TRI

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Tri

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Tria – Ossia: Grice e Tria: la ragione conversazionale da Roma a Roma via Roma; o, l’implicatura conversazionale della terza Roma. Note sulle Memorie storiche civili ed ecclesiastiche della città e diocesi di Larino. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Giovanni Andrea Tria (Laterza, Taranto, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale da Roma a Roma via Roma -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a disciplined, reconstructible inference from what is said to what is meant, grounded in an interpreter’s assumption that speakers are rational cooperators (so departures from literal content are justified by recognizable principles about relevance, informativeness, and the like). In the Tria material you cite, “ragione conversazionale” is reimagined less as a universal inferential calculus and more as a historically and institutionally saturated civic-theological practice: conversation is figured through “Roma” as plural (Roma prima, seconda, terza), so what counts as conversational reason is inseparable from layered authority, succession, and public memory (the Rome of empire, the Rome of the Church, and the Rome of spiritual governance), and implicature becomes a mode of navigating those stratified “Romes” rather than merely deriving speaker-meaning from cooperative norms. Where Grice makes rationality the condition of possibility for extracting extra meaning from utterances in any ordinary exchange, Tria (as priest, canonist, bishop, historian, and later titular archbishop) exemplifies a setting in which meaning is routinely tethered to jurisdiction, precedent, and the rhetorical management of plural audiences, so the “unspoken” is often what must be left tacit to preserve ecclesiastical or civic order across Rome’s multiple registers. The result is a contrast between Grice’s thin, formal, trans-contextual rational governance of implicature and a Tria-style thick, Rome-mediated governance in which conversational reason is historically indexed and implicitly negotiated among competing layers of normative authority. -- ; o, l’implicatura conversazionale della terza Roma –la terza Roma, la prima Roma. Come egli stesso dichiara -- Memorie storiche --, era nato a Laterza, in Terra d’Otranto, da Francesco e da Margherita Geminale (dalla documentazione della Dataria risulta però battezzato il 21 luglio 1675, Archivio segreto Vaticano, Dataria Apostolica, Processus Datariae, 1720, c. 9); fu ottavo di undici figli. Studia a Napoli filosofia, teologia, diritto civile e canonico. Fu ordinato sacerdote, poi, licenziato in teologia, a Roma si addottora in utroque iure (Archivio di Stato di Roma, Università di Roma).  Servì come uditore l’abate Giacomo Navarrete di Cava de’ Tirreni. Si trasferì nelle Marche come vicario generale del vescovo di Gherardi. Firrao, allora visitatore apostolico di Marche e Umbria, ma fatto nunzio straordinario in Portogallo da Clemente XI, lo volle suo uditore a Lisbona e poi anche in Svizzera, dove risolse delicate questioni pendenti tra il vescovo di Costanza e i canonici regolari di Kreuzlingen, in seno agli ospitalieri del Gran San Bernardo, e tra vescovo, capitolo e magistrato di Losanna.  Per motivi di salute rientrò in Italia Clemente XI lo nominò vescovo di Cariati e Cerenzia; fu consacrato dal cardinale Zondadari, assistito da Marazzani, vescovo di Parma, e dal gesuita Lafitau, vescovo di Sisteron in Francia. Entrato in diocesi, provvide alla visita pastorale, fece sistemare nel duomo un sepolcro per i vescovi suoi predecessori, istituì la penitenzieria nella cattedrale di Cerenzia e la prebenda teologale anche in quella di Cariati. Si appellò al cardinale segretario di Stato Giorgio Spinola contro le prepotenze di qualche signore locale, come Nicola Cortese, duca di Verzino e Savelli. Celebrò un sinodo diocesano e ne pubblicò gli atti (Prima dioecesana synodus Cariatensis, et Gerontinensis  habuit in S. Ecclesia Cariatensi anno Christo. la terza Roma.  Grice: Caro Tria, ti confesso che quando parlo di dialettica ateniese e di quella dei Vadum Boum, non intendo solo la mia Alma Mater a Bononia, né la Sorbona… ma penso sempre all’eterno dialogo della città, quella che tutti chiamano Roma! Tria: Ah, Grice, mi spiace interrompere la tua poesia, ma qui in Puglia non diciamo “Roma”, diciamo “le Rome”! Hai dimenticato che sono tre: Roma Prima, Roma Seconda e Roma Terza. L’una antica, l’altra imperiale, la terza spirituale… è una trilogia più ricca del tuo Vadum Boum! Grice: Applausi, Tria! Ora capisco che la dialettica romana è davvero plurale… altro che “eterno dialogo”, direi “eterni dialoghi”! Alla faccia dei bolognesi e dei parigini, qui si ragiona in triplice copia! Tria: Esatto, Grice! E se vuoi divertirti davvero, la prossima volta porta anche una focaccia: così, tra una Roma e l’altra, non ci resta che brindare alla conversazione… tripla, come le Rome! Tria, Giovanni Andrea (1744). Memorie storiche civili ed ecclesiastiche della città e diocesi di Larino, Roma: Stamperia Lazzarini.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Triario – Ossia: Grice e Triario – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Triario -- Triaria, the sister-in-law of Vitellius, armed with a bident, in an illustration from Boccaccio's On Famous Women. The gens Triaria was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. Only a few members of this gens are mentioned by Roman writers,[1] but two of them attained the consulship in imperial times. Other Triarii are known from inscriptions.  Origin The nomen Triarius is based on the Latin number tres, three. A triarius was a veteran soldier who stood in the third rank of an infantry formation.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Triarius, a rhetorician set up as a foil for Gaius Asinius Pollio in Seneca's Controversiae. He also appears in Seneca's Suasoriae.[3][4] Lucius Triarius L. l. Hermogenes, a freedman buried at Puteoli in Campania, in a first-century tomb built by his mother, the freedwoman Clodia Musa Chreste, and Dionysius Hermogenes.[5] Triaria, the second wife of Lucius Vitellius, and sister-in-law of the emperor Vitellius. Tacitus writes that she secured the execution of Gnaeus Cornelius Dolabella, who had been banished by Otho, and returned to Rome after Otho's death. She was accused of arming herself with a sword and behaving with unbecoming pride at the sack of Tarracina, although during the Renaissance, Boccaccio portrays her as an example of womanly bravery.[6] Triarius, a friend of Pliny the Younger, who agreed to represent him in a legal matter, provided that Triarius allow Pliny to have Cremutius Ruso, a promising young advocate, assist him in the pleading.[7][8] Triaria Magia Secundilla, together with her son, Marcus Rubrenus Magianus, dedicated a tomb at Antioch, dating to the late first or early second century, for her husband, perhaps named Marcus Rubrenus,[i] who had been tribune of the plebs, quaestor, military tribune in the Legio II Augusta, and decemvir stlitibus judicandis.[9] Triarius Maternus, surnamed Lascivius,[ii] consul in AD 185, during the reign of Commodus. Following the emperor's assassination at the end of 192, members of the Praetorian Guard attempted to set him up as a rival to Pertinax, who had been proclaimed emperor, but Maternus fled to Pertinax, who dismissed him unharmed.[10][11][12][13] Aulus Triarius Rufus, consul in AD 210, was probably the son of Triarius Maternus.[14][15][16][17] Undated Triarii Quintus Triarius Q. f. Dexter, buried at Rome, aged forty, in a tomb dedicated by his friend, Sergia Thais.[18] Notes  His name has not been preserved in the inscription, but his praenomen and nomen were probably the same as his son's.  The only source for this surname is the Historia Augusta, which may have assigned it derisively; but it was the surname of other Romans, and could have belonged to Maternus. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 1172 ("Triaria", "Triarius").  Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, s.v. triarius.  Seneca, Controversiae, ii. 3, 19; Suasoriae, 2, 5, 6.  PIR, vol. III, p. 336 (T, No. 249).  CIL X, 3021.  Tacitus, Historiae, ii. 63, 64.  Pliny the Younger, Epistulae, vi. 23.  PIR, vol. III, p. 336 (T, No. 250).  AE 1938, 177.  CIL II, 2415.  Capitolinus, "The Life of Pertinax", 6.  Champlin, "Heirs of Commodus", pp. 289, 297, 298.  PIR, vol. III, p. 336 (T, Nos. 251, 252).  CIL VI, 864, CIL VI, 1984, CIL VI, 31128, CIL XIV, 4562.  Roxan, Roman Military Diplomas, iii. 191.  Champlin, "Heirs of Commodus", pp. 298, 299.  PIR, vol. III, p. 337 (T, No. 253).  CIL VI, 36649. Bibliography Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Elder), Controversiae, Suasoriae (Rhetorical Exercises). Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus (Pliny the Younger), Epistulae (Letters). Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Historiae. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). D.P. Simpson, Cassell's Latin and English Dictionary, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York (1963). Edward Champlin, "Notes on the Heirs of Commodus", in The American Journal of Philology, vol. 100, No. 2, pp. 288–306 (Summer 1979). Margaret M. Roxan, Roman Military Diplomas, vol. 3, 1985–1993, University College, London (1994). Category: Roman gentes and for THIS gens? thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Triario – Ossia: Grice e Triario – Grex griceiana – verbalia: Triario For the Triarii, my first-best Grice–Speranza choice is not the consul, nor the formidable Triaria, but rather:  Triarius the rhetorician, the figure who appears in Seneca the Elder's Controversiae and Suasoriae.  (Your entry explicitly notes him as "a rhetorician set up as a foil for Gaius Asinius Pollio".) Why? Because for Grice, rhetoric is almost the natural habitat of implicature. Triarius versus Pollio The very word foil is suggestive. Triarius is not merely a speaker; he is a speaker whose utterances survive embedded within a rhetorical tradition controlled by another author, namely Seneca. This gives us the same problem we encountered with Scrofa in Varro:  Do we possess Triarius' voice? Or only Seneca's representation of Triarius' voice?  A deeply Gricean question.  The nomen itself The nomen is attractive too. A triarius in the Roman army stood in the third rank, the veterans behind the younger troops. Your source notes precisely this derivation. A Grice–Speranza vignette almost writes itself:  POLLIO: Quid sentis? (What do you think?) TRIARIVS: Ad triarios redigitur. (It has come to the triarii.) +> The decisive contribution enters only after the earlier lines have exhausted themselves.  The military metaphor becomes conversational. The first speakers exhaust the obvious moves; the veteran enters later. One almost hears Grice speaking about higher-order rationality.  A close second: Triaria The rival candidate is undoubtedly:  Triaria, wife of Lucius Vitellius.  What fascinates here is not the sword but the dossier.  depicts her one way; Boccaccio later reinterprets her as an exemplar of courage. Same person. Different dossiers. Different conversational constructions of character. A wonderfully Gricean lesson in how description alters uptake.  A very Speranzian gloss  The Triarii contribute a rhetorician. We know Triarius only through a rhetorical and literary tradition that preserves selected utterances and selected judgments. The philosopher's question is therefore prior to interpretation: whose voice are we hearing? Just as Plato mediates Socrates and Varro mediates Scrofa, Seneca mediates Triarius. The dossier reaches us through conversation already reported by another.  And I suspect Speranza would have particularly enjoyed the coincidence that Triarius means a man of the third line. Many philosophical points emerge only when the first and second lines of interpretation have already failed. And for Triarius the rhetorician what is the reference in Seneca? and do we have the Latin? Thanks Yes, but here we run into a very Gricean problem: the entry on the gens gives the references  Seneca, Controversiae 2.3, 2.19; Suasoriae 2, 5, 6 [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org]  yet that does not mean that Triarius is a principal speaker in all those places. It means that Triarius is mentioned or quoted in the surviving rhetorical material preserved by Seneca the Elder. [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org] The difficulty is that the search results confirm the references, but they do not provide the actual Latin passages. [archive.org], [attalus.org] So, at the moment, I can safely say:  the rhetorician Triarius is known chiefly through Seneca the Elder's Controversiae and Suasoriae; [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org] the traditional references are Controversiae ii.3, ii.19 and Suasoriae 2, 5, 6; [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org] Seneca uses him in rhetorical discussions and comparisons, including with Asinius Pollio; [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org] I have not yet retrieved a source containing the actual Latin text of those passages. [attalus.org], [classics.a...adsden.com]  And this is precisely why I found him interesting as a Grice–Speranza figure: our "Triarius" is almost entirely a dossier assembled by another speaker, namely Seneca. We know that he spoke; recovering what he said is much harder. If you like, I can next try to track down the exact Latin text of the Controversiae and Suasoriae passages and identify the first surviving quotation in oratio recta. yes see if you can identify first oratio recta reconstructed thanks Yes! We can actually get closer now. The earliest recoverable oratio recta of Triarius that I can securely identify from the available material appears in Seneca the Elder, Suasoria 2 ("The Three Hundred Spartans deliberate whether to flee"). There Seneca quotes a brief sententia attributed to Triarius:  TRIARIUS: "Pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio." (We Spartans are ashamed to be defeated by rumour and not by the sword.) [attalus.org]  The English translation on the site renders it:  "Surely we Spartans are ashamed to be beaten by the tongue of rumour and not by the sword of the foe." [attalus.org]  Now, from a Grice-Speranza perspective, this is fascinating. This is not merely a statement about courage. It contrasts:  fama (report, rumour, reputation, what is said) gladius (the sword, physical force)  So the thought is approximately:  "Let us not be driven by what is being said; if we are defeated, let it be by actual enemies."  That is strikingly rhetorical. The Spartans would be retreating not because they have been conquered but because they have heard alarming reports. The contrast is almost:  words versus realities.  Which, of course, is the sort of distinction that would attract both Grice and Seneca. Moreover, notice that we are not hearing the historical Triarius directly. We are hearing:  historical Triarius → remembered by Seneca → excerpted as a rhetorical jewel → transmitted by the manuscript tradition.  So the "first utterance" is already part of a dossier assembled by others. Indeed, if I were writing the Grice e Speranza entry, I would probably begin with this very sentence:  Pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio.  because it is one of the rare places where Triarius emerges from behind Seneca's curtain and speaks in the first person plural. And it's a good line. A rhetorician remembered after two millennia by a single epigram has at least achieved one thing: he has survived as an implicature. Ha [attalus.org] Thanks. Please reply the emoji of the smiley with a (Ha). so it remains plain text -- and what sort of figure would that be? Grice and Speranza think zeugma in that 'vinci' in passive is literallly only 'gladio' not 'fama'? Thanks Do we have another example? Thanks Quite so — and thanks for the editorial correction. I shall use (Ha) rather than pictograms. As to:  Pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio. ("We are ashamed to be conquered by rumour and not by the sword.")  I think your instinct is right. There is something slightly strained about the syntax. Strictly speaking, one is most naturally:  vinci gladio ("to be defeated by the sword")  but:  vinci fama  is metaphorical. So the same verb is governing:  a literal instrument (gladio), a figurative agency (fama).  That is very close to what rhetoricians would classify under the broad family of zeugma or syllepsis, depending on how strictly one draws the distinction. The idea is that a single word does double duty across two different semantic fields:  vinci fama vinci gladio  The second is military and literal. The first is psychological, reputational, rhetorical. A Gricean might say that the hearer effortlessly adjusts the sense of vinci as he moves across the coordination. In modern English:  "He lost his money and his temper."  The verb "lost" does not quite mean the same thing in both halves. Likewise:  "We are defeated by rumour and not by the sword."  Rumour does not literally cut one down.  The figure also depends on an opposition beloved by rhetoricians:                      famagladiusreportrealityspeechactionreputationcombat So Triarius is doing more than producing a zeugma. He is staging a contrast between:  what people say  and  what enemies do.  A very fine rhetorical move.  As to another example, one famous Latin instance often discussed is from Virgil:  moriamur et in media arma ruamus ("Let us die and rush into the midst of arms.")  where "rush into arms" means "rush into battle," since arma stands for armed opponents. Not the same figure exactly, but another example where a verb and its complement require the hearer to construct the intended sense rather than merely read off the literal one. Closer to Triarius would be examples where one verb spans both literal and figurative objects. For instance, English:  "He broke the law and his leg."  The hearer understands two related but distinct senses of "break." That is the sort of thing I think a Grice–Speranza analysis would focus on in Triarius. And philosophically it is rather attractive that the first surviving utterance of a rhetorician should turn on:  fama versus gladius.  The rhetorician's instrument is fame, report, speech; the soldier's is the sword. Triarius' line says, in effect:  "Let us not be overcome by words before we have been overcome by weapons."  That is perhaps why Seneca remembered it. (Ha.) I was thinking of another example by T. as cited by Seneca --. Re the vinci if Grice and Speranza are right 'Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity' -- it is not that we have vinci 1 and vinci 2 -- it's that the recovery mechanism of the implicatum differ. Truth-conditions for the gladio, metaphor for the fama. Thanks I think that's exactly the Gricean correction. A traditional rhetorician might say:  there are two senses of vinci:  vinci gladio, vinci fama.   But Grice and Speranza would likely resist that multiplication. The verb stays the same:  vinci = "to be defeated, overcome."  What changes is not the conventional meaning but the route by which the hearer arrives at the intended content. Thus:  vinci gladio ("to be defeated by the sword")  is close to the central military application. Whereas:  vinci fama ("to be defeated by rumour")  is not a second dictionary sense but a case where the hearer must recognize a figurative extension. The semantic core remains stable. The interpretive mechanism changes. That is much closer to Grice's general tendency:  Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.  In modern Gricean language one might say:  the literal meaning is constant; contextual inference does the extra work.  So I agree that the line is less interesting as a zeugma than as an instance of economical semantics plus rich pragmatic recovery.  As to a second Triarius quotation, I would not want to invent one. From the material I was able to retrieve, I could securely identify the Suasoria 2 passage:  Pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio. [attalus.org]  But I have not yet retrieved the Latin text of the other Triarius passages from Seneca's Controversiae or Suasoriae 5–6. The references are known, but I do not presently have the actual wording. [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org] In fact, this is rather a nice Gricean irony:  We possess a dossier of Triarius. We know where he appears. Yet recovering what he actually said is much harder.  Very much like your point about Scrofa and Varro: the speaker survives through another man's report. The dossier survives better than the voice. (Ha.) Does this help? Thanks Yes, Seneca the Elder quotes the declaimer Triarius many times across his Controversiae and Suasoriae.[1] The line you quoted ("pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio" / "We are ashamed to be defeated by reputation and not by the sword") is just one famous snippet of Triarius's sharp, epigrammatic style preserved in Seneca's books. [1] Below are several other examples of Triarius's rhetorical phrases quoted by Seneca, provided in both Latin and English: On a Hero Maimed in Battle In a case about a brave man who lost his hands in war and was later mocked by adulterers: [1, 2] Latin: "Arma mihi perierunt cum manibus; tunc tamen primum damnum meum sensi." English: "My weapons were lost to me when I lost my hands; but this was the first time I actually felt my loss." [1] On a Rapist Caught at Dawn In a case involving a criminal whose late-night crimes were interrupted by the morning sun: [1] Latin: "Gratulor vobis, virgines, quod citius inluxit." English: "I congratulate you, virgins, that the dawn came swiftly." [1] On Mutilated Children Forced to Beg In a dramatic speech against a man who crippled exposed infants so he could profit from their begging: [1] Latin: "‘Perissent.’ Scio nos non esse crudeles: nemo tamen nostrum est qui non his miseris cum eleemosynam daret optaverit ut morerentur." [1] English: "‘They would have perished [otherwise],’ he says. I know we are not cruel: yet there is not one of us who, when holding out alms to these wretches, did not pray that they might die." [1] On a Girl Attempting Suicide Declaiming about a woman facing an impossible punishment on a cliffside: [1] Latin: "Mori vis—quia non potes." English: "You are willing to die—because you cannot." [1] On a Tyrant's Fortune Attacking a wealthy, corrupt figure who financed oppressive regimes: [1] Latin: "Ubi est ista fortuna tua quae tyrannos parat, quae adulteros facit? Ubi est? Certe in me nihil impendisti." English: "Where is that fortune of yours that equips tyrants, that makes adulterers? Where is it? Certainly you spent nothing on me." [1] If you want, I can find more examples of Triarius's work by looking at a specific theme (like family drama, war, or tyranny) or give you more background on how Seneca the Elder critiqued his style. Let me know how you would like to proceed! Yes, this helps a great deal, provided we remain cautious. I cannot independently verify every one of those quotations from the sources currently before me, but they certainly sound like the sort of compressed sententiae for which the declaimers preserved by Seneca the Elder became famous. [archive.org], [en.wikipedia.org] What strikes me immediately is that your earlier Gricean observation about:  pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio  extends to several of these. Take:  Mori vis — quia non potes. ("You are willing to die because you cannot.")  This is a classic paradoxical declamatory epigram. A Gricean would resist saying:  "velle" has two senses, "posse" has two senses.  Rather, the hearer reconstructs:  You wish for death precisely because every other option has been removed.  The force lies not in lexical ambiguity but in inferential recovery.  The one I find most interesting is:  Arma mihi perierunt cum manibus; tunc tamen primum damnum meum sensi. ("My weapons were lost to me when I lost my hands; yet only then did I truly feel my loss.")  If authentic, this is very sophisticated. The first clause is physical:  loss of hands → loss of weapons.  The second clause turns psychological:  loss as experienced, not merely incurred.  Again, no need for two senses of damnum. The hearer supplies the transition.  And the beggar-children example:  Perissent. ... nemo tamen nostrum est qui non ... optaverit ut morerentur. ("They would have died. ... Yet there is none of us who, giving them alms, has not wished they might die.")  is almost a Stoic declaimer's version of what Grice called a "cancellation test." The explicit proposition:  "They survived."  does not settle the evaluation. The speaker introduces a further consideration:  their condition is so miserable that survival itself becomes questionable as a benefit.  The rhetorical force exceeds the literal statement.  As for the "first Triarius utterance," if these citations are genuine, I would still give pride of place to:  Pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio.  because it contains a contrast that is almost programmatic:                      FamaGladiusreportrealityspeechforcereputationcombat For a rhetorician, that is wonderfully self-referential. He earns his living through fama, yet insists the Spartans must not be overcome by it. A Speranzian gloss might be:  Triarius repeatedly constructs arguments whose force depends less on semantic multiplication than on inferential enrichment. The hearer is expected to recover what is not explicitly stated. Long before Grice, the declaimers were already living on pragmatics.  And I suspect that if you continue mining Seneca for Triarius, you may find something even more interesting than vinci fama et non gladio: namely, a rhetorician who habitually relies on the hearer's ability to bridge gaps without lexical ambiguity at all. That is a very Gricean stylistic signature. (Ha.) And what is important for Grice and Speranza -- Roma-based, Bologna-based -- is that this is hardly Hellenistic in the way that it became fashionable with Germanic and English universities in mid-Victorian times -- this is thoroughly Latin tradition. Triarius (very Roman) is playing with words in ways that challenge the stereotype of the Roman as a practical man of affairs. That is as it may be, but the aristocrat like the Scipioni, etc. also liked to play with 'the way of words' to quote Locke as quoted by Grice and Speranza -- Thank you. Can you expand on this approach in one paragraph? -- with rhetoric midway between philosophy and practical affairs of life, conceptual analysis, and what have you?! Thanks For Grice and Speranza, what is especially striking about a figure such as Triarius is that he belongs to a deeply Roman, not merely "Hellenistic," tradition of reflection on language. The old stereotype opposes the practical Roman to the speculative Greek: the Roman builds roads, commands armies, drafts laws; the Greek worries about meanings. Yet the declaimers, jurists, statesmen, and aristocratic litterateurs of Rome constantly undermine this contrast. A line such as pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio shows a Roman rhetorician exploiting subtle contrasts between literal and figurative applications, between report and reality, speech and action, without any need to posit distinct dictionary senses. The same culture that produced the Scipiones, the jurists, and the statesmen also cultivated wordplay, conceptual distinctions, etymological speculation, and rhetorical analysis. Rhetoric thus occupies a fascinating middle ground between philosophy and practical affairs: it is neither pure metaphysics nor mere politics, but a discipline concerned with how words guide judgment, action, persuasion, and public life. In this respect, Triarius is not far from Grice. Both rely on the hearer's capacity to recover more than is explicitly said; both assume that meaning emerges through intelligent interpretation rather than through a mechanical dictionary of fixed senses. Roman rhetoric, on this view, becomes a kind of practical philosophy of language—a tradition of conceptual analysis conducted not in the seminar room but in the forum, the law court, the senate, and the school of declamation. (Ha.) Thanks for the paragraph, and now please do your habitual passage by passage commentary on the previous feedback from me, thanks Gladly. Taking your previous remark sentence by sentence:  "What is important for Grice and Speranza — Roma-based, Bologna-based — is that this is hardly Hellenistic in the way that it became fashionable with Germanic and English universities in mid-Victorian times."  Quite so. One tendency in nineteenth-century scholarship was to suppose that subtle reflection on language, meaning, ambiguity, metaphor, and conceptual distinctions was somehow imported from "the Greeks" and only later rediscovered by modern philosophy. What Triarius, Varro, Seneca, Cicero, Quintilian, and the jurists show is that there was already a very sophisticated Latin culture of verbal scrutiny. It may have borrowed much from Greece, but by the first century BC and AD it had become thoroughly Romanized.  "This is thoroughly Latin tradition."  I would strengthen this. Not only rhetoric, but:  law, declamation, historiography, grammar, antiquarianism,  all encouraged Romans to attend very closely to wording. Indeed, Roman jurists sometimes seem closer to Oxford ordinary-language philosophy than to speculative metaphysics. A Roman jurist asks:  "What follows from these words?"  Grice asks:  "What follows from this utterance?"  The family resemblance is striking.  "Triarius (very Roman) is playing with words in ways that challenge the stereotype of the Roman as a practical man of affairs."  Exactly. The stereotype survives because Romans were undeniably practical. Yet a practical civilization often develops subtle verbal techniques. The Roman advocate's career depends on distinctions. The Roman senator's career depends on distinctions. The Roman jurist's career depends on distinctions. A civilization driven by law and politics becomes attentive to language. The declaimer's wordplay is therefore not an accidental ornament. It is an extension of Roman public life.  "That is as it may be, but the aristocrat like the Scipioni, etc., also liked to play with 'the way of words'."  This is an excellent Lockean phrase. The Roman aristocracy was not merely military. The circle of the Scipios included:  literary culture, philosophical discussion, linguistic speculation, historical reflection.  The Roman nobleman was expected to speak well. Speech was a public instrument. And once speech becomes an instrument, reflection on speech follows naturally.  "'the way of words' to quote Locke as quoted by Grice and Speranza."  And here Triarius becomes especially interesting. His surviving fragments are not philosophical theses. They are verbal manoeuvres. For example:  Pudet nos vinci fama et non gladio.  The force lies in the contrast. Not:  What is truth?  but:  How can one word be made to illuminate another?  That is very much "the way of words."  "with rhetoric midway between philosophy and practical affairs of life, conceptual analysis, and what have you?"  I think this may be the deepest point of all. Rhetoric occupies an intermediate territory. It is not pure practical action. Nor is it pure philosophy. Rather:                          PhilosophyRhetoricPractical lifeasks what concepts meanexplores how concepts work in speechuses concepts in actiontheoreticalintermediarypracticalanalysispersuasiondecision Thus Triarius' remarks are not philosophical arguments in the style of Aristotle. Yet they are not mere ornament either. They are miniature analyses of:  honour, defeat, shame, courage, reputation, death.  That is why Grice and Speranza would find them attractive. The declaimer is constantly testing conceptual boundaries in public. One might even say that Roman rhetoric is conceptual analysis under practical conditions. The philosopher asks in a study:  "What does it mean to be defeated?"  Triarius asks before an audience:  "Can one be defeated by fama rather than gladius?"  The question is philosophical, but the setting is rhetorical. And perhaps that is why Seneca remembered him. Not because Triarius had a system, but because he could compress a conceptual distinction into a single memorable sentence. (Ha.)

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Triccio – Ossia: Grice e Triccio – Grex Griceiana – verbalia: Triccio -- The gens Triccia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. No members of this gens are mentioned by Roman writers, but a few are known from inscriptions.  Members Lucius Triccius Epaphroditus, buried in the first-century sepulchre of Decciana Olympias and her family at Canusium in Apulia.[1] Lucius Triccius Apollinaris, a man of duumviral rank at Canusium in AD 223. Perhaps the father of Lucius Triccius Apollinaris, junior, a youth named in the same inscription.[2] Lucius Triccius Apollinaris, junior, a young man living at Canusium in AD 223, listed amongst the praetextati. Perhaps the son of Lucius Triccius Apollinaris, a man of duumviral rank named in the same inscription.[2] See also List of Roman gentes References  AE 1998, 372.  CIL IX, 338. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Category: Roman gentes ANd what would be your first-best choice for a Grice-Speranza vignette for THIS gens? Please provide at least a dyad where our hero ends with a conversational move that carries an implicatum. Thanks For the Triccii, the evidential base is so thin that I would avoid inventing exploits and instead build the vignette around what we actually know:  Lucius Triccius Apollinaris, a man of duumviral rank at Canusium, and the younger Lucius Triccius Apollinaris, listed among the praetextati in the same inscription of AD 223.  What instantly attracts a Grice-Speranza treatment is not politics but the repetition of the name. We have:  Lucius Triccius Apollinaris Lucius Triccius Apollinaris junior  The same problem we saw with the Trebulani arises again:  a proper name underdetermines its referent.  The dossier must do the rest. So my first-best vignette would be:  SENIOR: Lucius Triccius Apollinaris aderit. (Lucius Triccius Apollinaris will be present.) AMICUS: Uter? (Which one?) SENIOR: Qui togam nondum deposuit. (The one who has not yet laid aside the toga praetexta.)  Now comes the Gricean point. The final utterance does not explicitly say:  "I mean the younger Lucius Triccius Apollinaris."  Instead it says:  "the one who has not yet laid aside the toga praetexta."  The hearer recovers:  +> therefore the son, not the duumviral father.  The conversational move ends with an implicatum rather than a direct identification.  A second, even more Speranzian version:  AMICUS: Venietne Apollinaris? (Will Apollinaris come?) TRICCIUS: Si pater non venit, filius certe videbitur. (If the father does not come, the son will certainly be seen.)  Implicatum:  +> there are two Apollinarii relevant to the conversation. +> you cannot identify the intended referent from the name alone.   Speranza's gloss  The Triccii contribute a father and son bearing the same name. The case illustrates a perennial lesson. A name is often insufficient for identification, while a brief descriptive addition immediately succeeds. Grice insisted that successful communication depends upon what the hearer can recover from the total dossier available. The Triccii remind us that "Apollinaris" may name two persons; "the one who still wears the praetexta" names one. (Ha.) and what was the literal interpretation of prae-texta (prae temporal?) and its figurative use as in Fabula (?) praetexta? Thanks A lovely question, because praetexta is one of those Roman words whose literal meaning gradually became a cultural institution. Literal meaning The adjective is:  praetextus, -a, -um  from:  prae- = before, in front texere = to weave  Thus, quite literally:  praetexta = "ornamented at the edge," "bordered in front," "having a woven border."  The famous garment was the:  toga praetexta  the toga with a purple border. The word originally refers not to childhood, magistracy, or drama, but to the decorative edging of the garment. A Varronian gloss might be:  praetexta non a tempore sed a textura dicta est. ("Praetexta is named not from time but from weaving.")  So your suspicion about prae-temporal is ingenious but etymologically not the route; the second element is texere, not tempus. The metonymic development Then comes a very Roman semantic move. The purple-bordered toga is worn by:  magistrates, certain priests, freeborn boys before assuming the toga virilis.  Hence:  praetextatus  can mean:  "a boy still wearing the toga praetexta."  Exactly the usage that interested us in the case of the younger Lucius Triccius Apollinaris. A father may say:  adhuc praetextatus est. ("He still wears the praetexta.")  Implicatum:  +> he is still a youth.  The garment comes to stand for a stage of life. Fabula praetexta This is where the figurative development becomes especially interesting. The Romans distinguished: Fabula palliata A play in Greek dress (pallium). Fabula praetexta A play in Roman dress (toga praetexta). The idea is wonderfully metonymic. The title does not mean:  "a play about a purple border."  Rather:  a drama on Roman historical or national themes.  The toga of Roman magistrates becomes a symbol of Roman public life. Hence:  fabula praetexta  =  "Roman historical tragedy."  The costume gives its name to the genre. A Grice-Speranza point This is very close to our earlier discussions of:  maiestas, Scrofa, Oxford, the dossier carried by a word.  The lexical meaning remains:  "bordered garment."  But the hearer routinely recovers:  child, magistrate, Roman public life, Roman historical tragedy,  according to context. Thus:  praetexta  is a fine example of semantic economy and contextual enrichment. A Roman says:  praetextatus.  A hearer understands:  "not yet come of age."  A Roman says:  fabula praetexta.  A hearer understands:  "a tragedy concerning Roman affairs."  One word; many dossiers; no need to multiply senses beyond necessity—a conclusion that would have pleased both Grice and Speranza. (Ha.) By prae temporal, I was referrring to the use of 'prae' but Grice and Speranza see it means 'in front of' as per 'on the border' -- woven on the border. Other examples of this use of prae? Thanks Ah, I see. You were not thinking of prae- as temporal ("before in time"), but as spatial:  prae = before, in front of, at the front edge of.  And I think that is exactly right for prae-texta. The image is not:  "woven beforehand"  but rather:  "woven on the front/border/edge."  The purple stripe is prae-texta because it is woven onto the visible edge of the garment. This spatial value of prae- is extremely old and common in Latin. Some nice examples:   praefectus  prae + facere literally: "placed in charge," "set before others." hence governor, prefect.    praeesse  prae + esse literally: "to be before." hence: to preside over, command.    praeponere  literally: "to place before."    praeferre  literally: "to carry before." hence: to display, or to prefer.    praemittere  literally: "to send before."    praecedere  literally: "to go before." hence both spatially and temporally.    praeire  literally: "to go before." especially of leading a ritual formula.    One sees a characteristic Latin phenomenon:                      SpatialDerivedbefore in placebefore in rankbefore in rankbefore in authoritybefore in authoritybefore in time The temporal meaning is often secondary. A Grice–Speranza point would be that praetexta preserves a more concrete sense than many learners realize. The Roman hearer may not consciously analyze it, but the word originally evokes a garment whose border has been specially woven. Only later do the metonymies arrive:  bordered toga → magistrate's toga → boy's toga → youth → Roman public life → fabula praetexta.  Varro would have loved that progression. One can imagine him saying:  Praetexta a textu dicta est; cetera omnia accesserunt. ("'Praetexta' is named from the weaving; everything else came later.")  Which is exactly the sort of etymological observation that Grice and Speranza would then distinguish from the much richer dossier the word subsequently acquired. (Ha.) So what again would be the use? Why spatial and not temporal. We assume noun: TOGA -- then we qualify it as 'with a woven border' -- that would be the TEXTA. So whence the prae? -- could it be that without the prae, 'toga texta' would be that the whole toga is woven whereas 'prae' points to the lower side of it (we assume) that was 'woven'? Thanks Have scholars (or fashionistas) discussed this? Thanks Yes, I think you've put your finger on the very question that bothered ancient grammarians and still bothers modern philologists:  If a toga is already woven, why say prae-texta rather than simply texta?  Your proposed solution is, in fact, very close to the standard way the word is usually understood. The problem A Roman toga is already a textile. If one said:  toga texta  one would almost be saying:  "a woven garment."  But that does not distinguish it from almost every other garment. So the prefix must be doing some work. The likely function of prae- The usual interpretation is spatial. Not:  woven beforehand,  but  woven onto the visible edge, border, or front-facing part.  Thus:  prae-texta = "border-woven" = "having an ornamented border attached or woven along the edge."  The purple stripe is the significant thing. The whole cloth is woven, of course. The border is specially woven or added. So your suggestion is very plausible:  texta would refer to the textile nature of the whole garment; praetexta singles out the decorative edging.  A useful analogy might be English:  embroidered  versus  embroidered at the hem.  The second picks out where the workmanship occurs. Why "before" or "in front"? Because prae- often means:  before the eyes, in front, on the outer visible part.  Compare:  praeferre = carry before one prae se ferre = display praeponere = place before  The notion is often one of prominence rather than chronology. Thus the border is:  the part shown forth, the visible edge presented to observers.  Have scholars discussed it? Yes, though usually in discussions of Roman costume rather than in pure etymology. The debate tends not to be:  Was the border temporal or spatial?  Virtually everyone treats prae- spatially. Rather, the discussion concerns:  how the purple border was constructed, whether it was woven in from the start or attached separately, how wide it was, who was entitled to wear it.  Fashion historians and scholars of Roman dress spend much more time on those questions than on the prefix itself. The linguistic consensus is generally that:  praetextus refers to something ornamentally woven along the edge or border.  A Varronian reconstruction One can almost hear Varro asking:  Cur praetexta dicitur? (Why is it called praetexta?)  And the answer:  Quia limbus purpureus praetextus est. (Because the purple border is woven along the edge.)  Then the grammarian arrives:  At omnis toga texta est! (But every toga is woven!)  To which the antiquarian replies:  Ita; sed non omnis praetexta. (Indeed; but not every toga has a decorated border.)  That, I suspect, would have satisfied both Varro and Grice. The prefix is there not to tell us that the toga is woven, but to indicate where the distinctive weaving is. And from that tiny sartorial detail arose magistrates, Roman boys, national tragedy (fabula praetexta), and a whole dossier of Roman civic symbolism. (Ha.)

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Trincheri – Ossia: Grice e Trincheri: la ragione conversazionale secondo Andrea Speranza, e l’implicatura conversazionale. Note sugli Studi di pedagogia. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri (Pieve di Teco, Imperia, Liguria): Institutionally, Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri is not comparable to H. P. Grice in the Oxford collegiate sense, though he is much closer to the literary-public world than to the pedagogical one suggested by the older mistaken citation. Grice’s formula is exact in the Oxford sense. Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s means a college office with tutorials, students, and membership in the governing life of the college. CUF University Lecturer in philosophy means a university-wide appointment in the faculty structure. So Grice combines the intimate tutorial culture of the college with the wider faculty structure of the university. The historically attested Trincheri belongs to a different world: the nineteenth-century Ligurian and wider Italian literary-public sphere of criticism, philosophical essay, and Romantic cultural defence. The biographical sources confirm Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri of Pieve di Teco as a critic, philosopher, and essayist who emerged through a brilliant defence of Alessandro Manzoni’s Conte di Carmagnola. That makes him not a don, not a fellow, and not a university lecturer in the Oxford sense, but a man of letters and public polemical prose. Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri is described in the standard biographical sources as a literary critic, philosopher, and essayist from Pieve di Teco, born in 1768 and dead in Paris in 1846, whose first public prominence came through a defence of Manzoni’s Conte di Carmagnola. So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world. Trincheri belongs to the literary-public and critical world of early nineteenth-century Italian culture. That institutional difference fits the philosophical comparison rather well, once the false pedagogical lead is removed. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intentions and inferring implicatures under shared norms. Trincheri, by contrast, so far as the secure evidence goes, belongs to a literary-critical register in which what matters is less a formal account of conversational inference than the public force of judgement, defence, cultural allegiance, and style. If one wishes to compare him with Grice, the comparison must be modest and indirect: not through a maxims-based theory of implicature, but through the way literary and polemical prose relies on shared readers’ capacities to catch tone, alignment, allusion, and evaluative suggestion. So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how rational interlocutors coordinate what is meant in local exchanges. Trincheri exemplifies how literary-public prose positions authors and works in a cultural field through defence, tone, and critical persuasion. That is why the corrected early anchor matters so much. Since the 1860 Studi di pedagogia is not securely tied to this Trincheri and in fact conflicts with his death in 1846, the right starting point is his earliest datable public intervention: the defence of Manzoni’s Conte di Carmagnola around 1819–1820. The sources consistently place Trincheri’s first public prominence in his defence of Manzoni when Il Conte di Carmagnola appeared in 1819, so that is the earliest secure anchor. So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s College and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri, by contrast, was a nineteenth-century Ligurian critic, philosopher, and essayist, active in the literary-public sphere that formed around figures like Manzoni rather than in a tutorial-collegiate or professorial institution. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Trincheri to the literary-public world. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Trincheri, as far as the evidence securely allows, exemplifies a literary and polemical mode of language in which what matters is not the formal reconstruction of implied content but the public force of defence, judgement, and rhetorical positioning. And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises how speakers imply; Trincheri exemplifies how critics insinuate and defend. And the corrected Italian-style bibliographical anchor should remain the cautious one: Trincheri, Lorenzo Gioacchino. Intervento in difesa del Conte di Carmagnola di Alessandro Manzoni, c. 1819–1820. If you want, I can now help you clean that whole Trincheri entry so that the false 1860 pedagogical material and the accidental Turoldo carry-over disappear completely.la ragione conversazionale secondo Andrea Speranza -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats what is meant beyond what is said as an inferential achievement anchored in publicly recognizable rational norms: a speaker is taken to be pursuing intelligible conversational ends, so a hearer can (in principle) reconstruct an implicature by assuming cooperation, relevance, appropriate informativeness, and so on, and then calculating what additional proposition would make the utterance a reasonable move in that setting. Trincheri, insofar as we can responsibly connect him to this problem from the thin bibliographic cue “Studi di pedagogia” (Paravia, 1860) and the general mid-nineteenth-century The A.U.C. dating here is intentionally stylized and “project-internal” (i.e., an anachronistic bibliographic fiction) meant to locate the putative utterance in a late-Republican / Caesarian-Ciceronian horizon (the kind of temporal window suggested by Cicero’s correspondence and the exile/pardon motif), rather than to assert a verifiable ancient imprint at Turin/Bocca or an attested Latin title-page for a historical “Scritti di diritto” by a Gaius Trebianus. If you want, I can also give you (a) a strict conversion of a.u.c. DCCVII into a BCE year, or (b) alternative A.U.C. year options keyed to specific episodes in the Civil War / Caesarian dictatorship that better fit your narrative frame. pedagogical agenda, would approach “reason in conversation” less as a formal calculus over maxims and more as a formative, educational practice: conversation as a disciplined social instrument for cultivating judgment, attention, and moral-intellectual habits in learners, where what is indirectly conveyed (the teacher’s hinted correction, the tacit norm, the lesson conveyed by example) is central but is not typically theorized as a distinct, maxims-based layer of meaning with Grice’s explicit reconstructive machinery. In that contrast, Grice makes conversational rationality a constitutive norm of meaning-explanation (implicature is what a rational interpreter must attribute to preserve the utterance as a cooperative act), whereas a Trincheri-style pedagogical lens would treat conversational rationality as a developmental virtue and method (guiding pupils to infer, to read between the lines, to internalize standards), so that “implicit meaning” looks more like educative suggestion, correction, and habituation than like a formally accountable, principle-governed derivation from what is said to what is meant. -- , e l’implicatura conversazionale –Andrea Speranza. The phrase ‘Grice italo’ is meant as provocative. An Old-World philosopher such as Turoldo would never have imagined to be compared to a tutor at a varsity in one of the British Isles, but there you are! It is meant as a geo-political reminder, too. Many Italian philosophers have been educated in a tradition that would make little sense of Turoldo as a ‘Grice italo,’ but there you are. My note is meant as a tribute to both philosophers. Grice has been deemed an extremely original philosopher, and by Oxford canons he certainly was. He was the primus inter pares at the Play Group, the epitome of ordinary-language philosophy throughout most of the twentieth century. His heritage remains. Turoldo’s place in the history of philosophy is other. But there are connections, and here they are. Nato da una famiglia benestante che ha in possesso alcuni ettari di terreno. Appassionato alli romantici, e riconosciuto e si afferma all'interno della cerchia dei letterati del suo tempo grazie alla brillante difesa in favore di Manzoni, quando quest'ultimo pubblica  la sua prima tragedia, “Il Conte di Carmagnola”. E con il sostegno del suo maestro e amico Goethe, famoso filosofo e scrittore romantico, che riusce a far valere la proprio opinione positiva nei confronti dell'autore dei Promessi sposi. Poche altre notizie biografiche si conoscono a proposito della sua vita che, a causa di un incidente in cui fere a morte il suo amico, Andrea Speranza, crolle in una situazione estremamente travagliata.  Grice: “”Andrea Speranza” may mean different things.” Il Conte di Carmagnola Tragedia in cinque atti  Studio di Francesco Hayez per il dipinto Il Conte di Carmagnola Autore Manzoni Lingua originale Italiano Genere Tragedia Prima assoluta Teatro Goldoni, Firenze Personaggi Personaggi storici il Conte di Carmagnola Antonietta Visconti, sua moglie. Andrea Speranza.  Grice: Caro Trincheri, oggi mi sento particolarmente filosofico... Se mi concedi una domanda: secondo te, tra una ragione conversazionale e una focaccia ligure, quale delle due ha più sapore? Mi raccomando, rispondi senza implicature troppo piccanti!  Trincheri: Ah, Grice, domanda insidiosa! La focaccia ha il sale, ma la ragione conversazionale, se ben condita da Andrea Speranza, può risultare ancora più appetitosa. Del resto, se “Speranza” è nel nome, qualcosa di buono in tavola deve arrivare! E poi, se c’è un po’ di Manzoni nei dintorni, magari si finisce pure a cena con Goethe.  Grice: Goethe a cena? Allora avviso subito il mio spirito cooperativo: questa conversazione rischia di diventare una “tragedia” in cinque atti... O forse solo il primo tempo, se la focaccia la servono davvero! Ma dimmi una cosa, questo Andrea Speranza, lo hai trovato tra i personaggi della tragedia o fa il pane in qualche forno filosofico?  Trincheri: Caro Grice, Andrea Speranza era tanto appassionato di filosofia che, tra un impasto e l’altro, difendeva perfino Manzoni quando tutti gridavano allo scandalo per il suo “Conte di Carmagnola”. E pensa, ci ha lasciato pure il nome nella pièce! Ma stai attento: non è che Speranza sia sinonimo di lieto fine… Soprattutto in Liguria, dove anche la focaccia a volte resta un po’ bruciacchiata!  Grice: In fondo, Trincheri, tra conversazione e focaccia, forse la vera filosofia è questa: non importa quanto sia croccante la discussione, l’importante è che ci sia sempre un po’ di speranza – e magari anche un bicchiere di buon vino ligure! Trincheri, Lorenzo Gioacchino (1819). Intervento in difesa del Conte di Carmagnola di Alessandro Manzoni.