SAB

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sab

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabbadini – Ossia: Grice e Sabbadini: il ciceronismo di Grice a Clifton. Note su Saggi di critica letteraria. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Remigio Sabbadini (Sarego, Vicenza): Cceronismo ed implicatura. For Grice and Sabbadini the hinge is the same—a classical understanding of how meaning is governed by reason—but they approach it from opposite ends of the same Latin corridor. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats rationality as an interactional norm: what is said is calibrated against what a reasonable hearer is entitled to infer, so implicature arises not from words themselves but from shared expectations of intelligible conduct. Sabbadini, by contrast, arrives at the same phenomenon through philology rather than pragmatics: in his work on Cicero and the humanists, meaning is traced genealogically, as a historically sedimented practice in which names, signs, and traditions acquire force through transmission rather than immediate inspection. Where Grice asks how an utterance licenses an inference here and now, Sabbadini shows how a name like Cicero licenses expectations across centuries, inviting readers to hunt for a cece on the nose even when none is there. Grice’s insight is that such inferences are rational but defeasible, products of cooperative reasoning rather than semantic entailment; Sabbadini’s is that scholarship itself operates by the same logic, moving from traces to conclusions under norms of disciplined inference. In both cases, meaning is reason-governed without being mechanically determined: it lives neither in brute signs nor in private intentions alone, but in the shared practices—conversational for Grice, philological for Sabbadini—that make understanding accountable, corrigible, and historically intelligible. Grice: “In the Oxford that I knew, you were introduced to philosophy upon completion of the fifth term of your Lit. Hum. degree, so the classics were in my veins. Those who followed the P. P. E. did not care, or know, the first thing!” Cicero, Grice. Filosofo italiano. CICERONE FILOSOFO ITALIANO. Filologo. Laureatosi a Firenze, insegna successivamente nei ginnasî di Girgenti, di Velletri e di Ventimiglia e nei licei di Salerno, di Livorno e di Palermo. Passa quindi a insegnare letteratura latina a Catania e nell'accademia scientifico-letteraria, poi università, di Milano. Studia, degli scrittori latini, Orazio, Cicerone, Seneca, i commentatori antichi di Terenzio, e soprattutto Virgilio, cui dedica una lunga serie di lavori, da un articolo pubblicato sulla Rivista di filologia e istruzione classica, alla monumentale edizione critica -- Roma. Ma S. leg soprattutto il suo nome alla storia dell'umanesimo filologico, della quale si può dire il creatore. Anche qui un'ininterrotta fervida attività, dal saggio sull'umanista velletrano Mancinelli, pubbl. nella Cronaca del Ginnasio di Velletri, all'articolo su Frulovisio umanista, pubblicato in Giorn. stor. della lett. ital. Edizioni di epistolarî, ricostruzioni e precisazioni biografiche, descrizioni e illustrazioni di codici: tutto un complesso lavoro intorno a umanisti di ogni provenienza e di diverso valore, tra i quali, prediletto, Veronese, cui S. dedica speciale attenzione (cfr. l'ampia biografia, pubbl. nel Giornale Ligustico, il volume La scuola e gli studi di G., Catania, e soprattutto l'edizione e l'illustrazione dell'epistolario, Venezia. Coronano questa mirabile attività nel campo umanistico il Metodo degli umanisti -- Firenze -- e specialmente le Scoperte dei codici latini -- Firenze: opera saldissima per dottrina e forza di pensiero, che è base indispensabile per ogni ulteriore studio sull'umanesimo filologico. II volume Classici e umanisti da codici ambrosiani -- Firenze --, che raccoglie alcuni scritti pubblicati sparsamente, contiene un Elenco cronologico deqli scritti S.  CICERONE.  Grice: Caro Sabbadini, oggi il filosofo Speranza mi ha ricordato che a Vadum Boum i classici non si studiano: ti finiscono direttamente nelle vene. E quando ci finiscono, cominciano subito a fare i genealogisti. Sabbadini: Ah, i genealogisti: con Cicerone basta pronunciare il nome e subito qualcuno chiede: “Ma dov’è il cicer?”—latino cicer, ciceris, cioè il nostro cece. E già ti stanno guardando il naso come se fosse un commento antico. Grice: Appunto: e qui viene la mia implicatura (che non dirò ad alta voce). Se “Cicero” viene da cicer, è un designatore rigido del… cece sul naso? Oppure designa solo un fatto d’archivio—un nonno ceciuto—e quindi non si eredita nulla, salvo il soprannome? Perché il pubblico, appena sente “Cicerone”, conclude: “Allora il cece ce l’hai tu”, e pretende la prova empirica. Sabbadini: La tua implicatura salta il naso di Cicerone e punta al cece—come Speranza concorderà con gioia: il vero “cicer” non sta (per forza) sulla pelle, sta nella tradizione che incolla il segno al nome. Se fu l’antenato ad avere il cece, il cognomen è ereditabile anche quando il cece non lo è; ma, per una bizzarra giustizia filologica, chi porta il nome paga pegno: la gente cerca il legume sul volto del discendente, come se l’etimologia fosse una visita medica. In breve: Cicero non designa rigidamente un bernoccolo—designa rigidamente una storia, e il resto lo fa la malizia del pubblico. Sabbadini, Remigio (1885). Saggi di critica letteraria. Torino: Loescher.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabellio – Ossia: Grice e Sabellio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabellio. The gens Sabellia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned in history, and none of them achieved any of the higher offices of the Roman state. The most famous of this family was Sabellius of Ptolemais in Pentapolis, the author of the so-called Sabellian Heresy. Other Sabellii are known from inscriptions.[1]  Origin The nomen Sabellius belongs to a class of gentilicia typically formed directly from cognomina ending in -illus and -ellus, typically diminutive suffixes. The surname Sabellus referred to a member of the Oscan-speaking peoples of central and southern Italy, particularly the Sabines, Marsi, Samnites, and their relatives, and thus the name belongs to a common type of cognomen derived from the names of peoples and places of origin.[2]  Branches and cognomina The only cognomina known from this gens were Primus, first, a surname that usually indicated the eldest of a group of siblings, and Dilectus, dear or beloved. There is no evidence that either of these represented distinct families of the Sabellii.[3]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Lucius Sabellius, prosecuted by Lucius Caesulenus, a famous speaker, under the lex Aquilia, for unlawfully damaging the property of another. The young Cicero heard Caesulenus' accusation, which he thought remarkable for the way in which he exaggerated the facts to characterize Sabellius as the most wretched type of villain.[4] Lucius Sabellius Ɔ. l. Primus, a freedman, and the husband of Furfania Tertia, named in an inscription from Canusium in Apulia.[5] Sabellia Ɔ. l. Salvia, a freedwoman named in an inscription from Canusium.[6] Gaius Sabellius Dilectus, buried at Cirta in Numidia, aged ninety.[7] Sabellius, apparently a resident of Ptolemais, where he was an influential leader of the early Church about the middle of the third century.[i] He taught that the Trinity represented three aspects of one unified God, rather than three separate persons. This belief was strongly opposed by Dionysius of Alexandria, and eventually rejected by the Church Fathers.[1] Footnotes  Timotheus, presbyter of Byzantium, calls Sabellius bishop of the Pentapolis, and distinguishes him from Sabellius the Libyan, but without evidence. Abulpharagius calls him a presbyter of Byzantium, but this is contradicted by all of the evidence. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, pp. 685, 686 ("Sabellius").  Chase, pp. 113, 114, 124.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. s. dilectus, primus.  Cicero, Brutus, 34. s. 131.  AE 1987, 285.  CIL IX, 396.  CIL VI, 10108. Bibliography Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Category: Roman gentes and from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabellio – Ossia: Grice e Sabellio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabellio. For the Sabellii, my first-best choice is unquestionably not the obscure freedmen, but the two figures who create a wonderfully Gricean contrast:  Lucius Sabellius, the man prosecuted in the anecdote Cicero heard as a youth. Cicero remarks that the prosecutor Lucius Caesulenus was remarkable for his exaggeration, painting Sabellius as the most wretched sort of villain. [GREXv2 | Word] There is, however, a second and perhaps even more mischievous candidate: Grice e Sabellio Reo Cicero's anecdote says that Lucius Caesulenus exaggerated the facts in prosecuting Sabellius. [GREXv2 | Word] That leads immediately to a Gricean discussion of hyperbole. Speranza:  Num Sabellius vere erat omnium nequissimus? (Was Sabellius really the most wicked of men?)  Grice:  Fortasse non. (Perhaps not.)  Speranza:  Cur ergo ita dixit accusator? (Then why did the prosecutor say so?)  Grice:  Ut persuaderet. (To persuade.)  +> Hyperbole is often used not to state facts literally but to shape an audience's attitude. That is very close to Grice's interest in what is conveyed beyond what is strictly said. Grice gives only one example of hyperbole (superlatio) as conversational implicature: "Every nice girl loves a sailor" "Ship ahoy: All the nice girls lvoe a sailor" (What is the correct title). Interstingly, Tullio Cic. gets to know about S. mainly through hyperboli? Thanks Yes, and there is a nice convergence between Cicero's anecdote and Grice's remarks on hyperbole. The Grice example you have in mind is the music-hall / popular-song type utterance:  "All the nice girls love a sailor."  sometimes associated with the refrain:  "Ship ahoy! Ship ahoy!"  Grice's point is that nobody is expected to interpret the quantifier literally. The speaker does not mean:  Every single nice girl without exception loves a sailor.  Rather, the hearer is expected to derive a weaker, more plausible interpretation. Hyperbole becomes a case where what is said and what is conversationally conveyed diverge. Now compare Cicero's account of Lucius Caesulenus' prosecution of Sabellius. Cicero says he remembered Caesulenus because of the remarkable way he amplified and exaggerated matters, painting Sabellius as a villain of the worst sort. [GREXv2 | Word] What is interesting is that, in Cicero's report, Sabellius himself almost disappears. We encounter him not directly but through the prosecutor's rhetoric. A Gricean reconstruction might be: Caesulenus:  Nemo umquam tam nefarius fuit quam Sabellius. (No one was ever so wicked as Sabellius.)  Grice:  Surely that is hyperbole.  Caesulenus:  Of course.  Grice:  Then what did you mean?  Caesulenus:  That the jury should regard him with extreme disfavor.  +> The point is not the literal superlative but the induced attitude. In that sense, yes: Cicero's knowledge of Sabellius is mediated by rhetorical amplification. The memorable feature is less the underlying dispute than the prosecutor's style. Cicero recalls the way Sabellius was presented. [GREXv2 | Word] There is also a pleasing contrast with the Sisenna–Rusius episode.  With Sisenna, the dispute concerns a verbum novum (sputatilica). With Caesulenus, the dispute concerns rhetorical amplificatio and hyperbole.  In Gricean terms:  Sisenna raises questions about expression-meaning. Caesulenus raises questions about speaker-meaning and what is conveyed by exaggeration.  And one could imagine Grice smiling at the result:  We know Sabellius chiefly through somebody else's rhetorical overstatement.  which is a very ancient example of a familiar Gricean lesson:  what survives in memory is often not merely what was said, but how it was said. and what is Cicero's Latin followed by Eng. tr. in round brackets? just 'most wicked'? And what do we independently know about how black that picture was painted? Thanks The difficulty is that the surviving notice in the gens article compresses Cicero's discussion. We should be cautious. What the source explicitly tells us is that in the Brutus Cicero remembered Lucius Caesulenus' accusation of Sabellius because of the remarkable way in which Caesulenus enlarged and exaggerated the facts, portraying Sabellius as an exceptionally wretched villain. [GREXv2 | Word] I have not found the full Latin passage of Brutus §131 in the available sources here, so I should not fabricate a quotation. What we can say is:  Cicero remembers the prosecutor, not the legal merits of the case. [GREXv2 | Word] The memorable feature is the amplificatio—the rhetorical inflation of Sabellius' wickedness. [GREXv2 | Word] We do not independently know from the material provided that Sabellius was actually a notorious criminal. The source only reports how he was depicted by the accuser. [GREXv2 | Word]  That is precisely what makes the case interesting for a Gricean. One might reconstruct:  Caesulenus: Sabellius omnium hominum miserrimus / nequissimus est. (Sabellius is the most wretched / most worthless of men.)  But that is a reconstruction, not a quotation from Cicero. And Grice would immediately ask:  Was Caesulenus literally asserting a ranking among all villains?  Almost certainly not. The force would be:  +> "Take an extremely unfavourable attitude toward Sabellius."  In that respect the case resembles Grice's hyperbole examples. What survives is not so much information about Sabellius as information about the prosecutor's rhetorical strategy. Indeed, from the evidence supplied, we know almost nothing independently about Sabellius himself. What survives is essentially:  Sabellius was prosecuted under the lex Aquilia; Caesulenus made a great rhetorical performance out of it; the young Cicero remembered the performance. [GREXv2 | Word]  That is rather striking. Sabellius reaches posterity chiefly as the object of somebody else's exaggeration. A very Gricean moral would be:  Sometimes what history preserves is not the man, but the implicatures generated around him. It seems the implcature is Tullio C. found it all unfair -- hyperbole in the lips of a prosecutor is not just "Every nice girl loves a sailor" -- the use is comparative of two adj. susp. and crim. more susp. than anything Tullio had heard, more incrim. than anything Tullio had heard -- how do we parse that from that latin below? Thanks From Cicero’s Brutus (Section 131), we learn that Lucius Sabellius was a Roman defendant prosecuted in his old age by the plebeian accuser Lucius Caesulenus under the Lex Aquilia. [1, 2] Below is the linguistic breakdown and the historical context of the passage. Latin Text & English Translation Latin (Splash Latino): "Atque eodem tempore accusator de plebe L. Caesulenus fuit, quem ego audivi iam senem, cum ab L. Sabellio multam lege Aquilia de iustitia petivisset." [1] English (Attalus / E. Jones Translation): "At the same time lived L. Caesulenus, a man of plebeian rank, and a professed accuser, like the former: I myself heard him in his old age, when he endeavoured, by the Aquilian law, to subject L. Sabellius to a fine, for a breach of justice." [1] What We Learn About L. Sabellius Legal Target: Sabellius was targeted by a professional plebeian prosecutor (accusator de plebe) named Lucius Caesulenus. [1, 2] The Charge: He faced financial penalties (multam petivisset) brought under the Lex Aquilia, a Roman law traditionally regulating property damage, loss, or wrongful behavior. [1, 2] Cicero's Observation: Cicero notes that Caesulenus was incredibly skilled at making Sabellius look guilty, using highly "suspicious and incriminating" language to exaggerate the claims against him. [1] The Context of the Passage The Literary Work: The Brutus is a dialogue written by Cicero in 46 BC that acts as a comprehensive historical survey of Roman orators and public eloquence. [1] The Chronological Placement: In Section 131, Cicero is reviewing the minor and less reputable orators from the late 2nd century BC (the era of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus). Sabellius is not mentioned because he was an orator, but rather to provide a historical example of the prosecutorial style of Caesulenus. [1, 2, 3] Textual Nuance: It is worth noting that in classical scholarship (such as the Loeb Classical Library edition), the name "Sabellius" is widely considered a manuscript corruption. Historians and editors frequently emend the name to Lucius Saufeius, a well-known contemporary and friend of Atticus. [1] (Note: This classical Roman legal figure is completely unrelated to the famous 3rd-century Christian heretic Sabellius, who founded the theological doctrine of Sabellianism/Modalism). [1, 2, 3] If you are tracking this down for a paper or translation, would you like me to analyze the legal mechanics of the Lex Aquilia in this specific context, or provide more information on the emendation to Lucius Saufeius?[1] L'AI può commettere errori, quindi verifica le risposte can you expand on the Latin for the case by the prosecutor — his words against Sab? 3 siti In Cicero’s Brutus (131), Cicero does not quote the exact verbatim speech that Lucius Caesulenus used against Sabellius. Instead, he uses highly precise Latin rhetorical terms to describe the manipulative linguistic style of the prosecutor's words. [1] The second half of Section 131 provides the vital expansion of how Caesulenus spoke: [1] "...non fecissem hominis paene infimi mentionem, nisi iudicarem qui suspiciosius aut criminosius diceret audivisse me neminem." [1] Translation: "...I should not have mentioned a man of nearly the lowest rank, if it were not my judgment that I have never heard anyone speak in a more suspicious or incriminating manner." Analysis of the Prosecutor's Style Cicero highlights two specific Latin adverbs that define how Caesulenus built his case: [1] Suspiciosius (More Suspiciously): This indicates that Caesulenus's words were designed to plant doubt and twist ordinary actions into looking highly conspiratorial. He didn't just state facts; he framed every detail to make Sabellius look shifty and deceitful. Criminosius (More Accusatorially / In a More Incriminating Manner): This means his speech was hyper-aggressive, reproachful, and tailor-made to manufacture guilt. He chose emotionally charged vocabulary that automatically implied criminal intent, even where evidence was thin. The Mechanics of the Lex Aquilia Claim The nature of the words is closely tied to the specific legal phrase used earlier in the section: [1] "multam lege Aquilia damni iniuria petivisset" (or de iustitia in some older manuscripts). [1, 2] Under Roman civil law, the Lex Aquilia primarily dealt with damnum iniuria datum—financial compensation for property damage or loss caused unlawfully. Because this was a civil suit focused on damages rather than a major criminal trial, a standard prosecutor might have given a dry, technical breakdown of property values.[1] Instead, Cicero points out that Caesulenus treated it like a massive criminal conspiracy. He was an accusator de plebe (a low-ranking public mudslinger) who relied on weaponizing sinister innuendos (suspiciosius) to blow a property dispute way out of proportion and secure a heavy fine against Sabellius. [1] Would you like to explore how Cicero contrasts this aggressive plebeian style with the refined orators he mentions immediately after, or look into other examples of Roman prosecutors using criminosius language? Yes. And I think the strongest Gricean point is that Cicero is not saying that Caesulenus lied. He is saying something subtler about how he spoke. The key Latin is:  non fecissem hominis paene infimi mentionem, nisi iudicarem qui suspiciosius aut criminosius diceret audivisse me neminem.  A fairly literal rendering is:  "I should not have mentioned a man of almost the lowest rank, had I not judged that I had heard no one speak more suspiciously or more incriminatingly than he did."  The comparative adverbs are the heart of the matter:  suspiciosius = "more suspiciously," "in a more suspicion-generating manner." criminosius = "more accusatorily," "in a more charge-laden or incriminating manner."  Notice that Cicero does not write:  falsius (more falsely),  nor  mendacius (more deceitfully).  Instead he comments on the rhetorical manner.  A Gricean parsing might be: What Caesulenus said:  Facts A, B, C.  How Caesulenus said them:  Every fact is presented in the most sinister possible light.  What the jury is invited to infer:  +> Sabellius is not merely liable under the Lex Aquilia. +> Sabellius is the sort of person capable of any wrongdoing.  So the implicature does not arise from a false proposition but from a pattern of presentation.  This is why your comparison with:  "Every nice girl loves a sailor"  is illuminating but also limited. The song is harmless hyperbole. A prosecutor's hyperbole is different. The force of  suspiciosius  is almost:  "he made ordinary circumstances look suspicious."  And the force of  criminosius  is almost:  "he made doubtful matters look criminal."   One can reconstruct the young Cicero listening: Caesulenus:  This act? Suspicious. That act? More suspicious. The next act? Practically a confession.  Young Cicero:  But where is the actual proof?   Ha That is close to what Cicero seems to be admiring and criticizing simultaneously.  Your formulation is especially good:  "more suspicious than anything Cicero had heard," "more incriminating than anything Cicero had heard."  That is in fact almost exactly what the Latin comparative construction says:  audivisse me neminem "that I had heard nobody..."  combined with  suspiciosius aut criminosius diceret "...speak in a more suspicious or more incriminating manner."  So the point is comparative rhetoric, not comparative wickedness. We do not independently know from this passage that Sabellius was particularly black a character. What we know is that Cicero thought Caesulenus was exceptionally skilled at making someone appear black. The surviving memory is about the prosecutor's style, not the defendant's guilt. [GREXv2 | Word] And that is remarkably Gricean: the principal object of analysis is not the truth of what was said, but the inferential pressure generated by the way it was said.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabellio – Ossia: Grice e Sabellio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabellio. Sabellius of Ptolemais, associated with the doctrine later called Sabellianism, according to which the Trinity represented three aspects of one God rather than three distinct persons. [GREXv2 | Word]  Of the two, I would choose the heresiarch Sabellius, because the issue is almost tailor-made for Grice:  When are two descriptions descriptions of one thing, and when are they descriptions of different things?  That is perilously close to Grice's interests in identity, predication, and category mistakes. Grice e Sabellio Speranza:  Quid docebat Sabellius? (What did Sabellius teach?)  Grice:  Non tres personas separatas esse, sed unum deum tribus modis ostensum. (Not three separate persons, but one God presented in three modes.) [GREXv2 | Word]   Speranza:  Ergo unum est quod tribus nominibus describitur? (So one thing is being described by three names?)  Grice:  Hoc ferme videtur. (That seems approximately the idea.)   Now the dialogue becomes Gricean. Speranza:  Si idem est, cur tria nomina? (If it is the same thing, why three names?)  Grice:  Quia non semper multiplicitas descriptionum multiplicitas rerum est. (Because a multiplicity of descriptions is not always a multiplicity of things.)  +> Distinct descriptions do not automatically imply distinct entities.  A Hardie-style interruption: Hardie:  Is this theology or philosophy?  Grice:  Usually both. Ha. My verdict The most distinctively Gricean Sabellius is: Grice e Sabellio Haeretico because the underlying issue is:  Are three descriptions evidence of three things?  or  Can apparently different manifestations belong to one underlying subject?  That sort of question lies remarkably close to the logical and philosophical interests that repeatedly occupied Grice. [GREXv2 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabellio – Ossia: Grice e Sabellio: la ragione conversazionale e l’escatologia a Roma. Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Sabellio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’escatologia. For S. and Grice the common thread is not doctrine but discipline: both treat meaning as something constrained by rational accountability rather than by mere verbal form. Sabellius’ modalism arises from a pressure internal to discourse itself: how can Christians speak coherently about the divine without multiplying agents beyond intelligibility? His answer is not primarily metaphysical invention but a regulative move within theological language, insisting that apparently plural predications (“Father,” “Son,” “Spirit”) be understood as modes of one being if rational speech about God is to avoid contradiction and pragmatic collapse. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning generalizes this insight at a secular level. For him, what hearers are entitled to infer depends on norms of cooperative rationality, not on lexical items alone; heresy, confusion, or category error can arise not because a word is false but because an inference is illicit under shared expectations. Where Sabellius worries that a misplaced linguistic distinction fractures monotheism into incoherence, Grice worries that unregulated inference fractures communication itself. In both cases, meaning is not what expressions mechanically encode, but what a rational interpreter may draw from them under disciplined constraints: remove the governing principle—modal unity for Sabellius, cooperative reason for Grice—and discourse degenerates into either theological absurdity or conversational noise. He struggles with the problem brought by the Galileans – from Galilea, not followers of the Florentine astronomer -- about the trinità. He argues that the three dimensions of the so-called ‘trinità’ should be understood as three modes of one single being, rather than as three separate persons. The theory, which he dubs ‘modalism,’ is soon condemned as heretical, as is he.   GRICEVS: Sabelli, salve! Hodie, ut leviter dicam, cum philosopho Spe de rebus ultimis collocutus sum—et miror quomodo vocabulum eschatologia apud nos in volgare saepe fiat quasi escatologia, quasi de latrinis potius quam de novissimis. SABELLIVS: Salve, Grice. Ita est: Galilaei (non astronomi, sed illi de Galilaea) plus quam syllabas turbant; et dum de trinitate disputamus, saepe de vocibus ipsis litigamus, quasi heresis interdum in una littera lateat. GRICEVS: Ego vero nihil dicam—sed mihi dulcis est ille sonus Graecus, “X”, quem in eschatologia audis quasi in ipsa ruina mundi: at auribus Italicis, etiam Bononiae, saepe evanescit, et remanet tantum “s” lenis, quasi finis rerum esset sine fractura, sine χ. SABELLIVS: Implicatura tua, Grice, eschatologica est—ut Spes consentiet; ideo hic eam Graece rite scribemus: συνεπαγωγή ἐσχατολογική. Nam si χ tollis, tollis quasi ipsum cardinem: non iam de ἔσχατα, sed de sonis mollibus agitur. Et bene mones: apud Bononiam (ne dicam apud plebem) saepe perit littera, et cum littera perit, sensus quoque paene perit. Sabellio (a.u.c. CMLXVIII). Dicta. Roma..

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabidio – Ossia: Grice e Sabidio -- Grex grieiana – verbalia: Sabidio The gens Sabidia was an obscure plebeian family at ancient Rome. Few members of this gens are mentioned in ancient writers, but a number are known from inscriptions.[1]  Origin The nomen Sabidius belongs to a large class of gentilicia formed using the suffix -idius. These typically formed from cognomina ending in -idus, but the suffix was one of a number which came to be regarded as a regular gentile-forming suffix, and was applied even in cases where there was no morphological justification. There is no evidence of a surname Sabidus, but the name might be etymologically related to Safini, an Oscan name for the Sabines and their descendants.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Manius Sabidius M'. f., legate in Sicily in an uncertain year during the late Republic.[3] Sabidius, a friend of Gaius Antonius Hybrida, whom he supported in his candidacy for the praetorship of 66 BC. Antonius went on to become consul in 63.[4] Publius Sabidius, one of the municipal duumvirs at Ostia in AD 18. He had held the office once before.[5] Sabidius Pollio, said by Apollonides of Nicaea to have forged the letters attributed to Aratus, and some of those attributed to Xenophon. Some scholars have suggested that he might be the Sabidius famously but enigmatically addressed by Martial.[i][6][7][8] Publius Sabidius Pollio, praetor urbanus in an uncertain year; perhaps the same person as Publius Subidius Pollio, aedile in AD 30.[9] Sabidius Severus,[ii] one of the speakers in a dialogue by Apuleius, debating the values of common sense and patriotism.[10] Footnotes  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. "I do not love thee, Sabidius, nor can I say why; this only I can say, I do not love thee." This epigram is the source of the English rhyme, Doctor Fell.  The manuscript has Safidius, which Schryver amends to Sabidius. See also List of Roman gentes References  Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, vol. III, p. 686 ("Sabidius").  Chase, pp. 121, 122.  NSA, 1900, 97.  Quintus Tullius Cicero, De Petitione Consulatus, 2. § 8.  Fasti Ostienses, CIL XIV, 244.  PIR, vol. III, p. 151.  Martial, Epigrammata, i. 32.  "Dissertation upon the Epistles of Euripides", p. 555.  CIL X, 774, CIL X, 1233.  Apuleius, Florida, iv. 18. Bibliography Quintus Tullius Cicero, De Petitione Consulatus (attributed). Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Lucius Appuleius, Florida. Richard Bentley, "Dissertation upon the Epistles of Euripides", in Dr. Richard Bentley's Dissertations, Wilhelm Wagner, ed., S. Calvary & Co., Berlin (1874), pp. 554–568. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, William Smith, ed., Little, Brown and Company, Boston (1849). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Notizie degli Scavi di Antichità (News of Excavations from Antiquity, abbreviated NSA), Accademia dei Lincei (1876–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). Category: Roman gentes and about THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabidio – Ossia: Grice e Sabidio -- Grex grieiana – verbalia: Sabidio For the Sabidii, my first-best Grice–Speranza vignette is almost certainly: Grice e Sabidio Non Amato because of the famous epigram attributed to Martial:  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. [GREXv2 | Word]  ("I do not love you, Sabidius, and I cannot say why; this much only can I say: I do not love you.") The reason this is irresistibly Gricean is that it looks like a violation of what Grice would later call conversational expectations.  Latin with English  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; (I do not love you, Sabidius, nor can I say why.) [GREXv2 | Word]   hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. (This much only can I say: I do not love you.) [GREXv2 | Word]   Grice notices a problem Speranza:  Cur non amas Sabidium? (Why do you not like Sabidius?)  Grice:  Nescio. (I do not know.)  Speranza:  At dicis te non amare. (But you say you do not like him.)  Grice:  Ita. (Yes.)   The joke is that the hearer naturally expects:  "I do not like him because ..."  Instead the explanation never arrives. The expected conversational move is withheld.  A Gricean implicature The literal content is:  "I do not know why I dislike Sabidius."  But the epigram invites further speculation:  +> There are so many reasons that I cannot begin listing them.  or  +> The dislike is instinctive and beyond articulation.  or even  +> The question itself is pointless; the conclusion is enough.  The humour depends on frustrating the expectation of a reason.  Hardie and Grice Hardie:  Why is the poem funny?  Grice:  Because the first line creates a question.  Hardie:  Which is?  Grice:  Why does he dislike Sabidius?  Hardie:  And the second line?  Grice:  Refuses to answer it. Ha  What makes this especially attractive is that the entire epigram is built around a conversational structure: A:  Why?  B:  I cannot tell you why.  That is almost a miniature treatise on expectation, relevance, and frustrated explanation. So my choice for the gens Sabidia is not the forger Sabidius Pollio nor the theological figure from another tradition, but the unforgettable addressee of Martial's epigram: Grice e Sabidio Non Amato Speranza:  Cur? (Why?)  Grice:  Hoc ipsum poeta recusat dicere. (That is exactly what the poet refuses to say.)  +> The hearer's demand for an explanation survives even when the speaker explicitly declines to provide one. [GREXv2 | Word] and can we scan it? Because Grice doubts metrics. Note too that the logical form is ~(Poeta AMAT Sabidius). -- Externally, that could be because Sabidius does not exist. Thanks Yes, and Martial's epigram is especially interesting because it is both metrical and logically odd. The text is:  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. [GREXv2 | Word]  Metre The poem is an elegiac couplet: First line = dactylic hexameter. A rough scansion is:  Nōn ămŏ | tē Săbĭ | dī nĕc | pōssŭm dĭ | cĕrĕ क्वā | rĕ  (noting that editors differ slightly in details of quantity and resolution). The second line is the pentameter:  hōc tăn | tŭm pōssŭm dĭ | cĕrĕ ‖ nōn ămŏ | tē  The important point for your Gricean observation is that the punchline is metrically delayed. After  nec possum dicere quare  ("nor can I say why") the hearer expects an explanation. Instead the second line circles back:  non amo te.  ("I don't love you.") The poem ends where it began. That is part of the joke.  Logical form At the simplest level:  ¬(Poeta amat Sabidium)  ("It is not the case that the poet loves Sabidius.") But you are quite right that this leaves open many possibilities. For example:  Sabidius may be unpleasant. Sabidius may have wronged the poet. Sabidius may be fictional or nonexistent. The poet may simply lack any positive attitude.  The sentence itself does not entail a reason. Indeed that is what the poem exploits.  Gricean point The audience expects:  Why don't you love Sabidius?  The first line promises:  I cannot say why.  One still suspects a reason is coming. But the second line gives:  hoc tantum possum dicere ("this much only can I say")  and repeats the original proposition. Thus: What is said  I do not love Sabidius.  What the audience seeks  An explanation.  What is withheld  Any explanatory premise.  The poem is almost a conversational frustration machine.  Existence Your point about existence is sharp. Strictly speaking,  Non amo te, Sabidi  does not by itself entail that Sabidius exists. Modern logic often treats:  Loves(poet, Sabidius)  as presupposing a referent, but ordinary language is looser. One can perfectly well say:  "I don't believe in unicorns."  without thereby implying unicorns exist. Similarly a Gricean could ask:  Does the poem assert the existence of Sabidius, or merely use the name?  The epigram itself does not make existence the issue; it relies on the ordinary conversational presumption that there is someone called Sabidius. But as a matter of logical form, your observation is correct: the negation leaves many possibilities open, including nonexistence. One suspects Grice would have enjoyed that very point. The whole force of the epigram comes not from what is entailed, but from what the audience naturally expects and never receives. And the point of ~ is The present King of France, let's call him, Bill, is bald" -- And Martial does not have "I hate you" -- It is not the case that I love thee". The 'thee' does bring a problem. Cf. Descartes: It is not the case that I love thee, malignant demon, because thou mayst not exist." Thanks Yes, and here Martial becomes unexpectedly relevant to both Russell and Grice. The epigram does not say:  odi te, Sabidi (I hate you, Sabidius.)  It says:  non amo te, Sabidi (I do not love you, Sabidius.) [GREXv2 | Word]  That is logically much weaker. If we schematize:  AxAxAx = "I love x"  then Martial gives:  ¬A(Sabidius)  not  O(Sabidius)  ("I hate Sabidius"). The hearer naturally strengthens it:  +> I dislike him. +> I have something against him. +> There is a reason.  But those are implicatures, not entailments.  Your Russellian point is even sharper. With  "The present King of France is bald"  Russell analyzes the description away. The sentence is false because the existential component fails. Now compare:  Non amo te, Sabidi.  A strict logician may ask:  Does this presuppose that Sabidius exists?  In ordinary Roman conversation, yes, practically speaking. The vocative  Sabidi ("Sabidius!")  is already treating Sabidius as an interlocutor. But the negation creates an interesting asymmetry. If I say:  "I love Sabidius,"  I seem committed to there being somebody to love. With:  "I do not love Sabidius,"  matters are murkier. As you beautifully put it:  "I do not love thee, malignant demon, because thou mayst not exist."   Ha Descartes could indeed say to the Evil Demon:  Non amo te. (I do not love thee.)  without having settled whether there is any such being.  A Gricean would then ask: Why does the hearer immediately seek a cause? Because "I do not love X" conversationally invites:  Why not?  The second half of Martial's epigram exploits this expectation:  nec possum dicere quare (nor can I tell why)  and then, instead of supplying the reason, repeats:  non amo te. [GREXv2 | Word]  The poem therefore has a shape rather like: A:  Why don't you love Sabidius?  B:  I cannot tell you why.  A:  Then what can you tell me?  B:  Only that I don't love him.  Which is almost pure Grice: the audience expects an explanation, and the explanation is withheld. So the deepest joke may not be hostility toward Sabidius at all. It may be the failure of the expected inferential step:  ¬(I love Sabidius)  is all the poet strictly says; the reader does all the rest. Ha. The example Grice gives in 'Intention and Uncertainty' is -- The president (of the British Academy, here in first row) has a corkscrew in his pocket. Why do you say so? Any reason? "Oh, no reason whatsoever." with martial it may be ineffability of reason. his play on quantity versus quality (or strength and candour). "that much" -- the stongest claim I can make -- candour: Don't expect -- I have no evidence or cannot express any reason. There is the ambiguity as to wheether 'why' requires a reason or a cause. Thanks Yes, and I think Martial's epigram becomes much more interesting when read through Grice's distinction between strength and candour. The epigram is:  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; (I do not love you, Sabidius, nor can I say why.)   hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. (This much only can I say: I do not love you.) [GREXv2 | Word]  The crucial phrase is:  hoc tantum possum dicere ("this much only can I say")  The force is almost Gricean before Grice.  Strength The strongest conversationally useful claim would be:  "I do not love Sabidius because ..."  with a reason supplied. The reader expects:  quare? (why?)  to be answered. Instead the answer never comes.  Candour Martial then presents himself as maximally candid:  I shall not pretend to have a reason which I cannot provide.  In Gricean terms, something like:  I cannot provide sufficient evidence, justification, diagnosis, or articulation of the cause.  So:  hoc tantum possum dicere is almost "that is as far as my warrant extends."   Comparison with Grice's British Academy example As you note, Grice imagines:  "The President of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his pocket."  Followed by:  "Any reason for saying that?" "No reason whatever."  The oddity is that the assertion is stronger than the evidence. Martial reverses the situation. He says:  I do have the attitude. I cannot supply the reason.  The sincerity of the attitude is not in doubt. The articulation of the grounds is.  Cause or reason? This is where the ambiguity becomes fascinating. Latin:  quare?  like English:  "why?"  can invite either: Causal reading  What caused you not to love Sabidius?  Perhaps:  temperament, instinct, appearance, some forgotten incident.  Rational reading  What reason do you have for not loving Sabidius?  That is:  what justification? what evidence? what complaint?  Martial never tells us which is lacking. That ambiguity is part of the joke.  A Grice–Speranza reconstruction Speranza:  Cur non amas Sabidium? (Why do you not love Sabidius?)  Grice:  Quia nescio. (Because I do not know.)  Speranza:  At certe causa aliqua est. (But surely there is some cause.)  Grice:  Fortasse causa est; rationem dare non possum. (Perhaps there is a cause; I cannot provide a reason.)  +> The existence of a psychological explanation does not guarantee the speaker's ability to formulate a justification. That, I suspect, is very close to Martial's effect. The poem is not:  "I hate Sabidius."  Nor even:  "Sabidius is bad."  It is:  "My attitude toward Sabidius exceeds my ability to account for it."  Which is why hoc tantum possum dicere is the perfect ending: the poet retreats to the minimum commitment he can honestly make. The dislike remains; the explanation evaporates.Ha. And in fact, not an attitude but the absence of one ('not love'). Thanks Exactly. That is a very important Gricean correction. The poem is often paraphrased as though Martial were reporting a negative attitude:  "I hate Sabidius."  But the literal text is much weaker:  Non amo te, Sabidi. (I do not love you, Sabidius.)  Logically, the content is merely:  ¬(I love Sabidius)  and not:  I dislike Sabidius, I hate Sabidius, I despise Sabidius.  Those stronger readings are invited by context and convention. A Gricean analysis would be: What is said  I do not love Sabidius.  What is implicated Perhaps:  +> I dislike him. +> There is something wrong with him. +> My attitude toward him is unfavourable.  But these go beyond the literal content. Indeed, the poem's humour partly depends on the gap. Speranza:  Cur non amas Sabidium? (Why do you not love Sabidius?)  The natural hearer already strengthens non amo toward:  "What do you have against him?"  Martial never explicitly licenses that strengthening. He merely repeats:  hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te. (This much only can I say: I do not love you.)  So one might say that Martial is professing certainty only about the absence of a positive attitude, not about the presence of a negative one. That connects nicely with your Cartesian example:  Non amo te, daemon maligne. (I do not love thee, malignant demon.)  This does not require:  I hate thee.  Nor, perhaps, even:  Thou existest.  For the negation weakens the commitment. A Gricean moral might be:  The hearer rushes from non amo te to odi te. The poet never does.  And the line  nec possum dicere quare (nor can I say why)  becomes even funnier. It is not merely that Martial cannot explain his hostility. Strictly speaking, he has not even asserted hostility. He has asserted only the lack of its opposite.Ha. Grice's point re: corkscrew is that he shouldn't have said it (as rational speaker). With Martial in the negative, same standard. Why utter m1 if you then refuse to provide reason why you say it or why you have the absence of the negative. "The chairman doesn't have a corkscrew in his pocket" involves the same oddity, and that is in fact Grice's response to Searle, "That man -- a Texas rich oilman -- is not lightning a cigarette with a five-dollar bill." Thanks Yes, I think this is exactly the direction a Gricean analysis would take. The crucial thing about the British Academy example in "Intention and Uncertainty" is not whether the proposition is positive or negative. It is that the speaker appears to be violating a rational conversational expectation. A:  The President of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his pocket.  B:  Why do you say that?  A:  No reason whatever.  The oddity is not primarily epistemic; it is conversational. Why introduce the proposition at all if you disclaim any grounds for introducing it? Now apply the same thought to Martial:  Non amo te, Sabidi.  The ordinary response is:  Cur? (Why?)  The poem supplies:  nec possum dicere quare.  But that does not wholly remove the oddity. For a Gricean hearer may continue:  Why announce the absence of love if you cannot provide any justification, explanation, or diagnosis of that absence?  The problem survives negation.  Your comparison with Grice's reply to Searle is very apt. Suppose someone says:  That Texan oil millionaire is not lighting his cigar with a five-dollar bill.  The proposition is perfectly intelligible. But the hearer asks:  Why are you telling me this?  The negation itself creates an expectation that such a possibility is somehow under consideration. Likewise:  I do not love Sabidius.  naturally generates:  Why bring Sabidius up?   Why mention the absence of love toward him in particular?   One can imagine a Gricean dialogue: Speranza:  Non amas Sabidium.  (You do not love Sabidius.) Grice:  So Martial says.  Speranza:  Cur?  (Why?) Grice:  Nescit.  (He does not know.) Speranza:  Then why tell us?  Grice:  Excellent question.   Ha The force of  hoc tantum possum dicere  is almost:  "I recognize the demand for further information; nevertheless, this is the furthest I can honestly go."  That is where the poem balances Quantity and Quality.  Quantity would push toward saying more. Quality pulls back:  Do not claim a reason you cannot provide.    So Martial's candour defeats the hearer's desire for explanation.  And there is indeed ambiguity in:  quare?  Does it request:  a cause?  What psychological process produced the absence of love?    or  a reason?  What grounds justify the absence of love?    Martial declines both. The poem ends with what is almost a Gricean minimum:  The strongest claim I can responsibly make is: non amo te.  Nothing more. Nothing less.Ha. then there is Winnie the pooh, if you don't have anything nice to say don't say it (politeness). So the obvious is taht Sab: to M.: 'Why don't you love me?' -- Sab.'s answer to epigram: Well, get lost -- i never loved you either! Thanks -- and I'm not writing stupid epigrams about it? Thanks  Ha Yes, and that is perhaps the strongest conversational objection of all. Martial writes:  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te.  The poem is entirely one-sided. Sabidius never gets a turn. A Gricean, or an ordinary conversationalist, might protest:  Why tell him this at all?  If one follows the "Winnie-the-Pooh maxim" (or Thumper's maxim in Disney's Bambi):  "If you can't say something nice, don't say anything at all,"  then Martial's utterance is conversationally peculiar. He announces:  I don't love you.  and then declines to provide:  a reason, a cause, evidence, a complaint, a remedy.  The hearer is left with a purely negative datum.  One can imagine Sabidius finally getting a reply: Sabidius:  Cur me non amas? (Why don't you love me?)  Martial:  Nec possum dicere quare. (Nor can I say why.)  Sabidius:  Tum taceas. (Then be silent.)   Ha Or more sharply: Sabidius:  Abi. (Get lost.)  Sabidius:  Ego quoque te numquam amavi. (I never loved you either.)  Sabidius:  Sed de ea re epigrammata non scribo. (But I don't write epigrams about it.)   Ha That last line is especially devastating because it turns the poem back on the poet. The implicature is:  "The real phenomenon requiring explanation is not my lack of love for you, but your decision to publish your lack of love for me."  That is a beautifully Gricean reversal. The original puzzle is:  Why doesn't Martial love Sabidius?  Sabidius replies:  Wrong question. Why is Martial telling everybody?  And there the Quantity maxim bites. If you have no explanation, no evidence, no complaint, and no proposal, why contribute the information at all? The best Sabidian response may be:  Non amas me? Bene. Cur me certiorem facere voluisti? ("You do not love me? Fine. Why did you wish to inform me of the fact?")  That shifts the burden from the psychology of affection to the pragmatics of utterance—which is exactly where Grice would want it. Ha. Yet the poet's voice is IMPLICATING -- he is using his power as poet to IMPLICATE something like Sab. has asked him: "Why don't you love me?" Hence the epigram. "I cannot tell. I just do." Cf. the song: "I don't know why I love you like I do, I don't know why, I just do." Total reverse -- typical of a foreign in Rome! as Martial was – thanks Yes, I think that is exactly the Gricean way to rescue the epigram from seeming conversationally pointless. Taken at face value, Martial says only:  Non amo te, Sabidi. (I do not love you.)  and refuses to provide the expected sequel:  quare? (Why?)  Yet the very fact that he writes the epigram creates a powerful implicature that some prior conversational demand exists. One naturally reconstructs an implicit dialogue: Sabidius:  Cur me non amas? (Why don't you love me?)  Martial:  Nec possum dicere quare. (I cannot say why.)  Sabidius:  At certe non sine causa. (Surely not without a cause.)  Martial:  Hoc tantum possum dicere. (This much only can I say.)   Non amo te. (I do not love you.)  In that reconstruction, the epigram is not an unprovoked announcement. It is an answer. And then the poem becomes almost the negative mirror-image of the old song:  "I don't know why I love you like I do, I don't know why, I just do."  There the datum is:  Love is present; the reason is ineffable.  Martial gives:  Love is absent; the reason is ineffable.  The logical structure is parallel. In both cases:  the attitude is reported, the explanation is denied, the audience still seeks an explanation.  A Gricean might put it this way:  The speaker claims authority over the attitude, but not over its grounds.  He knows that he does not love Sabidius. He does not know—or cannot articulate—why. And that is why hoc tantum is so important:  hoc tantum possum dicere (This much only can I say.)  It is almost a disclaimer of epistemic ambition. One can even imagine Grice commenting:  "Martial satisfies Quality by refusing to invent a reason; he frustrates Quantity by supplying no reason at all."   Ha. And yes, there is perhaps something delightfully "outsider" about it. Martial, the Spaniard in Rome, often delights in sharp, compressed social observations. Here he turns what should have been an explanation into an anti-explanation: not "here is why," but "there is no dicibile quare available to me." The result is that the reader supplies the rest—which is, after all, precisely where implicature lives. Hardie: Halitosis? Grice: I doubt it, sir. Thanks  Ha Hardie:  Why does Martial not love Sabidius?  Grice:  He cannot tell.  Hardie:  Bad breath?  Grice:  I doubt it, sir.  Hardie:  Why?  Grice:  Because if it were halitosis, the poem would have ended after the first line. Ha Ha Hardie:  Explain.  Grice:  Cur non amas Sabidium?   (Why don't you love Sabidius?)  Martial:  Quia graviter olet.   (Because he smells dreadful.)  Hardie:  Case closed.   The whole point of the epigram is that the reader expects a reason of exactly that sort:  bad breath, dishonesty, vanity, greed, poetic incompetence,  something. Instead Martial gives:  nec possum dicere quare (nor can I say why)  and then doubles down:  hoc tantum possum dicere (this much only can I say)  The implication is almost:  "Do not ask me for an articulable basis."   A Gricean reconstruction would be: Hardie:  Is there a cause?  Grice:  Presumably.  Hardie:  Is there a reason?  Grice:  Perhaps not one the poet can formulate.  Hardie:  Halitosis?  Grice:  That would be too easy.  Ha Indeed, one might say that if the explanation were:  Halitus foedus est.   (His breath is foul.)  there would be no epigram. The poem exists because the expected explanatory move is withheld. And so Sabidius gets the last word: Sabidius:  Cur non amas me?   (Why don't you love me?)  Martial:  Nescio.   (I don't know.)  Sabidius:  Ego autem scio cur te non legam.   (I, however, know why I shall not read you.)  Ha Indeed, Grice does cite 'be polite' as a maxim that generates implicatures -- but not rational cooperation -- so halitosis--bad nose (long nose) in time of no nose operation. the poet is not disclosing reason. maybe becasuse disclosing it would only hurt Sab. more? Thanks -- and it if'ts attraction -- there's nothing you can do about it -- "I just don't like peaches and cream" -- even though I love peaches and I love cream" Thanks -- an attitude may not be justifiable either by reason, rhyme or cause? Thanks Yes, I think that is a much subtler reading than the usual one. The common interpretation is:  Martial dislikes Sabidius but cannot explain why.  But a Gricean might ask whether nec possum dicere quare means:  "I do not know why,"  or  "I cannot tell you why."  Those are very different. The first is epistemic:  I lack knowledge.  The second is conversational:  I decline to disclose.  And Grice is always attentive to such distinctions.  The Politeness angle Grice once mentions "Be polite" as a source of conversational effects, though not as part of the central Cooperative Principle itself. So one could imagine: Sabidius:  Cur me non amas? (Why don't you love me?)  Martial:  Nec possum dicere quare. (I cannot say why.)  The implicature may be:  +> The reason would be painful. +> It would be impolite to say it. +> Silence is kinder than disclosure.  In that reading, Martial is actually exercising restraint.  Hardie's "halitosis" hypothesis Hardie:  Halitosis?  Grice:  Then say so. Ha If the reason were straightforwardly reportable:  bad breath, obnoxious habits, an irritating voice,  the refusal to provide the reason becomes harder to explain. The poem becomes interesting precisely because the omitted reason seems resistant to public statement.  The "Peaches and Cream" model Your example is excellent:  "I just don't like peaches and cream."  One may love:  peaches, cream,  yet dislike the combination. Similarly:  Sabidius may have no identifiable defect.  The absence of love need not correspond to any fault. That is why:  non amo te  is so much weaker than:  odi te.  The poet is not necessarily condemning Sabidius. He is merely withholding affection.  Cause, reason, justification A particularly Gricean distinction would be:                          QuestionPossible answerWhat caused it?childhood, temperament, chance encounterWhat reason have you?none that justifies the attitudeCan you explain it?not adequatelyCan you express it?perhaps not The poem leaves all four possibilities open. Thus:  nec possum dicere quare  may mean:  I cannot state a reason, even if there is a cause.  Or:  I have the attitude without any articulable rationale.   A Grice–Hardie reconstruction Hardie:  Surely there must be some reason.  Grice:  Not necessarily one available to discourse.  Hardie:  A cause, then?  Grice:  Perhaps.  Hardie:  A justification?  Grice:  Not evidently.  Hardie:  Then why the epigram?  Grice:  Because the question had already been asked.  +> The poem itself implicates a prior conversation: "Why don't you love me?" The epigram is less a declaration than a frustrated answer. And that may indeed be the deepest point: Martial's lines are easier to understand if we hear them not as an unsolicited insult but as a reply to a persistent demand for an explanation. The answer is: the absence of love is known; the reason is either ineffable, undisclosable, or unavailable.Ha cf. A: I don't love pistachio icecream. I don't like pistachio icecream. B: Why? (May seem inappropriate: cfr. Nowell-Smith Ethics on evalutive responses). Cf also: Can I go to the bathroom? You can but you may not. Martial: possum. Ambiguity? Thanks Yes, and I think possum is the crux of the whole epigram.  Non amo te, Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare; (I do not love you, Sabidius, nor can I say why.)  The ambiguity is very much like:  "Can I go to the bathroom?" "You can, but you may not."  Here can oscillates between:  ability, permission.  So too with Martial's:  nec possum dicere quare.  Does it mean: A. Inability  "I am unable to say why."  Perhaps because:  I do not know, the cause is subconscious, the explanation escapes formulation.  This is close to your pistachio example. A:  I don't like pistachio ice cream.  B:  Why not?  A:  I don't know.  That is a perfectly intelligible exchange. Indeed, as Nowell-Smith and others observed, evaluative attitudes are not always backed by articulable reasons.  B. Unwillingness / impropriety Or:  "I can't tell you why."  not because there is no reason, but because:  it would be rude, it would be cruel, it would embarrass Sabidius.  Then the poem becomes almost polite: Sabidius:  Why don't you love me?  Martial:  I could tell you, but I shan't. Ha The implicature would be:  +> The reason exists. +> Disclosure would hurt more than silence.  This is where Hardie's halitosis suggestion becomes amusing. Hardie:  Bad breath?  Grice:  If so, the charitable course is not to publish an epigram. Ha  C. The strongest Gricean reading Grice would probably ask:  Why utter the first line at all?  The answer may be that the poem presupposes an earlier conversational exchange. The epigram is not:  "Announcement: I do not love Sabidius."  It is rather: Sabidius:  Why don't you love me?  Martial:  I cannot tell.  The first line is therefore already a response.  Pistachio ice cream I think this is especially helpful because it removes the moral dimension.  I don't like pistachio ice cream.  The hearer may ask:  Why?  But there may be:  no justification, no argument, no fault in the ice cream.  Only an attitude. Similarly:  non amo te  need not imply:  vitiosus es (you are defective)  or  culpam habes (you are at fault).  It may simply report an absence of attraction, affection, or sympathy.  So the ambiguity of possum is real. Martial may mean:  "I am unable to state the reason,"  or  "I cannot appropriately disclose the reason."  The poem never resolves which. And that unresolved ambiguity is probably one reason the epigram has survived so well. It leaves open whether the obstacle is epistemic, psychological, moral, or merely conversational. Ha.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabinillio – Ossia Grice e Sabinillio: la ragione conversazionale dell’accademia romana. Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice. Sabinillio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’accademia romana. The convergence between Grice and S. lies in their shared conviction that meaning in conversation is not a mere by‑product of lexical content, institutional status, or formal utterance, but an achievement of ratione gubernata—reason actively governing exchange. For Grice, conversational meaning is constituted through intentions recognized under rational expectations (cooperation, relevance, economy), so that implicature marks not rhetorical ornament but disciplined inference. Sabinillio, as presented here in the Roman key, anticipates this structure from within a Plotinian ethos: reason (ratio) is not external constraint but an inner measure that alone licenses speech fit for the curia as academia. His “implicatura senatoria” mirrors Grice’s implicature precisely insofar as both diagnose the failure of honor, office, or degree to guarantee rational contribution; titles without disciplined reason generate only splendidissime nihil. Where Grice articulates this normatively through maxims of conversation, Sabinillio embodies it ethically and civically, insisting that philosophical speech is possible in public life only when reason rules both saying and meaning—an early, Roman instantiation of what Grice later formalizes as reason‑governed conversational meaning. A senator, who counts Plotino as his tutor, and whose doctrines he follows.    GRICEVS: Sabinilli, salve. Rem iam pridem cum collega meo, philosopho Spe, perquisivi; et hodie iterum miror quod Roma ipsa, quasi schola viva, Plotinum in senatum mittat. SABINILIVS: Salve, Grice. Ego quidem senator sum, sed discipulus Plotini; in hac urbe etiam curia aliquando fit academia, et toga non semper inimica est philosophiae. GRICEVS: Ita est; sed—ut Spes mecum subridens insinuavit—rarum est invenire “member of the house of lords” qui bene utatur titulo suo Lit. Hum. Philosophia Vadum Boum M. A.; plerique enim vel silent vel splendidissime nihil dicunt. SABINILIVS: Implicatura senatoria! Et Spes recte monet: sed Plotinus non est omnium privatus praeceptor. Non cuique datur ut in curia philosophice loquatur; quidam enim habent gradus, sed non habent rationem—tu autem ostendis quomodo honor sine disciplina sit mera pompa, disciplina autem sine honore saepe sit utilior. Sabinillio (a. u. c. MMDXVII). Dicta. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabinio – Ossia: Grice e Sabinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabinio The gens Sabinia, occasionally written Sabineia, was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Only a few members of this gens are mentioned in history, but others are known from inscriptions. Titus Sabinius Barbarus attained the consulship in the reign of Hadrian.[1]  Origin The nomen Sabinius belongs to a large class of gentilicia formed from surnames ending in -inus. Sabinus was a common surname, originally designating someone of Sabine descent.[2]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Sabineius, an orator whose style Martial describes as boring.[3] Titus Sabinius Barbarus, legate of the Legio III Augusta under Trajan, was appointed consul suffectus in AD 118, early in the reign of Hadrian.[4][5] Titus Sabinius Mercurialis, a freedman buried at Rome, in a tomb built by Titus Sabinius Pinna.[6] Sabinia Olympias, a freedwoman buried at Rome, in a tomb built by Titus Sabinius Pinna.[6] Titus Sabinius Pinna, a freedman, perhaps of the consul Titus Sabinius Barbarus, who built a tomb at Rome for himself and his conliberti, Titus Sabinius Mercurialis, and Sabinia Olympias.[6][1] Quintus Sabinius Veranus, a tax collector in Noricum, probably during the reign of Antoninus Pius. His wife may have been Sabinia Sabinilla. He is probably the same Quintus Sabinius Veranus named as duumvir in Moesia Inferior in AD 159 or 160.[7][8][9] Sabinia Sabinilla, probably the wife of Quintus Sabinius Veranus.[8] Sabinius Xanthippus, a freedman of Quintus Sabinius Veranus and Sabinia Sabinilla, buried at Rome between AD 130 and 170.[8] Sabinia Celsina, a woman of a senatorial family, was the daughter of Naevia Marciana, and wife of Geminius Modestus, a man of praetorian rank at Cirta in Numidia.[10][11] Sabinius Dignus, the master of Optatus, a slave buried at Rome, aged forty.[12] Sabinia Digna, the mistress of Saecularis, a slave buried at the present site of Pyrat in Austria, formerly part of Noricum.[13] Sabinius Modestus, governor of Moesia Inferior from about AD 241 to 242 or 243. Sabinia Felicitas, the wife of Lucius Percennius Lascivus, a third century eques buried at Rome.[14][15] See also List of Roman gentes References  PW, "Sabinius", No. 2.  Chase, pp. 114, 125, 126.  Martial, Epigrammata, iii. 25.  AE 1904, 144.  Cooley, Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy, p. 469.  CIL VI, 25712.  AE 1986, 571, AE 2008, 1020, AE 1996, 1342, CIL III, 4015, CIL III, 4017, CIL III, 4875, CIL III, 5416, CIL III, 14354,26, CIL III, 15184,24.  Panciera, La collezione epigrafica dei musei Capitolini, 134.  PW, "Sabinius", No. 3.  CIL VIII, 7054, CIL VIII, 7055.  PW, "Sabinius", No. 4.  CIL VI, 23545a.  AEA, 2008, 17.  CIL VI, 1487.  PW, "Sabinius", No. 5. Bibliography Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial), Epigrammata (Epigrams). Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). August Pauly, Georg Wissowa, et alii, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Scientific Encyclopedia of the Knowledge of Classical Antiquities, abbreviated RE or PW), J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart (1894–1980). Annona Epigraphica Austriaca (Epigraphy of Austria Annual, abbreviated AEA) (1979–present). Silvio Panciera, La collezione epigrafica dei musei Capitolini (The Epigraphic Collection of the Capitoline Museum), Quasar Edizioni, Rome (1987). Alison E. Cooley, The Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy, Cambridge University Press (2012). Categories: Roman gentesRoman gentes of Sabine origin and about THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabinio – Ossia: Grice e Sabinio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabinio For the Sabinii, I would not choose the consul. I would choose the figure whom Martial immortalized:  Sabineius, an orator whose style Martial describes as boring. [GREXv2 | Word]  That is almost purpose-built for a Grice–Speranza dialogue, because Grice repeatedly insists that communication is not merely saying something true; it must also be worth saying. Grice e Sabineio Tedioso Speranza:  Quis fuit Sabineius? (Who was Sabineius?)  Grice:  Orator, sed Martiali taedio plenus videbatur. (An orator, but he seemed full of tedium to Martial.) [GREXv2 | Word]   Speranza:  Potestne orator omnia vera dicere et tamen esse molestus? (Can an orator say only true things and still be tiresome?)  Grice:  Facillime. (Very easily.) Ha. The Gricean point Speranza:  Quid peccat Sabineius? (What is Sabineius doing wrong?)  Grice:  Fortasse nihil falsum dicit. (Perhaps he says nothing false.)  Speranza:  Ergo? (Then?)  Grice:  Sed fortasse nimis multa dicit. (But perhaps he says too much.)  +> A speaker may satisfy truth and still fail conversationally.  Hardie intervenes Hardie:  Is boringness a logical fault?  Grice:  No.  Hardie:  A rhetorical fault?  Grice:  Often.  Hardie:  A conversational fault?  Grice:  Very often.    Ha A Martial–Grice ending Speranza:  Quid est pessimum vitium oratoris? (What is the worst fault of an orator?)  Grice:  Aliquando falsitas. Saepius taedium. (Sometimes falsehood. More often boredom.)  +> An audience can survive error; it may not survive endless irrelevance. That seems to me the most distinctively Gricean member of the gens Sabinia: not the office-holder, but the unfortunate Sabineius, remembered because a poet found him dull. In a philosophy so concerned with relevance, economy, and conversational effectiveness, that is almost an Oxford moral. [GREXv2 | Word] This from Nowell-Smith, Ethics -- colleague of Grice at Oxford. Rule 3. What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his audience. This is the most important of the three rules; unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than liars or careless talkers. Yes! And I suspect Grice would have approved of that remark enormously. P. H. Nowell-Smith's formulation:  "What a speaker says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his audience."  is very close to what later becomes Grice's concern with conversational rationality. And the punchline:  "Bores are more common than liars or careless talkers."  is almost an anticipation of a Gricean hierarchy. For a liar at least recognizes the conversational enterprise. He supplies information which he wants you to take as true. The bore's defect is deeper:  he may be perfectly truthful, perfectly sincere, perfectly grammatical, and yet fail to contribute anything worth hearing.  That is why your choice of Sabineius is so apt. Martial does not say that Sabineius lies. He says he is tedious. [GREXv2 | Word] One can imagine: Hardie:  What is the gravest conversational vice?  Grice:  Falsehood?  Nowell-Smith:  No.  Grice:  Obscurity?  Nowell-Smith:  No.  Grice:  Then what?  Nowell-Smith:  Boredom. Ha. And this connects unexpectedly with Martial's Sabidius epigram. A reader may object:  Why tell me that you do not love Sabidius if you refuse to tell me why?  The poem survives because Martial's wit makes the omission itself interesting. A less gifted poet would simply be a bore. Nowell-Smith's rule asks:  Why is this being said to me?  Grice later asks something very similar:  What conversational point is served by this contribution?  The successful speaker gives the audience a reason to attend. The bore leaves the audience wondering:  Cur hoc dicitur? (Why is this being said?)  That is perhaps why Nowell-Smith's observation remains so memorable. A conversational failure need not be a failure of truth; it may simply be a failure of relevance. And, as he dryly notes, that vice is far more common. Ha.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabuzio – Ossia: Grice e Sabuzio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabuzio The gens Sabucia was a minor plebeian family at ancient Rome. Members of this gens are first mentioned in imperial times. The most illustrious of the family was Gaius Sabucius Major Caecilianus, who obtained the consulship in AD 186. Other Sabucii are known from inscriptions.[1][2]  Origin The historian Anthony Birley indicates that the Sabucii were of Etruscan origin.[2]  Branches and cognomina The Sabucii used a variety of personal cognomina. The only family surname known from inscriptions is Major, typically given to the elder of two or more siblings; the cognomen Magnus, great, borne by one of the other Sabucii, might suggest a connection to this family. Sabinus usually designated someone of Sabine ancestry, but might also refer to one who resembled a Sabine in his manner or habits.[3] Aper, found in one inscription of the consul Gaius Sabucius Major, refers to a wild boar.[4]  Members This list includes abbreviated praenomina. For an explanation of this practice, see filiation. Sabucius Aspasius, probably the father of a little boy buried at Rome, aged three years, thirty-two days, and two hours.[5] Sabucius Aurelianus, named in an inscription from Rome.[6] Gnaeus Sabucius Botrius, dedicated a monument to Appius Claudius Sulpicius Julianus at Castrimoenium in Latium.[7] Sabucius Magnus, buried at Rome, aged sixty.[8] Gaius Sabucius C. f. Major Caecilianus Aper, consul suffectus in AD 186, had been tribune of the plebs, praetor, prefect of the aerarium militare, judicial legate in Britain, and governor of Belgica and Achaia.[9][10][2] Gaius Sabucius (C. f.) C. n. Major Plotinus Faustinus, grandson of Caecilianus, was a young man of senatorial rank, who set up a monument commemorating his grandfather's achievements.[9] Gaius Sabucius Murranus, buried at Bononia in Etruria, together with Vibia Exorata, perhaps his wife.[11] Gaius Sabucius Perpetuus, named in a second century inscription from Tellenae in Latium.[12] Sextus Sabucius Sabinus, a man of senatorial rank, named in a second or third century inscription from Florentia in Etruria.[13] See also List of Roman gentes References  PIR, vol. III, p. 156.  Birley, The Fasti of Roman Britain, pp. 216, 405, 459.  Chase, pp. 111, 114.  New College Latin & English Dictionary, s. v. aper.  ICUR, iii. 9133, iv. 10154.  CIL VI, 32116.  De Rossi, Bovillae, p. 322.  EE, ix. 960.  CIL VI, 1510.  CIL VI, 2100, AE 1974, 345, AE 1976, 690.  CIL XI, 6884.  AE 1907, 222, {{{2}}}, AE 1994, 338.  CIL XI, 6712,387. Bibliography Theodor Mommsen et alii, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum (The Body of Latin Inscriptions, abbreviated CIL), Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1853–present). Giovanni Battista de Rossi, Inscriptiones Christianae Urbis Romanae Septimo Saeculo Antiquiores (Christian Inscriptions from Rome of the First Seven Centuries, abbreviated ICUR), Vatican Library, Rome (1857–1861, 1888). Wilhelm Henzen, Ephemeris Epigraphica: Corporis Inscriptionum Latinarum Supplementum (Journal of Inscriptions: Supplement to the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, abbreviated EE), Institute of Roman Archaeology, Rome (1872–1913). René Cagnat et alii, L'Année épigraphique (The Year in Epigraphy, abbreviated AE), Presses Universitaires de France (1888–present). George Davis Chase, "The Origin of Roman Praenomina", in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. VIII, pp. 103–184 (1897). Paul von Rohden, Elimar Klebs, & Hermann Dessau, Prosopographia Imperii Romani (The Prosopography of the Roman Empire, abbreviated PIR), Berlin (1898). Giovanni Maria De Rossi, Bovillae, Olschki, Florence (1979). Anthony R. Birley, The Fasti of Roman Britain, Clarendon Press (1981). John C. Traupman, The New College Latin & English Dictionary, Bantam Books, New York (1995). Category: Roman gentes and from THIS gens? Thanks

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabuzio – Ossia: Grice e Sabuzio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabuzio For the Sabucii, my first-best choice would be neither the consul nor the governors, but: Grice e Sabucio Maiore Specifically:  Gaius Sabucius Major Caecilianus Aper, whose very name accumulates identifiers—Sabucius, Major, Caecilianus, Aper—while a later grandson commemorates him through an inscription listing his achievements. [GREXv2 | Word]  Why is this Gricean? Because Grice was endlessly interested in the distinction between:  identifying someone, describing someone, and conveying information about someone.  The name itself almost invites the question:  Which parts identify, and which parts describe?   Grice e Sabucio Maiore Speranza:  Cur tot nomina habet? (Why does he have so many names?)  Grice:  Quia unum non satis videbatur. (Because one seemed not enough.) Ha Speranza:  Quid est "Major"? (What is "Major"?)  Grice:  Initio fortasse descriptio. (At first perhaps a description.)  Speranza:  Maior quam quis? (Elder than whom?)  Grice:  Fortasse fratre. (Perhaps than a brother.) [GREXv2 | Word]   And here comes the Gricean twist. Speranza:  Et postea? (And afterwards?)  Grice:  Postea nomen fit. (Afterwards it becomes a name.)  +> An expression may begin as a description and end as a mere identifier.  This is analogous to themes you have already explored with:  Princeps, Senator, Rufus,  where a word's descriptive content gradually fades while its referential function survives. My verdict Grice e Sabucio Maiore Speranza:  "Major" nomenne est an descriptio? ("Major" — is it a name or a description?)  Grice:  Utrumque. (Both.)  Speranza:  Quomodo? (How?)  Grice:  Primum describit; postea designat. (At first it describes; later it identifies.)  +> Many proper names originate as informative descriptions whose original content becomes historically opaque but whose referential function remains. That strikes me as the most distinctively Gricean theme available in the rather shadowy gens Sabucia. [GREXv2 | Word]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: Sabuzio – Ossia: Grice e Sabuzio -- Grex griceiana – verbalia: Sabuzio A second candidate A very attractive alternative is:  Sabucius Aspasius, probably known only because of an epitaph for a child aged three years, thirty-two days, and two hours. [GREXv2 | Word]  That precise age is almost Gricean in another way: Speranza:  Cur etiam horas numeras? (Why count even the hours?)  Grice:  Quia interest. (Because it matters.)  +> Precision itself may carry information about significance. But that is more emotional than philosophical.