AM

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza : La Conversazione – I Verbali: AM

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Amaduzzi – Ossia: Grice e Amaduzzi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale Giovanni Cristofano Amaduzzi: (Savignano sul Rubicone, Forli, Romagna): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers recover what a speaker means, including implicatures, by assuming a cooperative, rational exchange in which what is said is only part of the communicative act and the rest is supplied by intention-recognition and shared norms of relevance and informativeness. Amaduzzi, an eighteenth-century Roman-based erudite from Savignano sul Rubicone (educated under Giovanni Bianchi/Jano Planco and active as a philologist, antiquarian, and intellectual networker), approaches “reason in discourse” from the institutional and republic-of-letters angle rather than from micro-pragmatics: he writes and reflects on academies as sites where inquiry is socially organized (e.g., Discorso filosofico sul fine ed utilità dell’Accademie, 1777), on the alliance and boundary between philosophy and religion (La filosofia alleata della religione, 1778), and on the nature of truth and opinion (Discorso filosofico dell’indole della verità e delle opinioni, 1786), while also producing learned prefatory work for grammars and alphabets (notably for Propaganda Fide projects) that treat language as a disciplined medium for transmitting knowledge across communities. The comparison, then, is one of level and target: Grice models the rational “engine” inside a single exchange (how implicature is generated and responsibly inferred), whereas Amaduzzi models the rational ecology that makes such exchanges worth having and governable over time—academies, correspondence networks, and linguistic standardization as infrastructures of shared norms, authority, and credibility. Where Grice treats the implicit as a routinely calculable surplus of meaning in ordinary talk, Amaduzzi’s emphasis on institutions of learning and on calibrating truth vs. opinion suggests a more Enlightenment concern with how publics decide what to accept, how intellectual communities stabilize standards, and how discourse remains civil and productive across confessional and national boundaries; in Gricean terms, Amaduzzi is helping to build and police the common ground and the interpretive expectations that make implicature possible and trustworthy, while Grice explains how, once that common ground is in place, reason can do its characteristically economical work by letting much remain unsaid yet still reliably understood. Grice: “Oddly, I had occasion to refer to A.’s birthplace in my little thing on Caesar crossing the Rubicon! I love A. He philosophises about the academy of Paris, and the academy of Berlin, but nothing about the English Academy! He notes that the warrior against the Trojans is Echademos and it is thus natural that the first important accademy be founded in Tuscany, since a Tuscan hates a Roman! A.’s hobby is to collect references to ‘accademies, which are all nonsensical, since only ONE has a rigid designation link to Echademos!”. Allievo a Rimini di BIANCHI, si trasfere a Roma. Un assestamento nella sua vita si registra come rilevano i diari dei suoi primi diporti, gl’odeporici autunnali eruditi, le brevi perlustrazioni compiute nei dintorni della città eterna o comunque entro lo stato della chiesa, emblema di un genere letterario che mostra la sua versatilità di interessi.  Dei filopatridi, grazie alla protezione di Clemente, anch’egli ex allievo di BIANCHI. Scrive le prefazioni di importanti grammatiche di lingue. Corrisponde con Metastasio, Monti, Denina, Pindemonte, Tiraboschi, e Spallanzani. Spicca anche dissertazioni di ordine FILOSOFICO illuminista. La filosofia alleata della religione, l’ndole della verità e dell’opinione, denunciato all’inquisizione, ispirati all’empirismo, cercando di coniugare il sensismo col cattolicesimo, vede nel primo un approccio alla conoscenza dell'uomo. Vicino al giansenismo regalistico, come emerge dal carteggio con Scipione de' Ricci, ha parte nella discussione che porta alla soppressione della compagnia di Gesù.  S’occupa d’archeologia, curando i FRAGMENTA VESTIGII VETERIS ROMÆ e la raccolta di antichità a Girgenti, in carteggio con ANTINORI. Compone canzoni, rime, e su Anacreonte. È tra gl’arcadi, pseudonimo Biante Didimeo. Sopra l’instituzioni canoniche, de officio archidiaconi, donaria duo græce loquentia VICVS SANDALARIVS. Alfabeto etrusco, grandonico-malabaricum sive samscrudonicum..  Grice: Caro Amaduzzi, ogni volta che penso alla tua Savignano sul Rubicone, mi torna in mente Cesare e il famoso attraversamento del fiume! Ma ciò che davvero mi colpisce di te è il tuo modo di filosofare sulle accademie: Parigi, Berlino... e mai l’Inghilterra! Il tuo spirito accademico è quasi un viaggio tra i popoli più che tra idee. Amaduzzi: Grice, che bel paragone! In effetti, ho sempre amato esplorare, sia nei dintorni della città eterna che tra le varie accademie europee. Credo che ogni luogo abbia un modo unico di intrecciare conversazione e filosofia, e forse proprio la varietà rende ricca la nostra ricerca. Grice: Mi affascina anche la tua attenzione verso la lingua e il senso – le tue prefazioni a grammatiche di lingue diverse sono quasi ponti tra mondi. E la tua corrispondenza con Metastasio e gli altri? È come se volessi far dialogare il passato col presente, la tradizione con l’innovazione. Amaduzzi: Proprio così, Grice! Per me la filosofia è fatta di dialoghi continui, anche quando si parla di archeologia o di sensismo. Il confronto, la pluralità delle voci, è la vera anima della conversazione. Come diceva Anacreonte: “La parola ben detta vale più di mille azioni.” Amaduzzi, Giovanni Cristofano (1766). Grammatica ragionata. Roma: Pagliarini.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Amafinio – Ossia: Grice ed Amafinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Amafinio. The Amafinio or Amafanio was a Roman family during the late Republic. The best-known member of the gens was Gaius A., one of the earliest Roman writers in favor of the Epicurean philosophy. Cicero considered his works deficient in arrangement and style.[1]  See also List of Roman gentes References  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Academica Priora, i. 2, Tusculanae Quaestiones, iv. 3.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  GENS. This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Amafinio – Ossia: Grice e Amafinio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto a Roma Gaio Amafinio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto a Roma. Contemporaneo di Cicerone, che lo cita in coppia con CATIO, opera a Roma a partire da quando CICERONE s’occupa dell'ORTO come un ‘trend’ della filosofia romana. A. e uno dei primi romani a redigere un saggio in latino per diffondere la la fisica dell’orto. Benché la sua opera ha successo, CICERONE giudica il lavoro insufficiente per quanto riguarda lo stile. Opere rappresentative di questa filosofia, in latino si può dire non ne esistano. O, se mai, sono assai poche. Ciò è dovuto alla difficoltà della materia e al fatto che i nostri connazionali sono presi da ben altri problemi, e ritenevano inoltre che quelle non sono cose da piacere a gente senza istruzione come sono loro. Mentre essi taceno, venne fuori A.. Quando usceno i suoi saggi la gente ne rimane impressionata, e accorda notevolissimo favore alla dottrina di cui egli era rappresentante, per la facilità con cui si capiva, per l’attrazione esercitata dalle seducenti lusinghe del piacere, e anche perché, dal momento che non le e offerto nulla di meglio, prende quello che c’e. Ma quando i loro stessi autori ammettono apertamente di non saper scrivere né con chiarezza, né con ordine, né con gusto, né con eleganza, io rinuncio senza rammarico a una lettura così poco attraente. Tanto, le teorie della loro scuola le sanno già tutti quelli che abbiano un minimo di cultura. Così, visto che poi non si preoccupano nemmeno loro del modo in cui scrivono, non vedo perché gl’altri debbano andare a leggerli. Che si leggano tra di loro, con quelli che la pensano in quel modo. Noi invece siamo dei parere che, qualunque cosa si scriva, si dove scrivere pel pubblico colto: e se non riusciamo a mantenerci sul piano adeguato, non dobbiamo per questo dimenticarcene. Ad Familiares. Howe, A., LUCREZIO. Enciclopedia Italiana. Academica. Tusculanae Disputationes.  Enciclopedia Italiana. Griceus: Amafini, dic mihi, quid tibi videtur de Epicureo orto? Estne inter Romana philosophiae instituta aliquid novi, an magis traditum? Amafinius: Gricee, ortus nobis est quasi schola naturae, ubi voluptas ipsa docet hominem vivere secundum naturam. Non opus est verbis elegantibus, sed simplici expositione, ut omnes intellegant felicitatem esse in animi quiete et corpore sano. Griceus: Sed quid dicis de iudicio Ciceronis? Ait enim te nimis vulgarem scribere, nec satis ornate neque ordine. Nonne putes stilum quoque ad philosophiam pertinere? Amafinius: Gricee, mihi vero videtur philosophia ut fructus orti: si utilis est, omnes gustare possunt. Non omnes requirunt ornamenta; veritas ipsa satis clara est etiam sine floribus verborum. Scripsi ut populo prodessem, non ut eloquentiae laudes colligerem. Amafinio, Gaio (XXX). Dicta.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ambrosoli – Ossia: Grice e Ambrosoli: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.  Luigi Antonio Ambrosoli (Varese, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rational, publicly recoverable inference from what is said plus shared expectations of cooperative talk: speakers can mean more than they explicitly state because hearers assume relevance, appropriate informativeness, and intelligibility, and then work out what must have been intended. Ambrosoli—best known not as a system-building philosopher but as a rigorous historian of ideas and political movements—approaches “conversational reason” at a different level: his maxim that philosophy is a patrimony of spirit and has no homeland, whereas doctrines and schools do, frames intellectual life as transnational in aspiration but locally rooted in institutions, parties, and civic struggles; his lifelong engagement with figures like Carlo Cattaneo and with the Risorgimento and democratic traditions (alongside collaboration with scholars such as Chabod and ties to the liberal-antifascist milieu associated with names like Calamandrei) treats thought as something whose meaning is inseparable from the concrete public conversations of a polity. The contrast with Grice is therefore complementary: Grice supplies the micro-mechanics by which an utterance in a given exchange yields determinate implied content under rational norms, while Ambrosoli supplies the macro-historical account of how the “shared background” that makes such inference possible is formed—through schools, periodicals, political alignments, and civic commitments that stabilize what counts as relevant, tactful, or evidential in a community’s discourse. Where Grice brackets ideology to isolate the logic of conversational inference, Ambrosoli foregrounds ideology and institutional setting to show how traditions of talk (federalism vs centralism, democratic rhetoric, “né aderire né sabotare” styles of civic stance) sediment over time; and that is precisely where the two meet: Gricean implicature depends on common ground, but Ambrosoli’s kind of historiography is, in effect, a study of how that common ground is historically constructed, contested, and transmitted, so that “reason-governed meaning” is at once a local calculative phenomenon (Grice) and a long-run civic achievement embedded in the life of doctrines and schools (Ambrosoli). Grice: “I like A.: ‘La filosofia è patrimonio dello spirito e non ha patria; l’hanno, invece, le dottrine e le scuole.’ But then he dedicates his life to CATTANEO, whose ‘patria’ informs his philosophy, as it does in MAZZINI and in each philosopher for whom A. provides an exegesis! At Oxford we call such a ‘philosophical historian’!” Uno dei protagonisti della storiografia filosofica, si dedica alla ricerca storica, coniugandola con un costante impegno civile.  Laureato a Milano, sotto Chabod, i suoi studi si orientarono particolarmente al risorgimento, a CATTANEO, con esiti unanimemente apprezzati pel rigore filologico, l'acume interpretativo, e la ricerca storiografica. Contribuisce alla ricostruzione della storia dei movimenti e dei partiti politici, ed al movimento operaio e socialista.  Collabora con CALAMANDREI e RUSSO. Il movimento democratico; né aderire né sabotare, la federazione nazionale, i periodici operai e socialisti, libertà in GENTILE, rivoluzione, ll'unità d'Italia, il federalismo., ricerca storica e impegno civile. Insurrezione milanese, filosofia romana, filosofia italiana, filosofia di Varese. Grice: Ambrosoli, ho letto la tua frase: “La filosofia è patrimonio dello spirito e non ha patria; l’hanno, invece, le dottrine e le scuole.” Mi affascina questo pensiero! Secondo te, la filosofia può davvero superare i confini nazionali? Ambrosoli: Grice, credo fermamente che la filosofia sia universale: lo spirito umano cerca sempre la verità, ovunque si trovi. Tuttavia, è inevitabile che le dottrine e le scuole si radichino nelle culture e nelle storie dei popoli, come ho visto studiando Cattaneo e il Risorgimento italiano. Grice: Hai dedicato gran parte della tua ricerca alla storia dei movimenti politici e filosofici italiani. Secondo te, il pensiero civile e l’impegno storico possono influenzare la filosofia, o restano due ambiti separati? Ambrosoli: Per me, Grice, la filosofia e l’impegno civile si intrecciano come i filari di una vigna. Studiare la storia e promuovere il progresso sociale sono modi di dare voce alla filosofia nei fatti, non solo nelle parole. Come diceva Calamandrei, “né aderire né sabotare”, bisogna sempre cercare la libertà e il dialogo nell’azione concreta. Ambrosoli, Luigi Antonio (1946). Il movimento democratico milanese. Milano, Feltrinelli.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Grice e Amelio: la setta di Firenze -- Roma – filosofia italiana  Amelio Gentiliano (Firenze, Toscana): la setta di Firenze -- A follower of Plotino, who called him 'Amerio' -- suggesting indivisibility. He comes from Etruria where he studies with Lisimaco . Upon his arrival in Rome, he studies with Plotino, becoming a close friend of Porfirio in the process. A. writes a great deal. He takes copious notes of the lectures of Plotino and writes them up into a series of volumes for the benefit of his son Ostiliano Esichio. He writes another series of volumes attacking the views of the gnostic Zostriano, and he also produces a book defending Plotino against charges of plagiarising the works of Numenio. Given his output, there may be some truth in the suggestion of Cassio Longino that A. tends to write at greater length than is necessary.  GRICEVS: Ameli, ex Etruria ad Romam venisti quasi syllaba indivisibilis, sed libris tuis totam bibliothecam divisisti. AMELIVS: Ita est, Grice, Plotinus me “Amerium” vocavit, sed Cassius Longinus me “verbosum” mallet. GRICEVS: Porphyrium amicum habuisti et Zostrianum oppugnasti, sed num etiam filium Ostilianum Esichium scribendo terruisti? AMELIVS: Minime, nam ille meas notas amat, et si nimis scribo, hoc est quia philosophia brevis est, chartae autem patientissimae.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Grice e Amico: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.  Giovanni Battista Amico (Cosenza, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice: “I like A.; at the time when a philosopher’s duty is to watch the stars, he notices that instruments are unnecessary, given Aristotle’s conception of concentric orbits. His treatise is highly popular in Padova; therefore, he was killed. I cannot imagine the same thing happen to Ayer at Oxford after the success of his “Language, Truth, and Logic””! Studioso d’astronomia, abbraccia il  LIZIO. De motibus corporum cœlestium iuxta principia peripatetica sine eccentricis sed epicyclis. Legge a Padova sotto MAGGI, PASSERI, e DELFINO. Il primo a discutire il modello tolemaico. L’assassinio è provocato dall’invidia, impicato d’un anonimo che compone l'epitaffio. A. cosentino, qui cum omnes omnium liberalium artium disciplinas miro ingenio, solerti industria, incredibili studio, latine Grece atque etiam Hebraice percurrisset feliciter, ipsa adolescentia suorumque laborum et vigilarum cursu pene confecto, a sicario ignoto, literarum, ut putatur, virtutisque, invidia, interfectus est. Ammazzatto da sicario ignoto per invidia delle sue lettere e virtù. Monumentorum Italiæ quae hoc nostro sæculo et a christianis posita sunt. Assalito, derubato e ucciso mentre cammina nei vicoli di Padova. Il processo contro ignoti accerta che è scomparsa una borsa contenente carte con rivoluzionarie osservazioni. Subito dopo l’inquisizione istitusce un processo postumo per eresia contro lui. A. fa menzione TELESIO  ed AQUINO lo define così grande filosofo. Cosenza gli dedica il planetario.  L’evoluzione della flosofia d’A., il suo destino intellettuale, il suo karma scientifico, se fosse vissuto abbastanza, soltanto pochi anni ancora, da imbattersi nel De Revolutionibus di Copernico. Le cose non sono andate così; e un giovane dal destino incompiuto, ma dall’indiscutibile intelligenza puo solo tentare di dare un senso a teorie che valgono solo dal punto di vista dell’osservatore. Questo è un mondo antico, come dice Leopardi, spazzato via a guisa d’una mera illusione dalla rivoluzione astronomica. Piperno, A. Arcavacata. Pianeta. G.: Read the title again. S.: De motibus corporum cœlestium iuxta principia peripatetica sine eccentricis sed epicyclis. G.: Good. Now take just the phrase. S.: Principia peripatetica. G.: Yes. What does it mean? S.: At first glance, “Peripatetic principles.” G.: At second glance? S.: “Principles belonging to the Peripatetic school.” G.: Better. Why not simply Aristotelis principia? S.: Because Amico does not want merely “Aristotle said so.” He wants a whole tendency, a school, a style of reasoning, the inherited apparatus of the Lyceum and its successors. G.: So “peripatetic” is already broader than “Aristotelian.” S.: Usually, yes. G.: Usually is a very weak adverb. S.: It keeps one alive. G.: Not in Padua, apparently. S.: No. In Padua success in astronomy could be rather final. G.: Quite. But stay with the phrase. Does “principium peripateticum” make literal sense? S.: Strictly, not very much. G.: Why not? S.: Because peripateticus is already figurative. It derives from walking about, from the περίπατος, and then by metonymy it comes to mean Aristotle’s school, and then by extension the school’s doctrines. G.: Good. So the first metonymy is place or activity to school. S.: Yes. The walk, or the place of walking, becomes the body of thinkers. G.: And the second? S.: The school becomes its doctrines. Thus a principium can be called “peripatetic” only through the school, not through walking. G.: Exactly. A principle cannot literally stroll. S.: Though many do, in Oxford. G.: Only badly. What was the περίπατος, then? S.: A covered walk, or promenade; and by extension the Lyceum setting where Aristotle taught. G.: A gymnasium. S.: Yes. Not a monastery, not a cave, not a Tuscan villa. A gymnasium in Athens. G.: Busy Athens. S.: Very busy Athens. G.: Whereas Plato’s Academy— S.: Also not originally “an academy” in the modern Italian sense, but a grove or precinct associated with Akademos. G.: Good. So the Academy is topographical before it is institutional, and the Peripatos is ambulatory before it is doctrinal. S.: Yes. And both become common nouns by the usual crimes of posterity. G.: I am glad you call them crimes. S.: I thought it would please you. G.: It does. So if Amico says iuxta principia peripatetica, he does not mean “according to principles that walk around.” S.: No. He means according to principles characteristic of the Aristotelian–Peripatetic tradition. G.: Characteristic, yes. But I still dislike it. S.: Because you dislike “peripatetic.” G.: I do. It sounds like a schoolmaster’s nickname elevated into ontology. S.: Yet one sees why he uses it. G.: Go on. S.: He is writing in 1538. Padua is saturated with Aristotelian commentary, university transmission, school identities, and a live contrast with other tendencies. “Peripatetic” lets him invoke a lineage rather than a single authorial citation. G.: So he is saying, in effect, “I stand within the Aristotelian astronomical inheritance.” S.: Precisely. G.: But with epicycles. S.: Yes, which is already amusing. Sine eccentricis sed epicyclis. No eccentrics, but epicycles. A title that sounds sober until one notices that it is a housekeeping operation on the heavens. G.: He is cleaning the Ptolemaic cupboard with Aristotelian loyalties still on the shelf. S.: Very good. G.: And why does he need the appeal at all? S.: Because to discuss celestial motions in that period is not merely to calculate. It is to place oneself among schools. One is not just right or wrong. One is peripatetic, ptolemaic, perhaps thomist, perhaps something else. The title does institutional work. G.: And rhetorical work. S.: Exactly. It tells the reader, before any argument begins, that the treatise proceeds iuxta principia peripatetica, according to a recognised body of doctrine, hence not as mere whim or astronomical insolence. G.: Astronomical insolence is often the beginning of truth. S.: It is also often the beginning of one’s obituary. G.: Especially in Padua, if one is walking through the wrong alley with the right papers in one’s bag. S.: Quite. G.: Now let us abuse the phrase in the singular. Suppose one says principium peripateticum. S.: Then the absurdity becomes more visible. G.: Why? S.: Because “peripatetic principle” in the singular invites one to imagine there is some one thing called the peripatetic principle, as if the school had a single maxim equivalent to “walk while thinking.” G.: Which would at least improve digestion. S.: Yes. And philosophy too, perhaps. G.: Vice versa. S.: Exactly. G.: But as a phrase it is still poor. S.: Yes. Because “peripatetic” there functions as a cross-categorial transfer. What belongs properly to a place, habit, or sect is predicated of an abstract item. G.: A principle. S.: A principle. G.: So one might say it is a dead figure. S.: Or a living one that has stopped apologising. G.: I prefer dead. It gives one less work. S.: And yet we tolerate “stoic principle,” “academic principle,” “peripatetic doctrine,” all the same. G.: Which is why language is a dangerous medium for philosophers. S.: Better than silence. G.: Not always. S.: You are thinking of the title principium stoicum. G.: Yes. Which literally ought to mean what? A porch-principle? S.: A stoa-principle. A principle of the colonnade. G.: Quite. And principium accademicum would, if taken literally, mean what? A grove-principle? A Hekademean shrub maxim? S.: Very good. G.: Thank you. The point is that school labels by metonymy become doctrinal adjectives, and then everyone forgets the transfer. S.: Which is why Amico can write principia peripatetica without blushing. G.: Whereas I blush on his behalf. S.: You are too kind. G.: I know. Now tell me: where did Aristotle actually do this walking? S.: At the Lyceum in Athens, a public gymnasium and surrounding precinct. G.: So the “walking school” is not a school for ramblers but a teaching practice attached to a civic place. S.: Yes. The association may be with the covered walkways, or with Aristotle’s manner of discussing while walking, or with the school’s location and routine. Antiquity itself is not as pedantically settled about the exact image as later handbooks pretend. G.: Which is a relief. I dislike certainty in philology when founded on retrospective tidiness. S.: As everyone does who has done any. G.: Why was walking good for philosophy? S.: Because the body assists the mind. G.: A dangerous thesis to utter at Oxford. S.: Yet true. Walking regulates pace, and pace regulates thought. Also one can talk beside someone without having to stare at him, which lowers the social temperature. G.: Very important. Many philosophical errors arise from facing people too directly. S.: And digestion. G.: Yes, digestion. One should not ignore it. Plato in the grove, Aristotle in the walk, Oxford in the fields or along St John’s Grove if one is lucky. S.: More often along the more boring pavements. G.: Sadly. S.: But the principle remains. G.: Careful. Not the principium peripateticum, I hope. S.: No. Merely the physiological truth that men reason better if they move occasionally. G.: Good. Now, back to Amico. Does “peripatetic” in his title mean “belonging to Aristotle personally,” or “belonging to the larger Aristotelian school tradition”? S.: The latter, surely. Even if Aristotle remains the gravitational centre. G.: Gravitational is a bad astronomical metaphor in this period. S.: Quite right. The concentric-orbit centre, then. G.: Better. And in Padua? S.: In Padua the Aristotelian inheritance is university inheritance: read under Maggi, Passeri, Delfino, move inside school language, dispute models under recognised doctrinal banners. “Peripatetic” is institutional shorthand. G.: So the title says as much about Padua as about the heavens. S.: Exactly. G.: That is useful. S.: It often is, to see titles as declarations of allegiance rather than bare summaries. G.: Especially in sixteenth-century Latin. S.: Especially there. G.: Now I have a personal difficulty. I may wish to see myself as peripatetic. I walk. I discuss. I like Aristotle. But I also like Kant. S.: Then you are in trouble. G.: I know. I had thought of Ariskant. S.: Horrid. G.: Kantotle? S.: Worse. G.: You are very severe. S.: Out of loyalty. G.: Could one not be both? S.: Of course. Only not under one barbarous compound. G.: So I must avoid calling myself a peripatetic unless I mean merely that I enjoy walking while talking. S.: Which would be harmless enough, provided you do not then infer a doctrinal tradition from your afternoon constitutional. G.: Very good. I should hate to found a school accidentally by exercise. S.: That has happened before. G.: More often in Italy than in Oxford. S.: Far more poetically in Italy, certainly. G.: Let us probe “iuxta.” S.: According to, in conformity with, alongside as governed by. G.: So not simply “from Aristotle,” but “in line with Peripatetic principles.” S.: Yes. It is a phrase of method and allegiance together. G.: And “sine eccentricis sed epicyclis”? S.: There the title becomes almost comic in its precision. He preserves epicycles while rejecting eccentrics. He is adjusting the astronomical machinery to keep it more acceptable under his chosen principles. G.: So the principia peripatetica are functioning as a constraint on model-building. S.: Exactly. The title says: celestial motions treated according to Peripatetic principles, and therefore with certain geometrical devices excluded and others retained. G.: Which is why the phrase is not empty. S.: No. Rhetorically overgrown, perhaps, but substantively useful. G.: You are kinder than I am. S.: I am younger. G.: That is often the same thing. S.: For a while. G.: Could he have written iuxta Aristotelis principia? S.: He could have, but it would have narrowed the field too much. “Peripatetic” invokes the transmissive tradition, commentators, school usage, the accepted way of treating Aristotle in the university. “Aristotle” alone might suggest direct textual piety rather than living scholastic inheritance. G.: So “peripatetic” is socially thicker. S.: Precisely. G.: That is a good phrase. S.: Thank you. G.: And from noun to adjective? S.: Peripatos, the walk or promenade; Peripateticus, pertaining to that school or its members; then doctrines and principles become “peripatetic” by doctrinal transfer. G.: And from adjective to activity? S.: In a loose modern sense, yes: to be peripatetic is to move about. But that is already a semantic afterlife, not the philosophical heart of the ancient term. G.: Oxford has many afterlives of ancient terms. S.: Indeed. Most of them are tutorial. G.: You are improving. S.: Thank you. G.: Now compare with “academic.” S.: Same structure. Academy from Akademos, then Plato’s school, then any learned institution, then any profession trying to look more thoughtful than it is. G.: Excellent. S.: And therefore “academic principle” is no better literally than “peripatetic principle.” G.: Better institutionally, perhaps, but no better literally. S.: Yes. G.: And “stoic”? S.: From the stoa, the painted porch; then the school; then the doctrines. G.: So all three are school-adjectives founded on local metonymy. S.: Exactly. G.: Which philosophers then treat as if they were transparent doctrinal descriptors. S.: Because once the transfer is established, the literal source recedes. G.: Or is politely forgotten. S.: Yes. G.: Why does this matter? S.: Because if one forgets the transfer one begins to think the doctrine belongs naturally to the label, rather than historically to a school, place, and transmission. G.: Very good. So in reading Amico we should hear not “walking-principles” but “principles of the Aristotelian school tradition as then understood in Padua.” S.: Exactly. G.: And perhaps note, with some dryness, that the phrase is rhetorically inherited rather than logically pristine. S.: Very much so. G.: We must not, then, call every such adjective philosophically innocent. S.: No. They are institutionally loaded and semantically second-hand. G.: “Second-hand” is a little cruel. S.: Only a little. G.: Good. Now, does the title’s phrase justify one in saying that Amico is not merely citing Aristotle, but positioning himself within a Peripatetic astronomy? S.: Yes. That is exactly what it does. G.: Even though his treatise sounds in part like a repair job on inherited models. S.: Especially then. Repair from within the school carries more authority than assault from outside it. G.: Until Copernicus arrives and the whole scenery shifts. S.: Had Amico lived a little longer. G.: Yes. A very short phrase with a very long historical sadness. S.: He belongs to the last confidence of the old sky. G.: That is nearly poetic. S.: I apologise. G.: Don’t. Even Oxford allows a little poetry in astronomy. S.: Under supervision. G.: Always. Now, one last thing. If I wanted to avoid “principium peripateticum” in my own prose, what should I write? S.: “A principle of the Peripatetic school,” or “an Aristotelian school principle,” or “a principle characteristic of the Peripatetic tradition.” G.: Excellent. Prose saved. S.: At some cost to elegance. G.: Elegance is often the enemy of exactness. S.: And exactness the enemy of publishers. G.: Particularly in Padua, if the title sells and the author gets murdered. S.: A severe review. G.: Posthumous, too.Grice: Amico, ho sempre ammirato la tua capacità di osservare il cielo senza strumenti, seguendo le orme di Aristotele. Secondo te, è possibile davvero comprendere i moti celesti solo con la ragione e l’occhio umano? Amico: Grice, credo che l’intuizione sia la vera chiave. Se ci lasciamo guidare dall’ingegno e dallo studio, possiamo arrivare lontano, anche senza strumenti. L’universo si rivela a chi ha occhi curiosi e mente aperta. Sono convinto che la filosofia debba sempre interrogare la natura, senza paura di andare contro le convenzioni. Grice: Hai vissuto un destino difficile, Amico; la tua passione ti ha portato lontano, ma l’invidia ha spento il tuo cammino troppo presto. Se avessi avuto la possibilità di leggere Copernico, pensi che avresti cambiato il tuo approccio? Amico: Forse sì, Grice. Ogni nuova scoperta è un dono, e la ricerca non si ferma mai. Come dice Leopardi, il mondo antico viene spazzato via dalle rivoluzioni della conoscenza. Ma resta la bellezza di cercare, “perché chi si ferma è perduto” – e la filosofia, come le stelle, appartiene a chi sa guardare con meraviglia. Amico, Giovanni Battista (1538). De motibus corporum cœlestium iuxta principia peripatetica sine eccentricis sed epicyclis. Padova, Tipografia del Seminario.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Amidei -- Grice e Amidei: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del leviatano Cosimo Amidei (Peccioli, Pisa, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del leviatano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how speakers can mean more than they explicitly say because conversation is a rational, cooperative practice: hearers assume the speaker is being appropriately informative, relevant, and orderly, and so they can infer (calculate) implicatures from what is said plus shared purposes and context. Amidei, a little-documented Tuscan jurist educated in Pisa and connected with Beccaria and the Verri circle, approaches “reason in discourse” from the side of legal-political reform rather than linguistic analysis: in his Discorso filosofico-politico sopra la carcere de’ debitori (Pisa, 1762), inspired by Dei delitti e delle pene, the target is the Leviathan-like tendency of sovereign and institutional power (including ecclesiastical power) to overreach, and the remedy is a rational, public argument about limits, proportionality, and humanity in law. The comparison is therefore one of levels and aims: Grice supplies the micro-mechanics by which rational agents extract communicated commitments (including what is prudently left unsaid) from utterances in a talk exchange, whereas Amidei supplies a macro-normative application of rational discourse to constrain coercive institutions—showing how what must remain “implicit” in polite conversation (tact, restraint, avoidance of needless offense) has an analogue in jurisprudence as restraint on punishment and on the state’s reach. In Gricean terms, Amidei’s reformist rhetoric treats legal institutions as if they too must satisfy a kind of cooperation condition with the public—laws should be intelligible, justifiable, and non-arbitrary—while Grice treats conversational interaction as the site where such justifiability is continuously enacted in miniature through reasoned inference and mutual accountability. Grice: “I like A.; he knew Beccaria well, and thinks, with Hart, that debtors should not necessariliy go to jail, to which Beccaria famously responded: ‘depends on what you mean by necessarily should’”. Non si sa quasi nulla sulla biografia d’A.. Si laurea in giurisprudenza a Pisa. Per le modeste condizioni della famiglia aveva chiesto di essere ammesso al collegio di sapienza, e ottene un posto gratuito. Stando ad una lettera di Verri al fratello Pietro, A. e un magistrato fiorentino, "notaro criminale".  Fra le poche cose certe vi è quella che conosce personalmente BECCARIA , di cui e un ammiratore e con cui e in corrispondenza. Discorso filosofico-politico sopra la carcere de debitori”; "La chiesa e la repubblica dentro i loro limiti. Concordia discors. l'origine della potestà ecclesiastica, gl’oggetti sopra de’quali si regge la postestà ecclesiastica, l'origine della potestà politica, il sovrano, le conseguenze, le cause della forza della potestà ecclesiastica nel governo temporale, limite del sovrano o potestà politica, immunità, privilegj ed esenzioni del bene ecclesiastico, priviolegij ed esenzione personali dell’ecclesiastico, l'asilo, matrimonio, celibato, professioni religiose, giuramento, benefizio ecclesiastico, la scomunica, la proibizione de;libri, la religione, la politica, i mezzi per diminuire i mendichi. Discorso filosofico-politico sopra la carcere de’debitori, ispirata direttamente del Dei delitti e delle pene di BECCARIA, è considerato una importante espressioni del riformismo e dell'umanitarismo, ha gran successo, recensito con favore. Venturi, Vasco, illuministi, riformatori toscani, Venturi, lettera d’A. a BECCARIA du Dei delitti e delle pene; Savio, Dottrina ed azione dei giurisdizionalisti. Implicatura sovrana, implicatura intersoggetiva, implicatura sovresoggetiva, implicatura sovre-umana, implicatura sovrepersonale primo disegno, carteggio con Verri, la strada verso l’utopia giuridizzionalistica, la chiesa, the high church of england, Gianni abolisce la carcerazione per debiti, tacito. Grice: Caro Amidei, voi italiani parlate spesso del Leviatano, ma permettimi di dire che noi inglesi abbiamo un rapporto tutto nostro con il concetto: dopotutto, siamo stati noi a decapitare Carlo I! Nessuno come noi ha affrontato il sovrano con tanto radicalismo.  Amidei: Grice, sarà pure, ma da noi il Leviatano assume un volto più giuridico che regale. La nostra sfida è sempre stata limitare il potere, ecclesiastico o politico, piuttosto che eliminarlo del tutto. E poi, ammettiamolo: in Italia, tra la Chiesa e la Repubblica, il vero Leviatano non si lascia prendere così facilmente!  Grice: Questo è vero, Amidei, e forse proprio per questo la vostra tradizione di riforma e umanitarismo mi ha sempre affascinato. Ho letto il tuo discorso sulla carcerazione per debiti; ricordava un po’ lo spirito di Beccaria, ma con un tocco tutto toscano.  Amidei: Ti ringrazio, Grice. È vero, ho sempre pensato che la legge dovesse servire all’umanità e non il contrario. In fondo, tra sovrani e Leviatani, preferisco costruire ponti di dialogo piuttosto che tagliare teste! Amidei, Cosimo (1762). Discorso filosofico-politico sopra la carcere de’debitori. Pisa, Stamperia della Sapienza. 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ampio – Ossia: Grice ed Ampio -- Grex griceiana: Ampio. The Ampii is a family at Rome, during the last century of the Republic, and into the first century AD. The first member of the gens to achieve prominence is Titus A. Balbo, who was first tribune of the plebs, then held the praetorship. The only praenomen associated with the known members of the gens is Titus. The only cognomen of this gens which occurs under the Republic is Balbus, a common surname originally referring to the habit of stammering. The cognomen Flavianp used by another member of the gens may have been a personal surname, perhaps reflecting a family connection with the Flavii, since the man who bore it was already of advanced years before the first of the Flavian emperors came to power. Titus Ampius Balbus, tribune of the plebs, and praetor. Titus Ampius Flavianus, governor of Pannonia during the wars following the death of the emperor Nero. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  Category: Roman gentes

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ampio – Ossia: Grice ed Ampio -- Grex griceiana: Ampio. So for this Ampio -- we can imagine the tribune, later pretore -- and someone having him recite the cursus honorum. I mean, the idea is that first, tribune, then praetor. Not vice versa, first praetor, then tribune? So was the order fixed? I guess it differed between patrician and other -- like Ampio -- but what would be the steroetypical for each class? the A. dialogue in Latin, a few moves, in Latin, with translation and implicatures. Input? Feedback? Thanks -- This is a very nice case because it combines institutional order (cursus honorum) with conversational expectations—which is exactly where Grice/Speranza shines. Let me first clarify the history briefly, then give you the Latin dialogue.  I. Was the order fixed? Short answer:  Yes—by the late Republic the order was largely fixed. Typical cursus honorum:  Quaestor (Aedile – optional) Tribune of the plebs (for plebeians, often early) Praetor Consul  So:   Tribune → Praetor   Praetor → Tribune  (not normal)   Nuance  Patricians could not be tribunes (originally), so their path differed. Plebeians (like Ampius Balbus) could be tribunes, and this often came before the praetorship.  So your instinct is exactly right:  Ampius follows the typical plebeian order.   II. Conversational reconstruction (Latin) Move 1 — The questioning Interrogator: “Ampi, recita mihi cursum honorum tuum. quo ordine magistratus gessisti?” Translation: “Ampius, recite your career to me. In what order did you hold your offices?” Implicature (English):  Assumes there is a normative order Testing conformity to Roman expectations Slightly evaluative: “did you follow the rules?”   Move 2 — Ampius states his path Ampius: “Primum tribunus plebis fui, deinde praetor; sic mos maiorum docet.” Translation: “First I was tribune of the plebs, then praetor; thus the custom of our ancestors teaches.” Implicature:  Aligns himself with tradition (mos maiorum) Claims legitimacy via conformity Signals: “my career is properly Roman”   Move 3 — The hypothetical challenge Interrogator: “At quid si quis prius praetor fieri velit, deinde tribunus?” Translation: “But what if someone wanted to become praetor first, and then tribune?” Implicature:  Tests rigidity of the system Suggests possible ambition or shortcut Introduces tension between desire vs order   Move 4 — Ampius’ correction Ampius: “Non licet ordinem vertere: magistratus gradatim petendi sunt, non saltim.” Translation: “It is not permitted to invert the order: offices must be sought step by step, not by leaps.” Implicature:  Appeals to institutional necessity “gradatim” vs “saltim” = → orderly progression vs opportunistic jumping Condemns irregular ambition without naming it   Move 5 — The Gricean twist Ampius: “Qui ordinem non servat, plus dicere vult quam civitas audiat.” Translation: “He who does not keep the order wishes to say more than the state is willing to hear.” Implicature:  Ambition = over-speaking (Gricean excess) Links political behaviour to maxim of Quantity Suggests:  violating cursus = violating conversational measure     III. Grice/Speranza reading This is quite elegant conceptually.  1. Cursus honorum = conversational structure  fixed order = grammar of political life deviation = pragmatic violation   2. Ampius as “cooperative speaker” He follows:  order expectation incremental progression  → like a speaker who respects conversational maxims  3. The challenger = flouter “Why not praetor first?” → analogous to:  saying too much too soon skipping inferential steps   4. Core analogy                      PoliticsConversationcursus honorumstructured discourseskipping officesjumping conclusionsambitionover-informativeness  IV. Final Speranzian close  Ampius climbs the magistracies as a careful speaker builds an argument—step by step—while the man who would be praetor before tribune resembles the speaker who wishes to arrive at the conclusion before he has supplied the premises.   If you like, we can contrast this with someone like Caesar, who does bend (or compress) the cursus, creating a “conversational impatience” at the political level. Your 'by steps, not leaps'is good -- there's also the inconvinence: which you can have in Latin by interrogator -- what if someone wants to become a praetor, and then a tribune? Ampio is PUZZLED, because the cursus is upward mobility. Ampio: One may just as well ask why you may want to become a pupil or tutee after you've een tutored. I: Well, this is what Cato the Censor wished: to become a pupil of Greek letters in his old age -- ALLEGEDLY, as Joan Rivers would add? What would the cursus be for a patrician, up to senator? Have people studied this as per books or articles? Input? Feedback, Thanks? Exceptions to the cursus honorum, or the phenomenon where an officer who has achieved LEVEL N, then becomes officer in LEVEL N-1 minus 1? Thanks You’ve now reached the most interesting part of the cursus honorum: not the tidy textbook ladder, but the places where it bends, loops, or even reverses, and where Romans themselves felt the conceptual awkwardness—exactly the sort of “conversational embarrassment” Grice would enjoy. Let me answer in three layers:  I. Your Cato example: “becoming a pupil after being master” Your analogy is excellent.  The normal cursus is:  progressive (gradatim)   Your hypothetical:  regressive (retrogradus)    So your line:  “why become a pupil after being taught?”  fits perfectly.  About Cato Sources confirm:  Cato the Elder was strongly anti‑Greek culturally, yet later engaged with Greek learning and literature seriously [en.wikipedia.org]  But:  ❗ The sources do not explicitly say in simple terms “he became a pupil in old age.” This is a traditional topos (especially from later authors like Plutarch) rather than a precise institutional statement.  So your Joan Rivers gloss (“ALLEGEDLY”) is entirely justified.  II. The cursus for patricians vs plebeians 1. General cursus (late Republic) The standard sequence:  quaestor → (aedile / tribune) → praetor → consul [livius.org]   2. Key difference: the tribunate  Tribune of the plebs:  originally only for plebeians designed to protect plebeian interests [unrv.com]    So:                  ClassTypical pathPlebeian (quaestor → tribune → praetorPatricianquaestor → aedile → praetor  So:  Ampius (tribune → praetor) is perfectly normal plebeian progression   III. Was regression (N → N−1) possible?  Yes — and this is your best point. From scholarship:  The cursus was “structured” but “regularly broken” [thecollector.com] In earlier periods:  even high magistrates sometimes held lower offices later (especially in crises) [bmcr.brynmawr.edu]     So:  It was unusual, but not impossible, that someone might:   return to a lower rôle or accept a subordinate function   Why would this happen? Possible (non-exclusive) reasons:  military necessity political defeat temporary expediency prestige of specific role (context-dependent)   Conceptually (your insight) To Romans, this looked like:  a violation of narrative order  Which explains Ampius’ puzzlement.  IV. A Gricean Latin dialogue: regression vs progression Let us stage your refined scenario.  Move 1 — The provocative question Interrogator: “Quid si quis, cum praetor fuerit, postea tribunus fieri velit?” Translation: “What if someone, having been praetor, later wanted to become tribune?” Implicature:  provokes a conceptual violation tests limits of institutional meaning invites absurdity   Move 2 — Ampius’ puzzled response Ampius: “Cur hoc velit? idem est ac si quis post doctum discipulus esse cupiat.” Translation: “Why would he want this? It is the same as if someone, after being taught, wished to become a pupil.” Implicature:  equates political order with epistemic order highlights asymmetry: learning = irreversible   Move 3 — The counterexample (Cato-type) Interrogator: “At Cato, ut dicitur, senex Graecas litteras discere voluit.” Translation: “But Cato, as they say, in old age wished to learn Greek letters.” Implicature:  introduces exception destabilizes Ampius’ analogy narrative interruption: reality ≠ logic   Move 4 — Ampius’ resolution Ampius: “Discere semper licet; honores autem retro non eunt. cursus honorum non circulus est.” Translation: “It is always permitted to learn; but offices do not go backward. The cursus honorum is not a circle.” Implicature:  separates:  intellectual life (reversible) political life (linear)   restores normative order   Move 5 — Gricean epigram Ampius: “Qui retro honorem petit, plus dicit quam res sinit.” Translation: “He who seeks an office backward says more than reality allows.” Implicature:  ambition = conversational overreach violation of institutional “syntax”   V. Have people studied this?  Yes — extensively. Modern scholarship (you already saw one):  Francisco Pina Polo, Cursus honorum: pathways to rank and power studies:  irregular careers flexibility of the cursus exceptions and deviations [bmcr.brynmawr.edu]     VI. Final synthesis You can now articulate a very elegant Grice/Speranza thesis:  The cursus honorum is not just a political ladder; it is a grammar. To move upward is to speak correctly; to move backward is to produce something intelligible perhaps, but infelicitous.   Final Speranzian close  Ampius is puzzled not because the reversal is impossible, but because it breaks the sentence that Roman life is supposed to form; and while a man may become a student again whenever he wishes, an office, once held, refuses to be said twice in reverse.   If you like, we can now take Caesar or Sulla as cases where the cursus is not reversed but violently “shortened,” which creates a different kind of conversational breach.