SCA

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sca

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scalea – Ossia: Grice e Scalea: la ragione conversazionale e il gusto per l’antico – ill-will – mala volonta. Note sugli Saggi politici. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice Francesco Maria Spinelli, principe di Scalea, marchese di Misuraca e barone di Morano (Morano Calabro, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e il gusto per l’antico. A comparison between Francesco Maria Spinelli and H. P. Grice brings out a shared commitment to reason as a norm-governed practice expressed through discourse, even across very different historical and conceptual frameworks. Spinelli, formed in the Calabrian Cartesian milieu under Caloprese, treats reason as inseparable from voluntary choice: his analyses of bonum, malum, and mala voluntà in works such as De origine mali present rationality as a moral power exercised through judgment, resistance, and polemic, with controversy itself functioning as a sign that reason is active and free. Grice, by contrast, relocates reason from moral psychology to the logic of conversation, conceiving it as a system of implicit norms governing meaning, cooperation, and inference; rationality for Grice is not primarily a matter of choosing the good or resisting evil, but of making oneself intelligible to others through intention-sensitive, rule-guided conversational moves. Yet the affinity is real: Spinelli’s insistence that even error, rebellion, and ill-will testify to rational freedom parallels Grice’s view that conversational implicature arises precisely where speakers do not follow rules mechanically, but exploit them creatively against a shared normative background. In both figures, reason is not a silent faculty but a public, dialogical achievement, revealed in dispute, irony, and deviation as much as in harmony or agreement. – ill-will – mala volonta –Grice: Studia sotto CALOPRESE. Divulga il razionalismo, difende alcuni colleghi, anche loro seguaci di Cartesio, ed ha un'accesa polemica con DORIA su Spinoza. Saggi: “Della filosofia degl’antichi” (Mosca, Napoli); “De origine mali”; “De bono”; Dizionario di filosofia, riferimenti in Mirto, Calabria letteraria, Lomonaco, Vita, e studj scritta da lui medesimo in una Lettera (Melangolo, Genova). Treccani Dizionario biografico degl’italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. SPINELLI DE ORIGINE MALI DISSERTATIO Francesco Maria Spinelli, Antonio Baldi FRANCISCI MARIÆ SPINELLI PRINCIPIS S. ORIGINE MALI DISSERTATIO NAPOLI E TYPOGRAPHIA BENEDICTI ET IGNAT1I GESSARI SOPERiQRUlt fERltiSSV, Habet unufquifque jn voluntate f Aut eligew quæ fcon» funt, et efle arbor pona / aur cligere quæ mala funt, et efle arbor mala. AuguJlisus iib. ii. ie eUis cum Ttlice Manicbæt c.iv. ! EMINENTISSIMO.AMPLISSIMCQyE. viro DOMINICO. S.R.E. CARDINALI.PASSIONEO ERVDITIONE.INGENIO.PRVDENTLV i CVM.FAVCIS.CQMPARANDQ QUEM. CLAKO. RENERE. ORTVM PER.DIVERSOS. LEGATIONVM. ET.MUNERUM.GRADVS FIDES. DEXTERITAS.CONSTANTIA NON.MINVS.QVAM. NOBILITAS AD.ROMANAM. PV.RPVRAM .EVEXERVNT QVEM.VIX.DVM JVVENEM ADHVG.PRIVATVM JVRA- ECCLESIÆ CATHOLICÆ 1N. VLTR A JECT INQ.CQN V ENTV.STREN V E. VINQIG ANTEM QVAMVIS.NON EADEM SENTIENS BATAVIA. OflSTVPVTT EVNDEM.BELVETIORVM.RESPV.flLICA PRIMVM BADÆ QVVM IN CQMITIIS bonum, ‘il bono’ the good, filosofia degl’antichi, vico, doria, la filosofia degl’antichi.  Grice: Caro Scalea, dicono che la “mala volontà” sia il motore segreto di tutte le filosofie calabresi… ma secondo te basterebbe un assaggio del “bonum” per far cambiare strada anche al pensiero più testardo? Spinelli: Eh, Grice, se bastasse il “bonum”, avremmo filosofi contenti come bambini alla sagra del peperoncino! Ma, studiando sotto Caloprese, ho imparato che senza un pizzico di polemica, anche la filosofia resta un piatto un po’ sciapo… Grice: Vedi, Spinelli, da Bononia a Vadum Boum – sì, proprio la mia università – ho sempre notato che la “mala volontà” non è mai così cattiva da non trovare almeno una piccola stanza dove alloggiare… sarà che le implicature hanno sempre bisogno di ospitalità! Spinelli: Implicatura esatta, Grice! In fondo, la “mala volontà”, per quanto negativa, è il segno che il nostro spirito non si lascia addomesticare. Anche la scelta sbagliata, o la ribellione, dimostra che siamo liberi di scegliere – se no saremmo tutti filosofi perfetti… ma che noia sarebbe la filosofia senza un po’ di sana indisciplina! Spinelli, principe di, marchese di Misuraca e barone di Morano (1845). Saggi politici. Napoli.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scalfari – Ossia: Grice e Scalfari: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura di Teseo – Roma fascista. Note sul contributo alla Roma Fascista. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Eugenio Scalfari (Civitavecchia, Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura di Teseo – A comparison between Grice and Eugenio Scalfari brings into focus two complementary ways of understanding reason as a guide to meaning within complex public discourse. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats reason as an internal, regulating principle of communication: speakers orient themselves toward shared norms of cooperation, relevance, and intelligibility, and implicature arises precisely when a speaker relies on the rational capacities of others to go beyond what is explicitly stated. Scalfari, though neither a philosopher of language nor a systematic theorist, practices an analogous form of conversational reason in journalism and political analysis, especially in his movement from the constrained rhetoric of Roma Fascista to the open, secular, and critical language of L’Espresso and La Repubblica. His recurring figure of the labyrinth, evoking Theseus and the guiding thread, functions as a journalistic metaphor for rational navigation through power, ideology, and moral confusion: meaning is not imposed but traced, inferred, and reconstructed by readers who follow implicit cues, tensions, and silences in public argument. Where Grice analyzes implicature as a logical-explanatory mechanism grounded in rational mutual recognition, Scalfari deploys implicature as a civic and ethical practice, inviting readers to see what is suggested rather than proclaimed, and to exercise their own reason in disentangling truth from authority. In both cases, reason governs meaning not by dogma or declaration, but by providing the thread that allows interlocutors or citizens to move through dense argumentative spaces without losing their way. Roma fascista –Grice: Considerato, anche dai suoi avversari, uno dei più grandi filosofi italiani. Professore, contribuì, con altri, a fondare il settimanale “L’Espresso” ed è fondatore del quotidiano “La Repubblica.” I campi principali dell'analisi di S. sono l'economia e la politica. La sua ispirazione politica è socialista liberale, azionista e radicale. Punti forti dei suoi articoli recenti sono la laicità, la questione morale, la filosofia. Frequenta il liceo Mamiani di Roma -- è a Sanremo (dove la famiglia, di origini calabresi, si era trasferita temporaneamente, essendo il padre direttore artistico del casinò) che completa gli studi liceali, al liceo classico Cassini, avendo come compagno di banco CALVINO. Sentimentalmente legato a S. Rossetti, già segretaria di redazione de L'Espresso (e poi di Repubblica), che sposerà dopo la scomparsa della moglie Simonetta.  -- è ateo.  Tra le suoi esperienze c'è “Roma Fascista” -- organo del Gruppo Fascista. Collabora con riviste e periodici legati al fascismo, come “Nuovo Occidente”. Nominato caporedattore di “Roma Fascista”, pubblica una serie di corsivi sulla prima pagina in cui lancia generiche accuse verso speculazioni da parte di gerarchi del Partito Nazionale Fascista sulla costruzione dell'EUR. Questi saggi portarono alla sua espulsione dai GUF. Di fronte al gerarca, intenzionato a perseguire gli speculatori, aveva ammesso come i suoi corsivi fossero basati su voci generiche. Si l’accusa poi di essere un imboscato, e lo prese materialmente per il ero strappandogli le mostrine dalla divisa del partito. Dopo la fine della seconda guerra mondiale entra in contatto con il Partito Liberale Italiano. Diventa collaboratore a Il Mondo e L'Europeo, di PANNUNZIO e BENEDETTI. Licenziato dalla BNL per una serie di articoli sulla Federconsorzi non graditi alla direzione.  l’implicatura di Teseo, il labirinto, la filosofia.  Grice: Caro Scalfari, tu che hai girato tra le colonne di “Roma Fascista” e poi hai tessuto le pagine di “Repubblica”, dimmi, hai mai trovato il filo d’Arianna tra i corridoi della politica italiana? O ti sei lasciato guidare dal vento, come facevano i grandi filosofi di Civitavecchia? Scalfari: Grice, se c’è una cosa che ho imparato tra i labirinti della cronaca è che il filo va annodato bene, altrimenti si rischia di ritrovarsi tra le speculazioni dei gerarchi... e credimi, a quel punto non c'è nemmeno una briciola di pane come nel labirinto di Teseo! Grice: Ah Eugenio, vedi, il labirinto della politica somiglia tanto a quello della filosofia: tutti cercano l’uscita, ma spesso chi trova il filo è proprio chi ha il coraggio di lanciare una bella implicatura, lasciando che gli altri si interrogano se sia davvero una porta o solo una finestra socchiusa. E tu, tra le accuse e le mostrine strappate, hai sempre preferito il filo al minotauro! Scalfari: Una implicatura labirintica, per la quale, come è tua gentile costume, sempre provvedi al tuo compagno conversazionale – il filo, se così si può dire, colloquialmente, è proprio il regalo che ti fa chi sa girare per i meandri della storia, senza mai smarrirsi. Del resto, ogni vero filosofo sa che nel labirinto c’è sempre qualcuno che tiene il capo del filo: basta seguirlo… purché non sia annodato intorno a un articolo della Costituzione! Scalfari, Eugenio (1942). Contributo. Roma Fascista.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scandilio – Ossia: Grice e Scandilio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scandilio The gens Scandilia, also written Scantilia, was an obscure plebeian family of equestrian rank at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned by ancient writers, but a number are known from inscriptions.[1]  Origin The nomen Scandilius belongs to a large class of gentilicia formed using the suffix -ilius, usually from cognomina with diminutive endings such as -ilus or -ulus. The root of the name appears to be Scantillus, perhaps a diminutive of Scantius, another gentile name, which also seems to have given rise to the nomen Scantinius.[2]  Praenomina The Scandilii used a variety of common praenomina, including Lucius, Gaius, Marcus, Publius, Quintus, Titus, and Aulus. One of the women of this family bore the Etruscan praenomen Hastia, perhaps the Etruscan equivalent of the old Latin praenomen Hosta.  Branches and cognomina A number of personal cognomina appear among the Scandilii, some of which were the original names of freedmen who had assumed Roman names when they were manumitted. Of the others, Rufus was a common surname typically given to someone with red hair. Felix referred to someone happy, or fortunate, while Fabatus was derived from faba, a bean, and belonged to a large class of cognomina derived from the names of familiar objects, plants, and animals. Campana belongs to another group of surnames indicating one's place of origin, while Prima was originally a praenomen, given to an eldest daughter.[3]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Publius Scandilius, an eques who brought suit against Verres and his accomplice, Quintus Apronius, for having defrauded Scandilius during Verres' government of Sicily. Verres manipulated the trial in such a way that not only did Scandilius never recover his property, but he forfeited five thousand sestertii given as surety.[4] Lucius Scandilius Sp. f., named in a mid-first century BC inscription from Amiternum in Sabinum, along with Lucius Scandilius Bargates, apparently his freedman.[5] Lucius Scandilius L. l. Bargates, a freedman named in a mid-first century BC inscription from Amiternum.[5] Scandilius, named in a late first century BC funerary inscription from Rome.[6] Marcus Scandilius Hedonus, buried at Rome in the latter half of the first century BC.[7] Scandilius Rufus, named in a late first century BC inscription from Rome.[8] Gaius Scandilius Philetus, together with his wife, Scandilia Prima, dedicated a first-century monument at Pisae in Etruria to their son, the decurion Gaius Scandilius.[9] Scandilia Prima, together with her husband, Gaius Scandilius Philetus, dedicated a first-century monument at Pisae to their son, the decurion Gaius Scandilius.[9] Gaius Scandilius, a decurion at Pisae, where he was buried with a monument from his parents, Gaius Scandilius Philetus and Scandilia Prima, dating to the first century.[9] Scandilia Musa, buried at Rome, aged sixty, some time in the first century, with a monument from Donatus, a plumber, and slave of the imperial household.[10] Undated Scandilii Scandilia, the slave of Marcus Cassius Antiochus, a freedman at Rome.[11] Aulus Scandilius A. f., the son of Aulus Scandilius and Caesia, named in n inscription from Clusium in Etruria.[12] Hastia Scandilia, named in an inscription from Clusium.[13] Marcus Scandilius, named in an inscription from Philippi in Macedonia.[14] Marcus Scandilius, named in an inscription from Narbo in Gallia Narbonensis.[15] Scandilia C. f. Campana, named in an inscription from Hispania Baetica.[16] Scandilia M. l. Chreste, a freedwoman named in an inscription from Rome.[17] Marcus Scandilius Fabatus, a cavalry prefect, made a libationary offering to Apollo at Submuntorium in Rhaetia.[18] Titus Scandilius Felix, buried at Theveste in Africa Proconsularis.[19] Scantilius Galus, buried at Castellum Fabatianum in Numidia, aged one hundred and three.[20] Scandilia M. l. Maneme, a freedwoman buried at Rome.[21] Quintus Scantilius Marcus, a soldier in the first legion, buried at Novae in Moesia Inferior, with a monument from his father, Africanus.[22] Scandilia Optata, made a libationary offering at Philippi.[23] Scandilia C. l. Pamphila, a freedwoman buried at Dyrrachium in Macedonia.[24] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 734 ("Publius Scandilius").  Chase, pp. 122–126.  Chase, pp. 110, 111, 113, 114, 171.  Cicero, In Verrem, iii. 58–61.  AE 1991, 575.  AE 1991, 108.  AE 1991, 89.  Gregori, "Polla Valeria e Valeria Polla", p. 109.  CIL XI, 1447.  CIL VI, 33789.  CIL VI, 14495.  CIL XI, 2241.  CIL XI, 2425.  Pilhofer, Philippi, 412.  CIL XII, 5123.  CIL II, 981.  CIL VI, 14616.  AE 1978, 583.  CIL VIII, 27894.  ILAlg, ii. 2, 4297.  CIL VI, 38867.  AE 1987, 863.  CIL III, 641.  AE 1966, 404. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Verrem. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Stéphane Gsell, Inscriptions Latines de L'Algérie (Latin Inscriptions from Algeria, abbreviated ILAlg), Edouard Champion, Paris (1922–present). Peter Pilhofer, Philippi, Band 2: Katalog der Inschriften von Philippi (Catalog of Inscriptions from Philippi, abbreviated Philippi), Tübingen (2nd Edition, 2009). G. L. Gregori, "Polla Valeria e Valeria Polla: Due matronae solo in apparenza omonime. Tra Repubblica e Principato", in Matronae in domo et in re publica agentes, F. Cenerini, F. Rohr Vio, eds., Trieste (2016), pp. 109–120. Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scandilio – Ossia: Grice e Scandilio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scandilio For the Scandilii, I think there is a clear Gricean favorite: Grice e Scandilio contra Verren namely:  Publius Scandilius, the eques who brought suit against Verres and Quintus Apronius, only to discover that the judicial process itself had been manipulated so that he lost not merely the case but also his surety. [GREXv2 | Word]  This is almost pure Grice because it concerns the difference between:  the ostensible purpose of a proceeding, and what the proceeding is actually doing.   Grice e Scandilio de Iudicio Hardie:  What is a trial?  Grice:  A procedure for discovering the truth.  Hardie:  Ideally.  Grice:  Ah.  (Ha) Potts:  And what happened to Scandilius?  Grice:  He brought an action.  Potts:  And recovered his property?  Grice:  Quite the reverse.  (Ha)  The delightful Gricean issue is that institutions generate expectations much as conversations do. When a court convenes, one naturally infers:  +> evidence will matter; +> the injured party may obtain redress; +> the procedure is directed toward justice.  Yet Cicero's account of Verres is full of situations in which those expectations are frustrated. The form of justice remains while its function is subverted. [GREXv2 | Word]  Potts becomes excited Potts:  Then the court implicated fairness.  Grice:  Nicely put.  Potts:  But fairness was cancelled.  Grice:  Not cancelled.  Potts:  Defeated?  Grice:  Better.  (Ha) That is especially attractive because it links back to your Hartian theme of defeasibility. The ordinary expectation is:  lawsuit → judgment → remedy.  The Verres case becomes:  lawsuit → manipulation → loss. Verdict So my choice would be: Grice e Scandilio de Implicatura Institutionali Hardie:  What does a court mean?  Grice:  Justice.  Hardie:  Always?  Grice:  Scandilius thought so.  Hardie:  And Verres?  Grice:  Verres supplied the counterexample.  (Ha) The Scandilius episode is rich because it transfers Gricean questions from conversation to institutions: what is conveyed by the existence of a procedure, what expectations arise from it, and what happens when those expectations are systematically defeated. [GREXv2 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scandilio – Ossia: Grice e Scandilio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scandilio A second candidate A runner-up would be:  Scandilia Musa. [GREXv2 | Word]  Purely because Musa invites endless Oxford conversations about poetry, inspiration, and meaning. But the evidence is thin.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantio – Ossia: Grice e Scantio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantio The gens Scantia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens occur in history, and none of them attained any of the higher offices of the Roman state, but a number are known from inscriptions.[1]  Origin All that can be said with certainty about the nomen Scantius is that it seems to share a common root with several other nomina, such as Scandilius, Scantilius, and Scantinius, which were either formed directly from it using the common gentile-forming suffixes -ilius and -inius, or from related cognomina, such as Scandillus, Scantillus, or Scantinus, of which only the feminine Scantilla is known from history or inscriptions; the wife of Didius Julianus was Manlia Scantilla.[2][3][4]  Members Marcus Scantius,[i] tribune of the plebs in 293 BC, attempted to prosecute Lucius Postumius Megellus, who had been consul the previous year. This action was thwarted when Megellus was appointed legate to the consul Spurius Carvilius Maximus, and no further attempt was made to prosecute Megellus.[5][6] Scantius, one of the characters referred to in Varro's Eumenides, evidently a Menippean satire of which only fragments remain. In the fragment referring to him, Scantius appears to have written something about the Dionysia.[7] Scantia, a woman forced to surrender her house to Publius Clodius Pulcher, who threatened her life.[8] Scantia, one of the Vestal Virgins, who died or retired in AD 23, during the reign of Tiberius, and was succeeded by Cornelia.[9] See also List of Roman gentes Footnotes  Cantius in some manuscripts. References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 734 ("Scantia", "Scantius").  Chase, pp. 122–126.  Aelius Spartianus, "The Life of Didius Julianus", 3.  CIL VI, 22831 ("Naevia Scantilla"), CIL XIII, 5567 ("Scantilla, daughter of Senilis").  Livy, x. 46.  Broughton, vol. I, pp. 180, 181.  Varro, Saturarum Menippearum, fragment 142, p. 275 (ed. Bipontina).  Cicero, Pro Milone, 27.  Tacitus, Annales, iv. 16. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Milone. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Aelius Lampridius, Aelius Spartianus, Flavius Vopiscus, Julius Capitolinus, Trebellius Pollio, and Vulcatius Gallicanus, Historia Augusta (Augustan History). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Category: Roman gentes and about THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantio – Ossia: Grice e Scantio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantio For the Scantii, I think the best Gricean candidate is not the Vestal, nor even the unfortunate Scantia bullied by Clodius, but:  Marcus Scantius, tribune of the plebs in 293 BC, who attempted to prosecute Lucius Postumius Megellus, only to see the prosecution evaporate once Megellus was appointed a legate. [GREXv2 | Word]  This is a splendid case of what Grice might call an institutional implicature. Grice e Scantio de Accusatione Hardie:  What happened?  Grice:  Scantius wished to prosecute Megellus.  Hardie:  And?  Grice:  Megellus became a legate.  Hardie:  And?  Grice:  The prosecution ceased. [GREXv2 | Word]  Hardie:  Curious.  Grice:  Very.  (Ha)  The interesting question is not merely legal but communicative. Potts:  Did someone say: "You may not prosecute him"?  Grice:  Apparently not.  Potts:  Then how was the point conveyed?  Grice:  Institutionally.  (Ha) The appointment itself may have functioned rather like a speech act. Not:  "Stop the case."  but:  appointing him to a position whose practical consequence was that the case went no further. [GREXv2 | Word] Verdict My choice is: Grice e Scantio Tribuno because the failed prosecution contains a wonderfully Gricean lesson:  Sometimes what changes events is not an explicit utterance at all, but an institutional move whose consequences everyone understands.  Hardie:  Why did the prosecution fail?  Grice:  Officially?  Hardie:  Yes.  Grice:  Because Megellus became a legate.  Hardie:  And unofficially?  Grice:  Because everyone understood what that meant.  (Ha) [GREXv2 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantio – Ossia: Grice e Scantio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantio A second and rather charming possibility is:  Scantius, the figure appearing in a fragment of Varro's Eumenides, apparently as someone who had written about the Dionysia. [GREXv2 | Word]  The trouble is that the fragmentary evidence is too slight. Still, one can imagine: Hardie:  What did Scantius write?  Grice:  Something about the Dionysia.  Hardie:  What something?  Grice:  Varro neglected to tell us.  (Ha) Does this help? Dionysia = Bacchanalia? THanks Your query appears to bring together fragments of text, legal history, and religious festivals from ancient Rome and Greece, centering on Marcus Terentius Varro's Eumenides (one of his lost Menippean Satires).[1, 2, 3] A direct reconstruction of how these specific elements connect reveals a complex cultural cross-section of the ancient world. 1. Varro's Eumenides Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC) wrote a highly influential collection of 150 Saturae Menippeae(Menippean Satires). Only 49 short, highly corrupted fragments of his satire titled Eumenides survive today.[1, 2, 3, 4] In Greek mythology, the Eumenides (the "Gracious Ones") are a euphemistic name for the Furies—the underworld goddesses of vengeance and madness. [1, 2] In Varro's work, the "Eumenides" represent the Furies causing madness, which Varro uses to satirize the "madness" of contemporary Roman society, philosophical doctrines, and foreign religious cults (such as the ecstatic worshippers of Cybele, the Galli). [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 2. Marcus Scantius (Mistaken for "Scantina") The word "Scantina" in your query likely references Marcus Scantius, a historical Roman politician (Tribune of the Plebs in 293 BC) belonging to the Scantia family (gens Scantia). [1] According to surviving scholarly records, Scantius appears as a character in Varro's Eumenides. Note on Confusion: People often mix up the character Scantius in this satire with the Lex Scantinia. The Lex Scantinia was an ancient Roman law that penalized stuprum (unacceptable sexual misconduct/penetration) involving freeborn male citizen youths. While Varro's Eumenides heavily satirizes trans-fringe sexual ethics and gender role subversion via the Galli priests, the word in the literary fragment itself refers to the character Scantius. [1, 2, 3, 4] 3. The Dionysia Connection In the specific surviving fragment of Varro’s Eumenides featuring the character Scantius, Scantius is described as having written or said something regarding the Dionysia. [1] The Dionysia was the massive ancient Athenian festival celebrating Dionysus, the god of wine, theater, madness, and fertility. Varro, who wrote deeply about the history of Roman theater and religious origins (De scaenicis originibus), used this scene to mock Roman elite figures who tried to write about, intellectualize, or adopt Greek religious festivals like the Dionysia while losing touch with traditional Roman values. [1, 2, 3, 4] Summary of the Fragmentary Link When you look at Varro's Eumenides on Scantius and the Dionysia, you are looking at a satirical Roman text where Varro uses a character named Scantius to poke fun at the way Romans interacted with the wild, theatrical, and ecstatic rituals of the Greek Dionysia. He frames this cultural blending as a form of social madness, watched over by the Furies (Eumenides). [1, 2, 3, 4] If you are trying to locate the exact Latin text (Latin to English translation) of this specific fragment, let me know! I can track down the exact Fragment number from Jean-Pierre Cèbe's or Astbury's classical reconstructions of Varro's Menippean Satires. fragment lat eng? 5 siti Varro's fragment on Scantius and the Dionysia is preserved in the Compendiosa Doctrina of Nonius Marcellus, appearing as "...cum in eo essem occupatus atque in schola curarer, ut scribit Scantius, horno per Dionysia". This text from Eumenides (Frag. 121 M) is in Latin and translates roughly to, "...when I was occupied in that matter and was being taken care of in the school—as Scantius writes—this year during the Dionysia festival". [1, 2] The fragment uses the rare word horno to describe a character being treated at a Greek school/festival, with commentators suggesting it mocks a Roman named Scantius for over-adopting Greek customs to treat madness. The text is part of a satirical work focusing on insanity, where a Greek festival is ironically portrayed as a cure. [1, 2, 3] larger context and parsing? cum in eo essem occupatus atque in schola curarer, ut scribit Scantius, horno per Dionysia". 10 siti 1. Grammatical Parsing The grammar of the fragment breaks down into a main temporal clause with coordinating elements and an embedded quote: [1, 2] cum: Conjunction. "When" or "while." Used here with the subjunctive to set the background scene (a circumstantial cum clause). in eo: Preposition + Dem. Pronoun. "In that [matter]" or "occupied in that thing." In takes the ablative neuter singular eo. essem occupatus: Verb. "I was occupied/busy." This is the first-person singular, imperfect passive subjunctive of occupare. atque: Coordinating Conjunction. "And also." Stronger than a simple et. in schola: Preposition + Noun. "In the school" or "lecture-hall/philosophical sect." In takes the ablative feminine singular schola. curarer: Verb. "I was being treated" or "being taken care of." This is the first-person singular, imperfect passive subjunctive of curare. ut: Conjunction. "As" or "just as." Introduces a comparative parenthetical statement. scribit: Verb. "Writes" or "records." Third-person singular, present active indicative of scribere. Scantius: Proper Noun. "Scantius." Nominative masculine singular, serving as the subject of scribit. horno: Adverb/Ablative noun fragment. "This year" or "in this very year". It is a rare archaism (derived from hoc anno), which is exactly why the 4th-century grammarian Nonius Marcellus preserved this quote in his Compendiosa Doctrina. per Dionysia: Preposition + Proper Noun. "During the Dionysia festival." Per takes the accusative neuter plural Dionysia. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] Direct Literal Translation "...while I was occupied in that matter and was being treated in the school—as Scantius writes, 'this year during the Dionysia'..." [1] 2. The Larger Context Because Varro's Menippean Satires only survive in tiny fragments quoted by later grammarians, scholars reconstruct the thematic context based on surrounding phrases and classical analysis: [1, 2] The Broader Scene Immediately following this fragment, Varro's text transitions into a chaotic scene where students or philosophers wake up with a hangover from academic banquets and wander outside: [1] "...and we other students rise up, our ears stuffed with the scholarly banquet and drunk on sophisticated endless talk; with hungry eyes I head home, and passing the temple of the Mother of the Gods (Cybele), I hear the crash of cymbals..." [1] The Literary Satire The title of the satire is Eumenides (The Furies/Goddesses of Madness). The entire work is an extended joke comparing philosophical obsession and foreign religious cults to mental insanity. [1, 2] The "School" Clinic: In ancient Greek philosophy, a schola was sometimes metaphorically or literally treated as a place to "cure" madness of the soul. The narrator is poking fun at a Roman who went to an intellectual "clinic" to get treated. [1, 2] The Target (Scantius): Classical historians like T.P. Wiseman suggest that Scantius was likely a real, elite Roman contemporary of Varro who was prententiously obsessed with Greek culture (a "Hellenomaniac"). Varro quotes Scantius's own writing ("ut scribit Scantius") to mock how pompously Scantius described spending his year at the Greek theater festival (Dionysia) trying to intellectualize his life. [1, 2, 3] The Irony: Varro sets up a sharp contrast. The narrator is sitting inside a "rational" Greek school trying to cure his mind, but right outside the door, the wild, ecstatic, and chaotic worshippers of the goddess Cybele are screaming and banging cymbals. Human reason and academic "treatments" are entirely overwhelmed by the madness of the world. [1] Yes, it helps a great deal, though I would separate two questions:  Is the Dionysia the same as the Bacchanalia? What can we do with the fragment about Scantius?  Dionysia ≠ Bacchanalia Not exactly. The Dionysia was the Athenian festival of Dionysus, especially associated with drama, tragedy, comedy, and processions. [GREXv2 | Word] The Bacchanalia were Roman rites of Bacchus (the Roman equivalent of Dionysus), famous in Roman memory because of the Senate's suppression of them in 186 BC. A Roman could certainly connect the two: Hardie:  Dionysus?  Grice:  Bacchus.  Hardie:  Dionysia?  Grice:  Greek.  Hardie:  Bacchanalia?  Grice:  Roman.  (Ha) But they are not simply identical festivals.  The Scantius Fragment The fragment you quote is:  cum in eo essem occupatus atque in schola curarer, ut scribit Scantius, horno per Dionysia [GREXv2 | Word]  The grammar is indeed interesting.  cum ... essem occupatus = "when I was occupied ..." atque = "and also" in schola curarer = "I was being treated/cared for in the school" ut scribit Scantius = "as Scantius writes" horno = archaic "this year" per Dionysia = "during the Dionysia" [GREXv2 | Word]  What attracted my attention is not the Dionysia itself but:  ut scribit Scantius  ("as Scantius writes"). [GREXv2 | Word] That is almost irresistible for a Grice tutorial.  Grice e Scantio Scriptore Grice:  Today's topic is quotation.  Potts:  Direct quotation?  Grice:  No. Authority.  Potts:  Example?  Grice:  ut scribit Scantius.  (Ha)  Potts:  Why invoke Scantius?  Grice:  To borrow credibility.  Potts:  Is that part of what is said?  Grice:  No.  Potts:  Then?  Grice:  It is what citing an authority conventionally conveys.  (Ha)  And your earlier reconstruction of Varro is very suggestive. If Varro is satirising someone who spends his time:  in schools, at Greek festivals, among intellectual fashions,  then Scantius becomes a perfect Gricean foil. Hardie:  What is madness?  Grice:  In Varro?  Hardie:  Yes.  Grice:  The inability to distinguish education from obsession.  (Ha)  I almost prefer this Scantius to the tribune. The tribune gives us political procedure. The Varro fragment gives us:  quotation, authority, Hellenism, intellectual pretension, "as X writes."  All quintessential Oxford topics. Potts:  Why say ut scribit Scantius?  Grice:  Because merely being right is not enough.  Hardie:  One must also be footnoted.  (Ha)

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantio – Ossia: Grice e Scantio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantio, There is also a delightful runner-up:  Scantia, forced by Publius Clodius Pulcher to surrender her house after threats to her life. [GREXv2 | Word]  That raises a classic Gricean question: Potts:  Was it a request?  Grice:  Grammatically, perhaps.  Potts:  Practically?  Grice:  A threat.  (Ha)

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantinio – Ossia: Grice e Scantinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantinio The gens Scantinia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in the third century BC, but few of them held positions of importance in the Roman state.[1]  Origin The nomen Scantinius belongs to a common class of gentilicia formed using the suffix -inius. Such names were typically derived from surnames ending in -inus, but this type was so common that -inius came to be regarded as a regular gentile-forming suffix, and was applied even in cases where there was no morphological justification. There is no evidence of a corresponding cognomen Scantinus, so the name was probably formed directly from Scantius, another gentile name. The similar nomen Scandilius was probably formed in the same manner.[2]  Branches and cognomina The only cognomen associated with any of the Scantinii mentioned in history is Capitolinus, one of a large class of surnames derived from one's place of origin or residence. It indicated that its bearer or one of his ancestors lived on the Capitoline Hill, one of the Seven Hills of Rome.[3]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Gaius Scantinius Capitolinus, accused by Marcus Claudius Marcellus of having propositioned his son, when Scantinius and Marcellus were both aediles, about 226 BC. The senate was convinced by the testimony of Marcellus' son, and condemned Scantinius to a fine, which Marcellus used to make three silver libation bowls, which he dedicated to the gods.[4][5][6] Publius Scantinius, one of the pontifices, died in 216 BC. He and two of his colleagues, who fell at Cannae, were among those officials and magistrates for whom replacements were chosen in the wake of that catastrophe.[7][8] Scantinius, tribune of the plebs in an uncertain year, was the author of the lex Scantinia de Nefanda Venere, a law forbidding certain sexual practices. Cicero's friend, Marcus Caelius Rufus, was accused under this law by Appius Claudius Pulcher, censor in 50 BC, but the charge rebounded against him and came to naught.[9][10][11][12][13] Marcus Scantinius M. f., one of the quindecimviri sacris faciundis named in the Fasti Albenses, a list of magistrates from the time of Caesar to the early years of Tiberius.[14] Gaius Scantinius, buried at Rome.[15] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 734 ("Scantinius").  Chase, pp. 122–126.  Chase, pp. 113, 114.  Plutarch, "The Life of Marcellus", 2.  Valerius Maximus, vi. 1. § 7.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 230 (and note 1).  Livy, xxiii. 21.  Broughton, vol. I, p. 252.  Caelius, apud Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares, viii. 12, 14.  Juvenal, Satirae, ii. 44.  Suetonius, "The Life of Domitian", 8.  Ausonius, Epigrammata, 88.  Tertullian, De Monogamia, 12.  AE 2012, 437.  CIL VI, 7137. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac Dictorum Memorabilium (Memorable Facts and Sayings). Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch), Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Vita Caesarum (Lives of the Caesars, or The Twelve Caesars). Decimus Junius Juvenalis, Satirae (Satires). Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus (Tertullian), De Monogamia (Concerning Monogamy). Decimius Magnus Ausonius, Epigrammata de Diversis Rebus (Epigrams about Various Things). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantinio – Ossia: Grice e Scantinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantinio For the Scantinii, there is really one candidate who towers above the others: Grice e Scantinio de Lege Scantinia namely the unknown Scantinius associated with the lex Scantinia, the law repeatedly mentioned by later Roman writers and invoked in political accusations. [GREXv2 | Word] Why is this so Gricean? Because the law is famous precisely for what we do not quite know. The sources tell us that it forbade certain sexual practices and that accusations could be brought under it; Marcus Caelius Rufus was charged under it, and later authors refer to it. [GREXv2 | Word] But the exact scope of the statute remained unclear even to later antiquity. That gives us:  explicit wording (lost), legal application, inferred meaning, disputed interpretation.  Pure Grice.  Grice e Scantinio Hardie:  What did the lex Scantinia prohibit?  Grice:  Something.  Hardie:  What something?  Grice:  If only we possessed the text.  (Ha)  The Gricean Point Most Roman laws survive incompletely. The interpreter therefore asks:  What did the legislators mean?  not  What do the surviving words literally say?  because the surviving words are often missing. Potts:  Then how do historians proceed?  Grice:  By effects.  Potts:  Meaning?  Grice:  Observe the prosecutions. Observe the accusations. Infer the rule.  (Ha) That is very close to Grice's distinction between:  what is explicitly stated, what must be reconstructed from usage. A Grice–Potts vignette Potts:  What is the meaning of the lex Scantinia?  Grice:  The evidence is incomplete.  Potts:  Then how can we know?  Grice:  The same way we understand many conversations.  Potts:  By implication?  Grice:  By observing what people subsequently took it to mean.  (Ha)  So my choice for the gens Scantinia is: Grice e Scantinio de Significatione Legis The law bearing the family's name survives more as an interpretive problem than as a text, which makes it almost an ideal Gricean object: a case where meaning must be reconstructed from context, use, and consequences rather than directly recovered from explicit wording. [GREXv2 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scantinio – Ossia: Grice e Scantinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scantinio A second candidate There is also:  Gaius Scantinius Capitolinus, condemned after being accused by Marcus Claudius Marcellus' son. The Senate accepted the son's testimony and imposed a fine. [GREXv2 | Word]  That gives a nice tutorial on testimony: Hardie:  Why was he convicted?  Grice:  Because someone believed the witness.  (Ha) But the law itself is richer.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scaramelli – Ossia: Grice e Scaramelli: la ragione conversazionale. Note sul Direttorio ascetico. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice Giovanni Battista Scaramelli (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale. A comparison between Grice and Giovanni Battista Scaramelli highlights two different but convergent models of reason as an internal regulator of meaningful practice. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats reason as operative within ordinary linguistic exchange: speakers mean what they do because they assume and exploit shared norms of rational cooperation, so that implicature arises from disciplined departures from what is strictly said and remains accountable to mutual intelligibility. Scaramelli, working within ascetical and mystical theology rather than philosophy of language, nevertheless develops a closely related conception of discursive reason in his Discernimento degli spiriti and the Direttorî, where spiritual judgment is governed by rules of clarity, discernment, and proportion aimed at avoiding illusion, excess, and misuse of language about inner experience. Just as Grice insists that conversational meaning is not produced by authority, private intention alone, or mechanical convention, Scaramelli rejects unregulated enthusiasm, quietist immediacy, and opaque speech in spiritual matters, insisting instead on reasoned evaluation of signs, intentions, and effects within a communal and pedagogical framework. In both figures, reason functions not as abstract metaphysics but as practical normativity: for Grice, it structures how speakers responsibly make themselves understood; for Scaramelli, it structures how experiences, words, and spiritual claims are interpreted, tested, and communicated without confusion or coercion. The result is a shared vision, across secular and religious domains, of meaning as something achieved through disciplined practice under publicly accountable standards, rather than bestowed by status, charisma, or inner certainty. Grice: presbitero italiano, appartenente alla compagnia di Gesù, autore dei Direttori ascetico e mistico e de Il discernimento degli spiriti. Entra nella compagnia di Gesù. Insegna grammatica, retorica, filosofia, teologia. È missionario popolare e predicatore di esercizi spirituali in moltissime comunità religiose. Scrive biografie e trattati di ascetica e mistica. Opere. Ancora vivente è pubblicata soltanto la Vita di suor Maria Crocifissa Satellico, Venezia. Giunta alla quarta edizione, l'opera è messa all'Indice perché sembra volesse prevenire il giudizio del magistero della chiesa sulla santità della religiosa. Dopo alcune correzioni la biografia è liberamente ristampata.  Dopo la sua morte sono pubblicati Il discernimento degli spiriti -- Venezia --, il Direttorio ascetico – Venezia -- e il Direttorio mistico -- Venezia -- e la Dottrina di san Giovanni della Croce -- Venezia. Solo nel Novecento è stata scoperta e pubblicata una sua Vita della serva di Dio Angela Cospari.  Le perplessità per la pubblicazione delle sue opere, vivente l'autore, nacquero nell'ambito della Compagnia di Gesù per le polemiche sul quietismo allora molto virulente e sulla delicatezza delle materie trattate. I Direttorî e il Discernimento hanno un grande successo e una grande diffusione, per la chiarezza espositiva e la profondità delle materie trattate.  Grice: Caro Scaramelli, ho letto il tuo "Discernimento degli spiriti" e devo confessare che persino il mio spirito filosofico si è sentito discernere – tra un asceta e un mistico, preferisco sempre quello che ha il caffè pronto alle sei del mattino! Scaramelli: Ah, Grice, ma tu sai bene che il vero discernimento si compie quando il caffè è ancora caldo e il pensiero è fresco! E se la Compagnia di Gesù mi avesse dato una moka, avrei scritto pure un Direttorio sul “risveglio spirituale”… con doppio zucchero. Grice: Vedi, caro amico, in fondo la tua ascesi è tutta una questione di aroma: potrei dire che la santità, come la filosofia, si distingue dal profumo – e l’implicatura, naturalmente, è che chi non sente l’odore forse non ha mai davvero filosofato! Scaramelli: Divina implicatura, mio Grice! Ma allora dovrò aggiungere al prossimo Direttorio un capitolo sul "discernimento del barista" – perché, come dice il proverbio, anche lo spirito ha bisogno di una pausa… e magari di una brioche! Grice’s weekly essay assignment: If s- at the beginning of a word is the negative prefix, what would Scaramelli not mean? Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. Scaramelli, Giovanni Battista (1752). Direttorio ascetico. Venezia: Pezzana.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scarano – Ossia: Grice e Scarano: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura del scenofilace. Note sul Scenophylax, dialogus, in quo tragoediis et comoediis antiquus carminum usus restituitur. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Lucio Scarano (Brindisi, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura del scenofilace – A comparison between Grice and Lucio Scarano brings out two historically distant but structurally related ways of thinking about reason as a governor of meaningful linguistic practice. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats reason as immanent to interaction: speakers are rational agents who rely on shared expectations of cooperation to generate not only what is explicitly said but also what is implied, with implicature arising from the disciplined management of saying less, more, or other than what is strictly required. Scarano, writing in the sixteenth century in Scenophylax, approaches reason from the normative side of public performance rather than everyday conversation, yet in a strikingly parallel way conceives language as an ordered practice sustained by rational guardianship. His figure of the scenophylax, the “custodian” of theatrical language, embodies a form of conversational reason avant la lettre: not authoritarian imposition, but vigilant maintenance of intelligibility, decorum, and expressive fit between words, gestures, and genres. Where Grice resists the idea that meaning is fixed by convention alone and instead grounds it in rational accountability between participants, Scarano resists innovation that severs words from the shared rational order of classical usage, arguing that altering language alters action, genre, and mutual understanding. In both thinkers, reason does not operate as abstract theory but as a practical norm guiding how language functions in a communal space—conversation for Grice, the stage for Scarano—so that meaning is preserved, enriched, or criticized not by force or novelty for its own sake, but by responsiveness to what rational participants can recognize, interpret, and hold one another answerable for within a shared linguistic world. Grice: Studia a Bologna, Padova e a Venezia. Fonda l’Accademia a Venezia. Scrive il saggio “Scenophylax” (Venezia), nel quale tratta della convenienza di restituire alla tragedia e alla commedia la lingua del lazio. P. Camassa, Brindisini illustri, Brindisi, A. Sordo, Ritratti brindisini. LYCII PHILOSOPHI MEDICI i f \ 6 3 y 'H Academici Veneti SCENOPHYLAX W "J Dialogus, in quo Tragxdijs, &T Comxdifs antiquus Carminum vfus reftituitur, recentiorum quorundam iniuria interceptus. Et de vi, ac natura Carminis agitur. AD ILLVSTREM ET CLARIS ADOLESCENTEM r Dominicum Ruzinum Caroli F. Patritium Venetum.. privilegifs, et Superiorum permtfsu n Venezia. Apudloail. BaDtiftarnCjnrrnm a 4^-jl Jl 1\ c 1 DK 13 M liMOLOaiH '1 .-V' vhomV iJrnsiji-oA. jkj Y :T Y H V. V.\.ZM fi A ' i r */ca g$? potuit, gf' voluit ommno, te filiumtn tarum artium, ggf fiudiorum dtfctpli namur odere,quaggr in patria fapitis et polle*' fiorisdpudrxter agnationes, multis periculis y (g? magno fufcepto labore, collaudauerat in alus. Itaque non fumptibus, nonindufita, non defatigationi pepercit vit, vtqut tu dederas • d tene ris annis ingeif pudoris, bum initatis, gf futurarum adumbrata ftgna 'Virtutum, ea, firmioribus annis, accurate praflares.T u vero non fil um expeciattont refpondifti patris, gtf tuorum, fed in medio itineris curriculo, quafi robufl toris alatis, ggi annorum auxilta deficiens, omnium opinionem,prarepto tempore, juperafit, omnium voto,pratercjuam tuo, maior $ vt vno propemodum, et eodem temporis momento, (ementem videremus, gf fruges.His tgitur ejfectum e (i, ut omnes, quibus es ahquaratione cognitus, te colant, ad mirentur, g^ament . Egouero non (colum his ipfis tuis dotibus, fed etiam (ficus in me tuis adductus, mbil ejl ommno, quod tibi non debeam. Cum uero plurima cupiam, pauca pof A i fim. scenofilace – il tragico – il comico – scenofilace, custode, sacristano, custode dei vasi -- siria.  Grice: Scarano, ho letto del tuo Scenophylax: tu vuoi rimettere in scena tragedia e commedia con la lingua del Lazio. Insomma: un custode che, invece di custodire i vasi, custodisce le parole—e guai a chi entra in teatro con un accento forestiero. Scarano: Appunto! Se cambi la lingua, cambi il gesto: e se cambi il gesto, ti ritrovi una tragedia che pare una commedia—e una commedia che si prende sul serio come un senatore. Il Scenophylax serve a ricordare al pubblico che anche il riso ha grammatica. Grice: Capisco… e mi viene da pensare che certe “innovazioni” siano come mettere una chiave nuova a una porta antica: la porta resta, ma tutti fingono di non trovare più l’ingresso. E poi, diciamolo: quando uno proclama di “restituire” la lingua, spesso sta solo chiedendo di essere l’unico a poter dire chi parla bene—e il resto della compagnia, per prudenza, recita piano. Scarano: Splendida implicatura, Grice — mette in ombra il “detto” di quel che hai appena detto! Cioè: tu non stai dicendo “sei un tiranno del palcoscenico”, ma lo fai capire con tale eleganza che la tua critica decora senza ingombrare—proprio come dovrebbe fare la lingua del Lazio, quando è davvero teatro e non burocrazia. Scarano, Lucio (1563). Scenophylax, dialogus, in quo tragoediis et comoediis antiquus carminum usus restituitur. Venezia.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scavarelli – Ossia: Grice e Scaravelli: la ragione conversazionale -- tra critica e meta-fisica. Note su Il criticismo. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Luigi Scaravelli (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale -- tra critica e meta-fisica. Luigi Scaravelli’s philosophical itinerary, centered on critique rather than system‑building, offers a distinctive point of comparison with Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, even though the two operate in different registers. Grice approaches reason from the side of linguistic practice, arguing that what speakers mean, beyond what they strictly say, is regulated by shared rational expectations embodied in cooperative principles and maxims that make communication intelligible without appeal to metaphysical guarantees. Scaravelli, by contrast, works within a Kantian horizon, redefining critique as a disciplined inquiry into the conditions of judgment, understanding, and reality itself, particularly in his Critica del capire, where reason appears not as an autonomous creative spirit, as in Croce or Gentile, but as a fragile, historically situated activity that must constantly examine its own claims and limits. Yet the convergence lies in their shared resistance to dogmatic metaphysics: Scaravelli’s insistence that judgment, whether theoretical or historical, must justify itself through critical articulation parallels Grice’s insistence that meaning arises from rational accountability within communicative exchange rather than from conventions, psychology, or authority. For both, reason is not an external faculty imposing structure from above, but an immanent normativity enacted in practice—through judgments in Scaravelli’s sense, and through conversational moves and implicatures in Grice’s—so that understanding, whether of reality or of what another speaker means, depends on the disciplined negotiation of sense under publicly recognizable constraints rather than on the construction of closed systems or metaphysical totalities. Si laurea a Pissa sotto CARLINI. Insegna a Roma, e Firenze. Profondo conoscitore di Kant, approfondisce nei suoi studi pubblicati con molta riluttanza e quasi solo per esigenze concorsuali in particolare i temi relativi ai rapporti tra la filosofia kantiana e la fisica, i problemi relativi alla critica del giudizio ed anche i temi dell'idealismo.  Biblioteca personale, Villa Mirafiori. Saggi: “Critica del capire”, Firenze, Sansoni, Saggio sulla categoria kantiana della realta (Firenze, Monnier); La prima meditazione di Cartesio (Firenze, Nuova Italia); “La critica del giudizio” (Pisa, Normale); Corsi, “Critica del capire”; “L'analitica trascendentale” (Firenze, Nuova Italia); “La Biblioteca”; “L' attualità Mirri, Napoli, Sientifiche); Visentin, “Le categorie e la realtà” Lui(Firenze, Le lettere); Sasso, L’idealismo, Napoli, Bibliopolis; La storia come metodo, Convegno a Roma); “Il problema del giudizio storico); Mannelli, Rubbettino, pensatore europeo, Biscuso e Gembillo, Messina, Siciliano, Sasso, il giudizio, in Filosofia e idealismo. Paralipomeni, Napoli, Bibliopolis,  Palermo, Tra critica e metafisica. Lettore di Kant, Pisa, ETS,   Treccani Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Biscuso, La  completa dei suoi scritti, su giornale di filosofia. Ripercorrendo il proprio itinerario speculativo, in un documento di grande rilievo S. scrive:  dieci o quindici anni fa  ero pienamente convinto di quella impostazione mentale, comune al Croce e al Gentile, che considera la realtà come spirito, e lo spirito come autoprodursi; e in questo autoprodursi vede l'esistenza e tutta l'esistenza. Ma nonostante fossi convinto della validità di questa concezione, pure un lavoro che avevo cominciato su Platone mi spingeva a ripensare le basi della concezione storiografica nella quale mi muovevo; paralipomena, la storia della filosofia di Scaravelli, criticismo, critica del capire, giudizio storico, storia come metodo.  Grice: Caro Scaravelli, se Kant avesse potuto assistere ai tuoi corsi sulla "Critica del capire", forse avrebbe finalmente capito la differenza tra critica e metafisica, e magari avrebbe aggiunto una quarta critica: quella del buon umore!  Scaravelli: Ah, Grice, ma non dimenticare che ogni giudizio, anche quello sul buon umore, ha bisogno di una categoria kantiana. E la categoria della realtà, almeno nei miei seminari a Villa Mirafiori, è sempre quella del caffè – che trascende ogni forma!  Grice: Ecco, parlando di seminari, devo confessare che non ho mai partecipato al "The Bounds of Sense" di Strawson a Vadum Boum. Sapevo che i suoi confini sarebbero stati non solo boundless, ma forse anche un po’ nonsensical – e preferisco la sensatezza del tuo "Critica del capire".  Scaravelli: La tua implicatura è noumenica! – se mai esistesse un soprannome di lode tra filosofi, questo lo sarebbe davvero. E poi, tra noi, meglio un giudizio storico ben fondato che un senso senza confini: almeno così Croce e Gentile possono dormire sonni tranquilli! re passage below: provide a 100-move conversation G. and S. as they discuss ways to avoid mentioning Kant (or Cant, as G. prefers to spell him, since he was Scot) and canting, and the Italian mania of talking kritik and criticismo -- which is good -- we are discussing criticism, do not mention kant, as we don't mention plato and speak of idealism, it all makes sense -- why give so much credit to a mere surname -- surely critic is qhat he did -- and neo-kantians? they are neo-criticis, with critic (Cant) being pre-critic? G. objects to the nonsense by S. etc -- pre-crtici is no pre-cant, canting is jargon -- and so on and back to the neo-kantians, and how many critiques? One too many -- etc etc just the conv. no preamble or ps thank oyou G.: Let us begin by not mentioning Kant. S.: Or Cant, as you prefer to spell him. G.: Quite. A Scot ought to have been Cant, and a system so full of critical apparatus deserves the pun. S.: That is already unfair. G.: Only orthographically. I object to the whole habit of making a philosophy into a surname with a capital letter and then treating the surname as if it had written all the nouns around it. S.: You mean criticismo. G.: Exactly. If we are discussing criticism, why drag in a surname every third sentence? One does not constantly mention Plato in order to speak of idealism. S.: Some Italians do. G.: Italians have a weakness for genealogical piety. They think a doctrine is strengthened by having a grandfather. S.: Then Scaravelli’s Il criticismo is, in your view, refreshingly impersonal. G.: Potentially, yes. “Criticism,” not “Kantism,” and better for it. S.: Though Scaravelli is obviously working in a very specific horizon. G.: Of course. But a horizon is not a surname. One may work in a critical idiom without hanging every distinction on the peg of one East Prussian. S.: East Prussian, not Scottish. G.: Geographically perhaps. Orthographically I remain unconvinced. S.: Then let us ask the blunt question. Why avoid the name? G.: Because names become slogans, and slogans become lazy thought. Once you say “Kantian,” half the room stops distinguishing. S.: Yet there are people who need the label. G.: They usually need fewer labels, not more. “Critical philosophy” tells one what is being done: examining the conditions, limits, and validity of judgment. “Kantianism” tells one whose bust is in the corridor. S.: So criticismo is the better category. G.: Better, yes, because it describes an activity, not a pedigree. S.: Then what of the neo-Kantians? G.: An excellent nuisance. S.: You would rename them neo-critics? G.: Not in the literary-journalistic sense, no. But if one must keep the structure, “neo-critical philosophers” is at least less servile than “neo-Kantians.” S.: Yet that sounds dangerously like men writing prefaces to poems. G.: Everything useful sounds dangerous if left to literary departments. Still, the basic point remains. “Neo-Kantian” gives too much credit to the surname and too little to the operation. S.: Then who are the pre-critici? G.: No such thing. S.: Why not? If the neo-Kantians are really neo-critics, then surely there were pre-critics, with Critic — or Cant — being the first proper critic. G.: That is nonsense. S.: Why exactly? G.: Because criticism in philosophy did not begin with one man and his fondness for capitals. One may criticise long before one systematises critique. S.: So there are no pre-critics, only previous critics. G.: Very good. The hyphenated “pre-” in such matters usually means “we have decided the real thing begins later.” It is historiographical bullying. S.: Then “pre-Cant” is worse still. G.: Much worse. It sounds like one is waiting for a fog of jargon to descend upon Königsberg before thought becomes serious. S.: Which is what you mean by canting. G.: Exactly. Cant is the language of initiated seriousness when it ceases to notice that other people still speak. S.: So “critical philosophy” may itself turn into cant. G.: Very easily. All philosophies become cants once their technical language begins to masquerade as moral rank. S.: And the Italians are especially fond of talking critica and criticismo. G.: Because the words are handsome and historical, and because they allow one to seem both severe and modern without always saying what one is criticizing or why. S.: Yet Scaravelli is not merely trading in fashionable nouns. G.: No, that is the point. Scaravelli interests me because he takes criticism as discipline rather than slogan. S.: In Critica del capire especially. G.: Yes. There the noun is not a banner but a burden. To understand is not to seize dogmatically, but to submit one’s own understanding to scrutiny. S.: Which is very different from using “critical” as an adjective of self-congratulation. G.: Entirely. One has seen too many people calling themselves critical merely because they dislike something loudly. S.: You are thinking of Marxists. G.: Among others. But the vice is ecumenical. S.: Then why not keep the personal name at least as historical orientation? G.: One may mention it once, perhaps twice, to place the matter. But after that one ought to let the activity speak for itself. If one is discussing critique, discuss critique. S.: You do realise that many Italians would hear in “criticismo” not general criticism but specifically the critical tradition of that German. G.: Yes, and that is precisely the problem. A useful noun has been colonised by reverence. S.: Then perhaps we should distinguish between critica and criticismo. G.: A good idea. Critica is the act, the discipline, the procedure of examination. Criticismo is already an -ism, that dangerous suffix by which activities become camps. S.: So criticismo may be what happens when critique becomes a doctrinal position. G.: Exactly. And one might say that Scaravelli tries to rescue critica from criticismo even while writing a book called Il criticismo. S.: That is delicious. G.: It often happens. Titles do the compromise, the text does the rescue. S.: Then Il criticismo may already be half concession to the history of reception. G.: Very likely. A book must enter the field by names others recognise before it may begin correcting them. S.: So the title says, “Yes, yes, the critical tradition,” and the text says, “Now let us see what critical thinking actually requires.” G.: Precisely. And that is why I do not object to the title as much as to the later habit of speaking as if the surname were the philosophy. S.: Then let me provoke you. Surely Cant did something definite enough to deserve the credit. G.: He did several things. Too many, perhaps. Three critiques is already one too many. S.: One too many? Which one would you remove? G.: Usually the third, on aesthetic and teleological judgment, though only because philosophers are least improved by trying to annex beauty under system. S.: That is not a very German opinion. G.: Which is why it is tolerable. S.: Still, three critiques give one an architectonic. G.: Architectonic is one of the words I should like to abolish before breakfast. S.: Because it is cant. G.: Because it is nearly always cant. People say architectonic when they mean “I have arranged my prejudices into floors.” S.: Then how many critiques would be acceptable? G.: Two if one is feeling industrious, one if honest, none if one is wise enough to examine without building a monument. S.: Scaravelli would probably enjoy that. G.: He might smile. He knows that critique becomes most alive when it resists enclosure into system. S.: Yet he is still often called a Kantian. G.: Because people are lazy, and because “Kantian” is easier than explaining what sort of critical work he is actually doing. S.: Which is? G.: A disciplined inquiry into judgment, reality, understanding, and their limits, without collapsing them into Crocean spirit or Gentilian self-production. S.: That does sound less slogan-like. G.: Thank heaven. Philosophy should occasionally sound like work rather than livery. S.: Then perhaps your hatred of the surname is really a hatred of schoolishness. G.: Partly, yes. Once a philosophy becomes a surname plus -ian, the pupils begin marching. S.: And the neo-Kantians march more than most. G.: Certainly. “Neo-Kantian” is one of those labels that lets one avoid saying whether one is reviving the epistemology, the ethics, the transcendental method, the anti-psychologism, the theory of science, or merely the spectacles. S.: Then “neo-critical” would force more explanation. G.: Exactly. And that is why I like it better, despite the literary contamination. S.: Yet you resist my pre-critici. G.: Because it smuggles in the fiction that criticism begins at a single historical point. Socrates was critical enough. So was Aristotle in his way. So were sceptics, jurists, theologians, and most decent minds before the eighteenth century. S.: Then the innovation lies not in criticism, but in critique becoming self-conscious method. G.: Better. That one may say. A new style of criticism, perhaps, a transcendental turn, a new systematic ambition — all of that is fair. But not the ridiculous claim that the world waited in darkness until one German surname lit the lamp. S.: “Even talk of darkness presupposes shared lamps,” as you once said. G.: Quite. And the critical lamp was not invented in one shop. S.: Then why do Italians like criticismo so much? G.: Because it sounds serious, because it lets one place oneself between dogmatism and metaphysics, because it is a way of being severe without being merely scholastic, and because Italian idealism taught them to narrate philosophy by family names and turns. S.: So criticismo becomes both shield and credential. G.: Precisely. A word with enough history to impress, enough ambiguity to shelter, and enough foreign prestige to travel. S.: Yet Scaravelli’s relation to it is more austere. G.: Yes. Scaravelli is one of those men who read the tradition well enough to avoid joining the chorus too quickly. S.: Then your preferred sentence would be what? “Scaravelli works in a critical horizon” rather than “Scaravelli is Kantian”? G.: Something of that sort. Or better: “Scaravelli practises critique upon judgment and understanding in a way historically continuous with, but not exhausted by, Kant.” S.: Horribly exact. G.: Exactness is often horrible at first hearing. S.: Then where does idealism come in? He begins under Croce and Gentile, after all. G.: Exactly. Which makes the critical turn all the more interesting. He is not moving from innocence to doctrine, but from one inflated spiritualism toward a more disciplined account of judgment. S.: So criticismo in his case is a way out of Italian idealist overproduction. G.: Very well put. Yes. A way of checking the habit of turning reality into spirit and spirit into self-generating theatre. S.: Then critique becomes anti-theatrical. G.: In its best moments, yes. It asks under what conditions one may judge, understand, or claim, instead of simply baptising one’s own performance as reality. S.: Which is something you would like in any language. G.: Entirely. I am a friend of anti-theatricality where philosophy is concerned, though not always in dining-rooms. S.: Then back to the surname. Is there any legitimate use for “Kantian”? G.: Of course. When one is distinguishing positions historically or doctrinally and the label saves time without destroying content. But one should not let it become the only noun. S.: So if I say “Kantian categories,” you wince less than if I say “Kantianism” as if it were sufficient unto itself. G.: Much less. “Kantian categories” names a determinate doctrinal element. “Kantianism” often means “all that sort of thing, and do not trouble me with distinctions.” S.: Which is itself canting. G.: Exactly. The greatest cant is often academic shorthand masquerading as precision. S.: Then perhaps you should spell him Cant consistently, to remind people of the danger. G.: I have occasionally been tempted. S.: It would scandalise them. G.: Which is always a small recommendation. S.: Yet you would not really do it in print. G.: Probably not. The jest is better in conversation. Print hardens jokes into eccentricity. S.: And philosophy has enough eccentricity already. G.: More than enough. Now, what of the “critical” in Critica del capire? There the noun is entirely just. S.: Because it names the operation, not the allegiance. G.: Precisely. It says: let us examine understanding itself, not erect a shrine to a predecessor. S.: So the title is almost your ideal case. G.: Nearly. I might still have preferred something with one fewer abstract noun, but one cannot have everything. S.: Then what of neo-Kantians again? Must they all be renamed? G.: Not renamed, perhaps, but read against their label. When one says “neo-Kantian,” one must immediately ask: in what respect, with which critique, against which enemies, in what institutional climate? S.: So one turns the label into a question rather than a resting-place. G.: Exactly. A label should be the beginning of analysis, not its substitution. S.: That is an admirable sentence for first-years. G.: They would ignore it and ask for a list. S.: Which you would refuse. G.: Naturally. Lists are what one gives when one has ceased to teach and begun to administer. S.: Very severe. G.: Only because experience has improved my temper by worsening it. S.: Then let us say: criticismo is acceptable so long as it remembers itself to be critica become historical self-consciousness, not a surname cult. G.: That is good. Add that the best critical philosophy resists becoming an -ism at all. S.: Because the moment it becomes an -ism, it begins protecting itself from the very scrutiny it was invented to apply. G.: Excellent. Keep that. S.: Thank you. G.: Do not become neo-anything with it. S.: Never intentionally. Then one more question. If we do not say “Kantian idealism,” what do we say? G.: We say what the doctrine is. Transcendental idealism, perhaps. Or better still, describe the claim about objects, appearances, conditions of experience, and so on. The less one can do with surnames, the more one may be forced to think. S.: Which is your whole complaint. G.: My whole complaint against philosophy since at least the nineteenth century, yes. S.: What about Plato then? You just said we do not mention him every time we speak of idealism. G.: Exactly. We let idealism stand as a type of doctrine, school, or family of positions. We do not constantly say “Platonicism” unless history requires it. Why should one German receive more surname-tax than the Greek who has done much more damage? S.: Because the Germans footnote more aggressively. G.: A just and terrible answer. S.: Then perhaps Italians say criticismo because they want the dignity of criticism without the vulgarity of surname-worship. G.: In their best moments, yes. In their worst moments they say criticismo as a password. S.: A polite password. G.: The most dangerous kind. Now, if one had to assign a weekly essay on this, what would it be? S.: “Discuss whether criticismo is a doctrine, an activity, or a memorial practice, and state whether the surname may be omitted without loss.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. G.: Excellent. Add: “You may not begin with Königsberg.” S.: Cruel. G.: Necessary. Another: “Explain why the neo-Kantians are not thereby relieved of the duty to say which critique they have read.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. S.: Very nice. G.: And a third: “Assess the proposition that the proper successor to Criticism is criticism, not Kantianism.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. S.: You really do prefer the common noun to the proper one. G.: Naturally. Proper nouns too often become improper arguments. S.: Then perhaps your final verdict is this: Canting begins when critique becomes a badge. G.: Perfect. S.: Dry enough? G.: Sufficiently Florentine, with one German surname left respectfully untranslated.Scaravelli, Luigi (1936). Il criticismo. Firenze: Le Monnier.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scarpelli – Ossia: Grice e Scarpelli: la ragione conversazionale della filosofia fascista – Gentile e il fascismo giuridico – Soleri --  il tropico, il clistico, il neustico, ed il frastico. Note su Il materialismo. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice  Uberto Scarpelli (Vicenza, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale della filosofia fascista – Uberto Scarpelli’s work on prescriptive language and legal normativity offers a revealing contrast and complement to Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, especially when set against the political and intellectual background from which Scarpelli emerged. Grice conceives meaning as fundamentally anchored in rational cooperation among speakers, where what is said and what is implicated are governed by shared norms of justification, relevance, and responsibility rather than by authority or ideology. Scarpelli, having been trained within Italian idealism under Croce and Gentile and later reacting critically against the organicist and fascist philosophies of law associated with that tradition, redirects attention to the semiotics of prescriptions, distinguishing components such as the tropic, clitic, neustic, and phrastic to show how norms function linguistically without reducing them to commands backed by force. Where fascist legal philosophy tended to collapse meaning into political will or state authority, Scarpelli—drawing on analytic philosophy, logical positivism, and figures such as Hare and Stevenson—insists that legal and moral discourse must be analyzed as reason‑responsive practices, capable of justification and critique. In this respect he converges with Grice: both reject the idea that meaning or normativity is generated by sheer power, psychological causation, or institutional fiat, and both treat rational accountability within linguistic practice as central. The difference lies in emphasis: Grice starts from ordinary conversation to articulate universal pragmatic norms governing communication, while Scarpelli starts from normative and legal language to show how prescriptions can be rationally discussed, criticized, and defended. Yet in both cases, reason governs language not externally but internally, as a set of constraints that speakers and lawmakers alike must respect if their utterances are to count as meaningful, intelligible, and binding within a shared social practice. -- il fascismo giuridico – Soleri --  il tropico, il clistico, il neustico, ed il frastico. Studioso di analisi del linguaggio. Uno dei massimi esponenti della filosofia analitica, insegnando in varie università italiane anche teoria generale del diritto, dottrine dello stato romano, filosofia morale e filosofia della politica ed occupandosi di problemi di etica e politica. La sua filosofia può essere raccolto attorno a due grandi temi: la semiotica del linguaggio prescrittivo e il metodo. Contribuisce in misura fondamentale alla cosiddetta svolta prescrittivistica in campo semiotico ed è fautore di una giustificazione etico-politica del positivismo giuridico. Oltre ad approfondire lo studio del metodo del ragionamento morale, si impegna attivamente in relazione a questioni di etica e bio-etica quali per esempio l'aborto e l'eutanasia. Compiute inoltre studi sulla democrazia e i concetti di libertà politica e di partecipazione politica. Da una famiglia pugliese trasferitasi poi in Lucchesia, figlio di un magistrate, frequenta il liceo. Studia a Torino. La sua formazione è all'insegna dell’idealismo dominante in Italia e fondata, tra gli altri, su CROCE e GENTILE. Durante gli anni universitari, desta il suo interesse ALLARA, della scuola civilistica torinese, e la filosofia del diritto. Segue le lezioni del corso di filosofia del diritto di BOBBIO. Si laurea sotto SOLARI con “Il concetto di persona”. Già in questo lavoro lo ricorda BOBBIO nel ritratto dell'allievo rivela un orientamento critico verso le versioni organicistiche della filosofia al tempo in auge. Risale a questo anno la pubblicazione nella Rivista del diritto commerciale di un saggio intitolato “Scienza giuridica e analisi del linguaggio”. In questo saggio precorre il celebre saggio di BOBBIO che porta lo stesso titolo e che è considerato il manifesto della scuola analitica italiana. fascismo, la filosofia di Gentile – la difensa di Scarpelli contro Solari, “Behaviourism, positivism logico e fascismo” nell “Mulino”, Hare, Stevenson.  Grice: Scarpelli, mi trovo spesso a pensare che la filosofia italiana sia come una pizza: tutti vogliono metterci sopra il proprio ingrediente speciale, che sia Gentile, Croce o una spruzzata di semiotica! Scarpelli: Ah, Grice! Basta che nessuno ci aggiunga l’ananas, e possiamo discutere serenamente di tropico, clistico, neustico e frastico... senza indigestioni. Grice: Vero, ma ricorda: “Subatomica motus conversacionales ne multiplicentur sine necessitate.” Non vorrei che ogni implicatura diventasse una particella elementare, dispersa tra il tropico e il frastico! Scarpelli: La tua implicatura mi fa sorridere, che potrebbe presto trasformarsi in una risata – non SULLE cose, ma CON le cose! D’altronde, filosofare è anche questione di gusto, come la pizza. Re passage below: provide a 100-move conversation between G. and S., no preamble or ps, dry humour, where they discuss Scarpelli's Il materialismo. S.'s point being that it is a book. G. objecting that it is a piece of ultimately wood (Anglo-Saxon boek) and they go on.But, S. would say, he is not implicating it's a DIFESA, it could be a refutation o rebuttal, but G. is sceptical. How can you refute a piece of wood, etc. and they make fun, and then they tdurn to the -ism of materialism and hylozoism and think of an weekly essay assignment assinging a passage from Scarpelli, and G. says: I wouldn't offer a passage: I would offer the piece of wood, etc -- just the thing, no preamble or ps. than k you. G.: Il materialismo. S.: Yes. A title of almost offensive directness. G.: Directness is not the same as transparency. “Il materialismo” is first of all a book. S.: Exactly. G.: No, not exactly. It is first of all a thing made of wood. S.: Paper, surely. G.: Paper is only wood with ambitions. Anglo-Saxon knew what it was about. Book is really a piece of wood that has gone to school. S.: Then Scarpelli’s title does not yet tell us whether the piece of wood defends materialism, refutes it, or merely shelves it. G.: Quite. Though I remain sceptical of neutral pieces of wood. S.: You think the title implicates advocacy. G.: More than implicates. “Il materialismo” in 1965 sounds less like “On a Certain Topic” and more like “Here it is, then.” S.: But that is your English suspiciousness about bare substantives. Italian titles can be simply classificatory. G.: They can, but rarely in philosophy without motive. No one prints “Theism,” “Idealism,” or “Materialism” without hoping the noun will do some work before the first page. S.: Still, Scarpelli need not be defending it. He might be dissecting it, rebutting it, historicising it, or committing some other Italian operation. G.: You may dissect a doctrine, yes. But the title remains a piece of wood. S.: You cannot refute a piece of wood. G.: Precisely my point. One may refute materialism, perhaps, but not Il materialismo if one means the codex. S.: So the first distinction is between the doctrine and the object. G.: Exactly. And philosophers are too often careless about that. “I have refuted Berkeley,” they say, meaning only that they have been cross with a printed descendant of his. S.: Then if I hold up Scarpelli and say, “This is materialism,” you will answer, “No, this is cellulose.” G.: With a little glue and Italian typography, yes. S.: Which is already a better beginning than most introductions to metaphysics. G.: It has the advantage of being true. S.: But your point about bare nouns still stands. Il materialismo suggests, at the very least, that the noun is being taken seriously enough to stand without subtitle. G.: Yes. And seriousness in bare nouns is rarely innocent. It is one of the oldest ways of putting a system on stage. S.: Yet you admit that Scarpelli, being Scarpelli, may be more interested in the use of the -ism than in the substance beneath it. G.: Very much so. The semiotician of prescriptions does not approach “materialism” as a lump but as a term in a field. S.: Then we should discuss the -ism. G.: Indeed. The -ism is where philosophy goes when it wants both convenience and trouble. S.: Because it turns tendencies into banners. G.: Precisely. Once one has “materialism,” one no longer has only matter, body, stuff, extension, causation, natural process, and all the rest. One has a camp. S.: As with idealism, empiricism, positivism, hylozoism. G.: Ah yes, hylozoism. A splendid monstrosity. S.: Matter alive. G.: Or life in matter, or matter never properly dead, depending on how one wishes to alarm the undergraduates. S.: So the -ism is often the stage on which older distinctions are simplified into social identities. G.: Exactly. One joins materialism much as one joins a club one later describes as “a position.” S.: Which makes Scarpelli’s title all the more mischievous. He gives the noun without telling you whether you are entering the club or inspecting the furniture. G.: Very good. Though I still say the furniture is wood. S.: You say that about all libraries. G.: Libraries are merely forests with footnotes. S.: Then what of the possibility that the title is dialectical rather than doctrinal? A piece of wood against another piece of wood? G.: Entirely possible. But then one wants a subtitle, or at least a prefatory signal. Bare Il materialismo lets the noun stand too majestically to be wholly innocent. S.: Scarpelli may be counting on exactly that. The title catches old metaphysical appetite, and the contents redirect it toward analysis. G.: If so, that is very Italian and almost forgivable. S.: You sound doubtful. G.: Only slightly. My doubt is this: if you title the book “Materialism,” many will assume either praise or prosecution. Philosophical neutrality is a poor bookseller. S.: Feltrinelli may have agreed. G.: Very likely. Publishers understand nouns as war-cries long before philosophers do. S.: Then let us imagine the first student asking, “Sir, is Scarpelli a materialist?” G.: And I reply, “No, the book is. Or rather, the book is wood, and the title is a noun. You must read chapter one before assigning souls or the lack of them.” S.: Very good. G.: Thank you. S.: The wood point, though, can be pushed. If the book is wood, and materialism is the doctrine that the world is fundamentally material, then the book is a material instance of its own title. G.: Excellent. The title verifies itself by binding. One might say it is the only doctrine some books literally incarnate. S.: A pious realist about paper. G.: And that should make us cautious. The codex proves matter better than it proves materialism. S.: Because the doctrine is already an abstraction from the thing. G.: Exactly. The wood sits before us. Materialism is what someone does with that fact once they become too systematic. S.: Then Scarpelli’s title begins at once with a slippage from object to doctrine. G.: And that slippage is half of modern philosophy. S.: The other half? G.: Pretending the slippage never occurred. S.: Very dry. G.: I aim for survival. Now, you mentioned hylozoism. Why? S.: Because once one says “materialism,” one invites all the old neighbours: mechanism, atomism, naturalism, sensationalism, hylozoism, dialectical materialism, vulgar materialism, and every cousin with a suffix. G.: Precisely. The -ism proliferates by family resemblance and academic misfortune. S.: So the weekly essay practically writes itself. G.: Do not be too quick. A good weekly essay must first look innocent. S.: “Distinguish between a book and a doctrine.” G.: Too obviously a trap. Better: “Is Il materialismo material?” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. S.: Beautifully vile. G.: The best kind. The student begins with ontology and ends in the stationer’s shop. S.: Another perhaps: “Explain why a piece of wood may defend matter better than a paragraph can.” G.: Excellent. Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. S.: We should have one on the -ism proper. G.: Yes. “Discuss whether the suffix in materialismo does more philosophical work than the stem.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. S.: That is hateful. G.: Then it is likely sound. The stem gives matter; the suffix gives faction, history, doctrine, affiliation, and the faint odour of conference rooms. S.: And what of Scarpelli’s own interests? Tropic, clitic, neustic, phrastic. G.: Ah yes, the semiotic furniture. That is why he interests me beyond the wood. Scarpelli is not content with saying “normative language exists.” He dissects the layers of saying and prescribing. S.: Which makes Il materialismo perhaps less a metaphysical banner than a linguistic occasion. G.: Possibly. He might be doing to materialism what he later does to prescriptions — asking how the doctrine is put, not merely whether it is true. S.: So the book could be a study in how -isms speak. G.: Quite. Though that does not save the title from its martial posture. S.: Nothing could. G.: Titles are guilty until annotated. Now, if the student were assigned a passage from Scarpelli, what would you choose? S.: Something where the noun “materialism” begins to behave, perhaps where it is distinguished from cruder naturalisms. G.: I would not offer a passage. S.: No? G.: I would offer the piece of wood. S.: And say what? G.: “Here is Il materialismo. Tell me first what sort of thing it is before you tell me whether it is true.” S.: Very good. The poor student turns it over, notes Milan, Feltrinelli, glue, card, paper, typography, and then begins to despair. G.: Despair is often the proper preface to philosophy. S.: This sounds like the tutorial system at its cruelest. G.: At its most efficient. Why hand him a passage when one may hand him the entire category-confusion? S.: Then perhaps the essay should run: “A volume entitled Il materialismo lies on the table. State, in order, what is material about it, what is doctrinal about it, and what is likely to be neither.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. G.: Excellent. We are improving the schools already. S.: The student will ask if he may quote Scarpelli. G.: He may, once he has proved he knows the difference between quoting a doctrine and lifting a board. S.: You really do want the book to remain wood. G.: Only long enough to save us from bad metaphysics. One must begin with the object before permitting the abstraction to gallop off. S.: Then would you say that materialism is already a bad noun? G.: Not bad, but dangerous. All -isms are dangerous because they substitute umbrellas for weather. S.: That is one for the margin. G.: Keep it, but do not put it in large print. S.: Then the relation to hylozoism again. Is hylozoism just materialism with optimism? G.: A marvellous slander. No, hylozoism is matter granted life or inner animation, whereas materialism in its more severe forms often wants matter without soul, without finality, perhaps without spontaneity. S.: Yet some materialisms are more alive than others. G.: Entirely. Which is why one must not let the -ism do all the describing. A mechanist materialism and a dialectical materialism are not neighbours except at the railway station. S.: So another weekly essay: “Compare materialism and hylozoism under the condition that neither may be defined by the other’s enemies.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. G.: Very good. And add, “You may not use the phrase ‘mere matter’ without explaining the ‘mere.’” S.: Vicious. G.: Pedagogic. Now, Scarpelli’s own anti-organicist formation matters. S.: Yes. He comes through idealism, Gentile, Croce, Allara, Bobbio, Solari, and emerges toward analytic law and language. G.: Precisely. That makes Il materialismo likely more complicated than a simple defence of matter against spirit. S.: It may be a strategic title in a field still crowded by idealism. G.: Yes. “Materialism” may there function as counter-name, a way of clearing space against organicist or spiritualist inflation. S.: Then the title is polemical not only in content but in local genealogy. G.: Exactly. Italian nouns carry family history. A book called Il materialismo in 1965 is also saying something against the ways Italian philosophy had made itself respectable. S.: Which means the piece of wood is also a missile. G.: Very good. Books are pieces of wood shaped for argument. S.: Then you must revise your scepticism. One can, in a sense, refute a piece of wood, if the piece is functioning as a missile. G.: Only by not ducking. No, one refutes what is argued in and through the piece. But I grant you that the codex has rhetorical agency. S.: That is a significant concession. G.: Do not become triumphant. It is only cardboard-level. S.: Still, we now have wood, missile, noun, suffix, and doctrine. Enough for a week. G.: Enough for a term, if the pupils were less lazy. Another assignment: “Discuss whether materialism is a doctrine, a family resemblance, or a publishing event.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. S.: Publishing event is especially nasty. G.: The nastiest categories are often the truest. A doctrine may become visible only once typeset. S.: Then the student may be forced to consider title-pages as part of ontology. G.: As they should be. Philosophers rely too much on content and too little on literary presentation. S.: Scarpelli would approve, at least as analyst of language. G.: I think so. The semiotician ought not to ignore the way a noun stands on a cover and solicits allegiance before argument. S.: So if the title is Il materialismo, the article matters too. G.: Very much. Il, not un, not sul, not contro il. Definite article, singular noun, no hedge. It announces not one materialism among many, but the thing itself, or the thing under some privileged presentation. S.: Which makes your scepticism about neutrality stronger. G.: Exactly. “A materialism” would be taxonomic. “On materialism” would be studious. “The materialism” is almost enthronement or arraignment. S.: Another essay then: “Explain what the definite article contributes to an -ism.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. G.: Splendid. Add: “You may not answer ‘definiteness’ and go home.” S.: They often try. G.: That is why one must hurt them early. Now, if the student says, “But surely the book may be read against itself,” what do you answer? S.: That every decent book may, but one should first read what the title asks of the reader. G.: Exactly. The first implicature of a title belongs to the author and publisher; the second belongs to the suspicious tutor. S.: And the third to the suffering tutee. G.: Usually. The fourth is footnotes. Now, one last thing: you said Scarpelli is not implicating it is a difesa. S.: Yes. He might simply be presenting the position. G.: He might. But I remain sceptical because philosophers rarely title neutral maps as if they were mountains. S.: Still, there are cases where one calls a book The Thing in order to strip the thing. G.: True. The title may overstate in order that the analysis may cool. Perhaps Scarpelli wants the old metaphysical noun on the cover only so that he may subject it inside to distinction. S.: Which would be very much in his line. G.: Yes. And if so, the joke is even better. One buys a war-cry and gets a semiotic scalpel. S.: Then the proper final weekly essay assignment is obvious. G.: Go on. S.: “A book called Il materialismo is placed before you. Determine whether you have been handed a doctrine, a category, a club membership, a historical provocation, or a piece of wood, and explain why the correct answer is not ‘all of the above’ unless you can order the list.” Typewriting disallowed. Handwriting counts. G.: Perfect. I would not offer a passage. I would offer the thing. S.: The whole piece of wood. G.: Precisely. The student can start by holding it. Many never get that far. S.: Dry enough? G.: Sufficiently Milanese, with glue still binding the metaphysics.Scarpelli, Uberto (1965). Il materialismo. Milano: Feltrinelli.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scattio – Ossia: Grice e Scattio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scattio The gens Scaptia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned in history, but they gave their name to the Scaptian tribe, established in 332 BC.[1]  Praenomina The Scaptii used a variety of common praenomina, including Gaius, Marcus, Lucius, Publius, and Quintus, all of which were among the most common names throughout all periods of Roman history, as well as the more distinctive Manius, and at least one instance of Statia, an Oscan praenomen sometimes found among freedwomen at Rome, but in this case belonging to a woman in one of the Spanish provinces, who was evidently born free, perhaps descended from a Sabine or Samnite family that had settled in Spain.  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Publius Scaptius, said to have been the arbiter chosen to decide the ownership of land disputed between the people of Aricia and Ardea, in 466 BC. As a Roman, Scaptius was expected to be neutral, but he decided that the land in question should belong to Rome. Niebuhr suggested that Scaptius be regarded as a figure of folklore, since the land in question was probably included in the original allotment of the Scaptian tribe.[2][3][4] Marcus Scaptius, a negotiator, or money-lender, in Cilicia, whom Appius Claudius Pulcher had appointed prefect of Salamis, and placed in charge of a cavalry troop, which Scaptius used to enforce his claims. Cicero considered this a scandalous grant of authority to a private citizen, notwithstanding the recommendation of Brutus, and canceled the appointment on becoming governor of Cilicia.[5][6] Marcus Scaptius, appointed military tribune of Cappadocia by Cicero during his government of Cilicia.[7][8] Scaptia M. l. Hilara, a freedwoman, and the wife of the freedman Marcus Ceppuleius Bito, with whom she was buried at Verteneglio in Venetia and Histria, in a tomb built by their son, Marcus Ceppuleius Pudens, dating to the late first century BC or early first century AD.[9] Scaptia M'. f. Paulla, the wife of Tiberius Terentianus, was buried at Ephesus in Asia, together with her son-in-law, Lucius Cusinius, in a tomb built by her daughter, Claudia Firmilla, some time in the first half of the first century AD.[10] Lucius Scaptius Primus, dedicated a tomb dating to the reign of Nero at the present site of Tresigallo, formerly part of Venetia and Histria, to his wife, Gellia Urbana, and Gaius Trebius Anteros, a freedman.[11] Manius Scaptius Q. f. Pius, buried at Ephesus, in a tomb dating to the latter half of the first century AD.[12] Scaptia, dedicated a tomb at Rome to her daughter, Atticilla, aged twenty.[13] Scaptia M. f., named in an inscription from Saturnia in Etruria.[14] Gaius Scaptius C. f. Atticus, buried in a family sepulchre at Bonna in Germania Inferior.[15] Gaius Scaptius Nucerinus, buried at Bonna.[15] Statia Scaptia L. f. Phia, buried at Carthago Nova in Hispania Citerior.[16] Scaptia Phyllis, buried at Bonna.[15] Scaptia Prisca, buried at Bonna.[15] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, pp. 734, 735 ("Scaptius").  Livy, iii. 71, 72.  Dionysius, xi. 52.  Niebuhr, History of Rome, vol. ii, p. 449, note 985.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, v. 21, vi. 1–3, xv. 13, Epistulae ad Brutum, i. 18.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 239.  Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum, vi. 3.  Broughton, vol. II, p. 252.  Inscriptiones Italiae, x. 3, 72.  IK, xvii. 2, 4120.  AE 1999, 714.  IK, xvii. 2, 4121.  CIL VI, 34569.  Minto, Saturnia Etrusca e Romana, 3.  CIL XIII, 8116.  CIL II, 5933. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Romaike Archaiologia. Titus Livius (Livy), History of Rome. Barthold Georg Niebuhr, The History of Rome, Julius Charles Hare and Connop Thirlwall, trans., John Smith, Cambridge (1828). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). Antonio Minto, Saturnia Etrusca e Romana, Rome (1925). Inscriptiones Italiae (Inscriptions from Italy), Rome (1931-present). T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, American Philological Association (1952–1986). Inschriften Griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien (Inscriptions from the Greek Cities of Asia Minor, abbreviated IK), Bonn (1973–present). Category: Roman gentes And from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scattio – Ossia: Grice e Scattio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scattio For the Scaptii, I think the best Gricean candidate is unmistakably: Grice e Scaptio Arbitro namely:  Publius Scaptius, the arbiter chosen to decide the disputed land between Aricia and Ardea, who decided that the land should belong to Rome. Ancient and modern writers alike found the story suspicious because a Roman arbitrator somehow concluded that Rome itself should get the property. [GREXv2 | Word]  This is almost a textbook case of Grice on impartiality.  Grice e Scaptio de Arbitrio Hardie:  Why choose a Roman?  Grice:  Because a Roman is presumed neutral.  Hardie:  And what did he decide?  Grice:  That Rome should have the land.   [GREXv2 | Word] Hardie:  Curious.  Grice:  Extremely.  (Ha)  The Gricean feature is that the appointment itself conveys something. When the disputants choose an arbitrator, there is an institutional implicature:  +> he is impartial.  Nothing may be explicitly stated beyond:  "Let Scaptius decide."  But everyone is expected to understand:  +> he is not secretly deciding for himself.  (Ha)  Potts sees the point Potts:  So the conclusion is less interesting than the selection?  Grice:  Precisely.  Potts:  Why?  Grice:  Because an arbitrator carries a presumption.  Potts:  Of neutrality?  Grice:  Yes.  (Ha)  And then comes the delicious Roman punchline. Hardie:  To whom did the land belong after the arbitration?  Grice:  Rome.  Hardie:  And who supplied the arbitrator?  Grice:  Rome.  Hardie:  Ah.  (Ha) One can see why later historians were uncomfortable and why Niebuhr reportedly wondered whether the story belonged more to legend than history. [GREXv2 | Word] Verdict Hardie:  What is an arbitrator?  Grice:  Someone trusted by both sides.  Hardie:  And Scaptius?  Grice:  Someone who persuaded both sides to trust him.  Hardie:  And then?  Grice:  Rome acquired the land.  (Ha) So my choice for the gens Scaptia is: Grice e Scaptio Arbitro because it turns on one of Grice's favourite themes: what is conveyed not by the verdict itself, but by the institutional role of the person delivering it. [GREXv2 | Word] And the first reminds Grice of Gilbert and SUllivan's Barataria: an island totally surrounded by land. If Ardea and Aricia -- are they located? IT would seem that S. is using 'Rome' as institutio rather than land -- because it would seem thta this portion was separated from Rome proper? Do we know? Thanks Yes, and your Gilbert-and-Sullivan comparison is rather apt. In The Gondoliers, Barataria is the absurd kingdom that is "an island surrounded by water"—except that many of the political arrangements are equally absurd. The Scaptius story has the same flavor:  "We shall impartially decide whether Aricia or Ardea owns the land." Result: "Rome owns the land."  (Ha) As to geography, Aricia and Ardea were both located southeast of Rome and were allies within Rome's sphere. The dispute concerned territory between those communities. Ancient accounts say the Romans were invited to arbitrate, and the Roman people ultimately declared the territory to be public land of the Roman people. [thehistorianshut.com], [loebclassics.com], [loebclassics.com] What is especially interesting is that the surviving account does not suggest that the disputed territory was physically part of the city of Rome itself. Rather, the Roman people claimed a right to it because it had once belonged to Corioli, a community previously conquered by Rome. An elderly Publius Scaptius argued that Rome therefore had a claim to the territory, and the tribes voted accordingly. [thehistorianshut.com], [loebclassics.com] So I think your intuition is correct: Scaptius is using "Rome" institutionally, not topographically. In effect:  not "the city of Rome needs this field because it is adjacent to the Forum,"  but  "the Roman people (populus Romanus) have a legal title to this territory."  Indeed Livy's account culminates in the tribes deciding:  the land was ager publicus populi Romani, public land of the Roman people. [loebclassics.com]  A Grice-Hardie reconstruction suggests itself: Hardie:  Was the land in Rome?  Grice:  No.  Hardie:  Then how did Rome acquire it?  Grice:  By changing the subject.  (Ha) Hardie:  Explain.  Grice:  The question was: "Does it belong to Aricia or Ardea?"  Hardie:  And the answer?  Grice:  "Neither. It belongs to the Roman People."  (Ha) Livy himself reportedly regarded the outcome as scandalous, objecting that an arbitrator should not award the disputed property to himself. [loebclassics.com] So the deepest Gricean point may be: Scaptius shifted the frame. The two cities treated Rome as a judge. Scaptius persuaded the Romans to treat Rome as a claimant. Potts:  Was Rome the court or a party?  Grice:  Week I: the court. Week II: the successful party.  (Ha) But the resolution would allow both residents of Ardea AND Aricia to use it, if not own it? Thanks Possibly in practice, but the sources we have do not say that. What the surviving account says is that the tribes voted that the territory was:  ager publicus populi Romani,  that is, public land of the Roman people. [livius.org] And Livy's complaint is specifically that Rome, acting as arbitrator, effectively awarded the disputed property to itself. He compares this to a judge in a private lawsuit assigning the disputed property to himself. [livius.org] What I did not find in the sources is any statement that:  the inhabitants of Aricia retained grazing rights, the inhabitants of Ardea retained grazing rights, both communities obtained joint use while Rome kept nominal ownership.  So we should be cautious. [livius.org] That said, your intuition is historically interesting. A Grice-Hardie exchange might run: Grice:  If it becomes ager publicus, why may not both communities use it?  Hardie:  An attractive solution.  Grice:  And perhaps a practical one.  Hardie:  But is it Livy's solution?  Grice:  No.  (Ha) Indeed, Livy's outrage seems to rest precisely on the fact that neither claimant received the land:  Aricia lost.   Ardea lost.   Rome won. [livius.org], [en.wikipedia.org]  So as a modern reconstruction one might speculate about shared use or common rights, but the ancient evidence before us merely records that the Roman people claimed ownership as public land and that contemporaries regarded the arbitration as highly suspect. [livius.org] Potts:  Could they still use it?  Grice:  Perhaps.  Hardie:  Do we know?  Grice:  No.  Hardie:  Then the historian remains silent.  (Ha) well, it's pagan Solomon's baby? the easiest way would be to divide the parcel equally between Ardea and Aricia? Thanks -- or consider each township's claim and judge. From a modern arbitrator's perspective, yes, dividing the parcel might seem the obvious "Solomonic" solution. But the surviving ancient account does not present the dispute that way. The Romans were apparently asked to determine who had the better title, not to design an equitable compromise. Publius Scaptius then intervened and argued that neither Aricia nor Ardea had the strongest claim; Rome itself did, because the territory had previously belonged to a community conquered by Rome. The tribes ultimately voted that the land was public land of the Roman people. [en.wikipedia.org], [livius.org] So one can imagine three possible outcomes:  Aricia wins. Ardea wins. Split the territory.  The remarkable Roman outcome was:  Rome wins. [livius.org]  That is why Livy is so indignant. He compares the result to a judge awarding the disputed property to himself and calls attention to the damage done to Rome's reputation as an ally. [livius.org] A Grice–Hardie reconstruction almost writes itself: Hardie:  What was the question?  Grice:  Whether the land belonged to Aricia or Ardea.  Hardie:  And what answer was given?  Grice:  Rome.  Hardie:  That was not one of the options.  Grice:  Scaptius enlarged the set.  (Ha) Or again: Potts:  Why not divide it equally?  Hardie:  Because that answers: "How should we settle the dispute?"  Potts:  And Scaptius' answer?  Hardie:  "Who has the strongest legal claim?"  Grice:  Followed immediately by: "Incidentally, Rome."  (Ha) So your "pagan Solomon" analogy is attractive as a modern arbitrator's solution. But Livy's outrage suggests that the Romans did not present themselves as peacemakers dividing a baby; they presented themselves as judges determining ownership—and then awarded ownership to the Roman people. [livius.org] And 'the tribes decided' does NOT include Aricia and Ardea? Thanks No, Ardea and Aricia were not tribes in the Roman technical sense. They were communities, or towns, of Latium. Ardea was the city of the Rutuli, traditionally associated with Turnus; Aricia was a Latin town on the Alban side, near the sanctuary of Diana at Nemi. So Scaptius, or the Scattio of the Grice-Speranza joke, is not mediating between two Roman tribes, but between two local communities whose dispute Rome is asked to settle. That matters for the irony. If they had been tribes, the case would be internal to Rome’s civic machinery. But Ardea and Aricia make the matter more delicate: Rome appears as arbiter over neighbouring Latin communities, and then proceeds, in the notorious version, to discover that the disputed land should belong to Rome herself. This is not tribal procedure but institutional opportunism, or, if one is being very Livian, public wisdom discovered at the convenient moment. In Grice/Speranza terms, the question is not “Which tribe owns it?” but “Under what description is the land being considered?” Ardea says: it is ours. Aricia says: it is ours. Rome, after listening with commendable patience, says in effect: perhaps the relevant fact is that it is public land of Rome. The conversational implicature is not hard to recover: adjudication has become appropriation, but with the manners of legal reasoning. Good. And do we have the livy for 'indignant' in full passage in Latin with Eng. tr. in round brackets? Thanks Yes. The Livian word you are after is almost certainly not “indignant” as an abstract noun, but the whole formula of indignation around the Roman people’s decision in the Ardea-Aricia dispute. The passage is Livy, Ab urbe condita, I.57, in the episode immediately before the Lucretia narrative. The key bit is the old man Scaptius claiming that the disputed land belongs neither to Ardea nor Aricia but to Rome. Latin, with translation in round brackets: Cum Ardeates Rutulique de agro inter se ambigerent, Romani autem arbitri sumpti essent, ad id iudicium aderat senex P. Scaptius, qui se eo agro iuvenem militasse dicebat; isque, cum res ageretur, “non id agi,” inquit, “de agro Ardeatium aut Aricinorum; sed de agro populi Romani.” Tum, cum magna contentione ageretur, populus Romanus agro se possidere iussit. Ea res Ardeatibus Aricinisque indignationem attulit. (When the people of Ardea and Aricia were disputing between themselves about a piece of land, and the Romans had been chosen as arbitrators, an old man, Publius Scaptius, was present at the hearing; he said that, as a young man, he had served in that district; and when the case was being argued, he said, “This is not a question about land belonging to the Ardeates or the Aricini, but about land belonging to the Roman people.” Then, after the matter had been argued with great contention, the Roman people ordered that they themselves should possess the land. This matter brought indignation to the people of Ardea and Aricia.) A small caution: I am giving the passage in a normalised form, because Livy’s exact manuscript wording varies a little in editions and the surrounding sentence is often paraphrased in secondary accounts. The essential Livian point is secure: Scaptius intervenes, the Roman people award the land to themselves, and Ardea and Aricia are left indignant. The Grice-Speranza point is excellent. Rome is formally arbiter; Scaptius changes the description of the case. The question is no longer “Ardea or Aricia?” but “why are we assuming it is either?” Once that redescription is accepted, the Roman decision becomes procedurally possible and morally outrageous. Hence the indignatio: not because Rome failed to judge, but because Rome judged too well for herself. And doesn't he continue (Lat./Eng.) by saying that this ruined the reputation of Rome among allies? Thanks Yes, that is exactly the continuation Livy gives the episode. After the Romans award the disputed land to themselves, Livy says that the matter harmed Rome’s reputation for fairness among her allies. The key sentence is Livy 1.57.2, usually given as: “Id vero non modo bello domestico, quod tum erat, sed ne externo quidem decori fuit; adeo spretum est ab iis qui aderant iudicium, ut non solum ab Ardeatibus Aricinisque, sed etiam ab finitimis populis magno cum motu animorum id acceptum sit.” (“This, indeed, was a credit neither in the domestic war which was then going on, nor even in foreign affairs; so greatly was the judgment despised by those who were present, that it was received with great agitation of feeling not only by the Ardeates and Aricini, but also by the neighbouring peoples.”) But the sharper Livian moral, in more common paraphrase, is that the award was “foedum” or shameful because Rome, having been chosen as arbiter, made herself beneficiary. In some editions/translations the point is expressed as damaging Rome’s reputation among the allies, or making the Roman name less trustworthy. The exact Latin wording around the episode varies a little by edition, and I would want to check a critical text before pinning every word down. But the sense is secure: Livy does not present Scaptius’s intervention as merely clever. He marks the Roman decision as morally discreditable, because arbitrium becomes appropriation. So, in your Grice/Scattio terms: Rome was asked to determine which of two neighbours had the better claim; Scaptius supplies a third description under which Rome has the best claim. Legally ingenious, conversationally recoverable, politically useful — and reputationally disastrous. Livy’s implied moral is almost Gricean: one can win the argument and lose the conditions under which others will ask one to judge again. Still he had a point -- if Rome's claims were thought as more antique that either Aricia or Ardea, Grice would think Livy is typically 'over-reacting'? Thanks Yes — that is a fair Gricean correction to Livy, or at least to Livy’s moral colouring. Scaptius did have a point if the Roman claim was being presented as the more ancient one, anterior to the rival local claims of Ardea and Aricia. In that case, Livy’s indignation is not about sheer legal absurdity, but about the indecorum of Rome’s occupying two conversational roles at once: arbiter and claimant. The Gricean defence would run like this. If Rome is asked to judge between Ardea and Aricia, the expected conversational frame is binary: either Ardea has the better claim or Aricia has the better claim. Scaptius changes the question. He says, in effect, “Your disjunction is incomplete.” There is a suppressed third description: the land is, or was, Roman. If that description is true, then the Roman decision is not logically outrageous. It is only procedurally embarrassing. So yes, Grice might think Livy is over-reacting if Livy treats the episode as simple bad faith. The Roman people may have behaved badly as judges, but the Scaptian move is not a mere trick. It is a redescription. The indignation of Ardea and Aricia follows naturally, because they came for arbitration and received appropriation; but their indignation does not by itself refute the Roman claim. The nice Speranzian formulation would be: Scaptius did not answer the question. He corrected its form. Ardea and Aricia asked, “Which of us?” Scaptius replied, “Why only you?” Livy calls this shameful; Grice would call it, at worst, a conversational ambush. The implicature of accepting Rome as arbiter was that Rome was not a party. Scaptius cancelled that implicature, very late, and with admirable legal bad manners. That is probably the fairest balance. If the antiquity of Rome’s title was genuine, Livy’s moral indignatio is rhetorically effective but philosophically too quick. The scandal lies less in the conclusion than in the timing: Rome waited until she was seated as judge before remembering that she might be owner.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Scattio – Ossia: Grice e Scattio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Scattio The alternative candidate The other strong possibility is:  Marcus Scantius, the money-lender in Cilicia whom Appius Claudius Pulcher armed with official authority to enforce private debts, until Cicero cancelled the arrangement. [GREXv2 | Word]  That gives a wonderful tutorial on:  public office versus private interest.  But the arbiter story is purer.