in Metapkysics IV, ii (T, ii) 1003a32f., there Aristotle brings up two of his favourite examples, the applications of the adjectives 'healthy' and "medical'.it." Similar considerations apply to applications of the adjective 'medical', that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art." On the most obvious interpretation of this passage Aristotic will be suggesting that standard semantic theory will be right in supposing the applicability of certain adjectives to particular items depends on a relationship of such items to an associated universal, but wrong in supposing that the relationship in question is invariably that of instantiation; other sorts of relationship are frequently involved. There is, however, a less obvious position which Aristotle might have been taking up; this position would maintain with respect to universals, that the only way in which individual items may be related to universals is that of instantiation: that there will beslogan might be "For there to be a universal U, with specializations U,, U2, .., U,, U has to be the genus of those specializations with all that that chails" (or, more bricfly, "no specialization without species").

 in Metapkysics IV, ii (T, ii) 1003a32f., there Aristotle brings up two of his favourite examples, the applications of the adjectives 'healthy' and "medical'.it." Similar considerations apply to applications of the adjective 'medical', that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art." On the most obvious interpretation of this passage Aristotic will be suggesting that standard semantic theory will be right in supposing the applicability of certain adjectives to particular items depends on a relationship of such items to an associated universal, but wrong in supposing that the relationship in question is invariably that of instantiation; other sorts of relationship are frequently involved. There is, however, a less obvious position which Aristotle might have been taking up; this position would maintain with respect to universals, that the only way in which individual items may be related to universals is that of instantiation: that there will beslogan might be "For there to be a universal U, with specializations U,, U2, .., U,, U has to be the genus of those specializations with all that that chails" (or, more bricfly, "no specialization without species").other entities which will indeed be general entitics though not universals; to them individual items may be related in a variety of ways which are distinct from instantiation. The relative merits of these two idcas will be a matter for debate.