GRICE E GIAVELLI

 Crisostomo Javelli was born in 1470 c., presumably in Piedmont, joined the Dominicans, and died in 1538. On Javelli see ÉTIENNE GILSON, « Autour de Pomponazzi: problématique de l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie au début du XVI° siècle », Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age, 28 (1961),  p. 163-279 (esp. p. 259-277); MICHAEL TAVUZZI, « Chrysostomus lavelli OP (c. 1470-1538). A Biobibliographical Essay: Part 1, Biography », Angelicum, 67 (1990), p. 457-482; ID., « Chrysostomus lavelli OP (c. 1470-1538). A Biobibliographical Essay: Part II, Bibliography », Angelicum, 68 (1991), p. 109-121.He is the author of a Compendium Logicae, which includes eleven treatises. The structure of Javelli's work mirrors Ockham's Summa logicae in many respects, but also Paul of Venice's Logica Parva (unlike Paul of  Venice, however, Javelli does not deal with obligations and insolubles).  The eleven treatises deal with the following topics:  I. Introductory remarks, which include a short history of logic;  Il. terms (this part corresponds to the doctrine dealt with by Aristotle in De  Interpretatione 2-5);  III. propositions;  IV. the five praedicabilia (this section corresponds to Porphyry's Isagoge);  V. the antepraedicamenta, the doctrine of the categories (praedicamenta), and the postpraedicamenta (this treatise, as is clear, corresponds to Aristotle's Categories);  VI. syllogism;  VII. supposition theory;  VIII. ampliatio and appellatio, i.e. changes in the supposition of a term and changes  in the tenses of verbs;  IX. theory of consequentiae;  X. de probatione terminorum (this treatise deals with the ways in which it is possible to show the truth, or the probability of a proposition);  XI. demonstrative syllogism (this part aims at expounding what Aristotle says in  his Posterior Analytics).    The treatise was first published in 1540 in Venice. The Compendium was rather successful, and went « through some thirty editions between 1540 and 1629 »?" Javelli had many teaching positions within the Dominican Order and, most probably, he wrote his Compendium logicae for didactic purposes. The tendency to systematize the 'new' logic of the late medieval authors and to present it as consistent with Aristotle's logic is even more evident than in Savonarola's Compendium. Javelli was also influenced by the humanists, inasmuch as his treatises draw attention to the linguistic, and historical context in which ancient logic arose. If Lorenzo Valla criticized Paul of Venice for the latter's unfamiliarity with the Greek language, Javelli dwells on the etymology of many key terms of logic, and shows a certain familiarity with both Greek and Latin. In his historical section,  Javelli maintains that Socrates and Plato « were not strong in answering and solving  because they did not have logic, even though they were strong in asking questions or in raising doubts » (« licet potentes essent ad interrogandum sive dubitandum, non tamen ad respondendum et solvendum propter logice carentiam »78). Logic was founded on its proper grounds by Aristotle, for whom  Javelli has words of deep admiration:  Hence, the Author of nature gave us Aristotle, who first discovered true logic with his almost divine mind and organized and brought it to completion in all its parts, so that we could discover the true rule of knowing that guides the human mind in arts and sciences."  TAVUZZI, « Chrysostomus lavelli OP ... Part I», p. 461, fn. 15.  Logicae Compendium Peripateticae, ordinatum per Reuerendum Magistrum Chrisostomum lauellum  Canapicium ordinis praedicatorum, ex officina Ioannis Blaui de Colonia, Olvssipponae 1556 (henceforth, [AVELLUS. Compendium logicae), fol. 4v.  79  IAvELLUs. Compendium logicae, fol. 4v: « Ut igitur vera sciendi regula directiva humani intellectus in artibus et scientiis inveniretur, datus est nobis ab authore naturae Aristoteles, qui suo pene divino ingenio primus logicam veram invenit, et secundum omnes partes ordinavit ac perfecit »  (my translation).      These words implicitly show the ideological background of the Compendium logicae, that is designed to expound Peripatetic logic. Javelli was aware that many topics of his treatise had not been discussed by Aristotle, but he nevertheless thinks that these doctrines are at least Aristotelian in spirit. When Javelli introduces the theory of suppositio, in the seventh treatise of his textbook, he states that doctrines like the suppositio  are consistent with Aristotelian philosophy, even though Aristotle did not propose them , and this will be clear to you once you progress in logic, philosophy of nature and in metaphysics under the guidance of Aristotle.*  Javelli's attitude in finding an agreement between the doctrines of Aristotle (and of Aquinas) and those of later thinkers has been already underlined by Michael  Tavuzzi, and may be said to be a trademark of his Compendium.  After his sketchy history of logic, Javelli defines logic as a rational science® and states that its generic subject is mental being. The subject of logic, as a distinct discipline, is the  " ens rationis ratiocinativum, quod est idem quod  argumentatio ».* This remark echoes Barbò's claim that the object of logic is the ens rationis, but Javelli seems to harmonize the 'Thomist' solution with the position of Albert the Great, because the ens rationis is qualified as ratiocinativum and this is said to be identical to argumentatio. According to Barbò, Albert the Great taught that the object of logic is 'arguments': Barbò noticed the similarity with what he took to be Aquinas's position, but stressed nevertheless the difference between the two medieval Dominicans. Javelli implicitly unifies their positions.  According to Javelli, logic is a science and not empirical knowledge, because it has proper subject and proper principles: the presence of these two elements is enough to hold that it falls under the rational sciences, and is divided into sub-disciplines according to the scheme that Aquinas introduces in the Proemium to his  Ibid., fol. 183v-184r: « etsi non habeantur ab Aristotele, tamen doctrinae peripateticae consonant, ut tibi constabit postquam in Aristotelis disciplina tam in logicalibus quam in physicis atque metaphysicis eruditus fueris » (my translation). Cf. MICHAEL TAVUZZI, «Herveus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance », Doctor Communis, 45 (1992), p. 132-152, esp. p. 148-150. LAVELLUS, Compendium logicae, fol. 5v: « [llogica est scientia rationalis discretiva veri a falso ». Javelli adds that « [logica est ars artium et scientia scientiarum, qua aperta omnes aperiuntur, et qua clausa omnes alie clauduntur » (fol. 6r); this statement echoes Peter of Spain's claim that « dialectica est ars artium, scientia scientiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens' » (Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales cum Versorii Parisiensis clarissima expositione, apud F. Sansovinum, Venetiis 1572, tr. 1, fol. 2v). Ibid., vol. 8r: « [s]ubiectum in illa universalissime sumptum est ens rationis, id est ens fabricatum ab intellectu et non habet esse extra intellectum ». Ibid., fol. 8v. Ibid., fol. 11r. commentary on the Posterior Analytics.8 In his treatise on terms, Javelli stresses that terms signify ad placitum, and that verbs are always tensed. 88 Javelli has something interesting to say about propositions. According to him, a proposition  1s omething s (oratto verum vel falsum signtcans Indicando s) the Clause  'indicando' is meant to exclude prayers, utterances of wish, etc. from the set of propositions. Javelli adds that only present tensed propositions are propositions in the fullest sense, because past-tensed and future-tensed utterances do not signify anything that is the case or that is not the case, and thus cannot be true or false:  The phrases (orationes) in the past and future indicative tenses do not signify primarily and per se 'true' and 'false', unless they are transformed into a phrase in the indicative present tense.'  This is not sufficient evidence to suggest that Javelli's understanding of propositions was analogous to Savonarola's and, regrettably, Javelli does not add many details to his definition. In the same third treatise, Javelli deals with modal propositions as well, and in this case the didactic aim of his exposition could not be more evident. He deliberately avoids all technicalities and limits himself to stating some basic principles of modal logic: modal propositions are defined as categorical propositions to which a modal operator has been attached as a prefix.  There are four modal operators for Javelli: necessary, contingent, possible, and impossible." Javelli maintains that also 'true' and 'false' are modes, and by doing so he refers to a traditional doctrine, which has been endorsed also by Aquinas in his De propositionibus modalibus. Javelli adds that also 'per se' and 'per accidens' are modes, and they correspond to 'necessary' and 'contingent' respectively:  Nam licet prima [i.e. 'per se'] aequipolleat modali de necesse, et secunda [i.e. 'per accidens'] modali de contingenti, tamen ‹non> sunt formaliter modales."2  Ibid., fol. 12r-13r. Cf. ARISTOTELES. De Interpretatione, 2, 16a19-20. This claim, although consistent with Aristotle's littera (cf. De Interpretatione, 3, 16b6-7), is at odds with Savonarola's exposition. This suggests that 'Thomist logic' was not a monolith and there were several debated issues. LAVELLUS. Compendium logicae, fol. 26v. 9 Ibid. fol. 28v: « Orationes etiam modi indicativi temporis praeteriti et futuri non significant primo et per se verum et falsum, nisi reducantur ad unam temporis praesentis indicativi» (my translation).  " Ibid., fol. 58v.  92 Ibid., fol. 59r. I suggest to add a 'non' to the sentence to make it intelligible.    This observation seems to suggest that modal syllogistic is grounded on Aristotle's theory of predication. " Javelli, however, does not expand this interesting intuition. Furthermore, even though he is aware of the distinction de sensu composito/de sensu diviso, he does not consider the problems that such a distinction may create within modal syllogistic.' His exposition of modal logic is intentionally simplified for didactic reasons; after having expanded modal conversions, Javelli adds: « that would be enough for now, lest you get confused, young man » (« haec pro nunc sufficiant ne tu iuvenis confundaris »)."  The tendency to simplify the core notions of medieval logic brings sometimes  Javelli to modify significantly these doctrines, as is the case in his supposition theory. Medieval authors did not understand the theory of suppositio as a mere theory of reference, but as a theory of meaning, namely as a theory for interpreting sentences." Javelli, on the contrary, seems to consistently maintain that the supposition theory is what we would nowadays call a theory of reference."  According to him,  the supposition is said to be the positing of a term instead of another, i.e. instead of one of its meanings. In this sense, we say that in this utterance 'God is good', the  93  It is perhaps worth mentioning that such an interpretation has gained an increasing consensus among contemporary scholars: cf. PAUL THoM, The Logic of Essentialism: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1996 (The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy, 43); MARKo MALINK, Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic, Harvard University  Press, Cambridge, MA 2013.  94  The laws of conversions for necessity propositions are valid de sensu composito; mixed necessity syllogisms (like Barbara LXL) are valid only if the modal operator is read de sensu diviso. This seems to suggest that Aristotle's modal logic is inconsistent. Javelli, however, seems not to be aware of this philosophical problem. His exposition of the distinction between de sensu composito and de sensu diviso is as follows: « in modali de sensu composito modus aut praeponitur aut postponitur toti dicto [...], in modali autem de sensu diviso modus nec praeponitur nec postponitur dicto, sed  95  mediat inter partes dicti » (IAVELLUS. Compendium logicae, fol. 61r).  LAVELLUS. Compendium logicae, fol. 62r.  % According to CATARINA DUTIL NovAES, suppositio provides mechanic rules, by means of which we can list all possible interpretations of an ambiguous sentence. The theory of the suppositio may also serve the purpose of finding the references of the elements of a sentence in certain context; writing about Ockham, Novaes observes that « supposition theory is better seen as a theory of propositional meaning in the sense that one of its main purposes is to provide an analytical procedure for determining what can be asserted by means of a given proposition - a procedure including, but by no means limited to, the determination of the entities that the proposition may be about, i.e., its possible supposita, as it would be the case if it were a theory of reference » (« An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition », Journal of the History of Philosophy,  97  46 [2008], p. 365-393, here p. 367).  PETER T. GEAcH presented supposition theory as a theory of reference in his classical monograph  Reference and Generality. An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories, Cornell University  Press, Ithaca, NY 1962 (Contemporary Philosophy).    term 'God' stands for its meaning, so that the sense is: what is signified by 'God' is good.'8  Javelli relies on the definitions of suppositio provided by Peter of Spain and by Peter of Mantua," but in his view the supposition theory is a theory of reference:  A substantive term in or outside a proposition, taken in itself, has a meaning, but it has a reference (non supponit) only in a proposition. To make this clear, note that 'to signify' precedes 'to have a reference' [...]. For 'to signify' is to introduce a term or a sound to represent a given something. ...] As a consequence, it is up to the first authors who give names to things to make it possible to signify. 'To have a reference' is to take an already given meaningful term so that it can refer to any of its meanings or references in a proposition. 10°  According to Javelli, 'supponit' may be translated with 'refers to a suppositum'.  Javelli was faced with two alternative interpretations of the suppositio. But surprisingly, he endorses the one that is more at odds with his understanding of suppositio as a theory of reference. Javelli writes that Thomists were debating among them as to whether a term can suppose (supponere) only in a proposition or also in itself. Javelli maintains that a term supponit only in a proposition - a conclusion that is certainly more consistent with an understanding of supposition theory as a theory of meaning, '' Javelli points out that this debate originated from the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I', q. 39, art. 4, ad 3. Javelli summarizes Aquinas's position as it follows:  In his answer to the third  never refers to a Person, unless ‹the word› is determined by its corresponding predicate, such as in 'God  TAVELLUS. Compendium logicae, fol. 184v: « dicitur suppositio positio termini pro alio, id est, pro aliquo suo significato. In quo sensu dicimus quod in hac oratione 'Deus est bonus', ly 'Deus' ponitur pro suo significato, ut sit sensus, id quod significatur per ly 'Deus' est bonum ».  Cf. Ibid., fol. 184v.  Ibid., fol. 185v: « terminus substantivus in propositione et extra [propositionem] per se sumptus significat, sed non supponit nisi in propositione. Pro cuius notitia adverte quod significare precedit supponere [...]. Nam significare est imponere terminum sive vocem ad aliquid certi representandum. [...] Unde facere significare spectat ad primos authores qui rebus nomina imponunt. ...J Supponere autem est accipere terminum iam impositum ad significandum ut stet in propositione pro aliquo suo significato vel supposito ». Cf. Ibid., fol. 186r. generates, 'God is Father', 'God is Son'. Hence  means (significet) a substance with a quality, a name properly means (significat) a quality, i.e. the form on the basis of which the name is attributed ;  however refers to (supponit) a substance, i.e. to the thing to which such name is attributed 3  This leads Capreolus to maintain that « this  is false: 'God does not generate God' » (« ista est falsa 'Deus non generat Deum' »). 104  If we were to follow Javelli's view, it is possible, I think, to maintain that a proposition like 'Deus non generat Deum' may also be true, inasmuch as the term 'Deus' in this context may be taken to refer not to a Person. Consequently, it would be true to say that God, qua Trinity, does not generate God, qua Trinity. 105  This example shows that Javelli had original ideas, even though he never wanted to explicitly detach himself to the core tenets of that 'Thomistic school', to which he belonged. 106  Ibid., fol. 186r-v: « in responsione ad tertium dicit quod homo per se supponit pro persona, Deus autem per se supponit pro natura. [...J [Plostquam beatus Thomas dixerat quod Deus supponit per se pro natura, statim declarans huiusmodi suppositionem format hanc suppositionem, ut cum dicitur 'Deus creat'. [...] Numquam autem supponit pro persona, nisi determinetur per predicatum relativum, ut 'Deus generat', 'Deus est pater', 'Deus est filius', ergo Deus non ex se, sed respectu talis praedicati supponit pro persona ». Johannis Capreoli Tholosani OP Thomistarum Principis Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, vol. I, ed. CESLAS PABAN, THOMAS PÈGUES, Alfred Cattier, Touronibus 1900, p. 222: « nomen, licet significet substantiam cum qualitate, proprie tamen significat qualitatem, hoc est formam a qua nomen imponitur; supponit vero pro substantia, hoc est pro re cui imponitur tale nomen ». Ibid., p. 224. According to the Catholic dogma, it is God the Father who generates God the Son. In other words, if we assume that the term 'Deus' supponit pro persona independently (and, hence, in every context), it follows that a proposition like 'God does not generate God' should be false. The sections on syllogistic are the less original parts of Javelli's treatise. Geli — Rossi