AR

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza : La Conversazione – I Verbali: AR

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arangio – Ossia: Grice e Arangio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del colloquio – la scuola di Napoli  Vladimiro Arangio Ruiz (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del colloquio – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats dialogue as a cooperative rational practice in which what is meant regularly outruns what is said: speakers design utterances for an audience that can recognize intentions, and hearers use shared norms (relevance, informativeness, intelligibility) to calculate implicatures as reasonable inferences from an utterance’s role in the exchange. Arangio-Ruiz, by contrast, is a philosopher-classicist whose central preoccupation is not a formal pragmatics of inference but the ethical and pedagogical character of dialogue, shaped by Greek models and by his own distinction (as your passage has it) between genuinely Socratic dialogue and sophistic “dialogo sofistico”: the former is oriented toward truth-seeking through disciplined questioning and mutual rational accountability, the latter toward winning, display, or strategic verbal advantage. That contrast maps naturally onto Grice’s concerns: Grice can explain even sophistic talk as meaning-bearing (it still generates implicatures, often via strategic underinformativeness, equivocation, or calculated irrelevance), but he insists that the intelligibility of those implicatures depends on a background presumption of rational cooperation—sometimes exploited, sometimes only partially honored, sometimes openly flouted in ways that themselves become interpretable. Arangio’s moralismo and his emphasis on individual moral conduct as the proper locus of “attualismo” (as against identifying philosophy with the life of the state) also resonate with Grice’s methodological individualism: conversational reason is anchored in what particular agents intend and can justify, even when they are embedded in institutional settings (schools, academies, “colloqui”). So where Grice supplies a micro-account of how interlocutors recover communicated content through rational inference under norms of cooperation, Arangio supplies a macro-normative typology of dialogue as a civic and moral practice—Socratic conversation as the humane, truth-directed use of reason versus sophistic conversation as a merely strategic manipulation of appearances—helping to frame Grice’s cooperative rationality not just as an interpretive heuristic but as an ethical ideal that distinguishes philosophical colloquy from verbal contest. -- la scuola di Napoli – filosofia napoletana – filosofia campanese -- filosofia italiana – , pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice,   (Napoli). Filosofo napoletano. Filosofo campanese. Filosofo italiano. Napoli, Campania. Grice: “We have Flores, we have Ruiz, we have Enriques – reminds me of Alan Montefiore! I like Vladimiro Arangio – my favourite is by far his philosoophising on Socrates’s ‘Sofista’ – he distinguishes between what he calls ‘Socratic dialogue’ (mine) and ‘dialogo sofistico’!” -- Vladimiro Arangio-Ruiz (Napoli) filosofo, grecista e accademico italiano. Fu il primo preside del Liceo scientifico Alessandro Tassoni di Modena, istituito a seguito della riforma Gentile.  Nacque da Gaetano, professore di diritto costituzionale. Frequenta a Firenze il corso di lettere nell'Istituto di studi superiori e si laureò con una tesi su Il coro nella tragedia greca in letteratura greca con Girolamo Vitelli, filologo, grecista, papirologo e senatore del Regno d'Italia.  Vladimiro appartenne a una illustre famiglia di giuristi: il fratello Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz fu uno dei maggiori studiosi di diritto romano, ordinario all'Napoli e alla Sapienza di Roma. Contravvenendo alla tradizione di famiglia, Vladimiro preferì dedicarsi agli studi filosofici e fu professore alla Scuola normale superiore di Pisa e alla facoltà di Magistero di Firenze.  Insegnò nei ginnasi di Stato e fu ufficiale d'artiglieria nella Prima guerra mondiale dove venne ferito. Si laurea con MARTINETTI, con Conoscenza e moralità. Sente fortemente l'influenza di MICHELSTAEDTER. Si propose una funzione critica ricostruttiva  dell'idealismo storicistico e dell'attualismo di GENTILE da cui trasse ispirazione per sviluppare il suo moralismo assoluto. Contrariamente a GENTILE che dichiara l'attualismo coincidente colla vita dello stato, A. crede che invece è identificabile con il comportamento morale individuale poiché la politica non è che un aspetto particolare della legge morale per sua natura universale.  Prose morali; Umanità dell'arte. Colloqui. Grice:Arangio, mi dicono che a Napoli la filosofia si discute come si gioca a scopa: chi ha il miglior argomento si prende il piatto! Arangio Ruiz: Grice, qui non si tratta di piatti, ma di dialoghi! Se il dialogo è socratico, si vince con la ragione; se è sofistico, si rischia di restare con le carte in mano e niente da mangiare! Grice: E allora, caro Vladimiro, dove sta la differenza? In filosofia, come in cucina napoletana, l’importante è non bruciare la mozzarella della conversazione! Arangio: Grice, la mozzarella va gustata con calma e la conversazione va condotta con umanità. Altrimenti, si rischia che il sofista venga e ti rubi pure il dessert! Arangio-Ruiz, Vladimiro (1911). Discorso del metodo. L’anima.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arato – Ossia: Grice e Arato: Roma antica -- filosofia italiana –  (Roma). 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arcais – Ossia: Grice ed Arcais: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Archibugi – Ossia: Grice e Archibugi: la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura conversazionale della PAX ROMANA. 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Archippo – Ossia: Grice e Archippo: il principe filosofo -- Roma antica -- filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A correspondent of PLINIO  Minore, pleads exemption from jury service on the grounds that “he is a philosopher” and produces a letter from DOMIZIANO testifying to that fact, and to his good character. It emerges later that A. had previously been sentenced to hard labour in the mines for forgery, which might cast some doubt on the authenticity of the letter. Although some were keen to see him back in the mines, he is generally popular. Archippo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco, “Grice ed Archippo

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Archippo – Ossia: Grice ed Archippo (Roma, Lazio): il principe filosofo. A correspondent of PLINIO  Minore, pleads exemption from jury service on the grounds that “he is a philosopher” and produces a letter from DOMIZIANO testifying to that fact, and to his good character. It emerges later that A. had previously been sentenced to hard labour in the mines for forgery, which might cast some doubt on the authenticity of the letter. Although some were keen to see him back in the mines, he is generally popular. GRICEVS: Archippē, princeps philosophorum Romae, num hodie iudicia fugis quia “philosophus es,” an quia metalla tibi nimis frigida videntur? ARCHIPPVS: Fugio sane, mi Grice, et ecce epistulam a Domitiano fero quae me bonum virum esse testatur, quamvis quidam dicant atramentum meum nimis “ingeniosum” esse. GRICEVS: Plinius Minor tibi respondens fortasse scribet te omnibus placere, sed rogat utrum litterae illae genuinae sint an tantum “implicatura” e carcere effugere cupiens. ARCHIPPVS: Si genuinae non sunt, saltem urbanae sunt, et Romani malunt philosophum ridere quam falsarium fodere, quod mihi prope sapientia ipsa videtur.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arco – Ossia: Grice e Arco: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della GRAVITAS.  Adolfo L’Arco (Teano, Caserta, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della GRAVITAS. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes implicature a rational, intention-sensitive by-product of cooperative exchange: what is meant can outrun what is said because speakers count on hearers to recognize goals, relevance, and communicative intentions, and to infer the extra content that makes the utterance a reasonable move in the conversation. L’Arco, as a Salesian priest, popular spiritual writer, and (per profiles such as the Italian Wikipedia entry) a public communicator of faith—including a notable RAI role in 1973 on Tempo dello Spirito—treats discourse less as a puzzle of inference and more as a pastoral art whose success depends on gravitas tempered by joy: his “philosophia umoristica” (e.g., the later Ridi e sorridi da saggio, 1984) and earlier devotional works (your passage cites Bosco si diverte, 1956) aim to make moral and theological truths memorable, livable, and socially transmissible. Put in Gricean terms, L’Arco is not primarily analyzing how implicatures are calculated; he is deliberately engineering the conditions under which certain implicatures reliably arise—using wit, brevity, and anecdotal framing so that an audience infers encouragement, consolation, or gentle correction without being hectored. Where Grice’s “reason-governed” emphasis is diagnostic (how rational agents recover meaning from minimal explicit content under cooperative norms), L’Arco’s is rhetorical-pastoral (how a speaker sustains benevolent cooperation—attention, trust, receptivity—by blending seriousness with a measured smile). The “gravitas” motif in your passage fits this alignment: Grice treats conversational seriousness as a matter of rational accountability and inferential discipline, while L’Arco treats it as a tone to be safeguarded precisely by allowing controlled humor, so that the hearer’s uptake is guided not only by logic but by goodwill; in both cases, what is communicated depends crucially on what is left unsaid, but Grice theorizes that gap as calculable implicature, whereas L’Arco exploits it as a practical technique for keeping conversation (and persuasion) both humane and effective. Grice: “I should like A.; but he is a priest and I’m C. of E.; on top, I love to say that philosophy ought to be FUN, provided it’s MY FUN – not Arco’s – so I find Arco’s ‘dictionary of philosophical ‘umorismo,’ or filosofia ‘umoristica’ frivolous, and unworthy of Roman gravitas!” Nato nella frazione Fontanelle entra fra i Salesiani di Bosco e fu ordinato sacerdote a Roma. Consegue a Napoli la laurea in filosofia. Per la sua preparazione filosofica, nonché per la profondità della sua filosofiai, è considerato tra i maggiori filosofi italiani. Uomo di anima sensibile e di infinita fede ha trascorso molto della sua vita scrivendo, interessandosi di agiografia. È stato protagonista televisivo sulla prima rete nazionale con il programma: Tempo dello Spirito.  Intensa e vasta la sua opera letteraria.  Longo e la sua intimità con Dio; Bosco si diverte, Sorgenti di gioia; Gesù sotterra un chicco di grano; Pira e il risorto; Fiori di sapienza. Dizionarietto di saggezza; La Donna del Sanctus; La parola agli atti processuali; quando la teologia prende fuoco. Quadrio salesiano; Bosco nella luce del Risorto; Bosco sorridente entra in casa vostra; Così  Bosco ama i giovani; Il padre nostro; Ma c'è poi questo Dio; Nota bene; Sorgenti di Gioia; Rinaldi copia vivente di Bosco; La sorgente eterna dell'amore; Noi esistiamo perché Dio Padre ci ama; Stile di Serenità; La Gioia a Portata di Mano; Ridi e sorridi da saggio; Dolcezza e speranza nostra; Dio ci ama con cuore d'uomo; Il Padre nostro; La Leva del Mondo: la preghiera; Eustachio; Il Cristo in cui Spero; Profeta e testimone del Risorto;  Elisabetta Jacobucci Francesca Alcantarina;  Longo; Così ridono i saggi; Alfonso amico del popolo; Il Sacro nome ti chiama per nome; La Leva del Mondo: la preghiera; pace universale, intuizioni e idee madri, un esploratore della felicità, servo di dio, apostolato della Sofferenza, gravitas, hagiography; if he has religious faith, he is not a philosopher. Grice: Arco, mi dica, la gravitas romana va d’accordo con il sorriso? Ho letto il suo dizionarietto di filosofia umoristica, ma temo che il mio spirito sia troppo anglosassone! Arco: Caro Grice, anche i filosofi hanno bisogno di una risata. Il sorriso, se ben dosato, non toglie gravitas ma la illumina: lo diceva pure Don Bosco, che la gioia è parte della fede! Grice: Però, Don Adolfo, se la filosofia italiana è così piena di felicità, rischio di perdere il mio aplomb inglese. Non sarà che la vera saggezza si trova tra una battuta e una preghiera? Arco: Grice, la saggezza italiana sa ridere, pregare e amare – magari anche tra una trasmissione televisiva e una pagina di agiografia. E ricordi: gravitas sì, ma sempre con un pizzico di gioia! Arco, Adolfo L’ (1956). Bosco si diverte. Napoli, Editrice Salesiana.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ardigò – Ossia: Grice e Ardigò: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Rodrigo Felice Ardigò (Casteldidone, Cremona, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally recoverable product of cooperative exchange: a hearer assumes that a speaker is aiming at a shared conversational purpose, and so treats apparent deviations from directness or maximal informativeness as clues to what is meant beyond what is said. Ardigò’s positivist moral psychology and sociology, by contrast, relocate the relevant “governing reason” from the micro-logic of utterance interpretation to the macro-logic of social life: in La morale dei positivisti (1869; later issued with a “Sociologia” part) he frames moral norms as naturalistic facts of social evolution and treats “civile” conduct as the arena in which egoism (prepotence) and anti-egoism (a cultivated counter-principle) are balanced, often with explicit skepticism about sentimentalist accounts of sympathy. Read alongside Grice, Ardigò supplies an anthropological-social background for why the Cooperative Principle is not a mere conversational convention but a stabilizing necessity of “convivenza civile”: conversational cooperation can be viewed as a localized mechanism by which an organismic social order maintains itself, converting brute egoistic pressure into predictable, rule-governed interaction. At the same time, the contrast is sharp: where Grice keeps the theory intentionally thin—deriving implicatures from publicly recognizable rational expectations that can be calculated case by case—Ardigò thickens the explanatory story with sociological teleology (social good, justice, the “golden rule” as prudential counsel, the presuppositions embedded in language as a social fact), so that what counts as “reasonable” in interaction is ultimately anchored in a naturalized account of moral formation and civic discipline. In short, Ardigò complements Grice by explaining why cooperative reasoning is socially functional and historically cultivated (the “civile gentleman” as the anti-egoist type), while Grice complements Ardigò by showing how, even when motivations are mixed and egoistic, conversational meaning still proceeds through a distinctive, intention-sensitive rational calculus that generates implicatures without requiring a full sociological theory to run. Grice: “I love A. but I have a few qualms. His Opere filosofiche is improperly indexed! The man wrote zillions! My attention was first caught by  a minor editorial note. La morale dei positivisti was reprinted a few years later after its first edition as divided into two parts, “la morale’ proper and ‘Sociologia’ – Since I have used philosophical biology and philosophical psychology, A. is indeed into philosophical sociology. As he notes, sociology is today’s philosophese for the politica of the lizio, re publica romana. And being a positivist, A. provides some good background, which will later be refuted by the neo-idealists that oppose this sort of philosophy, to the idea of two organisms, or pirots, interacting. While I speak of conversational egoism as balanced by conversational tu-ism; A., less of an altruist, laughs at the ridiculous sensist conception of simpatia, and speaks of two principles: the principle of egoism, or prepotence, found amoung brutal animals, and the principle of what A. calls ANTI-EGOSIM, found in the civil Italian gentleman – ‘civile’ being crucial, as in CASTIGLIONE, ‘discorso,’ or ‘conversazione’ civile.  Ma un giorno ci accorgeremo che in A. la filosofia italiana, la filosofia, ha una sua magnifica affermazione. Ora e per quel giorno, noi abbiamo fatto il nostro dovere. TROILO. Sociologia. Implicatura cooperativa positivismo filosofico  biologia filosofica psicologia filosofica naturalista il sociale l’intersoggetivo, la morale positivista, il positivism filosofico. La morale e il diritto all’altro, giustizia, bene sociale, benevolenza, beneficenza, calcolo ragionale nella convivenza sociale, evoluzione sociale, organismo sociale, positivismo, communicazione e convenienza sociale, onesta morale, spettazione di onesta reciproca, fondazione naturalistica della morale, il fatto sociale, il devere, la regola d’oro, fare all’altro cioe che vorreste fatto a te, consiglio di prudenza, critica, costume, presupposizione della lingua. G: Let us begin with the word itself: positivismo. I take Ardigò’s use to be the proper one, and I rather think your Italian ear should support me. D: It does, provided we keep clear that in Ardigò the word names not merely an epistemic scruple but a wider moral and social programme. G: Exactly. That is why I resist the later habit, especially after 1936, of letting “neo-positivism” or “logical positivism” swallow the older and broader use whole. D: You mean that when Ayer calls himself, or is called, a neo-positivist, the label is already a narrowing. G: A narrowing and, to my mind, a slight historical impertinence. Ardigò’s positivismo belongs to the line of Comte, and with it comes sociology, moral formation, the social organism, the civil order, the whole business of convivenza. D: Whereas Ayer’s concern is much more with verification, meaning, logic, and the policing of metaphysical utterance. G: Quite. Which is why I am tempted to say that the proper label for Ayer is not positivism at all, but empiricism, or at most logical empiricism if one wants to mark the alliance with formal methods. D: You would keep positivismo for Ardigò and his kind, and reserve empiricism for Ayer and the Vienna-facing set. G: That is the broad idea. Ardigò is an old-fashioned positivist in a way that is philosophically important. He is not merely worried about what counts as meaningful utterance. He is concerned with moral life, social evolution, justice, benevolence, prudence, and the civic shaping of character. D: In La morale dei positivisti, certainly, one does not find a mere theory of verification. G: No, thank heaven. One finds instead a naturalistic moral psychology and a sociology. One finds egoism and anti-egoism, prepotence and its civilized counter-principle. D: And that anti-egoism is crucial, because it shows that Ardigò’s positivism is not just a hard-headed cult of brute fact. It is already a programme of civilization. G: Civile is the key word. The civil gentleman, the cultivated anti-egoist, the man fit for conversazione civile. There Ardigò is very Italian indeed. D: Also very distant from Ayer. G: Yes. Ayer gives us a brisk and talented cleansing of philosophical language. Ardigò gives us an account of social life and moral formation under positivist auspices. These are not the same animal merely wearing different collars. D: Still, one might object that both reject metaphysical exuberance. G: True, but that is far too weak a bond to justify the same primary label. Many people reject metaphysical exuberance. It does not follow that they all belong under one historical umbrella. D: So your complaint is partly lexical and partly genealogical. G: Entirely so. Words have histories, and one ought not let the later, narrower use erase the earlier, richer one. If you call Ayer a positivist without qualification, you risk making Ardigò invisible. D: Or making Comte invisible. G: Precisely. Comte is indispensable here. Ardigò is intelligible in a Comtean horizon: science, society, order, progress, the social fact before the linguistic test. D: Whereas Ayer arrives through another route, though not wholly severed from that older lineage. G: Through Vienna, through logical analysis, through the new prestige of symbolic method, through anti-metaphysical impatience of a specifically twentieth-century sort. D: And through the English taste for empiricism. G: Just so. Which is why I say that “empiricism” is the better label. It has the right ancestry for English philosophy. Locke, Hume, the lot. Ayer is far more at home there than under the old positivist banner. D: Yet the banner was historically used. G: I know. People often use the wrong banners. That is one of the consolations of history: it gives philosophers something to correct. D: You promised jokes. G: Ah yes. First, if one insists on positivism, one should remember that its literal antonym would be negativism, which sounds less like a doctrine than a poor breakfast mood. D: And the second? G: If neo-positivism is really a thing, does that mean the earlier variety becomes palaeo-positivism? One imagines Ardigò as a philosophical fossil, which is absurd and therefore instructive. D: Palaeo-positivism has a certain comic dignity. G: It does. A museum case, perhaps: “Specimen from the age when positivism still meant society, morals, and civilization rather than merely the syntax of respectable utterance.” D: The joke has a serious point. Prefixes can conceal theft. G: Exactly. Neo often means: we have taken an old word and quietly moved the furniture. D: Let us stay with Ardigò. What, in your view, makes him representative of positivism in the strict and proper sense? G: Two things above all. First, the breadth of his ambition: he means positivism as a worldview, not as a criterion of sentence-admissibility. Second, the social and moral content: he naturalizes ethics and civic order. D: So the very title La morale dei positivisti matters. G: Immensely. You could not imagine Ayer writing The Morality of the Positivists and meaning by it the formation of civic anti-egoism in the organism of society. D: No, one imagines instead a pamphlet on what not to say in metaphysics. G: Quite. Ardigò speaks of benevolence, beneficence, justice, social good, the rule of life with others. His language of morality is rooted in social fact and social evolution. D: And there is his skepticism about sentimental sympathy. G: Which I rather like. He will not found morality on a gush. He prefers a cultivated counter-principle, a disciplined anti-egoism. In that respect he is sterner and perhaps saner than some moral sentimentalists. D: There is also the organismic picture of society. G: Yes, and it matters. For Ardigò, society is not an accidental aggregate of speakers. It is an organized, evolving order in which norms and language alike are socially embedded. D: That gives him a relevance to your own concerns with conversation. G: Naturally. If I speak of conversational cooperation, Ardigò offers a thicker social background: why cooperation is cultivated, why civility matters, why predictable interaction is a social necessity. D: But he would not derive implicature. G: No, and that is where our difference remains healthy. My own account is deliberately thin. One need not invoke a full sociology to explain how a hearer recovers what is meant from what is said. D: Still, Ardigò helps explain why such recovery belongs within civilized life. G: Exactly. He provides the anthropology, or rather the social-moral backdrop, not the calculative micro-theory. I tell you how a conversationalist infers. Ardigò tells you why a society would need creatures capable of that sort of orderly inferential coexistence. D: So Ardigò complements rather than anticipates you. G: Nicely put. He is not a theorist of implicature. He is a theorist of the social conditions under which cooperative reason becomes functional and prized. D: Let us move to Oxford. Who, in the years around Ayer’s 1936 landmark, would have echoed Ardigò there better than Ayer himself? G: Not Ayer, certainly. Ayer was importing a sharper, younger, Vienna-tuned impatience. If you want an Oxford echo of the broader social and moral cast, you would look less to the self-styled logical positivist and more to those with a larger civic or social-philosophical temper. D: Whom do you have in mind? G: Some of the moral and political philosophers, certainly, though none is simply Ardigò in English clothes. One might think of figures concerned with social order, ethical formation, public reason, perhaps even some idealist survivors turned naturalists in spite of themselves. But the exact echo is imperfect. D: So the point is comparative affinity, not direct duplication. G: Precisely. Oxford had moralists, classicists, social thinkers, and empiricists. It did not have an Ardigò on every staircase. But if the question is who best reflects positivism as a broad social programme, the answer is: not Ayer. D: Because Ayer represents a narrower philosophical enterprise. G: Yes, and a brilliant one in its own way. I do not deny the landmark. I deny the title’s historical overreach. D: Might one say that Ayer belongs under logical empiricism more than logical positivism? G: I should be very happy with that. Logical empiricism is less misleading. It keeps the epistemic and analytic emphasis without annexing the full Comtean-Ardigò landscape. D: And it sounds less like an attempted coup over the older word. G: Exactly. One must protect historical vocabulary from successful invasions. D: There is also Colorni in your background. G: Ah yes, Colorni is helpful because he, like Ayer, looks toward Vienna and Kraus, and thereby marks the continental route by which “positivism” shifts its center of gravity. D: So Colorni helps show the transition from broader positivism to the more specifically logical or analytic variant. G: Yes, and also the complication. For once Vienna appears, one gets a new atmosphere: language critique, anti-metaphysics, formalization, clarification, a harsher sense of philosophical hygiene. D: Whereas Ardigò belongs to the nineteenth-century confidence that science can underwrite an entire civil order. G: Splendidly said. That is the heart of it. Ardigò’s positivism is not just epistemological modesty. It is a civilizational programme. D: And one rooted in Italy’s own vocabulary of the civile. G: Exactly. One cannot overstate the importance of that. Civil conversation, civil morality, civil formation. Ardigò stands in that line more readily than in any proto-Vienna line. D: Then when Ayer uses neo-positivism, he is taking over a word whose older social resonance has not vanished, even if he has little use for it. G: Just so. That is why the label jars. It is not wholly false, but it is historically rude. D: Let us return to empiricism. Why is that label better for Ayer? G: Because Ayer is centrally concerned with experience, evidence, verification, the elimination of pseudo-statements, the analytic-synthetic distinction, and the limits of meaningful discourse. This is an empiricist temper refined by logic, not a Comtean social gospel. D: So if one says logical empiricism, one gets both the English ancestry and the Viennese method. G: Exactly. It is tidy without being flattening. D: And one leaves positivism to name the broader nineteenth-century movement. G: Or at least to name it primarily. Historical priority should count for something. D: This would also preserve the intelligibility of La morale dei positivisti as a title. G: Indeed. Under the broader sense, the title is entirely natural. Under the Ayerian narrowing, it would sound almost bizarre. D: Because one would expect a theory of meaningfulness, not a treatise on morality and social discipline. G: Exactly. Ardigò’s very title is evidence in your favor and mine. D: Our favor, I hope. G: Quite. Let us not let egoism defeat anti-egoism in the middle of a discussion about Ardigò. D: He would demand anti-egoism of us both. G: And prudent civility besides. D: There is another point. In Ardigò, language itself is a social fact, not merely a vehicle for truth-conditions. G: Yes, very important. Presuppositions embedded in language, custom, reciprocal expectations of honesty, the rule of social life. He is thicker than the later linguistic hygienists. D: That thickness is exactly what your own thin theory of conversational reason avoids. G: Avoids methodologically, yes. One can derive implicatures without first solving sociology. But Ardigò remains useful because he shows why a civilized order cultivates the very expectations on which such derivations rely. D: So one might say: Ardigò explains the habitat, you explain the mechanism. G: Admirable. I shall steal that if you permit. D: I permit it on condition of attribution. G: Very anti-egoistic of you. D: Thank you. Now, what of Comte himself? Does Ardigò merely inherit him, or transform him? G: Both. He inherits the broad ambition and the scientific-social aspiration, but he adapts them to Italian moral and civic concerns. Ardigò is not just a provincial Comtean. He has his own language of moral cultivation and social fact. D: Then his positivismo is neither merely imported nor merely local. G: Exactly. It is a serious national inflection of a European movement. D: Which makes the later annexation of the word by logical positivists even more misleading. G: Yes. A later technical school should not be allowed to retroactively monopolize an older continental vocabulary. D: There is perhaps also a matter of tone. Ardigò sounds civic and formative; Ayer sounds combative and eliminative. G: Very good. Ardigò builds a social order. Ayer clears a philosophical desk. D: Both useful operations, but not the same one. G: Precisely. D: Then what would you say, in one sentence, if forced? G: I would say: Ardigò is a positivist in the original, broader, Comtean-social sense; Ayer is better described as a logical empiricist than as a positivist simpliciter. D: And in two sentences? G: If you insist on calling Ayer a neo-positivist, do so with a warning label. Otherwise one will mistake palaeo-positivism for a fossil when in fact it was the main body. D: There is your second joke again. G: I am a man of limited comic resources but strong commitment. D: Let us then conclude with the contrast neatly laid out. Ardigò: moral psychology, sociology, social organism, anti-egoism, civil life, naturalized morality. Ayer: verification, logical analysis, anti-metaphysical critique, empiricist discipline. G: Exactly. And the bridge term, if one needs one, is logical empiricism, not a confiscatory positivism. D: With Comte behind Ardigò. G: And Vienna behind Ayer. D: And Colorni as one of the figures marking that Viennese orientation. G: Yes, that helps situate the transition. D: Then I think we have the point. G: So do I. And, to end positively rather than negatively, let us grant Ayer his landmark without giving him Ardigò’s name. D: A nicely anti-egoistic settlement. G: Ardigò would approve.Grice: Caro Ardigò, la tua “morale dei positivisti” mi ha fatto riflettere: credi davvero che tra egoismo e anti-egoismo ci sia spazio per una conversazione civile, o finiamo tutti a calcolare il bene come se fossimo contabili della benevolenza?Ardigò: Grice, se fossimo davvero contabili, la simpatia sarebbe solo una voce di bilancio! Ma io dico che il vero italiano, quello civile, sa essere anti-egoista senza perdere il gusto della conversazione – ti assicuro, anche Castiglione avrebbe approvato.Grice: Però qualche brutale animale potrebbe obiettare: “Io preferisco la prepotenza, altro che discorso civile!” Secondo te, la filosofia italiana può davvero domare la bestia che vive in ognuno di noi?Ardigò: Grice, la filosofia italiana ha un segreto: sa ridere della bestia, e la converte con una battuta. Il trucco sta nel fare all’altro ciò che vorresti fosse fatto a te – se la bestia non capisce, almeno si diverte. Ecco la vera implicatura cooperativa: convivenza e un pizzico di ironia. Ardigò, Rodrigo Felice (1869). Pomponazzi. Mantova.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arellio – Ossia: Grice ed Arellio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arellio. The Arellii were a family at Rome. Although of equestrian rank, this gens does not appear to have been particularly large or important, and is known primarily from three individuals. A., a talented painter at Rome, who gains notoriety for depicted goddesses with the features of his own mistresses. Arellius Fuscus, a rhetorician at Rome. He was a tutor of OVIDIO and Fabianus, and a rival of Marcus PORZIO Latro. His son, who had the same name, is also a rhetorician. Quintus A. Fuscus, either the father or the son, bore the praenomen Quintus, but it is not certain which.[5] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 275 ("Arellius"), vol. II, p. 191 ("Arellius Fuscus").  Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis, xxxv. 37.  Pliny the Elder, Historia Naturalis, xxxiii. 12. § 152.  Seneca the Elder, Controversiae, x. p. 157, proëm. ii.; Suasoriae, iv. p. 29. (ed. Bipontina),  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. II, p. 191 ("Arellius Fuscus"). Bibliography Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Elder), Controversiae (Controversies), Suasoriae (Rhetorical Exercises). Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Historia Naturalis (Natural History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Stub icon                              This ancient Roman biographical article is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesArelliiAncient Roman people stubs I suppose there are at least two interesting Griceian Arelli. One PAINTS a scene which depicts, say, Giuno and the peacocks, and we can have a dialogue with a co-conversatioanlists saying: but that's Fabia (+> your mistress). "No, it's Giuno -- don't you see the peacocks? -- the other (b) is the rivalry of rhetoric -- what would they rival on -- and we can have a dialogue with A. saying that the other charges less -- +> he is worse; and multiplies rhetorical praecepta beyond necessity, as A. does not – Thanks Yes—this is a perfect Arellian pair, because both cases turn on misfiring or over‑extended inference:  (a) painter → visual implicature mistaken for reference (b) rhetorician → economic/pragmatic implicature (cheap = bad; many rules = overdoing meaning)  Let’s give you both dialogues.  I. (a) Arellius the painter (Juno vs mistress) Latin dialogue (6 moves) Spectator: “Haec non Iuno est—Fabia tua est.” Arellius: “Iuno est.” Spectator: “Vultus mulieris tuæ est.” Arellius: “Pavo advertesne?” Spectator: “Pavonem video—sed os agnosco.” Arellius: “Quod agnoscis, addis; quod pinxi, Iuno est.”  Translation  “That is not Juno—it is your Fabia.” “It is Juno.” “It has your mistress’s face.” “Do you not notice the peacock?” “I see the peacock—but I recognize the face.” “What you recognize, you add; what I painted is Juno.”   Grice/Speranza analysis This is a textbook case of visual implicature:  Painter’s intention:  Juno (marked by peacock attribute)   Viewer’s inference:  Fabia (facial recognition)     Clash:                     LevelPainterSpectatorexplicit (depiction)goddessgoddessimplicateddivine archetypemistress  Key line  “Quod agnoscis, addis” (“What you recognize, you add.”)   He blames the viewer’s enrichment, not his own intention.  Speranzian formulation  The painter asserts Juno by attribute; the spectator recovers Fabia by resemblance; and the dispute turns on whether meaning lies in what is depicted or in what is inferred.   II. (b) Arellius Fuscus (rhetorical rivalry) Here the issue is different:  rival rhetorician:  charges less → implicature: worse multiplies rules → implicature: verbosity = incompetence     Latin dialogue (6 moves) Discipulus: “Cur ad Fuscium veniam, non ad illum qui minus accipit?” Arellius Fuscus: “Minus accipit—ideo minus dat.” Discipulus: “At ille plura praecepta docet.” Fuscus: “Plura dicit—non magis docet.” Discipulus: “Ergo pauca sufficiunt?” Fuscus: “Quae sufficiunt, non multiplicantur.”  Translation  “Why should I come to Fuscus and not to the one who charges less?” “He charges less—therefore he gives less.” “But he teaches more rules.” “He says more—not teaches more.” “So few things suffice?” “What suffices is not multiplied.”   Gricean analysis Two implicatures being managed:  1. Price implicature  “minus accipit → minus dat”   not logically necessary but socially conventional   price signals quality  2. Quantity overload  “plura dicit—non magis docet”   many rules ≠ better teaching violation of Quantity/Manner   Key principle  good teaching = minimal sufficient expression   III. Arellian synthesis (very neat)                     ArelliusDomainGricean problemPainterimageviewer adds too muchFuscusrhetoricteacher subtracts excess  Contrast  Painter:  struggles with over‑interpretation   Rhetorician:  combats over‑production      Final Speranzian close  One Arellius paints a goddess and is told he has painted a mistress, while another speaks little and is told others speak more; but the truth in both cases is the same: that the hearer adds what the speaker did not say, and the incompetent multiplies what ought to be left unsaid.    If you like, we can add a third Arellius (the son rhetorician) as a degenerate case—inheriting the rules but multiplying them, a perfect anti‑Gricean.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arennio – Ossia: Grice ed Arennio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arennio. The Arennii were a family at Rome during the period of the Punic Wars. It is known chiefly from two individuals, probably brothers, who held the office of tribune of the plebs, during the War with Hannibal.  Members Gaius Arennius, tribune of the plebs in 210 BC.[2] Lucius Arennius, tribune of the plebs, and prefect of the allies, was taken prisoner in the battle in which Marcellus was defeated by Hannibal.[3] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor  Titus Livius, Ab Urbe Condita xxvii. 6.  Titus Livius, Ab Urbe Condita xxvii. 6, 26, 27.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  GENS       This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs So for this Arennio prefect of the allies (what allies?) we can have a tryad: Marcello (what gens): I concede defeat. Annibal (via translator from Phoenician). That is not enough. M. What do you mean? A: I'll take your prefect as prisoner. M: What for? Annibal: STupid questions merit no answers. Thanks Great case—this one lets you stage war‑time implicature under coercion, plus a bit of Roman constitutional vocabulary.  I. Clarifications first 1. “Praefectus sociorum” — what allies? Here sociorum = the Italian allies of Rome:  non‑Roman Italian communities bound by treaty (foedus) supplying troops to Roman armies  So:  praefectus sociorum = commander of the allied (non‑citizen) contingents within a Roman force.   2. Who is Marcellus?  Marcus Claudius Marcellus gens: Claudia (patrician)   3. Historical frame  Hannibal defeats a Roman force a Roman officer (your Lucius Arennius, prefect of allies) is captured surrender is offered—but Hannibal demands more   perfect for a Gricean escalation:  explicit concession ≠ sufficient fulfillment of expectations   II. Triadic dialogue (Marcellus – Hannibal – Arennius) Let’s stage it tightly.  Latin dialogue (6 moves) Marcellus: “Fateor me victum esse.” Interpres (pro Hannibale): “Hic ait non satis esse.” Marcellus: “Quid amplius postulas?” Interpres: “Praefectum sociorum captivum dabit.” Marcellus: “Quid eum accipere prodest?” Hannibal (per interpretem): “Stulta interrogas—quae captam rem sequuntur, non explicantur.”  III. Translation  Marcellus: “I admit that I am defeated.” Interpreter (for Hannibal): “He says that is not enough.” Marcellus: “What more do you demand?” Interpreter: “You will hand over the prefect of the allies as prisoner.” Marcellus: “What use is taking him?” Hannibal: “You ask foolish things—what follows from capture is not spelled out.”   IV. Gricean structure This is very elegant.  1. Marcellus’ move  “Fateor me victum esse.”   implicature:  “hostilities / demands should cease” “defeat = sufficient condition”   2. Hannibal’s reply  “non satis est” (via interpreter)   cancels that implicature:  defeat ≠ completion of obligations   3. The key escalation  demand for the praefectus sociorum  This is not random:  symbolically:  control over Rome’s allies   pragmatically:  leverage / humiliation     4. Final move (most Gricean)  “stulta interrogas…”  Hannibal refuses to explicate:  what the capture means what consequences follow   This is deliberate suppression of explicature:  “I will not spell out what you already know.”   V. Deep structure                      SpeakerStrategyMarcellusassumes norms (defeat → closure)Hannibalrejects norm (adds further conditions)Arenniussilent object = token of control  Conceptual contrast  Roman:  defeat = defined legal-political state   Hannibal:  defeat = starting point for further extraction     VI. The role of Arennius He is crucial:  not just prisoner but:  embodiment of the allies    So taking him implies:  Rome’s network is penetrable   VII. Speranzian synthesis  Marcellus says “I am defeated” expecting the recognitional consequences to follow; Hannibal replies that the consequences are not contained in the words, and demands an additional token, the prefect of the allies, thereby showing that what is said does not determine what must be done, and that meaning in war, as in conversation, depends upon who controls the completion of the inference.   VIII. Ultra‑compact formula  Victus sum ≠ satis est.    Short answers  Allies = Italian socii Marcellus gens = Claudia Dialogue: supplied Key theme: refusal to complete the implicature of “defeat”   If you like, we can now contrast this with a Roman diplomatic exchange (where implicatures are shared) to show how Hannibal breaks the cooperative principle.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Argentieri – Ossia: Grice e Argentieri: la ragione conversazionale e il deutero-esperanto.  Emmanuele Argentieri (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e il deutero-esperanto. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an inference licensed by rational cooperation: speakers rely on shared expectations about informativeness, relevance, and perspicuity, and hearers recover what is meant (often beyond what is said) by assuming the speaker is still being cooperative at the level of intentions. Argentieri’s “lingua euratlantica” project (developed publicly at least by 1960 and systematized in L’integrazione linguistica euratlantica, 1963) approaches the same phenomenon from the opposite direction: instead of explaining how conversational understanding routinely outruns grammar, it proposes to redesign the linguistic code—through staged, “democratic” normalization and integration of grammars and shared vocabulary—so that cross-national understanding becomes more direct, less dependent on ad hoc pragmatic bridging. In Gricean terms, Argentieri is trying to shift communicative burden from implicature to what is explicitly encoded (a more uniform morphosyntax and lexicon would reduce the need for inference across divergent linguistic habits), whereas Grice’s point is that even a maximally regularized code will still leave meaning underdetermined because conversation is an action guided by intentions and rational audience-design, not merely a transfer of well-formed strings. The “deutero-Esperanto” joke in your passage captures that tension: Argentieri’s integrationist stages aim at a stable common language “without offending” nationalist sentiment, but Grice would predict that once people actually use that language, implicatures will proliferate again—through choices of variant (cafè/coffee/caffè), strategic underinformativeness, and context-sensitive shortcuts—because the rational economy of conversation rewards leaving things unsaid when they can be safely inferred. So Argentieri offers a political-linguistic engineering ideal (make mutual understanding easier by harmonizing the code), while Grice offers a philosophical-pragmatic explanation of why mutual understanding is possible even amid code-diversity—and why, even in a harmonized code, reason-governed implicature remains a constitutive feature of how humans communicate. Grice: “As with A., it occurred to me that pirotese, as any other language, really, evolves: there’s proto-pirotese, which in time becomes deutero-pirotese, and others follow: trito-pirotese, tetarto-pirotese, pempto-pirotese, hector-pirotese, hebdomo-pirotese, ogdo-pirotese, enato-pirotese, decato-pirotese, endecato-pirotese, dodecato-pirotese. Lingua euratlantica. L'integrazione linguistica euratlantica, A. agita l'unificazione  delle lingue parlate nell'area euratlantica, cioè dell'italiano, ecc., e propone una soluzione mediante l'integrazione, che dove aver luogo con metodo rigidamente democratico. Tale metodo s’articola in un itinerario di tappe. Una prima tappa è la normalizzazione delle singole lingue mediante la semplificazione e il fissaggio d’una grammatica comune e la valorizzazione del patrimonio comune vocabolaristico. La seconda tappa è l'assimilazione dell’italiano e l’altri lingue col rendere comune anche la grammatica complementare. La terza tappa è l'arrivo alla costituzione d’una lingua atlantica. In questa lingua c’e un fondo comune di parole uguali – cf. Grice on ‘suit’ pronounced as ‘soot,’ which irritated him. C’e una struttura comune grammaticale morfo-sintattica; e c’e divergenze soltanto nelle parole di radice latina, le quali però sono unificate rispettivamente alla lingua di cui sono proprie. La quarta tappa è quella finale, in cui anche il dizionario atlantico si sono compenetrati, dando luogo al prevalere di una parola piuttosto che di un'altra nell'ambito delle masse delle lingue integranti, in modo da aversi UNA LINGUA SOLA, COMUNE, ai milioni di uomini dell'area. La lingua, applicando tutti i suggerimenti d'A., puo essere un fatto compiuto in breve tempo; e ricca, varia, piacevole, adatta alle esigenze della vita moderna, cara a tutti, perchè ottenuta senza offendere i sentimenti nazionalistici di nessun popolo.  Come si vede, anche nella sua scarna linearità, l'idea d'A. è estremamente suggestiva e meritevole dell'attenzione dei filosofi come Grice e i suoi sequaci – ‘e meglior dal deutero-esperanto’ -- degli studiosi, dei politici, e dei tecnici. Grice: Argentieri, ti confesso che la tua idea della lingua euratlantica mi ha colpito! Ma dimmi, in questa nuova lingua, come chiameresti il caffè? Argentieri: Caro Grice, il caffè rimane caffè – più democratico di così non si può. Però, se la pronuncia diverge, basta fissare una regola. Magari la chiamo “cafè” per accontentare i francesi, o “coffee” per non far arrabbiare gli inglesi. Grice: E la grammatica? Se mi sbaglio con una desinenza, rischio di essere escluso dal club euratlantico? Argentieri: Nessun rischio, caro amico! Nella nostra lingua, anche gli errori fanno parte della festa. Se uno dice “piacere” invece di “pleasure”, applaudiamo! E se qualcuno osa inventare una parola, la votiamo: chi vince entra nel dizionario – altro che deutero-esperanto, questo è il vero spirito democratico! Argentieri, Emmanuele (1960). Cina rossa: Chiesa delle catacombe. Vita e Pensiero.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ario – Ossia: Grice e Ario e la ragione conversazionale. Tutore di filosofia d’OTTAVIANO, che lo stima talmente tanto che, dopo la conquista di Alessandria, dichiara d’aver risparmiato la città solo pel bene d’Ario.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arione – Ossia: Grice e Arione: la setta di Locri -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Locri). Filosofo italiano. A Pythagorean visited by Platone. Arione. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Arione”

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristea – Ossia: Grice e Aristea: la diaspora di Crotone -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Metaponto). Filosofo italiano. According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristea was a Pythagorean. Aristea. GriceLuiigi Speranza, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristea.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristeneto – Ossia: Grice e Aristeneto – Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Nizza). Filosofo italiano. A pupil of Plutarco. Aristeteneto. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristeneto Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristeneto – Ossia: Grice ed Aristeneto – Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Nizza). Filosofo italiano. A pupil of Plutarco.  Grice: Aristeneto, sei davvero una via di mezzo tra Roma e Nizza – e un filosofo italiano che ha persino studiato con Plutarco! Dimmi, le lezioni erano più filosofiche o più “nice”? Aristeneto: Caro Grice, a Nizza si filosofeggia anche sulla qualità del sole! Plutarco diceva: “La saggezza è come il clima, va colta quando c’è bel tempo”. A Roma invece… preferite il ragionamento nuvoloso? Grice: Che bello, filosofia mediterranea! Ma dimmi, Aristeneto, in classe a Plutarco, c’era mai qualcun altro che si metteva a discutere sulle implicature del pranzo? Aristeneto: Oh, spesso! Con Plutarco il pranzo era sempre questione filosofica: “Mangia, ma pensa!” diceva. Da allora ho imparato che ogni insalata ha la sua ragione… e anche le olive, se ben interrogate, rispondono. Here Grice has an Aristenetus, a disciple of Plutarco at Nizza that's Nicaea in Asia? Most likely, yes: this “Nizza” is again not Nice on the Riviera, but Nicaea in Bithynia. The main clue is the name itself. Aristaenetus is regularly transmitted with the ethnic Nicaenus, and Italian cataloguing tradition explicitly preserves that form. The BeWeB entry for the Italian translation of his letters lists him as Aristaenetus : Nicaenus, which is exactly the sort of evidence one wants here. That points to Nicaea in Asia Minor, not to Nice near Ventimiglia. [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] So Grice’s instinct is very probably right again: “Nizza” in the Speranza file is best understood as an Italianised modern rendering standing in for ancient Nicaea, that is modern İznik in Turkey. [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] I should, however, separate two questions. On the place-name, the case is fairly strong: Aristaenetus is indeed associated with Nicaea by the ethnic Nicaenus. [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] On the claim that he was a pupil of Plutarch, I do not have a solid confirming source from this pass. What I do find is that modern scholarship and academic notices treat Aristaenetus as a late antique Greek epistolographer, probably of the fifth or sixth century, closely engaged with Platonic eros and classical literary material, but not in the material I found securely as a documented direct pupil of Plutarch. [sns.it], [fondation-...lenique.fr], [en.wikipedia.org], [britannica.com] That chronological point matters, because if the intended Plutarch is the famous Chaeronean Plutarch of the first–second century, the dates sit very badly with the usual placing of Aristaenetus in late antiquity. One could imagine confusion with another later Plutarch, such as Plutarch of Athens, but I do not yet have evidence that this is what Speranza meant. [sns.it], [fondation-...lenique.fr], [britannica.com], [handwiki.org] So the dry answer is this. Yes, “Nizza” here is very likely Nicaea in Asia Minor, not Nice in the old county of Nice. But the second half of the entry, the direct discipleship to Plutarch, remains unverified on the present evidence and may rest on a conflation or a loose secondary tradition. [beweb.chie...ttolica.it], [en.wikipedia.org], [britannica.com] If you want, I can do one more narrow pass specifically on whether any source explicitly says Aristaenetus studied under Plutarch of Athens, because that is the only version that looks chronologically even remotely salvageable. [fondation-...lenique.fr], [britannica.com], [handwiki.org]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristeo – Ossia: Grice e Aristeo: la setta di Crotone -- Roma – filosofia italiana 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristio – Ossia: Grice ed Aristio: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano. Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Grice: “When Italians speak of The Portico, I think they mean something, as when they speak of ‘L’Orto’ they mean ‘pleasure’ or eudaemonismo. ‘Portico’ and ‘Orto’ are hardly philosophical terms!” Keywords: portico. Filosofo italiano. A friend of ORAZIO  and probably a follower of the sect of the Porch. Aristio Fusco. Keywords: portico. GRICEVS: FVSCVS, dic mihi: cum Romani “Porticum” laudant, philosophiamne appetunt, an tantum umbram? ARISTIVS: Utramque; sub porticu Stoicus durat, sed ego—Orazî amicus—saepe duro sedens, quod est disciplina commodissima. GRICEVS: Ergo “Porticus” est quasi regula sermonis: columnas habet, ne verba corruant; “Orto” vero est quasi voluptas—sed vix terminus philosophicus. FVSCVS: Minime vix: Roma philosophatur etiam ambulans; si nomen leve est, gravis est mos—et sub porticu semper invenies aliquem qui se sapientem putet. This friend of Horatius, Aristius Fuscus, was gens Fusca? Any other members of it? Aristius Fuscus was very likely not of a separately attested gens Fusca in the strong prosopographical sense. The normal Roman inference from Fuscus is that it is a cognomen, not a gentilicium. In the name Aristius Fuscus, Aristius is the nomen and points to the gens Aristia; Fuscus is then the cognomen, meaning roughly dark, swarthy, or tawny. So the friend of Horace is best understood as a member of the gens Aristia, with Fuscus as his family branch or personal cognominal marker, not as a man of a gens Fusca. That is also how he is usually taken in classical scholarship. The difficulty is that the gens Aristia is itself not one of the most heavily documented Roman gentes, and Aristius Fuscus is far more famous as Horace’s friend than as a node in a large recoverable family archive. So one should be cautious about building too much genealogical masonry around him. As for other members, the safest answer is this. One may expect other Aristii in inscriptions and scattered prosopographical material, but not a clearly famous and well populated gens organized for the literary memory the way, say, the Julii, Claudii, or Cornelii are. If the question is whether there are other famous members of a supposed gens Fusca, the answer is effectively no, because Fusca is not the usual way the family would be identified. If the question is whether there are other people called Fuscus or Fusca in Roman history, certainly yes, in abundance, but that only shows the spread of the cognomen, not the existence of a distinct gens Fusca. So the dry formulation would be: Aristius Fuscus is not naturally read as belonging to a gens Fusca. He is read as an Aristius of the gens Aristia, with Fuscus as cognomen. Other Fusci are plentiful in Roman naming, but they are bearers of the cognomen Fuscus, not evidence for a single coherent gens Fusca. If you like, I can next give you a short prosopographical note in the same dry English metalanguage on Aristius Fuscus as Horace’s friend, including what can and cannot be safely inferred about his Stoic colouring.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristide – Ossia: Grice e Aristide: la setta di Reggio -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Reggio). Filosofo italiano. According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristide was a Pythagorean. Aristide. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristide.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristippo – Ossia: Grice e Aristippo: la diaspora di Crotone -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Taranto). Filosofo italiano. According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristippo was a Pythagorean. Aristippo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristippo.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristo – Ossia: Grice e Aristo – Roma He specialised in legal philosophy. Plinio  Minore describes him as a man of great wisdom, and superior in virtue to all the philosophers of his time. Aristo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristo,

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristo – Ossia: Grice e Aristo – Roma –filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The brother of Antioco and a friend of Brutus. Aristu was said to hae been an inferior philosopher to his brother, but a wholly admirable individual. Aristo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristo.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristocleida – Ossia: Grice e Aristocleida: la diaspora di Crotone -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Taranto). Filosofo italiano. According to Giamblico of Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”),  a Pythagorean. Aristocleida. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristocleida.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristocle – Ossia: Grice e Aristocle: il Lizio a Roma A member of the Lizio, studied at Rome under Erode Attico. Tito Claudio Aristocle. Aristocle. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristocle.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristocrate – Ossia: Grice e Aristocrate – Roma – filosofia italiana. –  – Filosofo italiano. Regarded as an accomplished philosopher, a man of great learning, and someone who lead a pious life. A puil of Lucio Anneo Cornuto and a friend of both Persio and Agatino. Petronio Aristocrate. Aristocrate. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristocrate.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristocrate – Ossia: Grice e Aristocrate: la setta di Reggio -- Roma According to Giamblico di Calcide, Arisocrate was a Pythagorean. Aristocrate. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristocrate.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristodoro – Ossia: Grice e Aristodoro: all’isola -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Siracusa). Filosofo italiano. Aristodoro was the recipient of the tenth letter of Platone – but we do not if he responded to it. In the letter, Plato credits Aristodor as being a “philosopher” himself. Aristodoro. Refs. , pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristodoro.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristomene – Ossia: Grice e Aristomene: la diaspora di Crotone -- Roma – filosofia italiana (Metaponto). Filosofo italiano. According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristomene was a Pythagorean. Arostomene. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice e Aristomene,” Aristone – Roma – filosofia italiana – Filosofia del principtao --  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A philosopher at Rome, attached to the household of Marco Lepido. According to Seneca, A. used to engage in philosophical discussions when travelling around in a carriage, leading a wit to observe that he was obviously not a ‘peripatetic.’ Aristone. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristone.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristone – Ossia: Grice e Aristone: la setta di Ceo -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Ceos). Filosofo italiano. Ariston of Julii after the town on Ceos. Aristone. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristone.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristosseno – Ossia: Grice ed Aristosseno e LA ragione conversazionale. How to live the good life.  

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arnoufi – Ossia: Grice ed Arnoufi – Roma – filosofia italiana – . (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A philosopher. His talents extended to magic. He conjured up a storm for the Romans at a time when they were short of water. Arnoufi. Grice, “Grice ed Arnoufi.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ariano – Ossia: Grice ed Arriano: il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Scolaro di Epitteto. Lucio Flavio Arriano. Arriano. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Arriano.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Ario – Ossia -- Grice ed Ario Didimo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale. Tutore di filosofia d’OTTAVIANO, che lo stima talmente tanto che, dopo la conquista di Alessandria, dichiara d’aver risparmiato la città solo pel bene d’Ario. Ario suggere ad Ottaviano di giustiziare Cesarione, il figlio di Cleopatra e GIULIO Cesare -- οὐκ αγαθὸν πολυκαισαρίη, un gioco di parole basato su un verso d’Omero. A., come i suoi due figli Dionisio e Nicanore, insegnano filosofia ad OTTAVIANO.Viene spesso citato da Temistio, il quale afferma che Ottaviano lo considerava meritevole quanto Agrippa. In Quintiliano si scopre che A. scrive o insegna anche retorica. Si tratta probabilmente dello stesso A. la cui Vita era nella parte finale mancante delle Vite di Diogene Laerzio. Ario Didimo viene solitamente identificato con l'Ario le cui opere vengono citate a lungo da Stobeo, e che sintetizzano lo stoicismo, la scuola peripatetica ed il platonismo. Il fatto che il nome completo sia Ario Didimo lo sappiamo grazie ad Eusebio, il quale cita due lunghi passaggi della sua visione stoica del dividno; la conflagrazione dell'universo; e l'anima. Plutarco, Ant., Apophth.; Cassio Dione; Giuliano, Epistles; comp. Strabone. Braund at al, Myth, history and culture in republican Rome: studies in honour of Wiseman, University of Exeter Press, La frase originale era οὐκ αγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη " cioè "Non è bello avere troppi capi" o "il regno di molti è una brutta cosa" (Omero, Iliade). "polukaisarie" è una variante di "polukoiranie". "Kaisar" (Cesare) sostituisce "Koiran(os)", che significa "capo". Sventonio, Augustus, Temistio, Orat., Quintiliano, iComp. Seneca, consol. ad Marc. 4; Eliano, Varia Historia; Suda; Richard Hope, The book of Diogenes Laertius: its spirit and its method, Inwood, The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, Cambridge ^ Eusebio, Praeparatio Evangelica, Pomeroy, A. Epitome of Stoic Ethics. Texts and Translations; Graeco-Roman. Atlanta, GA: PORTICO. GRICEVS: Arie Didime, si Octavianus Alexandriam tibi servavit, cave ne tu ei tot Caesares relinquas. ARIVS: Recte mones: non bonum polykaisariē, nam unus Caesar satis est, duo iam tumultus. G: At tu, philosophus et rhetor, uno verbo imperium purgas—ego vix uno verbo vinum peto. A.: Noli timere, Grice: tu vinum pete, ego sententiam dem, et uterque urbem servabit—tu guttur, ego Romam.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristo – Ossia: Grice ed Aristo (Roma, Lazio). He specialised in legal philosophy. Plinio  Minore describes him as a man of great wisdom, and superior in virtue to all the philosophers of his time. GRICEVS: Aristo Romam tenes et iuris philosophiam colis; dic mihi, utrum leges intellegas an leges te ipsae intellegant? ARISTO: Ego leges intellego, sed Romani saepe malunt me sapientem vocare quam sententiam meam sequi. GRICEVS: Plinius Minor te sapientissimum et virtute superiorem cunctis philosophis sui temporis dixit, unde suspicor te etiam in iudicio pudorem vincere posse. ARISTO: Si virtus mea omnibus placet, tum vel in Foro hoc optime valet: facit ut etiam adversarius, dum me laudat, causam suam amittat.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristo – Ossia: Grice ed Aristo (Roma, Lazio): The brother of Antioco and a friend of Brutus. Aristu was said to hae been an inferior philosopher to his brother, but a wholly admirable individual. GRICEVS: Aristo, Roma te iactat philosophum Italicum; sed dic mihi, num Antioco fratre tuo etiam tu philosopharis, an tantum urbanissime ambulas? ARISTO: Philosophor, Grice, sed fateor Antiocum altius volare; ego tamen, ut aiunt, homo plane admirabilis sum—praesertim apud Brutum. GRICEVS: Optime—sic Roma duos habet: unum sapientissimum, alterum suavissimum; et Brutus, inter gladios, amicos eleganter colligit. ARISTO: Ita est: Antiocus docet, ego convido; Roma enim amat philosophiam, sed ridere etiam—alioquin cur tam diu staremus in Foro?

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristocrate – Ossia: Grice ed Aristocrate -- Petronio Aristocrate – Roma – filosofia italiana. –  – Filosofo italiano. Regarded as an accomplished philosopher, a man of great learning, and someone who lead a pious life. A puil of Lucio Anneo Cornuto and a friend of both Persio and Agatino.  GRICEVS: Aristocrate, Roma ipsa philosophari videtur, sed tu — si licet — es “caput” quod ambulat. ARISTOCRATES: Ego vero discipulus Cornuti fui, sed Persium et Agatinum amicos habui—itaque noli me nimis “sanctum” fingere. GRICEVS: Si “pium” te dicunt, fortasse est quia nimis bene discis et nimis raro gloriaris. ARISTOCRATES: Age, Grice, si quid de me scribes, fac ut “puil” fiat “pupil,” ne etiam Latine erubescam.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristone – Ossia: Grice ed Aristone (Roma, Lazio): Filosofia del principato. A philosopher at Rome, attached to the household of Marco Lepido. According to Seneca, A. used to engage in philosophical discussions when travelling around in a carriage, leading a wit to observe that he was obviously not a ‘peripatetic.’ GRICEVS: Ariston, cum in curru cum Lepido vehereris et de philosophia dissereres, dixit quidam te certe non esse peripateticum, sed per-carrucam. ARISTON: Rideat ille, Grice, nam ego ambulare possum et tamen disputare, sed in via Romana melius est sedere quam frangi. GRICEVS: At si philosophia in rota pendet, cavendum est ne syllogismus in cloacam cadat et Lepidus nos expellat. ARISTON: Nihil time, nam si currus trepidat, ego sententiam brevem facio—ut via salva sit et disputatio non fiat casus.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristone -- Grice ed Aristone: la setta di Ceo -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Ceos). Filosofo italiano. Ariston of Julii after the town on Ceos. Aristone. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aristone. GRICEVS: Ariston Ceus, discipule sectae Ceae, Romamne venisti ut sapientiam doces, an ut nos doceas quomodo iucunde desinere vivendum sit? ARISTON: Veni, Grice, ut vos doceam vivere tam constanter ut etiam mors, si adsit, more hospitis dimittatur. GRICEVS: At in nostro Gruppo di Gioco, si quis hospes nimis mane discedit, dicimus eum maximam relationis violasse. ARISTON: Tum respondeo: ego relationem servo—nam si vita mala est, optimum est brevem colloquium facere et surgere.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aristosseno – Ossia Grice ed Aristosseno (Roma, Lazio) e LA ragione conversazionale. How to live the good life.  A. filosofo italo Dice A. che il vero amore del bello sta nelle attività pratiche e nelle scienze; perché l'amare e il voler bene hanno inizio dalle buone usanze e occupazioni, così come, nelle scienze ed esperienze, quelle buone ed oneste amano davvero il bello; mentre ciò che dai più è detto amore del bello, cioè quello che si manifesta nelle necessità e nei bisogni della vita è, se mai, la spoglia del vero amore.»  (Stobeo, Florilegio) Filosofo antico, peripatetico e scrittore di teoria musicale. Ritratto immaginario d’A. Figlio di Spintaro, allievo di Socrate, è da questi e dal padre avviato alla musica – come Grice -- e alla filosofia.  S'interessa alla dottrina pitagorica, per poi diventare discepolo di Lampo Eritreo, di Senofilo e infine uno dei principali allievi d’Aristotele: infatti ebbe l'incarico di tenere nella sua scuola lezioni di musicologia. Aspira alla successione del maestro e la nomina di Teofrasto alla direzione della scuola peripatetica, dopo la morte di Aristotele, è la profonda delusione della sua vita.  Infatti si trasfere a Mantinea, una città del Peloponneso famosa pella diffusione della musica, dove vive per molti anni, ha molti discepoli detti Aristosseni ed è consigliere del re Neleo. Qui scrive due opere, Il carattere dei Mantinei e l'Elogio dei Mantinei.  È, tra l'altro, andata perduta un'opera di A. intitolata Sull'ascoltare musica, nella quale pare si sostenesse il carattere necessariamente attivo di questa operazione, che richiede un vigile e assiduo confronto tra i suoni passati – Grice: “I am hearing a sound” – “I am hearing a noise” -- e quelli presenti e futuri. Ossia, A. riconosce la funzione fondamentale della MEMORIA – cf. Grice on LOCKE -- nell'intelligenza della musica, come risulta da un paragrafo degl’Elementi di armonia. Di queste due cose, invero, la musica è co-esistenza: SENSAZIONE E MEMORIA – Grice, “Personal identity”: “I am hearing a noise”/ Ravel, Pavane, Mahler, Wagner. Taranto, Puglia. GRICEVS: Arisoxene, si vera amor pulchri in bonis moribus et operibus est, cur tot philosophi tantum de pulchro disputant et nihil pulchre faciunt? ARISOXENVS: Quia, Grice, multi amant umbram pulchri in necessitatibus vitae, non ipsum pulchrum quod in scientiis et exercitatione habitat. GRICEVS: Ergo melior est qui bene canit et bene vivit quam qui de harmonia scribit et dissonanter se gerit? ARISOXENVS: Ita sane, nam musica ipsa coexistentia est sensus et memoriae, et sine memoria etiam pulchrum statim fugit quasi nota quae nondum audita iam periit.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arnouifi – Ossia: Grice ed Arnoufi (Roma, Lazio). A philosopher. His talents extended to magic. He conjured up a storm for the Romans at a time when they were short of water.  GRICEVS: Arnoufi, Roma sitit, sed tu philosophus Italicus es—potesne nobis imbrem, non solum sententias, evocare? ARNOUFI: Possum, Grice, nam ars mea paulo magica est, et Romani, si aquam volunt, primum rideant. GRICEVS: Ridebimus, sed quaeso noli tonitrua nimis scholastica facere, ne senatus in syllogismos madeat. ARNOUFI: Age ergo, ecce nubes—et si quis rogat unde venit, dicam: ex ipsa Romae philosophia, quae tandem aliquid utile fecit.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.) H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arpineo – Ossia: Grice ed Arpineo -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arpineo. The Arpineii or Arpinii were a family at ancient Rome. It is known chiefly from a single individual, Gaius A., an eques in Caesar's army during the Gallic Wars. “A.” belongs to a class of gentilicia formed using the suffix -eius, typically formed from words or names ending in -as. The root of the nomen is the cognomen Arpinas, a surname indicating a relationship to the city of Arpinum in southern Latium, whence the ancestor of this family probably came. Gaius Arpineius, an eques, and a friend of Quintus Titurius Sabinus, who was sent to confer with Ambiorix. Publius Arpinius, a potter whose maker's mark appears on pottery from Leontopolis in Egypt.[4] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 349 ("Gaius Arpineius").  Chase, p. 120.  Caesar, De Bello Gallico, v. 27.  CIL III, 13585. Bibliography Gaius Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico (Commentaries on the Gallic War). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Category: Roman gentes Do we have any trace of what the Gallic language that people like Ambiorix may have spoken? For this Arpineo -- we can imagine a dyad beween GIULIO and A. G sends A. to confer with Ambiorix and A. returns with the message _IN GALLIC_ to Caesar's despair. 'You should have asked for an interpreter.' A: It was not felt to be necessary, given the friendly gesture displayed by Ambiorix. I think he meant 'yes.' -- Giulio: _Thinking_ is not enough for a military. Thanks This is a beautiful case—because here philology (what language did Ambiorix speak?) meets a perfect Gricean failure (what happens when meaning is guessed without a shared code?). Let me split it into two parts:  I. What language did Ambiorix speak?  Short answer He almost certainly spoke a variety of Gaulish (a Continental Celtic language).  What we actually know  Gaulish was:  a Celtic language spoken across Gaul and adjacent regions [en.wikipedia.org] part of the Indo‑European family   It is:  extinct preserved only in:  ~800 inscriptions names, short texts, dedications, coins [en.wikipedia.org]       Caesar himself tells us something crucial  the peoples of Gaul differ “lingua, institutis, legibus” (in language, institutions, laws) [topostext.org]   So:  Gauls did not speak Latin Romans had to:  rely on interpreters or bilingual intermediaries     Ambiorix specifically  King of the Eburones his name itself is:  Gaulish (ambi‑rix) (“king”) [en.wikipedia.org]     So we can safely say:  Ambiorix spoke a Belgic Gaulish dialect (perhaps with Germanic influence, but still Celtic in structure).   What did it sound like? We do not have continuous texts or dialogue. We only have fragments like:  Segomaros Uilloneos toutius Namausatis… (“Segomaros… citizen of Nîmes… dedicated this…”) [mnamon.sns.it]   So:  we can reconstruct words and grammar but not full conversational fluency   Bottom line (scholarly caution)  We know the language family and some vocabulary, but we do not know exactly how a real conversation sounded.   II. Your Arpineius scene (perfect Gricean failure) Now your idea is excellent:  Arpineius sent to negotiate returns with message in Gaulish misunderstood as “yes”   this is a catastrophic implicature error.  Latin dialogue (6 moves) Caesar: “Quid respondit Ambiorix?” Arpineius: “Haec dixit—(Gallice).” Caesar: “Cur non Latine rettulisti?” Arpineius: “Ex vultu et gestu intellexi—adsensus videbatur.” Caesar: “Non intellegere, sed putare visum est.” Caesar (graviter): “Putare non satis est imperatori.”  Translation  Caesar: “What did Ambiorix reply?” Arpineius: “He said this—(in Gaulish).” Caesar: “Why did you not report it in Latin?” Arpineius: “From his face and gestures I understood—he seemed to agree.” Caesar: “You did not understand—you guessed.” Caesar: “Guessing is not sufficient for a commander.”   III. Gricean analysis This is almost textbook.  1. Failure of shared code  No common language therefore:  no stable “what is said”     2. Arpineius’ move He replaces:  linguistic meaning  with:  gesture-based inference   i.e.:  meaning reconstructed from:  facial expression demeanor     3. The fatal implicature He infers:  gesture → consent  But:  the mapping is not guaranteed   4. Caesar’s correction  “non intellegere, sed putare”  This is brilliant:  distinction between:  understanding (shared semantics) guessing (private inference)     IV. Deeper point (very Gricean) Grice assumes:  shared language cooperative principle  Here:  both fail  So:                      Normal conversationThis caseshared codeno shared codeimplicature groundedimplicature speculativeinference accountableinference arbitrary   Final Speranzian synthesis  Arpineius confuses understanding with inference, taking a gesture to mean assent in the absence of a common language; but Caesar insists that where no shared code exists, no implicature can be safely drawn, and that in such cases thought is not knowledge but conjecture—insufficient for a military decision.    Ultra‑compact formula  Intellexisse ≠ putasse.    Short answers  Yes, Ambiorix likely spoke Gaulish (Celtic)  But we have only fragmentary evidence of the language  Dialogue: supplied (Caesar vs Arpineius)  Key theme: collapse of meaning without shared language    If you like, I can try a mock reconstruction of Ambiorix’s reply in pseudo‑Gaulish, just to give a philological flavor of what Arpineius might have heard.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arrighetti – Ossia: Grice e Arrighetti: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale.  Giulio di Filippo Arrighetti (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, reconstructible inference from what is said to what is meant, guided by cooperative expectations (relevance, sufficient information, clarity) and by the speaker’s intention that the hearer recognize those intentions. Arrighetti, as your passage presents him, stands closer to the early modern rhetorical tradition that Grice sometimes retrofits as a precursor: Arrighetti’s Aristotelian-Ciceronian framework treats conversation as an art of civil reasoning whose success depends not only on logical demonstration but on judgment, deliberation, and the management of benevolence between speaker, interlocutor, and audience, with “diletto” (pleasure, the agreeable) functioning as a legitimate instrument of persuasion. The comparison is therefore a shift of explanatory center: Grice aims to explain how hearers can rationally recover unspoken content even when speakers omit, hedge, or apparently violate conversational norms, whereas Arrighetti aims to train speakers in how to structure discourse so that it achieves its civic-rhetorical ends (winning attention, securing goodwill, guiding judgment) through topics, figures, and orderly arrangement. This makes Grice’s implicature look like a generalization of what classical rhetoric catalogued piecemeal as figures and strategic indirections: where Arrighetti systematizes the “figures of rhetoric” as techniques within oratio (and distinguishes oratio from mere vocalization), Grice redescribes the same phenomena as products of a single inferential engine—pragmatic reasoning operating over shared norms—so that irony, understatement, hinting, strategic omission, and even certain “figures” become cases of what an utterance conversationally implies rather than additional encoded meanings. In short, Arrighetti supplies a normative rhetoric of how to converse well in public life (mind and mouth coordinated under benevolence and judgment), while Grice supplies a minimalist rational mechanics of how conversational understanding works even when the rhetoric is imperfect or indirect, showing that the social art Arrighetti teaches is underwritten by a deeper, intention-and-reason based logic of interpretation. Grice: “It was when giving the seminars at Oxford on conversation when I realised that, as for the ‘fgures of rhetoric,’ as identified by Aristotle and systematized by, among others, A., my idea of ‘implicature’ covered them all!” Filosofo fiorentino. Filosofo toscano. Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. Grice: “I like Arrighetti: his forte was Aristotle’s rhetoric, and he was very popular with the Accademia degli Ardenti, and later with a subgroup of this, The Accademia degli Svelati (which later merged with the Accademia dei Lunatici); his other forte was the distinction between ‘oratio’ and ‘oratio vvocalis’ – “Os” is of course Romann for ‘mouth’ – but figuratively for ‘linguaggio’ – (after all, the tongue is IN the mouth). I happen to prefer ‘mouth,’ because Roman ‘os’ is related to ‘essere’: you are who you are, i.e. you exist, because you can breathe through your mouth. Appartenente a una nobile famiglia fiorentina, studia la lingua greca e le filosofie Aristotelica e Platonica a Pisa e Padova. La rettorica di CICERONE spiegata.  È lodevol'usanza di tutti i buoni espositori et massime di quelli del lizio proporr'alcuni capitoli dal principio di qualunque trattato ch'eglin si metton ad esporre. l’arte di conversare, filosofia civie, rispondere, argomentare, il fine della retorica, le la rettorica distinta in tre parti, demostrazione, giudizio, buon giudizio, deliberazione, albero della retorica, luoghi retorici, il fine della poesia e il diletto, animale ragionabile, animale non-ragionabile, lucrezio, cicerone, quintiliano, il dire dilettevole, la benevolenza dell’oratore, la benevolenza del conversante, la benevolenza dell’auditore, la benevolenza dell’audienza, principi di rettorica, cicerone sulla rettorica di Aristotele – l’aristotele toscano, aristotele per i platonici di fiorenze, del piacere, della lussuria, dell’onore, dell’ingegno, del riso – Bergson – la felicita come fine – arte e natura. Figura retorica. Keywords: figura retorica. G.: In the old days, my dear S., things were trivial. S.: You mean easy. G.: No. Tri-vial. Three roads. Grammar, dialectica, rhetorica. Civilisation before specialisation. S.: Already nostalgic. G.: Not nostalgic. Merely resentful of progress. S.: And you want the three kept apart? G.: Distinct, not quarantined. Grammar concerns the saying. Dialectica concerns the exchange. Rhetorica concerns the management of effect. S.: Start with grammar, then. What is it? G.: The discipline of saying something properly enough that it may be said to have been said at all. S.: Rather dry. G.: Dryness is one of grammar’s charms. It does not aspire to save souls. S.: And it is not philosophy? G.: Not in the ambitious sense. Grammar gives you the sentence, not the wisdom. S.: “The saying,” then? G.: Yes. What is said, and how one says it. Case, construction, propriety, intelligibility. Mouth-work under rules. S.: Mouth-work sounds almost low. G.: Most indispensable things do. S.: Then dialectica? G.: Not “logic,” if you please. That is the later bureaucratic title. S.: What is wrong with “logic”? G.: It sounds as though one were hiring a machine. Dialectica is reasonableness in living exchange between rational creatures. S.: So not validity alone? G.: Certainly not. A man may be valid and yet impossible. S.: That would exclude many philosophers. G.: It would reduce the profession severely. S.: And rhetorica stands between the two? G.: Exactly where sensible people always put it, and where modern people have forgotten to look. S.: Explain. G.: Grammar asks whether the utterance is well-made. Dialectica asks whether it stands up in exchange. Rhetorica asks what it does to its audience. S.: “Audience” already sounds public, forensic, literary. G.: Because Oxford has exiled rhetoric to literary studies, where it spends its retirement discussing metaphor. S.: And wrongly? G.: Incompletely. Metaphor is a parish matter. Rhetoric is a civic one. S.: So Arrighetti matters because he preserves the civic view? G.: Precisely. He keeps alive the Aristotelian-Ciceronian thought that conversation is an art of civil reasoning, not merely a collision of propositions. S.: Yet you do not claim Arrighetti was himself a great philosopher. G.: No. One need not be a philosopher to keep philosophy’s furniture in repair. S.: Harsh. G.: Fair. A locksmith is not thereby a metaphysician. S.: Then what does Arrighetti preserve? G.: The older arrangement. The sense that speaking well involves judgment, benevolence, order, delight, and the governance of minds without brutalising them. S.: “Delight” sounds suspiciously non-philosophical. G.: Only to philosophers who think boredom is probative. S.: And benevolence? G.: Essential. The benevolence of speaker, conversant, auditor, audience. Without that, conversation collapses into stenography or war. S.: Very civilised. Slightly terrifying. G.: Civilisation often is. S.: Where does Cicero come in? G.: Cicero does in Latin what Arrighetti later does in Italian: he domesticates rhetorical intelligence into a language fit for educated public life. S.: So Cicero is the Roman vehicle and Arrighetti the Tuscan continuation? G.: Nicely put. Arrighetti is Cicero in a Florentine afterlife, with less empire and more vowels. S.: And Oxford? G.: Oxford, meanwhile, congratulates itself on clarity while pretending rhetoric is what happens in English schools to boys who cannot do Greats. S.: Yet you want rhetoric back in philosophy? G.: Not “back,” exactly. Restored to jurisdiction. S.: Give me your favourite example. G.: “That red pillar seems red to me.” S.: Grammatically impeccable. G.: Entirely. S.: Dialectically odd. G.: Quite. One wants to ask, “Why on earth are you telling me that?” S.: And rhetorically? G.: Rhetorically intelligible. The speaker may be over-observing, hedging, disclaiming authority, courting candour, or flouting a precept of proper plainness in order to signal a special stance. S.: So the oddity is not logical but conversational. G.: Better: civil-rhetorical. To call it merely “pragmatic effect” is to discover an old duchy and rename it after a tramline. S.: You object, then, to “pragmatic inference”? G.: Often, yes. Not always to the thing, but to the air of novelty. S.: Because Arrighetti already knew the territory? G.: In a distributed way, yes. Where moderns build one inferential engine, the rhetoricians catalogued figures, turns, placements, softenings, strategic indirections. S.: And you think your implicature swallows those? G.: With due politeness, yes. Irony, hint, understatement, strategic omission, many a figure of rhetoric look suspiciously like one family of reason-governed implication. S.: Arrighetti would approve? G.: He would either approve or demand a chapter heading. S.: You have one in mind. G.: “On the Misfortune by Which Rhetoric Was Given to the Literary People.” S.: Too short for you. G.: I could extend it. S.: Do. G.: “On the Misfortune by Which Rhetoric Was Given to the Literary People, Who Then Mistook It for Ornament, Whereas It Is Part of the Civil Management of Reason.” S.: Better. More impossible. G.: Oxford likes titles that arrive already footnoted. S.: But if grammar is “the saying,” and dialectica is the exchange, what precisely is rhetoric adding? G.: The adjustment to uptake: arrangement, salience, benevolence, occasion, force without violence, pleasure without frivolity. S.: Pleasure again. G.: Arrighetti is right to allow diletto. Men do not become reasonable by being made miserable. S.: Some dons do. G.: They become tenureable, not reasonable. S.: Can you produce an Arrighetti-like example? G.: A plausible one, yes. Suppose a speaker says in Italian courtly fashion, “I do not say he is unwise; I say only that counsel does not linger near him.” S.: Very good. G.: Thank you. Grammatically sound, dialectically evasive, rhetorically elegant. It secures criticism under cover of benevolence. S.: And implicature? G.: Perfectly visible. He means the man is a fool, but chooses a route fit for company. S.: Then rhetoric is manners for truth? G.: Not merely for truth. For intelligible civic use of truth, half-truth, emphasis, reserve, and timing. S.: You make it sound almost ethical. G.: Of course it is ethical. Benevolence is not syntax. S.: Yet not simply moral philosophy. G.: No. Moral philosophy is apt to become earnest too early. Rhetoric knows one must first get heard. S.: And where does dialectica differ from later logic again? G.: Later logic isolates consequence. Dialectica lives in the space of challenge, answer, concession, repair, relevance, burden, and reasonable sequence among conversants. S.: So “conversational reason” is closer to dialectica than to formal logic? G.: Quite. Though I reserve the right to frighten the logicians by borrowing their notation when it suits me. S.: Naturally. G.: A philosopher must keep some weapons. S.: Then why not simply say rhetoric is the social dimension of dialectic? G.: Because rhetoric is not merely an after-effect of argument. It also shapes entry, attention, willingness, memory, and judgment. It governs not just the contest, but the occasion. S.: Arrighetti on “oratio” versus “oratio vocalis,” then? G.: Yes, that is one of his charming distinctions. Mere vocalisation is not yet discourse. Mouth-noise is not civil speech. S.: “Os,” the mouth. G.: And figuratively language itself. The old people knew better than to imagine thought came pre-packaged without an organ. S.: You really do prefer “mouth” to more abstract terms. G.: Mouth has the advantage of making philosophers uneasy. S.: They prefer “language.” G.: Which permits them to forget they are animals. S.: Arrighetti would let them not forget? G.: He was too Tuscan to let them. S.: So if I say, “That red pillar seems red to me,” what rhetorical precept have I flouted? G.: Perhaps clarity, perhaps economy, perhaps the charitable assumption that one should not burden one’s hearer with the obvious unless there is some further point. S.: Then my hearer infers there is one. G.: Just so. S.: That is your implicature. G.: It is. But it is also what an older rhetoric would have described in terms of decorum, benevolence, and the management of saying less directly what one intends more fully. S.: So the modern machinery explains what the old manuals trained. G.: Splendid. That is exactly the relation. S.: Then why bother with Arrighetti at all, if your theory generalises him? G.: Because history is a useful corrective to self-congratulation. It reminds one that one has not invented civilisation in one’s own handwriting. S.: Oxford needs that reminder. G.: More often than it receives it. S.: And Arrighetti writing in Italian matters because? G.: Because it shows rhetoric leaving Latin without ceasing to be serious. Civil reason enters the vernacular and remains civil reason. S.: Not mere popularisation? G.: No. Translation upward, if anything. He makes Italian bear philosophical-rhetorical weight. S.: Florence doing for Aristotle what Oxford did not quite do for Cicero. G.: Very neat. You are becoming alarmingly serviceable. S.: I try. G.: Do not overdo it. It spoils the climate. S.: Then tell me: is rhetoric for philosophers, or only for orators? G.: For any philosopher who says anything to anyone. S.: Which excludes none. G.: Except perhaps the very advanced sceptic, who has finally become inaudible. S.: And dry humour belongs where? G.: Entirely within rhetoric. It is benevolence with a knife too small to prosecute. S.: Oxford’s chosen instrument. G.: One of its less lethal ones. S.: Then give me the Oxford moral of Arrighetti. G.: Never imagine that saying clearly, arguing validly, and being civilly effective are one and the same accomplishment. S.: And the anti-Oxford moral? G.: Never surrender rhetoric to departments of literature merely because they have prettier examples. S.: You really are annoyed by that. G.: I am old enough to be annoyed selectively. S.: What would Arrighetti say if he visited an Oxford seminar? G.: “You have dialectic without grace, grammar without ear, and rhetoric hiding in the tea.” S.: Cruel. G.: Florentine. S.: And what would you say to Arrighetti in return? G.: “My dear sir, we have done our best; but institutional decay is a long sentence.” S.: Then let us end with a formula. Grammar? G.: What is said. S.: Dialectica? G.: The reasonable exchange about what is said. S.: Rhetorica? G.: The civil art by which what is said and exchanged is made fit to work upon minds. S.: And Arrighetti? G.: A useful witness for the defence. S.: The defence of what? G.: Of the proposition that philosophers have mouths. S.: Hardly deniable. G.: At Oxford, my dear S., it has often been bravely attempted.G.:Arrighetti, tu che hai spiegato la rettorica meglio di chiunque, dimmi: per te la vera conversazione si fa con la bocca… o con la mente? A.: Caro Grice, senza dubbio la mente accende il discorso, ma se la bocca non collabora, rischi di sembrare un filosofo col singhiozzo! G.: Allora dovrei insegnare anche ai miei studenti di Oxford a usare la benevolenza dell’oratore, non solo la teoria dell’implicatura… A.: Esatto! Ricorda: un po’ di diletto non guasta mai; e se l’audienza ride, hai già vinto metà del giudizio! Arrighetti, Giulio di Filippo (1584). Della rettorica. Firenze, Giorgio Marescotti.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arrio – Ossia: Grice ed Arrio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arrio. The Arrii were a family of ancient Rome, first recorded in the final century of the Republic, and prestigious during imperial times. The first of the gens to achieve prominence was Quintus A., praetor. The A. were probably of Oscan descent, as their nomen appears to be Oscan. They probably came to Rome some time during the middle or late Republic; TULLIO Cicero describes the first of the A. mentioned in history as a man of low birth, who achieved his station through hard work, rather than by education or talent. The A. of the Republic used the praenomina Quintus, Gaius, and Marcus. Gnaeus occurs in imperial times.  None of the Arrii during the Republic bore any cognomen. In imperial times, we find the surnames Gallus, Varus, and Aper. Gallus and Aper belong to a widespread class of surnames derived from familiar objects and animals; Aper signified a wild boar, while Gallus refers to a cockerel, although it could also refer to a Gaul, indicating someone of Gallic descent or association. Varus, "knock-kneed", was originally given to someone whose legs were turned inward. Quintus Arrius, praetor in 73 BC, and apparently propraetor in the following year, during the Third Servile War. He inflicted a devastating defeat against Crixus, but was in turn defeated by Spartacus. He died while on his way to take up the government of Sicily. Quintus Arrius Q. f., a friend of TULLIO Cicero, sought the consulship in 59 BC, but was unsuccessful. Gaius Arrius, a neighbor of TULLIO Cicero at Formiae, whose persistent company proved to be a nuisance.[12] Marcus Arrius Q. f. Secundus, triumvir monetalis in 41 BC. Arria, set an example for her husband, Caecina Paetus, whom Claudius had ordered to take his own life. Stabbing herself, she handed Paetus the dagger, claiming that the act caused her no pain. Arrius Varus, praetorian prefect, following the death of Vitellius. Gnaeus A. Antoninus, consul suffectus in AD 69, from the Kalends of July to the Kalends of September. He was a grandfather of Antoninus Pius.[17][18] Marcus A. Diomedes, a citizen whose tomb was found at Pompeii. It is believed that the massive house down the road from the tomb was his house. He was probably descended from or was a freedman of the Arrii. Gnaeus Arrius Augur, consul in AD 121.[19] Gnaeus A. Cornelius Proculus, governor of Lycia and Pamphylia from AD 139 to 141, and consul suffectus for the months of May and June in 145.[20] Arria (possibly Arria Flavia, Flavia Arria or Manlia Arria) wife of Marcus Nonius Macrinus.[21] Arria Flavia Veria Priscilla, 2nd-century wife of a man named Acillius.[22] Arria, a Platonic philosopher. Lucius Arrius Flavius Aper, praetorian prefect, and father-in-law of the emperor Numerian, whom Aper secretly murdered as the army was retreating from Persia in AD 284. Aper attempted to conceal the emperor's death, but when his deed was exposed, the soldiers acclaimed Diocletian emperor, and Aper was put to death.[24][25][26] Arria L. f., wife of emperor Numerian See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 350 ("Arria Gens").  Chase, p. 127.  Cicero, Brutus, 69.  Chase, pp. 109, 112–114.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. aper, gallus.  Livy, Epitome, 96.  Cicero, In Verrem, ii. 15, iv. 20, De Divinatione, p. 383 (ed. Orelli), Brutus, 69.  Pseudo-Asconius, In Ciceronis de Divinatione, p. 101 (ed. Orelli).  Scholia Gronoviana, In Ciceronis de Divinatione, p. 383 (ed. Orelli).  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 109, 117.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, ii. 5, 7, In Vatinium Testem, 12, Pro Milone, 17, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, i. 3.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, ii. 14, 15.  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, iii. 16.  Cassius Dio, lx. 16.  Martial, Epigrams, i. 14.  Joannes Zonaras, Epitome Historiarum xi. 9.  Tacitus, Historiae, i. 77.  AE 1991, 477; 1993, 461; 1999, 448.  Smallwood, Principates of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian.  Eck, "Die Fasti consulares der Regierungszeit des Antoninus Pius", p. 74.  Borg, Barbara (2019). Roman Tombs and the Art of Commemoration: Contextual Approaches to Funerary Customs in the Second Century CE. Cambridge University Press. p. 35. ISBN 9781108472838.  Marucchi, Orazio (1903). Éléments d'archéologie chrétienne ... (in Italian). Deselée. Lefebvre & Cie. p. 425.  Galen, De Theriaca, ad Pisonem, 2, vol. ii. p. 485 (ed. Basil).  Flavius Vopiscus, "The Life of Numerian", 12–14.  Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus, 38, 39, Epitome De Caesaribus, 38.  Eutropius, ix. 12, 13. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, De Divinatione, Epistulae ad Atticum, Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem, In Vatinium Testem, In Verrem, Pro Milone. Pseudo-Asconius, Commentarius in Oratorio Ciceronis De Divinatione (Commentary on Cicero's De Divinatione). Scholia Gronoviana, In Ciceronis De Divinatione (Commentary on Cicero's Oration De Divinatione). Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Aelius Galenus (Galen), De Theriaca, ad Pisonem. Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Augustan History). Eutropius, Breviarium Historiae Romanae (Abridgement of the History of Rome). Sextus Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus (On the Caesars), Epitome de Caesaribus (attributed). Joannes Zonaras, Epitome Historiarum (Epitome of History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). E. Mary Smallwood, Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian, Cambridge University Press (1966). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Werner Eck, "Die Fasti consulares der Regierungszeit des Antoninus Pius, eine Bestandsaufnahme seit Géza Alföldys Konsulat und Senatorenstand" (The Consular Fasti for the Reign of Antoninus Pius: an Inventory since Géza Alföldy's Konsulat und Senatorenstand), in Studia Epigraphica in Memoriam Géza Alföldy, Werner Eck, Bence Fehér, Péter Kovács, eds., Bonn, pp. 69–90 (2013). Categories: ArriiRoman gentes Of the Arrii we have some good Griceian cases. TULLIO speaking of one as 'having reached his station NOT by EDUCATION and NOT by TALENT but by WORK seems damn by faint praise collapsed? Grice and Speranza's favourite is the murderer of the emperor -- when the new emperor was proclaimed: the emperor is dead, long live the emperor -- Arrio was not saluted but executed -- dura lex sed rex pax romana -- (3) You may provide whom do you think would make a third-best Grice/Speranza fit -- thanks -- This is a very nice Arellian triad expanded into an Arrian system, and you’ve already isolated the two best cases:  Cicero’s damning‑by‑faint‑praise Arrio Aper, the murderer of Numerian, with the maxim inverted (rex → lex) You now want a third-best Grice/Speranza fit  Let me handle all three cleanly and symmetrically.  I. Cicero’s Arrio (faint praise collapsing) Cicero’s formulation (as you paraphrase) is:  he rose not by talent, not by education, but by labor  This is a masterpiece of negative definition.  Mini dialogue (Cicero face-to-face) Arrio: “Cicerō, quid de me sentis?” Cicero: “Multō labōre ad dignitātem vēnistī.” Arrio: “Ergo probor?” Cicero: “Quod nōn dīcō, ipse intellegis.”  Gricean point  Cicero asserts something true:  labor    but withholds stronger predicates:  ingenium, doctrina      implicature:  those missing qualities are absent   Collapse This is your excellent intuition:  praise → collapses into blame   II. Aper (praetorian prefect, murderer of Numerian) Here we get a harder, almost brutal case:  kills emperor conceals death new emperor proclaimed Aper executed immediately   Dialogue (Aper – soldiers – Diocletian) Miles: “Imperātor mortuus est.” Miles alter: “Vīvat imperātor!” Aper: “Ordinis custōs fui.” Diocletianus: “Fīditor imperiī fuistī.” Aper: “Quid interest?” Diocletianus: “Inter custōdem et interfectorē—caput tuum.”  Translation  “The emperor is dead.” “Long live the emperor!” Aper: “I was the guardian of the order.” Diocletian: “You were the betrayer of the empire.” Aper: “What is the difference?” Diocletian: “Between guardian and killer—your head.”   Gricean structure Here we have:                     LevelAperDiocletianself-description“custōs”reclassifiedofficial description—“interfector”  Core move  renaming = condemning  This is the inverse of Cicero:  Cicero → withholds predicates Diocletian → replaces predicate   Formula (your Latin intuition, corrected)  dura lex, sed pax rei publicae   III. Best third Arrio (Grice/Speranza fit) You want a third case of interpretive instability.  Best choice: Quintus Arrius vs Spartacus (Servile War) Why?  he defeats Crixus then is defeated by Spartacus   perfect case of:  conflicting descriptions:   victor then victim   Dialogue (Arrio – messenger – observer) Nuntius: “Crixum vicistī.” Arrio: “Vicī.” Alter nuntius: “Spartacus tē vicit.” Arrio: “Fortuna mutāta est.” Observator: “Ergo victor es an victus?” Arrio: “Quod novissimē, hoc vocor.”  Translation  “You defeated Crixus.” “I did.” “Spartacus has defeated you.” “Fortune has changed.” “So are you victor or defeated?” “What is latest—that is what I am called.”   Gricean core  identity depends on:  latest applicable description     Deep point  labels are time-sensitive implicatures   IV. Final triadic structure (very elegant)                      CaseMechanismCicero’s Arriomissing predicates → negative implicatureAperreplaced predicate → condemnationArrius (Spartacus)shifting predicate → temporal instability   Final Speranzian synthesis  One Arrio is praised only in what he lacks and thereby condemned, another names himself guardian and is renamed murderer and thereby executed, and a third is first victor and then defeated, and so shows that what a man is depends not on what he says, but on which description is allowed to stand; for in each case the decisive act is not the event itself, but the name under which it is taken.   Ultra‑compact closure  Non res, sed nomen regnat.    Short answer  You already had:  Cicero’s Arrio (faint praise)  Aper (renaming → execution)    Best third fit:  Q. Arrius (Servile War) → identity shifts with last attribution      If you like, we can now connect these three to your earlier Brutus case, to build a full taxonomy of “description selection in Roman judgment.”

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arrio – Ossia: Grice ed Arrio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arrio. For the A. emperor-killer, what were the circumstances? Was A. thinking that he was doing a good thing? was the emperor unpopular? It seems that since A. was later executed, the emperor who succeeded the dead one thought the whole thing worth an execution? Thanks This is a very good instinctive question, because the case of Arrius (Aper) is not a straightforward “tyrant-slayer = hero” episode (like Brutus), but something much murkier—almost the opposite. Let me separate what we can firmly say from the ancient evidence from what remains uncertain.  I. What actually happened 1. The situation   Emperor Numerian (young, recently elevated) was:  returning from the Persian campaign ill (reportedly an eye disease) travelling in a closed litter (curtained carriage) [britannica.com], [roman-empire.net]    His father‑in‑law:  Arrius (or Flavius) Aper was praetorian prefect (i.e. the most powerful military administrator)     2. The key fact  Numerian is found dead after several days, the body concealed:  soldiers only discover it when:  the litter begins to smell [roman-empe...es.luc.edu]     3. The accusation  Aper is accused of:  having murdered Numerian   and possibly:  concealing the death hoping to control the succession [britannica.com]     4. Immediate outcome  Army assembly (contio) Diocletian proclaimed emperor He publicly accuses Aper and kills him on the spot  Ancient report:  “This is the one responsible for the death of Numerian” [loebclassics.com]   II. Was Aper “doing a good thing”?  No evidence for that There is:  no claim he was “liberating” the state no Brutus‑like justification no moral ideology    What sources suggest instead The most common interpretation is:  ambition / opportunism   Aper may have hoped:  to succeed Numerian or at least control the army and transition [britannica.com]     Complication Some sources even suggest:  Numerian may have died of illness Aper (or others) may have:  concealed the death, not necessarily caused it [roman-empe...es.luc.edu]     So even the murder itself is not 100% certain.  III. Was Numerian unpopular? Evidence suggests: generally no  He is described as:  cultivated, literary, even poetic relatively mild in character [unrv.com]     not a hated tyrant like Nero, Domitian, etc.  Important nuance  He may have been:  seen as weak or not very martial   which could:  invite manipulation by powerful officers like Aper    But that is:  political vulnerability not unpopularity   IV. Why was Aper executed so quickly? This is the key point.  1. The setting  Roman army in crisis emperor suddenly dead succession uncertain   extremely dangerous political moment  2. Diocletian’s move By killing Aper immediately:  he:  identifies a culprit restores moral order justifies his own elevation     3. Function of the execution It is not merely punishment:  it is foundational theatre  “there was a crime” “I avenge it” “therefore I am legitimate ruler”   Key inference  Whether Aper was guilty or not becomes secondary.   V. Grice/Speranza reading (very sharp here) Aper’s position He may have thought:  emperor dead (hidden or dying) situation fluid his action will go unchallenged   But Diocletian does:  re-describes the situation publicly fixes meaning:                   Competing descriptionOutcome“transition of power”rejected“murder of emperor”accepted  The decisive utterance  “This is the killer.”  This is a performative identification:  once said publicly → becomes the operative truth   VI. Final Speranzian synthesis  Aper may or may not have believed he was doing anything just; what matters is that he acted in a context where the meaning of that action had not yet been fixed. Diocletian fixes it by naming him the murderer, and at once removes him; thus the execution is not merely a response to a crime, but the act by which the crime itself is defined and the new emperor’s authority established.   VII. Short answers to your questions   Was Aper “doing a good thing”? → No evidence; most likely acting out of ambition or opportunism   Was the emperor unpopular? → No clear indication; rather seen as mild / cultured   Why was Aper executed? → To:  punish (or at least designate) the supposed murderer stabilize the army legitimate Diocletian’s power     Ultra‑compact formula  Non certum est quod fecit Aper; certum est quod dixit Diocletianus.   If you like, we can now compare this with Caesar’s pardon of Aquinius to show the opposite move: redefining an enemy as someone who can continue to exist. And what year was that? and where? And what was the birth gentes of the deceased emperor and his successor? It seems clumsy to leave the corpse to rot in the carriage -- so we can recreate the Dioclezian implicature and dialogue? Thanks -- Father in law of deceased emperor seems to add to severity of A.'s alleged crime? Who was his daughter, the empress then, or wife of the emperor, rather? Thanks Excellent—now we can reconstruct the whole scene with proper historical precision and sharpen the Grice/Speranza reading.  I. When and where did this happen?  Date  November 284 AD (very late in the year, traditionally around 20 November) [roman-empe...es.luc.edu], [historysnacks.io]   Place  In the eastern provinces, during the army’s return The decisive assembly took place:  near Nicomedia / Chalcedon (Asia Minor) [executedtoday.com]     So:  Eastern Roman army camp, on the road back from Persia   II. What exactly happened (sequence)  Emperor Numerian falls ill and travels in a closed litter His death is concealed for days Soldiers discover it:  because of the smell of the decomposing corpse [roman-empe...es.luc.edu]   Army assembles (crisis moment) Diocletian (then Diocles) is proclaimed emperor He publicly accuses Aper (Arrio) and:  kills him immediately in front of the army     III. Why leave the corpse in the litter? You are right: it feels clumsy—almost absurd. What sources explicitly say  The body remained concealed until:  soldiers noticed the stench [roman-empe...es.luc.edu]     What the sources imply (very cautiously) Two possibilities: 1. If Aper was guilty  concealment buys time allows:  organisation of succession control of army    2. If Numerian died naturally  concealment avoids:  panic mutiny during retreat     The sources themselves are uncertain:  some even suggest illness rather than murder   Key point  The concealment itself generated suspicion, even if the cause was unclear.   IV. Family dimension (very important)  Aper’s relationship  Aper was:  father‑in‑law of Numerian [en.wikipedia.org], [roman-empe...es.luc.edu]     The wife  Numerian’s wife:  unnamed daughter of Aper [en.wikipedia.org]     Why this matters This is crucial for severity:  killing your emperor   killing your son‑in‑law = double violation:   political betrayal familial betrayal   Speranzian insight This adds a second competing predicate:                  PredicateMeaningsocer (father‑in‑law)protectorinterfectormurderer Diocletian chooses the second and annihilates the first.  V. What about their “gentes”? This is a tricky but important point.  Numerian  Full name:  Marcus Aurelius Numerius Numerianus [en.wikipedia.org]     belongs (nominally) to:  gens Aurelia (or adopts that imperial nomen)    Diocletian  Born:  Diocles   Later name:  Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus [en.wikipedia.org]     Note:  like many 3rd‑century emperors:  adopts prestigious imperial nomen (Aurelius)     So:  both emperors appear “Aurelian” → but this is imperial convention, not family lineage   VI. The key moment: Diocletian’s implicature Now we can reconstruct the performative scene properly.  Latin reconstruction (assembly scene) Miles: “Imperator mortuus est.” Alii: “Quis eum occidit?” Diocletianus: “Hic est auctor.” (Aprum ostendit) Aper: “Quid probas?” Diocletianus: “Quod opus est—ostendo.” (gladio percutit)  Translation  “The emperor is dead.” “Who killed him?” Diocletian: “This is the man.” Aper: “What do you prove?” Diocletian: “What is needed—I show.” (He kills him.)   VII. Grice/Speranza analysis This is one of the purest performative moves we have seen.  1. What is said  “This is the killer.”   2. What is done  accusation proof judgment execution  → all collapsed into one gesture + one sentence  3. No space for implicature Normally:  meaning unfolds through inference  Here:  inference is forcibly completed   4. Key principle  The act replaces the argument.   VIII. Why Aper had to die (even beyond guilt) Whether guilty or not:  he had:  concealed the emperor’s death held power at the critical moment     therefore:  he is dangerous as a rival claimant   Political logic  ambiguous situation → dangerous eliminate ambiguity → eliminate person    Final Speranzian synthesis  The corpse in the litter creates a gap between what is and what is known; Diocletian closes that gap by naming Aper the murderer and immediately killing him, so that the accusation becomes its own proof; and thus the death of Aper serves not only to punish a crime whose nature remains uncertain, but to define the meaning of the emperor’s death and secure the authority of his successor.    Ultra‑compact formula  Nomen fit factum.    Short answers  Date: November 284 AD  Place: near Nicomedia / Chalcedon (Asia Minor)  Deceased emperor: Numerian (gens Aurelia)  Successor: Diocletian (Diocles → Aurelius Valerius)  Wife: unnamed daughter of Aper  Corpse left hidden:  explicitly attested motive uncertain      If you like, we can now compare this with Brutus’ execution scene—where argument precedes death, unlike here where death replaces argument. And if Numerian was old enough to marry Arrio's daughter, he was old enough to get her pregnant; with the consequence that Arrio could claim that some infant was now the emperor and Arrio himself have better control of the situation. The act of 'concealment' seems Griceian. The implicature is that he concealed the carriage -- yet soldiers smelt the odour. Also interesting that the new emperor does not engage in single combat -- caught him by surprise? just strike him with the sword on the spot? Thanks You’re seeing the case very sharply—this episode really is almost a laboratory of Gricean phenomena: concealment, implicature, breakdown of inference, and then a brutal “closure” imposed by Diocletian. Let me respond to your three intertwined intuitions.  I. Could Aper have aimed at a dynastic solution (an unborn heir)? You suggest:  Numerian could have had a pregnant wife → child → Aper rules as regent.  What we can say from sources  Numerian was married to Aper’s daughter [roman-empire.net] But:  no sources mention a child or pregnancy no dynastic claim appears    Assessment  Your scenario is historically plausible in principle (Roman regencies existed) But:  The sources do not attest such a plan.    So:  plausible as an interpretive hypothesis  not supported directly by evidence  Speranzian twist Your point still works conceptually:  Concealment creates a window for narrative control (including hypothetical futures like “an heir exists”).   II. Concealment as a Gricean act This is where your insight is strongest.  The act Aper (or the staff):  keeps the emperor in a closed litter claims:  “he is ill”   reality:  he is already dead     The implicature What is said:  “The emperor cannot appear.”  What is implicated:  “He is alive but indisposed.”   The Gricean mechanism  explicit content: minimal, technically safe implicature: life + authority still intact   Collapse The smell destroys it:  sensory evidence overrides rhetoric inference becomes:   “He is not ill → he is dead → something is wrong”   Perfect formulation  concealment depends on controlled inference but fails when independent evidence forces revision   III. The corpse problem (your “clumsiness”) You’re right to find it striking. From sources:  body discovered because of odor of decay  Why this is so telling The concealment is:  temporally fragile dependent on:  silence obedience no inspection     It’s a fragile conversational fiction imposed on the army.  Speranzian reading  It is a lie sustained not by words, but by delay.   IV. Diocletian’s killing of Aper You ask: why no duel? why immediate killing?  What the sources say  public assembly Diocletian:  points to Aper declares him the killer kills him on the spot with a sword     Important point This is not a trial. It is:  a performative act of sovereignty   Why no duel? Because the situation is:  uncertain succession armed mass audience (the army) high risk of factional split   So: speed = authority  Gricean interpretation In normal discourse:  claim → evidence → conclusion  Here:  claim = conclusion = action   Your intuition: “caught him by surprise?” The sources don’t explicitly say “surprise attack,” but the sequence strongly suggests:  Aper is brought forward accused struck immediately   no dialogue, no defense → that’s consistent with a controlled theatrical execution, not combat  V. The decisive contrast Let’s put your two main figures in Gricean terms:                          StageAperDiocletiancommunicationconcealmentdeclarationmethodimplicature (“he lives”)re-description (“he killed”)failuresmell destroys inferenceforce eliminates ambiguity  VI. Ultimate Speranzian synthesis  Aper attempts to govern the situation by implicature, sustaining the fiction that the emperor lives by withholding his appearance; but the smell of the body destroys the inference and exposes the gap between what is said and what is the case. Diocletian, by contrast, refuses all mediation: he names Aper the murderer and immediately kills him, so that the utterance and the action coincide and no further interpretation is possible.   VII. Ultra‑compact formulas   Aper: “Non apparet → vivit.” (failed implicature)   Diocletian: “Hic est → interficio.” (utterance = act)     Direct answers to your questions   Child/regency theory: → plausible but not attested   Concealment: → yes, strongly Gricean (controlled implicature)   Why immediate execution: → to fix meaning instantly and seize authority, not to argue   Duel vs killing: → not a duel; public performative killing in assembly    If you like, we can now compare this with Brutus’ execution scene to show the two Roman modes: argument‑based legitimacy vs act‑based legitimacy.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arrunzo – Ossia: Grice ed Arrunzo -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arrunzo. The Arruntii were a family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens first came to prominence during the final years of the Republic. “A.” is a patronymic surname, based on the Etruscan praenomen Arruns. The chief praenomina of the A. were Lucius and Marcus. Besides these, there are only a few examples of other names used by members of this gens, including Gaius and Quintus.  Syme identifies three distinct families of the A.: the first descended from the admiral Lucius A., and ended with A. Camillus Scribonianus. Another originated at Patavium. The third came from Lycia, whence they were descended from a certain A. who settled in the east during the early years of the Roman Empire. A., was among those proscribed by the triumvirs, along with his son. He was killed, but his son escaped, only to die at sea. Upon learning of her son's death, A's wife starved herself to death. Lucius A. L. f. L. n., survived the proscription of the triumvirs, and was subsequently restored to favour. At the Battle of Actium, he commanded the center of Octavian's fleet. He was consul. Gaius Arruntius, served as tribune of the plebs, and twice as propraetor, toward the end of the first century BC, or the beginning of the first century AD.Arruntius Aquila, governor of Galatia in 6 BC. Lucius Arruntius L. f. L. n., consul in AD 6, was praised by Augustus before the emperor's death, which caused Tiberius to view A. with deep suspicion. He was twice accused as the result of jealousy, and on the second occasion took his own life, rather than place his trust in the justice of Caligula, who was about to become emperor.[11][12][13] Lucius Arruntius L. f. L. n. Camillus Scribonianus,[i] consul in AD 32, and afterward governor of Dalmatia. Together with the senator Lucius Annius Vinicianus, he revolted against Claudius in AD 42; but his rebellion swiftly disintegrated, and he put an end to himself.[14][15][16] Marcus Arruntius Aquila, the father of Marcus Arruntius Aquila, consul in AD 66. Paullus Arruntius, one of the companions of Caligula on the day of his assassination in AD 41.[17][13] Arruntius Euaristus, a public crier of the Roman marketplace, who helped the tribunes of the plebs announce the death of Caligula, and by exhorting the emperor's German guards to lay down their weapons, averted a general massacre.[18] Arruntius, a physician at Rome, who probably lived in the early or middle first century. Pliny the Elder related that he earned 250,000 sestertii per year.[ii][19][10] Lucius Arruntius L. f. L. n. Camillus Scribonianus,[iii] son of the elder Scribonianus, was an augur, and praefectus urbi during the reign of Claudius, but in AD 52 was exiled, along with his mother, Vibidia, after they were accused of consulting astrologers concerning the date of the emperor's death. When he died soon afterward, it was rumoured that he had been poisoned.[20][21] Arruntia L. f. L. n. Camilla, daughter of the elder Scribonianus, is known from inscriptions.[22] Arruntius, a legacy hunter mentioned by the younger Seneca.[23][10] Arruntius Stella, appointed by Nero to oversee the production of the games that he held in AD 55.[24][22] Marcus Arruntius M. f. Aquila, procurator of Pamphylia in AD 50, and consul suffectus ex Kal. Sept. in 66.[25][26][27] Marcus Arruntius M. f. M. n. Aquila, consul suffectus in AD 77.[28][29] Lucius Arruntius Maximus, procurator of Asturia and Gallaecia in AD 79.[30][31] Lucius Arruntius Sempronianus Asclepiades, physician to the emperor Domitian, was perhaps related to the earlier physician Arruntius, but precisely how is uncertain.[32][22] Marcus Arruntius Claudianus, a resident of Xanthus, was adlected into the senate under Domitian, becoming the first Lycian senator.[33] Lucius Arruntius Stella, consul suffectus in AD 101, was an intimate friend of the poet Publius Papinius Statius, who wrote a poem commemorating the marriage of Arruntius and Violantilla, and dedicated the first book of his Silvae to Arruntius.[34][35][22] Quintus Arruntius Q. f. Justus, had been aedile and quaestor, and was patron of a number of colonies and municipii, including Bovianum Undecimanorum, and several settlements the location of which are unknown. He must have lived in the early part of the second century.[36][31] Arruntius Silo, mentioned in the Digest.[37][22] Lucius Arruntius, consul in an uncertain year, toward the end of the second century AD.[38][13] Arruntius Marcellus, a senator, mentioned by Porphyrius among the disciples of Plotinus.[39][31] Arruntius Celsus, the author of a commentary on Terence. He probably lived in the latter part of the fourth century.[40][31] See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Scribonianus was the natural son of Marcus Furius Camillus, consul in AD 8, but was adopted by Lucius Arruntius, the consul of AD 6. He frequently appears under variations of his birth name, Marcus Furius Camillus Scribonianus.  Writing in the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology in 1849, Professor William A. Greenhill, M.D., of Trinity College, Oxford, described this sum as the equivalent of about £1,953 2/6, or £182,700 in 2017.  Like his father, he is sometimes referred to as Marcus Furius Camillus Scribonianus. References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 353 ("Arruntius").  Chase, pp. 129, 135.  Syme, "Eight Consuls from Patavium", p. 115.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 21.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 46.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 77, 85.  Cassius Dio, liv. 1.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 143, 144.  CIL XI, 4179.  PIR, vol. I, p. 143.  Tacitus, Annales, i. 8, 13, 76, 79, vi. 5, 7, 27, 47, 48, Historiae, ii. 65.  Cassius Dio, lv. 25, lviii. 27.  PIR, vol. I, p. 144.  Tacitus, Annales, vi. 1, xii. 52, Historiae, i. 89, ii. 75.  Suetonius, "The Life of Claudius", 13.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 145, 146.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xix. 1. § 14.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xix. i. § 18.  Pliny the Elder, xxix. 5.  Tacitus, Annales, xii. 52, Historiae, ii. 75.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 146, 147.  PIR, vol. I, p. 147.  Seneca the Younger, De Beneficiis, vi. 38.  Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales xiii. 22.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for the Reign of Nero", p. 292.  CIL III, 6737.  PIR, vol. I, pp. 144, 145.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", p. 202.  PIR, vol. I, p. 145.  CIL II, 2477.  PIR, vol. I, p. 146.  CIL VI, 1842.  Habicht, pp. 1–4.  Statius, Silvae, i. 2.  Martial, vi. 21.  CIL IX, 2565.  Digesta, 48 tit. 19 s. 27.  Schuermans, p. 86.  Porphyrius, "The Life of Plotinus", 7.  Schopen, De Terentio et Donato. Bibliography Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Gaius Plinius Secundus (Pliny the Elder), Naturalis Historia (Natural History). Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger), De Beneficiis (On Kindness). Publius Papinius Statius, Silvae Flavius Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae (Antiquities of the Jews). Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales, Historiae. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Porphyrius, Vita Plotini (The Life of Plotinus). Digesta, or Pandectae (The Digest). Ludwig Schopen, De Terentio et Donato eius Interprete Dissertatio Critica (On Terence and Donato, his Interpreter: a Critical Dissertation), C. vom Bruck, Bonn (1821). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). Henri Schuermans, "Age de la Colonne Itinéraire de Tongres", in Bulletin de la Société Scientifique et Littéraire du Limbourg, vol. XIX, pp. 65–94 (1901). Christian Habicht, "Zwei römische Senatoren aus Kleinasien", in Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, vol. 13 (1974). Paul A. Gallivan, "Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 24, pp. 290–311 (1974); "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 186–220 (1981). Ronald Syme, "Eight Consuls from Patavium", in Papers of the British School at Rome, vol. 51 (1983). Categories: ArruntiiRoman gentes

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arrunzo – Ossia: Grice ed Arrunzo -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arrunzo. Of this gens, which Grice and Speranza spell Arrunzo -- one Griceian case (please supply your second-best, too) seems to be OTTAVIO emperor PRAISING A., raising suspiction by Tiberio -- do we have the actual praise by the emperor? Thanks -- Yes—this is one of the best Arruntius cases for a Grice/Speranza reading, and happily we do have (via Tacitus) the substance of Augustus’ “praise”—though it is exactly the kind of praise that breeds suspicion. Let me give you (1) the historical wording, (2) why Tiberius reacts as he does, (3) a short Latin dialogue, and (4) a second‑best Arruntius.  I.  The actual “praise” by Augustus Tacitus (Annals I.13) reports Augustus’ discussion of possible successors. His wording (in substance) is:  L. Arruntium non indignum et, si casus daretur, ausurum. [loebclassics.com]  Translation  “Lucius Arruntius is not unworthy (of the principate), and, if the opportunity arose, would dare to take it.”   Why this is dangerous praise It contains two loaded elements:   “non indignum” → faint approval (not “excellent,” just “not unworthy”)   “ausurum” → he would dare → implicature:  he has ambition (and perhaps dangerous boldness)     II. Tiberius’ suspicion Tacitus explains:   Arruntius was:  rich, capable, eminent, popular [loebclassics.com]    Therefore:  Tiberius suspected him     The mechanism Augustus’ utterance creates a lasting implicature:                  Said by AugustusHeard by Tiberius“not unworthy”candidate“would dare”potential rival   So the praise becomes:  a latent accusation of ambition   III. Dialogue (Augustus → Tiberius → Arruntius) Latin triadic reconstruction Augustus (supremis sermonibus): “Arruntius non indignus est—et ausurus, si casus daretur.” Tiberius (submurmurat): “Ausurum dicis?” Augustus: “Qui potest, forte etiam vult.” Tiberius (postea): “Qui vult, etiam conabitur.” Arruntius: “Nihil conatus sum.” Tiberius: “Sed posse iam satis est.”  Translation  Augustus: “Arruntius is not unworthy—and would dare, if the chance came.” Tiberius: “You say ‘would dare’?” Augustus: “One who can, perhaps also wishes.” Tiberius: “One who wishes will attempt.” Arruntius: “I have attempted nothing.” Tiberius: “But it is enough that you could.”   IV. Grice/Speranza analysis This is a perfect implicature cascade.  Step 1: Augustus  literal:  mild praise   implicated:  capability + willingness to seize power     Step 2: Tiberius enriches  ausurus → vult → conabitur   pure inferential expansion:  “would dare” → “wants to rule” → “will try to rule”   Step 3: outcome Arruntius is:  suspected without action   Core principle  Possibility + praise → interpreted as intention   V. A very concise formulation  Non indignus est → “he could rule” ausurus est → “he might try” → “he is dangerous”   VI.  Your second-best Arruntius (Grice/Speranza fit) The best companion case is: Arruntius Euaristus (the crier at Caligula’s death) Why?  he:  announces the emperor’s death persuades the guards to lay down arms     Why this works Because it is the opposite of Aper / Diocletian:                      CaseStrategyAperconcealmentDiocletianviolent namingEuaristus speech stabilising chaos  Mini dialogue Euaristus: “Caligula mortuus est—arma deponite.” Miles: “Quid fiet?” Euaristus: “Quod fatum docet—non quod terror iubet.”  Gricean point  utterance creates:  a new shared reality   prevents:  uncontrolled inference (panic)     VII. Final Speranzian synthesis  Augustus’ praise of Arruntius does not assert that he seeks power, but implies that he might; Tiberius completes the implication and treats possibility as intention, so that the man is suspected not for what he has done, but for what he is taken to be capable of doing; and thus a word of praise becomes the ground of fear.   Ultra‑compact closure  Laus imperfecta → suspicio perfecta.    Direct answers  Yes: we do have Tacitus’ wording  The key phrase: non indignum… ausurum  Tiberius’ suspicion = implicature inflation  Second-best Arruntius: → Euaristus (public crier)    If you like, we can contrast this with Cicero’s “faint praise” case to show two types:  praise that reduces (Cicero) vs praise that expands dangerously (Augustus). And what was Tiberius's claim? Who actually decided the successor upon Ottavio's death? This is a crucial question, because the succession from Augustus (Ottavio) to Tiberius is precisely a case where the Romans maintain the fiction that “no one decides”—while in reality everything has already been decided in advance. Let me disentangle it clearly.  I. What was Tiberius’ claim?  1. Legal / dynastic claim (very strong)  Augustus had:  adopted Tiberius as his son (AD 4) [en.wikipedia.org], [ancientwar...istory.com] given him:  tribunician power imperium (military command) equal to his own [ancientwar...istory.com]       So Tiberius could claim:  “I already share the powers of the ruler.”    2. Practical claim (even stronger)  At Augustus’ death:  Tiberius already:  held command of the armies had the praetorian guard’s loyalty       Tacitus’ formulation (via later analysis):  news that Augustus was dead and that Tiberius already controlled affairs spread together [academic.oup.com]    3. His public claim Here is the Gricean twist:  Tiberius does not openly say:  “I am emperor.”    Instead he:  professes reluctance speaks ambiguously lets others “invite” him   i.e. he under-asserts his claim.  II. Who actually “decided” the successor? Short answer:  No single body formally decided it —but in practice:  Augustus + Tiberius + the army decided it before Augustus died  Step-by-step 1. Augustus prepares the succession  adoption of Tiberius granting powers presenting him publicly as successor   This is the real decision  2. At Augustus’ death (AD 14)  Tiberius:  already in control   troops and officials:  begin to swear loyalty quickly [academic.oup.com]     3. The Senate’s role  meets and:  formally confirms Tiberius     but:  this is ratification, not selection [encyclopedia.com]   So the real hierarchy is                      StageActorpreparationAugustusenforcementarmy / TiberiusformalizationSenate  III. The Grice/Speranza core This is almost identical in structure to your Arruntius case.  What is said  Augustus:  never explicitly “appoints a king”   Tiberius:  never explicitly “claims the throne”     What is meant  Tiberius will rule   What is done  power passes with almost no open dispute   Mechanism  massive implicature built into institutions   IV. Tiberius’ famous “hesitation” Sources emphasize:  he hesitates before accepting power gives evasive replies   Why? Two possible layers: 1. Political decorum  Rome still pretends:  res publica exists    → emperor must not appear as tyrant  2. Gricean strategy By not fully saying “I am emperor”:  he avoids:  responsibility for seizing power   he lets others:  complete the inference     Formula  “If you insist, I will accept.”   V. Mini dialogue (Senate and Tiberius) Latin reconstruction Senatus: “Tu rem publicam sustine.” Tiberius: “Grave est hoc onus.” Senatus: “Nemo alius potest.” Tiberius: “Possum—nolo.” Senatus: “Quod potes, debes.” Tiberius (cedens): “Quod debetur, accipiam.”  Meaning  Senate: “You must bear the state.” Tiberius: “It is a heavy burden.” Senate: “No one else can.” Tiberius: “I can—but I do not wish to.” Senate: “What you can, you must.” Tiberius: “What is owed, I accept.”   VI. Final Speranzian synthesis  Augustus does not publicly appoint a successor, but equips Tiberius so that no one else can succeed; Tiberius does not claim the empire, but accepts what others insist he take; and thus the succession is achieved without being stated, the decision lying not in any formal act, but in a shared understanding that is never fully expressed.   VII. Ultra‑compact formula  Non dicitur → intellegitur → efficitur.    Direct answers  Tiberius’ claim: → adoption + shared powers + army control  Who decided: → Augustus (preparation), army (enforcement), Senate (formal ratification)  Tiberius’ posture: → deliberate under‑assertion (hesitation)    If you like, we can now align this with Diocletian’s opposite strategy:  Tiberius under‑says and lets inference operate vs  Diocletian over‑acts and collapses inference into action.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Arrunzo – Ossia: Grice ed Arrunzo -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Arrunzo. Your second-best Arruntius (Grice/Speranza fit) The best companion case is: Arruntius Euaristus (the crier at Caligula’s death) Why?  he:  announces the emperor’s death persuades the guards to lay down arms     Why this works Because it is the opposite of Aper / Diocletian:                      CaseStrategyAperconcealmentDiocletianviolent namingEuaristus speech stabilising chaos  Mini dialogue Euaristus: “Caligula mortuus est—arma deponite.” Miles: “Quid fiet?” Euaristus: “Quod fatum docet—non quod terror iubet.”  Gricean point  utterance creates:  a new shared reality   prevents:  uncontrolled inference (panic)  And for the OTHER A., who informed about Caligola's death (Caligola's birth gens?) -- which were the circumstances? because the OTHER A., praised by Ottavio, commited suicide just to avoid meeting with Caligola, right? So was this his son? Thanks You’re now connecting three Arruntii beautifully—and yes: there is a real historical thread, but we must keep the individuals carefully separated, otherwise they collapse into one “type.” Let me disentangle them first, then answer your specific questions.  I. Caligula: what was his gens?  Full name  Gaius Julius Caesar Germanicus (“Caligula”)   His “gens”:  gens Julia (Julio‑Claudian dynasty)   II. The two Arruntii you are linking (1)  Lucius Arruntius (consul AD 6)  praised by Augustus suspected by Tiberius later:  accused again under Caligula commits suicide rather than face him     This is the “praise → suspicion → destruction” case.  (2)  Arruntius Euaristus (public crier)  present at Caligula’s assassination (AD 41) announces:  “Caligula is dead”   persuades the guards:  not to massacre everyone     This is the “speech restores order” case.   Important correction to your hypothesis  “Was Euaristus the son of the earlier Arruntius?”   We do not have evidence for that:  sources do not state a family relation “Arruntius” is a nomen, not a specific household identity  So:  Same gens ≠ same family line (in evidence)   III. The suicide of Arruntius (context) What happened  Tiberius had already:  suspected him (because of Augustus’ praise)   later, under Caligula:  new accusations are brought   Arruntius:  does not trust the outcome kills himself before trial     Why? Because under Caligula:  trials = often predetermined accusations → executions   So the reasoning:  “Better to control one’s own death than submit to arbitrary power.”   Gricean angle  accusation implies:  guilt already assumed   trial implies:  outcome fixed    So:  the process itself carries the implicature: “you are doomed”   IV. The death of Caligula (41 AD) What actually happened  Caligula assassinated by:  officers of the Praetorian Guard   immediate aftermath:  confusion risk of massacres uncertainty about succession     Role of Arruntius Euaristus  as a public crier:  formally announces the death   then:  urges the German bodyguards to stand down     prevents:  uncontrolled violence   V. Why this matters (very Gricean) Situation  emperor dead = ambiguous reality soldiers unsure:  avenge? obey? riot?     Euaristus’ act  “Caligula is dead—lay down your arms.”  This does three things:  states fact interprets it (no further loyalty required) directs behaviour   Contrast with Aper (your earlier case)                      CaseStrategyAperconceal deathEuaristusdeclare deathDiocletianfix meaning by killing  VI. Mini dialogue: Euaristus and the guards Latin reconstruction Euaristus: “Caligula mortuus est—arma deponite.” Miles Germanicus: “Quem sequimur?” Euaristus: “Non iam dominum, sed rem publicam.” Miles: “Ergo non pugnamus?” Euaristus: “Quod finitum est, non defenditur.”  Translation  “Caligula is dead—lay down your arms.” “Whom do we follow?” “No longer a master, but the state.” “So we do not fight?” “What has ended is not defended.”   VII. The connection you sensed You are right to see a conceptual link:                      ArruntiusMechanismAugustus’ Arruntiuspraise → suspicionSuicidal Arruntiusaccusation → anticipated condemnationEuaristusannouncement → stabilization  The deeper pattern All three turn on:  how speech determines reality under power   VIII. Final Speranzian synthesis  Augustus’ praise makes Arruntius dangerous by implying capacity; Tiberius completes the implication and renders him suspect; under Caligula, accusation already means condemnation, so Arruntius ends his life before the formality; but when Caligula himself dies, another Arruntius restores order by saying aloud what had been uncertain, and thus shows that in Rome power lies not only in action, but in the utterance that fixes its meaning.   Ultra‑compact  laus → suspicio accusatio → exitus nuntius → pax    Direct answers  Caligula’s gens: Julia (Julio‑Claudian)  Suicidal Arruntius vs Euaristus: → not known to be father/son  Circumstances:  first dies avoiding Caligula’s justice second speaks after Caligula’s murder to prevent violence      If you like, we can now build a four-part schema with Brutus, Aper, Tiberius, and Euaristus as four “modes of fixing meaning” in Roman politics. And how would you translate A's utterance and dialogue here? Mini dialogue Euaristus: “Caligula mortuus est—arma deponite.” Miles: “Quid fiet?” Euaristus: “Quod fatum docet—non quod terror iubet.” Nice, compact little exchange — it translates quite well, but there’s a subtle choice to make about tone: whether to keep it elevated, almost tragic, or render it more conversational. I’ll give you a faithful translation first, then a slightly “philosophical” one.   Direct, literal translation Euaristus: “Caligula mortuus est—arma deponite.” → “Caligula is dead—lay down your arms.” Miles: “Quid fiet?” → “What will happen?” Euaristus: “Quod fatum docet—non quod terror iubet.” → “What fate teaches—not what fear commands.”   Slightly polished / idiomatic version Euaristus: “Caligula is dead—put down your weapons.” Soldier: “What happens now?” Euaristus: “What destiny dictates—not what panic urges.”   Grice/Speranza note (since you’re tuning for that) The last line is very elegant:  fatum docet → “what the situation itself reveals / makes clear” terror iubet → “what fear impulsively orders”  So the contrast is:  rational inference vs emotional reaction  Or, more Gricean:  follow the evidence-based conclusion not the implicature generated by fear   ✦ Ultra‑compact philosophical gloss  “Act on what the facts imply, not on what fear suggests.”   If you want, I can also give a more Ciceronian or Stoic-flavoured translation (more sententia-like), which would fit very well with the tone of Roman moralizing prose.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Artemidoro – Ossia: Grice ed Artemidoro – Roma – filosofia italiana – . Filosofo italiano. Expelled from Rome. A close friend of CECILIO -- Plinio Minore, who admired him greatly and supported him after he was one of the philosophers expelled from Rome. Plinio describes him as a s a man of sincerity and integrity, as someone ho lived a frugal and disciplined life, and as someone who faded physical hardship with indifference. Artemidoro. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice e Artemidoro. Artemidoro (Roma, Lazio). Expelled from Rome. A close friend of Plinio Minore, who admired him greatly and supported him after he was one of the philosophers expelled from Rome. Plinio describes him as a s a man of sincerity and integrity, as someone ho lived a frugal and disciplined life, and as someone who faded physical hardship with indifference. GRICEVS: Artemidore, Roma te expulit, sed num expulit etiam disciplinam tuam, an tantum te fecit philosopho leviore sarcinis? ARTEMIDORVS: Roma corpus expulit, sed mentem non potuit, et ego frugalior factus sum, quasi expulsionem pro exercitatione acceperim. GRICEVS: Plinius Minor te tam sincere laudat ut suspicer eum te sustentare non solum nummis sed etiam epistulis—quae interdum duriores sunt quam hiems. ARTEMIDORVS: Ita est: ille me admiratur, ego labores indifferenter fero, et simul ridemus quod integritas mea plus itineris facit quam sandalia mea.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Articuleo – Ossia: Grice ed Articuleo -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Articuleo, The Articuleii were a Roman family who achieved prominence during the early Roman Empire. The gens is known chiefly from its two members who held the consulate.  Quintus A. Peto, suffect consul and ordinary consul. Quintus A. Peetino, ordinary consul. See also List of Roman gentes References  Fasti Capitolini.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)    GENS             This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs For this gens, Articuleo -- Grice and Speranza were wondering were the patricians learnt Rome, and how early was the vocabulary for grammar developed, as 'articulus'? Robins, in History of Linguistics, has a chapter on 'Rome' where he discusses the terminology as adapted from his previous chapter 'Greece' for all the parts of speech, and Varro did a lot on 'analogy', etc -- but without a trivium and quadrivium, it was all up to the Greek or Latin paidagogos their parents could find. We can imagine a comical conversation in latin about this Articuleo as he defends himself from being more than the artis -- where he takes 'culus as diminutive? Input? Feedback? Thanks This is delightful—because with Articuleius you get a natural pun that lends itself perfectly to a mock‑grammatical, meta‑linguistic joke, exactly in the spirit of your Grice/Speranza interest. Let me first briefly answer the background point, then give you the Latin comic dialogue, and finally draw the Gricean moral.  I. Quick historical note (grammar at Rome) You are right:  Roman grammatical terminology is largely a translation from Greek (e.g. nomen, verbum, casus, articulus) Figures like:  Varro worked on analogia vs anomalia   Education:  no fixed trivium/quadrivium yet (that is later) instead:  ludus litterarius → grammaticus → rhetor      And:  articulus is directly Greek (arthron), originally meaning a “joint” → later “grammatical particle/article”.  II. The pun: Articuleius → articulus Your instinct is excellent:  Articuleius ≈ someone full of articuli hears:  “You are nothing but grammar!”    He responds:  by analyzing his own name and misparsing -culus as a diminutive   III. Latin comic dialogue Scene: a grammaticus teasing Articuleius  Grammaticus: “Articulēī, nihil es nisi articulus.” Articuleius: “Articulus? immo Articulēius sum.” Grammaticus: “Idem est—pars orationis es.” Articuleius: “Pars? non totus?” Grammaticus: “Articulum tantum agis.” Articuleius: “Si -culus est diminutivum, parvus saltem sum—sed non nihil.”  IV. Translation  Grammarian: “Articuleius, you are nothing but an article (a grammatical particle).” Articuleius: “An article? No, I am Articuleius.” Grammarian: “Same thing—you are a part of speech.” Articuleius: “A part? Not a whole?” Grammarian: “You play only the role of an article.” Articuleius: “If -culus is a diminutive, I am at least small—but not nothing.”   V. The joke unpacked 1. False equivalence  Grammarian:  collapses:  Articuleius → articulus       name → category  2. Articuleius’ defence He tries two strategies: (a) identity vs description  “I am Articuleius, not articulus”  (b) morphological rescue  “-culus = diminutive”   therefore:  not nothing just small   VI. Grice/Speranza angle This is a miniature masterclass in: 1. Category mistake  Person → grammatical unit like:  Brutus case (filius → coniurator)     2. Implicature “nihil es nisi articulus” implies:  you are:  trivial merely functional lacking substance     3. Response: reinterpret the word Articuleius:  does not reject the word but reanalyses it   VII. Ultra‑Speranzian formulation  The grammarian reduces Articuleius to a part of speech; Articuleius accepts the analysis but alters its force, treating the supposed diminutive as mitigation rather than annihilation, and thereby shows that meaning depends not only on etymology, but on the use to which it is put.   VIII. Optional sharper punchline If you want a sharper closing: Articuleius: “Si ego articulus sum, tu interiectio es—multum clamas, parum dicis.” → “If I am an article, you are an interjection—you make a lot of noise and say little.”   This keeps your entire thematic chain intact:  Roman grammar from Greek naming vs describing faint reduction vs defensive reinterpretation   If you like, we can connect articulus to Stoic logic (lekta, sayables), which would bring your Grice comparison even closer.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Artorio – Ossia: Grice ed Artorio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Artorio The Artorii were family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned in history, but a number are known from inscriptions. Under the later Empire at least some of them were of senatorial rank.  At least two distinct linguistic origins have been proposed for “A.” Schulze, Herbig, and Salomies propose that the name is derived from the Etruscan praenomen Arnthur, perhaps Latinized as Artor. Other scholars have proposed a Messapic origin, identifying a “Artorres,” "descendant of Artas", with a Messapic possessive suffix -orres, indicating filiation. Some scholars have suggested that A. might be the origin of the Welsh name Arthur. The chief praenomina of the A. were Lucius, Gaius, Marcus, and Quintus, four of the most common names throughout Roman history. Lesser-used praenomina of the A. included Gnaeus, Sextus, and Titus, and there are a few examples of other names.  The Artorii do not appear to have been divided into distinct families, but a number of them used common surnames, such as Secundus, typically designating a second or younger child, and its derivatives.  Artorius, according to Quadrigarius, the antagonist of the Capuan knight, Cerrinus Vibellius Taurea, during the Second Punic War. In Livy, Taurea's opponent is Tiberius Claudius Asellus.[7][8] Gaius Artorius, dedicated an altar to Venus at Minturnae in Latium, dating to the second century BC.[9] Artoria, the former mistress of Gaius Artorius Dipilus.[10] Gaius Artorius Ɔ. l. Dipilus, a freedman named in an inscription from Casilinum, dating to 84 BC.[10] Artoria Monime, the wife of Gaius Valerius, was buried at Neapolis between 50 BC and AD 31.[11] Marcus Artorius Asclepiades, a friend and physician of Octavian, whom he attended at the Battle of Philippi. He died in a shipwreck in 31 BC.[12][13][14] Marcus Artorius Geminus, legate of Augustus, and prefect of the military treasury in AD 10.[15] Marcus Artorius M. l. Philero, a freedman named in an inscription from Pompeii, dating to the latter part of the first century BC.[16] Lucius Artorius C. f., a soldier in the nineteenth legion, named in an inscription from Caesena in Cisalpine Gaul, dating to the reign of Augustus.[17] Artoria L. l. Cleopatra, a freedwoman named in an inscription from Caesena, dating to the reign of Augustus.[17] Marcus Artorius M. f. Rufus Zopyrus, the husband of Artoria Callista, named in an inscription from Casilinum, dating to the first half of the first century AD.[18] Lucius Artorius Sex. f. Sex. n., son of Sextus Artorius and Praeconia Posilla, buried in a family sepulchre at Ameria in Umbria, dedicated by his sister, Artoria Secunda, dating to the first third of the first century AD.[19] Gaius Artorius Bassus, one of the municipal officials at Thugga in Africa Proconsularis, by AD 47 had been pontifex, aedile, and duumvir.[20] Artoria M. l. Callista, a freedwoman, and the wife of Marcus Artorius Rufus Zopyrus, named in an inscription from Casilinum in Campania, dating to the first half of the first century AD.[18] Artorius Q. f. Histrianus, one of the municipal duumvirs at Verona in Venetia and Histria, had held a number of civil posts, including quaestor of the treasury, during the early part of the first century AD.[21] Marcus Artorius M. l. Secundus, a freedman buried at Rome with his wife, Clodia Apta, in the first half of the first century AD.[22] Gaius Artorius Proculus, a grammarian whom Quintilian mentions among those who consider the trope a type of figure.[23][24] Artorius Liberalis, named in an inscription from Pompeii.[25] Marcus Artorius, one of the municipal duumvirs of Pompeii.[26] Marcus Artorius, a gladiator named in an inscription from Pompeii.[27] Marcus Artorius Stephanus, named in an inscription from Rome, dating between AD 31 and 70.[28] Artoria Flaccilla, accompanied her husband, Decimus Novius Priscus, into exile in AD 65. Priscus was a friend of Seneca the Younger, whom the emperor Nero suspected of participating in the conspiracy of Gaius Calpurnius Piso.[29] Artoria Harmonia, buried at Carthage in Africa Proconsularis, aged two, in a tomb dating between the reigns of Nero and the Flavian emperors.[30] Artorius Maximus, dedicated a monument at Dyrrachium in Macedonia to his wife, Valeria Rufina, aged thirty-two, and their son, Artorius Rufinus, aged nineteen years, two months, dating from the latter half of the first century, or the first half of the second.[31] Artorius Rufinus, son of Artorius Maximus and Valeria Rufina, buried at Dyrrachium, aged nineteen years, two months.[31] Gaius Artorius, the father of Artoria Flora, according to an inscription from the early second century.[32] Artoria C. f. Flora, named in an inscription from Flavia Solva in Noricum.[32] Gnaeus Artorius Callistus, dedicated a monument at Rome to his wife, Volumnia Auxis, dating to the second half of the first century AD.[33] Artoria Prima, wife of Clemens, an exhorter of a 'factio', was buried at Rome with a monument from her husband, dating to the second half of the first century AD.[34] Marcus Artorius M. l. Primus, a freedman and architect, named in several inscriptions from Pompeii.[35] Titus Artorius T. l. Faustus, a freedman named in an inscription from Canusium, dating to the first or early second century.[36] Titus Artorius T. l. Fortunatus, a freedman named in an inscription from Canusium, dating to the first or early second century.[36] Titus Artorius T. l. Rusticus, a freedman named in an inscription from Canusium, dating to the first or early second century.[36] Gnaeus Artorius Victor, buried at Rome in the late first or early second century.[37] Artoria Prima, named in an inscription from Rome, dating to the first or second century, together with her son, Montanus, and a Marcus Artorius Secundus.[38] Marcus Artorius Secundus, named in an inscription from Rome, dating to the first or second century, together with Artoria Prima and her son, Montanus.[38] Artorius Marcellinus, dedicated a second century monument at Placentia to his wife, Clodia Leon.[39] Artorius Rufus, a grammarian quoted on several occasions by Festus.[40][24] Artorius Valens, a native of Alexandria, was a soldier buried at Misenum, aged twenty-six, having served for six years, with a monument from Julia Agrippina, variously dated from around the reign of Nero, or the latter part of the second century.[41][42] Artorius Saturninus, a native of Siscia, was Decurion of the Cohors I Lusitanorum, one of the auxilia stationed in Moesia Inferior. He was buried near the Tropaeum Trajani, aged forty-five, having served twenty-five years. His children, Gaius Artorius, Roscia Saturnina, and Artorius Saturninus, dedicated a monument in his memory, dating between AD 130 and 170.[43] Gaius Artorius, one of the children of Artorius Saturninus, a soldier buried near the Tropaeum Trajani in Moesia Inferior.[43] Artorius Saturninus, one of the children of Artorius Saturninus.[43] Lucius Artorius Castus, a centurion in a number of legions and primus pilus of the Legio V Macedonica, was named prefect of the Fleet at Misenum, dux of detachments of the three British legions during an expedition against the Armenians, and governor of the province of Liburnia.[44][45][46][47] Artorius Victor, dedicated a monument at Apulum in Dacia to his wife, Ulpia Maximilla, dating from the late second century.[48] Artoria Euphraenusa, buried at Misenum in Campania, aged twenty-six, with a monument from her husband, Artorius Sabinus, dating from the late second century or the first half of the third.[49] Artorius Sabinus, the husband of Artoria Euphraenusa.[49] Gaius Artorius, named in a second- or third-century inscription from Bedriacum in Venetia and Histria.[50] Lucius Artorius Hilarianus, named in a list of members of the boat-builders' guild at Ostia at the beginning of the third century.[51] Titus Artorius Minervalis, named among the municipal officials of Canusium, in an inscription dating to AD 223.[52] Artoria Privata, buried at Narona in Dalmatia, aged sixty, with a monument from her daughter, Aurelia Ursina, dating from the third century.[53] Lucius Artorius Pius Maximus, governor of Asia at some point between AD 284 and 298, during the reign of Diocletian.[54] Artorius Amachius, dedicated a tomb at Rome for his wife, Aurelia, and their family on the thirteenth day before the Kalends of December in AD 348.[55] Artoria Frontima, named in a fourth or fifth-century funerary inscription from Salona in Dalmatia.[56] Artorius Julianus Megethius, a senator named in a Christian inscription from Rome, dating to the fifth century. He was the husband of Accia or Maria Tulliana, granddaughter of the rhetorician Victorinus. They had a daughter, Tulliana.[57] Undated Artorii Artoria, the wife of Lucius Fabius Eutychus, a municipal official of equestrian rank at Ostia in Latium, and the mother of Gaius Domitius Fabius Hermogenes, who followed in his father's footsteps, holding a number of positions of responsibility.[58] Artoria M. l., a freedwoman named in an inscription from Grumentum in Lucania.[59] Artorius, named in a funerary inscription from Salona in Dalmatia.[60] Artorius, mentioned in an inscription from the present village of El Ghouiba, formerly in Africa Proconsularis.[61] Gaius Artorius C. f., dedicated a monument at Ateste in Regio X to Appaea Montana, a freedwoman.[62] Gnaeus Artorius Cn. f., named in an inscription from Carthage in Africa Proconsularis.[63] Marcus Artorius, named in an inscription from Placentia in Cisalpine Gaul.[64] Marcus Artorius M. l., a freedman named in an inscription from Rome.[65] Marcus Artorius, freedman of Hyginus, named in an inscription from Aquileia in Venetia and Histria.[66] Quintus Artorius Q. f., named in an inscription from Interamnia Praetuttiorum in Picenum.[67] Publius Artorius, named in an inscription from Thibilis in Numidia.[68] Sextus Artorius Sex. f., husband of Praeconia Posilla, and father of Sextus, Lucius, and Artoria Secunda, who built a family sepulchre at Ameria.[19] Sextus Artorius Sex. f. Sex. n., son of Sextus Artorius and Praeconia Posilla, buried in a family sepulchre at Ameria.[19] Artorius Abscantus, buried at Rome, with a monument dedicated by Prepusa, a freedwoman.[69] Artorius Adiutor, son of Gaius Artorius Secundus and Artoria Doxa Euhodia, buried at Rome, aged one year, four months, fifteen days, and ten hours.[70] Gnaeus Artorius Agathopus, buried at Brixellum, with his wife, Briccia Pieris, children, Fortunatus and Ingenua, his wife's freedwoman, Amanda, and nurse Doris.[71] Quintus Artorius Amemptus, buried at Rome, with a monument from his wife, Artoria Veneria.[72] Quintus Artorius Antiochus, named in an inscription from Rome.[73] Quintus Artorius Antiochus Priscus [74][citation needed] Artoria Aphrodisia, buried at Tarentum in Calabria.[75] Gaius Artorius Atimetus, buried at Rome, with a monument from his wife, Artoria Felicula.[76] Artoria L. f. Atticilla, daughter of Lucius Artorius Atticus and Villia Faustina, buried at Rome, aged seven years, four months, and twenty-seven days.[77] Lucius Artorius Atticus, husband of Villia Faustina, and father of Artoria Atticilla, for whom he dedicated a monument at Rome.[77] Marcus Artorius M. l. Auctus, a freedman buried at Rome.[78] Artoria Auxesis, the wife of Marcus Minatius Gallus, one of the municipal duumvirs at Visentium in Etruria.[79] Artoria Basilia, buried at Rome, together with her husband, Quintus Artorius Pamphilus.[80] Artorius Capito, the father of Artoria Longina, Artorius Felix, and Artorius Capito, named in an inscription from Ostia. Artorius Capito, son of Artorius Capito, named in an inscription from Ostia.[81] Gaius Artorius C. f. Celer, an Epicurean philosopher, buried at Sicca Veneria in Africa Proconsularis, aged thirty-two.[82] Gaius Artorius Celer Munatianus brother of the Epicurean philosopher.[82] Lucius Artorius L. l. Chrysanthus, a freedman named in an inscription from Canusium in Apulia.[83] Gaius Artorius Cilo, named in an inscription from Puteoli in Campania.[84] Artoria Corinthias, together with Lucius Tiburtius Tyrannus, dedicated a monument at Rome to their patron, Lucius Tiburtius Telesphorus, and freedman, Lucius Tiburtius Atticus.[85] Quintus Artorius Crescens, buried at Rome, with a monument from his wife, Turuntia Sabina, dating to the second century.[86] Publius Artorius Docilis, a standard-bearer in the fourteenth urban cohort, dedicated a monument at Rome to Publius Herennius Macedo, a soldier in the same cohort.[87] Artoria Doris, dedicated a monument at Rome to her daughter, Ulpia Marcia, a slave of the imperial household, aged thirteen years, seven months, and twenty-one days.[88] Artoria Doxa Euhodia, buried at Rome, aged about twenty-eight, with her son, Artorius Adiutor, and a monument from her husband, Gaius Artorius Secundus.[70] Artoria Egloge, dedicated a monument at Rome to her son, Cydimus, aged two.[89] Artorius Eunus, a freedman buried at Rome, with his wife, Artoria Eutychia.[90] Artoria Euplia, the wife of Gaius Julius Sabinus, with whom she dedicated a monument at Ravenna for Marcus Helvius Maximus, a soldier in the praetorian guard.[91] Artoria Eutychia, a freedwoman buried at Rome, with her husband, Artorius Eunus.[90] Artoria Faustina, buried at Sigus in Numidia, aged seventy-five, with her husband, Marcus Sittius Honoratus, aged fifty-five.[92] Sextus Artorius Faustus, named in an inscription from Rome.[93] Artoria Felicula, dedicated a monument at Rome to her husband, Gaius Artorius Atimetus.[76] Artoria S. f. Felicula, buried at Rome, together with Gnaeus Pompeius Antigonus.[94] Artorius Felix, son of Artorius Capito, named in an inscription from Ostia.[81] Artorius Felissimus, dedicated a monument at Narona to Aemilia Barbara, his wife of fifty-six years.[95] Marcus Artorius Festus Concessianus, buried at Hippo Diarrhytus in Africa Proconsularis, aged seventy-five.[96] Artoria Firma, a freedwoman named in an inscription from Aquileia in Venetia and Histria.[66] Lucius Artorius C. f. Florentinus, buried at Lalla Dahlia in Africa Proconsularis, aged sixty-five.[97] Decimus Artorius S. f. Fructus, a goldsmith buried at Rome, aged twenty-seven. Marcus Artorius M. l. Hilarus, a freedman named in an inscription from Grumentum.[59] Marcus Artorius Honoratus, buried at Aquae Flavianae in Numidia, aged eighty.[99] Gnaeus Artorius Hyginus, buried at Thacia in Africa Proconsularis, aged fifty-one.[100] Quintus Artorius Itamus, buried at Rome, aged fifteen, with a monument from his sister, Laelia Stilbe.[101] Artoria Januaria, buried at Auzia in Mauretania Caesariensis, aged eighty. Gaius Artorius Julius Augendus, one of the quaestors in charge of the aerarium.[103][i] Lucius Artorius L. l. Licinus, a freedman named in an inscription from Caesena.[17] Artoria Longina, daughter of Artorius Capito, named in an inscription from Ostia.[81] Gaius Artorius Maximus, a soldier in the fourth legion, dedicated a monument at Nazareth in Syria Palaestina to Gaius Julius Quartus, another soldier in the same legion, aged thirty, having served ten years.[104] Marcus Artorius Melanthus, buried at Rome, with a monument dedicated by Hilara.[105] Titus Artorius Modestus, buried at Narbo in Gallia Narbonensis.[106] Artoria Namses, buried at the present site of Sers, formerly in Africa Proconsularis.[107] Lucius Artorius L. l. Nicephor, a freedman buried at Herdonia in Apulia.[108] Gaius Artorius Orta[...], son of Valeria Tertia, named in an inscription from Narbo.[109] Quintus Artorius Q. l. Pamphilus, a freedman buried at Rome with his wife, Artoria Basilia.[80] Publius Artorius Pastor, a native of Alexandria, was a soldier buried at Blera in Etruria, aged thirty-two, having served twelve years, with a monument dedicated by Aponius Maximus.[110] Quintus Artorius Phoebus, named in an inscription from Rome.[111] Artorius Primitivus, husband of Valentia Flora, with whom he dedicated a monument at Rome to their son, aged twenty-two years, two months, and nineteen days.[112] Artoria L. f. Prisca, buried at Biglia in Venetia and Histria, together with her mother, Minucia Maxima, grandfather, Manius Minucius, and Lucius Livius.[113] Marcus Artorius M. f. Priscillus Vicasius Sabidianus, a military tribune with the seventh legion.[114] Lucius Artorius Priscus, the husband of Minucia Maxima, and father of Artoria Prisca.[113] Artoria C. f. Procula, buried at Narbo with her husband, Titus Pompeius Venustus, and children, Titus Pompeius Proculus, and Pompeia Venusta.[115] Artoria Riparia, buried at Cirta in Numidia, aged one hundred.[116] Marcus Artorius Rufus, a suboptio serving in an unidentified unit, mentioned in an inscription found at the church of San Lorenzo in Cesarea, in Ravenna.[117] Marcus Artorius M. l. Scindalamus, a freedman named in an inscription from Grumentum.[59] Artoria Sex. f. Sex. n. Secunda, daughter of Sextus Artorius and Praeconia Posilla, built a family sepulchre at Ameria for her parents, and her brothers, Sextus and Lucius.[19] Artoria Secundina, the wife of Gellius Felix, and mother of Lucius Gellius Artorius, buried at Salona, aged eight years and nine months.[118] Artoria Secundina,[ii] the wife of Decimus Sellius Felix, and mother of Lucius Sellius Artorius, buried at Laus Pompeia in Gallia Transpadana, aged eight years and nine months.[119] Gaius Artorius Secundus, dedicated a monument at Rome to his wife, Artoria Doxa Euhodia, and son, Artorius Adiutor.[70] Gaius Artorius Simplicianus, buried at Uchi Maius in Africa Proconsularis, aged twenty-one.[120] Gaius Artorius Simplicius, buried at Uchi Maius, aged seventy.[121] Lucius Artorius Solon, dedicated a monument at Rome to his wife, Sessia Fortunata, aged thirty-one years, seven months, and twenty-three days.[122] Artoria Tertulla, the wife of Titus Fullonius Firmus, and mother of Titus Fullonius Justus, for whom she and her husband dedicated a monument at Ravenna.[123] Gaius Artorius Tertullus, flamen at Thubursicum in Africa Proconsularis, where he dedicated monuments to his wife, Titania Primula, aged forty-three, and son, Gaius Artorius Tertullus, aged fourteen.[124] Gaius Artorius C. f. Tertullus, buried at Thubursicum, aged fourteen.[124] Lucius Artorius Tyranus, buried at Rome, aged forty-four years, ten months, and twenty-three days, with a monument from his wife, Fulvia Lacaena.[125] Artoria Veneria, wife of Quintus Artorius Amemptus, for whom she dedicated a monument at Rome.[72] Quintus Artorius Q. f. Vettus, buried at Turgalium in Lusitania, aged five.[126] Marcus Artorius Zethus, buried at Aquileia.[127] Artoria Zoë, dedicated a monument at Rome to her son, Lupercianus, aged six years, fourteen days.[128] See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Memoriae formula is attested from the second century onwards.  This inscription is suspiciously similar to that of the other Artoria Secundina, suggesting that one of them is from a cenotaph, or has been moved, and that one of the readings is erroneous. References  Schulze, Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen.  Herbig, Tituli Faleriorum Veterum, p. 98.  Salomies: Die römischen Vornamen, p. 68.  Chelotti, Morizio, & Silvestrini, Le epigrafi romane di Canosa, pp. 261, 264.  Santoro, "Per la nuova iscrizione messapica di Oria", "La Nuova Epigrafe Messapica".  Linguist Blanca María Prósper supports a possible link between the gens Artoria and Messapic Artorres and derives the latter from the Proto-Indo-European root *h2er- "to join, to fit together"; she proposes that Artorres (and thus its Latinized form Artorius) should be translated as "(descendant/family of the) Assembler". See: Prósper, Blanca María, "Language change at the crossroads: What Celtic, what Venetic, and what else in the personal names of Emona?", Voprosy Onomastiki, Vol. 16, Núm. 4, 2019, pp. 33-73 [p. 48]  Quadrigarius, Annales, vi. apud Priscian, Ars Grammatica, x.  Livy, xxiii. 46, 47.  AE  AE SEG Caelius Aurelianus, De Morbis Acutis, iii. 14.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 70.  Jerome, In Chronicon Eusebii.  CIL VI, 90.  Borelli, Un Impegno per Pompei, add. 2.  CIL CIL X,  CIL .  CIL VIII, 26517.  NSA, CIL  CIL Quintilian, ix. 1.  Smith, "Proculus, C. Artorius", in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology,  CIL  CIL IV, 8, CIL IV, 16.  CIL IV, 2508.  AE 1993, 193.  Tacitus, Annales, xv. 71.  CIL VIII, 13223.  AE CIL III, .  NSA, 1919-293.  Liverani and Spinola, Le Necropoli Vaticane, vol. i, p. 222.  CIL IV, 3340,110, CIL X, 807, CIL X, 841.  CIL IX, 356.  AE .  CIL .  CIL XI, .  Festus, pp. 225, 352, 364 (ed. Müller).  CIL X, 8208 (Restored as "Valens", and dated to latter second century).  U.S. Epigraphy Project, inscription MI.AA.UM.KM.L.820 (Given as "Vales", and dated between AD 58 and 71).  CIL CIL III, 1919, CIL III, 12791.  Tomlin, Britannia Romana, pp. 155–157.  Birley, Roman Government of Britain, p. 355.  Loriot, "Un mythe historiographique: l'expédition d'Artorius Castus contre les Armoricains", pp. 85–86.  IDR, iii. 5-2, 608.  CIL X, 3462.  Pais, Supplementa Italica, 670.  CIL XIV, 251.  CIL IX, 338.  CIL III, 8476.  CIL III, 14195,27, AE 1939, 58, AE 1961, 195, AE , AE 2006, 1587.  ICUR, CIL III, 9226.  CIL VI, 30130  CIL XIV, 4642.  CIL X, 245.  CIL III, 9403.  AE 2007, 1714.  CIL V, 2566.  ILAfr, 371.  CIL XI, CIL VI, 8306.  InscrAqu, CIL IX, 5091.  ILAlg, ii. 2, 4883.  CIL VI, 12472.  CIL CIL XI, 1032.  CIL CIL VI, 9769.  Phaedrus, Fabularum Aesopiarum.  ASP, 2004–117, 6.  CIL VI, 12473.  CIL VI, 28952.  CIL VI, 5992.  CIL XI, 2910.  CIL VI, 12477.  CIL XIV, 617a.  AE 1937, 34.  AE CIL X, 8186.  CIL VI, 27403.  Pais, Supplementa Italica, 605.  CIL VI, 32738.  AE CIL CIL VI, 12485.  CIL CIL VIII, 5849.  CIL CIL VI, 12486.  CIL III, 1846.  CIL VIII, 1209.  CIL VIII, 27708.  CIL CIL VIII, CIL VIII, 15649.  CIL VI, 12475.  CIL VIII, 20763.  CIL VI, 1928.  SJC, CIL CIL XII, 5204.  BCTH,  CIL CIL XII, 4623.  CIL CIL VI, 12478.  CIL CIL V, 714.  CIL CIL XII, 5066.  CIL VIII, 7216.  AE 1985, 401.  CIL III, 2520.  CIL V, 6387.  CIL VIII, 26292.  CIL CIL VI, 12481.  CIL XI, 179.  CIL VIII, 4882.  CIL VI, 12482.  CILCaceres, ii. 522.  InscrAqu, ii. 2248.  CIL VI, 21676. Bibliography Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius, Annales, fragments collected by Hermann Peter, in Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae (Fragments of Roman Historians), B.G. Teubner, Leipzig (1914). Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Roman History. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Sextus Pompeius Festus, Epitome de M. Verrio Flacco de Verborum Significatu (Epitome of Marcus Verrius Flaccus' On the Meaning of Words). Gaius Julius Phaedrus, Fabularum Aesopiarum (Aesop’s Fables). Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (Quintilian), Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of Oratory). Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus (St. Jerome), In Chronicon Eusebii (The Chronicon of Eusebius). Caelius Aurelianus, Celerum Passionum, or De Morbis Acutis (translation of Soranus of Ephesus, On Acute Diseases). Archivio Storico Pugliese (Historical Archive of Apulia, abbreviated ASP) (1948–present). L'Année épigraphique, René Cagnat et alii (eds.), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romanae Septimo Saeculo Antiquiores, Giovanni Battista de Rossi (ed.), Vatican Library, Rome (1857–1861, 1888). Corpus de Incripciones Latinas de Cáceres, Julio Esteban Ortega, (ed.), Universidad de Extremadura (2007–2013). Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Theodor Mommsen et alii (eds.), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Corporis Inscriptionum Latinarum Supplementa Italica (Italian Supplement to the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum), Ettore Pais (ed.), Rome (1884). Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques (Archaeological Bulletin of the Committee on Historic and Scientific Works, abbreviated BCTH), Imprimerie Nationale, Paris (1885–1973). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Inscriptiones Aquileiae, Giovanni Battista Brusin (ed.), Udine (1991–1993). Inscriptiones Daciae Romanae (Inscriptions from Roman Dacia, abbreviated IDR), Bucharest (1975–present). Inscriptions Latines de L'Algérie, Stéphane Gsell (ed.), Edouard Champion, Paris (1922–present). Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità (News of Excavations from Antiquity, abbreviated NSA), Accademia dei Lincei (1876–present). Scripta Judaïca Cracoviensia (abbreviated SJC), Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków (2002–present). Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum (Supplement of Greek Epigraphy, abbreviated SEG) (1923–present). Anthony Birley, The Roman Government of Britain, Oxford (2005), p. 355 Licia Vlad Borelli, Un Impegno per Pompei, Mailand (1983). Marcella Chelotti, Vincenza Morizio, and Marina Silvestrini, Le epigrafi romane di Canosa (The Roman Epigraphy of Canusium), vol. 1, Edipuglia srl (1990). Gustav Herbig, Tituli Faleriorum Veterum Linguis Falisca et Etrusca Conscripti, Barth (1910). Paolo Liverani and Giandomenico Spinola, Le Necropoli Vaticane. La Città dei Morta di Roma (The Vatican Necropolis: The City of the Dead of Rome), Mailand (2010). Xavier Loriot, "Un mythe historiographique: l'expédition d'Artorius Castus contre les Armoricains", Bulletin de la Société nationale des antiquaires de France (1997). Olli Salomies, Die römischen Vornamen: Studien zur römischen Namenbung, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki (1987). Ciro Santoro, "Per la nuova iscrizione messapica di Oria", in La Zagaglia, A. VII, No. 27, pp. 271–293 (1965); "La Nuova Epigrafe Messapica", in Ricerche e Studi, vol. 12, pp. 45–60 (1979). Wilhelm Schulze, Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen (The History of Latin Proper Names), Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin (1904). R.S.O. Tomlin, Britannia Romana: Roman Inscriptions and Roman Britain, Oxbow (2018). Gustav Wilmanns, Inscriptiones Africae Latinae (Latin Inscriptions from Africa, abbreviated ILAfr), Georg Reimer, Berlin (1881). External links Wilhelm Schulze, Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen (Volume 5, Issue 2 of Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Göttingen Philologisch-Historische Klasse) Categories: ArtoriiRoman gentesArthurian legend What would be your best Grice/Speranza fit from the gens of Artorio? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Artorio – Ossia: Grice ed Artorio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Artorio Excellent—Artorius is a very fertile gens for your purposes because it gives you something slightly different from your previous cases: not so much political implicature, but technical / rhetorical self‑reference—especially with the grammarians.   Best Grice/Speranza fit: Gaius Artorius Proculus (the grammarian) You already noticed the key phrase in your material:  he “considers the trope a type of figure”  This is gold.  Why this is the best fit Because it turns on a meta‑classification problem:  what is a trope? what is a figure? are they the same, or different?   exactly the sort of ambiguity Grice loves:  a dispute not about words, but about how words are classified.   I. The conceptual issue In classical rhetoric:  trope = semantic shift (e.g. metaphor) figure = formal/stylistic device  But Proculus collapses them:  trope ⊆ figure   Gricean relevance This is:  a case of category expansion redefining a boundary thus shifting:  what counts as literal vs non‑literal     II. Latin dialogue (Proculus vs rival grammaticus)  Grammaticus alter: “Tropus non est figura—sed mutatio verbi.” Proculus Artorius: “Mutatio ipsa figura est.” Alter: “Figura est forma, non sensus.” Proculus: “Forma sine sensu nulla est forma.” Alter: “Ergo omnia figura sunt?” Proculus: “Quae intelleguntur praeter verba, figura sunt.”  III. Translation  “A trope is not a figure, but a change of word.” “The change itself is a figure.” “A figure is form, not meaning.” “Form without meaning is no form.” “So everything is a figure?” “Whatever is understood beyond the words is a figure.”   IV. Grice/Speranza analysis This is deeply Gricean.  Key line  “quae intelleguntur praeter verba…”  → “what is understood beyond the words”  This is basically:  implicature avant la lettre   Proculus’ thesis (reconstructed)  all meaning beyond literal wording = figure  → collapses:              Literal / saidNon-literal / implied“what is said”“what is meant”  That is pure Grice territory.   Second-best fit: Marcus Artorius Asclepiades (physician of Octavian) This one gives you a very different Gricean situation:  attends Octavian at Philippi physician = interpreter of symptoms   Why it works Medicine is:  interpretation of signs (signa)  → symptoms → diagnosis  exactly like:  utterance → implicature   Latin mini-dialogue Octavianus: “Corpus valet—cur times?” Asclepiades: “Non verba, sed signa specto.” Octavianus: “Quae sunt signa?” Asclepiades: “Quae latent, plus dicunt quam quae apparent.”  Translation  “My body is fine—why do you worry?” “I look not at words, but at signs.” “What signs?” “What is hidden speaks more than what appears.”   Gricean point  explicit report:  “I am fine”   physician:  rejects surface interprets deeper evidence      Final pairing (very clean)                     ArtoriusDomainGricean mechanism Proculusrhetoricclassification of implicature itself Asclepiadesmedicineinference from signs vs statements   Final Speranzian synthesis  One Artorius disputes whether a trope is a figure, thereby disputing whether what is meant belongs to what is said; another reads in symptoms what is not declared by the patient; and in both cases the same distinction emerges—that between the word and what lies beyond it, which must be inferred rather than heard.   Ultra‑compact closure  Quod dicitur—parum est; quod intellegitur—regnat.   If you like, we can now connect Proculus directly to Grice’s metaphor theory, since his move essentially says:  metaphor is not exceptional—it is just one case of meaning beyond the words. And what was the context for Proclo -- his surroundings. He couldn't find a Latinism for Greek 'tropos'. Greeks distinguished 'skhema' that got translated as 'figura' -- the tropos is indeed kinesis --- phototropism--In fact Grice's colleague at Oxford R. M. Hare calls the 'tropic' the sign of mood -- along with the neustic (dictor), the phastic (dictum) and the clistic (sign of closure). so he would be interested in this. But the Latins also used modus for things like 'modus imperativus' or 'modus indicativus,' 'modus declarativus' -- What was the context of this Artorio's teachings? Thanks This is a very good question—because with Gaius Artorius Proculus we are no longer in bare anecdote, but in a technical intellectual milieu: the Roman grammaticus / rhetorician operating under heavy Greek influence. Let me reconstruct his context, then situate his conceptual move, and finally connect it to your very nice Grice–Hare framework.  I. Where does Proculus “belong”? (his intellectual surroundings) 1. The setting: the grammaticus’ school Proculus is not a philosopher proper, but a:  grammarian–rhetorician (as cited by Quintilian)  So his environment is:  late Republic / early Empire pedagogy:  advanced schooling after basic literacy training in:  reading poets parsing language rhetorical figures      Structure of schooling (informal, but standard)                          StageTeacherContentlitteratorelementaryreading, writinggrammaticusProculus’ levellanguage, poetry, grammarrhetoradvancedargument, persuasion  Proculus sits at the crucial middle stage where:  language is analysed, not merely used.   2. The Greek inheritance You are exactly right:  Latin terminology is largely a translation of Greek theory                           GreekLatinσχῆμα (skhēma)figuraτρόπος (tropos)tropusμέρος λόγουpars orationisἔγκλισιςmodus  Romans did not invent the system → they adapted and translated it.  3. The difficulty Proculus inherits Greek distinguishes:  tropos = “turning” (semantic shift) skhēma = “configuration” (formal pattern)  But Latin:  already has figura (good for skhēma) must import tropus (a semi‑foreign technical word)   So Proculus is working inside:  an unstable bilingual conceptual system   II. What Proculus is doing (conceptually) Your key reported point:  he treats tropus as a species of figura  This is not trivial—it is a reclassification of meaning itself.  1. Greek model (roughly)                  CategoryFunctiontropemeaning-shiftfigureform-pattern  2. Proculus’ move He effectively says:  the shift in meaning IS itself a formal feature   collapses:  semantic deviation formal device   3. Why this matters He is implicitly claiming:  there is no sharp boundary between what is said and how it is said   III. Your link: Hare and Grice You made a very sophisticated connection:  Hare:  tropic / neustic / phatic / clistic   Grice:  what is said vs what is implicated     1. Tropos as “kinesis” Your intuition is excellent:  tropos = “turning” so:  metaphor = movement of meaning     Proculus:  treats that movement as structurally integral   2. Comparison with Hare Hare’s:                      ComponentFunctionphaticcontent (dictum)neusticforcetropicmood element  Parallel Proculus is effectively saying:  the “tropic” dimension (shift, non‑literal force) belongs to the same layer as form (figura)   3. Gricean interpretation Grice:  distinguishes:  what is said what is implicated    Proculus tends toward:  reducing that distinction—everything beyond literal wording becomes “figure”   IV. The specific pedagogical context So what would Proculus actually be doing in class?  Likely teaching practice  reading:  Vergil, Ennius, etc.   pointing out:  metaphors (tropi) constructions (figurae)   asking:  how meaning shifts     Why the debate arises Students (and rival teachers) must answer:  Is metaphor a different thing—or just a special case?   V. A reconstructed classroom exchange This puts him in context:  Discipulus: “Magister, hoc verbum proprie non dicitur—tropus est.” Proculus: “Quid est tropus?” Discipulus: “Mutatio sensus.” Proculus: “Et quid est figura?” Discipulus: “Forma orationis.” Proculus: “Mutatio sine forma fieri potest?” Discipulus: “Non videtur.” Proculus: “Ergo tropus quoque figura est.”  Translation  “This word is not literal—it is a trope.” “What is a trope?” “A change of meaning.” “And what is a figure?” “A form of expression.” “Can a change occur without form?” “It seems not.” “Therefore a trope is also a figure.”   VI. Final Speranzian synthesis  Proculus works in a school where Greek distinctions are translated into Latin terms not fully equivalent to them; faced with the division between trope and figure, he collapses it, treating every departure from literal speech as a form of expression, and thereby anticipates the insight that what is meant beyond the words is not something extraneous, but belongs to the structure of discourse itself.   ✦ Ultra‑compact formulation  Tropus motus est; figura forma motus.    Direct answer  Context: → grammatical-rhetorical teaching environment influenced by Greek theory Problem: → translating / adapting tropos vs skhēma Proculus’ move: → integrates semantic shift into formal classification Your link: → aligns very well with Hare’s tropic and Grice’s implicature   If you like, we can now push this further into Stoic lekton theory—where “what is meant” becomes an entity of its own, halfway between Proculus and Grice. Well, in fact when Grice tries to give an informal taxonomy, he starts with 'something like a figure of speech' -- he does not distinguish there between skhema noeseos and skhema logoi? To take Grice's example. For which we can find a Latin equivalent: [This minor poet cited by Catulus] is venenum. metaphor -- Now. suppose we take latin fo 'hemlock' and say [Latin for hemlock' est venenum. So Catulus is not really duplicating 'senses.' While Grice calls 'Poeta venenum est' an implicit FIGURA, to say that [Hemlock] venenum est is ALSO a figure -- a literal one -- Maybe Artorio considered this: the literal as yet figurative? Thanks This is a very subtle—and very fertile—move you are making: you are pushing beyond the usual “trope vs figure” dispute to something deeper:  whether even the literal already has the structure of a figure.  That is exactly where Proculus becomes interesting in a Gricean light.  I. Your Catullus example refined Let’s formalise the contrast you propose: 1. Metaphorical (Catullan type)  Poēta venēnum est → “This poet is poison”   apparent category shift:  person → substance   Grice:  implicature / figurative meaning     2. Literal (hemlock case)  Cicūta venēnum est → “Hemlock is poison”   standard classification:  substance → kind     Your insight  Why should the second be “non‑figural”? It still sorts reality via language.  Exactly.  II. Proculus’ possible move (reconstructed) You suggest:  perhaps Proculus saw that even the literal is structured like a figure.  This is not explicitly attested—but it is a very plausible extrapolation from:  his collapsing:  tropus ⊆ figura    Let’s extend that logic:  Classical scheme (simplified)                      TypeStatusliteralnon‑figuraltropefiguralfigurestylistic  Radical Proculan extension (your reading)                      TypeStatusliteralalready structuredtropeexplicit deviationfiguregeneral mechanism  So:  “figure” becomes the way meaning is organized at all.   III. Grice’s position (as you note) Grice says:  “something like a figure of speech”  He does not sharply distinguish:  skhēma noēseōs (figure of thought) skhēma logou (figure of expression)   He is already blurring the Greek distinction, much like Proculus.  IV. Your key philosophical claim Let’s sharpen it: Is “cicuta venenum est” also figurative? Not metaphorical—but still:  it imposes a categorisation structure  The predication:  X est Y  is itself:  a mapping a structuring operation   That is your insight:  literal discourse = “zero‑degree tropic”   V. Latin dialogue (Proculus pushed to your conclusion)  Discipulus: “Magister, ‘poēta venēnum est’ tropus est.” Proculus: “Concedo.” Discipulus: “‘Cicūta venēnum est’ autem propriē dicitur.” Proculus: “Propriē—sed non sine formā.” Discipulus: “Quid interest?” Proculus: “Hoc: ibi sensus vertitur, hic ōrdinātur—uterque figurā tenētur.”  Translation  “ ‘The poet is poison’ is a trope.” “Granted.” “But ‘Hemlock is poison’ is literal.” “Literal—but not without structure.” “What is the difference?” “There, meaning is turned; here, it is ordered—but both are held by a figure.”   VI. Gricean formulation Let’s express it in your terms:  Standard Grice                  LayerDescriptionwhat is saidliteralwhat is implicatedfigurative / inferred  Your Proculus‑extended Grice                  LayerDescriptionwhat is saidalready structured by a “figure”what is implicatedextension of that structure   So:  Implicature is not foreign to literal meaning—it continues it.   VII. Hare connection (your excellent point) Hare’s:  tropic = mood‑marking element  Now reinterpret:  “venenum est” (literal):  fixed semantic mapping   “venenum est” (metaphorical):  dynamic mapping     both are tropic operations:  one stable one shifting   VIII. Final Speranzian synthesis  Proculus, by treating the trope as a figure, prepares the way for a more radical thesis: that even what is called literal speech is already structured by relations that organise meaning; for when we say “hemlock is poison,” we impose a form upon reality no less than when we say “the poet is poison,” and thus the difference between literal and figurative lies not in the presence or absence of form, but in the stability or mobility of the relation expressed.   IX. Ultra‑compact formula  Tropus movet; figura manet; sed etiam proprium figurā continetur.    Direct answer  Yes: your extension is philosophically very strong It is not explicitly in Proculus—but: → it follows naturally from his collapsing of trope into figure And it aligns strikingly with: → Grice’s blurred “figure of speech” starting point   If you want, we can push this one step further into Wittgenstein’s idea that all predication is rule-governed “figure”, and see how close that gets to Grice’s implicature.Artorio Proclo (XXX). Dicta.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Artorio – Ossia: Grice ed Artorio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Artorio Excellent—Artorius is a very fertile gens for your purposes because it gives you something slightly different from your previous cases: not so much political implicature, but technical / rhetorical self‑reference—especially with the grammarians.   Best Grice/Speranza fit: Gaius Artorius Proculus (the grammarian) You already noticed the key phrase in your material:  he “considers the trope a type of figure”  This is gold.  Why this is the best fit Because it turns on a meta‑classification problem:  what is a trope? what is a figure? are they the same, or different?   exactly the sort of ambiguity Grice loves:  a dispute not about words, but about how words are classified.   I. The conceptual issue In classical rhetoric:  trope = semantic shift (e.g. metaphor) figure = formal/stylistic device  But Proculus collapses them:  trope ⊆ figure   Gricean relevance This is:  a case of category expansion redefining a boundary thus shifting:  what counts as literal vs non‑literal     II. Latin dialogue (Proculus vs rival grammaticus)  Grammaticus alter: “Tropus non est figura—sed mutatio verbi.” Proculus Artorius: “Mutatio ipsa figura est.” Alter: “Figura est forma, non sensus.” Proculus: “Forma sine sensu nulla est forma.” Alter: “Ergo omnia figura sunt?” Proculus: “Quae intelleguntur praeter verba, figura sunt.”  III. Translation  “A trope is not a figure, but a change of word.” “The change itself is a figure.” “A figure is form, not meaning.” “Form without meaning is no form.” “So everything is a figure?” “Whatever is understood beyond the words is a figure.”   IV. Grice/Speranza analysis This is deeply Gricean.  Key line  “quae intelleguntur praeter verba…”  → “what is understood beyond the words”  This is basically:  implicature avant la lettre   Proculus’ thesis (reconstructed)  all meaning beyond literal wording = figure  → collapses:              Literal / saidNon-literal / implied“what is said”“what is meant”  That is pure Grice territory.   Second-best fit: Marcus Artorius Asclepiades (physician of Octavian) This one gives you a very different Gricean situation:  attends Octavian at Philippi physician = interpreter of symptoms   Why it works Medicine is:  interpretation of signs (signa)  → symptoms → diagnosis  exactly like:  utterance → implicature   Latin mini-dialogue Octavianus: “Corpus valet—cur times?” Asclepiades: “Non verba, sed signa specto.” Octavianus: “Quae sunt signa?” Asclepiades: “Quae latent, plus dicunt quam quae apparent.”  Translation  “My body is fine—why do you worry?” “I look not at words, but at signs.” “What signs?” “What is hidden speaks more than what appears.”   Gricean point  explicit report:  “I am fine”   physician:  rejects surface interprets deeper evidence      Final pairing (very clean)                     ArtoriusDomainGricean mechanism Proculusrhetoricclassification of implicature itself🥈 Asclepiadesmedicineinference from signs vs statements  ✦ Final Speranzian synthesis  One Artorius disputes whether a trope is a figure, thereby disputing whether what is meant belongs to what is said; another reads in symptoms what is not declared by the patient; and in both cases the same distinction emerges—that between the word and what lies beyond it, which must be inferred rather than heard.   Ultra‑compact closure  Quod dicitur—parum est; quod intellegitur—regnat.   If you like, we can now connect Proculus directly to Grice’s metaphor theory, since his move essentially says:  metaphor is not exceptional—it is just one case of meaning beyond the words. Artorio (XXX). Dicta.