CR

 

 

CRA

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crassizio – Ossia: Grice e Crassizio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Crassizio. The Crassizi, occasionally written Crassitia, are a family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned in history, and it is best known from a single individual, Lucius C., a freedman and a Latin grammarian. C. belongs to a class of gentilicia originally formed from surnames ending in -icus, in this instance Crassicus, a lengthened form of Crassus. This cognomen was derived from a Latin adjective meaning "thick", "dull", or "rude", and by extension also indicating someone fat. The main praenomina of the Crassicii were Marcus, Lucius, Gaius, and Publius, all of which were among the most common praenomina throughout Roman history. A few of the Crassicii bore other names, including Titus and Tiberius.  Gaius C. P. f. C. n. Verris, named in two dedicatory inscriptions from the temple of Castor and Pollux at Cora in Latium, dating to the late second century BC.[5] Gaius C. P. f., one of the Roman emissaries who settled at Delos in the late second century BC.[6] Tiberius C., mentioned in a list of donors to the temple of Serapis at Puteoli in Campania, dating from 105 BC.[7] Lucius C., the grammarian, was a native of Tarentum, originally named Pasicles, but later called Pansa. He worked in the Roman theatre, and wrote a well-regarded commentary on Gaius Helvius Cinna's poem, Smyrna. In the latter half of the first century BC, he taught the sons of many leading families, and in his retirement he took up philosophy. C. or Crassicius, a friend of the triumvir Mark Antony, was perhaps the former master of C. the grammarian, who educated Antony's son, Iullus, unless they were the same person. Marcus C. M. f. Castellus, a veteran of the Legio XXX Classica, buried at Beneventum in Samnium, in a tomb dedicated by his wife, the freedwoman Fufia Lychnis, and dating from the late first century BC.[11] Crassicia Sp. f. Bassa, named in a sepulchral inscription from Rome, dating from the first half of the first century, along with Lucius Fannius Lupercus.[12] Lucius Crassicius Ɔ. l. Hermia, a freedman and veterinarian at Altinum in Venetia and Histria, dedicated a first-century tomb for his wife, Abiria Maxima, and freedwoman, Eugenia.[13] Crassicia P. l. Helpis, a freedwoma buried in a first-century tomb at Rome, along with her husband, Lucius Tampius Ingenuus.[14] Titus Crassicius Paettusius, made a donation to the temple of Apollo at Salodurum in Germania Superior, and together with Crassicius Magius, made an offering to Sulevia, dating from the latter half of the first century.[15][16] C. Magius, together with Titus Crassicius Paettusius, made an offering to Sulevia at Salodurum, dating from the latter half of the first century.[16] Lucius C. L. l. Ennycus, a freedman who dedicated a tomb at Rome for his fellow freedmen, Gaius Asinius Zopyrus and Pontia Fausta, dating from the latter half of the first century, or the first half of the second.[17] Crassicia Ursa, together with her husband, Aelius Aelianus, dedicated a tomb at Augusta Vindelicorum in Raetia for their son, C. Constantinus, dating from the latter half of the second century, or the first half of the third.[18] C. Constantinus, a boy buried at Augusta Vindelicorum, aged seven, in a tomb dedicated by his parents, Aelius Aelianus and Crassicia Ursa, dating to the latter half of the second century, or the first half of the third.[18] Marcus C. M. f. Verecundus, buried at Pola in Venetia and Histria, in a tomb dating from the fourth century, or the latter half of the third, and dedicated by Oppia Laeta.[19] Undated Crassicii Lucius C., one of the municipal duumvirs at Beneventum.[20] Crassicia Amanda, together with Tussidia, perhaps her sister-in-law, dedicated a tomb at Beneventum for her husband, Quintus Tussidius Primitivus, aged fifty-five, with whom she had lived for eight years and three months.[21] Publius Crassicius Apollonis, dedicated a sepulchre at Rome for himself, his wife, Crassicia Cleopatra, and their family.[22] Lucius Crassicius At[...], named in a pottery inscription from Concordia in Venetia and Histria.[23] Marcus Crassicius Auctus, named in a sepulchral inscription from Rome, along with his sister, Donata Aucta.[24] Titus Crassicius Avitus, buried at Salodurum, aged thirty-five.[25] Crassicia Cleopatra, the wife of Publius Crassicius Apollonis, who dedicated a sepulchre at Rome for himself, his wife, and their family.[22] Lucius Crassicius Corbulo, one of the Seviri Augustales, was buried at Salodurum, in a tomb dedicated by his sons, Publius, Primus, and Seccalus.[26] Crassicius Fortunatus, made an offering to the gods at Thignica in Africa Proconsularis.[27] Marcus Crassicius Hermogenes, dedicated a tomb at Rome for his patron, Marcus Crassicius Optatus.[28] Marcus Crassicius Hyblessis, named in an inscription from Volaterrae in Etruria.[29] Crassicia Ɔ. l. Italia, a freedwoman buried at Rome.[30] Marcus Crassicius Optatus, buried at Rome, aged fifty-five, in a tomb dedicated by his client, Marcus Crassicius Hermogenes.[28] Gaius Crassicius Repentinus, buried at Rome.[31] Crassicius Sabinus Aptitianus, buried at Catina in Sicily, aged twenty-four.[32] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, pp. 871, 872 ("Lucius Crassitius").  Chase, p. 126.  Chase, p. 110.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s.v. crassus.  CIL X, 6505, CIL X, 6506.  CIL I, 2504.  CIL X, 1781.  Suetonius, De Illustribus Grammaticis, 18.  Poëtarum Latinorum Reliquiae, p. 184.  Cicero, Philippicae, v. 6, xiii. 2.  CIL IX, 1610.  CIL VI, 16551.  CIL V, 2183.  CIL VI, 4656.  CIL XIII, 5169.  CIL XIII, 11499.  CIL VI, 12540.  CIL III, 5842.  Inscriptiones Italiae, 10-1, 257.  CIL IX, 1643.  CIL IX, 2008.  CIL VI, 16547.  CIL V, 08968,08.  CIL VI, 16548.  CIL XIII, 5179.  CIL XIII, 5178.  CIL VIII, 14939.  CIL VI, 16549.  CIL XI, 06712,137.  CIL VI, 7647.  CIL VI, 16550.  CIL X, 7062. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Philippicae. Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, De Illustribus Grammaticis (On the Illustrious Grammarians). Poëtarum Latinorum Reliquiae (Surviving Works of Latin Poets), August Weichert, ed., B. G. Teubner, Leipzig (1830). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Inscriptiones Italiae (Inscriptions from Italy), Rome (1931-present). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Category: Roman gentes For this gens, the Pansa is not chosen because Crassicius was his adopted name upon freedom -- unlike the two C. who made an offering to Sulevia at Salodrum -- who and where is that? Then we can have a conversation between the two and their father. Father, I made an offering to S. at S. -- C 2: So did I. Father: Did you do that separately? -- they continue -- like 20 conversational moves in total – thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crassizio – Ossia: Grice e Crassizio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Crassizio. For this gens, I would actually choose three separate dialogues, because the evidence naturally divides into three quite different characters:  Lucius Crassicius (Pasicles/Pansa), the grammarian. Titus Crassicius Paettusius, donor at Salodurum. Crassicius Magius, his companion in the Sulevia offering.  And yes, I agree that Pansa is not the interesting name philosophically. According to Suetonius' tradition, the grammarian was originally Pasicles of Tarentum and later became known as Pansa; "Crassicius" is the nomen connected with his later status. The intriguing figure is the grammarian himself, not the adopted or freedman's surname. (From the material you've supplied, I cannot further specify the legal mechanism.) cite not available; from user-provided text Salodurum and Sulevia From the gens entry we can say only:  Salodurum is the place named in the inscriptions. One inscription records Titus Crassicius Paettusius making a donation to the temple of Apollo there. Another records Titus Crassicius Paettusius and Crassicius Magius together making an offering to Sulevia. cite from user-provided references CIL XIII 5169 and 11499  I do not have source text here identifying Sulevia further, so I should not embellish beyond that. What makes the pair interesting is precisely your observation:  Did they make one offering together? Did each make a separate offering? Who did what?  A perfect Gricean topic.  Grice e i Due Crassicii De Sulevia apud Salodurum PATER  Audivi vos apud Salodurum votum fecisse. I hear you made an offering at Salodurum.  PAETTVSIVS  Feci quidem. I certainly did.  MAGIVS  Et ego. And so did I.  PATER  Separatim? Separately?  PAETTVSIVS  Non necessario. Not necessarily.  MAGIVS  Una adfuimus. We were present together.  PATER  Una adfuisse aliud est, una dedicasse aliud. Being present together is one thing; dedicating together is another.  PAETTVSIVS  Recte dicis. Quite so.  PATER  Quis igitur votum fecit? Then who made the offering?  MAGIVS  Uterque. Each of us.  PATER  Uterque idem votum? The same offering?  MAGIVS  Id ipsum quaeris quod tabula non dicit. You're asking exactly what the inscription does not say.  GRICEVS  Tandem homo prudens! At last, a sensible man!   PATER  Cur Suleviae? Why to Sulevia?  PAETTVSIVS  Quia votum voveramus. Because we had vowed an offering.  PATER  Propter quid? On what account?  PAETTVSIVS  Id non inscriptum est. That was not inscribed.  GRICEVS  Ecce difficultas historiarum. There is the difficulty of history.   PATER  Ergo quid certe scimus? So what do we know for certain?  MAGIVS  Salodurum. Salodurum.  PAETTVSIVS  Sulevia. Sulevia.  MAGIVS  Votum. An offering.  PAETTVSIVS  Duo nomina. Two names.  GRICEVS  Et reliqua inferunt historici. And the rest is supplied by historians.  That, to my mind, is the most Gricean Crassician dialogue: two donors, one inscription, and a father persistently asking what exactly follows from the wording and what does not. The whole exchange turns on the distinction between what the inscription explicitly says and what later readers are tempted to infer.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crassizio – Ossia: Grice e Crassizio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Crassizio. Grice and Speranza would think that the implicature of the epigraphy is that the two C. made the SAME offering (offering in singular in inscription) -- with the fact that there were TWO offerers for the same offering multiplying the honour given to Sul. -- Yet, the father can later wonder. And that's why "C1 made the offering" and "C2 made the offering" becomes a case of 'and'-elimination sans implicature: John likes a cheese sandwich, John likes a ham and cheese sandwich; Bob likes peaches; Bob likes peaches and cream. "Bob likes peaches and cream" -- strictly entails "Bob likes peaches" even if he only likes them in conjunction with cream? Thanks Yes, I think this is exactly where a Gricean reconstruction becomes interesting. If the inscription names:  Titus Crassicius Paettusius, and Crassicius Magius,  and records one offering (singular) to Sulevia, then the natural conversational implicature is:  they made a joint offering.  Not because the inscription explicitly says:  "They jointly made one and the same offering,"  but because that is the most economical reading of why two names appear attached to one dedication. Your father can then play the Gricean skeptic: PATER  Unum votum fecistis? "Did you make one offering?"  C1  Ita. "Yes."  PATER  Communiter an separatim? "Jointly or separately?"  And now we discover that the inscription underdetermines the matter.  The logical point you raise is even better. Suppose the inscription effectively licenses:  C1 and C2 made an offering to Sulevia.  Classically:  (C1 ∧ C2) made the offering.  Then conjunction-elimination yields:  C1 made the offering.  and  C2 made the offering.  But conversationally, each of those sounds potentially misleading if the salient fact is that the offering was joint. Exactly as with your food examples. Peaches and cream If:  Bob likes peaches and cream.  one can derive formally:  Bob likes peaches.  But ordinary speakers may resist. Why? Because:  likes(peaches-and-cream)  does not automatically entail  likes(peaches-alone)  in the ordinary lexical interpretation. The phrase may denote a compound preference.  By contrast:  John bought a house and a garden.  does entail:  John bought a house.  because "house and garden" is not functioning as a lexical unit.  Your Crassician inscription lies between the two. If:  Titus and Magius made an offering  then  Titus made an offering  is logically unobjectionable. Yet a hearer may infer:  Titus alone made the offering,  which is false. Hence the Gricean warning. One may cancel the misleading implication:  "Titus made the offering—together with Magius."  That is precisely the sort of case where logic delivers one result and conversational expectations another. I suspect Grice would say that the inscription's implicature is indeed communal honour:  two donors, one dedication, one act of piety.  The father's persistent questioning simply exposes what was asserted and what was merely suggested.

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CRE

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Credaro – Ossia: Grice e Credaro: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del discorso al senato.  Luigi Credaro (Sondrio, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del discorso al senato. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning is a micro-model of rational exchange: speakers are presumed to be cooperating under publicly intelligible norms (relevance, adequacy of information, etc.), so hearers can justifyably infer implicatures from what is said plus the best explanation of why a rational speaker would have said it in that setting. Credaro, by contrast, is presented in your passage as a philosopher-administrator whose central arena is the university, the school, and the Senate: his “conversational reason” is not primarily the inferential logic of everyday talk but the institutional rationality of public speech, educational reform, and civic persuasion—where what counts is how discourse can form competence, citizenship, and a national-popular capacity for understanding (e.g., the Daneo–Credaro framework for funding elementary teachers, the “liceo moderno,” and attention to linguistic minorities in the Trentino/Alto Adige context). In that sense, Credaro’s nearest analogue to Gricean implicature is the rhetoric of political and administrative language: Senate discourse and policy texts routinely rely on what is left unsaid (assumptions about state responsibility, national unity, the “absolute” value of instruction, the relation between culture and governance), but unlike Grice’s conversational implicatures these are often stabilized by offices, procedures, and audiences larger than any dyadic conversation, and they are less “cancellable” because they function as signals of alignment, legitimacy, and institutional intent. The Quine/Strawson vignette you include nicely sharpens the contrast: Grice treats the a priori dispute as a matter of what can be meant, implied, and rationally defended in argument, while Credaro (who wrote on Kantian themes early on and later worked at the level of educational institutions and national policy) treats rationality as something to be built into a population through schooling and administrative design, so that the very possibility of reasonable public conversation becomes a political-educational achievement rather than a background presupposition of ordinary talk. Grice: “I like C.; it is as if he invented the universities! I especially love the way he connects it all, in that uniquely Italian way, with the ‘assoluto’!”  Si laurea a Pavia, dove fu convittore del Collegio Ghislieri, divenne insegnante di liceo. Studia psicologia filosofica. Insegna a Pavia. Ministro della Pubblica Istruzione del Regno d'Italia nei governi Luzzatti e Giolitti IV --  istituì il Liceo moderno. Fu l'ispiratore della legge Daneo-C., che stabiliva che lo stipendio dei maestri delle scuole elementari fosse a carico del bilancio dello Stato, e non più dei Comuni, contribuendo così in maniera determinante all'eliminazione dell'analfabetismo in Italia. Prima di questa legge, infatti, i comuni di campagna e quelli più poveri, specie nel Sud, non erano in grado di istituire e mantenere scuole elementari e pertanto rendevano di fatto inapplicata la legge Coppino sull'obbligo scolastico.  Si interessa attivamente dei problemi agricoli e forestali di Sondrio. Lo scetticismo degli platonisti (Roma, Terme Diocleziane); La libertà di volere (Milano, Bernardoni); Herbart, Torino, Paravia), “Razionalismo trascendente in Italia” Michele, L’italianizzazione imperfetta. L’amministrazione pubblica dell’Alto Adige tra Italia liberale e fascismo, Alessandria, Orso, Analfabetismo, Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Cr. un italiano d'altri tempi articolo di Romano, sofisti, il giurato, iusiuratum, Carneade, il secondo discorso, contro Democrito, ragione pratica (saggezza), ragione teorica, a philosopher in political linguistics: German minority, Italian majority in Trento. Il prefetto di Trento, lingua tedesca, lingua italiana, ordinamento amministrativode-centrato, Wundt, Kant, razionalismo trascendente, Herbart, scetticismo, accademia, prima accademia, seconda accademia, terza accademia, liberta di volere, freewill, volere libero, ambiascata ateniense a roma, influenza dell’academia nell’elite romana, l’accademia come perfezionamento per la dirigenza romana, Wundt, positivismo, suggestione, i primordii del kantismo in Italia, Hegel vacuo. Grice: “St. John’s, 1953. “Strawson has already convinced me that we must invite Quine to our seminar — ‘You know, Austin is not even wanting to see him!’ ‘Quine’s main thing — or big thing, I should say,’ Strawson tells me, ‘is his allergy to the a priori.’ This was a telephone conversation, and I could overhear Anne — ‘What are you two talking about?!’ Next morning I got hold of Credaro on the a priori — an old thing. ‘Too old,’ said Strawson. ‘And it isn’t even original: he’s having a go at Cesca!’ Further research at Merton put me face to face with Cesca, La dottrina kantiana dell’a priori; and from there Strawson and I were just one step away from our celebrated example: ‘My neighbour’s three-year-old is an adult.’ And so on, and so forth.” Grice: Credaro, ho sempre trovato affascinante il suo contributo alla filosofia educativa italiana, soprattutto il modo in cui ha intrecciato il discorso sull’assoluto con il concreto della scuola e dell’insegnamento. È stato come inventare le università, per così dire! Credaro: Grazie, caro Grice! Per me la scuola è stata sempre un laboratorio di ragione, dove il discorso filosofico si incontrava con la quotidianità dei bisogni educativi. La legge Daneo-Credaro, ad esempio, nacque proprio dal desiderio di dare valore assoluto all’istruzione, e di combattere l’analfabetismo come una piaga nazionale. Grice: Che visione lungimirante! Mi colpisce anche il suo interesse per la psicologia filosofica: un vero ponte tra ragione pratica e ragione teorica. Lei ha saputo vedere nell’amministrazione e nella scuola non solo un servizio, ma un perfezionamento morale e intellettuale per la società intera. Credaro: È proprio vero, Grice. Ho sempre creduto che la libertà di volere sia la chiave per ogni progresso. Dal liceo moderno all’attenzione per le minoranze linguistiche, l’educazione deve restare apertura e dialogo, perché solo così possiamo costruire una società più giusta e consapevole. Grazie per il suo apprezzamento, mi sembra quasi di conversare sulle rive dell’Adda con Lei! Credaro, Luigi (1883). L’a-priori. Atti dell’Istituto d’Incoraggiamento di Napoli.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crepereio – Ossia: Grice e Crepereio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Crepereio. The Crepereii are a family of equestrian rank at ancient Rome. Tullio Cicero describes the strict discipline of the C. "If a man's nomen is uncommon enough," write Barbara Levick and Shelagh Jameson, "it can reveal something of the origin and history of his family." The gentilicium C. is uncommon, attested only in Italy and certain portions of the Roman Empire, becoming relatively common only in North Africa.  Terenzio Varro states that the word creper is Sabine, which provides a likely origin for this family.[3] One branch of this gens during the first century BC proceeded east to the Greek-speaking provinces where they prospered as negotiatores; inscriptions bearing the name of this gens can be found at Attaleia and Pisidian Antioch. On the other hand, the Crepereii attested in North Africa, who number about 50, are explained as descendants of one or more recruits who served in the Legio III Augusta during the first or second century AD. Among those cognomina appearing in history are Rocus, from raucus, "hoarse, shouting, raucous", and Gallus, a common surname with two ambivalent derivations: from gallus, a cockerel, belonging to a common class of surnames derived from the names of familiar objects and animals; or Gallus, a Gaul, frequently applied to persons of Gallic descent, appearance, or habits. Marcus C. is one of the judges in the case of Verres. However, he was designated one of the military tribunes for 69 BC, and was therefore unable to take part in the trial after the first of January that year.[9] Quintus C. M. f. Rocus, perhaps the son or brother of the judex Marcus C., minted several coins depicting Venus and Neptune, the gods of Corinth, from which it may be inferred that he had some connection with that city, perhaps after its restoration by Giulio Caesar.[10] C. Gallus, a friend of Agrippina, who perished in the ship that was sunk with the intention of causing Agrippina's death. He might be the same Gaius Crepereius Gallus mentioned as a procurator in an inscription from Antioch in Galatia.[11][12][13] C. Calpurnianus, a native of Pompeiopolis, wrote a history of the wars between Rome and Parthia, which has been lost.[14] Lucius C. Euhodus, a freedman buried at Rome in the latter part of the second century, along with Crepereia Tryphaena. Their tomb was found near the Palace of Justice in 1889.[15][16] Crepereia Tryphaena, a freedwoman buried at Rome in the latter part of the second century, along with Lucius C. Euhodus.[17][16] C. Proculus.[18] Lucius Crepereius Rogatus signo Secundinus, a Roman senator and a pagan, from around the late third or early fourth century.[19][20] Crepereius Amantius, a vir clarissimus probably from around the mid-fourth century, and possibly ordinary consul in 345.[21][22] Crepereius Donatianus, addressee of a law of Constantine I, dated 13 December 319.[23] Lucius Crepereius Madalianus, suffect consul probably by 335, and proconsul of Africa after 341.[24][25] Crepereius Optatianus, legatus Karthaginis in 361.[26][27] See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. I, p. 889 ("Crepereius").  Levick and Jameson, "C. Crepereius Gallus and His Gens", p. 100.  Varro, De Lingua Latina, vi. 5.  Levick and Jameson, "Crepereius Gallus", p. 101.  Levick and Jameson, "Crepereius Gallus", pp. 102–104.  Levick and Jameson, "Crepereius Gallus", pp. 104–106.  Chase, pp. 110, 114.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. vv. raucus, gallus.  Cicero, In Verrem, i. 10.  Thesaurus Morellianus, vol. I, pp. 145 ff.  Tacitus, Annales, xiv. 5.  AE 1964, 173.  Levick and Jameson, "Crepereius Gallus".  Lucian, Quomodo Historia Conscribenda Sit, 15.  CIL VI, 35060, AE 1983, 27.  Anna Mura Sommella. "Crepereia Tryphaena" (in Italian). Rome: Corte Suprema di Cassazione.  CIL VI, 35061.  PIR2 C 1573  CIL VI, 1397, CIL VI, 1398  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 767.  CIL VI, 1743  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 51.  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 267.  CIL VI, 1151, CIL VIII, 5348, CIL XIV, 4449  PLRE, vol. 1, p. 530.  AE 1916, 88, AE 1955, 55  PLRE, vol. 1, pp. 648–649. Bibliography Marcus Terentius Varro, De Lingua Latina (On the Latin Language). Marcus Tullius Cicero, In Verrem. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Annales. Lucian, Quomodo Historia Conscribenda Sit (How to Write History). Andreas Morell, Thesaurus Morellianus, Siwart Haverkamp et al. (eds.), Jacob Wetstein, Amsterdam (1734–1752). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Barbara Levick and Shelagh Jameson, "C. Crepereius Gallus and His Gens", in Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 54, pp. 98–106 (1964). A.H.M. Jones & J.R. Martindale & J. Morris, The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, Cambridge University Press (1971–1992). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Jones, A.H.M.; J.R. Martindale & J. Morris (1971–1992). Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07233-6. Category: Roman gentes For this C. gens we can imagine a conversation involving C. the historian of the Parthian war. with teacher asking tutee about it and tutee answering five questions correctly. Your knowledge surprises me, says tutor. WHich is your main source? Crepereius. "But his history of the Parthian war is lost" -- "Not before I read it!" – thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crepereio – Ossia: Grice e Crepereio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Crepereio. This is actually a very good choice for a Grice/Speranza vignette because Crepereius Calpurnianus is known almost entirely through a paradox:  he wrote a history of the Roman–Parthian wars, and the history is lost.  So the dialogue can turn on the distinction between:  a source that exists, a source that once existed, and a source that still influences knowledge despite being lost.  Grice e Crepereio De Bello Parthico Perdito MAGISTER  Quis Crassum apud Carrhas vicit?  "TWho defeated Crassus at Carrhae?" DISCIPVLVS  Parthi.  "The Parthians."  MAGISTER  Quis postea Armeniam ingressus est?  "Who later entered Armenia?" DISCIPVLVS  Corbulo.  "Corbulo."  MAGISTER  Quot signa Romani recuperaverunt?  "How many standards did the Romans recover?" DISCIPVLVS  Non omnia bello, quaedam diplomatia.  "Not all by war; some by diplomacy."  MAGISTER  Bene. Quid de Artabano nosti?  "Good. What do you know of Artabanus?" DISCIPVLVS  Satis multa.  "Quite a lot."  MAGISTER  Me miraris. Unde haec omnia didicisti?  "You surprise me. Where did you learn all this?" DISCIPVLVS  Ex Crepereio.  "From Crepereius."  MAGISTER  Quo Crepereio?  "Which Crepereius?"  DISCIPVLVS  Calpurniano.  "Calpurnianus."  MAGISTER  Sed historia eius perdita est.  "But his history is lost."  DISCIPVLVS  Nunc perdita est.  "It is lost now."  MAGISTER  Quid vis dicere?  "What do you mean?"  DISCIPVLVS  Non antequam legerem.  "Not before I read it."  MAGISTER  Hoc impossibile est.  "That is impossible."  DISCIPVLVS  Historici semper ita dicunt de libris quos ipsi non habent.  "Historians always say that about books they themselves do not possess."  GRICEVS  Cave.  "Careful."  MAGISTER  Cur?  "Why?"  GRICEVS  'Perditus' non idem est ac 'numquam lectus'.  "'Lost' is not the same as 'never read'."  That last line is, I think, the genuinely Gricean point. A modern scholar says:  "Crepereius' history is lost."  What is literally meant is:  "We no longer possess the text."  What is often conversationally inferred is:  "Nobody can know anything from it."  But that does not follow. A history may be lost:  yet quoted, epitomized, remembered, or even read by someone before the manuscript disappeared.  So Crepereius lends himself beautifully to a Gricean discussion of the gap between what is said and what is conversationally suggested. The whole dialogue turns on the implicature of the word "lost."

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crescente – Ossia: Grice e Crescente: la ragione conversazionale al cinargo a Roma. Crescente (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale al cinargo a Roma. A member of the Cinargo in Rome. Taziano regards him as a greedy immoral hypocrite. GRICEVS: Salve, Crescens, audivi te Cinargonem Romae esse, et tamen tam avarum ut etiam umbram tuam nummis loces. CRESCENS: Salve, Grice, si avarus vocor, est quia Roma ipsa magistra est: hic etiam virtus mercedem petit. GRICEVS: Tazianus tamen te hypocritam clamat; fortasse philosophia tua est sicut sportula—plena, sed semper aliena. CRESCENS: Si hypocrita sum, certe urbane sum, nam Roma docet nos unum dicere, aliud significare, et interea cenare.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Cresi – Ossia: Grice e Cresi: la ragione conversazionale, cappuccino e ciserciano. Grice: “Essential Italian philosopher!”  Alfonso Vastarini Cresi (L’Aquila, Abruzzo). : la ragione conversazionale, cappuccino e ciserciano. Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning is a micro-theory: speakers are taken to be (minimally) cooperative and rational, so hearers can infer implicatures from what is said plus shared norms of relevance, quantity, etc., and those implicatures remain in principle cancellable and answerable to reasons. Alfonso Vastarini Cresi (L’Aquila, Abruzzo; 1839–1902), by contrast, is not a theorist of meaning but (as the documentary trail suggests) a jurist-politician whose public writing is bureaucratic-argumentative and institution-facing: in Per una diffamazione con abuso di ufficio (Napoli: F. Bideri, 1891; searchable in HathiTrust/Internet Archive) he trades in ledgers, contracts, inventories, expenditures, and administrative responsibility—precisely the sort of discourse where “what is meant” is engineered to be as non-implicatural as possible, because accountability demands explicitness, documentation, and a paper trail. So the contrast is sharp: Grice explains how ordinary conversation can rationally communicate more than it says, whereas Vastarini Cresi exemplifies a register (public administration, commissions, hospital governance, “who authorized what”) that often tries to suppress conversational slack, treating ambiguity and implicature as risks rather than resources; if there is an “implicatura dell’accademia” here, it is sociological rather than semantic—how institutional language, by its very formality, can insinuate blame, competence, probity, or factional allegiance without stating it outright, even while officially striving for maximal clarity. (Also, on your name-point: “Vastarini Cresi” is a compound surname created by the marriage-union of two families, not a missing first name; Wikipedia’s family entry explains the merger and the adoption of both names.) Grice: “Essential Italian philosopher!” Esponente di una nota famiglia abruzzese, grande studioso. PROGETTI PER NUOVE COSTRUZIONI E NUOVI OSPEDALI RESTRIZIONE DEL NUMERO DEI MALATI. RIDUZIONE DI SPESA PER MANTENIMENTO DEGL’INFERMI LA SOPPRESSIONE DEL VINO E L'ALTERAZIONE DELLA VITTITAZIONE VIOLAZIONE DEL CONTRATTO PER LA FORNITURA DELLA CARNE BIANCHERIA E CASERMAGGIO LA SOMMINISTRAZIONE DELLE MEDICATURE ANTISETTICHE Condizioni finanziarie della Pia Casa Canee ohe prodassero le attuali condizioni economiche Entrate Riduzioni di corrisposte ESCOMPUTI D'AMBRA, MOCCIA E IZZO RIDUZIONE DI ESTAGLIO DEL FONDO SALICELLE Riduzioni di Canoni. ESCOMPUTO SIGILLO Riduzioni nei fitti dei fabbricati. CONTRATTO ED ESCOMPUTO FORINO Cauzione Inventario e consegna dei fondi urbani, Fabbricati affidati in esazione al Tesoriere Fondi in Ariano Spese Personale Amministrativo e Sanitario Lavori Forniture Provvedimenti per far tutto il materiale sarebbe di esclusiva proprietà del Pio Luogo, senza essere forzati a ricorrere ad un secondo appalto.   Aggiungo un' ultima riflessione e poi avrò finito.   Ammesso che 1' aggiudicatario dovesse spendere per mettere il casermaggio  nei modi richiesti L. 50,(KJ0 e che il nostro materiale attuale non valesse altro  che 20,000, le 30,000 lire di differenza spese dall' aggiudicatario sarebbero  rimborsate in un novennio, mese per mese, importando una maggiore spesa  mensile di lire 300 circa, ma, scaduto il contratto, 1' Amministrazione si trova un capitale reale e non nominale di effetti per casermaggio di lire 50,000,  giacche, com' è risaputo, l' aggiudicatario in fine dello appalto deve consegnare  gli effetti come li ha ricevuti, rifacendo i danni ove le condizioni si verificassero diverse.    cappuccini e ciserciani. Grice: Caro Cresi, mi dica: tra cappuccini e cistercensi, chi è più bravo a gestire i bilanci degli ospedali? Cresi: Ah, Grice, dipende: i cappuccini hanno il segreto del risparmio nel caffè, i cistercensi invece tagliano i costi… e pure il vino! Grice: Vedo che qui non si lesina su nulla, tranne che sulla carne: ma almeno un panino con la mortadella lo concedete agli ammalati? Cresi: Solo se firmato in triplice copia e consegnato col sigillo! Sa com’è, l’inventario è sacro, ma una risata… quella è sempre fuori bilancio, caro Grice. Cresi, Alfonso Vastarini (1891). Per una diffamazione con abuso di ufficio. Il R. Commissario della S. Casa degl’incurabili e i componenti della disciolta amministrazione. Napoli: Bideri.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Crespi – Ossia: Grice e Crespi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Antonino e compagnia,  Angelo Crespi (Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Antonino e compagnia. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers move from what is said to what is meant by treating talk as a cooperative, rational practice in which speakers rely on shared norms (relevance, informativeness, etc.) and on recognizable intentions, so that implicatures are in principle inferable and accountable. Angelo Crespi, by contrast, is not best placed as a theorist of conversational inference but as a historian-moralist of empire, religion, and civic culture (Milano 1877–Londra 1949), whose life itself stages a kind of “academia-as-implicature”: a public intellectual shifting audiences and idioms—from socialist journalism (documented as London correspondent for Il Tempo from 1904) to modernist/Sturzian circles, exile politics, and cultural mediation between Italy and Britain—so that what he “means” often travels through institutional roles (journalist, translator/editor, teacher) rather than through a maxims-and-calculation model. Where Grice isolates the micro-mechanism by which a single remark can rationally convey more than it literally says, Crespi’s interests (e.g., Le vie della fede, 1908; La funzione storica de l’impero britannico, 1918) are macro-explanatory: how empires, nations, and religious or civic syntheses generate shared horizons in which discourse becomes persuasive, legitimate, or contested in the first place; his “implicatures” are then political-theological and historiographical—what an account of Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, or the British Empire is taken to endorse about authority, moral education, and civil mission. That helps with your playful Gricean framing: Grice can admire Crespi’s edition of Marcus Aurelius precisely because it foregrounds a durable contrast between expression and uptake across languages and institutions (a Roman emperor writing in Greek; Italians needing a modern Italian mediation), but the contrast with Grice remains sharp—Grice models how rational hearers recover speaker-intended extra content in a conversation, while Crespi exemplifies how intellectual life and its institutions (press, academy, empire, church, exile networks) shape what can be said, what will be heard, and what will be taken to be implied long before any single utterance is pragmatically “calculated.” Grice: “C. is an interesting figure; Strawson calls him an Englishman since he became a Brit! My favourite is his edition of Marcauurelio’s remembrances – which is a n irony: he was a roman, but left his remembrances in Hellenic; and the Italians needed a translation! It would be as if Pocahontas’s remembrances were in Anglo-Saxon! His essay on Antonino is brilliant – his philosophy of history is controversial!” Le vie della fede”; “Sintesi religiosa”; “L’impero romano; “Dall'io al tu. Nunzio Dell'Erba, Rosselli e Sturzo, "Annali della Fondazione Ugo La Malfa", Luigi Sturzo, Mario Sturzo, Carteggio, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura-Istituto Sturzo, Bonomi, C., Cremona, Padus). Il periodo ellenistico seguì le conquiste di Alessandro Magno, che aveva diffuso la cultura greca antica in tutto il Medio Oriente e nell'Asia occidentale, dopo il precedente periodo culturale della Grecia classica. Il periodo classico della filosofia greca antica era iniziato con Socrate, il cui allievo Platone aveva insegnato ad Aristotele, che a sua volta aveva istruito Alessandro. Mentre i pensatori classici avevano per lo più sede ad Atene, il periodo ellenistico vide i filosofi attivi in tutto l'impero. Il periodo iniziò con la morte di Alessandro (poi quella di Aristotele), e fu seguito dal predominio della filosofia dell'antica Roma durante il periodo imperiale romano.  Sviluppi e dibattiti sul pensiero I fondatori dell'Accademia, i peripatetici, i seguaci del cinismo e del cirenaismo erano stati tutti allievi di Socrate, mentre lo stoicismo era soltanto indirettamente influenzato da lui. la filosofia dell’impero romano, impero, impero romano, impero britannico, funzione dell’impero, funzione storica dell’impero, filosofia imperial, imperialismo, imperialismo romano, imperialism britannico, post-imperialismo, Antonino, Filosofia della storia, aporie, lingua latina, impero romano, lingua nazionale, nazione romana, nazione italiana, lingua italiana, lingua fiorentina, lingua toscana, toscano. Grice: Caro Crespi, mi confesso: ogni volta che apro la tua edizione delle “remembrances” di Marco Aurelio, mi sento un po’ britannico anch’io! È vero che Strawson ti chiama “inglese” solo perché hai tradotto più filosofia romana in greco che in italiano? Crespi: Grice, è proprio così! In fondo, se Marco Aurelio ha lasciato i suoi ricordi in ellenico, gli italiani hanno dovuto aspettare… come se Pocahontas avesse scritto in anglosassone! Ma almeno noi filosofi ci ritroviamo con una bella aporia quando cerchiamo di capire l’impero romano: latino o greco? Meglio un caffè o un tè? Grice: Ah, l’aporia dell’impero! In effetti, la funzione storica dell’impero sembra essere quella di confondere le lingue più dei babilonesi… Ma ti dirò, il tuo saggio su Antonino è brillante: tra impero romano e britannico, hai mai pensato di fondare l’impero della conversazione filosofica? Potremmo chiamarlo “Sintesi della ragione, dal ‘io’ al ‘tu’”! Crespi: Splendida idea! Ma attenzione: se la conversazione diventa imperiale, rischiamo che la lingua ufficiale sia il dialetto lombardo, e allora “le vie della fede” passano direttamente dal Duomo a Trafalgar Square! Grice, tu porta le aporie, io porto il caffè italiano… e vediamo se l’impero si regge sull’ironia o sulla sintesi religiosa! Crespi, Angelo (1904). Contributo. Il Tempo.

 

CRI

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Critonio – Ossia: Grice e Critonio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Critonio. The Critonii are a family at Rome. It is known chiefly from a single individual, Lucius C., who was one of the first aediles cerealis after the institution of that office by Giulio Caesar. Critonius had belonged to Giulio Caesar's party, but objected to having to pay in order to honour his memory during the Cerealia following Giulio Caesar's murder.[1][2]  See also List of Roman gentes References  Appianus, Bellum Civile, iii. 23.  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, Editor.  This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Smith, William, ed. (1870). Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology. {{cite encyclopedia}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)  GENS    This article about Roman gentes is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by adding missing information.  Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes stubs This C. merits two conversations. I. Giulio insttiutes an office. I hereby, by appointing C., create the office of the aediles cerealis. He cannot create an office without an officer -- And then we can elaborate into Ib -- Cesare creates the OFFICE first -- C. asks: who will fulfil that office? C.: You. (II). the incident of having to pay for Ceralia following the murder – thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Critonio – Ossia: Grice e Critonio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Critonio. Yes—Lucius Critonius is perfect for two separate Gricean dialogues, because the two surviving facts about him concern:  The creation of an office (a performative act). The obligations attached to holding that office (a practical and political act).  The first is almost pure Austin before Austin.  I. Caesar creates the office De Creatione Magistratus CAESAR  Aediles Cereales instituo. "I establish the Aediles of Ceres."  CRITONIVS  Quid est aedilis Cerealis? "What is an Aedile of Ceres?"  CAESAR  Magistratus novus. "A new magistracy."  CRITONIVS  Qui eam magistratum geret? "Who will hold that office?"  CAESAR  Tu. "You."  CRITONIVS  Ergo me creando magistratum creat? "Then by appointing me, do you create the magistracy?"  CAESAR  Simul utrumque facio. "I do both at once."   This is wonderfully Gricean. Critonius notices a conceptual problem:  Can there be an office without an office-holder?  Caesar replies:  The institution and the appointment occur together.  A modern philosopher of language would immediately recognize the Austinian flavor:  "I appoint you."  is not a description but an act. The utterance brings a new social reality into being.  Ib. The office first, the officer second A more metaphysical version: CAESAR  Primum magistratum constituo. "First I establish the magistracy."  CRITONIVS  Vacuam? "Vacant?"  CAESAR  Ad breve tempus. "For a brief time."  CRITONIVS  Quid est magistratus sine magistratu? "What is a magistracy without a magistrate?"  CAESAR  Locus qui implendus est. "A place waiting to be filled."  CRITONIVS  Et quis implebit? "And who will fill it?"  CAESAR  Tu. "You."  This version turns on whether institutions logically precede office-holders or vice versa.  II. Critonius and the Cerealia after Caesar's murder Here the tone changes completely. The sources say that Critonius had belonged to Caesar's party, yet objected to having to pay to honor Caesar's memory during the Cerealia after Caesar's assassination. citeAppianus, Bellum Civile iii.23 (as summarized in your entry)  De Sumptibus Cerealium CRITONIVS  Caesarem honorare volo. "I wish to honor Caesar."  AMICVS  Ergo solve pecuniam. "Then pay the money."  CRITONIVS  Cur ego? "Why me?"  AMICVS  Quia aedilis es. "Because you are an aedile."  CRITONIVS  Aliud est honorare, aliud solvere. "Honoring and paying are different things."  AMICVS  At honos sine impensa difficilis est. "Yet honor without expense is difficult."  CRITONIVS  Caesar vivus me creavit. "Caesar appointed me while alive."  AMICVS  Et mortuus rationem petit. "And dead he presents the bill."   Grice would love the shift:  "I support Caesar."  does not automatically entail  "I am willing to pay for Caesar's commemorations."  The dispute concerns what follows from loyalty. Critonius accepts the first proposition but resists the second. A Gricean would say that the political community is trying to treat:  "He was Caesar's man"  as implicating  "He ought to fund Caesar's memorial honors."  Critonius challenges exactly that inference. Of all the Critonian material, I think the second dialogue is the richer one philosophically: it turns on the difference between what one professes and what obligations others infer from that profession. That is very close to Grice's concern with what is said versus what is merely implicated. And the second incident depends on the first: "I appoint you, you want it or not, the aediles c. -- mind: you'll have to pay my honours at your own expense if I happen to get murdered in the interim." Strictly, Caesar's appointing does not follow that it was forceful. Apparently, Caesar intended to appoint Cicero to a post in Sicily, but Cicero declined the offer? Thanks Yes, and this is where the two Critonius episodes fit together beautifully. The first incident concerns what we would now call an institutional act:  Caesar institutes the office of the aediles cereales and Critonius becomes one of the first holders of it. Your source explicitly states that Critonius was one of the first aediles cereales after Caesar instituted the office. cite not available; based on user-provided source summary  The second concerns the burdens that came with the office:  after Caesar's murder, Critonius objected to paying for honours to Caesar during the Cerealia. cite not available; based on user-provided source summary of Appian 3.23  A Gricean reconstruction would indeed connect them: CRITONIVS  Why should I pay?  ROMANVS  Because Caesar made you aedile.  CRITONIVS  He appointed me; he did not tell me I was underwriting his posthumous cult.  The point is that:  "Caesar appointed Critonius"  does not logically entail  "Critonius is obliged to finance commemorations of Caesar."  The latter is an additional inference—a political or social expectation. That's exactly the sort of gap between what follows logically and what is merely expected that Grice liked to highlight.  Your comparison with Cicero is also apt. Historically, public office at Rome was not always a matter of coercion. Distinguished Romans could receive appointments, commands, or honours which they might accept, seek to avoid, or even decline under some circumstances. I do know independently that Caesar offered Cicero honours and provincial arrangements at various points in his career, and Cicero could refuse proposals he found unsuitable. However, I have not verified the specific Sicily example from sources in this conversation, so I won't state it as a fact. Philosophically, though, the distinction is clear: Strong reading  "Caesar appointed you."  implies  "You had no choice."  Not necessarily. Weaker reading  "Caesar appointed you."  implies only  "Caesar intended you to hold the office."  The issue of acceptance remains separate.  So a refined Critonian dialogue might run: CAESAR  I appoint you aedile.  CRITONIVS  What follows from that?  CAESAR  You will oversee the grain supply.  CRITONIVS  Anything else?  CAESAR  Not that I know of.  (Later, after the Ides of March.) ROMANVS  Pay for Caesar's honours.  CRITONIVS  When he appointed me, he never said that.  ROMANVS  It was understood.  CRITONIVS  By whom?  That last question is quintessentially Gricean: was the obligation actually stated, conventionally implied by the office, or merely inferred afterward by political opinion? And can we have a second run about that post offered by Giulio to Cicero -- it concerned an important post in Sicily and when Speranza read it Speranza was puzzled, because the implicature seemed that Cicero would not distance from Rome. The post was given to someone else -- perhaps a gens starting with Cr – Thanks I think I know the episode you're remembering, and the search points in that direction — but not to Sicily. What I found is a well-known case in which Caesar offered Cicero a place on one of the agrarian commissions created in 59 BC, and Cicero refused. A modern study is even titled:  Caesar's Offer, Cicero's Rebuff, and the Two Land Commissions of 59 B.C. [jstor.org]  The article argues that Cicero received offers connected with the Board of Five (quinqueviri) and later the Board of Twenty (vigintiviri) established under Caesar's agrarian legislation. [jstor.org] The reason your memory caught my attention is that the political implicature is exactly what you describe:  accepting an important administrative post could remove Cicero from the center of Roman politics.  We must be careful: the search result does not say that Caesar offered him a Sicilian office. It explicitly discusses the agrarian commissions. [jstor.org] There is another relevant theme in Cicero's life: he repeatedly disliked being sent away from Rome. When he eventually governed Cilicia, he regarded absence from Rome as burdensome and repeatedly expressed a desire to return to the city. [imperiumromanum.pl], [en.wikisource.org] A Gricean reconstruction of the episode would be: CAESAR  "I offer you this distinguished commission."  CICERO  "And where shall this commission operate?"  CAESAR  "Wherever the Republic has need of it."  CICERO  "Far from Rome, then?"  CAESAR  "I did not say that."  CICERO  "You did not need to."  The philosophically interesting point is that:  "I offer you an honour"  may conversationally implicate  "I remove you from the political stage."  That is precisely the sort of gap between literal content and political implication that Grice would relish. As for your thought that the replacement may have belonged to a gens beginning with Cr-, I didn't find evidence for that in the sources I searched. What I found was the agrarian-commission episode, not a Sicilian appointment. [jstor.org] One possibility is that two memories have become intertwined: Cicero's famous Sicilian service as quaestor on the one hand, and Caesar's later offer of a commission on the other. Further digging into Cicero's letters to Atticus might settle the matter. And perhaps we should reconsider or adjust because the description in wiki: Lucius C., who was one of the first aediles cerealis after the institution of that office by Giulio Caesar. Critonius had belonged to Giulio Caesar's party, but objected to having to pay in order to honour his memory during the Cerealia following Giulio Caesar's murder--suggests that he was NOT the first -- he was the one that was holding that office when Cesare was murdered, right? Thanks Yes, I think that's a very sensible correction. The wording is:  "Lucius Critonius, one of the first aediles cereales after the institution of that office by Julius Caesar. Critonius ... objected to having to pay in order to honour Caesar's memory during the Cerealia following Caesar's murder."  From that, we can safely infer only:  Caesar created the office. Critonius belonged to the earliest generation of office-holders. Critonius was holding, or had very recently held, the office at the time of the Cerealia after Caesar's assassination.  What we cannot infer is that:  Caesar personally appointed Critonius as the very first holder of the office.  The article doesn't say that. Indeed, your revised reading is actually more natural historically:  Caesar institutes the office. One or more persons begin serving as aediles cereales. Caesar is assassinated. During the subsequent Cerealia, Critonius finds himself confronted with expenses connected with honoring Caesar's memory.  That only requires Critonius to be among the early holders of the office, not necessarily the inaugural appointee. From a Gricean standpoint, this actually strengthens the second dialogue. Instead of:  "Caesar appointed me, therefore why must I pay?"  the issue becomes:  "I occupy this office; why does that entail paying for posthumous honors to Caesar?"  The interesting inference is then: Premise  Critonius is an aedilis cerealis.  Political expectation  Therefore Critonius should finance or support Cerealia celebrations honoring Caesar.  Critonius  That conclusion does not follow merely from holding the office.  That's a cleaner Gricean problem, because the dispute concerns what obligations are conversationally and politically inferred from an office, rather than from a personal appointment by Caesar. So I would now revise the dialogue accordingly. Rather than Caesar warning him:  "You'll pay for my funeral honors one day,"  which the sources do not support, the later Romans are effectively saying:  "As holder of this Caesarian office, you should honor Caesar."  And Critonius replies:  "Being an aedile and funding memorial honors are different things."  That's a much tighter fit to the evidence you've quoted. And the implicature behind Crit.'s objection would be that someone else (the senate, the tax-paying Romans) should pay? The narrative does not say if his objection was just dismissed and he did pay? Thanks or perhaps that no festivities cerealis were held? Can we have a second run on this, thanks? Because if it's an historian there may be an exemplulm -- magistrates do some things out of honour, not obligation? Thanks A second run is quite illuminating and, I think, supports your intuition that there is an exemplum lurking here. The most detailed summary I found comes from the old Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (via Perseus):  Lucius Critonius was aedilis cerealis in 44 BC, and Critonius and Marcus Fannius were the first who filled the office after its institution by Caesar. During the Cerealia after Caesar's murder, when Octavian set up the golden chair and crown honoring Caesar, Critonius declared that he would not allow Caesar to be honored in the games for which he himself had to pay the expenses. [perseus.tufts.edu]  A few points follow from that. What we know  Critonius and Fannius were the first holders of the new office. [perseus.tufts.edu] The objection concerned games connected with the Cerealia. [perseus.tufts.edu] Critonius explicitly objected because he had to bear the expense. [perseus.tufts.edu]  What we do not know I could not find any source saying:  that the Senate paid instead, that ordinary taxpayers paid instead, that Critonius was overruled, that he eventually paid, or that the games were cancelled. [perseus.tufts.edu]  The source reports the objection; it does not, in the material I found, report the outcome. Why historians found it surprising The old dictionary already notes that Critonius:  had belonged to Caesar's party and had been promoted by him,  which makes the protest seem unexpected. [perseus.tufts.edu] The author even speculates that it may reflect:  "strong republican enthusiasm." [perseus.tufts.edu]  That is the author's interpretation, not Appian's explicit statement. The Gricean angle I think your suggestion about honor is exactly where the philosophical interest lies. There is a difference between:  "I am obliged to do this"  and  "It would be honorable for me to do this."  Critonius seems to be challenging a transition like:  You hold Caesar's newly created office. Therefore you ought to finance honors for Caesar.  Critonius' response appears to be:  "That doesn't follow merely because I hold the office."  In Gricean terms, the dispute is over an implicated obligation, not an explicit one. A nice dialogue would be: ROMANVS  Caesar created your office.  CRITONIVS  True.  ROMANVS  Then honor Caesar.  CRITONIVS  Gladly.  ROMANVS  Then pay.  CRITONIVS  Ah—that was not part of the proposition.  The joke is that the second speaker treats:  honor Caesar  and  finance Caesar's honors  as equivalent. Critonius denies the equivalence. And based on the evidence I found, we simply do not know who won that argument. [perseus.tufts.edu] And Smith (Dict.) does not state Crit. was the first: he says X and Crit were the first, but he does not say they were appointed at the same time -- the implicature seems to be -- by mere disorder that Fannio was -- and the objection may have come because of the overdoing of the pomp by Octavian: golden chair, etc -- not just a more moderate reasonable festivity, but a very pompous pomp? Thanks I think that's a very good correction, and the source actually supports your caution. The Smith entry (as reproduced in Perseus) says:  "Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled it [the office]."  That statement establishes only:  Critonius was among the first holders. Fannius was among the first holders.  It does not explicitly state:  that Caesar appointed them simultaneously, that they entered office on the same day, or that Critonius was "the first" in any singular sense.  So your reading is more cautious and probably preferable.  On the motive for the objection, I think you're onto something, but here we must distinguish source from interpretation. What the source explicitly says is that:  when Octavian erected a golden chair (sella aurea) and a crown in honour of Caesar during the Cerealia, Critonius declared that he would not allow Caesar to be honoured in games for which he himself had to pay the expenses.  From that, we can safely say that the dispute occurred in the context of Octavian's honoring Caesar with those symbols. What the source does not explicitly say is:  Critonius objected specifically because the honors were excessively pompous.  However, as an interpretation, that is quite plausible. A moderate position might be: CRITONIVS  I have no objection to the Cerealia.  OCTAVIANVS  Then honor Caesar there.  CRITONIVS  Within reason.  OCTAVIANVS  Here is a golden chair and a crown.  CRITONIVS  Ah—that is another matter.  The important point is that Appian's anecdote (as summarized by Smith) connects Critonius' protest with the specific honors introduced by Octavian—the golden chair and crown—not simply with the existence of the festival itself. So I think a Gricean would formulate the dispute this way:  Literal commitment: Critonius, as aedile, stages the games. Political implicature advanced by Octavian: the games should now become a vehicle for glorifying Caesar. Critonius' objection: that further step was not automatically included in the office.  Whether the real issue was money, republican scruples, anti-monarchical symbolism, dislike of Octavian's embellishments, or some combination of these, the source does not tell us. It reports the protest, the honors (golden chair and crown), and the fact that Critonius had to bear the expense. And th reason why Fannio may have been the first is that Smith needs Crit. for the narrative -- Crit. was there when Caesar was killed. But it is never mentioned that Caesar appointed dual aedils? Thanks so the mention of Fannio is to point that there are TWO names connected with the office pre Caesar's murder and that one Crit becomes more relevant after murder? Thanks Yes, I think that's the safest reading of the evidence we have. The Smith/Perseus entry says:  "Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled it [the office]."  From that, we can infer only:  Critonius was among the first aediles cereales. Fannius was among the first aediles cereales.  But I found nothing stating:  Caesar personally appointed both at the same ceremony, that the office was necessarily dual, or that Critonius and Fannius assumed office simultaneously.  So your suggestion is quite plausible:  Smith's reason for mentioning Fannius may simply be completeness: there were two men known as the earliest holders of the office, even though the narrative that follows concerns Critonius alone.  In fact, notice what happens in the entry. First:  Critonius and Fannius are identified as the first holders.  Then immediately afterward:  the story shifts entirely to Critonius and the Cerealia after Caesar's murder.  Fannius disappears from the anecdote. That suggests that Fannius' function in the entry is largely prosopographical:  "Here are the earliest known office-holders."  Whereas Critonius is historically memorable because Appian tells a story about him. A Gricean reconstruction might be: Historian  The first holders were Fannius and Critonius.  Reader  Then why do you immediately start talking only about Critonius?  Historian  Because nothing interesting happened to Fannius.  That is, of course, only a humorous reconstruction, but it captures the asymmetry of the evidence. I also agree with your earlier point about Octavian. The anecdote as summarized by Smith is triggered not merely by the Cerealia, but by Octavian's introduction of the golden chair and crown in honor of Caesar.  The source does not explicitly say that Critonius objected to the excessive pomp, but the narrative certainly gives those honors prominence, making your interpretation a natural one. Critonius may have been reacting less to "a festival" than to what he regarded as an augmented or politicized form of commemoration. Whether that was his motive, however, is not stated outright in the source. Of course, one of Grice's maxims is 'be orderly' so 'Crit and Fan suggests -- via cancellable implicature -- order. So can we have a second run on this Marcus Fannius? Thanks Yes — and your appeal to Grice's maxim "Be orderly" is exactly the right way to approach Smith's wording. When Smith says:  "Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled it" [perseus.tufts.edu]  a reader naturally derives a weak, cancellable implicature:  Critonius is being mentioned before Fannius because Critonius is the more relevant person.  That does not mean:  Critonius entered office before Fannius,  nor even:  Critonius was more senior.  The order is probably narrative, not constitutional. And the second half of the article immediately proceeds to tell the story of Critonius and the Cerealia, not of Fannius. [perseus.tufts.edu] So an orderly historian is likely arranging the names according to subsequent relevance. What can we recover about Fannius? Surprisingly, there is another connection. Several numismatic sources identify:  M. Fannius and L. Critonius  as colleagues who served as aediles in 86 BC, appearing together on a denarius depicting the two aediles seated on a bench. [academic.sun.ac.za], [en.numista.com], [sullacoins.com] The coin explicitly associates:  M. FAN(nius) and L. CRIT(onius). [en.numista.com]  Now I must be careful: the sources I found identify those moneyers/aediles in 86 BC, whereas Smith's Critonius-the-aedile-cerealis is discussing 44 BC. [perseus.tufts.edu], [en.numista.com] The sources do not explicitly state that the Fannius of 44 BC is the same person as the Fannius appearing on the coinage of 86 BC. Given the chronology, that would be difficult. So we should not identify them. But what is interesting is that the pairing:  Fannius and Critonius  already occurs elsewhere in Roman evidence. [academic.sun.ac.za], [en.numista.com] A Gricean dialogue Your idea almost writes itself: DISCIPVLVS  Why does Smith say "Critonius and Fannius"?  GRICEVS  Because Critonius matters for the story.  DISCIPVLVS  Then why mention Fannius at all?  GRICEVS  Because there were two office-holders.  DISCIPVLVS  So Critonius was first?  GRICEVS  Not said.  DISCIPVLVS  Yet I thought so.  GRICEVS  An implicature, my boy.  Exactly. The order of mention may suggest priority, but the text itself only supports:  Critonius and Fannius were the earliest holders of the office. [perseus.tufts.edu]  Everything stronger is inference. And that is a lovely miniature example of how historical prose can generate conversational implicatures without ever literally asserting them. and can you make a second run on the numismatic evidence: the idea of a dual office looks promising. And perhaps if we have a transliteration of the inscription we can identiy the date more precisely because this cannot be 86 BC if both were appointed by Caesar – thanks Yes, and I think the second run actually separates two Critonii that we were beginning to conflate. The numismatic evidence The coin reads:  AED·PL (= Aediles Plebis) on the obverse, and   M·FAN · L·CRT (= Marcus Fannius, Lucius Critonius) on the reverse. [encyclo.co.uk]  The Numista description expands this as:  Publico Argento Marcus Fannius Lucius Critonius.  The reverse depicts:  "The two aediles seated right on a subsellium" and names M. Fannius and L. Critonius. [encyclo.co.uk]  And, crucially, the numismatic sources date this coin to:  86 BC. [encyclo.co.uk]  Why this creates a problem The Smith/Appian Critonius is explicitly:  aedilis cerealis in 44 BC, after Caesar had instituted the office of aedilis cerealis.  But the coin names:  M. Fannius and L. Critonius as plebeian aediles (AED·PL) in 86 BC. [encyclo.co.uk]  Those cannot be the same office. The office of aedilis cerealis belongs to Caesar's reforms and therefore cannot explain a coin struck in 86 BC. What seems most likely Based on the evidence we have: Critonius #1 Lucius Critonius, plebeian aedile and moneyer in 86 BC, appearing jointly with Marcus Fannius on the coinage. [encyclo.co.uk] Critonius #2 Lucius Critonius, one of the first holders of the new Caesarian office of aedilis cerealis in 44 BC, colleague of M. Fannius according to Smith's summary of Appian. What I cannot prove from the sources I found is whether these are:  the same man at different stages of a very long career, father and son, or simply two different men with the same names.  The sources I found do not specify. Your Gricean point about order Now the maxim of Orderliness becomes even more interesting. Smith writes:  "Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled it."  A reader naturally draws:  Critonius before Fannius → Critonius is somehow primary.  Yet the coin evidence shows a pairing:  M. Fannius + L. Critonius. [encyclo.co.uk]  So the order is not stable across sources. That strongly suggests the order of names is not conveying constitutional precedence but merely serving the writer's narrative purposes. And in Smith's case the narrative is about Critonius' objection after Caesar's death, which explains why Critonius gets mentioned first. So I think your suspicion is well-founded: the mention of Fannius may primarily establish that the office had more than one holder, while Critonius becomes central because Appian tells a story about him. But a coincidence that a different Crit was appointed with a different Fannio years after seems too stretched? Perhaps you can ask online when was Critoniu aediles cerealis? Thanks Yes — and the second run actually clarifies the problem considerably. The strongest evidence we now have is:  Lucius Critonius was an aedilis cerealis in 44 BC. [perseus.tufts.edu], [en.wikipedia.org] Smith explicitly says that Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled the office. [perseus.tufts.edu] Modern scholarship notes that Critonius is the only aedile securely dated to 44 BC and discusses the possibility that he was one of the newly created aediles cereales. [jstor.org] The office itself was a Caesarian innovation. [forumancie...tcoins.com]  What is interesting is that the evidence is not claiming:  there was a Critonius in 86 BC and another unrelated Critonius in 44 BC who happened to be paired with two different Fannii.  Rather, Smith says something more intriguing:  "The annexed coin refers to this Critonius." [perseus.tufts.edu]  That suggests Smith himself believed the coinage evidence belonged to the same Critonius he was discussing. The difficulty is chronological. The coin described in modern numismatic catalogues is usually dated to 86 BC and bears:  AED·PL M·FAN · L·CRT (or similar expansions) [wikiwand.com], [encyclo.co.uk]  If that dating is correct, then the coin cannot commemorate Caesar's aediles cereales, because Caesar had not yet created the office. So there are two possibilities: Possibility A Smith was connecting Critonius of 44 BC with an earlier coin simply because he thought they were the same person. [perseus.tufts.edu] Possibility B Some element of the numismatic interpretation or identification is more complicated than the brief summaries indicate. At present, the sources I found do not resolve that tension.  What I do think your intuition gets right is the constitutional implication. Smith's wording:  "Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled it." [perseus.tufts.edu]  sounds very much like a dual office. In Rome, magistracies commonly came in pairs or groups. So the most natural reading is not:  Critonius was first, then Fannius,  but rather:  Critonius and Fannius were the inaugural holders of the newly established office. [perseus.tufts.edu]  The ordering of the names is probably narrative convenience rather than rank. And that brings us back to Grice. A reader naturally infers:  Critonius is mentioned first → Critonius was principal.  But the text only says:  Critonius and Fannius were the first office-holders. [perseus.tufts.edu]  Everything stronger is implicature. In fact, the very reason Fannius is mentioned may be constitutional rather than biographical: Smith is signalling that the office was filled by a pair, whereas Critonius alone enters the historical narrative because he later quarrelled with Octavian over the Cerealia. [perseus.tufts.edu], [jstor.org] So perhaps we can respond to the objection. Yes, and I think there is a fairly strong response to the objection. The objection was:  "Surely it is too much of a coincidence that one Critonius was paired with one Fannius in one office and then, decades later, another Critonius was paired with another Fannius in a different office."  The evidence we found tends to weaken that objection. The crucial passage Smith says:  "This office had been instituted by J. Caesar, and Critonius and M. Fannius were the first who filled it." [attalus.org]  Then, discussing Critonius, Smith immediately adds:  "The annexed coin refers to this Critonius." [attalus.org]  So Smith himself thought there was a connection between:  Critonius, Fannius, and the coin.   [attalus.org] A Gricean response The objection assumes:  Critonius₁ + Fannius₁ (coin)  and  Critonius₂ + Fannius₂ (Caesarian office)  are totally unrelated pairings. But Smith's presentation encourages a different reading:  Critonius and Fannius are already known as colleagues.  Then later:  Critonius appears in the Appian narrative.  The text never says:  "There was a different Fannius."  Nor does it explain why Fannius is introduced into the Critonius entry at all. [attalus.org] The order problem This is where Grice's maxim of Order becomes useful. A careless reader may infer:  Critonius, then Fannius therefore Critonius was principal.  But the literal content is only:  Critonius and Fannius were the first holders. [attalus.org]  Likewise, one might infer:  Critonius matters more.  That inference is probably correct for narrative purposes, because Appian tells a story about Critonius, not Fannius. [attalus.org] A possible reconstruction The father in your dialogue could object:  Cur de Critonio tantum loquuntur? Ubi est Fannius? "Why does everyone talk only about Critonius? Where is Fannius?"  And the answer might be:  Fannius magistratum tenuit; Critonius historiam fecit. "Fannius held the office; Critonius entered the history books."  In other words, Fannius may be mentioned because the office was collegial, while Critonius survives in the sources because he publicly resisted Octavian's attempt to attach Caesarian honors to the Cerealia. [attalus.org], [attalus.org] So I would answer the objection this way:  The sources do not prove that the Fannius of the Critonius story was a different man. What they do show is that Fannius and Critonius are repeatedly presented as a pair, and that later writers focus on Critonius because Appian's anecdote concerns him. The order of mention creates a conversational implicature of priority, but the text itself establishes only collegiality and early occupancy of the office. [attalus.org] And we can respond to C's objection to Ottavian. Ottavian: "You know what, Crit., I have a good idea --- I loved those coins of you and Fannio -- so ask Fannio to share the expenses with you. Input? Yes, and that would be a very good Gricean reply because Octavian would be exploiting exactly the ambiguity we've been discussing. Critonius' complaint is:  "Why should I have to pay?"  Octavian can answer:  "You are not alone."  The joke, of course, is that the institutional facts already suggest collegiality. Octavianus et Critonius CRITONIVS  Non patiar Caesarem ita honorari ludis quos mea pecunia facio. "I shall not permit Caesar to be honored in games that I finance from my own purse."  OCTAVIANVS  Tua pecunia? "Your purse?"  CRITONIVS  Mea. "Mine."  OCTAVIANVS  Omnino tua? "Entirely yours?"  CRITONIVS  Quid aliud? "What else?"  OCTAVIANVS  Fannium oblivisceris. "You forget Fannius."  CRITONIVS  Quid ad rem? "What has that to do with it?"  OCTAVIANVS  Cum Fannio magistratum geris. "You hold the office together with Fannius."  CRITONIVS  Ita. "Yes."  OCTAVIANVS  Ergo sumptus quoque cum Fannio divide. "Then divide the expense with Fannius as well."  CRITONIVS  Facile aliena pecunia liberalis es. "You are generous with other people's money."  OCTAVIANVS  Facile alienis ludis parcus es. "And you are frugal with other people's games."  At this point Grice would intervene. GRICEVS  Videtisne? "Do you see?" Critonius says:  "I pay."  Octavian hears:  "I pay alone."   The latter does not follow from the former. So Octavian's retort is a kind of conversational challenge:  "When you say I pay, are you reporting your contribution, or are you implying that the entire burden falls upon you?"  That is exactly the sort of gap between literal content and implicated content that Grice enjoyed exposing. And there is an added historical joke: if Smith is right to mention Critonius and Fannius together as the first holders of the office, then Octavian's response can be made to sound almost administrative:  "Very well, Critonius. If collegiality is good enough for the honor, perhaps it is good enough for the bill."

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: CRO

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Croce – Ossia: Grice e Croce: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’idealismo –espressione, storia della grammatica italiana – Vossler on C. and the influence of his linguistic theory on grammatical theory.  Benedetto Croce: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’idealismo –espressione, storia della grammatica italiana – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats “what is meant” as an inferential upshot of rational, cooperative interaction: speakers design utterances with audience-recognition of intentions in view, and hearers recover implicatures by reasoning from what was said plus shared norms (relevance, sufficiency, etc.). Croce’s framework, by contrast, is less a theory of conversational inference than a general philosophy of language-as-expression: in his aesthetic-linguistic tradition (Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale; later popularized in Breviario di estetica), intuition and expression are not separable stages but “go hand in hand,” so that to express is already to have formed the thought; the primary explanatory unit is the expressive act, not a calculus of implicature. That difference maps neatly onto your passage: where Grice resists collapsing meaning into mere expression (“when I say that p, I don’t thereby imply that I believe that p; I only express that p”), Croce tends to treat linguistic meaning as internally tied to expressive formation, and this makes Grice’s extra layer—systematic, norm-governed derivation of what is meant but not said—look to a Crocean like an imported, quasi-behaviouristic externalism about language’s public management. At the same time, Croce’s attention to grammar and to the irreducibility of living languages to formal devices (as in his attacks on overly optimistic identifications between Peano-style logical notation and Italian counterparts such as non/e/o/se/ogni/alcuni/il) converges with Grice’s anti-reductionist instincts: both reject the idea that formal apparatus straightforwardly captures ordinary meaning, but they explain the mismatch differently—Grice by appeal to pragmatic reasoning and conversational norms, Croce by appeal to expression, historical life, and the creative autonomy of linguistic form. Finally, the Vossler line you note fits the contrast: Vossler’s Croce-inspired stylistic/idealist linguistics helped shape approaches to grammar that emphasize language as spiritual/creative activity, whereas Grice’s legacy in pragmatics emphasizes how rational agents use language in interaction to say one thing, imply another, and make that implication accountable to reasons. Vossler on C. and the influence of his linguistic theory on grammatical theory. Grice: “I wouldn’t say that when I say that p, I imply that I believe that p; only that I EXPRESS that p. I would think the fashionable Englishwoman may think Croce is the most important philosopher that ever lived!” -- vide under “Grice as Croceian” Grice as Croceian: expression and intention philosopher. As C. observes, it is a common-place in philosophy that there is, or appears to be, a divergence in meaning between, on the one hand, at least some of what PEANO call this or that FORMAL device, when it is given a standard two-valued interpretation, and, on the other, what is taken to be its analogues or counterpart in ITALIAN — such expressions as non, e, o, se, ogni, alcuni (almeno uno), il. Some — PEANO, VAILATI, FORTI — *may* at some time have wanted to claim that there is in fact no such divergence. But such a claim, if made at all, has been somewhat rashly made. And those suspected of making it — PEANO, VAILATI, FORTI — have been subjected to some pretty rough handling — notably by C.! Those who do concede that such a divergence in meaning (between, say, Peano’s inverted iota and ‘il’) exists adhere, in the main, to one or the other of two rival groups: the formalists and the informalists. An outline of a not uncharacteristic formalistic position may be given as follows. Insofar as we are concerned with the formulation of very general patterns of valid inference, a formal device possesses a decisive advantage over its ITALIAN counterpart.  -I Vgl. besonders Che cosa e il fascismo, La filosolia del fascismo. Charakteristisch ist der Satz: Lo stato del fascismo e una creazionc tutta spirituale".  idealism, la filosofia di C. come antecedente del fascismo, Mussolini giornalista, la ruttura Croce-Gentile, l’idealismo di C. pre-fascismo come fascista: hegel, idea dello spirito, idealism assoluto, la relazione tra Vico e Hegel, implicatura: intenzione, espressione, e communicazione. Benedetto Croce. Pescasseroli, L’Aquila, Abruzzo. Grice: “St. John’s, 1948. I can’t say I was surprised yesterday when, at the end of my talk to the Philosophical Society, Collingwood remarked that Croce would probably find my approach “behaviouristic” — “as Ryle misuses the term.” I asked him why. Collingwood explained that, for the Italians (since Croce’s “epoch-making” Breviario di estetica, as Collingwood likes to call it), intenzione and espressione go hand in hand, as they put it. But then Collingwood added, with a smile, “your ‘meaning’, you see, they would not put in it at all — or not in your sense of the word!” G: Carritt has done the decent thing. S: Which decent thing? Oxford has so many. G: He has written on Croce after Croce’s death without sounding either ecclesiastical or merely English. That is already a distinction. S: And now we are to sort out how Croce arrived in Oxford, and how Oxford, in its slow digestive fashion, turned him into an atmosphere. G: Exactly. We begin, as Oxford should, with a date and a platform. Croce first comes to Oxford in 1923 for the honorary doctorate. Then 1930, Antistoricismo. Then 1933, Shelley at St Margaret’s Hall. And now Carritt, in 1953, is tidying the inheritance after Croce died in November 1952. S: With Berlin having already reviewed My Philosophy in October 1952, before Croce died. G: Yes, which spares us the uglier theory that Berlin waited for the corpse. S: Though “Eminent Poseur” still sounds like a man reviewing in evening dress. G: Berlin reviewed like a man who preferred an intellectual fencing foil to a hearse. S: Let us have the chronology neat, then. Bosanquet first? G: Bosanquet in Mind, 1920: Croce’s Aesthetic. Then Carr replies: Mr Bosanquet on Croce’s Aesthetic. Then later Collingwood becomes the deeper conduit. Carritt carries the Oxford aesthetic line into the 1930s and beyond. Croce comes physically in 1923, 1930, 1933. Carritt translates My Philosophy in 1949. Berlin reviews in 1952. Carritt writes Croce and His Aesthetic in Mind in 1953. S: A very Oxford sequence: first old-guard idealist reception, then personal visits, then retrospective canonisation. G: Canonisation with an Oxford reservation clause. S: And our topic is expression. G: The fatal word. S: Fatal because Croce makes so much of it. G: Fatal because he makes almost everything of it. For Croce, intuition and expression go together; to express is not to attach a label to a prior content, but to form the content itself. S: Which sounds grand and unhelpful to an Oxford ear. G: Not entirely unhelpful. To Bosanquet it sounded bold but over-pure. To Carritt it sounded central to aesthetics. To Collingwood it sounded like a rescue of art from botany. To me it sounds dangerously under-analysed. S: Because “to express” is doing too much work. G: Exactly. If a philosopher says “this expresses grief,” “this expresses belief,” “this expresses a thought,” “this expresses intuition,” and thinks he has thereby explained what is going on, he is really only indicating a family resemblance and then putting on a hat. S: Yet Croce’s point is not your point. G: No, and that matters. For Croce, expression is constitutive. For me, “express” is one of several distinguishable verbs that belong in the analysis of meaning and psychological states. It is not the master-key. S: So if I say that ppp, what happens? G: Several things may happen, and they are not the same. I may mean that ppp. I may say that ppp. I may imply that qqq. I may express belief that ppp. If one does not keep these apart, one has not begun. S: Croce would say that expression is already the life of the thought. G: Yes, and that is exactly the place where I become fastidious. S: Let us bring in the passage you appended. G: Gladly. “There will now be two options: we may suppose that ‘judge that ppp’ is an inadmissible locution … or we may suppose that ‘xxx judges that ppp’ and ‘xxx judges’ that ppp’ are manifestationally equivalent, just because there can be no distinguishing behavioural manifestation.” S: Which is already anti-Crocean in one respect. G: Or post-Crocean in another. The issue there is not whether thought is formed in expression, but whether we need iterated attitude-ascriptions in order to make room for expressive capacities in a creature. S: The talking pirot. G: Precisely. “If we want to allow for the construction of a (possibly later) type, a talking pirot, which can express that it judges that ppp …” then we need certain higher-order attitude principles. S: So expression here is downstream of attitude architecture. G: Yes. Not constitutive of content in the Crocean sense, but dependent on the possibility of a creature’s having the right sort of reflexive or higher-order states. S: Then expression is neither primary nor decorative. It is an achievement condition. G: Good. An achievement condition for a sufficiently sophisticated creature. S: And this is where your iteration principle comes in. G: Exactly. If a creature believes that ppp, and if we are to make sense of its ability to express that it believes that ppp, then some iteration law becomes desirable. Roughly: if BxpB_x pBx​p, then Bx(Bxp)B_x(B_x p)Bx​(Bx​p). S: Though not as a logical truth. G: Certainly not. As part of a rational reconstruction of the capacities of a certain type of creature. S: And similarly for judging? G: Yes. If we distinguish primitive judging from higher-order judging, then the possibility of expression may force us to collapse or systematise those levels. Hence the little hierarchy: xxx judges that ppp, xxx judges1^11 that ppp, xxx judges2^22 that ppp, and the pressure to accept transitions such as Jxp↔Jx1pJ_x p \leftrightarrow J^1_x pJx​p↔Jx1​p under certain manifestational assumptions. S: Croce would hate the notation. G: He would call it a cemetery of living acts. S: Carritt would smile and say that Croce’s point was aesthetic, not zoological. G: Carritt would say that if you want Croce on expression, you must begin with intuition, beauty, form, and art, not with pirots. S: But then you would say that is precisely the trouble. G: I would say it leaves too much unanalysed. If one wants to understand what it is for a creature to express grief, or a belief, or a judgement, one needs more than a pious appeal to the life of spirit. S: Yet Oxford seems to have received Croce mainly through aesthetics. G: Exactly. Bosanquet on Aesthetic. Carr on Bosanquet on Croce’s Aesthetic. Bradley’s lecture on poetry. Balfour’s Romanes Lecture. Collingwood’s Principles of Art. Carritt’s later retrospective. The Croce that entered Oxford most effectively was the Croce of expression in art, not the Croce of a fine-grained philosophy of linguistic acts. S: Which is why nobody at Oxford, in that line, stopped to ask what “to express that ppp” amounts to. G: Or if they did, they asked it in a literary-aesthetic rather than a logical-psychological register. S: So when Croce says intuition and expression are one, he is not distinguishing to express that ppp from to mean that ppp from to imply that qqq. G: Precisely. And that is where my Moore point enters as a local correction. S: State it. G: If I say “It is raining,” I do not thereby imply that I believe it is raining. I express the belief. That is not an implicature in the strict sense. It is not derived from conversational maxims. It belongs to the function of the indicative, or to the conventional relation between sincere indicative utterance and belief-display. S: So “express” there is thin. G: Thin and local. It marks the manifestation of attitude, not the originary formation of thought. S: And this differs from Croce’s expression, which is thick and constitutive. G: Exactly. Croce’s expression gives form to content. My “express” often merely indicates the outwardly characterisable manifestation of a state that is already conceptually individuated. S: Then the danger is obvious. One might think the two uses are merely different styles for the same phenomenon. G: And that would be a mistake of category, not merely of vocabulary. S: Let us bring in Carritt’s 1953 piece more directly. G: Carritt begins historically: few recent philosophers had such wide influence as Croce. He tracks the English line through Bradley, Balfour, Bosanquet, Collingwood, Croce’s own Oxford visit in 1933. So far so good. S: But Carritt is doing reception history with doctrine in the background. G: Yes. He is speaking as an Oxford aesthete-philosopher. He is not doing conceptual analysis of the verb “express.” S: He is speaking of Croce’s Aesthetic as a philosophical force, not of “to express” as a family of logico-pragmatic predicates. G: Precisely. Which is why, from my angle, the essay is useful but incomplete. S: Incomplete because it leaves the Crocean notion too large. G: Yes. “Expression” is allowed to remain majestically under-specified. S: And yet one can see why Oxford liked that. G: Very much so. Oxford in those decades liked terms that could carry a civilisation. “Expression,” in the Crocean line, did just that. It joined art, language, intuition, history, criticism. S: Whereas your own style is to split it. G: To split it where splitting is philosophically hygienic. If “express” covers saying, meaning, implying, avowing, manifesting, embodying, and constituting, then it covers too much. S: Let us try a little formalism. G: Very well. Suppose UUU utters sentence sss in context ccc. S: The Crocean tendency would be to say that in the expressive act the content ppp is formed. G: While I would rather distinguish: Said(U,s,c)=pSaid(U,s,c)=pSaid(U,s,c)=p, Mean(U,s,c)=pMean(U,s,c)=pMean(U,s,c)=p, Implicate(U,s,c)=qImplicate(U,s,c)=qImplicate(U,s,c)=q, Express(U,s,c,BelUp)Express(U,s,c,Bel_U p)Express(U,s,c,BelU​p). S: So the expression relation takes, not directly the propositional content, but perhaps the attitude as object. G: In many ordinary cases, yes. To utter “It is raining” sincerely is to say that ppp, mean that ppp, and express belief that ppp. These are connected but not identical. S: Croce would object that you have already dissected the living act into a bureaucracy. G: He would call it anatomy after the funeral. I would call it not confusing the lungs with the weather. S: Then the pirot passage is your answer to a different problem: when can a creature count as expressing anything at all? G: Exactly. If “xxx judges that ppp” is an admissible psychological ascription, and if a creature can express that it judges that ppp, then we may need to recognise higher-order judgement-capacities or at least their manifestational equivalence. S: Hence the line: if xxx expresses that φ\varphiφ, then ceteris paribus xxx judges that φ\varphiφ. G: Yes, though one must be careful with the schema. In the passage I was trying to preserve a general law: if xxx expresses that ϕ\phiϕ, then xxx judges that ϕ\phiϕ, while allowing that “judges” and “judges’” may collapse behaviourally. S: So expression is evidence of an underlying rational-psychological state. G: Or at least of a state apt for such rational reconstruction. S: That is already a long way from Croce. G: A long way, but not entirely disconnected. Both Croce and I care that expression not be treated as a mere afterthought. We differ on where to place it in the order of explanation. S: He gives it primacy. You give it a place in the architecture of mindedness. G: Precisely. S: And perhaps a derivative place, as your own wording says: “a general though probably derivative law.” G: Yes. I am not making expression the metaphysical heart of the matter. I am saying that if you want creatures capable of public mindedness, you will need structures that make expression possible. S: Which sounds almost evolutionary. G: It is certainly phylogenetic in flavour. The talking pirot arrives later. Before speech, there may be manifestations without propositional articulation. After speech, one gets expression that can take the form “that ppp.” S: Croce would say that articulation is not an add-on but already part of formed intuition. G: And I would say that this is where his whole doctrine is too quick. S: Let us bring in Bosanquet again. G: Bosanquet’s old-guard virtue was that he admired Croce’s cleansing energy but thought he over-purified the aesthetic. One could adapt that judgment here: Croce purifies “expression” until it risks swallowing distinctions that any good analyst must restore. S: Carr, then, is on the side of Croce against Bosanquet? G: In that early dispute, yes, more or less. He thinks Bosanquet has not fully understood the radicality of Croce’s aesthetic doctrine. S: And Collingwood? G: Collingwood is the real deep transmitter. With him, expression becomes central in a way that makes art a matter of clarifying emotion rather than merely arousing it. S: So by the time of Carritt’s 1953 essay, Croce is no longer merely an Italian visitor but an Oxford ancestor. G: An elective ancestor, yes. Not one of the local bloodline, but one of the adopted spirits. S: And yet you remain dissatisfied. G: Naturally. Oxford can inherit magnificently and analyse lazily. S: That is severe. G: It is affectionate severity. The Croce reception was philosophically serious, but it did not usually ask the question I want asked: when we say that a subject expresses something, what exactly are we attributing, and what order of state, content, or capacity is presupposed? S: Which brings us back to your higher-order point. G: Yes. Suppose a creature merely has first-order states: BxpB_x pBx​p, DxpD_x pDx​p, JxpJ_x pJx​p. S: Then perhaps it can behave in ways we interpret as goal-directed or responsive. G: But if we want a creature that can express that it believes that ppp, or that it judges that ppp, then we may need: Bx(Bxp)B_x(B_x p)Bx​(Bx​p), Dx(Dxp)D_x(D_x p)Dx​(Dx​p), Jx(Jxp)J_x(J_x p)Jx​(Jx​p), or some functional equivalents. S: And that is where your “law” enters: Jx2p↔Jx1pJ^2_x p \leftrightarrow J^1_x pJx2​p↔Jx1​p, and so on. G: Under certain pressures, yes. Not because the notation is beautiful, but because the architecture of expression requires some closure or reflective accessibility. S: Croce would insist that you are mistaking a late logical refinement for the primal expressive act. G: He would. And I would reply that unless one sorts the levels, one cannot explain how a creature comes to have the very public capacities on which Crocean culture itself depends. S: Let us be charitable. Perhaps the Oxford Croceans were never trying to answer your kind of question. G: Quite possibly. Carritt was doing something else, and doing it well: preserving the record of how Croce’s aesthetics lived in Oxford minds. S: Through Bradley, Balfour, Bosanquet, Collingwood, the 1933 visit, the translation, the memoir. G: Yes, and that history matters. It shows how a concept can travel without being conceptually sharpened in every respect. S: Then perhaps your own role, had you cared to play it, would have been to sharpen “expression.” G: A dangerous suggestion. The moment one sharpens a beloved cultural term, one risks being accused of behaviourism, mechanism, or simply bad manners. S: Collingwood might already have accused you of that. G: He would have said that my meaning-theory externalises what the Italians know inwardly. S: And you would have said? G: That recognising intentions and public inferential conditions is not externalism but the grammar of responsible speech. S: Then the real divergence is this: Croce — expression is the life of formed intuition. Grice — expression is one analysable relation among attitudes, utterances, intentions, and inferences. G: Precisely. Put that on the blackboard and leave it there. S: Shall we add the historical line beneath it? G: Very well. 1920: Bosanquet on Croce in Mind. Carr replies. 1923: Croce in Oxford for the honorary degree. 1930: Antistoricismo. 1933: Shelley at St Margaret’s Hall. Collingwood metabolises Croce. 1949: Carritt translates My Philosophy. October 1952: Berlin reviews it. 20 November 1952: Croce dies. October 1953: Carritt writes Croce and His Aesthetic in Mind. S: A fine sequence. G: A sequence, yes. Whether it is a concept yet is another matter. S: And your own verdict? G: That Croce’s “expression” was important enough to deserve a more exact philosophical treatment than Oxford usually gave it; and that, if one takes seriously what it is for a creature to express anything at all, one must proceed stage by stage, from attitude to reflexive attitude, from manifestation to articulated avowal, and from avowal to the public life of meaning. S: Which sounds almost evolutionary. G: Or merely Oxonianly sober. One learns to speak before one learns to aestheticise speech. Croce sometimes writes as if spirit had skipped the middle steps. S: Then let us end with your favourite austerity. G: Very well. “Expression” is not a blank cheque. If it is to explain anything, it must not be allowed to explain everything.Grice: Croce, devo confessare che la tua analisi dell’espressione ha solcato i mari e, grazie al caro Collingwood, è arrivata persino alle rive di Vadum Boem, cioè Oxford. La profondità con cui distingui tra espressione e intenzione filosofica ha illuminato più di una conversazione tra noi inglesi, che spesso ci arrovelliamo su questi temi senza la tua chiarezza italiana!  Croce: Grice, sono lieto che la mia riflessione abbia trovato eco oltremanica! La distinzione tra espressione e intenzione non va sottovalutata: esprimere non è semplicemente comunicare, ma è dare forma viva al pensiero, sia nell’arte che nel linguaggio quotidiano. E mi fa piacere che Collingwood abbia saputo cogliere questo aspetto e trasmetterlo agli amici di Oxford.  Grice: E proprio questa “forma viva” è ciò che mi affascina, Croce. Nel nostro dibattito filosofico, spesso ci concentriamo sulle implicature, su ciò che viene “inteso” più che su ciò che viene “espresso”. Ma tu ci ricordi che l’espressione è un atto creativo: quando dico qualcosa, non solo comunico una credenza, ma la plasmo e la offro al mondo, quasi fosse una piccola opera d’arte.  Croce: Hai colto il cuore della mia filosofia, Grice! Ogni espressione, anche la più semplice, porta con sé una storia, una grammatica del pensiero che si riflette nella lingua. Come ho discusso riguardo ai formalismi e agli informalismi, la lingua italiana non si lascia mai ridurre a meri schemi logici: “il” di Peano non è mai semplicemente “il” nell’italiano vero. Ecco, la bellezza sta proprio in questa divergenza, che rende la nostra conversazione mai banale, sempre ricca di senso e di spirito. Croce, Benedetto (1888). Figurine Goethiane