GRICE E BOZZI

 Further examples are to be found in the area of the philosophy of perception. One is connected with the notion of "seeing ... as." Wittgenstein observed that one does not see a knife and fork as a knife and fork.' The idea behind this remark was not developed in the passage in which it occurred, but presumably the thought was that, if a pair of objects plainly are a knife and fork, then while it might be correct to speak of someone as seeing them as something different (perhaps as a leaf and a flower), it would always (except possibly in very special circumstances) be incorrect (false, out of or-der, devoid of sense) to speak of seeing an x as an x, or at least of seeing what is plainly an x as an x. "Seeing... as," then, is seemingly represented as involving at least some element of some kind of imaginative construction or supplementation.