Orwelliana

Speranza






Don't be beguiled by Orwell: using plain and clear language is not always a moral virtue

Orwell season has led me back to his famous essay “Politics and the English Language”, first published in 1946.

 It is written with enviable clarity.

But is it true?

Orwell argues that

“the great enemy of clear language is insincerity."

"When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words.”

I suspect the opposite is now true.

When politicians or corporate front men have to bridge a gap between what they are saying and what they know to be true, their preferred technique is to convey authenticity by speaking with misleading simplicity.

The ubiquitous injunction

“Let’s be clear”,

followed by a list of five bogus bullet-points, is a much more common refuge than the Latinate diction and Byzantine sentence structure that Orwell deplored.


We live in a self-consciously plain-spoken political era.

But Orwell’s advice, ironically, has not elevated the substance of debate.

It has merely helped the political class to avoid the subject more skilfully.

The art of spin is not (quite) supplanting truth with lies.

It aspires to replace awkward complexities with catchy simplicity.

Successful spin does not leave the effect of skilful persuasiveness.

It creates the impression of unavoidable common sense.

Hence the artifice becomes invisible – just as a truly charming person is considered nice rather than “charming”.

There is a new puritanism about the way we use words, as tho' someone with a broad vocabulary or the ability to sustain a complex sentence is innately untrustworthy.


Out with mandarin obfuscation and donnish paradoxes, in with lists and bullet points.

But one method of avoiding awkward truths has been replaced by another.

The political class now speaks as it dresses:

in matt navy suits and open-necked white shirts.

Elaborate adjectives have suffered the same fate as flowery ties.

 But this is not moral progress, it is just fashion.


The same techniques have infiltrated the literary world.

Popular non-fiction has evolved using quotidian prose style to gloss over logical lacunae.

The whole confessional genre relies on this technique.

“Gladwellian”, properly defined, is the technique of using apparently natural, authentic and conversational style to lull readers into misplaced trust.

Disarmed, we miss the sleights of hand in the content.

As a gentlemanly cricketer, I learned the hard way that when a team-mate said,

“Look mate, I’ll be straight with you because nobody else will”, he was about to be neither straight nor my mate.

The most consistently dishonest player I encountered spent much of his career beginning conversations with engaging declarations of plain-spoken honesty.

His confessional, transparent manner helped him get away with years of subtle back-stabbing.

When another team-mate thanked him for sitting him down and saying, “Look mate, I’ll be straight with you because nobody else will”, I felt a horror of recognition: another one duped.

If I’d studied Shakespeare more closely, I wouldn’t have been so easily fooled.

Othello’s tormentor, Iago, is seen as an honest and blunt man (though he does confess to the audience that “I am not what I am”).

His public image derives from his affectation, his sharpness of speech.

Iago is believed because he seems to talk in simple truths.


In King Lear, Cornwall and Kent argue about the correlation between directness and authenticity.


Cornwall (wrong in this instance but right in general) argues that straightforwardness often masks the most serious frauds:

“These kind of knaves I know, which in this plainness harbour more craft and corrupter end than twenty silly-ducking observants that stretch their duties nicely.”

Using plain and clear language is not a moral virtue, as Orwell hoped.

Things aren’t that simple.

In fact, giving the impression of clarity and straightforwardness is often a strategic game.

The way we speak and the way we write are both forms of dress.

We can, linguistically, dress ourselves up any way we like.

We can affect plainness and directness just as much as we can affect sophistication and complexity. We can try to mislead or to impress, in either mode.

Or we can use either register honestly.

Philip Collins, the speechwriter and columnist, has written a book about how to persuade an audience.

The Art of Speeches and Presentations is a superb primer, full of erudition and practical wisdom.

Collins holds up Orwell’s essay on politics and language as a model of sound advice.

But deeper, more surprising truths – contra Orwell – emerge from his arguments.

He explains how using simple, everyday speech is effective but he also quotes Thomas Macaulay’s argument that “the object of oratory is not truth, but persuasion”.

Following this logic, there is, unavoidably, a distinction between ends and means.

Whatever the moral merits of your argument, it is always best to present it in the clearest, most memorable style.

Disarming linguistic simplicity is a technique that can be learned.

But how you deploy that technical mastery – the authenticity of the argument – is quite a different matter.

There is a further irony about “Politics and the English Language”.

Orwell argues that the sins of obfuscation and euphemism followed inevitably from the brutalities of his political era.

In the age of the atom bomb and the Gulag, politicians reached for words that hid unpalatable truths.

By contrast, our era of vague political muddle and unclear dividing lines has inspired a snappy, gritty style of political language: the no-nonsense, evidence-backed, bullet-pointed road to nowhere.

Orwell’s essay is rhetorically persuasive.

And yet it makes little attempt to prove its central thesis.

The reader, having nodded at a series of attractive and catchy stylistic observations, is tempted to accept the central thesis.

In fact, Orwell’s combination of masterly style and under-examined logic is the perfect refutation of his own argument.