Some time ago the idea occurred to Grice that there might be two distinguishable disciplines each of which might have some claim to the title of, or a share of the title of, Metaphysics.     The first of these disciplines I thought of as being categorial in character, that is to say, I thought of it as operating at or below the level of categories. Following leads supplied primarily by Aristotle and Kant, I conceived of it as concerned with the identification of the most general attributes or classifications, the summa genera, under which the various specific subject-items and/or predicates (predicate-items, attributes) might fall, and with the formulation of metaphysical principles governing such categorial attributes (for example some version of a Principle of Causation, or some principle regulating the persistence of sub-stances). The second discipline I thought of as being supracategorial in character; it would bring together categorially different subject-items beneath single classificatory characterizations, and perhaps would also specify principles which would have to be exemplified by items brought together by this kind of supracategorial assimilation. I hoped that the second discipline, which I was tempted to label "Phil-osophical Eschatology," might provide for the detection of affinities between categorially different realities, thus protecting the principles associated with particular categories from suspicion of arbitrariness.  In response to a possible objection to the effect that if a pair of items were really categorially different from one another, they could not be assimilated under a single classificatory head (since they wouldbe incapable of sharing any attribute), I planned to reply that even should it be impossible for categorially different items to share a single attribute, this objection might be inconclusive since assimilation might take the form of ascribing to the items assimilated not a common attribute but an analogy. Traditionally, in such disciplines as theology, analogy has been the resort of those who hoped to find a way of comparing entities so radically diverse from one another as God and human beings. Such a mode of comparison would of course require careful examination; such examination I shall for the moment defer, as I shall also defer mention of certain further ideas which I associated with philosophical eschatology.  For a start, then, I might distinguish three directions as being ones in which a philosophical eschatologist might be expected to deploy his energies:  The provision of generalized theoretical accounts which unite specialized metaphysical principles which are separated from one another by category-barriers. Fulfillment of such an undertaking might involve an adequate theoretical characterization of a relation of Affinity, which, like the more familiar relation of similarity, offers a foundation for the generalization of specialized regularities, but which, unlike similarity, is insensitive, or has a high degree of insensitivity, to the presence of category-barriers. To suggest the possibility of such a relation is not, of course, to construct it, nor even to provide a guarantee that it can be constructed An investigation of the notion of Analogy, and a delineation of its links with other seemingly comparable notions, such as Metaphor and Parable. Can this list be expanded? At this point I turn to a paper by Judith Baker, entitled "Another Self': Aristotle On Friendship" (as yet unpublished). On the present occasion my concern is focused on methodological questions; so I propose first to consider the ideas about methodology, in particular Aristotle's methodology, which find expression in her paper, and then to inquire whether these ideas suggest any additions to the prospective subject matter of philosophical eschatology.  (1) Judith Baker suggests that Aristotle's philosophical method, which is partially characterized in the Nicomachean Ethics itself as well as in other works of Aristotle, treats the existence of a common consensus of opinion with respect to a proposition as conferringleast provisional validity (validity ceteris paribus) upon the proposition in question; in general, no external justification of the acceptance of the objects of universal agreement is called for. This idea has not always been accepted by philosophers; to take just one famous ex-ample, Moore's attachment to the authority of Common Sense seems to be attributed by Moore himself to the acceptability of some principle to the effect that the Common Sense view of the world is in certain fundamental respects unquestionably correct. Unfortunately Moore does not formulate the principle in question, nor does he identify the relevant aspects. If my perception of Moore is correct, he would in Aristotle's view have been looking for an external justification for the acceptance of the deliverances of Common Sense where none is required, and so where none exists.  (2) Though no external justification is required for accepting the validity of propositions which are generally or universally believed, the validity in question is only provisional; for a common consensus may be undermined in either of two ways. First, there may be a common consensus that proposition A is true; but there may be two mutually inconsistent propositions, B, and B,, where while there is a common consensus that either B, or B, is true, there is no common consensus concerning the truth of B, or the truth of By; there are, so to speak, two schools of thought, one favoring B, and one favoring B,. Furthermore (we may suppose), the combination of B, with A will yield C,, whereas the combination of B, with A will yield Cz; and C, and C, are mutually inconsistent. In such a situation it becomes a question whether the acceptability of A is left intact; if it is, a method will have to be devised for deciding between B, and B,. (The preceding schematic example is constructed by me, not by Aristotle or Judith Baker.) Second, to cope with problems created by the appearance on the scene of conflicts or other stumbling blocks the theorist may be expected to systematize the data which are vouched for by common consensus by himself devising general propositions which are embedded in his theory. Such generalities will not be directly attested by a consensus, but their acceptability will depend on the adequacy of the theory in which they appear to yield propositions which are directly matters of general agreement. When an impasse (aporia) arises, the aim of the theorist will be to eliminate the impasse with minimal disturbance to the material regarded as acceptable before the impasse, including the theoretical generalities of the theorist. Judith Baker claims that a typical example of such an impasse is recognizedby Aristotle as arising in connection with friendship; the threefold proposition that in the good life no good is lacking, that the good life is self-sufficient, and that the possession of friends is a good, each element in which is a matter of general agreement. This seems to validate the inconsistent proposition that the good life both will and will not involve the possession of friends. It is Judith Baker's suggestion that Aristotle's characterization of a friend as another self (another me) is a serious theoretical proposal which is designed to eliminate the impasse with minimal disturbance.  (3) Judith Baker mentions also a certain kind of criticism, an example of which, leveled at Socrates's treatment of justice in The Re-public, was produced about twenty years ago by David Sachs. Sachs complained that in response to a request from Glaucon and Adeiman-tus to show that the just life is a happy life, Socrates first recharacter-izes the just life in terms of the conception of a soul in which all elements maximally fulfill their function and then argues that a life so characterized will be a happy life. This response on the part of Socrates is guilty of an ignoratio elenchi; what Glaucon and Adeimantus want Socrates to show to be happy is the just life as understood to be the life to which the word "just" applies in its ordinary sense, but what Socrates does is in effect to redefine the notion of the just life as that life which exemplifies justice where justice is defined in terms of fulfilment of function. But that the just life is happy is not what Socrates was asked to show; what is wanted from him is a demonstration not that the just life is happy but that the just life is happy; and this he fails to provide. There seems plainly to be something wrong with this line of criticism; Sachs calls Socrates to task for exhibiting in his rejoinder just those capacities which have earned him his reputation as an eminent ethical theorist, which are indeed the very capacities the presence of which has marked him out as a specially suitable person to respond to the skepticism of Thrasymachus.  Surely he cannot be debarred from using just those talents which he has been more or less invited to use. There is the further point that the mode of criticism with which Sachs assailed Socrates could be adapted for use against any theorist of a certain very general kind, which could embrace many theorists who have no connection at all with philosophy; in fact, I suspect that any theorist whose theoretical activity is directed toward rendering explicit knowledge which is already implicitly present would be vulnerable to this kind of charge of having "changed the subject." So it seems to me that a detailed anal-ysis of the illegitimacy of this kind of criticism would be both desirable and at the same time by no means easy to attain.  The reflections in which I have just been engaged, then, suggest to me two further items which might be added to a prospective subject matter of philosophical eschatology, should such a discipline be allowed as legitimate. One would be a classification of the various kinds of impasse or aporia by theorists who engaged in the Aristotelian undertaking of attempting to systematize material with which they are presented by lay inquirers, together with a classification of the variety of responses which might be effective against such im-passes. The other would be a thoroughgoing analysis of the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate imputations to a theorist of the sin of "having changed the subject." Beyond these additions I have at the moment only one further suggestion. Sometimes the activities of the eschatologist might involve the suggestion of certain principles and some of the material embodied in those principles might contain the potentiality of independent life, a potentiality which it would be theoretically advantageous to explore. This further exploration might be regarded as being itself a proper occupation for the eschatologist.  One example might be a further examination of the theoretical notion of an alter ego, already noted as a notion which might be needed to surmount an impasse in the philosophical theory of friendship. Another example might be the kind of abstract development of such notions as movement, that which moves, and that which is moved, which is prominent in Book 1 of Aristotle's Metaphysics, which forms a substantial part of what is thought of as Aristotle's Theology.  I shall not, however, at this point attempt to expand further the shopping list for philosophical eschatology. I shall turn instead to a different but related topic, namely the possibility that in Plato's Republic we find a discussion of justice which does as it stands, or would after a certain kind of reconstruction, serve as an example of an application of philosophical eschatology. I shall first develop this idea, and then at the conclusion of my presentation furnish a summary account of its argument.  II. The Actual Debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the Republic  We should bear in mind that the purpose of looking at the discussion of Justice in the Republic is to see if the course of that discussioncould be looked on as a conscious, subconscious, or unconscious venture by Socrates or Plato into the discipline of philosophical escha-tology.  The discussion begins with a pressing invitation to Socrates to take part in an examination of the question "What is Justice?" It is clear that despite the intrusion of distractions Socrates has not lost sight of this focus. Two preliminary answers are put forward; that of Cephalus ("to tell the truth and pay one's debts"); and that of his son Polemar-chus ("to give every man his due"). The first of these answers seems to be an attempt to exhibit the nature of Justice by means of its paradigmatic rules, while the second attempts to provide a general characterization or definition. Socrates points out that even paradigmatic rules allow of exceptions, with the consequence that a practical principle will be needed to identify the exceptions; while Polemarchus's suggested definition is faulted on the grounds that counterintuitively it allows Justice on occasion to be exhibited in causing harm. It seems to be open to Polemarchus to reply to Socrates that the connection of Justice with punishment makes it questionable whether it is counterintuitive to suppose that Justice sometimes involves causing harm. Indeed we might inquire why the answers suggested by Cephalus and Polemarchus are given house-room at all if they are going to be so cursorily handled.  (3) The debate with Thrasymachus. A number of different factors to my mind raise serious questions about the role of this debate in the general scheme for the treatment of Justice in the Republic.  The quality of Thrasymachus's dialectical apparatus seems to be (to put it mildly) not of the highest order. Socrates himself remarks that in the course of the debate the original question ("What is Justice?") becomes entangled in a confused way with a number of other seemingly different questions such as whether the just life is the happiest life (or is more, or less, happy than the unjust life), whether the just life is worthy of choice, etc. What does Thrasymachus achieve beyond the generation of confu-sion?  Socrates' replies to Thrasymachus are by no means always intellectually impeccable; yet so far as I can see, this fact is not pointed out. Glaucon and Adeimantus are dissatisfied with the upshot of this debate and call upon Socrates to show that the just life is the happylife, not making it clear what the connection is between this demand and the answering of the original question about the nature of Justice. (e) Socrates endeavors to meet the demands of Plato's older broth-ers, but to do this, he resorts to the elaborate presentation of an analogy between the soul and the state. What justifies the presentation, in the current context, of the nature of this analogy?  (4) Blow-by-blow details of the debate with Thrasymachus.  Round 1. Thrasymachus at the outset couples the thesis that "jus-tice is the interest of the stronger" with the admission that rulers are not infallible in their estimates of where the interest of the stronger lies. As the comments of Socrates, Polemarchus, and Cleitophon make clear, this leads Thrasymachus into an intolerable tension between the idea that the edicts of the ruler command obedience because they spring from a belief on the part of the ruler that obedience is in the interest of the stronger, and the idea that obedience is demanded if, but only if, it would in fact be conducive to the interest of the stronger. Thrasymachus seeks to repair his position by distinguishing between (a) what the ruler commands and (b) what the ruler commands qua ruler; the latter cannot but be conducive to the interest of the stronger, though no such assurance attends the former.  Though no one points this out, the attempted escape seems to carry the consequence that whether the ruler's commands do or do not call for obedience may be, and may continue to be, shrouded in obscurity.  But apart from this initial confusion, the debate in Round 1 is characterized by a number of further disfigurements or blemishes, responsibility for which may attach not only to Thrasymachus but, by as-sociation, to Socrates. Some of these disfigurements or blemishes may indeed also be visible in subsequent rounds.  It is not made clear, nor indeed is the question raised, whether the kind of justice under discussion is political (or politico-legal) jus-tice, or moral justice. The general tenor of Thrasymachus's remarks would suggest that his concern is with political or politico-legal jus-tice. Indeed it seems not impossible that it is part of Thrasymachus's position that there is no such thing as moral justice, that the concept of moral justice is chimerical and empty. If this were his position, he could be characterized as a certain sort of skeptic; but whether or not it is his position should surely not be left in doubt. Thrasymachus nowhere makes it clear whether he regards the popular application of the term "just," which Thrasymachus may not himself endorse, as a positive or a negative commendation. Are just acts supposed to be acts which fulfill some condition which acts should fulfill, or acts which are free from an imputation that they fulfill some condition which acts should not fulfill?  It is not clear whether Thrasymachus's thesis that justice is the interest of the stronger is to be taken as a thesis about the "nominal essence" or about the "real essence" of justice. Is Thrasymachus suggesting that the right way to conceive of justice, the correct interpretation of the term "just," is as signifying that which is in the interest of the stronger? Or is he suggesting that whatever content we attach to the concept of justice, the characteristic which explains why just acts are done and why they have the effects which standardly attend them, is that of being in the interest of the stronger? Thrasymachus seems uninterested in distinguishing between the use of the word "just" ("right") as part of a sentential operator which governs sentences which refer to possible actions (e.g., "it is just  (right) that a person who has contracted a debt should repay it at the appointed time," "it is just for a juror to refuse offers of bribes") and its use as an epithet which applies to actually performed actions (e.g.,  "he distributed payments, for the work done, justly"). The two uses are no doubt intimately connected with one another, but they are surely distinguishable.  (e) Thrasymachus is not at pains to make it clear whether the phrase "the stronger" refers to the ruler or government (the official boss) or to the person or persons who wield political power (the real boss). These persons might or might not be identical.  As a result of these obscurities the precise character of Thrasyma-chus's position is by no means easy to discern.  Round 2. At the end of Round 1, as it seems to me, Socrates seeks to counter Thrasymachus's reliance on a distinction between what the practitioner of an art ordains simpliciter and what the practitioner ordains qua practitioner of that art, by suggesting that if we take this distinction seriously, we shall be led to suppose that when the practitioner acts qua practitioner, his concern is not with his own wellbeing but with the well-being of the subject matter which the art con-trols; so rulers qua rulers will be concerned with the well-being of their subjects rather than of themselves. This contention seems open to the response that there is nothing to prevent the well-being of the subject matter from being, on occasion, that state of the subject matter which is congenial to the interest of the practitioner. This indeed may be the tenor of Thrasymachus's outburst comparing the treat-ment of subjects by rulers with the treatment of sheep by shepherds.  If so, Socrates does not seem to have any better reply than to suggest that the dominance of concern on the part of rulers to obtain compensation for their operations hardly supports the idea that it is common practice for them to use their offices to feather their own nests; a response to which Socrates adds an obscurely relevant demand for a distinction between the practice of an art which is typically not directed toward the interests of the practitioner, and the special case of a concomitant exercise of the art of profit-making, which is so directed.  Thrasymachus, however, complicates matters by introducing a new line of attack against the merits of justice vis-à-vis injustice. He suggests that in the private citizen justice (devotion to the interest of the stronger, that is, of the ruler) is folly, while injustice (devotion to his own interest) is sensible even if dubiously effective; while the grand-scale injustice of rulers, as exhibited in tyranny, has everything to recommend it. It is not clear that this manifesto is legitimate, since it is not clear that, on his own terms, Thrasymachus is entitled to count tyranny as injustice; the tyrant is not preferring his own interests to the interests of someone stronger than himself, since no one is stronger than he. It is true, of course, that while Thrasymachus may not be entitled to call tyranny injustice, he may be equally not entitled to call it justice, since though the tyrant may be the strongest person around, he is certainly not stronger than himself. So perhaps Thrasy-machus's plea for injustice may turn out to be a misfire.  Round 3. In response to a query from Socrates, Thrasymachus recapitulates his position, which is not that injustice is a good quality and justice a bad quality, nor (exactly) the reverse position, but is rather that justice is folly or extreme simplicity, whereas injustice is good sense. With this contention there is also associated Thrasyma-chus's view that injustice implies strength, and that the unjust life rather than the just life is the happy life.  Socrates' reply to Thrasymachus invokes arguments which seem weak to the point of feebleness. In his first argument he gets Thra-symachus to agree that the just man seeks to compete with, or outdo only the unjust man, whereas the unjust man competes both with the just and with the unjust. Reflection on the arts, however, prompts the observation that in general the expert competes only with the inex-pert, whereas the nonexpert competes alike with the inexpert andwith the expert, so it is the just man, not the unjust man, who runs parallel to the general case of the expert, and who therefore must be regarded as possessing not only expertise but also good sense. Among the flaws in this argument one might point particularly to the dubious analogy between the province of justice and the province of the arts, and also to a blatant equivocation with the word "compete," which might mean either "try to perform better than" or "try to get the better of."  In the succeeding argument against the alleged strength of injustice, Socrates remarks that injustice breeds enmity, observes that efficient and thoroughgoing injustice requires "honor among thieves," and concludes that a fully unjust man would in real life be weaker than one who was less fully unjust. Maybe this argument shows that the unjust man cannot, with maximum effectiveness, literally "go the whole hog" in injustice; but this is far from showing that he should never have started on any part of the hog.  Finally, Socrates counters Thrasymachus's claim that the unjust life, rather than the just life, is the happy life, by getting Thrasymachus to agree that at least for certain kinds of things the best state of a thing of that kind lies in the fulfillment of the function of that kind, which will also constitute an exhibition of the special and peculiar excellence of things of that kind; and also that justice is in the required sense the special excellence of the soul; from which he concludes that justice is the best state of the soul and as a consequence gives rise to the happy life. This argument, perhaps, palely foreshadows Socrates' strategy in the main part of the dialogue; but at this point it seems ineffective, since no case has been made out why Thrasymachus should agree to what one would expect him to regard as the quite uncongenial suggestion that justice is the special excellence of the soul.  (5) Transition to the main body of the Dialogue. Glaucon and Ad-eimantus express dissatisfaction with Socrates' handling of Thrasy-machus. Glaucon invokes a distinction between three classes of goods: those which are desirable only for their own sake, those which are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of their conse-quences, and those which are desirable only for the sake of their con-sequences. He remarks that it is the view of Socrates, shared by himself and Adeimantus, that justice belongs to the second class of goods, those which are doubly desirable; but he wishes to see the truth ofthis view demonstrated, particularly as the generally received opinion seems to be that justice belongs to the third class of goods which are desirable only for the sake of their consequences and have no intrinsic value. He wishes Socrates to show that justice is desirable in respect of its effect on those who possess it, independently of any rewards or consequences to which it may lead. He wishes Socrates to show that it is reasonable to desire to be just rather than merely to seem just, and, indeed, that the life of the just man is happy even if his reputation is bad. Otherwise it will remain feasible:  that the institutions of justice are acceptable only because they secure for us the greater good of protection from the inroads of others at the cost of the lesser evil of blocking our inroads upon others, and that if the possession of Gyges's ring would enable our inroads upon others to remain undiscovered, no reasonable person would deny himself this advantage. Adeimantus reinforces the demands expressed by Glaucon by drawing attention to the support lent by the prevailing education and culture to the received opinion about justice as distinct from the view of it taken by Socrates, Glaucon, and himself. Apart from the tendency to represent the rewards associated with justice as really attending not justice itself but the reputation for justice, Adeimantus observes that even when the rewards are thought of as attending not merely the semblance of justice but justice itself, the rewards are conceived of as material and consequential rather than as consisting in the fact that justice is its own reward. He also points to the fact that even when recognition that it is injustice rather than justice which pays leads to the pursuit of injustice and thereby to the incurring of divine wrath, the prevailing culture and education teach that the gods can be bought off. So unless Socrates follows the course proposed by Glaucon, he will be saddled with the charge that really he agrees with Thrasymachus, that so-called justice is really pursuit of the interest of the stronger, the strength of whose case lies in his command of the big battalions, and that the so-called injustice involved in the alternative pursuit of one's own interests is really inhibited only by the threat of force majeure.  In his attempt to accede to the demands of Glaucon and Adeiman-tus, Socrates embarks on his elaborate analogy between the state and the soul. The details of this presentation lie outside the scope of my present inquiry, which is concerned only with the structural aspects of Socrates' procedure.  When we operate as moral philosophers in the borderland between Ethics and Political Theory, one of the salient questions which we encounter is whether there is a distinction between moral and political concepts and how such a distinction, if it exists, should be characterized. In this connection it will be of great importance to consider the viewpoint of a philosopher, if such a philosopher can be found, who maintains that there is no distinction, or at least no genuine distinction, between moral and political concepts in this area or in some significant part of this area. If it were possible without undue distortion to exhibit Thrasymachus as a kind of moral skeptic-as someone who holds, for example, that while political justice, or polit-ico-legal justice, is an intelligible notion with real application, the same cannot be said of moral justice, which can be seen to be ultimately an illusion-then it might be philosophically advantageous to regard Thrasymachus in that way. We should examine, therefore, the prospects of success for such an interpretation of Thrasymachus's po-sition. Can he be viewed as one who regards political justice, but not moral justice, as a viable concept? If we attempt to proceed further in this direction, we encounter a difficulty at the outset, in that it is unclear just what concept it is which the friends of moral justice suppose to be the concept of moral justice. Is the term "moral justice" to be thought of as referring to moral value in general, as distinct from other kinds of value? Or is the notion of moral justice to be conceived as possessing some more specific content, so that, while both fairness and loyalty are morally admirable qualities, only the first can be properly regarded as a form of moral justice? And if the notion of moral justice is to be supposed to cover only a part of the domain of moral value, to which part of that domain is its application restricted? To the region of fairness? To that of equality of opportunity? To that of respect for natural rights? Rival candidates seem to abound.  In the case of Plato's Thrasymachus it seems that he, perhaps like Plato himself, is not disposed to engage in the kind of conceptual sophistication practised by Aristotle and by some philosophers since Aristotle; for Thrasymachus, the friends of moral justice (on the assumption that the representation of Thrasymachus as a kind of moral skeptic is legitimate) will be philosophers who treat the term "moral justice" as one which refers to morality, or to moral virtue in general,  a usage which Aristotle also recognizes as legitimate, alongside the usage in which "justice" is the name of one or more specific virtues.  If our program requires that we try to represent Thrasymachus as a certain sort of moral skeptic, obviously one part of his position will be that the concept of moral justice is unacceptable. One or both of two forms of unacceptability might be in question, namely alethic unacceptability and semantic unacceptability. The suggestion might be that positive ascriptions of moral justice are never in fact true, and so are always alethically unacceptable, or that such ascriptions, together perhaps with their negations, suffer from some form of un-intelligibility, and so are semantically unacceptable. Some indeed might contend that general alethic unacceptability generates semantic unacceptability, that if a certain kind of characterization is always false, that implies that that kind of characterization is in some way unintelligible. Let us assume that the revised presentation of Thrasy-machus will be one which, for one reason or another, ascriptions of moral justice are semantically unintelligible. This assumption will leave open a considerable range of possibilities with regard to the more precise interpretation of the notion of semantic unacceptability, ranging perhaps from the extreme suggestion that ascriptions of moral justice are just gibberish, to the suggestion that they admit no fully successful rational elucidation. Within the boundaries of this position, the new Thrasymachus might perhaps hold that, though the concept of moral justice is semantically unacceptable, a related concept, which we may call "moral justice»," is fully admissible. Moral justice is to be supposed to have precisely the same descriptive content as moral justice; ascrip-tions, however, of moral justice will entirely lack the ingredient of favorable valuation or endorsement which is carried by the term  "moral justice." It might, however, be objected that the proposed separation of the descriptive content of moral justice from its evaluative content is quite inadmissible; if we are looking for predicates which from an ascriptive point of view are specifications of the general descriptive condition for moral justice, but which at the same time lack the evaluative element which attaches to the term "moral justice," we shall need predicates which are considerably more specific than "morally just»" Indeed, some might claim that it is pure fantasy to suppose that any predicate, however specific, could signify a descriptive character which falls within the general character signified by the term "moral justice" after detachment of the term's eval-  uative signification. Description cannot be thus severed from evalua-tion.  (5) Whatever may be the final upshot of debate about the possibility of separating the descriptive and the evaluative significations of the term "morally just," it is clear that a further element in the position of the new Thrasymachus will be that whatever semantic unacceptability may attach to moral justice, there is a further kind of jus-tice, namely political (or politico-legal) justice, which is free from this defect. Political justice is a concept which is both intelligible and has application. The old Thrasymachus, however, wished to combine this recognition of the intelligibility and the applicability of the concept of political justice with the contention that the applicability of the concept of political justice to a particular line of actual or possible action provided a basis not for the commendation but rather for the discommendation of that line of action; the wise, prudent, or sensible man would be led away from rather than toward the adoption of a certain course of action, would become less rather than more favorably disposed toward the idea of his becoming engaged in it, if he were told, perfectly correctly, that political justice required his engagement in it. This further contention has the air of paradox; how could the fact that political justice, or indeed any kind of justice, requires a man to undertake a particular course of action, be in the eyes of that man a bad mark against doing the action in question? Can the new Thra-symachus align himself in this matter with the old? It can fairly easily be seen that the idea that the position of the old Thrasymachus involves paradox is ill-founded. That this is so can best be shown by the introduction of one or two fairly simple distinctions. First, a value (or disvalue) may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. Roughly speaking, the value (or disvalue) of x will be intrinsic if it attaches to x in virtue of some element in the character of x; it will be extrinsic if it depends on the nature of some effect of x. To present the distinction somewhat more accurately, a value or disvalue of x will be intrinsic if its presence is dependent on some property of * which may indeed be a causal property, but if it is a causal property, it is one whose value or disvalue does not depend on the value or disvalue of that which is caused. The property of causing raised eyebrows is a causal property and may be one with which value or disvalue is associated; but if the eyebrow-raising is something with which value or disvalue is associated, this is not because of the antecedent value or disvalue of elevated eyebrows, but rather because of a connection between raised eyebrows and sur-  prise. A value or disvalue will be extrinsic if it attaches to x in virtue of a causal property the value or disvalue of which depends upon the antecedent value or disvalue of that which is caused. Second, a value or disvalue may be either direct or indirect. A value which is a direct value of x must rest, if it rests on other features at all, on features of x which, at least on balance, are values rather than disvalues; simi-larly, a direct disvalue of x, if it rests on other features of x, must rest on features which are at least on balance disvalues. An indirect value of x may rest on a prior disvalue of x, provided that this disvalue is less than that which would attach to any alternative state of x. The disvalue of being beheaded may be indirectly a value, provided that (for example) it is less than the disvalue which would attach to the only other option, namely to being burned at the stake. The least of a number of possible evils may thus be indirectly a good. The old Thrasymachus, then, was perfectly entitled to deny that political justice is directly a kind of good, provided he was willing to allow (as he was) that indirectly it is, or may be, a good. There is then no conceptual barrier to incorporating in the position of the new Thrasymachus the thesis that political justice is only indirectly a good; it is acceptable only as a way of averting the greater evil of being at the mercy of predators.  (6) This would perhaps be an appropriate moment to consider a little more closely what I have been speaking of as Thrasymachus's combination of rejection of the concept of moral justice and acceptance of the concept of political justice. There are two ways of looking at this matter. One, which is, I think, suggested by my discussion, is that there are two distinct concepts, which some philosophers regard as being both parallel and viable, namely moral justice and political justice. The special characteristic of Thrasymachus is supposed to be that he allows the second concept while rejecting the first. I shall call this approach the "two-concept" view of justice, according to which the unqualified term "justice" might be used to refer to either of two distinct concepts. The second way of looking at things I shall call the  "one-concept" view of justice, according to which the least misleading account of the difference between moral justice and political justice will be not that two different concepts are involved, but that two different kinds of reason or backing may be relied upon in determining the application of a single concept, namely that expressed simply by the word "justice" without the addition of any adjectival modifi-cation. The term "justice" will always ultimately refer to a system of practical rules for the regulation of conduct, perhaps not just any and  every such system but one which conforms to certain restrictions— for example, perhaps, one which is limited to the regulation of certain kinds of conduct or regions of conduct. The difference between moral and political justice might be thought of as lying in the fact that in the case of moral justice the system of rules is to be accepted on account of the intrinsic desirability that conduct of a certain sort should be governed by practical rules or by practical rules of a certain sort, where a system of rules of political justice rests on the desirability of the consequences of making conduct subject to rules, or to those particular rules. This possibly more Kantian conception of the relation between moral and political justice will perhaps carry the consequence that the view of Socrates and his friends that moral justice is desirable independently of the consequences of acting justly is no ac-cident, but is a constitutive feature of moral justice; without it, moral justice would not be moral. It should of course be recognized that the idea that there is only one concept of justice, though there may be different kinds of reason for accepting a system of rules of justice, does not entail that one and the same system of rules of justice may be acceptable for radically different kinds of reasons; there might be a single concept of justice without its ever being true that different sorts of reason could ever justify the acceptance of a single system of rules of justice. We may, of course, if we wish to treat a one-concept view of justice as in fact invoking two concepts of justice; but if we do, we should recognize that the two concepts of justice are higher-order concepts, each relating to different kinds of reasons governing the applicability of a single lower-order concept of justice.  (7) Let us take stock. We seem to have reached a position in which  (a) we have failed to detect any incoherence in the views of the old Thrasymachus, and (b) it seems to be a live possibility that intrinsic desirability is not an accidental feature but is a constitutive feature of moral justice. We should now inquire what considerations, if any, would be grounds for dissatisfaction with the viewpoint of Thra-symachus.  IV. Moral Justice and Skepticism  (1) The claim that what I am presenting is a reconstruction of Socrates' original defense of moral justice rests on my utilization of some of Socrates' leading ideas, notably on the idea that the presence of moral justice in a subject x depends upon a feature or features of components of x, that the relevant feature or features of the compo-  nents is that individually each of them fulfills its role or plays its part, whatever that role or part may happen to be (or, perhaps better, taken all together, their overall state is one which realizes most fully their various separate roles), that in satisfying this condition, they, the com-ponents, enable x to realize the special and peculiar virtue of excellence of the type to which x essentially belongs, that this fact entitles us to regard x as a good or well-conditioned T (where "T" refers to the type in question), and this in turn, if membership of T consists in being a soul, ensures that the life of x is happy, in an appropriate sense of "happy." My account also resembles the original account given by Socrates in that it deploys the notion of analogy which was a prominent ingredient in Socrates' story, though it seeks to improve on Socrates' presentation by making it clear just why the notion of analogy should be brought into this discussion, and by making its appearance something more than an expository convenience. My presentation seeks also to link the idea of maximal or optimal fulfillment of function not merely with the concept of moral injustice but more centrally and more directly with the more widely applicable concept of what one might call "health." This change carries with it an increase in the number of stages to be considered from two (the political and the moral) to three (the physiological, the political, and the moral). My presentation also introduces the suggestion that the very same factors which determine whether a particular entity x, belonging to a certain type T, merits the accolade of being a T which is healthy, well-conditioned, or in good shape, also by their presence (in lower de-grees) determine the difference between the existence (or survival) of x, rather than its nonexistence (or nonsurvival). The same features, for example, which at the physiological stage determine whether a body is or is not well-conditioned, also determine by their appearance or nonappearance in lower degrees whether that body does or does not exist or survive. (This example in fact calls for a more careful formulation.) I shall proceed to a more detailed discussion of the three stages recognized in my account. The complications are consid-erable, and intelligibility of presentation may call for omissions and convenient distortions.  (2) Stage 1. At this stage (the physiological stage) there appear a number of different items or types of item, namely:  physiological things, such as human and animal bodies (o-thing,, $-thing› -thingn; physiological components (¢-components or bodily organs).These will include both distinct types of -component or organ, like the Liver and the Heart, and distinct instances or tokens of these types, like my liver and my heart, or my liver and your heart. Entry will distribute a number of different types of bodily organ one apiece among human or animal bodies. For these purposes sets of teeth and pairs of human legs will have to count as single organs. Functional properties of physiological components or organs. These correspond to the jobs or functions which the various organs crucially fulfill in the life of the @-thing or body to which they belong, such as walking, eating, achieving, and digestion. For convenient oversimplification I assume that each organ has just one functional property, which will be variable in degree.  (d) Certain properties of @-things (bodies) ("global properties") which will be dependent on the functional properties exhibited by the arrays of physiological components or organs which belong to the things in question. The properties under this head which presently concern me are two in number: one, which will not be variable in degree, will be the property of existence or survival, which will depend on the array of physiological components belonging to a particular -thing achieving a minimal level with respect to the functional properties of the members of the array, that is to say, a level which is sufficient to ensure that the array of physiological components continues to exhibit some positive degree of the functional properties of that array. The other -thing property which will concern me is one which will be variable in degree; it is the property of well-being, or wellbeing as a -thing of the sort to which it belongs. Maximal well-being will depend on an optimal combined exemplification of the functional properties of a -thing's physiological components. The higher levels of this latter property are commonly known as "bodily health" (with-out qualification), or as "bodily healthiness." At all levels the phrase  "bodily health" may be used to signify the dimension within which variation takes place between one level and another.  (3) Before I embark on a consideration of the details of subsequent stages, perhaps I should amplify the account of my intended proce-dure, including the general structure of my strategy for the characterization and defense of moral justice:  (a) The items involved in the stage 1 (physiological entities or bod-ies, their components or organs, the functional properties, and certain overall features of bodies, such as existence and being in good shape, which are dependent on the functional properties of organs) exist orare exemplified quite naturally and without the aid of analogy at this level. The stage therefore may be regarded as providing paradigms which may be put to work in the specification of related items which appear in subsequent stages and into the constitution of which analogy does enter.  (b) Those members of the list of items, mentioned in 3(a) as appearing in later stages, which are properties as distinct from things, may be specified in two different ways. One way will be to make use of abstract nouns or phrases which are peculiar and special to properties belonging to that stage, and which do not incorporate any reference to more generic properties specifications of which are found also at stages other than the one to which the property under discussion itself belongs. The other way is to build the specifications from what at least seem to be more generic properties, together with a differentiating feature which singles out the particular stage at which the specified properties apply. Leaving on one side for a moment the second mode of specification, I shall comment briefly on the first. This may be expected to yield for us, at the political stage, such properties as those expressed by the phrases "political justice" and "political existence,'  " and by whatever epithets are appropriate for the expression of the features of this or that part of a state on which the global properties of political justice and political existence will depend.  Again, at the psychological stage, the first method will give us, unless the state is beset by illusion, expressions for the psychological properties of moral justice and psychological existence, and for the particular features of parts of the soul (whatever these parts may be) on which the presence of moral justice and psychological existence will depend. It will be noted that more than one important issue has so far been passed over; I have ignored the possibility that political and moral justice might be different specifications of a more general feature for which the name "justice," without added qualification, might be appropriate; I have left it undetermined whether "parts of the state" are to be regarded, as they were by Socrates, as particular political classes or in some other way, perhaps as political offices or de-partments; and I have so far ducked the question of the objects of reference of the phrase "parts of the soul." Such matters obviously cannot be indefinitely left on one side.  (c) I turn now to the considerably more complicated second mode of specification of the relevant range of properties. As already re-marked, this mode of specification will incorporate references to seemingly generic properties the appearance of which are not restricted to just one stage, a fact which perhaps entitles us to talk here about "multistage" epithets (predicates) and properties. Examples of second-mode specification will be such epithets as "is in good shape as a body" and "is in good shape as a state," both of which incorporate the more generic epithet "is in good shape" which seemingly applies to objects belonging to different stages, namely to animal bodies and to states. In addition to such "holistic" epithets which apply to subjects which inhabit different stages, there will also be "meristic" epithets, like "part" itself, which apply to parts of such aforementioned subjects. One of my main suggestions is that the multistage epithets which are characteristically embedded in second-mode specifications always, or at least in all but one kind of cases, apply only analogically to the subjects to which they do apply. I may remark that we shall need to exercise considerable care not to become entangled with our own bootlaces when we talk about analogical epithets, the analogical application of epithets, and analogical properties. Such care is particularly important in view of the fact that it is also one of my contentions that there will be properties the possession of which may be nonanalogically conveyed by use of the first mode, and analogically conveyed by use of the second mode.  It should be observed that although I have claimed that there are two different modes of property-specification, I have not claimed that for each individual property, at least within a certain range of prop-erties, a specimen of each mode of specification will be available for use; it may be that in certain cases the vocabulary would provide only for a second-mode specification, or that a first-mode specification can be made available only via a stipulative definition based initially on a preexisting second-mode specification. Since in my view most of the difficulties experienced by philosophers concerning this topic have arisen from doubts and discomforts about the applicability and consequences of second-mode specifications, gaps which appear in the ranks of first-mode specifications might be expected to favor neo-Socrates rather than neo-Thrasymachus, unless neo-Thrasymachus can make out a good case in favor of the view that where first-mode specifications are lacking, second-mode specifications will also be lacking; in which case the onus of proof will lie on the skeptic rather than on his opponent. It should also be observed that further discus-sion of the relation between second-mode and first-mode specifications might make a substantial contribution to two distinct philosophical questions, namely:  (i) whether it is sometimes true that description presupposes valuation (since second-mode specification seems only too often to rely on ideas about how things should go or ought to go);  (i) whether it is sometimes or always true that valuation presupposes Teleology or Finality, since second-mode specifications characteristically introduce references to functions and purposes.  (d) I shall now recapitulate the main features which I am supposing to attach to first-mode and second-mode specifications, with a view to raising some further questions about the two modes:  (i) Properties which will be specified, when one uses first-mode specifications by single-stage epithets (properties like bodily health, political justice, and, perhaps controversially, moral justice) may also be specified by the use of second-mode specifications which will incorporate references to seemingly multistage properties such as wellbeing and existence. The property of bodily health, for example, may also be referred to as the property of well-being as a physiological entity, the property of political justice as the property of well-being as a political entity (or state), and the property of moral justice (perhaps) as the property of well-being as a psychological entity (or soul).  (i) The global properties of well-being as this or that type of entity will depend on a maximal (or optimal) degree of fulfillment, by the various parts of the subjects of those global properties, of a sequence of meristic properties associated with the jobs or functions of those parts.  (iii) The very same meristic properties on which the various forms of well-being depend will also determine, at a lower degree of realiza-tion, the difference between the existence and the nonexistence of the entities which inhabit a particular stage.  (iv) It might be possible, by a move which would be akin to that of  "Ramsification," to redescribe the things which inhabit a certain stage, their components or parts, the jobs or functions of such com-ponents, the property of well-being and the property of existence as being just those items which, in a certain realm, are analogical counterparts to the prime items, in the physiological realm, respectively, of bodies, organs, bodily functions, health, and life (survival).  (v) These proposals might achieve a combination of generalizationand justification (validation) of the items to which they relate, given the assumption that the proposed redescriptions are semantically and alethically acceptable.  Among the questions which most immediately clamor for consideration will be the following:  (Q1) How are we to validate my intuitive judgment that second-mode specifications which involve multistage epithets will always, or at least sometimes, be analogical in character?  (Q2) How are we to elucidate the phrase used in (iv) "in a certain realm"?  (Q3) How is it to be shown that the proposed redescriptions are not merely semantically but also alethically acceptable?  I will take these questions in turn.  (e) Question (Q1) calls for the justification of a thesis which, without offering arguments in its support, I suggested as being correct, namely that if there are multistage epithets, that is to say, epithets which apply sometimes to objects belonging to one stage and also sometimes to objects belonging to another stage, the application of such an epithet to one, and possibly to both, of these segments of its extension must be analogical rather than literal. It seems to me that, before such a thesis can be defended or justified, it needs to be emended, since as it stands it seems most unlikely to be true. Consider first the epithet "healthy"; there would, I think, be intuitive support for the idea that when we talk, for example, of "a healthy mind in a healthy body," at least one of these applications of the epithet  "healthy" must be analogical rather than literal, since only a body can be said to be literally healthy. But if we turn to the epithets  "sound" and "in good order," though I think there will be intuitive support for the idea that both bodies and minds may be said to be sound or to be in good order, and indeed for the idea that bodies and minds can truly be said to be sound or in good order just in case they can truly be said to be healthy, there will not, I think, be intuitive support for the idea that the application of the epithets "sound" and  "in good order" to either bodies or minds, or to both, is analogical rather than literal. I would in fact be inclined to regard the application of each of these epithets to both kinds of entity as being literal. I would suggest that the needed emendation, while it allowed that the literal application of epithets may straddle the division between its applicability to subjects that belong to one stage and to subjects that belong to another, would insist that, when such literal cross-stageapplications occur, they depend upon prior cross-stage applications of some other epithet, where one or even both of the segments of application are analogical rather than literal.  How should the emended thesis be supported? My idea would be that the barriers separating the applications of an epithet to objects belonging to one stage from its application to objects belonging to another will in fact be category-barriers, and that there are good grounds for supposing that objects which differ from one another in category cannot genuinely possess common properties, and so cannot ultimately, at the most fundamental level, be items to which a single epithet will literally and nonanalogically apply. If objects x and y are categorically debarred from sharing a single property, then they are also debarred from falling, literally and nonanalogically, within the range of application of an epithet whose function is to signify just that property. There is nothing to prevent a body and a mind from being, each of them, literally in good order, provided that the condition needed for being literally in good order is that of being either literally healthy (in the case of a body) or (in the case of a mind) (analogically speaking) healthy. Perhaps the first matter to which we should attend in an endeavor to form a clear conception of (for ex-ample) the place of being (analogically speaking) healthy, a feature which may attach to minds, within a generalized notion of being in good order, or (perhaps) of being healthy, is the consideration that the question whether the application of a certain epithet to certain things is literal or analogical, is by no means the same question as the question whether its application to those things is or is not to be taken seriously. It may, for example, remain an importantly serious question whether John Stuart Mill is properly to be regarded as a friend of the working classes long after it has been decided that, if the epithet  "friend of the working classes" does apply to John Stuart Mill, it applies to him analogically rather than literally; it does not apply to him in at all the same kind of way as that in which the epithet "friend of Mr. Gladstone" may have applied or, perhaps, failed to apply to him. The question whether a particular person is in good shape may be a question an important aspect of which is expressed by the question "Is his mind (analogically speaking) healthy?"; if so, given that the first question is, as it may be, one to be taken seriously, the same would be true of the second question.  A second consideration, which we should not allow ourselves to lose sight of, is one which has already been briefly mentioned in thefirst part of this essay. We are operating in an area in which, not infrequently perhaps, we shall be under pressure from what Aristotle would have called an Aporia. We find ourselves confronted by a number of seemingly distinct kinds of items, and by a number of features each of which is special to one of these kinds. If we heed intuition— also, perhaps, if we heed the way we talk —we shall be led to suppose that these features are all specifications of some more general feature which is manifested, with specific variations, throughout the range formed by the kinds in question, a putative general feature for which ordinary language may even provide us with a candidate's name.  Furthermore, if we heed intuition, we shall be led to suppose that the members of this range of special features have a common explana-tion, a further general feature which accounts for the first general feature, and also, with the aid of specific variations, for the original range of special features. To follow this route would seemingly be just to follow the procedures which we constantly employ in describing and accounting for the phenomena which the world lays before us. In the present case, the application of this method would be to a range of items which includes bodies, states, and (perhaps) souls and also to such special features of these items as (respectively) bodily health, political justice, and (perhaps) moral justice.  Unfortunately, at this point, we encounter a major difficulty. The items which are the subjects to which the members of the range of special features attach, namely bodies, states, and souls, insofar as they are genuine objects at all, seem plainly to belong to different categories from one another; and these categorial differences would be such as to preclude, if widely received views about categories are to be accepted, the possibility that there are any properties which are shared by items which differ from one another with respect to the kinds to which they belong. It looks, then, as if the possibility that there is a generic property of which the special properties are differ-entiations, and the possibility that there is a further generic property which serves to account for the first generic property, have both been eliminated. I have in fact not attempted to set out a theory of categories which would carry this consequence, and it would certainly be necessary to attempt to fill this lacuna. But the prospects that this undertaking would remove the difficulty do not at first sight seem encouraging. If, then, we are not to abandon all hope of rational so-lution, we shall be forced to do one of three things:  (i) Relinquish the idea of applying here procedures for descriptionand explanation which are operative in examples which are not bedeviled by category difference.  (ii) Argue that the category differences which seem only too prominent on the present occasion are only apparent and not real. (iii) Devise a less restrictive theory of the effect of category differences on the sharing of properties.  In the light of these-problems, we should obviously be at pains to consider whether attention to the notion of analogical application would have any chance of providing relief.  I propose to leave this problem on one side for a moment, returning to consideration of it at a later point; immediately, I shall address myself to a possible response to the suggestion that the question whether the possible application of a given epithet to a certain subject is an issue which it is proper to take seriously, is quite distinct from the question whether such application, if it existed, would be analog-ical or literal. The response would be that the distinction between the two questions does not have to be a simple black-or-white matter; it might be that, while the fact that if such application existed at all it would be an analogical application is not a universal obstacle to the idea that the application is one which should be taken seriously, it is also not true that there is no connection between the two questions; if the inquiry into the application of the epithet is one of a certain sort or one which is conducted with certain purposes in view, then the idea that such application would be analogical stands in the way of the idea that the application is one to be taken seriously; if, however, the character and purposes of the inquiry are of some other sort, then the two questions may be treated as distinct.  It might, for example, be held that if the inquiry about the application of an epithet is one which aims at reaching scientific truth, at laying bare the true nature of reality, then the fact that the application of the epithet would be analogical conflicts with the idea that it should be taken seriously; if, however, the inquirer's concern is not with scientific truth but rather with the acceptability, either in general or in a particular case, of some practical principle (or principle of conduct), then the two questions may be treated as distinct. Something like this "halfway" position is perhaps discernible in Kant; in, for example, his claim that Ideas of Pure Reason, with regard to which no transcendental proofs are available, admits of "regulative" but not of "constitutive" employment, a suggestion which is perhaps repeated in his demand for a nondogmatic kind of teleology, a teleol-ogy which somehow guides our steps without adding to our stock of beliefs. The situation, however, is vastly complicated by the fact that the notion of what is "practical" is susceptible to more than one in-terpretation; on a wider interpretation, any principles or precepts would count as practical provided that they relate to questions about how one should proceed. On a second interpretation of "practical," only those examples of principles and precepts which are "practical" in the first sense will count as "practical" which relate not just to some form of procedure but to procedure in the world of action as distinct from procedure in the world of thought. Imperatives which are practical in the second and narrower sense will, as Kant himself seems to have thought, include those which tell us how to act but will not include those which tell us how to think; they will be concerned with the conduct of the business of life but not with the conduct of the business of thought. This ambiguity leaves principles and precepts which concern conduct of the business of thought in a somewhat indeterminate position; they will be practical in the wider sense since they are concerned with questions about how we should conduct our-selves; however, what is given with one hand seems to be swiftly taken away by the other when we observe that the conduct they prescribe is conduct which is specifically involved in arriving at decisions about scientific truths and the nature of reality. For me the issue is made even more complicated by the fact that I have instinctive sympathy toward the idea that so-called transcendental proofs should be thought of as really consisting in reasoned presentation of the neces-sity, in inquiries about knowledge and the world, of thinking about the world in certain very general ways. This viewpoint would introduce interconnections between what we are to believe and how we are to proceed which will be by no means easy to accommodate.  I return now to discussion of the quandary which I propounded a little while ago, and the severe limitations on explanation seemingly imposed by category-differences between features which need to be explained. As I see it, my task will be to provide a somewhat more formalized characterization of the phenomenon of analogical application than has yet been offered, perhaps a logico-metaphysical char-acterization, which will at the same time be one which both preserves those category-differences and their consequential features, and at the same time avoids undue restrictions on the application of standard procedures for the construction of explanations. This may seem like a tall order, but I think it can be met.Let us first look at the notion of instantiation and at one or two related notions. If I am informed that x instantiates y (that x is an instance of y), and also that y specifies z (that y is a specification of z, that being y is a way of being z, that y is a form of z), then I am entitled to infer that x instantiates z. If, however, instead of being informed that y specifies z, I am informed that y instantiates z, the situation is different; I cannot infer from the information that x instantiates y and y instantiates z, that x instantiates z. The relation of instantiation is not transitive, since if azure specifies blue, and blue specifies color, then it looks as if azure must specify color. Let us now define a relation of "subinstantiation"; x will subinstantiate z just in case there is some item or other, y, such that x instantiates y and y instantiates z. We might perhaps offer, as a slightly picturesque representation of the foregoing material, the statements that if x specifies y, then x and y belong to the same level or order of reality as one another, if x instantiates y, then x belongs to a level which is one step lower than that of y, and that if x subinstantiates y, then x belongs to a level which is two steps lower than that of y. Now it seems natural to suppose that when a number of more specialized explanations are brought under a single more general and so more comprehensive ex-planation, this is achieved through representing the various features, which are separately accounted for in the original specialized expla-nations, as being different specifications of a single more general fea-ture. If, however, we were entitled to say that the crucial relation connecting the more specialized explicanda with a generalized expli-candum is not, or at least is not in those cases in which the specialized explicanda are categorically different from one another, that of specification but rather of subinstantiation, then we shall be able to avoid the uncomfortable conclusion that the admissibility of generalized ex-plicanda involves the admissibility of the idea that categorically different subject items may be instances of common properties. An item need not, indeed perhaps cannot, instantiate that which it subinstan-tiates.  To conclude my treatment of the quandary, I need to show, as best I can, that a systematic replacement of references to the relation of specification by references to the relation of instantiation would have no ill effect on the standard procedure for generalizing a set of specialized explanations, with which we have provided ourselves, of the presence of discriminated specialized properties. To fulfill this under-taking, I must consider two cases, one involving the application of aprocedure for generalization which is characterized in terms which involve reference to the relation of specification, and the other in which all references to specification are replaced by references to additional and "higher-level" occurrences of the relation of instantia-tion.  Case I. (i) We start with a group of particulars (x, through x,), with regard to each of which we are informed that it possesses property D; and with two further groups of particulars (y, through Ym and z, through z‹) instantiating, respectively, properties E and F.  (i) The generalization procedure begins when we find further properties A, B, C, such that x, through x,, y, through Ym and z, through Z, instantiate, respectively, A, B, and C; and (as we know or legitimately conjecture) A implies D, B implies E, and C implies F. (iii) We next find the more general properties P, Q, such that A and D, specify in way 1, respectively, P and Q; B and E, specify in way 2, respectively P and Q; and C and F, specify in way 3, respectively, P and Q.  (iv) We are now, it seems, in a position to predict that whatever instantiates property P, will, in a corresponding way, instantiate property Q; that is to say, to predict for example that anything which has A will have D; and though I would hesitate to say that provision of the materials for systematic prediction is the same thing as explana-tion, I would suggest that, at least in the context which I am consid-ering, it affords sufficient grounds for supposing that explanation has in fact been achieved.  Case II. Case II begins to differ from Case I only when we reach stage (iti). In Case Il stage (iii), instead of saying that A and D specify in way 1, respectively, P and Q, we shall say something to the effect that A and D are "first group" instances, respectively, of P and Q; and precisely parallel changes, introducing, instead of the phrase "first-group instance" either the phrase "second-group instance" or "third-group instance" will be made in what we say about properties B and E and properties C and F.  Though I would not claim to have a wholly clear head in the mat-ter, it seems to me that the difference between Case Il and Case I generates no obstacle to the attribution of legitimacy of the procedure for generalization with which I am currently concerned. The scope for systematic prediction, and so for explanation, will be quite un-affected. If I am right in this suggestion I shall, I think, have succeeded in providing what was mentioned in Part I of this essay as a desider-atum, namely a development of a concept of Affinity, which would be less impeded by category-barriers than the more familiar notion of Similitude.  (f) I now turn briefly to question Q2. This is the question how to interpret the expression "in respect to a certain realm" within such phrases as in "an analogical extension, in a certain realm, of the property of health, in the primary physiological realm to which animal and human bodies are central." I should make clear the problem of ambiguity which prompts this question; there is one way of looking at things, one conception, according to which there is a certain realm, which is that to which souls are central, and into which there is projected an analogical extension of the property of health. In this conception the notion of souls is logically prior to the notion of the psychological realm to which souls are central, and both are logically prior to the property which is the analogical extension of the property of health, which in the primary physiological realm is the property of bodies. But there is another conception which might particularly appeal to those who regard souls as being, initially at least, somewhat dubious entities, according to which souls are introduced into the psychological realm to be the subjects or bearers of a property in that realm which is an analogical extension of the property of health, which in the physiological realm belongs to bodies. According to this conception, fairly plainly, the conception of souls is logically posterior both to the notion of the psychological realm and to the analogical extension of the property of health which exists in that realm. Question Q2 is in effect an accusation: it suggests that the two conceptions are mutually inconsistent, since souls cannot be at one and the same time both logically prior to and logically posterior to both the concept of the realm to which they are supposedly central and to a certain property, analogous to bodily health which exists in that world; it further suggests that Socrates (or neo-Socrates) need both of these conceptions, but, of course, cannot have both of them.  To meet this objection, I would suggest that a promising line to take would be to deny that we start with a certain realm, the psychological realm, the nature of which is determined either by the subject-items, namely souls, which are central to it, or by the properties, such as a certain analogue of bodily health, which characterize things in it; and that we then proceed at a later point to add to it the remaining members of these two classes of elements. Rather, we start off with analogues of two of the elements in the primary physiological realm,souls which are analogues of bodies and a class of properties one of which is an analogue of bodily health, and call the realm to which these analogues belong the psychological realm. In this way the incoherence covertly imputed by question Q2 will be dissolved, since neither of these psychological elements (souls and properties like the analogue of bodily health) will be logically prior to the other. What in fact has been done is to introduce, first, a double analogical extension of two types of items which belong to the primary physiological realm and, second, the notion of a psychological realm for use in a convenient way of talking about what has initially been done.  No doubt more than this will need to be said in a full treatment of the topic; but perhaps for present purposes, which are primarily directed toward defusing a certain criticism, what has been said will be sufficient.  V. Prospects for Ethical Theory (Question Q3)  Question Q3 might be expanded in the following way; we can imagine ourselves encountering someone who addresses us in the following way: "You have certainly achieved something. There is one class of philosophers who would be inclined to deny that the notion of moral justice can be regarded as an acceptable and legitimate con-cept, because there is no way in which the intuitive idea of moral justice can be coherently presented in a rigorous manner. What you have said has shown that such a philosopher's position is untenable; for you have shown that if we allow the possibility of representing moral justice as a certain sort of analogical extension of a basic no-tion, namely health, which is a property of bodies, items which belong to a basic or primary realm of objects, you have succeeded in characterizing in a sufficiently articulated way the possession of moral justice to which the philosopher in question is opposed on the grounds of its incoherence. That is no small achievement, but it is not, nevertheless, from your point of view, good enough. For there will be another class of philosophers who find no incoherence in the notion of moral justice, but claim that lack of incoherence is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for accepting moral justice as a genuine feature of anything in the world. The uses that we make of our characterizations of moral justice and other such items must be as part of an as it were encyclopedic picture of the fundamental ingredients and contents of the rational world; and if, of the two would-be encyclopedic accounts, one contains everything which the other contains together with something which the other does not contain, while the other account contains nothing beyond a certain part of what the first account contains, it will be rational, in selecting the optimum encyclopedic volume, to prefer the smaller to the larger vol-ume, unless it can be shown that what is contained in the larger volume but omitted in the smaller one is something which should be present in a comprehensive picture of the rational world. To be fit for inclusion in an account of the rational world, a contribution must be not only coherent but also something which is needed. This demand you have not fulfilled."  To this critic I should be inclined to reply in the following manner.  "I agree with you that more is required to justify the incorporation of moral justice within the conceptual furniture of the world than a demonstration that the notion of moral justice is one which is capable of being coherently and rigorously presented; and I agree that I have not met this additional demand, in whatsoever it may consist. But I think it can be met; and indeed I think I can not only say what is required in order to meet it but also bring off the undertaking of actually meeting it. The required supplementation will, I suggest, involve two elements; first, a demonstration of the value, in some appropriate sense of "value," of the presence in the world of moral justice, and second, a demonstration that it is, again in the same appropriate sense, up to us whether or not the notion of moral justice does have application in the world." I shall now enlarge upon the two ingredients of this proposed response.  First Supplementation. A person who is concerned about the realization in the world of moral or political justice will encounter at a number of points alternative options relating to such realization which he may have to take into account. The number of such options will vary according to whether a "two-concept" view or a "one-concept" view is taken of justice; the number will be larger if a two-concept view is taken, and I shall begin with that possibility.  (1) On a two-concept view, there will be two properties the realization of which has to be considered, moral justice and political justice.  One who is concerned about the application of these properties, and who is unhampered by any skeptical reservations, will have to consider the application of each of these properties to a particular indi-vidual, standardly himself, and also to a general subject-item, such as a particular totality of individuals each of whom might consider theapplication to himself as an individual of each of the initial proper-ties. There will also be a variety of distinct motivational appeals which the application of one of these forms of justice has to a particular subject-item, the consequential appeal of that realization (e.g. its payoff), or both. If we go beyond Plato, we might have to add such forms of motivational appeal as that which arises from subscriptions to some principle governing the realization of the initial property.  (2) On a one-concept view the initial array of options will be considerably reduced, though it is perhaps questionable whether such reduction will correspond to any reduction in genuinely distinct and authentic options. On the assumption that it would not, I shall temporarily go along with the idea that a one-concept view is the correct one. On this view a distinction between moral and political justice will reappear as the difference between concern for the application of a single property, that of justice, when it is motivated by the intrinsic appeal of its realization in a given subject-item (one might perhaps say its moral appeal or alternatively, when it is motivated by the idea of the consequence of such a realization (one might say by its political appeal). One should perhaps be careful to allow that the idea that a single concept or property may exert different forms of motivational appeal does not carry with it the idea that one and the same body of precepts will reflect that concern, regardless of the question whether the motivational foundation is moral or political.  It is crucially important to recognize that situations which are only subtly different from one another may exert quite different forms of motivational appeal. Nothing has so far been said to rule out the possibility that while Socrates and other such persons may each be concerned that people in general should value the realization of justice in themselves because of its intrinsic appeal, that is to say, for moral reasons, nevertheless their concern that people in general should value for moral reasons the realization in themselves of justice is based at least in part on consequential or political grounds rather than on any intrinsic or moral appeal. It is possible to be concerned that people be sensitive to the moral appeal of being just, and at the same time for that concern to be at least partly founded on political rather than on moral considerations. If that is so, then the concern for a widespread realization of moral justice might itself have a nonmoral foundation. Such considerations as these might be sufficient to ensure that the realization of moral justice in a community is of value to that community. This value might consist in the fact that if themembers of a community are morally concerned for the realization of justice in themselves, their manifestation of socially acceptable behavior will not be dependent on the real or threatened operations of law-enforcers, to the advantage of all.  Second Supplementation. If we were to leave things as they are at the end of the first supplementation, though we should perhaps have shown that the realization of moral justice in the world was of value to inhabitants of the world and possibly also absolutely, we should not have escaped the suggestion that this alone is not adequate to our needs; it would leave open the possibility that all one could do would be to pray that moral justice is realized in the world, and then when we have found out whether this is or is not the case, to jubilate or to wail as the case might be. To make good our defense of moral justice, we should need to be able to show that in some sense the realizability of moral justice in the world is up to us. At this point it seems to me we move away from the territory of Socrates and Plato and nearer to the territory of Kant; it also seems to me that at this point the problems become immensely more difficult, and partly because of that, I shall not attempt to devise here a solution to them, but only to provide a few hints about how such a solution might be attained. As we have been interpreting the notion of moral justice, its realizability is an idea which is very close to that of the validity of Morality; and if we were to follow Kant's lead, we should be on our way to a supposition which is close to his idea that the validity of Morality depends upon the self-imposition of law, an idea which, though obscure, seems to suggest that what secures the validity of Morality is something which, in some sense or other of the word "do," is something that we ourselves do, and so perhaps in some sense or other "could," we could avoid doing. What kind of "doing" this might be, and how it might be expected to support Morality, to my mind remain shrouded in darkness even after one has read what Kant has to say; there seems little reason to expect that it would closely resemble the kind of doing with which we are familiar in the ordinary conduct of life. There is also important uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the word "could"; it might refer to some kind of psychological or natural possibility, something which some would be inclined to call a kind of causal possibility; or it might refer to some kind of "rational" possi-bility, the existence of which would require the availability of a reason or possible reason for doing whatever is said to be rationally possible.  Not everything which is psychologically possible is also rationallypossible; and I think it might be strategically advantageous if it could be held that the Kantian view assigns psychological possibility but not rational possibility to the avoidance of the institutive act which underlies Morality; but whether this is Kant's view, and how, if it is his view, it is to be made good, are problems which I do not know how to solve.  VI. The Republic and Philosophical Eschatology  Let me first present what I see as the background to the reconstructed debate between Thrasymachus and Socrates, or rather perhaps between neo-Thrasymachus and neo-Socrates. Neo-Thrasyma-chus is a Minimalist and a Naturalist who has affinities with Hume; he rejects the concept of moral justice on the grounds that it would be at one and the same time a nonnatural and psychologistic feature and also an evaluative feature. At this point we may suppose that neo-Socrates, who is not committed to any form of Naturalism, will have retorted to neo-Thrasymachus that a blanket rejection of psychologis-tic and evaluative features will totally undermine philosophy. This part of the debate is not recorded, but we may imagine neo-Thrasymachus to have responded that neo-Socrates is in no better shape; for he can make sense of the notion of moral justice only by representing it as a special case of a favorable feature, namely well-being, which spans category-barriers between radically different sorts of entities, such as bodies, political states, and persons. But neo-Socrates himself will be committed to holding a view of universals which will prohibit any such crossing of category-barriers by a single universal. To this charge neo-Socrates may resort to two forms of defense, one less radical than the other. The less radical form would involve the claim that while there have to be category-barriers, these do not have to be as severe and restrictive as the accusation suggests.  The more radical form of defense would refrain from relying on a more permissive account of category-barriers even though it allowed that such increased permissiveness would be in order. It would rely rather on a distinction between concepts which may span category-barriers, whether these are more or less severe in nature, and universals which may not span such barriers. A closely parallel distinction between (i) an expression's having a single meaning and (ii) its being used to signify a single universal can, I think, be found in Aristotle.  This distinction would be made possible by making concepts rest ona foundation of affinities as distinct from the foundation of similarities which underlies universals; affinities may, while similarities may not, be characterizable purely in analogical terms. The working out of such a distinction would be one of a variety of concerns which would be the province of a special discipline of philosophical escha-tology. The key to its success would lie in the observance of a distinction between instantiation and subinstantiation. The latter notion would permit generalization and explanation to cross category-barriers and would undermine the charges of incoherence brought by neo-Thrasymachus against neo-Socrates and his favored notion of moral justice. At some level of reinterpretation, then, Socrates's appeal to an analogy between the Soul and the State would be at least partly aimed at showing that the concept of Moral Justice, which Thrasymachus would like to banish as theoretically unintelligible, is analogically linked with the concept of bodily health, admitted by everyone, including Thrasymachus, as a legitimate concept, in such a way that, despite radical categorial differences between the two con-cepts, if the concept of bodily health is intelligible, the concept of Moral Justice is also intelligible.  However, to exhibit Moral Justice as a feature which is really applicable to items in the world, such as persons and actions, more is needed than to show that its ascription to such items is free from incoherence. It will be necessary to show that such ascription, if it were allowed, would serve a point or purpose, and also that it is in some important way up to us to ensure that such ascription is admis-sible. The fulfillment of the last undertaking might force us to leave the territory of Socrates and Plato and to enter that of Kant. H. P. Grice.