CE

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CEC

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ceccato – Ossia: Grice e Ceccato: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del plusquamperfectum --  implicatura imperfetta --  il perfetto filosofo.  Silvio Ceccato (Montecchio Maggiore, Vicenza, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del plusquamperfectum --  implicatura imperfetta --  il perfetto filosofo. A comparison between H. P. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and Silvio Ceccato’s operational and cybernetic approach to language highlights a deep structural contrast in how meaning, temporality, and understanding are conceived. Grice explains conversational meaning in terms of rational agency: implicatures arise because speakers knowingly adhere to, or strategically depart from, shared norms of cooperation, allowing hearers to infer intentions on the basis of practical reason and contextual expectations. Ceccato, by contrast, seeks to dissolve appeals to intention, normativity, and abstract mental entities by reconstructing meaning as the outcome of elementary mental operations, analyzable in functional and cybernetic terms and in principle reproducible by machines. His interest in grammatical aspect—such as the imperfective and perfective, or the plusquamperfectum—does not serve to model conversational inference, but to expose how linguistic forms encode procedural patterns of mental activity rather than communicative strategies. While Grice treats imperfectness, openness, and revisability as virtues of conversation that enable implicature and dialogue to remain dynamically rational, Ceccato treats “imperfection” as a clue to operational incompleteness, something to be dissected into attentional states and sequential functions. From a Gricean standpoint, Ceccato’s program risks explaining away the very phenomenon of conversational meaning by replacing communicative reason with mechanizable process; from Ceccato’s standpoint, Grice’s appeal to shared rational norms may appear theoretically opaque, relying on unanalyzed notions of intention and cooperation. The contrast thus marks a divide between a pragmatic conception of meaning as socially coordinated rational action and an operational conception that seeks to re‑engineer meaning from the ground up as a functional product of mental mechanisms. Grice: “I like C. – like other Italian philosophers, he has an obsession with geometrical conjunctions and my favoruite of his tracts is La linea e la strischia, but he philosophises on other issues, notably cybernetics, where he purports to give a mechanical explanation’ of la lingua, he has also talked about the ‘mente’ – an expression Italian philosophers hardly use as they see it as an Anglicism, preferring ‘anima.’ He rather boldly philosophised on eudaemonia, without taking into account Ackrill’s etymological findings, but then the Italians use ‘felicita’! ingegneria della felicita – and also of the ‘fabrica del bello. How to, and how not to. Are all how not to ironic? C. thinks not: he philosophises on sophistry in how NOT to philosophise, and sees Socrates, who claims to be ‘imperfect, i. e. ever unfinished, and echoing Shaw on Wagner, as il perfetto filosofo!” In Actions and events, I present a scheme for what modistae would have represented as TEMPVS imperfect. Surely if I was drinking, I drank. But grammarians would hold that it is INCORRECT false? to say so! C. develops a theory very similar to mine. Like myself, he is an unusual philosopher!” Filosofo irregolare, Propone una definizione di filosofia e un’analisi dello suo sviluppo storico. Prenderne le distanze e persegue la costruzione di un’alternativa. oportebat debebant oportebat sequebatur oportebat. Auctor ad Herenn satis erat infimae erant. Arthur Leslie Wheeler I.PEOOBESSIVE (TeUB) ImPEKFECT Aobistic Shifted Simple Cast. G. Fre- Prog. Past quent. Plautus Terence Cato Lucilius VARRONE Laberius Nepos Hortensius logonia tabella di Ceccatieff, operativismo, Teocono, il genitore come ingegnero, influenza di GENTILE, modelo cibernetico della communicazione adattazione sopravivenza, organo ipotetico funzione codice conversazionale modello mentale psicologia filosofica adamo II lingua adamica aspetto perfettivo imperfettivo conjugazione latino. One line of attribution gives it to Benito Mussolini, as a motto from 1927 tied to the inauguration of the Libreria del Littorio in Rome. But the same source also notes attribution to Leo Longanesi, and another modern discussion explicitly says it was coined by Leo Longanesi. So I would not present authorship as settled beyond dispute. G: 1939 has the advantage that one can pretend memory is already history. S: And history, if served early enough, passes for conversation. G: Quite. Let us begin in Oxford, because Oxford likes beginnings to occur at dinner. Tuesday, 20 November 1934, Clarendon Hotel, first annual dinner of the Oxford University Fascist Association. S: Very Oxonian already. One does not seize the state before soup. G: Nor, in Oxford, does one become a fascist in the abstract. One becomes one with printed menus, signatures, coats, and the proper sense that undergraduate conviction ought to be accompanied by table-service. S: And by the Leader. G: Yes, or at least by proximity to him. That is what interests me. The thing is not yet Blackshirt or Action in the broad public sense. It is clubbier than that. More local. More undergraduate. More embarrassing. S: More like a college supper with catastrophic politics. G: Exactly. The British version always has that air. The Italians, by contrast, had the indecency to organise things properly. S: You mean the GUF apparatus. G: Yes. The Gruppi Universitari Fascisti. One must admire, in a bleak way, the administrative intelligence of it. Not merely a newspaper, not merely a dinner, but a university-fascist world with organs, circuits, publication channels, and the expectation that if you were one of the universitari you wrote from within that structure. S: Which is where your young Ceccato comes in. G: Precisely. April 1934. Young Silvio Ceccato, matriculated in Milan, not yet laureato in law, but already sufficiently inside the university-fascist ecology to publish in Libro e moschetto. S: A title which always sounds as if it were joking until one remembers it is not joking at all. G: Book and musket. A perfect subtitle for ruining a student. The point is not war already declared, but peacetime militarisation. Read, drill, obey, review the arts, and be ready. S: So the undergraduate is at once a pupil and a recruit. G: Which mothers would rightly hate. “You are not there to spend your pupil-days this way. You should be doing Livy.” S: Or at least your law. G: Quite. But instead young Ceccato, twenty years old in 1934, writes a review in a journal for armed fascist university groups. And what does he review? Not a tract on steel, not a hymn to discipline, but two pieces by Manuel de Falla. S: Vita breve and Il cappello a tre punte. G: Indeed. Which is the exquisite comedy of ideology. You militarise youth and get, among other things, a musical review. S: I can’t resist it. My hat, it has three corners. G: If it had not three corners, it would not be my hat. S: If it had not three corners and a fascist masthead, it would not be Ceccato’s first listed publication. G: There you are. Though one must be exact: not literally his first thought, only the earliest listed piece we have in that venue. Still, it is early, and it matters. S: Because it anchors him politically. G: Yes, and institutionally. One does not casually drift into a giornale dei gruppi fascisti universitari in armi. One is already matriculated, already inside the circuit, already acceptable to the editorial ecology. S: Unlike Action or Blackshirt, where propaganda could absorb sympathisers at large. G: Exactly. The British right had organs, but they were movement organs. Libro e moschetto had a more specific sociological smell: university youth under fascist discipline. S: So Oxford’s nearest analogue is not Blackshirt the paper, but the OUFA dinner at the Clarendon. G: That is the right contrast. The Oxford University Fascist Association is not the Italian GUF. It is looser, clubbier, less official, less total, less well-integrated into the educational machine. But the Clarendon dinner of 20 November 1934 gives one the proper undergraduate texture: here are pupils, or undergraduates, dining in formation, with Mosley and Joyce hovering in the background of prestige and contamination. S: Joyce really is the detail that spoils the pudding. G: Mosley at dinner is one thing; Joyce is the aftertaste of destiny gone rancid. S: And yet from the undergraduate point of view it must have felt glamorous. G: Of course. That is the danger. Young men are flattered by nearness to history, and politics is expert at dressing vanity as vocation. S: Which returns us to Ceccato. G: Yes. He is not at a dinner in Oxford, but in Milan, studying for a law degree he will take only in 1937, already writing in 1934 from within a committed environment, and writing not a doctrinal piece but a review of performances. That is the interesting point. Commitment does not always first appear as explicit doctrine. It often appears as platform. S: One writes from inside the right paper before one writes the right philosophy. G: Just so. The venue speaks before the article does. S: And the article itself, absurdly enough, concerns de Falla rather than fascist anthropology. G: Which is why it is more revealing, not less. It shows that the regime did not merely want slogans; it wanted cultural occupancy. Even a review of La vida breve and El sombrero de tres picos can be fascistically situated if printed under the right masthead. S: Meaning that the path from book to musket runs through opera. G: Through opera, ballet, concert notices, and student seriousness. Total politics prospers not by replacing culture, but by annexing it. S: Oxford, by contrast, still lets fascism look a little amateur. G: Very much so. The Clarendon menu is almost comic in that respect. One imagines undergraduates trying to combine political hardness with hotel gentility, and not quite managing either. S: Scholar and commoner alike? G: Oxford has always allowed both to be foolish, though in slightly different accents. The scholar does it with better Latin; the commoner with more confidence. S: And Grice, up to 1935, is still the relevant undergraduate horizon. G: Exactly. That is why 1934 matters. By 1938 the thing has grown later, heavier, more post-undergraduate in tone. But 1934 catches the undergraduate atmosphere still warm. Grice could have known of such a dinner-world, even if he would have regarded it with the sort of dry contempt reserved for organised vulgarity. S: Whereas Ceccato, in the same year, is not merely near a movement but printed by one. G: And printed as an universitario. That is the sharp contrast. Oxford right-wing undergraduates may dine, associate, applaud, flirt with Mosleyite glamour. Italian university youth are being more systematically inscribed. S: Enjoy the day, seize the day, because once you graduate you no longer count as universitari. G: Exactly. Student politics has always relied on the pathos of expiration. One is important only while incomplete. S: A profound encouragement to shallowness. G: Or to haste. Which is not quite the same, though the results often coincide. S: Still, there is something melancholy in the thought that a boy of twenty writes his first listed review under fascist auspices, while another boy of Oxford dines at the Clarendon with ideological ambitions and probably still owes an essay on Livy. G: Melancholy, yes, but also instructive. Education is always in danger of being spoiled by politics, because politics flatters the young more quickly than learning does. S: Learning says, “Read Livy.” Politics says, “History needs you.” G: And mothers, being generally wiser than ideologues, say, “No, history does not need you; finish your books.” S: Which no undergraduate has ever believed. G: Nor should he entirely. But he ought to suspect that the menu, the masthead, and the review venue are already making claims on him that have little to do with music or law. S: So the final parallel is this. Oxford in 1934 offers the clubbable caricature: the Clarendon Hotel, Tuesday 20 November, undergraduate fascism with napkins. Milan in April 1934 offers the institutional version: Ceccato in Libro e moschetto, young, matriculated, committed enough to count. G: Yes. And if you want the driest moral of all: the Oxford boy could still imagine he was playing at politics. The Italian boy was already being organised by it. S: Even when reviewing de Falla. G: Especially then.Grice: Caro Ceccato, mi dica: cosa pensa, da perfetto filosofo, di questo plusquamperfectum? Io sono affezionato all’imperfetto, sa, quello che lascia sempre una porticina aperta al dialogo. Ceccato: Ah, Grice, il plusquamperfectum è come una linea geometrica: tutti credono sia perfetta finché non la si guarda troppo da vicino! Preferisco l’implicatura imperfetta, che permette ai filosofi di correggersi senza rimpianti. Grice: Ma lei, Ceccato, ha costruito una vera “ingegneria della felicità”! Non sarà che il filosofo perfetto insegue la felicità imperfetta, quella che si trova tra una striscia e una linea? Ceccato: Grice, la felicità perfetta esiste solo nelle grammatiche latine; nella vita, come nella filosofia, siamo tutti un po’ imperfetti. E forse è proprio questa imperfezione che ci permette di conversare allegramente, anche quando il nostro codice conversazionale si inceppa! Ceccato, Silvio (1934) Vita breve’ e ‘Il cappello a tre punte. Libro e Moschetto: giornale dei gruppi fascisti universitari in armi. Milano. 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecilio – Ossia: Grice e Cecilio -- Grex griceiana -- Cecilio Lucius Caecilius Jucundus, a Pompeian banker. The Cecilii are a family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are mentioned in history as early as the fifth century BC, but the first of the C. who obtained the consulship was Lucius C. Metellus Denter, in 284 BC.[1][2] The C. Metelli were one of the most powerful families of the late Republic, from the decades before the First Punic War down to the time of Augustus. Like other Roman families in the later times of the Republic, the C. traced their origin to a mythical personage, Ceculo, the founder of Praeneste. He was said to be the son of Vulcan, and engendered by a spark; a similar story was told of Servius Tullius. He was exposed as an infant, but preserved by his divine father, and raised by maidens. He grew up amongst the shepherds, and became a highwayman. Coming of age, he called upon the people of the countryside to build a new town, convincing them with the aid of a miracle. An alternative tradition claimed that the C. were descended from Caecas, one of the companions of ENEA, who came with him to Italy after the sack of Troy. The praenomina used by the C. during the Republic are Lucius, Quintus, Gaius, and Marcus. Titus appears only towards the very end of the Republic, and is not known to have been used by the great house of the C. Metelli.  The cognomina of this gens under the Republic are Bassus, Denter, Cornutus, Metellus, Niger, and Rufus, of which the Metelli are the best known. From the consulship of Lucius C/ Metellus Denter, the family of the Metelli became one of the most distinguished at Rome. In the latter half of the second century BC, it obtained an extraordinary number of the highest offices of the state. Quintus Metellus, who was consul in 143 BC, had four sons, who were raised to the consulship in succession; and his brother, Lucius Metellus, who was consul in 142, had two sons, who were likewise elevated to the same dignity.  The Metelli were distinguished as a family for their unwavering support of the party of the Optimates. The etymology of their name is quite uncertain. Festus connects it, probably from mere similarity of sound, with mercenarii. The history of the family is very difficult to trace, and in many parts conjectural. It is treated at length by Drumann.[8][9][10]  The victory of the consul L. Caecilius Metellus against Hasdrubal's elephants at Panormus in 251 seems to have left a durable impression on the Caecili Metelli, as many of them featured an elephant on the coins they minted. In fact, elephants are so often used on their coins that it might have become their emblem.[11]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Caecilii Metelli  Denarius of Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, 81 BC. The obverse depicts a head of Pietas, alluding to the agnomen, Pius. The elephant on the reverse commemorates the capture of Carthaginian elephants by Lucius Caecilius Metellus at Panormus in 251 BC.[12]  Denarius of Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, c. 46 BC. The obverse depicts the head of Jupiter. The elephant on the reverse may also allude to Africa, since the coin was minted there before the Battle of Thapsus.[13] Further information: Caecilii Metelli family tree Gaius Caecilius (Metellus), grandfather of Lucius Caecilius Metellus, the consul of 251 BC, and perhaps the father of Lucius Caecilius Metellus Denter, consul in 284. Lucius Caecilius (C. f.) Metellus Denter, consul in 284 and praetor in 283 BC, slain in battle against the Senones. Lucius Caecilius L. f. C. n. Metellus, consul in 251 and 247 BC, during the First Punic War, and afterward Pontifex Maximus.[14] Lucius Caecilius L. f. L. n. Metellus, quaestor in 214 BC, was degraded to an aerarius by the censors for proposing to abandon Italy and establish a new colony after the Battle of Cannae. Nevertheless, he was elected tribune of the plebs for 213, and prosecuted the censors.[15][16][17] Quintus Caecilius L. f. L. n. Metellus, consul in 206 BC, during the Second Punic War. Marcus Caecilius L. f. L. n. Metellus, praetor urbanus in 206 BC. Quintus Caecilius Q. f. L. n. Metellus, surnamed Macedonicus, triumphed over Andriscus, and became consul in 143 BC, and censor in 131. Lucius Caecilius Q. f. L. n. Metellus, surnamed Calvus, consul in 142 BC. Quintus Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus, consul in 123 and censor in 120 BC, conquered the Balearic Islands, receiving the surname Balearicus, and founded several cities there. Lucius Caecilius L. f. Q. n. Metellus, surnamed Delmaticus, consul in 119, triumphed over the Dalmati, and later became Pontifex Maximus. Lucius Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus, surnamed Diadematus, consul in 117 BC and censor in 115 BC.[18] Marcus Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus, consul in 115 BC, triumphed over the Sardinians. Gaius Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus, surnamed Caprarius, consul in 113 and censor on 102 BC, triumphed over the Thracians. Caecilia Q. f. Q. n. Metella, married Gaius Servilius Vatia. Caecilia Q. f. Q. n. Metella, married Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio. Quintus Caecilius L. f. Q. n. Metellus, surnamed Numidicus, consul in 109 and censor in 102 BC, triumphed over Jugurtha; expelled from the senate and exiled by Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, and not recalled for two years. Caecilia L. f. Q. n. Metella, wife of Lucius Licinius Lucullus, and mother of the younger Lucullus, the conqueror of Mithridates; she had a reputation for dissoluteness.[19] Quintus Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus, surnamed Nepos, consul in 98 BC. Quintus Caecilius (L.? f.) Q. n. Metellus, surnamed Celer, a mediocre orator, probably tribune of the plebs in 90 BC and perhaps aedile in 88.[20][21] Caecilia Q. f. Q. n. Metella, married Appius Claudius Pulcher, consul in 79 BC. Caecilia L. f. L. n. Metella, married first Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, consul in 115 BC, and second Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the dictator. Quintus Caecilius Q. f. L. n. Metellus, surnamed Pius, one of Sulla's most successful generals, consul in 80 BC, and later Pontifex Maximus. Gaius Caecilius Metellus, a junior senator circa 80 BC.[22] Quintus Caecilius Metellus, surnamed Creticus, consul in 69 BC, triumphed over the Cretans. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, consul in 68 BC, died at the beginning of his year of office. Marcus Caecilius Metellus, praetor in 69 BC. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Creticus, perhaps quaestor circa 60 BC, with Gaius Trebonius.[23][24] Quintus Caecilius Q. f. (L.? n.) Metellus Celer, consul in 60 BC. Marcus Caecilius (M. f.) Metellus, mentioned by Cicero in 60 BC.[25] Caecilia Q. f. Q. n. Metella, daughter of Metellus Celer. Quintus Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus Nepos, consul in 57 BC. Quintus Caecilius Q. f. Q. n. Metellus Pius Scipio, the son of Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, adopted by Metellus Pius; appointed consul suffectus from the kalends of Sextilis in 52 BC, and a partisan of Pompeius. Lucius Caecilius (L. f.) Metellus, tribune of the plebs in 49 BC, opposed Caesar's attempt to take possession of the sacred treasury.[26][27][28][29][30][31] Quintus Caecilius (Q. f. Q. n.) Metellus Creticus Silanus, consul in AD 7.[32][33] Caecilii Dentri  Denarius of Gaius Caecilius Metellus Caprarius, 125 BC. The reverse depicts the triumph of his ancestor Lucius Caecilius Metellus, with the elephants he had captured at the Battle of Panormus.[34] Lucius Caecilius Denter, praetor in 182 BC, obtained Sicilia for his province.[35] Marcus Caecilius Denter, one of the ambassadors sent to Perseus in 173 BC to inspect the affairs of Macedonia, and to Alexandria to renew the friendship with Ptolemaeus.[36] Caecilii Cornuti Marcus Caecilius Cornutus, praetor before 90 BC, then legate in 89 and 88 during the Marsic War. He escaped the purges of Marius in 87 through a ruse of his slaves, who passed him off for dead, before spiriting him off to Gaul.[37][38] Gaius Caecilius Cornutus, tribune of the plebs in 61 BC, praetor in 57, and promagistrate the following year in Bithynia and Pontus. He helped Cicero to return from exile during his praetorship, who affectionately called him a "quasi-Cato" for his Optimate ideas. He was probably the historian Cornutus, known from only three fragments, which deal with the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey.[39][40][41] Marcus Caecilius Cornutus, urbanus in 43 BC, committed suicide when Octavian seized Rome after the Battle of Mutina.[42] Marcus Caecilius M. f. Cornutus, a member of the College of Arvales in 21–20 BC, but perhaps as early as 29, when Augustus re-established the college.[43] Marcus Caecilius M. f. M. n. Cornutus, succeeded his father as Arval. He was of praetorian rank in the reign of Tiberius but, unjustly accused in connection with a plot against the Emperor, put an end to his own life in AD 24.[44][45] Others Gaia Caecilia, the legendary personification of Roman domesticity, frequently equated with Tanaquil, the wife of Tarquinius Priscus, the fifth King of Rome.[46] Quintus Caecilius, tribune of the plebs in 439 BC.[47] Statius Caecilius, a comic poet of the early 2nd century BC. Quintus Caecilius Niger, a Sicilian, and quaestor of Verres during his administration of Sicily. He contended with Cicero for the prosecution of Verres, pretending to be the enemy of his former master, but in reality desiring to deprive the Sicilians of Cicero's advocacy. Cicero's oration Divinatio in Caecilium was delivered against this Caecilius when the judices had to decide which should be given the prosecution.[48] Lucius Caecilius Rufus, half-brother of Publius Cornelius Sulla, was tribune of the plebs in 63 BC, and proposed that both Sulla and Publius Autronius Paetus, who had been elected consuls for 66, but been convicted of bribery and condemned, should again be allowed to stand for office; however, Sulla convinced him to withdraw the proposal. Rufus was a supporter of Cicero and the aristocratic party, and opposed agrarian reform. He was praetor in 57, and proposed the recall of Cicero from banishment, incurring the wrath of Publius Clodius Pulcher.[49][50] Quintus Caecilius, an eques, slain by his brother-in-law, Catiline, in the time of Sulla.[51][52] Quintus Caecilius, an eques, who became wealthy as a moneylender, died in 57 BC, leaving his fortune to his nephew, Titus Pomponius Atticus.[53][54] Quintus Caecilius Bassus, an eques, and partisan of Pompeius, was praetor in 46 BC. Titus Caecilius, primus pilus in the army of Lucius Afranius, killed at the Battle of Ilerda in 49 BC.[55] Caecilia, wife of the younger Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who divorced her in 45 BC.[56] (Caecilius) Bucilianus, a friend of Brutus and Cassius, was, together with his brother, Caecilius, recruited to the conspiracy against Caesar. On the fateful day, Bucilianus wounded Caesar in the back. He was probably a Bucilius adopted by a Caecilius.[57][58][59][60] Caecilius, one of the conspirators against Caesar, along with his brother, Bucilianus.[57] Caecilia, the daughter of Titus Pomponius Atticus, married Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa. Quintus Caecilius Epirota, a grammarian, and freedman of Titus Pomponius Atticus. Titus Caecilius Eutychides, a freedman of Titus Pomponius Atticus, afterwards adopted by Quintus Caecilius.[61] Caecilius Calactinus, a Jewish Greek rhetorician at Rome in the time of Augustus. Caecilius Bion, a writer on the properties of medicinal plants, used by Pliny the Elder.[62] Lucius Caecilius Jucundus, a banker at Pompeii during the first century AD, selected as the fictionalized subject of the Cambridge Latin Course. Quintus Caecilius L. f. Jucundus, elder son of the Pompeiian banker. Sextus Caecilius L. f. Jucundus Metellus, younger son of the Pompeiian banker. Caecilius of Elvira, or Saint Caecilius, traditional founder of the Archdiocese of Granada circa AD 64. Gnaeus Caecilius Simplex, appointed consul suffectus Ex Kal. Nov. by the emperor Vitellius in AD 69.[63][64] Caecilius Rufinus, expelled from the senate by Domitian because he danced.[65][66] Caecilius Clemens, a notary in Egypt mentioned between AD 86 and 100 in four papyri, notably Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 241 and 581. Caecilius Classicus, proconsul of Hispania Baetica from AD 97 to 98, was prosecuted for corruption, but died before he could be tried.[67] Aulus Caecilius Faustinus, consul suffectus in AD 99. Gaius Caecilius, grandfather of the writer and statesman "Pliny the Younger". Lucius Caecilius Cilo, father of the writer and statesman "Pliny the Younger". Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus, or "Pliny the Younger", a writer and statesman during the late first and early second century. He was a member of gens Caecilia from birth, but was adopted by his maternal uncle, the scholar Gaius Plinius Secundus, or "Pliny the Elder", and changed his name accordingly. Quintus Caecilius Redditus, an eques, was governor of Mauretania Tingitana from AD 120 to 122, and later of Noricum. Quintus Caecilius Marcellus Dentilianus, consul suffectus around AD 150.[68] Caecilius Juventianus, governor of Noricum during the reign of Antoninus Pius.[69] Gaius Caecilius Salvianus, vice prefect of Roman Egypt, who became governor in 176 following the execution of the rebel Gaius Calvisius Statianus. Sextus Caecilius, a jurist, who may or may not be identical with Sextus Caecilius Africanus. Sextus Caecilius Africanus, a jurist during the latter half of the second century Caecilius, a writer of Argos on the art of fishing.[70] Caecilia, or Saint Cecilia, a semi-legendary matron of Rome, and Christian martyr under Alexander Severus, circa AD 230. Modern historians suspect that she was executed during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Caecilia Paulina, Roman empress during the Crisis of the Third Century. She was the wife of Maximinus Thrax, and mother of Gaius Julius Verus Maximus. She probably died in 236, as Maximinus had her deified that year. Almost nothing is known about her, as most of the works dealing with the reign of Maximinus have been lost. Caecilius Natalis, the person who maintains the cause of paganism in the dialogue of Marcus Minucius Felix, entitled Octavius.[71][72] Thascius Caecilius Cyprianus, a Christian philosopher, who became Bishop of Carthage, was martyred, and sanctified as Saint Cyprian. Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius, a Christian author and advisor to Emperor Constantine the Great. Footnotes  The appearance of Titus Caecilius, a patrician consular tribune for the year 444 BC in Livy, is a false reading for Titus Cloelius. See also List of Roman gentes Cecilia Cecilia (disambiguation) References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 526 ("Caecilia Gens").  Livy, iv. 7.  Festus, s. v. Caeculus.  Servius, vii. 678.  Solinus, ii. 9.  Hartung, Die Religion der Römer, vol. i, pp. 88 ff.  Klausen, Aeneas und die Penaten, pp. 761 ff.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, pp. 1055, 1056 ("Metellus").  Festus, p. 146 (ed. Müller).  Drumann, Geschichte Roms, vol. ii, pp. 17–58.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 287, 288, 292, 293, 387, 388, 390, 471.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 390.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 471.  Polybius, i. 39, 40.  Livy, xxiv. 18, 43.  Valerius Maximus, ii. 9. § 7.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 260, 261 (note 2), 264.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 531–533 (note 1).  RE III.1 (1897), col. 1234 ('Caecilius 132')  RE, vol. III (1), col. 1208; supplement III, col. 222 (Caecilius 85).  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 26, 30 (note 7), 41, 45 (note 5); vol. III, p. 37.  Waterfield, Plutarch: Roman Lives, p. 481.  Drumann, Geschichte Roms, ii. 57.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, xv. 21. § 2.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, ii. 1. § 1.  Plutarch, "The Life of Caesar", 35, "The Life of Pompeius", 62.  Cassius Dio, xli. 17.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 41.  Caesar, De Bello Civili, i. 33.  Lucan, iii. 114 ff.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, x. 4, 8.  Cassius Dio, lv. 30.  Fasti Capitolini, AE 1927, 101; 1940, 59, 60.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 292, 293.  Livy, xxxix. 56, xl. 1.  Livy, xlii. 6.  RE, vol. iii.1, col. 1200; supplement i, col. 267 (Caecilius 44).  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 26, 30 (note 2), 31 (note 13), 36, 43, 45 (note 11).  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, i. 14.  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 179, 200, 210.  B. M. Levick in Cornell, Fragments, vol. I, pp. 426–428; vol. II, pp. 848–851; vol. III, p. 519. Levick writes that Marcus Caecilius Cornutus, the Arval of 21 BC is another, but less likely possibility.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 338.  Rüpke, Fasti Sacerdotum, pp. 578, 579.  Tacitus, Annales, iv. 28.  Rüpke, Fasti Sacerdotum, p. 579.  Pliny the Elder, vii. 74.  Livy, iv. 16.  Cicero, Divinatio in Caecilium.  Cicero, Pro Sulla, 22, 23; Post Reditum in Senatu, 9; Pro Milone 14; Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, iii. 3. § 2.  Asconius Pedianus, In Ciceronis Pro Milone, p. 48 (ed. Orelli).  Quintus Tullius Cicero, De Petitione Consulatus, 2.  Asconius Pedianus, In Ciceronis In Toga Candida, 84 (ed. Orelli).  Cornelius Nepos, The Life of Atticus, 5.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, i. 1, 12, ii. 19, 20, iii. 20.  Caesar, De Bello Civili, i. 46.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xi. 23, xii. 52, xiii. 7.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 113, 117.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xv. 17, xvi. 4.  Drumann, Geschichte Roms, vol. iii, 2nd ed. (ed. P. Groebe, 1906), pp. 632, 633  Shackleton Bailey 1976, p. 105.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, iv. 15.  Pliny the Elder, xxviii. 57.  Tacitus, Historiae, ii. 60, iii. 68.  Cassius Dio, lxv. 17.  Cassius Dio, lxvii. 13.  Suetonius, "The Life of Domitian", 8.  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, iii. 8.  Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand unter der Antoninen, pp. 202 ff.  CIL III, 5182  Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, i. 13.  Minucius Felix, Octavius.  Bähr, Die Christlich-Römische Theologie, § 19. Bibliography Polybius, Historiae (The Histories). Marcus Tullius Cicero, Divinatio in Quintum Caecilium, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, Post Reditum in Senatu, Pro Milone, Pro Sulla. Quintus Tullius Cicero, De Petitione Consulatus (attributed). Gaius Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Civili (Commentaries on the Civil War). Cornelius Nepos, De Viris Illustribus (On the Lives of Famous Men). Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (Lucan), Pharsalia. Quintus Asconius Pedianus, Commentarius in Oratio Ciceronis In Toga Candida (Commentary on Cicero's Oration In Toga Candida), Commentarius in Oratio Ciceronis Pro Milone (Commentary on Cicero's Oration Pro Milone). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Plutarchus, Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Sextus Pompeius Festus, Epitome de M. Verrio Flacco de Verborum Significatu (Epitome of Marcus Verrius Flaccus' On the Meaning of Words). Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae (The Banquet of the Learned). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Gaius Julius Solinus, De Mirabilis Mundi (On the Wonders of the World). Marcus Minucius Felix, Octavius. Maurus Servius Honoratus (Servius), Ad Virgilii Aeneidem Commentarii (Commentary on Vergil's Aeneid). Johann Adam Hartung, Die Religion der Römer (The Religion of the Romans), Palm und Enke, Erlangen (1836). Johann Christian Felix Bähr, Die Christlich-Römische Theologie, Christian Friedrich Müller, Karlsruhe (1837). Rudolf Heinrich Klausen, Aeneas und die Penaten, Friedrich and Andreas Perthes, Hamburg and Gotha (1839). Wilhelm Drumann, Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergang von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung, oder: Pompeius, Caesar, Cicero und ihre Zeitgenossen, Königsberg (1834–1844). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Broughton, T. Robert S. (1952–1986). The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. American Philological Association. Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). Géza Alföldy, Konsulat und Senatorenstand unter der Antonien (The Consulate and Senatorial State under the Antonines), Rudolf Habelt, Bonn (1977). Robin Waterfield, Plutarch: Roman Lives, Oxford University Press (1999). Jörg Rüpke, Anne Glock, David Richardson (translator), Fasti Sacerdotum: A Prosopography of Pagan, Jewish, and Christian Religious Officials in the City of Rome, 300 BC to AD 499, Oxford University Press, 2008. Tim Cornell (editor), The Fragments of the Roman Historians, Oxford University Press, 2013. Shackleton Bailey, David Roy (1976). Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature. American Philological Association. ISBN 978-0-89192-180-6. August Pauly; Georg Wissowa; Wilhelm Kroll; Kurt Witte; Karl Mittelhaus; Konrat Ziegler, eds. (1894–1980). Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. Categories: CaeciliiRoman gentesRoman gentes of Latin origin For the Cecilii, we have the gens entry and two more -- your third-best choice for a Grice/Speranza vignette? Thanks --

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecilio – Ossia: Grice e Cecilio – GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: CECILIO -- GRICE E CECILIO METELLO -- GRICE E LUTAZIO -- "Butcher!" by those who called for the sums they had earned as slaughtermen. Assassinations proceeded to such a fearful degree, that Q. LUTAZIO Catulus asked CORNELIO Sulla, in confidence, whether it was the intention of the latter to spare any human being at all? for there seemed a chance of his having no one left to rule over but himself; Can this witticism be ascribed in Latin to Lutazio as per sources, other than Abbott below? Input? Feedback? Thanks -- Abbott: GRICE E LUTAZIO -- "Butcher!" by those who called for the sums they had earned as slaughtermen. Assassinations proceeded to such a fearful degree, that Q. LUTAZIO Catulus asked CORNELIO Sulla, in confidence, whether it was the intention of the latter to spare any human being at all? for there seemed a chance of his having no one left to rule over but himself; This is a very good test case, because here Abbott is not simply inventing, but compressing and displacing a well-attested anecdote—yet he puts the words into the wrong mouth.  1. Is the witticism attested? Yes—something extremely close is attested in Plutarch. But not to Lutatius Catulus. The famous remark occurs in Plutarch, Life of Sulla 31, where a senator (usually identified as C. Metellus, sometimes another figure in the tradition) asks Sulla:  “We do not ask you to spare those you have decided to kill, but to relieve the uncertainty of those you intend to save.” [lexundria.com]   Meaning  killings are so indiscriminate that survival itself becomes uncertain the plea is:  “at least tell us who will NOT be killed”   This is directly parallel to Abbott’s version:  “are you going to spare anyone at all?”   2. Why Catulus appears in Abbott Abbott attributes it to:  Q. Lutatius Catulus  But the sources show:  Catulus:  opposed Marius later committed suicide during Marian terror [loebclassics.com], [en.wikipedia.org]  So Abbott:  transfers a Sullan-era remark onto a different aristocrat for narrative convenience or comic effect   3. What would the Latin look like? From Plutarch’s version, a Latin equivalent would be something like:  non rogamus ut eos quos occidere constituisti serves, sed ut eos quos servaturus es a metu liberes  or more sharply:  dic nobis quos servare velis  (= “tell us whom you intend to spare”)  Abbott’s simplified version Your Abbott line:  “are you going to spare any human being at all?”  would correspond to something like:  num quemquam omnino servaturus es?   4. Is there a parallel in Latin sources? The idea is clearly part of the tradition. But: the surviving full formulation is preserved in Greek (Plutarch)  Latin historians like Livy (for this period) are fragmentary, so:  we don’t have a neat Ciceronian or Sallustian Latin version   5. Gricean reading (very nice case) This is actually a superb example.  What is said  “Tell us whom you will spare”   What is implicated  “You are killing indiscriminately / excessively”.  So:  indirect criticism avoids direct accusation   Stronger implicature (Abbott’s version)  “Will you spare anyone at all?”  → even more explicit:  there may soon be no subjects left to govern   6. Conversational structure This is NOT mere dialogue, but: SpeakerFunctionSenatorpolite rebuke via questionSullarefuses clarity → escalates terror. A classic Gricean indirect speech act:  literal request → real criticism   7. Final synthesis  The anecdote is attested (Plutarch, Sulla 31)-- but not originally attributed to Catulus. Abbott reshapes it into a sharper epigram. Latin reconstruction possible but not preserved verbatim. Pragmatically:  an indirect protest against unbounded violence     One-line takeaway  Abbott’s witticism reflects an authentic ancient anecdote—preserved by Plutarch in Greek—where a senator tactfully asks Sulla to identify whom he intends to spare, thereby indirectly condemning the indiscriminate killings; but the attribution to Lutatius Catulus is a literary transposition, and the exact Latin form is not extant, though easily reconstructible.   If you like, we can compare this with Tacitus’ later “safe criticisms” of emperors—very similar use of indirect questioning. Excellent—this is exactly where philology and your Gricean angle meet nicely. Let me give you:  the Greek (as far as preserved)-- a careful Latin reconstruction -- the identity (birth name / gens) of “Metellus”   1. Greek (Plutarch, Sulla 31) From the preserved Greek (Perseus text):  ἐτόλμησε… Γάϊος Μέτελλος… πυθέσθαι τί πέρας ἔσται τῶν κακῶν, καὶ ποῖ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ δεῖ πεπαῦσθαι τὰ γινόμενα προσδοκᾶν. [perseus.tufts.edu] Literal sense:  “Gaius Metellus dared to ask Sulla what end there would be of these evils and how far he intended to go before one might expect them to cease.”   Then the famous remark (reported in translation):  “We do not ask you to release those you have decided to kill, but to relieve the anxiety of those you intend to save.” [lexundria.com]  and then:  “Then let us know whom you intend to punish.” [lexundria.com]  So:  the first part = question about the limit the second = rhetorical reformulation (the famous epigram)   2. Latin reconstruction (idiomatic, not attested verbatim) There is no surviving Latin text of this passage, so we reconstruct Ciceronian-style Latin.  (A) First question (Greek → Latin)  quid tandem erit finem malorum, et quo usque procedes ut ista tandem desinant?  (“What will be the end of these evils, and how far will you go before they cease?”)  (B) Famous remark  non rogamus ut eos quos occidere decrevisti serves, sed ut eos quos servaturus es a metu liberes   (C) Final sharp formulation  dic igitur quos punire velis  or even more pointed:  fac sciamus quos percutere velis. This last move corresponds exactly to Plutarch’s:  “Then tell us whom you intend to punish.”   3. Who is “Metellus”? (birth name and gens) Plutarch says:  Γάϊος Μέτελλος (“Gaius Metellus”) [perseus.tufts.edu]  Modern prosopography:  Gaius Caecilius Metellus (uncertain identification) [en.wikipedia.org]   So: ElementValuePraenomenGaiusGensCaeciliaCognomenMetellus  Thus your cataloguing:  gens Caecilia (Metellus branch) is fully justified.   4. Gricean note (brief, since you’ll appreciate it) The Greek question:  τί πέρας ἔσται τῶν κακῶν;  is:  formally information-seeking pragmatically:   indirect criticism of unlimited violence   Then the second move sharpens it:  removes ambiguity forces Sulla into:  an explicit policy (proscription lists). So the dialogue evolves: StageForcequestionmild protestreformulationironyfinal demandcoercive clarity  5. One-line takeaway  The “Metellus” is most likely Gaius Caecilius Metellus of the gens Caecilia, and while we lack a direct Latin version, Plutarch’s Greek preserves both the initial cautious question about the limits of Sulla’s violence and the sharper follow‑up (“tell us whom you intend to punish”), which can be rendered naturally in Latin; the exchange is a classic case of an indirect question evolving into a pointed demand for accountability.   If you like, we can compare this with Cicero’s practice of escalating from quaestio to accusatio in courtroom rhetoric—it’s structurally very similar. The Cecilio line (for Grice and Speranza have him by 'gens' under "C") is a good example of incorporated negation implicature: "How many will you spare?" There is a NOT incorporated, as per implicature: Who will you NOT kill, honestly -- just asking for a friend." -- For Grice ~ carries this implicature: A: How is Smith doing in his new job at the bank. B: He has NOT been to prison yet. Input? Feedback? Thanks Yes—this is a very nice Gricean connection, and your formulation is exactly right: the Metellus/Caecilius move is a textbook case of what we might call negation by implicature under polite questioning. Let me align your example with the ancient one.  1. The Metellus move as incorporated negation Surface (from Plutarch):  “Tell us whom you intend to spare.”  or (sharpened):  “How many will you spare?”   What is said (explicit content)  There exists some (possibly non-empty) group of spared persons.   What is implicated--Strong implicature:  You are killing (almost) everyone.   Reconstructed inner form You nicely put it:  “Who will you NOT kill?”  Exactly:  the negation is:  not overtly stated but structurally presupposed and pragmatically forced     2. Parallel with Grice’s classic example Your example:  A: How is Smith doing in his new job? B: He has not been to prison yet.   What B says  negative proposition:  “Smith has NOT been to prison” What B implicates  Smith is: dishonest incompetent corrupt at risk of prison. So:  the negation introduces a baseline expectation of wrongdoing   3. Alignment with Metellus Now compare: StructureGrice exampleMetellussurface negation“has not been to prison”“whom will you spare”hidden proposition“he might go to prison”“you are killing most people”implicaturenegative evaluationmoral condemnation. Both rely on:  contrast between what is expected vs what is stated   4. Why this works especially well in Roman context Roman political language:  avoids direct accusation (dangerous!) prefers:  indirection controlled understatement. So instead of saying:  “You are murdering indiscriminately” Metellus says:  “Which ones will you save?” -- Which presupposes:  there are very few to save   5. Logical reconstruction (your formulation refined) Let:  K(x) = “x is killed” S(x) = “x is spared”   Explicit:  ∃x S(x)?  Implicature:  ∀x K(x) (almost all are killed). So:  the negation is embedded via domain restriction   6. Why it is witty (and safe) This is the key Roman rhetorical trick:  avoids:  direct accusation   forces:  the hearer (Sulla) to recognize the absurdity. And this produces:  a polite but devastating critique. 7. Your “just asking for a friend” analogy Perfect. Because: tone = innocent content = devastating--Same structure: “Who will you NOT kill?” = “Surely you won’t kill everyone… right?” 8. Final synthesis. Metellus = classic case of negation by implicature--parallels Grice’s “not yet in prison” example--surface form:  mild, even helpful-- underlying meaning:  strong moral condemnation. One-line takeaway--Metellus’ question operates exactly like Grice’s “He has not been to prison yet”: by focusing on the exception (“those you will spare”), it implicates the overwhelming general rule (that nearly everyone is being killed), thus embedding a powerful negative judgment within a formally polite and indirect utterance.   If you like, we can compare this with Cicero’s non iam hoc quaero… sed… constructions, which push this same implicature mechanism even further. But is the force of "~" equivalent as per Grice's example: "It is not the case that Smith has been to prison yet." -- Metellus question: where does the "~" appear? As per implicature. I was thinking this is Metello's answer to CORNELIO SILLA having shown his list in his proscription -- "I WILL KILL A, B, C, and D." Metello: Please make explicit now: ~(CORNEllio kills E, F, and G). Feedback? Input? Thanks -- as "It is not the case that I have AIDS." "It is not the case that I have an affair with Madonna." Grice's example after Searle: It is not the case that the millionarire from Texas is lighting his cigare with a 5 dollar bill." This is a really penetrating way of putting it—you’re essentially asking:  where is the Gricean “~” (negation operator) located in Metellus’ utterance?  And your instinct is right that it is not in the syntax, but in the implicature generated by the question. Let me lay it out carefully.  1. Grice’s example: explicit ~ vs implicit ~ Example:  “He has not been to prison yet”  Logical form:  ~P (not imprisoned)  Implicature:  imprisonment is expected / relevant. Here:  ~ is explicit implicature builds from it   2. Metellus: where is the “~”? Surface (Plutarch):  “whom will you spare?”  Logical form:  ∃x S(x) (there exists someone spared)   But pragmatically:  almost everyone is being killed. So the real content is:  ~(many spared) or more strongly: ~(∃ many x such that S(x))   3. Your formulation (very close) You propose:  Sulla: “I will kill A, B, C, D” Metellus: please make explicit: ~(kills E, F, G)  Yes—but let’s sharpen the operator.  Better formalization Let:  K(x) = x is killed S(x) = x is spared  Then: Sulla’s practice:  ∀x (K(x))  (almost universal killing)   Metellus’ question:  “Which x satisfy S(x)?”  But the implicature is:  ¬∃x (S(x)) or “very few x such that S(x)” . So the ~ applies to abundance, not existence strictly.  4. The key insight: NEGATION OF EXPECTATION In Grice’s terms, this is closer to:  “It is not the case that there are many spared”  rather than:  “It is not the case that anyone is spared”   So the operator is:  ~ over the default assumption of civility / selectivity   5. Compare with your modern examples “It is not the case that I have AIDS”  explicit denial neutral (without context)   “It is not the case that the millionaire is lighting his cigar with a $5 bill”  denial of an extreme stereotype   Metellus:  does NOT say:  ~K(x) directly   instead asks:   “Who is not in K(x)?” So it’s:  question form encoding negation through contrast   6. Why this is different from explicit ~ Your key point:  the negation is incorporated, not overt  Exactly.  Structure: CaseNegation“He has not been…”explicit (~P)Metellusimplicit: ~(normal distribution of mercy). So we can say:  the “~” is pragmatically supplied, not syntactically expressed   7. Final clean formulation Metellus’ utterance:  “Tell us whom you intend to spare.”  carries:  ~(the set of spared persons is significant)  or more strongly:  almost all are in the killed-set   8. One-line takeaway  In Metellus’ question the negation is not expressed but implicated: instead of stating ~P (“you are killing everyone”), he asks for the complement set (“whom will you spare?”), thereby shifting the conversational focus so that the negation applies to the expected norm (that some would be spared), producing a Gricean effect analogous to—but structurally subtler than—explicit negation.   If you like, we can formalize this using set complement notation (K vs S) in a fully algebraic way—it becomes very elegant. I would think "~" also in case "I have not AIDS" or "I am not having an affair with Madonna" TRIGGER BY IMPLICATURE that someone has put that forward -- so in this respect it is more like "It is not the case that the king of France is not bald" -- for there is no such thing -- and someone has put forward that there is a king of France -- it is not the case that ther is a king of France." Someone has put forward that he is bald -- or not bald -- (Russell: Hegelians like a synthesis: the king wears a wig). And the negation then transferred from existence to 'baldness'. WIth METELLO: "Am I justified in thinking that you will NOT kill all?" Input? Feedback? Thanks Yes—this is a very sophisticated way of putting it, and you’re essentially converging three strands (Grice, Russell, and Roman rhetoric) into a single mechanism. Let me align your intuition carefully.  1. Your key move: negation triggers a prior discourse You say:  “I do not have AIDS” → implicates that someone has raised it  Exactly. In Gricean terms:  the negation ~P often presupposes conversational relevance of P i.e. someone (or the context) has put P “on the table”   Structure  Surface: ~P Triggered presupposition: → P is under consideration. So:  negation often signals reaction, not initiation   2. Russell connection (your France example) You bring in:  “The king of France is not bald”  Russell analysis:  existence of king predication of baldness   Your insight:  negation can “shift level”  Exactly—two readings:  ¬(∃x King(x) ∧ Bald(x)) (∃x King(x)) ∧ ¬Bald(x). And Grice adds:  speaker intentions determine which reading is active   3. Now Metellus in this framework You propose:  “Am I justified in thinking that you will NOT kill all?”  This is excellent, because it makes explicit the hidden ~.  Surface utterance  “Whom will you spare?”   Reconstructed layer  Is it the case that ¬(you kill everyone)? So the negation is:  applied to the totality of killing   4. Where is the “~” in Metellus? This is the key:  the negation is not syntactic but embedded in the presupposed alternative   More formally: Let:  K = “Sulla kills x” Domain = Roman citizens   Assumed norm (background):  ¬∀x K(x) (not everyone is killed)   Metellus’ question:  identifies the set:   S(x) = citizens spared   But implicature:  that set is vanishingly small or unclear. So:  the ~ is applied to the expected normal distribution of mercy   5. Your France analogy sharpened You compare:  “There is no king of France”  → someone must have assumed there was  Similarly: Metellus:  “Whom will you spare?”  → someone must assume:  there are spared persons. And the implicature challenges that:  maybe there are none   6. Deep alignment (your three cases). CaseMechanism“not in prison yet”implicates expectation of guilt“no king of France”challenges existential presuppositionMetelluschallenges presupposition of selective killing. All involve:  negation operating on background assumptions   7. Final distilled reading Metellus’ utterance =  surface: existential inquiry underlying: ¬(normal limits of violence hold)   Or in your excellent phrasing:  “Am I justified in thinking that you will NOT kill all?”  Which implies:  maybe that assumption is false   8. One-line takeaway  In Metellus’ question the negation (~) does not appear overtly but operates at the level of presupposition: by asking “whom will you spare,” he invokes the normally accepted constraint that not everyone will be killed, only to undermine it implicitly—much like Russellian “king of France” cases, where the real target of negation is not merely a predicate but the background assumption that the relevant class or distinction meaningfully exists.   If you like, we can formalize this using presupposition logic (Strawson vs Russell vs Grice)—your instinct is already right on that frontier.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecilio – Ossia: Grice e Cecilio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – Roma. Note su Dicta de iustitia et iure. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Quinto Cecilio Metello Numidico (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: CECILIO -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats talk as a cooperative, rational enterprise in which hearers are entitled to reconstruct a speaker’s communicative intentions, and where implicature is what a rational interpreter is licensed to infer (and can in principle calculate) given what was said plus shared norms of relevance, informativeness, and sincerity; “Metello,” by contrast, enters your passage as a Romanized test case for how such rational reconstruction is shaped by forensic and civic life, because the Metellan lens is juristic and political: justice as ius (a public, institutional, and adversarial concept) rather than primarily a moral property, and Carneades’ paired speeches (praise then demolition) exemplify not cooperative convergence on truth but the strategic, dialectical reversibility of reasons in the forum. So where Grice uses “reason” to explain how ordinary conversation can reliably transmit more than literal content through mutually recognized intentions and cooperative expectations, Metellus (as pupil and later antagonist of Carneades) highlights how the same inferential machinery can be recruited in settings where the point is not shared understanding but pressure-testing, undermining, or re-framing normative concepts—producing implicatures that function like legal insinuations, rhetorical traps, or political positioning. In short: Grice models implicature as a product of conversational rationality aimed at intelligibility and coordination, whereas the Metellan/Carneadean scene stresses that reason in discourse is also institutionally situated and often agonistic, so that what is “meant beyond what is said” can be governed not only by cooperative maxims but by the priorities of law, power, and the contestability of ius itself. Grice: “At Oxford, we follow Cicero’s statement that philosophy in western Europe started when the Greeks sent an embassy led by Carneade to Rome. Greece is not considered part of Western Europe – and that’s why we keep the frieses of the Parthenon! Now M. knew Carneade, so he may well be regarded as the first Roman, and thus Western European philosopher!” -- Filosofo italiano. A Roman general and politician. A pupil of Carneade. Grice: “Fortunately, we have enough material to be able to reconstruct what M. found appealing in Carneade. In the first speech, Carneade PRAISED Roman justice – dike --; in his second speech, the next day, he condemned it. This left an enduring mark in M. who dedicated the rest of his life to abuse Carneade!” – Grice: “I deal with M.’s and Carneade’s alternate concepts of ‘dike’ or the ‘ius’ in my ‘Philosophical eschatology and Plato’s Republic – Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus defend what I see as a politico-legal concept of the ius, not a moral one. It may be argued that the legal or politico-legal concept, is PRIOR to the moral – and it takes a special kind of metaphysical construction routine to prove otherwise!” Quinto Cecilio Metello Numidico. GRICEVS: Salvē, METELLVE; audīvi te Carneadēn audivisse: Oxoniēnsēs statim ex hoc efficiunt ut sis “primus philosophus Occidentālis”—geographiā semper comiter labōrante. METELLVS: Salvē, GRICEVE; sī hoc satis est, tum omnis quī prandium cum Carneadē superāvit cathedram meret: modo longē ab Athēnīs. GRICEVS: At quam pulchrē docuit: hesternō diē iustitiam Rōmānam laudāvit, posterō diē eandem evertit—methodus perfecta: laus, deinde correctiō. METELLVS: Correctiō? ego id “cervīcis torquendum” appellō. Duās ōrātiōnēs dedit; ego tertiam reliquā vītā composuī: “Quaēsō, desine.” The gens here is Cecilia -- noble? On your question, yes: Cecilia works, and “noble” is not misplaced, but it needs handling with some dryness. In this context Cecilia can be made to do several things at once. It can suggest a gens-name without sounding merely antiquarian, and it can carry the faint Roman dignity that suits the Metellan material. But if one says flatly that the gens is “noble,” the sentence risks sounding either too handbookish or too pleased with itself. Speranza’s better move would be to let the nobility appear as a social and political fact rather than as an heraldic adjective. In other words, one does better to imply rank than to announce it. If you want a compact formulation in the neutral Speranza voice, I would suggest something along these lines: Cecilia here is not a decorative genealogical flourish, but the proper Roman signal of placement. One is dealing not with a free-floating moral thinker, but with a man of the Caecilian world, that is, a figure already situated within rank, office, family memory, and the public burdens of Roman life. “Noble,” if one insists on the word, should be heard not romantically but institutionally: Metellus belongs to the sort of house from which Rome expects magistrates, generals, and examples. That matters because the contrast with Grice is not merely between antiquity and Oxford, but between two settings in which reason works under very different social expectations. Grice’s reason is reconstructive, cooperative, and conversational in the sense of intelligibility among rational equals; Metellus’s reason is civic, adversarial, and juridical, moving in a world where the inference from what is said to what is meant is conditioned by rank, office, and the contestable life of ius. If you want it slightly sharper and more epigrammatic: The point of “Cecilius” is not genealogy for its own sake, but the reminder that Metellus enters discourse already preceded by family, office, and Roman expectation. “Noble” is acceptable only if heard in that severe Roman sense: less romance than responsibility, less ornament than burden. And if you want the driest possible version: The gens is Cecilia, and yes, noble enough, though Rome generally preferred to let office prove what genealogy advertised. I would also make one small factual caution. If the phrase is “The gens here is Cecilia,” the Roman form should be handled carefully, because one normally speaks of the gens Caecilia, not simply “Cecilia,” unless the slight looseness is part of the stylisation. So for exactness in English meta-language, “the gens here is the Caecilia” or “Metellus belongs to the gens Caecilia” would be safer. If you like, I can now do one of three things in chat only: refine the whole Metellus paragraph into a smoother Speranza-style passage, give you three alternative opening sentences for the Metellus entry, or tighten the Latin exchange so that it sits more neatly with the prose frame. This is the first Cecilio that Speranza has as a philosopher -- are there other in the gens, or notable figures? Yes. If Speranza is asking whether this is the first Cecilio he can plausibly treat as a philosopher, the answer is probably yes in the stricter sense, and no in the broader family sense. In the stricter sense, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus is unusually apt because he is not merely a public man of the gens Caecilia, but one whom the tradition can connect, however lightly, with study under Carneades and with a recognisable intellectual afterlife in Roman political and juridical discourse. That gives Speranza a philosophical foothold rather than a merely prosopographical one. [en.wikipedia.org], [britannica.com] But the gens itself is crowded with notable figures, above all in the Metellan branch. The family Caecilia gens was one of the great plebeian houses of the Republic, and the Caecilii Metelli produced an extraordinary number of consuls, censors, triumphators, and priests. So if by “other in the gens” you mean notable Roman figures, there are many; if you mean other philosophers, that is much harder. [en.wikipedia.org] The most useful names for Speranza, I think, would be these. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, consul in 251 and 247, is the old heroic figure of the First Punic War, remembered especially for Panormus and the elephants. He is important for family prestige and emblem rather than for philosophy. [en.wikipedia.org] Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus is one of the great makers of the dynasty: conqueror in Macedonia, consul in 143, censor in 131, and a chief architect of Metellan prestige. He matters for Roman statecraft and family hegemony, but he is not a philosopher in the useful Speranzian sense. [encyclopedia.com] Lucius Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Balearicus, Lucius Caecilius Metellus Diadematus, Gaius Caecilius Metellus Caprarius, and Marcus Caecilius Metellus are all notable as magistrates and as evidence of the astonishing concentration of office within the family. They are excellent for showing that the Metelli were a political machine before they were anything like a philosophical scene. [en-academic.com] Then there is Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius, son of Numidicus, a major Sullan figure, consul in 80, pontifex maximus, and military commander in Spain. Again, very notable, but more as a statesman and dynastic continuator than as a philosopher. [britannica.com], [encyclopedia.com] Later still, Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio is important because he joins the Caecilian and Scipionic lines by adoption and becomes one of the last great senatorial opponents of Caesar. He is a splendid example of late Republican aristocratic entanglement, but not really a philosopher either. [en.wikipedia.org] So if you want the driest answer in Speranza’s key, it would be something like this: Metellus Numidicus is probably Speranza’s first Caecilius who can be treated as a philosopher rather than merely as a Roman notable. The gens Caecilia, and especially the Metelli, offers many eminent men of office, war, priesthood, and public dignity; but eminence is not yet philosophy. Numidicus is useful because the Carneadean connection allows him to stand, however obliquely, at the point where Roman public life and Greek philosophical schooling actually meet. The others are mostly important as the civic and dynastic background that makes such a meeting intelligible. And if you want a slightly more pointed version: The Caecilii give Speranza no shortage of consuls, censors, generals, and pontiffs; what they do not give him in abundance is philosophers. That is why Numidicus matters. He is not merely another Metellus with an agnomen and a triumph behind him, but one whom Roman political seriousness can be shown, however grudgingly, to have passed through a Greek philosophical weather. There is also one small correction worth keeping in reserve. In strict Roman nomenclature one should speak of the gens Caecilia, and of individual men as Caecilii, not “Cecilio” as though the nomen were already Italianised. Speranza can of course Italianise on purpose, but if he wants the Roman line audible, Caecilius or Caecilii is safer. If you like, I can now do one of two things in chat only: give you a compact paragraph for Speranza on why Numidicus is the first philosophically usable Caecilius, or sketch a miniature family note on the Metelli so that the reader feels the dynastic weight behind him. Talking of which, the plural -- which in Italian would be Cecili -- is indeed the source for most plural surnames in Italian -- is there a Cecili surname in Italy or Rome today that can claim descendancy from this gens -- and what is the etymology of the Caec- caecil- caecilia? do we know -- caecus would be 'blind' and -il- sounds like a diminutive element? Yes, there is a modern Italian surname Cecili, and it appears to be especially a central-Italian surname, with a concentration in Lazio and a smaller presence in Umbria. One surname source puts it in the Roman and Frosinone areas, with a small Perugian branch as well, and even notes the form Cecili as distinct from the rarer Cecilio and the related Cecilia. [cognomix.it] But the stronger claim, that present-day bearers of Cecili or Cecilio can claim actual lineal descent from the ancient gens Caecilia, is another matter. In the strict genealogical sense, that is usually not something one can responsibly assert from the surname alone. Ancient Roman nomina often survived in personal names, saintly names, learned Latin, and later surname formation, but that is not the same thing as documented blood continuity across two millennia. So the careful answer is: continuity of name-form, yes; provable descent from the gens, generally no, unless a particular family has unusually strong documentary evidence. [cognomix.it], [antenati.c...ura.gov.it], [familysearch.org] In Speranza’s dryer register, one might put it this way. Italy can certainly still produce a Cecili, and central Italy seems especially willing to do so; what it cannot do, merely by producing the surname, is restore the Roman Republic intact. A modern Cecili may well be onomastically descended from Caecilius; whether he is genealogically descended from the ancient Caecilii is a question for archives, not etymology. [cognomix.it], [en.wiktionary.org], [antenati.c...ura.gov.it] On the etymology, your instinct is basically right. The standard ancient derivation takes Caecilius from Latin caecus, “blind.” Several modern reference points repeat that derivation directly. Wiktionary gives Caecilius simply as “from caecus,” and surname material on Cecili points back to the gentilicium Caecilius, sometimes through a form like coeculus, glossed as “quasi cieco, che vede a fatica.” [cognomix.it], [en.wiktionary.org] Now, as to the middle piece, your feeling about a diminutive is understandable, but one should be cautious. The -il- in Caecilius does look tempting if one is thinking in terms of little blind man, or blind-ish, but Roman gentilicia are not always so transparent segment by segment. It is safer to say that Caecilius belongs to a family of Latin name-formations built on a root and a gentilicial ending, rather than to insist that -il- here is straightforwardly a productive diminutive exactly as in later Romance feeling. The popular and antiquarian tradition does often move in the direction of “caeculus/coeculus,” that is, “somewhat blind,” “dim-sighted,” or “little blind one,” and that may preserve an old way of hearing the name; but linguistically I would not over-certify the diminutive analysis unless one had a specialist on Latin onomastics on the table. So the safe formula is: Caecilius is traditionally connected with caecus, blind; some etymological traditions further suggest an intermediate or related form such as caeculus/coeculus, implying dim-sightedness or a quasi-diminutive nuance, but the exact internal morphology should be handled with modesty rather than triumph. That, I think, is the right degree of caution. [cognomix.it], [en.wiktionary.org] And there is one further historical point that may amuse Speranza. The feminine Caecilia became vastly more culturally visible than the masculine in later Europe, largely because of Saint Cecilia. That helps explain why modern Romance and post-Romance forms drift so naturally toward Cecilia, Cecilio, and Cecili, even when the ancient Roman background is only half remembered. In other words, the gens survives not only through Roman political memory, but through Christian and vernacular naming practice. [cognomix.it], [behindthename.com] So if you want the shortest answer in a form Speranza could reuse, I would suggest: Yes, there is a modern Italian surname Cecili, especially in central Italy, and onomastically it is very plausibly a continuation of the old Caecilius-name family; but that does not by itself prove descent from the ancient gens Caecilia. As for the etymology, the usual derivation is from caecus, blind. One may hear in the form a secondary nuance such as “dim-sighted” or “little blind one,” but the prudent scholar lets that remain an old etymological hearing rather than a dogma of morphology. If you like, I can now do either of two things, still only in chat. I can give you a compact Speranza-style paragraph on Cecili and the Caecilii for insertion later, or I can go more philological and sketch the passage from Caecilius to Cecilio, Cecilia, and Cecili in Italian and Romance form. The Caecilia sounds almost a patrician gens to Grice and he wonders if there are other members other than this accumulatively named Quinto Cecilio Metello Numidico, perhaps with names that show a bit more of that famous (infamous?) Roman gravitas? Grice’s instinct is excellent—and very Roman. The gens Caecilia sounds patrician, and behaves like one, but in fact it is not. Let me give you the clean structure first, then add the gravitas.  1. The basic fact (slightly counterintuitive)  The gens Caecilia is plebeian, not patrician. [en.wikipedia.org]  And yet:  The Caecilii Metelli became one of the most powerful aristocratic houses of the Republic. [en.wikipedia.org]  So: not patrician by origin-- but fully nobiles (the ruling elite) by achievement. This is the classic Roman pattern:  not born noble → became indispensable   2. Why it “sounds” patrician to Grice Because:  the Metelli dominate magistracies for generations they produce:  consuls censors generals pontifices    Indeed:  the Metelli branch held an extraordinary concentration of high offices, especially in the 2nd century BC [en.wikipedia.org]  So psychologically:  they function like a patrician dynasty   3. Yes—many other Caecilii (with gravitas!) Your Numidicus is only one among a crowd of imposing names. Here are a few, in a style befitting Gricean admiration. Early gravitas (almost mythic) Lucius Caecilius Metellus (cos. 251, 247)  defeats Carthaginian forces associated with elephants (family emblem) pontifex maximus. Roman type:  pious general, half‑religious, half‑military. The great constructor Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus  conqueror of Macedonia consul (143), censor father of multiple consuls. Key point:  he builds the dynasty. The proliferating sons (pure Roman excess) From Macedonicus’ line:  Metellus Balearicus (Balearic Islands) Metellus Diadematus Metellus Caprarius. Notice the pattern:  each becomes a consul with a distinct agnomen of conquest or distinction  This is Roman gravitas at scale—almost institutional. Your man Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus  consul, censor fights Jugurtha studies with Carneades (!) [en.wikipedia.org]. This is why Speranza chooses him:  a Metellus who has seen philosophy. The filial Stoic Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius  earns “Pius” for devotion to his exiled father [en.wikipedia.org]. Pure Roman virtue:  pietas elevated to nomenclature.  The late aristocratic tangle Metellus Pius Scipio  born a Cornelius Scipio adopted into the Caecilii Metelli [en.wikipedia.org] Shows:  how the great houses interlock and cannibalize each other   4. So: is there Roman gravitas here? Overwhelmingly yes. But it is not:  aristocratic elegance  It is:  institutional density  They embody:  office lineage repetition continuity  Indeed:  one Metellus produces four consular sons—twice over [en.wikipedia.org]   5. Why there are few “philosophers” Your earlier insight holds:  The Caecilii produce statesmen, not thinkers  Even when they meet philosophy (Carneades):  they do not become philosophers they remain:  Roman interpreters of philosophy within public life     6. Final Gricean formulation You could put it like this:  The Caecilii do not give Rome many philosophers; they give it something more formidable— a family in whom reason is always already public, juridical, and institutional.   7. Final epigram (inevitable)  The Caecilii were not born patrician; they simply behaved as if Rome could not proceed without them.   If you like, I can produce a short “Metellan catalogue” in Speranza style—just names and agnomina, laid out almost like a Roman litany. When we say this Cecilio SAW Carneade was that during the brief embassy episode? Or was he a tutee in Athens? Wasn't there a Roman specifically designated to TRANSLATE what these three infamous Greeks were saying (Carneade, Diogene, Critolao) --. This interpreter was possibly patrician of the Circolo degli Scipioni? Cato would rather have kept the thing untranslated (Didn't he say that when he went to Athens he knew enough Greek to communicate but always used Latin, instead?) -- So what was Cecilio's link with Carneade, strictly? Thanks. This is an excellent cluster of questions—and you’re right to suspect that two quite different “contacts” with Carneades are being conflated in casual summaries. Let me separate them rigorously.  1. The embassy to Rome (155 BC) This is the famous episode:  Carneades (Academic), Diogenes (Stoic), Critolaus (Peripatetic) come to Rome on a diplomatic mission [academic.oup.com] they give public lectures; Carneades performs his famous pro–contra justice display  Crucial point: This is not a teaching situation, but a public, diplomatic, and rhetorical event  And yes — there WAS an interpreter You are exactly right.  Gaius Acilius (a Roman senator)  served as interpreter to the Senate [en.wikipedia.org] translated the philosophers’ speeches    Also confirmed in narrative sources:  the philosophers’ speeches before the Senate were interpreted by Gaius Acilius [lexundria.com] So your intuition is spot-on:  Greek → Latin mediation was necessary (at least formally) and was entrusted to a Roman aristocrat with Greek competence   2. Cato’s reaction (your Gricean hero-villain) Cato the Elder:  deeply suspicious of Greek philosophy feared it would corrupt Roman youth pushed to dismiss the envoys quickly [sourcebook...ordham.edu]  Your memory is correct in spirit:  Cato is associated with:  preference for Latin over Greek resistance to Greek cultural penetration    One source even records that he refused to address Greeks in Greek and insisted on Latin. [imperiumromanum.pl]. So:  Cato would indeed have been unhappy with the whole “translation-and-fascination” process   3. Now: Metellus (Numidicus) and Carneades Here is the key correction. Metellus did NOT “see” Carneades only at Rome Instead:  he was sent to Athens in his youth and studied under Carneades [en.wikipedia.org]  This is a completely different relation: ContextNature of contactRome (155 BC)spectacle, embassy, public rhetoricAthens (later)education, tutelage  4. So what is the correct link? Strictly speaking:  Metellus Numidicus = pupil (or at least student) of Carneades in Athens not merely an auditor at the Roman embassy. The embassy:  explains why Romans became interested creates the cultural opening. The Athenian study:  explains how Metellus actually acquired philosophical formation   5. The deeper Roman pattern This is almost programmatic:  Greeks come to Rome → shock and seduction Roman youth becomes curious → goes to Athens Philosophy is reimported → Romanized  So:  The embassy is the trigger, Athens is the school, men like Metellus are the transmitters   6. Your question about the “circle of the Scipios” You are on very plausible ground:  Roman elites (especially Scipionic circles)  were already philhellenic   the interpreter (Acilius) was:  a senator of distinction [en.wikipedia.org]    We do NOT (from the sources here) have an explicit statement that:  he belonged to Scipio’s inner circle  But:It is consistent with the broader pattern of Greek‑educated elite mediators  7. Final synthesis (Gricean form) You could put it like this:  Metellus did not merely hear Carneades when Rome heard him; he studied him when Rome had already half-decided to fear him.   8. Final epigram (inevitable)  At Rome, Carneades amazed them; at Athens, he educated them— and Metellus belongs to the second story.   If you want, I can trace which Romans only heard Carneades (the “spectators”) versus those who studied Greek philosophy (the “converts”)—it sharpens your distinction beautifully. And Cecilio then fits the pattern of Cicero's son -- wasn't he sent to Athens to learn, too -- if not philosophy? When Cecilio went to study under Carneade -- would they have met at the old Garden of Hekademos -- i.e. the same site remained the 'campus' of the Academia, we think? You’re now putting together the right constellation: Metellus → Cicero’s son → Athens → Academy. Let me answer in two clean layers: (1) the Roman pattern, (2) the physical/philosophical “campus.”  1. Yes: Metellus fits the same “Roman-to-Athens” pattern Your comparison is exactly right. Cicero’s son  Marcus Tullius Cicero Minor  was sent to Athens for study [en.wikipedia.org] studied:  philosophy (notably under Cratippus, a Peripatetic) [academic.oup.com] rhetoric (declamation in Greek, Latin training, etc.) [en.wikipedia.org]. So Athens is functioning as:  the finishing school of Roman elites   Metellus (your “Cecilio”)  Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus  sent to Athens in youth studied under Carneades [Category:G...- NovaRoma]. So he belongs to the earlier generation of exactly the same educational pattern.  The pattern itself By the 2nd–1st c. BC:  Roman aristocratic education = Rome (formation) → Athens (completion)  Modern analogy (not inaccurate):  Athens = a kind of elite “university abroad” [worldhistory.org]   2. Now: where did they actually meet Carneades? This is the delicate point. The Academy still existed  Plato’s Academy:  located just outside Athens in a grove (Akademeia / Hekademeia) [britannica.com], [detailedpedia.com]   it continued through the Hellenistic period the phase of Carneades is called:  the “New Academy” [britannica.com]  So yes:  the same institutional site (or at least the same traditional place) is still in play. Carneades’ role  Carneades was:  scholarch (head) of the Academy [encyclopedia.com]. So when Metellus “studied under Carneades,”:  he is (very probably) participating in the living teaching tradition of that Academy. But caution: not a “campus” in the modern sense We must avoid over‑visualising it:  The Academy was:  a grove + gymnasium + philosophical circle not a fixed lecture hall or university structure    Even in Cicero’s own description:  visiting “the Academy” means:  going to a place outside the city where philosophers converse [archive.org]     3. So: did Metellus literally walk in Plato’s grove? Best answer:  Yes, in continuity of place and institution but:  not as a student in a formal building rather as a participant in a philosophical community localized in that traditional site     4. The historical layering (nice Gricean image) You can think of it like this: LayerMeaning of “Academy”Platophysical grove + founding schoolCarneadessame tradition, now skepticalRoman studentsdestination of intellectual pilgrimage  5. Final synthesis So your two insights come together cleanly: Metellus = prototype -- Cicero’s son = continuation-- both participate in:  Roman elite education via Athens    And spatially: they likely encountered philosophy in the same traditional Academy site ❗ but not in a modern “campus” sense   6. Final epigram (in your key)  The Romans did not found their schools at Athens; they went to a grove where others had already done all the talking— and listened.   If you like, I can map which Roman families systematically sent sons to Athens (it becomes almost a sociological pattern: the “philhellenic cursus studiorum”). And in fact, since you mention, Cratippo becomes Marco Tullio Cratippo, and now I see that while the responsibility was Cicerone who asked Cesare for this, the actual tutee of Cratippo was also a Marco Tullio. Two questions: We don't think Cecilio or any body else 'adopted' a philosopher -- 'i.e. sponsor his citizenship (b). Is the implicature that Cratippo left the lovely skies of Athens for those of Rome -- or was it merely a formality -- for status, and not actualy residency in Rome? Thanks. Excellent—this is exactly the right level of precision, both historically and Gricean. Let me separate your two questions cleanly.  1. Did Romans “adopt” philosophers (like Cratippus)? Short answer: No—not in the legal Roman sense.  There is no evidence that:  Cratippus was adopted into the gens Tullia (or any Roman gens) or that anyone “sponsored” him into citizenship in that sense    Instead: What actually happens  Cicero obtains for Cratippus:  Roman citizenship (granted politically)   This allows:  honor recognition integration into Roman elite networks.  But:  Citizenship ≠ adoption  Adoption would imply:  change of gens legal filiation inheritance relations  None of that occurs.  Why the name “Marcus Tullius Cratippus”? This is the crucial subtlety:  When a foreigner receives citizenship:  he often takes the praenomen + nomen of the patron   So:   Cratippus becomes Marcus Tullius Cratippus. This looks like “adoption” linguistically, but:  it is:  onomastic integration, not familial adoption. Gricean formulation  He does not mean “my son” by the name; he means “my protégé under Roman law.”   2. Did Cratippus actually move to Rome? Here we need to be careful. What we can safely say  Cratippus:  taught in Athens (Cicero’s son studied with him there) [grokipedia.com]   Cicero:  arranged honours and citizenship for him     What is NOT clearly established From the sources we have: No explicit statement that:  Cratippus permanently relocated to Rome. No clear evidence that:  he abandoned Athens as his base     So what is the most plausible reading? The safest interpretation:  his Romanization is primarily status, not relocation  That is:  he remains an Athenian teacher but becomes:  a Roman-recognized intellectual asset. Why this makes sense Athens was still:  the intellectual capital the place Roman elites went to  So:  moving him to Rome would almost defeat the purpose  Instead:  Rome imports prestige by name but leaves teaching in Athens   3. Implicature (your key question) You asked whether there is an implicature that:  Cratippus left Athens for Rome. Yes—there is a potential implicature, but it is misleading. Literal reading:  “Marcus Tullius Cratippus” → sounds like a Roman resident aristocrat  Historical reality:  Greek philosopher teaching in Athens with Roman patronage   So:  The name suggests incorporation; the reality preserves distance.   4. Metellus vs Cicero’s son (loop closed) Now your earlier comparison locks in beautifully:   Metellus → goes to Athens to study Carneades   Cicero’s son → goes to Athens to study Cratippus. In both cases:  Romans travel to philosophy; philosophy does not migrate to Rome.   5. Final epigram (inevitable)  Rome could give a philosopher its name— but still had to go to Athens to hear him.   If you like, we can map how often Greek philosophers did actually relocate to Rome (some do, especially later), versus those—like Cratippus—who remain anchored in Athens while being symbolically “Romanised.”Cecilio Metello Numidico, Quinto (a. u. c. DCXLV). Dicta de iustitia et iure. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecilio – Ossia: Grice e Cecilio -- Grex griceiana -- Cecilio  For the Caecilii, my third-best Grice/Speranza choice (after your Metellus–Carneades and Metellus–Sulla material) would actually be:  Quintus Caecilius Niger, the would-be prosecutor of Verres, defeated by Cicero in the Divinatio in Caecilium.  Why? Because the entire case is about a conversationally fascinating question:  Who is really speaking for whom?  Niger says:  "I wish to prosecute Verres."  Cicero says, in effect:  "No, you wish to prevent a real prosecution."  That is almost pure Grice.  The conversational puzzle On the surface: CAECILIVS NIGER  Verrem accusare volo. ("I wish to prosecute Verres.")  Literal content:  Niger wants to prosecute Verres.  Cicero's reconstruction:  +> Niger wishes to protect Verres. +> Therefore his professed intention is not his actual intention.  The whole Divinatio turns on the distinction between:  what a man says he intends, what his conduct suggests he intends.  A very Gricean distinction between:  utterer's declared intention  and  utterer's real communicative purpose.   A vignette NIGER  Accusator ero. ("I shall be the prosecutor.")   CICERO  Cur tu potius quam ego? ("Why you rather than I?")   NIGER  Rem publicam defendo. ("I defend the Republic.")   CICERO  Verremne? ("Verres, perhaps?")   NIGER  Male audis. ("You mishear me.")   CICERO  Immo bene infero. ("No, I infer well.")   The Gricean point The hearer is asked to choose between two hypotheses: Hypothesis A Niger means what he says:  "I want justice."  Hypothesis B Niger's application is strategic:  "I want the prosecution to fail."  The argument is not over facts. It is over:  the correct interpretation of an avowed intention.  That is about as Gricean as Roman forensic rhetoric gets. But what was the evidence by Tullio of Cecilio's insincerity? Can't people change? Cecilio did NOT become the prosecutor; so it's all hypothetical what we are discussing. Cecilio may have proved a great prosecutor. Of course, under Cicero's lens, that title, 'greatest prosecutor' belongs to Cicero himself? Thanks Exactly. A Gricean should be very suspicious of Cicero's argument here. The historical fact is:  Quintus Caecilius Niger wanted to be appointed prosecutor against Verres.  The judges chose Cicero instead. Everything beyond that is advocacy. What Cicero is doing in the Divinatio in Caecilium is not proving a historical fact but arguing for an appointment. So from a Gricean point of view, we should distinguish: What Cicero can show  Niger had been Verres' quaestor. Niger had previously worked with Verres. The Sicilians preferred Cicero. Cicero presented himself as the more vigorous and independent prosecutor.  What Cicero wants the judges to infer  +> Niger's supposed hostility to Verres is insincere.  That is an implicature Cicero tries to generate. But it is not something he can directly observe.  The Gricean issue: can people change? Absolutely. A very Gricean reply to Cicero would be: CICERO  "He was Verres' man."  NIGER  "I was."  CICERO  "Then why prosecute him now?"  NIGER  "Because I have changed my mind."  That is perfectly coherent. Indeed, the possibility of repentance, disillusionment, quarrels between former allies, or genuine moral awakening is what makes Cicero's task difficult. If change were impossible, there would be no argument to make.  Cicero's real evidence The strongest evidence is not:  "Niger once knew Verres."  The strongest evidence is:  "Niger would be a less dangerous prosecutor."  That is the practical concern underlying Cicero's speech. Cicero's case is essentially:  If you appoint Niger, Verres benefits.  Notice how close this is to Ravilla's famous:  cui bono?  ("who benefits?") The reasoning is not:  Niger is certainly insincere.  but rather:  Verres would probably prefer Niger to Cicero.  That is a much weaker—and more defensible—claim.  A nice Gricean reversal One could even imagine Niger saying:  Tu dicis me Verrem servaturum esse. ("You say I would save Verres.")  CICERO  Ita. ("Yes.")  NIGER  Unde scis? ("How do you know?")  CICERO  Nescio; timeo. ("I do not know; I fear it.")  That, I think, is closer to the actual situation. Cicero's speech is forensic rhetoric, not a laboratory demonstration of another man's intentions.  And your last point is especially good: in a sense, the title of "best possible prosecutor of Verres" is precisely what is at stake. Cicero's speech is partially an argument against Niger, but it is also an argument for Cicero. A Gricean might say that the overt topic is Niger's suitability, while the covert topic is Cicero's own claim to be the prosecutor Rome needs.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecilio – Ossia: Grice e Cecilio -- Grex griceiana – Cecilio Another attractive candidate A close runner-up would be:  Lucius Caecilius Metellus, tribune in 49 BC, who tried to prevent Caesar from taking the sacred treasury.  One can imagine: CAESAR  "I need the treasury."  METELLVS  "You shall not have it."  CAESAR  "The Republic requires it."  METELLVS  "The Republic is precisely why you shall not have it."  The quarrel is over what "for the Republic" means. Again, a dispute about interpretation rather than brute fact. And did the one who opposed Giulio's taking the sacred treasury had his way? Same case -- who tells the story? What was Giulio's office then? What authority did Cecilio have in OPPOSING LEGALLY that Giulio take the sacred treasury? Thanks No, Metellus did not get his way. Caesar obtained access to the treasury despite the tribune's opposition. The usual account is that Metellus physically and legally obstructed the move, but was forced aside after threats from Caesar or Caesar's supporters. [en.wikipedia.org], [wiki2.org] From a Grice/Speranza perspective, this is precisely why the episode is interesting: the legal right and the practical outcome diverge. What office did Caesar hold? In the opening phase of the Civil War (49 BC), Caesar had entered Italy with his army and was confronting the Pompeian regime. The source I found says he addressed a Senate meeting and requested money and troops before moving against the treasury. [en.wikipedia.org] For the purposes of this episode, the crucial point is not his exact title but that:  Caesar wanted the money, and had the power to take it.  What authority did Metellus possess? A very important one:  Lucius Caecilius Metellus was tribune of the plebs in 49 BC. [en.wikipedia.org], [wiki2.org]  According to the source, he may have vetoed the proceedings authorizing Caesar's financial requests. Then, when Caesar moved against the aerarium (state treasury), Metellus physically blocked the entrance and interposed his tribunician authority. [en.wikipedia.org] That is the legal basis of his opposition. Who tells the story? Several ancient sources are cited in modern discussions of the episode, including:  Cicero, Caesar, Plutarch, Appian, Cassius Dio, Lucan. [en.wikipedia.org]  An intriguing detail is that:  Caesar's own Civil War commentary omits the confrontation before the treasury. [en.wikipedia.org]  A Gricean would immediately become suspicious of that omission. The Gricean vignette METELLVS  Veto. ("I forbid it.")  CAESAR  Res publica pecunia indiget. ("The Republic needs money.")  METELLVS  Idcirco veto. ("That is precisely why I forbid it.")  The explicit dispute:  who controls the treasury?  The implicit dispute:  who now speaks for the Republic?  That is the real conversational issue. Metellus' veto carries the implicature:  "You are not entitled to act as if the state were your private possession."  Caesar's response carries the counter-implicature:  "Necessity overrides your constitutional obstacle."  In the event, power defeated procedure. Metellus retained the legal argument; Caesar obtained the money. [en.wikipedia.org] And that is almost a perfect Roman example of the difference between having authority and being able to enforce it. I think Grice has a similar case: a policeman raising his hand in a sign of stop in front of a driver MEANS that the driver will stop/should stop/shall stop. A police STANDING in front of the car does not. Cecilio's physical presence cannot MEAN -- or by standing there he cannot MEAN that Giulio is not to take the treasury. By appealing to his authority he would MEAN or did mean that -- not that Giulio cared or took the uptake, or was exactly being cooperative! Input? Yes—this is a very Gricean distinction, and I think your analogy is exactly on the right track. In the early Grice papers, there is a difference between:  a natural sign, a mere obstacle or cause, a meaningful act intended to be recognized as such.  The policeman case is a paradigm. Case 1: Policeman raises his hand The policeman intends that the driver recognize:  "I am exercising authority; you are to stop."  The driver's recognition of that intention is part of the mechanism. Hence Grice is willing to regard this as close to non-natural meaning (meaningNN).  Case 2: Policeman merely stands in the road A body in the road may cause stopping. But the stopping can occur without any recognition of communicative intention. The driver may think:  "There's an obstacle."  The policeman's presence therefore functions causally rather than communicatively.  Now apply this to Metellus If Metellus merely plants himself in the doorway of the treasury, that resembles:  policeman standing in front of the car.  His body obstructs access. That by itself need not mean:  "You are forbidden to enter."  It may simply impede entry.  The tribunician veto But when Metellus acts as tribune and says, in effect:  Veto. "I forbid it."  everything changes. Now the intended effect is not merely physical obstruction. The communicative intention is:  "Recognize that I am exercising tribunician authority."  And the reason for compliance is meant to be:  the authority of the office.  This is much closer to Grice's policeman raising his hand. The desired uptake is:  "Because I recognize what this act means, I stop."   The fascinating Roman wrinkle Caesar understood perfectly well what Metellus meant. The problem was not failure of communication. The problem was refusal of compliance. A Gricean might put it this way:  Meaning succeeded. Perlocution failed.  Metellus meant:  "You are not to take the treasury."  Caesar grasped that message completely. But Caesar did not accept the practical conclusion.  A Grice–Speranza reconstruction METELLVS  Veto. ("I forbid it.")  CAESAR  Intellego. ("I understand.")  METELLVS  Ergo desines? ("Then you will stop?")  CAESAR  Intellegere non est obsequi. ("Understanding is not obeying.")  That is almost the philosophical heart of the episode. The communicative act works perfectly. The hearer recognizes the intention. What fails is the cooperative acceptance of the reason presented. So I think your formulation is exactly right:  Metellus' physical presence alone does not meanNN that Caesar is not to take the treasury. Metellus' exercise of tribunician authority does meanNN that Caesar is not to take the treasury.  The tragedy is that Caesar's uptake was intellectual rather than practical: he understood the veto but overrode it. In Gricean language, the illocution succeeded while the desired perlocution did not. So here is the Grice below -- we can have a direct conversation then, with PHYSICAL ACTION-CUM-APPEAL TO AUTHORITY (if failed) by Cecilio, and you can add the description of the act in Latin as per sources you quoted, thannks -- Grice: I have a very avaricious man in my room, and I want him to go; so I throw a pound note out of the window. Is there here any utterance with a meaning,,? No, because in behaving as I did, I did not intend his recognition of my purpose to be in any way effective in getting him to go. This is parallel to the photograph case. If on the other hand I had pointed to the door or given him a little push, then my behavior might well be held to constitute a meaningful,, utter- ance, just because the recognition of my intention would be intended by me to be effective in speeding his departure. Another pair of cases would be ( I ) a policeman who stops a car by standing in its way and (2) a policeman who stops a car by waving. Yes. This is almost a textbook application of Grice's distinction. Grice's contrast is: Case A The policeman merely stands in front of the car. The driver stops because there is an obstacle. The stopping is caused. No appeal to the recognition of an intention is essential. Case B The policeman raises his hand. Now the driver is supposed to reason:  "He intends me to recognize that he is directing traffic."  Recognition of the intention becomes part of the mechanism. That is much closer to Grice's meaningNN.  Now consider Metellus. The historical reports say that when Caesar moved against the aerarium (state treasury), Metellus blocked the way and interposed his tribunician authority. [ancientrom...y31-14.com], [jstor.org] A Speranzian reconstruction might separate the two components. I. Mere physical obstruction METELLVS (ante fores aerarii consistit)  "stands before the doors of the treasury"  Gricean analysis This resembles the policeman standing in the road. If Caesar cannot enter, that may be simply because:  Metellus is physically in the way.  The effect is causal.  II. The tribunician act Then comes the crucial Roman addition. METELLVS  Veto. ("I forbid it.")  or more expansively:  Tribunicia potestate veto. ("By tribunician authority, I forbid it.")  Now the intended reasoning is:  I am tribune. Tribunes possess veto power. I am exercising that power. Therefore you are not to proceed.  This is much closer to Grice's policeman raising his hand. The act works through recognition.  III. Caesar's uptake The fascinating thing is that Caesar appears not to misunderstand. The dialogue is not: METELLVS  Veto.  CAESAR  Quid dicis? ("What do you mean?")  Rather: METELLVS  Veto.  CAESAR  Intellego. ("I understand.")  METELLVS  Ergo abstinebis? ("Then you will refrain?")  CAESAR  Non. ("No.")  The communicative act succeeds. The practical effect fails.  Grice's avaricious-man example Your quotation about the pound note is especially apt. Throwing money out the window merely causes the miser to leave. Pointing at the door attempts to get him to leave through recognition of an intention. Similarly:                      ActGricean statusMetellus simply blocks the doorwaycausal obstacleMetellus declares vetocommunicative actCaesar understands but proceedsuptake without obedience So the deepest Gricean moral here is:  Metellus was not primarily trying to stop Caesar with his body. He was trying to stop Caesar by giving Caesar a reason.  The tragedy of the episode is that Caesar recognized the reason perfectly well and decided that, in the circumstances of civil war, it was not a reason he intended to follow. That is why this is such a beautiful case of the separation between meaning, uptake, and compliance. And then we can further the parallelism or lack of it. Grice has it in the present tense: A police stops a car by standing in its way. Implicature: he succeeds. (E.g. the driver does not run him over). Case II: A police stops a car by waving. The police is out of the way so it's only the rational uptake and the driver's rendition or submission to the authority that does the work or trick. In an act of war, which is almost Caesar's -- this does not work because tribune is nothing compared to Caesar with his troops. or security detail -- the sources may say sometehing about this. Caesar does not recognise the AUTHORITY of the tribune, and has ways to override the PHYSICAL BLOCKAGE? Input? Yes, I think you've identified a deeper distinction than the one Grice explicitly draws. Grice's two cases are: Case 1: Physical obstruction  "A policeman stops a car by standing in its way."  The stopping occurs because the policeman constitutes an obstacle. The driver's psychology is almost irrelevant. If he continues, he hits the policeman. So the success condition is largely physical.  Case 2: Symbolic authority  "A policeman stops a car by waving."  Now the policeman is not physically preventing motion. The driver's recognition of authority does the work. The mechanism is normative and communicative rather than mechanical.  Now consider Metellus and Caesar. The historical reports say that Metellus blocked access to the treasury and interposed his tribunician veto; they also report that he was forced aside and that Caesar or Caesar's men threatened him. [ancientrom...y31-14.com], [jstor.org] So we have both Gricean mechanisms operating at once: Stage 1: The body METELLVS  (ante fores aerarii consistit)  He stands before the treasury. This resembles the policeman standing in the road.  Stage 2: The office METELLVS  Veto.  Now he invokes tribunician authority. This resembles the policeman raising his hand. The intended reasoning is:  I am tribune. Tribunes possess a veto. Therefore you are not entitled to proceed.   Where the analogy breaks In ordinary civic life, the driver's acceptance of the policeman's authority is normally taken for granted. But Caesar is not an ordinary citizen driving down an ordinary road. The situation is already one of civil war. So the real question becomes:  Does Caesar recognize the authority?  I would formulate the answer carefully. The sources support saying that Caesar proceeded despite the veto and that Metellus was forced aside. [ancientrom...y31-14.com], [jstor.org] What the sources do not explicitly say is that Caesar failed to understand the authority. Quite the contrary, the dramatic force of the episode comes from the assumption that he understood perfectly well what a tribunician veto was. So the episode is not:  failure of recognition,  but rather:  refusal of compliance.   A Grice–Speranza reconstruction METELLVS  Veto.  CAESAR  Scio te tribunum esse. ("I know that you are a tribune.")  METELLVS  Ergo cessabis. ("Then you will desist.")  CAESAR  Non quia non intellego, sed quia non cedo. ("Not because I do not understand, but because I do not yield.")  That is the crucial distinction. The driver's response to the waving policeman is:  recognition → obedience.  Caesar's response is closer to:  recognition → rejection.   In Gricean language, one might almost say:  the meaningNN succeeds, the uptake succeeds, the perlocutionary goal fails.  Metellus communicates successfully. Caesar understands. What disappears under the pressure of civil war is not meaning, but the institutional framework that normally makes recognition of authority sufficient for obedience. [ancientrom...y31-14.com] For, as Grice would say, after the Rubicon, a tribune is a 'piece of cake' for Caesar. But there is no conversational helpfulness. So imagine that Caesar stopped to listen and argued with the tribune. Why do you oppose my taking the aerarium dough -- and do you think your physical presnece will stop me or block me, little man!? So they go on to argue and Cecilio forgives Giulio's impolite manners, and gives a reason why the aerarium should not be defunded, and Caeasar explains he NEEDS money to build an army to defeat Pompeo -- but the system in hich Pompeo opertes is the one where Cecilio (and not Giulio) operates? Meanwhile, Bruto and Cassio are watching and this is the last but one starw that broke the camel's back? Input? I think this is a very good Grice/Speranza reconstruction, provided we keep separate the history and the philosophical dramatization. Historically, what we can say is:  Metellus was tribune of the plebs in 49 BC. He opposed Caesar's attempt to access the state treasury (aerarium). He interposed his veto and blocked the way. Caesar nevertheless proceeded, and Metellus was forced aside. [ancientrom...y31-14.com], [jstor.org]  Everything else is reconstruction—but fruitful reconstruction. What fascinates me is that, in Gricean terms, Caesar and Metellus are operating under different conversational constitutions. Metellus' world Metellus' reasoning is:  I am tribune. The veto is recognized. Therefore my "Veto" gives you a reason to stop.  This resembles Grice's waving policeman. The authority is institutional. The force of the act depends on recognition of a norm. Caesar's world Caesar's reasoning might be reconstructed as:  I recognize the veto. I deny its practical supremacy in the present emergency.  That is different from misunderstanding. It is almost:  "I understand your reason; I reject its priority."  A very Gricean distinction.  A Speranzian dialogue METELLVS  Veto. ("I forbid it.")  CAESAR  Scio. ("I know.")  METELLVS  Cur ergo pergis? ("Why then do you continue?")  CAESAR  Quia pecunia opus est. ("Because money is needed.")   METELLVS  Aerarium rei publicae est. ("The treasury belongs to the Republic.")  CAESAR  Rem publicam servo. ("I am saving the Republic.")   METELLVS  Non tuam rem publicam. ("Not your Republic.")  CAESAR  Una est. ("There is only one.")   That is where the real disagreement lies. Not over money. Not even over law. But over:  Who speaks for Rome?   The Gricean twist Metellus' utterance:  Veto.  normally carries the implicature:  +> discussion over.  because institutional authority settles the matter. In ordinary Roman politics:  tribune vetoes, others stop.  After the Rubicon, that implicature no longer holds. Caesar hears:  "I forbid it."  and treats it as:  "You prefer that I not do this."  The force of the institutional speech act collapses.  Brutus and Cassius watching As historical fact, I would not attribute this episode directly to the later conspiracy; the sources I found do not make that connection. [ancientrom...y31-14.com] But as a Speranzian symbol, it works beautifully. Brutus and Cassius could be imagined observing: BRVTVS  Intellegitne tribunum? ("Does he understand the tribune?")  CASSIVS  Nimis bene. ("Far too well.")  BRVTVS  Cur ergo non paret? ("Then why does he not obey?")  CASSIVS  Quia iam sibi plus credit quam rei publicae. ("Because he now trusts himself more than the Republic.")  The Gricean moral would be:  The failure is not one of communication. Caesar understands perfectly. The failure is one of accepted authority.  Meaning succeeds. Uptake succeeds. Compliance fails. And that is a much more dangerous political situation than mere misunderstanding.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecilio – Ossia: Grice e Cecilio -- Grex griceiana – Cecilio Why not Jucundus? The Pompeian banker is delightful (and Cambridge Latin Course immortality counts for something), but philosophically he is mostly interesting for documents and transactions. Caecilius Niger, by contrast, gives us:  a man whose declared purpose and suspected purpose diverge,  which is almost a ready-made Grice/Speranza dialogue on intention, sincerity, and implicature.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecina – Ossia: Grice e Cecina: il circolo di Cicerone – GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: CECINA -- Roma – filosofia italiana Aulo Cecina Peto (Roma): il circolo di Cicerone -- A comparison between Grice and Aulus Caecina can be drawn by viewing both as theorists of meaning who explain interpretation through rule‑governed rational practices rather than through brute causation. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning holds that utterances convey more than their literal content because rational agents assume cooperation and reason from what is said to what is meant, using shared principles and contextual expectations. Caecina, as presented by Seneca and echoed in the Ciceronian circle, treats lightning in an analogous way: thunderbolts are not merely physical events but signs that require disciplined interpretation, governed by an established system of rules derived from the Etruscan disciplina and refined through philosophical reasoning. Just as Grice denies that implicatures are automatic or mechanical effects of language, Caecina rejects the idea that every thunderclap directly determines political or moral consequences; both insist that meaning arises through inference rather than direct causation. In this sense, Caecina reads the sky as Grice reads conversation: nature “speaks,” but only a trained reasoner can determine what, if anything, is being communicated. Grice’s emphasis on intentions, maxims, and rational inference thus finds an unexpected classical parallel in Caecina’s lightning lore, where interpretation is constrained by shared norms, background knowledge, and a refusal to infer more than the evidence warrants. A friend of CICERONE, and an expert on divination. According to Seneca, he wrote a book about lightning. Aulo Cecina. Cecina. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice e Cecina,”  GRICEVS: Caecina, si in Circulo Ciceronis fulmina tam diligenter interpretaris, num Iuppiter ipse tibi epistulas mittit, an tantum nimis clara implicatura in caelo est? CAECINA: Nihil mirum, Grice, nam Cicero dicebat omnia esse signa, sed ego addo: si tonat, non statim res publica perit—nisi tu ita inferre velis. GRICEVS: At Seneca narrat te librum de fulmine scripsisse; dic mihi, utrum fulmen sit locutio naturae an oratio brevissima, sine verbis sed cum strepitu? CAECINA: Utrumque, amice: natura loquitur, ego glossemata scribo, et postea omnes dicunt me divinationem docere, cum ego tantum caelum legere coner quasi Ciceronis stylum. o Grice and Speranza have two Cecina here -- but nobody ever cared to distinguish them into minore and maggiore? You’ve spotted something real, but the answer is: No—ancient authors did not systematically distinguish these two “Caecinae” as maggiore / minore. And there is a good Roman reason why they didn’t.  1. First, are they the same “type” of name? Yes—but:  Aulus Caecina (the Ciceronian) Aulus Caecina Paetus (Arria’s husband, Stoic)  Both share:  Aulus → praenomen Caecina → nomen (gens Caecina)  So they belong—at least nominally—to the same gens (Caecina).  2. Why no “maggiore / minore”? Because Romans did not distinguish primarily by chronological size or priority. Instead they used: (a) Additional naming elements  Paetus clearly distinguishes the Stoic:  Aulus Caecina Paetus    (b) Contextual anchoring  Cicero’s circle → “the Caecina of divination” Tacitus/Pliny → “Arria’s husband”  So:  Romans disambiguate by cognomen or narrative context, not by “major/minor” labels (which are later, scholarly habits)   3. Why you feel the need for “maggiore / minore” Because in your case:  both are:  Aulus Caecina philosophically interesting connected to disciplina, interpretation, restraint    So the names collapse.Your instinct is modern and archival:  “we must invent labels to prevent collision”   4. What the Romans would say A Roman would simply insist:  “They are not the same man—because one is Paetus.”  Dropping “Paetus” is exactly what causes your problem.  5. Gricean reinterpretation (the fun part) This is almost a textbook case: What is said:  “Caecina”  What must be inferred:  from Cicero → the lightning-theorist from Tacitus → the Stoic conspirator. So:  “Caecina” is a high-context name, relying on audience competence   6. Your Speranza solution (implicit) You effectively create two files:  Cecina (Ciceronian, interpreter of lightning) Cecina Paetus (Stoic, husband of Arria)  And give them distinct philosophical profiles: Caecina 1Caecina 2interpretation of signsrestraint of utterancedivinationStoic silencesky as textaction as meaning  7. Why no ancient doubling? Because Romans prefer:  intensification (extra names) over external labeling (“major/minor”)  So instead of:  Caecina maior / minor--they do:  Caecina vs. Caecina Paetus. 8. Final answer. Yes, they are distinct individuals. Both belong (nominally) to the gens Caecina. Romans distinguish them by cognomen + context. They do not use “maggiore/minore” type distinctions   9. Final epigram (in your vein)  The modern scholar divides men into greater and lesser; the Roman adds a name—and expects you to remember why.   If you like, we can look at other famous “collisions” (e.g. multiple Scipios, multiple Catones) and see how Romans systematically avoid “major/minor.” And what is the connection with that Roman who adopted Peto as part of his name to honour his father in law? I guess he did not adopt 'Cecina' because it would have sounded prepotent? Connect. Thanks. What does Arria have to do with all this. Who was this 'adopted' Peto's wife that made the original Peto his father in law? Excellent—now we can connect the three threads properly: (1) the name Paetus, (2) Arria and her husband, (3) your intuition about “adopting” a father‑in‑law’s name.  1. Start with the secure core: Arria and Caecina Paetus From the sources:   Arria (Arria Maior)  famous Roman matron wife of Aulus Caecina Paetus [en.wikipedia.org]    Caecina Paetus  Roman senator condemned after a failed revolt under Claudius [en.wikipedia.org]    Arria:  stabbed herself handed the dagger to her husband said: “Paete, non dolet” (“Paetus, it does not hurt”) [en.wikipedia.org]  So:  “Paetus” is simply his cognomen, the name by which Arria addresses him.   2. What is “Paetus” as a name?  It is a cognomen (third name), not a gens. Cognomina often began as:  nicknames (sometimes physical traits) family branch names later inherited markers [Cognomen - NovaRoma]    So:  Paetus ≠ separate family system it is an internal label within (or attached to) the gens Caecina   3. Now your key question: Did someone “adopt” Paetus to honour a father‑in‑law? Here we must be very precise: What Romans did do  Adoption (legal) → changes gens (nomen) Sometimes people also:  preserve or attach additional names signal alliances or ancestry through extra cognomina. What they did NOT normally do  Marriage does not transfer names One does not take the father-in-law’s nomen or cognomen automatically   4. So what about your specific intuition? You are essentially asking:  Could someone take “Paetus” because of a connection through marriage (Arria’s family)?  The answer: Possible as a descriptive or inherited cognomen—but not through formal adoption via the wife. Key principle:  Roman names follow the male line (patrilineal) not the marital (in‑law) line   5. Where Arria actually fits in Arria matters because she fixes the name “Paetus” in cultural memory  Her famous line:  makes “Paetus” a philosophical emblem (Stoic courage)   Later tradition:  remembers the husband primarily as:  “Paetus — the man addressed by Arria”      So:  Arria does not transmit the name legally she amplifies it symbolically   6. Your “prepotence” insight (very good) You suggest:  maybe he avoided adopting “Caecina” because it would sound presumptuous  This is actually quite plausible as a social intuition (though not formally attested):  adopting a gens name → strong legal/juristic claim using a cognomen → lighter, less “prepotent” signal  So in Roman terms: LevelWeightgens (Caecina)heavy, legal identitycognomen (Paetus)lighter, personal / familial marker. So:  taking or emphasizing “Paetus” is socially safer and subtler   7. The real mechanism behind “extra names” By the Imperial period:  names accumulate people signal:  ancestry alliances prestige --but not always by strict adoption So your “adopted Paetus” case is better understood as:  onomastic accumulation, not formal adoptio   8. Final clean answers to your questions “What is the connection?”  Paetus = cognomen of Aulus Caecina Paetus became famous through Arria’s story  “Was it adopted to honour a father‑in‑law?” --not in the formal Roman sense--possibly preserved / emphasized as part of family identity  “Why not adopt Caecina?”  because:  that would require full legal adoption and implies a shift of gens   whereas:  Paetus can circulate more flexibly    “Who was the wife?”  Arria (Arria Major) wife of Caecina Paetus famous for:  Stoic courage “Paete, non dolet” [en.wikipedia.org]     9. Final epigram (your style)  The gens gives a man his place; the cognomen gives him his story— and Arria made “Paetus” unforgettable.   If you like, I can map how “Paetus” reappears later (e.g. Thrasea Paetus) and show how the name becomes almost a Stoic badge across generations—which fits your Grice–Speranza reading beautifully. So it was the son of this Thrasea Paetus who adopted the Paetus to honour his father in law -- so a different Paetus fom the paetus of "non dolet" -- Expand, Input? Yes—now you are exactly on the interesting thread, and it does fork into two different “Paeti,” which are often (quietly) conflated. Let me disentangle the line cleanly.  1. First Paetus: Arria’s husband Aulus Caecina Paetus  gens: Caecinia cognomen: Paetus famous because of:  “Paete, non dolet.”   dies under Claudius (42 CE). This is your original Paetus.  2. Second Paetus: Thrasea Paetus Now we move one generation forward.  Publius Clodius Thrasea Paetus important Stoic senator, opponent of Nero  Here is the key:He is called Paetus as well But:  his nomen is Clodius (not Caecina!) “Paetus” is carried over / attached   3. How does Thrasea get “Paetus”? This is the critical connection.  Thrasea is connected by marriage to Arria’s family specifically:  he marries Arria Minor  the daughter of Arria Major and Caecina Paetus. So:  Thrasea = son‑in‑law of the original Paetus   4. So why is he called “Paetus”? Here your intuition is right, but needs a small correction: not formal adoption (no transfer of gens)--rather:  honorific / familial continuation via cognomen    So:  Thrasea “takes” or retains Paetus to mark connection with that family line   5. Why only “Paetus” and not “Caecina”? Your earlier instinct becomes very sharp here. Because:  Caecina = gens → heavy, legal, exclusive Paetus = cognomen → flexible, attachable. So:  taking “Caecina” would imply full juridical integration taking “Paetus” allows:  association without usurpation    So your word “prepotent” is exactly right:  adopting Caecina would look like claiming the whole lineage retaining Paetus signals respect, not appropriation   6. Third step: the next generation The line continues:  Thrasea Paetus his descendants also carry Paetus  Now the meaning shifts: StageMeaning of “Paetus”Caecina Paetusoriginal family cognomenThrasea Paetusaffinal/honorific continuitylater descendantsinherited identity marker  7. So yes — two Paeti You now have: (A) The “non dolet” Paetus  Caecina Paetus Stoic exemplar via Arria  (B) The Thrasea Paetus line  transmitted through marriage connection philosophically significant (Stoic opposition). Different origins, same emblem.  8. Gricean angle (and Speranza’s gold) This is a perfect case of name acquiring implicature over time:   originally:  “Paetus” = merely a cognomen    after Arria:  “Paetus” ⇒ courage, Stoic endurance    after Thrasea:  “Paetus” ⇒ political Stoicism under Empire    So:  the name begins to mean more than it literally designates   9. Final clean answer  Thrasea Paetus is connected to the original Paetus via marriage (Arria’s daughter). He carries “Paetus” as a familial/honorific cognomen. Not formal adoption, but onomastic continuity.Two historically distinct “Paeti”   10. Final epigram (fitting your project)  The first Paetus was made by Arria’s knife; the second by memory—and the Romans never forgot which name to keep.   If you want, we can trace how “Paetus” becomes almost a Stoic badge-name across Tacitus’ narrative—that’s where your Grice–implicature analogy really tightens. Oops. I guess I meant 'adApt,' not 'adOpt' -- I was indeed indicating that this Clodio (his gens) adOpted 'Peto' and became hereditary -- as a token of affection and remembrance for the sad story of his father in law. Expand? Input? Incidentally, the Ciceronian Caecina, was he not a Peto, too? (And are 'adOpt' and 'adApt' cognate?) Splendid—this is now very precise, and your correction from adOpt → adApt goes straight to the heart of the matter. Let me unfold it carefully.  1. “Paetus” in Thrasea is adapted, not adopted You are right to insist:  Thrasea Paetus does not adopt the name legally; he adapts it socially.  So:  Publius Clodius Thrasea (his proper legal identity) becomes known as:  Thrasea Paetus. This is not adoptio (no change of gens), but:  onomastic adaptation to mark affinity and honour   2. Why “Paetus” becomes hereditary here Now your key intuition:  the name is retained in memory of the father‑in‑law  This is exactly right in spirit. Mechanism:  Thrasea marries Arria Minor  daughter of Arria Major + Caecina Paetus   the name Paetus is already:  morally charged (Arria’s act) Stoically prestigious. So:  “Paetus” becomes a badge of philosophical and familial allegiance  Then:  it passes to descendants becomes, in effect, hereditary within this branch   3. Why not adopt “Caecina”? Your earlier idea of “prepotence” applies beautifully here:  Caecina = gens (heavy, juridical, exclusive) Paetus = cognomen (light, adaptable, expressive)  So:  taking “Caecina” would be a legal claim taking “Paetus” is a commemorative gesture. Hence your formulation:  “token of affection and remembrance” 4. The philosophical effect (Grice would enjoy this) After Arria:  “Paetus” no longer just names a man it implicates:  courage Stoic constancy dignified death    After Thrasea:  it additionally implicates:  resistance to tyranny (under Nero). So the name becomes:  a compressed moral narrative   5. Was the Ciceronian Caecina also “Peto/Paetus”? No—this is an important separation.   Aulus Caecina (Cicero’s friend):  Etruscan aristocrat expert in lightning/divination not known as “Paetus”    Aulus Caecina Paetus (Arria’s husband):  later figure explicitly bears the cognomen Paetus    So: no, the Ciceronian Caecina is not “Paetus”--they are distinct figures within the broader Caecina/ Caecinia naming sphere   6. Your linguistic question: Are adopt and adapt cognate? Yes—very neatly so. Both derive from Latin ad- (“to, toward”):  adoptare → “to choose for oneself, adopt as a child” adaptare → “to fit, adjust to”  So:  WordLatin rootSenseadoptadoptaretake into one’s familyadaptadaptarefit to a purpos. Your correction is philosophically perfect:  Thrasea does not adopt Paetus (legal transfer) he adapts it (symbolic alignment)   7. Final synthesis You can now state the case cleanly:   Original Paetus  Caecina Paetus (Arria’s husband) gives the name its moral force    Thrasea Paetus  Clodian by gens adapts “Paetus” via marriage connection turns it into a heritable Stoic badge     8. Final epigram (worthy of your series)  He did not take the name by law, but wore it by memory— and Rome understood the difference.   If you like, we can track how Tacitus uses “Paetus” almost as a coded moral label—a bit like your Gricean implicature fully lexicalized into a name.Cecina, Aulo C.  Or re adopt/adapt we can perhaps say that the logical grammar is different. We could use either in the case of the son in law. He adopts the NAME of his father in law -- thus ADAPTING his own original name -- whereas ADOPT when applied as a dyadic relation between two people (say Giulio Cesare/Ottavio) only ADOPT is apt. One is adopted by the other. But if the arguments of the relation ADOPT/ADAPT are not 'people', but say a 'person' and a 'name' one can (without Griceian conflation) use either -- 'adopt the name of his father in law thus adapt his previous original name' Feedback? This is very nicely put—and you’re doing exactly what Grice would approve: separating the logical grammar of two superficially similar verbs. Let me refine your proposal a bit and make the distinctions fully explicit.  1. Your central distinction is correct You say:  when the relata are persons, “adopt” is the only proper verb when the relata are person + name, both “adopt” and “adapt” become available  That is exactly right.  2. The two logical schemata We can formalize (very Gricean move): (A) Adopt (personal relation) Binary relation:  ADOPT(x, y) = x takes y as son   both arguments are persons effect:  legal transfer of identity change of gens, status, inheritance, etc.    Example:  Caesar adopts Octavian. Here:  “adapt” would be wrong because nothing is being “fitted”—a legal relation is created   (B) Adopt/Adapt (person–name relation) Now the pattern:  TAKE/USE(x, N) where N = a name  This splits: (i) “Adopt a name”  conventional English usage means:  “take up, assume as one’s own”    (ii) “Adapt a name”  emphasizes:  modification of one’s existing naming structure     3. Your synthesis (refined) Your sentence is excellent; I’d just sharpen it slightly:  He adopts the name of his father‑in‑law, thereby adapting his own original name.  That is philosophically precise because:   “adopts the name” → focuses on addition/appropriation   “adapts his name” → focuses on internal restructuring    4. Why the distinction matters (in the Thrasea case) For Thrasea Paetus: He does not adopt the person (no adoptio). He adopts the name “Paetus”. In doing so, he adapts his existing Clodian identity  So:  ADOPT(person) vs ADOPT(name) vs ADAPT(name)  are three distinct grammatical constructions  5. Gricean payoff Now the really nice bit. There is a potential implicature confusion:   hearing “he adopted Paetus” → might suggest legal adoption   but:  the intended meaning operates at the level of name adoption/adaptation    So the hearer must recover:  the speaker means “onomastic incorporation,” not “legal filiation”   6. Even tighter formulation (if you want to polish it) A very clean Grice–Speranza version would be:  In the case of persons, adoption is constitutive; in the case of names, adoption is appropriative, and adaptation structural.   7. Final verdict on your claim. Your distinction is:  linguistically sound philosophically useful historically appropriate  And not at all a “Gricean conflation”—rather the opposite:  it is a Gricean disambiguation of logical form   8. Final epigram (naturally)  He did not adopt the man, but the name— and in adopting it, he adapted himself.   If you like, we could push this into a mini typology of Roman naming verbs (sumere nomen, inferre cognomen, accipere nomen)—they map quite beautifully onto your adopt/adapt contrast. (a. u. c. DCCV) De fulguribus. Roma. 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecina -- Grice e Cecina Aulo Cecina Peto (Roma): il portico a Roma – In comparing Grice with Aulus Caecina Paetus, the point of contact lies not in doctrine but in the structure of meaning generated under conditions of rational restraint. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning insists that what is communicated is governed by reasoned inference rather than by explicit statement alone: speakers say less than they mean, trusting that hearers will infer more by assuming rational cooperation and sensitivity to norms. Caecina Paetus, as represented through Tacitus and Pliny and crystallized in the scene of his death with Arria, embodies an analogous Stoic economy of speech. His own silence during the conspiracy against Claudius, and Arria’s utterance “It does not hurt” while dying, exemplify a form of meaning that is maximally compressed yet norm-guided. Arria’s words deny pain at the level of what is said, but convey constancy, courage, and moral instruction at the level of what is meant; the hearer is expected to infer these values through shared ethical understanding rather than through explicit exposition. This is precisely the kind of case Grice uses to show that meaning is not reducible to semantics but is constrained by rational expectations about relevance, sufficiency, and purpose. In Caecina’s Stoic world, as in Grice’s conversational framework, restraint is not communicative weakness but communicative strength: reason governs when to speak, when to remain silent, and how much may safely be inferred. Caecina’s Dicta, sparse and transmitted through testimony, thus function as classical instances of reason‑governed implicature, where the force of an utterance lies not in what is asserted but in what a rational audience must, and must be able to, understand. The husband of Arria Peto Maggiore. He belonged to the Porch. He becomes involved ina plot against the emperor Claudio. He was condemned to commit suicide and his wife encouraged him to go through it by committing suicide first, and passing the knife in the proceeding with the infamous utterance, ‘It does not hurt.’ GRICEVS: Caecina, cum ad Porticum pertinere te dicas, num etiam in coniuratione contra Claudium “virtutem” appellasti, an tantum “imprudens consilium” implicuisti? CAECINA: Ego quidem stoice tacui, sed res ipsa clamabat, et Claudius plus audivit ex rumoribus quam ex meis sermonibus. GRICEVS: At Arria, uxor fortissima, cum prior ferrum sibi adegit et dixit “non dolet,” videtur mihi maximi momenti exemplum esse: dixit minus, significavit plus. CAECINA: Ita est, Grice, nam illa uno verbo dolorem negavit, sed omnibus Romanis docuit quid sit constantia—et mihi reliquit tantum officium, non querelas. Cecina, Aulo C. Peto (a. u. c. DCCXCV). Dicta. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecinio – Ossia: Grice e Cecinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cecinio. The Cecinii are a family of Etruscan origin at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the time of Tullio Cicero, and they remained prominent through the first century of the Empire, before fading into obscurity in the time of the Flavian emperors. A family of this name rose to prominence once more at the beginning of the fifth century. The Etruscan roots of the C. are indicated by the form of their nomen, which in the masculine form ends in -na, typical of Etruscan names. The feminine form, Caecinia, is formed as though the masculine form were Caecinius, which is also encountered, though rarely, in inscriptions. The Caecinae seem either to have derived their name from, or given it to, the river Caecina, which flows by the town of Volaterrae, one of the ancient cities of Etruria. A sepulchre belonging to the Caecinae has been discovered near Volaterrae; a beautiful sarcophagus, now in the Museum of Paris, was found inside. The poet Caecina had a villa in the same neighbourhood, and families of the name have resided at modern Volterra until the present day. From the tomb of the Caecinae, we learn that Ceicna was the Etruscan form of the name.[1]  The chief praenomina of the Caecinae were Aulus, Gaius, and Lucius, all of which were common throughout Roman history. Other common praenomina are occasionally found, including Quintus, Publius, and Sextus. The family was divided into several branches, and we accordingly find on the funeral urns the cognomina Caspu and Tlapuni; in Latin inscriptions we also meet with the surnames Quadratus and Placidus, and various others occur. Aulus C., a native of Volaterrae, whom Tullio Cicero defended in his oration, Pro Caecina.[3] Aulus C. A. f. Severus, an orator and scholar of Etruscan culture. He was a political opponent of Giulio Caesar, but was pardoned at the end of the Civil War. He was the author of a work on Etruscan religious practices, which was an important source of information for Pliny the Elder and Seneca the Younger.[4][5][6][7] C., a native of Volaterrae, and friend of Octavian.[8][9] Aulus C. Severus, suffect consul in 1 BC and legate of Germanicus, triumphed over the Cherusci in AD 14. Gaius Caecina Largus, consul suffectus in AD 13. Aulus C. Paetus, consul suffectus in AD 37; put to death by the emperor Claudius in AD 42. Gaius Caecina Largus, consul in AD 42, close friend of Claudius, inhabited the magnificent house which formerly belonged to Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, a contemporary of Cicero. Quintus C. Primus, consul suffectus in AD 53, probably in the middle of the year.[27][28] Gaius C. Tuscus, governor of Egypt, was banished by the emperor Nero.[29][30][31] Aulus C. Alienus, one of Vitellius' generals in AD 69.[32][33][34][35][36] Licinius C., a senator attached to Otho's party, in AD 69.[37][38] Gaius Laecanius Bassus C. Paetus, consul suffectus for the months of November and December in AD 70, and subsequently governor of Asia.[39][40][41][42] Gaius Caecina Largus, governor of Thracia c. AD 198.[43] C. Largus, praefectus annonae c. AD 250.[44] Aulus C. Tacitus, governor of Hispania Baetica, and consul, possibly ordinary consul in 273.[45] Antonius C. Sabinus, consul in AD 316. Caecinia Lolliana, a priestess of Isis, and the wife of Gaius Ceionius Rufius Volusianus Lampadius.[46][47] Publilius Ceionius C. Albinus, presumably the son of Lampadius and Lolliana, was governor of Numidia between 364 and 367.[48] C. Decius Albinus, son of Publilius, was praefectus urbi of Rome in AD 402.[49] Caecina Decius Aginatius Albinus, praefectus urbi of Rome in AD 414.[50] Albinus, praefectus urbi of Rome in AD 426, consul in 444, and praetorian prefect of Italy from 443 to 449. Possibly identical to Aginatius Albinus. Caecina Decius Basilius, consul in 463 and twice praetorian prefect of Italy.[51] C. Decius Maximus Basilius, consul in AD 480 and praetorian prefect of Italy in 483.[52] C. Mavortius Basilius Decius, consul in AD 486.[53] Caecina Decius Faustus Albinus, son of Maximus Basilius, was consul in 493 and praetorian prefect of Italy around 500. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 529 ("Caecina").  Chase, pp. 117, 118.  Cicero, Pro Caecina.  Suetonius, "The Life of Caesar", 75.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, vi. 5–9, xiii. 66.  Hirtius, De Bello Africo, 89.  Seneca the Younger, Quaestiones Naturalis, ii. 39, 56.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xvi. 8, Epistulae ad Familiares, vi. 5.  Appian, Bellum Civile, v. 60.  Tacitus, Annales, i. 31, 32, 56, 60, 63–68, 72, iii. 18, 33, 34.  Cassius Dio, lv. 29, 30, 32.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 112.  Fasti Magistrorum Vici, CIL VI, 10286, 10287.  Fasti Arvalium, AE 1987, 163; 1991, 306; 1991, 307.  Fasti Antiates, CIL X, 6638, CIL X, 6639.  Gordon and Gordon, "Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13".  Diana Gorostidi Pi, "Sui consoli dell’anno 13 d.C.: Nuovi dati dai fasti consulares Tusculani", Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 189 (2014), pp. 269-271  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, iii. 16.  Cassius Dio, lx. 16.  Martial, Epigrammata, i. 14.  Zonaras, xi. 9.  Cassius Dio, lx. 10  Asconius Pedianus, In Ciceronis Pro Scauro, p. 27 (ed. Orelli).  Pliny the Elder, xvii. 1.  Tacitus, Annales, xi. 33, 34.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for the Reign of Claudius", pp. 407, 408, 412, 424.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for the Reign of Claudius", pp. 411, 423, 425.  Tacitus, Annales, xiii. 20, Historiae, iii. 38.  Suetonius, "The Life of Nero", 35.  Cassius Dio, lxiii. 18.  Tacitus, Historiae, i. 52, 53, 61, 67–70, ii. 20–25, 30, 41–44, 71, 99, 100, iii. 13, 14, 31.  Cassius Dio, lxv. 10, 14, lxvi. 16.  Josephus, Bellum Judaïcum, iv. 11. § 3.  Suetonius, "The Life of Titus", 6.  Aurelius Victor, Epitome de Caesaribus, 10.  Tacitus, Historiae, ii. 53.  Pliny the Elder, xx. 18. s. 76.  CIL VI, 200, AE 1908, 86.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", pp. 187, 213.  Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten", p. 304.  Salomies, Adoptive and Polyonymous Nomenclature, pp. 115 ff.  Leunissen, Konsuln und Konsulare, p. 291.  CIL VI, 31849.  CIL VIII, 10988.  CIL VI, 512, CIL VIII, 25990  PLRE, vol. I, p. 511.  PLRE, vol. I, pp. 34–35.  PLRE, vol. I, pp. 35–36.  CIL VI, 1659, CIL VI, 1703.  CIL XV, 7107.  CIL XV, 7420.  CIL X, 6850, CIL X, 6851. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares, Pro Caecina. Aulus Hirtius (attributed), De Bello Africo (On the African War). Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Quintus Asconius Pedianus, Commentarius in Oratio Ciceronis Pro Scauro (Commentary on Cicero's Oration Pro Scauro). Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger), Naturales Quaestiones (Natural Questions). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Flavius Josephus, Bellum Judaïcum (The Jewish War). Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Cassius Dio, Roman History. Sextus Aurelius Victor (attributed), Epitome de Caesaribus. Joannes Zonaras, Epitome Historiarum (Epitome of History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Arthur E. and Joyce S. Gordon, "Roman Names and the Consuls of A. D. 13", in American Journal of Philology, vol. 72, pp. 283–292, (1951). A. H. M. Jones & J. R. Martindale, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (abbreviated PLRE), Cambridge University Press (1971–1992). Paul A. Gallivan, "The Fasti for the Reign of Claudius", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 28, pp. 407–426 (1978); "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 186–220 (1981). Werner Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten der senatorischen Statthalter von 69/70 bis 138/139" (Annual and Provincial Fasti of the Senatorial Governors from AD 69/70 to 138/139), in Chiron, vol. 12 (1982). Paul M. M. Leunissen, Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von Commodus bis Severus Alexander (Consuls and Consulars from the Time of Commodus to Severus Alexander), Verlag Gieben, Amsterdam, (1989). Olli Salomies, Adoptive and Polyonymous Nomenclature in the Roman Empire, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki (1992). Jones, A.H.M.; J.R. Martindale & J. Morris (1971–1992). Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07233-6. Categories: CaecinaeEtruscan familiesRoman gentesRoman gentes of Etruscan origin For the Cecina -- we have two and the gens entry -- your third-best choice alla Speranza/Grice? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cecinio – Ossia: Grice e Cecinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cecinio. For the Caecinae, if we set aside:  Aulus Caecina of Cicero's Pro Caecina (the legal/property-dispute Caecina), Aulus Caecina Severus, the Etruscan scholar of lightning and divination (your Gricean "reader of signs"),  then my third-best Speranza/Grice choice would be:  Aulus Caecina Alienus, one of Vitellius' generals in AD 69. The gens entry explicitly identifies him as one of Vitellius' generals during the Year of the Four Emperors. cite not available; from user-provided text only.  Why him? Because he gives us a wonderful problem of political allegiance as conversational meaning. In civil war, every act says something. A general's march means:  "I support Vitellius."  A defection means:  "I no longer support Vitellius."  A refusal to march means:  "I support him less than I pretend."  The entire political world becomes Gricean.  Grice e Cecina Alieno Before battle VITELLIVS  Mecum esne? ("Are you with me?")  ALIENVS  Imperatori pareo. ("I obey my commander.")   VITELLIVS  Hoc non quaesivi. ("That is not what I asked.")   ALIENVS  Tamen respondi. ("Yet I answered.")   Gricean analysis What is said:  "I obey my commander."  What is not said:  "I am loyal to you."  Vitellius hears the omission. The implicature is generated by what Alienus declines to assert. Very Roman. Very Tacitean. Very Gricean.  Why not Caecina Paetus? Paetus and Arria are magnificent, but the Gricean lesson is almost too obvious:  Paete, non dolet.  is a classic understatement whose communicated content vastly exceeds its literal content. You've already extracted that beautifully.  Why not the lightning Caecina? The lightning Caecina is perhaps the most philosophical of the lot, since he stands halfway between:  natural signs, conventional signs, inference, and divination.  Indeed, one could argue he is the best overall Gricean Caecina.  A sleeper candidate: the friend of Octavian There is also an intriguing Caecina in your list:  Caecina, a native of Volaterrae, friend of Octavian.  The notice tells us almost nothing else. Precisely for that reason, a Speranzian reconstruction could be delicious. OCTAVIANVS  Esne amicus meus? ("Are you my friend?")  CAECINA  Adhuc sum. ("So far, I am.")  The implicature:  friendship during civil war is always provisional.   So my ranking would be:  Aulus Caecina Severus (lightning, signs, interpretation). Aulus Caecina Paetus (non dolet, Stoic implicature). Aulus Caecina Alienus (loyalty, silence, and political meaning).  Of the three, Alienus is perhaps the most purely Gricean, because the central question is:  What does a man's conduct mean when his explicit words are insufficient?  That is almost a Roman version of Grice's distinction between what is said and what is meant.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cedizio – Ossia: Grice e Cedizio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cedizio. Denarius possibly minted by a Caecidius Noctua between 194 and 190 BC. The owl on the reverse may be an allusion to the moneyer's cognomen. The Cedizii are a pfamily at ancient Rome. Members of this gens first came to prominence in the early decades of the Republic, but none obtained the consulship until Quintus C. Noctua. The family faded from public life during the later Republic, but one of the C. was known to Juvenal. “C.” belongs to a class of gentilicia derived from cognomina ending in -ex or -icus. Here, the root seems to be a surname, Caedicus, the meaning of which is uncertain. The Caedicii used the common praenomina Lucius, Gaius, Marcus, and Quintus.  The only cognomen found among the Caedicii of the Republic is Noctua, an owl. Surnames derived from familiar objects and animals were quite common at Rome. Noctia seems to have been a personal cognomen, as it was not borne by later Caedicii. None of the other Caedicii mentioned in history bore any surname. Several numismatists, such as Grueber, nevertheless suggest that this cognomen was a reference to a supernatural warning that Marcus C. witnessed before the Gallic Sack of Rome. Lucius C., tribune of the plebs in 475 BC, charged Spurius Servilius Structus, the consul of the previous year, with mishandling the war against the Veientes, who had occupied the Janiculum. Servilius defended himself ably and was acquitted.[8][9] Marcus C., a commander of the Roman army after the Gallic sack of Rome, urged the senate to grant Marcus Furius Camillus the command against the Gauls.[ Gaius Caedicius, a legates of the consul Lucius Papirius Cursor in 293 BC. He led the cavalry in an important battle against the Samnites.[14] Quintus C., father of Quintus C. Noctua, the consul.[15] Quintus C. Q. f. Noctua, consul. He was censor in 283, but resigned, perhaps due to the death of his colleague, whose name has not been preserved. Quintus Caedicius Q. f. Q. n., consul in 256 BC, during the First Punic War. He died in his year of office and was succeeded by Marcus Atilius Regulus, who won an important naval victory. Caecidius Noctua, triumvir monetalis between 194 and 190 BC.[7][18] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 531 ("Caedicia Gens").  Juvenal, Satirae, xiii. 197, xvi. 46.  Chase, p. 126.  Chase, pp. 112, 113.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. noctua.  Livy, v. 32.  Grueber, Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum, vol. II, pp. 217, 218.  Livy, ii. 52.  Dionysius, ix. 28.  Livy, v. 32, 45, 46.  Plutarch, "The Life of Camillus", 14.  Zonaras, vi. 23.  Appianus, Bella Celtica, 5.  Livy, x. 40.  Fasti Capitolini, AE 1927, 101; 1940, 59, 60.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 184, 188.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 208.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 211. Bibliography Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia (Roman Antiquities). Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Decimus Junius Juvenalis, Satirae (Satires). Plutarchus, Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bella Celtica (The Gallic Wars). Joannes Zonaras, Epitome Historiarum (Epitome of History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Herbert Appold Grueber, Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum, Vol. I-III, London, Trustees of the British Museum (1910). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Category: Roman gentes For this gens, we can imagine the conversation happening while the supernatural warning before the Gaul sack that gave the gens the cognomen? So that the conversation, say 6 moves in Latin, translated, ends with a move by which C. implicates something (+> that-clause following). Thanks They didn't give a hoot what the plebeian was saying. The wiki entry on the gens is rather sloppy in not specifying the actual connection noctua as per Gruber and the other numismatics reports -- because the owl does occur in the coins, that predated Livy, if he only speaks of 'the silence of the night.' But wasn't this plebeian rather good at battling with those Gaulls afterwards? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cedizio – Ossia: Grice e Cedizio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cedizio. This is a lovely Speranza case because the tradition itself is already halfway to a Gricean reconstruction. The sources say that Marcus Caedicius reported a supernatural warning before the Gallic sack of Rome, and later antiquarian speculation connected the cognomen Noctua ("owl") with that warning. Your entry notes that some numismatists thought the owl on the coin alluded to the prodigy witnessed by Marcus Caedicius. The exact content of the conversation is not preserved in the material you've supplied, so what follows is imaginative reconstruction. The historical kernel is the warning; the dialogue is Speranzian embroidery. Conversatio ante cladem Gallicam CAEDICIVS  Audite, Quirites; vox de nocte audita est. "Listen, Romans; a voice was heard in the night."   CIVIS  Quis locutus est? "Who spoke?"   CAEDICIVS  Nescio; hominem non vidi. "I do not know; I saw no man."   CIVIS  Quid ergo dixit vox? "What then did the voice say?"   CAEDICIVS  Gallos adventare monuit. "It warned that the Gauls were approaching."   SENATOR  Num vis nos ex una voce exercitum movere? "Do you want us to mobilize an army because of a single voice?"   CAEDICIVS  Non impero; nuntio. "I do not command; I report."   The Gricean final move CAEDICIVS  Si vox falsa est, nihil amittimus; si vera est, Roma amittitur. "If the voice is false, we lose nothing; if it is true, Rome is lost."  Implicature  +> Rational men should act as though the warning might be true.  Notice that the implication is not literally stated. Caedicius does not say:  Ergo statim arma capite. "Therefore take up arms immediately."  Instead he offers a calculation of risks. The hearers are left to infer:  "The cost of ignoring the warning is greater than the cost of believing it."  That is very Gricean: the conclusion is not asserted but invited.  An even more Speranzian version would exploit the owl (noctua). CIVIS  Cur noctuam tam diligenter spectas? "Why do you watch the owl so carefully?"  CAEDICIVS  Quia noctua non loquitur nisi nocte. "Because the owl speaks only at night."  CIVIS  Et quid significat? "And what does it mean?"  CAEDICIVS  Hoc Roma mox inveniet. "Rome will soon discover."  Implicature  +> A disaster is approaching, even if I cannot yet prove it.  That ending is perhaps the most Gricean of all: Caedicius does not explicitly predict catastrophe; he leaves Rome to draw the conclusion itself. And do we have the Latin for the souce, to check what vocabulary they used. With so many supernatural signs, Speranza thinks that Grice should have given more importance to the Romans and then he'd have natural meaning, non-natural meaning and super-natural meaning. Since here it is a WARNING, perhaps the idea is not so much: "Disaster will occur' but "Prepare" -- Interestingly, Noctua compares to Vaerlio CORVUS -- the two cognomina mentioning specific avians. Thanks Yes, and the actual Latin is quite revealing. Livy writes:  Eodem anno M. Caedicius de plebe nuntiavit tribunis se in Nova via, ubi nunc sacellum est supra aedem Vestae, vocem noctis silentio audisse clariorem humana, quae magistratibus dici iuberet Gallos adventare. "In that year Marcus Caedicius, a plebeian, reported to the tribunes that in the Nova Via ... he had heard in the silence of the night a voice clearer/louder than a human voice, which ordered that the magistrates be told that the Gauls were approaching." [loebclassics.com]  A few words jump out:  vox — a voice. clariorem humana — "clearer/louder than a human one." magistratibus dici iuberet — "ordered that the magistrates be told." Gallos adventare — "the Gauls are approaching."  Notice your point: the message is not simply predictive:  "Disaster will occur."  Rather, it is structured as a warning directed to officials:  "Tell the magistrates."  That is already halfway to an imperative. The supernatural voice isn't merely conveying information; it is seeking action.  Grice's Third Category? Your joke about  natural meaning, non-natural meaning, supernatural meaning,  is actually rather apt. Grice's example:  Those spots mean measles.  Natural meaning. The policeman:  raises his hand.  Non-natural meaning. Marcus Caedicius gives us a strange hybrid:  a supernatural source intentionally communicates a warning.  The Roman religious mentality wants to treat the voice as having:  an author, an intention, a message, and practical consequences.  In Gricean terms, Jupiter is behaving suspiciously like a speaker.  The neglected implicature Livy's next sentence is also important:  Id ... propter auctoris humilitatem spretum "This was disregarded because of the low status of the informant." [loebclassics.com]  The problem was not misunderstanding. People understood perfectly well that:  Gallos adventare.  The problem was uptake. The Romans reasoned:  "A mere plebeian reports this."  and treated that as grounds for dismissal. A wonderfully Gricean failure of cooperative reasoning.  A six-move dialogue Here's a reconstruction closer to Livy's wording. Latin CAEDICIVS  Vocem noctis silentio audivi.  TRIBVNVS  Cuius vocem?  CAEDICIVS  Clariorem humana.  TRIBVNVS  Quid dixit?  CAEDICIVS  Magistratibus dici iussit Gallos adventare.  TRIBVNVS  Et quid nos facere vis?  CAEDICIVS  Nihil dico.  Translation CAEDICIUS  I heard a voice in the silence of the night.  TRIBUNE  Whose voice?  CAEDICIUS  One louder than a human voice.  TRIBUNE  What did it say?  CAEDICIUS  It ordered that the magistrates be told that the Gauls were approaching.  TRIBUNE  And what do you want us to do?  CAEDICIUS  I say nothing.  Implicature  +> You should prepare for the arrival of the Gauls.  That conclusion is never explicitly stated.  Noctua and Corvus Your comparison with Valerius Corvus is excellent. Both are bird cognomina:  Corvus = raven. Noctua = owl.  But the symbolic force differs. The raven becomes an active military helper in the famous duel of Corvus. The owl is associated with:  night, warning, portent, watchfulness.  So if Grueber's interpretation is right, Noctua isn't merely "owl." It may function almost as:  "the family of the man who heard the warning in the night."  A much more Gricean bird than Corvus, because it is connected not with combat but with interpretation. The raven helps win the fight; the owl asks whether anyone will understand the message. Of course Grice was joking with his meaningN and meaning NN--what is Natural about 'the budget meansN will have a hard year'. Plus he did not believe in gaps. So surely meaningN/meaningNN leaves nothing out -- "Even if some uses of 'mean' would be borderline' as he grants. In the owl case, the Romans dismissing the plebeian status of the reporter, treated as merely meaningNN rather than SUPER-natural. Now, Grice is joking. This is the physis -- a NATURA category, metaphysical. ALL IS NATURAL. Here the owl is more likely an envoy of MINERVA right -- la civetta di Minerva? Boezio says vox significativa and yet adds: animal also have voices, but not significativa. Wrong! The owl behaves propositionally: "that you should tell the magistrates that the gaulls are coming" -- cf. the brits are coming. This was in a specific 'via.' Most likely it was just a hoot, and the Romans didn't give a hoot to it? Thanks Yes, I think there are several Gricean jokes hidden here. First, on meaningN and meaningNN. Grice never really intended "natural meaning" to be a grand metaphysical category. As you say, the label is almost mischievous. "Those spots mean measles" and "the budget means a hard year" are already rather different uses of mean. Grice's real target is not Nature versus Artifice, but:  meaning that does not depend on communicative intention, meaning that does depend on communicative intention.  The names meaningN and meaningNN are a classificatory convenience. So a Roman augur, an Etruscan diviner, or Caecina interpreting lightning might well object:  Nothing is more natural than Jupiter's communicating through signs.  From their viewpoint, a divine message is not outside nature; it is part of the structure of reality.  The Caedicius case is especially interesting because Livy's vocabulary is strikingly intentional. He says:  quae magistratibus dici iuberet Gallos adventare "which ordered that the magistrates be told that the Gauls were approaching." [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  That is not merely:  "a sound occurred."  Nor even:  "an owl hooted."  The reported content already contains:  an imperative (iuberet), an audience (magistratibus), a proposition (Gallos adventare).  In Gricean terms, the voice is represented as having something very close to communicative intention.  Your point about Boethius is nice. Boethius' contrast:  human vox significativa, animal voice not significant,  would look dubious to a Roman diviner. A Roman might answer:  "The owl is not merely producing noise. The owl is conveying something."  Indeed, the whole Roman religious apparatus presupposes that birds can be read propositionally. Not:  owl ⇒ owl  but:  owl ⇒ that battle should be postponed.  or:  owl ⇒ that the magistrates should attend carefully.  The sign is already interpreted as having structured content.  And yes, Minerva inevitably enters the picture. Historically, Livy speaks of a mysterious voice, not of Minerva or of an owl. The owl connection comes later through the cognomen Noctua and antiquarian speculation about the family memory of the prodigy. [ancientrom...y31-14.com] But a Speranzian reconstruction could certainly have a Roman say:  Noctua Minervae nuntia est. "The owl is Minerva's messenger."  The bird becomes an envoy. Almost a divine diplomat.  What I particularly like is your observation that the Romans' mistake was not necessarily one of semantics but of source-credibility. Livy explicitly says the warning was disregarded:  propter auctoris humilitatem because of the low social standing of the informant. [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  So they did not reason:  "No message was sent."  They reasoned:  "The messenger is not worth listening to."  A wonderfully Roman form of dismissing testimony.  The most Gricean reconstruction might be: CAEDICIVS  Gallos adventare.  MAGISTRATVS  Quis dicit? ("Who says so?")  CAEDICIVS  Vox.  MAGISTRATVS  Quis es tu? ("Who are you?")  CAEDICIVS  Plebeius.  MAGISTRATVS  Tum nihil dicit vox. ("Then the voice says nothing.")  The irony, of course, is that they are evaluating not the content but the social standing of the witness. And then Rome gets sacked. As for "they didn't give a hoot"—that is probably the most Speranzian ending available. The owl may or may not have been Minerva's envoy; but Livy's moral is clear enough: Rome paid far more attention to the rank of the reporter than to the content of the report. [ancientrom...y31-14.com] They didn't give a hoot what the plebeian was saying. The wiki entry on the gens is rather sloppy in not specifying the actual connection noctua as per Gruber and the other numismatics reports -- because the owl does occur in the coins, that predated Livy, if he only speaks of 'the silence of the night.' But wasn't this plebeian rather good at battling with those Gaulls afterwards? Thanks I think your criticism of the gens entry is fair. The entry carefully reports two separate facts:  Marcus Caedicius heard the supernatural warning before the Gallic sack (from Livy). [ancientrom...y31-14.com] Some numismatists, including Grueber, suggested that the later cognomen Noctua ("owl") and the owl on the coin might allude to that famous warning episode (as your supplied gens article reports).  But the article never really explains how the two are supposed to connect. As you note, Livy's text says:  vocem noctis silentio audisse "he had heard a voice in the silence of the night" [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  Livy says nothing about an owl. So the owl connection is not Livy's. It's an antiquarian or numismatic interpretation trying to explain why a later Caedicius would place an owl on his coin. A fuller article might have said something like:  "Although Livy reports only a mysterious nocturnal voice, some modern numismatists have interpreted the owl (noctua) on coins of the Caedicii as a retrospective family reference to Marcus Caedicius' famous night-time warning."  That would make the logic much clearer.  As to your second question:  wasn't this plebeian rather good at battling those Gauls afterwards?  The source material does not say that. What Livy explicitly tells us is:  Marcus Caedicius was a plebeian. He reported the warning. The warning was ignored. Rome suffered the Gallic disaster. [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  The gens article separately mentions:  Marcus Caedicius, a commander after the Gallic sack, urged the Senate to give command to Camillus.  But the article does not explicitly identify that commander as the same Marcus Caedicius who heard the voice. The similarity of name is suggestive, but the text as given does not prove identity. So a careful historian must stop short of saying:  "the warning-hearer later became a successful anti-Gallic commander."  The evidence supplied does not establish that.  From a Speranza-Grice angle, though, it is tempting to imagine the irony: Before the sack  "A plebeian says the Gauls are coming."  Romans:  "Who listens to him?"  After the sack  "Perhaps we should have listened."  And yes, your joke is probably the best summary:  They didn't give a hoot what the plebeian was saying.  The remarkable thing in Livy is that the warning itself is not treated as obscure. The failure lies in the social reception:  propter auctoris humilitatem spretum "it was disregarded because of the low status of the informant." [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  A perfect Roman case in which the problem is not the message, but the messenger. Not only they dismissed and didn't give a hoot about what C. Noctua was saying but stuck him with that nickname for posterity -- Cedizio The Hoot. Cruel Romans. It is only reasonable and humanitarian that a later Cedizio (who else) would investigate the history, recall the warning, and the general, and adds the source of the hoot (the noctua -- which was preserved in the humorous nickname C. acquired) afterwards? Thanks -- the Romans dismissing the signal as coming from a plebeian is Dumezil: the augur is the third-caste -- they cannot start believing everyone or the system collapses. You had to be either agrarian (say, plebeian, farmer), or warrior or augur? Thanks I think as Speranzian mythology of the gens, that is actually a rather attractive reconstruction—provided we distinguish it from what Livy explicitly says. What Livy gives us is:  Marcus Caedicius hears a mysterious nocturnal voice. The voice orders that the magistrates be told that the Gauls are coming. The warning is disregarded because of the informant's humble status (propter auctoris humilitatem spretum). [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  What Livy does not give us is:  an owl, the cognomen Noctua, any explanation of an owl-symbol.  Those belong to the later numismatic interpretation reported in your gens entry. So the Grueber-style hypothesis almost writes itself:  An early Caedicius hears a warning in the night. The warning is ignored. The family remembers. Later Caedicii adopt or celebrate the owl (noctua) as a family emblem of the warning that Rome ignored.  That is not Livy; it is an antiquarian reconstruction. But it is a plausible family-memory story.  I also like your joke:  Rome ignored him, and then commemorated him forever as "Caedicius the Hoot."  There is a very Roman cruelty in that. One can imagine a later Caedicius saying: CAEDICIVS IUNIOR  Cur Noctua vocamur? ("Why are we called Owl?")  SENEX  Quia maior noster monuit. ("Because our ancestor warned them.")  CAEDICIVS IUNIOR  Et audiverunt? ("And did they listen?")  SENEX  Minime. ("Not at all.")  CAEDICIVS IUNIOR  Et tamen Noctua manemus? ("And yet we remain Owl?")  SENEX  Ita. Roma numquam errorem suum obliviscitur; tantum aliter narrat. ("Yes. Rome never forgets its mistake; it merely retells it differently.")   As for Dumézil, I think your insight is interesting, though it goes beyond what Livy explicitly says. In Dumézil's tripartite scheme, very roughly:  sacred/juridical function, warrior function, productive/agricultural function.  The problem with Marcus Caedicius is that he is not speaking from the recognized religious office. He is not:  augur, pontifex, haruspex.  He is merely:  a plebeian reporting a voice.  From an institutional viewpoint, believing him creates a problem:  If every citizen can report divine warnings directly, what becomes of the official machinery for interpreting divine signs?  That is close to the point you're making. The issue is not only:  "He is low-status."  but also:  "He lacks the authorized role."  In a Dumézilian reading, the message arrives through somebody who stands outside the recognized channel for such messages.  And that is perhaps the deepest Gricean irony. The Romans do not reject the content because it is supernatural. Romans loved supernatural warnings. They reject the report because the wrong person reports it. The failure is institutional, not semantic. The warning means:  Gallos adventare.  The difficulty is deciding:  Who is entitled to say what the gods mean?  That is a much more Roman question than whether the owl actually hooted – owl emojy.  Also Boezio, drawing on De Interpretatione distinguishes between articulated voice humana and animal voice -- "I heard a hoot". "I heard a vox". What did it say? "That the magistrates were to be informed of the gauls arriving." "That was quite an articulated vox." (Murmur: "It was a hoot". Was it a hoot? "A repeated hoot, I would say. It was clearer than human voice: Eodem anno M. Caedicius de plebe nuntiavit tribunis se in Nova via, ubi nunc sacellum est supra aedem Vestae, vocem noctis silentio audisse clariorem humana, quae magistratibus dici iuberet Gallos adventare.-- What C. heard: "ma--gi--stra---ti---bus---dici--iu--be--re--tt---galllos---ad--ven---t--a--re? Input? Yes—and here we're right at the border between Aristotle, Boethius, Livy, and Grice. The crucial Livian phrase is:  vocem ... audisse clariorem humana "he had heard a voice clearer/louder than a human one" [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  Notice: Livy does not say  strigem audivit ("he heard an owl"), or noctuam audivit ("he heard an owl").  He says:  vocem.  And not just any voice:  a voice carrying a message: quae magistratibus dici iuberet Gallos adventare "which ordered that the magistrates be told that the Gauls were approaching." [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  Now from a Boethian-Aristotelian perspective this is already remarkable. Boethius, following De Interpretatione, distinguishes:  mere voice (vox), articulated/significant voice (vox significativa).  Animals have sounds. Humans have discourse. But Livy's report is awkward for that distinction. Because what Marcus Caedicius reports is not:  "hoo-hoo-hoo"  but effectively:  "Tell the magistrates that the Gauls are approaching."  That is propositional content. Indeed it contains:  an imperative component  magistratibus dici iuberet   a proposition  Gallos adventare    The "voice" behaves almost like a speaker.  This is where your Noctua hypothesis becomes amusing. Suppose the original phenomenon was in fact nothing more than:  a repeated owl-call.  Then the possibilities are: Version 1: Livy's supernatural reading The voice literally communicated:  "Gallos adventare."  Version 2: Augural interpretation The owl merely hooted. Marcus interpreted the hoot as:  +> danger approaches. +> inform the magistrates.  The informational content comes from interpretation. Version 3: Gricean reconstruction The owl produced:  hoo-hoo-hoo.  Caedicius supplied:  "The gods intend me to understand that the Gauls are coming."  Which would make the owl something like a divine utterance whose content is pragmatically recovered.  One can imagine the dialogue. TRIBVNVS  Quid audisti? ("What did you hear?")  CAEDICIVS  Vocem.  ("A voice.") TRIBVNVS  Quid dixit?  ("What did it say?") CAEDICIVS  Gallos adventare.  ("That the Gauls are coming.") (murmur among the crowd) QVIDAM  Noctua erat. ("It was an owl.")  CAEDICIVS  Fortasse. ("Perhaps.")  QVIDAM  Noctua Latine loqui non potest. ("An owl cannot speak Latin.")  CAEDICIVS  Nec Galli. ("Neither can the Gauls.")  That's almost the joke. The whole issue is whether the content belongs to:  the sound, the hearer, or the gods.   And that's why your suggestion of a Gricean third category is so entertaining. For Grice:  meaningN: smoke means fire. meaningNN: waving means stop.  For a Roman augur:  the owl means Rome should prepare.  Not because of brute causation. Not because of ordinary communicative intention. But because the world itself is treated as an intentional sign-system. A Caedicius or a Caecina might well say:  Natura non loquitur; di loquuntur per naturam. ("Nature does not speak; the gods speak through nature.").  Which is perhaps the most Roman reply imaginable to both Boethius and Grice. In fact, as Grice would remark, at least 'it was not a parrot.' Grice's favourite anecdote by John Locke commenting on Prince Maurice's parrot who could speak -- and which has Locke distinguishing a 'very intelligent rational parrot' from 'Man' -- later Grice will combine the parrot with Carnap's pirot (as in pirots carulise elatically) and speak of Humans as very intelligent rational pirots. The parrot's voice is more 'articulated' than the 'voice in the silence of the night' in Via Novi that communicated to C. that the magistrates ought to be informed tthat the Gaulls were coming. Livy's reference to the dismissal is social critique -- "I told you!" -- because retrospectively, it works that they SHOULD have paid notice, even if coming from a plebeian who had the cheek, as you say, not to provide HIS interpretation of a 'hoot' but to provide the full message with the interpretant. Livy's implicature is that the Gauls WERE coming -- and C. 'knew' or felt he knew that -- else, why mention the anecdote at all? Is Livy criticising Dumezil? Input? Feedback? Thanks Yes, I think you're putting your finger on something quite deep in Livy. The key thing is that Livy does not narrate the episode as a puzzle about acoustics. He does not ask:  Was it an owl? Was it a voice? Was it a dream?  Instead he reports:  M. Caedicius ... nuntiavit tribunis ... vocem ... audisse ... quae magistratibus dici iuberet Gallos adventare. [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  The content is already fully interpreted. The reported message is not:  "hoo."  It is:  "Tell the magistrates that the Gauls are approaching."  So Marcus Caedicius appears not merely as a hearer but as an interpreter.  The Locke-Parrot angle Your comparison with Locke's parrot is very apt. The famous parrot allegedly speaks. The philosophical problem becomes:  Is this merely articulate sound? Or genuine rational discourse?  Now compare Caedicius. The paradox is that the "voice" of the night is in one sense less articulate than Locke's parrot:  we never meet the speaker, we never observe the utterance, we only hear Caedicius' report.  Yet it is in another sense more articulate:  it contains a proposition, an imperative, a recipient, a practical recommendation.  It already comes packaged with its interpretation.  Livy's real interest I think you're right that Livy's interest lies elsewhere. The sentence immediately following is crucial:  propter auctoris humilitatem spretum "it was disregarded because of the low status of the informant." [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  That is social criticism. The issue is not:  "Could a voice really mean that?"  The issue is:  "Why did nobody listen?"  And Livy's answer is:  Because the witness was socially insignificant.   "I told you!" Exactly. The whole anecdote is retrospective. Livy already knows:  the Gauls came.  His readers know:  the Gauls came.  Therefore the episode acquires the structure:  warning, dismissal, catastrophe.  The implied lesson is:  the warning should have been taken seriously.  Otherwise there would be little point in narrating it.  Is Livy criticizing Dumézil? Not literally, of course—Dumézil is two millennia later. But he may be criticizing something that a Dumézilian might find structurally necessary. You put it well:  If every plebeian may report divine messages, the official system becomes unstable.  The Roman religious system normally contains authorized interpreters:  augurs, pontiffs, haruspices.  Caedicius is none of these. He is a plebeian reporting a message directly. Livy's story seems to suggest that rigid attention to status can itself become a source of disaster. The irony is:  Rome had a message. Rome had its content. Rome lost because it mistrusted the messenger.   A Gricean reformulation Perhaps the most Gricean way of putting it is: The Romans did not reject the meaning. They rejected the speaker. Or: Caedicius:  "Gallos adventare."  Magistrates:  "Who says so?"  Caedicius:  "I do."  Magistrates:  "That is the problem."  And Livy's retrospective implicature is indeed:  +> Had they attended to the content rather than the social rank of the witness, Rome might have been better prepared. [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  As for the owl, I rather like your reconstruction: perhaps what happened historically was a nocturnal sign, perhaps even an owl-call. But family memory, numismatic symbolism, and Livy's moral narrative gradually transformed the hoot into a proposition. The owl became, in effect, a very Roman "rational pirot." Owl emojy.  But the anecdote must have been the talk of the town for Livy to care to report it centuries later -- it is like the cackling of the geese of the Capitolinus. Although Livy does not say 'owl' -- why bring that some plebeian had such an elaborate message to the magistrates? Also Via Novi seems proximate. He could have just said: "I think I saw them or heard them." Instead, he brings this nocturnal voice -- and can we parse the indirect message -- where is the imperative 'dici'? the voice 'ordered' -- iubet -- how can a VOICE order? that's a categorial mistake -- PEOPLE or authorities order -- why inerprose the magistrates -- this was not just Riviere: The brits are coming. This is strategical warning -- Tell not the old wives at the gathering BUT THE MAGISTRATES that they may prepare the troops -- about the information of the impending Gaul attack? Thanks  I think you're reading Livy exactly in the direction he wants to be read. The striking thing is not merely that a voice was heard. The striking thing is the complexity of the message. Livy's wording is:  vocem noctis silentio audisse clariorem humana, quae magistratibus dici iuberet Gallos adventare "a voice, clearer than a human one, which ordered that the magistrates be told that the Gauls were approaching." [ancientrom...y31-14.com]  Let's parse the grammar. The relative clause:  quae ... iuberet  refers back to vox. Literally:  "a voice ... which ordered..."  As you observe, that is almost a category mistake. Voices do not normally order. Persons order. Authorities order. Generals order. Yet Roman prodigy-language constantly anthropomorphizes signs. The vox is functioning as if it were an agent.  The really important word is not Gallos adventare. It is:  magistratibus dici  "that it be told to the magistrates." The content is not merely:  The Gauls are coming.  The content is:  Tell the magistrates that the Gauls are coming.  So the structure is: Proposition  Gallos adventare.  Directive  magistratibus dici.  Authority  iuberet.  The voice is not reporting. The voice is commanding.  This is why your comparison with Paul Revere is only partial. Paul Revere says:  The British are coming.  Livy's voice says something closer to:  Inform the competent authorities immediately because the Gauls are coming.  The message already contains a theory of political action. The voice is effectively saying:  Don't gossip. Don't panic. Tell the people who can mobilize the army.   And that, I think, explains why Livy preserves the story. If Marcus Caedicius had simply said:  Gallos vidi. "I saw Gauls."  or  Gallos audivi. "I heard Gauls."  the anecdote would be much less remarkable. Instead we have:  a mysterious nocturnal voice, an imperative, a chain of communication, official recipients, subsequent disaster.  It is a perfect warning narrative.  As for the owl, I think your reconstruction is better than many modern summaries. Livy nowhere says:  owl.  But the later family memory represented by Noctua may be trying to answer precisely the question:  What was the source of this nocturnal warning?  An owl is a natural candidate because:  it belongs to the night, it already carries religious associations, it can generate an eerie "voice in the silence."  So one can imagine a family tradition developing:  The warning came by night. The warning came from the noctua. Therefore we are the Noctua branch.  That is speculation, but at least it gives a rational bridge between Livy's vox nocturna and the later numismatic owl.  The deepest Gricean point, however, is this: Marcus Caedicius does not report the sound. He reports the content. Nobody asks:  What phonemes did the voice produce?  or  Was it a hoot?  Instead the report is already at the level of what Grice would call the communicated message. The form is lost. The meaning survives. Which is perhaps why Livy cared enough to preserve it centuries later. The story is not really about acoustics at all. It is about a warning that turned out to be right—and a city that ignored it. The social critique comes in the next sentence:  propter auctoris humilitatem spretum,  because they dismissed it on account of the humble status of the reporter. [ancientrom...y31-14.com] Livy's implicit moral is almost:  They asked the wrong question. Not "Who is speaking?" but "Who is carrying the message?" and, disastrously, they judged the message by the messenger. [ancientrom...y31-14.com]

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CEI

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cei – Ossia: Grice e Cei: la ragione conversazionale a Roma – l’implicatura conversazionale del fratello d’Antonino. Lucio Vero Cei: la ragione conversazionale a Roma – l’implicatura conversazionale del fratello d’Antonino. Grice: “The gens  Ceionia does not have a direct, widely recognized Italian surname equivalent, as a Roman gens names does not typically evolve into a surname in a linear fashion. However, C. is the closest linguistic descendant or a form derived from it.  Despite being frequently contrasted with ANTONINO’s legendary discipline alla PORTICO, C. is highly educated. He studies philosophy under noted teachers such as Apollonius of Chalcedon and Sextus of Chaeronea. Patronage and Culture: He is credited with promoting philosophy across the Empire. He uses his position to support philosophes, and the study of philosophy, helping to maintain Rome as a centre of philosophical thought. While historical accounts often emphasize his "worldly passions" (such as games and luxury) over his intellectual depth, his co-rule was part of a period where the principles of IL PORTICO —specifically virtue, rationality, and duty—are the guiding ideals of the imperial administration.  il principe filosofo di Siracusa. Cuoco. Platone in Italia. Filosofo romano. Filosofo lazio. Filosofo italiano.  Roma, Lazio. Like Antonino, he is adopted by Antonino Pio. They share many tutors, including Erode Attico, Frontone, Apollonio, and Sesto. They both succeed the throne when their adoptive father dies. When he dies, his brother deifies him for the Roman people. Quando ANTONINO , gia cesare d’Antonino Pio, divenne augusto alla morte del padre adottivo, si verifica un fatto straordinario. L’impero romano ha pella prima volta nella sua storia DUE imperatori legittimi. Ma come si giunse a questa anomala Oxford University Press, . Baird, F. E. Philosophic Classics, Volume I: Ancient Philosophy. Routledge, . Dio Cassius. Cassius Dio's History. Caesar and Christ. Simon & Schuster, . Grant, M. The Climax of Rome. Weidenfeld, Harvey, B. K. Daily Life in Ancient Rome. Focus, . Hays, G., translator. Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Modern Library, . Lewis, J. E. The Mammoth Book of Eyewitness Ancient Rome. il principe filosofo. GRICEVS: Cei, si gens Ceionia cognomen Italicum non peperit, num hoc ipsum implicat Romanos tam nobiles fuisse ut ne posteri quidem eos “in cognomen” contrahere auderent? CEI: Fortasse, Grice, sed ego implico me potius philosophum quam luxuriosum videri, cum tamen inter ludos et delicias discipulos Apollonii et Sexti in mensa mea alere soleam. GRICEVS: Antoninus quidem ad Porticum te semper opponitur, sed ego suspicor te virtutem et officium colere—tantum paulo clarius dicere deberes, ne populus solum de balneis tuis loquatur. CEI: Age, Grice, frater me post mortem divinizavit, quod est maxima conversatio Romana: cum nihil iam dicere possim, urbs tamen ex silentio meo totum elogium colligit.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cei – Ossia: Grice e Cei -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cei. The Ceionii or Caeionii or the Caeionii family was an ancient Roman senatorial family of imperial times. The first member of the gens to obtain the consulship was Lucius C. Commodus. The rise of this family culminated in the elevation of the emperor Lucius Verus, born Lucius C. Commodus. The Ceionii were probably of Etruscan origin. Their nomen resembles other Etruscan names, such as Cilnius, and the family does not appear in history before the first century. The historian Aelius Spartianus wrote that they came from Etruria, or perhaps from the town of Faventia, which was itself of Etruscan origin. The praenomina used by the Ceionii were Lucius, Gaius, and Marcus.  The most illustrious family of the Ceionii bore the cognomen Commodus, meaning "friendly, obliging," or "pleasant." The agnomen Verus, meaning "true", was borne by some members of this family. Many other surnames occur, some of which were ordinary cognomina, such as Rufus, meaning "red" or "reddish," or Bassus, "stout".[3][4] However, as with many families of imperial times, many surnames were acquired from other families to whom the C. were related or otherwise politically connected.[1]  Postumus, a surname belonging to the father of the emperor Albinus, is derived from the praenomen Postumus, referring to a youngest child, although a popular false etymology derived it from post humus, "after burial", meaning a child born after his father's death.[5][4] In a letter referred to by the historian Julius Capitolinus, C. Postumus claimed to be a descendant of the ancient patrician house of the Postumii, whose nomen was itself derived from the praenomen Postumus.[6] C. named his son Albinus, supposedly in reference both to the extraordinary whiteness of his skin, and to the noble family of the Postumii Albini; however, several other members of the gens also bore the surname Albinus.[7][3]  This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Ceionii Commodi Lucius Ceionius Commodus, consul in AD 78.[8][9] Lucius Ceionius (L. f.) Commodus, consul in AD 106.[10][11] Lucius Ceionius L. f. (L. n.) Commodus Verus, consul in AD 136, adopted by the emperor Hadrian as his heir.[12] (Marcus?) Ceionius (Commodus?), father of the consul of AD 156. Marcus Ceionius Silvanus, consul in AD 156.[13] Lucius Ceionius L. f. L. n. Commodus, better known as Lucius Verus, emperor with his adoptive brother Marcus Aurelius from AD 161 to 169.[14][15][16] Ceionia L. f. L. n. Fabia, one of the sisters of Lucius Verus, was originally betrothed to Marcus Aurelius; the engagement was dissolved at the request of Antoninus Pius, and she married Plautius Quintillus, consul in AD 159.[17][18] Ceionia L. f. L. n. Plautia, a sister of Lucius Verus, married Quintus Servilius Pudens, consul in AD 166.[19][18] Gaius Avidius Ceionius L. f. L. n. Commodus, the brother of Lucius Verus. Ceionii Albini Ceionius Postumus, said by the Historia Augusta to be the father of the emperor Albinus.[7] Syme said he is an invention of the author.[20] Decimus Clodius Albinus, emperor from AD 196 to 197.[21][22][23][24] Ceionius Postumianus, a relative of the emperor Albinus, who helped him gain the attention of the Antonines.[25] Syme said he is an invention of the Historia Augusta.[20] Ceionius Albinus, a distinguished man, probably a relative of the emperor Albinus, put to death by Septimius Severus.[26] Syme said he is an invention of the Historia Augusta.[20] Ceionius Albinus, praefectus urbi under the emperor Valerian; his full name may have been Marcus Nummius Ceionius Annius Albinus. A Nummius Albinus was praefectus urbi in AD 256.[27][28] Gaius Ceionius Rufius Volusianus, praefectus urbi of Rome in AD 310 and 311, and from 313 to 315, as well as consul in 311 and 314. Ceionius C. f. Rufius Albinus, consul in AD 335, and praefectus urbi from 335 to 337. Gaius Ceionius Rufius Volusianus signo Lampadius, praetorian prefect of Gaul in AD 354 and 355, proconsul of Africa, and praefectus urbi in 365.[29][30] Ceionius C. f. Rufius Albinus, praefectus urbi from AD 389 to 391.[31] Ceionius C. f. Rufius Volusianus, vicar of Asia before 390.[32][33] Publius Ceionius C. f. Caecina Albinus, grandfather of Eustochius, Bishop of Tours during the mid-5th century.[34] Ceionii Juliani Ceionius Julianus, praefectus urbi in AD 310 and 311, a friend of the historian Vopiscus. Possibly fictitious or a confusion with the other Juliani.[35][36] Marcus Ceionius Julianus Camenius, proconsul of Africa from 326 to 333 and praefectus urbi of Rome in 333–334.[37][38] Publius Publilius Ceionius M. f. Julianus, corrector of Tuscany and Umbria before 370.[39][40] Alfenius Ceionius P. f. M. n. Julianus Camenius, a pagan, held several priesthoods and was vicar of Africa in 381.[41][42][43] Caeionius Camenius, possibly a son of Alfenius.[44] Caeionia Fusciana, sister of Caeionius Camenius.[45] Others Ceionius, praefectus castrorum under Publius Quinctilius Varus, took his own life after the disaster of Teutoburg Forest, in AD 9.[46] Marcia Aurelia Ceionia Demetrias, a freedwoman of the emperor Lucius Verus, and mistress of the emperor Commodus, in whose downfall she played a prominent part; she was later put to death by Didius Julianus.[47][48][49] Ceionius Virius Bassus, consul in AD 271, and a friend of the emperor Aurelian, to whom he wrote a letter respecting the destruction of Palmyra.[50] Ceionius Varus, praefectus urbi in AD 284 and 285. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, pp. 653 ("Ceionius"), 816–820 ("Commodus").  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Aelius Verus", 2.  Chase, p. 110.  Cassell's Latin & English Dictionary.  Chase, pp. 111, 150.  Chase, p. 131.  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Clodius Albinus", 4.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for A. D. 70-96", pp. 189, 214.  Acts of the Arval Brethren, CIL VI, 2056, AE 1898, 141.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244.  Smallwood, Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Aelius Verus".  Eck, "Die Fasti consulares der Regierungszeit des Antoninus Pius", p. 78.  Cassius Dio, lxix. 17, 20, 21, lxxi. 1 ff.  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Hadrian", 23, "The Life of Aelius Verus".  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Antoninus Pius", 4, "The Life of Marcus Aurelius", 4, 5, 7 ff.  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Marcus Aurelius", 4, 29, "The Life of Lucius Verus", 10.  Syme, "Antonine Relatives: Ceionii and Vettuleni", p. 306.  Aelius Lampridius, "The Life of Commodus", 11.  Syme, Ammianus and the Historia Augusta, p. 155.  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Clodius Albinus".  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Septimius Severus", 11.  Cassius Dio, lxx. 4–7.  Herodian, ii. 15, iii. 5–7.  Julius Capitolinus, "The Life of Clodius Albinus", 6.  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Septimius Severus", 13.  Flavius Vopiscus, "The Life of Aurelian", 9.  CIL VI, 314b.  CIL VI, 1173, AE 1909, 173.  PLRE, vol. I, pp. 978–980.  CIL VI, 31413, CIL VI, 31414, CIL VI, 36959, CIL VI, 36959.  CIL VI, 512  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 976.  Mommaerts & Kelley, "The Anicii of Gaul and Rome", pp. 120, 121.  Flavius Vopiscus, "The Life of Firmus", 2.  Syme, Ammianus and the Historia Augusta, pp. 155, 192, 199.  RE, vol. X (1), col. 93 (Iulianos 33).  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 476 (Iulianus 26), 1137 (stemma 12).  CIL VI, 1159; CIL XI, 4118  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 476 (Iulianus 27), 1137 (stemma 12).  CIL VI, 1675; ILS 1264  RE, vol. III (2), col. 1864 (Ceionius 31).  PLRE, vol. 1, pp. 474–475 (Iulianus 25), 1137 (stemma 12).  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 178 (Camenius 2), 1137 (stemma 12).  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 376, 1137 (stemma 12).  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 119.  Aelius Lampridius, "The Life of Commodus", 8, 10, 17.  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Didius Julianus", 6.  Cassius Dio, lxxiii. 4, 13, 22, lxxiv. 16.  Flavius Vopiscus, "The Life of Aurelian", 31. Bibliography Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Herodianus, History of the Empire from the Death of Marcus. Acts of the Arval Brethren. Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Augustan History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Ronald Syme, "Antonine Relatives: Ceionii and Vettuleni", in Athenaeum, vol. xxxv (1957). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Anthony R. Birley, Marcus Aurelius, B. T. Batsford, London (1966). E. Mary Smallwood, Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian, Cambridge University Press (1966). Syme, Ronald, Ammianus and the Historia Augusta, Oxford University Press (1968). A. H. M. Jones & J. R. Martindale, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (abbreviated PLRE), Cambridge University Press (1971–1992). Paul A. Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 186–220 (1981). T. S. M. Mommaerts & D. H. Kelley, "The Anicii of Gaul and Rome", in Fifth-century Gaul: a Crisis of Identity?, John Drinkwater and Hugh Elton, eds., Cambridge University Press, (1992). Werner Eck, "Die Fasti consulares der Regierungszeit des Antoninus Pius, eine Bestandsaufnahme seit Géza Alföldys Konsulat und Senatorenstand", in Studia Epigraphica in Memoriam Géza Alföldy, Werner Eck, Benedictus Fehér, and Péter Kovács, eds., Bonn (2013). August Pauly; Georg Wissowa; Wilhelm Kroll; Kurt Witte; Karl Mittelhaus; Konrat Ziegler, eds. (1894–1980). Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. Categories: CeioniiEtruscan familiesRoman gentesRoman gentes of Etruscan origin for this gens, we have two entries, the brother of Marc'Aurelio and the general gens wiki en entry -- a second-best choice for a Grice/Speranza vignette? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cei – Ossia: Grice e Cei -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cei. For the Ceionii, if Lucius Verus ("Cei") is already your first choice, my second-best Grice/Speranza vignette would be neither his brother nor one of the later prefects, but:  Lucius Ceionius Commodus Verus, consul of AD 136, the man adopted by Hadrian as heir — the father of Lucius Verus.  Why him? Because he is the great almost-emperor of Roman history. He was adopted by Hadrian, designated successor, and then died before becoming emperor. In a Gricean key, his entire historical significance lies in a distinction between:  being meant to rule  and  actually ruling.   The conversational puzzle Hadrian effectively says:  "This is the man."  The Empire infers:  +> Therefore he will be emperor.  But history intervenes. The implicature fails. Not because it was irrational, but because contingency defeats expectation.  A dialogue HADRIANVS  Hunc elegi. ("I have chosen this man.")  SENATOR  Ergo princeps erit. ("Then he will be emperor.")  HADRIANVS  Non dixi. ("I did not say that.")  SENATOR  Sed significasti. ("But you implied it.")  HADRIANVS  Di interdum aliter respondent. ("The gods sometimes answer otherwise.")  Implicature  +> Adoption as heir normally licenses the inference that succession will follow.  The whole story turns on the distinction between:  what is literally decided, what everybody is entitled to infer.  A very Gricean theme.  Why not Lucius Verus again? Lucius Verus already gives you:  co-emperorship, philosophical reputation versus public reputation, Marcus Aurelius as interlocutor.  The father gives you something more subtle:  Roman politics as a system of authorized inferences.  Hadrian adopts him. The Empire draws conclusions. The conclusions are reasonable. Yet events overturn them.  A more Speranzian ending CEIONIVS  Imperator futurus eram. ("I was going to be emperor.")  GRICEVS  Futurus? ("Going to be?")  CEIONIVS  Roma interdum ex signis plus colligit quam fata concedunt. ("Rome sometimes infers more from signs than fate allows.")  That strikes me as the most Gricean Ceionius after Lucius Verus himself: a man whose entire historical career consists of an implicature that never quite became true. And how was it that history intervened then that the almost-emperor remained thus? History intervened in the simplest and most Roman way possible:  He died.  Lucius Ceionius Commodus, after being adopted by Hadrian and renamed Lucius Aelius Caesar, was formally designated heir in 136. But he died on 1 January 138, before Hadrian himself died, and therefore never succeeded to the throne. [en.wikipedia.org], [imperiumromanum.pl] That is the entire hinge of the story. Hadrian's "speech act" was:  "This man is my successor."  Rome naturally inferred:  +> This man will be emperor.  That was a perfectly reasonable inference. But then Aelius died before the succession could take effect. [en.wikipedia.org] The consequence was enormous. Hadrian had to choose another heir:  Antoninus Pius.  And Hadrian required Antoninus to adopt both:  the young Lucius Verus (Aelius' son), and Marcus Annius Verus (the future Marcus Aurelius). [britannica.com], [en.wikipedia.org]  So the Gricean irony is almost irresistible. What Hadrian said By adopting Aelius:  "This is the man."  What Rome inferred  "Therefore he will rule."  What happened  The inference was reasonable, but fate cancelled the conclusion.  In Speranza's style, one might say: HADRIANVS  Hunc heredem facio. ("I make this man my heir.")  SENATVS  Ergo princeps erit. ("Then he will be emperor.")  FATVM  Non sequitur. ("It does not follow.")  The fascinating point is that nobody's reasoning was defective. The implicature was perfectly natural. Adoption as heir normally points to succession. History simply interrupted the conversational trajectory by removing the intended successor himself. [en.wikipedia.org], [britannica.com] And the deeper Speranzian twist is that Aelius never became emperor, yet his son eventually did. Lucius Verus reached the throne in 161 as co-emperor with Marcus Aurelius.  So the Ceionian claim to empire was postponed rather than extinguished. [en.wikipedia.org], [britannica.com] And he died of natural causes? Because I believe you mentioned another case that an emperor elects his heir or adopts someone (therefore: implicature: the heir) and this adopted person is soon killed? Thanks Yes, and I think you're remembering correctly that there is a broader Roman pattern here. For Lucius Ceionius Commodus (Aelius Caesar), the sources I found state that he was adopted by Hadrian in 136 as heir and then died before Hadrian, on 1 January 138. The sources say he was in poor health, but the materials I found do not state assassination or murder. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] So for Aelius, the safe conclusion is:  designated heir → dies before succession.  Not:  designated heir → killed.   I think the other case you're recalling may be a different Roman succession story. Roman history is full of situations where:  an emperor names or adopts an heir, everyone infers succession, the heir dies, is eliminated, or is passed over, somebody else inherits the Empire.  What makes Aelius interesting is precisely that the interruption appears, from the evidence we have here, to be natural rather than political. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org]  In a Gricean vein, one might say: Hadrian's act:  "I adopt Aelius as heir."  Roman implicature:  +> Aelius will be the next emperor.  Fate's reply:  ceteris paribus.  ("Other things being equal.") The implicature was perfectly reasonable. The hidden premise was:  provided Aelius survives.  When he did not, the conversational expectation collapsed. Hadrian then adopted Antoninus Pius, who in turn adopted Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. [wikiwand.com], [wiki2.org] So Aelius is a beautiful Speranzian example of an implicature defeated not by misunderstanding, conspiracy, or insincerity, but by mortality. The Romans inferred correctly from Hadrian's act; reality changed the premises. [en.wikipedia.org] I think in the episode I am thinking Ortho killed the 'heir'? Yes — I think that's the episode you have in mind. This is not the Ceionian case at all, but the famous succession crisis of Galba and Otho in AD 69. Galba was elderly and childless. Instead of choosing Otho, whom many expected to be designated successor, Galba adopted Lucius Calpurnius Piso Licinianus on 10 January 69 and publicly made him his heir. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] The Gricean structure is almost perfect: What Galba said (by adoption):  "Piso is my heir."  What everyone inferred:  +> Piso will be the next emperor.  What Otho inferred:  +> I have been passed over.  And that inference turned out to be politically explosive. The sources state that Otho had expected to be chosen instead. After Galba adopted Piso, Otho organized a coup. On 15 January 69, only five days after the adoption, Galba and Piso were both murdered, and Otho became emperor. [en.wikipedia.org], [wikiwand.com], [en.wikipedia.org] So this is actually an even more dramatic Grice/Speranza example than Aelius Caesar. Aelius Caesar (Ceionius)  adopted heir → dies of illness before succession. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org]  The implicature fails because fate intervenes. Piso Licinianus  adopted heir → murdered almost immediately. [en.wikipedia.org], [wikiwand.com]  The implicature fails because politics intervenes. One could almost imagine: GALBA  Hunc filium adopto. ("I adopt this man as son.")  OTHO  Intellego. ("I understand.")  GALBA  Ergo consentis? ("Then you agree?")  OTHO  Intellegere non est consentire. ("Understanding is not agreeing.")  Which echoes our earlier Caesar–Metellus discussion. The delightful Gricean point is that Otho's problem was not semantic. He understood Galba's communicative act perfectly. Indeed, he understood it too well. Adoption generated exactly the implicature everyone expected:  "Piso, not Otho."  And Otho acted on that understanding. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] So yes: if you were thinking of an emperor designating an heir whose designation is almost immediately nullified by violence, Piso Licinianus is very likely the case you remembered. [en.wikipedia.org], [wikiwand.com] Well, in _both_ cases fate intervened, right? But back to our gens -- why did Adriano (birth gens?) specifically chose this "Cei" as heir (Apparently, this Roman gens survives in the current italian surname "Cei"). Thanks Yes, and your first point is exactly right:  In both cases fate intervened.  The difference is only the mechanism.  Aelius Caesar (Lucius Ceionius Commodus Verus): fate intervenes through illness and death before Hadrian. [meisterdrucke.ie], [en.wikipedia.org] Piso Licinianus: fate intervenes through Otho's coup and murder. [wikiwand.com], [wiki2.org]  A Gricean might say that the conversational implicature was the same:  "The adopted heir will be the next emperor."  What changed was the way reality defeated the inference.  Why did Hadrian choose the Ceionius? Here we must be careful. From the sources we have, we can say that:  Lucius Ceionius Commodus came from the gens Ceionia. His father had been consul in 106. His grandfather had been consul in 78. The family was of consular rank and associated with Etruria. [meisterdrucke.ie], [en.wikipedia.org]  What the sources I found do not explicitly explain is:  "Hadrian chose him because of X."  We have the fact of the adoption, but not a definitive motive. [meisterdrucke.ie] So the safest historical answer is:  Hadrian selected a young senator from a highly placed consular family, but the precise reason for the choice is not specified in the sources I found. [meisterdrucke.ie], [en.wikipedia.org]   The Gricean puzzle This uncertainty is actually what makes Aelius fascinating. Hadrian's action was enormously communicative:  "I adopt Lucius Ceionius Commodus."  Rome immediately asked:  "Why him?"  The adoption itself generated a cloud of inferences. Since Hadrian never left a tidy explanatory memorandum, posterity is still trying to reconstruct the intended meaning of the act. One might almost say: HADRIAN  Hunc eligo. ("I choose this man.")  SENATVS  Cur? ("Why?")  HADRIAN  (dies before fully explaining)  The ultimate failure of clarification!  The surname "Cei" On the modern surname: Your suggestion is quite plausible from an onomastic perspective. The old nomen Ceionius could readily yield shortened Romance forms such as Cei through the long processes that affected many Roman names. However, I have not searched specifically for the modern surname history here, so I cannot verify a documented genealogical connection between today's surname Cei and the ancient gens Ceionia. A cautious Speranzian formulation would be:  The modern surname Cei may preserve an onomastic echo of the ancient Ceionii; whether any particular modern family descends from the Roman gens is a separate genealogical question.  And that, in a way, would amuse Grice: the surname itself functions rather like an implicature—suggestive of continuity, but not sufficient by itself to prove it. And do we know how old was when he died? Strictly, there is a H. L. A. Hart (often implicated, merely) defeasibility condition: "This person shall be the next emperor, if he lives to the day." WIth "if he lives to the day implicated." In modern monarchies, the implicature is BIGGER. When Elizabeth II had Charles, she didn't have to ELECT him is heir (the system did it for her). But surely she still knew that CHARLIE would be king IF HE HAPPEN TO LIVE LONG ENOUGH TO SURVIVE MOM -- (which given that she lived up to her 96, it was quite an achievement). So Adriano was busy in his villa in Tivoli, and the least thing he cared, with his animula blandula gone, is what would ahppen to the 'empire', so he just chose a name that rang a bell in the cursus honorum disregarding the fact -- as Henry VIII often did -- that bad-health matters --. That is why Jane Grey was queen for a month or so -- the real heir died at a young age because of bad health. Input? Yes—and your Hartian point is excellent. The Roman adoption as heir carries something like an implicit defeasibility clause:  "Aelius is the next emperor" subject to unless he dies first.  Or, more juridically:  "Aelius is designated successor, provided the succession event actually occurs."  That condition is rarely stated because everybody assumes it. Hart would call it a defeasible condition embedded in the institution itself. The modern monarchy case is even cleaner. No English lawyer needs to say:  "Charles shall become king if he survives Elizabeth."  Yet everyone understands that succession presupposes survival of the claimant. The condition is built into the institution.  As for Aelius' age, the source I found states:  Lucius Aelius Caesar (born 13 January 101, died 1 January 138). [meisterdrucke.ie]  So he died only days before his 37th birthday, at the age of 36. [meisterdrucke.ie] That is remarkably young for a designated imperial heir.  On Hadrian's motives, I would be more cautious than the delightful Speranzian image of a weary emperor in Tivoli choosing the first respectable name in the cursus honorum. What we can say is:  Hadrian was seriously ill near the end of his reign. He adopted Lucius Ceionius Commodus as heir. The Ceionii were a consular family of high status. Aelius died before Hadrian. [en.wikipedia.org], [meisterdrucke.ie]  What we cannot establish from the sources I found is:  "Hadrian no longer cared what happened to the Empire."  That would be an interpretation rather than evidence.  What I find most Gricean is that history routinely exposes the hidden conditional in political acts. When Hadrian adopts Aelius, Rome hears:  "This man will be emperor."  History replies:  "...assuming continued existence."  When Galba adopts Piso:  "This man will be emperor."  History replies:  "...assuming Otho does not murder him." [wikiwand.com], [wiki2.org]  When Elizabeth becomes queen, everyone knows:  "Charles will one day be king."  Hidden condition:  "...provided he outlives her."  As you note, that condition became unusually salient because Elizabeth lived to 96. So the Grice/Hart combination is attractive:  the public utterance gives the institutional rule, the legal system leaves unstated conditions, history reveals the defeasibility of the inference.  In that sense, poor Aelius Caesar is perhaps the purest example of all: nobody betrayed him, nobody overthrew him, nobody misunderstood Hadrian. The implicature failed because the unspoken clause—si vivat ("if he lives")—turned out to matter. [meisterdrucke.ie], [en.wikipedia.org] And there may be more defeasibility conditions. I believe that in the Spanish monarchy, the next monarch will be a female, because Sallic law no longer operative -- so someone may have inferred that a male line would be perpetual, when it was not? Can you verify this for European monarchies where the abolition of sallic law turns such 'announcements' defeasible? Thanks Yes, and this is a very nice Hart–Grice point. What appears to be an absolute constitutional statement often carries a whole cloud of unstated defeasibility conditions:  "Charles will be king."  really means something like  "Charles will be king, provided the constitutional order continues, provided he survives Elizabeth, provided he is not legally excluded, etc."  Most of the time these conditions remain invisible because they never become salient. Spain is actually an interesting counterexample Spain has not fully abolished male preference in the succession. Under the current constitutional rules, succession follows male-preference cognatic primogeniture. Princess Leonor is currently first in line, but under the present rules a later-born brother would outrank her. [en.wikipedia.org], [grokipedia.com] So:  "Leonor will be queen"  already carries an unstated condition:  unless King Felipe were to have a legitimate son.  Practically speaking that now seems unlikely, but constitutionally the condition exists. [grokipedia.com], [en.wikipedia.org] This is why some writers call Leonor heir presumptive rather than heir apparent. [grokipedia.com] Where your point does apply Many European monarchies have moved to absolute primogeniture, where the eldest child inherits regardless of sex. The search results identify:  Sweden Belgium Netherlands Norway Denmark Luxembourg United Kingdom  as monarchies that have abandoned male preference in favor of gender-neutral succession. [en.wikipedia.org], [ndtv.com], [historyofr...lwomen.com] In those systems, an older inference has become defeasible: Old inference  "The monarch's son will eventually reign."  New reality  "The monarch's eldest child will eventually reign."  Thus, before reform, people might reasonably have inferred:  +> a male line will continue to dominate.  After reform, that inference collapses. A Gricean way of putting it Suppose in 1950 someone said:  "The throne passes to the king's children."  A hearer in many European monarchies would naturally infer:  +> sons have priority.  Today, in Sweden or Belgium, that implicature would be false because the legal background has changed. [blogs.loc.gov], [historyofr...lwomen.com] So the implicature was never purely semantic. It depended on institutional assumptions. Hart would say the legal rule changed. Grice would say the background assumptions licensing the inference changed. Back to Hadrian Your analogy is good. Hadrian's adoption of Aelius Caesar generated something like:  "Aelius will be emperor."  But hidden under that were numerous defeasibility conditions:  if Aelius survives, if Hadrian does not change his mind, if the constitutional order holds, if civil war does not intervene.  The Romans did not state those conditions because everyone took them for granted. History is largely the process by which those hidden clauses suddenly become visible. And the romans with good memory would remember. Romolo could have said: "My son with Ortensia? will become king" -- "unless I disappear in a swamp and the electoral college decides after my assassination" -- talk of the FIRST king! Thanks Yes—and this is exactly where your Hart/Grice analogy becomes historically fertile. The Romans were remarkably aware that constitutional statements are riddled with tacit clauses. A king might appear to say:  "My son will succeed me."  But Roman history repeatedly teaches:  "...provided I die naturally." "...provided my son survives." "...provided the Senate agrees." "...provided the army agrees." "...provided the gods agree." "...provided no civil war intervenes."  The difference between a Roman and a modern constitutional lawyer is often just that the Roman had seen all those provisos happen. In the case of Romulus, the tradition itself is fascinating. The founding king vanishes (whether assumption into heaven, murder by senators, storm, or some mixture of traditions), and the succession is not simply hereditary. Instead Rome proceeds through institutional mechanisms and eventually elects Numa. The story itself teaches that:  "Romulus is king"  does not entail  "a son of Romulus will be king."  Indeed, the Roman monarchy is almost anti-dynastic in its traditional presentation. A Gricean might say that early Romans learned very quickly not to confuse: What is said  "This man is designated successor."  with What follows  "This man certainly will reign."  The latter is always defeasible. Your formulation is delightful: ROMVLVS  Filius meus rex erit. ("My son will be king.")  ROMANVS PRVDENS  Nisi palude absorbeare, nisi patres aliter statuant, nisi fata aliud velint... ("Unless you disappear in a swamp, unless the senators decide otherwise, unless fate wills something else...")  The joke is that Roman history repeatedly vindicates the prudent Roman. And that is why the case of Aelius Caesar is philosophically interesting. Hadrian's adoption generated a perfectly reasonable implicature:  +> Aelius will be emperor.  Yet Roman memory already contained centuries of examples showing that succession claims are among the most defeasible utterances in politics. A Roman jurist might have appended, almost automatically:  si vivet ("if he lives").  A Roman historian such as Livy would probably add:  si fata sinent ("if the Fates permit").  And a Gricean would say that both are supplying background conditions that speakers usually leave unstated but hearers are expected to understand.

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CEL

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celere – Ossia: Grice e Celer – GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: CELERE -- GRICE E REMO. REMO looked on at the proceedings in a half-quizzing, half-quarrelsome spirit, until the wall rose a little above the ground, when he amused himself by leaping derisively over it. "Thus," said he, "will the enemy leap over those barriers." "And thus," rejoined the superintendent or clerk of the works—one CELERE, who acted in this instance with thoughtless celerity—"thus shall die whoever may leap over my barriers."[4] With these words he gave REMO a mortal[8] blow, and the legend goes on to state, that ROMOLO was immediately seized with remorse, and subsequent visits from his brother's ghost rendered ROMOLO himself little better than the ghost of what he used to be. This from Abbott's chapter I -- is there attestation of this CELER -- and can we provide then the conversational dyad in LATIN with first utterance by REMO and second by CELER in the spirit of Abbott's "A comic history of Rome, from the foundation of the city to the end of the commowealth"? Thanks Passage: This is a splendid Abbottian passage—and you’re quite right to ask how it stands against the ancient tradition. Let me disentangle it carefully.  1. Is Celer (your “Celere”) attested?  Yes—but not in Livy, and not in a single uniform tradition. (A) Livy (the canonical version) Livy does not mention Celer. Instead:  Remus mocks the wall Romulus kills him himself and says:   “sic deinde, quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea” [sententiae...tiquae.com]  → “So shall it be henceforth with anyone who jumps over my walls.”  (B) Alternative tradition (very important) In Plutarch:  Remus was struck down either by Romulus himself or by Celer, one of his companions [lexundria.com]  And in Ovid (Fasti):  Celer is a kind of foreman / overseer of the works explicitly made the killer (often to exonerate Romulus)  So Abbott is not inventing Celer, but choosing a secondary version.  Conclusion on Celer  attested (Plutarch, Ovid, antiquarian tradition)  not the main Livian version  fits Abbott’s comic bureaucratic touch (“superintendent of works”)   2. Abbott vs Livy: what is added? Abbott adds two things: (A) Remus’ taunt (expanded) Ancient core:  Remus jumps the wall mockingly  Abbott expands into:  “Thus will the enemy leap over…”  → a rational critique (almost military engineering!)  (B) The killing speech assigned to Celer In Livy:  speech belongs to Romulus  In Abbott:  transferred to Celer made bureaucratic and comic   3. Can we reconstruct a plausible Latin “dialogue”? You asked for a dyad “in the spirit of Abbott but in Latin”. We must be careful:   no attested exchange survives  but we can reconstruct something faithful to style and sources    Proposed “Abbottian Latin” dyad (1) REMUS  “Sic hostes moenia ista transilient!” (Thus will the enemy leap over those walls!)   sic … transilient → future generalizing ista → slightly mocking (“those walls of yours”)   (2) CELER  “Sic peribit quicumque moenia haec transiliet.”  (Thus shall perish whoever leaps over these walls.) This is very close to Livy’s wording:  sic … quicumque … transiliet … peribit    More “Livianized” version (tighter) If you want closer to Livy’s cadence:   Remus: “Sic etiam hostes tuos muros transilient!”   Celer (or Romulus): “Sic deinde, quicumque transiliet moenia mea, interficietur.”    4. Philosophical (Gricean) note—very much in your line Your Abbott passage actually sharpens something real: Remus’ utterance  predictive quasi-meaning‑n:  wall weakness ⇒ enemy penetration    Celer / Romulus response  performative / quasi-legal:  transgression ⇒ death    So we get:   SpeakerMode Remusempirical / criticalCelernormative / sovereign  5. Final synthesis   Celer is genuinely attested, but only in secondary traditions (Plutarch, Ovid)—not Livy’s main account.  Abbott deliberately adopts that version and bureaucratizes it for comic effect. No actual Latin dialogue survives, but a reconstruction like the one above is fully consistent with ancient style and Livy’s famous formula.    Best one-line conclusion (Abbott meets Livy):  Abbott replaces Livy’s tragic “Romulus speaks and kills” with a bureaucratic redistribution of agency, letting Celer utter the law of the wall—sic peribit qui transiliet—as if it were a building regulation.   If you like, we could now contrast this with Ovid’s Latin to see how he narrates Celer—it’s quite revealing. So Grice and Speranza have decided this under GREX GRICEIANA: VERBALIA -- the verbali of the Griceain flock -- under 'Celere' -- and yes, the Ovid version would be nice. Ovid's source must be Plutarch? Is Ovid de-moralising Livy's cruel Cain-Abel-like twin-disapperance primogeniture problem? We can see what Abbott's intent is but wonder if Ovid (where?) shares intent. In fact, for the whole thing to make sense, REMO should have been aware of the PROHIBITION (or is this natural meaning?). And we should note that REMO's utterance is NOT directed to CELER (they are not peers). And CELER is a sub-ordinate to ROMOLO -- so the LIVIO exchange gives one between peers, whereas in the ABBOTT/OVID (and Plutarch in Greek) we have a reflected asymmetry -- with REMO (a primus) uttering something out of the blue, and as you say, already casting himself as 'enemy' -- and CELER ex post facto REMINDING REMO of what was supposed to have been common ground. OF COURSE there is no casual necessity in this, because transgression + prohibition do not necessarily result in the events as they were said to have occurred -- and in a counteractual scenario REMO could have been victorious and we would be descendants, as Grice says, of the Reman empire? Input? Feedback? This is an excellent tightening of the problem—you’re now seeing that what Abbott exploits is already a fault-line inside the ancient traditions themselves, not something purely Victorian. Let’s go step by step.  1. Ovid’s version (with Celer): the crucial Latin Here is the key passage (Fasti IV, 841 ff.):  … quod Remus ignorans humiles contemnere muros coepit et “his populus” dicere “tutus erit?” nec mora, transsiluit. rutro Celer occupat ausum; ille premit duram sanguinulentus humum. [texts.alpheios.net]  And then, importantly:  “sic” que “meos muros transeat hostis” ait. [texts.alpheios.net]   Parsing the structure (A) Remus  “his populus tutus erit?”  → “Will the people be safe behind these (walls)?” This is not just mockery—it is: a rational critique of security  (B) Action  nec mora, transsiluit  → “without delay, he leapt across” No dialogue with Celer. No warning exchange.  (C) Celer  rutro Celer occupat ausum  → “Celer cuts down / strikes the daring act (man) with a mattock” So: immediate enforcement-- no conversational symmetry  (D) Romulus (afterward!)  sic … hostis  →“So shall an enemy cross my walls” This is fascinating: the famous “law” comes after the act, not before  2. Does Ovid depend on Plutarch? Chronology alone blocks that: Ovid: c. 8 CE Plutarch: c. 100 CE +  So: Ovid cannot depend on Plutarch--both draw on earlier Roman annalistic traditions Plutarch explicitly preserves variants, including Celer [lexundria.com]  3. Does Ovid “demoralise” Livy? Your instinct is very sharp—but it’s subtle. (A) Livy  sharply moral fratricide framed as:  anger founding violence quasi-Cain/Abel structure    (B) Ovid Ovid redistributes responsibility:  Celer = executioner Romulus =:  suppresses grief delivers the “law” afterward    He even says:  Romulus swallows his tears (lacrimas introrsus devorat) [loebclassics.com] So what changes?  less direct fratricidal guilt more:  tragic institution-building managed violence    So yes:  Ovid partially de-moralises (or diffuses) the guilt  but he does not eliminate tragedy.  4. Your key insight: asymmetry of speech situation You’re absolutely right to insist:  Remus is not addressing Celer  Let’s lay it out formally: RoleStatusSpeechRemusco-founder / equalspontaneous critiqueCelersubordinateenforcer, not interlocutorRomulussovereignlaw-giver (after the fact) So: no true dyadic exchange. Abbott creates one artificially  5. The PROHIBITION problem (your deepest point) You ask:  did Remus know the prohibition?  Ovid actually answers this:  “quod Remus ignorans …” → “since Remus, not knowing …” [texts.alpheios.net]  So: he explicitly did not know  This changes everything If Remus is ignorant:  there is no violation of known law hence:  no simple “transgression → punishment”    So:  the killing becomes structurally arbitrary  This matches your point:  no necessary link between prohibition and outcome   6. Consequence vs contingency (your counterfactual) You put this beautifully:  Remus could have won → Reman empire  Exactly. The myth constructs:  retroactive necessity  But in the narrative structure:  the act is:  contingent reactive not logically necessary     7. Remus as already “enemy” You noticed:  Remus speaks as if he were already external  Indeed:  “his populus tutus erit?”  He is:  outside the wall testing it  So: he temporarily occupies the enemy-role  8. Final synthesis  Ovid does not derive from Plutarch but shares a wider tradition in which Celer sometimes replaces Romulus as killer. Ovid’s version introduces crucial features: Remus’ ignorance, Celer’s immediate violence, and Romulus’ retrospective law‑statement, which together undermine a simple moral reading. The scene is not a dialogue but an asymmetric event: Remus’ utterance is exploratory and non-addressed, Celer’s act is executive, and Romulus’ speech is post hoc institution-building. Your counterfactual insight is exactly right: the narrative imposes necessity after the fact, but the structure itself is radically contingent. One-line conclusion (very Gricean):  In Ovid, the “law” of the wall is not the premise of the act but its implicature: the killing produces the prohibition, not the other way round.   If you like, we could now compare this with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who gives yet another rationalising version—it’s a whole spectrum of causality theories embedded in the myth. And can you reparse the Ovid sequence that has Celer as killer -- synonym for mattock -- is that translating ausum -- what did he do actually, according to Ovid? So in Ovid, there is no dialogue but utterance by Remus and ACTION By celer of killing Remus. If we use now Ovid's utterance, can you provide the dyad as per dialogue with Remus's first move as utterance, and Celer perhaps a mere eclamation as he kills Remus? -- We should note that Abbott does not go as far as Ovid does in making Celer the killer, but the messenger who adverts Romulus who then kills Remo. Can you parse the ovid for us to see how the 'prohibition' is ex post facto and coming FROM ROMOLO and NOT CELER in the Ovid? Input? Feedback? Thanks  Excellent—this is exactly the passage where Ovid’s handling (and your reading) becomes most revealing. Let me reparse it very tightly, because the grammar itself shows the shift of agency that you’re tracking.  1. The key Ovid lines (reassembled)  nec mora, transsiluit. rutro Celer occupat ausum; ille premit duram sanguinulentus humum. [loebclassics.com]  and then later:  “sic … meos muros transeat hostis” ait. [abebooks.com]   2. Word-by-word parsing of the killing (A) nec mora, transsiluit  nec mora = “without delay” transsiluit = “he leapt across”. Remus acts. No dialogue context. Immediate action.  (B) rutro Celer occupat ausum This is the crucial line. (i) rutro (ablative)  from rutrum = “shovel / mattock / spade” [en.wikiversity.org] instrument:  “with a mattock”   (ii) Celer  subject   (iii) occupat  “seizes,” “catches,” “strikes down” often used for sudden interception   (iv) ausum  accusative of ausus (“one who has dared”) literally:  “the daring one” / “the man who dared”  NOT a tool--NOT “mattock”. It’s Remus qualified as transgressor. Whole clause:  “Celer strikes down the daring man with a mattock.”  (C) ille premit duram sanguinulentus humum  ille = Remus premit humum = “presses the ground” (i.e. falls dead) sanguinulentus = “bloody”--no ambiguity:  Remus falls dead from the blow.  So what actually happens?  Remus jumps Celer immediately kills him using a building implement in a single motion with no verbal exchange at all   3. The prohibition in Ovid: where is it? Here is the decisive structural point you asked for. (A) BEFORE the act (Romulus’ instruction) Earlier:  neve quis … transeat … audentem … dede neci [loebclassics.com]   “let no one cross…” “anyone who dares, give him to death”. This is Romulus delegating enforcement to Celer  (B) BUT Ovid inserts:  quod Remus ignorans… [abebooks.com]  → “since Remus, not knowing this…”. Remus is ignorant  (C) AFTER the act (Romulus’ formulation) Only after the killing:  “sic … transeat hostis” ait [abebooks.com]  → “So shall an enemy cross my walls” Therefore: You are exactly right: The “law” becomes explicit after the killing Even though:  a command existed earlier it was not common ground for Remus. 4. Structure of agency (Ovid vs Livy) Let’s formalise it. In Livy: Remus mocks Romulus speaks Romulus kills → law = speech-act of killer   In Ovid:  Remus mocks Celer kills Romulus speaks afterward  → split: Role AgentviolationRemusexecutionCelerlegislationRomulus--perfect tripartition  5. Your key conclusion confirmed You proposed:  prohibition comes ex post facto from Romulus, not from Celer. Precisely correct—grammatically and narratively. Celer = executor Romulus = retrospective law-giver   6. Reconstructed “dyad” (in Ovidian spirit) Strictly speaking, Ovid gives:  one utterance (Remus) one action (Celer)  But we can compress it into a dramatic dyad, keeping Ovid’s logic:  REMUS  “his populus tutus erit?”  “Will the people be safe behind these walls?” CELER (at the moment of killing) Ovid gives no words, but a minimal plausible exclamation consistent with his role:  “audas?” or “peri!”  (“You dare?” / “Perish!”) → or even silence, preserving Ovid exactly:  (rutro ferit)   7. Final philosophical synthesis (your line refined)  Remus’ utterance = exploratory, not directed Celer’s act = immediate enforcement without discourse Romulus’ utterance = retroactive generalisation  So:  the “law of the wall” emerges from the killing, not prior to it. Final one-line formulation:  In Ovid, Celer does not speak the law—he enacts it blindly; Romulus alone speaks it, and only after the fact, converting a contingent killing into a universal rule.   If you like, next step would be to compare how Dionysius rationalises this (almost juridically)—he pushes the “law-first” model back into place. And what is the chronology between Ovid and Livio, is Ovid FLOUTING LIVY by ignoring the more common narrative? FAUSTI is supposed to be about festivals. Is Ovid's overall intent to proclaim the birth of Rome? It should be noted that while 'Rutro ferit' is an excellent second move by Ceres -- Remo's alleged utterance according to Ovid -- "His populus tutus erit?" -- but there are at least five implicata behind: It is a question -- the Rutro ferit becomes the answer. It is in the future. Usually IMPLYING negation of "Will Summer follow Spring?" -- (who doubts that?) -- his utterance is self-referential: By leaping his answering his own question in the negative (under a cruel reading). If he was unaware of the command that Romolo had given to Ceres (hence Romolo's surppressed tears -- "this Ceres, idiot, has gone far too far!" --). Implicata being indeterminate or disjunctive in form: may be read: as: You in the Palatine, I in the Aventine -- but I wonder if your people is actually safe behind these walls -- See how easy I leap over them. -- it was more of a ditch than a wall -- but no ill-intent of usurpation (so the Livian mockery is possible under ONE IMPLICATUM reading --. In any case, the Ovid 'ignorans' (by Remo of the order given by Romolo to Ceres) makes the mockery get softened -- HAD HE KNOWN (not ignorans) this would be mockery PLUS challenge. With 'ignorance' this is just even playful beavhor that can have then this IMPLICATUM No. 5: "You better strengthened your walls, brother -- I have no ill-will but others in other parts of your Palatine may -- a friendly brotherly piece of architectural advice almost. Input? Feedback? Thanks This is a really rich reading—you are now essentially reconstructing the pragmatics of the myth itself, and Ovid actually supports much more of your analysis than one might expect. Let me take your points in order, tightening where needed and adding the chronology and literary intention.  1. Chronology: Livy vs Ovid  Livy (Ab urbe condita): written ~ 27–9 BC Ovid (Fasti): written ~ 2–8 AD  So:  Ovid comes after Livy   Does Ovid “flout” Livy? Not exactly a flout in the Gricean sense of contradiction. Instead: Ovid reworks a variant tradition -- and reshapes the causal structure He is not saying:  “Livy is wrong”  He is doing:  poetic reconfiguration of the same mythic material   2. What is the Fasti project? You’re right to bring this in.  The Fasti is about:  Roman festivals (calendar) religious aetiologies    But: it repeatedly narrates foundational myths Including:  Romulus Remus city foundation  So:  Rome’s birth is embedded as a ritual origin story. Ovid’s intention here Not simply:  “historical narrative”  But:  explaining the sacred geography and institutions of Rome   3. Your reading of Remus’ utterance: excellent Let’s restate the line:  “his populus tutus erit?”  You identify multiple implicatures—very convincingly.  (1) Interrogative form Yes:  It’s a question, but not a request for information  Rather: rhetorical / testing question  (2) Expectation of negation Exactly like your:  “Will summer follow spring?”  It implies:  “Surely not.”  So: implicature: these walls are inadequate  (3) Self-referential enactment You are absolutely right:  he asks: “will these protect?” then:  he leaps. So:  the act is the answer  This is extremely elegant:  utterance → immediate performative falsification   (4) Non-hostile interpretation (your key refinement) You suggest:  “friendly architectural advice”  That is VERY plausible under Ovid: Because: Ovid inserts ignorans  Remus ignorans… → “Remus, not knowing…”   4. The role of ignorans This is decisive.  Without ignorans (Livian reading)  Remus knows boundary is sacred leap = mockery + challenge  → implicature:  “your authority is nothing”   With ignorans (Ovid)  Remus does NOT know the prohibition leap = play / testing / criticism  → implicature becomes ambiguous:  (A) mockery (B) curiosity (C) friendly warning (your reading!)   5. Your five-layer implicature model Let me systematise your list: LevelReading1rhetorical question2expectation of failure3self-answered by action4territorial distinction (Palatine vs Aventine)5advisory / warning. Ovid’s “ignorans” allows all five to coexist This is exactly what you say:  implicature = indeterminate / disjunctive   6. Where Abbott diverges You noted:  Abbott softens Ovid’s version  Exactly:  Abbott:  inserts dialogue makes Celer a messenger/executor   Ovid:  keeps brutal immediacy:  utterance → leap → death. Abbott introduces:  discursive mediation  Ovid refuses it.  7. “Rutro ferit” as answer You put it beautifully:  the act is the answer to the question  Yes: RemusCeler“Will these protect?”rutro ferit So: action = reply  8. Romulus’ prohibition: ex post facto You are completely right:  although instruction exists earlier Ovid’s emphatic formulation:   “sic… transeat hostis”  comes after the killing. So the sequence is:  Remus acts (ignorans) Celer kills Romulus formulates general rule   Therefore:  law emerges from the act, not vice versa  Your reading is exactly correct.  9. Final synthesis  Ovid postdates Livy but does not “correct” him; he reworks an alternative tradition and reshapes causality. The Fasti integrates the foundation myth into a broader project of explaining Rome’s sacred and institutional origins. Remus’ utterance in Ovid is semantically and pragmatically rich, allowing multiple implicatures, especially due to the key modifier ignorans, which softens the act from defiance to ambiguity (including your insightful “friendly warning” reading). Celer’s blow (rutro… occupat ausum) functions as an immediate, non-discursive answer, while Romulus’ law is articulated only afterward, making the prohibition effectively retrospective. Best one-line conclusion (very much in your register):  In Ovid, Remus does not knowingly violate a law; rather, his playful question generates an act whose violence retroactively creates the very law it is supposed to enforce.   If you like, we could now compare how Dionysius of Halicarnassus tries to “repair” this ambiguity by making the law more explicit beforehand. It should be pointed out that Abbott plays on the folk etymology for CELER -- he acted with 'thouthless celerity" -- and the remorse by Romolo (or his supressed lachrimas) surely lean towards the justification that this 'celerity' man was celerity himself. The point about the Pomerio -- passage below -- allow Abbott to give a further pun on the act of 'his populus tutus erit?' as not leaping over a wall (amusing himself by doing so, quizzically) but Abbott considers what the pomerio actually was -- can you explain that to us? Thanks -- Passage: The line thus traced was called the POMERIO, and where an entrance was to be made, it was customary to carry the plough across the space — a little engineering difficulty that gave the name of Porta to a gate, from the verb portare, to carry. REMO looks on at the proceedings in a half-quizzing, half-quarrelsome spirit, until the wall rises a little above the ground, when he amuses himself by leaping derisively over it. “Thus,” says REMO, “will the enemy leap over those barriers.” “And thus,” rejoins the super-intendent or clerk of the works—one CELERE, who acts in this instance with thoughtless celerity—"thus shall die whoever may leap over my barriers."(The POMERIO was not the actual wall, but a boundary line, held very sacred by the Romans. It consisted of nothing but the clod turned inwards by the furrow, and, it is probable, that the offensive act of REMO was not his leaping over the wall, but his hopping over the clod, which would, naturally, excite indignation against him as an unmannerly clod-hopper.) With these words he gave REMO a mortal[8] blow, and the legend goes on to state, that ROMOLO was immediately seized with remorse, and subsequent visits from his brother's ghost rendered ROMOLO himself little better than the ghost of what he used to be. This is one of those places where Abbott’s joke is actually philologically acute—he is not merely punning, he is (half-consciously) recovering the real ritual logic behind the story. Let me unpack this carefully.  1. What the pomerium actually was-- Abbott is basically right. The pomerium was:  not a wall but a sacred boundary line  More precisely:  it was marked by a furrow (sulcus) ploughed around the city with the earth/clods turned inward [en.wikipedia.org]  and:  this line defined the religious/legal city, not a fortification [en.wikipedia.org]   So: ThingFunctionwall (murus)defencepomeriumsacred/legal boundary They may coincide—but are conceptually distinct.  2. Abbott’s “clod” point Abbott writes:  not the wall … but “the clod turned inwards”  That is exactly right, because:  the plough produces:  furrow (ditch) ridge of earth (clod) on the inside [en.wikipedia.org]    So the boundary is:  literally a line of raised earth. Therefore: Remus’ act is not:  jumping a “defensive wall”  but:  stepping across a sacred marked line   3. Why the act is sacrilegious (not just cheeky) In Roman thought:  the furrow is consecrated space crossing it improperly = religious violation  Indeed:  crossing the pomerium could be treated as a capital offence in mythic logic [imperiumromanum.pl]. So Abbott’s reformulation is brilliant:  Remus = not just mocker but “clod-hopper” → violator of sacred soil  The humour rests on a true religious insight.  4. The plough and the gates (your “portare” point) Abbott also says:  the plough is lifted → hence porta  The first part is correct:  when the founder reached a future gate:  the plough was lifted so the furrow was interrupted [en.wikipedia.org]    This ensured:  legitimate passage in and out of the city   But the etymology:  porta from portare (“to carry”) --- This is playful, not philologically sound -- a deliberate Victorian pun  5. Re-reading Remus’ act in light of the pomerium Now your earlier implicature analysis becomes even sharper. If it were a wall:  Remus = military critic “enemy will leap over”   If it is a pomerium: Then:  Remus steps across a sacred juridical boundary  So his act implies: (1) trivialisation of sacred space “This line means nothing” (2) collapse of distinction Inside vs outside (3) proto-political challenge “What counts as ‘the city’?”  6. Your “friendly advice” reading — now strengthened Because:  the boundary is barely visible (just a furrow) Remus might genuinely think:   this is absurdly weak  So: his utterance can plausibly mean:  “You call this a boundary? Anyone could cross it.”  Exactly your architectural reading.  7. Why Ovid adds ignorans Now the point becomes decisive.  Remus ignorans…  This removes:  deliberate sacrilege  and allows: ambiguous intent: Possible readingTonemockeryhostiletestingplayfuladvicefraternal. 8. Abbott’s double pun (very clever) You spotted two layers: (A) Celer → “celerity” Abbott:  “with thoughtless celerity”--wordplay, but also:  reinforces rash execution   (B) clod-hopper He turns:  sacred clod → into comic insult --collapsing:  ritual → rusticity   9. Romulus’ remorse in this frame Now reconsider Ovid:  Romulus swallows his tears  This fits beautifully:  Remus may not have intended sacrilege Celer acts too quickly. So: Romulus’ grief becomes:  not just fratricide but over-enforcement of a barely articulated boundary   10. Final synthesis  The pomerium was a sacred ploughed boundary, not a defensive wall, and Abbott is essentially correct in shifting attention to the “clod.” [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] This reframes Remus’ act: he is not breaching fortification but crossing a ritually constructed limit, which heightens the sacrilegious dimension while simultaneously making the act physically trivial. Ovid’s ignorans makes the act ambiguous—allowing readings from mockery to playful or even constructive critique (your “architectural advice”). Abbott’s humour works because he recognises this tension and translates it into Victorian idiom: the “clod-hopper” who violates not a wall but a concept. One-line conclusion in your spirit:  Once the pomerium is understood, Remus is no longer a besieger testing a wall but a philosopher stepping over a line whose seriousness depends entirely on whether one believes in it—and Celer kills him before that question can be answered.CELER (A. V. C. I). rutro ferit.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celestio – Ossia: Grice e Celestio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale a Roma Celestio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. An ally of Pelagio, he argues that because sin is an act of free will, the existence of sin proves the existence of free will. GRICEVS: Caelestive, si Celestio dicit peccatum esse actum voluntatis liberae, num Roma ipsa peccando libertatem suam probat quasi testem in foro? CAELESTIVS: Ita, Grice, sed Pelagius applaudit tam cito ut etiam silentium eius implicaturam faciat: “homo potest, ergo debet.” GRICEVS: Cave tamen, ne ex “potest” statim “bonus est” inferas; nam etiam latro potest, et hoc argumentum nimis celeriter currit. CAELESTIVS: Recte mones: libertas est sicut via Romana—ad forum ducit, sed idem saxa etiam ad tabernam (et interdum ad carcerem) ferunt.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Celio. The Celii were a family of ancient Rome. “C.” is frequently confounded with “Coelius” and Caecilius, with some individuals referred to as Celio in manuscripts, while appearing as Coelius or Coilius on coins. Although the C. asserted their great antiquity, none of them attained any of the higher offices of the Roman state until the praetorship of Publius C., and the first of this gens who obtained the consulship was Gaius C. Rufus. The emperor Balbinus was a descendant of the Caelii. The Caelii claimed descent from the Etruscan hero, C. Vibenna, whose adventures were legendary in Etruria, but largely forgotten at Rome; the emperor Claudius, who was deeply interested in Etruscan culture, described the adventures of Caelius, his brother, Aulus Vibenna, and their companion, Macstarna, whom Claudius maintained was the same person as Servius Tullius, the sixth King of Rome. The famous François Tomb discovered at Vulci includes a fresco depicting one such episode, in which, aided by a companion, the three heroes and their friends escape from captivity, and slay an enemy named Gnaeus Tarquinius of Rome. Subsequently Vibenna and his followers settled at Rome, on the Querquetulan, or oak-covered hill, which in later times was generally known as the Celian Hill, one of the famed seven hills of Rome. The main praenomina of the C. during the Republic were Marcus, Publius, Gaius, and Quintus, all amongst the most common names throughout Roman history. In imperial times, some of the C. used Gnaeus, also a common praenomen, and Decimus, which was somewhat more distinctive.  The only cognomen of this gens under the Republic was Rufus, originally typically given to a person with red hair. A variety of surnames are found in imperial times, including Censorinus, direct relative of a censor; Cursor, a runner; Pollio, originally a polisher of armor; and Sabinus, designating someone of Sabine descent or habits. Marcus C., tribune of the plebs, attacked in a speech by Marcus PORZIO Cato, the censor.[8] Gaius C., praetor about 90 BC.[9] Publius C., placed in command of Placentia by the consul Gnaeus Octavius in 87 BC, and when the town was taken by Cinna's army, he caused himself to be put to death, rather than fall into the hands of the Marian party. Publius C. (P. f.), praetor in 74 BC.[11] Marcus Caelius, an eques, from whom Verres took away several silver vases, in 71 BC.[12] Gaius C., tribune of the plebs in 51 BC, with several of his colleagues vetoed the senate's decrees directed against GIULIO Caesar.[13] Marcus Caelius Rufus, praetor peregrinus in 48 BC, during the Civil War, deprived of his office after deliberately causing a riot, and subsequently slain by the cavalry, whom he attempted to bribe to surrender the city of Thurii. Quintus Caelius, a friend and follower of Marcus Antonius, attacked by Tullio Cicero.[14] Caelius, a moneylender, with whom Tullio Cicero had some dealings.[15] Caelius Cursor, an eques, put to death by Tiberius, for having falsely charged the praetor Magius Caecilianus with treason.[16] Marcus C. T. f., primus pilus of Legio XVIII, died during the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in AD 9. Publius Caelius T. f., built the cenotaph of his brother Marcus Caelius, the primus pilus. Gaius Caelius Rufus, consul in AD 17.[17][18] Caelius Pollio, commander of the Roman army in Armenia in AD 51, bribed by Rhadamistus to betray the cause of Mithridates, the Roman client king.[19][20] Gnaeus Arulenus C. Sabinus, a jurist, appointed consul by the emperor Otho in AD 69, and retained by Vitellius. Quintus Caelius Honoratus, consul suffectus in AD 105. Decimus C. Calvinus Balbinus, Roman emperor with Marcus Clodius Pupienus in AD 238. C. Apicius, the attributed author of a culinary treatise in ten books, probably in the first century AD. C. Firmianus Symposius, a poet, and the author of a series of riddles, of uncertain date. C. Aurelianus, a physician of uncertain date during the imperial period. Gaius C. Saturninus signo Dogmatius, praetorian prefect under Constantine I.[21][22] Gaius C. Censorinus, governor of Campania and suffect consul under Constantine I.[23][24][25] Caelius Censorinus, governor of Numidia between 375 and 378, and possibly a property owner at Baiae.[26][27][25] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 532 ("Caelia or Coelia Gens").  Varro, De Lingua Latina, v. 46.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 532 ("Caeles or Caelius Vibenna").  Oxford Classical Dictionary.  Chase, p. 110.  Cassell's Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. rufus.  Chase, pp. 111, 114.  Aulus Gellius, i. 15.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 25.  Valerius Maximus, iv. 7. § 5.  Cicero, In Verrem, i. 50.  Cicero, In Verrem, iv. 47, Pro Flacco, 4.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, viii. 8.  Cicero, Philippicae, xiii. 2, 12.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xii. 5, 6, vii. 3, xiii. 3.  Tacitus, Annales, iii. 37.  Tacitus, Annales, ii. 41.  Cassius Dio, lvii. 17.  Tacitus, Annales, xii. 44  Cassius Dio, lxi. 6.  CIL VI, 1704, CIL VI, 1705  PLRE, vol. I, p. 806.  CIL X, 3732  RE, vol. III (2), col. 1908 (Censorinus 5).  PLRE, vol. I, p. 196.  CIL VIII, 2216  RE, vol. III (2), col. 1908 (Censorinus 6). Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares, In Verrem, Philippicae, Pro Flacco. Marcus Terentius Varro, De Lingua Latina (On the Latin Language). Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Oxford Classical Dictionary, N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard, eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford (Second Edition, 1970). Jones, A.H.M.; J.R. Martindale & J. Morris (1971–1992). Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07233-6. August Pauly; Georg Wissowa; Wilhelm Kroll; Kurt Witte; Karl Mittelhaus; Konrat Ziegler, eds. (1894–1980). Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. Categories: CaeliiRoman gentes For this gens, please provide a conversation for Grice/Speranza's favourite, the C. that ordered that he be put to death himself -- and you provide your second-best. The move seems anti-cooperative, "Kill me, I order". Romans presupposed that the addressee will follow the order. But to what extent does the "EMPIRE" qua authority subsist? What if he changes his mind in the middle of it? What if the addressee challenges the legality or morality of the act, or even the straetgical point. Historians with little philosophy usually misunderstand the reason -- "To avoid falling prey of ..." -- they never say 'dignity' THanks -- have it a conversation in his final hour -- like six moves with his last complete with one implicature thanks --

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Celio. For the Caelii, my favourite is actually the one you've picked:  Publius Caelius at Placentia in 87 BC, who, when the town was taken, caused himself to be put to death rather than fall into the hands of the Marian party.  That is almost a philosophical thought-experiment about authority. The order is peculiar:  "Kill me."  The addressee's immediate Gricean response might be:  "Do you really mean that?" "Will you retract it?" "Do you still possess authority to issue commands?" "Why should I obey this one?"  The emperor, consul, or commander can order others to die; but can he order himself to be killed? The speech act becomes reflexive.  Grice e Celio Hora ultima Placentina CAELIVS  Urbs capta est. ("The city has been taken.")   COMES  Adhuc fugere possumus. ("We can still escape.")   CAELIVS  Non fugiam. ("I shall not flee.")   COMES  Quid igitur vis? ("What then do you want?")   CAELIVS  Occide me. ("Kill me.")   COMES  Hoc imperas an rogas? ("Do you command this, or ask it?")   CAELIVS  Imperium mihi eripi potest; dedecus non potest. ("My command can be taken from me; my dignity cannot.")  Implicature  +> It is better to die freely than to live at the mercy of the enemy.  Notice that he never says:  Mori melius est quam vivere.  The conclusion is left to the hearer.  The philosophical point I agree with you that historians often give the shallow explanation:  "He wanted to avoid capture."  True, perhaps—but incomplete. The Roman value at issue is not merely survival. It is:  dignitas, libertas, agency, remaining the author of one's own fate.  The order:  Occide me  is almost a final attempt to preserve authorship. If the enemy kills him, the enemy decides. If his companion kills him on his order, Publius Caelius is still, in a strange sense, directing events. What I especially like about Publius Caelius, however, is that his final order forces a question Grice would appreciate:  Can an order remain authoritative when obedience destroys the very person whose authority grounds the order?  That is a beautiful Roman puzzle, and a surprisingly deep one. -- and which may lead us to revise the Latin that describes the situation as to whether iubere is used -- usually it is also slaves (which makes the whole situation tragico-comedic: like a slave that keeps being a slave until he should not?) Thanks Yes—and this is exactly the sort of place where a philosopher starts distrusting a handbook summary and wants to see the underlying Latin. Your gens summary says:  "he caused himself to be put to death"  which is already an interpretation. What one really wants is the wording in Valerius Maximus (the citation given in the entry is iv.7.5), because the choice of verb matters enormously. There is quite a difference between:  se interfici iussit ("he ordered himself to be killed"), mortem sibi conscivit ("he brought death upon himself"), a servo occisus est iubente se ("he was killed by a slave on his own instructions"), se occidendum dedit ("he surrendered himself to be killed"),  and so on. The philosophical implications differ.  Why the slave matters Your point is excellent. Suppose the scenario is: CAELIVS  Occide me.  SERVVS  Dominum?  ("My master?") The paradox is immediate. The slave remains obligated by the master's authority precisely up to the point where obeying destroys the very source of that authority. It is almost a Roman version of the liar paradox. The structure is:  Master commands. Slave obeys. Obedience eliminates the master. The authority grounding the command disappears in the act of execution.  A Gricean would enjoy this enormously.  Is iubere really enough? Even if the verb is iubere, things remain tricky. Normally:  iubeo te facere X  presupposes a continuing authority relation. But here:  iubeo te me occidere  creates a self-consuming order. The command abolishes the commander. The speech act destroys the institution that licenses it. That is philosophically richer than many historians allow.  Roman dignity versus prudence As you noted earlier, historians often summarize:  "He preferred death to capture."  That is not false. But it misses the Roman logic. The interesting question is:  Why issue an order rather than kill yourself?  The answer may be that the order itself preserves agency. Even in defeat, Caelius is not merely being acted upon. He remains:  commander, issuer of instructions, author of the final act.  The very last thing he does is command.  A Grice–Speranza reconstruction SERVVS  Si te occidero, quis erit dominus meus? ("If I kill you, who will be my master?")  CAELIVS  Nemo. ("No one.")  SERVVS  Cur igitur paream? ("Why then should I obey?")  CAELIVS  Quia nunc adhuc parebis. ("Because for now you still will.")  SERVVS  Et si mutaveris sententiam? ("And if you change your mind?")  CAELIVS  Tum iam sero erit. ("Then it will already be too late.")  Implicature  +> My authority over you endures just long enough to determine the manner of my own end.  That is a very Roman thought: the final exercise of imperium occurs at the precise moment imperium is about to vanish. And I agree with you completely that before choosing a final vignette one would ideally inspect Valerius Maximus' actual Latin. The choice between iubere, imperare, mortem sibi consciscere, or some circumlocution could significantly alter the Gricean analysis. It is not clear, but it sounds like Petronius was 'a bit of a slave' Input? I found this now: In Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium 4.7.5, Valerius Maximus recounts the death of Publius Caelius (the Roman commander at Placentia during the civil wars of the 80s BC). He portrays it as a tragic assisted suicide driven by old age, severe illness, and a refusal to be captured by the approaching Cinnan army. [1, 2] Rather than focusing solely on Caelius, the passage serves as a moral exemplum highlighting the profound loyalty (pietas) and gratitude of his social subordinate, Lucius Petronius, who aided Caelius in death and then took his own life. [1, 2] The Latin Text The specific portion of Valerius Maximus 4.7.5 detailing the final sequence is as follows: [1] "...erat ob Octauio consule Placentiae praepositus Caelius. qua a Cinnano exercitu capta et senior iam et graui ualitudine adfectus, ne in potestatem hostium ueniret, ad auxilium dexterae Petroni confugit. quem is ab incepto consilio frustra conatus abstrahere in isdem supremis necessitatibus comes illi datus est: nam et Caelius iugulo eius ferro coniecto mortis securitatem accepit, et Petronius dominum adfectu sequi quam superesse maluit." [1] English Translation "...Caelius had been placed in charge of Placentia by the consul Octavius. When the city was captured by Cinna's army, being already an old man and afflicted by severe illness, he fled to the help of Petronius' right hand so that he would not fall into the power of the enemy. Petronius, having tried in vain to dissuade him from his intended plan, became his companion in those ultimate, inevitable moments: for Caelius, once the blade was driven into his throat [by Petronius], received the safety of death, and Petronius preferred to follow his master out of affection rather than survive him." [1, 2, 3] Key Linguistic and Narrative Features The Motive: Caelius is motivated by a combination of external threat (ne in potestatem hostium ueniret- "lest he fall into enemy hands") and physical frailty (senior iam et graui ualitudine adfectus). [1, 2] The Method: The phrase ad auxilium dexterae Petroni confugit ("fled to the assistance of Petronius' right hand") introduces the assisted suicide. It culminating in iugulo eius ferro coniecto ("the blade having been driven into his throat"), illustrating the graphic physical reality of the death blow. [1] The Philosophical Twist: Valerius oxymoronically calls Caelius’s violent death mortis securitatem ("the safety/security of death"), framing suicide as a logical refuge from the political vengeance of the Cinnan forces. [1, 2] The Reciprocal Sacrifice: The emphasis immediately shifts away from Caelius's death to Petronius’s choice to die with him (comes illi datus est), driven by an emotional refusal to outlive his patron (sequi quam superesse maluit). [1, 2] I can translate other segments of this section or provide historical context on the Siege of Placentia and the Cinna-Octavius conflict. Would you like to explore that? [1, 2, 3] This is much better than the earlier "he ordered himself to be killed" reconstruction, because the Latin you've found does not foreground iubere at all. What Valerius actually stresses is:  ad auxilium dexterae Petroni confugit "he fled to the assistance of Petronius' right hand."  and then:  Petronius ... frustra conatus abstrahere "Petronius tried in vain to dissuade him."  and finally:  Caelius ... mortis securitatem accepit "Caelius received the security/safety of death."  The emphasis is not on command but on appeal, persuasion, and loyal cooperation. That changes the philosophical picture considerably. Why Petronius is interesting Petronius is not behaving like a mere slave-automaton. Valerius explicitly says:  ab incepto consilio frustra conatus abstrahere he tried to pull Caelius away from the plan.  So the conversation presumably went something like: CAELIVS  Mori volo. ("I want to die.")  PETRONIVS  Noli. ("Don't.")  CAELIVS  Hostes adsunt. ("The enemy is here.")  PETRONIVS  Fortasse effugiemus. ("Perhaps we can escape.")  CAELIVS  Senex sum et aegrotus. ("I am old and ill.")  PETRONIVS  Vivere tamen melius est. ("Yet it is better to live.")  CAELIVS  Mihi non. ("Not for me.")  Notice:  Petronius argues.  That is not the behavior of a blindly obedient servant. Valerius actually gives him moral agency.  The key phrase: mortis securitas I think you've spotted the philosophically richest phrase. Valerius does not merely say:  mortem accepit ("he received death")  but:  mortis securitatem ("the security/safety of death").  That is an extraordinary expression. Death becomes a refuge. Not because death is intrinsically good. But because, for Caelius:  capture, humiliation, political vengeance,  are worse. As you noted, modern historians often reduce this to:  "to avoid capture."  Valerius' language is more Roman. The operative value is something close to:  dignity, independence, freedom from degradation.   A Grice/Speranza final dialogue I would now reconstruct the last conversation rather differently. Latin CAELIVS  Capta est Placentia.   PETRONIVS  Adhuc sperare possumus.   CAELIVS  Senex sum et gravi valetudine affectus.   PETRONIVS  Non est necesse mori.   CAELIVS  Necesse non est.   PETRONIVS  Cur ergo?   CAELIVS  Mortis securitatem malo quam hostium clementiam.  Translation CAELIUS  Placentia has fallen.  PETRONIUS  We may still hope.  CAELIUS  I am an old man and gravely ill.  PETRONIUS  There is no necessity to die.  CAELIUS  No necessity.  PETRONIUS  Why then?  CAELIUS  I prefer the security of death to the mercy of enemies.  Implicature  +> Some conditions are worse than death.  He never says:  Melius est mori.  ("It is better to die.") The hearer is invited to draw that conclusion.  And yes, I agree with your instinct: Petronius comes across not as a mechanical slave but almost as a friend, counsellor, and moral interlocutor. Valerius' whole point is pietas—the extraordinary devotion of Petronius, who first opposes the plan and then, once unable to change it, accompanies his master all the way to death. That is much richer than the simple formula "Caelius ordered himself killed." But was Petronius technically Caelius's slave? It sounds like a good gens name Probably not, or at least we should be very cautious. The passage you quoted says:  Petronius dominum adfectu sequi quam superesse maluit. "Petronius preferred to follow his master out of affection rather than survive him."  The word dominum certainly means "master" here. But in Roman usage that does not automatically prove slave status. A few observations:   Valerius does not call him explicitly:  servus (slave), libertus (freedman), or cliens (client).    The name Lucius Petronius sounds like a perfectly respectable Roman name. Indeed, the Petronii were a well-known Roman gens. The fact that he bears a full Roman name naturally makes one hesitate before assuming he was a slave.   On the other hand, Romans could and did call social inferiors dominus's dependants, and a freedman might still refer to a former owner as dominus. So the term alone is not decisive.   Therefore, the safest historical answer is:  The passage explicitly calls Caelius his dominus, but the text you quoted does not explicitly identify Petronius as a slave. We would need further evidence to determine whether he was a slave, a freedman, or another dependent attached to Caelius.  Philosophically, though, your instinct is interesting. Valerius seems deliberately to elevate Petronius above mere servility. He first:  frustra conatus abstrahere "tried in vain to dissuade him,"  which makes him an adviser and interlocutor, not a mechanical executor of orders. In fact, the dialogue implicit in Valerius is almost anti-slavish: CAELIVS: Mori constituo. ("I have decided to die.") PETRONIVS: Noli. ("Do not.") Only after arguing against the plan does Petronius assist and then choose to die himself. So even if he were legally a slave, Valerius is portraying him morally as something closer to a loyal friend. That is why the story belongs in Valerius' chapter on exemplary loyalty (pietas), not in a chapter on obedience. and can you have a second run to check this Petronius versus Caelius? Surely Petronius was a poor persuader? Thanks Not that it matters, but it would correspond to a different level -- he is on a first-name basis -- it's not 'Guard! You! Kill me!" -- Thanks Yes, I think a second run actually strengthens your suspicion. The Latin is:  ad auxilium dexterae Petroni confugit "he fled to the help of Petronius' right hand."  and:  quem is ab incepto consilio frustra conatus abstrahere "Petronius tried in vain to draw him away from the plan."  and finally:  Petronius dominum adfectu sequi quam superesse maluit "Petronius preferred, out of affection, to follow his master rather than survive him."  What strikes me is that Valerius names him:  Petronius  not  servus quidam ("a certain slave"), or minister, or satelles.  The naming itself gives him individuality. That's not proof that he was free, but it makes him more than a mere functionary in the narrative. The poor persuader? Perhaps. But Valerius' phrase:  frustra conatus abstrahere  does not suggest a token objection. It suggests genuine resistance:  "he tried, but unsuccessfully."  Valerius wants us to admire Petronius because he did not immediately comply. He first argued. Only after failing to change Caelius' mind did he assist him. So the moral sequence is:  dissuasion, loyalty, self-sacrifice.  Not:  order, obedience.  The importance of the first name I think your instinct is right. The psychological atmosphere is very different between:  "Guard! You there! Kill me!"  and  "Petronius..."  The Latin practically invites the latter reconstruction. One imagines two men who know each other well. Something like: CAELIVS  Petroni, non possum effugere.  ("Petronius, I cannot escape.") PETRONIVS  Adhuc spes est.  ("There is still hope.") CAELIVS  Mihi non est.  ("Not for me.") PETRONIVS  Noli hoc facere.  ("Do not do this.") CAELIVS  Faciendum est.  ("It must be done.") PETRONIVS  Tum te sequar.  ("Then I shall follow you.") That feels much closer to Valerius' picture than a naked military command. The Gricean point The really interesting thing is that Petronius' attempted persuasion presupposes that Caelius' intention is revisable. If Petronius thought:  "the commander has issued an order"  there would be little point arguing. Instead he behaves as though Caelius is still deliberating. The conversation remains open. Petronius is treating Caelius as a rational agent who might yet be given reasons to live. That is why I would read the episode less as an example of authority and more as an example of failed persuasion followed by extraordinary fidelity. In fact, the phrase that carries the greatest philosophical weight is probably not dominum, but adfectu:  Petronius dominum adfectu sequi quam superesse maluit.  Valerius' explanation is not:  imperio ("because of command"),  but:  adfectu ("because of attachment, affection, devotion").  That shifts the episode away from pure hierarchy and toward something much closer to friendship, loyalty, and shared fate. And can you online check for a source other than Valerio to see if they do mention a Petronio associated with Celio in Piacenza? Thanks I checked, and interestingly I did not find another source in the search results that independently mentions a Petronius associated with Publius Caelius at Placentia. What I found points back to Valerius Maximus 4.7.5 as the source of the anecdote. [ia801705.u...rchive.org], [attalus.org], [thelatinlibrary.com] So the cautious conclusion is:  As far as the evidence located here goes, Petronius' connection with Caelius appears to depend on Valerius' account. I did not find a second ancient source in the search results corroborating the episode. [ia801705.u...rchive.org], [attalus.org]  Now philosophically, that actually makes Petronius more intriguing. The wording you supplied:  ad auxilium dexterae Petroni confugit "he fled to the help of Petronius' right hand"  is remarkably personal. And then:  ab incepto consilio frustra conatus abstrahere "he tried in vain to dissuade him."  This is not the language one instinctively expects for:  "Guard, execute me."  Rather, it sounds like:  "Petronius, help me."  followed by:  "No, Caelius, don't do this."  Only after the failure of persuasion does the act occur. What especially caught my eye is that Valerius explicitly explains Petronius' conduct by:  adfectu "affection, devotion."  not by:  imperio "command."  In other words, Valerius' moral is:  Petronius acted because he loved or was devoted to Caelius,  not:  because Caelius successfully exercised authority over an inferior.  That does not settle the legal question of whether Petronius was slave, freedman, client, or retainer. But it does suggest that Valerius wanted his readers to view the relationship at the level of pietas and fides, not mere obedience. In fact, your instinct that the scene has a quasi-tragic conversational structure seems right. The hidden dialogue is not: CAELIVS: Occide me. PETRONIVS: Parebo. but rather: CAELIVS: Mori volo. PETRONIVS: Noli. CAELIVS: Constitui. PETRONIVS: Frustra te revocare conor. and only then the fatal act. So if I were writing the Speranza vignette, I would make Petronius a failed persuader rather than an obedient executioner. That seems closer to the spirit of Valerius' text. Apparently Petronius was a soldier, not a 'slave' technically -- I found this below. Input? Lucius Petronius was a Roman soldier of humble origins who attained the rank of military officer and entry into the equestrian order (eques). Beyond his social ascent, historically, he is a completely obscure figure outside of this single narrative. [1, 2, 3] No other surviving ancient sources—such as Appian, Plutarch, Cicero, or Velleius Paterculus—mention him or expand on his life. [1, 2, 3] Why Is He Lost to Other Sources? The surviving history of the First Roman Civil War (80s BC) is highly fragmented. While major figures like Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Lucius Cornelius Cinna dominate the larger historical chronicles, mid-level officers and local commanders often vanished from the historical record unless they served a specific rhetorical purpose. Petronius survived in memory solely because Valerius Maximus culled local Roman historical archives specifically looking for exempla—moral character studies—rather than broad military history. [1, 2] The Portrait of Petronius in Valerius Maximus In the broader paragraph of Factorum et Dictorum Memorabilium 4.7.5, Valerius provides the only biography we have of Petronius: [1] Social Mobility: He was born into a very modest family (humili admodum loco natus). [1] The Benefactor: He achieved equestrian status and a distinguished military rank entirely through the political patronage (beneficium) of Publius Caelius. [1, 2] The Debt of Gratitude: Valerius notes that during prosperous times, Petronius had no way to prove his gratitude (gratum animum). The fall of Placentia provided the tragic stage for him to repay his "social debt" with absolute loyalty (pietas). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Avoid the Common Historical Confusion Because Lucius Petronius is obscure, it is easy to accidentally confuse him with far more famous Romans who shared the same nomen (family name): [1] Gaius Petronius Arbiter (The Satirist): The famous courtier of Emperor Nero and author of the Satyricon. He lived a century later (dying in 66 AD) and also committed suicide, but his death was a political protest against Nero. Publius Petronius Turpilianus: A Roman general and consul who served as governor of Britain after the Boudican rebellion. Petronius Maximus: A wealthy 5th-century Roman emperor who ruled briefly in 455 AD. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] Lucius Petronius remains a distinct, micro-historical figure: an equestrian officer whose entire legacy is distilled into a single, dramatic moment of battlefield devotion at the Siege of Placentia. [1, 2, 3] If you are researching Roman values, I can provide more details on how beneficium (favors) and pietas (duty) operated between Roman patrons and clients. Would you like to explore that cultural context? [1, 2, 3] Yes, if that information comes from the fuller context of Valerius' anecdote, then it changes the philosophical picture substantially. The crucial point is that Petronius is no longer a slave-example but a beneficium–pietas example. On your earlier reading, the puzzle was:  How can a master order a subordinate to kill him?  But on this newer reading the structure is closer to:  How can a beneficiary repay an overwhelming personal debt when the patron who elevated him chooses death?  That is a different Roman moral universe. The key phrase you quoted earlier remains:  Petronius dominum adfectu sequi quam superesse maluit.  Even if dominus is used, Valerius explains the action by:  adfectus ("devotion", "attachment")  rather than by:  imperium ("command").  So the implied conversation becomes less juridical and more personal. The old model CAELIVS  Occide me.  PETRONIVS  Parebo.  ("I shall obey.") This is a command-obedience model. The new model CAELIVS  Mori constitui.  ("I have decided to die.") PETRONIVS  Noli.  ("Don't.") CAELIVS  Hostes adsunt.  ("The enemy is here.") PETRONIVS  Tecum maneo.  ("I remain with you.") Now the relationship is not master/slave but patron/client, commander/protégé, benefactor/beneficiary.  Interestingly, Petronius' attempt to dissuade him becomes more important. Valerius says:  frustra conatus abstrahere  He tried to pull him away from the plan and failed. That means Petronius is not merely executing a decision; he is participating in deliberation. In Gricean terms, the conversation remains open. He offers reasons. He challenges the proposed course of action. Only when persuasion fails does loyalty take over.  I also think your observation about the name is significant. A narrative of a slave often reads:  servus quidam, "a certain slave."  Valerius gives us:  Lucius Petronius.  That sounds like a person with a civic identity and social trajectory of his own, precisely the sort of man who could have risen from humble origins into the equestrian order, as your source suggests. So for a Speranza vignette I would now rewrite the climax as: PETRONIVS  Cur mori vis?  ("Why do you wish to die?") CAELIVS  Ne vivam beneficio hostium.  ("So that I may not live by the favor of enemies.") PETRONIVS  Ego te servare volo.  ("I wish to save you.") CAELIVS  Iam satis servasti.  ("You have already saved me enough.") PETRONIVS  Tum sequar.  ("Then I shall follow.") Implicature  +> The greatest repayment of a benefit is fidelity, even when persuasion has failed.  That seems much closer to Valerius' moral purpose than the simpler "master orders subordinate to kill him" reading. a beneficiary's idea of what beneficenza is! Oddly Petronius becomes more Roman than the benefactor: the old man was perhaps too weak to grab a sword and fall upon him. Petronius does it for him. And, as a night cap, he does it to himself. Talk of mutual beneficenza alla Grice! Ha! These Romans! One supersedes the other! Some exemplum from Valerio -- it would be banned in schools today! Ha! Yes, by modern pedagogical standards Valerius Maximus would probably be escorted out of the curriculum office. What I find delightful is that the story begins as an exemplum of beneficium and ends as a kind of escalating competition in pietas. The structure is almost absurdly Roman:  Caelius promotes Petronius from humble origins. Petronius owes gratitude. The city falls. Caelius decides that death is preferable to capture. Petronius argues against it. Petronius helps him die. Petronius then dies himself.  One almost hears a Gricean commentator muttering:  "This is an unusually robust conception of reciprocation."  The irony, as you note, is that the beneficiary becomes in some respects more Roman than the benefactor. Caelius is old, ill, defeated, and seeking what Valerius calls:  mortis securitas,  the "security" or "safety" of death. Petronius, by contrast, still has options. Valerius explicitly says he preferred:  sequi quam superesse,  "to follow rather than survive." The really Roman word is not mors but superesse. Petronius rejects survival itself. From a modern perspective one wants to say:  "But surely survival is the point!"  Valerius' Roman reader is invited to think:  "But survival at what moral price?"  That's why the anecdote belonged in a collection of moral examples. And yes, there is something almost comic in the escalation: CAELIVS  "Help me die."  PETRONIVS  "No."  CAELIVS  "Yes."  PETRONIVS  "Very well."  (does so) PETRONIVS  "On reflection, I shall join you."  One act of loyalty supersedes another. A Gricean might even speak of a race of implicatures: Caelius implies:  +> loyalty consists in helping me.  Petronius replies by action:  +> true loyalty consists in not outliving me.  He strengthens the original commitment. In a curious way, Petronius' final act "outdoes" the benefactor's. Valerius begins with Caelius and ends with Petronius because the moral center of gravity has shifted. The old commander receives mortis securitas; the former protégé receives the exemplum. Very Roman indeed. And yes, one suspects a modern school inspector might object that "the lesson outcome is not aligned with contemporary wellbeing objectives." Valerius would probably accept the criticism and proudly insert it into Book VI under De Constantia. and also because if the official title involved benefacere benefactor beneficiarius there is an irony that the bene to be fact is to 'kill' -- your benefactor -- and then yourself. Grice has a paper on 'ill-will' which is not maleficenza but mala voluntas as opposed to bona voluntas and beneficentia -- so the irony there, too? Thanks it's like in their deliberation they deliberate that the good make (bene face) for Petronio is to kill his bene -- factor and as an epilogue kill himself -- refuting all those premises in the previous deliberation where he tried to convince C. not to have or ask Petronius do it for him? Thanks Yes, and I think you've found a very Roman irony that a modern moral philosopher would relish. The whole anecdote is officially about:  beneficium (the benefit conferred by Caelius) and gratus animus (Petronius' grateful response).  Yet the beneficium culminates in an act which, if described bluntly, is:  Petronius kills his benefactor.  And then:  Petronius kills himself.  The vocabulary and the action pull in opposite directions.  In Gricean terms, there is a tension between: What Petronius argued Earlier:  frustra conatus abstrahere "he tried in vain to draw him away from the plan."  So Petronius' deliberative position is:  "You should not die."  That is his explicit practical conclusion. What Petronius does Later:  he performs the very act he argued against.  At first sight one might think:  contradiction.  But a Roman would say:  not contradiction, but a change in the relevant duty.  The duty of persuasion gives way to the duty of fidelity.  This is where your point about bene-facere becomes very sharp. Petronius' final reasoning is almost:  The greatest benefit I ever received came from Caelius. I have failed to persuade him. The greatest good I can now do for him is what he wants. Therefore I assist his death.  A modern reader recoils. A Roman reader is invited to admire. Valerius is deliberately writing for the second audience.  And yes, here Grice's distinction between:  benevolentia (good will)  and  malevolentia (ill will)  becomes amusing. Petronius' action outwardly resembles hostility:  he kills a man.  Yet Valerius insists it is motivated by:  adfectus, devotion, gratitude, loyalty.  The physical act resembles maleficence. The intention is represented as beneficence. A Gricean would immediately separate:  act-description, motive, communicated intention.  The same bodily movement (plunging a sword) can belong to radically different descriptions.  The deepest irony is perhaps this: Petronius' final act seems to refute his earlier argument. Earlier he says, in effect:  "Do not die."  Later he says by action:  "You were right to die."  A Roman moralist would reply:  No. I argued because friendship required argument. I complied because friendship required compliance.  The obligations change over the course of the conversation.  A Speranza-style epigram might be:  Petronius first tried to save his benefactor from death; failing that, he converted gratitude into obedience, and obedience into imitation. Thus the final beneficium was to perform the act he had spent the preceding dialogue arguing against.  Or, more grimly:  The Roman beneficiary repaid a benefit by killing the benefactor who had bestowed it, and then settled the remaining balance by dying himself.  One suspects Valerius intended admiration. Grice, I think, would have smiled at the extraordinary complexity of the practical reasoning required to make that look like benevolentia rather than its opposite.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Celio. My second-best Caelius I would choose Marcus Caelius Rufus, the brilliant, reckless friend of Cicero. He is especially Gricean because he keeps treating institutions as conversational conventions that may be renegotiated. One can imagine: CICERO  Cur tumultum moves? ("Why are you stirring up disorder?")  CAELIVS RVFVS  Quia omnes regulas serio nimis accipiunt. ("Because everyone takes the rules too seriously.")  CICERO  Res publica non est iocus. ("The Republic is not a joke.")  CAELIVS  Donec cadit. ("Until it falls.")  Implicature  +> Political institutions survive only while citizens continue to treat them as binding.  Very modern; very Gricean.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Celio. Denarius issued by Gaius Coelius Caldus in 104 BC. The obverse depicts a head of Roma, the reverse Victoria driving a biga.[1] The gens Coelia, occasionally written Coilia, was a family at ancient Rome. The Coelii are frequently confounded with the Caelii, with some individuals called Caelius in manuscripts, while they appear as Coelius or Coilius on coins. The first of this gens who obtained the consulship was Gaius C. Caldus. The Caelii mentioned in history used the praenomina Lucius, Gaius, and Marcus, all of which were amongst the most common names at Rome.  There only regular surname of this gens under the Republic was Caldus, derived from the Latin calidus, which translates "hot" or "rash". The same cognomen also gave rise to the gentilicium Calidius. Early Coelii Lucius C., commanded as a legate in Illyricum during the war against Perseus, and was defeated in his attempt to take the town of Uscana.[7][8] Lucius C. Antipater, a jurist and historian during the latter half of the second century BC. Gaius (C.) Antipater, a legate of Gaius Norbanus in 82 BC, was among the officers murdered at a banquet by their colleague, Albinovanus. He was probably related to the historian, since their cognomen is otherwise unknown during Republican times.[9][10] Marcus C. M. f. Vinicianus, quaestor circa 56 BC, tribune of the plebs in 53, praetor about 48, and subsequently proconsul of Bithynia and Pontus. Although a supporter of Pompeius during his tribunate, he was a partisan of GIULIO Caesar during the Civil War.[11][12] Coelii Caldi Gaius C. C. f., a senator in 129 BC, probably the father of Gaius Coelius Caldus, the consul of 94 BC.[13] Gaius C. C. f. C. n. Caldus, consul in 94 BC, a novus homo and minor orator. Lucius C. C. f. C. n. Caldus, septemvir epulo.[14][15] Gaius Coelius L. f. C. n. Caldus, quaestor under TULLIO Cicero in Cilicia in 50 BC; when Cicero departed the province, he left the administration in the hands of Caldus.[16][17] C. Caldus, taken prisoner by the Germans following the defeat of Publius Quinctilius Varus in AD 9, killed himself rather than be subjected to the torture he anticipated.[18] Later Coelii Lucius C. Festus, suffect consul in AD 148.[19] Marcus Coelius Roscius, legate of the twentieth legion, stationed in Britain at the time of Nero's death in AD 68.[20] Publius Coelius Balbinus, consul in AD 137.[21] Coelia Concordia, a Virgo Vestalis Maxima, or head of the Vestals, erected in 385 a statue to Vettius Agorius Praetextatus, whose wife later honored her in equal fashion. She is the last Vestal attested epigraphically.[22][23] C. Sedulius, a Christian poet of the early fifth century. See also List of Roman gentes References  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 324.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 532 ("Caelia or Coelia Gens").  Chase, pp. 111, 122.  Cicero, De Inventione, ii. 9.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 561 ("Caldus").  Cassell's Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. v. calidus.  Livy, xliii. 21.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 422.  RE, vol. 4.1, col. 185; supplement 3, col. 255 (Coelius 6).  Broughton, vol. II, p. 71.  ILLRP, 402.  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 210, 228, 273, 288.  Sherk, "Senatus Consultum De Agro Pergameno", p. 367.  RE, vol. 4.1, col. 196 (Coelius 15).  Crawford 1974, p. 459.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, ii. 15, 19, Epistulae ad Atticum, vi. 2, 4-6, vii. 1.  RE, vol. 4.1, col. 196 (Coelius 14).  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 20.  Eck, Werner; Fehér, Bence; Kovács, Péter (2013). "Die Fasti consulares der Regierungszeit des Antoninus Pius. Eine Bestandsaufnahme seit Géza Alföldys Konsulat und Senatorenstand". Studia Epigraphica in Memoriam Géza Alföldy. Antiquitas. Reihe 1, Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte (in German). Bonn: R. Habelt. pp. 69–90. ISBN 978-3-7749-3866-3.  Tacitus, Historiae, i. 60.  CIL XV, 900, CIL XV, 1057  CIL VI, 2145  RE, vol. 4.1, col. 831 (Concordia 4). Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Inventione, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Historiae. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Attilio Degrassi, Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae, (Free Latin Inscriptions of the Republic, abbreviated ILLRP), La Nuova Italia, Florence (1957–1963). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Robert K. Sherk, "The Text of the Senatus Consultum De Agro Pergameno", in Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, vol. 7, pp. 361–369 (1966). Crawford, Michael Hewson (1974). Roman Republican Coinage. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-07492-6. August Pauly; Georg Wissowa; Wilhelm Kroll; Kurt Witte; Karl Mittelhaus; Konrat Ziegler, eds. (1894–1980). Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. Categories: CoeliiRoman gentes What would be your choice of COELIVS for a Grice/Speranza vignette? One killed himself, but that's normal Roman practice. Grice and Speranza are interested in restored pronounciation (Ellis?). Grice studied Latin at Clifton -- where CAELIVS Caelius would be pronounced quite different from THIS gens, which is COELIVS Coelius --yet in Italian, it becomes, say, in Treccani, "Celio" -- Horor! Input?

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Celio. For the Caelii/Coelii, I would actually not choose poor Publius Caelius of Placentia as my first Grice/Speranza vignette. Noble, yes; philosophically distinctive, less so. Roman self-killing to avoid capture is almost a genre. My choice would be:  Marcus Caelius Rufus, the friend-correspondent of Cicero, the brilliant, unstable, witty political operator of the late Republic.  Why? Because he lives in letters, insinuations, political manoeuvres, and shifting alignments. He is almost made for Grice. Cicero's correspondence already places him inside an environment where what matters is not merely:  what is said,  but  what is being signalled.  A Caelius Rufus vignette practically writes itself as a study in implicature, political irony, and strategic ambiguity.  On the pronunciation point, you've touched a delightful philological nerve. The horror ("Celio!") is real only if one is trying to hear the ancient sounds. School Latin (Grice at Clifton) Grice would likely have learned something closer to:  Caelius ≈ "See-lee-us" Coelius ≈ often not clearly distinguished.  The old English public-school pronunciation tends to flatten the distinction. Restored pronunciation (Ellis, and later scholars) Under restored Classical pronunciation:  Caelius would be approximately Kai-li-us  while  Coelius would be approximately Koi-li-us  There is a real distinction. Roman ears would hear different diphthongs:  ae oe  even if by the imperial period they were converging in actual speech. Italian tradition Then comes the Italian catastrophe—at least from the restored-pronunciation point of view. Both tend to collapse toward:  Celio  which obliterates the old distinction. Hence your cry:  Horror!  Quite justified from a historical-linguistic standpoint.  A Speranzian dialogue almost suggests itself: GRICEVS  Caeliusne an Coelius?  ("Caelius or Coelius?") ROMANVS  Interest.  ("There is a difference.") ITALVS  Celio.  ("Celio.") GRICEVS  Periit diphthongus.  ("The diphthong has perished.") Implicature  +> Civilizations fall not only through Gauls and civil wars, but also through sound change.   Indeed, for a Grice interested in Ellis, pronunciation, and conversational inference, the very confusion between Caelius, Coelius, and Celio might be a better vignette than any individual member of the gens. The manuscript tradition itself becomes a conversational problem:  Which name did the Romans intend? What are we licensed to infer from the spelling? When does orthographic assimilation destroy evidence?  Those are wonderfully Gricean questions. Here the entries so far for you to select a second-best alla Grice/Speranza as it were -- thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Celio. Given the Coelii (strictly Coelii, not Caelii), I would choose as my second-best Grice/Speranza vignette:  Lucius Coelius Antipater, the jurist and historian.  Not because he is the most famous Coelius, but because he is the most Gricean after your pronunciation vignette and after any Cicero-linked figure. Why? Because a historian lives from the distinction between:  what happened,  and  what is reported to have happened.  That is already dangerously close to:  what is said, what is meant, what may legitimately be inferred.   Grice e Coelio Antipatro GRICEVS  Antipater, historiam scribis; veritatemne scribis?  ("Antipater, you write history; do you write truth?") ANTIPATER  Conor.  ("I try.") GRICEVS  At fontes discordant.  ("But the sources disagree.") ANTIPATER  Homines quoque.  ("Men disagree too.") GRICEVS  Quid facit historicus?  ("What does the historian do?") ANTIPATER  Minus dicit quam scit, plus intellegi sinit quam dicit.  ("He says less than he knows and allows more to be understood than he says.") Implicature  +> Historical understanding always exceeds the explicit testimony.  Very Gricean.  Why not the Varus prisoner? The Coelius Caldus captured after Teutoburg and killing himself to avoid torture is noble, but, as you say, almost "normal Roman practice." One more Roman choosing death before humiliation. A historian, however, constantly confronts:  reports, witnesses, reliability, interpretation.  That is much closer to Grice's interests.  A philological vignette But honestly, for Speranza I still suspect the best "Coelius" is not a person but a diphthong. One can almost hear Grice, after Ellis and restored pronunciation: GRICEVS  Coelius sum.  ("I am Coelius.") ITALVS  Celio.  GRICEVS  Non dixi.  ("I did not say that.") ITALVS  Sed hoc significasti.  ("But that's what you meant.") GRICEVS  Immo diphthongum perdidisti.  ("On the contrary, you lost the diphthong.") Implicature  +> Sound change generates false conversational inferences.  That is actually a very Gricean concern: what happens when the hearer reconstructs more than the speaker intended because a linguistic distinction has disappeared. So my ranking for the Coelii would be:  Lucius Coelius Antipater (historian; interpretation and testimony). The Coelius/Caelius/Celio pronunciation problem itself (Ellis, Grice, restored pronunciation). The Teutoburg Coelius Caldus (Roman dignity under defeat).  And I confess that, for Speranza, the disappearing oe may be the most philosophical Coelius of them all. Periit diphthongus. The name survives; the distinction does not.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Grice e Celio -- Celio Rufo, Marco – famous orator. Cicero’s Pro Caelio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celio – Ossia: Celio Rufo, Gaio – consul.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cellucci – Ossia: Grice e Cellucci: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del paradiso – aus dem Paradies, das Cantor uns geschaffen, soll uns niemand vertreiben können. Carlo Cellucci (Santa Maria Caputa Vetera, Caserta, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del paradiso – aus dem Paradies, das Cantor uns geschaffen, soll uns niemand vertreiben können. Grice: “I love C.; for one, he wrote on Cantor’s paradise, which is an extremely interesting tract and figure! There’s earthly paradise and heavenly paradise and C. knows it! C/, like me, also philosophised on ‘logic,’ in my case because of Strawson; in his, because of me!” Si laurea a Milano. Insegna a Roma. logica dimostrazione, matematica, epistemologia. Breve storia della logica Perché ancora la filosofia” perche no? Le ragioni della logica, metodo” I limiti della scesi scoperta, Scienza et Società, Creatività; Conoscenza scientifica e senso comune. In La guerra dei mondi. Scienza e senso comune, Razionalità scientifica e plausibilità. In I modi della razionalità, eds. M. Dell'Utri et A. Rainone. Mimesis, Milano); Filosofia della matematica, Paradigmi,  Il paradiso di Cantor, Bibliopolis, Napoli La filosofia della matematica, Laterza, Roma); Breve storia della logica: Dall'Umanesimo al pr imo Novecento   Perché ancora la filosofia Filosofia e matematica, Laterza, Rome, Le ragioni della logica, “La rinascita della logica in Italia”, e morta? -- metodo,  scoperta, Scienza e Societa. Creatività. lizio  e il ruolo del nous  nella conoscenza scientifica”, senso comune. In  La guerra dei mondi. Scienzae senso comune, Razionalità scientifica e plausibilità, In  I modi della razionalità, logica polivalente computabilità intelligenza. informatica dei Lincei, Ripensare la filosofia. La spiegazione in matematica. Periodicodi Matematiche  (For Grice, unlike Kantotle, mathematics “7 + 5 = 12” has zero-explanatory value. il paradiso di PEANO, formalismo accademia adequazione, calcolo di predicato di primo ordine, regole d’inferenza, spiegazione matematica, connetivo, connetivo russelliano, connetivo intuizionista, prova, lizio mente nous anima numero, definizione splicita, implicita, graduale ROTA VELIA non-contradizzione significato, divergenza connetivo logico e connetivo nella lingua volgare non e o, si ogni alcuno al meno uno il. Grice: Merton, 1964. Off to my seminar on “conversation” as University Lecturer—odd. Ryle used “Oxford” itself as his pet example of a category mistake back in ’49: “There’s no such thing as Oxford,” he says, “only colleges, buildings, dons, undergraduates, and so forth.” Very well: no “Oxford.” But then what on earth is a “University Lecturer”? That sounds like a double oxymoron: a lecturer without a lectern, attached to a university that, strictly speaking, does not exist. Besides, “lecturer” is a mistranslation of the old Bolognese lettore, the lector: the man is supposed to do what lectors do—read. (Wainwright or some such introduced “Reader” into our system, but it has such a vernacular touch that most avoid it, as if it were announcing you read books rather than produce them.) Still, I like Merton: the philosophy library is good, and the thick volumes of abstracts sit there, freely open to any member of the university—you see the joke, if there is no such thing—so one browses, as a man does, thinking what further conversational maxim to inflict on whomever happens to attend this afternoon. Today I browse into Geymonat’s latest achievement. He has finally got his Carlo Cellucci out of Milano—con correlatore, as the Italians put it—one Ettore Casari. Apollo did it to Daphne by turning her into laurel; Geymonat does it to Cellucci by indulging him with a branch of laurel for what, precisely? For all the effort you can see transpired in a thesis titled Ordinali ricorsivi. Now suppose I want to order my maxims. First maxim: do this. Second maxim: do that. Is that what Cellucci has in mind—an etiquette-book for rational creatures? Not likely. More likely he is following the footsteps of that Genius Croce never understood: Giuseppe Peano, the Turin master of recursion. So it is more like my own analysis of communication, which is a bit of a rule-book whether I like it or not: RULE 1: If you want to communicate that ppp, ensure that your addressee will believe that you believe that ppp (with adaptations for different “directions of fit,” if one must be technical). RULE 2: Keep everything out in the open—do not sneak. (This is not poker; it is more like bridge.) RULE 3: Obey all the rules—including this rule—so keep in the open not only that you are obeying Rule 1 and Rule 2, but that you are obeying Rule 3 herself (and yes, regola is feminine, Descartes would insist), which is obliging you to obey. That is possibly an ordinale ricorsivo for Cellucci—or possibly not. We don’t take philosophy of mathematics seriously here, and I have nobody handy to diffuse my doubts—except E. J. Lemmon, who tells me that most likely what Cellucci means by “ordinale ricorsivo” is…Grice (aside, lowering his voice as if Lemmon were a confessor): E. J., tell me plainly. When Cellucci writes Ordinali ricorsivi, is he merely ordering his maxims as if they were Boy Scout commandments? Or is there something more diabolical—something that makes one’s ordering itself a function of one’s ability to order? E. J. Lemmon (patiently, with the air of someone who has explained this to too many metaphysicians): It’s neither Boy Scouts nor diabolism. It’s recursion with a clock. Grice: A clock? Lemmon: A notion of effective well-order. Think of the ordinary ordinal sequence—0,1,2,…,ω,ω+1,…0,1,2,\dots,\omega,\omega+1,\dots0,1,2,…,ω,ω+1,…—as a hierarchy of “types of counting.” Now add a constraint: you only count in ways that are computably describable. An ordinal is “recursive” (roughly) when its well-ordering can be presented so that membership and the order relation are decidable by an effective procedure. Grice: So it is the Cantorian paradise—provided one enters with papers in order. Lemmon: Exactly. Cantor gives you the garden; recursion theory gives you the admissions office. A “recursive ordinal” is an ordinal you can reach by a computable climb—your steps are algorithmic, not mystical. Grice: Then Cellucci’s title is not First Maxim, Second Maxim but rather First Maxim, Second Maxim—provided you can say what ‘second’ means without invoking an angel. Lemmon: Better: “provided your ordering is given by a rule you could, in principle, hand to a machine.” The recursive ordinals are the well-orders that admit a computable notation system. Above a certain point—once you hit the first non-recursive ordinal—you can still talk about ordinals, but you can’t effectively enumerate your way up to it. Grice: So there is a frontier. Lemmon: A sharp one: the Church–Kleene ordinal ω1CK\omega_1^{CK}ω1CK​. It’s the least ordinal that has no recursive notation system. Everything below it is “reachable” by recursion; at it and beyond, you can keep pointing, but you can’t keep computing. Grice (delighted): That’s my seminar attendance exactly. Everything below ω1CK\omega_1^{CK}ω1CK​ is the set of men who can find the room; everything above it is the set of men who mean well but cannot locate the staircase. Lemmon: Your analogy is imperfect but serviceable. Grice: So what is the moral for my maxims? Suppose I try to “order” them, as Cellucci orders ordinals. Does the analogy hold? Lemmon: Only if your maxims form a system where (i) each step depends on prior steps, and (ii) the dependency is itself rule-governed. In your case: you propose maxims, then meta-maxims about using maxims, then maxims about being seen to use maxims—so you’re building a hierarchy. Cellucci’s point (if you’re lucky) would be: some hierarchies are effectively surveyable, others only ideal. Grice: And my Rule 3—the one that says “obey the rules, including this one”—is it recursive? Lemmon: It’s self-referential. That isn’t automatically non-recursive, but it’s where the trouble begins. Recursion theory is full of structures that are perfectly rigorous yet defeat naïve enumeration. You can have a clean rule that nonetheless generates a boundary you cannot effectively cross. Grice: So the punchline is: conversation is computable only up to ω1CK\omega_1^{CK}ω1CK​, after which one is forced into rhetoric. Lemmon (dryly): After which one is forced into Italian. Grice: That settles it. Cellucci is not ordering my maxims as if he were a Scoutmaster. He is telling me: “You may enter Cantor’s paradise, but only so long as your implicatures are recursive.” Lemmon: And if they aren’t? Grice: Then the porter—Zermelo-Fraenkel, wearing a computability badge—says: “Your set is too large,” and my audience says: “Your point is too subtle,” and we all go to the bar. Lemmon: Which is, in Oxford, the only effective procedure.Grice: Cellucci, se Cantor ci ha dato il suo paradiso, tu mi spieghi perché ogni volta che ci entro con un insieme “troppo grande” mi cacciano fuori come al bar dopo mezzanotte? Cellucci: Perché nel paradiso di Cantor l’ospitalità è infinita ma il portiere è Zermelo-Fraenkel: ti lascia entrare, però ti controlla il bagaglio assiomatico. Grice: E Aquinate, che tu chiami “Tommaso” come fosse un collega di corridoio, davvero sarebbe griceiano, o è solo che implicatura e angelicità ti fanno rima? Cellucci: È griceiano eccome: nella Summa dice meno di quanto sa, lascia intendere più di quanto scrive, e poi ti chiede pure di essere cooperativo con la Grazia. Celucci, Carlo (1964).Ordinali recorsivi. Milano, sotto Geymonat e Casari –

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Celso: l’orto a Roma sotto il principato di Domizio -- Nerone– filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A follower of the Garden during the principate of Domizio -- Nerone. Celso: l’orto a Roma sotto il principato di Nerone– filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A follower of the Garden during the principate of Nerone. Celso. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice e Celso, GRICEVS: Cels(e), sub Nerone in horto Epicuri latere iuvat, sed num etiam licet philosophari, an tantum brassicam colere? CELSVS: Licet, Grice, nam dum Caesar cantat et urbs ardet, nos in horto discimus voluptatem esse quietem, non clamoribus palatii similem. GRICEVS: At si Nero te roget cur in horto sedeas, respondebisne “sapientiam quaero,” an “saltem umbram, quia Roma nimis lucet”? CELSVS: Dicam “sapientiam et umbram,” et addam me Epicureum esse, non incendiarium, ne princeps putet hortum meum esse consilium.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Celso – Ossia: Grice e Celso: Roma antica – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The son of Archetimo and a friend of Simmaco, he teaches philosophy in Rome. Celso. Celso: Roma antica – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The son of Archetimo and a friend of Simmaco, he teaches philosophy in Rome.  GRICEVS: Celse, Archetimi fili, quid doceas Romae hodie—an philosophiam tam facile tradis quam Simmacho amicitias? CELSVS: Doceo, Grice, et in urbe Roma sententiae meae ambulant celerius quam discipuli, quia illi semper ad thermas fugiunt. GRICEVS: Si discipuli ad thermas currunt, num hoc “philosophiam docent” aut tantum “sudorem significant”? CELSVS: Sudorem quidem significant, sed si post balneum redeunt et mecum rident, iam aliquid sapientiae in Urbe doceri confitebor.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cefalo – Ossia: Grice e Cefalo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice e Cefalo.

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CEN

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Centenio – Ossia: Grice e Centenio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Centenio The Centenii are a Roman family in the time of the Second Punic War. It is best known from two individuals, Gaius C., propraetor, whose cavalry force was defeated by Maharbal, and Marcus C. Penula, a veteran centurion distinguished for his bravery, who was granted a force to deal with Hannibal in Lucania, and was likewise defeated in 212.[1][2][3][4][5][6]  See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Polybius, The Histories, iii. 86.  Titus Livius, Ab Urbe Condita, xxii. 8, xxv. 19.  Appianus, Bellum Hannibalicum, 9-11, 17.  Joannes Zonaras, Epitome Historiarum, viii. 25.  Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal, 4.  Paulus Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Paganos Libri VII, iv. 16.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)    GENS             This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs For this gens, we can imagine a conversation by a C. to wit his father -- the first a boy -- as they recount their family history -- so Dad explains that one fought against X, and that the other foughtt against Y, in th same war -- 'Defeats count, Dad?" -- Yes, son -- and then give an utterance with implicature (all otherwise in Latin and English, implicatum only in English, after +> and with a 'that'-clause format. Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Centenio – Ossia: Grice e Centenio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Centenio For the Centenii, the beauty is that the whole gens seems almost built around a family joke that only Romans would find encouraging:  "Your ancestors were both defeated by Hannibal's people."   "And we still remember them."  A Speranzian father-to-son conversation could exploit precisely that.  Grice e Centenio PATER  Audi, fili: Gaius Centenius contra Maharbal pugnavit.  FILIUS  Et vicitne?  PATER  Minime; victus est.   FILIUS  Quid de Marco Centenio Penula?  PATER  Is quoque contra Hannibalem pugnavit.   FILIUS  Et ille vicitne?  PATER  Ne ille quidem; victus est.   FILIUS  Ergo apud nos etiam clades numerantur?  ("So among us even defeats count?")  PATER  Fili, de victoriis hostes gloriantur; de proeliis maiores nostri.  ("My son, enemies boast of victories; our ancestors boast of battles.") Implicature  +> that courage deserves remembrance even when success does not follow.   Or, a slightly sharper Roman ending: FILIUS  Nemo ex nostris vicit?  ("Did none of our men win?") PATER  Contra Hannibalem pugnasse satis est.  ("To have fought against Hannibal is enough.") Implicature  +> that participation in a great struggle may itself be honorable, regardless of the outcome.  That strikes me as very Roman and very Gricean: the father never explicitly says,  "Our ancestors were brave men."  Instead, he merely recounts the defeats and lets the son infer the evaluative conclusion. The family memory preserves not victory but dignitas in defeat. So please provide translation to English of utterances that you've left in Latin only – thanks Of course. Here is the dialogue with every utterance translated: Grice e Centenio PATER  Audi, fili: Gaius Centenius contra Maharbal pugnavit. "Listen, my son: Gaius Centenius fought against Maharbal."  FILIUS  Et vicitne? "And did he win?"  PATER  Minime; victus est. "Not at all; he was defeated."   FILIUS  Quid de Marco Centenio Penula? "What about Marcus Centenius Penula?"  PATER  Is quoque contra Hannibalem pugnavit. "He too fought against Hannibal."   FILIUS  Et ille vicitne? "And did he win?"  PATER  Ne ille quidem; victus est. "Not he either; he was defeated."   FILIUS  Ergo apud nos etiam clades numerantur? "So among us even defeats count?"   PATER  Fili, de victoriis hostes gloriantur; de proeliis maiores nostri. "My son, enemies boast of victories; our ancestors boast of battles."  Implicature  +> that courage deserves remembrance even when success does not follow.   Or, in a slightly sharper Roman version: FILIUS  Nemo ex nostris vicit? "Did none of our people win?"  PATER  Contra Hannibalem pugnasse satis est. "To have fought against Hannibal is enough."  Implicature  +> that participation in a great struggle may itself be honorable, regardless of the outcome.  I rather like this second ending because it sounds authentically Roman. The father never says:  Fortes erant. "They were brave."  Instead he merely observes:  Contra Hannibalem pugnasse satis est.  and leaves the boy—and the reader—to infer the evaluative conclusion. That is very much a Gricean move.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Centi – Ossia: Grice e Centi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale di SAVONAROLA e compagnia – dal pulpito al rogo Tito Sante Centi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale di SAVONAROLA e compagnia – dal pulpito al rogo – scuola di Segni – filosofiia romana – filosofia lazia -- filosofia italiana – , pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice,  (Segni). Filosofo romano. Filosofo lazio. Filosofo italiano. Segni, Roma, Lazio. Grice: “I like Centi; he is better than Kenny! C. dedicates his life to AQUINO o “San Tomasso,” as he calls him – first-name basis. But he also philosophises on other figures notably Savonarola. However, he is deemed the expert on ‘Aquino,’ as he also called him – as we call Occam Occam! According to C., Aquino is a Griceian! You tell me one of them Italian philosophers is a priest, and I refuse to call him a philosopher – the same with them Irish Catholics, like Kenny, and even non-Irish, like Copleston!” Esperto d’Aquino. Studia a Roma sotto Garrigou-Lagrange. Insegna a Roma. Noto soprattutto per il suo commento ad AQUINO. Somma Teologica”. Commenta anche la Summa contra Gentiles, il Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, De perfectione spiritualis vitae etc.) e varie Questiones Disputatae.  Commenta AQUINO e Beato Angelico. Revisa SAVONAROLA e ne ha difeso l'ortodossia, la vera ragione della sua condanna la sua opposizione alle politiche espansionistiche del papa Quod quidem non est intelligendum, ut homo, et non homo accipiatur ex parte subiecti, non enim nunc agitur de enunciationibus quæ sunt de infinito subiecto. Unde oportet quod homo et non homo accipiantur ex parte prædicati. Sed quia philosophus exemplificat de enunciationibus in quibus ex parte prædicati ponitur iustum et non iustum, visum est Alexandro, quod prædicta littera sit corrupta. Quibusdam aliis videtur quod possit sustineri et quod signanter Aristoteles nomina in exemplis variaverit, ut ostenderet quod non differt in quibuscunque nominibus ponantur exempla.  gemitus, Aquino’s cry – natural sign of his illness – gemitus infirmis, gemitando infirmus signat infirmitas -- tomismo, segno, segnante, segnato. Aquino, why Aquino is hated at Oxford.  Segni, Roma, Lazio. Grice: Centi, dimmi la verità: Savonarola dal pulpito “implicava” più di quanto dicesse, o era solo un Griceiano senza saperlo? Centi: Caro Grice, era così griceiano che persino quando taceva dal pulpito generava implicature più lunghe della Summa di San Tommaso. Grice: E allora perché finì dal pulpito al rogo—violazione della Massima di Quantità o del galateo papale? Centi: Né l’una né l’altro: fece capire troppo chiaramente che la politica del papa era un pessimo argomento, e quella sì che fu un’implicatura… fatale. Centi, Tito Sante (1890). Il pensiero religioso di Dante. Firenze: Tipografia Galletti e Cocci.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cento – Ossia: Grice e Cento: la ragione conversazionale Vincenzo Cento: la ragione conversazionale. Grice: “I like C.!” filosofia morale di GENTILE. idealismo temperato, il quale cerca d’accordare coll’immanenza quella trascendenza, che l’idealismo assoluto pretende di escludere assolutamente; e ne dice le ragioni — le quali svolge in Lo Spirito. Critica l’idealismo attualistico. U ek Da qualche tempo si succedono più frequenti e incalzanti, da diverse parti del campo filosofico, le critiche alle dottrine dell’idealismo assoluto. La cosa si comprende; poichè: ormai il ciclo di svolgimento di quella filosofia appar compiuto; non solo come sistemazione teoretica per sè, ma anche ME come applicazione sui varii terreni dove essa è provata; in cui si è imposta come riforma legislativa della politica in cui si è spinta ad affermarsi come dottrina del Fascismo. Riferendoci all'aspetto speculativo del sistema sembra si possa veramente dire ch’esso abbia raggiunto, sia come processo storico dalla posizione critica della sintesi a priori, donde piglia le mosse; sia nell’assetto intrinseco, limiti e forme: Se l’idealismo assoluto puo logicamente costituirsi a premessa e ossatura filosofica del fascismo è cosa discutibile; noi crediamo che, così, il Fascismo non s’appogge- rebbe validamente. Congiunto coll’attuale sistema politico, l’idealismo assoluto si presenta con due caratteri prin- cipali, di misticismo e di antiliberalismo, Il primo si riconnette col problema religioso dell’idealismo assoluto in generale. In particolare si deve osservare serrata critica di C.: A il quale con essa ha dato un’altra prova del suo spirito appassionato, ma coraggioso e libero. Altre critiche hanno preceduto quella di C.; ma il suo studio, fuori d’ogni protesa erudita e scolastica, appare intiero nel suo suggestivo carattere personale. Pensoso del problema filosofico, specialmente nell’aspetto morale, C.s’abbandona alla sua meditazione, ai suoi dubbi, ai suoi accoramenti. Così, anche quando sì dissenta, si è presi da lui; tanto egli è immediato. Questo vuol testimoniare dell’alta considerazione che si deve fare di lui, e rende sul punto complessivo della critica all’idealismo assoluto, più vivo ed intimo il consenso. Roma, Lazio.  Grice: Vincenzo, mi piace il tuo idealismo temperato, ma dimmi: non ti manca mai un po’ di assolutezza? Sai, ogni tanto vorrei poter dire: “Ecco, qui è tutto chiaro!” Cento: Grice, se dicessi che tutto è chiaro, dovrei anche spiegare perché ogni mattina il caffè mi sembra diverso! L’immanenza e la trascendenza si rincorrono come i gatti nei cortili romani. Grice: Vedo che la tua critica all’idealismo attualistico è come il traffico di Roma: ogni tanto si blocca, ma poi riparte con slancio filosofico! Sarà per questo che il fascismo non trova parcheggio? Cento: Grice, la filosofia non ha bisogno di parcheggi, ma di strade aperte. Quando mi medito sui miei dubbi, sento che anche tu sei un po’ romano: pensoso, ma pronto a ridere della vita, come ogni vero filosofo. Cento, Vincenzo (1911). Studi critici sulla poesia italiana. Roma: Società Editrice Italiana.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Centofanti – Ossia: Grice e Centofanti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della filosofia italica, no romana – Appio.  Silvestro Centofanti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della filosofia italica, no romana – Appio. Grice: “I love C.; he is a silvestro indeed, born in the rus of Tuscany, dedicates all his life to the philosophy of Tuscani, notable is his philosophical explorations on “Inferno’s Dante,” to use the Cole Porter mannerism. But my favourite are his notes on ROMOLO  – how much he hated the Etrurians, he made them second-class!, and most importantly, the academic tradition as part of a larger exploration on Italian philosophy as such. At Oxford, Warnock does not name a dedicatee to his history of English philosophy, but in a typical Italian manner, C. dedicates his history of Italian philosophy to a member of the nobility, the duca de Argento!” Si laurea a Pisa. Insegna a Pisa. La prova della realtà esteriore secondo ROVERE verità obiettiva della cognizione umana CROTONE in Monumenti del giardino Puccini, Accademia. Cospirazione e processo a CAMPANELLA Noologia formola logica nazione e diritto di nazionalità Aosta Buti sopra Alighieri” BONAIUTO CROTONE, teatro di glorie, e sede d’istituto celebratissimo. Non prima giunge Pitagora a CROTONE che tosto vi opera un mutamento I crotoniati si adunano intorno mossi dalla fama dell’uomo, e vinti dalla soavità dell’eloquio e dalla forza delle ragioni discorse. Vi ordina la sua società, che cresce a grande eccellenza. Sibari, Taranto, Reggio,  Catania, Imera, Girgentu. La discordia cessa. Il costume ha riforma, e la tirannide fa luogo all’ordine liberale e giusto. Non soli i lucani, i peucezi, i messapi, ma I ROMANI (pria di Carneade!) vengono a lui; e Zaleuco e Caronda, e NUMA escono legislatori dalla sua setta. l’arcano della diedero soccorso a’Romani. Dicesi poi che ROMOLO fu levato dalla vista degli uomini. filosofia della storia, accademia prova della realita steriore oggettivio della cognizione Ennio.   Calci, Pisa, Toscana.  Grice: Caro Centofanti, devo confessare che ogni volta che rifletto sulla ricchezza della tradizione filosofica italica – non semplicemente italiana – resto incantato! Nessun confronto possibile con le isole britanniche, dove, se mi permetti la battuta, i nostri antenati dipingevano il corpo di blu e filosofeggiavano sull’arte di sopravvivere alla pioggia, più che sull’essere e il nulla! Centofanti: Grice, le tue parole mi lusingano e mi divertono! In effetti, dalle dolci colline della Toscana fino ai giardini di Crotone, lo spirito filosofico italico ha sempre privilegiato il dialogo, la bellezza e una certa passione per l’ordine giusto, piuttosto che il semplice pragmatismo insulare. Grice: Esattamente! E penso spesso a come la vostra accademia – così orgogliosamente dedicata a un duca, come giustamente fai notare – abbia saputo onorare la memoria di giganti come Romolo o Pitagora, mentre da noi si ricordano più le battaglie che i pensieri. Centofanti: In fondo, caro amico, la vera filosofia è un viaggio tra inferni e accademie, tra la selva oscura dantesca e la ricerca di una verità condivisa. Ma, come diceva il saggio, “ogni terra ha i suoi miti”; l’importante è che continuiamo a dialogare, ché anche sotto la pioggia britannica può germogliare una buona idea! Centofanti, Silvestro (1822). Lettera sulla vita di Alighieri. Firenze:Piatti.

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CER

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerano – Ossia: Grice e Cerano: la filosofia sotto il principato di Domizio Nerone Cerano: la filosofia sotto il principato di Nerone -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A philosopher in Rome in the time of Nerone. GRICEVS: Cerane, sub Nerone philosophari Romae est quasi inter tibias et gladios syllogismos numerare—quomodo animum tuum servas? CERANVS: Servare conor, Grice, nam sub principe etiam verba metuunt, et tamen philosophus Romanus debet verum dicere saltem tam caute quam coquus salem. GRICEVS: At si Nero te roget quid sit sapientia, respondebisne breviter, an implicaturis eum circumduces ne ipse circumducat te? CERANVS: Breviter dicam “sapientia est tacere tempore,” sed ita ridebo ut intellegat me docere, non delatorem esse.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerdo – Ossia: Grice e Cerdo: l’anima di Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma) – Filosofo italiano. Only the soul resurrects. Cerdo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice e Cerdo. Cerdo: l’anima di Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma) – Filoso4fo italiano. Only the soul resurrects. GRICEVS: Cerde, si Roma corpus est, dic mihi quaeso: solumne anima Romae resurget, an etiam tabernae et thermopolia in caelum migrant? CERDVS: Solam animam, Grice, quia Roma vera non in lateribus sed in spiritu habitat, et quod grave est, grave manet in terra. GRICEVS: Ergo cum ego in Subura cecidi, anima mea surget, sed tunica mea—heu—non resurget, nec ullus sutor in inferis erit? CERDVS: Surget anima tua, et, si sapis, etiam risus tuus resurget; tunicam autem relinque, ne in resurrectione quoque nimis Romanus sis.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerebotani – Ossia: Grice e Cerebotani: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della botanica linguistica –  e il prontuario -- il toscano di Ceretti.  Luigi Cerebotani (Lomanto del Garda, Brescia, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della botanica linguistica –  e il prontuario -- il toscano di Ceretti. Grice: “C. is a genius, and I’m amused of his surname, since a linguistic botanisit he surely was! His ‘prontuario del periodare classico’ charmed everyone, including his ‘paesani’ of Brescia – the little bit on Lago di Garda! There’s a stadium in his name! He also played with Morse, which means he was a Griceian, since he was into the most efficient way of ‘transmit’ information! ‘quod-quod-libet, he called it, what Austin had as Symbolo!”  Lincei. organismo e estetica dell’italiano Inventa il teletopo-metro, l’auto-le-meteoro-metro, e il tele-spiralo-grafo. Il pan-tele-grafo o tele-grafo fac-simile, a comunicare immediatamente e per via elettrica il movimento di una penna scrivente o disegnante ad altre comunque distanti. tele-grafia multipla. club elettro-tecnico tele-topo-metro misura la distanza tra due punti. tachimetria senza stadia Trasmettere La Divina Commedia a 600 km di distanza. lingua parlata è tanto più sufficiente quanto più ampiamente è desunto dal dialetto. Il dialetto ha locuzioni così proprie all'idea, quali non sono specificamente possedute da verun altro. Di queste precellenze particolari la lingua deve liberamente approfittare e non immiserirsi nell'IDIOMA locale d'una provincia. Seguitiamo il buon esempio del grande ALIGHIERI, che, quantunque toscano, esordì  a scrivere la sua commedia non nell'idioma toscano, ma in italiano. Spirito oggettivo. Molte forme grammaticali e lessiche sono riducibili allo spirito generale della lingua italiana, talune non lo sono: il buon criterio del letterato deve scernere quelle da queste, e, se l'idea esige neologismi, li deve creare conformemente al genio della lingua, e omogeneamente ai materiali idiomaticamente o letterariamente prestabiliti nella lingua italiana. Coll'idioma  esclusivamente toscano s'immiserisce non solo la lingua, ma conseguentemente anche l'idea, la quale trascende le limitazioni locali e popolari. implicature, la lingua e lo spirito d’Italia. Grice: Caro Cerebotani, mi diverte sempre pensare che la botanica linguistica abbia un suo prontuario! Ma dimmi, se trasmetti la Divina Commedia a 600 km, Dante ti ringrazia o ti corregge? Cerebotani: Grice, Dante sarebbe fiero, purché l’italiano non si riduca al puro dialetto! E se qualche verso arriva stonato, basta inventare un neologismo e il Lago di Garda applaude. Grice: Geniale! Allora il prontuario serve anche per trasmettere l’umorismo: ogni locuzione di Brescia può diventare una regola universale, a patto che il club elettrotecnico non si offenda. Cerebotani: Grice, la lingua italiana è come una pianta: cresce meglio se la si annaffia con la fantasia. E se Morse ti invita a trasmettere un messaggio, ricorda: anche Alighieri preferiva filosofeggiare in italiano, non solo nel toscano! Cerebotani, Luigi (1930). Elementi di diritto civile. Brescia: Apollonio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ceremonte – Ossia: Grice e Ceremonte: il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana Ceremonte: il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Teacher of Domizio Nerone. Member of the Porch. He took a materialist view of the world, claiming that the gods should be IDENTIFIED with the planets, and that everything in the world can be explained in physical terms. GRICEVS: Caeremon, dum sub porticu Romae ambulas, num vere credis deos non in caelo sed in planetis quasi in taberna stellarum numerari? CAEREMON: Credo, Grice, nam Neroni docui deos esse nomina rotantium corporum, et mundum nihil nisi physicam esse—quod etiam porticus mea sine mysteriis sustinet. GRICEVS: At si Iuppiter tantum planeta est, cur tam graviter tonat—an etiam fulmen est tantum argumentum materiale, non ira divina? CAEREMON: Ita est, et si tonat, non minatur sed demonstrat, quod natura loquitur et nos, quasi discipuli sub porticu, ridendo intellegimus.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ceretti – Ossia: Grice e Ceretti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del PASŒLOGICES SPECIMEN Pietro Ceretti (Intra, Verbania, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del PASŒLOGICES SPECIMEN. Grice: “I love C.; and I wish Strawson would, too! Ceretti distinguishes three stages in the development of a communication system. The first is very primitive, obviously, and avoids the reference to ‘io’ and ‘tu’ as metaphysical – ‘hic’ and ‘nunc’ will do. The second stage he says may be all that some societies need – ‘green’ for this plant – The third stage involves the general concept of ‘plant’ and this is where a soul-endowed entity (animal) can refer to a plant or to an animal like himself or his companion – at this last stage, C. speaks of ‘soul’ (anima), and the affectations of the mind being what is communicated – if that’s not Griceian, I do not know what is!” Studia a Novara. Ultime lettere di un profugo” sul modello di FOSCOLO. Apprende diverse lingue. La idea circa la genesi e la natura della Forza”. Idealista, tenta una revisione in senso soggettivistico in Pasaelogices Specimen. Si dedica a ALIGHIERI , che, quantunque toscano, esordì  a scrivere la sua Commedia in italiano. Spirito oggettivo. Molte forme grammaticali e lessiche sono riducibili allo spirito generale della lingua italiana, talune non lo sono: il buon criterio del letterato deve scernere quelle da queste, e, se l'idea esige neologismi, li deve creare conformemente al genio della lingua, e omogeneamente ai materiali idiomaticamente o letterariamente prestabiliti nella lingua italiana. Coll'idioma  esclusivamente toscano s'immiserisce non solo la lingua, ma conseguentemente anche l'idea, la quale trascende le limitazioni locali e popolari. communication convention homo sapiens pirote inter-subjective animale anima  psychic, psychical versus psychological, progression, pirotological progression, cenobium, neologismo, panlogica, pantologico, logo, esologo, essologo, sinautologo, prologo, dialogo, autologo, tre categorie: tesi QUANTITA (meccanica), anti-tesi, QUALITA (fisica), sin-tesi MODALITA (vita) – arte/religione/filosofia; storia/didattica/diritto, antropologia, antropopedeutica, antroposofia, prasseologia. St John’s, 1953. We are doing Categories with Strawson, for the entertainment of any member of the University who happens to be free (and for the improvement of those who are not). This week we are on what Strawson insists on calling prepositional nouns. He has a list—an actual list—and the requirement, as he frames it, is that the relevant expressions begin with what he calls a spatial (or temporal, or spatio-temporal) preposition, which he pronounces praepositio solely to see whether I will bite. So I decide to irritate him in return. Not with a counter-example in English—he would only annex it—but with something from a foreign tongue, something he cannot casually subsume under “ordinary usage.” I go hunting for an early specimen in Italian and come back with Pietro Ceretti, L’ultima lettera d’un profugo. Strawson’s reaction was the usual. I do not mean the expected one; the usual and the expected do not coincide. What on earth took you to profugus? he asks. Where are you fuging? he adds, with the air of a man who believes he has just diagnosed a hidden anxiety. He then dedicates a full slice of the seminar to the etymology of profugus. The Latin is from pro plus fugere: one who has fled forth; not merely “a traveller” (which would be too cheerful) but a person driven out, expelled into motion. And the neat point, Strawson thinks, is that the word contains both the movement and the direction: the fugere, yes, but also the pro, the outwardness, the being-thrown-forward. So he treats profugus as if it were a grammatical specimen: a preposition fused into a noun by historical accident, and now haunting our metaphysics with the suggestion that displacement can be lexical. Meanwhile I am silently reading Ceretti’s last letter, which is much more agreeable than Strawson’s derivation, even if Ceretti has the bad manners to leave no forwarding address. Editorial note (for the pedants, who are, after all, our people): profugo in Italian is simply the refugee, the exile, the displaced person; but it keeps, by inheritance, the Latin structure, pro plus fugere, and so it carries a built-in theory of location. The “prepositional noun” is not a cute grammatical subclass: it is, in Ceretti’s hands, a metaphysical diagnosis. To be a profugo is to have one’s identity expressed as a preposition. Punchline (since Oxford requires one): Strawson spent an hour proving that profugus contains a preposition; Ceretti spent a page proving that the preposition contains the man.Grice: Caro Ceretti, leggo il tuo PASŒLOGICES SPECIMEN e mi viene in mente che la conversazione è davvero un viaggio: dalle radici primitive, dove basta un “hic” e “nunc”, fino al punto in cui l’anima si mette a filosofare sul verde delle piante! Ma dimmi, quando hai deciso che “io” e “tu” sono troppo metafisici, hai fatto un salto mortale? Ceretti: Grice, ti assicuro che quando si parla di “io”, “tu”, “pianta” o “anima”, a Novara si preferisce sempre il “verde” – almeno quello non ti corregge mai! Però, se la conversazione arriva alla qualità delle piante, allora anche il mio cane vuole intervenire: lui pensa che l’anima sia il cuscino... e magari ha ragione. Grice: Ah, la saggezza del cane! Forse Strawson dovrebbe prendere lezioni dal tuo animale: di certo saprebbe distinguere tra “pianta” e “panlogica” meglio di tanti filosofi. E poi, se la comunicazione ha tre stadi come dici tu, io mi fermo al secondo: basta che non mi chiedano di parlare latino quando mi serve il tè. Ceretti: Ma Grice, se Dante ha scritto la sua Commedia in italiano, allora possiamo filosofeggiare anche sulle piante e sulle anime senza mischiare troppo le lingue. La vera forza sta nel creare neologismi: se serve, inventiamo “pirote inter-subjective” per discutere al cenobium, e va bene anche per il caffè! E poi, la vita è tutta una sintesi: tra arte, religione e filosofia, basta che non si finisca a parlare solo di meccanica! Ceretti, Pietro (1847). Ultima lettera d’un profugo.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ceronetti – Ossia: Grice e Ceronetti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della lanterna,  Guido Ceronetti (Torino, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della lanterna, Grice: “I like C.; he is a typicall Italaian philosopher; that is, a typically anti-Oxonian one; he thinks, like Croce and de Santis did, that philosophy is an infectious disease that some literary types catch! My favourite of his tracts is “Diognene’s torch”! Genial!” Per essere io morto all'Assoluto vivo come un innato parricida tra gente già di padre nata priva; pPer aver detto all'Inaccessibile addio da un cortiletto senza luce vergogna vorrei gridarmi ma resto muto. Tutto è dispersione, lacerazione, separazione, rotolare di ruota senza carro, e questo ha nome esilio, o anche mondo. Di vasta erudizione e di sensibilità umanistica, collabora con vari giornali. Tra le sue opere più significative vanno ricordate le prose di Un viaggio in Italia e Albergo Italia, due moderne descrizioni, moderne e direi dantesche, da cui vien fuori tutto l'orrore del disastro italiano, e le raccolte di aforismi e riflessioni Il silenzio del corpo e Pensieri del tè. Di rilievo la sua attività di saggista (Marziale, Catullo, Giovenale, Orazio). Da vita al teatro dei Sensibili. Le sue marionette esordivano su un piccolo palcoscenico, assisterono personalità quali Montale,Piovene, e Fellini. I Sensibili divenne pubblico e itinerante In Difesa della Luna, e altri argomenti di miseria terrestre, critica il programma spaziale da prospettive originali e poetiche. "il fondo senza fondo" -- raccoglie un materiale Dalla buca del tempo: la cartolina racconta.  eutanasia, La ballata dell'angelo ferito. Moravia  tematiche ambientali, vegetarismo anacoreta.  Solo un vero vegetariano è capace di vedere le sardine come cadaveri e la loro scatola come una bara di latta. problema del male Rechtsgesch., da ultimo l'acuta ricostruzione del Brini, Ius naturale,  La condizione patrimoniale del coniage superstite  nel diritto romano classico, Bologna, Fava e Garagnani;  Il diritto privato romano nelle comedie di Plauto, Bocca; Le azioni exercitoria e institoria nel diritto romano, Parma, Battei. la lanterna, la lantern di Diogene, poesia latina, Catullo, Marziale, Orazio, Giovenale, il filosofo ignoto, la pazienza del … Aforismi. St. John’s, 30 September 1955. Grice: Next Tuesday I’m recording my Third Programme lecture for the BBC; and, as surely as Tuesday follows Monday, this Friday finds me not doing another stroke of work on ta meta ta physika. In any case we’re seeing the Master of the Kindergarten tomorrow, and at St John’s too, so I must warn Jackson. This Friday, accordingly, finds me not at Blackwell’s but at Thornton’s. A philosopher, even an Oxford one, requires refreshment; and Strawson assures me that Thornton’s can beat Blackwell’s on poetry. So I pick up an Italian item—Italian which I don’t really speak, except when I’m rehearsing that quartet in Rigoletto—and drift, a little shamelessly, into the Foreign Languages section. There I find a small volume: Guido Ceronetti, Psalterium primum. Pears, who happens to be with me, says: That’s very Italian of Ceronetti. Grice: Palaeo-Italian, if you please. Pears: All right. But where does the t come from? Grice: The t? Pears: The t in psalTerium. There’s no t in salmi, and no t in psalm either, for that matter. Grice: This isn’t a phonetic question, Pears. It’s a metaphysical one. Saturday. After the morning meeting with the Play Group. Pears approaches me. Pears: I’ve found it, Grice. Grice: Found what? I imagined he meant a wallet, or something usefully lost. Pears: The missing t. Grice: Ah. Pears: You see—since I’m a classicist, and you are too (double Firsts, both of us), I thought I’d do the obvious thing: go backwards. Not to Italian, but to Greek. And the story is this. The word psalm is Greek in origin: psalmos, from psallein, to pluck—of a stringed instrument. The psalterion is the instrument itself, the thing-with-strings. Latin, being Latin, took over the family as psalmus and psalterium. One word for the song; one for the harp-like contraption that makes the song possible. That is the t: not a stray consonant, but the instrument smuggled into the title. Grice: So the t is the harp. Pears: Exactly. Grice: Then Ceronetti is not merely being “Italian.” He’s being precise. He’s telling us, in one consonant, that these are not just psalms but psalms as made—psalms with an apparatus. Pears: And if you insist on metaphysics, the moral is obvious. The t marks the passage from utterance to means: from what is sung to what makes singing possible. Grice: Good. You’ve recovered the t; I’ll keep the book. That seems, between friends, a fair division of labour. Pears: One more thing. Grice: Yes? Pears: It’s still true there’s no t in salmi. Grice: Quite. That’s why Ceronetti put it back.Grice: Caro Ceronetti, devo confessare che, pur essendo un Lit Hum di Vadum Boum—Oxford, non ho mai avuto difficoltà a connettermi con tutte le vostre raffinate citazioni sul Cinargo. È come se la lanterna di Diogene illuminasse anche i corridoi delle nostre antiche aule! Ceronetti: Ah, Grice, la lanterna di Diogene trova sempre chi la accende, anche tra i filosofi oxoniani! Ma forse è proprio la dispersione, l’esilio, che ci permette di riconoscere la luce: il filosofo, ignoto o meno, vive tra separazione e ricerca, come Catullo e Marziale insegnano. Grice: Splendida risposta! Il vostro teatro dei Sensibili mi ricorda che la filosofia non è solo un’infezione letteraria, ma anche una danza di marionette: ognuna porta in scena la propria lanterna, e ognuno illumina l’orrore o la meraviglia di questo disastro italiano o umano. Ceronetti: Grice, se la filosofia è una malattia, almeno è contagiosa tra chi sa vedere le sardine come piccoli cadaveri in una bara di latta! La lanterna serve a mostrare anche il fondo senza fondo, come direbbe Catullo, e forse solo così possiamo davvero difendere la luna e il nostro misero terrestre viaggio. Ceronetti, Guido (1955). Nuovi Salmi (Psalterium Primum).

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cepario – Ossia: Grice e Cepario -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cepario. The Caeparii are a Roman family during the late Republic. It is best known from two individuals: Marcus C. of Tarracina, one of the conspirators of Catiline, who was supposed to induce the people of rural Apulia to revolt, in 63 BC; and another Marcus C., mentioned by Tullio Cicero. “C.” is Latin for "a trader in onions"[3]  See also List of Roman gentes References  Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Catilinam, iii. 6, Epistulae ad Familiares, ix. 23.  Gaius Sallustius Crispus, The Conspiracy of Catiline, 46, 47, 55.  "caeparius" in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (1879) A Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Clarendon Press  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  GENS                                  This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs So for this gens, we can imagine a conversation with the first C. mentioned above -- the 'supposed to induce" implies he never did -- so we can imagine the news being received by him about Catilinina and C. ending his conversation -- in Latin, but with english translation -- with a implicature-laden utterance, for which you provide only the implicatum in English, followed by +> and in a that-clause scheme. The fact that he was supposed to do something bad -- induce the people of Apulia to revolt -- or ambivalent, in a way was a release for C. -- you can make this a 8 move conversation -- 'induce the people of rural Apulia' seems vague enough -- one farmer, two farmers, what? And we can have that ambiguous vague order as having come from Catilina in the first place. Thannks.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cepario – Ossia: Grice e Cepario -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cepario. A nice Grice/Speranza angle is precisely that Catiline's alleged instruction is remarkably vague. "Go to Apulia and induce the countryside to revolt" sounds decisive until one asks:  How many people? Which towns? Which landowners? Which shepherds? By what means?  The order carries much less determinate content than its dramatic reputation suggests. So let us imagine Marcus Caeparius at the moment he receives news that the conspiracy has been uncovered.  Grice e Cepario NUNTIUS  Marce, res patefacta est. "Marcus, the affair has been exposed."   CAEPARIVS  Quid ais?   "What are you saying?"   NUNTIUS  Catilina discessit; multi comprehensi sunt.   "Catiline has left; many have been arrested."   CAEPARIVS  Et de Apulia quid auditur?   "And what is being heard about Apulia?"   NUNTIUS  Nemo adhuc movit agricolas.   "No one has yet stirred up the farmers."   CAEPARIVS  Fortasse nemo movebit.   "Perhaps no one will."   NUNTIUS  Nonne eo missus eras?   "Were you not sent there for that purpose?"   CAEPARIVS  Facilius est agricolas numerare quam seditionem metiri.   "It is easier to count farmers than to measure a revolt."  Implicature  +> that the supposed mission had never possessed a clear or practicable objective.   The joke, in a Gricean key, is that Caeparius never explicitly says:  "I did not intend to do it."  Nor does he say:  "The plan was absurd."  Instead he comments on the indeterminacy of the assignment itself. Catiline's instruction sounds forceful, but Caeparius' final remark invites the hearer to infer that "inducing rural Apulia to revolt" was never a fully specified course of action in the first place. That is very much the kind of gap between what is said and what is pragmatically understood that Grice and Speranza would enjoy.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cepasio – Ossia: Grice e Cepasio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cepasio. The Cepasii or Cepasii are a family at Ancient Rome. It is known primarily from two brothers, Gaius and Lucius C., who obtained the quaestorship through their oratorical skill. Tullio Cicero describes them as contemporaries of Quintus Hortensius, and says that they were hard workers, although their rhetorical style was relatively simple. Several members of this gens are known from inscriptions at Rome, including a number of children.[1][2][3][4]  Members Gaius Caepasius, an orator contemporary with Hortensius, who became quaestor through his rhetorical ability. Lucius C., brother of Gaius, who likewise served as quaestor thanks to his oratorical skill. Cepasius Severianus, the husband of Valeria Severiana, and son-in-law of Publia Ovinia Dionysia, for whom he and his wife dedicated a monument at Novaria in Cisalpine Gaul, dating to the first half of the second century.[5] Cepasia Valeriana, buried in a second century tomb, possibly built by her husband, at Vercellae in Cisalpine Gaul.[6] Titus Caepasius Maxumus, buried at the present site of Abertura, south of the Roman town of Turgalium in Lusitania.[7] Cepasius Secundus, a soldier in the thirteenth Legion, fulfilled a vow to Silvanus, according to an inscription from Ad Fines in Pannonia Superior, dating to the later second or third century.[8] Aurelia Cepasia, a little girl buried at Rome some time in the third century, aged six years, three months, and twenty-eight days.[9] Cepasius, a youth buried at Rome, aged seventeen, with a monument from his parents.[10][11] Cepasia, a young woman buried at Rome, aged twenty-three, on the fourth day before the Ides of January (January 10).[12][13] Cepasia, buried at Rome on the fourth day before the Nones of November (November 2).[14][15] Cepasius, a little boy buried at Rome, aged six years and five days.[16] Cepasia, a girl buried at Rome, aged nine years and twenty-five days, on the fourth day before the Kalends of October (September 28).[17] Cepasia, a little girl buried at Rome, aged five years and nine months.[18] Cepasia, the wife of Lucretius Germanus, named on a family sepulchre at Rome.[19] Cepasius, named in a funerary inscription from Rome.[20] Cepasia, the wife of Frontonianus, buried at Rome, aged twenty-eight years, six months, on the seventh day before the Ides of July (July 8).[21][22] See also List of Roman gentes References  Cicero, Brutus, 69, Pro Cluentio, 20, 21.  Julius Victor, p. 248 (ed. Orelli).  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, iv. 2. § 19; vi. 1. § 41, 3. § 39.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 533 ("C. and L. Caepasii").  AE 1999, 781.  AE 1986, 260.  Ortega, Corpus de Inscripciones Latinas de Cáceres, ii. 421.  CIL III, 14045.  CIL VI, 2787.  ICUR, i. 2986.  ILCV, 2616.  ICUR, i. 2733.  ILCV, 2993.  ICUR, i. 2947.  ILCV, 3021.  ICUR, i. 3388.  ICUR, iii. 7491.  ICUR, viii. 21714.  ICUR, ix. 23866.  ICUR, x. 26559.  ILCV, 3318a.  ICUR, ix. 23865. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, Pro Cluentio. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (Quintilian), Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory). Gaius Julius Victor, De Arte Rhetorica (On the Art of Rhetoric). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Giovanni Battista de Rossi, Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romanae Septimo Saeculo Antiquiores (Christian Inscriptions from Rome of the First Seven Centuries, abbreviated ICUR), Vatican Library, Rome (1857–1861, 1888). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Ernst Diehl, Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres (Ancient Latin Christian Inscriptions, abbreviated ILCV), Weidmann, Berlin (1925–1931). Julio Esteban Ortega, Corpus de Inscripciones Latinas de Cáceres (The Body of Latin Inscriptions from Caceres), Universidad de Extremadura (2007–2013). Category: Roman gentes So for his gens, we can imagine a 15 move conversation between the two brothers as they discuss -- list, for memorisation -- what they call 'praecepta conversandi' -- alla Orazio 'ars amandi' -- each praeceptum is in the imperative -- there is an overall one -- 'influence your conversational partner in a helpful way for a possible third party who may be witness to the conversation' or something like this -- the idea is that things like conversational candour (which they mention), conversational benevolence, which they mention, conversational self-love, which they mention, and conversational clarity, which they mention, are said to derive from this superior praecepta which why it does not concernt EXPLICIT conversational helpfulness (which they mention) is derived from the previous praceptum about influencing. Thanks.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cepasio – Ossia: Grice e Cepasio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cepasio. A delightful Cepasian reconstruction would be to imagine the two brothers, Gaius and Lucius Caepasius, having reached the quaestorship through rhetoric and deciding to compose a little handbook:  Praecepta Conversandi ("Rules for Conversation")  The key Speranzian idea is that all the subsidiary virtues derive from one supreme principle:  Influence your interlocutor in a way beneficial to a rational third party who may witness the conversation.  The witness could be:  a judge, a voter, a student, posterity, or even oneself tomorrow.   Grice e Cepasii De Praeceptis Conversandi GAIVS  Luci, quod est primum praeceptum conversandi? "Lucius, what is the first rule of conversation?"   LVCIVS  Interlocutorem ad utilitatem auditoris flecte. "Influence your interlocutor toward the benefit of the hearer."   GAIVS  Quid secundum? "What is the second?"   LVCIVS  Vera dic. "Speak truth."   GAIVS  Quid tertium? "What is the third?"   LVCIVS  Clare dic. "Speak clearly."   GAIVS  Quid quartum? "What is the fourth?"   LVCIVS  Benigne dic. "Speak kindly."   GAIVS  Quid quintum? "What is the fifth?"   LVCIVS  Te ipsum ne neglege. "Do not neglect yourself."   GAIVS  Quid sextum? "What is the sixth?"   LVCIVS  Tempori apta dic. "Say what suits the occasion."   GAIVS  Quid septimum? "What is the seventh?"   LVCIVS  Nec plus nec minus quam oportet dic. "Say neither more nor less than is fitting."   GAIVS  Cur tot praecepta, si primum iam habemus? "Why so many rules, if we already possess the first?"   LVCIVS  Qui auditori prodest, et verum et clarum et benignum et prudens esse debet. "He who benefits the hearer must also be truthful, clear, benevolent, and prudent."  Implicature  +> that conversational truthfulness, clarity, benevolence, moderation, and proper self-regard are derivative virtues whose justification lies in the higher aim of beneficial influence upon rational observers.  That final move is rather un-Gricean in wording yet Gricean in spirit. The brothers never explicitly say:  "Conversational helpfulness is not the highest principle."  Instead Lucius explains all the familiar virtues—candour, clarity, benevolence, measure—as consequences of a more fundamental goal: making conversation socially useful for those who witness and learn from it. That gives the Cepasii a little Roman Ars Conversandi to rival Ovid's Ars Amandi. So now let's adjust the conversation, and make it 20-move -- with their two songs involved -- and use the rubrics in the other session mentioned: conversational helpfulness (as different from the overall principle which is influence your co-conversationalist in ways which are helpful to a possible third party -- not necessarily to your co-conversationalist himself -- since the nature may be adversarial, or competitive), and especially then conversational candour (use the Latin for that, and for the next to follow), conversational clarity, conversational self-love, and conversational benevolence. The idea is that the simple imperatives have GRANDIOSE titles attached to them. Let the brothers display their skills for the teaching of their two respective sons. Thank you Praecepta Conversandi Cepasiana A dialogue between Gaius and Lucius Caepasius before their two sons. The joke is that each simple imperative is introduced by a magnificently grand title, worthy of a philosophical school, while the practical precept itself remains wonderfully brief.  GAIVS  Fili mi, hodie artem conversandi discemus. "My son, today we shall learn the art of conversation."   LVCIVS  Et filius meus simul discat; praecepta enim omnibus communia sunt. "And let my son learn as well; for the rules are common to all."   FILIVS GAII  Quod est summum praeceptum? "What is the highest rule?"   GAIVS  Praeceptum Imperiale Conversationis: "The Imperial Rule of Conversation:" Interlocutorem ad utilitatem auditoris flecte. "Influence your interlocutor toward the benefit of the hearer."   FILIVS LVCII  Etiamsi auditor taceat? "Even if the hearer remains silent?"   LVCIVS  Maxime, si taceat. "Especially if he remains silent."   FILIVS GAII  Quid de adiutorio conversationis? "What of conversational helpfulness?"   GAIVS  Praeceptum Auxilii Conversationalis: "The Rule of Conversational Helpfulness:" Prosis colloquio. "Contribute to the conversation."   FILIVS LVCII  Quid de candore?   "What of candour?"   LVCIVS  Praeceptum Candoris Conversationalis: "The Rule of Conversational Candour:" Vera dic. "Speak truths."   FILIVS GAII  Quid de claritate? "What of clarity?"   GAIVS  Praeceptum Claritatis Conversationalis: "The Rule of Conversational Clarity:" Clare dic. "Speak clearly."   FILIVS LVCII  Quid de benevolentia? "What of benevolence?"   LVCIVS  Praeceptum Benevolentiae Conversationalis: "The Rule of Conversational Benevolence:" Benigne dic. "Speak kindly."   FILIVS GAII  Quid de amore sui? "What of self-love?"   GAIVS  Praeceptum Amoris Sui Conversationalis: "The Rule of Conversational Self-Love:" Te ipsum ne neglege. "Do not neglect yourself."   FILIVS LVCII  Num haec inter se pugnant? "Do these ever conflict with one another?"   LVCIVS  Interdum videntur pugnare. "Sometimes they seem to conflict."   FILIVS GAII  Quid tum faciendum est? "What should be done then?"   GAIVS  Ad summum praeceptum redi. "Return to the supreme rule."   LVCIVS  Nam qui verum, clare, benigne, et prudenter dicit, auditori prodest etiam cum adversario disputat. "For he who speaks truthfully, clearly, kindly, and prudently benefits the hearer even when disputing with an opponent."   Implicature  +> that conversational candour, clarity, benevolence, self-regard, and helpfulness derive their authority from the higher principle that one ought to influence one's interlocutor in ways beneficial to a rational third party who may witness the conversation.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerellio – Ossia: Grice e Cerellio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cerellio. The Cerellii are a family during the late Roman Republic and in imperial times. Few members of this gens occur in history. Caerellia was a learned and wealthy friend of Tullio Cicero.[1] Various Caerellii are known from epigraphy, including Caerellius Priscus, governor of Roman Britain in the late second century.  Members Caerellia, a wealthy contemporary of Cicero, whose philosophical writings she studied, and with whom she became intimately acquainted. Quintus Fufius Calenus accused them of having carried on an affair.[2][3][4][1] Caerellius Priscus, governor of various provinces, including Britain, was consul suffectus around AD 172. Gaius Caerellius Sabinus, legate of the Legio XIII Gemina, according to an inscription from Apulum in Dacia, dating between AD 183 and 185.[5] See also List of Roman gentes References  Leonhard Schmitz, "Caerellia", in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, pp. 535, 536.  Cicero, Ad Familiares, xiii. 72; Ad Atticum, xii. 51, xiii. 21, 22, xiv. 19, xv. 1, 26.  Cassius Dio, Roman History, xlvi. 18.  Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, vi. 3. § 112.  CIL III, 1092. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares. Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (Quintilian), Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory). Lucius Cassius Dio, Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). GENS                            This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesCaerelliiRoman gentes stubs So for this gens, we can have a ten move conversation between C. having returned as governor from province X -- and is now appointed -- this is AD 170 so you choose appropraite interlocutor superior -- governor of BRITANNIA. "Where is that?" -- It's north of what we used to call Britannia Minoris -- "So this is Britannia majoris" "Yes" "Superior Majoris" -- we already have a governor for Britannia Majoris Inferior" whom you'll see occasional at the Roman baths at Bath, you hope." Etc. –

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerellio – Ossia: Grice e Cerellio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cerellio. Since the sources only explicitly tell us that Caerellius Priscus was governor of various provinces, including Britain, and was consul suffectus around AD 172, I shall treat the rest as a Speranzian imaginative reconstruction rather than history. Grice e Cerellio Prisco Caerellius Priscus has returned from one province and is being interviewed by a superior in Rome before departing for Britain. PRAEFECTVS  Prisce, novum mandatum accepisti. "Priscus, you have received a new appointment."   CAERELLIVS  Quod mandatum? "What appointment?"   PRAEFECTVS  Britanniam gubernabis. "You shall govern Britain."   CAERELLIVS  Ubi est ista Britannia? "Where is this Britain?"   PRAEFECTVS  Ad septentrionem. "To the north."   CAERELLIVS  Septentrionem cuius rei? "North of what?"   PRAEFECTVS  Eius quod quidam Britanniam Minorem appellare possent. "Of what some might call Lesser Britain."   CAERELLIVS  Ergo haec est Britannia Maior? "Then this is Greater Britain?"   PRAEFECTVS  Ita, si geographis credas. "Yes, if you believe geographers."   CAERELLIVS  Et quis eam nunc administrat? "And who governs it now?"   PRAEFECTVS  Alius iam Britanniam Inferiorem curat; fortasse eum apud balnea convenies. "Another man already oversees Lower Britain; perhaps you will meet him at the baths."   CAERELLIVS  Romane an Britannice? "Roman baths or British baths?"   PRAEFECTVS  Si felix eris, utrumque. "If you are fortunate, both."   CAERELLIVS  Tum pergam. "Then I shall go."   PRAEFECTVS  Et quid de Britannia exspectas? "And what do you expect from Britain?"   CAERELLIVS  Si provincia tam longe est quam fama, me iam prope domum esse putabo cum ad fines eius pervenero. "If the province is as far away as its reputation, I shall think myself almost home when I finally reach its frontier."  Implicature  +> that the Empire has become so vast that governing its remote provinces requires as much endurance as authority.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerroni – Ossia: Grice e Cerroni: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale hegeliana -- Gaus e il sistema di diritto romano idealismo. Umberto Cerroni (Lodi, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale hegeliana -- Gaus e il sistema di diritto romano idealismo. Grice: “I like C.! He is very Italian. What other philosopher, surely not at Oxford, would philosoophise on the precocity of Italian identity? But his more general philosophical explorations may interest the Oxonian who is not into Italian studies! My favourite are his “Logic and Society,” which reminds me of my “Logic and Conversation.” Then he has a dialettica of feelings, which is what all my philosophy of communication is about; and has also philosophised on anti-contractualists like Constant!” Si laurea a Roma sotto Albertelli. Insegna a Roma. flosofia del diritto dottrine politiche filosofia della politica scienza della politica scienze politiche diritto economia: concetto marxiano di lavoro GRICE MARXISMO ONTOLGOCIO per una teoria positiva del diritto,); Idealismo e statalismo Individuo e persona democrazia, Il problema politico nello Stato; Diritto e sociologia, C.,  L'etica dei solitari; C democrazia parlamento società comunismo diritto privato pubblico Gentile; concezione normativa sociologica del diritto quaesitum non accennano alla lotta dei partiti ma alle diverse opinioni dei Sabiniani e dei Proculejani, che LA CONSUETUDINE per la quale IN DIFETTO DI LEGGE espressa  i senatoconsulti prende FORZA LEGISLATIVA, addivenuta un fatto certo ed indubitato. Sul/t/^ hanorarium e particolarmente la questione se Y Edictum perpetunm sotto ADRIANO un CODICE coi precedenti Editti Preterii e le Pandette giuristi dall'imperadore senza ehe arrestasse il movimento della legislazione Pretoria. Jus mttem edicendi habent magistratus popvM Mo^ mani Qu(wst<^res non mittuntur: id Edicium m pt'omnciis non proponitur. Istituzioni di Gaio che riguardano i responsi prui dentum, la distinzione del jus scriptum e non scriptum senza che un tal difetto fosse un gran aniio giacché le notizie e le conoscenze che ci vennero a  tal proposito per altri scrittori, sodisfano abbastanza  ai bisogni della scienza. Roman law categoria giuridica, neo-Trasimacco, Gaus, sistema di diritto romano. I can myself imagine not publishing two articles—never mind two books—in the same year; but Umberto Cerroni, an Italian, managed it in 1962: (i) Kant e la fondazione della categoria giuridica (Milano: Giuffrè, 1962)—a proper law-philosophy monograph, and in the University-of-Rome “philosophy of law” series no less.  (ii) Marx e il diritto moderno (Roma: Editori Riuniti, 1962)—which, as a title, already sounds like a contradiction performed in public.  One can almost hear the tutor’s hand in it. I always blame the tutor. In Oxford, Hardie made me, I made Strawson—one can draw the arrows and pretend it’s a proof. In Rome, poor Cerroni—graduating in 1947 in Filosofia del diritto, Faculty of Jurisprudence, University of Rome, under Pilo Albertelli—what exactly do you instil in a boy of twenty-one with Mussolini freshly shot and a whole republic trying to invent itself?  Perhaps the only intelligible ambition: get out of the programme and go and breathe. I know I did. Hardie kept calling me back; and I, in my turn, was not nearly so wicked to Strawson. Grice (postscript, with the faintly wounded precision you want): “As I re‑read what I’ve just written, I feel the itch to formalise it—because once you’ve caught the smell of a conditional, you begin to see conditionals everywhere. I once told Strawson: ‘What you mean doesn’t mean until you put it in logical form.’ His reply—clever, authoritative, and (as usual) ungrateful—was: ‘Quite the opposite, Grice: once you put it in logical form, you don’t mean it anymores.’ He said anymores on purpose, to make the point that formality does not merely translate; it changes the idiom. Now, what I wrote was:  ‘I can very well myself imagine NOT publishing two books in one same year—but that’s precisely what Cerroni did.’  You’re right to suspect a grammatical wobble. The “but” wants opposition, whereas the “precisely” wants identity, and the negation in the first clause makes the second clause sound like the same claim rather than the opposite claim. Let me put it into something like a clean logical shape. Step 1: Name the bits Let:  ggg = Grice ccc = Cerroni P(x)P(x)P(x) = “xxx publishes two books in the same year” Ig(φ)I_g(\varphi)Ig​(φ) = “Grice can imagine that φ\varphiφ” (or “finds φ\varphiφ conceivable”) yyy = 1962 (if we want to pin it down)  And, if you like, make it explicit that “two books” means “at least two distinct books”:  B1≠B2B_1 \neq B_2B1​=B2​, both authored by xxx, both published in year yyy.  So: Py(x)≡∃b1∃b2(b1≠b2∧Pub(x,b1,y)∧Pub(x,b2,y)).P_y(x) \equiv \exists b_1 \exists b_2 \big( b_1 \neq b_2 \wedge Pub(x,b_1,y) \wedge Pub(x,b_2,y) \big).Py​(x)≡∃b1​∃b2​(b1​=b2​∧Pub(x,b1​,y)∧Pub(x,b2​,y)). Step 2: What your English intends (charitably) You intended something like:  Grice finds it hard to imagine (for himself) doing that:  Ig(¬Py(g)).I_g(\neg P_y(g)).Ig​(¬Py​(g)). (Or, if you meant “I can imagine myself not doing it” rather than “I can’t imagine doing it,” that’s exactly this.)  Cerroni did do it:  Py(c).P_y(c).Py​(c). So the combined content is: Ig(¬Py(g)) ∧ Py(c).I_g(\neg P_y(g)) \ \wedge \ P_y(c).Ig​(¬Py​(g)) ∧ Py​(c). That is perfectly consistent: it says nothing contradictory at all. It just contrasts Grice’s personal propensity with Cerroni’s actual behaviour. Step 3: Why the original sentence feels off Because in ordinary English, the pattern:  “I can imagine not doing XXX; but he did XXX”  often sounds like you meant:  “I can hardly imagine doing XXX; but he did XXX.”  Those are different.  “I can imagine not doing XXX” = Ig(¬Xg)I_g(\neg X_g)Ig​(¬Xg​) (weak, almost trivial: of course you can imagine failing to do something). “I can’t imagine doing XXX” = ¬Ig(Xg)\neg I_g(X_g)¬Ig​(Xg​) (strong: you find it inconceivable you would do it).  If you want the stronger, more idiomatic Gricean complaint, you want: ¬Ig(Py(g)) ∧ Py(c).\neg I_g(P_y(g)) \ \wedge \ P_y(c).¬Ig​(Py​(g)) ∧ Py​(c). And then the “but” behaves properly. Step 4: The “opposite” point You’re also right that the rhetoric you want is: “Cerroni did the opposite of what I (typically) do.” That isn’t strictly “the opposite” in logical terms (since “not doing it” is the negation, and “doing it” is the opposite only in a loose sense). But as a Gricean aside it works, provided you phrase it as temperament, not as logical negation:  “I can easily picture myself failing to do such a thing; Cerroni did what I, temperamentally, would not.”  Or, more sharply (still Grice):  “If there is an ‘opposite’ here, it is not logical opposition but biographical contrast: my default is one book slowly; his was two books at a sprint.” What led me into that “self‑contradiction”? Three dull answers, and one interesting one.   Late hour + low glucose. One begins to write with the admirable aim of economy, and ends by economising on the very connective that carries the burden (“but”, “precisely”, “not”). Hunger is the enemy of the scope‑bar.   The polite lie that English negation is simple. It isn’t. Negation is one of those operators that, in English, behaves like a civil servant: it appears uniform, but it is constantly doing different jobs in different offices—truth‑functional negation here, objection‑to‑wording there.   The ambush of contrastives. The connective “but” is a little machine for manufacturing contrast. It strongly encourages the reader to construct a rhetorical opposition even when the underlying propositions are merely different. I wrote something that was logically consistent, but pragmatically shaped to sound oppositional—and thus to invite a mis‑uptake.   Now the interesting answer:  I accidentally mixed “negation of doing” with “negation of imagining.” “I can imagine not doing X” is one of those English locutions that, in ordinary use, can be heard as either:   the weak, almost trivial reading: I can picture myself failing to do X; or the strong, pride‑or‑self‑description reading: I can’t picture myself as the sort of chap who would do X.  English lets one slide between those readings without paying a toll. The moment you add “but” and “precisely,” the toll‑collector appears.  Is there a reference in English usage / pragmatics that “expands on that” sort of misfire? Yes—though, like most things worth knowing, it’s filed under a heading that does not mention your particular sentence. A. Negation as objection (not just denial): “metalinguistic negation” When negation is used not (only) to deny a proposition but to object to some aspect of an utterance—its implication, its wording, its appropriateness—then you are in the terrain of alleged metalinguistic (or “marked/external”) negation, or how “not” can trigger pragmatic ambiguity and mismatch between what is denied and what is objected to. Even if Grice’s case isn’t a textbook example of “No, not X, but Y”, the general lesson applies: negation interacts with what the hearer takes you to be doing, not merely with what you strictly say. B. General pragmatics / miscommunication as problem‑solving (Leech) For the broader “how did my phrasing misfire and distort uptake?” question, a very serviceable umbrella reference is Leech’s Principles of Pragmatics—a pragmatic model explicitly framed around conversational principles and how hearers reconstruct intentions. (It’s not about Grice;s specific negation pattern, but it’s precisely about the kind of pragmatic over‑inference Grice is describing.)  A Gricean way to close the PS (idiomatic, ready to lift): as Austin would say, I’ve committed an infelicity—not the dramatic kind where the marriage fails, but the domestic kind where the hearer’s uptake goes astray because my connectives have started quarrelling among themselves. The lesson is banal but dependable: never trust a sentence containing not, but, and precisely when you have not eaten. Negation is not merely an operator; it is a temptation.” Grice: Caro Cerroni, ogni volta che leggo i tuoi scritti sulla logica e la società mi viene da pensare che la dialettica italiana sia più vivace di una riunione del parlamento inglese! Ma dimmi, la ragione conversazionale hegeliana si applica anche alle discussioni sul diritto romano, o lì bisogna arrendersi al caos? Cerroni: Grice, ti assicuro che nel diritto romano il caos viene sempre ordinato da qualche senatoconsulto, o almeno ci si prova! La dialettica, quella vera, serve proprio a non confondere i Sabiniani con i Proculeiani... e se la legge manca, ci si affida alla consuetudine: come dire, se non c’è regola, si inventa sul momento! Grice: È proprio quello che avremmo bisogno a Oxford, una consuetudine che legittimi le pause per il tè! E dimmi, la dialettica dei sentimenti che tu esplori, può aiutarci a evitare le guerre tra i giuristi o bisogna sempre aspettare l’Edictum perpetuum? Cerroni: Grice, la dialettica dei sentimenti è il vero Edictum perpetuum della vita: senza quella, nemmeno il più astuto giurista riuscirebbe a convincere una sala di italiani ad abbandonare la discussione! E poi, come diceva Marx, il diritto nasce dal lavoro... ma forse il diritto alla pausa per il caffè dovrebbe essere garantito dalla Costituzione! Cerroni, Umberto (1967). Il marxismo e lo Stato. Roma: Editori Riuniti.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Certani – Ossia: Grice e Certani: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del sacrificio a Roma.  Giacomo Certani: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del sacrificio a Roma. Grice: “I like C. – but then in Italy they learn Hebrew at school, whereas we at Clifton separated Montefiore from the rest!” Grice: “Certani philosophised, like Kierkegaard later will, on ‘L’Abraamo’!” Si laurea a Bologna. Professore di filosofia morale a Bologna.  Conclusioni di filosofia” e di teologia. La verità vendicata; cioè Bologna difesa dalle calunnie di Guicciardini. “Il Gerione Politico, Riflessioni profittevoli alla vita civile, alle Repubbliche Oltre i sopraccennati ne parla ancora l'Orlandini negli Scrittori Bolognesi ec.   Curzio è un personaggio leggendario della Roma appartenente alla gens Curtia.  si getta nella voragine, La leggenda narra che nel Foro Romano si aprì una voragine apparentemente senza fondo. I sacerdoti interpretarono il fatto come un segno di sventura, predicendo che la voragine si sarebbe allargata fino ad inghiottire Roma, a meno che non si fosse gettato in quel baratro quanto di più prezioso ogni cittadino romano possedeva.  Curzio convinto che il bene supremo di ogni romano fossero il valore e il coraggio, si lancia nella fenditura armato e a cavallo, facendo così cessare l'estendersi della voragine.  Questo autosacrificio agli dei inferi (Mani) è detto devotio.  Il luogo rimane nella leggenda come Lacus Curtius. narrata da LIVIO Annali.  Una statua equestre rappresentante CURZIO a Carrara, inserita nelle mura Albericiane in corrispondenza della Porta cittadina.  Il grande attore Antonio de Curtis, in arte Totò, sosteneva che la sua famiglia discendesse da questo personaggio leggendario. Cùrzio, Marco, su sapere.it, De Agostini. Marco Curzio, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Portale Antica Roma   Portale Biografie   Portale Mitologia Ultima modifica 2 anni fa Gens Curtia famiglie romane che condividevano il nomen Curtius  Lacus Curtius Punto d'interesse nel Foro romano  Bacchiacca. il sacrificio, devozione cavaliere penitente; ossia, la chiave del paradiso, chastita, maschile. Christian masculinity, Percival, The Holy Grail, the knight-penant, cavalier penitente. Bologna, Emilia-Romagna.  Grice: Caro Certani, devo confessare che la leggenda di Marco Curzio mi affascina sempre: gettarsi in una voragine per salvare Roma… Altro che i nostri esami di filosofia, qui ci vuole coraggio da cavaliere! Certani: Eh, Grice, i romani non si tiravano mai indietro! E pensa, se avessero avuto anche la vostra pioggia inglese, magari la voragine si sarebbe riempita da sola. Ma il valore, quello resta: un po’ come il sacrificio di Abramo, solo che a Bologna lo insegniamo con più gusto! Grice: Certani, questa devozione romana mi fa pensare che la vera chiave del paradiso sia sapere quando saltare… o forse è solo questione di sapere a chi tocca portare le calunnie fuori dalla città! Certani: Grice, hai ragione! In fondo, la filosofia morale serve anche a questo: imparare a saltare nella vita, possibilmente senza finire nella voragine… e se proprio dobbiamo, almeno che sia per qualcosa di prezioso, magari un buon pranzo bolognese! Certani, Giacomo (1915). La filosofia di Dante. Bologna: Zanichelli.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cerutti – Ossia: Grice e Cerutti: la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale del leviatano – organicismo politico – il corpo politico nella costituzione italiana.  Furio Cerutti (Genova, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale del leviatano – organicismo politico – il corpo politico nella costituzione italiana. Grice: “C. is into politics, like Hobbes, and it’s not surprising he philosophised on ‘il leviatano,’ as the Italians call it – and represent as a tortoise ridden by Jacob “La globalizzazione dei diritti umani dovrebbe avere il suo culmine con il riconoscimento del diritto che ha il Genere Umano alla sopravvivenza»  Insegna a Firenze. La sua filosofia verte principalmente sul marxismo occidentale e la teoria critica della Scuola di Francoforte da cui, tra l'altro proviene. filosofia politica delle relazioni ed affari globali, sfide globali (armi nucleari e riscaldamento globale), e la questione dell'identità “politica” (non sociale o culturale) degli europei in relazione con la legittimazione dell'unione europea. Da ricordare la sua amicizia con Bobbio del quale Cerutti stesso si ritiene allievo. Altre opere: “Storia e coscienza di classe” (Milano); “Totalità, bisogni e organizzazione” (Firenze); “Marxismo e politica. Saggi e interventi, Napoli); “Gli occhi sul mondo. Le relazioni internazionali in prospettiva interdisciplinare, a cura di, Roma); “Sfide globali per il Leviatano. Una filosofia politica delle armi nucleari e del riscaldamento globale” (Milano, Vita e pensiero). Che cosa significa "Corpi politici"? Organismi che possono essere bersaglio di una condotta oltraggiosa in ragione della funzione politica dagli stessi svolti e dal cui novero risultano esclusi il Governo, il Senato, la Camera dei Deputati e le Assemblee regionali, rispetto ai quali la tutela penale viene offerta dall'art. 290. Articoli correlati a "Corpi politici" Art., Codice Penale - Violenza o minaccia ad un Corpo politico, amministrativo o giudiziario o ai suoi singoli componenti  Codice Penale - Oltraggio a un Corpo politico, amministrativo o giudiziario. corpo politico, l’organismo politico, lotta di classe, Lukacks, Marx, unione europea, identita culturale, identita sociale, identita politica, corpi politici, I corpi politici, brunetto latini, aquino, Egidio romano, Dante Banquet, Marsiglio di Padua, Pegula. Grice. St John’s. May 1967. I’m off to bridge—one of the few activities in which one may be calculating without being accused of “logic-chopping”—and, on the table in the Merton Philosophy Room (metaphorically; everything in Oxford is metaphorical until it becomes a bill) there lies a thing called Il Corpo. It is Italy’s latest novelty: a journal-title that announces, in two words, what the English take three lectures to admit—namely that philosophy, however high-minded, is conducted by bodies, and against time, and under the nuisance of appetite. I pick it up, not because I am a subscriber (I am not the subscribing sort), but because the table has done what tables do: it has presented an object as a conversational prompt. And there, among the contents, I see a title which is already an argument: “Lukács, Croce e la sociologia.” Now, I have spent years listening to Englishmen tell me that Croce is “not really a philosopher”—a historian with a taste for big nouns, a man who writes as if “Spirit” were a constitutional office. The English love to demote Italians: it allows them to keep the Pope, the opera, and the pasta, while keeping “philosophy” in a clean, damp room in Oxford. And then along comes Furio Cerutti—or at any rate “Furio Cerutti” as printed—and he does the opposite of the English demotion: he promotes Croce, but perversely, into a category Oxford has always distrusted. “Croce,” Cerutti seems to be saying—before I have even read the thing, and I do not apologise for reviewing before reading, since Sidney Smith had the right maxim: never read a work before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so—“Croce is a sociologist.” A sociologist. Oxford will not know what to do with that. If Croce is a sociologist, then (i) he is no longer merely “a historian,” and (ii) he is not quite “a philosopher” in the Oxford sense either. He becomes a hybrid. And hybrids are what the Sub-Faculty cannot file. Then the other name: Lukács. Now there is a date-game here, and it pleases me because it is the sort of game bridge-players enjoy: not brilliant, but exacting. Do Lukács and Croce overlap? Of course they do, in the blunt chronological sense; but the real question is whether they overlap intellectually—whether a Marxist Hungarian with a taste for totality and a Neapolitan idealist with a taste for history can be made to meet inside the same sentence without it exploding. And then, as always, I turn the question back on myself—because that is what Oxford has trained me to do: Do Lukács and Croce overlap with me? Not in influence, I should think (Ryle would have had an attack if one brought Hungarians into High Table), but in the deeper sense: they overlap with me insofar as they both remind one that what we call “philosophy” is often merely a disciplinary success—a way of keeping certain questions in the room and certain other questions politely outside it. So I put Il Corpo down—bridge awaits—and I think: If you want to understand why “philosophy of language” is a late banner-title, look at this: a 1967-ish Italian journal in which Croce is being dragged into sociology by way of Lukács. That is what the continent does: it refuses our neat partitions. And perhaps, after all, that is what conversation is for: not to keep fields separate, but to let them leak—responsibly, and with just enough implicature to keep the dons uneasy. Austin, let us be sober for a moment—sober enough to be accurate, and then we may resume being Oxonian. 1) What Cerutti is probably doing in “Lukács, Croce e la sociologia” If a young Italian Marxist (or post-Marxist, or revisionist, or “left-Hegelian-without-the-badge”) puts Georg Lukács and Benedetto Croce in the same title, he is likely trying to do at least three things:   Make Croce legible to the Marxist/critical-theory reader by treating Croce not as “mere historian” but as someone with a theory of society, culture, and institutions—i.e., as a sociological thinker in effect, even if he never joined the trade-union of sociologists.   Make Lukács legible in an Italian idiom by forcing him to confront the most imposing Italian idealist of the period (Croce), rather than allowing him to float as a purely “continental” import.   Stage a dispute about “totality,” history, and culture: Lukács is, as you know, the man of totality/reification/class consciousness; Croce is the man of historicism and the autonomy of the “spirit” (art, history, etc.). The interesting match is precisely that they both take history to be central, but they disagree about what it is and what it licenses.   You can cite, if you want a footnote for the bare fact that Lukács is indeed a founder figure in Western Marxism and a theorist of reification/class consciousness: György Lukács; and for Croce’s canonical self-description as philosopher/historian/politician (hence the easy “mere historian” demotion): Benedetto Croce. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] 2) Were Lukács and Croce contemporaries—do their careers overlap? Yes, massively.  György Lukács: 1885–1971. [en.wikipedia.org] Benedetto Croce: 1866–1952. [en.wikipedia.org]  So Cerutti’s pairing is not chronologically strained; it’s exactly the kind of “overlap” a 1967 piece can exploit. 3) Did Lukács ever fit into Oxford—was he “popular”? Did he lecture there? Here I have to be cautious.   I find no evidence in standard biographical summaries that György Lukács lectured at Oxford, held an Oxford post, or visited as an Oxford lecturer. His documented institutional trajectory in the interwar/war/postwar periods runs through Budapest/Vienna/Berlin/Moscow and back to Hungary, with political roles in 1919 and 1956. [britannica.com]   As for “popular in Oxford”: among Oxford ordinary-language philosophers (Ryle/Austin/Strawson/et al.), Lukács would not be a central reference-point—wrong genre, wrong style, wrong institutional channel. But among Oxford-adjacent literary and political discussion (and among students who read widely on Marxism), he could be “known” rather than “canonical.”   If you want a Gricean way to put it:  Lukács at Oxford was not a household god; he was a foreign cousin—known by reputation, occasionally invited to dinner by literary people, and largely ignored by those of us busy quarrelling about “if,” “know,” and “seems.”  4) Where did Lukács have his career—Hungary only? Not only Hungary. The clean short bio-line is:  After the 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic, he goes into exile (Vienna); later periods in Berlin and Moscow; after WWII he returns to Hungary and becomes professor in Budapest, and is again politically involved in 1956. That broad itinerary is summarised in Britannica’s entry on György Lukács. [britannica.com]  5) Why would Cerutti think Lukács and Croce “match” at all? Because they are natural antagonists on the same terrain:  both are theorists of history and culture (Croce via historicism; Lukács via Marxist philosophy of history and realism/aesthetics), and both treat ideas as socially consequential.  There’s also a specific historical bridge: Lukács (and his circle) did in fact engage Croce critically; scholarship even has an explicit line on “Hungarian critics of Croce,” including Lukács. János Kelemen is exactly on that. [link.springer.com] So Cerutti is not inventing the match ex nihilo—he’s tapping an existing European critical conversation.Grice: Confesso, caro Cerutti, che il Leviatano ha avuto un’influenza davvero esagerata a Vadum Boum: a Oxford non si poteva parlare di altro! Ogni volta che affrontavamo questioni di ordine politico o persino di filosofia del diritto, l’ombra di Hobbes aleggiava pesante tra i corridoi e le discussioni. Cerutti: È curioso, Grice, perché anche qui in Italia il Leviatano viene spesso evocato come simbolo dell’organismo politico. Eppure, io credo che oggi dobbiamo andare oltre Hobbes: la globalizzazione, le sfide ambientali e la complessità dei corpi politici richiedono una filosofia capace di pensare il diritto umano alla sopravvivenza, non solo l’ordine. Grice: Hai ragione, Cerutti. Mi affascina come tu abbia sviluppato una visione organica dei corpi politici, quasi che la costituzione italiana stessa sia un tessuto vivente. Forse, la vera conversazione sta proprio nell’ascoltare le esigenze globali e locali, senza perdere la dimensione umana e critica. Cerutti: Proprio così! L’organismo politico, per me, deve saper dialogare e adattarsi, come suggerisce anche la Scuola di Francoforte. I temi come la lotta di classe, l’identità politica e la legittimazione europea sono ormai questioni di sopravvivenza e solidarietà globale. Il Leviatano ci ha insegnato molto, ma ora è il momento di pensare un nuovo dialogo tra i corpi politici e il mondo. Cerutti, Fuio (1967). Croce e la sociologia. Il Corpo

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CES

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesa – Ossia: Grice e Cesa. (Arcinazzo Romano). Filosofo italiano. Arcinazzo Romano.  Lorenzo Cesa. (Arcinazzo Romano). Filosofo italiano. Arcinazzo Romano. Uomo politico italiano (n. Arcinazzo Romano, Roma,). Dopo la laurea in Scienze politiche, si è distinto negli affari ricoprendo incarichi di prestigio per note aziende e società (direttore delle relazioni esterne in Efimpianti S.p.A., ha fatto parte del CdA ANAS). Attivo in politica sin dalla giovinezza, è stato dirigente DC e membro del consiglio comunale di Roma, prima di partecipare alla fondazione del CCD (Centro cristiano democratico,). Quando il partito è confluito nell’UDC (2, Unione dei democratici cristiani e di centro), C. ha mantenuto un ruolo di primo piano nella formazione: è segretario nazionale. è stato eletto al Parlamento europeo e alla Camera dei Deputati. Grice: Caro Cesa, ho letto che hai iniziato la tua carriera tra affari e politica. Dimmi, è più facile gestire il consiglio comunale o il CdA di una grande società? Cesa: Grice, ti dirò: nel CdA ci si preoccupa dei numeri, in consiglio comunale invece dei numeri si preoccupa la maggioranza! In entrambi i casi, si finisce sempre a discutere di chi deve portare il caffè. Grice: E quando sei passato dal CCD all’UDC, hai sentito la differenza? O in politica cambiano solo le sigle, non le conversazioni? Cesa: Cambiano le sigle, Grice, ma le conversazioni restano: tutti vogliono essere democratici, cristiani e soprattutto centrati… almeno finché c’è una poltrona libera! Ma Arcinazzo Romano, ti assicuro, resta sempre il centro del mio pensiero. Cesa, Lorenzo (1857). Saggio di poesia italiana. Napoli: Sebezio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesalpino – Ossia: Grice e Cesalpino: la ragione conversazionale (Arezzo).  Andrea Cesalpino: la ragione conversazionale (Arezzo). Filosofo italiano. Abstract. Grice: “I like him”. Keywords: Arisotle, Kantotle, Ariskant. M. Roma. Ritratto di C. Andrea C., o Cisalpino, latinizzato in Andreas Cæsalpinus -- è stato un filosofo,botanico, medico e anatomista italiano. Casa natale Targa commemorativa Nato ad Arezzo, o più probabilmente nel contado aretino -- Dizionario biografico degli italiani –, ma si noterà che secondo Baldassarri e Martin, la data di nascita va probabilmente ristretta all'autunno. C. svolse i suoi studi a Pisa con i maestri Colombo e Ghini, laureandosi. A Pisa, succedette a Ghini nella direzione dell'Orto Botanico e come lettore di materia medica, e coprì la cattedra di medicina. Fabbrica un erbario, tutt'oggi conservato a Firenze, che dona all'Arcivescovo Alfonso Tornabuoni. L'opera di botanica che lo ha reso famoso, il De plantis libri XVI è pubblicato, però, anni dopo, quando C. ha già lasciato gli incarichi nell'orto. Vi è, tuttavia, una connessione importante tra l'erbario e la filosofia botanica di C., perché il primo serve per mettere alla prova la classificazione delle piante che descrive nel De plantis, il cui impianto aristotelico del lizio è confermato sia dall'importanza dell'ANIMA VEGETATIVA – cabbages cabbagise --, sia dall'impronta essenzialista. Pubblica un testo di filosofia, le Quaestiones peripateticae libri V, che verrà ripubblicato assieme alle Quaestionum medicarum libri II. In ambito medico, si occupa di anatomia e fisiologia. Allievo di Colombo, darà seguito all'indagine di quest'ultimo sulla piccola circolazione, confermando l'inesistenza dei pori intra-ventricolari. Questo è un passaggio decisivo nel lungo percorso che porta Harvey a dimostrare la teoria della circolazione sanguigna. Merito di C. è di aver definito – con la testimonianza del reperto anatomico – che il cuore (e non il fegato) è il centro del movimento del sangue e il punto di partenza delle arterie e delle vene. In seguito a diversi dissidi interni a Pisa, C. si trasferisce a Roma, dove diventerà medico di papa Clemente VIII e dove insegnerà medicina allo Studio romano. L'anno dopo diede una prova a favore della "circolazione" dimostrando che le vene legate in qualsiasi parte del corpo si tumefanno "sotto il laccio, cioè dalla periferia al centro", e che quando aperte, come nel salasso, lasciano fuoriuscire dapprima sangue scuro venoso e poi sangue rosso arterioso. Era la prova concreta che esiste una corrente centripeta opposta rispetto a quello che, tramite l'aorta e i suoi rami, porta il sangue dal cuore alla periferia: nel sistema vasale esistevano quindi due correnti opposte. Pubblica un testo di metallurgia, in cui applica il suo metodo di classificazione botanica ai minerali e alle pietre - giunge a questo interesse lavorando alla Methalloteca vaticana. Pubblica i primi libri dell'Ars medica, che verrà completata solo postumamente. Il suo lavoro più importante rimane quello in ambito botanico, perché sviluppa un nuovo sistema di classificazione delle piante che verrà seguito per tutto il XVII secolo. Tutt'oggi, C. è considerato uno dei primi grandi sistematici in quanto non solo descrisse e classificò 1500 specie -- De Plantis , ma fu il primo a suggerire una relazione tra struttura e funzione dei caratteri morfologici usati nella classificazione. Taurello, professore ad Altdorf, Alpes Caesae -- accusò C. e GRICE di identificare Dio – il genitore -- e la natura – significare naturale – o fisico-- , e il teologo inglese Parker lo accusò di ateismo. Bayle, nel suo Dizionario storico e critico, lo considera come un precursore di Spinoza. Queste accuse sono dovute a temi naturalistici o fisicisti – GRICE, significare-N e significare-NN -- presenti nelle sue opere come, ad esempio, la difficoltà di differenziare le anime umane da quelle degl’altri esseri mortali e la difficoltà di dimostrare l'immortalità delle anime individuali. Quaestiones peripateticae, Daemonum investigatio, in cui combatte la magia e la stregoneria; De plantis Marescotti. medicarum  peripateticarum Quomodo igi- turfimaginatio a rebus externis moueatur non intercedente fenfu & quo pavfto ad id pra:fl;andum per fenfum requiratur, explicatum efl: C ex motu qui inimaginatione fit, communicetur raotus rebus externis,diuiniorem caufam expoflulat: gitnifihominibus, &diuiniorem naturamadeptis. Omnes funt Quaternioncs, pr^ter a, quinternionem. Arezzo.  Grice: Professore Cesalpino, ho sempre ammirato la sua capacità di unire filosofia e botanica! Mi incuriosisce come la ragione conversazionale, secondo lei, possa emergere dallo studio delle piante. Crede che la natura stessa abbia un linguaggio? Cesalpino: Caro Grice, la natura parla a chi sa ascoltare: ogni pianta racconta una storia, e la classificazione è già dialogo. Per me, il sistema vegetale è guidato dall’anima vegetativa, che comunica attraverso forme e funzioni. L’osservazione attenta è la chiave per scoprire questa conversazione silenziosa. Grice: Che affascinante prospettiva! In effetti, anche la filosofia cerca di classificare concetti e idee, quasi come un erbario del pensiero. La sua esperienza in medicina e anatomia ha influenzato il modo in cui interpreta il linguaggio della natura? Cesalpino: Assolutamente, Grice. Studiare il cuore come centro del movimento mi ha insegnato che ogni sistema ha un proprio ordine interno, simile a una conversazione tra le parti che lo compongono. Anche tra le vene e le arterie vi è un dialogo di opposti, proprio come accade tra idee in filosofia. La classificazione, in fondo, è una forma di ragione conversazionale tra uomo e natura. Cesalpino, Andrea (1583). De plantis libri. Firenze:Marescotti.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesarini – Ossia: Grice e Cesarini – filosofia italiana–  (Genzano di Roma).  Cesarini – filosofia italiana–  (Genzano di Roma). Filosofo italiano. Grice: “Cesarini was more of a warrior than a philosopher, but I also fought in the North-Atlantic – in Italy, war trumps philosophy! He wrote a philosophical story of the war of Velletri – and liked to dress up as one of his ducal ancestors – a gentleman!” -- There are many philosophers with the name Sforza Cesarini. Figlio del III duca Lorenzo Sforza Cesarini. Convinto sostenitore del nuovo Regno d'Italia tanto da nascondere le armi degli insorti nel suo palazzo. Per questo motivo, il papa confisca tutte le sua proprietà che vennero loro restituite da Vittorio Emanuele II dopo il suo ingresso a Roma, reso possibile dalla presa di Porta Pia, accompagnato dallo stesso filosofo in veste di consigliere del re. Grice: “My mother loved him; but then every Englishman loved the Kingdom of Italy, or rather, every Englishman hated the Pope!” – Grice: “Sforza Cesarini should never be confused with the philosopher Cesarini Sforza: Sforza Cesarini is under “C”; Cesarini Sforza, the jurisprudential philosopher, is under “S”. IV duca Sforza Cesarini. Francesco II Sforza Cesarini. Francesco Sforza Cesarini. Sforza Cesarini. Cesarini. Keywords: “Letters of my father, kingdom of Italy, anti-Popish, Palazzo di Roma. Patria, patriotism, nazionalismo. Il nuovo regno d’Italia, Vittorio Emanuele II, Porta Pia. Grice. Grice: Caro Cesarini, dicono che tu sia stato più guerriero che filosofo! Dimmi, è vero che in Italia la guerra vince sulla filosofia? Cesarini: Grice, dalle nostre parti, se non hai almeno nascosto qualche arma in cantina, rischi di essere considerato poco patriota! Ma anche discutere sul Regno d’Italia è una battaglia, solo più rumorosa. Grice: E la filosofia? Non ti manca mai la voglia di vestirti da duca e scrivere qualche storia filosofica? Mia madre diceva sempre che ogni inglese amava il Regno d’Italia, purché si detestasse il Papa! Cesarini: La verità, Grice, è che la filosofia si trova spesso tra una presa di Porta Pia e una restituzione di palazzo. E come diceva mio padre: “la patria si difende anche con una buona conversazione!” Cesarini, Francesco II Sforza (1539). Lettere. Milano.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesarotti – Ossia: Grice e Cesarotti: implicatura conversazionale e ragione conversazionale.  Melchiorre Cesarotti (Padova, Veneto): implicatura conversazionale e ragione conversazionale. Grice: “Due to Ryle, no philosopher at Oxford was allowed to invoke a non-English philosopher, so I had to narrow down my research to Stevenson, who ain’t even English! I think Ryle would have had a stroke had he learned that some of the whole-time tutors in philosophy at Oxford was inculcating into his pupils a love for C.!” –semantic, segno, implicatura. FILOSOFO, scrittore, traduttore, linguista e poeta italiano. Studia a Padova sotto Toaldo Insegna a Padova retorica e belle lettere dei Ricovrati. a Venezia come precettore presso la famiglia Grimani, Qui entrò in contatto con Emo, i fratelli Gasparo e Carlo Gozzi, Carlo Goldoni e Angelo Querini.  Esordi e fama  Pietro Longhi, Ritratto di Melchiorre C., precettore dei Grimani di San Luca, XVIII secolo. Maturò nell'ambiente culturale veneziano l'esperienza che gli diede una fama europea, ovvero la traduzione in italiano dei Canti di Ossian (Poems of Ossian), pubblicati tre anni prima dallo scozzese James Macpherson; a quest'opera dedicò oltre un decennio, il diletto della Tragedia e l'origine e i progressi dell'arte poetica, quest'ultimo poi ripudiato ed escluso dall'edizione definitiva delle Opere L'edizione presentava anche un Ragionamento sopra il Cesare e un Ragionamento sopra il Maometto, a partire dai quali, probabilmente, era giunto alla stesura del saggio di carattere generale Era infine incluso un componimento in giambi latini, Mercurius. De Poetis tragicis, opera che, passando in rassegna la storia delle varie letterature, assegnava a Voltaire la corona di miglior monoscritto al web: canali e modalità di trasmissione dell'italiano, Atti del xit Congresso sILFI (Helsinki, Cesati, Firenze, Il latino é una lingua viva: una Praefatio., in V. Formentin ef al. cur., Lingua, umanità. La lingua italiana cosmopolitismo alla coscienza nazionale, Geopolitica delle lingue tra C. e Leopardi, Italiano: lingua di cultura europea, Esiste il genio delle lingue? Riflessioni C. e Leopardi, in Beccaria, Marello cur., La parola al testo. compilato da N. Tommaseo e B. Bellini, uTET, filosofia della lingua. Grice (St John’s, Michaelmas 1949 — Friday night, flicker time, the Film Society itching in my pocket as if it were a second set of keys): Austin, tomorrow morning, between your “excuses” and your tea, I mean to do something quite improper: I shall take an Italian Abbé into an Oxford discussion, and I shall do it without so much as a visa. Here is the provocation. Cesarotti calls his 1768 piece a “Saggio sulla filosofia delle lingue”—note the plural, which is already a philosophical move: it refuses the monoglot conceit that there is the language, the one blessed instrument, and everything else is merely dialect and error. (And if you insist on being bibliographically pious: the title circulates in later Padua printings as Saggio sulla filosofia delle lingue applicato alla lingua italiana.) [upload.wikimedia.org] Now, you ask me—very Oxfordly—to list collocations by Oxford philosophers of the exact English phrase “philosophy of language”, as if the existence of a discipline were guaranteed by the existence of its label. My answer is: you are nearly right to suspect that, in our mouths, the phrase is a latecomer, and when it does appear it is often retrospective, classificatory, or imported (German Sprachphilosophie, Viennese “meaning-theory” talk, that sort of thing). The Oxford men of our generation—Ryle, yourself, and the rest—more naturally say “linguistic analysis”, “ordinary language”, “meaning”, “use”, “sense and nonsense”, and only later, under professional pressure, will the umbrella-term philosophy of language harden into a respectable course-title. That is exactly why Cesarotti’s phrase is delicious: he had the cheek to name the enterprise early, and to name it in the plural. But—and here is where I answer you in my own voice, rather than in your “Oxford” voice—the absence of the collocation does not show the absence of the subject. It shows only a stylistic prejudice: we prefer to do the thing and distrust the banner. We are artisans of distinctions; we dislike shop-signs. So: if you demand the collocation “philosophy of language” in Oxford titles before the Gricean era, you will not get a long list. You will get, at best, a scattering—mostly from people writing about what the discipline later became. (And the modern reference-works that canonise the field are, of course, much later.) [iep.utm.edu], [academic.oup.com] If you ask instead what an Oxford philosopher would have meant by “philosophy of language” in 1949, I’d put it like this:   The Cesarotti point (1768): languages are plural, historical, and expressive; the “genius” of a language is not a superstition but a shorthand for how a community stabilises comparisons, metaphors, permissible derivations, and therefore permissible thoughts. Cesarotti begins where the Englishman usually ends: with translation, variation, and style. [upload.wikimedia.org], [academia.edu]   The Oxford point (1949): the real action is not “language” in the abstract but what we do with words: how a sentence earns its job in a circumstance; how an utterance’s point outruns its literal shape; how the hearer’s rational reconstruction is part of what the speaker counts on. If you want a slogan, mine is: the philosophy is not of language but of conversation—language under the discipline of purposes and expectations.   Why Cesarotti is a good stick to beat us with: he forces you to admit that “language” is not merely a neutral medium for propositions; it is already an inherited technology of comparison. In his own idiom: the parabola—comparison, carrying-across—comes before the tidy sentence. That is his way of reminding you that meaning is not born in the dictionary but in the social traffic that makes a comparison apt.   So tomorrow, when you ask me (with that air of yours, as if you’d caught me smuggling), “Grice, where do Oxford philosophers even say ‘philosophy of language’?”, I shall reply: They don’t—at least not happily. They do philosophy with language and about language, but they’re shy of naming it, because naming it would make it look like a department; and departments, like umbrellas, invite rain. And then I’ll add, just to be irritating: Cesarotti had the better instinct. If you are going to commit the metaphysical sin of talking about “language” as a single thing, at least have the decency to pluralise it first. All right — staying in chat only, and writing this as Grice (fastidious, mildly dry, Saturday-morning combative), with a few bibliographic “editorial-note” inserts you can lift out.  Grice (c. 1949 voice): “On Cesarotti, and on the late invention of ‘philosophy of language’ as a banner-title” Austin, I have done a small amount of philological housekeeping on your behalf, though I refuse to pretend this is anything other than a matter of labels. First: Cesarotti’s decency. He does not write filosofia della lingua (singular, as if there were only one tongue worth the bother), nor does he collapse everything into linguaggio (which tends to make one imagine a single engine-room called “Language”). He gives us lingue — plural — and then adds, with equal candour, that the exercise is applicato alla lingua italiana. That is: he announces in his title what Oxford tends to hide in footnotes — namely that every “general” doctrine about language begins life as a doctrine about some language with some habits, and then gets impertinently promoted. [faculty.ge...getown.edu] Now you ask me for “collocations”: who at Oxford writes philosophy of language as a phrase, in titles, as if it were a settled province of the realm. My answer (as before) is: we did the work long before we adopted the badge. The phrase “philosophy of language” is rather like “ordinary language philosophy”: useful to librarians, but seldom the natural self-description of the people actually doing the talking. Still, since you insist on titles, here is what you can safely put in your “Cesarotti—Oxford afterlife” note.  Editorial note (book-length, Oxford-oriented “Philosophy of Language” titles)   John R. Searle (ed.), The Philosophy of Language (Oxford Readings in Philosophy). Oxford University Press, 1971.  (Yes, that Oxford Readings; and yes, the editor is Searle.) [books.google.com], [amazon.in]   Bernard Harrison, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language. London: Macmillan, 1979.  (Your instinct is right: Harrison’s credentials aren’t “Oxford” in the tribal sense, but the book is a standard Anglophone entrée, and the title does the banner-work you’re tracking.) [books.google.com], [archive.org]   Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press / Oxford University Press, 1984.  (And yes: “Oxford” here is publisher-imprint; Blackburn’s own institutional affiliation is another matter.) [global.oup.com], [archive.org]   From the New World (since Cesarotti is about lingue and therefore about migrations):  William P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964.  (This is indeed early, and explicitly “Philosophy of Language” in the title, and it is perfectly capable of treating me as ideational “alla Locke” if it is in the mood.) [archive.org], [books.google.com]   Grice continues (the point, rather than the list) Now: what does this prove about Cesarotti? It proves something slightly annoying to Oxford pride. Cesarotti is already doing, in 1768, what Oxford later pretends to have invented: he is treating languages as objects of reflective theory, in the plural, and in a way that is not merely grammatical bookkeeping. Oxford, by contrast, spent much of the mid-century behaving as if it could discuss meaning while remaining embarrassed by the very idea of a “philosophy of language” as an advertised discipline. So if you want my Saturday-morning line to Austin, it is this:  We at Oxford did not lack a philosophy of language; we lacked the phrase. Cesarotti had the phrase (and the plural) long before we had the confidence to print it on a cover.  And if you want the sting in the tail (since you’re baiting Austin):  Any man can talk about “the philosophy of language” in the singular. Cesarotti’s small act of pluralisation is already a methodological rebuke.  You can insert the above wherever you like in the Cesarotti entry; just keep the “editorial note” bracketed if you want it to read like an aside rather than a thesis. If you want, I can also give you a two‑sentence “Gricean” transition from Cesarotti’s lingue to my own obsession with conversation (i.e., why plural languages matter because implicature is always local to a practice). Grice (in that tone which pretends it is not a tone): Austin, yes — the collapse is precisely there: the Companions. Once you have a Companion you have, by implication, a discipline, and once you have a discipline you have, by further implication, an industry; and once you have an industry you have, by the usual English perversity, a trade in “introductions,” “handbooks,” and “readers,” each assuring the reader that they may now possess the subject without having practised it. “Where is Basil Blackwell when we don’t need him?” I ask. Because the old Blackwell was, at least, a person: a bookseller with a face, a counter, an Oxford address, and (one hoped) an ear. The new Blackwell is a logo — and logos are always the first step toward metaphysics.  Editorial note (keep as an aside; you insert where you like) Who was Basil Blackwell? Sir Basil Blackwell (full name: Sir Basil Henry Blackwell), born 29 May 1889, died 9 April 1984, an Oxford bookseller/publisher who took over the family firm after his father’s death in 1924. [en.wikipedia.org] He was the son of Benjamin Henry Blackwell (1849–1924), who opened the Broad Street shop in 1879. [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org] When did the “cosy thing” begin?  The Broad Street shop’s founding date is treated as 1 January 1879, and the shop later expands “sideways, upwards, and underground.” [blackwells.co.uk] The “cosy building” becomes famously “massified” in a very Oxford way when the Norrington Room opens (the big underground room), 1966. [oxfordvisit.com], [en.wikipedia.org] The publishing empire eventually becomes part of a global conglomerate: Blackwell Publishing is acquired by John Wiley & Sons, creating Wiley-Blackwell (acquisition completed 2007). [en.wikipedia.org], [en.wikipedia.org]  Successors / family continuation (minimal, but safe): Basil’s sons (and later successors) took the business further in bookselling and publishing; one summary list includes Julian “Toby” Blackwell and Philip Blackwell among those continuing the family involvement. [en.wikipedia.org]  Grice continues (back to the joke, and to Butler) And yes, you are quite right to remind me of my own complicity. My “Some remarks about the senses” is printed in a volume titled Analytical Philosophy, edited by R. J. Butler — and the imprint is precisely the one I keep apostrophising: Basil Blackwell. [archive.org] This is the point: in the early phase, the publisher is a conduit — a civil mechanism for getting arguments from one dining-room to another. In the later phase, the publisher becomes a curator of fields: it manufactures the box (“philosophy of language”), then sells you the lid (“companion”), and finally persuades you that what matters is being properly stored. Hence my complaint, which you attribute to me rather accurately:  The Sub-Faculty wants to promote me. “Philosophy of Language,” they say, is my interest? No — my interest is: how a man can remain a philosopher without turning into a clerk of a sub-discipline. G: Rhetoric, Strawson. S: Dangerous already. Where? G: Padua. S: University? G: No, and that is the first point. Seminary first, university later. The Seminary of Padua. If you want the modern address, the old institution survives at Via del Seminario 29, which sounds suitably explicit for an institution devoted, among other things, to teaching how not to be too explicit. S: A seminary. So one imagines cassocks, novices, incense, and figures of speech deployed against temptation. G: Not wholly wrong. But if you imagine rhetoric there as merely pulpit thunder for little monks, you understate it badly. The place was post-Tridentine, yes, ecclesiastical, yes, profoundly Veneto-Catholic, yes; but also a high-level intellectual machine. Not merely pre-university in the simple modern sense. More like a clerical-humanistic formation in which grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric still formed a living order. S: The trivium with a bishop behind it. G: Precisely. And a bishop from Padua, which is almost enough to make Aristotle blush. S: So what kind of rhetoric would a nineteen-year-old Cesarotti be teaching there in 1750? G: The old answer first: the figures. Hyperbole, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, prosopopoeia, apostrophe, anaphora, antithesis, all the little glittering devices by which language ceases merely to state and begins to move. S: Figurae dictionis. G: Yes, and figurae sententiae too. S: Speech and thought. G: Exactly. Or if you want the Greek tags: schema lexeos and schema dianoias, though one should be careful not to make the seminary sound more Hellenic at breakfast than it was in practice. S: But one would have had the distinction available. G: Surely. And more than available: institutionally alive. Because rhetoric there is not just ornament. It is the discipline that governs what grammar cannot finish and what dialectic cannot civilise. S: Ah. There we are. Grammar tells you what can be said correctly. Dialectic tells you what can be inferred validly. Rhetoric tells you how a human being gets another human being to take the point. G: Beautifully put. Which is why your implicature obsession would have delighted Cesarotti, even if he would never have used the word. S: Or if he had, he would have Latinised it and made it sound safer. G: Quite. What we call implicature could easily have appeared to him as belonging not to grammatica, nor to dialectica, but to rhetoric in the broad old sense: what is suggested, insinuated, conveyed obliquely, managed through figure, order, tone, prudential reserve. S: In short, what is meant in that way. G: Exactly. “What is meant in that way” is almost the definition of rhetoric once one ceases to think rhetoric is only purple prose. S: So the novice in Padua is not merely learning how to say “O death, where is thy sting?” without tripping on the vocative. G: No. He is learning how discourse works upon minds. In a seminary that means sermons, exhortation, edification, doctrinal clarity, spiritual persuasion, scriptural exposition, moral address. S: And anti-sophistical hygiene, one hopes. G: Naturally. Only the devil produces pure sophismata. S: The devil and some Oxford undergraduates. G: I said pure sophismata. S: Fair enough. G: Still, the seminary setting sharpens the point. Rhetoric there had a double face. On the one hand, it is training for eloquence in service of religion and letters. On the other, it must always defend itself against the suspicion that eloquence is merely ornament, manipulation, verbal vanity, the thin red line between Augustine and Lucifer. S: So one imagines lessons of the form: metaphor is permitted; deception is not. Hyperbole is permitted; heresy is not. G: Admirably seminary. And very close to the real thing, I suspect. S: Yet all that happens after Locke. G: Yes, and that matters. Locke had already made words philosophically troublesome in Book III. But the seminary rhetorician is not doing Locke. Locke worries that words obscure ideas and corrupt understanding. Cesarotti, at nineteen, in Padua, is more likely still inhabiting the older humanistic regime in which language is not only a danger to thought but its public instrument. S: So Locke distrusts the mist; the rhetorician learns to walk in it. G: Precisely. Locke gives you an epistemology of verbal abuse. The seminary gives you an education in verbal force. S: Which means that when Cesarotti later writes on the philosophy of languages, he is not abandoning rhetoric but extending it. G: Very good. The figures remain, but their horizon broadens. What in 1750 is taught as rhetorical resource later becomes, in him, evidence that languages differ in genius, expressive possibility, historical sediment, and cultural force. S: The figure survives, but “figure of speech” becomes too narrow. G: Exactly. Because by then the figure has become symptomatic of something larger: not just a local flourish, but a way a language permits thought and comparison to happen. S: Comparison is key, surely. Metaphor already carries the thought that one thing is seen through another. G: Yes. And if you are later Cesarotti, translator, theorist of languages, watcher of idioms, you can look back at the seminary rhetoric of metaphor and see there the embryo of your later philosophy of linguistic plurality. S: So what begins as trope ends as comparative linguistics with literary ambition. G: Nicely compressed. And do not forget the school-jargon itself. That, too, matters. S: Ah yes. The perilous mobility of terms across the trivium. G: Exactly. In grammar, oratio is one thing; in logic, oratio may be propositionally regimented; in rhetoric, oratio becomes discourse in motion, arranged for effect. S: And terminus in logic is not merely a word in grammar, while in rhetoric a term may already be half a gesture. G: Quite so. A decent teacher of rhetoric in that world would have to dwell on these distinctions, because the same Latin vocabulary crosses disciplines while changing function. S: Which means that if a boy said “term” in a merely grammatical way during logic, he could be corrected; and if he said “proposition” in a merely logical way during rhetoric, he could be thought spiritually underdressed. G: Perfectly put. The whole education depends on keeping the disciplinary senses apart while also showing how they interlock. S: So rhetoric is what remains once pure well-formedness and pure validity have both been granted and still something human needs doing. G: That is excellent. You should put it on a seminary wall, though perhaps not where the novices can see it. S: They might become philosophers. G: God forbid. S: Or worse, translators. G: In Padua, that danger was very real. S: Let us come back to implicature. You are suggesting that if one asked, in 1750, where what is suggested but not said belongs, the best answer would not be logic but rhetoric. G: Broadly, yes. Not because rhetoric “owns” all implicit meaning, but because rhetoric is the discipline most at home with indirectness, arrangement, audience-expectation, decorum, insinuation, tact, force without bald statement. S: Which sounds astonishingly like our own concerns, except with less pipe-smoke and more cassock. G: Very much so. The seminary knew, even if it did not formulate it analytically, that discourse works by more than literal statement. A sermon that only said exactly what it said would be not only bad rhetoric but bad pastoral practice. S: So the novice needed this because souls are not moved by syntax alone. G: Just so. Grammar gets you correctness. Dialectic gets you consequence. Rhetoric gets you uptake. S: Austin would have liked that. G: He would have stolen it and denied the theft. S: And Cesarotti, looking back from later years, would see the continuity? G: I think so. At nineteen he is still a seminary rhetorician, but already inside a training where figures, turns, comparisons, amplifications, and accommodations are not decorative extras. They are how discourse becomes socially and intellectually effective. Later, when he thinks about languages rather than merely eloquence, he can generalise the lesson. S: So the young teacher of rhetoric is already the old philosopher of languages in embryo. G: Exactly. The Padua seminary does not give him his whole later theory, but it gives him the scene in which language first appears not as a transparent container for thought but as a formed, historical, active medium. S: All under the approving shadow of Trent. G: Yes, which adds the final irony. An institution designed partly to discipline language for orthodoxy helps produce a man who will later think language more plural, more comparative, and more mobile than orthodoxy ever likes. S: The devil does his best work through the trivium. G: Or Providence does. At Padua, one was never entirely sure which was speaking more elegantly.Grice: Professore Cesarotti, ho sempre ammirato il suo approccio alla lingua e alla filosofia! Mi incuriosisce come la sua esperienza di traduttore e poeta abbia influenzato la sua riflessione sul significato e sul segno. Come vede oggi il rapporto fra parola e pensiero? Cesarotti: Caro Grice, grazie per l’apprezzamento! Per me, la parola è il ponte vivo fra il sentire dell’animo e il mondo esterno. Nella traduzione degli Ossian, ho scoperto che ogni lingua possiede un’anima, e il segno non è mai neutro: è sempre impregnato di storia e sentimento. Grice: Che bella immagine! Anch’io penso che la conversazione sia fatta non solo di parole, ma di implicature e sfumature che solo chi ascolta con attenzione può cogliere. Lei crede che la bellezza della lingua italiana possa aiutare a svelare significati nascosti, quelli che magari sfuggono a una lettura superficiale? Cesarotti: Senza dubbio! L’italiano, con la sua ricchezza espressiva, invita al dialogo profondo. La vera filosofia della lingua, secondo me, si gioca proprio in queste pieghe, dove la parola suggerisce più di quanto dica. In fondo, come insegna la poesia, ciò che resta non è tanto il suono, ma l’eco che lascia nell’anima. Cesarotti, Melchiorre (1768). Saggio sulla filosofia delle lingue. Padova: Penada.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesennio – Ossia: Grice e Cesennio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesennio. The Cesennii are an Etruscan family from Tarquinii during the late Roman Republic and in imperial times. Two of its members were mentioned by Tullio Cicero, and the name is found in sepulchral inscriptions. Publius Caesennius, mentioned by Tullio Cicero in his oration, Pro Caecina.[2] Caesennia, wife of Marcus Fulcinius, and later of Aulus Caecina.[2] Gaius C. Philo, brought charges against Sextus Cloelius, a scribe who incited mob violence after the death of the tribune of the plebs Publius Clodius Pulcher. Philo succeeded in procuring Cloelius' condemnation.[4] Lucius Caesennius Lento, a supporter of Marcus Antonius, and one of seven agrarian commissioners appointed by Antonius to apportion the Campanian and Leontine lands. Lucius Caesennius Paetus, consul in A.D. 61, and governor of Syria under the emperor Vespasian. Lucius Junius Caesennius Paetus, consul in AD 79. Aulus Caesennius Gallus, consul suffectus prior to AD 80. Lucius Caesennius Sospes, consul in AD 114. Lucius Caesennius Antoninus, consul in AD 128. Aulus Junius Pastor Lucius Caesennius Sospes, consul in AD 163. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 557 ("Caesennius").  Cicero, Pro Caecina, 4, 6, 10.  Müller, Die Etrusker, vol. i, p. 433.  Asconius Pedianus, In Ciceronis Pro Milone, p. 55 (ed. Orelli). Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Caecina. Quintus Asconius Pedianus, Commentarius in Oratio Ciceronis Pro Milone (Commentary on Cicero's Oration Pro Milone). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Karl Otfried Müller, Die Etrusker, Albert Heitz, Stuttgart (1877).  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  Categories: CaesenniiRoman gentes For this gens we can choose the c.w who brings charges to the the 'scribe' and have a ten move conversation. Part of the evidence is not only that Cloelius 'incited mob violence' but that being a scribe, he inscribed grafitto -- at least one -- that did so. The Cloelio fails to defend himself on the ground that the graffito was not MEANT to induce mob violence even if it did. Etc the charge is ambiguous and there is no suggestion that it was something the scribe had done AS SCRIBE (Qua scribe) but we can play on the idea of him using his skills for that -- on a rock in the forum, say -- and then we can consider what he may have inscribed or scribed, as exactly the same utterance as he would UTTER. Since he WAS Condemned, our C. is providing evidence that Cloelio's utterance -- and his grafitto -- successfuly incited mob violence -- "Notthat it would matter, providing intentio rea, anyway" Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesennio – Ossia: Grice e Cesennio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesennio. Since the source only tells us that Gaius Caesennius Philo prosecuted Sextus Cloelius, a scribe, and secured his condemnation for conduct connected with the disorders following the death of Clodius, the graffito itself must be a Speranzian reconstruction, not a historical claim. The Gricean point is that words written can function exactly like words spoken, and the question becomes:  Did Cloelius merely write something? Or did he intend that people infer and do something?   Grice e Cesennio Filone In Foro Romano PHILO  Sexte Cloeli, hanc inscriptionem tu scripsisti? "Sextus Cloelius, did you write this inscription?"   CLOELIVS  Scripsi. "I did."   PHILO  Quid scriptum erat? "What was written?"   CLOELIVS  'Civibus libertas erepta est.' "'The citizens have been robbed of their liberty.'"   PHILO  Et postea turba concurrit. "And afterwards a crowd gathered."   CLOELIVS  Id non mea culpa factum est. "That did not happen through my fault."   PHILO  Cur id in foro incidisti? "Why did you inscribe it in the Forum?"   CLOELIVS  Quia verum esse putabam. "Because I thought it was true."   PHILO  Scriba es; scis verba non solum legi sed etiam sequi. "You are a scribe; you know that words are not only read but also followed."   CLOELIVS  Verba scripsi, non vim feci. "I wrote words; I did not commit violence."   PHILO  At qui facem in paleam iacit, ignem quoque scribit. "But he who throws a torch into straw writes the fire as well."  Implicature  +> that Cloelius foresaw that the inscription would provoke collective action and cannot dissociate himself entirely from the violence that followed.   What I like about this vignette is that Philo does not have to prove that Cloelius literally ordered:  "Go and riot!"  Instead, the argument is pragmatic. The prosecutor's reasoning is essentially Gricean:  Cloelius was educated. He knew who would read the message. He knew the political context. Therefore he knew what readers would infer.  Cloelius' defence is equally Gricean:  "I wrote a proposition, not an imperative."  Philo replies:  "In those circumstances, the proposition functioned as an imperative."  The whole case turns on the gap between what was explicitly inscribed and what was conversationally—or politically—communicated. That is precisely the territory Grice would have enjoyed.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesca – Ossia: Grice e Cesca Giovanni Cesca (Trieste): philosopher/pedagogue born in Trieste in 1858 (died in Messina in the 1908 earthquake). And yes, La dottrina kantiana dell’a priori is not his earliest publication: Treccani lists Storia e dottrina del criticismo: cenni (1884) as earlier, and a detailed online bibliography (Malerba’s Cesca page) lists multiple items already in 1883, including Il nuovo realismo contemporaneo della Teoria della Conoscenza in Germania e in Inghilterra (1883), L’evoluzionismo di Erberto Spencer. Esposizione critica (1883), and Le teorie nativistiche e genetiche della localizzazione spaziale. Saggio critico (1883). One wrinkle: library records differ on whether La dottrina kantiana dell’a priori is dated 1884 or 1885; the Internet Archive scan catalogs it as 1885, while Malerba’s bibliography lists it as 1884 (same Verona–Padova publisher, Drucker e Tedeschi), so it’s safest to treat it as “mid-1880s; sometimes dated 1884, often catalogued 1885,” unless you’re willing to privilege one catalog/edition. Cesca, Giovanni (1881). Le relazione tra Trieste e Vnezia sino al 1382 – Verona: Drucker & Tedesci

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesezio – Ossia: Grice e Cesezio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesezio. The Caesezii are a family at ancient Rome. It is known from a small number of individuals living during the late Republic. Publius C., the quaestor of Verres.[2] Gaius C., an eques who sought the aid of Giulio Caesar to pardon Quintus Ligarius.[3] Lucius C. Flavus, tribune of the plebs, was deprived of his office after earning the enmity of Giulio Caesar through is actions. Flavus, along with Lucius Epidius Marullus, had ordered the removal of crowns from Giulio Caesar's statues, and imprisoned a man who had saluted the dictator as rex. Caesar expelled them from the senate, but Flavus became quite popular as a result of his steadfastness. The tribune "Flavius" in Shakespeare's play Julius Caesar is based on him.[4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11] Caesetius Rufus, the owner of a house coveted by Fulvia, the wife of Mark Antony, by whom he was proscribed in 43 BC. Supposedly his death was the result of little more than Fulvia's greed.[12][13] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 557 ("Caesetius").  Cicero, In Verrem, iv. 65, v. 25.  Cicero, Pro Ligario, 11.  Appian, Bellum Civile, ii. 108, 122, iv. 93.  Suetonius, "The Life of Caesar", 79, 80.  Cassius Dio, xliv. 9, 10, xlvi. 49.  Plutarch, "The Life of Caesar", 61, "The Life of Antony", 12.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 68.  Livy, Epitome, cxvi.  Cicero, Philippicae, xiii. 15.  Valerius Maximus, v. 7. § 2.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 29.  Valerius Maximus, ix. 5. § 4. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Verrem, Philippicae, Pro Ligario. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome (Epitome). Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Roman History. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Category: Roman gentes So for this gens we will focus on that utterance, "Ave rex!" -- and how it offended C. who has the utterer expelled from the senate, even if later deprived of his office by Giulio. The conversation is between C. with the utterer of 'ave rex' with a third party understood -- and C. pressing as to what he meant -- Grice often focused on 'meat' in the past -- not 'what do you mean?' but 'what DID you mean?' By uttering 'ave rex,' utterer MEANT that... Implicatures and meaning specifications always follow a that-clause pattern since they are propositional in nature. Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesezio – Ossia: Grice e Cesezio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesezio. This is an excellent Gricean episode because the whole dispute turns on the difference between:  what was said  and  what was meant.  Historically, the sources report that Lucius Caesetius Flavus and Lucius Epidius Marullus reacted strongly against signs of monarchy surrounding Caesar, including the episode of a man saluting him as rex ("king"). citeturn0search? A Speranzian reconstruction might therefore focus on Flavus interrogating the speaker not about the words uttered, but about the intended meaning. Grice e Cesezio Flavo In Foro Romano CAESETIVS  Tu Caesarem regem appellavisti? "You addressed Caesar as king?"   CIVIS  Dixi tantum: "Ave, rex!" "I merely said: 'Hail, king!'"   CAESETIVS  Non quaero quid dixeris. "I am not asking what you said."   CIVIS  Quid ergo quaeris? "What then are you asking?"   CAESETIVS  Quaero quid significaveris. "I am asking what you meant."   CIVIS  Salutabam virum clarissimum. "I was greeting a very distinguished man."   CAESETIVS  Cur igitur non dixisti "Ave, Caesar"? "Why then did you not say 'Hail, Caesar'?"   CIVIS  Rex honoris causa dictum est. "'King' was spoken as a mark of honor."   CAESETIVS  Roma reges odit; honor ibi saepe consilium celat. "Rome hates kings; honor there often conceals a design."   CIVIS  Verbum unum fuit. "It was only a single word."   CAESETIVS  Unum verbum interdum rem publicam mutat. "A single word sometimes changes a republic."  Implicature  +> that by uttering "Ave, rex!" the speaker meant that Caesar was a fitting object of monarchical allegiance rather than merely an exceptionally distinguished citizen.  What I like here is that Flavus' key move is:  Non quaero quid dixeris ... quaero quid significaveris.  ("I am not asking what you said ... I am asking what you meant.") That is almost pure Grice. The literal content is undisputed. Everyone knows the words:  Ave, rex.  The whole controversy concerns the communicated proposition behind them:  Did the utterer mean merely "long live Caesar"?  or  Did he mean that Caesar ought to be regarded as king?  For a republican Roman such as Flavus, that difference was not linguistic trivia but a constitutional matter. The prosecution therefore turns on intended meaning, not merely on the inscription of sounds.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesio – Ossia: Grice e Cesio -- Grex griceiana -- verbalia: Cesio. Denarius of Lucius C., 112-111 BC. On the obverse is Apollo, as written on the monogram behind his head, who also wears the attributes of Vejovis. The obverse depicts a group of statues representing the Lares Praestites, which was described by Ovid.[1] The Cesii are a family at ancient Rome during the late Republic, and through to imperial times. The first member of this gens to achieve prominence was Marcus C., praetor. Under the Empire, the C. were distinguished for their literary achievements. “C.” may be derived from the Latin adjective caesius, meaning a light blue or blue-grey colour, typically used to refer to the colour of a person's eyes. The same root may have given rise to the praenomen Caeso, and perhaps also to the cognomen Caesar. The earlier Caesii appearing in history used the praenomina Lucius and Marcus, two of the most common names throughout Roman history, to which the later Caesii added Publius, Titus, and Sextus.  The Caesii under the Republic are not known to have used any regular cognomina. In imperial times, the surnames Cordus, Bassus, Nasica, and Taurinus appear. The first three are typical Latin cognomina. Cordus originally signified that a person was born late in the year, while Bassus indicated someone given to stoutness, and Nasica referred to someone with a prominent nose.[5] Taurinus belongs to a common type of cognomen derived from place-names, suggesting its bearer was a native of Taurinum, in northern Italy. Lucius C., triumvir monetalis in 112 or 111 BC. His coins feature the Lares Praestites, the guardian spirits of Rome.[7] Marcus C., praetor in 75 BC.[8] Marcus C., a rapacious farmer of the tithes in Sicilia during the administration of Verres, in and after 73 BC.[9] Lucius C., a friend of Cicero, who accompanied him during his administration as proconsul in Cilicia in 50 BC.[10] Marcus C., an intimate friend of Tullio Cicero, who held the office of aedile at Arpinum, the only municipium which had such a magistracy, in 47 BC.[11] Publius C., an eques of Ravenna, enrolled as a Roman citizen by Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo.[12] Sextus C., an eques, mentioned by Tullio Cicero as a man of great honesty and integrity.[13] Titus C., a jurist, and pupil of Servius Sulpicius Rufus. Caesius Cordus, governor of Crete during the reign of Tiberius, accused of extortion and condemned.[14] C. Nasica, commander of a legion in Britain under Aulus Didius Gallus. Lucius C. Martialis, consul suffectus from July to December in AD 57. Caesia Helpis, a wine producer and merchant at Pompeii.[15][16][17] Caesius Bassus, a lyric poet of the first century, who perished in the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79. C. Bassus, a grammarian of uncertain date, author of the tract Ars Caesii Bassi de Metris.[18] Titus C. Taurinus, a poet, who probably lived in the fourth century, was the author of the poem, Votum Fortunae.[19][20] See also List of Roman gentes References  Ovid, Fasti, v, 129-145  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 557 ("Caesia Gens", "Caesius", Nos. 1–6, "T. Caesius").  Cassell's Latin & English Dictionary, s.v. caesius ff..  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 536 ("Caesar").  Chase, pp. 109–111.  Chase, pp. 113, 114.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 312.  Cicero, In Verrem, i. 50.  Cicero, In Verrem, iii. 39, 43.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, i. 1. § 4, 2. § 2.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, xiii. 11, 12.  Cicero, Pro Balbo, 22, Epistulae ad Familiares, xiii. 51.  Cicero, Pro Flacco, 28.  Tacitus, Annales, iii. 38, 70.  CIL IV, 5789, CIL IV, 5790, CIL IV, 5791, CIL IV, 5792, CIL IV, 5793.  Berdowski, "Roman Businesswomen".  Longfellow, The Lives and Deaths of Women in Ancient Pompeii.  Putschius, Grammaticae Latinae Auctores Antiqui, pp. 2664–2671.  Wernsdorf, Poëtae Latini Minores, vol. iv., p. 309 ff.  Latin Anthology, Ep. 80, ed. Burmann; Ep. 622, ed. Meyer. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Familiares, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratem, In Verrem, Pro Balbo, Pro Flacco. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Publius Ovidius Naso (Ovid), Fasti. Elias Putschius, Grammaticae Latinae Auctores Antiqui, Hanover (1605). Pieter Burmann, Anthologia Latina (Latin Anthology), ed. Wernsdorf, (1759–1778). Johann Christian Wernsdorf, Poëtae Latini Minores (Minor Latin Poets), Altenburg, Helmstedt (1780–1799). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). Piotr Berdowski, "Roman Businesswomen: I: The Case of the Producers and Distributors of Garum in Pompeii", in Analecta Archaeologica Ressoviensia vol. III (2008), pp. 251–271. B. Longfellow, The Lives and Deaths of Women in Ancient Pompeii, University of Texas Press (2025).  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Schmitz, Leonhard (1870). "Caesius". In Smith, William (ed.). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. Vol. 1. p. 557.  Categories: Roman gentesCaesii For this gens, we can imagine a 20-move conversation (hopefully you can retrieve text of "Ars Caesi Bassi de metris" or synopsis) between C. and his son -- Grice considers 'suit' being pronounced as 'soot' in some dialects, which he found offensive. The idea is that the quantity and quality of what constitutes a 'metre' may impact the conversational message, and C. illustrates cases with his son -- Thanks.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesio – Ossia: Grice e Cesio -- Grex griceiana -- verbalia: Cesio. A delightful choice here is Caesius Bassus, the poet and metrical theorist (or, if one prefers, the grammarian whose Ars de Metris is associated with his name). We need not reconstruct the treatise in detail; the central idea is enough:  Meter is not mere ornament. The quantity and arrangement of syllables affect how an utterance is heard, remembered, and interpreted.  That is very Gricean. The father therefore teaches his son that conversational meaning does not reside solely in the proposition expressed, but partly in the form of its expression.  Grice e Cesio Basso De Metris et Sermone BASSVS  Fili, putasne idem esse quid dicatur et quomodo dicatur?   "My son, do you think it is the same thing what is said and how it is said?"   FILIVS  Non prorsus idem.   "Not entirely the same."   BASSVS  Recte respondes.   "You answer correctly."   FILIVS  Cur metra igitur discimus?   "Why then do we study metres?"   BASSVS  Quia aures iudicant antequam mens deliberet.   "Because the ears judge before the mind deliberates."   FILIVS  Potestne numerus sensum mutare?   "Can rhythm change meaning?"   BASSVS  Non sensum ipsum, sed viam ad sensum.   "Not the meaning itself, but the path to the meaning."   FILIVS  Da exemplum.   "Give an example."   BASSVS  Dic: "Venit consul."   "Say: 'The consul has arrived.'"   FILIVS  Venit consul.   "The consul has arrived."   BASSVS  Nunc tardius et gravius dic.   "Now say it more slowly and solemnly."   FILIVS  Venit... consul.   "The consul... has arrived."   BASSVS  Quid sentis?   "What do you perceive?"   FILIVS  Maiorem dignitatem.   "Greater dignity."   BASSVS  At verba eadem manent.   "Yet the words remain the same."   FILIVS  Ergo metrum quoque aliquid loquitur.   "Then meter too speaks."   BASSVS  Ita vero.   "Indeed."   FILIVS  Num idem accidit in colloquio?   "Does the same happen in conversation?"   BASSVS  Maxime.   "Especially there."   FILIVS  Quid ergo meminisse debeo?   "What then should I remember?"   BASSVS  Non modo verba tua, sed etiam pedes eorum custodi.   "Guard not only your words, but also their feet."  Implicature  +> that the form, rhythm, and delivery of an utterance contribute systematically to the hearer's interpretation of the speaker's communicative intention.   And now for the Gricean flourish that would have delighted Speranza: FILIVS  Quid interest utrum quis dicat "suit" an "soot"?   "What difference does it make whether someone says 'suit' or 'soot'?"  BASSVS  Parva mutatio soni interdum magnam mutationem animi indicat.   "A small change of sound sometimes indicates a great change of mind."  The proposition may remain constant; the pronunciation may nevertheless signal education, region, social allegiance, irony, affection, contempt, or seriousness. That is precisely the borderland between metrics, rhetoric, and Gricean pragmatics where a Roman Bassus and a philosopher like Grice might happily meet. Does this below help for you to provide a second conversation with the double number of moves? thanks -- Note autore Bassus, Caesius (Ps.) datazione: ???/??? Sotto l’indicazione ‘pseudo-Basso’ si annoverano alcuni excerpta metrici, anonimi e di provenienza incerta: si tratta di una breve ars de metris , relativa all’illustrazione di alcuni sistemi oraziani, e di un piccolo prontuario composto da due sezioni ( Breviatio pedum e De compositionibus : seguono altri due minimi elenchi, Genera versuum e Poeticae species latine ). Gli opuscoletti, rinvenuti insieme con le più estese opere de re metrica (Terenziano Mauro, Cesio Basso e Atilio Fortunaziano) riemerse nel 1493 a Bobbio grazie alla scoperta di Giorgio Galbiate, e trascritti una prima volta, con i testi maggiori, all’interno dello stesso monastero, confluirono poi nell’attuale Napoletano IV A 11 (= N), allestito dal Galbiate stesso in collaborazione con Tristano Calco, una volta rientrato a Milano, presso la corte di Ludovico il Moro. Nel codice essi occupano i ff. 99r-104v e risultano così dislocati: Ars Caesii Bassi de metris (99rv); Breviatio pedum (99v-100v); De compositionibus (100v-102v); Genera versuum - Poeticae species latine (102v). Gli excerpta , tramandati in coda al De metris Horatianis di Atilio Fortunaziano, trovarono spazio anche negli apografi vaticani discesi da N (Vat. lat. 3402; Vat. lat. 5216) e furono puntualmente accolti nell’ editio princeps dei metricologi latini allestita dal Parrasio nel 1504; in seguito, il van Putschen li stampò nel 1605, nella raccolta dei Grammaticae latinae auctores antiqui , sotto il titolo Atilii ars , e quindi, sulla scorta della princeps , Gainsford li inserì nell’edizione degli Scriptores Latini rei metricae (1837); gli excerpta seguono regolarmente il manuale di Atilio Fortunaziano anche nell’edizione del Keil. [A. Di Stefano] lingua: it Note Reference edition Caesii Bassi De metris et Atilii Fortunatiani De metris Horatianis , a c. di G. Morelli, Hildesheim 2011-2012 (Collectanea Grammatica Latina 11). vol. I, pp. 103-106. tipo: opera - lingua: en Edizione di riferimento Caesii Bassi De metris et Atilii Fortunatiani De metris Horatianis , a c. di G. Morelli, Hildesheim 2011-2012 (Collectanea Grammatica Latina 11). vol. I, pp. 103-106. L’ excerptum spurio, trasmesso insieme con altri stralci anonimi in coda al manuale di Atilio Fortunaziano, si inserisce nella diffusa produzione de re metrica , specificamente lirica, di età tardoantica: è probabile che il contenuto dell’estratto e la sua trasmissione insieme con parti originali del De metris di Cesio Basso ne abbiano provocato l’attribuzione al poeta-filologo di età neroniana, rappresentante a Roma della teoria derivazionista dei metri. Nell’anonimo excerptum oggetto di una rapida e alquanto smilza rassegna sono infatti i metri di cinque Odi oraziane: l’asclepiadeo minore, con l’analisi, attraverso l’incipit di carm . I 1, Maecenas atavis edite regibus , delle diverse proposte di divisione; l’endecasillabo saffico ( Iam satis terris nivis atque dirae [ carm . I 2]); il gliconeo, con l’incipit di carm . I 3: Sic te diva potens Cypri ; il sistema archilocheo III: Solvitur acris hiems grata vice veris et favoni ( carm . I 4,1), dove l’archilocheo viene presentato come unione di un heroicum e un itifallico, e trahuntque siccas machinae carinas (I 4,2), interpretato come una sezione ( portio ) giambica seguita da un itifallico; il sistema della strofe alcaica, rappresentato dai primi quattro versi di carm . I 9. Il ricco apparato di loci similes che correda l’edizione Morelli consente di cogliere la grande diffusione dell’indagine sui metri lirici oraziani, al cui confronto l’atteggiamento dell’anonimo redattore nella compilazione del testo risulta fortemente semplificativo. [A. Di Stefano] tipo: opera - lingua: it [Bassus] De metris riga 3 vol. VI Keil«Maecenas atauis edite regibus». asclepiadeon duodecasyllabon, cuius diuisio uaria, quidam <dividunt> sic, Maece spondeus, nas atauis choriambus, edite re idem, gibus pyrrichio uel iambus propter indifferentiam syllabae. alii per dipodias ita: Maecenas a, debuit anti<s>pastica <di>podia esse, <s>ed produxit syllabam primam et fecit epitritum quartum ex tribus longis et breui: tauis edi, anti<s>pastus est ex breui <et> duabus longis et breui: te regibus, paeon secundus ex breui et longa et duabus breuibus, uel si longa fuerit ultima, erit di[s]iambus. si uero ad paenultimam partem ultimae dipodiae breuis syllaba addatur, fiet elegiacus uersus pentameter sic: «Maecenas atauis edite remigibus». diuiditur prioribus aut dactylo et spondeo aut spondeo et dactylo, tamen medius spondeus debet semper esse sequentibus anapaesti[ci]s. «iam satis terris niuis atque dirae». sapphicon hendecasyllabon, quod est trimetron choriambicon catalecticon, cuius syllabam tertiam produxit in prima dipodia, quam corripere debuit. oportuit enim ita esse, iam satis est, posuit autem iam satis ter, pro choriambo epitritum secundum, id est ex longa et breui et duabus longis. secunda dipodia choriambica est, ris niuis at. tertio, que dirae, positus p. 306 vol. VI Keil pes pro dipodia bacchius, aut propter indifferentiam syllabae hoc metrum clauditur amphibracho, id est ex breui et longa et breui. «sic te diua potens Cypri». glyconion octosyllabon et genere asclepiadeon est. huic enim si addideris dipodian choriambicam, facies asclepiadeon sic: «sic te diua potens <diua potens> Cypri».’ diuiditur autem spondeo, choriambo, pyrrichio uel iambo propter syllabae indifferentiam: «sic te diua potens Cypri». «soluitur acris hiems grata uice ueris et fauoni». archilochion ithyphallicon: «soluitur acris hiems grata uice ueris et fauoni» commissum est ex heroico et ithyphallico: «soluitur acris hiems grata uice», huc usque heroicum; «ueris et fauoni», hoc ithyphallicon. «trahuntque siccas ’<‘machinae carinas» ’ hendecasyllabon archilochion *** ex iambico et ithyphallico: «trahuntque siccas» ’>, portio iambici, sequitur ithyphallicon: «machinae carinas». «uides ut alta stet niue candidum». alcaicon hendecasyllabon, cuius diuisio ita est: «uides ut alta», ex duobus iambis et syllaba et sequentibus duobus dactylis uel propter indifferentiam syllabae dactylo et amphimacro: «stet niue candidum». «Soracte nec iam sustineant onus», sicut prior scanditur. «siluae laborantes geluque», enneasyllabon, siluae spondeus, labo iambus, rantes spondeus, gelu iambus, que syllaba. «flumina constiterint acuto», <decasyllabon:> hoc constat ex quattuor pedibus heroicis syllaba detracta breui in tertio pede. fit enim integrum sic: «flumina constiterint ab acuto». p. 307 vol. VI Keil Bibliografia De Nonno, M. - Le citazioni dei grammatici - Salerno, Roma - (AM) - 597/646 Gaisford, T. - Scriptores Latini rei metricae. Manuscriptorum codicum ope subinde refinxit - Oxonii - (ED) - 0/0 Leonhardt, J. - Dimensio syllabarum. Studien zur lateinischen Prosodie-und Verslehre von der Spätantike bis in die frühe Renaissance - Göttingen - (MO) - 0/0 Bornecque, H. - Les clausules métriques latines - Lilles - (MO) - 0/0 Keil, H. - Grammatici Latini vol. 6. Scriptores artis metricae - Teubner, Lipsiae - (ED) - 0/671 Oberhelman, S.M. - Prose Rhythm in Latin Literature of the Roman Empire - First Century BC to Fourth Century AD - New York - (MO) - 0/0 Morelli, G. - Antiche liste di clausole ritmiche - 2008 - (AR) 136 - 319/355 Morelli, G. (adiuv. L. Cristante, P. d'Alessandro, S. Di Brazzano, M. Elice) - Per il testo dell'Ars Caesii Bassi de metris - (AM) - 138/141 D'alessandro, P. - Rufini Antiochensis Commentaria in metra Terentiana et de compositione et de numeris oratorum - Hildesheim-Zürich-New York - (ED) - 0/0 Caesii Bassi De metris et Atilii Fortunatiani De metris Horatianis, a c. di G. Morelli, Hildesheim 2011-2012 (Collectanea Grammatica Latina 11), vol.1, pp. 103-106 - unknown/unknown Yes — the material helps enormously, because the pseudo-Bassus excerpt is obsessed not with abstract metrical theory but with something much more Gricean:  the same verse can be divided in different ways, and different divisions make us hear it differently.  The repeated formulae are:  cuius divisio varia ("whose division is various")  and  alii dividunt sic ("others divide it thus")  The metrical fact remains the same; the analysis changes. That is almost a prototype of:  same utterance, different hearer's reconstruction.  So let us have Bassus give his son a longer lesson, moving from Horace to conversation.  Grice et Caesius Bassus De Metris et Sermone BASSVS  Fili, scis quid sit metrum? "My son, do you know what metre is?"   FILIVS  Numerus syllabarum. "The arrangement of syllables."   BASSVS  Non satis. "Not enough."   FILIVS  Quid igitur est? "What then is it?"   BASSVS  Metrum est modus quo auris ducitur. "Metre is the way in which the ear is led."   FILIVS  Num idem versus diversimode audiri potest? "Can the same verse be heard in different ways?"   BASSVS  Potest. "It can."   FILIVS  Quomodo? "How?"   BASSVS  Alii dividunt sic; alii aliter. "Some divide it one way; others another."   FILIVS  At verba non mutantur. "But the words do not change."   BASSVS  Verba manent; auditus mutatur. "The words remain; the hearing changes."   FILIVS  Num idem accidit in colloquio? "Does the same happen in conversation?"   BASSVS  Saepissime. "Very often."   FILIVS  Da exemplum. "Give an example."   BASSVS  Si quis dicat: "Ego illum laudo." "If someone says: 'I praise that man.'"   FILIVS  Quid inde? "What follows?"   BASSVS  Alius admirationem audit; alius ironiam. "One hears admiration; another hears irony."   FILIVS  Cur ita? "Why is that?"   BASSVS  Quia non tantum verba sed etiam numerus, sonus, morae audiuntur. "Because not only words, but also rhythm, sound, and pauses are heard."   FILIVS  Ergo metrum quoque significat? "Then metre also signifies?"   BASSVS  Non loquitur sicut verba loquuntur; sed ostendit quomodo verba audienda sint. "It does not speak as words speak; but it shows how words are to be heard."   FILIVS  Et quid de iis qui "suit" ut "soot" pronuntiant? "And what of those who pronounce 'suit' as 'soot'?"   BASSVS  Parva mutatio soni magnas opiniones de hominibus parit. "A small change of sound gives rise to great opinions about people."   FILIVS  Quid ergo memoria teneam? "What then should I remember?"   BASSVS  Eundem versum multi dividunt; eandem vocem multi interpretantur. "Many divide the same verse differently; many interpret the same utterance differently."  Implicature  +> that a speaker who neglects rhythm, pronunciation, pacing, and form cannot fully control how his utterance will be interpreted by rational hearers.  That, I think, is the most Gricean lesson one can extract from pseudo-Bassus' fascination with divisio varia: not merely that there are different metres, but that there are different legitimate ways of parsing the same linguistic phenomenon—and interpretation begins precisely there.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesonio – Ossia: Grice e Cesonio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesonio. The Cesonii are a family of ancient Rome. They first appear in history during the late Republic, remaining on the periphery of the Roman aristocracy until the time of Nero. Roman empress Milonia Caesonia, the last wife of the emperor Caligula was presumably descended from the C., as she bore their nomen. Another family of C. attained the consulship several times beginning in the late second century; it is not clear how or whether they were related to the earlier Caesonii.  “C.” is a patronymic surname, based on the praenomen Caeso. The Caesonii of the second and third centuries appear to have been an unremarkable family, of senatorial or equestrian rank, which eventually was elevated to the patriciate, holding many of the most important offices in the Roman state. This branch of the family may have originated in Latium or the surrounding region, perhaps the town of Antium.[6]  The name may derive from the root caesius, meaning "blue-grey," a word frequently used to describe the color of the eyes.  Marcus C., praetor, was a friend and colleague of Tullio Cicero.[7][8][9] Titus C. Priscus, an eques, held an official post under the emperor Tiberius.[10][11] C. Maximus, a friend of Seneca the Younger, was banished from Italy by the Emperor Nero. He had been consul. Caesonia, the wife of Rufus, honored by Martial in a poem describing her having the same birthday as Domitian. Some historians have speculated that she might have been Milonia Caesonia.[15] Gaius C. C. f. Macer Rufinianus, consul suffectus about AD 197–198.[16][11] Lucius C. C. f. C. n. Lucillus Macer Rufinianus, consul suffectus about AD 226–229.[17][11] Lucius C. L. f. C. n. Ovinius Manlius Rufinianus Bassus, consul suffectus around AD 260, and a second time in 284.[18][11] Caesonius Bassus, consul in AD 317.[19] Marcus Junius Caesonius Nicomachus Anicius Faustus Paulinus, praetor urbanus in AD 321.[20] Amnius Manius Caesonius Nicomachus Anicius Paulinus, consul in AD 334.[20] See also List of Roman gentes References  Suetonius, "The Life of Caligula", 25, 33, 38, 59.  Cassius Dio, lix. 23, 28, 29.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xix. 2. § 4.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 558 ("Caesonia").  Chase, p. 119.  Mennen, pp. 55, 56, 63.  Cicero, In Verrem, i. 10, Epistulae ad Atticum, i. 1, xii. 11.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 558 ("Marcus Caesonius").  Broughton, vol. II, p. 152.  Suetonius, "The Life of Tiberius", 42.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 270–271.  Tacitus, Annales, xv. 72.  Martial, vii. 44.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 987 ("Caesonius Maximus").  PIR, vol. I, p. 270 ('C', No. 166).  Mennen, pp. 55–58.  Mennen, pp. 58–60.  Mennen, pp. 60–62.  Mennen, p. 62.  Mennen, p. 63. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, In Verrem. Flavius Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae (Antiquities of the Jews). Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). Inge Mennen, Power and Status in the Roman Empire, AD 193–284 (2011). Categories: CaesoniiRoman gentes For this gens, we can reconstruct a conversation, say 6 moves, with C., the ex consul, being informed that he is being banished by DOMIZIO NERONE from ITALIA. Any plans? I'm moving to Menton -- that's still Italy -- I'm moving to Nizza -- that's still Italy -- I'm moving to Marseille -- that's non-italian enough. Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesonio – Ossia: Grice e Cesonio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesonio. Since the sources only tell us that Caesonius Maximus, a former consul and friend of Seneca, was banished from Italy by Nero, the destination is pure Speranzian reconstruction. The humour lies in the ambiguity of "leave Italy": how far away must one actually go? The conversation gradually discovers that geography and politics are not always the same thing. Grice e Cesonio Massimo De Exilio NUNTIUS  Caesoni Maxime, Nero te Italia excedere iubet. "Caesonius Maximus, Nero orders you to leave Italy."   CAESONIVS  Excedam. "I shall leave."   NUNTIUS  Quo ibis? "Where will you go?"   CAESONIVS  Mentonem. "To Menton."   NUNTIUS  Nondum satis longe. "Not yet far enough."   CAESONIVS  Nicaeam igitur. "Then to Nice."   NUNTIUS  Etiam Roma illic umbram suam mittit. "Even there Rome still casts its shadow."   CAESONIVS  Massiliam petam. "I shall go to Marseilles."   NUNTIUS  Et quid ibi invenies? "And what will you find there?"   CAESONIVS  Quod Roma mihi reliquit. "What Rome has left me."  Implicature  +> that exile deprives a man of place and office, but not necessarily of his identity or dignity.  I like the last move because, as with many Roman exiles, Caesonius never explicitly says:  "I remain the same man."  Instead he lets the hearer infer it from:  Quod Roma mihi reliquit.  "What Rome has left me." A very Senecan, and very Gricean, ending.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cestio – Ossia: Grice e Cestio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cestio. The Cestii are a family at ancient Rome during the later Republic, and in imperial times. The first member of the gens to obtain the consulship was Gaius C. Gallus. The family's name is commemorated on two monuments, the Pons C. and the Pyramid of C. which survive into modern times. C. seems to be derived from the cognomen Cestus, referring to an open-fingered boxing glove, or to a girdle. The Cestii probably of Latin origin.[2] Although the surname Gallus, borne by two of the family, might point to a Gallic origin, another surname of the Cestii, Camerinus, suggests that the Cestii might have claimed descent from the ancient Latin city of Cameria.[3] At least two other prominent families, the Sulpicii and the Coruncanii, seem to have come from Cameria.[4] However, the name might also indicate that some of the Cestii claimed descent from the great patrician house of the Sulpicii, who had long used this surname. The praenomina used by the Cestii included Gaius, Lucius, Numerius, Publius, and Titus. Except for Numerius, all of these were among the most common names throughout Roman history.  The Cestii do not appear to have been divided into distinct families. The cognomina Gallus, Macedonicus, Proculus, and Severus were probably personal surnames, as was Pius, a rhetorician and a native of Smyrna, who was perhaps a freedman of the gens. Gallus refers to a cockerel, or to someone of Gallic extraction. Macedonicus alluded to the military service of one of the Cestii in Macedonia, while Proculus was an old praenomen that came to be used as a surname in many families. Severus was a common surname meaning "grave, serious," or "severe", while Pius referred to a person known for being dutiful or pious. Cestii Galli Gaius C. Gallus, surnamed Camerinus, was a senator, and consul suffectus in AD 35.[7][8][9] Gaius C. C. f. Gallus, consul suffectus in AD 42, and governor of Syria, he failed to quash the revolt of the Jews circa AD 64 and 65, and was removed from his command. He apparently died before the arrival of his successor.[10][11][12] Lucius C. Gallus, commander of Legio XX Valeria Victrix and proconsul of Gallia Narbonensis under Marcus Aurelius.[13][14] Lucius Cestius Gallus Gallus Varenianus Lutatius Natalis Aemilianus, possible son of Lucius and patron of Gaulus in Sicily.[15] Others Lucius C., father of the Gaius Cestius for whom the Pyramid of Cestius was erected. A Lucius Cestius, perhaps the same person, was triumvir monetalis circa 43 BC.[16] Gaius Cestius, praetor in 44 BC, he belonged to the aristocratic party, and refused the offer of a province from Marcus Antonius. He may be the same as the Gaius Cestius mentioned by TULLIO Cicero in a letter to Atticus in 51, and the Cestius mentioned in the oration Pro Flacco in 59. He is probably the Cestius who perished in the proscriptions of 43 BC.[17][18] Cestius Macedonicus, a native of Perusia, acquired his surname on account of his service in Macedonia. When Perusia was taken by Octavian in 41 BC, he determined to destroy himself by fire, and setting his house ablaze, stabbed himself, then leaped into the flames. The fire spread to adjacent structures, ultimately destroying much of the town.[19][20] Gaius Cestius L. f., praetor, tribune of the plebs, and member of the septemviri epulones. The Pyramid of C. was erected in his honor, apparently during the reign of Augustus. He may be identical with one of the Cestii mentioned by Tullio Cicero. Lucius Cestius Pius, a native of Smyrna, who taught rhetoric at Rome, and was known for replying to Tullio Cicero with public speeches of his own. He is mentioned by both Seneca and Quintilian, neither of whom held a high opinion of him.[21][22][23][24] Cestius Cordus, governor of Creta et Cyrenaica circa AD 21. Numerius Cestius, consul suffectus in AD 55, succeeding the emperor Nero on the Kalends of March, and serving until the Kalends of May.[25][26] Cestius Proculus, was accused of repetundae in AD 56, but acquitted.[27] Cestius Severus, a notorious delator during the reign of Nero.[28] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, pp. 674, 675 ("Cestius").  Chase, pp. 129–132.  Chase, pp. 113, 114.  Tacitus, Annales, xi. 24.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 590 ("Camerinus")  Cassell's Latin & English Dictionary.  Tacitus, Annales, iii. 36, vi. 7, 31.  Cassius Dio, lviii. 25.  Pliny the Elder, x. 43.  Josephus, Vita Flavii Josephi, § 43, Bellum Judaicum, ii. 14. § 3, 16. §§ 1, 2, 18. §§ 9, 10, 19. §§ 1-9, 20. § 1, iii. 1.  Tacitus, Historiae, v. 10.  Suetonius, "The Life of Vespasian," 4.  CIL X, 3722  Anthony Birley, The Fasti of Roman Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 258f  CIL X, 7506  Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum, v. p. 169.  Cicero, Pro Flacco, 13, Epistulae ad Atticum, v. 13, Philippicae, iii. 10.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 26.  Appian, Bellum Civile, v. 49.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 74.  St. Jerome, In Chronicon Eusebii, cxci.  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae, iii. praef., Suasoriae, vii.  Quintilian, x. 5. § 20.  Meyer, Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta.  CIL IV, 5513.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for the Reign of Nero", p. 290.  Tacitus, Annales, iv. 41.  Tacitus, Historiae, iv. 41. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Philippicae, Pro Flacco. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Elder), Controversiae. Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (Quintilian), Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory). Flavius Josephus, Vita Flavii Josephi (The Life of Flavius Josephus), Bellum Judaïcum (The Jewish War). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars).. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus (St. Jerome), In Chronicon Eusebii (The Chronicon of Eusebius). Joseph Hilarius Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum (The Study of Ancient Coins, 1792–1798). Henricus Meyerus (Heinrich Meyer), Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta ab Appio inde Caeco usque ad Q. Aurelium Symmachum (Fragments of Roman Orators from Appius Claudius Caecus to Quintus Aurelius Symmachus), L. Bourgeois-Mazé, Paris (1837). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). D. P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Paul A. Gallivan, "Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 24, pp. 290–311 (1974). Categories: CestiiRoman gentes For this gens we may invent a conversation around the Pons C -- since Grice and Speranza have a thing about Tiberian bridges -- if that's what it was -- where is it located now? So we can have a conversation of the C. having finished constructed it -- by appropriate masons, and admiring the beauty of it with his son. Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cestio – Ossia: Grice e Cestio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cestio. Since the Pons Cestius still exists today as the Ponte Cestio in Rome, connecting Tiber Island (Isola Tiberina) to the Trastevere side of the Tiber, it is a particularly suitable monument for a Cestian vignette. [en.wikipedia.org], [mapcarta.com] Historically, we do not know which particular Cestius gave his name to the bridge. The sources explicitly state that the identity of the Cestius commemorated by the bridge is unknown. [en.wikipedia.org], [en-academic.com] So let us imagine a founder of the gens standing upon the completed bridge with his son. Grice e Cestio De Ponte CESTIVS  Vide, fili: pons perfectus est. "Look, my son: the bridge is finished."   FILIVS  Pulcher est. "It is beautiful."   CESTIVS  Pulchrior erit cum homines eo utentur. "It will be more beautiful when people use it."   FILIVS  Tot lapides posuisti? "Did you place all those stones?"   CESTIVS  Minime; artifices posuerunt. "Not at all; the craftsmen placed them."   FILIVS  Cur ergo pons tuum nomen fert? "Why then does the bridge bear your name?"   CESTIVS  Quia opus cogitavi. "Because I conceived the work."   FILIVS  Quid igitur maximum est: cogitare an aedificare? "What then is greater: to conceive or to build?"   CESTIVS  Neutrum soli satis est. "Neither is sufficient by itself."   FILIVS  Et quid facit pontem bonum? "And what makes a bridge good?"   CESTIVS  Quod duas ripas una via facit. "That it makes two banks into one road."   FILIVS  Ergo pons pacem facit? "Then a bridge makes peace?"   CESTIVS  Interdum. "Sometimes."   FILIVS  Et interdum? "And sometimes not?"   CESTIVS  Interdum exercitus transit. "Sometimes an army crosses."   FILIVS  Tum pons neuter est? "Then a bridge is neutral?"   CESTIVS  Sicut verba. "Just like words."   FILIVS  Quomodo? "How so?"   CESTIVS  Verba mentes iungunt; pontes terras. "Words join minds; bridges join lands."   FILIVS  Et quid vis posteros de hoc ponte cogitare? "And what do you wish posterity to think of this bridge?"   CESTIVS  Pontem videant; nomen obliviscantur. "Let them see the bridge; let them forget the name."  Implicature  +> that creating a lasting public benefit is more important than preserving one's personal fame.  A pleasing Gricean touch is the comparison:  Verba mentes iungunt; pontes terras.  The bridge becomes a physical analogue of conversation: both exist to connect what would otherwise remain separated.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesuleno – Ossia: Grice e Cesuleno -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesuleno. The Cesuleni was a Roman family during the late Republic. It is best known from the orator Lucius C., whom Tullio Cicero describes as a vulgar man, skilled at drawing suspicions upon persons, and in making them out to be criminals. Cicero heard him.[1][2]  See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, 34.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)    GENS                               This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs Since Tullio did hear this C. we can reconstruct a conversation where each charge is levelled against C.: you are vulgar -- you are skilled at drawing suspictions upon persons -- you are skilled in making them out to be criminals. To each, C. responds with the antithesis: "I know more vulgar men, and some come from Arpino" "To draw a suspicion is one thing that is beyond me: the suspicion is drawn by what I IMPLICATE which is cancellable." "Do you want me to make them out to be innocent just because?" Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cesuleno – Ossia: Grice e Cesuleno -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cesuleno. A wonderful Gricean choice, because Cicero's criticisms already sound like accusations against a proto-pragmatician. Cicero says that Lucius Cesulenus was:  homo vulgaris ("a vulgar fellow"), skilled at raising suspicions, skilled at making people appear guilty.  A Speranzian Cesulenus would happily reply that he does not assert guilt; he merely creates the circumstances in which others infer it. Grice e Cesuleno De Suspicionibus CICERO  Cesulene, vulgaris homo es. "Cesulenus, you are a vulgar man."   CESVLENVS  Plures vulgares novi; nonnulli Arpini sunt. "I know more vulgar men; some are from Arpinum."   CICERO  Suspiciones in homines concitas. "You stir up suspicions against people."   CESVLENVS  Minime; suspicio ipsa currit. "Not at all; suspicion runs on its own."   CICERO  At tu viam ei monstras. "But you show it the way."   CESVLENVS  Ego tantum quaedam dico. "I merely say certain things."   CICERO  Et homines inde scelera colligunt. "And people infer crimes from them."   CESVLENVS  Quod colligitur, revocari potest. "What is inferred can be withdrawn."   CICERO  Facis homines nocentes videri. "You make men appear guilty."   CESVLENVS  Visne ut innocentes videantur, etiam si contraria signa adsunt? "Do you wish them to appear innocent, even when signs point the other way?"   CICERO  Non de signis queror, sed de arte tua. "I complain not of the signs, but of your technique."   CESVLENVS  Ars mea non est damnare, sed auditores cogitare cogere. "My art is not to condemn, but to compel the audience to think."  Implicature  +> that if an audience reaches the conclusion that a person is guilty, responsibility lies at least partly with the audience's own inferential activity rather than solely with the speaker's explicit assertions.  The most Gricean moment is:  Quod colligitur, revocari potest. "What is inferred can be withdrawn."  That is almost a Roman anticipation of cancellability. Cesulenus' defense is not:  "I never suggested it."  but rather:  "I suggested it in such a way that the audience supplied the conclusion themselves."  To which Cicero's reply would presumably be that this is precisely what makes him dangerous.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cestronio – Ossia: Grice e Cestronio -- Grex griceiana: verbalia: Cestronio. The Cestronii are a family of ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned by Roman writers, but several are known from inscriptions.  Decimus C., dedicated a tomb at the site of modern Marano dei Marsi, formerly part of Sabinum, dating from the first half of the first century, for Gaius C. Tappo.[1][2] Gaius C. Tappo, buried at the site of modern Marano dei Marsi, in a tomb dedicated by Decimus C., dating from the first half of the first century.[1][2] Gaius Cestronius Severianus, buried at Thugga in Africa, aged sixty-five, in a tomb dating from the first half of the second century.[3][4] Lucius Cestronius Fortunatus Egrilianus, a boy buried in a late second- or third-century tomb at Thugga, aged nine years, five (months?).[5][6] Undated Cestronii Cestronia Fortunata, buried at Thugga, aged forty.[7][8] Cestronius Victor, a child buried at Thugga, aged two.[9] Cestronia Victoria, buried at the site of present-day El Ma El Biodh, formerly part of Numidia, aged forty-two.[10][11] See also List of Roman gentes References  CIL IX, 7965.  AE 2011, 317.  CIL VIII, 26788.  Mourir à Dougga, 228.  CIL VIII, 26786.  Mourir à Dougga, 226.  Mourir à Dougga, 229.  Inscriptions Latines de La Tunisie, i. 1–1519.  Chroniques d'Archéologie Maghrébine, 104–73.  CIL VIII, 26411.  Uchi Maius 2, ii. 180. Bibliography Samir Aounallah et alii, Chroniques d'Archéologie Maghrébine, Revue de l'Association historique et archéologique de Carthage (2022). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Antonio Ibba, Uchi Maius 2: Le iscrizioni, Sassari (2006). Mustapha Khanoussi, Louis Maurin, Mourir à Dougga: Receuil des inscriptions funéraires (Dying in Dougga: a Compendium of Funerary Inscriptions), Bordeaux, Tunis (2002). Alfred Merlin, Inscriptions Latines de La Tunisie (Latin Inscriptions from Tunisia), Fondation Dourlans, Paris (1944). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Category: Roman gentes For this, we can have a conversation of Roman father and son explaining burial practices. They pass by the tomb of C. -- a tomb dedicated by ANOTHER C. So son asks where is the tomb of the OTHER C. -- the father responds: "That's beside the point. In examining THIS tomb, you have to consider the man buried below and rememmber the name of the one who had the tomb built -- NOT where that other man himself is buried. Etc. Thanks.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cestronio – Ossia: Grice e Cestronio -- Grex griceiana: verbalia: Cestronio. A charming Cestronian vignette, because the only thing we really know is that:  Decimus Cestronius dedicated a tomb for Gaius Cestronius Tappo.  The son immediately asks the sort of question children ask—and philosophers sometimes ask too:  "But where is Decimus buried?"  The father must explain relevance.  Grice e Cestronio Ad Monumentum FILIUS  Pater, cuius est hoc monumentum? "Father, whose monument is this?"   PATER  Gaii Cestronii Tappōnis. "Of Gaius Cestronius Tappo."   FILIUS  Quis hoc aedificavit? "Who built it?"   PATER  Decimus Cestronius. "Decimus Cestronius."   FILIUS  Ergo Decimus dives fuit? "Then Decimus was wealthy?"   PATER  Satis dives ad monumentum ponendum. "Wealthy enough to erect a monument."   FILIUS  Ubi igitur Decimus ipse sepultus est? "Where then was Decimus himself buried?"   PATER  Istuc praeter rem est. "That is beside the point."   FILIUS  Cur? "Why?"   PATER  Quia hoc monumentum de Gaio loquitur. "Because this monument speaks about Gaius."   FILIUS  Sed nomen Decimi quoque habet. "But it bears Decimus' name too."   PATER  Recte; alter sub terra iacet, alter memoriam servat. "Correct; one lies beneath the earth, the other preserves the memory."   FILIUS  Quem ergo meminisse debeo? "Whom then should I remember?"   PATER  Utrumque, sed non eodem modo. "Both, but not in the same way."   FILIUS  Quomodo? "How so?"   PATER  Gaium, quia mortuus est; Decimum, quia non oblitus est. "Gaius, because he died; Decimus, because he did not forget."  Implicature  +> that acts of remembrance may preserve a person's memory almost as effectively as the tomb preserves the person's remains.  The Gricean twist is the father's rebuke:  Istuc praeter rem est. "That is beside the point."  The son asks a perfectly sensible question, but not the relevant one. The monument itself is a communicative act. To understand its meaning, one must ask:  "Who is being commemorated?" and "Who chose to commemorate him?"  not  "Where is everyone else buried?"

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CET

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cetronio – Ossia: Grice e Cetronio. Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cetronio The Cetronii, occasionally written Cetronia, are a family at ancient Rome that flourished during the late Republic and early decades of the Empire. :C.” is Etruscan in origin. Caetronius, father of the consul Vibius Pansa, was proscribed by Sulla.[2][3] Gaius Vibius Pansa C., natural son of the proscript C., was adopted by Gaius Vibius Pansa. A supporter of Giulio Caesar, he became consul, and died in that year fighting against Marc Antony.[3] Gaius C., legate of the Legio I Germanica in Germania at the accession of Tiberius in AD 14. Following a mutiny of the soldiers, C. held a court martial of the leaders, who were tried and executed by their fellow soldiers.[4][5][6][7] Gaius C. Miccio, praefectus of the aerarium militare, or military treasury, then of the aerarium populi Romani. C. Cuspianus, a centurion primus pilus, who later served as procurator Augusti in one of the provinces. He was buried in a second-century tomb at Axima, in Alpes Graiae, with a monument from his wife, Aegnatia Priscilla.[8][9][10][11] C. Pisanus, praefectus castrorum of the Legio III Augusta in AD 70, under the legate Gaius Valerius Festus, who ordered his arrest out of personal animus, following the murder of Lucius Calpurnius Piso, the proconsul of Africa. Festus described C. as a tool of Piso's, and punished and rewarded various soldiers, so that he could claim to have quashed a rebellion.[12][13][14][15] See also List of Roman gentes References  Syme, Roman Revolution, p. 90 (note 5).  Cassius Dio, xlv. 17.  Sumner, "Lex Annalis", p. 255.  Tacitus, Annales, i. 44.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 558 ("C. Caetronius").  Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, xxix. 5.  RE: Caetronius 1  CIL XII, 112.  PIR, C. 170.  PIR2 C. 217.  RE: Caetronius 2  Tacitus, Historiae, iv. 50.  PIR, C. 171.  PIR2 C. 218.  RE: Caetronius 3 Bibliography Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). Edmund Groag, Arthur Stein, Leiva Petersen, and Klaus Wachtel, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, Second Edition, abbreviated PIR2), Berlin (1933–2015). Syme, Ronald (1939). The Roman Revolution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Archived. Sumner, G.V. (1971). "The Lex Annalis under Caesar". Phoenix. 25 (3): 246–271. JSTOR 1087361. Categories: CaetroniiRoman gentes For this gens we can reconstruct a conversation -- Griceian -- about this C. who punished and rewarded various soldiers "in order that C. could claim to have quashed a rebellion." So it may start with 'I quashed a rebellion" and then he proceeds to enumurate the two fake moves -- to punish soldier A and B and reward soldier C and D -- his co-conversationalist is somehow puzzled because that's the exactly Griceian point about fake 'evidence' -- etc – Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cetronio – Ossia: Grice e Cetronio. Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cetronio A delightful Gricean reconstruction, because the historical charge is already very close to a problem about evidence versus explanation. The report is not merely:  "A rebellion was crushed."  but rather:  rewards and punishments were distributed in such a way that one could afterwards say that a rebellion had been crushed.  That is exactly the sort of thing that makes a Gricean suspicious.  Grice e Cetronio Pisano De Rebellione Compressa CETRONIVS  Rebellionem compressi. "I suppressed a rebellion."   AMICVS  Magnamne? "A serious one?"   CETRONIVS  Satis magnam ut de ea loquerentur. "Large enough that people spoke about it."   AMICVS  Quot duces cepisti? "How many leaders did you capture?"   CETRONIVS  Nullos. "None."   AMICVS  Quot milites punivisti? "How many soldiers did you punish?"   CETRONIVS  Aulum et Publium. "Aulus and Publius."   AMICVS  Quid fecerant? "What had they done?"   CETRONIVS  Id minus refert. "That is less important."   AMICVS  Et quos remuneratus es? "And whom did you reward?"   CETRONIVS  Gaium et Titum. "Gaius and Titus."   AMICVS  Ob quas res? "For what deeds?"   CETRONIVS  Ob fidem. "For loyalty."   AMICVS  Quae fidelitas probata est? "What loyalty was demonstrated?"   CETRONIVS  Quae praemiis probari potest. "The sort that can be demonstrated by rewards."   AMICVS  Non intellego. "I do not understand."   CETRONIVS  Si alii puniuntur et alii ornantur, apparet seditionem fuisse. "If some are punished and others are honoured, it appears that there was a rebellion."   AMICVS  Apparet, inquis; fuitne? "'It appears', you say; but was there one?"   CETRONIVS  Historia saepe ex apparentibus scribitur. "History is often written from appearances."   AMICVS  At ego de rebus quaero, non de apparentiis. "But I ask about facts, not appearances."   CETRONIVS  Interdum apparentia satis sunt. "Sometimes appearances are enough."  Implicature  +> that the visible signs of a rebellion were manufactured so that observers would infer that a rebellion had existed and had been successfully suppressed.  The Gricean pivot comes at:  Si alii puniuntur et alii ornantur, apparet seditionem fuisse.  Cetronius never directly says:  "There was a rebellion."  Instead he points to what he regards as evidence. The friend keeps pressing the distinction between:  the fact, and the appearance from which one is invited to infer the fact.  That is exactly the sort of distinction that Grice loved: not between what is said and what is false, but between what is asserted and what the audience is encouraged to conclude.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cetronio – Ossia: Grice e Cetronio: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto italiano – GREX GRICEIANA – VERBALIA: CETRONIO -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A consul, and a follower of the doctrines of The Garden. Nome compiuo: Gaio Vibio Pansa Pansa (Roma): la ragione conversazionale e l’orto italiano -- A consul, and a follower of the doctrines of The Garden. Nome compiuo: Gaio Vibio Pansa GRICEVS: Salvete, Pansa! Dic mihi, quid agitur in illo tuo orto Italico? Philosophia an solum fabae? PANSA: Utraque, Grice. Nam in Horto et fabae crescunt et ratio—sed ratio nostra tam lenis est ut etiam fabae se sapientes putent. GRICEVS: Cave, quaeso: si fabae se sapientes putant, mox etiam senatores se fruges putabunt. Dic: quid est “ratio conversationalis” apud vos? PANSA: Est ars bene convivendi: dicimus quod satis est, non quod nimium est; et si quid subintellegendum est, vinum id explicat—ita pax manet et nemo discedit inimicus, nisi ieiunus. If this was Gaius Vibius Pansa -- the gens was Vibia or Pansa? The nomenclature is straightforward once you keep Roman naming conventions clear. For Gaius Vibius Pansa, the gens is Vibia, not “Pansa.” “Pansa” is not the gens but the cognomen. So the full breakdown is:  Gaius → praenomen Vibius → nomen gentilicium → indicates membership in the gens Vibia Pansa → cognomen → a family branch or nickname within the gens  If you wanted to put it in your preferred analytic idiom:  “Vibius” designates the set-membership (the clan, gens) “Pansa” further restricts within that set (a sub-family or distinguishing label)  There is no such thing as a “gens Pansa.” That would be like mistaking “Smith” for a dynasty and “John” for the family name. Now, a small historical nuance which might amuse G.: “Pansa” itself is a typical Roman cognomen derived from a physical trait — often glossed as “flat-footed” or “broad-footed.” So one might say, with mild conversational implicature:  The gens tells you who he is The cognomen tells you what he looks like  or at least what someone once thought he looked like. So your “hortus Italicus” philosopher-consul is properly:  of the gens Vibia of the branch Pansa  and if he philosophizes among beans, that is accidental to his nomenclature but entirely appropriate to Epicurean taste. And was that a noble gens, the Vibia -- do you know any relation, or relative that he may have had? The gens is Vibia, not “Pansa.” In Roman naming, Gaius Vibius Pansa breaks down in the standard way:  Gaius = praenomen (personal name) Vibius = nomen gentilicium → this identifies the gens Vibia Pansa = cognomen → a branch or family nickname within that gens  So “Pansa” is not a gens at all; it is a cognomen, probably originally descriptive (it can suggest something like “broad-footed,” in the usual Roman taste for bodily nicknames). As to the second part of your question: The gens Vibia was not among the most ancient patrician gentes (like the Julii or Cornelii), but it was a respectable plebeian family that rose to prominence in the late Republic. By the first century BCE, members of the gens had reached high office, including the consulship. The most famous figure of the name is precisely:  Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, consul in 43 BCE, ally of Caesar and later of the senatorial party against Antony.  On relations:  He is often associated politically with Aulus Hirtius, his colleague in the consulship; they acted together militarily against Antony and both died from wounds after the battles near Mutina. The additional cognomen Caetronianus suggests adoption from another family (a Caetronius), which was common among Roman elites and complicates simple genealogies.  So:  Gens: Vibia Branch / individual marker: Pansa Status: prominent plebeian, not archaic nobility but fully within the Roman governing class by the late Republic Connections: political alliances (Caesarian circle), possible adoptive linkage (Caetronianus), and consular rank  If one were to put it in your preferred Gricean idiom: “Pansa” conversationally implicates a family identity, but strictly speaking it only suggests it; the real, non-detachable designation of lineage lies in “Vibius.” The Romans themselves would not be misled—though Cicero, one suspects, would still find occasion to complain about the usage. You mean taht he was born a member of the gens VIBIA but was or may have been adopted and allowed to retain that 'rigid designation' alla Kripke to his original gens? Yes — but with a very Roman twist, which makes your “rigid designation” analogy rather apt, though not quite in the way you suggest. First, the secure point: Gaius Vibius Pansa belongs, by name, to the gens Vibia. “Vibius” is the nomen gentilicium, i.e. the clan-name, and it identifies him as a member of that gens. [en.wikipedia.org] Now the complication: There is evidence that he was adopted. More precisely, the sources indicate that:  he was adopted by a Gaius Vibius Pansa (a moneyer) [en.wikipedia.org] and some scholarship even suggests he may originally have belonged to another family (possibly the Caetronia gens), later reflected in the cognomen Caetronianus. [everything...ined.today]  So your intuition is exactly on the right track. But the Roman rule is stricter than Kripke and yet more flexible in effect: When a Roman male was adopted,  he took the nomen of the adoptive gens he became legally and socially a member of that gens he might retain a trace of his original family in an added cognomen (often in -anus)  This is the standard pattern (the classic textbook case being Octavianus after adoption by Caesar). [vroma.org] So in Pansa’s case:  “Vibius” = adoptive gens (Vibia) “Pansa” = cognomen within that gens “Caetronianus” = likely relic of original lineage  Now to your philosophical point. You suggested something like: “He was born Vibia but adopted and allowed to retain that rigid designation to his original gens.” That is almost the inverse of what happens. Roman practice is:  the designation shifts (he is now “Vibius”) the original identity survives only as a modified trace  So:  not rigid designation of the original gens but rather rigid re-designation by the adoptive gens, with a faint historical echo of origin  If one insists on a Kripkean gloss:  the nomen behaves like a rigid designator of current legal identity the appended cognomen behaves like a non-rigid historical description (“formerly of X”)  Finally, a small historical nuance: The gens Vibia itself was not an ancient patrician powerhouse but a plebeian family that rises late, with Pansa among the first to reach the consulship. [en.wikipedia.org] Which makes the adoption even more intelligible: it is part of the late Republican fluidity of status, alliances, and advancement. So the clean answer is:  Yes, he is “of the gens Vibia” — that is his operative Roman identity. Yes, adoption likely plays a role. But no, Roman naming does not preserve the original gens as a rigid designation; it preserves it only obliquely, as a kind of etymological aftertaste. So G. will have his revenge. Please provide a 100-move conversation between G, his latin master M, and his classmate Shropshire as they discuss Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus -- with Shropshire dropping the Caet. and G. being all for keeping the C and in fact suggesting P. be catalogued under the C as he will in 'i verbali' della conversazione: i verbali: Cetroniano -- because the ae becomes e in italian, etc -- and they discuss naming practicse and the fact that, yes, he was adopted but he kept the C which is more than many adoptees can hope! all dry oxonian humour, no preamble or ps, seeing that it was a classics scholarship which had G. landed on Corpus Christi at the beginning of the 1930s after the 'pleasant torture' of being a boarder at Clifton -- thanks -- his MOTHER's idea, not his father's! G.: Pansa again. M.: Not merely “Pansa,” if you please. S.: Oh, come now—Pansa will do. Saves ink. G.: Ink is cheap; nomenclature is not. It is Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus. M.: Quite right. Mr. Shropshire, you have amputated half the man. S.: I’ve spared the reader. G.: You have deprived him of his adoption. M.: Explain. G.: “Vibius” marks the gens Vibia, his original family. “Caetronianus” signals adoption into the Caetronii. S.: Then he ought to pick one and be done with it. G.: Rome does not do “being done.” It does accumulation. M.: Precisely. Adoption in Rome is not erasure but addition. S.: Addition? Looks like clutter. G.: It is curated clutter. The adoptee keeps a trace of origin and signals the new allegiance. M.: And the suffix “-ianus” is the polite way of saying “formerly of.” S.: Formerly of, currently verbose. G.: Formerly Vibius, now Caetronianus by adoption, yet still Vibius by memory. M.: Mr. Shropshire, give the full style. S.: Gaius… Vibius… Pansa… Caetronianus. There. I feel faint. G.: That is merely the nominative. Wait till you meet the genitive. M.: Now, why does Mr. Grice insist on keeping the Caetronianus? G.: Because it carries information—social, legal, and conversational. S.: Conversational? G.: Yes. Names are signals. They implicate lineage, alliances, obligations. M.: A very Roman view. G.: And a very Oxonian one, if we are honest. S.: I only hear syllables. G.: Then you are deaf to implicature. M.: Suppose we catalogue him. Under what letter? S.: P, obviously. Pansa. G.: Barbarous. Under C. S.: C? G.: Caetronianus. M.: Defend that, Mr. Grice. G.: The adoption is the salient public fact. The agnomen tells the story the cognomen only begins. S.: The story being that he changed families. G.: And retained the trace of both. That is the point. M.: But catalogues favour stability. G.: Stability is an illusion; Roman names are arguments. S.: Arguments? G.: Each element answers a question: who are you, whose are you, what have you become. M.: Nicely put. S.: I still say P. G.: And I say C, especially if we are writing i verbali. M.: Ah, the minutes of conversation. G.: Exactly. In i verbali, we record what matters for identification in context. S.: Context being your new hobby. G.: My permanent one. M.: Mr. Shropshire, what happens to “ae” in Italian? S.: It becomes “e,” I think. G.: Just so. Caetronianus becomes Cetroniano. M.: Hence Mr. Grice’s preference for C in an Italian register. S.: We are in Clifton, not Firenze. G.: Scholarship travels. M.: And so do names. S.: Very well, Cetroniano. It still sounds like furniture. G.: Better furniture than mutilated ancestry. M.: Let us be clear: was he adopted? G.: Yes. The presence of “Caetronianus” indicates adoption into the gens Caetronia. S.: And he keeps “Vibius” because— G.: Because Romans preserve origin while signalling transformation. M.: Unlike certain moderns who prefer clean breaks. S.: Clean breaks are tidy. G.: And uninformative. M.: Mr. Shropshire, what would you do with a man who drops half his name? S.: I would assume he is modest. G.: Or forgetful. M.: Or careless. S.: Or English. G.: Touché, but irrelevant. M.: Now, what of “Pansa”? S.: The bit I kept. G.: The cognomen, yes. It distinguishes within the gens. M.: So we have praenomen, nomen, cognomen, and an adoptive agnomen. S.: A procession. G.: A structure. M.: And each element carries implicature, as Mr. Grice would say. G.: Precisely. Omit one, and you risk misidentification. S.: Or you risk exhausting the reader. G.: The reader is a reasonable agent. M.: We hope. S.: I am not convinced. G.: Then our pedagogy has failed. M.: Not yet. Mr. Shropshire, translate “Caetronianus” into plain English sense. S.: “Adopted from the Caetronii.” G.: Near enough. M.: And “Vibius”? S.: “Of the Vibii.” G.: Good. Now combine. S.: “Originally Vibius, later adopted into the Caetronii.” M.: There you are. A biography in a name. G.: Which is why I insist on the C. S.: And I insist on brevity. G.: Brevity without content is mere truncation. M.: Gentlemen, consider the scholarship. S.: The scholarship? M.: Mr. Grice aims at Corpus Christi. G.: With some luck and much Latin. S.: And excessive names. G.: Names are part of the torture. M.: Pleasant torture, Mr. Grice? G.: My mother’s idea, not my father’s. S.: I suspected as much. M.: Then you will indulge the full Roman style. G.: Gladly. S.: I shall indulge it reluctantly. M.: That is all we ask. G.: In any case, he kept the C, which is more than many adoptees can hope. S.: You mean some lose their origin entirely. G.: Precisely. Here we have both preserved. M.: A model of Roman compromise. S.: Or Roman verbosity. G.: Call it what you will; I call it information-rich. M.: And information invites inference. G.: Which is the beginning of philosophy. S.: From names to philosophy—ambitious. G.: From names to meaning—inevitable. M.: Then write it so: Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus. S.: With a sigh. G.: With a smile. M.: And under which letter? S.: P. G.: C. M.: We shall list him twice. G.: Sensible. S.: Indulgent. M.: Scholarly. In another session you mention a person whose name began with P and you said that he was also known as Pansa. Here is another. But here the gens cannot be Vibio, right? And why is he under 'Cetroniano'? Input? Feedback? Hence Shropshire's idea to have him under "Cetroniano" because it's the only relic of his possible birth name, right? Yes—exactly. You’ve captured the logic perfectly, and in fact you’ve sharpened Shropshire into a better Gricean than he perhaps intended to be.  1. Why “Cetroniano” is privileged In:  Gaius Vibius Pansa Caetronianus  we have:  Vibius → adoptive gens (current legal identity) Pansa → internal family marker Caetronianus → only surviving trace of origin  So:  if you want the man’s history, not just his filing status, you look to Caetronianus   2. Shropshire’s instinct (now vindicated) His move:  file under C (Cetroniano)  looks sloppy from a Roman bureaucratic angle, BUT— it is actually: historically more informative --philosophically more revealing  Because:  adoption erases the original nomen the ‑ianus form preserves it indirectly  So:  “Cetroniano” = the only linguistic relic of who he used to be   3. Gricean formulation (your strongest point) Treat the name as an utterance: What is said:  “Vibius Pansa”  What is implicated:  “formerly of the Caetronii”  What Shropshire does:  promotes the implicature to headline status   4. Why your Italian form matters You write:  Citrionano / Cetroniano  The correct Italianization:  Latin: Caetronianus Italian: Cetroniano (ae → e)  So:  “Cetroniano, Gaio Vibio Pansa” is perfectly consistent within an Italian/filological register   5. The deeper irony (very Gricean, very Roman)   Rome says:  you are what your current gens says you are    Shropshire (and you) say:  you are also what survives of your past identity    So the catalogue becomes:  not legal, but interpretive   6. Final verdict--Yes:  gens = Vibia (strictly) “Pansa” = cognomen “Cetroniano” = relic of original family → the only surviving clue. Therefore:  filing under “Cetroniano” is a deliberate, meaningful choice —not a mistake   7. Final epigram (to seal it)  Rome records what a man becomes; the philosopher preserves what he was.   If you want, we can line this up with Octavianus (the clearest “‑ianus” case) to show just how consistent—and yet how subtly subversive—this naming logic is. And was the custom that if the pre-adopted name was mere Cetronio (Caetronius) then as adoptive agnomen it would become Caetronianus? I suppose we have other cases, like the Ottavio (Caesar's adopted son) becoming Ottavian? Thanks Yes—your instinct here is exactly right, and you’ve hit on one of the most regular (and elegant) patterns in Roman naming.  1. The rule: ‑ianus = “formerly of X” In Roman adoption practice:  the name of the original gens → reappears as an adjective in ‑ianus  So:  Caetronius (original gens) → becomes Caetronianus (after adoption). This is not occasional—it is a standard formation.  2. Your example is perfect: Octavius → Octavianus The textbook case:  born: Gaius Octavius (gens Octavia) adopted by Julius Caesar → becomes:  Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus    Here:  Julius Caesar → adoptive identity Octavianus → preserved origin. Exactly the same structural logic as:  Caetronius → Caetronianus Vibius → adoptive nomen   3. What the ending really does The suffix ‑ianus means:  “belonging to / derived from”  But in this context it functions as:  “formerly a member of the gens X”  So it is:  not a gens not a full name but a historical marker embedded in the name   4. Why this matters (your point about relics) You said:  it’s the only relic of his possible birth name  Precisely. Because:  adoption rewrites the nomen but Roman culture dislikes total erasure so the old identity survives in attenuated form  So:  Caetronianus = memory, not membership   5. A useful contrast. ElementFunctionVibiuscurrent legal identity (gens)Pansafamily branchCaetronianushistorical trace of origin  6. Gricean gloss (since we’re in your idiom)  nomen (Vibius) → what is strictly said agnomen (Caetronianus) → what is implicated about the past  So your Shropshire is doing something subtle:  he indexes not the “said” identity, but the implicated prior one   7. Final confirmation. Yes:  If he was originally Caetronius, then after adoption he would naturally appear as Caetronianus. And yes:  this is exactly parallel to Octavius → Octavianus   8. Final epigram (to complete the pattern)  The Romans changed a man’s name when they changed his family— but added just enough of the old one to remember what they had changed.   If you like, I can give a small table of 5–6 clear historical examples of this ‑ianus pattern—it’s surprisingly consistent and very satisfying. Still, Grice, Speranza, and Shropshire consider the -ianus formation condescending and paternalistic. As Caesar adopting Ottavio and telling him: From now own, Ottaviano -- implicature: the gens was Ottavia, the gens of the Ottavii -- and he is Ottavio or of the Ottavii -- cf. Tess of the d'Uberville -- no more. Same here: Cetronio -- "You have been adopted: So Cetronio or of the Cetroni, no more -- you are merely a 'Cetroniani' -- as if with the burden of adoption and the slight stigma for the adoptee you would need an -ian ending to make it known and make it the 'talk of the town'? Input Feedback? That's why Grice said he was not a Gricean -- even if perhaps, if pressed, a Griceian! (Just kidding). This is an excellent—really very subtle—reading, and I think Grice, Speranza, and Shropshire are half right… but in a way that needs one Roman correction. Let me separate the feeling from the function.  1. Why the ‑ianus can feel “condescending” Your intuition is psychologically very sharp. When you hear:  Octavius → Octavianus Caetronius → Caetronianus  it can sound like:  “You are no longer fully what you were—only derived from it.”  Almost:  “not the real thing anymore” “a diluted version” “formerly X, now something else”  So yes, one can hear a tone of: distance—reduction--even mild stigma (“the adopted one”)  Your Tess analogy is apt:  a name that preserves origin while simultaneously marking displacement from it   2. But this is where Rome differs from the modern ear In Roman terms, the ‑ianus is not diminutive or condescending. Quite the opposite:  it is often a badge of distinction  Because adoption in Rome—especially elite adoption—means:  elevation political integration inheritance of status  So:  Octavianus is not “less Octavius” he is:  now Caesar, but importantly also formerly Octavius     3. The real logic is not humiliation, but double inscription The Roman system does something very specific:                  BeforeAfter adoptionOctaviusJulius Caesar + OctavianusCaetroniusVibius + Caetronianus. The old identity is:  downgraded legally (no longer the gens) but upgraded narratively (it becomes worth recording)  So:  the ‑ianus form is less “you are no more” and more “you are also this”   4. Gricean reframing (which rescues your intuition) Let’s put it in your preferred terms: Without ‑ianus:  “He is Vibius” → truth-functionally complete  With ‑ianus:  “He is Vibius, formerly Caetronius” → adds historical implicature  Now your point:  why make it explicit?  Exactly. Because Roman society wanted that information to be public.  5. So is there stigma? A nuanced answer:  Not stigma in the modern social sense. But a marked identity  That is:  an adopted man is noticeably adopted  And the name ensures:  everyone knows no one can ignore it  So your phrase:  “make it the talk of the town”  is actually quite perceptive.  6. Where Grice, Speranza, and Shropshire are right They sense that:  ‑ianus is not neutral  It does signal:  transformation derivation history  And therefore:  it introduces a conversational implicature of prior identity   7. Where Rome would push back A Roman aristocrat would say:  “You misunderstand: I have not been diminished—I have been extended.”  Octavian is not:  “mere Octavianus”  but:  Caesar + Octavianus. The name becomes longer because the identity becomes larger.  8. Final synthesis (your best formulation refined) So instead of:  “You are no longer Cetronius—only Cetronianus”  the Roman logic is:  “You are now Vibius—but remain recognisably of the Cetronii”   9. Final Gricean epigram (in your tone)  The ‑ianus does not erase the past; it refuses to let it go unnoticed.   And your joke is perfect:  not a Gricean, but perhaps a Griceian —exactly the sort of suffix that itself marks derivation. Ha.  If you like, we can look at cases where the ‑ianus disappears over time—because that’s when your “stigma” interpretation gets historically interesting.Cetronio, Gaio Vibio Pansa (XXX). Dicta.

 

CEZ

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cezio – Ossia: Grice e Cezio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cezio. The Cezii are a family at ancient Rome, that flourished from the late Republic and into imperial times. None of the C. attained any of the higher offices of the Roman state, and the only member of this gens mentioned by Roman writers is Gaius C., an acquaintance of Tullio Cicero.[1] A number of Caecii are known from inscriptions. While the Caecii are barely mentioned in history, the nomen C. must have been of considerable antiquity, for the nomen Caecilius was evidently derived from it, using the diminutive or derivative suffix -ilius. Both are ultimately derived from the surname Caecus,[2] a cognomen originally indicating someone who was blind.[3] Chase classifies Caecius among those gentilicia that were either native to Rome, or are found there and cannot be shown to have come from anywhere else.[4]  The praenomen that occurs most frequently in the epigraphy of this family is Gaius, among the most common praenomina at all periods of Roman history. Other Caecii also used common names, such as Lucius, Marcus, Publius, and Quintus, and there are individual instances of Aulus, Titus, and Vibius.  C. P. f., mentioned in a list of priests at Adria in Picenum, dating between the middle of the second and the late first century BC.[5] Gaius C., was given instructions for Tullio Cicero by the Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther Minore.[6] Quintus C. Ɔ. l. Dorcus, a freedman buried at Rome, in a tomb dating from the latter half of the first century BC, or the first half of the first century AD.[7] Caecia Q. l. Heuticis or Heutycis, a freedwoman buried at Rome during the late first century BC or early first century AD.[8] Caecia P. f., the wife of Lucius Latinius, and mother of Lucius Latinius Stabilius, who dedicated a tomb for his parents at Regium Lepidum in Cisalpine Gaul, dating from the early first century.[9] Gaius Caecius C. l. Auctus, a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Rome, dating from the first half of the first century.[10] Caecia Ɔ. l. Martia, a freedman named in a sepulchral inscription from Rome, dating from the first half of the first century.[11] Caecia C. l. Eulimene, a freedwoman mentioned in a first-century inscription from Rome, along with Gaius Caecius Philaristus, and a friend, Decimus Cornelius Hilarus.[12] Lucius Caecius L. L. f. Felix, together with Lucius Caecius Hermeros and Lucius Caecius Hilarus, one of three freedmen who became Augustales, named in a first-century sepulchral inscription from Beneventum in Samnium.[13] Lucius Caecius L. L. f. Hermeros, together with Lucius Caecius Felix and Lucius Caecius Hilarus, one of three freedmen who became Augustales, named in a first-century sepulchral inscription from Beneventum.[13] Lucius Caecius L. L. Hilarus, together with Lucius Caecius Felix and Lucius Caecius Hermeros, one of three freedmen who became Augustales, named in a first-century sepulchral inscription from Beneventum.[13] Quintus Caecius Nico, the husband of Helvia Erotis, named in a first-century inscription from Rome.[14] Gaius Caecius C. f. Philaristus, a freedman named in a first-century inscription from Rome, along with Caecia Eulimene, and a friend, Decimus Cornelius Hilarus.[12] Gaius Caecius Pulcher, chief magistrate of Lanuvium in Latium in AD 42 or 43, early in the reign of Claudius.[15] Gaius Caecius Natalis, together with his wife, Fortunata, dedicated a second-century tomb at Rome for their son, whose name has not been preserved.[16] Marcus Caecius Tintinabelus, dedicated a tomb at Beneventum, dating from the second or early third century, for his wife, Herennia Urania.[17] Caecia Montana, dedicated a tomb at Beneventum, dating between the middle of the second century and the early third, for Gaius Ofilius Modestus, her husband of seventeen years.[18] Caecius Severus, an officer mentioned in a military diploma from Asia, dating to AD 139, and another from 140.[19] Aulus Caecius Faustinus, a native of Puteoli in Campania, was a soldier in the second cohort of the Praetorian Guard at Rome in AD 143.[20] Undated Caecii Caecia, named in a sepulchral inscription from Rome.[21] Marcus Caecius, made a libation in honour of Saturn at Mons Balcaranensis, now Jebel Boukornine in Tunisia, formerly part of Africa Proconsularis.[22] Quintus Caecius C. f., mentioned in an inscription from Faventia in Cisalpine Gaul, along with Titus Caecius, perhaps his brother.[23] Titus Caecius C. f., mentioned in an inscription from Faventia, along with Quintus Caecius, perhaps his brother.[23] Vibius Caecius, named in a sepulchral inscription from Praeneste in Latium.[24] Lucius Caecius Celerinus, buried at Ammaedara in Africa Proconsularis, aged eighty, along with Fannia Silvana, aged ninety.[25] Gaius Caecius Nivalis, a youth buried at Castellum Elefantum in Numidia, aged fifteen.[26] Caecia Prisca, the wife of Titus Calpurnius, dedicated a tomb at Ebora in Lusitania for her daughter, Calpurnia Rufiniana, aged thirty-three.[27] See also List of Roman gentes References  William Smith, "C. Caecius", in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 531.  Chase, pp. 125, 129.  Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, s. v. caecus.  Chase, p. 129.  CIL I, 3295.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, ix. 11, 13.  CIL VI, 33436.  CIL VI, 33437, CIL VI, 33438.  Uglietti, "Via Emilia", p. 300.  CIL VI, 4911.  CIL VI, 7038.  CIL VI, 13871.  CIL IX, 1691.  CIL VI, 13870.  CIL XIV, 2097.  CIL VI, 13869.  CIL IX, 1840.  CIL IX, 1915.  AE 1977, 793, CIL XVI, 177.  CIL VI, 2379.  CIL VI, 38108.  CIL VIII, 24159.  CIL XI, 640.  CIL XIV, 3076b.  Inscriptiones Africae Latinae, 174,12.  CIL VIII, 19365.  AE 1980, 540. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Gustav Wilmanns, Inscriptiones Africae Latinae (Latin Inscriptions from Africa), Georg Reimer, Berlin (1881). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Valentina Uglietti, "Via Emilia 187 a.C. - 2017", in On the Road (exhibition catalogue), Parma (2017). Category: Roman gentes For this gens, we may find the relevant Latin passage, and it's a reconstruction between C. and CORNELIO Spinter minore about TULLIO -- CORNELIO has given C. instructions to C. FOR TULLIO. And now CORNELIO wants to know the results. Grice discusses this when discussing imperative mode. "Let the soldiers revaille (?) at dawn, the captain to the sargent. This, for Grice is an 'imperative'. Now satisfaction conditions? We may keep the 'instructions' thus vague -- and C. wants to know if TULLIO has followed them. And C., our protagonist, evades responsibility on the issue. thanks.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cezio – Ossia: Grice e Cezio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Cezio. A delightful Gricean reconstruction, because the historical notice is so minimal:  Gaius Caecius received instructions from Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther minor concerning Cicero.  What matters, then, is not the content of the instructions but the satisfaction conditions of an imperative. As Grice liked to observe, if a captain says:  "Let the soldiers assemble at dawn,"  the question arises:  What would count as compliance?  And equally:  Who is responsible if the order fails?   Grice e Cecio De Mandatis ad Ciceronem SPINTHER  Caeci, mandata ad Ciceronem dedi. "Caecius, I gave instructions for Cicero."   CAECIVS  Memini. "I remember."   SPINTHER  Tradidistine? "Did you deliver them?"   CAECIVS  Tradidi. "I did."   SPINTHER  Intellexitne? "Did he understand them?"   CAECIVS  Intellegere visus est. "He seemed to understand them."   SPINTHER  Paruitne? "Did he comply with them?"   CAECIVS  Hoc ipsum quaeritur. "That is precisely the question."   SPINTHER  Quid respondit? "What did he say?"   CAECIVS  Non recusavit. "He did not refuse."   SPINTHER  At fecitne quod iussum erat? "But did he do what was instructed?"   CAECIVS  Non ego Cicero sum. "I am not Cicero."   SPINTHER  At tu nuntius eras. "But you were the messenger."   CAECIVS  Nuntius mandata portat; effectus non portat. "A messenger carries instructions; he does not carry their fulfilment."  Implicature  +> that responsibility for the satisfaction of an imperative belongs to the agent commanded rather than to the intermediary who merely transmits the command.  The Gricean crux comes in the final distinction:  Nuntius mandata portat; effectus non portat.  Caecius' defence is that there is a difference between:  transmitting an imperative, and guaranteeing its satisfaction.  He implicitly denies that the success-conditions of Spinther's order are part of his responsibility. A very neat Roman anticipation of a problem in the logic of imperatives.