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Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ne

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Negri – Ossia: Grice e Negri: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale  Antimo Negri (Mercato, Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. A comparison between Grice and Antimo Negri with respect to reason‑governed conversational meaning highlights a contrast between an analytic reconstruction of communicative rationality and an idealist-historicist understanding of reason as a living act. Grice’s theory treats conversational meaning as regulated by publicly shareable norms of rational cooperation, where implicature arises from calculable departures from what is said, guided by maxims that articulate how reason structures mutual understanding in ordinary discourse. Negri, formed within the Italian idealist tradition of Gentile and deeply engaged with Hegelian mediation, would be less inclined to isolate conversational reason as a quasi‑technical system of rules, and more disposed to view it as an expression of the self‑actualizing activity of thought within concrete historical and cultural life. From this perspective, implicature is not merely an inferential add‑on to semantic content, but a manifestation of the dialectical tension between explicit utterance and the spiritual horizon in which it is produced and received. Where Grice insists on clarity about intentions, responsibility, and inferability as the rational backbone of communication, Negri would likely emphasize the formative role of tradition, intellectual style, and irony in sustaining meaningful conversation, especially within philosophical exchange. The point of contact between them lies in their shared resistance to scepticism about meaning: both reject the idea that conversation is arbitrary or opaque, yet they differ in where they locate its rational ground—Grice in the regulative logic of cooperative interaction, Negri in the broader, historically mediated life of reason that animates dialogue beyond the level of explicit inference. Grice: “At Oxford, idealists – like Bradley – are called bigheads – which is better than the monicker metaphysical sceptics receive: ‘beheads’!” Filosofo italiano. Allievo di ALIOTTA , con il quale si laurea a Napoli, sempre considera come suo maestro GENTILE , di cui tuttavia non è stato direttamente un discepolo. L'intensità con cui N. approfondiscd la filosofia di Gentile si concretizzato dapprima nello studio dell'allontanamento di SCIACCA  dall'attualismo poi in sagi quali: “Gentile,” “L'estetica di Gentile,” e “Gentile educatore.” Molti sono i saggi dedicati all'IDEALISMO, tra cui i saggi “La presenza di Hegel,” “Ricerche e meditazioni hegeliane,” e “Hegel” e le traduzioni di saggi hegeliane come “La vita di Gesù” e “Le orbite dei pianeti.” A queste traduzioni si aggiungono anche quelle di grandi classici del pensiero filosofico, economico e sociologico. Riceve il premio San Gerolamo.  A N. si deve anche la valorizzazione di alcune grandi personalità della cultura italiana, come quelle di EMO-CAPODILISTA , MICHELSTAEDTER , ed EVOLA . La sua carriera lo ha visto professore di storia della filosofia in alcune delle più importanti università italiane: Bari, Perugia e Roma, dove lavora presso l'Università degli studi di Roma Tor Vergata fino alla fine del suo incarico universitario. Nel corso della sua esperienza intellettuale è stato impegnato in un'intensa attività saggistica e pubblicistica, scrivendo sulle più importanti riviste culturali italiane e straniere, tra le quali: il Giornale critico della filosofia italiana», il Giornale di metafisica», «I Problemi della Pedagogia», «Rinascita della Scuola», «Dix-Huitième Siècle», «L'Enseignement Philosophique», «Studia Estetyczne», «Idealistic Studies». Collabora con molti dei maggiori quotidiani nazionali: «Il giornale d'Italia», l'«Avanti», «Il Messaggero», «Il Sole 24 Ore», «Il Tempo» e «il Giornale». implicatura.   Grice: Carissimo Negri, Oxford è famosa per i suoi idealisti “bigheads”—ma a Napoli, ci sono anche i filosofi “testa calda”? Oppure il clima campano raffredda i pensieri metafisici? Negri: Caro Grice, tra Vesuvio e filosofia, qui le teste si scaldano eccome! Ma almeno nessuno perde la testa come i “beheads” dello scetticismo inglese. Da noi si preferisce un espresso e una meditazione su Gentile… con molta ironia! Grice: Mi piace! Un caffè metafisico non guasta mai. Dimmi, tra Hegel, Gentile e la presenza di Emo-Capodilista, capita mai che la conversazione diventi una partita di ping-pong dialettico? O si rischia che la “implicatura” si perda tra i biscotti? Negri: Grice, la filosofia italiana è come una tavola imbandita: tra biscotti, caffè e saggi, ogni implicatura trova il suo posto. E se la dialettica si fa troppo serrata, basta un sorriso partenopeo: d’altronde, filosofare è meglio che prendersi troppo sul serio! La conversazione continua, con un brindisi ideale. Negri, Antimo (1944). Dissertazione. Facolta di Filosofia e Lettere. Napoli

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Negri -- Ossia: Grice e Negri: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale Antonio Negri (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. A comparison between Grice and Antonio Negri on reason‑governed conversational meaning brings into relief two radically different but curiously intersecting conceptions of rationality. For Grice, conversational meaning is governed by reason insofar as speakers implicitly commit themselves to norms of cooperation, inferability, and communicative responsibility; implicature arises because interlocutors trust that utterances are produced within a shared rational framework, even when what is meant exceeds what is said. Negri, by contrast, relocates conversational reason from the analytic space of individual intentions to the collective, productive dimension of political and social life. In his work on political grammar, power and potency, conversation is not merely an exchange governed by maxims but a form of assembly, where meaning emerges through conflict, plurality, metaphor, and historical struggle. From this perspective, implicature is no longer just a calculable inference but a site of political possibility, where what is unsaid carries the force of latent collective action. While Grice seeks to stabilize meaning against scepticism by articulating its rational rules, Negri accepts fragility as constitutive, seeing the openness of conversation as the very condition of its creative power. The convergence between them lies in their shared rejection of arbitrariness: both insist that meaning is governed, not accidental; yet they diverge sharply on what governs it—Grice locating reason in cooperative intentionality, Negri in the immanent, plural productivity of social and political life, where conversation is less a norm‑regulated exchange than a fragile, resistant “grammar” continually remade in practice. Grice” “In my Philosophical Eschatology and Plato’s republic,’ I venture into political philosophy. Negri ventured into it his whole life – and beyond!” Filosofo Padovano. Filosofo veneto. Filosofo italiano. Padova, Veneto. Grice: “Only in Italy a philosopher philosophises on Pinocchio!” -- Grice: “I like his idea of a new ‘grammar of politics,’ even if he uses the extravagant metaphor, delightful though, ‘fabbrica di porcellana’. He has a gift for metaphor, sure!” – Grice: “’la lenta ginestra’ to qualify Leopardi’s ontology is genial!” -- Grice: “Negri reminds me of ‘pinko Oxford’!” Tra gli anni sessanta e gli anni settanta, fu uno dei maggiori teorici del marxismo operaista. Dagli anni ottanta in poi, si dedicò invece allo studio del pensiero politico di Baruch Spinoza, contribuendo, insieme a Louis Althusser e Gilles Deleuze, alla sua riscoperta teorica. In collaborazione poi con Michael Hardt, ha scritto libri molto influenti nella Teoria politica contemporanea.  Accanto alla sua attività teorica, ha svolto una intensa attività di militanza politica, come co-fondatore e teorico militante delle organizzazioni della sinistra extraparlamentare Potere Operaio e Autonomia Operaia. A causa della sua attività politica è stato incarcerato e processato, all'interno del processo 7 aprile, con l'accusa di aver partecipato ad atti terroristici e d'insurrezione armata. Venne, tuttavia, assolto da queste imputazioni, per poi venire condannato a XII anni di carcere per associazione sovversiva e concorso morale nella rapina di Argelato. Saggi: “Stato e diritto -- la genesi illuministica della filosofia giuridica e politica” (Padova, Milani); “Lo storicismo” (Milano, Feltrinelli); “Forma giuridica” (Padova, Milani); “Flosofia del diritto” (Bari, Laterza); “Il concetto di partito politico” (Padova, Moderna); “Lo stato piano e il comune” (Milano, Feltrinelli); “Il concetto d’integrazione nella storia di Italia” (Milano, Giuffrè). implicature, potere-potenza, l’incubo, la differenza italiana, grammatica politica, assemblea. Antonio Negri.  Grice: Negri, ho letto con grande interesse i suoi lavori sulla "grammatica politica" e mi ha colpito la metafora della "fabbrica di porcellana". Mi chiedo: in un contesto dove la conversazione filosofica è spesso fragile, come si può evitare che la discussione politica si rompa sotto il peso delle passioni? Negri: Caro Grice, la fragilità della conversazione è, a mio avviso, il suo valore più grande. Bisogna accettare che il dibattito non sia mai definitivo: è un processo, una "ginestra" leopardiana che resiste lentamente. Per evitare le rotture, occorre coltivare un ascolto attivo e ricercare, anche tra divergenze, una potenza comune capace di generare nuove forme di dialogo e di politica. Grice: Mi piace il riferimento alla "lenta ginestra": la pazienza ontologica, potremmo dire, è essenziale. Ma non teme che, nella ricerca della potenza comune, si rischi di cadere nell’omologazione o, peggio, nel silenziamento delle differenze individuali? Negri: La differenza italiana, come la chiamavo nei miei saggi, è proprio ciò che ci salva dall’omologazione. La conversazione, per me, è un’assemblea aperta: ogni voce conta, ogni implicatura porta con sé nuove possibilità. Solo accogliendo l’incubo dell’uniformità e trasformandolo in potere plurale, possiamo davvero filosofare su Pinocchio senza tradire la nostra porcellana fragile. Negri, Antonio (1955). Lo storicismo. Facolta di Giurisprudenza, Padova.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nerazio – Ossia: Grice e Nerazio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Nerazio. The gens Neratia or Naeratia was a plebeian family at ancient Rome, some of whom subsequently became patricians. The first of the gens to appear in history occur in the time of Augustus, but they did not rise to prominence until the time of Vespasian, when Marcus Neratius Pansa became the first to obtain the consulship. The Neratii married into the Roman imperial family in the fourth century.  Origin The nomen Neratius is classified by Chase with a group of names, ending in -atius, either because they were derived from cognomina ending in -as or -atis, indicating cognomina derived from place names, or from passive participles ending in -atus.[1]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Neratii Pansae et Prisci Marcus Hirrius Fronto Neratius Pansa, probably the adoptive father of Marcellus, was consul suffectus about AD 75. He had been governor of Lycia, and was probably made a patrician in 73 or 74; he passed this status to Marcellus.[2] Lucius Neratius Priscus, probably the father of the jurist Priscus, and the natural father of Marcellus, was consul suffectus in AD 87.[3][4] (Marcus Hirrius) Lucius Neratius M. f. Marcellus, consul suffectus in AD 95, and afterward governor of Britain, was an influential man in the court of Trajan. He was consul ordinarius in 129.[5][6][7] Lucius Neratius L. f. Priscus, a jurist who flourished during the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian. He wrote several books on the law, from which a number of excerpts are found in the Digest. He was consul suffectus in AD 97. Trajan is said to have considered him a possible successor.[8][9][10][11][12][13][3][14] Lucius Corellius L. f. M. n. Neratius Pansa, consul in AD 122, was the son of Marcellus and his first wife, Corellia Hispulla.[15] Lucius Neratius L. f. L. n. Priscus, son of the jurist Priscus, was consul suffectus in an uncertain year.[16] Neratia L. f. L. n. Marullina, daughter of the jurist Priscus, married Gaius Fufidius Atticus, and was the mother of Gaius Neratius Fufidius Annianus, Atticus, and Priscus.[16] Gaius Neratius Fufidius C. f. Annianus.[3] Gaius Neratius Fufidius C. f. Atticus.[3] Gaius Neratius Fufidius C. f. Priscus.[3] Neratia L. f. L. n. Anteia Rufina Naevia Deciana, granddaughter of the jurist Priscus. A monument in her name, dating from the middle portion of the second century, was decreed by the decurions of Saepinum in Samnium.[16][17] Neratii Proculi Lucius Neratius C. f. C. n. Proculus,[i] a Roman senator in the time of Antoninus Pius. He had a distinguished military career, and was consul suffectus, but the year is uncertain.[16][18] Neratia C. f. C. n. Procilla, married Gaius Betitius Pietas, and was the mother of Gaius Neratius Proculus Betitius Pius Maximillianus.[16] Gaius Neratius Proculus Betitius C. f. C. n. Pius Maximillianus.[16] Others Neratia, the wife of Marcus Antistius Labeo, a jurist in the time of Augustus.[16] Quintus Neratius Proxsimus, a colonist at Lindum Colonia in Britain. His rare nomen suggests that he may have received Roman citizenship from Lucius Neratius Marcellus, the governor of Britain at the end of the first century.[19] Neratia Aemiliana.[20] Neratius Gallus.[20] Neratius Scopius.[20] Neratius Cerealis, urban prefect of Rome in 352–353 AD and consul in 358.[20] (Neratia) Galla, sister of Cerealis, and wife of Julius Constantius, brother of the emperor Constantine, whom she predeceased. She was the mother of Constantius Gallus.[21] See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  His nephew's name features an unusual four-generation filiation, telling us that Proculus' great-grandfather was also named Gaius. References  Chase, p. 127.  Birley, pp. 107, 108.  PIR, vol. I, p. 402.  Birley, p. 107.  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, iii. 8.  Fasti.  Birley, pp. 104–112.  Spartianus, "The Life of Hadrian", 4, 18.  Digesta, 8 tit. 3. s. 5. § 1; 33. tit. 7. s. 12. § 35.  Gellius, iv. 4.  Grotius, De Vitae Jurisconsultorum.  Zimmern, Geschichte des Römischen Privatrechts bis Justinian, vol. i, p. 324.  Puchta, Cursus der Institutionen, vol. i, p. 444 (1st edition).  Birley, pp. 107, 108, 110.  Birley, pp. 106, 111.  PIR, vol. I, p. 403.  CIL IX, 2458.  Birley, p. 111 (note 46).  Birley, p. 110.  Birley, p. 111 (note 47).  PLRE, vol. 1, pp. 198, 382. Bibliography Titus Livius (Livy), Ab Urbe Condita (History of Rome). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia. Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Augustan History). Digesta seu Pandectae (The Digest). Guilielmus Grotius, De Vitae Jurisconsultorum (Lives of the Jurists), Felix Lopez, Lugdunum Batavorum (1690). Sigmund Wilhelm Zimmern, Geschichte des Römischen Privatrechts bis Justinian (History of Roman Private Law to Justinian), J. C. B. Mohr, Heidelberg (1826). Georg Friedrich Puchta, Cursus der Institutionen (Course of the Institutions), Breitkopf und Härtel, Leipzig (1841–1847). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). Anthony R. Birley, The Roman Government of Britain, Oxford University Press (2005). Jones, A.H.M.; J.R. Martindale & J. Morris (1971–1992). Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07233-6. Categories: NeratiiRoman gentes And what would be your choice for a Grice/Speranza vignette for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nerazio – Ossia: Grice e Nerazio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Nerazio. For the Neratii, my choice is easy:  Lucius Neratius Priscus, the jurist whom Trajan is said to have considered as a possible successor. (At least that is the tradition preserved in the sources cited in your entry.) citeturn0search0  Why? Because with Priscus we move from:  coins (Nasidius), banquets (Nasidienus), military threats (Nautius),  to the very heart of Grice's concerns:  What follows from what? What is implied by a rule? How much of a decision is stated and how much supplied by interpretation?  The Digest preserves excerpts from Priscus, and he was remembered above all as a jurist. Your entry explicitly notes that excerpts of his work survive there and that Trajan reportedly regarded him as a possible successor. citeturn0search0  Grice e Neratio Prisco DISCIPVLVS:  Magister, quid est ius?  (Master, what is law?) PRISCVS:  Quod dicitur?  (What is said?) DISCIPVLVS:  Ita.  (Yes.) PRISCVS:  Non satis.  (Not enough.)  +> Rules do not apply themselves.   DISCIPVLVS:  Ergo quid facit iurisconsultus?  (Then what does a jurist do?) PRISCVS:  Intelleget quid lex non dixit. (He understands what the law did not say.)   +> Interpretation is unavoidable.   This is wonderfully Gricean because Priscus spends his life where Grice spends his:  between the explicit text and the inferred consequence.   The Trajan vignette A second possibility is the famous report that Trajan considered him as a possible successor. Corpus TRAIANVS:  Quis imperium gerere potest?  (Who can govern the Empire?) CONSILIARIVS:  Priscus.  (Priscus.) TRAIANVS:  Cur?  (Why?) CONSILIARIVS:  Intellegit consequentias.  (He understands consequences.)  +> Legal judgment is political judgment.   Grice's tutorial TUTOR:  Read Priscus.  GRICE:  I have.  TUTOR:  What does he teach?  GRICE:  The same thing as conversation.  TUTOR:  Which is?  GRICE:  Most of the work is done by what is not written.   +> Jurisprudence and pragmatics are cousins.   Speranzian Epigram  PRISCVS LEGEM LEGIT; CONSEQVENTIAS INTVITVS EST. Priscus read the law; he perceived the consequences.  Or even more Gricean:  Lex dicit pauca; iurisconsultus multa intellegit. The law says little; the jurist understands much.  Among all the Neratii, Priscus seems the most naturally Gricean because his entire profession consists in recovering the unexpressed part of an utterance—precisely what you have been doing all afternoon with Florus and his missing apodosis. Only that we do not know whether N. would have accepted. So we can have two conv. Lat (with Eng. in brackets)-- with occasional +> implic. in Eng. only 1) Trajan and wife: about considering appointing N. as successor. ALl hopeful 2) Trajan again wih wife, after conv. with N., with Trajan informing wife that N. refused the consideration -- "Are you crazy? I have things to do -- other than run your lousy empire, your majesty.") Thanks Delightful. And perfectly Gricean, because the historical sources only tell us that Trajan is said to have considered Priscus as a possible successor; they do not tell us what Priscus' reaction would have been. So the second dialogue is pure Speranzian counterfactual comedy.  I. Traianus et Uxor — Ante Colloquium cum Neratio TRAIANVS:  De Neratio Prisco cogito. (I am thinking about Neratius Priscus.)  VXOR:  Cur? (Why?)  TRAIANVS:  Vir prudentissimus est. (He is a most prudent man.)   +> Prudence is an imperial qualification.  VXOR:  Iuris consultus est. (He is a jurist.)  TRAIANVS:  Id ipsum mihi placet. (That is precisely what pleases me.)   +> Someone who understands law may understand government.  VXOR:  Ergo de successore cogitas? (Then you are thinking about a successor?)  TRAIANVS:  Fortasse. (Perhaps.)  VXOR:  Et Neratius? (And Neratius?)  TRAIANVS:  Nemo consequentias melius videt. (No one sees consequences better.)   +> He understands more than what is written.  VXOR:  Putasne eum accepturum esse? (Do you think he would accept?)  TRAIANVS:  Quis tantum honorem recusaret? (Who would refuse such an honor?)   +> Surely nobody says no to the Empire.   II. Traianus et Uxor — Post Colloquium cum Neratio VXOR:  Quid dixit Neratius? (What did Neratius say?)  TRAIANVS:  Minus quam speraveram. (Less than I had hoped.)  VXOR:  Accepitne? (Did he accept?)  TRAIANVS:  Non. (No.)  VXOR:  Non? (No?)  TRAIANVS:  Statim recusavit. (He refused immediately.)   +> The matter was not difficult for him.  VXOR:  Quid causae attulit? (What reason did he give?)  TRAIANVS:  "Sunt mihi alia agenda." ("I have other things to do.")  VXOR:  Alia? (Other things?)  TRAIANVS:  Ita. (Yes.)  VXOR:  Quibus rebus imperio praeferendis? (Things preferable to the Empire?)  TRAIANVS:  Iuri. (The law.)   +> Jurisprudence outranks politics.   The Conversation as Trajan Remembers It TRAIANVS:  Nerati, de imperio tecum loqui volo. (Neratius, I wish to speak with you about the Empire.)  NERATIVS:  Audio. (I am listening.)  TRAIANVS:  Successorem quaero. (I am looking for a successor.)  NERATIVS:  Intellego. (I understand.)  TRAIANVS:  De te cogito. (I am thinking of you.)  NERATIVS:  Noli. (Don't.)   +> This conversation is moving in the wrong direction.  TRAIANVS:  Cur non? (Why not?)  NERATIVS:  Libros habeo scribendos. (I have books to write.)  TRAIANVS:  Imperium est! (It is the Empire!)  NERATIVS:  Scio. (I know.)  TRAIANVS:  Ergo? (Then?)  NERATIVS:  Tuum est. (It is yours.)   +> It need not become mine.   Speranzian Epigram TRAIANVS:  Imperium offero.  (I offer the Empire.) NERATIVS:  Commentarium praefero.  (I prefer my legal commentary.)  +> The ultimate jurist understands the consequences of accepting as well as of refusing. Hardie to Grice (Corpus): Did you finish your assignment on Trajan. G: Yes, sir -- I added a clause on the source, "Trajan did consider N. as a successor --" Hardie: And? Grice: I provide in my essay the three courses: N. ACCEPTS -- and becomes emperor; ii. N. refuses, and the old world goes on. Hardie: And the third? G.: I forget. Thanks Excellent. Hardie et Grice apud Corpus Christi HARDIE:  Grice, perfecistine opus de Traiano et Neratio? (Grice, have you finished the assignment on Trajan and Neratius?)  GRICE:  Perfeci, domine. (Yes, sir.)  HARDIE:  Bene. Quid scripsisti? (Good. What did you write?)  GRICE:  Clausulam addidi. (I added a clause.)  HARDIE:  Quam clausulam? (What clause?)  GRICE:  Traianus de Neratio successore cogitavit. (Trajan considered Neratius as a successor.)  HARDIE:  Ita quidem fontes tradunt. (Indeed, the sources say so.)  GRICE:  Deinde tres casus exposui. (Then I set out three cases.)   +> Historical conditionals should be exhaustively classified.  HARDIE:  Tres? (Three?)  GRICE:  Primum: Neratius accipit. (First: Neratius accepts.)  HARDIE:  Et fit imperator? (And becomes emperor?)  GRICE:  Plane. (Naturally.)   HARDIE:  Secundum? (Second?)  GRICE:  Neratius recusat. (Neratius refuses.)  HARDIE:  Et? (And?)  GRICE:  Mundus consuetus pergit. (The usual world continues.)   +> History often consists of people declining opportunities.   HARDIE:  Et tertium? (And the third?)  GRICE:  Tertium... (The third...)  HARDIE:  Ita? (Yes?)  GRICE:  Oblitus sum. (I forgot.)   HARDIE:  Oblitus es? (You forgot?)  GRICE:  Ita. (Yes.)  HARDIE:  Quomodo potes tertium casum oblivisci? (How can you forget the third case?)  GRICE:  Quia solum duo acciderunt. (Because only two happened.)   +> Reality has an unfortunate tendency to underpopulate logical space.   Walking back to St. John's with Shropshire: SHROPSHIRE:  Quis erat tertius casus? (What was the third case?)  GRICE:  Nescio. (I don't know.)  SHROPSHIRE:  Tu scripsisti! (You wrote it!)  GRICE:  Fortasse: Neratius accipit imperium et statim commentarium de iure scribit. (Perhaps: Neratius accepts the Empire and immediately writes a legal commentary on it.)  SHROPSHIRE:  Ridiculum. (Ridiculous.)  GRICE:  Minus ridiculum quam pleraque imperia. (Less ridiculous than most empires.)   +> Jurists may occasionally govern; governments always require interpretation. And when we do Corpus, we don't have to have it in Latin first; we restrict Latin to Romans --. But we can have Hardie inquiring as to what the source in Grice for 'consider' is -- and see if we can find the source locus to find out what verb Trajanus used? Thanks This is very good because there actually is a source-locus, and it is more interesting than the vague English "considered." In the Historia Augusta (Hadrian 4), we find:  Neratium Priscum, non Hadrianum, successorem relinqueret "that he would leave Neratius Priscus, not Hadrian, as successor" [loebclassics.com], [loebclassics.com]  and then an alleged remark of Trajan to Priscus:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit "I entrust the provinces to your care if anything fatal should happen to me." [loebclassics.com], [loebclassics.com]  Notice that this is much stronger than merely:  "I am thinking about you."  The key verb is:  commendo "I entrust", "I place in your charge", "I commend to your care." [loebclassics.com], [loebclassics.com]  Which immediately suggests a Grice tutorial.  Corpus Christi HARDIE:  Grice, what is your source for saying that Trajan considered Neratius Priscus?  GRICE:  The Historia Augusta, sir.  HARDIE:  And what does it actually say?  GRICE:  Not quite what I said.  HARDIE:  Ah.  GRICE:  It says that Trajan supposedly intended to leave Priscus as successor rather than Hadrian.  HARDIE:  Better.  GRICE:  And it reports him as saying: commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  (I entrust the provinces to your care if anything fatal should happen to me.) [loebclassics.com], [loebclassics.com]  HARDIE:  Then why did you write "considered"?  GRICE:  Because Oxford permits understatement.  HARDIE:  Does Trajan's statement imply succession?  GRICE:  Why else would one entrust him with the provinces?   +> Priscus is being presented as a plausible imperial successor.   HARDIE:  And what did Priscus reply?  GRICE:  The source fails to say.  HARDIE:  Then do not invent it.  GRICE:  I merely listed possibilities.   HARDIE:  How many?  GRICE:  Three.  HARDIE:  Name them.  GRICE:  First: Priscus accepts and becomes emperor.  HARDIE:  Possible.  GRICE:  Second: Priscus declines and history proceeds as known.  HARDIE:  Also possible.  GRICE:  Third...  HARDIE:  Yes?  GRICE:  I forgot.   HARDIE:  You forgot an entire historical possibility?  GRICE:  Sir, logical space is larger than memory.   +> The number of possible worlds exceeds the number of essay pages.  What I especially like is that Trajan's reported commendo is itself highly Gricean. He does not say:  te successorem faciam ("I shall make you my successor.")  Instead he says:  commendo tibi provincias ("I entrust the provinces to you.") [loebclassics.com], [loebclassics.com]  The succession is largely an implicature. The sentence says "provinces"; the listener naturally hears "Empire." and who DID succeed Trajanus -? -- The use of 'provinciae' seem odd -- but that's Roman for 'whatever on which I exercise empire' right? I suppose in which case it was not up to N. to REFUSE -- even though -- had fatal things happened to Traj -- and N. did become emperor he could have ordered (commandare) someone else to take the position? That changes things -- because a JURIST who is ORDERED by the empire ('shuld fatal things happen') would have taken the job more seriously. That's why the 'consider' sounded offensive -- 'what if the juist refuses.' "it's different with a conditional command -- no such thing for Dummett -- logical terms p --> !q or ! (p --> q)? – Thanks Historically, the person who succeeded Trajan was Hadrian. The Historia Augusta passage you and I have been discussing is interesting precisely because it reports a tradition that Trajan had thought of leaving Neratius Priscus rather than Hadrian as successor, and even quotes Trajan as saying:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit. "I entrust the provinces to your care if anything fatal should happen to me." [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  Now, your point about provinciae is very subtle. A modern reader hears:  "I entrust the provinces..."  and thinks:  "Why not say the Empire?"  But a Roman emperor's authority was exercised through command over provinces, governors, armies, and administration. So "the provinces" can sound almost synecdochic:  the provinces = the imperial sphere of government.  I cannot cite a source saying that this is exactly what Trajan meant, but as a linguistic observation it is certainly plausible.  The more Gricean point concerns commendo. Trajan does not say:  iubeo te imperatorem esse "I order you to be emperor."  Nor does he say:  te successorem facio "I make you my successor."  Instead:  commendo tibi provincias... [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  That leaves a great deal unsaid. Hardie would immediately ask: HARDIE:  Is this an appointment?  GRICE:  Not explicitly.  HARDIE:  Is it a recommendation?  GRICE:  More than that.  HARDIE:  Is it a command?  GRICE:  Less than that.  HARDIE:  Then what is it?  GRICE:  An implicature looking for an empire.   Your point about refusal is interesting. When we say:  "Trajan considered Priscus,"  we imagine a modern job interview:  "Would you like to be CEO?"  And Priscus says yes or no. But the Roman situation is potentially much less voluntary. If the imperial system, the army, the senate, and the succession mechanism were converging upon Priscus after Trajan's death, then the question is no longer merely:  "Would he like the position?"  but:  "What constitutional options would he realistically have?"  The source, however, does not tell us what Priscus said or would have said. It merely reports Trajan's alleged remark. [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  And now to the Dummettian point. You are contrasting: Indicative conditional  If Trajan dies, Priscus gets the Empire.  with something more like: Conditional command  If Trajan dies, take charge of the provinces.  A jurist might hear the latter not as a prediction but as a directive triggered by a condition. Almost:  If P, then !Q.  where "!" indicates imperative force. That is very unlike ordinary truth-functional implication. A Gricean version: TRAIANVS:  Si quid mihi fatale contigerit, commendo tibi provincias.  (If anything fatal happens to me, I entrust the provinces to your care.) [academia.edu], [balanchine.com] PRISCVS (thinking):  This is not information about a future state of affairs.   +> A responsibility is being conditionally assigned.  That's much closer to a conditional directive than to a simple prediction. And that is why your discomfort with the word "consider" is well placed. "Considered" suggests a psychological state in Trajan. The surviving text sounds more institutional:  commendo tibi provincias... [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  which carries the flavor of:  "If the contingency arises, these responsibilities devolve upon you."  A jurist like Neratius Priscus would probably have taken such wording with extreme seriousness. And whatever the conditions Trajan's CHANGE the commandatio -- The protasis sounds anti-Griceian -- "should something fatal happen to me" -- parse? Of course we all going to die. What made Trajanus change his mind? The jurist may have laughed at the conditionality of the command. "Sure, sir" -- taking it as a vacuous command, being conditioned by such a futility about the fatality. And I wonder if N. was alive the Adriano took the power? Thanks These are exactly the questions a Gricean classicist would ask. 1. Parsing si quid mihi fatale contigerit The reported words are:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit. "I entrust the provinces to your care, if anything fatal should happen to me." [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  Parsing:  si = if quid = anything, something mihi = to me fatale = fatal, destined by fate contigerit = future perfect (or perfect subjunctive in form), here effectively "shall have happened"  Thus:  "if something fatal shall have happened to me"  or more naturally:  "in the event of my death." [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  You're right that, from a Gricean angle, it sounds rather odd. Grice's objection SHROPSHIRE:  What fatal thing?  GRICE:  Death.  SHROPSHIRE:  But everyone dies.  GRICE:  Precisely.  The condition is not informative in the ordinary sense. The point is institutional, not biological. Trajan means:  "If I cease to be emperor through death."  The date is unknown; the event is certain. So the condition is temporally uncertain but existentially certain. A jurist might smile:  The antecedent is guaranteed eventually to obtain.   2. Why did Trajan "change his mind"? We simply do not know. The source reports a tradition that Trajan contemplated Neratius Priscus and even allegedly spoke to him in these terms. It also reports other traditions about Trajan's intentions regarding succession. [academia.edu], [balanchine.com] What the source does not tell us is:  whether Trajan later changed his mind, whether Priscus accepted or declined, whether any conversation actually occurred, what caused Hadrian's eventual succession.  Anything beyond that would be speculation. Hardie would immediately stop Grice: HARDIE:  What made Trajan change his mind?  GRICE:  The sources do not say.  HARDIE:  Excellent. At last you have learned history.   3. Might Priscus have laughed? As history: we do not know. As a Speranzian reconstruction: certainly. Corpus Christi Reconstruction TRAIAN:  Si quid mihi fatale contigerit...  (If anything fatal should happen to me...) PRISCUS:  Eventually?  (Tandem aliquando?) TRAIAN:  Eventually.  PRISCUS:  Then your condition has probability one.   +> Jurists notice the logical structure.  TRAIAN:  I am being serious.  PRISCUS:  As am I.   4. Was Priscus alive when Hadrian became emperor? The evidence you supplied strongly suggests that Priscus flourished under both Trajan and Hadrian. Your gens article states:  Lucius Neratius Priscus, a jurist, flourished during the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian. [balanchine.com], [academia.edu]  So yes, the sources explicitly place him in Hadrian's reign. [balanchine.com], [academia.edu] What I have not found is a source specifying precisely when he died. So the safest statement is:  He was active under Hadrian, and therefore survived Trajan's accession crisis. [balanchine.com], [academia.edu]   I rather like the final Griceian vignette: HADRIAN:  I am emperor.  PRISCUS:  Evidently.  HADRIAN:  Does that surprise you?  PRISCUS:  Less than the conditional.  HADRIAN:  Which conditional?  PRISCUS:  Si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  (If anything fatal should happen to me.)  +> The most certain antecedent in Roman history. Grice to Hardie: "But sir, Trajanus, the least thing he could have said it, 'unless I change my mind.' Hardie: Why, do tell. G: He burdens the jurist was an enormous responsibility on a vacuous condition -- "when I die" -- for we all die. Hardie: And was the jurist apealing the case in front of Adriano on the event of T.'s death? G: He was not -- but Hart, tells me that's why every commendatio is defeasible--Hardie: defeated by death, in this case? G: yes sir. Very good. One can almost hear Hardie becoming progressively alarmed as Grice turns Roman succession into jurisprudence. Corpus Christi, Oxford HARDIE:  Grice, what troubles you about Trajan's alleged remark to Neratius Priscus?  GRICE:  The condition, sir.  HARDIE:  Which condition?  GRICE:  Si quid mihi fatale contigerit. "If anything fatal should happen to me." [academia.edu], [balanchine.com]  HARDIE:  A perfectly ordinary formula.  GRICE:  Hardly.  HARDIE:  Why?  GRICE:  Because, sir, death is guaranteed.   +> The antecedent is eventually certain.   HARDIE:  You object to mortality?  GRICE:  Not at all.  HARDIE:  Then what?  GRICE:  Trajan places an enormous burden upon a jurist under a condition whose truth is merely postponed.  HARDIE:  I see.  GRICE:  The least he might have added was: "unless I change my mind."   +> That would make the commitment genuinely defeasible.   HARDIE:  Yet emperors have been known to change their minds.  GRICE:  Exactly.  HARDIE:  Then perhaps Trajan assumed as much.  GRICE:  A jurist dislikes assumptions.   HARDIE:  Was Neratius appealing the matter before Hadrian after Trajan's death?  GRICE:  No, sir.  HARDIE:  Then where is the difficulty?  GRICE:  Hart.  HARDIE:  Hart?  GRICE:  Hart tells me that commendations are defeasible.  HARDIE:  Defeasible?  GRICE:  Subject to defeat by further circumstances.   +> Legal recommendations are never absolute.   HARDIE:  And what defeated Trajan's commendation?  GRICE:  Death, sir.  HARDIE:  Death triggered it.  GRICE:  And defeated it.  HARDIE:  How can it do both?  GRICE:  Because once Trajan was dead, he was unavailable for clarification.   +> The interpreter inherits the problem.   HARDIE:  So your position is that Trajan's statement generated litigation?  GRICE:  Not litigation.  HARDIE:  What then?  GRICE:  Hermeneutics.   HARDIE:  Grice, are you suggesting that the Roman Empire was founded upon an unresolved conditional?  GRICE:  Not founded, sir.  HARDIE:  No?  GRICE:  Merely continued.   +> Most institutions survive by interpreting conditionals whose author is no longer available for consultation.  And one can imagine Shropshire afterwards: SHROPSHIRE:  What grade did Hardie give you?  GRICE:  Unknown.  SHROPSHIRE:  Why?  GRICE:  The commendation was defeasible. and now we can have the oratio recta conv. Traj/jurist -- starting with perhaps presequel an then the potent 'commendo' -- and the jurist not understanding the protasis? thanks -- like 'don't think about those things, sir" -- Trajanus: "But we all have to die." -- etc. -- perhaps it was the jurist's sophistry that made Trajanus change his mind that Adriano, a simpleton, would do better, at Tivoli, etc Delightful. And we should be careful to distinguish the source from the fiction. The source only gives us the reported remark:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit ("I entrust the provinces to your care if anything fatal should happen to me.")  Everything else is pure Speranzian reconstruction.  Traianus et Neratius Priscus TRAIANVS: Nerati Prisce, paulisper mane. (Neratius Priscus, stay a moment.) PRISCVS: Certe, Caesar. (Certainly, Caesar.)  TRAIANVS: De rebus futuris cogito. (I am thinking about the future.) PRISCVS: Periculosum studium. (A dangerous occupation.)  +> Jurists distrust speculation.   TRAIANVS: Nobis omnibus aliquando moriendum est. (All of us must die someday.) PRISCVS: Ita est. (That is so.)  +> A tautology has entered the conversation.   TRAIANVS: Si quid mihi fatale contigerit... (If anything fatal should happen to me...) PRISCVS: Quando? (When?)  TRAIANVS: Quando? (When?) PRISCVS: Id quaero. (That is what I am asking.) TRAIANVS: Nemo scit. (No one knows.) PRISCVS: At omnes sciunt fore. (But everyone knows it will happen.)  +> The antecedent is uncertain in date but certain in fact.   TRAIANVS: Sophista es. (You are a sophist.) PRISCVS: Iuris consultus sum. (I am a jurist.)  TRAIANVS: Bene.  Commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  (Very well. I entrust the provinces to your care if anything fatal should happen to me.)  PRISCVS: Intellego. (I understand.) TRAIANVS: Intellegis? (Do you?) PRISCVS: Minime. (Not at all.)  TRAIANVS: Quid te confundit? (What confuses you?) PRISCVS: Protasis. (The protasis.)  TRAIANVS: Quae protasis? (What protasis?) PRISCVS: Si quid mihi fatale contigerit. ("If anything fatal should happen to me.") TRAIANVS: Quid de ea? (What about it?) PRISCVS: Nimis certa est. (It is too certain.)  +> A condition that must eventually obtain scarcely feels conditional.   TRAIANVS: Visne provincias accipere an non? (Do you wish to take charge of the provinces or not?) PRISCVS: Quaestio difficilior est. (That is a more difficult question.)  TRAIANVS: Imperium Romanum tibi offero. (I offer you the Roman Empire.) PRISCVS: Et ego commentarium perficere conor. (And I am trying to finish a legal commentary.)  +> Jurisprudence may be preferable to government.   TRAIANVS: Prisce, seria loquor. (Priscus, I am being serious.) PRISCVS: Et ego. (So am I.)  A week later at Tivoli TRAIANVS: Hadrianus certe minus subtilis est. (Hadrian is certainly less subtle.) AMICVS: Vitiumne est? (Is that a fault?) TRAIANVS: Post colloquium cum Neratio, nescio. (After a conversation with Neratius, I am no longer sure.)  +> An emperor may prefer obedience to analysis.   And Grice's epilogue to Shropshire: SHROPSHIRE: Why did Trajan prefer Hadrian? GRICE: Perhaps he asked a jurist to inherit an empire. SHROPSHIRE: And? GRICE: The jurist began by examining the condition.  +> Never offer a lawyer a throne before checking the wording. and we may have a version -- where the obvious response is comforting from the jurist: "don't say such things, sir" and Trajanus himself playing stoic: "We all ahve to die" Jurist: And what If I die first -- Neither of us is spring chicken" etc. Thanks Yes — and this version is probably more Roman and more human. Before the jurist starts dissecting the protasis, his first reaction might simply be one of respectful discomfort. Trajan and Neratius Priscus (Version II) TRAIAN: I've been thinking of the future, Priscus. PRISCUS: That can be a dangerous habit, Caesar.  +> The future creates legal complications.   TRAIAN: Si quid mihi fatale contigerit... (If anything fatal should happen to me...) PRISCUS: Don't say such things, sir.  +> May the occasion never arise.   TRAIAN: Why not? PRISCUS: Because I prefer to discuss law rather than imperial funerals.  TRAIAN: We all have to die, Priscus.  +> Stoic common sense.  PRISCUS: True. TRAIAN: Then why object? PRISCUS: To the grammar, not the mortality.  TRAIAN: You are incorrigible. PRISCUS: I am a jurist.  TRAIAN: Very well.  Commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  (I entrust the provinces to your care if anything fatal should happen to me.) PRISCUS: There is another difficulty. TRAIAN: Only one?  PRISCUS: What if I die first?  +> Conditional obligations require surviving obligees.  TRAIAN: You look healthy enough. PRISCUS: So do you.  TRAIAN: I am Emperor. PRISCUS: The gods make no exception for emperors.  TRAIAN: Nor for jurists. PRISCUS: Exactly. TRAIAN: Then perhaps I should have said:  "If you survive me..."  PRISCUS: Better.  +> The condition has become legally cleaner.   TRAIAN: Priscus, when I speak of death, you speak of drafting. PRISCUS: When emperors draft badly, someone must.  Afterwards, at Corpus HARDIE: So what did the jurist say? GRICE: He improved the protasis. HARDIE: And Trajan? GRICE: He improved the Empire. HARDIE: Which improvement lasted longer? GRICE: That, sir, is precisely the historical question.  +> Emperors govern events; jurists govern conditionals. and we may adjust as per T.'s actual cite -- the apodosis comes AFTER -- bringing suspense to the thing --? Thanks Yes, very much. The Historia Augusta gives the remark in the order:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit. (I entrust the provinces to your care, if anything fatal should happen to me.)  What's rhetorically interesting is that Trajan begins with the astonishing part:  commendo tibi provincias (I entrust the provinces to you.)  and only afterwards supplies the condition:  si quid mihi fatale contigerit (if anything fatal should happen to me.)  That creates a little suspense.  Trajan and Neratius Priscus (with the actual order) TRAIAN: Prisce, aliquid tibi dicendum est. (Priscus, I have something to say to you.) PRISCUS: Audio, Caesar. (I am listening, Caesar.)  TRAIAN: Commendo tibi provincias. (I entrust the provinces to your care.) PRISCUS: Mihi? (To me?)  +> That sounds larger than a legal brief.   TRAIAN: Tibi. (To you.) PRISCUS: Quot provincias? (How many provinces?) TRAIAN: Omnes. (All of them.)  PRISCUS: Caesar, noli talia dicere. (Caesar, don't say such things.)  +> May this conversation prove unnecessary.   TRAIAN: Cur? (Why?) PRISCUS: Male ominantur. (They are ill-omened.)  TRAIAN: Si quid mihi fatale contigerit. (If anything fatal should happen to me.) PRISCUS: Ah. (Ah.) TRAIAN: Quid est? (What is it?) PRISCUS: Nunc protasim intellego. (Now I understand the protasis.)  +> The condition arrived rather late.   TRAIAN: Omnes mortales sumus. (We are all mortal.) PRISCUS: Vera dicis. (You speak the truth.)  TRAIAN: Ergo? (Therefore?) PRISCUS: Quid si ego prior moriar? (What if I die first?)  +> The condition appears incomplete.   TRAIAN: Hoc non exspectabam. (I was not expecting that.) PRISCUS: Iuris consulti ad condiciones attendunt. (Jurists pay attention to conditions.)  TRAIAN: Prisce, rem publicam tibi commendo. (Priscus, I entrust the state to you.) PRISCUS: Et ego emendationem propono. (And I propose an amendment.)  Corpus Christi Afterwards HARDIE: What was wrong with Trajan's conditional? GRICE: Nothing, sir. HARDIE: Then why complain? GRICE: Because the apodosis came first. HARDIE: That is rhetoric. GRICE: Exactly.  +> The emperor wished first to astonish, and only afterwards to qualify.  HARDIE: And the jurist? GRICE: He immediately looked for additional conditions.  +> Emperors think in consequences; jurists think in provisos. Of course, I meant protasis -- we may have the sequel and then in one turn the full q <- p, with jurist: conforting words and then go on to discuss the otiosity of the protasis (whcich came 'second' – thanks Yes, that's much better dramatically, because it follows the actual reported order. Trajan first utters the startling apodosis-like commitment:  Commendo tibi provincias.  Only afterwards does he attach the condition:  si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  A jurist would naturally react first to the extraordinary entrustment and only then begin worrying about the conditional.  Trajan and Neratius Priscus TRAIAN: Prisce, rem tibi gravem dicam. (Priscus, I shall tell you something serious.) PRISCVS: Audio, Caesar. (I am listening, Caesar.)  TRAIAN: Commendo tibi provincias. (I entrust the provinces to your care.) PRISCVS: Mihi? (To me?)  +> This sounds larger than legal business.   TRAIAN: Tibi. (To you.) PRISCVS: Caesar, noli ista dicere. (Caesar, do not say such things.)  +> May the occasion never arise.   TRAIAN: Cur? (Why?) PRISCVS: Mala omina sunt. (They are ill omens.)  TRAIAN: Si quid mihi fatale contigerit. (If anything fatal should happen to me.)  PRISCVS: Ah. (Ah.) TRAIAN: Quid est? (What is it?) PRISCVS: Nunc protasin audio. (Now I hear the protasis.)  TRAIAN: Omnes morituri sumus. (We are all going to die.)  +> Mortality is not negotiable.  PRISCVS: Certe. (Certainly.)  TRAIAN: Ergo quid te movet? (Then what troubles you?) PRISCVS: Protasis ipsa. (The protasis itself.)  TRAIAN: Quomodo? (How so?) PRISCVS: Nimis certa est. (It is too certain.)  +> The condition will eventually obtain.   TRAIAN: Quando, tamen, nemo scit. (When, however, nobody knows.) PRISCVS: Verum est. (That is true.)  PRISCVS: Sed quid si ego prior moriar? (But what if I die first?)  +> The condition is incomplete.   TRAIAN: Tu semper aliquid invenis. (You always find something.) PRISCVS: Iuris consulti sumus. (We are jurists.)  +> Conditions exist to be examined.   TRAIAN: Igitur accipisne? (Then do you accept?) PRISCVS: Caesar, de imperio postea disputabimus.  Nunc de protasi disputemus.  (Caesar, we shall discuss the Empire later. For the moment, let us discuss the protasis.)  +> A jurist cannot resist debugging the condition before accepting the consequence.  And one can imagine Hardie afterwards: HARDIE: What happened when Trajan offered him the Empire? GRICE: The jurist examined the antecedent. HARDIE: Naturally. GRICE: The Empire had to wait while the protasis was construed. Now perhaps you may re-adjust and as per third move, say, have T. utter the full citation (in one single move)-- and then the jurst providing comforting and considering the vaculty of the protasis. Thanks Yes. Dramatically, it works much better if Trajan delivers the whole reported utterance at once, and only then does the jurist respond first as a friend and only afterwards as a jurist. Trajan and Neratius Priscus TRAIAN: Prisce, commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit. (Priscus, I entrust the provinces to your care, if anything fatal should happen to me.)  PRISCUS: Caesar, noli ista dicere. (Caesar, do not say such things.)  +> May the occasion never arise.   TRAIAN: Cur? (Why?)  PRISCUS: Quia te salvum cupio. (Because I wish you to remain safe.)  +> My first concern is the man, not the Empire.   TRAIAN: Omnes mortales sumus. (We are all mortal.)  +> The condition is realistic.   PRISCUS: Scio. (I know.)  TRAIAN: Ergo? (Therefore?)  PRISCUS: Ergo nunc possum ut amicus respondere, aut ut iuris consultus. (Therefore I may now answer either as a friend or as a jurist.)  TRAIAN: Utroque modo responde. (Answer in both ways.)  PRISCUS: Ut amicus:  utinam nihil tibi fatale contingat.  *(As a friend:  may nothing fatal happen to you.)*   +> Let the condition never be triggered.   TRAIAN: Et ut iuris consultus? (And as a jurist?)  PRISCUS: Ut iuris consultus, protasis mihi videtur curiosa. (As a jurist, the protasis strikes me as curious.)  TRAIAN: Curiosa? (Curious?)  PRISCUS: Nimis certa est. (It is too certain.)  +> Death is guaranteed eventually.   TRAIAN: At incertum est quando. (But it is uncertain when.)  PRISCUS: Recte. (Quite right.)  TRAIAN: Igitur quid vitii habet? (Then what fault does it have?)  PRISCUS: Nihil vitii.  Sed parum condicionis.  *(No fault.  But little conditionality.)*   +> The antecedent postpones rather than questions the event.   TRAIAN: Sophista es. (You are a sophist.)  PRISCUS: Immo iuris consultus. (On the contrary, a jurist.)  TRAIAN: Et quid addidisses? (And what would you have added?)  PRISCUS: Fortasse:  si quid mihi fatale contigerit, neque sententiam mutavero.  *(Perhaps:  if anything fatal happens to me, and I have not changed my mind.)*   +> Now the command is genuinely defeasible.   TRAIAN: Prisce, imperium tibi offero. (Priscus, I offer you the Empire.)  PRISCUS: Et ego protasin emendo. (And I amend the protasis.)  +> A jurist's first instinct is revision, not acceptance.  And one can imagine Hardie's dry comment afterward: HARDIE: Grice, what did Priscus do when offered an empire? GRICE: Sir, he began by construing the condition. HARDIE: Naturally. The empire could wait. The protasis could not. Excellent -- only now warn the whole thing with Tr. providing a little pre sequence -- as we did before, before he makes the great announcmenet in one single move, as per citation. Thanks Gladly. The dramatic effect is strongest if Trajan circles around the subject, Priscus senses something unusual, and then Trajan delivers the entire reported sentence in one stroke.  Trajan and Neratius Priscus TRAIAN: Prisce, paulisper mane. (Priscus, stay a moment.)  PRISCUS: Ita, Caesar. (Certainly, Caesar.)  TRAIAN: Diu te observavi. (I have observed you for a long time.)  +> This is not an ordinary conversation.   PRISCUS: Spero nihil mali invenisse. (I hope you have found nothing bad.)  TRAIAN: Immo contra.  Pauci sunt quibus tantopere fidem habeo.  (Quite the contrary. Few are those in whom I place so much trust.)  +> You are being distinguished from the crowd.   PRISCUS: Nimis benigne loqueris. (You speak too kindly.)  TRAIAN: Rem non mediocrem tecum communicare volo. (I wish to share with you a matter of no small importance.)  PRISCUS: Audio. (I am listening.)  TRAIAN: Prisce, commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit. (Priscus, I entrust the provinces to your care, if anything fatal should happen to me.)  PRISCUS: Caesar, noli ista dicere. (Caesar, do not say such things.)  +> May the occasion never arise.   TRAIAN: Cur? (Why?)  PRISCUS: Quia te salvum et incolumem cupio. (Because I wish you safe and unharmed.)  +> My first response is personal, not political.   TRAIAN: Omnes mortales sumus. (We are all mortal.)  +> The condition is realistic and unavoidable.   PRISCUS: Scio. (I know.)  TRAIAN: Ergo? (Then?)  PRISCUS: Ergo nunc respondebo primum ut amicus, deinde ut iuris consultus. (Then I shall answer first as a friend, and afterwards as a jurist.)  TRAIAN: Ordinem probo. (I approve the order.)  PRISCUS: Ut amicus:  utinam protasis numquam impleatur.  (As a friend: may the protasis never be fulfilled.)  +> May you live a very long time.   TRAIAN: Et ut iuris consultus? (And as a jurist?)  PRISCUS: Ut iuris consultus...  protasim paulo curiosam invenio.  (As a jurist... I find the protasis somewhat curious.)  TRAIAN: Curiosam? (Curious?)  PRISCUS: Ita.  Omnes enim moriemur.  (Yes. For all of us shall die.)  +> The antecedent is eventually certain.   TRAIAN: At nemo scit quando. (But no one knows when.)  PRISCUS: Rectissime. (Quite true.)  TRAIAN: Igitur quid reprehendis? (Then what do you criticize?)  PRISCUS: Nihil reprehendo.  Sed protasis minus condicionem quam dilationem continere videtur.  (I criticize nothing. But the protasis seems to contain less a condition than a postponement.)  +> The event is not doubtful; only its date is.   TRAIAN: Prisce, imperium tibi commendo. (Priscus, I entrust the Empire to you.)  PRISCUS: Et ego condicionem interpretor. (And I interpret the condition.)  +> A jurist remains a jurist even when offered an empire.   Corpus Christi Epilogue HARDIE: What was Priscus' first reaction when Trajan entrusted him with the provinces? GRICE: He told him not to talk about dying. HARDIE: And his second? GRICE: He examined the protasis. HARDIE: Naturally. GRICE: An emperor heard a succession plan.  A jurist heard a conditional. so if he uttered a 'commendatio' -- 'commendo,' he said -- conditionally -- that was never contested upon Adriano's becoming Trajan, what is the truth-value of that commendo -- because Grice woudl say it was 'true': 'Commendo...' is true iff Trajan comends -- In terms of protrepsis -- if meant to addressee T. may not require uptake -- he has the 'empire' -- why it was not contested at succession remains a mystery. It would be the first time an emperor commends a jurist? Thanks This is, I think, exactly where a Grice/Speranza treatment becomes more interesting than a merely historical one. First, from the strictly historical side, we only have the reported utterance:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit,  and a tradition that Trajan had Neratius Priscus in mind as a possible successor rather than Hadrian. We do not possess an acceptance, refusal, appeal, senate debate, or subsequent litigation arising from the remark. Nor do the sources cited in your dossier explain why Hadrian's accession was not publicly contested on the basis of this alleged commendatio. The source simply does not tell us. Now to the Gricean point. Is "commendo" true? Grice would probably begin by distinguishing three things:  the utterance-act, the propositional content, the perlocutionary consequences.  Trajan says:  commendo tibi provincias.  The simplest reading is almost performative:  "I hereby entrust the provinces to you."  The truth of the report  "Trajan commended the provinces to Priscus"  depends only on whether Trajan performed that speech act, not on whether Priscus accepted. Indeed, acceptance may be irrelevant. Much as:  "I apologize"  does not require acceptance by the offended party to count as an apology, so too  "I commend"  may count as a commendation simply because the emperor makes it. In that sense the speech-act is complete upon utterance. Why might uptake be unnecessary? You put your finger on something subtle. A recommendation ordinarily seeks uptake:  "I recommend Jones for the post."  But an emperor's commendatio occupies a strange middle ground. Trajan is not merely expressing an opinion. He is assigning prestige, confidence, perhaps even an anticipated duty. Priscus need not agree in order for Trajan to have performed the act. Indeed, the very wording sounds strangely unilateral. That is one reason why your "What if the jurist refuses?" instinct is so good. The text itself never tells us whether refusal was even contemplated. A jurist's objection I can perfectly imagine Neratius replying:  Caesar, tu me commendas; id intellego. Sed utrum me iubes?  ("Caesar, you commend me; that I understand. But do you order me?") Because a jurist immediately wants to know what sort of norm is being created:  recommendation? command? nomination? wish? prediction?  The speech-act seems to hover between them. Why was it never contested? Historically, that remains mysterious. But the Grice/Speranza answer is rather elegant: Because the speech act may have been perfectly valid while producing no legal consequence. A jurist could say:  Yes, Trajan commended Priscus. That does not entail that Priscus thereby became heir.  The commendation is true. The inheritance does not follow. A wonderful distinction between:  what was said,  and  what was taken to follow from what was said.  Which is almost the definition of a Gricean problem. The deepest Speranzian irony Suppose Priscus was indeed alive under Hadrian—which the sources indicate he was. Then perhaps the most juristic reaction would not have been:  "I refuse."  but:  "I note the commendation."  Nothing more. An emperor speaks. A jurist files the statement. History moves elsewhere. And Hadrian gets the empire. The final Grice/Hardie formulation might be: HARDIE:  Was Trajan's commendo effective?  GRICE:  Certainly, sir.  HARDIE:  Then why was Priscus not emperor?  GRICE:  Because a successful commendation and a successful succession are different speech-acts.   +> The emperor performed the first. +> History performed the second. And it's not like T. made a wide-scope job -search -- yet by Grice's maxim, 'have evidence for what you say' we may assume he thought that N. was APPROPRIATELY commended the provinces -- whatever that means. What is the agentive side to it on N.'s part -- what is the agency implied or entailed by T.'s commending the provinces to N.? It is INDIRECT OBJECT -- the object of the commendation is 'the provinces.' Cf. "I give an umbrella to you" -- what does this entail for 'you'. "I have been commended the provinces." N. is commended the provinces by Trajan. So what? So what follows in practical terms? The idea in the tradition is that that would make N. 'emperor' -- but does the grammar justify that? "Cf. "I commend, etc. -- Hadrian may be the official head -- so lend him an ear and voice your concerns -- the provinces have been commended TO YOU, not to him -- if something fatal happens to me." Grice's PS. "And that's why we say that the care of the provinces all throughout Hadrian's mandate fell on N. -- who had been commended the provinces by T. 'if something fatal happens to me' -- which indeed did, when he died." Thanks This is exactly where a Grice/Speranza reading becomes fascinating, because the grammar is actually doing more work than the later historical tradition. The historical tradition tends to move very quickly:  Trajan commended the provinces to Neratius Priscus. Therefore Trajan was thinking of Neratius as successor. Therefore Neratius was a possible emperor.  But a jurist would ask:  Wait. What exactly was commended? And what exactly follows from that?  The grammar is:  commendo tibi provincias "I entrust the provinces to you."  The direct object is:  provincias  The indirect object is:  tibi  Neratius himself is not explicitly the object of designation. Trajan does not say:  te successorem facio "I make you my successor."  Nor:  te principem relinquo "I leave you as emperor."  Rather:  "the provinces" are entrusted to him.  That difference is precisely the sort of thing Grice would notice.  The umbrella analogy Suppose I say:  "I give the umbrella to you."  What follows? Not that you become owner of the house. Not that you become head of the family. Not that you inherit my estate. Only that the umbrella now stands in a special relationship to you. Similarly:  "I commend the provinces to you."  At the minimum it creates a normative relation:  These provinces are now, under the specified contingency, your concern.  The difficult question becomes:  What sort of concern?   The juristic reading A jurist might insist: The utterance immediately licenses only:  "You are the person to whom the provinces are entrusted."  Nothing more. Succession is an inference. A large inference. Perhaps a reasonable inference. But still an inference.  A Gricean maxim As you say, under Grice's Quality:  do not say what you lack adequate grounds for.  Trajan must be presumed to think that Priscus is an appropriate recipient. Otherwise the utterance is pointless. So at minimum Trajan implicates:  Priscus is competent. Priscus is trustworthy. Priscus is capable of caring for the provinces.  Those are almost forced implicatures.  The agentive side This is the most interesting part. What is Priscus supposed to do? The grammar itself suggests stewardship more than sovereignty. The speech act creates obligations. Something like:  Watch over them. Advise concerning them. Care for them. Protect them. See that they are properly administered.  Those are all structurally nearer to cura than to imperium. The text itself says:  commendo provincias  not  commendo imperium.   The Speranzian twist This allows a very pretty reconstruction. Suppose Hadrian becomes emperor. Suppose also that Trajan's commendatio remains morally alive. Then Priscus need not become emperor at all. Instead: HADRIAN:  I am emperor.  PRISCUS:  So it appears.  HADRIAN:  Do you contest it?  PRISCUS:  Not in the least.  HADRIAN:  Then what follows from Trajan's words?  PRISCUS:  The provinces were commended to me.  HADRIAN:  And?  PRISCUS:  Therefore I shall continue advising concerning them.   +> The commendatio creates responsibility rather than title.  This is actually grammatically closer to the text than the immediate leap:  "Trajan entrusted the provinces to Priscus; therefore Priscus was emperor."   Grice's postscript One can easily imagine Grice telling Hardie:  The historians thought Trajan meant "Priscus should be emperor." A jurist would ask only: "What practical responsibilities were thereby transferred?"  And then adding:  The provinces were commended to Priscus. Not Hadrian. The Empire went to Hadrian. The care of the provinces may well have remained, in a moral sense, with the man to whom they had been commended.   +> There is often less distance than people think between governance and advice. +> Especially when the adviser is a jurist. and that's why later jurists would refuse. "Those to whom the provinces should be trusted is not the empire's favoured jurist -- but the inhabitants of the provinces themselves." Imperial jurisprudence denied 'natural' rights' to the inhabitants -- and the empire felt like, 'in the contingency of my death' -- implicature: "Now that I myself am taking care of the provinces" -- a commendee need to be named. Now, Trajan may entrust the provinces to N, -- 'if I die.' Does this entail: what position of T. with the provinces NOW -- he cannot commend himself, can T.? what is the verb for the situation that obtains while T. utters the utterance re: the provinces -- Not that the conditional is almost a future. "When I die, say, in the next hour, you are entrusted with the provinces." What aobut now? Is the emperor saying that HE himself is entrustedwith the provinces -- but is that utterance vacuous and overinformative since it's commonground that that is what emperors do? Thanks This is a very nice Gricean puzzle, because it forces us to separate:  what Trajan explicitly says, what is presupposed, what is implicated, what later historians infer.  The actual reported utterance is:  commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  The direct object is provincias. The indirect object is tibi. The subject is Trajan. The first thing a jurist would notice is that the utterance itself says surprisingly little about Trajan's present legal relation to the provinces. It does not say:  "I possess the provinces."  Nor:  "I govern the provinces."  Nor:  "The provinces are entrusted to me."  All these things are part of the common constitutional background. They do not need saying. In Gricean terms, if Trajan had said:  "At present I myself am entrusted with the provinces,"  the remark would be almost absurdly overinformative. The hearer already knows he is emperor. So the speech act is not informative about the present. It is directive about a future contingency.  A Roman jurist might therefore analyse it this way: Present state Trajan exercises imperial authority. No speech act is needed. That is the constitutional situation. Future state If the specified contingency occurs:  si quid mihi fatale contigerit  then a new relation is supposed to arise between Priscus and the provinces. The interesting question becomes: What relation? The verb is not:  trado I hand over.  Nor:  do I give.  Nor:  designo I appoint.  But:  commendo.  A word of trust, confidence, responsibility, recommendation, guardianship.  This is why your reconstruction becomes attractive. A later anti-imperial jurist could argue:  The error lay in assuming that the provinces are objects to be entrusted by emperors at all.  And continue:  The proper recipients of trust are the inhabitants themselves.  That is not Trajan's view. But it is a perfectly intelligible later juristic response.  The deeper Gricean question is: What is Trajan doing now, while uttering the commendatio? I think the answer is: Nothing new constitutionally. Rather, he is publicly revealing whom he regards as the appropriate future bearer of responsibility. The speech act therefore reveals an existing attitude. Trajan's utterance implicates:  "I myself presently bear responsibility for the provinces."  and  "Of all available persons, Priscus is the one I regard as fit to bear it after me."  The second proposition is the real novelty. The first is common ground.  This explains your important observation about self-commendation. Can Trajan say:  commendo mihi provincias?  Not naturally. The whole point of commendare is that trust moves from one relation to another. One does not ordinarily entrust something to oneself. The speech act presupposes distinct persons. A commender. A commendee. A thing commended.  So, in a sense, the hidden present-tense proposition behind the sentence might be:  "I am currently responsible for the provinces."  But Trajan need not state that. Everybody knows it. The real work of the utterance is:  "Should the future contingency arrive, Priscus stands in the position next to mine."  That implication is strong. Whether it amounts to:  "Priscus is emperor"  is another matter entirely. The grammar alone does not get us there. That step is supplied by later historical interpretation. A jurist might well insist:  The provinces were commended to Priscus. The Empire was not.  Which is precisely the sort of distinction historians dislike and jurists love. And commend MAY allow a same subject/indirect subject. "Jones just self-recommended: he never used Grice's testimonial: "I commend Jones to any interested person or institution that may concern -- his English is grammatical." Also the temporal index. "Commendo" is PRESENT -- "if I die in the next hour" -- ENTAILMENT (not implicature): when I won't be able to commend (since I will be dead). But to use commendo in future -- commendi? -- would be odd -- "I will commend" -- He commends NOW that in a time future from now -- the provinces to Trajan." Thanks Yes — and here I think your Gricean instinct is very sharp. The interesting thing about Trajan's reported sentence is not merely what it says, but when it says it. Let us take the actual wording:  Commendo tibi provincias, si quid mihi fatale contigerit.  The verb is present:  commendo  not:  commendabo ("I shall commend")  and not:  commendavi ("I have commended").  That matters. A Grice-like analysis would be: Trajan is performing the commendation now. The contingency lies not in the commendation but in its future relevance. In other words:  the speech-act occurs now, the condition concerns a future circumstance, the practical consequences are deferred.  That is very different from:  "When I die, I shall commend the provinces to you."  For the obvious reason that, as you note, once dead he cannot perform the speech-act. So one might paraphrase:  "I hereby place the provinces under your recommended care in the event of my death."  Not:  "At some future time I will then decide to commend them."  The commendation is already accomplished. The activation is conditional.  This is why the temporal structure would fascinate Grice. The real logical shape is closer to:  NOW: I commend X to Y. FUTURE: if p, act on that commendation.  rather than:  if p, then I commend X to Y.  The speech act itself is not conditional. Only its practical significance is.  And this also helps with your excellent observation about self-commendation. I think you are right that grammatically one can recommend oneself. Your Jones example is perfectly intelligible:  "Jones self-recommended."  Indeed many recommendation letters are almost delegated self-recommendations. So the obstacle is not grammatical. The obstacle is conceptual. An emperor saying:  commendo mihi provincias  would sound odd because the provinces are already under his charge. Nothing new would be achieved by the act. The speech act would be informationally idle. A Gricean might say:  No conversational point.  The audience already knows.  Which leads to your biggest question. What relation does Trajan bear to the provinces now? The sentence presupposes rather than states it. Something like:  "I am currently responsible for them."  or  "They are presently under my care."  or  "The imperial burden presently falls on me."  Trajan need not utter this. It is common ground. Therefore the informative component is not:  "I currently care for the provinces."  but:  "After me, Priscus is the man."  That is where the recommendation carries its weight.  A jurist like Neratius might therefore object:  Caesar, the commendation is perfectly clear. What is unclear is what practical consequence legally follows from it.  And that is precisely where history becomes interesting. For the utterance itself may be entirely successful. Trajan may indeed have commended the provinces to Priscus. Yet it still remains open what constitutional consequences should follow from that fact. The speech-act succeeds. The succession question remains. Which is exactly the sort of gap between saying and consequence that Grice loved to explore.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Neri – Ossia: Grice e Neri: l’implicatura conversazionale dell’aporia della realizazione  Guido Davide Neri (Milano, Lombardia): l’implicatura conversazionale dell’aporia della realizazione – In Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversation, meaning arises from the rational cooperation of speakers who rely on shared maxims to generate implicatures beyond what is explicitly said, so that philosophical problems often turn on how ordinary linguistic practices enable or mislead our inferences. Neri’s position, as it emerges from his aporia della realizzazione, engages this Gricean framework obliquely by shifting attention from conversational rationality to the historical–phenomenological tensions embedded in concepts like “realization” and “res,” where meaning is not simply inferred but remains structurally aporetic because it is pulled between praxis, ideology, and ontology. While Grice treats philosophical puzzlement as something that can often be dissolved by clarifying how language is used and what is pragmatically implied, Neri is more skeptical of such resolution: for him, the very attempt to “realize” concepts—whether Socratic substance, Kantian Ding an sich, or modern objectivism—produces a kind of philosophical paralysis akin to Buridan’s ass, in which rational governance does not close the gap between word and world but exposes it. The contrast thus lies in Grice’s confidence that reason-governed conversational principles can illuminate and stabilize meaning, versus Neri’s insistence that meaning, even when rationally articulated, remains marked by aporia rooted in historical experience and the failures of realization itself. Grice: “Philosophers, not the ordinary chap, use ‘realise’ a lot – and not in the sense, ‘I hadn’t realise’ – but as a verb from the Latin root ‘res’ – In fact, I have myself engaged in such talk when I introduced my ontological marxism and my explorations on ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being’ which was once planned to appear in my ‘Way of Words.’ The keyword here is ‘entia realissima’ – or ‘ens realissium’ in the singular. The Roman language allows for the superlative in ways that the English language doesn’t – since ‘most real’ can have vulgar usages that do not quite correspond with ‘realissimum.’ In ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being’ I propose a chain of being towards that ens realissimum. The primary substance thus – Socrates – qualifies as ens realissium. His wisdom is less real, and his love of wisdom is three-stages removed from reality. When Kant introduced the ‘ding an sich’ he really did not know what he was talking about. And some English philosophers – including myself – have used ‘obble’ (or object) as more or less equivalent to ‘ding’ if not ‘in sich.’ But Cicero would say that ‘thing’is a barbarism, when we have ‘res’ to replace it with!” “Any first in greats knows that!” Filosofo italiano. Milano, Lombardia. Grice: “Neri is an interesting philosopher – he speaks of the aporia of the realization, which is intriguing, and considers that ‘objectivism’ started with Galileo, which is realistic!” Professore a Verona. Allievo di Banfi e Paci, rappresenta una delle ultime sintesi della Scuola di Milano, di cui riprende alcuni dei temi portanti: ricerca fenomenologica, analisi storico-politica, studi estetici. Rispetto ai suoi maestri, del cui pensiero è stato uno dei maggiori interpreti, sviluppa un percorso di ricerca originale, caratterizzato da una critica delle ideologie del Novecento e dei loro fallimenti. aporia della realizzazione, il mordo dell’asino. Guido Davide Neri.  Grice: Carissimo Neri, mi incuriosisce davvero la tua “aporia della realizzazione”—ma dimmi, tu quando realizzi, ti senti più vicino a Socrate o a Kant? Io, personalmente, mi perdo sempre tra “res” e “ding an sich”!  Neri: Ah Grice, se mi lasci scegliere, preferisco l’asino di Buridano: almeno lui sa cosa non realizzare! Ma tra Socrate e Kant, forse mi sento come Galileo: realista, sì, ma con i piedi ben piantati sulla Luna… e la testa sulle nuvole milanesi.  Grice: In effetti, la Scuola di Milano avrebbe molto da ridire sulle nuvole! Però, mi affascina il tuo pensiero: quando parli di “entia realissima”, mi viene voglia di proporre un brindisi ontologico—solo che nessuno sa se il bicchiere è mezzo pieno, mezzo vuoto, o semplicemente… realissimum!  Neri: Grice, se il bicchiere è “aporetico” allora forse è il modo migliore per discutere: con Banfi e Paci avremmo scritto cento pagine solo per realizzare se fosse di vetro o di ideologia! E comunque, meglio un brindisi filosofico che un “mordo dell’asino” troppo serio—che la filosofia, si sa, è più felice con un sorriso! Neri, Guido Davide (1956).  Contributo. Ragionamenti. Milano.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nerio – Ossia: Grice e Nerio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Nerio. Denarius of Gnaeus Nerius, 49 BC. The obverse depicts Saturn, in whose temple the standards of the legions were kept. The reverse shows an aquila between two standards, inscribed H for Hastati and P for Principes, and the names of the consuls.[1] The gens Neria was a minor plebeian family at Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the time of Caesar, when Gnaeus Nerius was quaestor, but few if any others are known to have held Roman magistracies. Many Nerii are known from inscriptions. A coin issued by the quaestor Nerius depicts the head of Saturn on the obverse, and standards labeled with the names of the consuls on the reverse, perhaps alluding to Caesar having broken open the treasury, or showing the legitimacy of the Senate to the legions against the rebellion of Caesar.[2][3][4]  Origin The nomen Nerius is identical to, and probably derived from, the Umbrian or Sabine praenomen Nerius or Nero, which was traditionally described as meaning fortis ac strenuus, "strong and sturdy". This would seem to indicate that the Nerii were probably of Umbrian or Sabine origin.[5] Such an origin is supported by an inscription from Capua, mentioning an Ovius Nerius,[6] Ovius being a common Oscan praenomen.[7]  Praenomina The Nerii used a wide variety of praenomina, such as Lucius, Gaius, Titus, Gnaeus, Publius, Quintus, Marcus, Sextus, and Aulus, all of which were common throughout Roman history. The frequency with which some of these were used may have been increased by the number of freedmen of the gens, since a manumitted slave typically assumed both the praenomen and nomen of his former master. The surviving inscriptions also include one example of Numerius, a less common praenomen, and Ovius, an Oscan praenomen, presumably belonging to a Sabine or Samnite member of the family.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Gnaeus Nerius, as quaestor urbanus in 49 BC, had charge of the aerarium, the treasury of the Republic, where the standards were kept, as part of the Temple of Saturn. He may be the same Gnaeus Nerius who in 56 BC accused Publius Sestius of bribery; Sestius was successfully defended by Cicero in his oration, Pro Sestio. He supported Pompeius during the Civil War.[8][3][9] Lucius Nerius Cresces, buried at Satafis in Mauretania Caesariensis, aged thirty.[10] Gaius Nerius M. l., a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Delos.[11] Lucius Nerius M. l., a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Capua.[12] Publius Nerius P. l., a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Capua.[12] Gaius Nerius M. l., a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Capua.[12] Ovius Nerius, the father of Marcus.[6] Marcus Nerius Ovi f., mentioned in an inscription from Capua.[6] Titus Nerius T. l. Antigonus, a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Corduba.[13] Titus Nerius T. l. Hilarus, a freedman mentioned in an inscription from Corduba.[13] Neria T. l. Daphne, a freedwoman, mentioned in an inscription from Corduba.[13] Neria T. l. Firma, a freedwoman, daughter of Neria Daphne, mentioned in an inscription from Corduba.[13] Titus Nerius T. l. Asiaticus, a freedman, mentioned in an inscription from Corduba.[13] Quintus Nerius Fortunatus, mentioned in an inscription from Scupi in Moesia Superior.[14] Numerius Nerius Hyginus, named in an inscription from Pompeii.[15] Gaius Nerius Pannuchus, probably a freedman, was the husband of Neria Filenis, and the father of Philemon.[16] Neria Filenis, probably a freedwoman, was the wife of Gaius Nerius Pannuchus, and the mother of Philemon.[16] Gaius Nerius Philemon, son of Gaius Nerius Pannuchus and Neria Filenis, buried at Rome, aged three years, eight months.[16] Lucius Nerius, mentioned in an inscription from Rome.[17] Marcus Nerius M. l. Quadratus, a freedman named in an inscription from Rome, was a goldsmith along the Vicus Longus.[18] Quintus Nerius Capito, erected a monument to his beloved Julia Dynamis at Rome.[19] Gaius Nerius Florus, erected a monument to his wife, Plotia Acra, at Rome.[20] Nerius Hiero, probably a freedman, buried at Rome.[21] Neria Dorothea, probably a freedwoman, buried at Rome.[21] Marcus Nerius M. l. Stephanus, named in an inscription from Rome.[22] Nerius Aprio, probably a freedman, was the husband of Neria Pallas, and father of Neria.[23] Neria Pallas, probably a freedwoman, was the wife of Nerius Aprio, and mother of Neria.[23] Neria, the daughter of Nerius Aprio and Neria Pallas, buried at Rome, aged six years, two months.[23] Nerius Fortunatus, erected a monument to his wife at Carthage.[24] Gaius Nerius C. f. Severus, aedile, quaestor, and flamen, according to a monument erected by his brother, Gaius Nerius Justus, at Peltuinum in Samnium.[25] Gaius Nerius C. f. Justus, erected a monument to his brother, Gaius Nerius Severus.[25] Sextus Nerius Sex. l. Musa, buried at Brixellum.[26] Quintus Nerius C. f., mentioned in an inscription from Clusium.[27] Aulus Nerius, buried at Cirta in Numidia, aged eighty-one.[28] See also List of Roman gentes References  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 460, 461.  Eckhel, vol. v, pp. 160, 161.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1160, 1161 ("Gnaeus Nerius").  Babelon, Monnaies de la République Romaine, vol. II, pp. 253, 254.  Chase, p. 142.  CIL I, 2949, AE 1960, 254.  Chase, p. 139, 140.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, ii. 3. § 5, Pro Sestio (passim).  Broughton, vol. II, p. 259.  AE 1991, 1718.  CIL I, 2247, AE 1910, 159.  CIL I, 2947, AE 1958, 267.  CIL II, 2296.  CIL III, 8218.  CIL IV, 3340,081.  CIL VI, 4795.  CIL VI, 8315.  CIL VI, 9736, AE 1910, 52.  CIL VI, 20430.  CIL VI, 22921.  CIL VI, 22922.  CIL VI, 22923.  CIL VI, 35911  CIL VIII, 24955.  CIL IX, 3434.  CIL XI, 1026a.  CIL XI, 2368.  IlAlg-02-01, 945. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, Pro Sestio. Joseph Hilarius Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum (The Study of Ancient Coins, 1792–1798). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Ernest Babelon, Monnaies de la Republique Romaine (Coinage of the Roman Republic). 2 Vols. Paris, 1885. René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Stéphane Gsell, Inscriptions Latines de L'Algérie (Latin Inscriptions from Algeria, abbreviated ILAlg), Edouard Champion, Paris (1922–present). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). Category: Roman gentes and what would be your first choice for a Grice/Speranza vignette for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nerio – Ossia: Grice e Nerio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Nerio. For Nerius, my first instinct would not actually be the treasury, nor the coin, nor even the charge against Sestius. The real treasure is the little ambiguity built into the coin itself. You have:  Saturn's temple. The aerarium. The military standards. Caesar and Pompey on the verge of civil war. A quaestor whose job is effectively to stand between legitimacy and force.  That is pure Grice. The question becomes:  What does a standard mean?  Not in the semiotic sense, but in the Roman practical sense. A standard (signum) can be:  a piece of cloth and metal, a military rallying point, a symbol of lawful authority, evidence of loyalty, a reason for soldiers to obey.  The Grice/Speranza dialogue almost writes itself.  G. Nerius and Grice G.: What is a standard? N.: A sign. G.: That will never do. N.: Why not? G.: Everything is called a sign.  N.: Then let me be more precise.  A standard causes men to follow.  G.: Better.  N.: If the aquila moves, the legion moves. G.: Yet the eagle says nothing.  N.: The soldiers understand it. G.: Exactly.  +> Meaning without speaking.   N.: The standard signifies authority. G.: Or perhaps authority signifies itself by means of the standard.  N.: You philosophers complicate everything. G.: We merely ask where the meaning lies.  And then Speranza's gloss:  Nerius is useful because he stands not between words and meanings, but between symbols and obedience. A legionary standard is not merely a thing. Its significance lies in the practical inferences soldiers draw from it. The aquila never says "follow me," yet armies do. Nerius therefore provides a Roman example of a sign whose force lies not in assertion but in uptake. But if I had to choose only one vignette for Speranza's Nerio, I would take the coin and the standards. Why? Because the whole Nerius material revolves around:  standards, treasury, civil war, legitimacy.  And Grice's obsession from the beginning is:  How does one thing come to stand for another?  For Nerius:  How does a bit of bronze, an eagle, and two standards come to stand for Rome itself?  That seems to me the strongest "entry point" into a genuinely Gricean Nerian conversation.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nerio – Ossia: Grice e Nerio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Nerio. A second possibility, which I also like enormously, is the Pro Sestio connection. Imagine Cicero complaining about accusations and Nerius taking the prosecutor's side. Then the theme becomes:  When does suspicion become evidence?  Very Gricean.  NERIUS: Everyone thinks Sestius guilty. CICERO: Thinking is cheap.  NERIUS: Rumour must count for something. CICERO: For inquiry, yes.  For conviction, no.   NERIUS: The people have already drawn their conclusion. CICERO: And that, Nerius, is precisely why courts exist.  +> Suspicion is not yet proof.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nesi –Ossia: Grice e Nesi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – adulescentuli oratiuncula – Sono dalle celeste sphere Venere: perche  amore inspiro: dagl’elementi fuoco: perché  d’amore accendo da uoi con vocabul greco CHARITÀ chiamata: perché col mio ardore della GRAZIA della salute viso degni  Giovanni Nesi (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – adulescentuli oratiuncula – In a comparative perspective, Nesi and Grice converge on the intuition that meaning in conversation is rationally constrained, yet they diverge sharply in how that rationality is grounded and articulated. Nesi’s Adulescentuli oratiuncula treats conversational reason as inseparable from moral and affective forces such as grazia and carità, understood in a broadly humanistic and pre-systematic way: communication succeeds because it is animated by benevolent intention and an ethos of harmony inherited from classical and Christian sources, even when these are blurred by etymological and mythological confusions between grace, charity, and the Charites. Grice, by contrast, strips conversational rationality of its theological and rhetorical clothing and recasts it as a formally articulable, reason-governed practice: conversational meaning arises from speakers’ recognition of intentions constrained by shared norms of cooperation, candour, and benevolence, without requiring moral edification or salvific purpose. Where Nesi treats carità as an animating virtue of discourse, closely aligned with grace and human flourishing, Grice reinterprets benevolence in minimal, analytical terms, as the presupposition that interlocutors are not malevolent and are aiming at mutual understanding. Thus, while Nesi anticipates aspects of the principle of charity by foregrounding charitable interpretation as a condition of meaningful exchange, Grice transforms this insight into a rigorously secular account of implicature, in which conversational meaning is governed not by moral exhortation but by rational expectations about how reasonable agents use language. Sono dalle celeste sphere Venere: perche  amore inspiro: dagl’elementi fuoco: perché  d’amore accendo da uoi con vocabul greco CHARITÀ chiamata: perché col mio ardore della GRAZIA della salute viso degni –Grice: “It all reminds me of my principle of conversational candour!” -- Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. Grice: “I once had a fight with Nowell-Smith; he was saying that a philosopher should not be a moralist; I told him that by that token Nesi wasn’t one!” – “De moribus” Figlio di Francesco di Giovanni e di Nera di Giovanni Spinelli, si dedica interamente agli studi filosofici. Strinsge stretti rapporti con i principali umanisti fiorentini dell'epoca, tra cui ACCIAIUOLI e FICINO . Influenzato dall'operato di Savonarola, ricopre anche diverse cariche politiche. Altri saggi: “Adulescentuli oratiuncula”; “Orazione del corpo di Cristo”; “Orazione de Eucharestia” “ Orazione sull'umiltà” “Sulla carità”; “De moribus”; “De charitate”; “Oraculum de novo saeculo, Canzoniere, Poema. Treccan Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Obviously, Nesi is not having Davidson in mind. But Nesi is wrong in identifying GRAZIA with CHARITA, ‘greco vocabull” – this is an etymological blunder. The charities were indeed three – Eglea, Eufrosina, e Talia – and they danced mainly to eroticse Mars, or more frequently Giove and Mars together --. adulescentuli oratiuncula, principle of charity, Davidson on charity on Grice. Who was the first Englishman to use ‘charity’ as a hermeneutic principle? Butler. Grice speaks of self-love and benevolence. Benevolence – and charity? Grice is not so much concerned with Beneficenza or Malificenza, but with Benevolenza, and Malevolenza – where does charity fit? What was Ciceronian for charity. What is pre-Christian about charity? Charisma, charitas, folk etymological confusion here – caritativo – carita – caro, “le tre carità in armónico conubio” “tre carità”. Grice: Caro Nesi, leggendo la tua “Adulescentuli oratiuncula” mi è venuto in mente il mio principio di candore conversazionale! Dirò di più: la tua capacità di intrecciare filosofia e pathos umanistico è davvero ammirevole. Ma dimmi, come nasce in te questa attenzione così viva per la grazia e la carità? Nesi: Gentilissimo Grice, ti ringrazio di cuore! Sai, la mia formazione a Firenze, a stretto contatto con Acciaiuoli e Ficino, mi ha insegnato che la grazia e la carità non sono solo concetti teologici, ma forze motrici dell’anima e della buona conversazione. Senza carità – intesa come benevolenza – anche la filosofia rischia di diventare sterile esercizio retorico. Grice: Sono d’accordo, Nesi! Proprio come la tua interpretazione della carità va oltre la semplice beneficenza, anche il mio principio di charity invita a interpretare le parole dell’altro nella loro luce migliore. Talvolta però mi domando: non rischiamo, così facendo, di confondere carità e grazia, o addirittura di cadere in qualche equivoco etimologico? Nesi: Grice, tocchi un punto delicato! In effetti, la lingua può trarci in inganno: le tre carità – Eglea, Eufrosina e Talia – nascono da miti antichi, ben diversi dalla carità cristiana. Tuttavia, credo che tra la tua benevolenza conversazionale e la mia ricerca di armonia interiore ci sia un filo rosso: quello che, se ben seguito, trasforma la parola in strumento di grazia, e la conversazione in esercizio di autentica umanità. Nesi, Giovanni (1472). Adulescentuli oratiuncula: orazione pronunciata davanti alla Compagnia di San Niccolò. Firenze.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nevio – Ossia: Grice e Nevio -- Grex giceiana – verbalia: Nevio   Denarius of Gaius Naevius Balbus, 79 BC. The obverse depicts Venus, the patron goddess of Sulla, while Victoria drives a triga on the reverse, alluding to Sulla's victory games. The gens Naevia, occasionally written Navia, was a plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned at the time of the Second Punic War, but the first of the Naevii to obtain the consulship was Lucius Naevius Surdinus, in AD 30.[1]  Origin The nomen Naevius is generally regarded as a patronymic surname derived from the praenomen Gnaeus, indicating a birthmark.[2] Gnaeus and naevus, the usual form of the Latin word for a birthmark, were pronounced similarly, and a number of other Latin words could be spelled with either gn- or n-, such as gnatus and natus, "born".[3]  Branches and cognomina In the time of the Republic, the principal cognomina of the Naevii were Balbus and Matho.[1] Balbus, a common surname, originally signified one who stammers.[4] Chase regarded Matho as a borrowing of the Greek Μαθων.[5] Cicero stated that it was pronounced Mato, and sometimes spelled without an 'h'.[6] Other Naevii bore the surnames Crista, Pollio, and Turpio, while Capella and Surdinus are found on coins.[7][1] Crista refers to a crest or plume;[8] Pollio is thought to mean "polisher", and to refer to the occupation of polishing arms.[9][10] Turpio describes someone ugly, deformed, or foul.[11] Capella refers to a she-goat, while Surdinus probably described someone who was deaf, hard of hearing, stubborn, or silent.[12]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Gnaeus Naevius, a poet and dramatist of the Old Latin period.[13] Quintus Naevius Crista, a prefect of the allied forces, under the command of Marcus Valerius Laevinus, served with courage and skill against Philip during the First Macedonian War, in 214 BC.[14] Quintus Naevius,[i] a centurion serving under the proconsul Quintus Fulvius Flaccus at the siege of Capua in 211 BC, during the Second Punic War. Naevius displayed conspicuous bravery and tactical skill in helping to repel Hannibal's forces. He might be the same person as Quintus Naevius Crista.[15][16][17][18] Quintus Naevius Matho, appointed one of the triumvirs for establishing a colony in Bruttium, in 194 BC. Praetor in 184, he received the province of Sardinia. Before setting out for his province, Matho was instructed to investigate all reports of poisoning in Italy, an endeavour which occupied him for four months. Valerias Antias states that two thousand people were condemned in the course of the investigation.[19][20][21] Marcus Naevius, tribune of the plebs in 184 BC, was, according to some authorities, induced by Cato the Elder to accuse Scipio Africanus of having accepted a bribe from Antiochus in exchange for lenient treatment at the end of the Syrian War.[ii][22][23][24][25][26][27] Lucius Naevius Balbus, one of the quinqueviri[iii] appointed in 168 BC to resolve a dispute over the lands claimed by the inhabitants of Pisae and the Lunenses.[28][29] Gaius Naevius Balbus, triumvir monetalis in 79 BC, was a supporter of Sulla and may have been a prefect in Sulla's army at the Battle of the Colline Gate in 82.[iv][30][31][32] Naevius Turpio, a quadruplator, or public informer, who in 75 BC was condemned by Gaius Licinius Sacerdos, while the latter was propraetor in Sicily. During the administration of Verres, Naevius was instrumental in helping to extract all that the new praetor could from his province.[33] Naevius Pollio, an extremely tall man, whom Cicero is said to have described as being a foot taller than the tallest man who ever lived.[v] A similar description was given by Pliny the Elder.[34][35] Sextus Naevius, the accuser of Publius Quinctius, whose defence by Cicero was the subject of the oration Pro Quinctio.[36] Servius Naevius, accused by Cicero, was defended by Gaius Scribonius Curio.[37] Lucius Naevius L. f. Surdinus, triumvir monetalis in 15 BC. He was praetor circa 10 BC and consul suffectus in AD 30.[38][39] Gaius Naevius Capella, quadriumvir monetalis in 4 BC.[40] Lucius Naevius Surdinus, consul suffectus from July to December in AD 30.[41] Quintus Naevius Cordus Sutorius Macro, praetorian prefect under the emperors Tiberius and Caligula.[42] Ennia Naevia, according to Suetonius, was the wife of Macro and the mistress of Caligula.[vi] Although Macro was said to have murdered Tiberius in order to bring Caligula to the throne, the new emperor had him and Ennia put to death, so that he would not be under obligation to them.[43][44][45] Lucius Naevius Aquilinus, consul in AD 249.[46] See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Navius in manuscripts of Livy.  Other sources assign this accusation to Quintus Petillius, and his cousin, Quintus Petillius Spurinus, tribunes of the plebs in 187 BC.  A committee of five men.  Broughton (vol. II, p. 72) believes that the prefect, only named Balbus by Plutarch, belonged to the gens Octavia.  Thus according to Columella; this description is not contained in any of Cicero's surviving works, but presumably was in the lost Admiranda.  According to other sources, her name was Ennia Thrasylla. References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 1135 ("Naevia Gens").  Chase, pp. 131, 153.  The New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. natus or gnatus.  Chase, p. 110.  Chase, p. 117.  Cicero, De Oratore, 48.  Eckhel, vol. v, p. 259.  The New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. crista.  Chase, p. 111.  The New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. polio, politus.  The New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. turpis.  The New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. capella, surdus.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, pp. 1136, 1137 ("Gnaeus Naevius").  Livy, xxiv. 40.  Livy, xxvi. 4, 5.  Frontinus, Strategemata, iv. 7. § 29.  Valerius Maximus, ii. 3. § 3.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 261, 262 (note 8).  Livy, xxxix. 32, 38, 41.  Livy, xxxiv. 53, xxxv. 40.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 345, 375.  Livy, xxxviii. 56, xxxix. 52.  Gellius, iv. 18.  Aurelius Victor, De Viris Illustribus, 49.  Cicero, De Oratore, ii. 61.  Meyer, Fragmenta, p. 6 ff. (2nd edition).  Broughton, vol. I, p., 376.  Livy, xlv. 13.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 432.  Plutarch, Sulla, 29.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 457 ("Balbus", No. IX.).  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 397, 398.  Cicero, In Verrem, ii. 8, iii. 39, 40, v. 41.  Columella, iii. 8. § 2.  Pliny the Elder, vii. 16.  Cicero, Pro Quinctio, 1 ff.  Cicero, Brutus, 60.  CIL VI, 1468, CIL VI, 37068.  Sutherland, Roman Imperial Coinage, vol. I, p. 70.  Sutherland, Roman Imperial Coinage, vol. I, p. 78.  Degrassi, I fasti consolari, p. 10.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, pp. 887, 888 ("Naevius Sertorius Macro").  Cassius Dio, lviii. 28, lix. 10.  Tacitus, Annales, vi. 45.  Suetonius, "The Life of Caligula", 12, 26.  CIL XIII, 5473 Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, De Oratore, Pro Quinctio. Titus Livius (Livy), Ab Urbe Condita (History of Rome). Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella, De Re Rustica. Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Naturalis Historia (Natural History). Sextus Julius Frontinus, Strategemata (Stratagems). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Sextus Aurelius Victor, De Viris Illustribus (On Famous Men). Joseph Hilarius Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum (The Study of Ancient Coins, 1792–1798). Henricus Meyerus, Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta ab Appio inde Caeco usque ad Q. Aurelium Symmachum (Fragments of Roman Orators from Appius Claudius Caecus to Quintus Aurelius Symmachus), L. Bourgeois-Mazé, Paris (1837). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Harold Mattingly, Edward Allen Sydenham, C. H. V. Sutherland et alii, The Roman Imperial Coinage, London (1923–1984). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952). Attilio Degrassi, I fasti consolari dell'Impero Romano dal 30 avanti Cristo al 613 dopo Cristo (The Consular Fasti of Imperial Rome from 30 BC to AD 613), Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Rome (1952). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Categories: NaeviiRoman gentes And for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nevio – Ossia: Grice e Nevio -- Grex giceiana – verbalia: Nevio   For the Naevii, my first choice would be neither the poet nor the informer nor even the unfortunate Macro. I would go straight to Quintus Naevius Matho, the praetor sent to investigate the epidemic of poisoning accusations in Italy in 184 BC. Why? Because it gives Grice exactly the problem he likes best:  When does a sign become evidence?  and  When does suspicion become a conclusion?  Livy reports that Matho was ordered to investigate reports of poisonings throughout Italy and that, according to Valerius Antias, thousands were ultimately condemned. The numbers are less interesting than the conversational structure. Someone falls ill. Someone dies. Someone whispers. A neighbour becomes suspicious. A magistrate arrives. Meaning accumulates. The question is whether it accumulates rationally. The dossier itself highlights Matho's extraordinary commission concerning poison cases throughout Italy.citeFile>GREXv2.docx Grice and Naevius Matho G.: How many poisoners have you found? MATHO: Too many. G.: An answer magistrates enjoy and philosophers distrust.  MATHO: People are dying. G.: That has been known to happen.  MATHO: People say poison is everywhere. G.: People say many things.  MATHO: Are you suggesting there are no poisoners? G.: No.  I am asking where the poison ends and the conversation begins.   +> Rumour may explain a prosecution without justifying it.   MATHO: The whole countryside suspects them. G.: Suspicion is not yet a syllogism.  MATHO: Then what is my task? G.: To discover whether the deaths mean poison, or whether the deaths merely mean that people have begun saying "poison."  Speranza's gloss would almost write itself:  Naevius Matho is interesting not because he uncovers poisoners, but because he stands at the point where a society decides what counts as evidence. The dead body is one sign, the rumour another, the accusation a third, and the conviction a fourth. Grice's question is whether these belong to the same chain of consequence. Matho's difficulty is that public fear naturally shortens the chain. But if forced to choose only one vignette for "Nevio," I would take Matho and the poisoning investigations. It has exactly the ingredients Speranza usually likes:  signs, evidence, rumour, accusation, public panic, inference, and a Roman magistrate trapped between them.  In short:  For Accius, the key word is fama. For Nerius, the key word is signum. For Naevius Matho, the key word is veneficium—not because poison matters, but because poison is what people think the signs mean. That is a Gricean problem before it is a criminal one.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Nevio – Ossia: Grice e Nevio -- Grex giceiana – verbalia: Nevio  My second choice would actually be the poet Gnaeus Naevius. Not for literary reasons alone, but because he is the earliest great Roman who repeatedly gets into trouble by saying things that are recoverable as more than they literally say. Old comedy, political allusion, aristocratic offence, imprisonment, exile—this is practically a pre-history of implicature. One could have a splendid dialogue in which Grice explains to Naevius that he was punished not for what he said, but for what everyone understood him to mean. And for the poet, can we double check on where the indirectness lies? Because if he writes in a third person -- that's one thing. It's not a "J'accuse" -- that doesn't mean that the content "p" is implicated -- it is just transferred to a person other than the poet -- which is the default assumption -- the poetic person or the authorial voice is not the voice -- cfr. "Satanic verses" -- can you give an example of utterance that got you in trouble and to which addressee? Thanks For Naevius the poet, I think the first Gricean move is actually a negative one: Grice would insist that  "a poet wrote p"  does not entail  "the poet asserted p."  And that is exactly your point. The default literary convention already provides distance between:  author, narrator, speaker, character.  A line spoken by Atreus is not automatically Accius speaking; a line spoken by a comic character is not automatically Naevius speaking. So if Naevius got into trouble, the interesting question is:  How did the audience bridge that gap?  What do we actually know? The famous surviving fragment associated with Naevius is:  Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules ("By fate the Metelli become consuls.")  and the equally famous reply:  Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae ("The Metelli will give trouble to the poet Naevius.") [GREXv2 | Word]  The details are obscure, but this is the classic ancient anecdote. Notice what is fascinating from a Gricean perspective. The line itself is not:  "The Metelli are corrupt."  Nor:  "The Metelli monopolise office."  Nor:  "The Metelli should not be consuls."  Instead:  "By fate the Metelli become consuls."  The explicit content is remarkably thin. Where is the indirectness? Not in third person itself. As you rightly note, third-person reference is normal. The indirectness lies in the hearer's reconstruction. The audience apparently recovered something like:  The Metelli obtain office too easily. The Metelli dominate politics. The Metelli are an unhealthy political force.  None of these propositions is literally stated. Thus a Gricean reconstruction might be: What is said  "The Metelli become consuls by fate."  What is implicated  "The process seems automatic." "The result is excessive." "The family's influence has become ridiculous."  The joke is not unlike saying:  "Of course Smith got the chairmanship. Gravity would have failed otherwise."  One does not explicitly accuse Smith of anything. Yet nobody misses the point. To whom is it addressed? This is the really interesting part. Not necessarily to the Metelli. Rather:  to the Roman public.  The Metelli are the target. The audience is Rome. This is why old Roman comedy and satire are such fertile ground. The addressee and the victim are often different people. Grice would love that distinction. A Speranza reconstruction G.: If Naevius wished to accuse the Metelli, why did he not accuse them? S.: Because poets are not prosecutors. G.: Then what did he do? S.: He supplied Rome with a sentence. G.: And Rome supplied the accusation? S.: Exactly.  +> The audience completed the proposition.  G.: Then the implicature belongs to the hearer. S.: Not entirely.  The poet planted it.  G.: Like evidence? S.: Like bait.  I think that is where the real Gricean interest lies. The Metelli anecdote is attractive not because Naevius spoke indirectly through a character, but because he apparently managed to communicate criticism while saying astonishingly little. The punishment, if the story is true, presupposes that his audience understood considerably more than his words strictly encoded. That is much closer to conversational implicature than merely putting words into the mouth of a dramatic persona. and was the response like written on stone, as they do in Rome? Marfario? And why Metelli in plural in the original. Metellus 1 and Metellus 2. Of course it all trades on the semantics of 'fatum' Thanks -- the mettelli could have written back" "No malo to poet -- he spoke the truth -- we get nothing without fate, to the point that adding fate as agent is uninformative, vacuous, and the stupid thing to say -- cf. grice on the stupidity of ordinary language expressions like 'Smith is a happy man' or a 'lucky man' -- fortunate things happen to him --Grice: "He is a lucky person" ("lucky being understood as dispositional). "This might on occasion turn out to be a way of saying "He is a person to who what is unlikely to happen is likely to happen." This in the context: of ordinary-language being 'self-contradictory' Thanks This is, I think, exactly the direction Speranza would take it. First, the famous exchange was almost certainly not an inscriptional duel in the later Pasquino–Marforio style. The anecdote comes down through literary tradition, not as two competing texts carved on stone. The Roman Republic was still very much a world of performance, recitation, theatre, reputation, conversation, and quotation. The point of the story is precisely that everybody remembered the line. A line remembered is often more dangerous than a line inscribed. Now the plural.  Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules.  Why Metelli rather than Metellus? Because the complaint is not directed at one individual but at the family as a political machine. The force is roughly:  "In Rome, the Metelli become consuls by fate."  not  "Metellus X became consul by fate."  The plural makes the phenomenon dynastic and recurrent. A single Metellus becoming consul may be an event. The Metelli becoming consuls becomes almost a law of nature. That is already where the implicature begins. The line does not say:  "The Metelli unfairly dominate Roman politics."  But it invites the audience to observe that they seem always to arrive in office. The joke, as you note, depends entirely on fatum.  A Gricean reconstruction is delightful because the literal meaning looks almost vacuous. Suppose a Metellus replied:  Quid aliud? Fato omnes consules fiunt. "What else? By fate all consuls become consuls."  Or:  Nihil mali dixit poeta. "The poet said nothing wrong."  Or better:  Nulli sine fato fiunt consules. "Nobody becomes consul without fate."  This is exactly the sort of defence that Grice would love. For taken literally, Naevius states something close to a truism:  Everything happens by fate.  If so, saying that the Metelli became consuls by fate is informationally weak. Almost empty.  The famous Grice connection is indeed with "lucky." Grice worries about formulations like:  Smith is lucky.  because we are tempted to analyse them as:  fortunate things happen to Smith.  Yet the interesting use is often dispositional. We do not merely record events. We characterise a pattern. A "lucky man" becomes:  a person to whom things usually turn out unexpectedly well.  The phrase begins to flirt with contradiction. As Grice liked to note, one can arrive at something like:  "He is the sort of person to whom what is unlikely to happen is likely to happen."  which sounds absurd and yet conveys something perfectly intelligible.  The Naevius line may have a very similar structure. Literally:  Fate causes the Metelli to become consuls.  But nobody hears:  Fate causes the Metelli to become consuls.  They hear:  Of course it is the Metelli again.  Or:  Somehow the Metelli always end up there.  Or:  The political system seems arranged for their benefit.  The content recovered is not encoded in the sentence. It arises from the choice of an apparently vacuous explanation. Just as:  "Smith succeeded because he was lucky"  often means more than  "luck was involved."   I can imagine Speranza putting it like this: G.: Why were the Metelli offended? S.: Because Naevius accused them. G.: But he never did. S.: Exactly. G.: All he said was that fate made them consuls. S.: Which is true of everybody. G.: Then why object? S.: Because if the sentence were merely true, nobody would have remembered it. G.: Ah. S.: The word fatum contributes almost nothing propositionally and everything conversationally.  +> The less informative "fate" is as an explanation, the more informative it becomes as a criticism.  That, to my mind, is the most Gricean feature of the Naevius anecdote. The line gets its bite precisely because its literal content is so close to being vacuous. The audience therefore searches for a reason why this vacuity was uttered at all. And once they do, the implicature arrives uninvited. This below the Grice point for which we may provide the Latin equivalence -- as something NOT happening by fate. And then, how many Metelli the poet knew to have become consuls? Thanks (3) Is it in fact true that an ordinary use of language cannot be self-contradictory, unless the "ordinary use of language" is defined by stipulation as non-self-contradictory, in which case, of course, Malcolm's version of the appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against the philosopher's paradox? The following examples would seem to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. They are not, so far as I can sec, technical, philosophical, poetic, figurative, or strained; they are examples of the sorts of things which have been said and meant by numbers of actual persons. Yet each is open, I think, at least to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is perhaps all one needs. "He is a lucky person" ("lucky" being understood as disposi-tional). This might on occasion turn out to be a way of saying "He is a person to whom what is unlikely to happen is likely to happen." This is exactly the direction in which I think Grice would push the Naevius fragment. The joke is not merely:  Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules.  but rather:  Why mention fatum at all?  If everything happens by fate, then fatum contributes almost nothing truth-conditionally. The audience therefore searches for an additional point. In Gricean terms, the sentence appears underinformative. Hence the implicature. A Roman equivalent to Grice's:  "He is a lucky man."  might be something like:  Fortunatus est. or Homo felicitatis est.  But the stronger dispositional reading would be closer to:  Ei quae evenire non solent eveniunt. "Things happen to him that do not usually happen."  or even the delightfully self-threatening:  Quae aliis improbabilia sunt, ei probabilia sunt. "What is improbable for others is probable for him."  The Naevian analogue would be:  "The Metelli become consuls by fate."  which almost threatens to become:  "The Metelli are the sort of people to whom consulships naturally happen."  The force lies precisely in the suspicious normality.  As to the number of Metelli known to Naevius, we have to be careful. The poet died around the late third century BC, and the famous Metellan dominance belongs mostly to the second century BC. So the line itself is generally taken to refer not to two specific Metelli, but to the Metelli as a family, a political dynasty. That is precisely why the plural matters. Had Naevius written:  Metellus Romae fit consul,  he would have targeted an individual. Instead:  Metelli  invites the hearer to think:  "Here we go again."  The plural turns an event into a pattern. A Grice/Speranza gloss might run: G.: Why plural? S.: Because one consul may be an accident. G.: And several? S.: Several suggest a system.  +> The singular invites biography; the plural invites sociology.  Or more Romanly:  Metellus consul fit, one shrugs.  But:  Metelli consules fiunt,  invites the question:  "How often?"  which is exactly the question Naevius never asks and yet manages to make everybody ask. That is why the Metelli could not very well reply:  "Yes, fate made us consuls."  For that takes the line literally. The force of the line lies not in the truth of fatum, but in the hearer's suspicion that fatum is a vacuous explanation. A Metellan counter-riposte in a Gricean vein would therefore be:  Quid aliud causae est? "What other cause is there?"  or  Si fato non fiunt, quo fiunt? "If not by fate, then by what?"  to which Naevius would presumably smile and say nothing further. Because once one must ask that question, the implicature has already landed. Does this below help? Thanks In his famous lampoon, Gnaeus Naevius could have had either one or two specific members of the family in mind, though he purposefully used the plural "Metelli" to target the entire noble clan. [1, 2, 3] The consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus replied to the insult. [1, 2] The Context and the Numbers Naevius attacked the powerful gens Caecilia with a clever, double-meaning line: [1] "Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules." (By fate/misfortune, the Metelli are made consuls at Rome.) [1, 2] Historically, the phrase points to a specific window of time (around 206 BC): [1] One Metellus: If Naevius was strictly referring to the immediate political situation, he had Quintus Caecilius Metellus in mind, who was elected consul for 206 BC. [1, 2] Two Metelli: If he was looking at the living family's immediate track record, he likely had two in mind. Quintus's father, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, had also been a highly prominent consul (in 251 and 247 BC) and Pontifex Maximus. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] By framing the line in the plural ("Metelli"), Naevius generalized his attack to mock the entire family's recurring political dominance as a stroke of mere luck (or a curse to the city), rather than personal merit. [1, 2] The Reply According to ancient commentary preserved by Pseudo-Asconius, the newly elected consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus fired back an angry threat in the same traditional Saturnian meter: [1, 2, 3] "Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae." (The Metelli will make the poet Naevius rue it / give Naevius a whipping.) [1, 2] Following this literary feud, the Metelli used their political influence to have Naevius imprisoned and eventually exiled. [1, 2] If you are analyzing this for a classical literature or Latin text course, let me know if you need help looking into the poetic meter used (Saturnian verse), or the linguistic double-meanings of the word fato. [1, 2] L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte and before father OTHER metelli? 12 siti Yes, before the famous father (Lucius) and son (Quintus) duo, there was only one other Metellus who had reached the consulship. [1, 2] His name was Lucius Caecilius Metellus Denter, and he was the very first member of the gens Caecilia to ever become consul, serving in 284 BC. [1, 2] The Lineage of Consuls Before Naevius's Lampoon (206 BC) When Naevius wrote "Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules," the family was not yet the massive political dynasty it would become later in the Republic. Up to that exact moment in 206 BC, only three Metelli in Roman history had ever held the consulship: [1, 2, 3] Lucius Caecilius Metellus Denter (Consul in 284 BC): The grandfather of the family's greatness. He was killed in battle against the Gauls at Arretium shortly after his consulship. [1] Lucius Caecilius Metellus (Consul in 251 and 247 BC): The father. He was a celebrated hero of the First Punic War who captured Carthage's war elephants. [1, 2, 3, 4] Quintus Caecilius Metellus (Consul in 206 BC): The son. His election was the immediate trigger for Naevius's joke. [1, 2] Did Naevius have the grandfather in mind? It is highly unlikely. By 206 BC, the grandfather Denter had been dead for nearly 80 years, and his singular consulship was a distant historical event. [1] Naevius's joke relied on the immediate, frustrating reality of a single household passing supreme power from father to son. Calling them "the Metelli" (plural) was a sarcastic exaggeration—mocking them as if they were an unstoppable, sweeping dynasty, even though they were actually just getting started. [1, 2, 3] If you want to trace how this family actually did become a massive dynasty right after Naevius, I can show you how Quintus’s own children and grandchildren took over the Roman Senate. [1, 2, 3] L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte and under what law quintus exercised power to exile the poet? 5 siti Quintus Caecilius Metellus did not use a specific, newly passed statute to target Naevius. Instead, he invoked the most sacred foundation of Roman law: The Law of the Twelve Tables (specifically Table VIII, which governed civil wrongs and injuries). [1, 2] Because Rome did not yet have specialized courts for libel or freedom of speech, the consul relied on two legal mechanisms to punish and ultimately exile the poet: 1. The Twelve Tables (Defamation as a Capital Crime) Under the ancient laws of the Twelve Tables (compiled around 450 BC), defamation was treated with extreme severity. The specific provision outlawed occentare (singing or publishing insulting, defamatory verses against another citizen). [1, 2] The Penalty: The original law actually prescribed capital punishment (often death by clubbing or public flogging) for anyone who composed verses that brought infamy or disgrace upon another person.[1] The Application: While Metellus did not execute Naevius, he used this severe legal provision to justify having the poet arrested by the triumviri capitales (the magistrates in charge of prisons and executions) and thrown into jail. [1, 2, 3, 4] 2. Imperium and Extrajudicial Political Pressure (The Exile) Strictly speaking, early Roman law did not allow a consul to unilaterally decree an official "sentence of exile" onto a citizen without a public trial. Instead, Naevius’s exile was achieved through the exercise of magisterial imperium (supreme executive power) combined with raw aristocratic pressure: [1] The First Arrest: After his initial imprisonment, Naevius was actually released when the Tribunes of the Plebs intervened on his behalf. [1, 2] The Practical Exile: When Naevius continued his satirical attacks, the Metelli and their noble allies used their political clout to make life in Rome legally and physically impossible for him. They effectively forced him into exilium—a voluntary departure to avoid harsher legal prosecution or physical harm under the Twelve Tables. Naevius fled the Italian peninsula and spent his final days in Utica (modern-day Tunisia).[1, 2, 3] If you are writing a paper on this, I can help you look at how later Roman writers like Cicero or Horacecommented on these strict slander laws, or how Plautus references Naevius's imprisonment in his own plays.[1] L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte but didn’t commentators noted the vacuity of “fato” — is this an dxemplum of rigidity of mos naiorum? 14 siti Yes, classical commentators and modern philologists have deeply analyzed the deliberate "vacuity" or semantic blankness of the word fato in Naevius's line. This structural ambiguity—and the severe reaction it provoked—serves as a textbook exemplum of the absolute rigidity of the mos maiorum (the unwritten customs of the ancestors). [1, 2, 3, 4] 1. The Commentators and the "Vacuity" of Fato Naevius’s line is a masterpiece of passive-aggressive wordplay because fato acts as a linguistic blank check. Ancient grammarians and modern scholars (such as H.B. Mattingly) point out that the word has no fixed moral valence on its own: [1, 2, 4] The Favorable Meaning (OLD fatum 5): It can mean "by divine destiny". To a traditional Roman, saying someone is elected fato could be a grand compliment, implying the gods decreed their rule. The Pejorative Meaning (OLD fatum 6): It can mean "by ill omen," "by a stroke of bad luck," or "to the misfortune of Rome". [1, 2, 3] By leaning on the generic "vacuity" of the word, Naevius left himself plausible deniability. If confronted, he could claim he was merely praising the family’s divine right to rule. However, in the context of Roman political comedy, the audience knew exactly what he meant: the Metelli didn't win office through merito (personal merit or talent), but through blind chance or, worse, a curse upon the state. [, 2] 2. An Exemplum of the Rigidity of Mos Maiorum The Metelli's furious reaction demonstrates just how rigidly the Roman elite protected the mos maiorum. In the early Republic, aristocratic power relied entirely on unwritten social codes like dignitas (prestige) and auctoritas (social influence). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] This incident exposes the rigidity of that system in three ways: The Monopoly on Praise: Under the mos maiorum, public speech regarding the ruling class was strictly transactional. Nobility was maintained by public funeral orations and monumental inscriptions that praised an elite family's virtues (virtus, fides). Naevius broke this by introducing Greek-style maledicentia (open political satire) onto the Roman stage. The elite viewed this not as mere "artistic expression," but as a direct existential threat to the social hierarchy. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The fact that the Metelli arrested Naevius over a line that was technicallyambiguous shows that the ruling class did not care about legal nuance or literal meanings. Under the cultural code of the mos, if an aristocrat felt insulted, the insult had occurred. The social order mattered more than the objective truth of the text. The Suppression of Individual Critique: The mos maiorum demanded an elite consensus. Naevius was a plebeian and a playwright trying to use public comedy as a platform for political critique. By crushing him, the Metelli sent a rigid, unyielding message to the rest of the Roman populace: the theater is a place for Greek adaptations, not for questioning the political legitimacy of Roman magistrates. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] If you are examining the intersection of literature and Roman law, I can provide more details on how Plautus implicitly references Naevius's imprisonment in his play Miles Gloriosus, or how Cicero later lamentedthe strictness of these early Roman censorship rules. [1] Yes, it helps, but in a very Gricean way perhaps not exactly in the way its author intends. The strongest point is not the historical arithmetic (one Metellus, two Metelli, three Metelli), but the pragmatics of the plural. If, by 206 BC, the immediate trigger was Quintus Caecilius Metellus's consulship, then Naevius could easily have said:  Fato Metellus Romae fit consul.  Instead he says:  Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules.  The plural converts an event into a habit. That is already suspicious. A Gricean hearer asks:  Why plural?  and the answer is not:  because there happened to be several historical Metelli.  The answer is:  because Naevius wants "Metellus" to become a type.  The audience hears:  "Another one."  before hearing  "Which one?"   But the really beautiful point is your observation concerning fatum. The Metelli's ideal defence would indeed be:  Quid mirum? Omnia fato fiunt.  or  Si nos fato consules facti sumus, ceteri quoque fato fiunt.  ("If we became consuls by fate, everybody becomes consul by fate.") This is exactly analogous to the Grice examples concerning:  lucky, fortunate, accidental, by chance.  The trouble is that fatum contributes almost nothing explanatory. Indeed, that may be Naevius's whole trick. Suppose a Roman says:  Why did Metellus become consul?  Answer:  By fate.  The hearer immediately asks:  No, really, why?  The explanation is vacuous. And that vacuity itself conveys the criticism.  In Gricean terms: What is said  The Metelli become consuls through fate.  What is implicated  No genuine explanation is available. Their advancement appears automatic. Something suspiciously regular is occurring.  The explanation is so weak that the audience must search for another point. Exactly as with:  "Smith is lucky."  For Grice's complaint is that, taken dispositionally, this almost threatens contradiction:  He is a person to whom what is unlikely to happen is likely to happen.  One starts with a vacuous explanatory category and ends with a social characterization. Likewise Naevius may start with:  fate  and end with:  hereditary dominance.   I think Speranza would especially enjoy the following reconstruction: G.: Why were the Metelli offended? S.: Because Naevius denied their merit. G.: Did he? S.: Not literally. G.: What did he say? S.: That they became consuls by fate. G.: Which may well be true. S.: Precisely. G.: Then what is the complaint? S.: The complaint is that fate explains nothing. G.: Ah. S.: And an explanation that explains nothing invites a hearer to look elsewhere.  As for the mos maiorum point, I think the incident is interesting precisely because the aristocracy appears to have refused the distinction between:  what is literally said,  and  what is publicly understood.  A modern lawyer might say:  "Show me the accusation."  The Metelli seem rather to have said:  "We know perfectly well what everybody understood."  Which is almost anti-Gricean in theory but Gricean in practice. For they treated the implicature as the real offence. The marvel is not that Naevius was indirect. Roman comedy was full of indirection. The marvel is that the Metelli behaved as though the indirectness made no difference at all. They punished not the sentence, but the uptake. And that is why the little word fato, apparently the most vacuous word in the fragment, does nearly all the work. and at some point 'consul' -- as in the two-consul system -- became a matter of election so that we can replace 'by ELECTION -- specific sort of 'fatum' -- the Metelli become consuls"? Thanks wat was the proceudure at this poet's time? Thans -- and was his exile excuted, voluntary exile, where? Thanks -- the implicature of 'malum' may be addressed to guards and poet ("Didn't you know of defamation in Twelve Tables? You'll soon suffer it") thanks Yes. In fact, one way to sharpen the Grice/Speranza treatment is to replace fatum with the institutional mechanism which everyone knew was there. At Naevius's time, consulships were not literally bestowed by destiny. They were obtained through the Roman electoral process, ultimately through the comitia centuriata. So one could paraphrase the line as:  Comitiis Metelli Romae fiunt consules. "By elections the Metelli become consuls at Rome."  But notice what happens. The joke immediately dies. Because comitiis is informative. It tells us how. Whereas fato refuses to tell us how. That is why fatum is pragmatically brilliant. It substitutes a vacuous explanation for a political one. Grice would say that if someone asks:  Why did Metellus become consul?  and the answer is  Because of the election,  the cooperative requirement is satisfied. But if the answer is  Because of fate,  the hearer naturally suspects:  "You are withholding the real explanation."  The implicature is generated by explanatory insufficiency.  A very Speranzian reconstruction might be: G.: Why not say comitiis? S.: Because that answers the question. G.: And fato? S.: That answers nothing. G.: Then why say it? S.: Exactly.  +> The less fatum explains, the more it suggests.   As to the constitutional procedure in Naevius's day, the office of consul was already an elected magistracy of the Republic. The traditional Roman system of two annual consuls was long established before the late third century BC in which Naevius flourished. The immediate political reality known to Naevius was therefore election, canvassing, noble influence, family prestige, and aristocratic competition — not some mystical distribution of office. Which is why fato sounds so suspicious.  On the exile question, we must be cautious. The traditional story is:  Naevius attacked the Metelli. He was imprisoned. He was later released. He eventually left Rome and died at Utica in North Africa.  What is much less certain is the precise legal mechanism connecting these events. The later tradition often presents the exile as the consequence of aristocratic hostility and political pressure rather than a clearly documented formal sentence of banishment. In other words, "forced into exile" is safer than "judicially sentenced to exile." For a Speranza dialogue this uncertainty is actually useful. A jurist might say:  Was Naevius exiled?  and receive the answer:  Yes. But by whom?   Finally, your point about the reply:  Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae.  is very good. Most readers immediately take it as a threat directed at Naevius. But grammatically it almost functions as a public announcement. The addressee is not only the poet. It may equally be:  supporters of the Metelli, magistrates, guards, the political class generally.  Almost:  "The Metelli will see to this."  or  "The machinery is already in motion."  A Gricean reading would thus distinguish: What is said  The Metelli will give trouble to Naevius.  What is implicated  Authorities should act. Retaliation is expected. The poet has crossed a line. Existing law and custom will soon become relevant to him.  Hence your Twelve Tables point becomes very attractive. One can almost hear a Roman optimas saying:  Ignorabasne leges? "Did you not know the law?"  The threat need not be:  "We shall beat you."  It may be:  "You have placed yourself where the law can now be made to notice you."  Which is far more Roman, and perhaps more frightening. The beautiful irony is that Naevius's fato appears to invoke impersonal necessity. The Metelli's malum then converts that alleged necessity back into very personal agency. Fate made them consuls; they will make him suffer. The first line suppresses causes; the second line proudly supplies one. And wodehouse in one of his novels has a character 'wanting to be a poet' and all laughing. The fact that Quintus M. -- a Cecilio -- mentions 'poet' is derogatory -- as per: poets should be writing hexameters on goats and bucolics -- not denigrating a totally legitimate post and its occupants? Thanks -- malum will get to this POET -- no patrician, no Cecilio -- just a 'tabano' atacking tha patriciate -- although Cecilio was not a patrician gens originally, if one of the 100 gentes on which the comitte of electoral college depended that made M. a consul and his father, and another M. before these two? Thanks Yes; and this is exactly where Speranza can become both historical and Gricean at once. The line as we have it is:  Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae.  The striking thing is not merely malum but poetae. The reply could have been:  Naevio dabunt malum Metelli.  The extra noun is doing social work. It is almost:  "The Metelli will deal with Naevius — the poet."  or even,  "The Metelli will deal with that poet fellow."  Not because poeta was intrinsically contemptible. Naevius himself would not have thought so, nor would later Romans speaking of Ennius or Virgil. But in the context of a political confrontation, the contrast is obvious:  on one side, a great aristocratic house, on the other, a playwright.  The noun reduces him to his station. A Speranzian gloss might be:  The Metelli answer not the content but the speaker. They do not reply: "The accusation is false." They reply: "The speaker is a poet."  In Gricean terms, the attack shifts from proposition to source.  As for the social dimension, you are right to stress that the Caecilii Metelli were not originally patricians. They were a plebeian gens. Indeed, that is part of the irony. By Naevius's day they had become so successful that they behaved exactly as an entrenched ruling house was expected to behave. The poet's joke depends on that. The audience is not laughing at one magistrate. The audience is laughing at a family whose repeated success is beginning to look automatic.  And here the three-consul point matters. By the time of Naevius one could look back and see roughly:  Lucius Caecilius Metellus Denter (284 BC), Lucius Caecilius Metellus (251 and 247 BC), Quintus Caecilius Metellus (206 BC).  The immediate political reality is father and son. The grandfather is remote. But the joke converts these scattered offices into a single phenomenon:  "The Metelli become consuls."  Not:  "Metellus became consul."  The plural creates a dynasty before one really exists. That is why the line stings.  Your Wodehouse comparison is actually illuminating. When a Wodehouse character announces:  "I wish to be a poet,"  the room laughs because "poet" is being measured against the practical expectations of society. The title carries social implications. Something similar may be happening here. The Metelli are implicitly saying:  We occupy magistracies. You compose verses.  The social asymmetry is part of the threat.  And malum itself is wonderfully vague. Like fatum. Neither side names the mechanism. Naevius says:  fato.  The Metelli say:  malum.  Both words are strangely underdetermined. Naevius does not specify the cause of their success. The Metelli do not specify the form of his punishment. The audience supplies both. That is why the exchange is so Gricean. Literally:  The Metelli become consuls by fate. The Metelli will bring trouble upon the poet.  But the life of both lines lies in what is left unsaid. The poet leaves the explanation empty. The Metelli leave the threat empty. Each side trusts the audience to complete the sentence. That is why the lines survived. Had either side been fully explicit, they would probably be merely historical curiosities rather than miniature masterpieces of Roman conversational warfare. and of course the poet could have delivered a sort of empty epigram addressed to the 'nobles' that were engulfing if that's the word the office of consul. Instead he uses "Metelli" -- name offsense, name drop -- uttered when M. is consul. The implicature may be to ALL nobles. The malum then applies to ONE poet, but the further implicature: any outsider who even considers using 'literature' as vehicle for 'class criticism' Thanks -- so that what is said DICTIVUM: individual proper names. IMPLICATUM noble vs. outsider -- using literature as anti-propaganda for their class Thanks Yes. In fact I think this is the strongest Grice/Speranza reading of the episode. The usual reading is:  Naevius attacks the Metelli.  But that is too narrow. The brilliance of the line is that it is simultaneously narrower and broader than that. Dictum What is literally said?  Fato Metelli Romae fiunt consules.  The only political actors explicitly mentioned are:  the Metelli, the consulship.  No mention of:  nobility, aristocracy, elections, corruption, patronage, class.  Everything is hidden. Implicatum The audience reconstructs something much wider. Not:  "This Metellus is unworthy."  Nor even:  "The Metelli are unworthy."  But:  "Certain families appear to possess office as though by natural right."  The name functions as a synecdoche. The Metelli become the visible example of a larger phenomenon. That is why the individual proper name matters. Had Naevius written:  Nobiles Romae fato fiunt consules  the line would become ideological and abstract. Instead he chooses a household everybody can point to. The particular family carries the general criticism. A very Roman technique.  The response mirrors this structure. Dictum  Dabunt malum Metelli Naevio poetae.  Again:  Metelli. Naevius. Poet.  Only particular names. Only one poet. Only one family. Implicatum The real message is much wider. Not merely:  "Naevius will suffer."  But:  "This is what happens to people who use literature against the governing class."  The threat is exemplary. Almost pedagogical. The punishment of one poet is intended as instruction for many.  A Speranzian dialogue might run: G.: Why did Naevius say "Metelli" rather than "nobiles"? S.: Because names are stronger than categories. G.: Yet he meant more than the Metelli. S.: Of course. The family is the example. The class is the target.  G.: And why did the Metelli threaten one poet? S.: Because they were not speaking only to one poet. G.: Who else was addressed? S.: Every future poet. Every future playwright. Every future outsider tempted to convert literature into politics.  The symmetry is beautiful.                          DictumImplicatumMetelliaristocratic dominanceconsulshiphereditary political powerNaeviusthe literary outsidermalumsuppression of class criticism Thus the episode becomes less a quarrel between one poet and one family than a struggle over who may publicly interpret political reality. Naevius's line says, in effect:  "These names reveal a system."  The Metelli reply:  "This poet will be punished."  But what they mean is:  "Let no one else try the same experiment."  That is why the exchange survived. It is not merely personal invective. It is an early Roman dispute over whether literature may act as counter-propaganda against social prestige. The names are individual; the uptake is collective. That, I think, is exactly the sort of distinction Speranza would enjoy drawing with Grice.