An initial version of the idea I want to explore is that we represent the sentences (1) "John should be recovering his health by now" and (2) "John should join AA" as having the following structures; first, a common "rationality" operator 'Ace, to be heard as "it is reasonable that", "it is acceptable that", "it ought to be that", "it should be that", or in some other similar way; next, one or other of two mood-operators, which in the case of (1) are to be written as 'F' and in the case of (2) are to be written as 1; and finally a 'radical, to be represented by T' or some other lower-case letter. The structure for (1) is Acc + F + r, for (2) Acc +! + r, with each symbol falling within the scope of its prede-cessor. I am thinking of a radical in pretty much the same kind of way as recent writers who have used that term (or the term

'phrastic); I think of it as a sequence in the underlying structural representation of sentences, and I regard it as an undecided question whether there are any sentences in a natural language which contain a part which is a distinct surface counterpart of a radical (compare Wittgenstein's remarks about radicals in chemistry).

Obviously the next topic for me to take up is the characterization of mood-operators.

Moods

There are in fact two connected questions on which I shall try to find something to say. First, there is the obvious demand for acharacterization, or partial characterization, of mood-differences as they emerge in speech (which it is plausible to regard as their primary habitat); second, there is the question how, and to what extent, representations of moods, and so of mood-differences, which are suitable for application to speech may be legitimately imported into the representation of thought. We need to consider the second question, since, if the general 'rationality operator is to signify something like acceptability, then the appearances of mood-operators within its scope will be proper only if they may properly occur within the scope of the psychological verb "accept".

The easiest way for me to expound my ideas on the first of these questions is by reference to a schematic table or diagram (see Fig. 2). I should at this point reiterate my temporary contempt for the use/mention distinction; my exposition would make the hair stand on end in the soul of a person specially sensitive in this area.

But my guess is that the only historical philosophical mistake prop erly attributable to use/mention confusion is Russell's argument against Frege in "On Denoting", and that there are virtually always acceptable ways of eliminating disregard of the distinction in a particular case, though the substitutes are usually lengthy, obscure, and tedious.

I shall make three initial assumptions: (1) That I may avail myself of two species of acceptance, namely, I-acceptance and V-acceptance, which I shall, on occasion, call respectively "judging" and "will-ing". The latter pair of words are to be thought of as technical or semi-technical, though they will signify states which approximate to what we vulgarly call "thinking (that p)" and "wanting (that p)". especially in the senses in which we can speak of beasts as thinking or wanting something. I here treat 'judge and 'will' (and "accept) as primitives; their proper interpretation would be determined by their role in a psychological theory (or sequence of psychological theories) designed to account for the behaviours of members of the animal kingdom, at different levels of psychological complexity (some classes of creatures being more complex than others). (2)

That, as I suggested in a published article (the exact title of which 1 always find it difficult to remember),? at least at the point at which,

I° Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", Foundations of Language, 4 (Aug, 1968), 225-48.](Main clause):

U to utter to H (a sentence of the form] Op, + P

(Antecedent clause)

Operation

(Preamble)

Number

(1) A

(Supplement)

|（Diferential）

(Content.)

(Radicall

(Operator) | (Mood-name)

U wills H judges U

nonel

judges

wills H

(2) A

none

wills

wills H

(з) А

[none]

wills (3,a) (U a judges

?.H

Judicative, ('Indicative") Judicative, (Indicative')

(Main clause):

U to utter to H (a sentence of the form] Op, + P

(Antecedent clause)

Operation

(Preamble)

Number

(1) A

(Supplement)

|（Diferential）

(Content.)

(Radicall

(Operator) | (Mood-name)

U wills H judges U

nonel

judges

wills H

(2) A

none

wills

wills H

(з) А

[none]

wills (3,a) (U a judges

?.H

Judicative, ('Indicative") Judicative, (Indicative') Volitive, ('Intentional")

Volitive-

("Imperative"

Judicative Interrogative

wills

(8,0) (H

(4)

non| wills

wills U a judges wills (3,0) (U o wills

Judicative Interrogative

Volitive Interrogative,

(3,a) (H

wills U a wills

Volitive Interrogatives

Notes: Interrogatives: (i)

Legitimate substituends for 'o' are 'positively' and negatively: positively judging that p. and negatively judging that pis judging that not-p.

The 'uniquely existential' quantifier (3,a) is to be given a 'substitutional" interpretation. (ili) 1E the differential is supplemented (as in a B case), the quantifier is dragged back', so as to appear

immediately before 'H in the supplement.

FiG. 2. Schema of procedure-specifiers for mood-operatorsin one's syntactico-semantical theory of a particular language, one is introducing mood-differences (and possibly earlier), the proper form to use is a specification of speech-procedures; such specifiers would be of the general form "For U (utterer) to utter o if.." where the blank is replaced by the appropriate condition.

(3) That since in the preceding scheme 'O' represents a structure and not a sentence or open sentence, there is no guarantee that actual sentences in the language under treatment will contain perspicuous and unambiguous representations of their moods or sub-moods; an individual sentence may correspond to two (or more) mood-different structures; the sentence will then be structurally ambiguous (multiplex in meaning) and will have more than one reading.

The general form of a procedure-specifier for a mood-operator, as you will see from Fig, 2, involves a main clause (which comes first) and an "antecedent" clause, which follows "if". In the schematic representation of the main clause, "U" represents an utterer, "H" a hearer,

"P" a radical; and "Op." represents that operator whose number is i; for example, "Op.." would represent Operator Number 3A, which (since? F' appears in the Operator column for 3A) would be ?, F. The antecedent clause consists of a sequence whose elements are a preamble, a supplement to a differential (which is present only in a B-type case), a differential, and a radical. The preamble, which is always present, is invariant, and reads "U wills (that) H judges (that) U.... The supplement, if present, is also invariant; and the idea behind its varying presence or absence is connected, in the first instance, with the Volitive Mood (see initial assumption (2) above). It seemed to me that the difference between ordinary expressions of intention (such as "I shall not fail" or "They shall not pass") and ordinary imperatives (Like "Be a little kinder to him") could be accommodated by treating each as a special sub-mood of a superior mood; the characteristic feature of the superior mood (Volitive) is that it relates to willing that p, and in one subordinate case (the Intentional case) the utterer is concerned to reveal to the hearer that he (the utterer) wills that p, while in the other subordinate case (Imperative), U is concerned to reveal to H that U wills that H will that p. (In each case, of course, it is to be presumed that willing that p will have its standard out-come, namely, the actualization of p.) It also seemed to me thatthere is a corresponding distinction between two "uses" of ordinary indicatives; sometimes one is declaring or affirming that p. one's intention being primarily to get the hearer to think that the speaker thinks that p; while sometimes one is telling the hearer that p, that is to say, hoping to get him to think that p. It is true that in the case of indicatives, unlike that of volitives, there is no pair of devices which would ordinarily be thought of as mood-markers which serves to distinguish the sub-mood of an indicative sentence; the recognition of the sub-mood has to come from context, from the vocative use of the name of H, from the presence of a speech-act verb, or from a sentence-adverbial phrase (like

"for your information"). But I have already, in my initial assump-tions, allowed for such a situation. This A/B distinction seemed to me to be also discernible in interrogatives (of this, a little more later).

The differentials are each associated with, and serve to distin-guish, 'superior' moods (judicative, volitive) and, apart from one detail in the case of interrogatives, are invariant between 'A and B sub-moods of the superior mood; they are merely unsupple-mented or supplemented, the former for an 'A sub-mood and the latter for a 'B' sub-mood. The radical needs at this point (I hope) no further explanation, except that it might be useful to bear in mind that I have not stipulated that the radical for an 'intentional' (Volitive,) incorporate a reference to U ("be in the first person"), nor that the radical for an 'imperative' (Volitive,) incorporate a reference of H ("be in the second person"); "They shall not pass" is a legitimate intentional, as is "You shall not get away with it"; and "The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn" (said by a cap tain to a lieutenant) is a perfectly good imperative. I will give in full two examples of actual specifiers derived from the schema shown in Fig. 2.

1. U to utter to H I, P if U wills (that) H judges (that) U judges p.
2. U to utter to H I, P if U wills that H judges that U wills that H wills that p

Since, of the states denoted by differentials in the figure, only judging that p and willing that p are, in my view, strictly cases of acceptance that p, and the ultimate purpose of my introducing thischaracterization of moods is to reach a general account of linguistic forms which are to be conjoined, according to my proposal, with an 'acceptability operator, the first two numbered rows of the figure are (at most) what I shall have a direct use for. But since it is of some importance to me that my treatment of moods should be (and should be thought to be) on the right lines, I have added a partial account of interrogatives, and I shall say a little more. about them.

1. There are two varieties of interrogatives, 'Yes/No' interrogatives (for example, "Is his face clean?") and 'W' interrogatives ("Who killed Cock Robin?", "Where has my beloved gone?", "How did he fix it?"). The specifiers derivable from the schema will provide only for "Yes/No' interrogatives, though the figure could be quite easily amended so as to yield a restricted but very large class of "W interrogatives; I shall in a moment indicate how this could be done.
2. The distinction between Judicative and Volitive Interrogatives corresponds with the difference between cases in which a questioner is indicated as being, in one way or another, concerned to obtain information ("Is he at home?"), and cases in which the questioner is indicated as being concerned to settle a problem about what he is to do ("Am I to leave the door open?",

"Is the

prisoner to be released?", "Shall I go on reading?"). This difference is fairly well represented in English grammar, and much better represented in the grammars of some other languages.

(3) The A/B differences are (1 think) not marked at all in English grammar. They are, however, often quite easily detectable.

There is usually a recognizable difference between a case in which someone says, musingly or reflectively, "Is he to be trusted?" (a case in which the speaker might say that he was just wondering), and a case in which he utters the same sentence as an enquiry similarly, we can usually tell whether someone who says "Shall T accept the invitation?" is just trying to make up his mind, or is trying to get advice or instruction from his audience,

(4) The employment of the variable 'o' needs to be explained I have borrowed a little from an obscure branch of logic, once (but maybe no longer) practised, called (I think) "proto-thetic" (why?), the main rite in which was to quantify over (or through)connectives, 'o' is to have as its two substituents "positively" and

"negatively", which may modify the verbs "judge' and will; negatively judging or negatively willing that p is judging or willing that not-p. The quantifier (9,os) ... has to be treated substitutionally, as specified in note (ii). If, for example, I ask someone whether John killed Cock Robin (B case), I do not want him merely to will that I have a particular "Logical Quality" in mind which I believe to apply; I want him to have one of the "Qualities" in mind which he wants me to believe to apply. To meet this demand, supplementation must "drag back' the quantifier.

(5) To extend the schema so as to provide specifiers for 'single W-interrogatives (that is, questions like "What did the butler see?" rather than questions like "Who went where with whom at 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon?"), we need just a little extra appa-ratus. We need to be able to superscribe a "W' in each interrogative operator (for example, ?Wh, ?W!), together with the proviso that a radical which follows a superscribed operator must be an

'open' radical, which contains one or more occurrences of just one free variable. And we need what I might call a 'chameleon' variable 'X, to occur only in quantifiers, so that (3)) Ex is to be regarded as a way of writing (3x) Ex, while (3)) Fy is a way of writing (Sy) Fy. To provide specifiers for W-superscribed operators, we simply delete the appearances of 'o in the specifier for the corresponding un-superscribed operator, inserting instead the quantifier (3,2) (...) at the position previously occupied by (3,∞e) (..- ).

For example: the specifiers for "Who killed Cock Robin?" (used as an enquiry) would be: "U to utter to H "? W F: x killed Cock Robin' if U wills H to judge U to will that (3,2) (H should will that U judges (x killed Cock Robin))"; in which '(3,X)' will "take on" the shape '(S,x)' since 'x' is the free variable within its scope. H. P. Grice