations must be real.The correct solution to the question of whether relations are real or not, James contends, depends on assigning to a given relation no more but no less reality than is fitting to it. Those who rely on arguments such as the first two above to infer that relations are entirely devoid of reality are guilty of assigning relations too little reality; those who appeal to arguments such as the last two, showing that relations are distinct from their subjects in the way in which things are distinct from each other, assign too great a degree of reality to relations. The correct view must lie somewhere in between: relations are real, but are not distinct from their subjects in the way one thing is distinct from another.That they must be real is sufficiently shown by the first Simplician arguments mentioned above, to which James adds some others of his own. However, showing that they are not things is slightly more complicated. James' position, in fact, is that relations are not things “properly and absolutely speaking,” but only “in a certain way according to a less proper way of speaking.” A relation is not a thing in an absolute sense because of the “meekness” of its being, for which reason “it is like a middle point between being and non-being” (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 11, p. 30, 668–9). The reasoning behind this last statement is as follows: the more intrinsic some principle is to a thing, the more that thing is said to be through it; what is maximally intrinsic to a thing is its substance; a thing is therefore maximally said to be on account of its substance. Now a thing's being related to another is, in the constellation of accidents that qualify that thing, what is minimally intrinsic to it and thus farthest from its being, and so closest to non-being. But if relations are not things, at least in the absolute sense, what are they? James answers that they are modes of being of their foundations. “The mode of being of a thing does not differ from the thing in such a way as to constitute another essence or thing. The relation, therefore, is not different from its foundation” (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 11, p. 33, 745–7). Speaking of relations as modes allows us to acknowledge their reality, as attested by experience, without hypostasizing them. A certain number's being equal to another is clearly something distinct from the number itself. The number and its being equal are two “somethings” (aliqua), says James; they are not, however, two things; they are two in the sense that one is a thing (the number) and the other is a mode of being of the number.In making relations modes of being of the foundation, James was clearly taking his cue from Henry of Ghent, who has been called “the chief representative of the modalist theory of relation” (Henninger 1989). For Henry and James, relations are real in the sense that they are distinct from their foundations and belong to extra mental reality. However, James' understanding of the way in which a relation is a mode differs from Henry's. For Henry, a thing's mode is the same thing as its ratio or nature; it is the particular type of being that thing has, what “specifies” it. But according to James' understanding of the term, a mode lies beyond the ratio of a thing, like an accident of that thing (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, p. 34, 767–8). In conclusion, one could say that in his discussion of relations, James was guided by the same motivation as many of his contemporaries, namely securing the objectivity of relations without conferring full-blooded existence upon them. Relations do exhibit some form of being, James believed, but it is a most faint one (debilissimum), the existence of a mode qua accident. James discusses individuation in two places: Quodl. I, q. 21 and Quodl. II, q. 1. I will focus on the first treatment, because it is the lengthier of the two and because the tenor of James' brief remarks on individuation in Quodl. II, q. 1, despite certain similarities with his earlier discussion (Wippel 1994), make it hard to see how they fit into an overall theory of individuation.The question James faces in Quodl. I, q. 21 is a markedly theological one, namely whether, if the soul were to take on other ashes at resurrection, a man would be numerically the same as he was before. In order to answer that question, James tells us, it is first necessary to determine what the cause of numerical unity is in the case of composite beings. There have been numerous answers to that question and James provides a short account of each. Some philosophers have appealed to quantity as the principle of numerical unity; others to matter; others yet to matter as subtending indeterminate dimensions; finally, others have turned to form as the cause of individuation. According to James, each of these answers is part of the correct explanation though it is insufficient if taken on its own. The correct view, according to him, is that form and matter taken together are the principal causes of numerical identity in the composite, with quantity contributing something “in a certain manner.” Form and matter, however, are principal causes in different ways; more precisely, each accounts for a different kind of numerical unity. For by ‘singularity’ we can really mean two distinct things: we can mean the mere fact of something's being singular, or we can point to a thing qua “something complete and perfect within a certain species” (Quodl. I, 21, 227, 134–35). It is matter that accounts for the first kind of singularity, and form for the second. Put otherwise, the kind of unity that accrues to a thing on account of its being a mere singular, results from the concurrence of the “substantial” unity provided by matter and the “accidental” unity provided by quantity. By contrast, the unity that characterizes a thing by virtue of the perfection or completeness it displays is conferred to it by the form, which is the principle of perfection and actuality in composites.Although James thinks he can quite legitimately enlist the support of such prestigious authorities as Aristotle and Averroes in favor of the view that matter and form together are constitutive of a thing's numerical unity, his solution has struck commentators as a somewhat contrived and ad hoc attempt to reach a compromise solution at all costs (Pickavé 2007; Wippel 1994). James, it has been suggested, “seems to be driven by the desire to offer a compromise position with which everyone can to some extent agree” (Pickavé 2007: 55). Such a suggestion does accord with what we know about James' temperament, namely, his dislike of controversy and his tendency, on the whole, to prefer solutions that present a “middle way” (Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, q. 11, p. 23, 513; Quodl. II, q. 7, p. 108, 118; De regimine christiano, 210; see also Quodl. II, q. 5, p. 65, 208–209). However, James' professions of moderation must sometimes be taken with a grain of salt, as there are some positions he wants to pass off as moderate that are quite far from being so, as we will see in Section 7 below.The belief that matter contains the ‘seeds’ of all the forms that can possibly accrue to it is one of the hallmarks of James of Viterbo's thought, as is the belief that the soul pre-contains, in the shape of “propensities” (idoneitates), all the sensitive, intellective, and volitional forms it is able to take on. We will look at James' doctrine of propensities in the intellect in Section 5, and his doctrine of propensities in the will in Section 6. In this section, we present James' arguments in favor of seminal reasonsOne important reason for subscribing to the existence of seminal reasons is that the doctrine enjoys the support of Augustine.  Although James is sometimes quite critical of his Augustinian contemporaries, including his predecessor Giles of Rome, he is an unreserved follower of Augustine, especially when it comes to the greater philosophical issues, such as knowledge and natural causation. However, what is particularly interesting about James is the way in which he enlists such decidedly un-Augustinian sources as Aristotle, Averroes, and especially Simplicius in the service of his Augustinian convictions (Côté 2009). James offers a thorough discussion of seminal reasons in Quodl. II, q. 5.   The question he raises there is not so much whether there are seminal reasons, for this is “admitted by all Catholic doctors” (Quodl. II, q. 5, p. 59, 16), but rather, how one is to properly conceive of them. A seminal reason, according to James, has two characteristics: it is (1) an inchoate state of the form to be, and (2) an active principle. Most of the discussion in Quodl. II, q. 5 is devoted to establishing the first point. James thinks that the thesis that forms are present in potency in matter is consonant with the teaching of Aristotle, who, he claims, follows a “middle way” on the issue of generation, eschewing both the position that forms are created, and also Anaxagoras' “hidden-forms hypothesis,” according to which all forms are contained in act in everything. Now to say that forms are present in matter inchoately or in potency, according to James, entails that the potency of matter is something distinct from matter itself. One argument in favor of this thesis is that matter is not corrupted by the taking on of a form: it remains in potency towards other forms. Also, potency is relational, whereas matter is absolute. When James states that matter is distinct from potency he does not mean to say that they are entirely distinct or unconnected, quite the contrary: potency is the potency of matter. However, potency adds three characteristics to the concept of matter. First, it adds the idea of a relation to a form (matter is in potency towards a form); second, it adds the idea that the form to which it is related is a form it lacks; finally, it implies that the form which matter lacks is a form it has the capacity to acquire, for as James explains, one does not say that a stone is in potency toward the power of sight merely because it lacks sight. In order for something to be in potency toward a particular form it must both lack that form and also possess an aptitude to take it on. James neatly summarizes his views in the following passage: “[the potency of matter] denotes a respect of the matter toward the form, attendant upon its lacking that form and having the aptitude to take it on, so that four properties are included in the concept of potency, namely matter, lack of form, aptitude toward the form and a respect toward the form insofar as it is educible by an agent and motor cause” (Quodl. II, q. 5, p. 69, 359 – p. 70, 363). The originality of James' position lies in the way in which he conceives matter's aptitudes. The term “aptitude” has a precise technical meaning, which he fleshes out with the help of Simplicius' commentary on the Categories. It denotes a certain incipient or inchoative state of the form in matter. Potency and act, James tells us, are two states or modes of the same thing, not two distinct things. What exists in the mode of actuality must preexist in the mode of potency, but in an inchoate way. James is aware of the several objections that may be leveled against his conception of aptitudes or propensities. The most serious of these is perhaps the charge that their existence makes generation, i.e., the production of new beings, impossible or useless. James replies by suggesting that those who argue in this fashion misconstrue Aristotle's doctrine of change. For change, according to Averroes' understanding of Aristotle (see Quodl. III, q. 14), does not result from an agent's implanting a form in a receiving subject, for this would imply that forms “migrate” from subject to subject; it results rather from an agent's making that which is in potency to be in act. For this to occur, however, more is required than the mere passive potency of matter: the seminal reason must also be viewed as an active principle. The activity of potency manifests itself in the shape of a natural inclination or tendency to attain its completion.  Generation thus requires two things (besides God's general operative causality): the “transmutative” agency of an extrinsic cause and the intrinsic agency of the formae inchoativum which inclines the potency to attain its completion. James' doctrine of seminal reasons would elicit considerable criticism in the early fourteenth century and beyond (Phelps 1980). The initial reaction came from Dominicans, e.g., Bernard of Auvergne, the author of a series of Impugnationes (i.e., attacks) contra Jacobum de Viterbio, and John of Naples who argued against James' distinction between the potency of matter and potency. But James' theory would also encounter resistance from within the Augustinian Order, e.g., from Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo. James' doctrine of cognition must also be understood in the context of his thoroughgoing Augustinianism and against the backdrop of the late thirteenth-century arguments against Thomistic abstraction theories. According to Thomas Aquinas' theory of knowledge, the agent intellect abstracts a thing's form or essential information from the image or representation of that thing. The outcome of this process was what Aquinas called the intelligible species, which was then taken to “move” the possible intellect to conceptual understanding. However, as thinkers such as Vital du Four and Richard of Middleton were to point out (see the articles by Robert and Noone), the information coming in through the senses is related to a thing's accidental properties, not to its substance. How, then, could abstraction from the senses produce an intelligible species relating to the thing's essence? Although James of Viterbo agreed by and large with the spirit of this objection and believed that the replies by proponents of abstractionism were unsuccessful, he had another reason for rejecting the theory. This was because it implied a view of the intellect which he thought to be profoundly mistaken, namely, the view that there is a real distinction between the agent intellect (which abstracts the species) and the possible intellect (which receives it). If it were truly the case, he reasoned, that one needed to posit a distinct agent intellect because phantasms are only potentially intelligible, then, by the same token, one would have to posit an “agent sense”, because sensibles “are only sensed in potency” (Quodl. I, q. 12, p. 164, 234). But given that no proponent of abstraction admits an agent sense, one should not allow them an agent intellect. Furthermore, if there were an agent intellect distinct from the possible intellect, it would be a natural power of the soul and so would be required for the cognition of all intelligibles, not just a certain class of them. Similarly, qua natural power, its use would be required not only in the present life but also in the afterlife. But of course that would be absurd, as the agent intellect, ex hypothesi, is only necessary to abstract form from matter, something the mind does only when it is joined to a corruptible body. James was well aware that by denying the distinction between the two intellects, he was opposing the consensus view of Aristotle commentators. Indeed, his views seem to run counter to the De anima itself, though, as he would mischievously point out, it was difficult to determine just what Aristotle's doctrine was, so obscure was its formulation (Quodl. I, q. 12, p. 169, 426—170, 439). He replied that what he was denying was not the existence of a “difference” in the soul, but merely that the existence of a difference implied a distinction of powers (Quodl. I, q. 12, p. 170, 440–45). The intellect, he held, was both in act and in potency, active and passive, but one could account for its having these contrary properties without resorting to the two intellect model. This is because intellection is not a transient action (like hitting a ball), requiring an active subject distinct from a passive recipient; rather, it is an immanent action (like shining). James' solution, in other words, was to conceive of the intellect (as indeed the will) as essentially dynamic, as an “incomplete actuality”, its own formal cause, spontaneously tending toward its completion, much in the way seminal reasons tend toward their completing forms—indeed both discussions drew their inspiration from the same source: Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's analysis of the second species of quality. The intellect was described as a general (innate) propensity made up of a series of more specific (equally innate) propensities, the number of which was a function of the number of different things the intellect is able to know: “The intellective power is a general propensity with respect to all intelligibles, that is, with respect to the actual conforming to all intelligibles. On this general propensity are founded other specific ones, which follow the diversity of intelligibles” (Quodl. VII, q. 7, p. 93, 453–55). Of course, as James readily acknowledged, although the intellect is its own formal cause, it cannot issue forth an act of intellection without some input from the senses. However, the type of causality the senses were viewed as exercising was deemed to be purely “excitatory” or “inclinatory” (Quodl. I, q. 12, p. 175, 613–16), making the senses not the principal but rather an instrumental cause of intellection. In all, three causes account for the operation of the intellect, according to James: 1) God as efficient cause; 2) the soul and its propensities as formal cause, and 3) the object presented by the senses as “excitatory” cause. Although, as we have just seen, James rejected the distinction between the agent and possible intellects, there was another, equally widely-held distinction in the area of psychology that he did maintain, namely the distinction between the soul and its powers.For the purposes of this article, it will suffice to think of the debate regarding the relation of the soul to its powers as being motivated at least in part by the need to provide a coherent understanding of the soul's structure and operations in view of two inconsistent but equally authoritative accounts of the soul's relation to its powers. One was that of Augustine, who had asserted that memory, intelligence, and will (i.e., three powers) were one in substance (De trinitate X, 11), and so believed that the soul was identical with its powers; the other was Aristotle's, who clearly believed in a certain distinction, and whose remarks about natural capacities (dunameis) as belonging to the second species of quality, in Categories c. 8,14–27, and hence to the category of accident, making them distinct from the soul's essence, were commonly applied by the scholastics to the soul's powers. Each view, of course, had its supporters; and, naturally, as was so often the case, attempts were made to find a middle way that would accommodate both positions. During James' tenure as Master at the University of Paris, the majority view was very much that there was a real distinction. It was the view held by many of the scholastics whose teachings he studied most carefully, namely Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Godfrey of Fontaines. There was, however, a commonly discussed minority position, one that eschewed both real distinction and identity: that of Henry of Ghent. Henry believed that the powers of the soul were “intentionally”, not really, distinct from its essence. James, however, sided with Thomas, Giles, and Godfrey, against Henry (Quodl. II, q. 14, p. 160, 70–71; Quodl. III, q. 5, p. 83, 56—84, 63). His reasoning was as follows. Given that everyone agreed that there was a real distinction between the soul and one of its powers in act (between the soul and, e.g., an occurrent act of willing), then if one denied that there was a real distinction between the soul and its powers, as Henry had, one would be committed to the existence of a real distinction between the power in act (e.g., an occurrent act of willing) and that same power in potency (that is, the will, qua power, as able to produce that act), since the power in act is really the same as the soul. But as we saw in the preceding section, something in potency is not really distinct from that same thing in act. This followed from James' reading of Simplicius' account of qualities in the latter's commentary on Aristotle's Categories. For instance, seminal reasons are not really distinct from the fully-fledged forms that proceed from them, nor are intellective “propensities” really distinct from the fully actualized cognized forms. Hence, James concluded, the powers must be really distinct from the soul's essence. The question of the will's freedom was of paramount importance to the scholastics. Unlike modern thinkers, for whom establishing that the will is free is tantamount to showing that its act falls outside the natural nexus of cause and effect, showing that the will is free, for medieval thinkers, usually involved showing that its act is independent of the apprehension and judgment of the intellect. Although the scholastics generally granted that a voluntary act results from the interplay between will and intellect, most of them preferred to single out one of the two faculties as the principal determinant of free choice. Thus, for Henry of Ghent, the will is the sole cause of its free act (Quodl. I, q. 17), so much so that he tends to relegate the intellect's role to that of a sine qua non cause. For Godfrey of Fontaines, by contrast, it is the intellect that exercises the decisive motion (Quodl. III, q. 16). Although James of Viterbo sometimes claims to want to steer a middle course between Henry and Godfrey (Quodl. II, q. 7), his preferences clearly lie with a position like that of Henry's, as can be gathered from his most detailed treatment of the question in Quodl. I, q. 7. James' thesis in Quodl. I, q. 7 is that the will is a self-mover and that the object grasped by the intellect moves the will only metaphorically. His main challenge is to show is that this position is compatible with the Aristotelian principle that whatever is moved is moved by another. As we saw in the previous section, James believes that the soul is made up of what he calls “aptitudes” or “propensities” (idoneitates), which are the similitudes of all things knowable and desirable, “before [the soul] actually knows or desires them” (Quodl. I, q. 7, p. 91, 407 – p. 92, 408). The pre-existence of such aptitudes implies that the soul is neither a purely passive potency nor made up of fully actualized forms, but rather an “incomplete actuality” or, perhaps more correctly, a set of “incomplete actualities,” which James describes as being “naturally inserted in [the soul], and thus, remaining in it permanently, though sometimes in an imperfect state, sometimes in a state perfected by the act” (Quodl. I, q. 7, p. 92, 419–24). In order to show how this view of the soul is compatible with Aristotle's postulate that every motion requires a mover distinct from the thing moved, James introduces a distinction between two sorts of motion: efficient and formal. Efficient motion occurs when motion is caused by a thing that possesses the complete form of the particular motion caused; formal motion occurs when the moving thing has the incomplete form of the thing moved. Heating is given as an example of the first kind of motion; “gravity” or rather heaviness, i.e., the tendency of heavy bodies to fall, is cited as an example of the second kind of motion. Aristotle's principle applies only to the first kind of motion, James asserts, not the second. Things which possess an incomplete form naturally—i.e., in and of themselves without an external mover—tend to their completion and are prevented from reaching it only by the presence of an external obstacle. For instance, a heavy object naturally tends to move downward and will do so unless it is hindered. Such, mutatis mutandis, is the case of the soul and especially of the will: the will as an incomplete actuality naturally tends to its completion; in that sense, that is, formally but not efficiently, it is self-moved. The difference between it and the heavy object is that whereas the object moves upon the removal of an obstacle, the will requires the presence of an object; it requires, in other words, the intervention of the intellect in order to direct it to a particular object. However, once again, the intellect's action is viewed by James as being merely metaphorical, that is, extrinsic to the will's proper operation. Like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, James of Viterbo holds that the moral virtues, considered as habits, i.e., virtuous dispositions or acts, are connected. In other words, he believes that one cannot have one of the virtues without having the others as well. The virtues he has in mind are what he calls the “purely” moral virtues, that is, courage, justice, and temperance, which he distinguishes from prudence, which is a partly moral, partly intellectual virtue. In his discussion in Quodl. II, q. 17 James begins by granting that the question is difficult and proceeds to expound Aristotle's solution, which he will ultimately adopt. As James sees it, Aristotle proves in Nicomachean Ethics VI the connection of the purely moral virtues by showing their necessary relation to prudence, and this is to show that just as moral virtue cannot be had without prudence, prudence cannot be had without moral virtue. The connection of the purely moral virtues follows from this: they are necessarily connected because (1) each is connected to prudence and (2) prudence is connected to the virtues (Quodl. II, q. 17, p. 187, 436 – p. 188, 441). Since the time of Augustine, theologians had agreed that man needs the gift of grace in order to love God more than himself, and that he cannot do so by natural means. However, in the early thirteenth century, theologians raised the question of whether, at least in his pre-lapsarian state, man did not love God more than himself. That this was in fact the case was the belief of Philip the Chancellor as well as Thomas Aquinas. Other authors, such as Godfrey of Fontaines and Giles of Rome, argued further that to deny man the natural capacity to love God more than himself, while allowing this to happen as a result of grace, was to imply that the operations of grace went counter to the those of nature, which was contrary to the universally accepted axiom that grace perfects nature and does not destroy it. By contrast, James of Viterbo famously argues in Quodl. II, q. 2, against the overwhelming consensus of theologians, that man naturally loves himself more than God. He has two arguments to show this (see Osborne 1999 and 2005 for a detailed commentary). The first is based on the principle that the mode of natural love is commensurate with the mode of being and, hence, of the mode of being one. Now a thing is one with itself by virtue of numerical identity, but it is one with something else by virtue of a certain conformity. For instance Socrates is one with himself by virtue of his being Socrates, but he is one with Plato by virtue of the fact that both share the same form. But the being something has by virtue of numerical identity is “greater” than the being it has by reason of something it shares with another. And given that the species of natural love follows the mode of being, it follows that it is more perfect to love oneself than to love another (Quodl. II, q. 20, p. 206, 148 – p. 149, 165). The second argument attempts to infer the desired thesis from the universally accepted premise that “the love of charity elevates nature” (Quodl. II, q. 20, p. 207, 166–67). This is true both of the love of desire and the love of friendship. In the case of love of desire, grace elevates by acting on the character of love: by natural love of desire we love God as the universal good. Through grace God is loved as the beatifying good. Regarding love of friendship, James explains that God's charity can only elevate nature with respect to its “mode,” that is, with respect to the object loved, by making God, not the self, the object of love. In other words, James is telling us that if we are to take seriously the claim that grace elevates nature, there is only one way in which this can occur, namely by making God, not the self, the object of greatest love, which implies that in his natural state man loves himself more than God. James' opposition to the consensus position on the issue of the love of self vs. the love of God would not go unnoticed. In the years following his death, such authors as Durand of Saint-Pourçain and John of Naples criticized him vigorously and attempted to refute his position (Jeschke 2009). Although James touches briefly on political issues in Quodl. I, q. 17 (see Côté, 2012), his most extensive discussions occur in his celebrated De regimine christiano (On Christian Government), written in 1302 during the bitter conflict pitting Boniface VIII against the king of France Philip IV (the Fair). De regimine christiano is often compared in aim and content with Giles of Rome's De ecclesiastica potestate (On Ecclesiastical Power), which offers one of the most extreme statements of pontifical supremacy in the thirteenth century; indeed, in the words of De regimine's editor, James' goal is “to formulate a theory of papal monarchy that is every bit as imposing and ambitious as that of [Giles]” (De regimine christiano: xxxiv). However, as scholars have also recognized, James shows a greater sensitivity to the distinction between nature and grace than Giles (Arquillière 1926). De regimine christiano is divided into two parts. The first, dealing with the theory of the Church, is of little philosophical interest, save for James' enlisting of Aristotle to show that all human communities, including the Church, are rooted in the “natural inclination of mankind.” The second and longest part is devoted to defining the nature and extent of Christ's and the pope's power. One of James' most characteristic doctrines is found in Book II, chapter 7, where he turns to the question of whether temporal power must be “instituted” by spiritual power, in other words, whether it derives its legitimacy from the spiritual, or possesses a legitimacy of its own. James states outright that spiritual power does institute temporal power, but notes that there have been two views in this regard. Some, e. g., the proponents of the so-called “dualist” position such as John Quidort of Paris, hold that the temporal power derives directly from God and thus in no way needs to be instituted by the spiritual, while others, such as Giles of Rome in De ecclesiastica potestate, contend that the temporal derives wholly from the spiritual and is devoid of any legitimacy whatsoever “unless it is united with spiritual power in the same person or instituted by the spiritual power” (De regimine christiano: 211). James is dissatisfied with both positions and, as he so often does, endeavors to find a “middle way” between them. His solution is to say that the “being” of the temporal power's institution comes both from God—by way of man's natural inclination—in “a material and incomplete sense,” and from the spiritual power by which it is “perfected and formed.” This is a very clever solution. On the one hand, by rooting the temporal power in man's natural inclination, albeit in the imperfect sense just mentioned, James was acknowledging the legitimacy of temporal rule independently of its connection to the spiritual, thus “avoid[ing] the extreme and implausible view of [Giles of Rome]” (Dyson 2009: xxix). On the other hand, making the natural origins of temporal power merely the incomplete matter of its being was a way of stressing its subordination and inferiority to the spiritual order, in keeping with his papalist convictions. Still, James' very choice of analogies to illustrate the relationship between the spiritual and temporal realms showed that his solution lay much closer to the theocratic position espoused by Giles of Rome than his efforts to find a “middle way” would have us believe. Thus, comparing the spiritual power's relation to the temporal in terms of the relation of light to color, he explains that although “color has something of the nature of light, (…) it has such a feeble light that, unless there is present a more excellent light by which it may be formed, not in its own nature but in its power, it cannot move the vision” (De regimine christiano: 211). In other words, James is telling us that although temporal power does originate in man's natural inclinations, it is ineffectual qua power unless it is informed by the spiritual. Bibliography Modern Editions of James' Works Abbreviatio in I Sententiarum Aegidii Romani, dist. 36. Edited by P. Giustiniani, Analecta Augustiniana, 42 (1979): 325–338. De regimine christiano. A Critical Edition and Translation by R.W. Dyson, Leiden: Brill. Replaces Arquillière's edition (see below for complete reference), as well as Dyson's earlier translation in James of Viterbo, On Christian Government (De regimine christiano). Edited and Translated by R.W. Dyson, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1995. Disputationes de quolibet. Edited by E. Ypma, Würzburg: Augustinus Verlag, vols. I-III, and V, 1968-75. Prima quaestio disputata de Verbo. Edited by C. Scanzillo in “Jacobus de Viterbio OSA: La ‘Prima quaestio disputata de Verbo’ del codice A. 971 delle Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio di Bologna. Edizione e note,” Asprenas, Quaestiones de divinis praedicamentis, qq. I-X and XI-XVII. Edited by E. Ypma (Corpus Scriptorum Augustianorum, Vol. V, 1–2), Rome, Augustinianum, 1983, 1986; q. XVIII, Augustiniana, 38 (1988): 67–98; q. XIX, Augustiniana, 39 (1989): 154–185; q. XX, Augustiniana, 42 (1992): 351–378; q. XXI, Augustiniana, 44 (1994): 177–208; q. XXII, Augustiniana. Ypma's declining health and subsequent death prevented him from completing the edition of the remaining quaestiones. Summa de peccatorum distinctione. Edited by D. Ambrasi, Asprenas, Ambrasi, D., 1959, “La Summa de peccatorum distinctione del B. Giacomo da Viterbo dal ms. VII G 101 della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli,” Asprenas, 6: 47–78, 189–218, 288–308. Anderson, D., 1995, “‘Dominus Ludovicus’ in the Sermons of Jacobus of Viterbo (Arch. S. Pietro D.213),” in Literature and Religion in the Later Middle Ages: Philological Studies in Honor of Siegfried Wenzel, R. Newhauser and J. A. Alford (eds.), Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, pp. 275–295. Arquillière, F.-X., 1926, Le plus ancien traité de l'Église: Jacques de Viterbe ‘De regimine christiano’ (1301–1302). Étude des sources et édition critique, Paris: G. Beauchesne. Bataillon, L. J.,  1989, “Quelques utilisateurs des textes rares de Moerbeke (Philopon, tria Opuscula) et particulièrement Jacques de Viterbe,” in Guillaume de Moerbeke. Recueil d'études à l'occasion du 700e anniversaire de sa mort (1286),  J. Brams et W. Vanhamel (eds.), Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 107–112. Beneš, J., 1927, “Valor possibilium apud S. Thomam, Henricum Gandavensem et B. Iacobum de Viterbio,” Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 30: 333–55. Côté, A., 2012,“Le Quodlibet I, question 17 de Jacques de Viterbe: introduction, traduction et notes,” Augustiniana, L'âme, l'intellect, et la volonté, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. Latin text of James of Viterbo's Quod. I, q. 7 (partial), q. 12 (complete), and 13 (complete), with French Translation, Introduction, and notes. Le progrès à l'infini des perfections créées selon Godefroid de Fontaines et Jacques de Viterbe,” in Actualité de l'infinité divine aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles, D. Arbib (ed.) Les Études Philosophiques, 4: 505–530. –––, 2009b, “Simplicius and James of Viterbo on Propensities,” Vivarium, 47: 24–53. Fidel Casado, P., 1951–3, “El pensamiento filosófico del Beato Santiago de Viterbo,” La Ciudad de Dios,“Quaestiones de quolibet de Santiago de Viterbo (Quodlibeto I, q. 12),” Archivo Teológico Agustiniano, 2: 109–130. Giustiniani, P., 1979, “Il problema delle idee in Dio secondo Giacomo da Viterbo OESA, con edizione della Distinzione 36 dell'Abbreviato in I Sententiarum Aegidii Romani,” Analecta Augustiniana, La teologia studiata secondo le 4 cause aristoteliche in un'opera inedita di Giacomo da Viterbo,” Asprenas, 27: 161–188. Gossiaux, M. D., 1999, “James of Viterbo on the Relationship between Essence and Existence,” Augustiniana, 49: 73–107. –––, 2007, “James of Viterbo and the Late Thirteenth-Century Debate Concerning the Reality of the Possibles,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 74 (2): 483–522. Grabmann, M., 1936, “Die Lehre des Jakob von Viterbo (1308) von der Wirklichkeit des göttlichen Seins (Beitrag zum Streit über das Sein Gottes zur Zeit Meister Eckharts),” Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik, vol. 2, Max Hueber Verlag, Munich: 490–511. Gutiérrez, P. D., 1939, De B. Iacobi Viterbiensis O.E.S.A. Vita, Operibus et Doctrina Theologica, Rome: Analecta Augustiniana. Jeschke, T., 2009, “Über natürliche und übernatürliche Gottesliebe. Durandus und einige Dominikaner gegen Jakob von Viterbo (mit einer Textedition von In III Sententiarum, D. 29, Q. 2 des Petrus de Palude),” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévale, 76/1: 111–198. Kent, B., 2001, “Justice, Passion, and Another's Good: Aristotle among the Theologians,” in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte—After the Condemnation of 1277. Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and Texts, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28, J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds.), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 704–718. Libera, A. de, 1994, “D'Avicenne à Averroès, et retour. Sur les sources arabes de la théorie scolastique de l'un transcendental,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 4: 141–179. Mahoney, E. P., 1973, “Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James of Viterbo and other Thirteenth Century Philosophers (Saint Thomas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate),” Augustiniana, Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being according to Some Late Medieval Philosophers,” in Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval, P. Morewedge (ed.), New York: Fordham University Press, pp. 165–257. –––, 1995, “Duns Scotus and Medieval Discussions of Metaphysical Hierarchy: the Background of Scotus' ‘Essential Order’ in Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo,” in Via Scoti. Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso scotistico internazionale, Roma, 9–11 marzo 1993, vol. I, L. Sileo (ed.), Rome: PAA-Edizioni Antonianum, pp. 359-374. Noone, T., 2011, “The Problem of the Knowability of Substance: The Discussion from Eustachius of Arras to Vital du Four,” in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A tribute to S. F. Brown, K. Emery, R. L. Friedman, and A. Speer (eds.), Leiden: Brill. Osborne, T. M., 1999, “James of Viterbo's Rejection of Giles of Rome's Arguments for the Natural Love of God over Self,” Augustiniana, 49: 235–249. –––, 2005, Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Phelps, M., 1980, “The Theory of Seminal Reasons in James of Viterbo,” Augustiniana, 30: 271–283. Pickavé, M., 2007, “The Controversy over the Principle of Individuation in Quodlibeta (1277-ca. 1320): A Forest Map,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, C. Schabel (ed.) Leiden: Brill, pp. 17–79. Rigobert, M., 1947, Un traité de l'Église au Moyen–Âge. Étude historique et doctrinale du “De regimine christiano”, Albi. Robert, A., 2008, “Scepticisme ou renoncement au dogme? Interpréter l'eucharistie aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles,” χώρα • REAM, 6: 251–288. Ruello, F., 1970, “L'analogie de l'être selon Jacques de Viterbe, Quodlibet I, Quaestio I,” Augustiniana, , “Les fondements de la liberté humaine selon Jacques de Viterbe, Disputatio prima de Quolibet, q. VII (1293),” Augustiniana, 24: 283–347; 25: 114–142. Rüssmann, H., 1938, Zur Ideenlehre der Hochscholastik, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Heinrich von Gent, Gottfried von Fontaines un Jakob von Viterbo, Freiburg: Herder. Scanzillo, C., 1972, “Jacobus de Viterbio OSA: La ‘Prima quaestio disputata de Verbo’ del codice A. 971 delle Biblioteca dell'Archiginnasio di Bologna. Edizione e note,” Asprenas, 19: 25–61. Schönberger, R., 1986, Die Transformation des klassischen Seinsverständnisses. Studien zur Vorgeschichte des neuzeitlichen Seinsbegriffs im Mittelalter, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 21, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter. –––, 1994, Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik, Leiden: Brill, pp. 132–142. Wéber, E., 1981, “Eckhart et l'ontothéologisme: histoire et conditions d'une rupture,” in Maître Eckhart à Paris. Une critique médiévale de l'ontothéologie. Les Questions parisiennes n° 1 et n° 2 d'Eckhart, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera, P. Vignaux, E. Wéber, E. Zum Brunn (eds.), Paris: Presses universitaires de France, pp. 21–54. Wippel, J. F., 1974, “The Dating of James of Viterbo's Quodlibet I and Godfrey of Fontaine's Quodlibet VIII,” Augustiniana, 24: 348–386. –––, 1981, “James of Viterbo on the Essence-Existence Relationship (Quodlibet 1, Q. 4), and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Relationship between Nature and Supposit (Quodlibet 7, Q. 5),” in Sprache und Kenntnis im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 777–787. –––, 1994, “James of Viterbo (b. ca. 1255; d. 1308),” in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650, J.J.E. Gracia (ed.), Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 257–269. Ypma, E., 1974, “Recherches sur la carrière scolaire de Jacques de Viterbe,” Augustiniana, 24: 247–282. –––, 1975, “Recherches sur la productivité littéraire de Jacques de Viterbe jusqu'à 1300,” Augustiniana, 25: 223–282. –––, 1980, “La méthode de travail de Jacques de Viterbe. L'analyse d'une question,” Augustiniana, 30: 254–270. –––, 1980, “A propos d'un exposé sur Jacques de Viterbe,” Augustiniana, 30: 43–45. –––, 1985, “Jacques de Viterbe, témoin valable?,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 52: 232–234. –––, 1987, “Jacques de Viterbe, lecteur attentif de Gilbert de la Porrée,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 54: 257–261. –––, 1991, “La relation est-elle un être réel ou seulement un être de raison d'après Jacques de Viterbe,” in Lectionum Varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987), J. Jolivet (ed.), Paris: J. Vrin, pp. 155–162. Zumkeller, A., 1951, “De doctrina sociali scholae Augustininae aevi medii,” Analecta Augustiniana, 22: 57–84. –––, 1964, “Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und Philosophisch-Theologische Lehre,”Analecta Augustiniana, 27: 167–262. Giacomo da Viterbo.  L’iconografia dell’aureola tra Oriente e Occidente  ARTE L’iconografia dell’aureola tra Oriente e Occidente di Federico Nozza. Nell’arte cristiana occidentale, ma anche in quella orientale, l’elemento dell’aureola costituisce sicuramente uno degli attributi iconografici più riconoscibili.  La sua immagine identifica subito la rappresentazione di un Santo, di Cristo stesso, ma anche della Madonna. Può essere crocesegnata(ossia dotata di croce), per esempio nelle rappresentazioni di Cristo, oppure semplice, come nei santi. Come elemento figurativo, la sua origine è stata codificata iconograficamente fin dagli albori della figuratività cristiana, ovvero nel IV secolo.   Gli esempi del Mausoleo di Sant’Elena a Roma e della Chiesa di San Vitale a Ravenna (IV e VI sec.) Testimonianza preziosa e paradigmatica sono, ad esempio, i due mosaici delle calotte absidali del Mausoleo di Santa Costanza a Roma. Si tratta di un cimelio architettonico costruito attorno alla metà del IV secolo per la sepoltura della figlia di Costantino. Nei due mosaici, parzialmente restaurati e tra i pochi ad essersi conservati delle volte, si trovano due rappresentazioni di Cristo. La prima lo vede seduto sul Globo, mentre consegna le chiavi del Regno dei Cieli a Pietro (traditio clavium).  La seconda, invece, lo identifica giovane e apollineo mentre si erge sul monte da cui sgorgano i quattro fiumi dell’Eden, consegnando a Paolo la parola/legge della Nuova Alleanza (traditio legis). In entrambe le rappresentazioni musive, che costituiscono alcuni dei primi esempi di iconografia cristiana a Roma, il volto di Cristo è circonfuso da un’aureola blu-azzurra. Quest’ultima conferisce e immediatamente attribuisce alla figura un alone di divinità, disancorandolo dalla contingenza terrena e proiettandolo nella dimensione del trascendente.  Traditio clavium (a dx) e traditio legis (a sx) in due calotte del deambulatorio del Mausoleo di Santa Costanza a Roma (IV secolo) L’aureola è anche regale Talvolta, poi, sono i sovrani-imperatori stessi ad auto-rappresentarsi col capo circonfuso da aureola, come negli straordinari mosaici che arricchiscono il presbiterio della chiesa di San Vitale a Ravenna.Quest’ultimo, databile al secondo quarto del VI secolo, raffigura, tra gli altri, anche i ritratti degli imperatori Giustiniano e della moglie Teodora,entrambi corredati da aureola dorata.    L’imperatrice Teodora (a sx), moglie dell’imperatore Giustiniano (a dx), in due mosaici del presbiterio della Chiesa di San Vitale a Ravenna (VI secolo) Entrambi gli esempi, sebbene distanziati da ben due secoli, testimoniano alle origini del Cristianesimo ufficiale (ossia istituzionalizzato in una ecclesiae) un’iconografia dell’aureola già compiutamente codificata diffusa.   I primi esempi figurativi di aureole Sebbene, come detto, l’aureola costituisca un inconfondibile attributo iconografico cristiano, non è però nel Cristianesimo (che del resto si istituzionalizza nei primi secoli d.C.) che affondano le radici della sua nascita. Queste infatti, come del resto molti altri aspetti della liturgia e religione cristiana, devono essere rintracciate ben prima della nascita del Cristianesimo stesso.   Tale scelta figurativa risale a diversi secoli, se non millenni prima di Cristo.  Consiste nel rappresentare divinità (qualora queste potessero essere rappresentate) inscritte, totalmente o parzialmente, in aloni di luce funzionali a proiettare le figure in dimensioni ultraterrene ed evocarne la natura divina.  Per esempio, nella pittura parietale egizia, il dio Ra è quasi sempre rappresentato con un disco solare situato sopra il suo capo e inglobato da un cobra. In questo caso dunque, nelle rappresentazioni di Ra, il disco solare  ha soprattutto la funzione di rappresentare l’attributo del sole, di cui Ra, secondo la cosmologia egizia, era il dio referente.    Rappresentazione di Ra e Imentet (a sx.) sulle pareti della tomba di Nefertari nella Valle delle Regine a Luxor (Egitto) Quando l’aureola era ancora una corona raggiante Tuttavia, per poter conoscere i primi veri esempi di aureole, occorre risalire alle prime rappresentazioni della divinità di Mitra. Questa è nata in origine dallo Zoroastrismo (dal profeta Zarathustra, o Zoroastro) e successivamente, soprattutto presso l’Impero Romano, si è costituita come divinità indipendente e inscritta in uno specifico culto (quasi monoteista), detto appunto Mitraismo.  Nella fase imperiale soprattutto, il Mitraismodivenne la religione dominante dell’ecumene (sebbene non la sola) e poi concorrente al Cristianesimo delle origini. Quello che interessa rilevare però è che, in quanto dio solare e dunque simbolo di vita, anche nelle rappresentazioni di Mitra, la divinità venne ben presto corredata con attributi iconografici quali, per esempio, una “corona” raggiante.    Rappresentazione di Mitra come Sol Invictus su un disco argenteo romano Un simbolo trasversale della divinità tra Occidente e Oriente  Possono forse essere questi i primi significativi antecedenti dell’iconografia dell’aureola? Ben presto questa divenne un vero e proprio simbolo trasversale adottato in molte altre religioni di origine orientale. Forse la sua adozione è legata all’efficacia visiva con cui riesce a restituire allo sguardo un immediato riferimento alla dimensione trascendente e/o spirituale. Dapprima adottato nel Cristianesimo, questo riferimento venne poi, attraverso scambi culturali, trasmesso anche ad altre religioni orientali, tra le quali il Buddismo.   Sotto questo profilo appare infatti singolare che proprio negli stessi secoli in cui l’iconografia cristiana si codifica (tra il IV e il VI secolo), l’adozione dell’aureola come attributo iconografico si manifesta anche in diverse rappresentazioni buddiste in area cinese. Come si spiega questo utilizzo pressoché contemporaneo dell’aureola come attributo figurativo del divino, in due religioni così distanti e appartenenti a mondi diversi?  La chiave di volta è costituita ancora dal Mitraismo.    Reliquiario di Bimaran, I sec. d.C. circa Il Mitraismo è la chiave di lettura Per comprendere infatti la trasmissione di tali scelte figurative tra la cultura latina e quella asiatica, occorre risalire al primo secolo d.C. Per precisione quando gli Indo-sciti (popolazioni nomadi originarie dell’attuale Iran, dove lo zoroastrismo e con lui il Dio Mitra ebbero origine) e alcune popolazioni dell’Impero Kusana (originario dell’attuale Afghanistan), invasero e conquistarono alcuni territori degli attuali Pakistan e India. Portarono dunque  con sé e trasferirono alle popolazioni conquistate alcuni tratti della loro cultura e della loro religione, tra cui anche il Mitraismo con i rispettivi attributi iconografico-rappresentativi.  Nella latinità mediterranea, dunque, l’iconografia di Mitra avrebbe influenzato parzialmente quella cristiana. Parallelamente, attraverso un processo di osmosi culturale, la medesima iconografia veniva trasmessa anche alle culture e alle religioni orientali (Pakistan, India meridionale e, attraverso questa, la Cina), tra le quali anche il Buddismo. Questo processo pare avvenne precocemente, come testimonia il celebre reliquiario di Bimaran (città al confine con il Pakistan), databile al primo secolo d.C.   Dipinto cinese raffigurante Buddha (al centro) Ci sono poi altre importanti manifestazioni figurative del Buddismo, quali ad esempio alcune statue di Buddha risalenti al II sec. d.C. e oggi conservate al Tokyo National Museum. Oppure ancora diverse pitture cinesi raffiguranti Buddha sempre con il capo circonfuso da aureola.  Insomma, dalla pur brevissima disamina effettuata, ci si rende conto di quanto la cultura occidentale e quella orientale, dopo tutto, non siano poi così distanti. In questo senso, le testimonianze figurative nate dalle rispettive pratiche cultuali e religiose ne costituiscono un memorandum preziosissimo. Capocci. Keywords: peccatum – sin – holiness – aureola segno naturale della santita.  Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Capocci” – The Swimming-Pool Library. Capocci.

 

Grice e Capodilista: l’implicatura conversazionale -- n principio era la conversazione – filosofia fascista – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Battaglia Terme). Filosofo italiano. Grice: “I like Capodilista – good vintage (literally)! – Capodilista is difficult to comprehend, but when I was struggling to find examples of implicatura due to exploiting ‘be perspicuous,’ he was whom I was thinking! Keywords in his philosophy are ‘il non-detto,’ ‘homos eroticus’ – filosofia dell’espressione – metafisica – equilibrio apolineo-dionisiaco, positive-negativo –“  “Un pensiero perfetto in sé non esiste; un pensiero è perfetto solo nella serie innumerabile dei pensieri che nascono da esso.»  (Quaderni). Appartenente ad una famiglia veneziana di nobili origini, nacque nella villa di famiglia da Angelo Emo e da Emilia dei baroni Barracco. Studia a Roma sotto Gentile. Le sue riflessioni sul nihilismo sono un'anticipazione della filosofia di Heidegger.  Debitore dell'attualismo gentiliano. Partendo da questo, giunse a trasformarlo in una filosofia dove l'atto è la re-figurazione dell'auto-negazione del nulla che comunque conserva una sua funzione positiva così come nela religione romana la morte del corpo ha la funzione di salvezza nella redenzione dello spirito (animo). La forma superiore dello spirito intristisce e cerca invano di uscire da sé per trovare qualcosa che lo salvi. Un'istanza di salvezza che trova senso nella religione romana. Dio espia la sua universalità. Distrugge ogni valore e il proprio, sì che lo sparire, il nascondersi di Dio nella sua espiazione non è altro che la nuova creazione dei valori, e così il ciclo ricomincia. Dio si abolisce col suo stesso realizzarsi. Un altro punto fondamentale di sua filosofia è la figura centrale dell’intersoggetivita., del rapporto concreto particoare, particolarizato, inter-personale contrapposto all’astrazioni di una collettività IMpersonale generalizato (universalita, universabilita, generalita formale, generalita applicazionale, generalita di contenuto --, sia quella esaltata da uno stato etico (la communita, la popolazione, la societa). Una diada conversazionale non può essere un dato. Una diada conversazionale può essere solo un rapposro inter-soggettivo, cioè due resurrezioni. Il filosofo è assillato da questo fondamentale problema. Il problema è questo: di quali fedi si nutre e sussiste il mondo? Quale è la fede autentica che lo sostiene nella vita che gli dà la forza dell'attività e la convinzione di partecipare con la sua vita (o la sua azione o il suo essere) alla immortalità, cioè all'assoluto? La diada conversazionale ha bisogno dell'assoluto (l’universabilita) e pertanto il suo problema è questa partecipazione all'assoluto. Come raggiungerà l'assoluto le due uomini – le due maschi -- della diada conversazionale? Quale sarà la sua fede laica? Non certo quella collettivistica-sociale che ha fatto uso della violenza, la forza, e la autorita illegitima, e ha fallito ma neppure quella etrusca che ha compresso la libertà di coscienza.  I etruschi sono nati sotto il segno dello scandalo. Ma il sacro si è allontanato dalla sua scandalosa azione originaria.  Perché in ogni fede vi è qualcosa di scandaloso e di vergognoso? Perché vi è qualcosa di vergognoso nella verità e nella vita stessa? Forse l'elemento vergognoso è l'intersoggetivita pura attorno a cui verte la fede e che si crea con la sua negazione. L’intersoggetività è sempre nuda e la nudità è scandalosa. I vestiti sono l'uniforme innecessari della società. Invano due maschi credono di distinguersi con le vesti; e credono che le due nudità sia uniformità. Le vesti sono il riconoscimento della società, del sociale. Ma le vesti sarebbero nulla se non fossero animate dalla vita intersoggetiva di due nudità. Le veste sono orgogliose delle due nudità che  socializzanoa. È quindi con la libertà degl’entrambi della diada, con le due nudità, con il rifiuto di ogni veste di uniformità, IM-personalita, ed obbedienza all'autorità ad una dottrina o scuola di mistica pitagorica collettivizzante, che la diada recupera la sua essenza duale intersoggetiva interpersonale particolarizata che si fonda sull'amore -- alta espressione del "singolare duale".  Altre opere: “Il dio negative” (Marsilio, Venezia); “La voce d’Apollo musogete: arte e religione nella Roma antica” (Marsilio, Venezia); “Supremazia e maledizione” (Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano); “Il mono-teismo demo-cratico” (Mondadori, Milano); “Metafisica” (Bompiani, Milano); Il silenzio (Gallucci, Roma); “La meraviglia del nulla” Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Le parole che si riferiscono a dei valori, si svalutano progressivamente come le monete, come, appunto, i valori.  Quando pensiamo troppo profondamente, perdiamo l’uso della parola. La parola si può “usare”, cioè profanare, quando non se ne comprende il significato. Se comprendessimo il significato delle parole, non usciremmo mai più dal silenzio.  La conversazione è pericolosa per un’idea, per uno spirito, per una verità che non resiste alla lieve immediatezza (e cioè rapidità) che è l’anima irriducibile di una conversazione e di una comunicazione tra viventi (e che altro è l’arte?). E così l’idea è pericolosa per una conversazione. Conversazione (espressione, comunicazione ecc.) e idea tentano continuamente di sopraffarsi. Appunto perché l’una non può vivere senza l’altra.  È lecito ad un artista prendere sul serio ciò che scrive? Non decade dalla sua qualità di artista e di creatore per divenire soltanto un credente? Il torto dei romantici è stato principalmente quello di prendersi sul serio; i più antichi scrittori prendevano sul serio il loro argomento, ma sempre conservandosi estranei ad esso; senza considerare la loro soggettività di creatori come l’oggetto stesso della loro creazione. I romantici invece prendevano sul serio se stessi, e ciò li rendeva ridicoli, perché ovviamente non potevano più mantenersi al di sopra del loro argomento. Si dovette, pertanto, da Baudelaire in poi, ricorrere ad una forma di ironia. Ciò che distingue la sfera (moderna) del sacro è la mancanza di ironia; eppure può anche darsi che l’universo che abitiamo sia una forma dell’ironia divina, manifestatasi come creazione. Nella sfera antica del sacro, gli Dei di Democrito e di Epicuro ridevano negli intermundi. La sfera della sacralità antica si differenzia dalla sfera della sacralità moderna appunto perché gli antichi Dei, grazia alla loro pluralità, conoscendosi l’un l’altro, ridevano. Un’ilarità che non si addice a un Dio unico e solitario, ma che potrebbe, se l’Unico non fosse troppo preso da se stesso e dalla sua onnipotenza, tradursi nel termine più moderno di ironia. A noi uomini accade appunto di osservare che l’ironia è il solo modo di distaccarci dalla nostra onnipotenza, di uscire all’esterno della nostra assolutezza.  Le opere d’arte, come tutte le immagini, sono in realtà dei ricordi. Sono la memoria. Noi amiamo un’opera d’arte perché essa è la nostra memoria che si risveglia, che riprende possesso di noi, e del suo universo, cioè di tutto. La memoria talvolta dimentica; ed essa ricorda quando dimentica.  La forma letteraria in cui meglio ci si può esprimere è appunto la lettera (l’epistola). Perché l’altro è sempre presenta mentre scriviamo e abbiamo la facoltà di creare il destinatario. Abbiamo la facoltà di creare un pubblico come destinatario? Se non avessimo la facoltà di creare un destinatario, individuale e universale, non scriveremmo mai. Forse non penseremmo neppure. Nessuno scrive per sé. L’immagine e la rappresentazione, che dovrebbero essere la fedeltà assoluta delle cose rappresentate, sono allora infedeltà altrettanto assoluta, diversità radicale dal rappresentato? Il rappresentato in quanto oggetto è per definizione diversità assoluta dal soggetto; come allora, con quale sintesi si può superare questo iato? In quanto differenza dal soggetto, l’oggetto ne è la negazione, la pura negazione; e questa negazione, in quanto puramente essa stessa, è soggetto essa medesima, cioè è il soggetto che si nega; è l’atto del soggetto, in quanto questo atto è l’atto del negarsi. Quindi noi siamo la rappresentazione, siamo l’atto in cui tutte le cose sono e vivono, cioè l’attualità, in quanto siamo autonegazione. La negatività è l’universalità dell’atto. L’eco è la voce del nulla, la parola del nulla, appunto perché è esattamente la nostra voce e la nostra parola, obiettivata, ripetuta. L’obiettività è la ripetizione del soggetto che non può mai ripetersi? Tutto ciò che pensiamo o scriviamo è nell’atto stesso una metamorfosi. Il nostro pensiero non ha altro oggetto che il proprio nulla. L’arte dello scrivere è l’arte di far dire alle parole tutte le trasmutazioni che esse contengono e sono – tutta la loro attuale diversità, tutta la negazione che esse sono quando si affermano, e tutta l’affermazione che viene espressa dalla negazione. Mediante la loro trasmutazione, che è l’affermarsi dell’attualità di una negazione (cioè dell’attualità dell’atto che si riconosce come negativo), le parole finiscono per creare un organismo, un organismo di parole, cioè la frase: L’organismo della frase e del verbo che trasforma la negatività della parola in un atto. La parola è la diversità dell’atto. Negarsi e attualità, negarsi e trascendenza e diversità, sono sempre, e sempre attualmente congiunti; perciò la parola contiene il seme della frase, del discorso. Forse il nostro nome è soltanto uno pseudonimo; forse anche i nomi delle cose sono pseudonimi. Ma qual è il vero nome? È più probabile che le cose come crediamo di vederle siano soltanto gli pseudonimi di un nome; e noi stessi e il nostro essere siamo pseudonimi; di un nome che forse non conosceremo mai e che appunto per questo ha una realtà suprema. Una realtà unica. Una sintesi invisibile di realtà e verità. Una realtà che la conoscenza (la scienza) non può dissolvere, analizzare. Gli scritti di aforismi o di idee frammentarie, di epigrammi o di formule, sono i modi di esprimere l’assoluto, o qualche assoluto, qualche verità in forma breve. Ma ognuno di questi frammenti vuole essere l’espressione dell’assoluto, e quindi non può essere frammentario. Frammenti e parti che sono relative all’assoluto, senza esserlo, si trovano nelle opere di una certa ampiezza, ampie come la vita. La vita, essendo universale, può essere plurale. Il Mangiaparole rivista n. 1Il Mangiaparole 6 Mario Gabriele Lo scrivere è una forma silenziosa (fonicamente) del parlare; ma è un parlare che ha il singolare privilegio di non essere interrotto, se non dalla propria coscienza; la coscienza è la madre, l’origine del discorso, ma è anche la coscienza che fa al discorso, cioè a se stessa, le continue obiezioni. La coscienza è il maggiore obiettore di coscienza. La coscienza parla per affermarsi o per smentire? La nostra scrittura è geroglifica come la nostra parola, che non coincide con ciò che vuole esprimere, ma soltanto vi allude simbolicamente; allude a qualcosa di originariamente noto od originariamente ignoto. A qualcosa di diverso. La parola stessa è originariamente diversità. La Parola è diversità da se stessa e perciò coincide con la diversità dell’atto, con la diversità originaria che vuole esprimere? Questa coincidenza era l’ideale, lo scopo, la fede dell’età dell’autocoscienza. L’età dell’autocoscienza e la tirannia; vi è sempre un quid al di là dell’espressione, senza questo quid l’espressione non sarebbe una metamorfosi. La metamorfosi vuole esprimere se stessa con la negazione; noi alludiamo alla diversità con la negazione, con la identificazione. Noi siamo la verità; è proprio per questo che ci è impossibile conoscerla. la conosciamo quando diventa altro da noi. La conoscenza, l’espressione, la stessa memoria creano l’anteriorità della verità e della sua attualità. Se la verità è un Eden, noi possiamo conoscerla solo quando ne siamo fuori, quando ne siamo espulsi ed esiliati. L’arte dello scrittore consiste nel creare una complicità nel lettore; e di quale colpa diviene complice il lettore? Non lo si è mai saputo. Esistono innumerevoli sistemi di estetica e di spiegazioni complesse e fallaci di un atto che è la semplicità originaria. Una complicità del lettore con l’autore. Il delitto (e il diletto) perfetto. Soltanto l’inesprimibile è degno di un’espressione. La parola è un irrazionale ed è strano che essa esista in un mondo razionale e quantitativo; nel mondo dell’identità. la razionalità è soltanto nel numero; la Parola è divina, anzi la scrittura ha identificato la Parola (il verbo) e la divinità; per gli antichi il numero aveva significati simbolici, cioè spirituali. Oggi il numero privato di ogni significato è identificato dalla sua «posizione» (nello spazio è o sarà il vero successore della parola – ma troverà in se stesso una nuova irrazionalità?) Il numero è la massima razionalità e insieme la massima irrazionalità come serie infinita; non possiamo vivere senza irrazionalità, appunto perché la vita è essa stessa irrazionalità; il numero può vivere? Noi parliamo, noi scriviamo, senza ricordarci la suprema scadenza del silenzio. L’espressione più perfetta è quella che crea l’inesprimibile. L’aforisma e l’ironia sono una professione di scetticismo nei confronti della poesia. L’aforisma è la definizione, l’analisi, la spiegazione, la risoluzione in termini umani della lirica; l’ironia è la scoperta dei suoi motivi non lirici: uno sguardo dietro le quinte. Come esprimerò io il mio pensiero, la mia vita, la mia esperienza? Questa dovrebbe essere l’interrogazione da ogni uomo posta a se stesso. Vero è però che in genere l’inesprimibile è ciò che per noi ha più valore e importanza; quello verso cui ci sentiamo più attirati; quello per cui sentiamo come un’antica, istintiva e simpatica affinità e parentela. La quantità di parole inutili che uno scrittore inserisce nel suo scritto è inversamente proporzionale all’importanza dello scrittore stesso. Vi sono scritti in cui nessuna, o quasi, parola può essere tolta senza grave danno per l’opera e per noi; altri in cui si possono togliere tutte… (Q. 14, 1932).   Il caso della vendita della Palladiana Villa Emo a un magnate straniero. SEMBRA CHIUDERSI UN LUNGO MINUETTO DURANTE IL QUALE LA BANCA DI CREDITO TREVIGIANO HA CONCRETIZZATO L’INTENZIONE (SINO AD ORA MAI UFFICIALMENTE AMMESSA) DI ALIENARE IL BENE.    La vendita della Palladiana Villa Emo a Fanzolo di Vedelago è stata ufficializzata.  Il consiglio di amministrazione di Banca di Credito Trevigiano, che ne detiene la proprietà (da quando per 15 milioni di euro la acquistò dall’ultimo erede, il conte Leonardo Marco Emo Capodilista) ha messo ai voti il suo destino e ha deciso: accetterà l’offerta di uno sconosciuto magante straniero.  IL PERCORSO Sembra chiudersi così un lungo minuetto durante il quale l’istituto di credito ha concretizzato l’intenzione (sino ad ora mai ufficialmente ammessa) di alienare il bene. Il 9 gennaio la prima avvisaglia attraverso un comunicato stampa che parlava di un’offerta d’acquisto misteriosamente pervenuta “da un privato appassionato del Palladio, e desideroso di riportare la Villa (Patrimonio Unesco dal 1996) al suo originario splendore”. Ora la conferma di cedere “il solo edificio storico e non gli adiacenti cespiti occupati dalla banca. L’immobile oggetto della trattativa -specifica l’ultima comunicazione- non rappresenta un asset strumentale all’attività bancaria e il Consiglio di amministrazione (…) ha deciso di dare il via libera alle attività propedeutiche alla due diligence di tipo tecnico per giungere all’eventuale chiusura della transazione entro l’anno 2019. Fatto salvo il diritto di prelazione previsto dal D.lgs. a favore del Ministero dei Beni culturali e delle altre competenti autorità”. Nota, quest’ultima, che, ad onor del vero, suona un po’ come una beffa: se lo stesso ente di credito ad oggi dimostra di non poter investire nel mantenimento del bene (ordinario e straordinario inclusi i restauri di cui gli affreschi dello Zelotti avrebbero urgenza), ancor più lontana appare l’ipotesi che possa farsene carico un ente pubblico.  LA STORIA La storia recente del resto lo conferma: dopo il commissariamento (seppur temporaneo) da parte di Bankitalia, la fondazione appositamente creata per la gestione della villa ha dovuto dire addio ai 325 mila euro annui che Credito Trevigiano versava. Insufficienti i proventi derivanti da bigliettazione e affitto degli spazi. Così i bilanci in perdita, primi licenziamenti per il personale della fondazione, le dimissioni, nell’ottobre scorso del presidente Armando Cremasco. Poi, reciproche accuse tra parti, la preoccupazione del sindaco, la petizione “No alla vendita di Villa Emo a Fanzolo di Vedelago” su change.org che raggiunge in pochi giorni quota 975 firme. Tentativo inutile ma che tocca, negli intenti, un nodo fondamentale della vicenda: i firmatari sono soci, clienti della banca e semplici cittadini che riconoscono in Villa Emo il bene più rappresentativo della loro comunità. Un bene acquisito da una banca strettamente legata al territorio e che su di esso ha come stesso suo mandato quello di reinvestire. Una banca della comunità in cui però la comunità, a seguito di questo atto, non si riconosce più.  IL CASO DI VILLA EMO Il caso di Villa Emo, generalizzando, appare uno fra molti nell’inarrestabile processo di alienazione del nostro patrimonio storico. Perché agitarsi tanto se, solo per citare i casi territorialmente più prossimi, la magnate cinese Ada Koon Hang Tse ha recentemente acquisito Villa Cornaro a Piombino Dese (Padova) e il veneziano Palazzo Pisani Moretta sul Canal Grande? Perché forse, per fare un po’ d’ordine, ogni singola vicenda necessiterebbe d’un corretto approccio, di una corretta lettura, esercitando invece proprio il diritto a una non generalizzazione in polemiche a catena. Polemiche aventi nel nostro paese sempre le stesse parole-chiave: sostenibilità, valorizzazione, gestione strategica, autosufficienza nonché il terribile reiterato “fare sistema”. Anche il caso di Villa Emo (per la verità per ora confinato alla cronaca locale) si presterebbe quindi benissimo a dibattiti e disquisizioni filologiche in rapporto al paesaggio, alla fruizione futura (sarà ancora accessibile?) agli immancabili paragoni gestionali (esteri) qui in Italia spesso apparentemente inattuabili. Ma servirebbero, ancora una volta, a tener desta per un po’ l’attenzione e nulla più. L’analisi dei fatti dimostra solamente una sola, nuda verità: siamo bravissimi a scatenare il dibattito e a proporre a parole soluzioni possibili ma anche stavolta, conti alla mano, non siamo stati capaci di elaborare un piano di sostenibilità per tenerci stretto qualcosa che appartiene alla nostra storia. Non resta che augurarci che il nuovo proprietario si riveli un illuminato signore in villa. Così potremo risolvere il tutto con la consueta, amara alzata di spalle: “molto rumore per nulla”. Rodenigo Villa Emo is one of the many cre­ations con­ceived by Ital­ian Re­nais­sance ar­chi­tect Andrea Palladio. It is a pa­tri­cian villa lo­cated in the Veneto re­gion of north­ern Italy, near the vil­lage of Fan­zolo di Vedelago, in the Province of Tre­viso. The pa­tron of this villa was Leonardo Emo and re­mained in the hands of the Emo fam­ily until it was sold in 2004. Since 1996, it has been con­served as part of the World Her­itage Site »City of Vi­cenza and the Pal­la­dian Vil­las of the Veneto«.[1]  History Andrea Palladio's ar­chi­tec­tural fame is con­sid­ered to have come from the many vil­las he de­signed. The build­ing of Villa Emo was the cul­mi­na­tion of a long-lasting pro­ject of the pa­tri­cian Emo fam­ily of the Re­pub­lic of Venice to de­velop its es­tates at Fan­zolo. In 1509, which saw the de­feat of Venice in the War of the League of Cam­brai, the es­tate on which the villa was to be built was bought from the Bar­barigo fam­ily.[2] Leonardo di Gio­van­nia Emo was a well-known Venet­ian aris­to­crat. He was born in 1538 and in­her­ited the Fan­zolo es­tate in 1549. This prop­erty was ded­i­cated to the agri­cul­tural ac­tiv­i­ties that the fam­ily pros­pered from. The Emo family's cen­tral in­ter­est was at first in the cul­ti­va­tion of their newly ac­quired land. Not until two gen­er­a­tions had passed did Leonardo Emo com­mis­sion Pal­la­dio to build a new villa in Fan­zolo.  Historians un­for­tu­nately do not have firm chronol­ogy of dates on the de­sign, con­struc­tion, or the com­mence­ment of the new build­ing: the years 1555 or 1558 is es­ti­mated to have been when the build­ing was de­signed, while the con­struc­tion was thought to have been un­der­taken be­tween 1558 and 1561. There is no ev­i­dence show­ing that the villa was built by 1549: how­ever, it has been doc­u­mented to have been built by 1561. The 1560s saw the in­te­rior dec­o­ra­tion added and the con­se­cra­tion of the chapel in the west barchesse in 1567.[1] The date of com­ple­tion is put at 1565; a doc­u­ment which at­tests to the mar­riage of Leonardo di Alvise with Cor­nelia Gri­mani has lasted from that year.[3] Par­tial al­ter­ations were made to the Villa Emo in 1744 by Francesco Muttoni. Arches within both wings that were close to the cen­tral build were sealed off and ad­di­tional res­i­den­tial areas were cre­ated. The ceil­ings were al­tered. The villa and its sur­round­ing es­tate were pur­chased in 2004 by an in­sti­tu­tion and fur­ther restora­tions were made.  Since 1996, it has been con­served as part of the World Her­itage Site »City of Vi­cenza and the Pal­la­dian Vil­las of the Veneto«.[1]  The villa is at the cen­tre of an ex­ten­sive area that bears cen­turi­a­tion, or land di­vi­sions, and ex­tends north­ward. The land­scape of Fan­zolo has a con­tin­u­ous his­tory since Roman times and it has been sug­gested that the lay­out of the villa re­flects the straight lines of the Roman roads.[2]  Architecture Marcok The main building (casa dominicale). Villa Emo was a prod­uct of Palladio's later pe­riod of ar­chi­tec­ture. It is one of the most ac­com­plished of the Pal­la­dian Vil­las, show­ing the ben­e­fit of 20 years of Palladio's ex­pe­ri­ence in do­mes­tic ar­chi­tec­ture. It has been praised for the sim­ple math­e­mat­i­cal re­la­tion­ships ex­pressed in its pro­por­tions, both in the el­e­va­tion and the di­men­sions of the rooms. Pal­la­dio used math­e­mat­ics to cre­ate the ideal villa. These «harmonic pro­por­tions» were a for­mu­la­tion of Palladio's de­sign the­ory. He thought that the beauty of ar­chi­tec­ture was not in the use of or­ders and or­na­men­ta­tion, but in ar­chi­tec­ture de­void of or­na­men­ta­tion, which could still be a de­light to the eye if aes­thet­i­cally pleas­ing por­tions were in­cor­po­rated. In 1570, Pal­la­dio pub­lished a plan of the villa in his trea­tise I quat­tro libri dell'architettura. Un­like some of the other plans he in­cluded in this work, the one of Villa Emo cor­re­sponds nearly ex­actly to what was built. His clas­si­cal ar­chi­tec­ture has stood the test of time and de­sign­ers still look to Pal­la­dio for in­spi­ra­tion.[1]    Renato Vecchiato [CC-BY-SA-3.0] Another view of Villa Emo. The layout of the villa and its es­tate is strate­gi­cally placed along the pre-existing Roman grid plan. There is a long rec­tan­gu­lar axis that runs across the es­tate in a north-south di­rec­tion. The agri­cul­tural crop fields and tree groves were laid out and arranged along the long axis, as was the villa it­self.[1]  The outer ap­pear­ance of the Villa Emo is marked by a sim­ple treat­ment of the en­tire body of the build­ing, whose struc­ture is de­ter­mined by a geo­met­ri­cal rhythm. The con­struc­tion con­sists of brick-work with a plas­ter fin­ish, vis­i­ble wooden beams seen in the spaces of the piano no­bile, and coffered ceil­ings like that within the log­gia. The cen­tral struc­ture is an al­most square res­i­den­tial area.[4] The liv­ing quar­ters are raised above ground-level, as are all of Palladio's other vil­las. In­stead of the usual stair­case going up to the main front door, the build­ing has a ramp with a gen­tle slope that is as wide as the pronaos. This re­veals the agri­cul­tural tra­di­tion of this com­plex. The ramp, an in­no­va­tion in the Pal­la­dian vil­las, was nec­es­sary for trans­porta­tion to the gra­naries by wheel­bar­rows loaded with food prod­ucts and other goods. The wide ramp leads up to the loggia which takes the form of a col­umn por­tico crowned by a gable – a tem­ple front which Pal­la­dio ap­plied to sec­u­lar build­ings. As in the case with the Villa Badoer, the log­gia does not stand out from the core of the build­ing as an en­trance hall, but is re­tracted into it. The em­pha­sis of sim­plic­ity ex­tends to the col­umn order of the log­gia, for which Pal­la­dio chose the ex­tremely plain Tuscan order.[2] Plain win­dows em­bell­ish the piano no­bile as well as the attic.  The cen­tral build­ing of the villa is framed by two sym­met­ri­cal long, lower colon­naded wings, or barchesses, which orig­i­nally housed agri­cul­tural fa­cil­i­ties, like gra­naries, cel­lars, and other ser­vice areas. This was a work­ing villa like Villa Ba­doer and a num­ber of the other de­signs by Pal­la­dio. Both wings end with tall dove­cotes which are struc­tures that house nest­ing holes for do­mes­ti­cated pi­geons. An ar­cade on the wings face the gar­den, con­sist­ing of columns that have rec­tan­gu­lar blocks for the bases and capi­tols. The west barchesse also con­tains a chapel. The barchesses merge with the cen­tral res­i­dence, form­ing one ar­chi­tec­tural unit. This ty­po­log­i­cal for­mat of a villa-farm was in­vented by Pal­la­dio and can be found at Villa Bar­baro and Villa Baroer.[1]  Andrea Pal­la­dio em­pha­sises the use­ful­ness of the lay-out in his trea­tise. He points out that the grain stores and work areas could be reached under cover, which was par­tic­u­larly im­por­tant. Also, it was nec­es­sary for the Villa Emo's size to cor­re­spond to the re­turns ob­tained by good man­age­ment. These re­turns must in fact have been con­sid­er­able, for the side-wings of the build­ing are un­usu­ally long, a vis­i­ble sym­bol of pros­per­ity. The Emo fam­ily in­tro­duced the cul­ti­va­tion of maize on their es­tate (and the plant, still new in Eu­rope, is de­picted in one of Zelotti's fres­coes). In con­trast to the tra­di­tional cul­ti­va­tion of mil­let, con­sid­er­ably higher re­turns could be ob­tained from the maize.[5] It is not clear if the long walk, made of large square paving-stones, which leads to the front of the house, served a prac­ti­cal pur­pose. It seems to be a fifteenth-century thresh­ing floor.[6] How­ever, Pal­la­dio ad­vised that thresh­ing should not be car­ried out near a house.  Hans A. Rosbach. Frescoes by Giovanni Battista Zelotti, west wall of the hall Frescoes Hans A. Rosbach [CC BY-SA 3.0] Hall West The ex­te­rior is sim­ple, bare of any dec­o­ra­tion. In con­trast, the in­te­rior is richly dec­o­rated with fres­coes by the Veronese painter Gio­vanni Bat­tista Zelotti, who also worked on Villa Foscari and other Pal­la­dian vil­las. The main se­ries of fres­coes in the villa is grouped in an area with scenes fea­tur­ing Venus, the god­dess of love. Zelotti ap­pears to have com­pleted the work on the fres­coes by 1566.[1]  In the log­gia, the fres­coes have rep­re­sen­ta­tions of Cal­listo, Jupiter, Jupiter in the Guise of Diana, and Cal­isto trans­formed into a Bear by June. The Great Room is filled with fres­coes that were placed be­tween Corinthian columns that rise from high pedestals. The events in the fres­coes con­cen­trate on hu­man­is­tic ideals and Roman his­tory al­lud­ing to mar­i­tal virtues. Ex­em­plary scenes in­clude Virtue por­trayed in a scene from the life of Sci­pio Africanus. On the left wall is the scene of Scio­pio re­turns the girl be­trothed to Al­lu­cius and the right wall a scene show­ing The Killing of Vir­ginia. The sides  of these fres­coes have false niches that con­sist of mono­chrome fig­ures: Jupiter hold­ing a torch, Juno and the Pea­cock, Nep­tune with the Dol­phin, and Cy­bele with the Li­oness. These fig­ures al­lude to the four nat­ural el­e­ments (fire, air, water, earth). Side pan­els con­tain enor­mous pris­on­ers emerg­ing from the false ar­chi­tec­tural frame­work. On the south wall of the great hall to­ward the vestibule is a false bro­ken ped­i­ment that ap­pears above a real en­trance arch. A fresco of two fe­male fig­ures, Pru­dence with the Mir­ror and Peace with an Olive Branch, can be seen. The North wall at the cen­ter of the upper part of the build­ing con­tains the crest of the Emo Fam­ily. It is carved and gilt wood, sur­rounded by trompe-l'œil cor­nices and festoons.[1]  To the left of the cen­tral cham­ber is the Hall of Her­cules. It con­tains episodes re­fer­ring mainly to the mytho­log­i­cal hero. The in­tent was to em­pha­size the vic­tory of virtue and rea­son over vice. The fres­coes are in­serted in a frame­work of false ionic columns. The east wall con­tains scenes of Her­cules em­brac­ing De­janira, Her­cules throw­ing Lica into the sea, and The Fame of Her­cules at the cen­ter. The west wall is Her­cules at the Stake, placed within false arches. On the south wall is a panel above the door­way that de­picts a Noli me Tan­gere («Touch Me Not») scene.[1]  To the right of the cen­tral cham­ber is the Hall of Venus. This hall con­tains episodes that refer to the God­dess of Love. On the west wall within false arches are the scenes of Venus de­ters Ado­nis from Hunt­ing and Venus aids the Wounded Ado­nis. The east wall fresco shows Venus wounded by Love. On the south wall is a panel above the door­way that shows Pen­i­tent St. Jerome.[1]  The Ab­sti­nence of Scipio ap­pears fre­quently in cy­cles of fres­coes for Venet­ian vil­las. For ex­am­ple, the Villa la Porto Colleoni in Thiene and Villa Cordel­lina in Mon­tec­chio Mag­giore, built nearly 200 years later, also use this image, fos­ter­ing ideals which, had in the 15th and 16th cen­turies, re­sulted from the re­newed dis­cus­sion of the de­prav­ity of town life, in con­trast to the tran­quil­ity, abun­dance, and free­dom of artis­tic thought as­so­ci­ated with rural ex­is­tence. Hence, an­other room in the villa is called the Room of the Arts, fea­tur­ing fres­coes with al­le­gories of in­di­vid­ual arts, such as as­tron­omy, po­etry or music.[7]Within the many fres­coes are de­pic­tions of dif­fer­ent flow­ers and fruit, in­clud­ing corn, only re­cently in­tro­duced into the Po Val­ley. Many of the frescoes are pre­sented within false ar­chi­tec­ture, like columns, arches and ar­chi­tec­tural frame­work.[1]  Media Markhole [CC BY-SA 4.0] Perspective view of the front grounds Marcok / it.wikipedia.org [CC BY-SA 3.0] Perspective view of the rear garden. In the 1990s Villa Emo was fea­tured in Guide to His­toric Homes: In Search of Palladio,[8]Bob Vila's three-part six-hour pro­duc­tion for A&E Net­work.  The movie Ripley's Game used the Villa Emo as a lo­ca­tion. The City of Vicenza and The Palladian Villas in the Veneto: A Guide to the UNESCO Site. Italy: The Unesco Office of the Municipality of Vicenza, the Ministry of Cultural Assets and Activities. 2009. pp. 186–191. ^ a b c Wundram (1993), p. 164 ^ Wundram (1993), p. 165 ^ Beltramini, Guido (2009). Palladio. Italy. . ^ Wundram. Palladio Centre ArchivedJune 10, 2008, at the Wayback Machine (in English and Italian)Centro Internazionale di Studi di Architettura Andrea Palladio, accessed September 2008 ^ Wundram (1993), p. 173 ^ BobVila.com. »Bob Vila's Guide to Historic Homes: In Search of Palladio«. ^ »Ripley's Game News« ArchivedJune 9, 2008, at the Wayback Machine Retrieved on 2008 05 31 Sources The City of Vicena and The Palladian Villas in the Veneto: A Guide to the Unesco Site. Italy: The Unesco Office of the Municipality of the City of Vicenza. 2009. pp. 186–191. Wassell, Stephen R. »Andrea Palladio (1508-1580)«. Nexus Network Journal: 213–222. Beltramini, Guido, Palladio. Italy;  Boucher, Bruce (1998) [1994]. Andrea Palladio: The Architect in his Time (revised ed.). New York: Abbeville Press. Rybczynski, Witold; The Perfect House: A Journey with Renaissance Master Andrea Palladio. New York: Scribner. Wundram, Manfred (1993). Andrea Palladio, Architect between the Renaissance and Baroque, Cologne, Taschen.  Andrea Emo Capodilista. Emo Capodilista. Keywords: in principio era la conversazione, filosofia fascista, I taccuini del barone Capodilista, il taccuino del barone Capodilista. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Capodilista” – The Swimming-Pool Library. Capodilista.

 

Grice e Capograssi: l’implicatura conversazionale degl’eroi di Vico – filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza (Sulmona). Filosofo italiano. Grice: “I love Capograssi; at Oxford we’d call him a lawyer, but the Italians call him a philosopher! My favourite of his tracts is his attempts – linked as he was to the Napoli area – Vico relevant! Oddly, he stresses the ‘Catholic,’ or RC, as we say at Oxford, rather than the heathen, pagan, side, of this illustrious philosopher who Strawson – as along indeed with Speranza -- think as the greatest Italian philosopher that ever lived – I mean, what can be more Italian than Vico?!” Si occupa principalmente di filosofia del diritto. Fu membro della Corte costituzionale. Da un'antica famiglia nobile che vi si era trasferita da un comune della provincia di Salerno, a seguito del vescovo Andrea. Si laurea a Roma con “Lo stato e la storia", in cui già affiorano le problematiche connesse alle interrelazioni fra individuo, società e stato: problematiche che impegneranno tutta la sua filosofia. Insegna a Sassari, Macerata, Padova, Roma, e Napoli. Prende parte ai lavori che portarono alla redazione del Codice di Camaldoli.  La sua filosofia si centra nell’esperienza giuridica ed è rivolta alla centralizzazione della volontà del soggetto agente, che si imprime nell'azione stessa, vera fonte di espressione giuridica e di vita. La filosofia dovrebbe quindi occuparsi della vita e dell'azione, avendo a centro della sua speculazione la "persona".  Il suo pensiero si ricollega al personalismo. Il ponere al centro della sua filosofia il rapporto essenziale che intercorre fra il diritto inteso come esigenza giuridica e la vita consente alla filosofia del diritto di superare il campo della tecnica giuridica per pervenire ad una visione organica e totale del reale, cioè a Dio.  Fede e scienza; Lo Stato; Riflessioni sull'autorità; democrazia diretta; Analisi dell'esperienza comune; L’esperienza giuridica; La vita etica; Il problema della scienza del diritto); Incertezze sull'individuo, Milano, Giuffrè).  “Pensieri” sono alcuni scritti vergati su foglietti e conseglla. Nei Pensieri, poi raccolti e pubblicati, si colgono i momenti salienti della sua filosofia. La teoria dei valori. Il personalismo.  Il positivismo giurdico in Italia. Decentramento e autonomie nel pensiero politico europeo.  I sentieri dell'uomo comune. Dizionario biografico degli italiani. Kelsen avrebbe, invece, potuto utilizzare la stessa idea di una Norma Fondamentale come un principio etico-politico costituente. Anzi, proprio perché essa è tale, non si identifica con la pura fatticità della Forza, come, invece, pensa C.. Ed è rivendicando la funzione costituente della Norma Fondamentale che Bobbio può osservare: Il C. sostiene che tutta la costruzione kelseniana è così solida solo perché poggia su alcuni presupposti, e che questi presupposti non sono soltanto delle ipotesi di lavoro utili alla ricerca, ma si fondano su una vera e propria concezione della realtà. E che questa concezione è che il diritto è forza (N. BOBBIO, La teoria pura del diritto ecc., cit., p. 24. Per la posizione di C. si veda: Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, in «Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico», poi in Opere, Giuffrè, Milano). Le argomentazioni di Capograssi, secondo Bobbio, rinviano a una concezione giusnaturalistica del diritto che confonde «il criterio di validità e il criterio di giustificazione del diritto», e aggiunge che il Kelsen si limita a dire che il diritto esiste (indipendentemente dal fatto che sia giusto o ingiusto) solo quando la norma, oltre che valida, è anche efficace (il cosiddetto principio di effettività). Non si potrebbe mai trarre dalla concezione kelseniana il principio che il diritto è giusto in quanto è comandato, perché da nessun passo del Kelsen si può trarre la conclusione che il diritto, il quale esiste in quanto è comandato (e fatto valere colla forza), sia anche giusto53. Dunque, l’insoddisfazione di Bobbio per la soluzione kelseniana nasce dal fatto che il giurista viennese lascia aperto il problema del che cosa fondi e legittimi il sistema normativo e l’ordinamento giuridico, con la 50 BOBBIO, La teoria pura del diritto e i suoi critici, in «Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile», poi ristampato in ID., Studi sulla teoria generale del diritto, Giappichelli, Torino; Il saggio è ora in ID., Diritto e potere, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli. Utilizzo quest’ultima edizione. La citazione è alla p. 39. 51 Cfr. BOBBIO, MaxWeber e Hans Kelsen, «Sociologia del diritto», , ora in ID., Diritto e potere, BOBBIO, La teoria pura del diritto ecc.. Per la posizione di Capograssi si veda: Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, in «Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico», poi in ID., Opere, vol. V, Giuffrè, Milano, BOBBIO, La teoria pura del diritto, BISIGNANI conseguenza che la stessa funzione costituente della Norma Fondamentale non viene esplicitata. L’esigenza di superare i limiti teorici di Kelsen non comporta, però, il recupero del giusnaturalismo come ideologia (come idea di una fondazione del diritto su valori assoluti e trascendenti), ma sollecita il pieno recupero di quelle ragioni etiche e sociali che, dopo la catastrofe della Seconda guerra mondiale e dopo l’olocausto, si erano manifestate come una “rinascita del giusnaturalismo”54. Per queste ragioni Bobbio non si lascerà mai tentare dal ridurre lo Stato al suo ordinamento giuridico; a quello Stato-Forza che Capograssi rinfaccia a Kelsen. REFS.: Impressioni su Kelsen. C. E IL NICHILISMO GIURIDICO. ASPETTI DELLA CRISI DELLA SCIENZA GIURIDICA. Le “Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto” come critica all’astratto formalismo giuridico kelseniano e alla teoria del diritto come “forza e forma”. La “pars destruens” di C.. C. scrisse le “impressioni su Kelsen tradotto” poco dopo la traduzione della teoria generale del diritto e dello stato da Cotta e Treves, edita dalle Edizioni di Comunità. Si tratta di un saggio denso, in cui la prosa capograssiana e la sua cifra stilistica è mossa, libera, sinuosa, andante come sempre, ma particolarmente severa, austera, critica, propositiva, concettualizzante, come dappresso noteremo, sia nella “pars destruens” che nella “pars costruens” del saggio. La pars destruens è chiara e persuasiva. La dottrina kelseniana dello stato e del diritto si pone fuori i reali problemi della scienza giuridica ed una prima immediata impressione ha il lettore, e deve subito dirla, una impressione singolare di riposo. Sarebbe così bello se uno potesse accettare questo pensiero. Come si capisce il successo che ebbe quando nacque, in un’epoca e in un mondo, che ci è ormai così lontano e che era così facile ad accogliere ogni genere di illusioni. Qui non ci sono più problemi. Come per un’operazione di magia i problemi sono spariti. Non ci sono più disordini, incertezze, incoerenze, nel pensiero e nella realtà. Ogni cosa è sistemata ordinata disegnata in una specie di piano regolatore, che smista e distribuisce tutto in compartimenti separati. Se uno potesse accettare. Con tanto più impegno di attenzione il lettore è indotto a leggere.  Il diritto come concepito e teorizzato da Kelsen è una scienza esangue. Lo notava pure  Pigliaru, in “Persona umana ed ordinamento giuridico” richiamando proprio in nota il pensiero capograssiano testè citato. E’ un diritto scisso dall’essere e dalla storia, fondato su un’astratta idea di dovere contrapposta all’essere, entro una rigida separazione, che Kelsen svolge nell’opera surriferita, ma anche in altri scritti, tra natura (essere) e spirito (devere). Si tratta di un’idea di scienza giuridica totalmente formale, fondata sulla norma giuridica, monade, essenza, fondamento del sistema kelseniano. Il diritto è un ordinamento coercitivo basato sulla validità, cioè la forza vincolante e sull’efficacia cioè l’effettiva applicazione delle norme giuridiche. L’ordinamento giuridico è un sistema di norme connesse fra loro in base al principio che il diritto regola la propria creazione. Lo stato, il potere dello stato, i tre poteri dello stato, gli elementi dello stato, sono soltanto stadi diversi nella creazione dell’ordinamento giuridico. Così come, in questa intelaiatura teoretica, per Kelsen quelle che per lui sono le due fondamentali forme di governo, democrazia ed autocrazia, sono modi diversi di creare l’ordinamento giuridico. Lo stato, entro una simile ed asfittica concezione, è un ordinamento giuridico espressione di norme giuridiche valide ed efficaci, collocate in un sistema giuridico gerarchico, in cui ogni norma trae il fondamento della sua validità dalla norma gerarchicamente superiore e la stessa costituzione è ridotta a norma sulla normazione, sulle procedure di formazione della legge. C. nota opportunamente che lo stato è, altresì, un ordinamento relativamente accentrato, a differenza dell’ordinamento internazionale più decentrato. Un ordinamento che produce diritto e da cui deriva la giurisprudenza normativa, che coincide con un sistema di norme valide, che è l’unico sistema che deve riguardare l’indagine del filosofo della giurisprudenza. C. osserva, inoltre, che in Kelsen il diritto in senso sociologico che descrive l’effettivo comportamento umano che rappresenta il fenomeno del diritto e cerca di predire l’attività degli organi creatori del diritto e specialmente quella dei tribunali e lo stato in senso sociologico riguardano la sfera dell’ efficacia del diritto, delle norme, e sono condizionati dal diritto normative, così come quest’ultimo concerne la sfera della validità delle norme e condiziona la scienza sociologica del diritto. Ma scienza delle norme e scienza dei fatti sono scisse, ciascuna vive di vita propria, sono parallele e non interferenti, sempre rigorosamente distinte ed eterogenee. In questi due mondi così puri l’uno e l’altro, il filosofo si muove con la libera facilità con cui l’uccello vola nell’aria. Di conseguenza, la giurisprudenza normativa non si interseca mai con la giurisprudenza sociologica, il diritto come tecnica della sanzione ed ordinamento coercitivo può rivestire qualsiasi contenuto, in una concezione del dovere assolutamente formale che non ha nemmeno per così dire il contenuto di sé stessa come dovere, perché questo dovere  non ha nulla del dovere reale. E afferma altresì l’insigne autore, citando Bobbio e comparando la teoria generale del Kelsen a quella di Carnelutti, che se la teoria generale è teoria generale del diritto POSITIVO, sicuramente quella del Carnelutti, a differenza di quella del Kelsen, è relativa alla vita stessa della realtà giuridica, perché muove dalla nozione di diritto come composizione di conflitti di interesse. La teoria generale del Kelsen è astratta e resta sulla superficie della norma e della vita dell’esperienza giuridica comunale, perché il sistema gerarchico di norme valide trae il suo fondamento da una norma non da un fatto, da una norma fondamentale, una “Grundnorm”, presupposta ed ipotetica, ricavata con procedimento interpretativo dal filosofo. Quest’ultima pone una data autorità, non si fonda su nessuna norma, è valida» in virtù del suo contenuto e non «perché è stata creata in un certo modo, al pari di una norma di diritto naturale, a prescindere dalla sua validità puramente ipotetica, ed il suo contenuto è il fatto storico particolare qualificato dalla norma fondamentale come il primo fatto produttivo del diritto. La norma fondamentale cioè significa in un certo senso, la trasformazione del potere in diritto. La perfetta separazione della forma dal contenuto, la perfetta indifferenza della forma da qualsiasi contenuto, che è la base di tutto questo sistema, non vale per la norma fondamentale, che da validità a tutte le norme, che si caratterizzano proprio perché il contenuto è per esse indifferente…perché è proprio il contenuto a dare qui validità alla norma fondamentale». L’identificazione perfetta tra diritto e Stato, inoltre, fondata sulla “Grundnorm” e “l’esteriorità” del diritto, osserva il Nostro, deriva da una concezione del diritto «come forza», come «diritto naturale della forza». E’sistema di «norme sanzionatorie» che, formalmente, sono «un aliquid di stabile di fronte al perpetuo oscillare della forza», ma la cui validità è “emanazione” di una “norma fondamentale”, la quale trae il proprio contenuto dall’evento di forza che si è assicurato il potere vale a dire il diritto di riempire le forme vuote delle norme».Questo è il «residuo giusnaturalistico kelseniano»: il diritto naturale della forza» che fonda il diritto positivo statale. La prosa capograssiana sul punto è vibrante, incisiva: «qui il diritto è forza organizzata, cioè forza e forma; la forza sostiene e riempie la forma, la forma riveste la forza». La “pars destruens” del saggio in esame giunge al suo acme con una metafora corrosiva: «la rappresentazione del diritto che è in questo libro…richiama la visione di quegli spettri di città e paesi, che i bombardamenti avevano demolito in modo che erano rimasti in piedi muri e travi: non c’era più nulla tranne quel tragico scheletro di case nude e vuote, terribili sotto la luna», «ma che si sarebbe detto di uno di noi che avesse preso quei “cadavera urbium” per città viventi, per le case dove gli uomini vivono? Ci sarebbe stato errore pari a questo? E così accade per il diritto, come è esposto in questo libro». Il diritto è, in definitiva, confuso dal Kelsen per «eventi di forza», «dispositivi di sanzioni», «sistemi coercitivi». La “pars costruens” capograssiana ed il richiamo al pensiero del VICO ed alla concezione del “diritto come esperienza” La “pars costruens” dello scritto oggetto delle presenti considerazioni richiama, con riferimenti sintetici ma convincenti, il pensiero del Vico, sempre presente nella riflessione del C., la storia e lo storicismo, la nozione di esperienza. Capograssi indica come prioritaria la necessità «di non mutilare l’oggetto della scienza del diritto, cioè l’esperienza», «riducendola tutta al cosiddetto valore o alla cosiddetta forma o alla cosiddetta forza», alla «nuda forza» e alla «vuota forma»; la «necessità di vedere l’oggetto, cioè l’esperienza, nella sua integralità vivente, nella sua natura, cioè vichianamente nel modo di nascere perenne e quotidiano del diritto come vita e come esperienza, e quindi con tutto quello per cui nasce, per cui si afferma, per cui si concreta in forme concrete nella realtà». Al riguardo si accennano idee di grande importanza che hanno più ampi sviluppi nell’opera principale del Nostro, “Il problema della scienza del diritto”: la possibilità della conoscenza della realtà e del diritto si compie «nella comune coscienza umana di colui che osserva e conosce e di colui che opera nella realtà che è osservata e conosciuta. In quanto chi osserva partecipa della stessa vita, degli stessi principi, delle stesse esigenze di chi opera, è il segreto per cui chi osserva riesce a rendersi conto di quello che fa colui che opera». Ne “Il problema della scienza del diritto” si legge, infatti, ad esempio, che «con tutto il suo lavoro l’intelletto riflesso che si pone come scienza viene faticosamente e lentamente, perché fa il suo cammino momento per momento e tappa per tappa, scoprendo quella che è l’idea viva del diritto, la viene scoprendo traverso tutte le forme concrete e particolari dell’esperienza che essa forma». E l’idea viva del diritto si forma come «parte essenziale dell’esperienza», «momento e parte della vita stessa dell’esperienza» che «conosce sé stessa nella sua effettiva e determinata puntualità e riesce a conservare la realtà di sé stessa nelle sue molteplici e puntuali determinazioni». C., inoltre, soffermandosi ulteriormente sull’opera di Kelsen richiama anche «la grande verità vichiana che il mondo storico lo conosciamo perché lo facciamo…»; richiama il monito, proprio del Vico, di non «mettersi fuori dall’umanità…»E rileva che «se uno si mette al mondo supponendolo già compiuto…e quindi estraneo all’osservatore, necessariamente l’integralità dell’esperienza gli sfugge». In tal modo l’insigne autore coglie, dunque, il punto di maggiore fragilità dell’impianto teorico di Kelsen, cioè la netta, irriducibile, incolmabile separazione tra la “norma giuridica” e la “coscienza dell’individuo”, tra l’ “oggetto” ed il “soggetto”, tra la «norma estrinseca al soggetto e il soggetto estrinseco alla norma». La “pars costruens” capograssiana ruota, quindi, intorno al concetto di «unità in perenne movimento che è tutta la natura dell’oggetto» del diritto, «l’esperienza nella sua vivente umana unità» che è “falsata” (perché l’ “oggetto” è falsato) dai presupposti e dai postulati della teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato di Kelsen. E l’illustre autore, perciò, individua la «positività del diritto» come «coerenza intrinseca al processo di vita», «coerenza interna e vitale», e non «coerenza formale e artificiale», delle «determinazioni della vita giuridica», che «vivono nel concreto», ricordando un’opera in tal senso significativa, gli “Orientamenti sui principi generali del diritto” del civilista Cicu. 3. – Sull’attualità del pensiero di C. e su alcuni aspetti significativi dell’attuale crisi della scienza giuridica alla luce di recenti saggi monografici sull’argomento. Per una critica del “nichilismo giuridico” (ontologico) Perché è attuale la critica capograssiana al formalismo giuridico kelseniano? Perché nell’ “ambiguità del diritto contemporaneo”, per riprendere il titolo di un notissimo saggio del grande pensatore abruzzese, si parla di frequente di “crisi”, con ciò indicando, per riprendere il linguaggio dello stesso C., «una situazione che non vorremmo», «un elemento di disapprovazione» ed «un elemento di speranza», il richiamo di una «situazione passata» o «pensata», «che crediamo migliore, vale a dire che preferiremmo». Ora, tra gli autori che hanno approfondito gli aspetti dell’attuale crisi della scienza giuridica sono di notevole importanza, a parere dello scrivente, tre saggi monografici, il “Diritto senza società” di Barcellona, il “Nichilismo giuridico” (e la più recente opera dello stesso autore, “Il salvagente della forma”) di Irti ed “Il diritto e il suo limite” di Rodotà. Ritengo che la sfida più radicale ed invasiva[46], tra le teorie sviluppate in questi saggi, sia quella del “nichilismo giuridico” (più precisamente del “nichilismo giuridico ontologico”, riprendendo la ricostruzione di una recente monografia di Barcellona, “Critica del nichilismo giuridico”, che lo distingue dal “nichilismo giuridico cognitivo” nordamericano) e quest’idea è affermata dall’angolo visuale di chi cerca, come lo stesso Rodotà si propone con lucidità, risposte alternative al nichilismo. Il nichilismo, senza voler entrare nel merito di tutti i suoi significati, secondo il filosofo Severino ed il giurista Irti, significa, in un senso specifico al diritto ed alla tecnica economica, «ricavare le cose dal niente» e «riportarle al niente». Franco Volpi scrive che esso è «la situazione di disorientamento che subentra una volta che sono venuti meno i riferimenti tradizionali, cioè gli ideali e i valori che rappresentavano la risposta al “perché”e che come tali illuminavano l’agire dell’uomo». Nietzsche ne parla come «il più inquietante tra tutti gli ospiti». Sul punto penso al “Dialogo su diritto e tecnica”, scritto in più atti dai due stessi importanti autori surrichiamati, Irti e Severino, in cui l’Irti afferma che «l’unica superstite razionalità riguarda il funzionamento delle procedure generatrici di norme», «la validità non discende più da un contenuto, che sorregga e giustifichi la norma, ma dall’osservanza delle procedure proprie di ciascun ordinamento» ed il Severino ritiene che «la tecnica è destinata a diventare principio ordinatore di ogni materia, la volontà che regola ogni altra volontà», «la “capacità” della tecnica è la potenza effettiva (“potenza attiva” nel linguaggio aristotelico) di realizzare indefinitamente scopi e di soddisfare indefinitamente bisogni». L’idea di sistema giuridico unitario e di diritto statale «portatore di valori», in un simile orizzonte, è ormai destinato al declino irreversibile, sul viale tramonto. Il diritto della globalizzazione, e questo è il “topos” di crisi più acuta, porta alle estreme conseguenze quella scissione tra “liberalismo” e “liberismo” che Croce già tracciava negli anni trenta. Lo stesso Irti scrive che «la tecno-economia non conosce differenze soggettive ma soltanto variazioni di quantità». Il “diritto globale”, come nota un altro grande giurista, Francesco Galgano, fondato sul principio di effettività e non su quello di legalità, è pienamente funzionale all’ “idea di produzione” che viene dall’economia e, come scrive l’Irti, «caratterizza l’economia globale», i cui spazi sono fluidi e sottratti al controllo giuridico e politico degli Stati nazionali sovrani. E’ in crisi, come opportunamente pone in risalto lo stesso insigne autore ne “Le categorie giuridiche della globalizzazione”, il «dove del diritto», il «dove applicativo», il «dove esecutivo» delle norme, «l’intrinseca ed originaria spazialità del diritto», l’idea di “confine” consustanziale allo Stato nazionale moderno che si afferma con il capitalismo mercantile. Non solo: i ritmi produttivistici della tecnica e della sua volontà di potenza, posti in evidenza e criticati, pur se ritenuti ineluttabili da Severino, secondo lo stesso Irti «producono un vorticoso succedersi di norme giuridiche…» che «attesta la “nientità” del diritto, i canali delle procedurequesti che potremmo chiamare nomo-dotti, poiché conducono le volontà dalla proposizione alla posizione di norme - sono pronti a ricevere qualsiasi contenuto.Ogni ipotesi può scorrere in essi: la disponibilità ad accogliere qualsiasi contenuto è indifferenza verso tutti i contenuti…». Per cui, l’attuale crisi del diritto, «nella postmodernità giuridica», è «l’indifferenza contenutistica” che “sospinge verso il culto della forma” e costituisce perciò realizzazione ed inveramento dello “Stufenbau” kelseniano, “capace di tradurre in norma qualsiasi contenuto” (“la Grundnorm di Kelsen – che Severino definirebbe “logos ipotetico”- spiega la validità di qualsiasi ordinamento», è il trionfo del vuoto formalismo giuspositivista che «si svela nelle procedure produttive di norme», nella razionalità tecnica e nell’«autosufficienza della volontà normativa». Al riguardo si deve porre l’accento su un altro notevole autore, di diversa formazione culturale, il filosofo marxista Volpe, che in un saggio dal titolo emblematico, “Antikelsen”, contenuto nel suo volume “Critica dell’ideologia contemporanea”, individuava i limiti propri della dottrina del diritto e dello Stato del Maestro di Praga, del Kelsen, proprio riferendosi ad una concezione meramente formale, raffinata e colta espressione di un’idea borghese del diritto, della democrazia e dell’eguaglianza. Ma sono altrettanto importanti le profonde ed intelligenti critiche di Nicola Abbagnano, che ha giustamente parlato del formalismo giuridico nei termini di una dottrina adattabile a qualsiasi regime politico e quindi sprovvista di sostanza, di contenuti. Per tornare all’analisi di alcuni rilevanti aspetti dell’attuale crisi della scienza del diritto, “nichilismo e formalismo” sono i due aspetti pregnanti di un diritto “tecnico”, “autoreferenziale”, “senza società”, come scrive Pietro Barcellona realizzazione anche, secondo quest’ultimo autore, delle distorsioni della teoria sistemica di Luhmann. Rodotà nella sua opera summenzionata scrive che «il diritto deve misurarsi con una tecnica di cui è stata da tempo esaltata l’irresistibile potenza, la continua produzione di fini, alla quale sarebbe ormai divenuto impossibile opporsi. Così la tecnica annichilirebbe il diritto, condannato ormai ad una umile funzione servente. Ma questa è una profezia destinata a realizzarsi solo se la politica diviene progressivamente prigioniera di una logica che la induce a delegare alla tecnologia una serie crescente di problemi…e se il diritto, seguendola in questa deriva, accettasse un’espulsione da sé di valori e scopi, determinado quella che Michel Villey ha chiamato una “mutilazione del diritto per ablazione della sua causa finale. Per cui viene da chiedersi, in termini comunque molto problematici, se è possibile individuare una via d’uscita al declino dei sistemi giuridici e della certezza del diritto, alla “crisi di razionalità”, per riprendere Habermas, delle società capitalistiche postmoderne, all’oscuramento dei contenuti essenziali degli ordinamenti giuridici democratici, tra cui rientrano, anzitutto, i diritti fondamentali (lo stesso Rodotà ritiene altresì che «la ricostruzione di un fine del diritto intorno ai diritti fondamentali si presenta così come una guida quotidiana, come un test permanente al quale sottoporre anzitutto le scelte giuridicamente rilevanti. E’un impegnativo programma, che mette alla prova politica e diritto. La politica, considerata non più nell’area dell’onnipotenza, ma del rispetto. Il diritto, non più vuoto di fini, ma strettamente vincolato a un sistema di valori, dunque in grado di offrire una guida pur per le scelte tecnologiche») Insomma: qual è oggi lo scopo del diritto? Ed in che senso l’antikelsenismo vichiano e personalista di C. è attuale e può costituire, “storicizzato” ed adeguato al “presente storico”, una chiave di lettura delle asimmetrie e degli scompensi dei sistemi giuridici vigenti e degli attuali “usi sociali del diritto”?  La critica capograssiana al formalismo costituisce un richiamo al presente. Essa rappresenta una delle più significative alternative teoriche agli esiti del nichilismo formalista; essa, per riprendere le parole del Maestro che ricordiamo, è «sforzo per costruire la storia», per «realizzare la vita nei suoi termini di attualità», e quindi il diritto «nella profonda vita delle sue determinazioni positive»; anche perché il diritto, come scriveva un altro importante giurista, Satta, è «dover essere dell’essere» e non «dover essere» contrapposto all’«essere, “Sollen” staccato dal “Sein”. C. ne “L’ambiguità del diritto”propone delle conclusioni dense di speranza, affermando che «quest’epoca…pur muovendosi in un macrocosmo di dimensioni così gigantesche…non fa che mettere al centro di questo mondo e delle sue creazioni niente altro che l’uomo». Ed esse possono essere un’alternativa alla “nientità” del diritto globale contemporaneo ed al liberismo tecnicistico, produttivistico e massificante; al trionfo dell’ «Apparato tecnocratico», di cui parla Severino ne “La filosofia futura”, che quasi lascia presagire la «fine della storia» e del «divenire storico» come «farsi dell’esperienza umana» e, per riprendere Jhering, della “lotta per il diritto”. Il presente testo riprende, nelle linee essenziali, la relazione presentata al convegno di studi internazionale sull’ “Attualità del pensiero di C.”, Sassari, Mulino”. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, in “Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico”, ora in ID., Opere, Milano, KELSEN, General theory of law and State, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato, tr. it., a cura di Cotta e Treves, Milano; PIOVANI, Introduzione a G.Capograssi, Il problema della scienza del diritto, Milano, C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, op.cit., 314. Per una differente concezione del diritto critica verso il formalismo gradualista di Kelsen v. WINKLER, Teoria del diritto e dottrina della conoscenza.Per una critica della dottrina pura del diritto (1990), tr. it. di A. Carrino, Napoli (ove è scritto che «la dottrina pura e generale di Kelsen è stata…, sin dall’inizio, nelle sue premesse epistemologiche e gnoseologiche, priva di fondamenta solide…»); 189 (pagina in cui si afferma che «la dottrina pura del diritto di Kelsen si impiglia inevitabilmente in molteplici dilemmi. Un aspetto di questi dilemmi risiede nel tipo di determinazione dell’oggetto, un altro nella concezione della scienza. Un altro ancora nella ipostatizzazione di un orientamento metodologico che deifica il concetto teoretico del diritto, lo interpreta nel senso della logica formale, lo deforma e lo priva al tempo stesso del suo oggetto empirico»). [5] V. A. PIGLIARU, Persona umana ed ordinamento giuridico, Milano, 1953, 98. Su quest’opera v. G. BIANCO, Prefazione a Pigliaru, Persona umana ed ordinamento giuridico, in “Diritto @ storia”, dirittoestoria.it/5/Contributi/ Bianco-Pigliaru-persona- umana- ordinamento-giuridico ed in A. PIGLIARU, op.ult.cit., Nuoro, KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato, Milano, KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato. KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato, op.cit., 18 ss. KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato; KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato. KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato. KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato, op.cit., 126 ss. Peraltro Kelsen sull’argomento introduce una sua distinzione tra “Costituzione formale” e “Costituzione materiale” specificando che «presupposta la norma fondamentale, la costituzione rappresenta il più alto grado del diritto statale. La costituzione è qui intesa non già in senso formale, bensì in senso materiale. La costituzione in senso formale è un dato documento solenne, un insieme di norme giuridiche che possono venir modificate soltanto se si osservano speciali prescrizioni, la cui funzione è di rendere più difficile la modificazione di tali norme. La costituzione in senso materiale consiste in quelle norme che regolano la creazione delle norme giuridiche generali, ed in particolare la creazione delle leggi formali». Questa distinzione è, ovviamente, eterogenea rispetto al dualismo “Costituzione formaleCostituzione materiale” proposta dai “realisti”, in particolare da Costantino Mortati, Carl Schmitt, Guarino, peraltro con connotazioni peculiari in ciascuno degli autori richiamati. V. in argomento G. Bianco, Quel che resta della Costituzione materiale (tra congetture e confutazioni), in “La Costituzione materiale. Percorsi culturali e attualità di un’idea”, a cura di A. Catelani e S. Labriola, Milano. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, KELSEN, Teoria generale del diritto e dello Stato. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, CAPOGRASSI, Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. Ed il nostro aggiunge nella stessa pagina, con il consueto tono intelligente ed appassionato, che «concepito il diritto come forza e come forma, è evidente che l’ordinamento giuridico ha una doppia faccia, la forza, cioè l’efficacia, la forma, cioè la validità. La seconda dipende dalla prima ed è condizionata dalla prima; la prima finchè dura si esprime nella seconda; la validità è l’espressione formale dell’efficacia, e l’efficacia è la realtà sostanziale della validità. Per questo i due diritti in senso normativo e in senso sociologico si rispecchiano e vanno di conserva: sono due facce dello stesso fatto. Dappresso è scritto che «la forza è il principio del diritto; gli interessi, le passioni, le ideologie sono il contenuto; e la forma è la norma come puro dispositivo della sanzione, e l’ordinamento che è il sistema delle norme valide fondato sull’evento di forza che costituisce il contenuto della norma fondamentale. Si può dire, può non chiamare nuda, perché non ha in sé nulla di razionale: forza nuda dall’esterno, poiché s’impone per qualsiasi via e vince se è legittimata, forza nuda dall’interno di sé stessa, perché non è altro che il (preteso) fondo irrazionale e cieco dell’azione umana. Rare volte la concezione del diritto come nuda forza è stata espressa e svolta con più riuscita e più completa coerenza sia in sé sia nel suo naturale esplicarsi e compiersi nelle forme vuote delle norme. Abbiamo qui nella forma più razionale e perfetta il diritto naturale della forza e la sua dogmatica». C,, Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto,  C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Il problema della scienza del diritto (1937), Milano, 1962 (con introduzione di Pietro Piovani) C., Il problema della scienza del diritto. C., Il problema della scienza del dirittv btg55zo, C. Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto. C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, C., Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, op. cit., 356. Molto intense e particolarmente significative sono le vivaci conclusioni del saggio in considerazione: «Quello che è essenziale è questo riportare a questa unità vivente, a questa coerenza intrinseca al processo di vita, proprio le profonde esigenze e funzioni per cui il diritto costituisce un interesse formativo della vita; quel cogliere dall’interno e come componente il diritto tutta la sostanza etica del fenomeno giuridico. Qui il giurista è non il tecnico che fa uno sforza di costruzione puramente formale, per raggiungere una coerenza puramente formale, ma l’uomo, proprio l’uomo nell’alto senso della parola, che cerca di cogliere il diritto nella profonda vita delle sue determinazioni positive e nelle profonde e immutabili connessioni, con i principi e le esigenze costitutive della vita e della coscienza. Qui il giurista è proprio il collaboratore della vita, il collaboratore indispensabile del segreto processo traverso il quale la vita concreta si trasforma in esperienza giuridica, e l’umanità del mondo della storia viene perpetuamente difesa contro la barbarie sempre presente e sempre immanente della forza. E se non è questo, che cosa è il giurista? Che cosa ci sta a fare nella vita? Perché vive?» [41] V. G. CAPOGRASSI, L’ambiguità del diritto contemporaneo, in AA.VV., La crisi del diritto, Padova, 1953, 13-47, ora in ID., Opere. C., L’ambiguità del diritto contemporaneo; BARCELLONA, Diritto senza società, Bari, IRTI, Nichilismo giuridico, Bari, 2004; ID., Il salvagente della forma. RODOTÀ, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, Milano, 2006. [46] Sia consentito di rinviare a G. BIANCO, Nichilismo giuridico, in Digesto IV, disc.priv., sez.civ., III vol. di agg., Torino, BARCELLONA, Critica del nichilismo giuridico, Torino, RODOTÀ, La vita e le regole, op.ult.cit., 9 ss. Si legge, in particolare, tra i molti spunti presenti nel saggio monografico, che «sullo sfondo scorgiamo la fine di un’epoca nella quale esistevano valori generalmente condivisi, mentre oggi viviamo in un tempo caratterizzato da un politeismo dei valori e da controversie intorno al modo di dare riconoscimento al pluralismo…Si scorge una frontiera mobile, addirittura sfuggente, tra diritto e non diritto…»(p. 16); «il percorso tra diritto e non diritto porta al disvelamento progressivo dell’inadeguatezza della dimensione giuridica tradizionalmente conosciuta rispetto alla vita quotidiana…nello stesso ordine giuridico possono annidarsi i fattori che si oppongono al dispiegarsi della personalità, alla pienezza della vita» (p. 23); «non siamo più di fronte all’astrazione, ma alla cancellazione del soggetto».  V.in modo particolare sul punto M. HEIDEGGER, Il nichilismo europeo, tr. it., a cura di F. Volpi, Milano, 2003, 108; F. NIETZSCHE, La volontà di potenza, frammenti postumi ordinati da P. Gast e E. Forster-Nietzsche, nuova ed. italiana a cura di M. Ferraris e P. Kobau, Milano;  IRTI, Atto primo, in N. IRTI-E. SEVERINO, Dialogo su diritto e tecnica, Bari, 2001, 8 ss.; ID., Nichilismo e metodo giuridico, in “Nichilismo giuridico”, op. cit., 7. [51] V. F. VOLPI, Il nichilismo, Bari; NIETZSCHE, La volontà di potenza, IRTI, Atto primo, in N. IRTI-E. SEVERINO, Dialogo su diritto e tecnica, SEVERINO, Atto primo, in op. ult. SEVERINO, Atto primo, in op. ult. cit., 28-29. [56] Su cui v. B. CROCE, Liberismo e liberalismo, in “Elementi di politica”(1925), Bari, 1974, 69 ss. v. al riguardo N. IRTI, Il diritto e gli scopi, in “Esercizi di lettura sul nichilismo giuridico”, op. cit., 115 ss. Sull’argomento v. pure le riflessioni contenute in B. LEONI, Conversazione su Einaudi e Croce, in ID., Il pensiero politico moderno e contemporaneo, a cura di A. Masala e con introduzionedi L.M. Bassani, Macerata. IRTI, La rivolta delle differenze, in “Esercizi di lettura sul nichilismo giuridico”, in Nichilismo giuridico; IRTI, Nichilismo e formalismo nella modernità giuridica, in Nichilismo giuridico, op.ult.cit., 25. Sul pensiero del Galgano v. ID., Lex mercatoria, Bologna; IRTI, Le categorie giuridiche della globalizzazione, in Norme e luoghi. Problemi di geodiritto, Bari, 2006 (2a ed.), 143 ss., 144. [60] v. tra i molti scritti dell’illustre filosofo Id., La filosofia futura, Milano; Destino della necessità, Milano, 1980, p.41sgg.; Id., Essenza del nichilismo, Brescia, 1972, p.227sgg. [61] V. N. IRTI, Atto secondo, in E. SEVERINO-N. IRTI, Dialogo su diritto e tecnica. IRTI, Atto primo; VOLPE, Antikelsen, in ID., Critica dell’ideologia contemporanea, Roma, ABBAGNANO, Stato, in Id., Dizionario di filosofia, Torino;  BARCELLONA, Diritto senza società; BARCELLONA, Diritto senza società, op. ult. cit., 9 ss., 11, in cui si legge che l’epoca della globalizzazione «appare essenzialmente come definitivo tramonto della società come istituzione (come tecnica organizzativa), attraverso la quale si realizza la mediazione tra l’istanza di libertà e l’ordine prodotto dall’autogoverno della società, e come fine della storia intesa come metamorfosi dell’orizzonte di senso entro il quale si sviluppa la dialettica sociale…I concetti di Stato nazionale, che aveva rappresentato la forma dell’organizzazione sociale, e di sovranità, che aveva individuato nella democrazia, come governo di popolo, la base di ogni ordinamento, sono inutilizzabili per descrivere e comprendere le forme della globalizzazione». BARCELLONA, op. ult. cit., 151 ss., ove si afferma che nella teoria surrichiamata «il sistema può fare a meno delle intenzioni e dei progetti, della volontà e della coscienza e, in definitiva, degli uomini in carne ed ossa. Perché il suo destino si compie nella perfetta circolarità della riproduzione auto-referenziale e auto-riflessiva dei suoi “dispositivi” e della sua logica. Luhmann ha scoperto il segreto del moto perpetuo e per questo la sua teoria è ormai il nucleo vero di tutte le rappresentazioni della modernità…»(p. 152). V. al riguardo N. LUHMANN, La differenziazione del diritto (1981), tr. it., Bologna. RODOTÀ, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, RODOTÀ, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto. Su cui v. in generale le classiche pagine di JHERING, Lo scopo del diritto, tr. it., con introduzione di M.G. Losano, Torino, 1972, 6, in cui è scritto che «lo scopo è il creatore di tutto il diritto; non esiste alcuna norma giuridica che non debba la sua origine ad uno scopo; cioè ad un motivo pratico». Sul tema è stato opportunamente notato che «là dove si parla di scopo…si allude a processi intenzionali, consapevoli, voluti» (R. RACINARO, Presentazione di “La lotta per il diritto” di R.von Jhering, tr. it., Milano, 1989, XX). [71] Sull’attualità del pensiero del Capograssi v. anche il paragrafo quarto di BIANCO, Nichilismo giuridico. Al riguardo v. la ricostruzione contenuta in S. RODOTÀ, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, op.cit., 9 ss. [73] V. G. CAPOGRASSI, Impressioni su Kelsen tradotto, op. cit., 356. [74] Sul tema v. S. SATTA, Norma, diritto, giurisdizione, in “Studi in memoria di Carlo Esposito”, III, Padova, Capograssi, in “Raccolta di scritti in onore di Arturo Carlo Jemolo”, Milano, 1963, IV, 589 e ora in ID., Soliloqui e colloqui d’un giurista, Padova. Sull’argomento sia consentito rinviare, per una più articolata ed ampia trattazione, a G. BIANCO, Crisi dello Stato e del diritto in Salvatore Satta, in “Clio”. L’ambiguità del diritto contemporaneo. SEVERINO, La filosofia futura. La volontà che nell’Apparato si vuole sempre più potente e decide in questa direzione, in ogni momento del suo sviluppo decide innanzitutto di eseguire quell’insieme determinato di azioni che in quel momento aumentano determinatamente la sua potenza. In quantoè questa decisione, la volontà è quindi certa dell’accadimento di tali azioni e pertanto è certa di esistere nel futuro in cui tali azioni sono compiute. Ma la volontà che si vuole sempre più potente non è solo questa certezza di esistere in quel momento del futuro in cui la sua potenza riceve un incremento determinato: è anche la certezza che in ogni momento futuro essa sarà il tentativo di aumentare la propria potenza e cioè di trasformare ogni stato dell’essere. E’ certa del proprio tentativo. Decide che, in ogni momento del futuro in cui essa si troverà esistente, tenterà di aumentare la propria potenza», pur non essendo «certa che il divenire sia eterno» perché «la volontà che si vuole sempre più potente riconosce la possibilità del proprio annientamento»).  JHERING, La lotta per il diritto. Sostiene l’Insigne giurista che “il diritto ci presenta, pertanto, nel suo movimento storico, il quadro del tentare, del combattere, del lottare, in breve dello sforzo faticoso…il diritto come concetto rivolto a uno scopo, posto nel mezzo dell’ingranaggio caotico di scopi, aspirazioni, interessi umani, è costretto incessantemente a tastare, saggiare per trovare la via giusta, e, quando l’ha trovata, ad atterrare ancora innanzi tutto l’opposizione, che gliela preclude”.  C. The Antiquity of the Italian NationThe Cultural Origins of a Political Myth in Modern Italy. Francesco. Oxford. With Italy under Napoleon, the antiquarian topic of anti-Romanism is turned against the dominant French culture and becomes a pillar of the nation-building process. The antiquity of the Italian nation — prior to the Roman dominion — is evoked in order to support an inveterate Italian cultural primacy and proves very useful for creating Italian nationalism. The issue is completely forgotten today because Italian studies of Roman history, following the example of Mommsen, would drape a long veil over the period of earliest Italy, while, subsequently, Fascism openly claims the legacy of the Roman Empire. Italic antiquity, however, remains alive throughout those years and it often returns as a theme, intersecting deeply with the political and cultural life Italy. Philosophy examines the constantly reasserted antiquity of the Italian nation and its different uses in history, archaeology, palaeoethnology, and anthropology, from the Napoleonic period to the collapse of Fascism. Examining the fortunes and misfortunes of this subject, it challenges the view of 19th-century Italian nationalism as an ethnical movement, suggesting how deeply the image of pre-Roman Italy forged the political and cultural sensibility of modern Italy. Introduction Source: The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco. Oxford. The resumption of studies on Italian nationalism focuses upon the aggressive forms that Fascism comes to represent. The introduction discusses the easy notions of ethnic or racial nationalism, questioning these categories and suggesting how complex Italian nationalism is. Regarding this, the theme of the antiquity of the Italian nation—that is, the myth of a perpetual presence in the country substantiating a cultural primacy—represents an important example. An examination of the earliest Italy, as it was proposed in 19th-century Italian culture, suggests how it did not have a racial or ethnic basis, its main feature being cultural. This peculiar aspect of early Italian nationalism is outlined in its historical perspective, and the structure of the essay is described, indicating how the topic will be followed from its birth during the Napoleonic years to its final demise shortly after the fall of Fascism.  Keywords:   Italian nationalism, Fascism, earliest Italy.The historic past of the nation The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco. Oxford. This philosopher is devoted to the first explicitly nationalizing reading of the myth of antiquity developed by  Cuoco, who, in his “Platone in Italia”, recalls the existence at the dawn of humanity of a civilizing people, the Etruscans. In this way, Cuoco, aiming to establish antecedents for the Italian nation as it measures itself against the French cultural model, could propose the ethnic-cultural unity of the peninsula’s inhabitants since ancient times. Italian nationalists rediscover Cuoco’s thesis and see it as the basis of  Italian political identity. However, some philosophers have underlined how this can be regarded as a predatory operation, which overvalues the actual significance of “Platone in Italia” in the cultural context of Italy. It also shows how “Platone in Italia” remains known mainly for emphasizing the cultural primacy of the Italians rather than its assertion of their ethnic uniformity. Cuoco, Platone in Italia, Etruscans, Italian nationalists. A plural Italy. The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco. Oxford. Cuoco’s interpretation of Italian antiquity does not hold up against Micali’s Italy before the dominion of Rome. Micali responds to Cuoco’s view, suggesting that cultural unity does not lead one to believe that the country’s peoples necessarily share a common origin. It is Micali rather than Cuoco that come to dominate the patriotic culture of the Italians. The significant impact that Micali has is shown by the fact that Micali became a subject of great interest throughout the country, accompanying the national movement -- the so-called Risorgimento -- on its progress towards the events of the  revolution. Micali, Italy before the dominion of Rome, Cuoco, Risorgimento,  revolution. Unity in diversity. The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco Publisher: Oxford. We measure the impact of Micali on the political culture of the Risorgimento, testing the importance of his “Storia degl’antichi popoli italiani” on the studies of the Italic past published in several areas around the peninsula, especially in Lombardia, which remains the main Italian publishing centre, Napoli, and Sicilia. The analysis shows the multiple and different nationalizing uses of Micali’s works in tthese regions and confirms how his reading of a cultural, rather than ethnic, uniformity of the Italian people, is overwhelmingly accepted by the patriots on the eve of the revolution. Micali’s model appears, in fact, to be the only one that could be followed in a country which, though culturally united for centuries, is at the same time deprived of political cohesion.  Micali, Storia degl’antichi popoli italiani, Risorgimento, Naples, Sicily, Lombardy. The other Italy. The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco. Oxford. Micali’s model comes under fire when, after the political unification of the Italian peninsula, it becomes clear that the encounter between the various parts of Italy is not particularly harmonious. The problematic area of southern Italy seems to obstruct, rather than smoothen, the way towards a rapid process of stabilization for the newly unified state. We cast light on how the southern regions’s difficulty in becoming an integral part of the new unified Italy determine the reflections on the roots of a diversity which wocomes home to roost in the considerations concerning the Aryan race which populates ancient Italy. Unified Italy, southern Italy, Micali, Aryan race, Mediterranean race. The anthropology of the nation. The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco Publisher: Oxford Those who insist on the racist nature of the unified state improperly rely on Sergi’s anthropology as demonstrating firm evidence of his racist tendencies and establishing a connection between liberal Italy and Fascism. Philosophers have reconstructed Sergi’s career in order to re-situate him in his specific political and cultural context. From this point of view, his theme of racial differences within the nation suggests the existence of two different peoples on the peninsula: one northern and Aryan, the other southern and Mediterranean. This distinction remains popular and rapidly becomes a political matter, pertaining to the left of the political spectrum rather than the right. It is used to explain the reasons why the modernization of Italy seems to be grinding to a halt, as well as to help sustain the political struggle that the radical left launches against liberal Italy. Sergi, anthropology, racist tendencies, liberal Italy, fascism  Return to Rome. The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco Publisher: Oxford. The Italian state seems to be heading for an irreversible crisis. Faced with this challenge, many academics are quick to reaffirm the value of the unified state and reject every reading of Italian identity which does not sustain the idea of complete uniformity. This area is covered by philosophy, which deals with the renewal of the study of Roman history through the example of the work of Pais. A keen admirer of Micali, Pais soon adopts the model suggested by Mommsen, which sees in Roman expansionism a work of political and cultural unification of the whole of Italy. Pais’s main concern, therefore, is the construction of the nation’s common historical identity. That is why he aligns himself with all the political choices of the nationalist movement, from colonialism to the interventionism of The Great War and the acceptance of Fascism. Pais, nationalist movement, colonialism, Fascism. The Italian Fascist Empire, racial policy and Etruscology. The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Francesco. Oxford. Romanism does not eradicate the tradition of Italian plurality, founded on the specific contributions of peoples of different origins. The theme of Italic antiquity is useful during fascism. Following the war in Ethiopia and the foundation of the Italian Empire, the idea of italic antiquity is used to reject the mixing of races in the name of a civilising policy with regard to populations held to be inferior. This theme helps to bring about a significant return of academic interest in relation to the origins of Italy’s ancient civilisation.  Basing his ideas on the example of the ancient Romans, Pallottino is able to re-read Etruscan origins as the result of the meeting of different peoples through a cultural model that becomes common property. In this way, the process turns full circle and the work of  Micali makes a powerful comeback.   Romanism, Pallottino, Italic antiquity, Etruscan origins, Italian Empire, Micali. Keywords: gl’eroi di Vico, il culto degl’eroi, positivismo, positivismo giuridico, H. L. A. Hart, Kelsen, il concetto di stato, stato italiano, il mito dell’Italia nuova -- stato come forza, stato come autorita, Capograssi contro Bobbio. La critica di Bobbio a Capograssi, essere/devere – Capograssi/Hart – Capograssi e il fascismo – la nazione d'Italia previa all’unificazione -- in concetto di stato come medimen, medimen medimen medimen previous drafts --  il concetto di stato com medimen --– kelsen, positivismo giuridico – l’esperienza giuridica, azione giuridica, due tipi d’obbedenza: formale (vacua) e materiale (intenzione inclusa), intenzione, agire, vita etica, intersoggetivita, intersoggetivo, soggeto, individuo, interpersonalismo, l’interpersonalismo di Capograssi – Aligheri, Leopardi, Zibaldone, Rosmini. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Capograssi” – The Swimming-Pool Library. Capograssi.