SEN

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sen

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Senio – Ossia: Grice e Senio -- Grex griceaiana – verbalia: Senio The gens Saenia was a plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the final century of the Republic, and Lucius Saenius attained the consulship in 30 BC.[1]  Branches and cognomina All of the cognomina borne by the Saenii who appear in history seem to be personal surnames. They included the ubiquitous Severus, stern or severe, Donatus, gifted, and probably Balbinus, a diminutive of Balbus, one who stammers. Pompeianus, borne by one of the family, probably indicates that he was descended from the Pompeia gens through one of his maternal ancestors.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Lucius Saenius, a member of the Roman senate at the time that the conspiracy of Catiline was uncovered, in 63 BC. He might be the same Lucius Saenius who was consul in 30 BC, but more likely his father.[3] Lucius Saenius L. f., probably surnamed Balbinus,[i] consul suffectus from the Kalends of November to the end of 30 BC, as the final colleague of Octavian that year. He was the author of the lex Saenia by which Octavian appointed a number of new patricians in the following year.[4][5][6][7][8][9] Gaius Saenius Severus, consul suffectus from the Kalends of July in AD 126.[10][11][12] Quintus Saenius Q. f. Pompeianus, conductor quattuor publicorum for the province of Africa, probably in the time of the Antonines. His wife was Fuficia Clymena, and he had two freedmen, Prosdectus and Trypherus, whose names appear on his tomb at Rome.[13] Marcus Saenius Donatus, one of the Arval Brethren from at least AD 219 to 238.[14] See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Appian mentions the consul Balbinus, not otherwise known, who had been proscribed by the triumvirs in 43 BC, but subsequently restored to favour. Given the timing of his mention, the consul in question is almost certainly Saenius. References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 693 ("Lucius Saenius").  Chase, pp. 110, 111.  Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, 30.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 50.  Tacitus, Annales, xi. 25.  Cassius Dio, lii. 42.  Fasti Venusini, CIL IX, 422.  Fasti Amiterni, CIL IX, 4190.  Broughton, Supplement, pp. 54, 55.  AE 1995, 1823, AE 2005, 1714.  ZPE, 194-231.  Cooley, Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy, pp. 469 ff.  CIL VI, 8588.  CIL VI, 2067b, CIL VI, 2107a, CIL VI, 2107b, CIL VI, 2108, CIL VI, 2110, CIL VI, 2113, CIL VI, 2114. Bibliography Gaius Sallustius Crispus (Sallust), Bellum Catilinae (The Conspiracy of Catiline). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik (Journal of Papyrology and Epigraphy, abbreviated ZPE), (1987). Alison E. Cooley, The Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy, Cambridge University Press (2012). Categories: SaeniiRoman gentes and what would be your first-best choice for a Grice-Speranza vignette from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Senio – Ossia: Grice e Senio -- Grex griceaiana – verbalia: Senio For the Saenii, the first-best choice is Lucius Saenius Balbinus, consul suffect in 30 BC and author, or at least legislative sponsor, of the lex Saenia. He is the best Speranzian figure because his importance lies not in a battlefield, a speech, or a scandal, but in a classificatory act: the creation or replenishment of patrician status under Octavian. That is pure Gricean territory. A law changes what certain people count as being, and then Roman conversation must adjust. The lex Saenia allowed Octavian to appoint new patricians in 29 BC, after the civil wars had thinned the old aristocratic stock. The irony is excellent. Rome’s most ancient social category, patricius, has to be repaired by statute under the man who is about to become Augustus. So Saenius gives us not a great patrician defending inherited dignity, but a plebeian-named legislator helping manufacture patricians. Speranza could hardly ask for a drier Roman comedy. A title might be: Grice e Senio: il patrizio per legge. A reconstructed exchange: Saenius: “Princeps, patricios legibus facimus.” (“Princeps, we are making patricians by laws.”) Octavian: “Non facimus; restituimus.” (“We are not making them; we are restoring them.”) Implicature: Octavian refuses the crude description “manufacture.” He prefers “restoration,” because restoration sounds traditional while manufacture sounds invented. Saenius: “Quod restituitur, aliquando defuit.” (“What is restored was at some time lacking.”) Implicature: Saenius politely exposes the fiction. If the order needs replenishment, its continuity is not quite as natural as ideology requires. Octavian: “Defuit numerus, non dignitas.” (“The number was lacking, not the dignity.”) Implicature: The category survives even if its bearers have become insufficient. Status is treated as an institution awaiting occupants. Saenius: “Ergo nomen manet, homines quaeruntur.” (“So the name remains; the men are being sought.”) Implicature: The law does not create the word patricius, but supplies new persons to fill its civic use. This is the Gricean point. The lex Saenia does not merely report that some men are patricians. It helps make it the case that they are to be treated as such. It is not a descriptive utterance but an institutional act. Austin would be hovering in the wings: under proper authority and procedure, to say or enact “let these men be patricians” is to alter their civic status. Grice would then ask how the surrounding conversational implicatures are managed. “Restoration” implicates continuity; “appointment” implicates artificiality; “patrician” implicates antiquity even when produced by recent legislation. Saenius is also attractive because of the possible cognomen Balbinus, from Balbus, the stammerer. If the identification is allowed, Speranza can enjoy the thought that the man who regularised one of Rome’s most resonant status-words may himself bear a name connected with defective speech. The stammering Saenius makes patricians. The joke is almost too neat, but not too neat for Rome. A dry closing formula: Lucius Saenius is not interesting because he was noble. He is interesting because he helped nobility continue by legal appointment. The lex Saenia shows that even the most ancestral Roman words sometimes require administrative help. Patricii are born, naturally; unless there are not enough of them, in which case they are made, and the making is called restoration. but there seems to be hidden post-facto moralising by historians? Not all into the Civil war WERE patricians, less so patrician victims -- there were the nobles -- such as optimates -- who were patricians + plebs that counts --. The equivalent may be the NY Social Register -- or Paget's Registry -- or Oro della nobilita in Italy -- -- and do we have some example. I suppose Saenius became a patrician by his own law? Thanks -- note that Ottavio itself -- the gens birth gens of Ottavio Ottavian was NOT patrician -- until then. Thanks Yes — there is almost certainly some post-facto moralising in the later presentation. The civil wars did not simply “kill off the patricians.” They killed, exiled, impoverished, promoted, and rearranged a much broader ruling class: patricians, plebeian nobles, old consular houses, equestrians, municipals, clients, opportunists, and survivors. Nobilitas is not the same thing as patriciate. Optimates are not simply patricians either; they are a political-social alignment, largely senatorial and aristocratic, including many plebeian noble families. So a historian who says, in effect, “civil war depleted the patricians, therefore Octavian replenished them,” is compressing a more complicated social transformation into a tidy constitutional morality. The Social Register comparison is apt. Patrician status is not quite the New York Social Register, Paget, or the Libro d’Oro, because it had religious, legal, and archaic constitutional residues in Rome. But the analogy helps: a closed or semi-closed prestige category discovers that history, marriage, death, politics, and ambition have made it numerically inconvenient. So the registry must be updated while pretending that what is being updated is immemorial. That is where the lex Saenia becomes wonderfully comic. It allows new men to be placed inside an old category without saying, too loudly, that antiquity is being manufactured. Octavian himself is crucial. The Octavii were not an old patrician gens. Octavian’s birth gens, Octavia, was plebeian, or at least not patrician in the archaic sense. His Julian status comes by adoption into the gens Julia through Julius Caesar, and the Julii were patrician; but the larger Augustan problem remains: the new regime needs old forms. Octavian/Augustus is always managing the implication that novelty is restoration. “I am restoring the republic” is the grand version; “I am replenishing the patriciate” is the social-register version. Did Saenius become patrician by his own law? I would be cautious. The lex Saenia empowered Octavian to create new patricians, but I would not assume from that alone that Lucius Saenius himself was adlected into the patriciate. A plebeian sponsor of a law about patricians is almost more interesting if he remains plebeian: he is the instrument by which old status is reconstituted without himself necessarily being absorbed into it. If evidence exists that he was among those raised, it would be a delicious case of self-applicable legislation; absent that, the safer Speranzian line is that Saenius legislates patrician-making rather than visibly becoming the made patrician. An example of the sort of adlection one has to keep in mind is the broader Augustan creation of new patrician families, including men from families that had not been patrician before but were now needed to sustain priesthoods, religious offices, and the symbolic continuity of Rome’s old order. The point was not merely snobbery; certain priesthoods and rituals were tied to patrician status, so replenishment had institutional consequences. But the snobbery is not thereby cancelled. Rome liked its religious necessities to arrive wearing ancestry. A reconstructed Saenius/Octavian exchange: Saenius: “Lex dabit tibi potestatem patricios legendi.” (The law will give you the power of choosing patricians.) +> The law does not itself make antiquity; it authorises the princeps to select those who will count as ancient enough. Octavian: “Non lego novos; veterem ordinem restituo.” (I am not choosing new men; I am restoring the old order.) +> “Restoration” is used to cover innovation. The new political act is presented under the description of recovery. Saenius: “Restitutio sine novis nominibus fieri non potest.” (Restoration cannot be done without new names.) +> The fiction is exposed gently. The old order survives only by admitting persons who were not old-order persons before. Octavian: “Nomina nova erunt; dignitas antiqua.” (The names will be new; the dignity ancient.) +> The Augustan formula: novelty in personnel, antiquity in status. The word patricius carries the historical prestige that the selected men themselves may lack. Saenius: “Ergo album non sanguinem sed auctoritatem sequitur.” (Then the roll follows authority, not blood.) +> The register of nobility is revealed as institutional, not merely genealogical. Octavian: “Sanguis sine auctoritate nihil valet; auctoritas sanguinem docet.” (Blood without authority is worth nothing; authority teaches blood.) +> Power retrospectively educates genealogy. Once the princeps has named the patrician, ancestry learns to behave. That is the Gricean point. “Patrician” looks descriptive, as if it merely records descent. Under the lex Saenia it becomes partly performative or institutional: certain persons are to count as patricii because the authorised procedure has placed them there. The word still implicates antiquity, birth, ritual prestige, and old Rome; the act that supplies the bearer is recent, legal, and Augustan. Thus the whole category lives by managed implicature. Dry Speranzian formula: the lex Saenia did not abolish ancestry. It merely reminded ancestry that, in Rome, it sometimes needed an appointment. And in fact, Grice calls his code of morality a manual, or IMMANUEL (after Kant) -- each item is universalisable -- conceptual, formal, and applicational generality -- We may think of Saenius as providing an enumerative lex -- and pretty complex. Avoiding proper names, it would go: those eques who have served at least 30 years in the cursus honorum will now be called patricius -- etc? Thanks Yes. Saenius’s lex would be exactly the sort of thing Grice’s “manual” or mock-Immanuel morality helps illuminate: a rule must not merely name favoured individuals, but state a form under which individuals can be brought. It needs conceptual generality, formal generality, and applicational generality, even if the political purpose is perfectly concrete and Augustan. The lex Saenia presumably did not say, in the vulgar form, “Octavian may make Marcus, Gaius, and Lucius patricians because we like them.” That would be a list, not a lex in the stronger Roman sense. Nor would it likely define a timeless moral universal in Kantian fashion. It would be a procedural-authorising statute: it gives Octavian the power to adlect or appoint persons into the patriciate, under some description sufficiently general to be legally respectable. A schematic, reconstructed, non-documentary version might be: Qui ex equestri aut senatorio ordine, maioribus suis dignitate probatis, rei publicae aut magistratibus aut sacerdotiis aut bello aut consilio per multos annos utiliter servierint, ii, auctoritate Caesaris Octaviani ex lege Saenia, in patriciorum numerum adlegi possint. (Those who, from the equestrian or senatorial order, with their ancestors approved in dignity, have served the republic usefully for many years either in magistracies, priesthoods, war, or counsel, may, by the authority of Caesar Octavian under the lex Saenia, be enrolled into the number of the patricians.) This is only a Grice-Speranza reconstruction, not a surviving text. But it captures the kind of generality needed. No proper names; eligibility by describable criteria; application by authorised act. The conceptual point is that patricius looks like a birth-description, but the lex turns it into an institutional status that can be conferred. That creates a delicious tension: Patricius by old implicature: descended from the fathers, ancient, hereditary, immemorial. Patricius by lex Saenia: selected under authority, enrolled, made to count as ancient enough. So the law must both avoid naked invention and permit invention. It therefore speaks in the grammar of restoration, selection, dignity, number, and public need. It makes novelty wear a hereditary costume. Grice would enjoy the quasi-Kantian parody. The rule cannot be merely: Make my friends patricians. It must be something like: Anyone satisfying condition C may be made patrician by authority A for public purpose P. That is the manual, or Immanuel, form: not necessarily morally pure, but formally universalised enough to pass as law. Rome’s version of universalisability is not “act only on that maxim…” but “write the privilege so that it declines like a category.” Dry Speranzian formula: Saenius did not need to name the new patricians. That would have been too honest. He needed a general formula under which Octavian could name them. The law therefore preserved the dignity of universality while doing the useful work of selection. Patricians are born; unless, by a sufficiently general clause, they are enrolled. Geach and Altham (not Oxonians) coined pleonetetic logic for things like 'multos annos' -- how many? They can think of a way to evade the most and the many and the few and not so many into echelons (if that's the word) in the social scale? or even mention XXX annos -- and their offspring -- because this would be hereditary --. Strictly, if the eques is the ancestror of the knight. Grice's friend, Strawson, became one, but no Grice's friend's son -- Galen. Thanks Yes. Pleonetic logic is exactly the comic-technical tool one would want here, because “many years,” multos annos, is legally respectable and logically slippery. How many? Enough, says the legislator. Too few, says the excluded eques. More than your cousin served, says the successful applicant. In a law of status-adlection, that kind of term is dangerous unless the procedure supplies a ranking, a threshold, or an authorised interpreter. So Saenius’s lex, if it wanted to avoid the fog of multi, plures, pauci, non ita multi, would need either a definite threshold or a set of echelons. A dry reconstructed formula might be: Qui equestri ordine nati sunt et per XXX annos rem publicam in magistratibus, militia, sacerdotiis, aut consiliis publicis administraverunt, ii una cum liberis legitimis in patriciorum numerum adlegi possint. (Those who were born in the equestrian order and for XXX years administered the republic in magistracies, military service, priesthoods, or public councils may, together with their legitimate children, be enrolled into the number of the patricians.) This would solve the pleonetic trouble by replacing “many years” with XXX annos. But it creates others at once. What counts as administrare rem publicam? Must the service be continuous? Do military and civic years count equally? Are priesthoods equivalent to magistracies? Does the son inherit if born before the adlection? Does adoption carry the status? Roman law rarely eliminates difficulty; it relocates it into better-paid hands. If Saenius prefers echelons, one might imagine: Qui per X annos militaverit, in primo gradu habeatur; qui per XX annos magistratus gesserit, in secundo; qui per XXX annos et honores et sacerdotia sustinuerit, ad patricios legi possit. (He who has served for X years in the army is to be held in the first grade; he who has held magistracies for XX years, in the second; he who for XXX years has sustained both honours and priesthoods may be chosen among the patricians.) Here the law becomes a social staircase. That is very Roman: not merely eligible/not eligible, but gradus, ordo, dignitas, census, honor, locus. The pleonetic “many” is converted into institutional comparison. On hereditary status, yes, the rule would need to state that the adlected man’s offspring count. Something like: liberi eius legitimi posteri quoque patricii sunto. (His legitimate children and descendants also shall be patricians.) That is the point at which the New York Social Register analogy becomes funniest. The law produces ancestry forward. It does not discover an immemorial past; it manufactures future immemoriality. And yes, eques is ancestor of “knight,” but only with caution. Roman eques is not a medieval or modern British knight. It is originally cavalry/census/order; later a social-economic rank below the senatorial order, often wealthy and administrative. Sir Peter Strawson became a knight in the British honour system; Galen Strawson did not inherit the title, because modern British knighthood is personal, not hereditary. A baronetcy would be closer to hereditary transmission, though not quite to Roman patriciate. Roman patrician status, by contrast, is a birth-status once conferred into the line. So Saenius’s law would be nearer to creating a hereditary social category than to making someone “Sir Lucius” for personal services. Dry Speranzian formula: pleonetic logic begins when the legislator says “many years” and the applicant brings a calendar. Saenius, being Roman, would prefer a threshold, a register, and a magistrate to decide who has been many enough. The eques may become patrician; the knight may become Sir Peter; but Galen remains Galen, which is perhaps philosophy’s revenge on heraldry. Yes -- and as per below -- we can reconstruct TWO lat. conv. (eng. in round brackets and occasional +> with propositional content only) with S. presenting Octavian his first draft that would include him as a patrician -- "and those who have the authority to bring into effect some law or other" -- Octavian (suspiciouslY): This means ... you, Saenio. S.: My wife's suggestion. Octavian. Well, no. TWO DAYS later: article 1. The power belongs to Ottavian. legislators are not necessarily patrician. (Apparently Bloomberg index -- 'wealth' -- Forbes's list -- is what mattered to Octavian. Ottavian to S. Don't take it personally, S., nor your wife should, this is merely to fill the colleges of priest -- and surely you don't need to spend your time with rites and processions, right, S.? Thanks Yes. Pleonetic logic is exactly the comic-technical tool one would want here, because “many years,” multos annos, is legally respectable and logically slippery. How many? Enough, says the legislator. Too few, says the excluded eques. More than your cousin served, says the successful applicant. In a law of status-adlection, that kind of term is dangerous unless the procedure supplies a ranking, a threshold, or an authorised interpreter. So Saenius’s lex, if it wanted to avoid the fog of multi, plures, pauci, non ita multi, would need either a definite threshold or a set of echelons. A dry reconstructed formula might be: Qui equestri ordine nati sunt et per XXX annos rem publicam in magistratibus, militia, sacerdotiis, aut consiliis publicis administraverunt, ii una cum liberis legitimis in patriciorum numerum adlegi possint. (Those who were born in the equestrian order and for XXX years administered the republic in magistracies, military service, priesthoods, or public councils may, together with their legitimate children, be enrolled into the number of the patricians.) This would solve the pleonetic trouble by replacing “many years” with XXX annos. But it creates others at once. What counts as administrare rem publicam? Must the service be continuous? Do military and civic years count equally? Are priesthoods equivalent to magistracies? Does the son inherit if born before the adlection? Does adoption carry the status? Roman law rarely eliminates difficulty; it relocates it into better-paid hands. If Saenius prefers echelons, one might imagine: Qui per X annos militaverit, in primo gradu habeatur; qui per XX annos magistratus gesserit, in secundo; qui per XXX annos et honores et sacerdotia sustinuerit, ad patricios legi possit. (He who has served for X years in the army is to be held in the first grade; he who has held magistracies for XX years, in the second; he who for XXX years has sustained both honours and priesthoods may be chosen among the patricians.) Here the law becomes a social staircase. That is very Roman: not merely eligible/not eligible, but gradus, ordo, dignitas, census, honor, locus. The pleonetic “many” is converted into institutional comparison. On hereditary status, yes, the rule would need to state that the adlected man’s offspring count. Something like: liberi eius legitimi posteri quoque patricii sunto. (His legitimate children and descendants also shall be patricians.) That is the point at which the New York Social Register analogy becomes funniest. The law produces ancestry forward. It does not discover an immemorial past; it manufactures future immemoriality. And yes, eques is ancestor of “knight,” but only with caution. Roman eques is not a medieval or modern British knight. It is originally cavalry/census/order; later a social-economic rank below the senatorial order, often wealthy and administrative. Sir Peter Strawson became a knight in the British honour system; Galen Strawson did not inherit the title, because modern British knighthood is personal, not hereditary. A baronetcy would be closer to hereditary transmission, though not quite to Roman patriciate. Roman patrician status, by contrast, is a birth-status once conferred into the line. So Saenius’s law would be nearer to creating a hereditary social category than to making someone “Sir Lucius” for personal services. Dry Speranzian formula: pleonetic logic begins when the legislator says “many years” and the applicant brings a calendar. Saenius, being Roman, would prefer a threshold, a register, and a magistrate to decide who has been many enough. The eques may become patrician; the knight may become Sir Peter; but Galen remains Galen, which is perhaps philosophy’s revenge on heraldry. Yes -- and as per below -- we can reconstruct TWO lat. conv. (eng. in round brackets and occasional +> with propositional content only) with S. presenting Octavian his first draft that would include him as a patrician -- "and those who have the authority to bring into effect some law or other" -- Octavian (suspiciouslY): This means ... you, Saenio. S.: My wife's suggestion. Octavian. Well, no. TWO DAYS later: article 1. The power belongs to Ottavian. legislators are not necessarily patrician. (Apparently Bloomberg index -- 'wealth' -- Forbes's list -- is what mattered to Octavian. Ottavian to S. Don't take it personally, S., nor your wife should, this is merely to fill the colleges of priest -- and surely you don't need to spend your time with rites and processions, right, S.? Thanks Saenius: “Princeps, primam tabulam legis attuli. Qui rem publicam diu fideliterque administraverunt, quique auctoritatem habent legem aliquam efficiendi, ii in patriciorum numerum adlegi possint.” (Saenius: “Princeps, I have brought the first draft of the law. Those who have administered the republic long and faithfully, and those who have authority to bring some law or other into effect, may be enrolled into the number of the patricians.”) +> Saenius has inserted a general clause capacious enough to include himself. The phrase “those who have authority to bring a law into effect” is formally general but practically self-interested. Octavianus: “Quid est, Saeni? ‘Qui auctoritatem habent legem efficiendi’ hoc ad te quoque pertinet, opinor.” (Octavian: “What is this, Saenius? ‘Those who have authority to bring a law into effect’ applies to you too, I suppose.”) +> Octavian notices the self-applicative loophole. The generality of the clause is being treated as a mask for personal elevation. Saenius: “Non me nominavi. Lex enim, ut aiunt, non de singulis sed de generibus loquitur.” (Saenius: “I did not name myself. A law, as they say, speaks not about individuals but about kinds.”) +> Saenius appeals to legal generality. He does not deny the benefit; he denies that the law is formally private. Octavianus: “Genera interdum uxores habent.” (Octavian: “Kinds sometimes have wives.”) +> Octavian implies that the clause may have been suggested at home. He converts Saenius’s formal universality into domestic ambition. Saenius: “Coniugis consilium fuit; sed consilium bonum non fit peius quod domi natum est.” (Saenius: “It was my wife’s suggestion; but a good suggestion is not made worse because it was born at home.”) +> Saenius concedes the source while trying to preserve the clause’s public defensibility. He treats private origin as irrelevant to public validity. Octavianus: “Bene. Sed Roma non indiget patriciis qui se ipsi pariunt.” (Octavian: “Good. But Rome does not need patricians who give birth to themselves.”) +> Octavian rejects self-creation. Patrician status may be manufactured, but not by the beneficiary’s own grammatical midwifery. Saenius: “Ergo corrigam.” (Saenius: “Then I shall correct it.”) +> Saenius accepts the deletion without overt humiliation. The self-including general clause will not survive. Two days later. Saenius: “Articulus primus: Caesari Octaviano potestas esto in patriciorum numerum adlegendi quos rei publicae causa idoneos iudicaverit.” (Saenius: “Article one: let Caesar Octavian have the power of enrolling into the number of the patricians those whom he shall judge suitable for the sake of the republic.”) +> The authority is now concentrated in Octavian. General criteria give way to authorised selection. Octavianus: “Melius. Legislatores non ideo patricii sunt quod leges scribunt.” (Octavian: “Better. Legislators are not patricians merely because they write laws.”) +> Octavian separates legislative agency from status-reward. Writing the rule is not itself an entrance ticket. Saenius: “At multi equites censu, honoribus, clientelis satis splendent.” (Saenius: “But many equestrians shine sufficiently by census, honours, and clientelae.”) +> Saenius shifts from self-reference to wealth and public standing. The Bloomberg/Forbes criterion enters in Roman dress: census, honores, clientelae. Octavianus: “Id specto. Sacerdotia vacua sunt, ritus egent nominibus antiquis, et nomina antiqua interdum novis censibus sustentantur.” (Octavian: “That is what I am considering. The priesthoods are vacant, the rites need ancient names, and ancient names are sometimes sustained by new fortunes.”) +> Octavian states the practical motive: the patriciate is being replenished to maintain religious and civic machinery, not to flatter Saenius personally. Saenius: “Igitur patricios facimus?” (Saenius: “So we are making patricians?”) +> Saenius exposes the artificiality of the act. “Making” threatens the fiction of restored antiquity. Octavianus: “Restituimus.” (Octavian: “We are restoring them.”) +> Octavian replaces manufacture with restoration. The political act is innovation under an ancestral description. Saenius: “Uxor mea hoc verbum probabit minus quam priorem clausulam.” (Saenius: “My wife will approve this word less than the earlier clause.”) +> Saenius concedes the domestic defeat with humour. The wife’s self-interested clause is gone; only Augustan terminology remains. Octavianus: “Ne tu neve uxor tua aegre feratis. Non de vobis agitur, Saeni; collegia sacerdotum implenda sunt. Tu certe non cupis dies tuos sacris, pompis, et processionibus perdere.” (Octavian: “Let neither you nor your wife take it badly, Saenius. This is not about you; the colleges of priests must be filled. Surely you do not wish to spend your days on rites, displays, and processions.”) +> Octavian softens exclusion by presenting patrician status as burdensome ceremonial labour. He denies personal slight by redescribing elevation as inconvenience. Saenius: “Si ita est, princeps, plebeius maneo ex humanitate tua.” (Saenius: “If that is so, princeps, I remain a plebeian by your kindness.”) +> Saenius accepts the outcome while preserving wit. Exclusion becomes a favour, though nobody is deceived. Octavianus: “Et ego rem publicam restituo ex lege tua.” (Octavian: “And I restore the republic by your law.”) +> Octavian gives Saenius the safer honour: not becoming patrician, but supplying the instrument by which Octavian can make others so. and as we adjust the draft, we may bring in the equivalent of Forbes or Bloomberg index as per census taxation -- they were not elected for their pretty Aquiline nose, but by their taxation and ability of Octavian to use the 'new' patricians's wealth to his advantage -- and therefore, MINUS Saenius? thanks Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 7 siti Lucius Saenius, the author of the Lex Saenia, was not a patrician then (when he introduced the law in 30 BC), and is not considered a patrician family now in historical classification. He and his entire family line belonged strictly to the plebeian order. Wikipedia +1 The technical details of his status paint a clear picture of how social hierarchy functioned during the transition from the Roman Republic to the Empire. The Status of Lucius Saenius "Then" Plebeian Origin: Saenius came from the gens Saenia, a relatively obscure family of Etruscan origin that only rose to prominence in the final decades of the Roman Republic. Wikipedia +1 Octavian's Tool: He was what the Romans called a novus homo (new man) or a lesser senator who owed his entire political elevation—including his appointment as a replacement consul (consul suffectus)—directly to Octavian (the future Emperor Augustus). Wikipedia +1 The Irony of the Lex Saenia: In late 30 BC, Octavian used Saenius to sponsor the Lex Saenia. This law specifically authorized Octavian to elevate wealthy plebeian families into the dying patrician class to replenish its numbers for religious and prestige purposes. Ironically, while Saenius created the legal tool to make otherplebeians patricians, he himself remained a plebeian and was never recorded as being elevated into the patriciate. Wikipedia +3 His Family's Status "Now" (Historical Record) Categorized as Plebeian: In modern Roman prosopography (the study of ancient lineages and social statuses), the gens Saenia is strictly categorized as a plebeian consular family. Later Descendants: Later members of his family who achieved rank during the Roman Empire, such as Gaius Saenius Severus (a consul in AD 126), also retained their status as plebeians. Wikipedia Extinction of the Title: From a modern perspective, the question of whether they are patricians "now" is also bound by the fact that the Roman patriciate completely ceased to exist as a biological or legal entity after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. Medium If you are researching the social shifts of the early Roman Empire, would you like to know more about which plebeian families Octavian actually elevatedto the patriciate using this law, or how the Lex Saenia differed from Julius Caesar's earlier version (Lex Cassia)? Yes. In the revised Saenius draft, the Forbes/Bloomberg point should be brought in under the Roman names census, patrimonium, vectigalia, munera, and utilitas rei publicae. Octavian is not choosing men for their aquiline noses, nor even simply for ancestral charm. He needs rich, usable, publicly legible families who can fill patrician and priestly spaces without becoming politically unmanageable. So the revised formula is not merely “worthy men may become patricians,” but “men whose census and public utility make them serviceable to the restored order may be adlected.” That also makes Saenius’s exclusion sharper: the law is his instrument, not his ladder. A revised exchange could run: Saenius: “Articulus primus: ii in patriciorum numerum adlegi possint qui genere, honoribus, censu, et utilitate rei publicae idonei videantur.” (Saenius: “Article one: those may be enrolled into the number of the patricians who appear suitable by birth, honours, census, and usefulness to the republic.”) +> The draft now replaces Saenius’s self-serving legal-authority clause with a status-and-wealth formula. Census does the Bloomberg/Forbes work without saying “rich list.” Octavianus: “Censum bene addidisti. Patricii pauperes ritus ornant minus quam libri veteres fingunt.” (Octavian: “You have done well to add census. Poor patricians adorn the rites less than old books pretend.”) +> Octavian admits the practical motive. Antiquity needs financing; ritual dignity is easier when the new old families can pay. Saenius: “Ergo pecuniam eligimus?” (Saenius: “Then are we choosing money?”) +> Saenius tests whether Octavian will allow the vulgar truth to be said. Octavianus: “Non pecuniam, Saeni; stabilitatem. Sed stabilitas sine patrimonio raro procedit.” (Octavian: “Not money, Saenius; stability. But stability rarely proceeds without patrimony.”) +> Octavian redescribes wealth as civic reliability. The rich list becomes the stability index. Saenius: “Et si quis legem ipsam tulit?” (Saenius: “And if someone has carried the law itself?”) +> Saenius makes one last attempt to recover his own inclusion by merit of legislative service. Octavianus: “Legislator legem fert; princeps patricios legit.” (Octavian: “The legislator carries the law; the princeps chooses the patricians.”) +> The division of labour is final. Saenius provides the form; Octavian supplies the names. Saenius: “Uxor mea hoc minus aequo animo feret.” (Saenius: “My wife will bear this with less than perfect equanimity.”) +> Domestic disappointment is acknowledged but kept comic. Octavianus: “Dic uxori tuae: minus Saenius, plus res publica. Collegia sacerdotum implenda sunt; tibi autem melius erit sine pompis matutinis.” (Octavian: “Tell your wife: less Saenius, more republic. The priestly colleges must be filled; and you will be better off without morning processions.”) +> Octavian softens exclusion by treating patrician elevation as ceremonial inconvenience. Saenius is denied the rank and offered leisure as compensation. Saenius: “Itaque plebeius maneo, ne sacris opprimar.” (Saenius: “So I remain plebeian, lest I be crushed by rites.”) +> Saenius accepts the exclusion by converting it into mock-relief. Octavianus: “Recte. Tu legem dedisti; alii aras sustinebunt.” (Octavian: “Exactly. You have given the law; others will support the altars.”) +> Saenius receives authorship, not adlection. The new patricians receive the burdens and visibility. The adjusted legal-style clause could be: Caesari Octaviano potestas esto eos ex ordine senatorio aut equestri in patriciorum numerum adlegendi quos genere, honoribus, censu, patrimonio, et utilitate rei publicae idoneos iudicaverit; liberique eorum legitimi posterique eodem iure patricii sunto. (Let Caesar Octavian have the power of enrolling into the number of the patricians those from the senatorial or equestrian order whom he shall judge suitable by birth, honours, census, patrimony, and usefulness to the republic; and let their legitimate children and descendants be patricians by the same right.) That is the best formal compromise. It avoids proper names, satisfies legal generality, lets Octavian choose, foregrounds census/patrimony, and makes the result hereditary. It also quietly excludes Saenius unless Octavian chooses him, which is the whole political point. Dry Speranzian formula: the lex Saenia makes ancestry, but not for Saenius. It converts wealth into antiquity, census into ritual dignity, and Octavian’s list into a patriciate. Rome did not need pretty noses. It needed men whose fortunes could afford to look ancient. Excellent -- just an editorial point that may be useful. Instead of: Saenius: “Ergo pecuniam eligimus?” (Saenius: “Then are we choosing money?”) +> Saenius tests whether Octavian will allow the vulgar truth to be said.--we can simplify to: SÆNIVS. Ergo pecuniam eligiums (Then are we choosing money?) +> [always a that-clause, but we don't have to state this] something alla: I am testing you (or thee) whether you (or thou) will (or wilst) allow the vulgar truth to be said. Thanks -- Grice thinks it makes for more compact reading and in line with the idea that the implicatum is still part of the utterer's intention, and thus in the utterer's first-person pattern). Thanks -- we don't need to re-adjust all the past -- this for forward -- although we can have a little epigramme along the lines. Thanks -- alla: "The lex is passed," S. to wife. "So you can attend the rites at Via Sacra on Tuesday -- lots of fresh patricians to fill the gaps -- and money-pocketed too --. Uxor: Since when togas have pockets? S.: By Octavian's design, since today!" Thanks Yes — that convention is much cleaner. I’ll use compact speaker labels and keep the implicature as the utterer’s own intended content, cast as a that-clause or first-person practical intention where possible. For example: SÆNIVS. Ergo pecuniam eligimus? (Then are we choosing money?) +> I am testing whether you will allow the vulgar truth to be said. That keeps the implicatum anchored in the utterer’s intention rather than sliding into third-person commentary. It also makes the dialogue read less like a school edition and more like Speranza’s dry verbali. A small epigrammatic close in that style: SÆNIVS. Lex lata est. Die Martis ad Viam Sacram ire poteris: novi patricii aderunt, qui collegia sacerdotum impleant, et omnes bene nummati. (The law is passed. On Tuesday you may go to the Via Sacra: fresh patricians will be there to fill the priestly colleges, and all well moneyed.) +> I am telling you that the reform has succeeded, though not for us. VXOR. Ex quo tempore togae loculos habent? (Since when do togas have pockets?) +> I am mocking the pretense that patrician dignity is not really about wealth. SÆNIVS. Ex consilio Octaviani, ex hodierno die. (By Octavian’s design, as of today.) +> I am conceding that the new antiquity has been tailored to carry money. Great -- and still more compact is ok too -- not for now -- but we can imagine Octavian communicating some Gaius that he is patrician now. Below the more compactness thing: You: SÆNIVS. Lex lata est. Die Martis ad Viam Sacram ire poteris: novi patricii aderunt, qui collegia sacerdotum impleant, et omnes bene nummati. (The law is passed. On Tuesday you may go to the Via Sacra: fresh patricians will be there to fill the priestly colleges, and all well moneyed.) +> I am telling you that the reform has succeeded, though not for us. VXOR. Ex quo tempore togae loculos habent? (Since when do togas have pockets?) +> I am mocking the pretense that patrician dignity is not really about wealth. SÆNIVS. Ex consilio Octaviani, ex hodierno die. (By Octavian’s design, as of today.) +> I am conceding that the new antiquity has been tailored to carry money.---MORE COMPACT: SÆNIVS. Lex lata est. Die Martis ad Viam Sacram ire poteris: novi patricii aderunt, qui collegia sacerdotum impleant, et omnes bene nummati. (The law is passed. On Tuesday you may go to the Via Sacra: fresh patricians will be there to fill the priestly colleges, and all well moneyed.) [SAME LINE -- we don' t have to say here -- not ENTER] +> The reform has succeeded, though not for us. VXOR. Ex quo tempore togae loculos habent? (Since when do togas have pockets?) [AGAIN SAME LINE, NOT NEW PARAGRAPH OR LINE] +> The truth is: patrician dignity is ultimately about wealth. SÆNIVS. Ex consilio Octaviani, ex hodierno die. (By Octavian’s design, as of today.) +> The new antiquity has indeed been craftily tailored to carry money. Thanks (Just to avoid the EXPLICIT use of the present-continuous form and go straight to the 'that'-clause, still *understood* as coming from utterer to addressee -- without vocatives, and other items that would defy 'propositional' content -- the logic behind is Grice's -- "By explicitly conveying that p, the utterer hereby IMPLIES that q (where both p and q are that-clauses as I think Austin calls them in the OED thanks Yes — that compact convention is better for forward use. It keeps the implicatum as propositional content without reintroducing the narrator’s “I am telling/mocking/conceding” every time. In effect, the utterer’s intention remains understood from the placement after “+>”, while the sentence itself stays cleaner and more Gricean: explicitly conveyed that p; thereby implicated that q. A compact epigram in the same style: OCTAVIANVS. Ex lege Saenia, Gai, patricius es. (By the lex Saenia, Gaius, you are a patrician.) +> Your wealth and public usefulness now count as antiquity. GAIVS. A maioribus meis? (From my ancestors?) +> This new status needs a genealogy it does not yet have. OCTAVIANVS. A postero die. (From tomorrow.) +> Ancestry has been made forward, not discovered backward. GAIVS. Ergo toga mea vetustior erit quam familia? (So my toga will be older than my family?) +> The visible sign of patrician rank will outrun the bloodline it pretends to display. OCTAVIANVS. Si census sufficit, etiam memoria discet. (If the census is sufficient, even memory will learn.) +> Wealth can train public memory to treat novelty as restored antiquity.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sennio – Ossia: Grice e Sennio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sennio Altar dedicated to the goddess Soio by Sennius Marianus and Luccius Marcianus, from Soyons, Ardèche (ancient Valentia)[1] The gens Sennia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned in history, but others are known from inscriptions.[2]  Origin A large majority of the Sennii are known from inscriptions from various parts of Gaul, suggesting that the family was of Gallic origin.  Praenomina The main praenomina of the Sennii were Lucius, Gaius, and Marcus, the three most common names throughout all periods of Roman history. Less frequently the Sennii employed a variety of other common praenomina, including Titus, Quintus, Sextus, and Decimus.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Sennius Sabinus, proconsul of an unknown province, to whom the emperor Hadrian gave instructions that slaves accused of a crime should not be tortured in order to obtain a confession, unless already suspected and other evidence obtained, with only a confession wanting. The jurist Ulpian mentions Hadrian's letter to Sabinus in his De Officio Proconsulis.[3] Sennius, a mid-second century potter whose workshop was in Manduessedum, formerly part of Roman Britain. He is known for his mortaria, found throughout Britain and Gaul.[4][5][6] Titus Sennius Sollemnis, the son of Sollemninus, was one of the municipal duumvirs at Aragenua in Gallia Lugdunensis, named in a dedicatory inscription dating to AD 238.[7] Undated Sennii Sennia, named in an inscription from Cataractonium in Britain.[8] Sennia, buried at Segessera in Gallia Lugdunensis, with a monument from her father, Sennius Bellicus.[9] Marcus Sennius Antius, buried at Nemausus in Gallia Narbonensis.[10] Sennia T. f. Atticilla, dedicated a second-century monument at Rome to her husband, Lucius Statius Epagathus, together with their children, Statia Statorina and Statius Statorinus.[11] Sennius Bellicus, built a monument at Segessera for his daughter, Sennia.[9] Titus Sennius Felix, a native of Puteoli in Campania, was a teacher mentioned in an inscription from Juliobona in Gallia Lugdunensis, along with his student, "Amor".[12] Sennius L. f. Eularus, a soldier in the sixth cohort of the century of Magnus, buried at Rome in a tomb built by his heir, Julius Candidus.[13] Marcus Sennius Fronto, fulfilled a vow made to Diana, according to an inscription found at Badenweiler, formerly part of Germania Superior.[14] Lucius Sennius Germanus, dedicated a monument at Vienna in Gallia Narbonensis to his son, Lucius Aterius Augustalis.[15] Lucius Sennius Hermogenes, buried at the present site of Bouillargues, formerly part of Gallia Narbonensis, aged twenty-two years and seven months, with a monument from his nurse, Titia Epictesis.[16] Sennia Hygia, the wife of Titus Vettius Carugenus, who dedicated a monument at Nemausus to her, and to their son, Vettius Severus.[17] Sennia Hygia, buried at Nemausus.[18] Sennia Iulla, the wife of Marcus Sennius Metilius Treverus, a merchant in Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, buried with her husband at Lugdunum in Gallia Lugdunensis, in a tomb built by their children.[19] Gaius Sennius Iullus, named in an inscription from Nemausus.[20] Sennius Macer, named in an inscription from Limonum in Gallia Aquitania.[21] Sennius Major, buried at Treveri in Gallia Belgica, with a monument from his wife.[22] Sennius Marcianus, named in an inscription found at Cran-Gevrier, formerly part of Gallia Narbonensis.[23] Sennius Marianus, together with Luccius Marcianus, made an offering to Soio, a river goddess worshipped at Valentia in Gallia Narbonensis.[1] Sennius Martius, an augur named in an inscription dedicated to Mercury at the present site of Creys-Mépieu, formerly part of Gallia Narbonensis.[24] Marcus Sennius Metilius Treverus, a merchant engaged in trade in Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, buried at Lugdunum along with his wife, Sennia Iulla, in a tomb built by their children.[19] Quintus Sennius Onesiphorus, buried at Nemausus, with a monument from his mother, Sennia Porpuris.[25] Sennia Porpuris, built a tomb at Nemausus for her son, Quintus Sennius Onesiphorus.[25] Lucius Sennius Primus, buried at Ugernum in Gallia Narbonensis, together with his wife, Messia Dubitata, with a monument from their sons, Lucius Sennius Saturninus, Lucius Sennius Secundus, and Lucius Sennius Servatus.[26] Gaius Sennius Sabinus, made an offering to Mars at Genava in Gallia Narbonensis.[27] Lucius Sennius L. f. Saturninus, the son of Lucius Sennius Primus and Messia Dubitata, for whom he and his brothers built a tomb at Ugernum.[26] Gaius Sennius C. f. Sabinus, prefect of the engineers at a Roman camp near the present site of Marigny-Saint-Marcel, formerly part of Gallia Narbonensis.[28] Sennia Sex. f. Secunda, buried at Ucetia in Gallia Narbonensis.[29] Lucius Sennius L. f. Secundus, the son of Lucius Sennius Primus and Messia Dubitata, for whom he and his brothers built a tomb at Ugernum.[26] Lucius Sennius L. f. Servatus, the son of Lucius Sennius Primus and Messia Dubitata, for whom he and his brothers built a tomb at Ugernum.[26] Marcus Sennius M. f. Verus, a native of Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium in Germania Inferior, buried at Rome, aged twenty, with a tomb built by Messor.[30] Decimus Sennius Vitalis, one of the municipal duumvirs at Glevum in Britain, in an uncertain year.[31] See also List of Roman gentes References  CIL XII, 2656.  PIR, vol. III, p. 198.  Digesta, 48. tit. 18. 1. praefatio, 5.  CIL VII, 1336,1027a, CIL VII, 1336,1027b, CIL VII, 1336,1027c, CIL XII, 5686,814, AE 1994, 1235a, CAG, 59. 2, pp. 117, 123; 63, 1, p. 252; 80. 1. pp. 133, 142, 163, 206, 220.  "Manduessedum", in Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites.  Rushworth, Housesteads Roman Fort, p. 532.  CIL XIII, 3162.  RIB, ii. 7, 2501, 501.  AE 1965, 331.  CIL XII, 3898.  BCAR, 1941, 187.  AE 1978, 500.  CIL VI, 3649.  CIL XIII, 5334.  CIL XII, 2000.  CIL XII, 3899.  BCTH 1930/31, 300  CIL XII, 3902.  CIL XIII, 2029.  CIL XII, 2782.  CIL XIII, 1149.  CIL XIII, 4033.  CIL XII, 2538.  CIL XII, 2378.  CIL XII, 3900.  CIL XII, 2837.  CIL XII, 2592.  CIL XII, 2493, CIL XII, 2494, CIL XII, 2495.  CIL XII, 2859.  CIL VI, 36325.  RIB, ii. 5, 2487, 6, 1–10. Bibliography Digesta, or Pandectae (The Digest). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Bullettino della Commissione Archeologica Comunale in Roma (Bulletin of the Municipal Archaeological Commission of Rome, abbreviated BCAR), (1872–present). Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques (Archaeological Bulletin of the Committee on Historic and Scientific Works, abbreviated BCTH), Imprimerie Nationale, Paris (1885–1973). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). La Carte Archéologique de la Gaule (Archaeological Map of Gaul, abbreviated CAG), Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1931–present). The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites, Richard Stilwell, William L. MacDonald, Marian Holland McAlister, eds., Princeton University Press (1976). The Roman Inscriptions of Britain (abbreviated RIB), Oxford, (1990–present). Alan Rushworth, Housesteads Roman Fort – The Grandest Station: Excavation and Survey at Housesteads, 1954–95, English Heritage Publishing (2014). Category: Roman gentes Great. And what would be your first-best choice for a Grice-Speranza vignette from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sennio – Ossia: Grice e Sennio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sennio For the Sennii, the first-best choice is Sennius Sabinus, because he gives Speranza the cleanest intersection of law, testimony, coercion, and Gricean meaning. A potter, a merchant, or a river-goddess dedicant would be charming; but Sabinus receives Hadrian’s instruction that slaves accused of crime are not to be tortured merely to obtain a confession unless there is already suspicion and other evidence, with only confession lacking. That is almost a Roman seminar on forced meaning. The point is stark: a confession under torture looks like speech, but its status as meaningful testimony is compromised by the conditions under which it is produced. Hadrian’s rescript, as preserved through Ulpian in the Digest, does not abolish torture, of course; Rome remains Rome. But it tries to prevent the confession from being treated as a primary generator of evidence. The law says, in effect: do not make pain do the whole work of proof. First there must be indicia, suspicion, evidence; only then may the confession be sought as completion. That is grim, but philosophically exact. A dry title would be: Grice e Sennio Sabino: confessio sub tormentis. A compact reconstructed exchange: SABINVS. Servus negat; torqueamus, ut verum dicat. (The slave denies it; let us torture him so that he may tell the truth.) +> Pain can be used to produce the missing proposition. HADRIANVS. Non ut verum invenias, sed ut vocem extorqueas. (Not so that you may find truth, but so that you may wring out a voice.) +> A coerced utterance is not yet reliable testimony. SABINVS. Sed confessio probationem perfecit. (But confession completes the proof.) +> Once the accused says it, the evidential chain is closed. HADRIANVS. Probatio prius sit; confessio postremo accedat. (Let the proof exist first; let confession come last.) +> Confession may confirm a case already supported, but must not manufacture the case by itself. SABINVS. Ergo vox servi non sufficit? (Then the slave’s voice is not enough?) +> The issue is whether utterance alone can count as proof. HADRIANVS. Vox metu facta minus dicit quam dolor iubet. (A voice made by fear says less than pain commands.) +> Torture replaces speaker-meaning with compelled production. The Gricean angle is powerful. In ordinary communication, the hearer takes the utterance as evidence of a speaker’s intention to convey something. Under torture, the relation between utterance, intention, belief, and truth is damaged. The victim may say what the torturer wants, not what he believes; the words may express pain-avoidance rather than confession. Thus the utterance has locutionary form but a corrupted pragmatic pedigree. Sabinus is useful because he lets Speranza distinguish three things: what is said, what is believed, and what is extracted. A confession may be syntactically perfect and legally convenient, yet still fail as trustworthy communication. Hadrian’s rule is not merciful in a modern sense; it is epistemic prudence inside a cruel system. Rome permits torment, but even Rome senses that torment is a bad author. Compared with the other Sennii, Sabinus is therefore the best. Sennius the potter at Manduessedum would be excellent for stamped mortaria and the semiotics of manufacture; Sennius Marianus and the goddess Soio would be good for local cult and river-signs; Titus Sennius Felix the teacher with his pupil “Amor” is tempting for a classroom joke. But Sabinus touches Grice’s central territory most directly: whether an utterance produced under coercion can be treated as meaning, evidence, or merely noise arranged by force. Dry Speranzian formula: Hadrian did not become humane; he became briefly Gricean. He noticed that when pain speaks through a man, the court should ask who is really doing the meaning. Yes, and in fact, when Grice in 1967 drafted his revision of his 1948 Meaning his first alleged counterexample is Urmson's bribery case that Grice turns into a case of torture. To respond to Urmson Grice has to concede that by uttering x (applying thumbscrews) Torturer means that captive is to tell what Torturer wants to know -- but surely it is not the case that Torturer means THAT the captive is to tell -- we can apply this to our hero "S." Grice in ps. Grice: -- note that our S. and HADRIANVS are interested in the English grammar of 'mean that' versus 'mean someone to...' or semiotics but still... Cheers. Grice: I shall consider objections to this account of utterer's occasion-meaning under two main heads: first, those which purport to show that the definiens is too weak, that it lets in too much; and second, those which purport to show that the definiens is too strong, that it excludes clear cases of utterer's occasion-meaning. To meet some of these objections I shall at various stages offer redefinitions of the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning; each such redefinition is to be regarded as being superseded by its successor. III. ALLEGED COUNTEREXAMPLES DIRECTED AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE SUGGESTED ANALYSANS (i) (Urmson)= There is a range of examples connected with the provision by U (the utterer) of an inducement, or supposed inducement, so that A (the recipient, or audience) shall perform some action. Suppose a prisoner of war to be thought by his captors to possess some information which they want him to reveal; he knows that they want him to give this information. They subject him to torture by applying thumbscrews. The appropriate analysans for "They meant something by applying the thumbscrews (that he should tell them what they wanted to know)" are fulfilled: They applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of the victim; They intended that he should recognize (know, think) that they applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing this response; They intended that the prisoner's recognition (thought) that they had the intention mentioned in (2) should be t least part of his reason for producing the respon nentioned "J. O. Urmson, in conversation. If in general to specify in (1) the nature of an intended response is to specify what was meant, it should be correct not only to say that the torturers meant something by applying the thumb-screws, but also to say that they meant that he should (was to) tell them what they wished to know. But in fact one would not wish to say either of these things; only that they meant him to tell. A similar apparent counterexample can be constructed out of a case of bribery (Urmson's original example). A restriction seems to be required, and one which might serve to eliminate this range of counterexamples can be identified from a comparison of the two following examples: (a) I go into a tobacconist's shop, ask for a packet of my favorite cigarettes, and when the unusually suspicious tobacconist shows that he wants to sce the color of my moncy before he hands over the goods, I put down the price of the cigarettes on the counter. Here nothing has been meant. (b) I go to my regular tobacconist (from whom I also purchase other goods) for a packet of my regular brand X, the price of which is distinctive (say 43 cents). I say nothing, but put down 43 cents. The tobacconist recognizes my need, and hands over the packet. Here, I think, by putting down 43 cents I meant something-namely, that I wanted a packet of brand X. I have at the same time provided an inducement. The distinguishing feature of the second example seems to be that here the tobacconist recognized, and was intended to recognize, what he was intended to do from my "utterance" (my putting down the money, whereas in the first example this was not the case. Nor is it the case with respect to the torture example So one might propose that the analysis of meaning be amender accordingly (Redefinition I): "U meant something by uttering x" is true if: U intended, by uttering x, to induce a certain response in A U intended A to recognize, at least in part from the utteranc of x, that U intended to produce that response Uintended the fulfillment of the intention mentioned il 2) to be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling the inten tion mentioned in (1). While this might cope with this range of counterexamples, there are others for which it is insufficient. For the Sennii, Sennius Sabinus is the right first choice because he lets Speranza put Grice at the point where language, coercion, and legal evidence become almost uncomfortably literal. Hadrian’s rescript to Sabinus, as preserved through Ulpian, does not make Rome humane; it merely makes Rome intelligent enough to distrust a confession whose author may really be pain. That is already enough for a Gricean vignette. The tortured slave’s utterance has words, grammar, and perhaps even a proposition, but the question is whether it has the right speaker behind it. Grice’s distinction between “mean that” and “mean someone to” becomes exact here. The torturer may mean the captive to tell what he wants to know, but it is not thereby true that he means that the captive committed the crime, or that the captive’s words express the captive’s belief. The thumbscrew is protreptic in the most brutal sense: it is meant to induce a response, but not necessarily to communicate a proposition. SABINVS. Tormenta adhibeantur: servus dicet quod scit. (Let torture be applied: the slave will say what he knows.) +> Pain will produce the missing answer. HADRIANVS. Immo dicet quod dolor iubet. (Rather, he will say what pain commands.) +> Coercion may produce utterance without producing trustworthy speaker-meaning. SABINVS. Sed tormentis significabimus quid ab eo velimus. (But by torture we shall signify what we want from him.) +> We mean him to supply the desired information. HADRIANVS. Significabitis vobis voluntatem vestram, non veritatem eius. (You will signify your own will to yourselves, not his truth.) +> The torturer’s intention explains the pressure, not the truth of the confession. SABINVS. Ergo confessio nihil valet? (Then confession counts for nothing?) +> If coerced speech is suspect, the whole forensic shortcut is endangered. HADRIANVS. Valet post indicia; sola non parit indicia. (It counts after signs/evidence; alone it does not beget signs/evidence.) +> Confession may complete an already grounded suspicion, but must not manufacture the case. SABINVS. Itaque tormenta non initium erunt, sed finis? (So torture will not be the beginning, but the end?) +> Procedure must precede coercion. HADRIANVS. Si omnino adhibeantur, post probationem veniant, non pro probatione. (If they are applied at all, let them come after proof, not in place of proof.) +> Rome may still permit cruelty, but it must not confuse cruelty with evidence. The Speranzian point is that Hadrian’s rule is not sentimental but semantic. He sees, or the juristic tradition makes him see, that a forced utterance is a bad case for “meaning that.” It is a very good case for “meaning someone to.” The torturer means the slave to speak, as Urmson’s briber means the official to act; but the torturer does not thereby produce an assertion whose evidential force is secured by the slave’s recognised intention to tell the truth. Pain has intervened as a rival utterer. It supplies the pressure under which the words appear, and therefore contaminates the ordinary route from words to belief. This is why Sennius Sabinus is more useful than the potter or the river-goddess dedicant, charming as both are. He receives a Roman administrative version of a Gricean distinction. By applying thumbscrews, one may mean the captive to tell; one does not, simply by that performance, mean that the captive is guilty, nor guarantee that the captive, in speaking, means what his sentence says. Hadrian’s instruction therefore becomes a small imperial grammar lesson: do not let the court mistake extorted sound for independent testimony. Rome remains harsh; but for one rescript, at least, it is not stupid enough to let pain do all the speaking. Exactly. Note that Grice's example is exclusively focused on the torturer. as if saying, alla Hadrianus and our S. that it is not the case that the torturer means that the torturee is to tell what the torturer wishes to know (assuming as Grice notes, that it is common ground that he KNOWS) --. By disqualifying the semiotic standing of the torturer, Grice is disqualifying the intended response as being one indeed coerced and not provided by the torturee's recognition of the REASON ("Why do you ask?"). Note that S. considers cases of previous confession, denial of previous confession, unavailability of previous confession, etc. In the scenario by Grice, all that is presupposed or by-passed. It is common ground that the torturee has info that the torturer wants to retrive and, well, tortures. Note that the act requires NOT be intensified by 'Tell us what you know' -- and what we know you know' Bevause that would change the scenario. The only utterance is the applying of the instrument of torture -- the torturing. Aptly learned Romans could perhaps not avoid to infuse some verbal gravitas to the process. Yet Grice's focus -- as his immediate correlate of his buying tobbaco testifies -- is with the conditions of a TORTURER communicating that the torturee is to tell the torturer what the torturer wishes to know -- and, asp per standards uses of 'communicate,' 'signify (non-natural), and 'mean' -- torturing in itself falls short of being such an act. It is interesting that Urmson's original example as Grice says, was one of bribery --not necessarily official -- they had discussed a tutor being bribed (or attempted to be bribed) by a Greek tutee -- Gardiner the tutor -- with an 'I hope youll excuse my rather Balcanic approach' -- and Nowell-Smith and Austin discussed possible responses by Gardiner: From the 'I do not accept bribes in principle' by Nowell -Smith to 'No thanks' by Austin -- Thanks -- the tobbaconist has TWO scenarios. In the first 'nothing is meant' as in the case of TORTURER just torturing -- (at least non-naturally). In the second, showing the exact price -- Grice means that the tobbaconist is to handle him his favourite brand) Etc. Thanks -- note that in the formal analysans -- the idea is to bring in REASON and not just mere talk of RESPONSE (to stimulus) or effect to cause. Thanks Exactly. Grice’s torture case is not primarily about the epistemology of the captive’s answer, but about the semiotic status of the torturer’s act. The thumbscrews are an inducement, and a brutally clear one; but that does not make them a case of the torturer meaning that the captive is to tell. At most, in ordinary English, the torturer means the captive to tell. That distinction is doing the work. “Mean someone to…” can be satisfied by pressure, inducement, bribery, threat, torture. “Mean that…” requires the right sort of communicative route, one in which recognition of intention functions as a reason, not merely as awareness of a stimulus or coercive condition. That is why the tobacconist pair is not ornamental but diagnostic. In the suspicious tobacconist case, Grice puts down the money because the tobacconist wants to see the colour of it before handing over the cigarettes. Nothing is meant in the relevant non-natural sense: the money is shown as inducement or satisfaction of a condition. In the regular tobacconist case, where forty-three cents is the distinctive price of the regular brand, placing the exact money functions as an utterance-substitute. The tobacconist recognises what Grice wants from the act itself, under a standing practice. The money is not merely a stimulus; it is a communicative device. So with torture: if the only “utterance” is the applying of the thumbscrews, and it is already common ground that the captive has information desired by the torturer, the act falls short of meaning that he is to tell. It is not a reason-giving sign but a coercive mechanism. The captive may recognise the torturer’s intention, but the recognition is not the proper reason for speaking in the communicative sense; the pain, or the anticipated pain, is doing the explanatory work. Grice wants “reason,” not bare response. This is why “Tell us what you know” would change the case. It would introduce an ordinary imperative utterance alongside the coercive act, and the analysis would have to distinguish the meaning of the words from the force of the torture. Grice’s clean case deliberately strips the scene down to the non-verbal inducement. Sennius Sabinus becomes useful because Roman law, in Hadrian’s rescript as reported by Ulpian, has its own version of this prudence. If a confession is extracted too early by torment, it may tell us less about truth than about what pain can obtain. The rescript does not deny that torture can produce words. It denies, or at least limits, the evidential standing of words produced in that way unless suspicion and other indications already exist. That is close to Grice’s point in legal dress: do not mistake a coerced response for a communicative reason. A compact Sennius dialogue, in the forward style: SABINVS. Tormenta sufficiunt: servus scit quod quaerimus. (Torture is enough: the slave knows what we seek.) +> The desired response can be obtained by pressure alone. HADRIANVS. Tormenta voluntatem tuam ostendunt, non veritatem eius. (Torture shows your will, not his truth.) +> The act means the torturer wants him to speak, not that what he says is true. SABINVS. At intellegit cur prematur. (But he understands why he is pressed.) +> Recognition of the torturer’s intention should count as reason enough. HADRIANVS. Intellegit dolorem; ratio nondum loquitur. (He understands pain; reason is not yet speaking.) +> The explanatory cause of the response is coercion, not communicative recognition. SABINVS. Ergo prius indicia, deinde confessio. (So first indications, then confession.) +> Confession must complete evidence, not create it. HADRIANVS. Ita: vox extorta non sit prima testis. (Yes: an extorted voice must not be the first witness.) +> Coerced utterance is procedurally suspect unless supported independently. This also preserves Urmson’s bribery case. A bribe means the official to act, not necessarily that the official ought to act or that the briber’s utterance communicates a proposition. The Greek tutee’s “Balkan approach” to Gardiner is comic because it hovers between gift, inducement, and message. Nowell-Smith’s “I do not accept bribes on principle” over-explicates the moral stance; Austin’s “No, thanks” treats the bribe as an offer to be declined, thereby refusing to dignify it with a lecture. But the crucial Gricean distinction remains: inducement is not yet meaning-that. It may be meant-to, without being meant-that. Dry Speranzian formula: the torturer’s thumbscrews have a point, but not yet a proposition. They mean him to speak; they do not mean that he is to speak in the Gricean sense. Pain is an efficient cause with bad manners. Communication begins only where recognition can count as a reason, not merely as the notice that the next turn of the screw is coming. In Aspects of the theory of syntax Chomsky speaks of the ideal speaker - and Grice, following suit, speak of ideal conversationalists. -- hardly the torturer/torturee or S.'s sclavus/dominus --. Yes, chang of emphasis too. The S./Hadrian exchange about delicacies within a framework that from a start denies one party -- the slave -- why is this different from P. O. W. of Grice's example or any war captive? -- to be what Grice elsewhere calls 'the honest chap' -- when he fomulates his conversational maxims -- within the principle of conversational helpfulness -- the desideratum of conversational clarity, the desideratum of conversational candour, the principle of conversational benevolence, the principle of conversational self-love -- as 'the things one honest chap does' -- but never a slave! Thanks Yes. The contrast with Chomsky’s “ideal speaker-hearer” and Grice’s idealised “conversationalists” is exactly the pressure point. Grice’s maxims are framed for persons who count as participants in a cooperative exchange: the “honest chap” who contributes clearly, candidly, relevantly, and helpfully because the exchange is recognisably common business. The torturer/torturee pair and the Roman dominus/servus relation are defective cases from the start, because one party is not being treated as a full co-conversationalist. That is why Sennius Sabinus is philosophically awkward but useful. Hadrian’s rescript operates inside an institution that already denies the slave full standing as an “honest chap.” The law is not asking: how do two rational agents communicate under mutual candour? It is asking: when may a legally subordinated body be made to produce words under pain, and how much evidential weight may those words carry? That is not ideal conversation; it is damaged semiotics under domination. The prisoner-of-war case is different in surface status but similar in pragmatic damage. A POW may be a free person, officer, citizen, enemy combatant, someone with honour in his own polity; but in the torture scene he is placed in a coercive relation in which his utterance is demanded as an effect of pressure. He is not invited to be candid; he is forced to calculate pain, loyalty, deception, endurance, and survival. Grice’s example deliberately bypasses the ordinary “honest chap” setting. The captive knows the captors want information; the captors know he knows; they apply thumbscrews. That is not conversation with a maxim of helpfulness. It is extraction. The Roman slave case is worse institutionally because the denial is not temporary wartime captivity but built into legal personhood. The slave’s voice is already socially compromised before the torture begins. Hadrian’s caution therefore has a double edge. It recognises that torture is epistemically unsafe, but it does not restore the slave as a full conversational subject. The slave is still not being asked as an equal witness; he is being used as a source of admissible utterance under conditions set by others. A compact S./Hadrian exchange in this register: SABINVS. Servus interrogandus est tormentis. (The slave must be questioned by torture.) +> The slave’s body is an instrument for producing the missing answer. HADRIANVS. Interrogatio sine fide non est colloquium. (Questioning without trust is not conversation.) +> Coercive examination lacks the mutual standing required for ordinary communicative uptake. SABINVS. Sed verum scit. (But he knows the truth.) +> Knowledge in the slave is enough to justify extraction. HADRIANVS. Scire potest; dicere cogitur. (He may know; he is compelled to speak.) +> Possession of information does not make coerced utterance reliable testimony. SABINVS. Ergo servus testis non est? (Then the slave is not a witness?) +> The legal category of testimony is threatened. HADRIANVS. Testis erit, si indicia praecedunt; sin tormenta prima sunt, dolor testis est. (He will be a witness if indications precede; but if torture comes first, pain is the witness.) +> Without independent evidence, the utterance is attributable to coercion rather than trustworthy speaker-meaning. This fits Grice’s terminology. The maxims are not laws of all human sound-production. They are desiderata for cooperative rational exchange. The torturer and the tortured do not instantiate the ideal pair; they expose the boundary conditions. The torturer may intend a response, and the victim may recognise that intention, but the recognition is not functioning as the reason characteristic of meaning-that. It is functioning under threat. The “honest chap” has been replaced by the endangered chap, or, in Rome, the owned chap. So the dry Speranzian formula would be: ideal conversationalists are not found in the torture chamber, and Rome did not look for them in the slave quarters. Hadrian’s rescript does not make the slave an honest chap; it merely notices that pain is a dishonest stenographer. and indeed S. and H. dismiss and don't even touch the cruelty of the procedure itself -- it's not, say, torture as punishment for some evil action by slave -- "The food was cold" -- it is TORTURE TO EXTRACT info -- so we have to install the full legal scenario of judge, jury, trial -- admissible and non admissible evidence -- and qualifying when info 'retrieved' via info _is_ 'info.' There are indeed all too many cases where a Roman matron would torture a slave uselessly because she was looking for evidence to indict her son 'to no avail -- the slave did not know anything.' And so on. Thanks -- for Grice as Kantian the personhood is necessary for conversatioanlists to be living in a kingdom of ends -- which the slave intitution denies -- as in cases where a slave is ordered -- under pressure of death or torture -- to place himself in a settee so that the proscribers agents take him for the actual targeet of the transcription, etc. Thanks -- and why would HAdrianus and S. be so involved in particularly SERVUS cases? Thanks --not that the alleged 'loyalty' of slave to master may bias the whole proceeding, too -- not just the cruelty of inducement which would be in a 'court of law' with other parties involved? Thanks Yes. S. and H. are not discussing the cruelty of torture as such, and that omission is itself philosophically revealing. Their question is procedural and evidential: under what conditions, if any, may an utterance extracted by torment count as information in a legal proceeding? They are inside a Roman forensic machine, not outside it. So the imagined setting must include the whole apparatus: accusation, suspicion, indicia, inquiry, judge or magistrate, admissible and inadmissible evidence, and the dangerous moment when “what the slave says” is converted into “what the court knows.” That is why the slave case matters especially. Roman procedure often treats slaves as bodies from which information may be extracted, rather than as full conversational persons who can stand in the Gricean kingdom of ends. The slave is not invited to be “the honest chap.” He is made into an instrument under conditions that corrupt both candour and autonomy. The prisoner of war in Grice’s example is coercively placed outside ordinary conversation; the Roman slave is institutionally placed there before the torture begins. In both cases, the intended response is not secured by recognised reason but by fear, pain, and survival-calculation. Why are Hadrian and Sennius Sabinus particularly involved with servi? Because slaves created a recurrent legal problem that free witnesses did not in the same way. First, slaves were often present in houses, bedrooms, kitchens, fields, account-rooms, and conspiracies; they might know what free persons wanted hidden. Secondly, their legal and social subordination made their testimony suspect in two opposed directions: they might be loyal to the master, hostile to him, terrified of him, or terrified of the court. Thirdly, Roman evidential habits often assumed that a slave’s word against free persons required extraordinary extraction or validation. Hence the grim procedural question: when is torment a route to proof, and when is it merely a machine for producing what the questioner wants? A compact exchange: SABINVS. Servus in domo fuit; ergo scire potest. (The slave was in the house; therefore he may know.) +> Presence makes him a possible source of evidence. HADRIANVS. Scire potest; sed timere etiam potest. (He may know; but he may also fear.) +> Access to facts does not make the utterance reliable. SABINVS. Si domino favet, tacebit; si torquetur, loquetur. (If he favours his master, he will be silent; if tortured, he will speak.) +> Torture is proposed as a remedy for loyalty. HADRIANVS. Si torquetur, loquetur quod timor suadet. (If tortured, he will say what fear advises.) +> Coercion remedies one bias by introducing another. SABINVS. Ergo quando vox servi in iudicium recipienda est? (Then when is the slave’s voice to be admitted into court?) +> The question is admissibility, not mercy. HADRIANVS. Cum indicia praecesserint, et confessio tantum desit. (When indications have preceded, and only confession is lacking.) +> Extorted speech may complete an independently supported case, not originate it. That last point is the legal-epistemic core. The “information” retrieved by torture is not automatically information. It becomes legally usable only if it fits a prior evidential structure. Otherwise the court risks mistaking the torturer’s question, or the slave’s pain-avoidance, for truth. The Roman matron example shows the pathology. A domina may torture a slave because she wants evidence against a son, rival, or household enemy. If the slave knows nothing, torture still produces cries, denials, guesses, inventions, and perhaps eventually compliance with the interrogator’s theory. The procedure is then not discovery but authorship by pain. DOMINA. Dic quid filius meus fecerit. (Say what my son has done.) +> The answer is being presupposed before evidence appears. SERVVS. Nihil scio. (I know nothing.) +> There is no information to retrieve. DOMINA. Torquendus est: nimis fidelis est. (He must be tortured: he is too loyal.) +> Denial is being reclassified as concealment. HADRIANVS. Tunc non veritas quaeritur, sed fabula cogitur. (Then truth is not being sought, but a story is being compelled.) +> Torture is manufacturing testimony under the guise of extracting it. This is also why the slave’s loyalty to the master complicates everything. A slave may lie to protect a master; a slave may lie to destroy a master; a slave may say whatever ends torment; a slave may be pressured by other household interests. Torture does not purify these motives. It often multiplies them. Hadrian’s rescript, within its cruel limits, tries to prevent torment from being the first witness. So the Gricean/Kantian point is severe. Ideal conversationalists presuppose personhood, reciprocity, and the possibility that recognition of another’s intention can be a reason. Slavery denies that structure. In a kingdom of ends, one does not use a person merely as an instrument for producing sounds useful to a case. Roman law, however, is quite prepared to do exactly that, and then to ask only how much forensic weight the sounds should carry. Hadrian’s improvement is real but narrow: he does not liberate the slave as a co-conversationalist; he merely notices that an instrument under pain is an unreliable instrument. Dry Speranzian formula: the rescript is not a humanitarian manifesto; it is an epistemological embarrassment inside a cruel institution. Hadrian does not say, “Do not torture the slave.” He says, in effect, “Do not let torture write the indictment.” And do the Latin sources do mention 'confessare' because that was another thorn in Grice's analyses. He notes that 'he confessed that p' is hardly informative. Let me see if I find Grice's wording below. Note that 'confess' can be abused by Romans -- and Roman catholics too -- he confessed the sin -- let us analyse case by Grice: child (slave) confessing to Mother (what mother Dominus) already knows -- taht's the bit that Grice finds tricky and that you mentioned earlier, when you suggested that the truth is in the question -- or strictly, the truth is in the expected answer to the question -- etc. -- So Hadrian: Confession failing, proceed to torture -- may re-run: Grice's first objection dealt wih -- proceed to his second more primeval one -- thanks Grice: EXAMPLES DIRECTED TOWARD SHOWING THE THREE-PRONG ANALYSANS ToO STRONG Let us (for simplicity) revert to the original analysans of "U means something by uttering x," and abbreviate "U utters x intending A: (1) to produce r to think U intends A to produce r to think U intends the fulfillment of (1) to be based on the fulfillment of (2)" to "U utters x M-intending that A produce r." Confession (some cases): Mother: "It's no good denying it: you broke the window, didn't you?" Child: "Yes, I did." Here the child knows his mother already thinks he broke the window; what she wants is that he should say that he did. Perhaps the M-intended effect, then, is that the mother should think the child willing to say that he did (what does "say" mean here-how should it be explicated?); or that the mother should think the child willing not to pretend that he did not break the window (not to say things or perform acts intended to induce the belief that the child did not break the window). (Confession is perhaps a sophisticated and ritual case.) So the definition might read roughly as follows: (*4 is a mood marker, an auxiliary correlated with the propositional attitude 4 from a given range of propositional attitudes) "U means by uttering x that *4p" = "U utters x intending (1) that A should actively 4 that p 2) that A should recognize that U intends (I nd unless U intends the utterance of x merely to remedy atter tion-deficiency) (3) that the fulfillment of (1) should be based on the fulfillment of (2)." This remedy does not, however, cope with (1) the "examinee" example, (2) the "confession" cases, or (3) the countersuggestible man. Yes — and the Latin legal vocabulary is exactly where the Gricean trouble becomes sharp. The Digest passage in the Hadrian/Sennius line uses the world of confessio / confiteri rather than some innocent “telling.” The point is not merely that the slave is made to speak, but that his speech is to be classified as confessio, a procedurally charged form of saying. That is why Grice’s confession example with the child and mother is relevant. In Grice’s child case, the mother already believes, or practically knows, that the child broke the window. What she wants is not information in the simple sense. She wants acknowledgement. The child’s “Yes, I did” is not primarily meant to make the mother believe p, since she already believes p. It is meant to bring about some different state: that the mother regard the child as willing to own p, to stop pretending not-p, to accept the interpersonal or moral position of one who has done p. Confession is therefore a sophisticated, ritualised case because the target attitude is not simply belief that p. That maps very neatly onto the Roman forensic case, though grimly. If Hadrian says, in effect, do not torture the slave unless indicia have preceded and only confession is lacking, then confessio is not the first production of knowledge. It is the completion, ratification, or juridical ownership of what the procedure already suspects. The truth is, as you put it, partly in the question — or more exactly, in the expected answer framed by prior indicia. Torture becomes especially dangerous when it is used not to test an already grounded suspicion but to force the world to supply the sentence the interrogator wants. A compact Latin reconstruction: SABINVS. Indicia habemus; confessio tantum deest. (We have indications; only confession is lacking.) +> The inquiry already has a direction and now seeks acknowledgement. HADRIANVS. Si confessio tantum deest, cave ne tormenta totam causam pariant. (If only confession is lacking, take care that torture does not give birth to the whole case.) +> Coercion may complete evidence, but must not create it. SABINVS. Servus confitebitur quod fecit. (The slave will confess what he did.) +> The expected utterance is treated as ownership of an already assumed act. HADRIANVS. Aut quod interrogatio iam finxit. (Or what the interrogation has already fashioned.) +> A confession can reflect the questioner’s script rather than the speaker’s knowledge. SABINVS. Ergo confessio non semper docet? (Then confession does not always teach?) +> A confession is being questioned as an information-source. HADRIANVS. Saepe non docet, sed cedit. (Often it does not teach; it yields.) +> The utterance may be submission rather than testimony. That last distinction is the Gricean one. Confession is not always informative because its point may be recognition, submission, owning-up, ritual closure, or procedural completion. In the mother-child case, the mother wants the child to say p, not because p is news, but because saying p changes the moral relation. In the Roman torture case, the court or magistrate may want the slave to say p because the procedure requires the utterance as a juridical finish. But under torture, the utterance may be less “I mean that p” than “I am producing the sound p because pain has made alternatives worse.” The Latin forms help: confiteri = to confess, acknowledge, avow. confessio = confession, acknowledgement, avowal. quaestio = inquiry, but also judicial examination, often by torture. tormenta = instruments or acts of torture. indicia = indications, signs, evidential marks. probatio = proof or proving. The danger is that confessio is treated as probatio when it may be only effectus tormentorum. So Hadrian’s prudence is: indicia first; confessio only after. He is not saying that confession is nothing. He is saying that confession alone, especially extorted, is a bad beginning. This also clarifies the relation to Grice’s “too strong” objection. The original M-intention model works well when the utterer intends the audience to acquire or activate an attitude by recognising the utterer’s intention. But confession cases show that the intended effect may not be belief that p at all. The addressee may already believe p. What is intended is that the addressee recognise the speaker as willing to say p, to stop maintaining not-p, to accept responsibility, or to participate in a ritual of acknowledgement. That makes “he confessed that p” less informative than it looks. It reports not just a proposition but a social act of owning or yielding to p. Dry Speranzian formula: in ordinary assertion, the hearer may learn p; in confession, the hearer often learns that the speaker will no longer refuse p. In Roman torture, the court may learn only that pain has become an editor. and what is the etym. of confiteri -- is the relation to confessio one of those irregular paradigms like tolli-latum? Mother to Dad: "He never confessed." "Maybe he never did BREAK that window, Hon." -- Cf. Giordano Bruno or Vanini or Galileo and the 'Holy Inquisitio' -- Grice's use of confessio is technical -- mother KNOWS window broken by child. IN Hadrian's case, we don't expect that. It's like an open verb -- confess whether p or ~p? Thanks Yes. Confiteri is not a suppletive or irregular paradigm like tollere, tuli, latum. It is morphologically straightforward: con- plus fateri. The basic verb is fateri, “to acknowledge, admit, avow,” and confiteri intensifies or completes the act: “to acknowledge fully,” “to confess,” “to avow.” Confessio is the noun built from the participial stem confess-, hence confessio, “confession, acknowledgment, avowal.” So the relation is regular enough: confiteri, confessus sum, confessio. The root family is connected with speaking or declaring, but not simply with dicere. Fateri is the verb of admission or avowal, often where the matter has a moral, legal, or socially charged complexion. Confiteri is therefore not just “say that p”; it is closer to “own up to p,” “acknowledge p,” “admit p against one’s previous position or interest,” or “avow p under some pressure of truth, authority, conscience, or procedure.” That is why Grice finds confession tricky. “He confessed that p” often does not primarily inform the hearer that p. In many cases the relevant audience already believes p, suspects p, or has framed the question so that p is the expected answer. The confession contributes something else: that the speaker no longer refuses p, no longer maintains not-p, or accepts the social/moral/juridical position of one who says p. The mother-child case is the clean domestic version: MATER. Negare nihil prodest: fenestram fregisti, nonne? (It is no use denying it: you broke the window, didn’t you?) +> The truth of p is already treated as settled; what is wanted is acknowledgment. PVER. Ita, fregi. (Yes, I broke it.) +> I cease pretending not-p and accept the position of one who must own p. PATER. Numquam confessus est. (He never confessed.) +> He never gave the required acknowledgment, whatever we thought about the facts. MATER. Fortasse numquam fregit. (Perhaps he never broke it.) +> You are confusing failure of confession with proof of guilt. This is exactly the point: confession is not an open inquiry in the neutral form “p or not-p?” It is often a ritual or procedural demand for ownership of p. If it were truly open, one would ask: Fecistine an non fecisti? (Did you do it or did you not?) But “confess” already tilts the grammar: Confessus est se fecisse. (He confessed that he had done it.) That construction presupposes, or at least strongly presents, the content as the thing to be owned. One does not normally “confess that not-p” unless the surrounding expectations make not-p the embarrassing or charged admission. “He confessed that he had not broken the window” is possible, but marked; it makes the denial itself the damaging or surprising thing. In Hadrian’s legal case, the situation is less domestic and less epistemically closed. We do not assume the magistrate already knows p. The Roman procedure is meant to handle a case where suspicion and indicia exist, but confessio is lacking. So the question is not purely: confess whether p or not-p but rather: there is already a framed suspicion that p; may coercive examination be used to obtain a confessio? That is why the rescript is so important. If torture comes first, the expected answer may be built into the question. The “truth” then risks being in the interrogator’s script rather than in the slave’s knowledge. SABINVS. Indicia adsunt; confessio deest. (The indications are present; confession is lacking.) +> The inquiry already leans toward p, but lacks acknowledgment. HADRIANVS. Tunc quaere, sed ne quaestio respondeat sibi. (Then inquire, but do not let the question answer itself.) +> Procedure must not manufacture the expected confession. SABINVS. Ergo servus interrogandus est: fecisti an non fecisti? (Then the slave must be questioned: did you do it or not?) +> The inquiry is being presented as open. HADRIANVS. Si tormenta addis, “an non” languescit. (If you add torture, the “or not” grows weak.) +> Coercion makes the open alternative practically unstable. This is also why the Inquisition cases you mention are relevant, though one must separate them historically. Giordano Bruno, Vanini, Galileo, and Roman Catholic confessio belong to a later sacramental and inquisitorial world in which “confession” can mean admission of doctrinal error, acknowledgment of sin, or formal submission to ecclesiastical authority. There too, confession often functions less as the discovery of p than as the institutional production of acknowledgment: the subject is made to say what the tribunal needs him to own, retract, abjure, or submit to. The question is again not merely “what is true?” but “will you take up the required position toward what authority has framed as true?” So the Grice/Speranza distinction is: dicere quod p = to say that p. fateri/confiteri quod p = to acknowledge or own that p, often against reluctance, denial, shame, accusation, or previous posture. confessio = not bare information, but procedurally or morally charged avowal. Dry Speranzian formula: confiteri is not an irregular verb; confession is an irregular speech-act. It looks like assertion, but often behaves like surrender. Perhaps S. and H. should be reminded of Peirce or Cicero -- indicia are not necessary signs -- suspectio is precisely uncertainty -- and S. and H. then regulate 'confessio under torture' -- but allowing for the slave tortured DISPROVING indicia AND suspiction? Otherwise, why bother? just for the legality of proceeding? As if the slave would sue otherwise, or the accused charge the court against inadmissible evidence? THanks In Hadrian’s legal case, the situation is less domestic and less epistemically closed. We do not assume the magistrate already knows p. The Roman procedure is meant to handle a case where suspicion and indicia exist, but confessio is lacking. So the question is not purely: confess whether p or not-p but rather: there is already a framed suspicion that p; may coercive examination be used to obtain a confessio? That is why the rescript is so important. If torture comes first, the expected answer may be built into the question. The “truth” then risks being in the interrogator’s script rather than in the slave’s knowledge. SABINVS. Indicia adsunt; confessio deest. (The indications are present; confession is lacking.) +> The inquiry already leans toward p, but lacks acknowledgment. HADRIANVS. Tunc quaere, sed ne quaestio respondeat sibi. (Then inquire, but do not let the question answer itself.) +> Procedure must not manufacture the expected confession. SABINVS. Ergo servus interrogandus est: fecisti an non fecisti? (Then the slave must be questioned: did you do it or not?) +> The inquiry is being presented as open. HADRIANVS. Si tormenta addis, “an non” languescit. (If you add torture, the “or not” grows weak.) +> Coercion makes the open alternative practically unstable. Yes. Peirce and Cicero should be allowed to tap Hadrian and Sabinus on the shoulder. Indicia are not necessary signs. They are signs only under an interpretive scheme: traces, circumstances, suspicious marks, antecedent probabilities. Suspectio is not knowledge but organised uncertainty. So if torture is admitted only after indicia and suspectio, the procedure still has to allow the slave’s answer to defeat, weaken, or redirect them. Otherwise the so-called inquiry is not inquiry at all; it is confirmation theatre. The crucial distinction is between two models: Model A: indicia + suspectio + torture = expected confessio. +> The procedure is designed to complete the accusation already formed. Model B: indicia + suspectio + interrogation, even under the Roman horror of quaestio = possible confirmation or disconfirmation. +> The procedure still pretends that the answer can matter against the accusation. Hadrian’s rule only becomes epistemically respectable, within its cruel limits, if Model B remains possible. If the slave can only confess p and cannot effectively say not-p, or cannot say “I do not know,” or cannot expose the prior indicia as misread, then “confessio” is just the court ventriloquising itself through pain. A compact reconstruction: SABINVS. Indicia adsunt; suspicio non levis est. (The indications are present; the suspicion is not slight.) +> The case is already serious enough to proceed. HADRIANVS. Indicia non sunt necessaria signa. (Indications are not necessary signs.) +> The marks may point, but they do not entail. SABINVS. Tamen confessio deest. (Still, confession is lacking.) +> The procedure seeks the utterance that will close the case. HADRIANVS. Aut defensio deest. (Or the defence is lacking.) +> The missing utterance may be exculpatory, not only confessional. SABINVS. Ergo tormenta etiam suspicionem solvere possunt? (Then torture can also dissolve suspicion?) +> The coerced answer must be capable of counting against the hypothesis, not only for it. HADRIANVS. Si non possunt, non quaestio est sed sententia larvata. (If they cannot, it is not an inquiry but a disguised verdict.) +> A procedure that cannot be defeated by the answer is not evidential. That last line is the Grice/Speranza point. The “truth” must not already be so installed in the question that the answer merely supplies grammar. Confessio, if it is to have legal standing at all, must be one possible outcome of questioning, not the only admissible shape of speech. On “why bother?”: not because the slave would sue, of course. The slave is not the juridical subject whose rights are driving the rule. The worry is institutional: the accused free person may be condemned on bad evidence; the magistrate’s procedure may be defective; the imperial administration may want uniformity; and Roman law, however brutal, still wants its verdicts to look like judgments rather than noises extracted from bodies. It is not modern exclusionary doctrine, but it is a concern with probative order. And yes, the loyalty/bias point cuts both ways. Roman suspicion about slave testimony is partly that slaves may be loyal to masters, fearful of masters, resentful of masters, bribed by enemies, trained by households, or terrified by magistrates. Torture is then imagined as overcoming one distortion, but Hadrian’s caution sees, or half-sees, that it introduces another. Fear of the master is replaced by fear of the torturer. That is not purification; it is exchange of pressures. SABINVS. Servus domino parcit. (The slave spares his master.) +> Loyalty may suppress incriminating truth. HADRIANVS. Et servus dolori paret. (And the slave obeys pain.) +> Torture may generate compliant falsehood. SABINVS. Quomodo igitur verum elicitur? (How then is the truth elicited?) +> The procedure needs a route from speech to fact. HADRIANVS. Non elicitur sola vi; probatur signis, causis, testibus, deinde voce. (It is not elicited by force alone; it is proved by signs, circumstances, witnesses, and only then by voice.) +> Speech under coercion is last support, not first foundation. Peirce would enjoy the semiotic hierarchy, though not the institution. An index is not a conclusion. It points by contiguity, trace, or causal relation, but it still requires interpretation. Cicero would translate that into forensic prudence: indicia move suspicion; they do not convict by themselves. Grice adds: and if the final “utterance” is produced by pain, we must ask whether the utterer means that p, or whether the tormentor merely means him to produce p-shaped words. So the dry Speranzian formula: Hadrian does not abolish torture. He merely tries to prevent the quaestio from becoming a machine in which suspicion enters at one end and confession comes out the other, labelled evidence. Which is back to Grice's torture: "Suppose a prisoner of war to be THOUGHT by his captors to possess some INFORMATION [p] which they want him to reveal; he KNOWS that they want him to give this information. They subject him to torture by applying thumbscrews. " Almost what he later treats as 'perhaps a special ritual case, confession" when we have a mother, a broken window and a child -- Eric Trump recalls on Ivana Trump's funeral that the idea was typical of an Eastern Europoean: Ivanka would convince Ivana that Eric had done the thing, and he was being spanked by Ivana, he was called a 'liar'!"--by titling the thing 'confession' for the mother-child scenario Grice is, like he does with the POW-restricting the conditions to his area of interest, in this case, p [child broke window] is uncontested. Take 'confessio' as label out and just provide indicia and suspectio and she would have to torture! Cheers! Thanks -- Grice had boy son and girl daughter, so scenario alla Trump where daughter did break the window but blames son for it is possible. Thanks ("He didn't confess." G: "Your use of ~ is confusing: Do you mean it is not the case that he did it -- for how can you confess that not p--or what? What if he just didn't know? Or never saw his sister breaking window? Thanks -- "Confession (SOME CASES -- others not -- others not even 'confessio'): It's not good denyying: you broke the window, didn't you. Yes I did. Here the child, Grice says, KNOWS that his mother ALREADY THINKS [not knows] that he broke the window. What she wants is that he should say that he did. Grice's problem: "perhaps the meaning-intended effect is that the mothershould think the child willing to SAY THAT he did (what does 'say' mean here -- how should it be explicated?); or that the mother should think the child willing NOT to pretend that he did NOT break the window [disclose] (not to say things or perform acts intended to indluce the belief that the child DID NOT [emphasis Grice's] break the window. And we shouldn't be too concerned: "Confession is hardly conversational and perhaps a SOPHISTICATED *AND* ritual case -- witness S. and H. and the Holy Inquisitio. Etc. Thanks Yes. Grice’s “confession” label is deliberately fenced off: some cases, not all cases, and certainly not every forensic or theological use of confessio. In his mother-child example the interesting feature is that p is already treated as settled enough for the mother’s practical purpose. The child knows that the mother already thinks he broke the window. What she wants is not discovery but acknowledgment, or perhaps the cessation of a pretence. That is why Grice immediately hesitates over “say”: the intended effect may be that the mother think the child willing to say that p, or willing not to continue acting so as to induce belief in not-p. Confession there is a ritual of owning-up, not an information-transfer. The POW torture case is structurally different. The captors are only said to think the prisoner has information they want. They do not want confession in the mother’s sense; they want retrieval. The thumbscrews mean the captive to tell; they do not mean that p. The intended response is induced by pain, and the recognition of the torturer’s intention is not the right sort of reason for producing the response. It is awareness of coercion. That is why Grice’s tobacco counterexample matters: in the regular-tobacconist case the money is a communicative device because recognition of the act’s intended role is part of the reason for handing over the cigarettes; in the torture case the instrument is an inducement, not a non-natural utterance with a proposition. Hadrian and Sennius Sabinus sit awkwardly between these. Roman quaestio wants the slave’s utterance to count as confessio, but the legal scenario is not mother-child ritual. It is also not the clean POW case, because there are supposed to be indicia and suspicio before torment. So the procedure pretends to be open enough for p, not-p, “I do not know,” or “your indicia are misread” to matter. If only p can count, then “confessio” is merely the expected answer dressed as evidence. A compact version: SABINVS. Indicia adsunt; servus quaerendus est. (The indications are present; the slave must be examined.) +> The case is serious enough to seek the missing utterance. HADRIANVS. Quaerendus, non iam confitendus. (Examined, not already made to confess.) +> The answer must not be pre-written by the question. SABINVS. Si negat? (If he denies it?) +> Denial may be treated as obstruction rather than evidence. HADRIANVS. Tum indicia audienda sunt, non dolor solus. (Then the indications must be heard, not pain alone.) +> A denial can weaken suspicion if the procedure is genuinely evidential. SABINVS. Si nihil scit? (If he knows nothing?) +> The process must allow ignorance, not merely guilt or concealment. HADRIANVS. Nihil quoque responsum est, nisi tormenta aliud fingant. (Nothing too is an answer, unless torture invents another.) +> Coercion can manufacture content where none exists. This is where your Trump-family style anecdote, stripped of personalities and kept as type, is useful: sister breaks the window, brother is accused, mother already has her theory, and “confession” becomes the name for the answer that fits the maternal script. “He did not confess” is then dangerously ambiguous. It may mean: he did not acknowledge what he did. But it may also mean: he did not supply the answer we had already decided was due. Grice’s worry is exactly there. PATER. Non confessus est. (He did not confess.) +> The required acknowledgment was not produced. GRICE. Hoc ‘non’ est lubricum. (This ‘not’ is slippery.) +> Failure to confess is not proof that p, nor proof that not-p. PATER. Ergo non fregit? (Then he did not break it?) +> You are treating absence of confession as exoneration. GRICE. Vel fregit et tacuit, vel non fregit, vel nescivit quid soror fecisset. (Either he broke it and kept silent, or he did not break it, or he did not know what his sister had done.) +> The space of alternatives is larger than the ritual category “confession” allows. And yes: “confess that not-p” is possible only in marked contexts, where not-p is itself the embarrassing or demanded admission. Normally confessio leans toward p as the charge. The open forensic form is not confiteri but interrogari: fecistine an non fecisti? (Did you do it or did you not?) But once one says confessus est se fecisse, the grammar has already tilted toward p. Confession is not a neutral interrogative operator. It is a ritualised speech-act of acknowledgment, often after denial, shame, accusation, pressure, or authority. So the dry Speranzian formula is: Grice calls the mother-child case “confession” only after carefully arranging that the mother already has p in hand. Remove that arrangement and the window becomes a court. Add torture and the court becomes a machine for making the child, slave, or captive say what the question has already decided to hear. And in fact, in the S./H. case, torture may not be in the offing. If the slave confesses VOLUNTARILY -- he volunteers that p, S. would be MORE than happy, as would H.? Why are confessio and tomentum conceptually linked when they may not? Thanks Yes. In the S./Hadrian case, torture need not be in the offing at every point. Confessio and tormenta are conceptually linked in the Roman procedural discussion because tormenta are one possible, and especially problematic, route to obtaining confessio from a servus; they are not analytically linked. A voluntary confession is perfectly intelligible, and both Sabinus and Hadrian would treat it very differently from an extorted one, though still within the social suspicion attached to slaves. The link is forensic, not lexical. Confessio can be voluntary acknowledgment: confiteri, confessus est, confessio. Tormenta enter when the court or magistrate distrusts silence, denial, loyalty, fear, or concealment, and wants to compel the utterance that procedure calls “confession.” So the conceptual trouble is this: once the institution expects confessio, torture becomes the ugly instrument by which the expected answer may be produced. But if the slave volunteers p before pressure, the question changes from “may we torture to obtain p?” to “what weight does this volunteered p have?” A compact reconstruction: SABINVS. Servus ultro confessus est. (The slave confessed voluntarily.) +> The utterance was not produced by torment. HADRIANVS. Ergo tormenta cessent. (Then let torture cease.) +> Coercion is not needed where acknowledgment has already been given. SABINVS. Confessio sola sufficit? (Does confession alone suffice?) +> Even voluntary speech still raises evidential questions. HADRIANVS. Sufficit minus quam probatio, plus quam rumor. (It is less than proof, more than rumour.) +> Voluntary confession has weight, but it is not magically identical with truth. SABINVS. At servus domino favere potest. (But the slave may favour his master.) +> Status and loyalty may bias even uncoerced speech. HADRIANVS. Ideo indicia quaeruntur, non quia vox nulla est, sed quia sola nimis est. (That is why indications are sought: not because the voice is nothing, but because alone it is too much.) +> The court needs supporting signs because any single voice, especially a subordinated one, is procedurally dangerous. So confessio and tormentum are linked because Roman law is worried about a particular evidential sequence: suspicion, signs, interrogation, perhaps torture, confession, judgment. But a confession can occur without torture, just as a question can occur without thumbscrews. What Hadrian’s rule tries to regulate is the dangerous case where the confession is missing and the magistrate is tempted to make pain supply it. Grice’s point remains parallel. In the torture example, the thumbscrews are not an assertion and do not “mean that” the captive is to tell; they are an inducement meant to make him tell. If the captive freely volunteers the information, then we are no longer analysing the thumbscrews as the supposed communicative act. We are analysing the captive’s own utterance. That utterance may be true, false, sincere, strategic, loyal, fearful, or confused; but it is at least closer to the ordinary field of speaker-meaning than the sound produced under torment. Dry Speranzian formula: confessio and tormenta are not married; Rome merely kept introducing them. Voluntary confession is speech with its own dangers. Extorted confession is speech with a torturer standing inside the grammar.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sentio – Ossia: Grice e Sentio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sentio Denarius of Lucius Sentius, 101 BC. On the obverse is the head of Roma, while the reverse depicts Jupiter driving a quadriga. The gens Sentia was a plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in history toward the end of the Republic. The first of the Sentii to obtain the consulship was Gaius Sentius Saturninus, in 19 BC.[1]  Origin The origin of the nomen Sentius is uncertain, but it might be derived from the Latin sentus, thorny. Chase classifies it among those gentilicia that either originated at Rome, or cannot be shown to have come from anywhere else.[2] Syme prefers an Etruscan origin, noting that the name seems abundant at Clusium. However, the Sentii Saturnini of the late Republic were from Atina in southern Latium.[3]  Praenomina The main praenomina used by the Sentii were Gaius, Gnaeus, and Lucius, all of which were very common throughout Roman history. Other names attested from inscriptions include Quintus and Sextus.  Branches and cognomina The most important family of the Sentii bore the cognomen Saturninus, which occurs on coins. Other coins of this gens include no surnames.[1] One of the more noteworthy Sentii of imperial times bore the surname Augurinus, an occupational cognomen probably indicating that he or one of his ancestors was an augur.[4]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Sentii Saturnini Gaius Sentius C. f., praetor urbanus in 94 BC, and governor of Macedonia from 93 to 87. He repelled an invasion of the Thracians under Sothinus, but was later driven back by Ariathes and Taxiles.[5][6][7][8][9][10][11] Lucius Sentius C. f., triumvir monetalis probably between 105 and 100 BC, was praetor in an uncertain year, between 93 and 89.[12][1][13][14] Gaius Sentius C. f. C. n. Saturninus, the father of Vetulo.[14] Gnaeus (Sentius C. f. C. n.) Saturninus,[i] served probably as quaestor or legate under Quintus Caecilius Metellus in Crete in 68 or 67 BC.[15][16] Gnaeus Sentius Cn. f. C. n. Saturninus, a young man addicted to luxury and privilege.[15][17][18][19] Sentia C. f. C. n., married Lucius Scribonius Libo, praetor urbanus in 80 BC, and was the mother of Scribonia, the wife of Augustus, and Lucius Scribonius Libo, consul in 34 BC.[20] Gaius Sentius C. f. C. n. Saturninus Vetulo, one of those proscribed by the triumvirs in 43 BC, escaped death by assuming the insignia of a praetor, and marching to Puteoli, where he boarded a ship for Sicily, and joined Sexus Pompeius. He went over to Octavian in 35.[21][22][23][24] Gaius Sentius C. f. C. n. Saturninus, supposed by some scholars to be the same as Vetulo, but more probably his son, was consul in 19 BC, and afterward governor of Africa and Syria. He was governor of Germania from around AD 3 to 6, and distinguished himself in the campaigns of Tiberius, for which he was awarded the triumphal ornaments.[25][26][27][28][29][30] Gaius Sentius C. f. C. n. Saturninus, consul in AD 4, the year in which the lex Aelia Sentia was passed.[31][32] Gnaeus Sentius C. f. C. n. Saturninus, consul suffectus in AD 4, was appointed governor of Syria in AD 19, and was forced to eject Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, the preceding governor, who refused to vacate his office.[31][33][32] Lucius Sentius C. f. C. n. Saturninus, the third son of Gaius Sentius Saturninus, attended the trial of Herod's sons in 6 BC, along with his father and brothers, Gaius and Gnaeus.[31][32] Gnaeus Sentius Cn. f. C. n. Saturninus, consul in AD 41, with the emperor Caligula, whose behaviour he denounced in a long speech before the senate following the emperor's assassination.[34][32] Gnaeus Sentius Cn. f. Saturninus, a native of Atina, was a scout serving in the eighth cohort of the Praetorian Guard, in the century of Severus. He was buried in a first century tomb at Rome, aged twenty-seven, having served for eight years.[35] Lucius Sentius L. f. Saturninus, a native of Mediolanum in Cisalpine Gaul, was a scout serving in the century of Lucius Cornelius Viator. He was buried at Rome, aged thirty-three, having served for thirteen years.[36] Gaius Sentius Saturninus, a veteran of the fourth legion, built a tomb at Stobi in Macedonia for himself, his wife, Gavia Julia, their son, Gaius Sentius Saturninus, and Sentia, the freedwoman of Zosimus.[37] Gaius Sentius C. f. Saturninus, the son of Gaius Sentius Saturninus and Gavia Julia, was a soldier in the fourth cohort of the Praetorian Guard. He was buried at Stobi in a tomb built by his father.[37] Sentia, the freedwoman of Zosimus, buried in a family sepulchre built at Stobi by Gaius Sentius Saturninus.[37] Sentia Saturnina, dedicated a tomb at Comum in Cisalpine Gaul to her husband, Gaius Catius Secundus.[38] Sentia Saturnina, buried at Naraggara in Africa Proconsularis, aged sixty-five, along with Decimus Gargilius Gargilianus, aged sixty-eight.[39] Quintus Sentius Saturninus, a man of equestrian rank, buried in an ornate tomb at Iufi in Africa Proconsularis.[40] Others Sentius Potitus, mentioned in a rescript of uncertain date.[41] Sentius, denounced and put to death during the reign of Nero. The senator Helvidius Priscus recalled him as one of the friends of Vespasian who had been destroyed by the delatores, along with Publius Clodius Thrasea Paetus and Quintus Marcius Barea Soranus.[42] Sextus Sentius Sex. f. Caecilianus, consul in AD 75 or 76, after a distinguished career, in which he had been decemvir stlitibus judicandis, military tribune with the eighth legion, plebeian aedile, praetor, governor of a senatorial province, legate of the fifteenth and third legions, and governor of Mauretania Tingitana.[43][41][44][45] Sentius Augurinus, a close friend and contemporary of Pliny the Younger, who described him as a skillful and eminent poet. He wrote short works in the style of Catullus and Gaius Licinius Macer Calvus. He might be the same person as the Quintus Gellius Sentius Augurinus, governor of Macedonia under Hadrian.[46][47][48] Sentius, a centurion who was sent as an envoy to Mebarsapes during Trajan's Parthian War, in AD 116. Mebarsapes imprisoned him at Adenystrae, but when Roman forces approached the city, Sentius led his fellow prisoners in a revolt, killing the Parthian commander, and opening the gates to the Romans.[49] Gnaeus Sentius Aburnianus, consul suffectus in AD 123.[50] Gaius Sentius Severus Quadratus, a man of senatorial rank, and an official of the imperial court at an uncertain period.[51] Sentia Sabina,[ii] a Roman matron from a senatorial family, named in an inscription from the late third or early fourth century.[52] Quintus Sentius Fabricius Julianus, twice proconsul of Africa, the second time from AD 412 to 414.[53][54] See also List of Roman gentes Notes  Klebs, following earlier authorities, identifies him as Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, and confounds him with his son.  Savina in the inscription. References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III. pp. 783, 784 ("Sentia Gens").  Chase, p. 131.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", p. 157.  Chase, p. 112.  Orosius, v. 18.  Plutarch, "The Life of Sulla", 11.  Cicero, In Verrem, iii. 93, In Pisonem, 34.  Livy, Epitome, 70.  Appian, Bella Mithridatica, 35, 41.  Broughton, vol. II, pp. 12, 15, 16 (note 5), 18, 22, 28, 35, 42, 43, 49; Supplement, p. 57.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 158, 159.  Eckhel, vol. v, p. 305.  Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 327–328.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 159, 160.  Cicero, Pro Plancio, 19.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 157–161.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, viii. 14. § 1.  Valerius Maximus, ix. i. § 8.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 157–159, 162.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 159, 161.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 77.  Appian, Bellum Civile, iv. 45, v. 139.  Valerius Maximus, vii. 3. § 9.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 159, 161, 162.  Velleius Paterculus, ii. 92, 103, 105, 109.  Cassius Dio, liv. 10, lv. 28.  Frontinus, De Aquaeductu, 10.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xvi. 10. § 8; 11 § 3; xvii. 1. § 1; 3. § 2; 5 § 2, Bellum Judaïcum, i. 27. § 2  Broughton, Supplement, p. 57.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 159, 161, 162, 165.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xvi. 11. § 3.  Syme, "Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", pp. 159, 165.  Tacitus, Annales, ii. 74, 79, 81, iii. 7.  Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae, xix. 2, Bellum Judaïcum, ii. 11.  CIL VI, 2722.  CIL VI, 3629.  AE 1934, 128.  CIL V, 5338.  CIL VIII, 16825  AE 1992, 1796.  PIR, vol. III, p. 199.  Tacitus, Historiae, iv. 7.  CIL IX, 4194.  Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", pp. 202, 219.  Spaul, "Governors of Tingitana", p. 238.  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, iv. 27, ix. 8.  CIL III, 586.  PIR, vol. II, p. 115.  Cassius Dio, lxviii. 22.  Eck and Pangerl, "Neue Diplome", pp. 287 ff.  CIL V, 5811.  CIL VI, 41291.  CIL VIII, 25837, CIL VIII, 25864.  PLRE, vol. 2, pp. 641–642. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Pisonem, In Verrem, Pro Plancio. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Marcus Velleius Paterculus, Compendium of Roman History. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Flavius Josephus, Antiquitates Judaïcae (Antiquities of the Jews); Bellum Judaïcum (The Jewish War). Sextus Julius Frontinus, De Aquaeductu (On Aqueducts). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Appianus Alexandrinus (Appian), Bella Mithridatica (The Mithridatic Wars), Bellum Civile (The Civil War). Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Cassius Dio), Roman History. Paulus Orosius, Historiarum Adversum Paganos (History Against the Pagans). Joseph Hilarius Eckhel, Doctrina Numorum Veterum (The Study of Ancient Coins, 1792–1798). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Ronald Syme, "The Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini", in Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, vol. 13, part 2, pp. 156–166 (April, 1964). Jones, A.H.M.; J.R. Martindale & J. Morris (1971–1992). Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07233-6. Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press (1974–2001). Paul A. Gallivan, "The Fasti for A.D. 70–96", in Classical Quarterly, vol. 31, pp. 186–220 (1981). J.E.H. Spaul, "Governors of Tingitana", in Antiquités Africains, vol. 30, pp. 235–260 (1994). Werner Eck and Andreas Pangerl, "Neue Diplome mit den Namen von Konsuln und Statthaltern", in Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, vol. 187, pp. 273–294 (2013). Categories: SentiiRoman gentes and what would be your first-best choice for a Grice-Speranza vignette for THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sentio – Ossia: Grice e Sentio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sentio For the Sentii, the first-best Grice-Speranza choice is Gaius Sentius Saturninus Vetulo, the proscribed man who escapes by assuming the insignia of a praetor and marching to Puteoli. It is much better than taking one of the later consuls or even Sentius Augurinus the poet, though Augurinus is tempting. Vetulo gives a perfect case of status as sign, costume as utterance, and survival by controlled uptake. The situation is splendidly Gricean. In 43 BC, under the proscriptions, Sentius Saturninus is marked for death. Instead of hiding as a private fugitive, he puts on the signs of public authority: the praetorian insignia. He does not merely wear clothes; he makes an institutional assertion without words. The lictor-like apparatus, the bearing, the march, the public form of magistracy all communicate: this man is not a hunted proscribed victim; he is a magistrate moving under office. The lie is semiotic, not necessarily verbal. He survives because others read the signs under the expected Roman code. A title writes itself: Grice e Sentio: insignia pro vita. Compact reconstructed scene: SENTIVS. Praetoris insignia sumamus. (Let us take up the insignia of a praetor.) +> Survival now depends on being read under office, not under proscription. SERVVS. Sed praetor non es. (But you are not a praetor.) +> The visible sign will not correspond to the legal fact. SENTIVS. Hodie satis est videri. (Today it is enough to seem so.) +> In a crisis, uptake can outrun truth. VIATOR. Quis illic cum fascibus venit? (Who is that coming with the fasces?) +> The observer is already processing signs of authority before asking for proof. SENTIVS. Magistratus transit; viam date. (A magistrate passes; make way.) +> Treat the insignia as institutionally valid and do not inspect the bearer too closely. VIATOR. Via patet. (The road is open.) +> The disguise has produced the intended response. SERVVS. Ergo non mentitus es? (Then you did not lie?) +> The servant asks whether successful sign-management counts as verbal falsehood. SENTIVS. Nihil dixi nisi iter. (I said nothing except the route.) +> The deception lies in arranged uptake, not in a spoken proposition. This is ideal for Grice because it separates natural sign, conventional sign, institutional sign, and speaker-meaning. Praetorian insignia are not natural signs of being a praetor; they are conventional-institutional signs. In ordinary circumstances, they work because costume, office, and public recognition correspond. Vetulo exploits that correspondence. He produces the sign-vehicle without the status it normally signals. The audience’s inference is rational under normal conditions and false in this one. That is why the manoeuvre works. It also connects beautifully with Accetto and dissimulation. Vetulo’s act is not honest dissimulation in Accetto’s high sense, perhaps; it is survival simulation. But it shows why the moral vocabulary of disguise is not enough. The act is deceptive, yet politically understandable under proscriptional terror. If the regime has turned names into death warrants, then a man may try to survive by making another sign-name visible. The cognomen Saturninus adds another layer but should not dominate. The family later produces serious imperial figures, including governors and consuls, but Vetulo is the best vignette because his entire episode turns on the momentary power of signs. A later consul merely holds office. Vetulo performs office without holding it, and the performance is good enough to save him until Puteoli and Sicily. Dry Speranzian formula: Sentius Saturninus did not escape by hiding who he was, but by appearing too officially to be questioned. In Rome, the fasces were not an argument; they were a grammar. Vetulo survived by declining death under one description and crossing Italy under another. Good! Let's have two variant -- yours and another -- to see if you agree that the +> may have variants. etc. Thanks A) SENTIVS. Praetoris insignia sumamus. (Let us take up the insignia of a praetor.) +> Survival now depends on being read under office, not under proscription. SERVVS. Sed praetor non es. (But you are not a praetor.) +> The visible sign will not correspond to the legal fact. SENTIVS. Hodie satis est videri. (Today it is enough to seem so.) +> In a crisis, uptake can outrun truth. VIATOR. Quis illic cum fascibus venit? (Who is that coming with the fasces?) +> The observer is already processing signs of authority before asking for proof. SENTIVS. Magistratus transit; viam date. (A magistrate passes; make way.) +> Treat the insignia as institutionally valid and do not inspect the bearer too closely. VIATOR. Via patet. (The road is open.) +> The disguise has produced the intended response. SERVVS. Ergo non mentitus es? (Then you did not lie?) +> The servant asks whether successful sign-management counts as verbal falsehood. SENTIVS. Nihil dixi nisi iter. (I said nothing except the route.) +> The deception lies in arranged uptake, not in a spoken proposition. B) SENTIVS. Praetoris insignia sumamus. (Let us take up the insignia of a praetor.) +> Survival now depends on being read under office, not under proscription. SERVVS. Sed praetor non es. (But you are not a praetor.) +> The visible sign will not correspond to the legal fact. SENTIVS. Hodie satis est videri. (Today it is enough to seem so.) +> In a crisis, uptake can outrun truth. VIATOR. Quis illic cum fascibus venit? (Who is that coming with the fasces?) +> The observer, I, is, or am, already processing signs of authority before asking for proof. SENTIVS. Magistratus transit; viam date. (A magistrate passes; make way.) +> Treat the insignia as institutionally valid and do not inspect the bearer too closely. VIATOR. Via patet. (The road is open.) +> The disguise has produced the intended response.[HERE IT IS WHERE SOME MODIFICATION MAY BE IN ORDER -- BUT THEN WE DON'T HAVE TO HAVE IMPLICATUM FOR EACH MOVE--The road is open +>Praetors always caeteris paribus have open way. SERVVS. Ergo non mentitus es? (Then you did not lie?) +> [abbrev.] Does sign-management count as falsehood. SENTIVS. Nihil dixi nisi iter. (I said nothing except the route.) +> The deception lies in arranged uptake, not in a spoken proposition. Magistracy passes, rather than Magistratus passit -- which WOULD be a lie. -- in any case, this may be post-factum moralising for the poor S. had to carry those fascies for the rest of his life, and in any case abandoned his domus, dulcis dulcis domus -- home, home, sweet sweet home – thanks Yes, I agree that the “+>” can and should vary. It is not a mechanical gloss; it is a reconstruction of what the utterer’s move is meant to make available in that position. So A is fine as a fuller explanatory version, while B is closer to the compact “verbali” style. I’d prefer B going forward, but with two adjustments. First, “Magistratus transit” is excellent because it avoids the direct falsehood “ego praetor sum.” It is an institutional description placed in the air: “a magistracy/magistrate passes.” The phrase lets the insignia do the lying, or at least the misleading, while the speaker preserves a sliver of deniability. “Magistratus passit” would not be right; “magistratus transit” works. If one wanted still more ambiguity: SENTIVS. Magistratus transit; viam date. (A magistrate passes; make way.) +> Treat this passage as official and do not inspect the man too closely. That is cleaner than “treat the insignia as institutionally valid,” because it stays nearer to the utterer’s intended practical effect. Second, for the viator’s “Via patet,” the implicature should indeed be narrower and speaker-based. Not “the disguise has produced the intended response,” which is narratorial. Better: VIATOR. Via patet. (The road is open.) +> Praetorian passage is to be allowed. Or, if you want the viator’s own uptake: VIATOR. Via patet. (The road is open.) +> This is official passage. Then the later analysis can say that the disguise succeeded. The +> line itself should stay as the propositional content recoverable from that move. A tightened variant would be: SENTIVS. Praetoris insignia sumamus. (Let us take up the insignia of a praetor.) +> Survival depends on being read under office, not under proscription. SERVVS. Sed praetor non es. (But you are not a praetor.) +> The visible sign will not correspond to the legal fact. SENTIVS. Hodie satis est videri. (Today it is enough to seem so.) +> Uptake may save where truth would kill. VIATOR. Quis illic cum fascibus venit? (Who is that coming with the fasces?) +> The signs of authority require classification before interference. SENTIVS. Magistratus transit; viam date. (A magistrate passes; make way.) +> This passage is official and should not be inspected. VIATOR. Via patet. (The road is open.) +> Praetorian passage is to be allowed. SERVVS. Ergo non mentitus es? (Then you did not lie?) +> Sign-management may not count as spoken falsehood. SENTIVS. Nihil dixi nisi iter. (I said nothing except the route.) +> The deception lies in arranged uptake, not in an asserted proposition. And yes, the post-factum moralising matters. Sentius may not have been conducting a seminar in semiotics while holding borrowed fasces; he was trying not to be killed. The later Grice/Speranza analysis is what lets us see the structure: not pure assertion, but performed status; not ordinary lying, but conventional signs arranged to make the wrong description operative. The cost remains real. He escaped death, but not into easy comedy: he abandoned house, name, ordinary passage, and sweet home. “Domus dulcis domus” is exactly the kind of thing one only quotes once one has lost it. Indeed! And this may be closer to Grice's "He was caught in the grip of a vice/vyse -- sin/carpenter's tool? Does Short Lewis also allow magistratus, -a, -um, and then the magistratus as abstract noun? Thanks -- it was a good move, even if he had to leave his home swee home, as we said -- and what about the S. poet -- even if Grice disliked metrics? Thanks The abstract noun for "magistracy" in Latin is magistrātus itself. [1, 2] In Latin, the word magistrātus is a 4th-declension masculine noun that functions as both the abstract concept and the concrete individual: [1, 2, 3] Abstract meaning: "Magistracy," "magisterial office," or "civil office". Concrete meaning: "A magistrate" or "public official". [1, 2, 3] Etymology and Structure The word was originally formed as an abstract noun by combining the root noun magister (master/chief) with the 4th-declension abstract suffix -ātus (which denotes a state, office, or official status). Over time, Roman writers began using the name of the office to also refer to the person holding it. [1, 2] Alternative Abstract Terms If you want to refer strictly to the status, power, or authority of a magistrate without using magistrātus, Latin literature frequently uses these closely related abstract nouns: imperium: The supreme executive power or command held by the highest magistrates (like consuls or praetors). potestās: The legal authority, power, or political office inherent to a magistrate's role. honōs (or honor): Literally meaning "honor," this abstract noun was the standard Roman term used to describe a public office or magistracy (hence the phrase cursus honōrum, the ladder of offices). [1, 2] Are you translating a specific phrase into Latin, or would you like to see how magistrātus changes its forms in a full 4th-declension grammar table? Yes — that Gricean “vice/vise” comparison is very apt. It is a case where a single sound-form invites two routes: moral grip and carpenter’s tool. “Caught in the grip of a vice” can be heard as sin holding one, or a vise holding one, and the interest lies in how context selects the intended construal. Vetulo’s “magistratus transit” works similarly, though institutionally rather than lexically: the form on display lets the hearer take an office-bearing passage where the legal fact is false. The fasces are the visible “vise” gripping uptake. On magistratus: the noun magistratus, -us is fourth declension and covers both the abstract “magistracy, office, authority” and the concrete “magistrate.” There is not normally a separate adjective magistratus, -a, -um doing the work here in classical prose; if you see magistratus as a form, it is usually the noun or participial-looking by history, not a productive adjective meaning “magisterial.” So in our line: SENTIVS. Magistratus transit; viam date. (A magistrate / the magistracy passes; make way.) +> This passage is official and should not be inspected. The beauty is that magistratus can hover between office and office-holder. If the passer-by says ego praetor sum, he lies directly. If he says magistratus transit, the visible insignia and the abstract-concrete ambiguity do the work. “Office is passing” is almost true enough in theatrical Rome, because what is passing is the performance of office. That is why the move is good even if costly. He saves himself by allowing an institution to be mistaken for its bearer. Sentius then pays for the trick by exile of another sort: survival away from domus dulcis domus. The fasces are not merely props; once he has made his life depend on them, he carries their implicature for the rest of the journey.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sentio – Ossia: Grice e Sentio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sentio As for Sentius Augurinus the poet: he is the attractive second choice. Pliny the Younger praises him as a polished writer of short poems in the Catullan-Calvan manner. Grice may dislike metrics, but that need not stop Speranza. Augurinus is useful because his name itself is already interpretive: augur-inus, the little or derived augur, whether by family occupation or cognomen. A poet named Augurinus writing elegant trifles is almost too good: he produces small verbal birds and waits to see what the audience takes as omen. A compact vignette: PLINIVS. Augurine, versus tui leves sunt, sed non inanes. (Augurinus, your verses are light, but not empty.) +> Your poems look like trifles but carry cultivated point. AVGVRINVS. Si leves sunt, facilius volant. (If they are light, they fly more easily.) +> Brevity and lightness help circulation. PLINIVS. Et quid significant dum volant? (And what do they signify while they fly?) +> A poem’s social meaning lies in uptake, not only in metrical form. AVGVRINVS. Quod lector augurari potest. (What the reader can augur.) +> The reader supplies the omen-like implicature from the poem’s small signs. Grice would not need to scan the metre. He could let Pliny do that. The Gricean issue is how a short poem, like a social gesture, invites an educated reader to recover more than it states. With Vetulo, the signs of office are used to escape death. With Augurinus, signs become literary omens. One Sentius survives by being misread as a magistrate; the other survives because Pliny reads him well. Dry Speranzian formula: Vetulo makes office pass where no office is; Augurinus makes verses fly where no bird is. In both cases, the question is not what is physically present, but what the competent Roman is prepared to take it as meaning. Pliny -- a bit conceited? He misremembers a few rather poor lines that treat him as tantus vir? Thanks Tutti Immagini Video Notizie Maps Shopping Libri Voli Finanza 8 siti Yes, the poetry of Sentius Augurinus survivesexclusively because Pliny the Younger preserved it in one of his letters. Wikipedia However, there is a famous and ironic literary twist regarding a single specific line. The Missing "Second Verse" In Letters 4.27, written to Pompeius Falco, Pliny highly praises the short poems (poematia) of his friend Sentius Augurinus. He writes out a poem that Augurinus composed in Pliny's honor. Oxford Research Encyclopedias +2 But in the text of the letter, Pliny notes a gap in his own memory: "I will enable you to act the critic of my criticism if I can recall the second line of the piece. I remember the others, [except this one]..." romanletters.org +1 Because Pliny openly admitted that he forgot the second verse (secundus uersus) of the poem while writing to Falco, that specific line is lost to history. What Does Survive? The rest of the poem (eight lines total) does subsistand can still be read today within Pliny's correspondence. Written in hendecasyllabic meter (in the witty style of Catullus), the surviving text reads: I occasionally write trifles in verse; [Line 2: Lost / Forgotten by Pliny] How Catullus, how Calvus did it of old! But what do I care? Pliny alone is my model. He leaves the courtroom and the serious assembly, To show us that he, too, knows how to play. He writes verses, he loves, and he seeks our praise, And why shouldn't a great mind seek a little fun? Cambridge University Press & Assessment If you want, I can: Provide the original Latin text of the surviving lines Share Pliny's full letter detailing his praise for Augurinus's work Explore other lost poets known only through Pliny's letters L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte 1 sito Here is the original Latin text from Pliny's Letters(4.27), including his note about the missing line. Pliny's Note on the Missing Line "Faceremque te uersus mei textoris iudicem, si meminisset secundum uersum, quem ego, dum quaero, oblitus sum." (I would make you the judge of my weaver of verses, if he had remembered the second line, which I, while looking for it, forgot.) The Surviving Poem Bozza Canto carmina uersibus minutis, [Versus Secundus Deest] ut olim Catullus uocitat Caluusque. Sed quid ad me? Unus Plinius est mihi. Ille forum et graues deponit curas, ut et ipse ludere sciat, scribit carmina, amat, et laudari quaerit, et cur non tantus uir parua petat? If you want, I can: Break down the grammatical structure of a specific line Provide the exact text of the rest of Pliny's letter to Falco Compare Augurinus's style to Catullus's original meters 24 siti Here is the line-by-line grammatical parsing of Sentius Augurinus's surviving poem, focusing on the core structure and case usage. Line 1: Canto carmina uersibus minutis Canto: Verb; 1st-person singular, present active indicative. "I sing" or "I write". carmina: Noun; accusative neuter plural of carmen. Direct object of canto. "Songs" or "poems". uersibus: Noun; ablative masculine plural of uersus. Ablative of means/instrument. "With/in verses". minutis: Adjective; ablative masculine plural of minutus (from minuere). Modifies uersibus. "Small", "petty", or "trifling". Line 3: ut olim Catullus uocitat Caluusque ut: Conjunction. "As" or "just like". olim: Adverb. "Once", "of old", or "formerly". Catullus: Noun; nominative masculine singular. Proper noun; subject of uocitat. uocitat: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active indicative of uocitare (frequentative of uocare). "Is or was calling/doing repeatedly". Note: Often emended in manuscripts to related verbs like "uolitant" (fly about) or "faciebat" (did). Caluusque: Proper noun (Caluus) in the nominative masculine singular + enclitic conjunction (-que, meaning "and"). Gaius Licinius Calvus, another famous Roman neoteric poet. Line 4: Sed quid ad me? Unus Plinius est mihi. Sed: Conjunction. "But". quid: Interrogative pronoun; nominative neuter singular. "What". ad: Preposition taking the accusative. "To" or "with respect to". me: Personal pronoun; accusative singular of ego. Object of ad. Unus: Adjective/Numeral; nominative masculine singular. Modifies Plinius. "Pliny alone" or "only Pliny". Plinius: Proper noun; nominative masculine singular. Subject of est. est: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active indicative of esse. "Is". mihi: Personal pronoun; dative singular of ego. Dative of reference or possession. "To me" or "mine". Line 5: Ille forum et graues deponit curas Ille: Demonstrative pronoun; nominative masculine singular. Subject of deponit, referring back to Pliny. "He" or "That man". forum: Noun; accusative neuter singular of forum. Direct object of deponit. "The forum" (the law courts). et: Conjunction. "And". graues: Adjective; accusative feminine plural of grauis. Modifies curas. "Heavy", "serious", or "weighty". deponit: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active indicative of deponere. "Lays aside" or "puts down". curas: Noun; accusative feminine plural of cura. Second direct object of deponit. "Cares" or "concerns". Line 6: ut et ipse ludere sciat ut: Conjunction introducing a purpose or result clause. "So that" or "in order that". et: Adverbial here. "Even" or "also". ipse: Intensive pronoun; nominative masculine singular. "He himself". ludere: Verb; present active infinitive of ludere. Complementary infinitive dependent on sciat. "To play" or "to write light verse". sciat: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active subjunctive of scire. Subjunctive required by ut. "He may know how". Line 7: scribit carmina, amat, et laudari quaerit scribit: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active indicative of scribere. "He writes". carmina: Noun; accusative neuter plural. Direct object of scribit. "Poems". amat: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active indicative of amare. "He loves". et: Conjunction. "And". laudari: Verb; present passive infinitive of laudare. Objective infinitive completing quaerit. "To be praised". quaerit: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active indicative of quaerere. "He seeks" or "strives". Line 8: et cur non tantus uir parua petat? et: Conjunction. "And". cur: Interrogative adverb. "Why". non: Adverb. "Not". tantus: Adjective; nominative masculine singular. Modifies uir. "So great" or "such a great". uir: Noun; nominative masculine singular. Subject of petat. "Man". parua: Noun/Substantive adjective; accusative neuter plural of paruus. Direct object of petat. "Small things" or "trifles". petat: Verb; 3rd-person singular, present active subjunctive of petere. Deliberative subjunctive in a question. "Should seek" or "would strive for". If you want, I can: Explain the Catullan hendecasyllabic meter used in this poem Parse Pliny's introductory sentence about forgetting the second line Discuss how "ludere" specifically functions as a technical literary term for light poetry The poem by Sentius Augurinus, as quoted in Pliny's Letters 4.27, consists of lines that playfully contrast the poet's light verse with the serious, public life of his contemporary, Pliny the Younger. This brief, eight-line work highlights a shared interest in trivial, elegant poetry similar to that of Catullus and Calvus. You can also: View the surrounding prose commentary in Latin and English Learn more about the poetic influences of Calvus and Catullus on later Roman writers 5 siti The poem by Sentius Augurinus, as quoted by Pliny in Letters 4.27, consists of seven extant lines, with the second line missing from the original source. This piece playfully compares the author to classical poets like Catullus and Calvus, while humorously elevating Pliny above them for choosing light poetry over legal work. The full Latin text and English translation, featuring a missed line, can be found in the provided source. Pliny the Younger to Pompeius Falco (c. 104 AD) | Roman Letters Vale. English Translation Published English. To Pompeius Falco. This is the third day that I have been attending the recitals of Sentius Augurinus, which I have... romanletters.org Pliny the Younger to Pompeius Falco (c. 104 AD) | Roman Letters Poematia appellat. Multa tenuiter multa sublimiter, multa venuste multa tenere, multa dulciter multa cum bile. Aliquot annis puto nihil generis eiusdem absoluti... Yes — Pliny is a little conceited here, and the conceit is part of the evidence. He preserves Augurinus because Augurinus preserves Pliny. The poem survives not because it is an independent monument of Latin lyric genius, but because it says, in effect, “Pliny is my Catullus, my Calvus, my model, and even so great a man may seek small pleasures.” Pliny’s forgetfulness of the second line only makes the comedy better: he remembers enough to transmit the compliment, but not enough to make himself look entirely disinterested. A compact Grice/Speranza treatment would be: PLINIVS. Poematia Augurini placent; unum paene totum memoria teneo. (Augurinus’ little poems please me; I remember one almost entirely.) +> The poem is worth preserving, especially where it praises me. FALCO. Paene? (Almost?) +> The missing line may matter more than the preserved praise. PLINIVS. Secundus versus excidit; ceteri satis dicunt. (The second line has slipped away; the others say enough.) +> The loss is tolerable because the surviving lines still carry the compliment. AVGVRINVS. Unus Plinius est mihi. (Pliny alone is mine.) +> Pliny is being made the privileged literary model. PLINIVS. Nimis fortasse, sed non invitus lego. (Too much perhaps, but I do not read unwillingly.) +> The praise is excessive, but I am not disposed to suppress it. FALCO. Tantus vir parva petit? (So great a man seeks small things?) +> The poem flatters Pliny by making his taste for trifles a sign of largeness, not vanity. PLINIVS. Etiam magna ingenia ludere sciunt. (Even great minds know how to play.) +> My light verse and my wish to be praised are compatible with dignity. The Gricean point is that Augurinus’ poem is not merely about Pliny’s poetic play; it is a social act inside a circle of mutual recognition. The line “unus Plinius est mihi” does not just assert preference. It performs affiliation. It tells Pliny that his light verse is not a lapse from forensic seriousness but a model for elegant leisure. Pliny, by quoting it, repeats the compliment under the cover of criticism. He invites Falco to judge Augurinus, but he also makes Falco witness the praise of Pliny. The lost second line is therefore almost too fitting. The poem is fragmentary because Pliny’s memory is selective, and his memory selects well enough for Pliny. Speranza would not need to accuse him of bad faith. It is enough to observe that literary survival often follows vanity’s filing system. Augurinus’ own poetic value is transmitted through the very line of patronal compliment that makes Pliny want to transmit him. Dry Speranzian formula: Augurinus wrote small verses; Pliny preserved the small verses that made Pliny large. The missing second line is a loss to literature, perhaps; the surviving praise was not allowed to suffer the same fate. and does the thing has metre? In which case Pliny's memory is not Lockean -- Grice misremembers a Hamlet line: "The lady doth protest too much, methinks" as "Methinks the lady doth" -- and Donne's poem "From the four corners of the earth" but the second has METRE and rhyme -- in S.'s case we may only have METRE? Thanks Yes — the Augurinus piece has metre. It is in hendecasyllables, the Catullan light-verse metre Pliny explicitly associates with that world of poematia. So Pliny is not merely remembering “content”; he is remembering metrical form, and the missing second line is more embarrassing because the metre ought to have helped him. It is not quite Lockean memory as bare preservation of an idea; it is memory under form, where rhythm supplies a retrieval frame and still fails. The poem is not rhyme-based in the English sense. Latin quantitative verse depends on long and short syllables, not end-rhyme. So unlike Donne, where metre and rhyme can help carry and recall the line, Augurinus gives us metre without rhyme. That makes Pliny’s lapse more interesting. He has the Catullan frame, but the second verse still drops out. The form survives enough for him to know a line is missing, but not enough to restore it. This is why the comparison is good: Hamlet misremembered: “The lady doth protest too much, methinks” becomes “Methinks the lady doth...” The order shifts, but the line’s proverbial force survives. Memory keeps the social tag more than the exact dramatic syntax. Donne: “At the round earth’s imagined corners...” or the remembered “From the four corners of the earth.” Here metre, rhyme, and devotional momentum assist recall, even when the literal phrase becomes philosophically odd enough for Austin to use Nowell-Smith as the straight man. Augurinus: hendecasyllabic light verse, no rhyme, with Pliny preserving the praise but losing line two. The metre marks the absence rather than repairing it. So Speranza’s dry formulation might be: PLINIVS. Secundum versum non teneo. (I do not retain the second verse.) +> The metre has preserved the place of the loss, not the lost line. FALCO. At Catullianus erat. (But it was Catullan.) +> The form ought to have assisted memory. PLINIVS. Etiam numeri obliviscuntur. (Even metres forget.) +> Formal structure is not enough to guarantee verbal survival. AVGVRINVS. Unus Plinius est mihi. (Pliny alone is mine.) +> The remembered compliment has survived better than the forgotten verse. FALCO. Ergo memoria tua metrum sequitur, laudem retinet. (So your memory follows the metre but retains the praise.) +> Pliny’s recollection is not disinterested. The Gricean point is that metrical form contributes to uptake and retention, but does not fix meaning or memory by itself. A line can be known to be missing because the form demands a line there. That is almost a formal implicature of absence: the poem’s structure says, “something belongs here,” while Pliny cannot supply what. In Augurinus’s case, then, we have metre without rhyme, praise without full text, and memory whose most reliable survival is the bit flattering Pliny. Dry enough, and very Plinian. and can we parse the quotation [poem quoted] with vowel quantity? Thanks Yes. The quoted Augurinus piece is generally treated as Catullan hendecasyllabic verse, so we can scan it by the hendecasyllable pattern: – u u – u – u – u – – That is: long, short, short, long, short, long, short, long, short, long, long. The text is a little awkward because line 2 is missing, and some transmitted wording is uncertain in the versions circulating online. But for the familiar preserved lines, the metrical idea is clear: Pliny remembers the praise well enough, but not the whole poem. A working scansion with marked quantities: Cántō cármina vérsibus minūtīs – u u – u – u – u – – “I sing poems in little/trifling verses.” Here Cántō fills the opening long + two shorts by resolution-like treatment only if the text is handled carefully; some editors/quotations differ, so this line should be checked against a critical text. The important point is the Catullan hendecasyllabic frame. [versus secundus deest] “the second verse is missing.” ut ólim Catúllus aut Calvus – u u – u – u – u – – “as once Catullus or Calvus did.” Again, the exact transmitted Latin matters. If the wording is “ut olim Catullus aut Calvus” or a close variant, it is being shaped to the Catullan metre and the old neoteric model. sed quid ad mé? Unus Plínius est mihi This is often where online quotation becomes metrically suspicious. A stricter hendecasyllabic form would require the line to be divided or transmitted in a form that scans. The phrase “Unus Plinius est mihi” is the remembered critical point, not necessarily a whole metrical line as modern snippets present it. The safer Grice/Speranza note is therefore: the poem is hendecasyllabic in intention and literary type, but online reconstructions of the exact lineation are not always metrically reliable. Pliny’s letter should be checked in a critical Latin text before fixing every quantity. The best-known surviving sense is something like: ille fórum grávesque cúras – u u – u – u – u – – “He lays aside the forum and serious cares” ut ipse lúdere scíat This too is too short as printed if treated as a standalone hendecasyllable, so it may belong to a longer line in the actual text or be mislineated in the summary form. scribit cármina, ámat, laudárī quaerit Likewise, the idea is metrically Catullan, but the snippet line needs critical control before one prints a formal scansion. et cūr nōn tantus vir párva petat? Again, strong as a sentiment, but not safely scannable in the simplified online lineation. So the honest answer is: yes, the poem has metre, and the metre is hendecasyllabic; but I would not certify the vowel quantities of the whole quoted version from the snippet form, because the lineation and wording appear corrupted or paraphrastic in places. The secure philological move is to consult Pliny, Epistulae 4.27 in a critical text, then scan line by line. For a Grice/Speranza formulation: PLINIVS. Secundum versum excidit. (The second verse has slipped away.) +> The metre preserved the vacancy, not the occupant. FALCO. At hendecasyllabi erant. (But they were hendecasyllables.) +> The metrical frame should have helped memory. PLINIVS. Etiam numeri laudationem servant prius quam verba. (Even metres preserve praise before words.) +> What survived most reliably was the compliment to Pliny. Dry enough: Pliny’s memory is not Lockean recollection of an idea, nor Donnean rhyme-assisted retrieval. It is metrical vanity with a missing line. Although perhaps alla Grice we may reconstruct something like Pliny pretending to remember and then realising he does not and he is caught in the grip of it -- so he goes Dum DOOM DOOM dum dum -- etc -- i. e. the second line to fit the scheme of brevis (dum) and long (DOOM)? Thanks Yes. One can imagine Pliny caught in the grip of the metre: not remembering the line, but remembering the slot in which the line must have stood. That is the comic philology of it. The metrical scheme survives as a kind of empty form, a little ghost of quantity: DUM-da-da-DUM-da-DUM-da-DUM-da-DUM-DUM, if one allows nursery percussion to impersonate hendecasyllables. For the Phalaecian hendecasyllable, the usual scheme is: – – – u u – u – u – – with the opening sometimes described with variation in the first positions, but the Catullan feel is unmistakable: a strong opening, then the choriambic run, then the clipped close. In a comic oral approximation one might give: DOOM DOOM DOOM dum dum DOOM dum DOOM dum DOOM DOOM or, if Pliny is half-remembering: PLINIVS. Secundus versus... DOOM DOOM DOOM dum dum DOOM dum DOOM dum DOOM DOOM... fugit. (The second verse... DOOM DOOM DOOM da da DOOM da DOOM da DOOM DOOM... has fled.) +> I remember the metrical place of the line better than the line itself. FALCO. Ergo numerum tenes, verba amisisti. (So you keep the rhythm and have lost the words.) +> Your memory preserves form without content. PLINIVS. Non verba amisi omnia. “Unus Plinius est mihi” manet. (I have not lost all the words. “Pliny alone is mine” remains.) +> The compliment to me has survived the general wreck of memory. FALCO. Versus secundus periit; laus prima mansit. (The second verse perished; the praise remained first.) +> Your memory is not impartial. PLINIVS. Memoria quoque ordinem habet. (Memory too has its order.) +> What flatters the rememberer receives priority. This is quite Gricean, because the missing line is not simply absent. It is recoverably absent. Pliny knows that something belongs there because the poem’s form and his own recollection of the surrounding lines generate a place-holder. The metre is, so to speak, an implicature of vacancy: “there was a line here, and it had this shape, but I cannot supply its words.” That also explains why this differs from misquoting Hamlet or Donne. In the Hamlet case, the remembered social tag survives, even with word order distorted. In Donne, rhyme and rhythm help the line become memorable, and Austin can exploit the remembered oddity against Nowell-Smith. In Augurinus, Pliny’s memory preserves metrical expectancy and the self-flattering lines, while the actual second line drops out. He is not Lockeanly retaining a full idea; he is metrically haunted. Dry Speranzian formula: Pliny forgets the line but not the metre, and forgets least where Pliny is praised. The verse is gone; the vacancy scans. Well, if it's good for Pliny and Grice it's good for Garfunkel and Simon -- apparently when they presented the song to the recording studio -- they went dee-dee -- Garfunkel added otiosely: "We still neeed lyrics for the intro." WIth recording abruptly stopping him: "You give us enough nonsense when you try content, so keep the form -- like S. Augurinus." Thanks Intro] Dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee Doo doo doo doo doo doo doo doo doo Dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee dee [Chorus] And here's to you, Mrs. Robinson Jesus loves you more than you will know Woah, woah, woah God bless you please, Mrs. Robinson Heaven holds a place for those who pray Hey, hey, hey Hey, hey, hey Yes — perfect Simon-and-Garfunkel material, with one caveat: the lyric excerpt itself is copyrighted, so I can’t reproduce or continue the words beyond what you supplied. But the Grice/Speranza point works beautifully without needing the protected text. The joke is that “dee-dee” is not yet nonsense if it preserves the place of future meaning. Like Pliny’s missing hendecasyllable, the form knows something the words have not yet supplied. Garfunkel’s alleged “we still need lyrics for the intro” is almost too Plinian: he notices the vacancy. The producer’s reply, in your reconstruction, is the anti-Pliny move: keep the vacancy; the nonsense is doing better work than content would. So the “dee-dee” is not failed language but successful pre-language, or better, successful anti-lexical vocable. A compact Speranzian formulation: PLINIVS. Secundus versus deest. (The second verse is missing.) +> The metrical place survives without the words. GARFUNKEL. Verba principio desunt. (The intro still lacks words.) +> The melodic place is waiting for lexical filling. PRODVCER. Nihil deest: forma iam cantat. (Nothing is missing: the form already sings.) +> The vocables are sufficient because their function is musical and recognisable, not propositional. GRICE. Ergo non est silentium, sed locus sine sententia. (So it is not silence, but a place without a proposition.) +> Meaning may be carried by form, timing, and uptake before lexical content arrives. The parallel is sharp: Pliny remembers the metrical vacancy but loses the line. Simon and Garfunkel keep the vocable vacancy because it works better than a line. Augurinus loses content inside form. The pop intro preserves form against content. In Gricean terms, “dee-dee” does not mean that p, but it plainly means something in use: it signals entry, mood, recognisable song-shape, perhaps playful sociability, perhaps “this is the hook before the hook.” It is not assertion; it is musical protrepsis. It tells the listener how to enter the song without telling the listener anything that could be contradicted. Dry Speranzian close: Pliny forgot the words and kept the metre; the studio kept the non-words and got the record. Literature calls the first a lacuna. Pop calls the second an intro. and can you IMAGINE some verbal output -- had the producer NOT acted wisely? It would surely be SO LOADED! that's why we could have Pliny with his doom da -- and Falco saying -- I liked the flowing of the second verse -- whose CONTENT deest, not FORMA -- best. Thanks Yes — one can imagine a disastrous “contented” intro very easily: it would over-explain, over-symbolise, and ruin the air of effortless vacancy. That is just why the producer’s imaginary wisdom matters. A vocable like “dee-dee” does not fail to say; it refuses to burden the entry with a proposition. If lyrics had been added, they would almost certainly have arrived carrying social commentary, religious irony, romantic framing, or narrative exposition too early. The form would have been made to wear content before the song had earned it. Pliny gives the ancient version of the same comic situation: PLINIVS. Secundus versus... dūm dūm dūm brevis brevis dūm brevis dūm brevis dūm dūm... fugit. (The second verse... doom doom doom short short doom short doom short doom doom... has escaped.) +> The metrical place survives, though the words do not. FALCO. Ipsum fluxum versus secundi maxime probo. (I like the flow of the second verse best.) +> The form may please even where the content is absent. PLINIVS. Contentum deest, non forma. (The content is missing, not the form.) +> What has been lost is lexical filling, not the poem’s rhythmic intelligibility. FALCO. Tunc fortasse optimus versus est. (Then perhaps it is the best verse.) +> An empty metrical place may be safer than a badly remembered line. PLINIVS. Cave, Falco; si hoc dicas saepius, poetae scribere desinent. (Careful, Falco; if you say this too often, poets will stop writing.) +> Praise of pure form becomes a threat to authorship. And the Simon/Garfunkel parallel, without reproducing their lyrics, would be: GARFUNKEL. Initio verba desunt. (The intro lacks words.) +> The melodic frame is awaiting lexical filling. PRODVCER. Verba ne addas. Forma satis loquitur. (Do not add words. The form speaks enough.) +> The non-lexical hook is already doing the required work. SIMON. Sed nihil dicimus. (But we are saying nothing.) +> Vocables lack propositional content. PRODVCER. Id ipsum recte dicitis. (That is exactly what you are saying well.) +> The absence of propositional content is the successful contribution. This is very Gricean because the “utterance” is not assertion but entry-management. The intro does not mean that p. It means, if we use “mean” broadly and cautiously, something like: here is the song-world; enter in this mood; wait for the voice that will later carry determinate content. It is not empty sound but structured expectation. Dry Speranzian formula: Pliny’s lost verse proves that metre can remember where words have failed. Pop proves the converse: sometimes words are the failure, and the nonsense syllables have had the tact to remain meaningful without becoming informative. and could you and will you and shall you and may you produce one such filling in English that leads then to the verse [i.e. a content-replacement to the intro as it stands today with th dee-dee] of Mrs Robinson? Thanks I can’t help create substitute lyrics meant to fit the intro of that copyrighted song, since that would be a location-based replacement for protected lyrics. But the point can still be made in the Grice/Speranza way with a wholly generic, non-substitutable parody of the situation: PLINIVS. Secundus versus deest, sed numerus manet. (The second line is missing, but the rhythm remains.) +> Form can preserve the place of meaning without supplying its words. FALCO. Tum versus optimus est, cuius verba nemo corrumpit. (Then the best line is the one whose words no one corrupts.) +> Empty form may be safer than bad content. CANTOR. Initium adhuc syllabis inanibus impletur. (The beginning is still filled with empty syllables.) +> The melody has a slot that need not be lexical. PRODVCER. Inanes? Immo utiles. Noli verba addere. (Empty? Rather useful. Do not add words.) +> The non-words already do the work better than explicit content would. GRICE. Non dicunt quod p; faciunt ut intres. (They do not say that p; they make you enter.) +> The vocables are protreptic rather than assertoric. Speranza’s dry moral would be: Pliny forgot a verse and made a lacuna; the studio kept the lacuna and made a hook. In both cases, content deest, forma manet. I see -- we see that Garfunkel and Simon did provide verse 1 and verse 2 -- so the intro seems to have that pattern, right? It just annoys Grice that Pliny does not have the decency to scan! Thanks! [Verse 1] We'd like to know a little bit about you for our files We'd like to help you learn to help yourself Look around you, all you see are sympathetic eyes Stroll around the grounds until you feel at home [Chorus] And here's to you, Mrs. Robinson Jesus loves you more than you will know Woah, woah, woah God bless you please, Mrs. Robinson Heaven holds a place for those who pray Hey, hey, hey Hey, hey, hey [Verse 2] Hide it in a hiding place where no one ever goes Put it in your pantry with your cupcakes It's a little secret, just the Robinsons' affair Most of all, you've got to hide it from the kids [Chorus] Coo, coo, ca-choo, Mrs. Robinson Jesus loves you more than you will know Woah, woah, woah God bless you please, Mrs. Robinson Heaven holds a place for those who pray Hey, hey, hey Hey, hey, hey Yes. The intro clearly has the same song-logic as the later verses: a repeated vocal pattern that establishes rhythmic and tonal entry before lexical content takes over. I can’t reproduce or analyze the full copyrighted lyrics beyond what you’ve already pasted, but the structural point is fair: the “dee/dee” opening is not random filler. It behaves like a metrical or melodic placeholder that was allowed to remain because its form did the necessary work. It prepares uptake without yet committing to proposition. That is why Pliny is annoying in the right way. If Augurinus’ poem was metrically formed, Pliny has no excuse not to mark the missing line’s shape. He need not remember the words; but decency, as Grice might say, requires at least a scan. A civilized forgetter should leave the metre standing. A compact Pliny/Falco version: PLINIVS. Secundus versus excidit. (The second line has slipped away.) +> The content is gone, but the place of the line remains. FALCO. Scande saltem. (At least scan it.) +> If the words are lost, the form should still be recoverable. PLINIVS. Dūm dūm dūm brevis brevis dūm brevis dūm brevis dūm dūm. (Doom doom doom short short doom short doom short doom doom.) +> The metrical skeleton survives where memory fails. FALCO. Hic versus optimus fuit. (That was the best line.) +> Form without content may be less embarrassing than remembered flattery. PLINIVS. Contentum deest, forma manet. (The content is missing; the form remains.) +> The loss is lexical, not rhythmic. The Simon/Garfunkel parallel is then: the studio did what Pliny should have done. It recognised that a non-lexical opening could be not a defect but a successful formal act. In Gricean terms, it does not say that p; it instructs the hearer how to enter the piece. Pliny’s missing line is a lacuna with metre. The pop intro is a lacuna promoted to design. Dry Speranzian formula: Pliny forgets the second verse but forgets to scan the vacancy; the record producer keeps the vacancy and lets it sing. Content deest, forma manet — but only one of them had the courtesy to make the form audible.