GRICE E RIMINI

 

Grice e Rimini: la ragione conversazionale, o del significato totale, la percezione del pane e Socrate è seduto – filosofia italiana -- Luigi Speranza (Rimini). Filosofo italiano. Rimini, Emilia-oIl primo a conciliare gli sviluppi delle idee d’Occam ed Aureolo. Questa sua sintesi ha un impatto duraturo. Insegna a Bologna, Padova, Perugia, e Rimini. Da lezioni sulle sentenze di Lombardo. Oltre alla sua opera principale, il commento alle sentenze di Lombardo, scrive diversi saggi, tra cui: “De usura,” “De IV virtutibus cardinalibus” – cf. Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire --  e un estratto del commento alle sentenze, il “De intentione et remissione formarum,” un’appendice sulla IV distinctio del I libro del commento alle sentenze, una tabula super epistolis. Augustin. Manifesta una certa attitudine sincretistica tra gli sviluppi d’Occam ed Aureolo. Mostra analoga tendenza anche nella ri-costruzione e dell'analisi del processo della percezione animale e umana e il conoscere umano, nelle quali si fondono in maniera originale elementi etero-genei desunti da Aristotele del Lizio, Agostino e Ockham. Causa un grave fraintendimento della sua filosofia, è qualificato come tortor infantium, per la supposizione di aver condannato alle pene eterne i bambini che muoiono senza il battesimo. In realtà espone tale dottrina senza pronunciarsi. Talvolta è indicato quale antesignano dei nominalisti. Altre saggi: “Gregorii lettura super I et II Sententiarum”; “De imprestantiis venetorum”. Mazzali, Gori, Manuale di filosofia medievale, Dizionario biografico degl’italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Dizionario di filosofia.  Now two important consequences follow from Gregory's definition of the object of complex knowledge as the significatum totale of the conclusion. Firstly, it entails a proposition of a special kind which meets the requirements of both demonstration and experience.? Not every proposition does so. Indeed Gregory dis-tinguishes three different kinds of propositions. They are in two categories. The first is of mental images representing actual spoken words, or statements, from which they are directly derived and which vary according to the language in which they are framed: for example Greek or Latin.3 The second is of mental images which have no direct correlation with words; it consists in purely mental concepts undiversified by language, the same for all men.  These are the mind's natural signs prior to words, which have been instituted to express them.* They are divided into those which are  (bid, pono etiam tetio quod propositio aliqua non est ipsam esse veram  2 Secundo, idem est obiectum scientie et assensus sciabilis, sive assensus sit scientia sive distinguatur. Nam ei quod quis scit assentit, sed obiectum assensus sciabilis est significatum conclusionis. Ei enim assentit quis habens demon-strationem quod significat conclusio demonstrationis (ibid., O).  a Quidam enim est earum que sunt vocalium enuntiationum imagines vel similitudines ab exterioribus vocibus in anima derivate, vel per ipsam ficte, iuxta modum qui infra dist. 3 declarabitur de abstractione et fictione in anima  conceptuum. Et iste non sunt eiusdem rationis in omnibus  * Quidam vero genus est enuntiationum mentalium que nullarum suntultimately founded upon sense experience and those which are not.  The former, whether they originate directly or indirectly by simple or complex knowledge, or just inhere in the mind, have their source in external things; they are as much the property of the deaf and dumb as of other men, for experience, not words, is their agent. The other group, on the contrary, owes nothing to external knowledge; its images belong to propositions which are held as matters of belief or opinion and remain unverified. ? They do not come within the province of knowledge.  Of these three groups only the second represents both know-ledge and assent.? The first consists simply of words, devoid of either knowledge or judgement; the third of judgement, or assent, divorced from knowledge. Gregory includes in the third category dissent since it is the negative act of assent.  The effect of this classification is to isolate statement, know-similitudines vocum, nec secundum illarum diversitatem in hominibus habentibus diversificantur. Sed eadem sunt secundum speciem apud omnes idipsum naturaliter significantes quid vocales eis subordinate ad significandum ad placitum et per institutionem significant; et ille sunt illa verba que nullius lingue sunt, et vocalia verba exteriorius sonantia (Prol.).  secundum enuntiationum mentalium subdividitur: quantum quedam immediate ex rerum intuitivis notitiis incomplexis, tanquam ex partialibus causis vel ex alis complexis vel incomplexis, ex illis mediate vel immediate causatis, seu ex habitibus ex talibus notitiis complexis derelictis causantur, vel forsitan etiam quedam non ex aliquibus incomplexis notitiis causantur, sed sunt simpliciter prime venientes in mentem naturaliter. Quedam vero sun que non ex talibus primis notitis rerum aliquo predic  torum modorum causantur, cuiuismodi sunt enuntiationes quibus quis enuntiat mente et iudicat sic vel sic esse aut non esse, non cognoscens tamen intuitive, aut alia notitia prima vel ex intuitiva derivata, que sic sit vel non sit, sicut enuntiat in mente quis dum credit vel opinatur. Secundi autem generis propositiones et enuntiationes sunt et notitie et  assenus propositiones primi generis sic sunt enuntiationes quod non sunt notitie formaliter, necque assensus, non plus quam enuntiationes vocales quibus sunt similies. Tertii autem generis propositiones et enuntiationes quidem sunt et assensus,  sed non notitii ibid.). Ex his autem sequitur quod dissensus non est aliquis actus intellectus a quolibet assensu distinctus, quinimmo quilibet est assensus quidam. Quod probatur, quantum cum assensus mentalis sit enuntiatio, dissensus erit enuntiatio sibi opposite] knowledge, and judgement as separable elements in a mental demons-tration. One does not imply the other, so that the statement can obtain either exclusively or in combination with knowledge or judgement.  Only when all three are joined together can there be a true demonstration. The statement alone tells whether something is or is not, according to whether it is affirmative or negative, knowledge enables us to ascertain its truth or falsity; assent or belief affords the judgement necessary to any demonstration" and is thereby the means by which a conclusion is reached. R., then, unlike Occam, keeps assent and knowledge separate; although, when present together in the same demonstration, they are all part of a single mental action, we have seen that propositions containing one do not logically imply those containing the others. The separation between them gives rise to the second consequence in R.’s treatment of complex knowledge. For since assent has to be to a proposition embodying a statement of truth, the object of assent is the proposition, not an external object. Consequently the object of assent is a complex, as opposed to a simple, signification; or as R. puts it, it is  Ulterius sequitur ex istis quod non omnis mentalis enuntiato est assensus, licet omnis assensus sit mentalis enuntiato. Et quod quamvis omnis notitia complexa... sit mentalis cuntiatio, non tamen e contrario omnis mentalis enuntiatio est talis notitia. Item quod quamvis omnis notitia complexa sit assensus, non quilibet tamen assensus est talis notitia quia est circa obiectum scientie, quod proprie est illud quod significatur per conclusionem demonstrationis, ut patet ex primo articulo, intellectus habet actum enuntiandi et actum cognoscendi et actum credendi seu assentiendi nam per ipsam conclusionem enuntiat sic esse, si est affirmativa, vel non sic esse, si est negativa. Cognoscit etiam sic esse sicut enuntiat unde primo Posteriorum dicitur,  quod scire est per demonstrationem  intelligere, et quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Non solum autem enuntiat et cognoscit sic esse, sed etiam credit seu assentit quod ita est. Prima conclusio est quod conclusio demonstrationis mentalis propric accepte est assensus de sic esse sicut ipsa significat ga conclusio est quod circa taliter demonstratum vel scitum non sunt ponendi tres actus distincti in anima ad enuntiandum conclusionem et cogno-scendum et credendum, seu assentiendum, sic esse vel non sic esse; sed quod idem actus sufficiat ad hoc, et idem actus est conclusio, notitia, et assensus (ibid.).a complexe significabile.! Its meaning derives not from direct sen-sory experience but from mental activity. It is an expression, as opposed to thing, describing a set of relations which has no direct correspondence to an actual object. Hence, although Gregory has throughout stressed that the truth of any proposition rests upon its foundation in experience, this is not the same as saying that it can in itself be directly encountered. Its reality is of a different order; verbal rather than actual.  Now there are three ways in which something? can be said to be. In its most general sense it embraces any sign, simple or complex, true or false; secondly it can denote any sign which is true; finally in its strictest sense it is confined to that which is actually in being, and conversely by this criterion that which does not so exist is nothing. While by the first and second modes the totale significatum can be said to exist, by the third it cannot, as, for example, to say that man is an animal is both a statement and a true one but not something which can be seen in itself. R., as Élie shows in Le complese significabile, here opens the way to what is akin to scepticism in making a distinction between verbal statements and sensory reality. In his case, however, it had the opposite effect, since it enabled him to recognize a true description without seeking to identify it with any specific object in rerum natura. As applied to God's attributes, the divine persons, and sin, we shall see that the innovation of the complexe significabile was employed to reassert the most rigorous traditionalism.  If it is here that complex and simple knowledge diverge, it is also the point at which they meet, for the absence of direct experience in complex knowledge compels it to depend for its truth upon simple knowledge: no simple knowledge, no true  Ad probationem dico quod non assentimus proprie loquendo nisi signi-ficabili per complexum, nec aliunde vere dicimur assentire alicui complexo, nisi quia assentimus ei quid ipsum significat (Prol.). He regards the terms aliquid, ens, and res as synonymous. Tertio modo sumuntur ista ut significant aliquam essentiam sive entitatem  existentem, et hoc modo quid non existit dicitur nihil (ibid.).  * Cum dicitur utrum istud totale significatum sit aliquid, dico quod, si aliquid sumatur pro primo vel secundo modo, est aliquid; si vero tertio modo sumatur, non est aliquid, unde homo esse animal non est aliquid... (ibid.).complex knowledge, is the law governing all valid mental demonstration. There is a constant order between what can be known directly in itself and the judgements which can be made about it; and ultimately the guarantee for the validity of the latter lies in the truth of the former.? As R. says, a proposi-tion is true or false in accordance with the truth or falsity of that to which it refers. Experience is therefore the final arbiter, appeal to which transcends the findings of a conclusion taken in itself and so gives rise to the totale significatum.  From this there follows, finally, the conclusion, or corollary, so momentous for fourteenth-century cosmology, that knowledge of one thing does not entail knowledge of another. It springs  *logically from Gregory's findings over the object of complex knowledge in which judgement must be based upon simple knowledge, and has two aspects. One is R.'s sustained re-buttal of the contention of St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent that there can be a single habit for all knowledge. Apart from in-  stancing the absurdities to which this would lead, in allowing everything to be deduced from first principles, R. bases his arguments upon the character of complex knowledge. Firstly, as we have seen above, a demonstration is true only if it can be verified, and this applies equally to each of the components which make it up. Thus the knowledge (and habit) of the conclusions is not the same as knowledge of the principles; one does not engender the other. Secondly, each proposition must be reached by a separate act of verification: far from knowledge of one lead-ing to knowledge of another, we can know one proposition and  1 Aut notitia conclusionis, id est enuntiabilis per conclusionem, sit notitia nobis naturaliter ex alia prior notitia, aut non. Si non, ergo non est scientia  proprie loquendo unde illud dicitur falsum enuntiabile, cuius enuntiatio est falsa, vel esset falsa si esset, et illud verum, cuius enuntiatio est vera, vel esset vera si formaretur.  Vel aliter, illud dicitur verum quod est enuntiabile per veram enuntiationem, illud falsum quod per falsam non sequitur notitia conclusionis eque preexigit notitiam premissarum,  sicut notitia terminorum nulla autem una enuntiatione nobis naturaliter possibili possunt tam diversa enuntiabilia enuntiari yet be ignorant of others,' for each refers to its own object;ª it can be particular, universal, affirmative, negative, according to its significatum totale. Thirdly, only that knowledge which derives from direct experience can be complete knowledge: to know something a priori is not to know something on account of some-thing else but to infer it from a premiss.' Thus the proposition which tells us that the moon is liable to eclipse does not tell us that such and such an opaque body is the cause of a particular eclipse; that can only be known directly. Knowledge, then, far from being a unity governed by a common habit and a common set of principles is individual, resting ultimately upon specific, veri-fiable experiences. The other aspect of the individuality of knowledge lies in the status of the subject. Duns Scotus had held that the subject of any knowledge contained virtually within itself all the truths pertain-ing to it, and that in God, as the first subject, inhered the habit of all truths." Gregory rejects this view. A subject, and its proper-ties, he says, can be understood in one of two ways: as the terms of a proposition? or as things themselves for which the terms stand.® In the first sense they can obtain either formally in them-selves, if the proposition is a composite one comprising distinct  1 Notitia unius principii potest stare cum ignorantia alterius (Prol.). Significata principiorum sunt alia et alia, et unum non cognositur per  alud, igitur non est unus habitus constat autem quod demonstrationis aliqua est propositio universalis et aliqua particularis, aliquando etiam aliqua est propositio affirmativa, aliqua negativa. Item de diversus predicatis vel subiectis obiective sunt, sicut aliud significatum totale est unius propositionis demonstrationis vocalis, aliud alterius. Ad confirmationem dicendum quod aliud est dictu scire est cognoscere hoc propter hoc. Aliud est dictu scire est cognoscere quod est propter hoc.  Primum enim universaliter verum est... Secundum autem non universaliter, tum quia ille qui scit aliquid precise a priori et per causam non cognoscit quod hoc est propter hoc (Op. Ox. I, Prol. q.3, and Rep. Par. q.I.). premitto quod subiectum et passio in proposito possunt dupliciter accipi: uno modo pro terminis mentalibus quorum unus vel formaliter secundum se  vel quas significant (ibid.).parts, so that both the subject and properties are separate from each other.' Alternatively, if the proposition is not composite but simple, standing for only one term, as it were, then the subject and its properties are equivalent, in the event of which one can be predicated of the other.* In every case the subject and the proper-ties, whether as terms in a mental proposition or as self-subsisting entities, are not implied in each other: that is, one does not virtually contain the other,a nor does one entail knowledge of the other.* In the first place, if the property were contained virtually within the subject, it would not be a property, for it would then become a different thing from the subject, and, as Duns says, be joined to the latter in a causal relation as its effect. Thus, in the case of say a straight line which is divisible, the line and its divisi-bility would become separable entities, so that either, by God's power, the divisibility could exist without the line, or the line, as virtually containing its own divisibility, could divide itself— both absurd. The same position is reached with whatever is con-sidered, as for example, the separation of a creature from his property of annihilability, leaving the latter with no subject.? It is equally inapplicable to God, in whom nothing inheres virtually,  and to the celestial bodies. Si vero propositio non sic componatur.. tunc inquam talis passio mentalis non nisi equivalenter dicitur predicari de subiecto (ibid.). Prima (conclusio] est accipiendo subiectum et passionem secundo modo, non omme subiectum scientie vel principii continet virtualiter primo suam passionem. Secunda quod notitia subiecti non sic continet, scilicet, primo virtualiter notitiam passionis, et si subiectum et passio primo modo accepta non sunt aliud quam notitie incomplexe subiecti et passionis secundo modo acceptorum, ut aliqui volunt, tunc idem dictum, primo modo accipiendo subiectum et passionem, quod subiectum non continet passionem. Si ista passio est alia res etc., vel est aliqua res actu existens in linea, qua ipsa linea est formaliter divisibilis, que vocatur divisibilitas; vel linea non est divisibilis per huius divisibilitatem quam habet actualiter, sed per divisionem quam habet possibiliter. Si detur primum, possibile erit per dei potentiam esse lineam absque tali natura. Patet, tum quia accidens potest esse sine subiecto...  Si detur secundum, igitur linea, quando dividitur, causat divisionem in seipsa, quod est absurdum In the second place, among nothing created does knowledge of one thing entail virtual knowledge of another such that the know-ing of one thing is the cause of knowing something else.1 This conclusion shows the degree to which the Ockhamist cosmology of individual experience had gained currency, even if, as we have stressed, this does not imply scepticism or a purely critical out-look. As we have seen, all knowledge of the external world, that is knowledge which deals with creatures and their relation to one another, depends upon direct experience of what is known.  Hence immediate (intuitive) knowledge of one thing cannot by its very nature engender intuitive knowledge of another not itself directly experienced. Similarly, abstractive knowledge, since it is dependent upon what has previously been known, cannot give rise to further knowledge either intuitively or abstractively.? R. has no difficulty in showing that no virtual knowledge can meet these conditions: knowledge of man does not in itself entail virtual knowledge of his capacity for beatitude or his ability to smile;? in knowing of the existence of rhubarb we do not thereby know virtually its curative properties in purging choler.* To be known these attributes have to be experienced for  themselves.  Thirdly, if our propositions are true only when founded on experience, conversely our experiences do not in themselves lead to demonstrations—the source of scientia in the strict sense.» Thus we can have distinct and separate intuitive knowledge of both rhubarb and of its curative powers without thereby knowing it, as  1.. quia nulla notitia unius rei continet primo virtualiter notitiam alterius.  Loquor de rebus creatis (Prol.) per notititiam intuitivam unius rei non potest haberi intuitiva alterius... et per consequens non primo virtualiter continetur a notitia intuitiva alterius, nec secundum... quia nulla talis [abstractiva notitia] potest haberi nisi pre-habita intuitiva eiusdem rei... Nec tertium potest dici. Tum quia abstractiva non potest esse prima, et per consequens nec primo continere. Tum quia multo minus per abstractivam unius rei potest haberi intuitiva alterius quam per intuitivam. Tertia conclusio probatur, nam multe sunt propositiones immediate que  sunt principia artis et scientic, in quibus predicantur passiones proprie de subiectis, nec tamen ad eas sumendas sufficit notitia incomplexa ctiam distincta  subiecti et notitia distincta passionis (ibid., 16 B).a universal truth, that rhubarb purges choler: this is the property of propositions which make up complex knowledge.' Thus, simple knowledge does not virtually contain complex know-ledge.* In the same way, one principle cannot be inferred from another, for in any demonstration each has to be known imme-diately, nor can the conclusion be known from the subject or knowledge of the subject. We have thus, as it were, boxed the compass in rejecting any source of knowledge other than simple intuitive experience and any means of understanding (or scientia) other than complex propositions. In the one case each component must be given in experience; in the other a separate mental process of affirmation and negation is needed. Neither therefore permits knowledge, least of all universal knowledge, through one first and all-embracing subject; as this would short-circuit the processes necessary for reaching a true demonstration as just adumbrated. In short, since one thing cannot be known from another, and cause cannot be inferred from effect, there can be no way to the universal knowledge contained in propositions other than by individual experience; while, for their part, individual propositions must be combined into a demonstration before they yield universal truths.  What, then, is the subject of knowledge? If the subject is taken to mean that which is signified in reality, as opposed to one element in a mental proposition, and knowledge is regarded as that which is signified in a specific demonstration, then the subject of knowledge is that which is. Thus in the statement that a line is I etiam si quis novit(a) quod hoc singulare rheubarum est purgativum cholere, et illud, et sic de pluribus, ad habendum notitiam universalem, quod omne rheubarum etc, necessario requiritur quedam alia notitia universalis non causata ex illis singularibus. Ms. Univ.: noverit.  Ex his patet quod notitie incomplexe subiecti distincte et predicati seu passionis non continet primo virtualiter notitiam complexam principii. Quarta conclusio quod unum principium non continet primo virtualiter aliud seu una premissa aliam quia subiectum seu notitia subiecti non continet primo virtualiter pro-positiones immediatas, igitur nec conclusionem. Quinta [conclusio] quod subiectum scientie non continet virtualiter primo omnes veritates illius scientie divisible the subject is the line as divisible.' If, however, we speak of the subject as part of a mental demonstration, then the subject is one part of the total knowledge thus gained; for, unlike the object of knowledge, which is reached by a complex of judgement and experience, the subject is simple.? Taking knowledge in the wider sense as a collection of conclusions all pertaining to a single body of scientia, there will then be as many subjects of such knowledge as there are conclusions and objects known,* as in the case of the subjects which go to make up logic or medicine. Here the determining factor will be the nature of the subject in question." Accordingly, Gregory's entire treatment of the relation of the different kinds of knowledge, and of their parts, to one another is governed by the experience which we gain of them. The validity of anything known springs from the evidence which experience provides, and that experience can only be of individuals. It is at once the bond which unites and the barrier which divides the simple and the complex, the subject and the object. There remains to be considered self-evident knowledge. It difters from both purely simple individual apprehension and trom demonstration, and indeed strictly speaking from a proposition at all, in dealing with necessary truths immediately evident to all.  As defined by Gregory, it is a statement or its equivalent, the  1 dico quod subiectum scientie est illud quid scitur per illam esse tale. Et ratio subiecti, seu esse subiectum, est scire esse tale vel tale, verbi gratia, huius scientia qua scitur omnem lineam rectam finitam esse divisibilem in duo media.  Subiectum est linea; ipsa enim scitur esse divisibilem etc., et ipsam esse subiec-tum huius scientie non est aliud quam ipsam sciri esse divisibilem etc (Prol.  supposito quodtalis conclusio mentalis non sit actus simplex...sed essenti-aliter sit composita ex subiecto et predicato sicut propositio vocalis et scripta ...et sic subiectum scientie est pars scientie actualisquia subiectum secundum omnes est aliquid incomplexum. Si vero loquamur de scientia secundo modo dicta, sicut eius sunt plures conclusiones et plura obiecta scita, sic etiam sunt plura subiecta.  Et ista patent discurrendo per ea que communiter assignantur subiecta in scientiis... quam etiam per rationem, quantum non apparet taliter qualiter tot partiales scientie dicantur ad unam scientiam totalem pertinere (ibid., P).Gregorius Ariminensis. Gregorio da Rimini. Rimini. Keywords: complesso significabile, semplice, complesso, animale, pane, l’animale percezione del pane, Socrate is seated, truth-functionality, scuola italiana, scuola di Bologna, studi generali in Italia, studio di Rimini. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Rimini” – The Swimming-Pool Library.