Grice e Zubiena

 

[ME faculte, a F faculte, ad I facultät em power, ability, op portunity, also resources wealth, f fachs easy

(of early L facul adv = facile easily)

Macullas and faciatas (see TACILITy) were orginally different forms of the same word the latter owing to its more obvious relation to the adj retained the primary sense of easiness, which the former had ceased to have before the classical period ]

Grice: 

“As I look back upon my former self, it seems to me that when, fifty years ago, I began the serious study of philosophy, the temperament with which I approached this enterprise was one of what I might call dissenting rationalism.' The rationalism was probably just the interest in looking for reasons which would be found in any intelligent juvenile who wanted to study philosophy.”

I count myself wonderfully fortunate to have begun my philosophical studies as a pupil.” Of a good tutor.

 

“It seems to me that 1 learnt from him just about all the things which one can be taught by someone else, as distinct from the things which one has to teach oneself.”

“More specifically, my initial rationalism was developed under his guidance into a belief that philosophical questions are to be settled by reason, that is to say by argument.”

“I learnt also from him how to argue, and in learning how to argue I came to learn that the ability to argue is a skill involving many aspects, and is much more thanan ability to see logical connections (though this ability is by no means to be despised).”

Now compare with Kant:

Man fann bie untere Facultät biejenige Slaffe ber Univerfitat nennen, die ober fo fern fie fid mur mit Rebren befdäftigt, welde nicht auf ben 1o Befebl eines Dberen gur Sidtidnur angenommen merden. Nun fann es gwar gefdeben, daß man eine proftife Rebre aus Gehorfam befolgt; fie aber barum, weil es befoblen ift (de par le Roi), für wahr angunehmen, ift nidt allein objectio (als ein ltrtbeil, das nicht fein follte), fondern aud fubjectio (als ein foldes, weldes fein Wend fällen fann) fleditera 20 Dings unmöglid). Denn ber irren will, wie er fagt, irrt wirtlid nicht unb nimmt bas falfe Urtbeil nidht in ber Obat für mahr an, fondern giebt nur ein Gürmabrhalten falf@lid por, bas in ibm dod nict angutreffen

ift. — Wenn aljo von der Wahrheit gewiffer Lebren, bie in bffentliden Bortrag gebradt merben follen, bie Rede ift, fo fann fich der Gehrer Dess 2s falls nicht auf hödften Befehl berufen, nody ber Lehrling vorgeben, fie auf Befebl geglaubt zu haben, fondern nur menn vom Chun geredet wirb. Medann aber muß er dod, baß ein folder Befebl wirflid ergangen, ime gleiden daß er ibm au geborden berpflidtet oder menigftens befugt fei, burd ein freies Urtheil erfennen, widrigenfalls feine Unnahme ein leeres 30 orgeben und Eüge ift. - Mun neut man daß Bermögen, nad) ber Quto= nomie, D. i. frei (Brincipien bes Denfens überhaupt gemaß), zu urtbeilen, Die Bernunft. alfo wird bie philofophie facultat barum, weil fle für die Wahrheit ber Sebren, bie fie aufuebmen ober auch nur einraumen foll, fteben muß, fu fo fern als frei und nur unter ber Gefeßgebung ber 35 Bernunft, nidt ber ber Regierung {tehend gedadt werden müffen.

“The lower faculty of philosophy is the rank in the university that occupies itself with teachings which are NOT adopted as directives by order of a superior, or in so far as they are not so adopted.”

“Now, in the faculty of philosophy, a pupil may well comply with a … teaching out of obedience, but we can never ACCEPT it … simply because we are ordered to (de par le Roi).”

“To accept a teaching that way is not only objectively impossible — a judgment that OUGHT NOT to be made — but also subjectively quite impossible: a judgment that NO ONE one can make.”

“For the man who, as he says, wants to err does not really err and, in fact, accept the false judgment as true.”

“He merely declares, falsely, an assent that is not to be found in him.”

“So, when it is a question of the *truth* of a certain teaching to be expounded in public, the teacher cannot appeal to a supreme command nor the pupil *pretend* that he believed it by order.”

“This may  happen only when it is a question of *action,* and even _then_, the pupil MUST recognize, by a FREE judgment, that such a command was really issued and that he is obligated, or at least entitled, to obey it;”

“otherwise, his acceptance of a command would be an empty pretense and a lie.”

“Now the power to judge autonomously — that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general)—is called *reason*.”

“So, the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the *truth* of the teachings it is to adopt — or even allow —, must be conceived as *free* and subject only to laws given by REASON, not by the  government.”