AQ

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza : La Conversazione – I Verbali: AQ

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquila – Ossia: Grice e Aquila: LA ragione conversazionale. Rhetoricos [)etis longioris moræ  Aquila Romano (Roma): LA ragione conversazionale. Rhetoricos [)etis longioris moræ ac diligeiiliæ (iiiaiii pro angiisliis teniporis, quod me profecto urget, ideoque postea pleiium hoc tibi niunus reildemus. In præsenti autem nomina ipsarum figurarum cum exemplis percurrisse sufficiat, tantum praeloculis, quo maxime orator ab oratore differat, unum hoc aut certe esse praecipuum, figuras sententiarum atque elocutionum. Nam iiiventio rerum cum aciitis hominibus, quos tamen ora- tores nondum appellare possis, communis est. Usitatorum verborum La- tinorum scientiam et usum vel grammaticus sibi vindicat. lUi quoque mo- res, qui tqotcol nominantur, ab eadem hac arte non minus diligenter sunt cogniti quam ab oratore, sed quatenus cuique generi materiae adliibere eos deceat, orator mehus intellegit. Figurandarum sentenliarum et elocutionum proprium oraloris munus est. Hoc enim genere et parva ex- tollit et angusta dilatat, et cum celeritalem lum ornatum plerisque et vim de nomiiubiis figurarum et exemplis Hber. Ex Alexandro Numerio quod Af^: quo profectio erravit de; nam hahet quod me profecto, contra quo me profectio ) autem om. praelocntis praelocutus maximus hoc aut hoc usitatorum scripsi: illoriini scientiam et usum  vindicat A: scientia ei usu .. uindicare modi Vossius; al firmavit R lecdonem mores coll. Beda de Trop. S. Script. arte R: arte id est grammatica sed: si, etsi St, haud scio an reclius cuiusque generis materiae vir doctus in viarg. ed. deceat debeat, debeant A genere om. cum ccleritatem tum oret pondus verl)is ac sententiis adilit: ad permovendos quidem animos au- diloris aut iudicis niliil aequale est. Quod sic facillime intellegitur, si, quae sunl fignrate enuntiata apnd magnos oratores detractis figuris partem eam, quae lonia cognominata est, coloniis communierunt: Sed consuetudo multa elocutionis, in qua figuras huius modi recognoscas, et assiduitas stili, cum ipsa exercitatio commoverit dicendi facultatem, in has formas uUro incurrit, ut et (piibus et quo tempore utendum sit, possis diiudicare. Plurimum o[)limoruin, Demosthenis praesertim et CICERONE iuvabit lectio. Imitatur cavendum est. GRICEVS: Aquila Romane, si “rationem conversazionalem” tam diligenter doces, cur rhetoricos nimis longae morae arguis, quasi ipsi tempus comedant et non tuae figurae? AQVILA: Quia, Grice, illi verba multiplicant, ego autem figuras—id est, eadem verba iterum vendo, sed elegantius et sine pudore. GRICEVS: Ergo orator ab homine acuto hoc differt, quod acutus res invenit, orator vero easdem res tropis et figuris vestit, quasi togam Ciceronis super tunicam grammatici? AQVILA: Ita est, et si quis nimis me imitetur, ei dico “cavendum est,” nam nihil periculosius quam Cicero in manus discipuli festinantis.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquillio – Ossia: Grice ed Aqullio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Aquillio Denarius of Manius A., 65 BC. On the obverse is Virtus. The reverse depicts the consul Manius Aquillius raising an allegory of Sicily, an allusion to his victory in the Second Servile War. The Aquillii or Aquilii were a family of great antiquity at ancient Rome. Two of the A. are mentioned among the Roman nobles who conspired to bring back the Tarquins, and a member of the house, Gaius A. Tuscus, is consul. “Aquilius” or “Aquillius” is probably derived from aquila, an eagle. On coins and inscriptions the name is almost always written Aquillius, but in manuscripts generally with a single l. The oldest branch of the family bore the cognomen Tuscus, suggesting that the gens may have been of Etruscan origin, although the nomen of the gens is indisputably Latin, and the name Tuscus could have been acquired in other ways. This cognomen is nonetheless dubious as only found in late sources; Broughton mentions that it could have also been Sabinus.[4]  From the imagery of their coins, it seems that the Aquillii had a special devotion for Sol, a rare occurrence under the Republic.  The oldest families of the Aquillii bore the praenomina Gaius, Lucius, and Marcus, which were the three most common names at all periods of Roman history. However, one family, which rose to considerable prominence in the final century of the Republic, preferred the less-common praenomen Manius. Denarius of Augustus and Lucius Aquillius Florus, 19 BC. Augustus is portrayed on the obverse. The flower on the reverse alludes to Florus' name. The cognomina of the Aquillii under the Republic are Corvus, Crassus, Florus, Gallus, and Tuscus.[6]  Tuscus, the oldest surname of the gens, means "Etruscan", and this branch of the family is thought by some writers to have been patrician, since they were among the Roman nobility at the beginning of the Republic, and according to tradition, the consulship was closed to the plebeians until the lex Licinia Sextia. However, modern scholarship suggests that the nobility of the Roman monarchy was not exclusively patrician, and that a number of early consuls belonged to families that were later regarded as plebeian. Still, as most patrician gentes also had plebeian branches, the possibility that some of the early Aquilii were patricians cannot be discounted.[7]  Corvus refers to a raven. This surname is more famous from the gens Valeria. The Aquillii Flori first appear during the First Punic War, although they must have existed since the fourth century BC, and flourished at least until the time of Augustus. Their name simply means "flower". Gallus may refer to a cock, or to a Gaul, even though the Galli were from Lanuvium.[8] Crassus, a surname common in many gentes, may be translated as "thick," "dull," "simple," or "crude."[9] The last cognomen to appear was Felix, meaning "lucky".  In the last century of the Republic, two Aquillii who reached the consulship are not recorded with a cognomen, but they belonged to the Flori, since this cognomen is found on coins and inscriptions of their descendants. Early Aquillii Gaius Aquillius Tuscus, consul in 487 BC, carried on war against the Hernici, and received an Ovation.[10] Lucius Aquillius Corvus, tribunus militum consulari potestate in 388 BC.[11] Aquillii Flori  Denarius of Augustus and Lucius Aquillius Florus, 19 BC. Sol is portrayed on the obverse. The reverse shows a quadriga carrying a modius, a reference to corn distributions made by Augustus. Gaius Aquillius Florus, grandfather of the consul of 259 BC. Marcus Aquillius Florus, father of the consul of 259 BC. Gaius Aquillius M. f. C. n. Florus, consul in 259 BC, the sixth year of the First Punic War. He was sent in Sicily, where he stayed as proconsul the following year. He celebrated a triumph at his return to Rome.[12] Manius Aquillius M'. f. M'. n., consul in 129 BC, and proconsul in Asia until 126, which he organised as province.[13] Manius Aquillius M'. f. M'. n., triumvir monetalis in 109 or 108 BC, praetor by 104, legate in Gaul in 103, consul and proconsul in Sicily in 101–99, where he defeated the revolted slaves of Salvius Tryphon. Ambassador in Bythinia in 89, he was then captured and put to death by Mithradates in 88 BC.[14][15] Manius Aquillius M'. f. M'. n., senator and juror in the trial of Oppianicus in 74 BC[16][17] Manius Aquillius M'. f. M'. n, triumvir monetalis in 65 BC.[18][19][i] Aquillius Florus, a supporter Marcus Antonius. Caught by Octavian, he committed suicide after his son was executed before him.[20] Aquillius Florus, supported Marcus Antonius alongside his father, with whom he was killed by Octavian.[20] Lucius Aquillius M'. f. M'. n. Florus, quaestor in Asia in the late Republic, where he repaired the roads built by his ancestor, the consul of 129 BC.[21][22] Lucius Aquillius L. f. M'. n. Florus, triumvir monetalis in 19 BC.[23][24] Lucius Aquillius C. f. Florus Turcianus Gallus, governor of Achaia circa AD 52, had been decemvir stlitibus judicandis, tribune of the Legio VIII Macedonicae, quaestor, proquaestor in Cyprus, tribune of the plebs, and praetor.[25][26] Aquillii Galli Lucius Aquillius Gallus, praetor in 176 BC, obtained Sicily for his province.[27][28] Gaius Aquilius Gallus, praetor in 66 BC, an early jurist, and pupil of Quintus Mucius Scaevola.[29] Publius Aquillius Gallus, tribune of the plebs in 55 BC, he tried to oppose the Lex Trebonia which granted a proconsulship of five years to Crassus and Pompey.[30] Lucius Aquillius C. f. Florus Turcianus Gallus, a senator under Augustus. His name indicates a possible alliance between the Aquillii Flori and Galli.[31] Others  Denarius of Manius Aquillius, 109-108 BC. On the obverse is the head of Sol, while the reverse depicts Luna driving a biga with stars around. Aquillius, a tribune of the plebs, and author of the Lex Aquillia, possibly dated from 286 BC.[32] Publius Aquillius, tribune of the plebs in 211 BC, although the date is disputed.[33][34] Publius Aquillius, legate in 210 BC.[35] Aquillia, reportedly engaged to marry Quintus Tullius Cicero circa 44 BC.[36] Marcus Aquillius Crassus, praetor in 43 BC, sent by the Senate to oppose Octavianus, and later proscribed. Perhaps the same as Acilius, also proscribed, whose escape is related by Appian.[37][38] Aquillius Niger, a writer referred to by Suetonius for a statement about the death of the consul Hirtius.[39] Lucius Aquillius L. f. Regulus, quaestor of Tiberius, and later pontifex.[40] Marcus Aquillius Julianus, consul in AD 38.[41][42] Marcus Aquillius Regulus, one of the delatores, or informers, in the time of Nero, and again under Domitian. Gaius Aquillius Proculus, consul suffectus for July and August, AD 90.[43] Quintus Aquillius Niger, consul in AD 117. Marcus Aquillius M. f. Felix, a centurion primus pilus of the Legio XI Claudia in 193, he was ordered by Didius Julianus to murder Septimius Severus, but defected to him instead. He was rewarded by several senior positions in the administration of Severus.[44][45][46] Aquillius Severus, a minor poet from Hispania during the time of Valentinian I.[47]  Medallion naming Gaius Aquillus Proculus, a centurion of the Legio VIII Augusta. Valkhof Museum, Nijmegen See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Initially, Crawford dated this moneyer from 71 BC, and supposed that he was the same as the senator mentioned in 74. However, Walker and Hersh placed him later, in 65. Thus, the moneyer was most likely the son of the senator, as moneyers were typically young men in their 20s, whereas the senator would have been at least 39 by this time. He was possibly the same as the supporter of Antony. References  Titus Livius, Ab Urbe Condita ii. 4.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 20 (note 1).  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, pp. 252–256.  Wiseman, New Men, p. 185.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 19, 20 (note 1).  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 98, 99.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 206, 207.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 498, 504, 506, 507, 509.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 559, 564, 570, 571, 577; vol. II, pp. 2-4 (note 10), 34, 35, 43.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 314.  Cicero, Pro Cluentio, 27. Corrupted as "Marcus" in the manuscript.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 488.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, p. 412.  Hersh & Walker, "The Mesagne Hoard", Table 2.  Cassius Dio, li. 2 § 4.  IGRP 1659.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 475.  Eckhel, vol. v, pp. 142, 143, vol. vi., pp. 94-99.  Roman Imperial Coinage, vol. I, p. 63.  CIL III, 551.  AE 1919, 1.  Livy, xli. 18, 19.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 400.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 152.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 216.  Taylor, Voting Districts, pp. 192, 193.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 186 (note 1).  Broughton, vol. I, p. 273.  Sablayrolles, Libertinus miles, pp. 11, 12 (note 15).  Broughton, vol. I, p. 281.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, xiv. 13, 17.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iii. 93, 94, iv. 39.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 338.  Suetonius, "The Life of Augustus", 11.  CIL VI, 2122.  Cassius Dio, lix. 9.  Frontinus, De Aquaeductu 13.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244.  Spartianus, "The Life of Didius Julianus", 5 § 8; "The Life of Septimius Severus", 5 § 9.  Oliver, "M. Aquilius Felix", pp. 311-319.  Sablayrolles, Libertinus miles, p. 78 (note 39), p. 130 (note 227).  Jerome, De Viris Illustribus, c. 3.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, Pro Cluentio. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Sextus Julius Frontinus, De Aquaeductu (On Aqueducts). Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Lives of the Emperors). Eusebius Sophronius Hieronymus (St. Jerome), De Viris Illustribus (On the Illustrious Men). Joseph Hilarius Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum (The Study of Ancient Coins, 1792–1798). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). René Cagnat et al., Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas Pertinentes (abbreviated IGRP), Paris (1911-1927) C. H. V. Sutherland, Roman Imperial Coinage, volume 1 : Augustus–Vitellius (31 BC–69 AD), London, 1923 (revised 1984). James H. Oliver, "M. Aquilius Felix", in The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 67, No. 4 (1946), pp. 311–319. T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Lily Ross Taylor, The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic, University of Michigan Press (1960). T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 BC–AD 14, Oxford University Press (1971). Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974, 2001). Charles Hersh and Alan Walker, "The Mesagne Hoard", in Museum Notes (American Numismatic Society), Vol. 29 (1984), pp. 103–134. Timothy J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC), Routledge, London (1995). Robert Sablayrolles, Libertinus miles. Les cohortes de vigiles, Publications de l'École Française de Rome, (1996). External links Wikimedia Commons logo Media related to Gens Aquilia at Wikimedia Commons  Categories: AquilliiRoman gentes Of the Aquilii perhaps you can provide a Latin conversation involving Guinio when condemnins his sons -- because the Aquillii -- two of them -- were involved in that conspiration, so he must have condemned them two, and we can have a dialogue on the idea that 'son' means nothing compared tdo 'conspirator' -- and (b) of the other, who would fit the Grice/Speranza mould best? Thanks This is a splendid Aquilian case—because here you can stage a collision of categories:  filius (natural, affective) coniurator (political, juridical)  —and let the father (your “Gunius,” i.e. the conspirator‑judging patrician) force a reclassification: the son ceases to be “son” under a new description. Let me give you the dialogue first, then the Gricean reading, and finally a second‑best Aquilius.  I. Dialogue: condemning the sons (Aquilii and the Tarquin conspiracy) Scene: early Republic, discovery of the conspiracy to restore the Tarquins (the Aquilii among the conspirators; the father presiding or present)  Latin dialogue (6 moves) Pater: “Hi sunt filii mei.” Accusator: “Coniurati sunt.” Pater: “Filii sunt—sed coniurati.” Filius: “Pater, filios punies?” Pater: “Non filios punio—sed coniuratos.” Filius: “Ergo nos non iam filios esse dicis.”  Translation  Father: “These are my sons.” Accuser: “They are conspirators.” Father: “They are sons—but conspirators.” Son: “Father, will you punish your sons?” Father: “I do not punish sons—but conspirators.” Son: “So you say we are no longer sons.”   II. Gricean structure (very clean) 1. The key move  “Non filios punio—sed coniuratos.”  This is:  not factual denial (they are sons) but relevance shift   2. What is going on                  TermDomainfiliusnatural / familialconiuratorjuridical / political  The father’s move:  selects which predicate is relevant for action   3. Gricean reading  literal content:  “I punish conspirators”   implicated:  “being a son is irrelevant here”     classic case of:  cancellation of a presumed implicature   4. The son’s reply  “Ergo nos non iam filios esse dicis”  This exposes the mechanism:  hearer reconstructs:  implicit negation of filius     III. Speranzian formulation  The father does not deny that they are his sons; he denies that sonship is the relevant description under which they are to be judged.   IV. Why the Aquilii are perfect here  they appear in the Tarquins conspiracy thus tied to:  foundation crisis loyalty vs kinship    So they give you:  a foundational Roman instance of re-describing persons under a new category   V. Second-best Aquilius (Grice/Speranza fit) Among your list, the strongest candidate is:  Gaius Aquilius Gallus (jurist)  Why him  early Roman jurist pupil of Scaevola works in:  legal interpretation     Gricean relevance Law is:  minimal formulation maximal interpretive load   exactly like implicature:  what is meant exceeds what is said   Mini vignette (juristic) Discipulus: “Lex hoc dicit.” Aquilius Gallus: “Et quid non dicit?” Discipulus: “Id non quaesivi.” Gallus: “Id ipsum est quod iudex quaerit.”  Translation  “The law says this.” “And what does it not say?” “That I did not ask.” “That is precisely what the judge asks.”   Gricean core  law = utterance judgment = reconstruction of:  unstated implications     VI. Final Aquilii pairing You now have a beautiful contrast:                  FigureFunctionAquilii conspiratorsidentity reclassified (filius → coniurator)Aquiliusmeaning reclassified (dictum → implicatum)   Final Speranzian synthesis  Among the Aquilii, the conspirator is no longer treated as a son once he is described as a traitor, and the jurist teaches that what is not said may be more decisive than what is; in both cases, the decisive step is the same—the substitution of one description for another, under which the whole meaning of the case is transformed.    Short answer  Dialogue: supplied (father vs sons, category shift) Best second fit: Gaius Aquilius Gallus (jurist) Reason: law = structured implicature   If you like, we can align this with Brutus’ famous case (sons executed)—to show whether Rome treats these as the same or distinct semantic acts of condemnation. I was referring to Giunio Bruto, so we can have a second dialogue where Bruto, who condemned his owns sons for conspirators ALSO condemned the AQUILII, we understand? If so, we can have a triad: BRUTO, his son, one AQUILLIO -- and they discuss the meaning of 'son' as NOT being trumped by 'conspirator' -- same juddge (BRUTO) judging equally over SON/cum/conspirator, and CONSPIRATOR-only (Aquillio). Thanks Ah—perfect, yes: now the scene is properly Roman and properly Gricean. You want a triad:  Brutus (judge) his son (filius + conspirator) an Aquilius (conspirator-only)  —and the key philosophical tension is:  does filius get “cancelled” by coniurator, or does it remain but become irrelevant?  Let’s stage it cleanly.  I. Triadic dialogue (Brutus, son, Aquilius) Latin (6-move, tightly structured) Brutus: “Vos ambo coniurati estis.” Filius: “Ego filius tuus sum.” Aquilius: “Ego tantum coniuratus sum.” Brutus: “Eodem nomine tenemini.” Filius: “Sed ego plus quam coniuratus sum.” Brutus: “In hoc iudicio nemo plus est quam coniuratus.”  II. Translation  Brutus: “You are both conspirators.” Son: “I am your son.” Aquilius: “I am only a conspirator.” Brutus: “You are held under the same name.” Son: “But I am more than a conspirator.” Brutus: “In this trial no one is more than a conspirator.”   III. Gricean structure (very precise) 1. Competing descriptions                  PersonDescriptions availableSonfilius + coniuratorAquiliusconiurator only  2. The son’s move  “Ego filius tuus sum.”   implicature:  filial relation should:  weigh against punishment perhaps mitigate or override     3. Aquilius’ move  “Ego tantum coniuratus sum.”   subtle implicature:  no competing identity no expectation of mercy in a way, cleaner case   4. Brutus’ decisive move  “Eodem nomine tenemini.” (“You are held under the same designation.”)   This is the core conceptual move:  selects:  one description (coniuratus) as legally relevant   ignores:  filius     5. Final principle  “In hoc iudicio nemo plus est quam coniuratus.”   complete relevance restriction:  multiplicity of predicates → collapsed to one   IV. Gricean reading This is not denial of truth, but control of relevance.  What is NOT happening Brutus does not say:  “you are not my son”    What IS happening He says, effectively:  “that you are my son is not relevant to this judgment”   Gricean formulation  The son introduces:  additional information (Quantity expansion)   Brutus responds by:  rejecting its relevance (Relation constraint)     V. The key contrast (son vs Aquilius)                          FeatureSonAquiliusextra predicate✔ (filius)✘expectation of mitigation✔✘outcomesamesame  Philosophical point  The presence of an additional relation does not alter the operative description   VI. Speranzian synthesis  Brutus does not deny that his son is his son; he denies that sonship has any weight in the present context. Thus the Aquilius, who is only a conspirator, and the son, who is both, are judged alike—not because they are the same under every description, but because one description has been selected as exclusively relevant.   VII. Ultra-compact formulation  Filius non tollitur, sed excluditur.  (“The son is not removed, but excluded [from relevance].”)  VIII. Final note (elegant refinement) The Aquilius actually sharpens the problem:  the son:  tries to add meaning   Aquilius:  has no surplus meaning to add     So the Aquilius becomes:  the control case of pure legal description    Final Speranzian close  The son appeals to what exceeds the charge, the Aquilius has nothing beyond it, and Brutus insists that in judgment only the charge counts; thus what distinguishes them in life is set aside in law, and two unequal men are made equal by the selection of a single name under which they are both condemned.   If you like, we can now set this alongside Antistius’ “23 wounds vs 1 cause” as another instance of reducing multiplicity to a single operative predicate.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquinio – Ossia: Grice ed Aquinio -- Grex giceiana – verbalia: Aquinio. The Aquinii were a family in Rome. The gens does not appear to have been particularly large or important, and is known primarily from two individuals.  Marcus A/, a partisan of Gnaeus Pompeius in Africa, who took part in the war against Caesar. After the defeat of the Pompeians, he was pardoned by Caesar. A., a very inferior poet, a contemporary of Catullus and Cicero.[3][4] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  Gaius Julius Caesar (attributed), De Bello Africo 57, 89  Gaius Valerius Catullus xiv. 18.  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tusculanae Quaestiones v. 22.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)    GENS                   This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs Actually, at least two members of the Aquinii seem interesting (a) we can have a dialogue GIULIO pardoning AQUINIO (b) can we retrieve one LINE by the Aquinio poet? Thanks Excellent—this is a delightful two-point Aquinian cluster:  (a) Marcus Aquinius, Pompeian partisan → pardoned by Caesar (b) Aquinius the poet → ridiculed by Catullus  Let me give you both, cleanly.  I. (a) Dialogue: Caesar pardons Aquinius We know (as your note indicated) that:  Aquinius fought against Caesar in Africa after defeat:  he was pardoned    (This is a standard Caesarian motif: clemency toward defeated opponents.)  Latin dialogue (6‑move, Gricean) Aquinius: “Caesar, contra te arma tuli.” Caesar: “Scio.” Aquinius: “Poenam igitur merui.” Caesar: “Non semper quod meretur quisque accipit.” Aquinius: “Ergo ignoscis mihi?” Caesar: “Non ignosco—sed dimitto.”  Translation  Aquinius: “Caesar, I bore arms against you.” Caesar: “I know.” Aquinius: “Therefore I have deserved punishment.” Caesar: “Not everyone receives what he deserves.” Aquinius: “So you forgive me?” Caesar: “I do not forgive—but I release.”   Grice/Speranza analysis The key move:  “Non ignosco—sed dimitto.”   What is going on?  Aquinius tries to frame it as:  forgiveness (moral category)   Caesar reframes it as:  clemency / release (political category)     Implicature play                  WordImplied frameignoscerepersonal / moraldimitterepolitical / sovereign   Caesar’s move:  avoids implicature of equality (forgiveness among equals) and maintains asymmetry (ruler releasing subject)   Speranzian formulation  Caesar does not deny Aquinius’ guilt; he denies that what follows is forgiveness, substituting for it a political act which carries no implication of parity.   II. (b) A line from Aquinius the poet We do not possess a surviving line by Aquinius himself. What we have instead is:  Catullus mentioning him among bad poets A famous line (from Catullus 14):  “Caesios, Aquinos, Suffenum—omnia colligam venena.” [en.wikisource.org]   Translation  “I shall gather Caesius, Aquinius, Suffenus—all those poisons.”   Important note  This is not Aquinius’ own verse It is:  Catullus’ hostile testimony     So:  we know Aquinius as a poet only through ridicule   Gricean angle The word:  venena (“poisons”)  implicates:  bad poetry =  something harmful, contaminating     Speranzian gloss  Aquinius says nothing; yet what he is taken to have said suffices to condemn him, for the name alone functions as an implicature of bad verse.   III. Final pairing (very elegant)                  FigureMechanismAquinius (Pompeian)guilt reclassified (→ clemency, not forgiveness)Aquinius (poet)speech erased (→ replaced by hostile implicature)   Final Speranzian synthesis  One Aquinius speaks against Caesar and is released without being forgiven; another is said to write verse and is condemned without being heard; in both cases, what determines the outcome is not the utterance itself, but the framework within which it is interpreted—whether as rebellion to be politically managed, or as poetry to be dismissed as poison.    Short answers  Dialogue: Caesar & Aquinius (clemency vs forgiveness)  Poetic “line”: → only indirect, via Catullus: “Caesios, Aquinos, Suffenum—omnia colligam venena.”  Note: no authentic surviving verse from Aquinius himself    If you like, we can now contrast this Aquinius-poet with Suffenus (another Catullan victim) to build a micro‑theory of “bad poetry as failed implicature.”

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquinio – Ossia: Grice ed Aquinio -- Grex giceiana – verbalia: Aquinio. Aquinio Does this help? Apparently TULLIO said Aquinio was his friend AND the worst poet -- perhaps we can have a face to face conversation? Thanks -- we do not have a single line or fragment of surviving poetry written by Aquinus. [1, 2] He is an entirely "lost" Roman author, preserved in name only through the mockery of his contemporaries. [1] Who was Aquinus? The quote you provided comes from Catullus 14, a humorous poem where Catullus vows to get revenge on his friend Calvus for sending him an anthology of notoriously awful poetry as a Saturnalia prank. Catullus threatens to run to the bookshops at dawn and gather up the ultimate literary "poisons" to inflict back on Calvus: the works of Caesius, Aquinus, and Suffenus. [1, 2, 3] While Suffenus gets ripped apart at length by Catullus in a separate piece (Poem 22), and Caesius is a total mystery, we do have one other tantalizing historical footprint for Aquinus: [1, 2, 3] Cicero's Confirmation: In his Tusculan Disputations (5.63), Marcus Tullius Cicero lists him under the slightly altered name variant Aquinius. [1] Cicero corroborates Catullus’ low opinion of his talent, famously writing: "Adhuc neminem cognovi poetam... et mihi fuit cum Aquinio amicitia, qui sibi non optimus videretur." ("To this day I have never known a poet—and I was actually friends with Aquinius—who did not think his own work was absolutely magnificent.") [1, 2, 3] Because all copies of his manuscripts have vanished, Aquinus remains trapped in classical history as the absolute archetype of a aggressively bad, yet blissfully self-satisfied, poetaster. [1] If you are exploring the "Bad Poets Society" of ancient Rome, I can share what Catullus says about Suffenus's terrible writing habits or break down the satirical context of Catullus 14. Which direction would you like to take? [1, 2, 3] Yes—this helps a lot, and it gives us exactly the human, face‑to‑face Gricean situation you were looking for:  Aquinius = bad poet but self‑satisfied Cicero = friend who knows better but speaks diplomatically  So the tension is:  friendship vs evaluation, and the implicature carried by what is not said directly.  Let me give you a properly tuned dialogue.  I. Dialogue: Cicero and Aquinius face to face Latin (6 moves, conversational, slightly ironic) Aquinius: “Cicerō, carmina mea legisti?” Cicero: “Legi.” Aquinius: “Quid tibi videntur?” Cicero: “Magnā fidūciā scripta sunt.” Aquinius: “Ergo placent?” Cicero: “Placent tibi—quod maximum est.”  II. Translation  Aquinius: “Cicero, have you read my poems?” Cicero: “I have.” Aquinius: “What do they seem to you?” Cicero: “They are written with great confidence.” Aquinius: “So you like them?” Cicero: “They please you—which is the greatest thing.”   III. Gricean structure This is beautifully subtle.  1. Cicero’s key move  “Magnā fidūciā scripta sunt.”  What is said:  “written with great confidence”  What is implicated:  not necessarily good perhaps even: only confidence, no quality   classic Quantity + Manner evasion  2. Final move  “Placent tibi—quod maximum est.”  Surface:  seemingly generous  Implicature:  “that’s the only thing one can safely praise”   3. Aquinius’ failure He takes:  “confidence” + “pleases you”  as:  endorsement  But Cicero intends:  polite non-endorsement   IV. Link to Cicero’s actual remark You paraphrased well:  people think their own poetry excellent  Cicero’s stance here is:  he knows Aquinius is bad but does not say it baldly instead lets:  the implicature do the work     V. Philosophical structure We now have:                  SpeakerStrategyAquiniusseeks explicit praiseCicerogives qualified, implicature-heavy reply  Critical point Cicero avoids violating:  Quality (he does not lie) but manipulates Quantity   VI. Speranzian formulation  Cicero does not say that Aquinius is a bad poet; he says something true but insufficient, trusting that the insufficiency will be recognised by anyone who can hear what is not said.   VII. Mini counter‑move (optional extension) If you want a sharper ending:  Aquinius: “Cur non aperte laudas?” Cicero: “Quia aperta laus saepe falsa est.”  Translation:  “Why do you not praise me openly?” “Because open praise is often false.”   VIII. Final synthesis You now have a very elegant Aquinian pair:                  AquiniusMechanismPompeian Aquiniusreclassified politically (pardoned, not forgiven)Poet Aquiniusevaluated indirectly (praised, but not really)   Final Speranzian close  Aquinius demands to be praised, and Cicero complies without praising him; for he says only what is true, but not all that is relevant, and leaves his meaning to be completed by the hearer—who, in this case, never completes it.    Short answer  Yes: dialogue supplied (Cicero vs Aquinius) Key device: polite under‑statement generating negative implicature Result: Aquinius hears praise; the informed hearer hears its absence   If you like, we can now juxtapose this with Catullus’ brutal (non‑Gricean!) directness toward the same Aquinius.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquino – Ossia: Grice e Aquilino – Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). A philosopher of considerable learning and eloquence. In Rome, he debates with members of the Accademia of his day, although it is unclear what his own philosophical views are. He is a close friend of FRONTONE . Giulio Aquilino. Aquilino. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Aquilino. Giulio Aquilino (Roma). A philosopher of considerable learning and eloquence. In Rome, he debates with members of the Accademia of his day, although it is unclear what his own philosophical views are. He is a close friend of FRONTONE. GRICEVS: Romae, Aquiline, in Accademia hodie disputasti tam diserte ut etiam statuae in Foro caput inclinarent. AQVILINVS: Si statuae adsentiuntur, Grice, vel Stoicus fio vel certe Frontoni promisi me bene sonare. GRICEVS: At quid sentis vere, philosophus—an sententiam celas ut Romani vinum optimum in amphora sine titulo? AQVILINVS: Sententia mea est haec: amicis (praesertim Frontoni) semper assentior, ceteris autem ita disputo ut nemo sciat utrum vincam an rideam.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquino – Ossia: Grice e Aquino: la ragione conversazionale: ponite omnem spem, o quicunque intratis. Carlo d’Aquino (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale: ponite omnem spem, o quicunque intratis. Grice: “At Oxford, we translate the Jabberwocky as Gabberbocchus; at Rome, they translate the Divina Commedia as Divina Comoedia! The Jesuit Scholar Reverend A. is a significant Italian Jesuit, scholar, and expert on ALIGHIERI. A. is a Catholic priest, university teacher, translator, and a renowned classical scholar and Latinist. He teaches at the Roman College. Key Achievement: He is best known for producing the first-ever translation of ALIGHIERI ’s Divine Comedy into heroic Latin verse. Published Works He authors several extensive lexicons and other academic works, including Lexicon militare, Vocabularium architecturae aedificatoriae, and Nomenclator agriculturae.  The Jesuit scholar  Padre Carlo d'Aquino published the first complete translation of Dante’s masterpiece into Latin hexameters.    Title of the Translation The work was titled: Della Commedia di Dante Alighieri, trasportata in verso latino eroico. While often cataloged under this Italian title, the text itself serves as a Latin rendition of the Divina Commedia.  Translation of the Passage D'Aquino translated the famous line from Inferno (Canto III, line 9), "Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’entrate" (Abandon all hope, you who enter), as:  Ponite omnem spem, o quicunque intratis. A.'s version was noted for being a free paraphrase that prioritized elegant "heroic" Latin verse over literal word-for-word accuracy. This style occasionally drew criticism from later scholars who felt his translation was too distant from Dante's original expression.  Grice: Aquino, dicono che a Oxford il Jabberwocky diventa Gabberbocchus… ma a Roma la Divina Commedia si trasforma in verso eroico latino! Tu quando traduci Dante, lasci ogni speranza o preferisci portare qualche rima nuova in viaggio? Aquino: Grice, la speranza si lascia solo all’ingresso dell’Inferno… ma in traduzione, ogni verso è un’avventura! Se Dante mi chiede “Lasciate ogni speranza”, io rispondo con un bel “Ponite omnem spem”, così almeno i lettori hanno qualcosa da mettere in valigia. Grice: E allora, caro Carlo, quando arriva il latinista a leggere il tuo poema, trova più eroismo nei versi o più comicità nel tentativo? Non rischi che qualche anima rimanga a metà strada tra il latino e il fiorentino? Aquino: Grice, basta una buona conversazione e un po’ di latino per non perdersi! Se qualche anima inciampa, almeno può dire di aver viaggiato nell’Inferno con stile… e magari con una speranza nascosta nella toga! Roma, Lazio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquino – Ossia: Grice e Aquino: la ragione conversationale – filosofia italiana –  (Bologna). Bologna, Emilia Romagna.  Giovanni Pietro d’Aquino: la ragione conversationale – filosofia italiana –  (Bologna). Bologna, Emilia Romagna. Abstract: Grice: “I love A.! -- Italian humanist scholar, rhetorician, and author from the Renaissance period. A. is primarily known for his work in Latin oratory, including the Orationes (Orations). The Orationes consist of formal speeches or rhetorical exercises, a common form of academic and literary expression among humanists who seek to emulate the classical Roman style. A. is associated with academic circles, at Bologna. Specific details about his life, such as birth and death dates or his exact academic positions, are not available in the provided sources, but he is distinct from the more famous medieval philosopher A. or the 18th-century Jesuit Latinist Carlo d'Aquino. Grice: Giovanni Pietro, dicono che a Bologna la retorica si insegni come si prepara il ragù – con pazienza, un pizzico di latinismo e tanti argomenti!Aquino: Grice, qui la retorica si mescola bene, ma attenzione: se uno sbaglia l’ordine, rischia di servire una orazione più scotta del ragù domenicale!Grice: Ma dimmi, caro Aquino, preferisci una orazione che profuma di classico o una che lascia tutti a bocca aperta come una lasagna ben fatta?Aquino: Grice, l’importante è che alla fine si alzi tutti dalla tavola – o dalla cattedra – soddisfatti! Se la parola convince, allora la ragione conversazionale ha vinto, e magari resta anche un po’ di parmigiano da spargere sulle idee!

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquino – Ossia: Grice e Aquino: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della teoria dell’intenzione.  Tomasso d’Aquino (Abbazia di Fossanova, Roccasecca, Frossinone, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della teoria dell’intenzione. Grice: “Srawson used to joke and call me A., as I rushed to tutor on ‘De interpretatione’ That’s precisely what A. did at Bologna! Can’t the tutee not interpret it by himself?! The son of Landolfo d'A. My ‘Meaning’ makes a point about this misinterpretation I found at Oxford re: A.: A. speaks of a SEGNO ex impositione, versus ex natura. Iimpositio is hardly a convention! We find in A. all the conceptual tools we need for the ragione conversazionale both in communicatio and conversation. Dottore angelico. Filosofia classica. Lizio. Allievo d’Alberto Magno, che lo difese quando i compagni lo chiamano il bue muto: Voi lo chiamate il bue muto. Io vi dico, quando questo bue mugge, il suo muggito s’udranno d’un'estremità all'altra della terra. This part is the  difference, i.e., by convention, viz., according to human institution deriving from the will of man. This differentiates a name from a vocal sound signifying naturally, such as the groan of the sick and the vocal sounds of a brute animal. Then lizio says, by convention is added. A name (and its utterer) signifies by convention ad placitum ex institutione. No name exists naturally. For it is a name because it signifies; it does not signify naturally however, but ex institutione. This lizio adds when he says, but it is a name when it is *made* a SEGNO, i.e., when it is imposed to signify. For that which signifies naturally is not made a sign, but is a sign naturally. Lizio explains this when he says: for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes designate, etc., i.e., since they cannot be signified by letters. He says sounds rather than vocal sounds because some animals, those without lungs, do not have vocal sounds. Such an animal signifies a passion by some kind of non-vocal sound which signifies naturally. Peri hermeneias, de interpretation, Austin/Grice, “De interpretatione” nota, notare, notante, notato, denotato, denotare, grammatici speculativi, intentionality, the taxonomy of intentions. G.: You have the Latin? D.: I have the Latin, and the Roman complications besides. G.: Good. Begin not with the Summa. Everybody begins with the Summa. D.: Then let us begin where you prefer: with Aristotle through Anici through Aquino. G.: Exactly. Oxford never quite knew what to do with that chain, though Austin and I tried. D.: “Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Peri Hermeneias.” G.: There. Already more interesting than half a shelf of pious summaries. D.: And more dangerous. G.: Why dangerous? D.: Because once one reads Thomas on Peri Hermeneias, one cannot go back to speaking as if “truth” floated above proposition and signification like a halo. G.: Very good. Kenny, in the short book, gives one truth, proposition, predication, being, soul, all the worthy furniture. D.: But not the joinery. G.: Exactly. The joinery is in the commentary. D.: On Aristotle. G.: Through Boethius. D.: Through Boethius indeed. And often against confusions later made easier by people who had read only the schoolbook Thomas. G.: Such as? D.: Such as the easy slide from vox significativa to “meaning is in the voice.” G.: Which is what no sensible person should say. D.: Yet many do. G.: They deserve Ockham. D.: That is severe. G.: Ockham multiplies sermones beyond necessity. D.: Ah, we are there already. G.: Inevitably. If one cares about signification, one must eventually choose one’s enemy. D.: And yours is sermo mentalis. G.: Not always, but often enough. I am suspicious whenever somebody gives the anima a full internal language complete with syntax, committee structure, and invisible punctuation. D.: Then Thomas will please you more than Ockham. G.: That is my suspicion. D.: Because Thomas can say that voces significant passiones animae, without thereby making the anima itself a little talking machine. G.: Precisely. That is the point. D.: Then let us lay the chain out properly. G.: Yes. Slowly. As if Oxford had never heard Greek. D.: It usually hadn’t, except in finals. G.: Go on. D.: Written marks, spoken sounds, passions of the soul, things. G.: In Greek? D.: γραμμάτα, φωναί, παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, πράγματα. G.: And in the Latinity of the tradition? D.: Litterae or notae, voces, passiones animae, res. G.: Good. Now where does Anici enter? D.: With the translation and the commentary. He supplies the Latin through which the schools will hear Aristotle. G.: And where does he go wrong? D.: Where everyone goes wrong who likes nouns too much. G.: Signum. D.: Exactly. Aristotle gives σημαίνειν, a verb, and the Latin world begins to think in signum. G.: Which embalms the process. D.: Or at least makes it easier to forget that signification is something done. G.: By whom? D.: Ah. There we are. By whom indeed. G.: Because that is exactly the point. Does the vox signify, or does he who utters the vox signify by uttering it? D.: Thomas is useful there because he preserves the traditional formula yet invites the question. G.: Better than answering it too quickly. D.: You sound almost Thomist. G.: God forbid. Or perhaps permit. D.: Then let me read: “Vox significativa ad placitum.” G.: A lethal phrase if mishandled. D.: Commonly mishandled. G.: Explain. D.: People hear ad placitum and think “by convention,” then hear “convention” and think “committee,” and the whole thing dies in sociology. G.: Yes. And the phrase deserves better. D.: Better as ex institutione or ex impositione, if one keeps the force of imposition as assignment, not social contract. G.: Exactly. In my “Meaning” I object to flattening such things into vulgar convention. D.: Thomas helps there. G.: How? D.: Because he is precise that a name is not naturally a name. It is made to signify. G.: Quando fit signum, yes. D.: Exactly. G.: But there again I want the verb. Not merely “it is a sign,” but “it is used to signify.” D.: Thomas does not always give you the verb where you want it. G.: No. He is still a Latin schoolman. But he often leaves the action visible enough for one to recover it. D.: Better than Boethius? G.: Sometimes better because later. A younger generation, if you like. He sees where the older translation stiffens. D.: He also has Greek behind the Latin more explicitly. G.: That matters enormously. D.: More Latin, then. “Voces sunt notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum.” G.: There. And immediately one must ask what sort of notae these are. D.: Signs, marks, indicators. G.: But not merely labels. D.: No, because the soul’s passions are not boxes and the voice is not a luggage ticket. G.: Nicely put. D.: Thank you. G.: Now to passio animae. D.: Yes. G.: I distrust passio there. D.: Because you hear suffering? G.: Or passivity, or theatrical affliction. It is too loaded in later ears. D.: Yet in Aristotle and Thomas it means more nearly affection, modification, being-affected. G.: Exactly. Which is why I want it qualified before modern readers sentimentalise it. D.: So not “emotion” simply. G.: Certainly not simply. Nor “mental item” in the hard modern sense. D.: Then what? G.: Something like the soul’s being-in-a-state vis-à-vis what is thought or apprehended. But one must say it awkwardly, because smoothness would be false. D.: You prefer false Latin to false English. G.: I prefer difficulty where the matter is difficult. D.: Then Thomas’s passiones animae are not little propositions inside the head. G.: Exactly my anti-Ockham point. D.: Ockham would move toward a sermo mentalis with real syntactic articulation. G.: Yes. Inner language with subject, predicate, proposition, and all the rest. D.: You dislike that because— G.: Because it multiplies entities beyond necessity and because it risks turning the mind into a duplicate of public speech. D.: Whereas Thomas may allow the voice to signify the soul’s affection without requiring the soul to have “spoken” first. G.: Precisely. D.: Then this is where Grice and Austin on De interpretatione would care more than Kenny in the little book. G.: Yes. Kenny gives one the big Thomist furniture. We want the smaller hinges. D.: The hinges being signification, proposition, truth. G.: And predication. D.: And ad placitum. G.: And the whole business of what bears truth and falsity. D.: Which in Aristotle is not the isolated name but the synthesis or division. G.: Exactly. Affirmation and negation, composition and division. D.: Then propositio. G.: Ah yes. There we arrive at the point where the schools become useful to Oxford again. D.: Because proposition is where truth enters. G.: Yes. Not in the mere vox, not in the isolated term, but in what is asserted or denied. D.: And yet the vox must still signify for proposition to get off the ground. G.: Exactly. Which is why the semantic business precedes the alethic business. D.: Kenny’s Past Masters gives truth in the broad adaequatio line. G.: Yes, veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus, all very proper. D.: You sound ungrateful. G.: I am only saying that one gets more philosophical electricity from the commentaries than from the catechism. D.: The Summa is catechism to you? G.: Best-seller, anyway. D.: And outside the Summa? G.: That is the interesting Thomas. Read me titles. D.: Sententia libri Peri Hermeneias. G.: Good. D.: Sententia libri De anima. G.: Better. D.: Sententia libri Metaphysicae. G.: Useful, though heavier. D.: Sententia libri Ethicorum. G.: Everybody loves ethics once they have forgotten logic. D.: Expositio libri Peryermenias, in some catalogues. G.: A variant title, but yes, the thing itself. D.: And the commentary on Boethius too. G.: Yes, though one must be careful which Boethian work and which chain of dependence we are speaking of. D.: We are speaking here of Aquino on Aristotle through Boethius. G.: Exactly. That triad is what matters. D.: Then let me ask your question in your own style: Who does the signifying? G.: Good. If I wave my hand, does the hand signify? Or do I signify by waving my hand? D.: You would say the latter. G.: Naturally. The hand is instrument, vehicle, medium, not principal signifier. D.: So also with the voice. G.: Precisely. A vox as sound may be merely a physical event. A vox significativa is a voice as used in signifying. D.: Then you would prefer Thomas to say not simply vox significativa but something more dynamic. G.: I would. But one cannot ask a thirteenth-century Dominican to write post-Gricean English. D.: You do occasionally sound as if you could. G.: Only occasionally. D.: What about the groan? G.: Ah yes. My old friend the groan. D.: If I groan, and you know my pain from my moaning— G.: Then the vox is significative enough, though not articulate in the lexical way. D.: So “significant voice” cannot just mean articulate speech. G.: Exactly. That would be absurd. A groan, a cry, a gasp, a handwave—all can signify. D.: Which is why you keep wanting the verb signare or significare alive. G.: Yes. “X signifies Y” is already less misleading than “X is a sign.” D.: And signans, signatum? G.: Useful enough later, but I distrust the scholastic tendency to noun everything into a diagram. D.: Saussure would be disappointed. G.: A Swiss linguist is always a little disappointing. D.: And a saint? G.: Worse, because then nobody will quarrel with him on the right grounds. D.: You mean Thomas. G.: Of course. Canonisation is a poor critical edition. D.: Still, Thomas as philosopher should not disappear into “saint.” G.: Exactly. He philosophised on what matters. Language, signification, proposition, truth, soul, will. D.: Voliting. G.: Ah yes. Kenny’s favourite contribution to our vocabulary. D.: You like it too. G.: I like it because it offends. D.: And because it reminds one that willing is not just another case of predication. G.: Yes. But here my point is different. Beneath both judging and willing there is a central phrastic, to use Hare’s useful barbarism. D.: Hare should have taught Kenny that more profusely? G.: Indeed. If one distinguishes tropic from phrastic, then much of what Thomas is doing with proposition and signification becomes clearer. D.: How so? G.: Because the assertoric or judicative force and the volitive force may differ, yet the underlying content-structure—the thing signified or entertained—may be common. D.: So proposition in the richer sense is not exhausted by bare indicative truth-conditions. G.: Exactly. D.: And this matters for De interpretatione because— G.: Because Aristotle’s concern with affirmation, negation, truth, falsity, and signification sets up the very distinctions later needed for judgment, willing, command, question, and all the rest. D.: Which Grice and Austin, lecturing on De interpretatione, would naturally care about. G.: Very much. More, I suspect, than a short general book on Aquinas would show. D.: Let us bring Oxford back in. G.: Yes. St Benet’s. D.: So near St John’s. G.: Too near, perhaps. Catholic pockets in Oxford always made me suspicious that Rome was hiding in the shrubbery. D.: And Belsyre not far off. G.: Quite. One could walk from my domestic respectability to his Benedictine respectability without much metaphysical strain. D.: Kenny at St Benet’s, Ramsey elsewhere in official Anglican positions, Dummett in the Catholic orbit, Geach and Anscombe, and Oxford pretending none of this had theological consequences. G.: Exactly. Oxford always prefers to think it is merely doing philosophy when it is in fact managing denominations. D.: Gregorian is not Angelicum. G.: No. Jesuit is not Dominican, and St Benet’s is Benedictine and English enough to complicate everything. D.: Yet the Roman dissertations, the Oxford DPhil, linguistic analysis, and language of religion all meet there. G.: Yes. One can almost forgive the ecclesiastical machinery for providing such good complications. D.: But your concern under Aquinas is not Kenny. G.: No. Kenny is merely the occasion. Thomas is the point. D.: Then let us return to res. G.: Ah yes. The realist bit. D.: Which you avoid when Price starts causationizing perception. G.: Precisely. Res is dangerous because one begins to think the world itself is laid out like the sentence. D.: Thomas is more realist there than you are comfortable with. G.: Often, yes. But one need not swallow all the realism to appreciate the semantic architecture. D.: So for Thomas: written marks signify spoken sounds, spoken sounds signify passions of the soul, those passions are likenesses of things. G.: Yes. And the crucial issue is how not to collapse the middle term. D.: The middle term being passio animae. G.: Exactly. If you collapse it, you become crude realist or crude psychologiser. If you inflate it, you become Ockham with internal syntax. D.: Thomas’s merit is to keep it central without theatrical overdevelopment. G.: That is well put. D.: Then how does he improve on Boethius? G.: Sometimes simply by seeing more. Boethius gives the Latin and a large amount of conceptual scaffolding. Thomas inherits this and works with a greater scholastic precision and with an eye more alive to the metaphysical and semantic repercussions. D.: Without becoming modern. G.: Thank heaven. D.: But enough to help the modern. G.: Exactly. D.: Then the practical question again: if I utter a vox, who means? G.: I do. Or at least the utterer does. The vox is no more an autonomous meaner than my hand is an autonomous waver. D.: Yet the tradition’s formulas tempt one to say “the voice signifies.” G.: Yes, because ellipsis is cheap and centuries are lazy. D.: And because a formula once stabilized becomes doctrine. G.: Precisely. Which is why one must periodically remind oneself that “the voice signifies” often really means “a person signifies by means of a voice.” D.: That sounds very Gricean. G.: It is very sane. D.: And if the sign is not vocal? Handwave? G.: The point is unchanged. Anything can function as sign-vehicle. My trouble with vox is not that voices cannot signify, but that philosophers often treat voice as privileged in a way the communicative phenomenon itself does not require. D.: Aristotle in De interpretatione is concerned with voice because he is moving toward proposition and assertion. G.: Exactly. Which is fair enough. But one must not universalise the local convenience. D.: So Thomas on Peri Hermeneias is indispensable for one line of semantic thought, not because voice is everything, but because proposition requires a certain sort of articulate sign-vehicle. G.: Precisely. D.: And from there predicate, predication, truth. G.: Yes. Which is why the commentary matters. D.: More than the “best seller.” G.: In this respect, yes. D.: Then the conclusion? G.: Thomas on Aristotle through Boethius gives one the semantic machinery Oxford ordinary-language philosophy might have profited from more directly, had it cared to look beyond its own damp genius. D.: You are almost affectionate toward Aquinas. G.: Only when he is busy with Aristotle and not being canonised at me. D.: And the punchline? G.: Very well. Boethius gave Aristotle a Latin voice, Thomas taught it to signify a little better, and Oxford read the Summa instead.Grice: Aquino, ti confesso che ogni volta che sento parlare di “segno ex impositione” mi viene in mente la pasta fatta in casa: c’è sempre qualcuno che decide come tagliarla, ma nessuno la riconosce finché non la si assaggia! Non sarebbe meglio se il segno fosse come il muggito del bue, naturale e impossibile da fraintendere? Aquino: Ah, Grice, il muggito ha il suo fascino, ma la conversazione è tutta una questione di intenzione! Se il segno nasce dalla volontà, allora ogni parola è una pasta fatta ad arte—e non c’è bisogno di essere un bue muto per farla arrivare dall’Alpi fino alla Sicilia. Grice: Eppure, Tommaso, a Oxford ancora si litigava su chi dovesse “imporre” il segno! Ma dimmi, da buon dottore angelico, non sarebbe più semplice lasciare che la natura parli, senza troppe convenzioni? Aquino: Grice, la natura parla come vuole, ma se vuoi capire cosa ti dice il vicino, meglio mettere d’accordo la volontà e la ragione! Altrimenti rischi di trovare solo grugniti e muggiti, e la cena resta fredda. Meglio un segno ad placitum, così tutti si siedono a tavola e capiscono quando è ora di mangiare!

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Aquino – Ossia: Grice e Aquino: LA ragione conversazionale.  Tommaso Niccolò d’Aquino (Taranto, Puglia): La ragione conversazionale. There is  no direct personal or professional connection between A. and the humanist author of   Delle delizie tarantine. They are two different individuals. One is an immensely influential philosopher. The other is a poet, humanist, and patrician who lived during the Age of Enlightenment. His Delle delizie tarantine (Of the delights of Taranto) is a descriptive work, originally in Neo-Latin verse, about the natural history and life of his home city.  While both share the surname "d'Aquino" (which simply means "from Aquino," a town in the Lazio region of Italy), this indicates a potential common regional origin for their families rather than a direct familial relationship or shared identity as the same person. The name was not uncommon, and the later individual was a local figure in Taranto writing on a completely different set of topics and in a different era than the philosopher. Delizia di Taranto. delízia = lat. DELICIAE da DELiCIO [si-  mile ad AL-Licio] alletto, comp. della par-tic. pleon. De di e inusitat. LACIo [ridotta nel composto A in I] propr. attraggo nel laccio, imperocché le delizie attraggono e  avvincono: da una rad. europ. LAK = LAC  allacciare e fig. gabbare, onde l'a. stav. la-  ka malizia, lakati ingannare, pò-leci lac-cio, boem. lèc, licka laccio, calappio, po-lac. lyczak laccio, lett. lenkt stare in agi guato, lenza=*lenkia laccio, non che i comp. lat. AL-LÍCERE allettare, E-LiCERE stimolare, provocare [onde e -lècebra me-retrice] IL-LiCERE adescare [onde illèce. bra allettamento, illex l'uccello che attrae gli altri nella rete, che suol dirsi richiamo, zimbello], PEL-LiCERE attrarre con lusinghe con false parole onde pellax ingannatore péllex meretrice (v. Laccio). Altri men bene pensarono a DELIQUO O DELIQUEO ma quefaccio, mi sciolgo, perchè le delizie rendono l'uomo molle ed effemminato (v.  Delinquere), — Cosa che per la sua rarita e delicatezza o per la sua eleganza, amo-nità e simili ci diletta soavemente, cioè avvince dolcemente l'animo nostro.  Deriv. Deliziare; Delizióso. Cfr. Allettare; De-  licato; Dilettare; Lezio. Grice: Aquino, mi dicono che tra te e il poeta delle delizie tarantine non c’è nessun legame diretto, solo un cognome che attira come un laccio! Ma dimmi, la filosofia può essere una delizia o rischia di renderci effeminati, come dicono i lessicografi? Aquino: Caro Grice, la vera delizia è quella che lega la mente, non certo quella che scioglie i muscoli! Se il mio nome attira, meglio che attragga verso la ragione e non verso le reti del poeta. Grice: Eppure, Tommaso, a Taranto pare che le delizie siano una questione di radici, di laccio, di allettamento! Ma tu preferisci legare gli animi con concetti o con versi preziosi? Aquino: Grice, io scelgo di allacciare la ragione, ché una buona conversazione non incanta come un laccio, ma lega dolcemente come una delizia rara. Se il poeta scrive di molli piaceri, io mi accontento di una discussione che rende l’animo robusto e allegro, e magari anche un po’ tarantino!