Given the verbal — though Grice hopes not conceptual — complexity of certain aspects of reasoning, particularly of the account of what Grice calls moods and mood-operators, and in order to make the programme clearer, Grice attempts to clarifying the programme.     It seems to Grice that the faculty of Reason is most closely connected  with Reasoning and with Reasons.  Reasons (justificatory) are the stuff of which reasoning is made, and reasoning may be required to arrive (in some cases) even at the simplest of reasons.    So it seems proper to proceed from a consideration of reasoning to a consideration of reasons.    Grice distinguishes three types of case (if you like, three ways of using the word) with respect to the word 'reason' ('reasons'), which Grice calls the explanatory use (case), the justificatory use (case), and the justificatory-explanatory use (case), which Grice now renames the 'personal use (case).   The cases are interconnected, and a prominent way in which they are interconnected is the following.    If     someone thinks that a certain set of considerations is a justificatory reason for doing, intending, or believing something,     and     if     he in fact does, intends, or believes that thing because he so thinks,     his personal reason for actually doing (intending, believing) that thing is that the aforementioned set of considerations obtain.    And to state that someone did (intended, believed) something for a specified *personal* reason is a special case of giving an explanatory reason for his doing (intending, believing) that thing.    Since a justificatory reason, in the above sense, lies at the heart (so to speak) of reasons of other varieties, it seems proper to consider further the character of a justificatory reason.     These are (or are widely thought to be) divisible into practical and non-practical (alethic) reasons.     It is plain that certain common words like 'must, ought, 'should, necessary, etc. — which Grice labels common modals — not only are widely used in the specification of justificatory reasons in a way which is intimately connected with their justificatory character, but also are used on both sides of the practical/alethic barrier.     It seems relevant, then, to ask whether a common modal is univocal across this barrier (whether, that is, the barrier enforces changes of sense, or whether whatever multiplicities of sense these words may have appear equally on both sides of the barrier    Or whether, on the other hand,     there is merely an analogy between the practical employment and an alethic employmen of a common modal.    This problem seems highly germane to Kant's claim that there is a single faculty of Reason.    This question, or group of questions, about the possible indifference, with respect to their meaning or significance or signification or what an utterer signifies, of a common modal to crossing the barrier is, in more ways than one, a far from clear question.    With the idea of making it somewhat clearer, while at the same time gaining some illumination about relations between practical and alethic reasons, Grice proposes to start by explaining the possibility of giving a structural representation of a sentence involving two modals, which seemingly inhabit opposite sides of the barrier — namely, "credibility" and "desirability" — in terms of a single (maybe to some degree artificial) modal     "it is acceptable that"     in combination with one or other of two mode-markers, 'P' and '" followed by a phrastic (radical).     Grice proposes, however, not to restrict himself indefinitely to this case, and to bring some other common modal into the account.     Grice is talking about modes' rather than "moods' to make it clear that Grice is not trying to characterizse what a semantic analyst — as Grice calls him — would be likely to call a ‘mood,’ though Grice would expect there to be important links between some other semantic analyst’s 'moods' and Grice’s mode.    Grice would justify (or explain) his use of the term 'mode' by reference to his views about signification and meaning.     According to these views, what an utterer signifies is to be explained in terms of the effect which he intends to produce in an actual or possible addressee;     and, derivatively — and surely metaphorically — what a sentence in a language  ‘signifies’ is to be explained in terms of directives with respect to the employment of that sentence, in a primitive (basic) way, with a view to inducing in an addresssee a certain kind of effect;     what an utterer signifies will very often differ from what the sentence which he uses may be claimed to ‘signify’ — I *have* to use the scare quotes! — , but what an utterer signifies would (or should) be discernible on the basis of knowing the directive for the sentence — together with facts about the circumstances and intentions of the utterer.     The intended effect on an addressee is (in Grice’s view) one or other of a set of psychological attitudes with respect to some ‘propositional content' (to borrow momentarily a phrase which Grice does not normally use), and Grice’s mode-markers each correspond with one element in this set of attitudes for set of modes of thinking).    With respect to a particular sentence of the form '    Op + R'     mode-marker + phrastic),     Grice imagines the appropriate directive as arrived at in the following way.     We have, in the first instance, a 'signification-system' S, which will enable us to reach, for R, a statement to the effect that R signifies that such-and-such;     This may be taken as giving a specification of a 'factivity -condition (more loosely, truth-condition) for R.     To be handled by S,, R may be of any degree of logical complexity, but is to be pure (free from embedded mode-markers).     The meaning-specification for the particular sentence     Op + R    will then (in effect) be a directive to utter this sentence if you want to induce in an addressee the attitude corresponding to 'Op' (the mode-marker) with respect to that which R signifies according to system S,    A Sentence thus provided for will have, in its structure, a single mode-marker with maximal scope (no embedding of such markers).     However, it may be possible, in the second instance, to extend S, by setting up S, (containing S,) which does allow for at least limited embedding of mode-markers.     The idea which Grice is exploring relates to just such an extension.    Grice should perhaps remark that, though he is using, for his present purpose, a fairly standard idea of a 'radical' (phrastic, he is by no means free from qualms about it, as will appear shortly.     To return to the most directly relevant issues, Grice’s idea is that an examination of justificatory reasons leads naturally to an examination of modals (expressing specific kinds of justification) and mode-markers, which are intimately connected with psychological attitudes needing justification.    The stages through which, on this occasion, Grice shall conduct his exploration of the idea which Grice proposed in paragraph (3) are as follows:    a partial characterization of mode-markers as used in (or underlying) speech; this stage Grice virtually completed;    a brief consideration of what modifications might be required or convenient for the employment of mode-markers in the representation of the content of thought (of acceptance);    the application of the idea to be explored to a certain class of alethic acceptability statements (including certain probability statements) and to a certain class of practical acceptability statements, namely, a class roughly corresponding to Kant's Technical Imperative.     Then, some reflections on the capability of the initial idea to accommodate the extension of our consideration of practical acceptabilities to:    prudential acceptability, and  moral acceptability or   Categorical acceptability.     The connections with Kant are obvious.     Finally, if we survive to that point.    some attempt to assess the progress with respect to the Univocality Question".    Grice nearly finishes his discussion of topic C, leaving the remaining topics until later.     So Grice shall be lurching uncertainly in the general direction of ‘semantics,’ while next Grice shall be meandering gently in the suburbs of Morals.    In discussing the Univocality Question, we should be careful, so far as is possible, to distinguish between differences in the semantic features of practical and alethic discourse which are attributable simply to differences between the two kinds of mode-marker (alethic and practical), and those which are not so attributable, or though so attributable do nevertheless indicate a failure of Univocality — or of equal Multivocality — on the part of a common modal.     We know, of course, in advance, that the mode-markers are going to be importantly different, because of the difference of ‘direction of fit’ to use Austin’s jargon, obtaining between alethic and practical discourse;     primitive (perceptual) beliefs may be roughly thought of as generated by states of the world, and so serve as checks on the acceptability of more sophisticated beliefs;     Will primarily affects the world — rather than vice versa — and there is no factual check on the acceptability of volitions parallel to that on the acceptability of beliefs.     This difference, Grice thinks, is one which enormously impressed Kant.    Grice’s second main question with regard to modes is whether it is legitimate to apply devices, which are initially presented as structural elements underlying mode-differences expressed in speech, to the representation of the content of thought, and in particular of the content of acceptance-in-thought.     Since our concern is now with thought and not with utterance, and since we are concerned to provide directives not about how to think, but rather about how to specify what we think, it will plainly be appropriate to substitute a thought-verb for the phrase "to utter to H" in the main clause of the schema.   The verb "accept" would obviously be a proper substituend;     But we may note with interest that the verb "think" itself (if regarded as a maximally general content-governing thought-verb) would also be appropriate since the specific mode of thinking involved (whether a species of acceptance or not) would be identified by the particular mode-operator;     "think" would also have the advantage of generality.     So the main clause will now read     "x accepts (thinks) Op + p".    Since thinking, unlike conversation, is, in the crudest sense, at least, a one-party game, to retain as the preamble of the antecedent clause     "x wills x judges x..."     would be perverse;     To consider the simplest of relevant cases, it is difficult indeed for Grice to think of occasions on which     "I wanted myself to think that 1 thought that p"     would be a happy description of my state.     So let the revised preamble simply consist of "    x".     Our whole enterprise might seem to be fruitless if we did not allow the following specifiers:    x accepts (thinks) F, + p if (indeed iff, perhaps) x judges p    x accepts (thinks) I, + p if (iff) x wills p.    But what about the two 'B' cases?     Quite apart from cases in which it is my will now that I should judge or will p on some future occasion (cases which may exist, but which are not particularly relevant to Grice’s present purposes), there are important cases in which I will now that I judge or will now (or next to now) that p.     These are cases in which my lower nature interferes;     inclinations, or some other disturbing factors, stop me from judging or willing that p,     but do not stop me from willing that I will or judge that p,     a higher-order state which may or may not in the end win out.     Such cases of incipient incontinence of will or judgement are endemic to the constitution of a rational being.     It seems to Grice, then, that the B' cases should be allowed.     Since, however, Grice’s prime concern is with acceptability rather than with acceptance, and since it seems that what would justify accepting F, P (or !, P) would also justify accepting Fe P (or lp), and, again, vice versa, Grice thinks we can, within the scope of "it is acceptable that", safely omit the subscripts,    A curious phenomenon comes to light.     Grice began by assuming (or stipulating) that the verbs 'judge' and will' (acceptance-verbs) are to be 'completed' by radicals (phrastics).     Yet when the machinery developed above has been applied, we find that the verb ‘accept (or think) is to be completed by something of the form    'Op + p, that is, by a sentence.     Perhaps we might tolerate this syntactical ambivalence; but if we cannot, the remedy is not clear.    It would, for example, not be satisfactory to suppose that "that, when placed before a sentence, acts as a 'radicalizer' (is a functor expressing a function which takes that sentence on to its radical);     for that way we should lose the differentiations effected by varying mode-markers, and this would be fatal to the scheme.     This phenomenon certainly suggests that the attempt to distinguish radicals from sentences may be misguided;     that     if radicals are to be admitted at all, they should be identified with indicative sentences.     The operator 'F' would then be a 'semantically vanishing" operator.     But this does not wholly satisfy Grice     for, if 'Pis semantically vacuous, what happens to the subordinate distinction made by 'A' and 'B' markers, which seems genuine enough?     We might find these markers 'hanging in the air, like two smiles left behind by the Cheshire Cat.    Whatever the outcome of this debate, however, Grice feels fairly confident that he could accommodate the formulation of his discussion to it.    First, some preliminary points.     To provide at least a modicum of intelligibility for my discourse, Grice shall pronounce the judicativeoperator ' as "it is the case that', and the volitive operator Tas 'let it be that'; and 1 shall pronounce the sequence '@, y as given that o, v.     These vocal mannerisms will result in the production of some pretty barbarous 'English sentences';     but we must remember that what Grice shall be trying to do, in uttering such sentences; will be to represent supposedly underlying structure;     if that is one's aim, one can hardly expect that one's speech-forms will be such as to excite the approval of, let us say, lane Austen or Lord Macaulay.    In any case, less horrendous, though (for Grice’s purposes) less perspicuous, alternatives will, Grice thinks, be available.    Further, Grice is going to be almost exclusively concerned with alethic and practical arguments, the proximate conclusions of which will be, respectively, of the forms 'Acc (fp)' and 'Acc (f p)';     for ex-ample, 'acceptable (it is the case that it snows) and 'acceptable (let it be that I go home).     There will be two possible ways of reading the latter sentence,     We might regard 'acceptable' as a sentential adverb (modifier) like 'demonstrably'; in that case to say or think    'acceptable (let it be that I go home)' will be to say or think 'let it be that I go home, together with the qualification that what I say or think is acceptable;     as one might say,     'acceptably, let it be that I go home.     To adopt this reading would seem to commit us to the impossibility of incontinence;     for since     accept that let it be that 1 go home'     is to be Grice’s rewrite for "    V-accept (will) that 1 go home,     anyone x who concluded, by practical argument, that     'acceptable let it be that x go home'     would ipso facto will to go home.     Similarly (though less paradoxically) any one who concluded, by alethic argument,     'acceptable it is the case that it snows,     would ipso facto judge that it snows.     So an alternative reading '    it is acceptable that let it be that I go home,     which does not commit the utterer to     'let it be that I go home,     seems preferable.     We can, of course, retain the distinct form '    acceptably, let it be that (it is the case that) p'     for renderings of 'desirably and 'probably.    Let us now tackle the judicative cases.     Grice starts with the assumption that arguments of the form '    A, so probably B'     are sometimes (informally) valid;     'he has an exceptionally red face, so probably he has high blood pressure   might be informally valid, whereas     he has an exceptionally red face, so probably he has musical talent'     is unlikely to be allowed informal validity.    We might re-express this assumption by saying that it is sometimes the case that A informally yields-with-probability that B — where 'yields' is the converse of 'is inferable from").     If we wish to construct a form of argument the acceptability of which does not depend on choice of substituends for 'A' and 'B, we may, so to speak, allow into the object-language forms of sentence which correspond to meta-statements of the form:     'A yields-with-probability that B';     we may allow ourselves, for example, such a sentence as     "it is probable, given that he has a very red face, that he has high blood pres-sure".     This will provide us with the argument-patterns:    "Probable, given A, that B     so     probably, B*    "Probable, given A, that B    so,     probable that B".      To take the second pattern, the legitimacy of such an inferential transition will not depend on the identity of 'A' or of 'B';     though it will depend (as was stated) on a licence from a suitably formulated 'Principle of Total Evidence    The proposal which Grice is considering, in pursuit of the "initial idea", would (roughly) involve rewriting the second pattern of argument so that it reads:    It is acceptable,   given that it is the case that A,   that it is the case that B.    It is the case that A.    To apply this schema to a particular case, we generated the particular argument:    It is acceptable,   given that it is the case that Snodgrass has a red face,   that it is the case that   Snodgrass has high blood pressure.    It is the case that Snodgrass has a red face.    So, it is acceptable that it is the case that Snodgrass has high blood pressure.    If we make the further assumption that the singular 'conditional' acceptability statement which is the first premiss of the above argument may be (and perhaps has to be) reached by an analogue of the rule of universal instantiation from a general acceptability statement, we make room for such general acceptability sentences as:    It is acceptable,   given that it is the case that   x has a red face,   that it is the case that   x has high blood pressure.    which are of the form "    It is acceptable,   given that it is the case that Fx, that it is the case that Gx';     'x' here is, you will note, an unbound variable;     and the form might also (loosely) be read (pronounced) as; "    It is acceptable, given that it is the case that one (something) is F, that it is the case that one (it) is G."     All of this is (Grice thinks) pretty platitudinous; which is just as well, since it is to serve as a model for the treatment of practical argument.    To turn from the alethic to the practical dimension.     Here (the proposal goes) we may proceed, in a fashion almost exactly parallel to that adopted on the alethic side, through the following sequence of stages:    Arguments (in thought or speech) of the form:    Let it be that A     It is the case that B    so, with some degree of desirability,     let it be that C     are sometimes (and sometimes not) informally valid (or acceptable).    An Argument of the form:    It is desirable,     given that let it be that A and that     it is the case that B, that   let it be that C     Let it be that A   It is the case that B    so, it is desirable that let it be that C     should, therefore, be allowed to be formally acceptable, subject to licence from a Principle of Total Evidence.    In accordance with our proposal such an argument will be rewritten;    It is acceptable,   given that   let it be A and that it is the case that B,   that   let it be that C   Let it be that A It is the case that B    so, it is desirable that let it be that C    The first premisses of such arguments may be (and perhaps have to be) reached by instantiation from general acceptability statements of the form:     "It is acceptable, given that let one be E and that it is the case that one is E, that let it be that one is G."     We may note that sentences like "it is snowing" can be trivially recast so as (in effect) to appear as third premisses in such arguments (with 'open counterparts inside the acceptability sentence;     they can be rewritten as, for example, "    Snodgrass is such that it is snow-ing").     We are now in possession of such exciting general acceptability sentences as:     *It is acceptable,   given that   let it be that one keeps dry and   that it is the case that one is such that it is raining,   that let one take with one one's umbrella    A special subclass of general acceptability sentences (and of practical arguments) can be generated by 'trivializing the predicate in the judicative premiss (making it a 'universal predicate).     If, for example, I take '    x is F'     to represent     'x is identical with x'     the judicative sub-clause may be omitted from the general acceptability sentence, with a corresponding 'reduction' in the shape of the related practical argument.     We have therefore such argument sequences as the following:    It is acceptable,   given that let it be that one survives,   that let it be that one eats    So (by U,)     It is acceptable,   given that let it be that Snodgrass survives, that   let it be that Snodgrass eats    Let it be that Snodgrass survives    So (by Det)   It is acceptable that let it be that Snodgrass eats.    We should also, at some point, consider further transitions to:    Acceptably,     let it be that Snodgrass eats,     and to:    Let it be that Snodgrass eats.    And we may also note that, as a more colloquial substitute for    "Let it be that one (Snodgrass) survives (eats)"     the form     "one (Snodgrass) is to survive (eat)"     is available;     we thus obtain prettier inhabitants of antecedent clauses, for example,     "given that Snodgrass is to survive".    We must now pay some attention to the varieties of an acceptability statement to be found within each of the alethic and practical dimensions;     it will, of course, be essential to the large-scale success of the proposal which Grice is am exploring that one should be able to show that for every such variant within one dimension there is a corresponding variant within the other.   Within the area of defeasible generalizations, there is another variant which, in Grice’s view, extends across the board in the way just indicated, namely, the unweighted acceptability generalization (with theassociated singular conditional), or, as Grice shall also call it, the ceteris paribus generalization.     Such generalization Grice takes to be of the form "    It is acceptable (ceteris paribus),   given that @X, that yX"     and Grice thinks we find both practical and alethic examples of the form; for example,     "It is ceteris paribus acceptable,   given that   it is the case that one likes a person,   that it is the case that one wants his company",     which is not incompatible with     "It is ceteris paribus acceptable,   given that it is the case that   one likes a person and that   one is feeling ill, that   one does not want his company".     We also find     "It is ceteris paribus acceptable,     given that let it be that one leaves the country   and given that   it is the case that   one is an alien, that   let it be that   one obtains a sailing permit from Internal Revenue,     which is compatible with    "It is ceteris paribus acceptable,   given that let it be that   one leaves the country and   given that it is the case that one is an alien and that   one is a close friend of the President,   that let it be that   one does NOT obtain a sailing permit, and that one arranges to travel in Air Force I"    Grice discusses this kind of generalization, or law, briefly in Method in Philosophical Psychology"' Grice, "Method in Philosophical Psychology", Proceedings and Audresses of the American Philosophical Association —     and shall not dilate on its features here.     Grice will just remark that it can be adapted to handle functional laws' (in the way suggested in that address),     and that it is different from the closely related use of universal generalizations in 'artificially closed systems, where some relevant parameter is deliberately ignored, to be taken care of by an extension to the system;     for in that case, when the extension is made, the original law has to be modified or corrected, whereas Grice’s ceteris parious generalization can survive in an extended system;     and Grice regards this as a particular advantage to philosophical psychology-    In addition to these two defeasible types of acceptability generalization (each with alethic and practical sub-types), we have non-defeasible acceptability generalizations, with an associated singular conditional, exemplifying what Grice might call 'unqualified, 'unreserved', or 'full' acceptability claims.     To express these Grice shall employ the (constructed) modal     'it is fully acceptable that..;     and again there will be occasion for its use in the representation both of alethic and of practical discourse.     We have, in all, then, three varieties of acceptability statement (each with alethic and practical sub-types), associated with the modals "    It is fully acceptable that..."     (non-defeasible), '    it is ceteris paribus acceptable that...?,    and 'it is to such-and-such a degree acceptable that..,     both of the latter pair being subject to defeasibility.     Grice should re-emphasize that, on the practical side, Grice is so far concerned to represent only a statement which is analogous with Kant's Technical Imperatives ('Rules of Skill')    Grice is now visited by a temptation, to which of course Grice shall yield, to link these varieties of acceptability statement with common modals;     however, to preserve a façade of dignity Grice shall mark the modals Grice thus define with a star, to indicate that the modal so defined is only a candidate for identification with the common modals spelled in the same way.     Grice is tempted to introduce    'it must be that     as a modal whose sense is that of '    It is fully acceptable that' and "    it ought* to be that'     as a modal whose sense is that of '    It is ceteris paribus (other things being equal) acceptable that';     for degree-variant acceptability Grice can think of no appealing vernacular counterpart other than 'acceptable' itself.    After such introduction, we could allow the starred modals to become idiomatically embedded in the sentences in which they occur;     as in "    A bishop must" get fed up with politicians" ,     and in    "To keep his job, a bishop ought" not to show his irritation with politicians"    But Grice now confesses that Grice is tempted to plunge even further into conceptual debauchery than I have already;     having just, at considerable pains, got what might turn out to be common modals into Grice’s structures, Grice is at once inclined to get them out again.    For it seems to Grice that one might be able, without change of sense, to employ forms of sentence which eliminate reference to accept-ability, and so do not need the starred modals.     One might be able, to this end, to exploit "if" conditionals     together with a suitable modifier.     One might, for exam-ple, be able to re-express "    A bishop must* get fed up with politi-cians" as     "If one is a bishop, unreservedly) one will get fed up with the politicians";     and "    To keep his job, a bishop ought" not to show his irritation with politicians" as "    If one is to keep one's job and if one is a bishop, other things being equal, one is not to show one's irritation with politicians".     Of course, when it comes to applying detachment to the corresponding singular conditional, we may need to have some way of indicating the character of the generalization from which the detached singular non-conditional sentence has been derived;     the devising of such indices should not be beyond the wit of man.     So far as generalizations of these kinds are concerned, it seems to Grice that one needs to be able to mark five features    conditionality    generality:absolute, ceteris paribus, etc., thereby, ipso facto, discriminating with respect to defeasibility or inde-feasibility);    mode;    whether or not the generalization in question has or has not been derived from a simple enumeration of instances;     because of their differences with respect to direction of fit — to use Austin’s jargon — any such index will do real work in the case of an alethic generality, not in the case of practical generality.    So long as these features are marked, we have all we need for our purposes.   Furthermore, they are all (in some legitimate and intelligible sense) formal features, and indeed features which might be regarded as, in some sense, contained in' or required by' theconcept of a rational being, since it would hardly be possible to engage in any kind of reasoning without being familiar with them.   So, on the assumption that the starred modals are identifiable with their unstarred counterparts, we would seem to have reached the following positions.    We have represented a practical generalisation and an alethic generalization, and their associated conditionals, and with them certain common modals such as 'must' and ought, under a single notion of acceptability with specific variants.    We have decomposed acceptability itself into formal features.    We have removed mystery from the alleged logical fact that an acceptable practical 'ought' statement has to be derivable from an underlying generalization.    Though these achievements (if such they be) might indeed not settle the 'univocality questions, they can hardly be irrelevant to them.    Grice suspects that, if we were to telephone the illustrious Kant at his Elysian country club in order to impart to him this latest tit-bit of philosophical gossip, we might get the reply, "    Big deal!     Isn't that what I've been telling you all along?"    Grice must now give a little attention to the matter of formulating an appropriate version of a "Principle of Total Evidence" designed to govern detachment.     Grice cannot expect to reach anything better than an approximation to an adequate formulation; but perhaps even that would be a help.    Grice starts with a weight-bearing alethic acceptability-conditional — a singular probability conditional — and at once two remarks are called for:    first, that     Grice is no kind of expert in the theory of prob-ability, so Grice shall say little and say it fast.     Second, that the example Grice selects will not be fully representative of reasoning in this area; but perhaps it will be good enough for present purposes.    S (subject) owns a firm which makes and sells ornaments constructed from seashells, and     S is concerned, at t, to estimate    whether the firm's business will improve during the coming year.    S reflects that, these days, every beachcomber is collecting seashells like mad so as to sell them to firms such as his,     so he can get seashells more cheaply;     so it is likely, given that he will get seashells more cheaply,     that the business will improve.     He also reflects that his not easily replaceable craftsmen are getting restive for higher pay, and that he may have to give in;     so he accepts that,     given that the craftsmen are restive, that the business will not improve.     He further reflects that ornaments from seashells are all the rage at the moment, so he may be able to put his prices up and make more money.     He now consolidates these reflections and judges that     it is 'pretty likely, given that he will get seashells more cheaply,     that his employees are restive, and that     everyone is eager to buy seashell ornaments,     that his business will improve.     He now searches further to see if he can find any considerations which, when added to the antecedent of his last judgement, would result in an acceptable conditional favouring the supposition that his business will NOT improve.     After due search, he fails to find any such disturbing consideration;     so he "detaches and judges that     it is pretty likely that his business will improve.    The salient points here are     that, by consolidation (compounding antecedents) of prior acceptability-conditionals,     S has reached, by time t, an alethic acceptability-conditional which he accepts, and the antecedent of which he accepts.     That after due (proper) search for an 'upsetting* (disturbing) conditional he has, by time t, failed to come up with one.     Let me introduce two simple bits of terminology.     Let us say that y is an extension of an antecedent o if y is either identical with @ or is a further specification of o;     and let us say that the antecedent of a weighted acceptability-conditional C favours the consequent of C just in case the weight specified in C is above an indifference point (for example, assigns probability rather than improbability).    Grice will now attempt to formulate a version of a principle of total evidence (applicable to alethic acceptability-conditionals):    If     S accepts at t an alethic acceptability-conditional C, the antecedent of which favours, to degree d, the consequent of C,,    5 accepts at t the antecedent of C,    after due search by S for such a (further) conditional, there is no conditional C, such that     S accepts at t C, and its antecedent,    and (2) the antecedent of C, is an extension of the antecedent of C,,and (3) the consequent of C, is a rival (incompatible with) of the consequent of C,»and (4) the antecedent of C, favours the consequent of C, more than it favours the consequent of C:     S may judge (accept) at t that the consequent of C, is acceptable to degree d.    For convenience, we might abbreviate the complex clause (C) in the antecedent of the above rule as '    C, is optimal for S at t';     with that abbreviation, the rule will run:     "If § accepts at t an alethic acceptability-conditional C, the antecedent of which favours its consequent to degree d, and S accepts at t the antecedent of C and C, is optimal for S at C,, then S may accept (judge) at t that the consequent of C, is acceptable to degree d."    Before moving to the practical dimension, Grice has some observations to make.    Grice has said here nothing about the initial establishment of weighted acceptability-generalizations (from which singular acceptability-conditionals may be derived by instantiation) nor about how to compound them.     These are important and difficult ques-tions, but lie outside Grice’s immediate purpose.    Grice has been treating an instantiation step from such generalizations to related singular conditionals as automatic, reserving the application of detachment to those conditionals as what is subject to a version of the principle of total evidence.    But Grice can imagine someone taking the position that detachment is to be automatic, and that what is to be licensed by some version of the principle of total evidence is the instantiation step.    Obviously, for such a person, a differently formulated version of the principle of total evidence would be needed.     (Importantly, As Grice has set things up, an inferential licence to detach is relative to a subject (reasoner) S and to a particular time t.     Grice is inclined to regard this feature of such rules as characteristic of defeasible inference.    (Importantly) The application of Grice’s rule involves a value-judgement:     it has to be determined or supposed by S that detachment does follow upon due or proper search for a 'disturbing' conditional.     While Grice does not have to seek to characterize such a search more precisely, I do not regard this feature of his rule with distaste.    Grice now introduces an example from the practical dimension;     it has, Grice must allow, at certain points a quaintness which might suggest that the whole philosophical story is not yet being told.    S is invited by his mother to visit her in Milwaukee next week.    At this point he accepts the practical acceptability-conditional, which for simplicity Grice will formulate without (insertible) references to degree of acceptability.     The conditional is:     "It is acceptable, given that let S give his mother pleasure, and that S is her favourite son, that let S visit her in Milwaukee next week."    He reflects, and comes up with the following conditional (based on the fact that his firm is about to do its accounts, and he is head accountant): "    It is acceptable,     given that     let 5 get ready the firm's accounts and that     S is head accountant and it is accounting time, that     let S spend next week in his office in Redwood City."     He compounds, and comes up with: "    It is acceptable, given that let S give his mother pleasure and let S get ready the firm's accounts, and that     S is her favourite son and     S is head accountant and now is accounting time, that     S visit his mother in Milwaukee for a long weekend and return to his office in Redwood City on Tuesday."     S is then suddenly reminded that his wife, Matilda, has just had a bad car accident and is lying in hospital in Boise, Idaho, with two broken legs and internal injuries.     This prompts him to form the further judgement:     "It is acceptable, given that     let 5 sustain Matilda and that     5 is her husband and     she is lying in Boise, Idaho, with two broken legs, internal injuries and much pain, that     let S spend next week in Boise, Idaho."    S then compounds again and comes up with:     "It is acceptable, given that let S give his mother pleasure and get ready the firm's accounts and sustain Matilda, and that     S is his mother's favourite son and head accountant at accounting time and Matilda's husband with Matilda lying in Boise, Idaho (etc.), that let &     spend next week in Boise, Idaho, and     telephone his mother and his office daily."(    S, we may add, has rejected, or rated lower, a conditional with the same complex antecedent and a variant consequent, namely,    "Let S remove Matilda from hospital and take her around with him to Milwaukee and to Redwood City."    Being conscientious about practical inference, S searches (duly) for a further disturbing conditional, finds none, and applies detachment to the last conditional, arriving at:     "It is acceptable that let S spend next week in Boise, telephoning his mother and his office daily."    Now if (as surely we must) we take this example as a paradigm of a certain kind of practical reasoning, it looks to Grice as if the proposed formulation of a principle of total evidence could be applied to it without change, apart from the deletion of the word 'alethic and the substitution of the word 'practical.     There is the same search for a disturbing feature to upset an acceptability-conditional which thus far holds the day, the same failure to find it, and the same readiness, at that point, to apply detachment.    There are, however, two comments which need to be made which might point to features of practical acceptabilities which would threaten an attempt to represent the common modals in which Grice is interested as being univocal, or equally multivocal, across the board.     Grice has taken an example in which the 'subject' S (the reasoner) and the particular object to which the acceptability-conditionals refer are one and the same;     and one would certainly need to enquire what pertains when they are different; and (2) there may well be, in practical acceptabilities, a concealed relativity to a particular individual in the idea of a set of competing consequents, which my formulation of the principle of total evidence makes use of.     For rival possible consequents might have to be described as specifying members of a set of actions or states of affairs which are possible, open, or achiev-able;     and then the questions "possible for whom?", "achievable by whom?" might be embarrassing, as compelling a relativization of practical modals to particular persons.     Would we be talking about achievability or possibility for the reasoner, for the subject of the acceptability-conditional, or for some third party?     Grice shall not expand on these matters at this point, since they are closely related to enquiries which Grice shall address later.    Bating these anxieties, when we advert to non-weighted ceteris paribus acceptabilities, Grice also sees no reason why the propounded引    5 accepts at t an alethic (practical) acceptability-conditional G, the antecedent of which favours (to degree d) the consequent of C,    5 accepts at t the antecedent of Ca    after due search by § for such a (further) conditional, there is no conditional C, such that    S accepts at t Cy and its antecedent,    and (2) the antecedent of C, is an extension of the antecedent of C and (3) the consequent of C    Is a rival (incompatible with) of the consequent of Cuand (4) the antecedent of C, favours the consequent of C, more than    it favours the consequent of C,;     S may judge (accept) at f that the consequent of C, is acceptable (to degree d),    Omit phrases in brackets for unweighted kind of acceptability.    FiG. 3. Formulation of a Principle of Total Evidence     formulation of PTE should not be applied both in the alethic and the practical dimensions, provided of course that references to weights or degrees are eliminated by deletion of the phrases which on Fig. 3 are enclosed in brackets.   There is, however. sometimes detectable in this region a situation in which, when we come to apply detachment, we are in a stronger position than that which Grice has so far been envisaging.     The phenomenon in question might perhaps arise not only with regard to weighted accept-abilities; but of this Grice is uncertain.     It is, as he shall indicate, of some philosophical interest.    Consider a not wholly realistic example.     A doctor is considering how to treat a patient whom Grice shall call "Pidduck".     Grice shall phrase his reflections in terms of the expressions ought*, 'must", and the colloquial 'is to' (vice "let it be that").     The doctor has, or has available to him, the following acceptability-conditionals, each of them derived by instantiation from a ceteris paribus generalization which is (we pretend) well established.    "Given that Pidduck is to be relieved of cephalalgia (an ailment, a common symptom of which is headache), and that     Pudduck is of blood group O,     Pidduck ought* to take aspirin."    "Given that Pidduck is to be relieved of cephalalgia and also of gasteroplexis (an ailment, a common symptom of which is stomach cramp), and that     Pidduck is of blood group O,     Pidduck ought* to be treated by electromixosis (the very latest thing in this region of therapy)."    Given that Pidduck is to be relieved of cephalalgia and also of gasteroplexis, and that Pidduck is of blood group O and that his blood has an abnormally high alcohol content,  Pidduck ought' to be given gentle massage until his condition changes."    The doctor accepts the antecedents of the first to conditionals, but rejects the antecedent of the third;     he does not find an abnormally high alcohol content in Pidduck's blood.     Not only, however, does he reject the antecedent of conditional (3), but he considers that he has ample grounds for rejecting the antecedent of any conditional which extends the antecedent of (2);     he regards Pidduck's condition as a perfectly normal case of cephalalgia combined with gasteroplexis;     though there are (perhaps indefinitely many) good ceteris paribus generalizations with antecedents extending the antecedent of the generalization from which conditional (2) is derived, he is confident that none of them applies to Pidduck,     In such a situation, Grice suggests, the doctor is entitled to treat (in a non-medical sense) Pidduck's case as if it fell under a full-acceptability generalization (one which is not defeasible), which would be expressed by changing, in the generalization of (2), the word 'ought* to the word 'must".     He can then at once apply detachment, and decide (think) that Pidduck must* be given electromixosis.    The licence, in circumstances comparable with these, to shift from  'ought* to 'must*' is relevant to a celebrated complaint about Kant's ethical theory.     Expressed in Grice’s terms, Grice thinks that Kant believes that an imperfect or 'meritorious' obligation, such as the obligation     to develop one's talents     or     to help others,     Helpfulness  Cooperation    could be allowed to fall under generalizations ascribing one or other form of defeasible practical acceptability;     we could (in his terms) allow here conflicting grounds of obligation, though not conflicting obligations.     But with respect to a perfect obligation or a strict obligation, like obligations to tell the truth or to keep promises, this treatment is not available;     such obligations have to be thought of as matters of practical law, as falling (that is) under generalizations which invoke full (unqualified) practical acceptability.     Grice suspects that Kant takes this position partly from certain theoretical considerations and partly because Kant feels that, if Kant allows the possibility of an exception in such a case, allowed the 'must' to become an 'ought' — in the vernacular sense —, Kant would be failing to capture the stringency which Kant feels to attach to a particular case of *perfect* obligation.     Kant’s 'hard line' in this matter has brought down on his head a modicum of ridicule, in respect of his well-known contention that one should tell the truth — try to make your conversational move one that is true — do not say what you believe to be false — even to a would-be murderer searching for his intended victim.    It seems to Grice that one could honour Kant's non-theoretical motivation, and at the same time save him from ridicule, by an application of the licence which Grice has sketched.     Grice has not yet attempted to characterize the form of 'moral' acceptability, but let us suppose that, in the first instance, it differs from the practical acceptability which Grice has distinguished in that the generalizations associated with them omit, from their antecedents, any 'volitive" sub-clause.    A moral acceptability is of the form     Acc (F Ex;! Gx).     Now it would be quite open to us to maintain that even the generalizations connected with 'perfect obligation' are of the ceteris paribus variety;     and so to be expressed in terms of ought"'    But that, at the same time, it very often happens that, with respect to a particular case, we know that none of the sometimes defeating features applies; and so that, with respect to such cases, one is authorized to shift from ought"' to 'must*.     This seems to Grice to be not only a position which would both preserve Kant's intuition and save him from ridicule, but to be also a position of considerable plausibility.    Grice should like to begin the final section with a reminder of, and a slight enlargement upon, a fragment of his discussion of modes..     Speaking from a genitorial' point of view —  For a discussion of the "genitorial point of view", see  Grice, "Reply to Richards", in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Cateyories, Ends (Oxford — Grice would regard reasoning as a faculty for enlarging our acceptances by the application of forms of transition, from a set of acceptances to a further acceptance, which are such as to ensure the transmission of value — validity — from premisses to conclusion, should such value attach to the premisses.     By 'value' Grice means some property which is of value — of a certain kind of value, no doubt.    Truth is one such property, but it may not be the only one; and we have now reached a point at which we can identify another, namely, practical value or goodness.     So each of these should be thought of as special cases of a more general notion of satisfactoriness.    Let us work out a little more fully, though abstractly, how such a treatment might be constructed.    We have sentence-radicals which qualify for 'radical truth" or 'radical falsity'; some of those which so qualify, also qualify for ‘radical goodness' or 'radical badness'     We have judicative sentences (*F'-sentences) which are assigned truth (or falsity) just in case their radicals qualify for radical truth (or radical falsity);     and we have volitive sentences (!' sentences) which are assigned practical value (or disvalue) just in case their radicals qualify for radical *goodness* (or badness).     Since the sentential forms will indicate which kind of value is involved, we can use the generic term 'satisfactory.    We import into the object-language the phrases     'It is true that'     and '    It is good that';     'It is true that - P' is to be satisfactory qua true just in case '- p' is satisfactory qua true; and '    it is *good* that! p'     is to be satisfactory qua true just in case     '! p'     is satisfactory qua having practical value.    We introduce     'it is acceptable that'     with the syntactical provisions which Grice has been using.    on the practical side,    "It is acceptable that! p'     will be true just in case     'it is *good* that ! p'     is true.    We could now, if we wished, introduce generalized versions of some standard binary connectives.    using 'ф' and "y' to represent sentences, in either mode, we could stipulate that   To & w     is satisfactory just in case @ is satisfactory and ly is satisfactory;    To or un     is satisfactory     just in case one of the pair, o and y" is satisfactory, and     To → y     is satisfactory just in case either @ is unsatisfactory or V is satisfactory.     There are, however, a number of points to be made.    It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong the motivation would be for introducing such connectives, nor whether, if they are introduced, restrictions should not be imposed.     The problematic examples will be, of course, the mixed ones: those in which one clause is judicative and the other volitive.    It seems natural to look for guidance from ordinary speech.     “The beast is filthy and don't  (I shan't) touch it"     seems all right, but     Don't touch the beast and it is filthy"     seems dubious, and "    Touch the beast and it will bite you'    while idiomatic, is NOT a conjunction, nor a genuine invitation to touch the beast.     And "    Either he is taking a bath or leave the bathroom door open"     is perhaps intelligible, but     "Leave the bathroom door open or he is taking a bath"     seems considerably less so.    It is perhaps worth noting that, in unmixed cases, satisfactoriness would be specifiable either as satisfactoriness qua truth or as satisfactoriness qua practical value.    But, for mixed cases, no such specification would be available — unless we make a special stipulation — for example, that the volitive mode is to be dominant.    The real crunch comes, however, with negation — which Grice has been carefully ignoring.    Not + p    might perhaps be treated as equivalent     to '† not-p',     but what about     'Not ! p'?     What do we say in cases like, perhaps,     Let it be that I now put my hand on my head"     or     "Let it be that my bicycle faces north",     in which, at least on occasion, it seems to be that neither     '! A'     nor    nor"! - A'     is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory?     What value do we assign to '- ! A' and to '-! - A?     Do we proscribe the forms altogether for all cases?    But that would seem to be a pity, since     '- 1 - A     seems to be quite promising as a representation for     you may (permissive) do A;     that is, I signify my refusal to prohibit your doing A.     Do we disallow embedding of these forms?     But that — again if we use them to represent 'may' — seems too restrictive.   Again,     if"! A'     is neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory, do we assign a third 'value to     "! A'     — practically neuter' — or do we say that we have a 'practical value gap?   These and other such problems would require careful consideration.    But Grice cannot see that they would prove insoluble, any more than analogous problems connected with presupposition qua entailment or conversational implicature are insoluble.    in the latter case, the difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves.     H. P. Grice.