GRICE E BOEZIO

 

BOEZIO E GRICE: UNI-VOCALITY OF “EST” AND “IZZES”

J. L. Speranza, The Grice Club.

 

Abstract

In 1988, the year of his demise, H. P. Grice got published for The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (having moved from Oxford to Berkeley in his fifties) under the editorship of his former Oxford pupil B. F. Loar, a rather intriguing essay, entitled, “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being.’ Philosophers well aware of the deep issues involved in matters of ‘univocity’ of ‘being’ and its enemies – equivocity, etc. –, and some of them, were struck by the choice of ‘multiplicity’ in the title, and by the lack of square quotes. It is not the multiplicity of ‘being’, but of being itself! In these notes, I propose to reconsider Grice’s main point vis-à-vis what he calls elsewhere – scil. in the Kant lectures at Stanford – the ‘aequi-vocal’ thesis – as it conforms to his well known advice: unity of sense, multiplicity of implicatures. I add Austin and Boethius for good measure!

Keywords: Boethius, H. P. Grice, univocality, J. L. Austin.

“My enterprise,” Grice writes in his “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being,” posthumously edited by B. F. Loar, is “to explore some of the questions which arise out of a fairly well-known cluster of Aristotelian theses.” Which are these? The first brings him to his years of Oxford as university lecturer, in this case his joint seminar with J. L. Austin – who had been obsessed with paronymy since his tutorials with Prichard. In Categoriae, on which Grice lectured rather brilliantly with Austin at Oxford – as Ackrill testifies -- Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of case of the application of a word or phrase – say, ‘ist’ – in ‘The α is β’ or ‘A ist B’ [I will follow Boethius and stick to the third-person singular] to a range of situations. The first sort of cases that Aristotle isolates is that in which both the word or the phrase and a single definition, account, λόγος, or conceptual analysis, as I prefer, apply throughout that range. The second sort of cases is that, in which the word or phrase – “ist” --, but no single definition or conceptual analysis, applies throughout the range.

 In the first sort of case, Aristotle says, that the word or phrase – say “ist” (A ist B) -- is applied syn-nomymously, or, more strictly, to at least two things which are syn-nomina – each a synonymum as Boethius would have it. For the record, Lewis and Short defines synonymum as “a word having the same meaning with another, a synonym.” They give the source: Front. Eloqu. p. 237; Prisc. 579 P; Serv. Verg. A. 2, 128. (obs. Synophites,, ae, m., a read. In Plin. 37, 10, 59, section 162 fron synnephitis.

In the second sort of case, the word or phrase – say “ist” (A ist B)–  is, Grice goes on, applied homo-nymously (cf. AEQVI-VOCALLY)  — to at least two things which are merely homonuma. Lewis and Short lack an entry for homonymum. But have one for the masculine homoymus and the abstract noun homonymia. Homonymus is defined as ‘of the same name, homonymous, and they give Quintilian as the source: “sicut in his, quae homonyma vocantur: ut, Taurus animal sit, an mons, an signfum in caelo, an nomen hominis, an radix arboris, nis distinctum non intelligitur” – Quint. 8 2 13. Interestingly, for ‘homonymia’, translated by Lewis and Shrot as homonymy, their source is Fronto, Diff. Verbs, p.. 353. Aequivoces.

Provision is also made, Grice adds, for an *intermediate* class of cases – that fascinated Austin --, or (as some may prefer) a sub-division of homonymous applications of a word or phrase into (a) cases of “chance homonymy” and (b) cases of “other-than-chance homonymy,” or as Aristotlle calls them: cases of "paronymy". Cicero couldn’t translate this. So, no entry in Lewis and Short for paronymum, if for paronomasia! (cf. Dictionnaire des untranslatables – PARONYMY, citing Grice).

Ever the philosopher for great tags, Grice adds that one may label the second of these sub-division cases of "UNIFIED – the word is key -- Multiplicity of Signification, or meaning. With Boethius, I will assume throughout that when Grice writes ‘meaning,’ he means ‘signification,’ and vice versa. Prominent among examples of The Unity (Univocity, Aequivocity) of Multiple-Signification is the application of the verb 'ist’ (as in A ist B) – as in the formula ‘The α is β.’ My choice of alpha and beta is informed by Grice’s careful considerations in his more precise, “Utterer’s meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning” – and essay whose title he often found trouble in remembering. Now reprinted in WoW (p. 131ff), in that essay Grice provides for “To utter a psi-cross correlated … if (for some audience  or addressee A) the utterer U wants his audience o addressee A to psi-cross a particular R-correlate of alpha to be one of a particular set of D-correlates of beta. The reference here being his previous realization that a philosopher of language may “need to be able to apply such notion as a PREDICATION of beta (adjectival) on alpha (nominal).” (Smith is tactful, Smith is happy). (As an interesting point, in that essay, Grice is neutral about the mode of the utterance, ‘Let Smith be tactful’, whereas in his lectures on Aristotle he sticks to Aristotle’s obsession with the indicative mode).

Grice would often criticize Aristotle for what Grice calls Aristotle’s rather vague ‘dicta’. (The Pacific-Philosophical-Quarterly paper is an offspring of an earlier lecture delivered at Victoria, in the native country of G. E. L. Owen, to whom Grice makes more than a passing reference). According  to Aristotle, Grice reminds us, “[ist] is _said_ in many — more than one — ways.” Grice adds that, among further important examples of this type of UNIFICATION or univocity, or aequivocality, Aristotle and Grice seem to be seeking – never mind Boethius or Austin -- we find the word αγαθόν (Cicero bonum, “good”) which, according to Aristotle, exhibits a seemingly superficial *multiplicity* of signification related to, and perhaps even dependent upon, that displayed by ‘ist’ as in “A ist B”; for in Ethica Nichomachea – that brings Grice again to his years as University Lecturer at Oxford taught ‘for years at Oxford under the tutelage of the translation  by his Oxford tutor – of Owen’s generation -- Hardie -- Aristotle remarks that “αγαθόν” is  _said_ in *as many ways* as being.”

This needed doctrine of the Unification, Unity, Univocality, or Aequivocality of Apparently Multiple Signification of 'ist’ as in ‘A ist B’ is notoriously of great importance to Aristotle. It is used by Aristotle, no less, to preserve the otherwise acceptable characterisation  of the philosophical discipline of philosophia prima as dealing with ist qua ist. The characterization is threatened by two objections. The first objection being that it is not the case that "ist” (as in ‘A ist B’) applies *syn-nonymously* -- for lack of a conceptual definition, or λόγος -- to all the items of things with which such philosophia prima is supposed to be concerned. The second objection has Grice in jest: and it is the one that claims that there is, therefore, no more a genuine or legitimate single prima philosophia than there is, say, — English Oxonian spelling assumed— a genuine single science or discipline of vice. And this is because we apply the expression ‘vice’ to such a thing as dishonesty, which is a moral thing. But we also apply ‘vice’ to such a thing as a clamp, which is a thing made of metal, rather.  These objections can, Aristotle, Boethius, and Grice, and Austin (if ethics has a subject-matter) would hope, he met by the reply that a multiplicity – i. e. not unicity, but duality or plurality -- of signification – if not sense, or content -- can be tolerated in the terminology specifying the subject-matter of a single science, provided that such apparent multiplicity (again, duality or plurality, rather than unity -- of signification  is somehow UNIFIED. Enter UNI VOCAL. Do not multiply senses beyond necessity. Keep your utterance UNIVOCAL and feel free to multiply implicatures as you please.

Grice had witnessed the Viennese bombshells at Oxford as a student at Corpus, and has a thing or two to say about the attacks by Ayer. As if expanding on the state of the art of metaphysics in Post-War Oxford (in his joint article with his former pupil P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, ‘Metaphysics,’ in Pears, The nature of metaphysics,’ Grice notes: “I should like,” Grice says after some decades of hindsight, “to say a word (or two) about the nature of my interest in Aristotle — and the peripatetics in general — or the Lycaeum — and about the prospects of deriving from Aristotle a significant contribution to the enquiries which I have it in mind to undertake.” Grice (like Austin, but unlike Ayer) just happens to regards Aristotle as being, like one or two other historical figures — notably Kant (Kantotle is the best)— , not just a great philosopher of the past but as being a great philosopher simpliciter. That is to say: to think of Aristotle – as read by Boethius, say (vide Minnio Paulello on the Aristoteles Latinus – so much studied at Oxford) as being concerned with many of the problems to which we today are, or at least should be, devoting our efforts. Furthermore, it is Grice’s view that once Aristotle — or Boethius, or Vio – vide Ashworth on analogy in Vio in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy -- who worked so arduously on analogy to improve on Aquinas — is properly interpreted, he is likely found to have been handling such problems in ways from which philosophers still have much to learn. 

In brief, then, Grice subscribes to a programme of trying to interpret — of reconstruct — the views of Aristotle (and he is not too fussy about the difference between these two descriptions) in such a way that, unless Aristotle’s text is totally probibitive, Grice will ascribe to Aristotle a view which is true rather than false, reasoned rather than unreasoned, and interesting and profound rather than dull or trivial. Grice is convinced that, in the philosophical area within which the topics of this endeavour fall, there are specially strong reasons for listening as attentively as possible to what Aristotle has to say or implicate. After all, a defence and definition of the nature and range of the enquiries falling under philosophia prima is among the most formidable of philosophical tasks. Philosophers need all the help they can get, particularly at a time when metaphysicians are only recently beginning to re-emerge from the closet, and, to Grice’s mind, are still hampered by the after-math of decades of ridicule and vilification at the hands of those ‘rednecks of Vienna and their adherents’ — notably at Oxford!

The main questions to which Grice addresses himself are various, or shall we say, multiplicitous. As Aristotle suggests, IF at least some expressions connected with the notion of "ist” (never mind αγαθόν – the title of his Victoria conference was on ‘Aristotle on good and being’– as in ‘The α is β’ -- exhibit multiplicity of signification: of which actual expression or utterance is that suggestion true? More precisely: is “ist” -- the conjugated third-person singular form of the verb, in the canonical predication-relation surfaced in the syntactical construction ‘The α is β’ where this suggestion is most plausible? What cognates of the ‘ist’, if any, are similarly affected? What happens when ‘ist’ is merely deleted, as is often the case with Cicero – how can the absence of a verb have a SENSE? What about ‘Socrates walks’ and ‘Socrates is a walker’ – How much freedom should we allow for the convertibility of non-copulative utterances into copulative utterances? Grice has in mind the philosophical lexicon that also has entries for ‘inherentia’ or ‘praesentia,’ and their respective conjugated forms, including ‘existit.’ What link is there, if any, between unity,  multiplicity of significationand jdentity or difference of CONTENT or sense? In what different ways may semantic multiplicity actually become unified? What considerations, if any, confer upon the availability of a single definition or conceptual analysis of special pride of place among possible criteria for identity of meanin, or of sense, or content? Is Aristotle’s suggestion for univocality of ‘A ist B’ to be argued for? Or is it just a matter of the intuitions of the native, however dialectal, speaker of a language? How, if at all, can the availability of such a definition or conceptual analysis involved in the doctrine of univocality be confirmed -- or disconfirmed, for that matter? Is Aristotle's classification of the ways of unifying semantic multiplicity exhaustive? Are its components mutually exclusive? Which form of unification applies to the semantic multiplicity connected with "The α ist β"? Note that, unlike an English philosopher like Grice, Boethius does not need to involve himself with the definite descriptor – ‘the A’ -- when discussing the canonical copulative predication relation: “A ist B” just does.

One first key question to be faced with regard to the possible semantic multiplicity of 'α ist β,’ or of einai, to be, esse  or tò on, what is, ens  is a not very subile question of interpretation. In what range of employments of the word ‘be,’ or of an appropriate Greek or Latin of Italian or other English counterparts, is semantic multiplicity to be looked for? From a standard viewpoint, to which Grice admits he does not in fact wholly subscribe, there seem to be various  possible locations of such semantic multiplicity:  The thesis which Grice identifies with Canadian-born Oxford philosopher Owen – of the Ryle group – vide Owen’s necrology of Ryle in The Aristotelian Society, making a passing reference to the reverence Austin’s and laer Grice’s play group had amongst pupils -- in the word ‘be’ taken as meaning ‘existit’. Second, there is Grice’s own thesis, at this stage of development, that the word 'be' be taken as a copula in a statement of predication relation: The α is β. Grice considers two other possible collocations, only to go to dismiss soon: The word ‘be’ taken as expressing identity – vide his “Vacuous Names” for things like “Pegasus = Pegasus’ --. Fourth, the word ‘be’ considered as a noun and as roughly equivalent to 'object' or 'entity. ‘The ‘is’of the matter. Some of these four variants, Grice notes, are not really independent of one another. Since an entity or ens seems to be anything which is -- or exists, it is reasonable to suppose that semantic multiplicity would attach to such a noun as ‘entity’ or ens if, and only it, it also attaches to ‘exists.’ Furthermore, if we accept the commonly received view that 'existit’ may be paraphrased in terms of self-identity -- Pegasus exists if and only if Pegasus is identical with Pegasus, which creates to Meinongian ontological jungle, to paraphrase Grice in “Vacuous Names,” any semantic multiplicity in such a phrase as “is identical with” will go hand in hand with a corresponding semantic multiplicity in the ‘existit.’

Grice seems somewhat relieved to realise that we appear then to be left with just two independent candidates for semantic multiplicity: non-predicational ‘ist' (understood as meaning 'existit', as in the infamous thesis by Owen; and ‘ist’ understood as meaning a copula, as Grice 2.0. Owen, who left Canada to settle in Oxford, in his provocative Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology, that Grice finds some especial excitment in quoting just for amusement, opts indeed – with the aid of asterisks to distinguish between ‘is*’ and ‘is**’ -- for the supposition that semantic multiplicity attaches to 'ist,’ meaning, or with the sense of, 'existit’).“I for a long time shared this belief,” Grice confesses. Austin never did since, an earlier Defensor of linguistic botanizing, always found Prichard’s disregard for the paronymy of ‘agathon’ almost insulting! The two groups – Ryle’s, with Owen, and Austin’s, with Grice, hardly met while at Oxford. Still, our of deference for his Canadian senior, Grice considers Owen’s proposal first, since, too, Grice is the one to enjoy to learn from his errors. (Similarly, in his lecture for the British Academy, Grice starts by noting how he turned from a Stoutian into a neo-Prichardian).

Since Grice wishes to attribute a view to Aristotle only if Grice can find in Aristotle’s oeuvre, or altenatively invent on his behalf, a reasonable plausible argument to support it, Grice wonders whether we can find, or devise, such an argument in this instance. Grice offers the following. In Topica, Aristotle claims that being – or existence --, like unity is predicated of everything. By making this statement, Grice notes, Aristotle seems to imply that 'exists' is truly applicable to every, er, entity. But, Grice warns us, in making the dictum, Aristotle may also be implying that the universal ‘signified,’ or ‘denoted,’ by 'existit', or, if there is a more than such a universal – indeed a duality, plurality, or multiplicity, that one or another of each universal ‘signified,’ or denoted, by 'existit' is instantiated by every, er, entity. But Grice warns us to be cautious, and let us not assume that the second implicature holds, or is not cancellable!

Grice goes on to quote from his favourite Aristotle – as it was Boethius’s favourite, too --. In De Inierpretatione, on which as we’ve noted, Grice lectured for years at Oxford with Austin – Ackrill being among the fortunate pupils who attended, and who ends up translating the thing for The Clarendon Press --  Aristotle declares that every simple declarative sentence, or proposition, contains a hréme, or verb phrase, which ‘signifies’ something said of something else -- the ‘something else' being ‘signfied’ by a noun phrase. – like Smith’s dog, as in Smith’s dog is shaggy (Grice’s example in ‘Utterer’s meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning’.

Indeed, Grice notes, the divisibility of declarative sentences into a kaapináseis, or assertion, and a ipopirseis, or a denial, which respectively assert or deny something (shagginess or hairy-coatedness) about something (Smith’s dog, Fido) -- vide Boethius’s commentary -- suggests that the notion of the exhibition of the subject-predicate relation or form enters into the very definition or conceptual analysis of a declarative sentence or proposition. A crucial reason for Grice to leave Owen for good is that an existential sentence, or proposition – as logicians use ‘existential’ -- is no exception to this thesis, and it even tolerates a quantificational modifier (Some dog is shaggy). Indeed, ‘the a is b’ displays such a toleration. For the analysis of ‘Smith’s dog is shaggy’– being Grice’s example, as opposed to Fido is shaggy, Grice relies on German philosopher Hans Sluga, who had left Germany for Berkeley, for clarification on what ‘the’ actually means in English! See the footnote in Grice’s ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature.’ (Grice had met Sluga at Oxford and found the time to teach him some cricket – he got a tutorial in logic in exchange.

From this it follows that a so-called existential proposition attributes, ascribes, or predicates, a ‘universal’ (shaggy) to its subject item (Fido). And here the reductio ad absurdum of Owen’s proposal: if ‘existit’ did signify a single universal, it would signify a generic universal – but ‘being’ ain’t a genus --, as Grice calls it, since, as is shown by differences in the ten categories, there is more than one way of ‘existing’ which would be (now) a species of such genus as existence is claimed to be. But then Aristotle suggests in his Metaphysics, too -- a rather strong hint here -- that being, or existence, is notably not a genus, and so is *not* a generic universal. 

A crucially different account therefore, needs to be found of what are naturally thought of as more than one way of such an ‘existence.’‘Existit’ cannot ‘signify’, on the other hand, a singular or unique universal, since Greeks and Englishmen like to talk, and criss-cross at least the ten categories of Aristotle! Rather, ‘existit’ would ‘signify,’ or denote, now one, now another, of at least a duality, a plurality, or duality, or multiplicity of this o that universal – any of the each ten categories, with the provision that some include essential predication, i. e. predication of essentia – whereas the canonical form now involves what Grice sees as a non-essential predication relation – not what A is, but what A has – a hairy coat.

Now, if ‘existit’ would ‘signify’ a duality plurality of multiplicity of universals, that plurality should need to satisfy at least two serious conditions. First, the plurality of universals that ‘existit’ allegedly would ‘signify’ or denote should be as small a plurality as possible -- by an intuitively acceptable principle of economy or semantical parsimony – Grice’s razor: Senses – even significations, especially when ascribed to an expression rather than its utterer -- are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Second, each of the elemental categories or universals of the plurality for ‘existence’ would notably need to be an essential property of items of the kind to which it attaches.

While Owen’s thesis then involves a reference to ‘essentia,’ Grice feels like playing the linguistic game vis-à-vis Owen when distinguishing two senses of ‘is’ – is* and is** --. It is at this point that Grice coins ‘… IZZES …’ to name ‘is’ in such kind of predication of essentia. Grice’s logic is the converse of Aristotle, which allows Grice to introduce a counterpart for ‘… izzes …’ – notably: ‘… hazzes …’ – and its nominal counterpart: ‘a hazzer’. It is not that Fido IZZES a hairy coat, but that Fido HAZZES it. The removal of a property pertaining to the essentia – cognate indeed with ‘ist’ -- from any bearer belonging to a given kind (Fido is a dog) just deprives that bearer of existence. With respect to any kind, each element property seems to be entailed by the very concept of this spatio-temporal ‘existence,’ to which Owen’s thesis attributes such weight. The only set of universals which satisfies both of these two strong conditions is the set of category-heads themselves, as the most general list of properties of essentia one of another of which every item may on occasion possess.

Such ten category-heads then constitute the required plurality (not duality now) or multiplicity – which accounts for Aristotle’s ‘many ways’. ‘Exists’ by virue of ‘signifying’ a plurality or multiplicity of universals, exhibits multiplicity of signification. Interestingly, in his own “Utterer’s meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning”, Grice analyses meaning ascriptions for both the nominal “Fido” and the adjectival “shaggy”, skipping a meaning ascription for “is” altogether – to which he laid the focus in his Aristotelian researches only. The argument given by Aristotle in favour of the contention that the concept behind ‘ist’ is not a genus is, Grice admits, rather obscure, if not of the Heraclitean type. Aistotle’s argument for denying ‘ist’ a GENERIC conceptual analysis rests on the thesis that a genus G cannot be predicable of a differentia, or diaphoron – symbolized by Grice as D -- of one of its species S.

Aristotle also seems to rely on the supposition that, if  ‘ist’ were a genus, it would have to offend against this prohibition. After all, ‘ist’ is universally predicable. More formally, if S is a species of a genus G, it must be the case that G belongs essentially to S, and is, therefore in the same category as S, that S is differentiated, within G, by some universal D; and that D is categorially different from, and, so to speak, categorially inferior to both S and G, in that no item in the category of S and G attaches essentially to, and so be predicable of D. Grice’s example: ‘two-footed,’ as a difterentia, differs in category from man and mammal – it is a quality, rather than a substance, in such a way that neither man nor mammal can be predicated of it. Which is not the case. It is a secondary substance which is not predicable of a quality, even though it may be the case that, necessarily, anything which has a given quality is a given sort of substance. But, if ‘ist’ were a genus G, since ‘ist’ (read, alla Owen, ‘existit’) is universally predicable, it would be predicable of any differentia of any of its species.

To show that ‘existit’ possesses not merely multiplicity of signification as an EXPRESSION, but  multiplicity of signification as per UTTERER’s MEANING may render it aequi-vocal. An item Alpha “existit” just in case it belongs to some  category C. E. g., substance, quality, quantity, etc. If category C is a category OTHER  than the first one, i. e. a substance, an item x can be a C, i. e. fall under C, only if alpha is a C of some substance beta. This can be seen as an application of a version of the doctrine of universalia in se. A version of the doctrine of universalia in se demands that the existence of a universal U requires, not just the possibility, but the actuality of an item alpha or beta which instantiates that universal.

The instantiation thesis is explicitly enunciated by Aristotle in Metaphysics. X being a C of some substance beta which *instantiates* C entails – to use Moore’s coinage -- being a C of something Y which ‘exists; in that sense or under that interpretation of 'existit’ which is appropriate for a substance. – Bunbury, but not disinterestedness. For a substance to exist is, plainly, lfor it to be a substance. (In seminars at Oxford with Strawson, Grice played with the difference between ‘Bunbury doesn’t exist’ and ‘Disinterestedness doesn’t exist’. The former, but not the latter, requires spatio-temporal continuity: ‘That’s not true: he’s in the next room,’ whereas ‘Disinterestedness is in the other room’ only IMPLICATES that an ‘instantiation’ of ‘disinterestedness’ is in the other room. (Grice regretted that Strawson failed to credit him when Strawson eventually published his Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics. That a substance beta (say Fido) exists is prior to, or ‘presupposed’ by, each form of ‘exists,’ as it applies to an alpha which is not a substance – say, shagginess, or hairy-coatedness. The set of ways, in Aristotle’s phrase, in which 'existit’ is said are united by an appropriate relation to a primary substantial be, like Fido. "Exisit' would then exhibit unified semantic multiplicity

In spite of a recognisable affinity with philosophical positions which Aristotle is known to have liked, and also due to its bearing of at least a superficial charm, Owen’s argument does not however, lack its drawbacks -- both from a historical and from a conceptual point of view. A crucial passage for consideration is Aristotle’s Metaphysics devoted to what is (be) in the philosophical lexicon contained in the Metaphysics. There, Aristotle says, it seems, that whatever things are ‘signified’ by the forms of predication, presumably the categories, are said to be in themselves -- per se, kath'auta); 'be' has AS MANY SIGNIFICATIONS as there are forms of PREDICATION.. 

Since a predicate (beta) sometimes say what a thing (alpha) is, EST. But a predicate sometimes says what alpha is EST like. Sometimes, even, a predicate says how much alpha is, EST. And so on. There would be a different ‘signification’ of ‘EST’ corresponding to each predication, essential or non-essential. Occam’s razor rendered totally useless if it’s not here to cut Plato’s beard! Aristotle concludes that passage in the Metaphysics with the with the almost scholastic, if controversial, remark that there is no real difference in depth between the superficially varied “man walks (flourishes)” and “man is IST walking (flourishing).”

The obvious interpretation of this remark, beloved by Boethius and all the scholastics, is that the appearance of any verb-form like “walks” or “flourishes,” or “flies,” said of Pegasus, or “rides Pegasus,” said of Bellerophon, creates no major difficulty for Grice, since they may all be replaced, without loss or change of sense, by such an expression in canonical form such as  'is IST walking' or "is IST flourishing' ‘is flying, ‘is riding Pegasus’. If the expression regarded by Aristotle as canonical in form it is because the explicit use of ‘IST,’ whose multiplicity he is at least at his point discussing a copulative, or, strictly, COPULATION. Grice concedes that Aristotle on occasion does admit a categorial variation in the sense of copulative ‘ist’.  IST as IZZES, Owen is notably unwilling to allow that Aristotle is primarily concerned with copulative ‘ist’ regardless. As a result, and it seems Grice is having Warnock’s ‘Metaphysics in logic’ in mind here – in the well-circulated Flew collection --, Grice notes that Owen, rather strangely, interprets, the remark by Aristotle as alluding to semantic multiplicity in the copula as being supposedly a consequence of semantic multiplicity in ‘existit’!

Now, Owen’s interpretation seems difficult to defend for someone with the ears atuned to the type of linguistic botanizing that philosophers of Grice’s generation – like Austin, his senior by two years, and Warnock – but unlike Owen’s generation, like Ryle, or Prichard --. When Aristotle says that a predicate sometimes may say what a thing is, sometimes what  it is like -- its quality --, sometimes how much it is -- its quantity --, and so on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Fido – Smith’s infamously shaggy dog --, these predicates are categorially various, and so the use of the IST IzzES, in the ascription of these predicates, would undergo a terrifying corresponding variation of signification! In fairness to Owen, Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in IST not with variation between the various predicates of one subject, but with variation between essential, pertaining to the essentia, or per se, predications upon different, indeed categorially different, subjects. Grice is having in mind Aristotle’s predications such as as "Socrates IS a man", "Cambridge blue IS a colour (a blue, a blue colour) A desire to harmonise these statements leads Grice to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula IS exhibits a multiplicity of signification which corresponds to the categorial differences between different statements – assertions or denials -- about one subject, for example, Fido, but also that this semantic multiplicity may be attributable to a multiplicity in the notion of essential being IST. The signification of 'is’ would, if Owen were right, vary between  "Socrates is a man", “Fido is shaggy,” and Cambridge blue is a colour",  or, to use another of Aristotle’s examples from his bag of linguistic botany: the didascalian “A weight of two pounds is a magnitude.”

To voice his suspicion more explicitly, Grice ventures that it might be Aristotle's view that if "Sociates is BETA" of F, to adopt the canonical symbol used by Grice in “Vacuous Names” to refer to a predicate (Fa, Ga, Fb, Gb), Smiths dog is shaggy, is an accidental, i. e. non-essential, predication,  Beta (as in Utterer’s meaning, sentence meaning, and word meaning) or "F" (as in Vacuous Names) signifies an item in category C, and ‘has" expresses the CONVERSE of Aristotle's relation of inherentia or praesentia, then the LOGICAL FORM of a proposition like ‘Socrates is beta’ or ‘Socrates is F’ or ‘Smith’s dog is shaggy’ may be regarded as expressed by the simpler "Socrates HAS, but IS not, something which IS F" or BETA -- where 'ist’ represents a sense of 'is,’ of 'is essentially,’ which corresponds to category C. The copula est in such cases expresses the logical PRODUCT of a constant, and thus manageable and systematic relation expressed by 'has,’ HAZZES — not est— and a categorially variant relation expressed by 'is,’ est is essentially.’

These predominantly scholarly murmurs against the received view, Grice notes, that Aristotle regards so-called (by logicians) ‘Ex’ (or in Peano’s inverted Ex – an existential statement or proposition as the habitat of semantic multiplicity are not the only possible kinds of dissent. A different kind of complaint, against the viability of the position which Grice has been treating so far as if it were Aristotle's rather than against the suggestion that he in fact held it, would urge the untenability of the thesis, supposedly a foundation of his position that EZx  are a particular VACUOUS NAMES type of subject-predicate utterance type (Smith is happy). But it is possible, Grice concedes, that Owen voices something like this charge iwhen he distinguishes typex of exists. One form of such an objection would be that "goats mumble" EX (x), whether treated as a way of saying "goats always mumble" or saying "goats usually mumble", or of saying "goats sometimes mumble", or as being indeterminate between these alternatives, has to be supposed to presuppose the existence of goats. Cf Warnock – Strawson. This will be attested both by intuition, and by a need to extend to all interpretations a feature which is demanded for universal of total and particular utterance types, in order to escape ditficulties which arise in connection with the Square of Opposition. To suppose "a goats exists" – but not a stag-goat exists, or a flying horse exists outside the realms of Greek mythology -- to be analogous to "a goats mumbles", would be to suppose that "a goats exists — Warnock a tiger exists — " presuppose that a goats exists or to put it another way, the truth of "a goats exists" is a necessary precondition of its being enher tre or faise that a goats exists. 

This is an absurdity. Even for Collingwood, who loved a metaphysical presupposition (vide Grice’s early treatment of Collingwood, then a big name at Oxford, in ‘Metaphysics,’ in Pears, The nature of metaphysics). It seems to Grice that Aristotle can be defended against this attack. To begin with, the invocation of a semantic relation of  collingwoodisn presupposition is not the only recourse when one is faced with troubles about the Square of Opposition. One might, for example, try to deploy a pragmatic notion of presupposition which would not mitigate the alleged absurdity. Presupposition  as implicature in negation; presupposition as entailment in affirmation 

 But a more serious defence might suggest that Aristotle has more than one method of handling Ex existentisls; that there are indeed two such methods, both S est P subject-predicate in character, which when combined avoid the charge. In Metaphysics where the primary topic seems 10 be what kinds of attributes are constitutive of and differentiate between sons of sensible things, Aristotle argues the range of such crudal teatures is much larger than Democritus allows atom, and indicates ways of giving quasi definitions of a variety of sensible objects, such as a threshold or ice, which contain analogues of genus and differentia. 

At this point, almost parenthetically, he gives a pattern of conceptual definitional analysis for existentials about such things. The pattern consists (of the sequence some + genus* + l: + differentia*; c.g., "Some water IST frozen" (an analysand for "ice exists" and “A stone iIST situated in threshold position" (an analysand for "a threshold exists"). We have, then, for certain Ex existential a definiens in subject-predizate s Ist P form which by utilizing the elements in definitions, ELIZmIznATES eliminates the  'existit altogether. Grice goes on to suggest, on Aristotle's behalf, that this ELIMINATIVE form could be employed lo conceptually analyst and define general existentials, like "ice exists" , "A goat exists,” -- while the category citing forms. like Socrates is a substance could be used to conceptuallyto analyse or define singular existentials, like ‘Socrates exists".A strategy for an attempted presentation of in argument in support of the hypothesis that unified semantic multiplicity is to be located in the copula, or in a sub-range of examples in which est is used as a copula, viz., cases of accidental predication, will be to put forward as a preliminary a partial sketch of a theory of categories, which Grice regards as being in the main Aristotelian, to comment on some points of interest in that sketch, and finally to use it as a basis for the proposed argument. 

Grice’s sketch departs from Aristotle's own position in one or, two respects, thereby depicting i somewhat improved theory, and it will incorporate what seems to be a conspicuous extension of his theory, though one which, so far as I can see, he might well have accepted without detriment to his account. Grice’s motivation is to put forward an outline of an account of categories which is overtly more SYSTEMATIZc than the assemblage of dicta which one may extract from Aristotle's (L). Grice starts, much as Aristotle does in Categoriae, by distinguishing two forms of predication. Each relation, which may be called  "izzes' and -- "Hazzes', are approximately the converses, respectively, of his relations “Is” said of and “is in (a subject)”. Ian x izzes () y  i=df y is said of x. hab  X hZzsz y  =df y is present in x. Grice goes on to list some of the properties which I wish to assign to these relations, adding that n one or two cases there seems to be options. Izzing is reflexive (Vxix izzes x), non-symmetrical (symmetry-neutral), and transitive. Grice’s hazzing, on the other hand, is inreflexive, either intransitive or transitivily-neutral, and asymmetrical. In all cases, if an individual x izzes y, y is essential to x, in the sense that it x were not to izz y, x would no longer exist. It is, however, certainly not true in all cases that if x hazzes y, its hazzing y is essential to its existence; indeed, Grice confesses to an inclination to think, that this is not true in any case. Grice is however disposed to accept the following "mised" law. (0) 11 x I y and y H z, x Hz; the acceptability of this law would depend on the idea that a non individual y hazzes something z ilt [of necessity] every individual falling under y (that is every indivicual that izzes y) hazzes 2. Grice is however, not disposed to accopf the "mixed" law. (ii) If x H y and y lz,  x Il z, since I would like to espouse the idea that a subject a (in any category other than that of x) harzes only individuals); in which case, l might also espouse the idea that the copula Ist can be conceptually analyzed or defined in terms of the disjunction of & l y and x H something z which I y. Grice makes izzing reflexive, so some of his definitions must differ from his, since I cannot claim, as le did in Caregories 3a7, that nothing tzzes an individual substance. The definitions will run as follows. I is an individual iff nothing other than x izzes x. x is a primary individual iff x is an individual and nothing hazzes x. x is a primary substantial (x is in the category of "substance") iff sune primary individual izees x. x is il secondary substance ig & is a primary substantial but not an individual. x is identical with y iff x izzes y and y izzes x. y is predicable of x iff either x izzes y or & huzzes something z which izzes y. 

Grice is now ready to compare his definition with the conceptual analysis of the copula est.  And y will be a primary element in some category other than that of substantials just in case there is a individual x [an individual which is a primary substantiall which hazzes something z which in tum izzes y (this allows for the possibility that z may be identical with y). Obviously, in the case of such a foreign predication a method will be needed for determining which foreign' category is involved as being the category of the predicated item y. 

We can attempt to make use of the different one-word interrogatives which can be extracted from Aristotle – and Cook Wilson, whose Statement and Inference Grice sort of worshipped, with the supposition that items in a particular category may be suitably invoked to provide answers to just one of the kinds of questions asked by each of such interrogatives. But it is not clear that such a list of interrogatives is sufficiently comprehensive (relatives, for example, seem to escape this programme. Nor is it clear what the rational basis would be for such a list of questions. While Aristotle says much that is interesting about some particular categories, his attempts, for example in the cases of quantity and quality, to pick on primary distinguishing marks are not clear. Such shortcomings matter Little. It seems sufficient to assume the availability of some discriminating procedure (perhaps some furtirer development of the 'interrogatives method) since Grice’s main concern is with the consequences of a scheme involving some procedure of such a sort. At this point the sketch incorporates the extension of Aristotle's thcory of categories. Grice assumes that there is an operation, substantialisation – a metaphysical routine if ever there was one – Grice, Prejudices and preilections, which become the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, which, when applied directly to an individual which belong to a con-substantial category, relocates it  in a NON-primary division of the category of substantials, thereby instituting or licensing the alocated items as further subjects of hazzing; the items hazzed by them will inhabit NON primary divisions of categories other than that of substantials. A Qualities of substance na be might be relocated as a non primary substantial, thereby becoming subjects which hazz (soy) further qualitatives of quantitatives, : that is to say. inhabitants of a NON primary division of this or that NON substantial category. So the category of qualitatives may include qualities of substances, qualities of substantialized qualities (or substantialized quantities) of substances, and so without any fixed limit. Fidinterestnedd diedng exist Banbury doesn’t exist.

The scheme would, provide for substantialisation with respect to some, but not necessarily to all, items which initially belong to some NON substantial category; some categories, however, might be inebigible£ for the application of substantialisation, and in other categories it might be that only sub-categories would be eligible for substantialisation.The scheme also ensures that substantialisation goes hand-in hand with beooming a subject of hazzing; but would not guarantee that substantialised items would hazz further items in every non-substantial category. Admittedly, Grice’s scheme as is absirace : and it would be necessary to make sure that it could have application to concrete cases.  It might also, even if concretely applicable, be only PARTIAL in character; it might, for example, provide for one kind of category (say “logical categories”), but leave other kinds of categories, like sensory categories, unprovided for. Grice’s scheme leaves room lor sub. categorial diversities within a given overall entegory, There might be distinctions between, for example, qualities of substances, qualities of quantities of substances, qualities of quantities of actions of substances, and so forth. All of these specific classes would fall within a general category of QUALITY: and there would be opportunity to legislate against any item's belonging to more than one sub-division. Within an already discriminated category or sub-category there might be a categorial distinction between substantializable and non-substantialicable items.There will be room 1o adopt a cruerion of realiy distinct frem the perhaps increasingly cedious Quineian condition of being "quantifiable over"

One might, for example, insist that reality attaches, or full reality attaches, only to items which besides being izzers, being izzed, and being hazzed, are themselves haziers (that is, are susceptible to substantialisation).Since it cannot be assumed that a non-primary substantial will receive predicables in every non-substantial category, there is room for distinctions of richness between the range of categories from which predicobles apply to one huzzer, and that from which predicables apply to another; and these variations in predicationable richness could be used as a measure of degree of reality: the richer the realer, with primary substantials at the top. Having discussed two different suggestions about the possible location of semantic multiplicity associated with the notion of ist Grice expands. One would lie ta the range of maximally general specifications of the notion of existit (of the use of the verb to be' to signify existence). The other would lie in the use of the copula to signify different predication relations. 

Both suggestions seem to have solid Aristotelian foundations. The categorial multiplicity of the term 'existit' and the distinction between different forms of predication relations are both well-established Aristochian docirines. So far, then, there might seem little room for a preference of one suggestion to the other. There are, however, two lines of reflection which in one way or another might upset this equilibrium. The first line of reflection would allow that Aristotle or an Aristotelian might have good reasons for secking TWO, rather than merely one, predication-relation, reasons perhaps connected with intuitively acceptable restrictions on the scope of transitivity, and with a desire to block such unwanted inferential moves as "Socrates is white, white is a colour, so Socrates is a colour.” (But cf. “Fido’s coat is shaggy; so Fido is shaggy”). But it remains true that nocharacterization hos been given of the concept of a predication-relation; and though certain formal properties may have been assigned to izzing and hazzing, it is not clear that these formal properties would by themselves be adequate guides for someone wanting to be told how to apply the terms izzing' and luzzing' to a particular case. It is not clear, either, whot extra formal supplementation could he provided, one would hardly suppose, for example, such relational terms to be susceptible of ostensive definition. It may then be that these relations do not (and presumably cannot) have a readily discernible character, a fact which if not a blemish at least creates a problem.  It is ultimately possible then that despite initial appearances the notion of a predization-relation is not well-defined, and indeed that apparent examples of such relations are illusory. This alternative line of reflection then, might confer better survival chances upon the first of the two suggestions here dstinguished.

A different line of reflection, however, is one which Grice is certainly more inclined to take seriously. Unlike the previous one, this line of reflection would not lavour the attribution to Aristotle of one rather than the other of two viens about the location of a contain semantis multiplicity. It would rather suggest. or conjecture, that the attribution to Aristotle of either view would involve a misconception of Aristotle's position, unless it wore accompanied by a recognition of a certain not immediately obvious distinction. Enter pragmatics – and implicature. It would be a mistake to suppose Aristotle to be holding that exists est ‘signifies; a plurality of distinct universals and that therefore the existential 'is' bos a plurality of meaning; It would also he a mistake to attribute to Aristotle the view that the copulative 'is may signify one or another of lWo predication-relations thereby ‘signifying’ a plurality of universals, with the consequence that the copulative "is' has more than one meaning. What Aristotle is really proposing is a separation of — the question what an U universals is, — the question how many SIGNIFICATIONS an expression possesses. Aristotle is suggesting the possibility that a particular expression may have only one meaning sense or content and yet be used on different occasions to point to different universals. It is no doubt trus that historically universals were admitted to the realm of philosophical discourse in order to be items in which the meaning of particular expressions might consist. But this historical fact does not establish an indissoluble connection between universals and the meanings of a linguistic expression; and it should be modified or abandoned should subsequent rational reflection provide reasons for adopting such a ovurse.

Grice is well aware that his suggestion, whether advanced on behalf of Aristotle or independently, that a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the universal or universals, which either in general or on a particular occasion are pointed by the expression, and, on the other hand, the meaning or meanings of the expression in question, which is likely to give rise to a sense of shock. Grice suggests that susceptibility to this sense of shock will be independent of the question whether the person who feels it is friendly or unfriendly towards universals. Grice invites us to consider first the reaction of one who is friendly to universals. The philosopher may be liable to take the view that the reason for introducing universals in the first place was primarily, indeed exclusively, to equip ourselves with a range of items, each of which would serve as that which was meant, or as one of the things that was meant by significant expressions. This is what a universal does, and it is what they are supposed to do, and they do it perfectly well; it is not therefore in order te propose a severance of just that connection with meaning which gives universals a raison d'être. One who is unfriendly to universals can hardly be expected to be more sympathetic to the proposal, such a person might be unfriendly to universals either because, like Quine, while he is prepared to describe each of a multitude of expressions as being meaningful, be is not prepared to count as legitimate specifications of what it is that a meaningful expression means, or he is not prepared to allow that two distinct expressions may each mean the same thing. These denials are plainly linked; if it is legitimate to ask of two meaningful expressions, what it is that each mcans we can hardly preveat it from being the case, sometimes, that what each means is just the same as what the other means. Alternatively the enemy of universals might not wish to eliminate specifications of meaning or the possibility of synonymy; his position is rather that an adequate account of the full range of meaning-concepts can be provided without resort to universals. But the enemies of universals, from whichever camp they come, may well insist that one who, unlike them, is disposed to bring in universals is not at liberty to contemplate divorcing them from that connection with meaning which he will have to allow as underlying their claim to existence.

Grice is not sure that such hostility to the general idea of divorcing the ‘signification’ of one or more universals from the possession of one or more meanings is as solidly founded as initially it appears to be. If I ask someone whether he knows the birth place of Cicero, he might reply in two quite different ways. He might say: “Certainly I do; he was born in Arpino.” Alternatively he might reply "I am afraid I don't. Cicero was born in Arpino, 1 am afraid I have never been able to get to Arpino so I don't know the place at all." The obvious difference between these two distinct interpretations of the question seems to me to be plainly connected with the functioning of certain pronouns as (a) indirect interrogatives (b) as relatives; in my example, the first reply claims knowledge where Cicero was born, the second claims ignorance of that place where (in which) Cicero was born.

There are other ways of looking at the linguistic phenomenon presented by my example, which are not incompatible with the way just outlined. and indeed which may turn out to be useful complementaries to it. One might draw attention to a distinction between knowledge of propositions and knowledge of things, suggesting that what the first respondent claims is propositional knowledge, whereas, what the second respondent disclaims is thing-knowledge; the second respondent exhibits a certain bit of propositional knowledge but professes substantial ignorance concerning the item to which his propositional knowledge relates. There is of course no reason why these two states should not coexist. While we are directing our attention to this approach, we night bear in mind that one kind of knowledge might be dependent on the other. It might, for example, be the case that knowing a thing a consists in the possession of a perhaps indefinitely extended supply of pieces of propositional knowledge, all of which are cases of propositional knowledge which relates to x; or alternatively, knowledge of x might consist not in an indefinite supply of pieces of propositional knowledge about x, but rather in the possession of a foundation or a base from which such propositional knowledge may be readily generated. Yet a further idea to be considered begins with the recognition that definite descriptions like many other kinds of phrases may, within a sentence occupy either subject position or predicate position; as some might prefer to put it, "the birth place of Cicero" may be used either referentially or predicatively. It might then be suggested that in the mouth, or at least in the mind, of the first respondent the phrase "the birth place of Cicero" occurs predicatively, whereas in the case of the second respondent it occurs referentially, as, potentially at least, a subject expression. If we suppose the phrase to occur predicatively in a given cose, it will be necessary that one should be able to point to a mentioned or unmentioned item to which the predicate in question might apply: then, in the case of the first respondent in normal circumstances there will be some particular item which he thinks of as, or believes to be, the birth place of Cicero.

The relevance of this discussion to the topic of meaning and universals is that it may with some plausibility be alleged that those who have invoked universals as the items in which the meaning or meanings of significant expressions consist are guilty of representing such a phrase as "knowing the meaning of the word 'watershed " as referring to knowledge of an object or thing, as knowledge of “that which” the word watershed' significs or means (where the pronoun "which' is a relative pronoun); whereas, in fact, the phrase plainly refers to knowing what the word ‘watershed’ – or ‘runt’ means where the pronoun 'what' is indirectly interrogative rather than relative. The theory of universals as meaning, then, rests on a syntactical blunder; that this is so is attested by the fact that in principle at least the caning of an expression E, may be identical with the meaning of the expression E’ but plainly to know the meaning of E, is not the same as to know the meaning of E’.

This attack on the historical genesis of universals as the focal elements in a certain kind of anti-nominalistic theory of meaning, might encounter the following response. It might not be denied that the kind of syntactical blunder, which I have been attempting to expose, is in fact a blunder and has indeed been committed by some who have championed the cause of universals. It is, however, a remedial blunder which can be rectified, ultimately not only without damage, but even with advantage to the view of universals as the primary constituents of meaning. Once universals are admitted, they can be, and should be, thought of and accepted as being those items which are the meanings of this or that element of language. In the end, then, knowing the meaning of an expression E would emerge as knowing what E means, rather than what an utterer U means by uttering E, that is, as propositional knowledge connected with interrogative pronouns rather than as thing-knowledge connected with relative pronouns. So everything comes right in the end; and the tie between universals and meanings cannot be put asunder.

This defence of the inviolability of the link between universals and meanings may be ingeniously contrived, but is not, I think, irresistible. If the specification of meanings were to provide not merely a useful mode of employment for universals once they are recognized as being around, but rather the sole justification and raison d’être of the supposition that they are around, the specification of meaning would have to be not merely something that can be commodiously done with universals, but rather something which cannot be done or fully done without universals. To my mind this stronger requirement cannot be met. There are, I think, some cases of expressions E such that knowing the meaning of E cannot comfortably be represented as knowing, with respect to some acceptable entity that it is that to which the description "the (a) meaning of E" applies. I offer two examples:

If Grice were to say "The wind is blowing in the direction of Arpino", any normally equipped Greek, Latin, English, or Italian speaker would know the meaning both in general and on the current occasion of the phrase ‘in the direction of Arpino’; that is to say he would know both what in general the phrase means and what Grice meant by it on the occasion of utterance. But such examples of knowledge of the meaning in general, and also the meaning relevant to a particular occasion, of a particular phrase, so far as 1 can sec, neither requires, nor is assisted by, the specification of an admissible entity which is to be properly regarded as that to which the description ‘the meaning of the phrase ‘in the direction of Arpino’’ applies, either generally or on this occasion. It is unlikely that there is such an admissible entity, the phrase 'in the direction of Sacramento' does not seem to be one which applies to any particular entity; and even if it were possible to justify the claim, such a justification seems hardly to contribute to one's capacity for knowing what such a phrase means.

 By a precisely parallel argument I may know perfectly well what is meant by the phrase ‘the inducement which I offers you for looking after my farm in Sibila', even though I am neither helped nor hindered by the presence or absence of any thought to the effect that there is some admissible item which satisfies the description "the meaning of the phrase 'the inducement which I offer you for looking atter my farm in Sibile' "

Before leaving this topic, Grice makes two further comments. First, the fact that the conection between universals and meanings may not be inviolable does not dispense someone who wishes to modify it from obligations to make clear just what changes he is making; second, if a theory of meaning should fail to provide an indispensable rationale for the introduction of universals, it might turn out to be incumbent upon a metaphysician to offer an alternative rationale. But this question will have to wait for another occasion.

Let us for the moment retain an open mind on the nature of Aristotle's views about the connection between the unification of semantic multiplicity and the presence or absence of identity of meaning. Aristotle lists a number of modes of this kind of unification which I shall consider one by one. As one embarks on this enterprise one might well bear in mind the possibility that the list provided by Aristotle might not be intended to be exhaustive; and that the number and proper characterization of the modes which do occur in Aristotle's list is sometimes uncertain. Aristotle refers to cases in which a general term is applied by reference to a central item or type of items as ones in which there is a single source for a contribution to a single end. It is not clear whether he is giving a single general description or a pair of more specific descriptions each of which applies to a different sub-class of examples. I know no way of settling this uncertainty. The modes of unification actually listed by Aristotle consist in (a) what 1 shall call recursive unification in which the application of each member of a range of predicates is determined by the conditions governing the application of a primary member of that range, (b) what I may, with deference to Owen, call focal unification (unification which derives from connection with a single central item), (c) analogical unification, in which the applicability of one predicate or class of predicates is generated by analogies with other predicates or classes of predicates, I shall consider these headings in order. The cases of recursive unification are primarily, though not exclusively. mathematical in character; they are also cases in which what one might call the "would-be" species of a generic universal stand to one another in relations excmplifying priority and posteriority. The Platonists, so Aristotle tells us, regarded such priority and posteriority as inadmissible between fellow species of a single genus. Aristotle does not explicitly subscribe to this view, but he does not explicitly reject it and is liable to act as if he accepted it. Why should priority and posteriority stand in the way of being different species of a single genus? Why should not different numbers be distinct species of the genus number? In the case of numbers, End. Eih. (121%aff.) attempts a reductio ad absurdum: if there were a form (universal) signified by "number" it would have to be prior to the first number, which is impossible; this argument might be expanded as follows: consider a sequence of "number-properties" (Pl, p?..., e.g., 2-ness, 3-ness ...): such a sequence satisfies, inter alia, the following conditions. For any x and for any n 1, x instantiates Pi entails x does not instantiate pa-' (nor indeed any P').For any x and for any n * 1, x instantiates P" entails something y (* x) instantiates pr-/If P™ = P'
, no counterpart of (a), (b) holds; so Pl is the first number. If the fulfillment of the above conditions is to be sufficient to establish a sequence of properties as a sequence of number properties, then there cannot be a universal number; if there were, it would, like any genus, be prior to each of its species, and so prior to Pl; but since P' is the first number it cannot have a predecessor and so nothing can be prior to it. There seem to be two objections. It is by no means clear that the above conditions are sufficient to guarantee that a sequence of properties is a sequence of number-properties. Even if they were, one part of them would not be fulfilled in the case of Pl and being a number; if x instantiates Pl (viz., 2-ness), x, not something other than x, will instantiate being a number, a set whose cardinality is 2 itself instantiates being a number (as a cardinality). If this route to a denial of the existence of a generic universal number fails there are two further possibilities. One might attempt to represent conformity to a "standard" genus-species-differentia model as being not just an acceptable picture of situations in which a more general universal has under it a range of subordinate universals which are its specializations, but as being constitutive for such examples of the existence of the more general universal. The slogan might be "For there to be a universal U, with specializations U,, U,, ..., U,, U has to be the genus of those specializations with all that that entails" (or, more briefly, "no specialization without species"). The justification for such a claim will not be easy to find. While, intuitively. one might be prepared to accept the idea that a more general universal must be independent of its specializations in that the non-emptiness of the general universal should be compatible with the emptiness of any particular specialization (though not of course with the emptiness of all specializations), it does not seem intuitively acceptable to make it a condition of the existence of U that any pair of specializations U, and U2 should be in this sense independent of one another. One might try a simpler form of argument. If the special cuses for the application of a general term E, that is to say, the universals U, ... U, are united by a single ordering relation R into a series 5, the elements of which [U, ... U.] cover every item to which E applies, and only such items, then we do not need a generic universal U; its would-be species U, ... U, are already unified by membership of the series S. The expression "being an instance of some universal in the series S" is of course applicable to anything to which E is applicable; but this expression does not even look like the name of a gonus.

A second mode of unification to which semantic multiplicity may be susceptible, that of focal unification, is discussed at length by Aristotle in Metaphysics. There Aristotle brings up two of his favourite examples, the applications of the adjectives "healthy' sanus and 'medical' medicalis. He states that everything to which the ‘healthy' applies is related to, in one way or another, the focal item of health, "one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another that in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it." Similar considerations apply to applications of the adjective 'medical'. That which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art." On the most obvious interpretation of this passage Aristotle will be suggesting that standard semantic theory will be right in supposing the applicability of certain adjectives to particular items depends on a relationship of such items to an associated universal, but wrong in supposing that the relationship in question is invariably that of instantiation; other sorts of relationship are frequently involved. There is, however, a less obvious position which Aristotle might have been taking up; this position would maintain with respect to universals, that the only way in which individual items may be related to universals is that of instantiation: that there will be other entities which will indeed be general entities though not universals; to them individual items may be related in a variety of ways which are distinct from instantiation. The relative merits of these two ideas will be a matter for debate. The focal mode of unification is of special interest in my present enquiry since Aristotle states quite plainly that this is the mode of unification which applies 10 the semantic multiplicity connected with being. Categorially different sorts of things may all be said to be by virtue of different kinds of connections which they have to the focal item, which will be intimately connected with the notion of substance. This central item might be an individual substance or, more likely, might be the notion of substantal type: any items which 'izzed' this type would be an individual substance and so would exist. But non-substantial items could also be said to be by virtue of their relationship (different in different cases) to the same central item; some things may be said to be because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, and so forth. It is evident that Aristotle habitually thinks of the focal item as being a universal, or at least some kind of general entity; but such restriction is not mandatory, nothing prevents the focal item from being a particular. Consider the adjective French or italiano as it occurs in the phrases, "French citizen",  citadino italiano, "French poem", poema italiano, "French professor". professore italiano. The following features are perhaps significant: (1) The appearance of the adjective in these phrases is what I might call "adjunctive" rather than "conjunctive" or "attributive". A French poem, is not as I see it, something which combines the separate eatures of being a poem and being French, as a fat philosopher would simply combine the features of being fat and of being a philosopher. "French" here occurs, so to speak, adverbially. (2) The phrase "French citizen" standardly means "citizen of France", while the phrase "French poem standardly means "poci in French"; but it would be a mistake to suppose that this fact implies that there are two (indeed more than two) meanings or senses of the word "French". The word French" has only one meaning, namely "of or pertaining to France"; it will, however, be what one might call 'context sensitive"; we might indeed say, if you like, that while "French" has only one meaning or sense, it has a variety of meanings-in-context; relative to one context, "French" means "of France" as in the phrase "French citizen", whereas relative to another context "French" means, "in the French language" as in the phrase "French poem". Whether the focal item is a universal or a particular is quite irrelevant to the question of the meaning of the related adjective; the medical art is no more the meaning of the adjective 'medical', as France is the meaning of the adjective 'French'. As a concluding observation I may remark that while the attachment of the context may well suggest an interpretation in context of a word, it need not be the case that such suggestion is indefeasible. It might be for instance that "French poem" would have to mean "poem composed in French" unless there were counter indications; in which case, perhaps, the phrase might mean "poem composed by a French competitor" (in some competition). For the phrase "French professor" there would be two obvious meanings in context; and disambiguation would have 10 depend on a wider linguistic context or on the circumstances of utterance.

Finally, Grice turns to a third mode of unification, that he describes as what is possibly the most baffling of the ways explicitly suggested by Aristotle as being those in which what Grice is calling the UNIFICATION OF the multiplicity of significations may arise, even if made less baffling by Vio – vide Ashford. These will be cases in which the application of an epithet to a range of objects is accounted for by analogy detectable within that range; more explicitly to analogies between the specific universals which determine the application of the epithet, or (perhaps) between the exemplifications of those universals by this or that type of object. More explicitly to analogies between the specific universals U, and Uz etc., which determine the application of the epithet, or (perhaps) between the exemplifications of U,, Uz ete., by items of the sorts ly. lo etc., The puzzling character of Aristotle's treatment of this topic arises from a number of different factors. First there are two things which Aristotle himself might have done to aid our comprehension. He might have given us a firm list of examples of epithets, the application of which to a given range of objects is to be accounted for in this way; alternatively, he might have given us a reasonably clear characterization of the kind of accounting which analogy is supposed to provide, leaving it to us to determine the range of application of this kind of accounting. Unfortunately he does neither of these things; he offers us only the most meagle hints about the way in which analogy might unify the various applications of an epithet; we are told, for example, that as sight is in the eye, so intellect is in the soul with the implicit suggestion that this fact accounts for the application of the word 'see' both to cases of optical vision and cases of intellectual vision, and he also suggests that analogy is responsible for the application of the word 'calm' both to undisturbed bodies of sea water and to undisturbed expanses of air. Such offerings do not get us very far, furthermore, not surprisingly, where Aristotle seems to fear to tread the commentators are most reluctant to plant their own feet. Perhaps the least unhelpful suggestion comes from the influential Oxford philosopher Ross who suggests as Aristotle's view that the application of the word 'good' is attributable to the fact that within onc category things which are good are related to things in general belonging to that category in a way which is analogous to the way in which good things in some second category are related to the general run of things which belong to that second category. Apart from obscurity in the presentation of this idea, Ross's suggestion takes for granted something which Aristotle himself does not tell us, namely that the application of the epithet 'good' is one exemplification of unification which is the outcome of analogy: Ross's suggestion about 'good' would, moreover, be at best only a description of one special case of analogical unification, and would not give us any general account of such unification. I might add that little supplementary assistance is derivable from those who study general semantic concepts; such persons seem to adhere to the principle that silence is golden when it comes to discussion of such questions as the relation between analogy, metaphor, simile, allegory and parable. So far as Aristotle himself is concerned it seems fairly clear to me that tie primary notion behind the concept of analogy is that of ‘proportion.’ This notion is embodied, for example, in Aristotle's treatment of justice. where one kind of justice is alleged to consist in a due proportion between return (reward or penalty) and antecedent desert (merit or demerit) but it remains a mystery how what starts life as, or as something approximating to, a quantitative relationship gets converted into a not-quantitative relation of correspondence of affinity. It looks as if we might be thrown back upon what we might hope to be inspired conjecture. Grice takes as his first task the provision of an example, congenial to Aristotle, of the unification by analogy of the application to a range of objects of some epithet. I shall expect this to involve the detection of analogical links between the exemplifications of the variety of universals which the epithet may be used to signify. My chosen specimen is the verb grow. In this case a number of different kinds of shifts might be thought of as possessing an analogical unification. One of these would be examples of shifts in respect of what might be termed syntactical metaphysical category. A substance, indeed a physical substance like a lump of wax or a mass of metal, might be said to grow; and it would be tempting here to suggest that the relevantly involved universal, that of increase in size or getting larger, provides the foundational instance of the signification of a universal by the word "grow'; we have here, so to speak, the 'ground-floor' meaning of the verb. But not only the physical substance itself but the various accidents of the substance may also be said to grow; not only the piece of wax but its magnitude, some event or process in its history, its powers or causal efficacy and its aesthetic quality (beauty) might each be said to grow; and it seems not unplausible to suggest that though growth on the part of these non-substantial accidents might be different, and more or, again, less boringly connected with growth on the part of the substance, there will always be some kind of correspondence or analogical connection between growth in the case of a non-substantial item and growth in the case of a substantial item. Another and different kind of categorial variation may separate some of the universals which the word "grow' may be used to signify from others; these will be connected with differences in the sub-categories within the category of substance within which fall different sorts of entities which may be said to grow; different universals may be signified by someone who speaks of a plant as growing and by someone who speaks of a human being as growing, and the confection between these diverse realizations of growth may rest on analogy. In what is called the growth of a plant, internally originated increase in size may occupy a prominent place, whereas in the case of a human being the kind of development which may be involved in growth may be much more varied and complex; the link between the two distinct universals which may be signified might be provided by analogy between the roles which such changes fulfill in the development of the very different kinds of substances which are being characterized. No doubt many further kinds of analogical connection would emerge within the general practice of attributing growth. Grice’s next endeavour will be an attempt to supply some general account of the way in which the presence of analogy may serve to unify semantic multiplicity; and if such an account should be found to offer prospects of distinguishing analogy from other concepts, particularly metaphor which belongs to the same general family, that would be a welcome aspect of the account. It is my idea that in metaphorical description a universal is signified, which though distinct from that which underlies the literal meaning of an epithet is nevertheless recognizably similar to that literal signification. Grice comes then to the notion of analogy itself. I shall start by considering items any one of which may be called an S,; I shall initially suppose that being an S, consists in belonging to a substantial type or kind, S,. though that supposition may be relaxed later. My first move will be to assume that being an S, consists in being subject to a system of laws which jointly express the nature of the type or kind Si; and further that these laws, which furnish the central theory of S,, will all be formulable in terms of a finite set of S,-central properties (let us say P, to P,); each law will involve some ordered extract from the central set, and their totality will govern any fully authentic Sy. This totality may well not include all the laws which apply to S,: but it does include all the laws which are relevant to the identity of Sy, all the laws which determine whether or not a particular item is to count as an 5,- Grice next considers not merely things each of which is an S,, but also things each of which is an Sz; it is to remain at least for the moment an open question whether or not the type S, is identical with the type S1. 1 assume that, as in the case of S,, membership of S, is determined by conformity to a system of laws relating to properties which are central to S2. I shall symbolize these properties by the devices Or ... Q.. We now have various possibilities to consider. The first is that every law which is central to the determination of Sz is a mirror image of a law which is central to S,; and that the converse of this supposition also obtains. To this end we shall assume that the properties which are central to being an $, are the properties O, through Os; and that if a law involving a certain ordered extract from the set P, through P, belongs to the central theory of Sto a law involving an exactly corresponding ordered extract from the set O, through, will belong to the central theory of Sa; and that the same holds in reverse. In that case, we shall be in the position to say that there is a perfect analogy between the central theories of S, and Sz; and in that case, it may also be tempting to say that the types S, and S, are essentially identical. We should recognize that if we yield to this temptation we are not thereby forced to say that Sy and S, are indistinguishable, they might, for example, be differently related to perception, only one of them (perhaps) being accessible to sight; we shall only be forced to allow that essentially, or theoretically, the types are not distinct; how that is to be interpreted will remain to be seen. The possibility just considered is that of a total perfect analogy between the central theories of S, and Sa. There is also, however, the possibility of a partial pertect analogy between S, and Sz. That is to say pait of the central theory of one type (say S,) may mirror the whole of the central theory of Sz, or again may mirror some part of a central theory of Sz. In such circumstances one might be led to say (in one case) that the type S, is a special case of the type S,; or (in the other case) that the types S, and S, both fall under a common super-type, determined by the limited area of perfect analogy between the central theories of S, and Sz. A third possibility will be that no perfect analogy, either total or partial, exists between the two central theories; the best that can be found are imperfect analogies which will consist in laws central to one type approximating, to a certain degree, with the status of being analogues of laws central to the other. At this stage, Grice proposes a relaxation in the characterization of the signification of such symbols as 'S!', 'Sz etc., which till now I have been regarding as signifying substantial types or kinds, reference to which is made in more or less regimented discourse of a theoretical or scientific sort. I shall now think of such symbols as relating to what I hope might be legitimately regarded as informal precursors of the aforementioned substantial types, as expressing concepts of one or other classificatory sort, concepts which will be deployed in the unregimented descriptions and explanations of pre-theoretical. Examples of such unregimented classificatory concepts might be the concepts of an investor, a doctor, a vehicle, a confidante, and so on. I would hope that in many ways their general character might run parallel to that of their more regimented counterparts. In particular, Grice hopes and expects that their nature would be bound up with conformity to a certain set of central generalities (platitudes, truisms, etc.); to be an investor or a vehicle will be to do a sufficient number of the kinds of things which typically are done by investors or vehicles. One might expect, however, that the variety of possible forms of generalization might considerably exceed the meagre armament which theoretical enquirers normally permit themselves to employ. One might also hope and expect that the generalities which would be expressive of the nature of a particular classificatory concept would be formulable in terms of a limited body of features which would be central to the concept in question. This material might be sufficient to provide for the presence from time to time of analogy, at least of imperfect analogy, between scucralities which aro expressive of distinct classificatory concepts. When they occur, such analogies might be sufficient to provide for semantic unity in the employment of a single epithet to signify dilferent classificatory concepts; and this semantic unity, in turn, might be sufficient to justify the idea that in such cases the expression in question is used with a single lexical meaning.

Grice concludes the presentation of his suggestions about the interpretation of the notion of analogy as a possible foundation for semantic unity with two supplementary comments. The first is that there seems to be a good ease for supposing that anyone who accepts this account of analogy-based unity of meaning is not free to combine it with a rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. The account relies crucially on a connection between the application of a particular concept and the application of a system of laws or other generalities which is expressive of that concept, and, this in tum, relies on the idea of a stock of further concepts, in terms of which these laws or generalities are to be formulated, being central to the original concept. But it seems plausible, if not mandatory, to suppose that such centrality involves a non-contingent connection between the original concept and the concepts which are said to be central to it, a connection which cannot he admitted by one who denies the analytic/synthetic distinction. So either one accepts the analytic/synthetic distinction or one rejects at least this account of analogy-based semantic unity. I make no attempt here to decide between these alternatives. The second comment is that material introduced in Grice’s suggested elaboration of the notion of analogy, particularly the connection between concepts and conformity to laws or other generalities, may serve to provide a needed explanation and justification of the initial idea that the applicability of a single defining formula, couched in terms of the ideas of genus, species, and differentia is a paradigmatic condition, if not an indispensable condition, for identity of meaning. We might, for a start, agree to treat a situation in which the applicability of an epithet to an item i, rests on a conformity to exactly the same laws or generalities as does its application to item iz, as being a limiting case of partial perfect analogy. Situations in which no ic interpretation at all is required may be treated as limiting cases of situations in which, though reinterpretation is required. one is available which achieves partial perfect analogy. As one might say, a law is perfectly analogous with itself. Situations, then, in which an epithet applies to a range of items solely by virtue of the presence of a single universal, and so of a single set of laws, may be legitimately regarded as a specially exemplary instance of a kind of unity which is required for identity of meaning.

Both a proper assessment of Aristotle's contribution to metaphysics and the theory of meaning and studies in the theory of meaning themselves might profit from a somewhat less localized attention to questions about the relation between universals and meaning than has so far been visible in Grice’s reflections. I have it in mind to raise not the general question whether, despite the Nominalists, a theory of meaning requires universals (to which I shall for the moment assume an affirmative answer), but rather the question in what way universals are to be supposed to be relevant to meaning. Consideration of the practices of latter-day lexicographers, so far from supporting a charge that, at least on my interpretation of him, Aristotle has proposed an illegitimate divorce between universals and meaning suggests that it would be proper to go a deal further than did Aristotle himself in championing such a divorce, There will be many different forms of connection between the variety of universals which may be signified by a non-equivocable expression beyond that countenunced by the tradition of theory of definition, and even perhaps beyond the extensions to that theory envisaged by Aristotle himself. These will include some forms of connection like those involved in metonymy and synecdoche, recognized by later grammatical theorists, and no doubt others as well. It would, I suggest, be a profitable undertaking to study carefully the contents of a good modem dictionary, with a view to constructing an inventory of these various modes of connection. Such an investigation would, I suspect, reveal both that in a given case the invocation of one mode of connection may be subordinate and posterior to the invocation of another, and also that there is no prescribed order or limitation of order which such invocations must observe. Grice suspects, also, that it might emerge that the question whether variations of meaning are thought of as synchronic or diachronic has no bearing on the nature of the uniting connections. The same forms of connection will be available in both cases, and these in turn may well be found to correspond with the range of different figures of speech which conversational practice may typically employ. Should this conjecture turn out to be correct, the underlying explanation of its truth might, I would guess, run along the following lines. Rational human thought and communication will, in pursuit of their various purposes, encounter a boundless and unpredictable multitude of distinct situations. Perhaps unlike a computer we shell not have, ready made, any vast array of forms of description and explanation from which to select what is suitable for a particular occasion. We shall have to rely on our rational capacities, particularly those for imaginative construction and combination, to provide for our needs as they arise. It would not then be surprising if the operations of our thoughts were to reflect, in this or that way, the character of the capacities on which thought relies. I have to confess to only the haziest of conception bow such an idea might be worked out in detail.

 

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