Villa Speranza: GRICE E CAPOCASALE

Grice e Capocasale: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei segni di dialettica – scuola di Montemurro – filosofia basilicatese -- filosofia italiana – Luigi Speranza, pel Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice, The Swimming-Pool Library (Montemurro). Filosofo basilicatese. Filosofo italiano. Montemurro, Potenza, Basilicata. Grice: “You gotta love Capocasale; my favourite is his ‘corso filosofico,’ which the monks rendered as ‘CVRSVS PHILOSOPHICVS,’ almost alla Witters! Capocasale multiplies the principles of reason – I thought there was just one – On top, he uses the trouser-word, ‘vero,’ – so he thinks he is philosophising about the ‘vero principio della ragione,’ or its plural! In fact, he is philosophising about conversational implicature!” Figlio di Lorenzo e Maria Lucca, sin da ragazzino aiuta il padre nel suo mestiere di fabbro ferraio. Nel tempo libero si dedica alla filosofia, mostrando grande attitudine nella filosofia romana antica in particolare. Con la morte del padre, avvenuta quando C. aveva 15 anni, visse tra Corleto Perticara, Stigliano e San Mauro Forte, procurandosi da vivere come insegnante privato, dedicandosi contemporaneamente allo studio della filosofia e del diritto. Dopo esser stato governatore baronale di Sarconi, incarico ottenuto appena ventenne, lasciò la Basilicata per trasferirsi a Napoli, conseguendo la laurea in giurisprudenza. Dopo gli studi universitari, insegnò filosofia nella scuola dallo stesso fondata a Napoli. Vestì l'abito talare e fu nominato da Ferdinando IV precettore di logica e di metafisica all'Napoli. Perse tale incarico con l'arrivo di Giuseppe Bonaparte: sotto il suo governo gli fu concessa solamente la docenza privata. Con la restaurazione, Ferdinando IV lo nominò vescovo di Cassano. C., tuttavia, preferendo l'insegnamento, rinunciò alla carica, così come fece più tardi con l'incarico di pari grado conferitogli per la diocesi di Sora-Aquino-Pontecorvo. Sempre nell'ateneo partenopeo ebbe la cattedra di diritto di natura e delle genti: i suoi teoremi, di stampo lockiano, ebbero una certa risonanza, tanto da essere citati da filosofi come Fiorentino, Gentile e Garin. Alcuni suoi discepoli divennero importanti personalità culturali del tempo come Francesco Iavarone, Quadrari, Scorza, Arcieri e Mazzarella. Sempre fedele alla monarchia borbonica, si schierò contro le insurrezioni carbonare. Precettore del futuro re delle Due Sicilie: Ferdinando II. Fu inoltre membro di varie Accademie come la Parmense, la Fiorentina, la Cosentina, l'Augusta di Perugia, Aletina e Renia di Bologna, degli Intrepidi di Ferrara, de' Nascenti e degli Assorditi di Urbino, dei Filoponi di Faenza. Altre opere:“Divota novena del gloriosissimo taumaturgo S. Mauro” (Roma); “Esercizio di divozione verso il glorioso confessore S. Rocco” (Napoli); “Cursus philosophicus” (Napoli); “Saggio di politica privata per uso dei giovanetti ricavata dagli scritti dei più sensati pensatori” (Napoli); “Catechismo dell'uomo e del cittadino” (Napoli); “Codice eterno ridotto in sistema secondo i veri principi della ragione e del buon senso” (Napoli); “Saggio di fisica per giovanetti” (Napoli); “Istituzioni elementari di matematica” (Napoli); “Corso filosofico per uso dei giovanetti”. Dizionario biografico degl’italiani -- un filosofo lucano alla corte dei Borboni. Quoniam PHILOSOPHIA est scientia quae viam ad felicitatem sternit. Ea vero rationis solius ductu cognoscitur, ac demostrationis ope vernm investigat. In vero autem inveniendo methodus utramque facit paginam. Patet primum FILOSOFI studium esse debere, intellectum, sive facultatem cogitandi, ad veritatem methodice investigandam, ac di iudicandam aptum reddere, eumque mediis opportunis acuere, vel, si morbo aliquo laboret, salutaribus eidem mederi remediis. Et quia veritas per demonstrationem invenitur et iudicatur. Demonstratio vero methodo perficitur. Liquet, ei necessarium esse, mentem quoque ad demonstrationem, ac methodum ad sue facere, ut in eo habitum adquirat, in quo FILOSOFI scientia consistit. Quamvis vero omnes homines naturali quodam verum cognoscendi, iudicandi, rationes denique conficiendi facultate praediti sint, eaque a multis usu, atque exercitatione ad summum usqne perfectionis gradum sit redacta: quum tamen plurimis erroribus sint obnoxii, nisi facultatem illam regulis quibusdam certis, at que indubiis dirigant, disciplina aliqua in veniatur, oportet, quae regulas ac praecepta tradat, quibus naturalis illa cogitandi vis augeatur, perficiatur, et ad veritatis investigationem in offenso pede dirigatur. Naturalis haec percipiendi, iudicandi, ratiocinandi que vis LOGICA NATURALIS appellatur, quae qunn in casuum similium observatione, adeoqne in sola praxi consistat, non solum erroribus est obnoxia sed rerum causas et rationes ignorans, confusam tantummodo cognitionem, non vero scientiam producere potest. Ex quo legitime fluit LOGICAE ARTIFICIALIS necessitas. Disciplina haec vulgo LOGICA ARTIFICIALIS appellatur, quam definimus per doctrinam, qua regulae traduntur, quibus, humana mens in cognoscenda, et di iudicanda veritate dirigatur. Vocatur haec a non nullis PHILOSOPHIA RATIONALIS, ARS COGITANDI, et kat i Sony LOGICA. Logicae Prolegomena quae tantum abest, ut essentialiter a Naturali differat, ut sit potius distincta eiusdem explicatio, adeoque tanto illa praestantior quanto distincta cognitio praestat confusae. Ex quo patet, FILOSOFI sola Logica naturali esse non posse contentum, sed ei colendam esse artificialem. Quandoquidem autem Logica artificialis leges explicat naturalem iudicandi facultatem dirigentes: sequitur ut eas ex mentis humanae natura deducat, adeoque mentis operationes prius, carum que naturam distincte explicare; deinde vero eam in veritatis investigatione, atque examine veluti manuducere debeat: uno verbo, ut prima theoriam, deinde praxin ostendat. Vltro ergo mihi sese offert genuina Logicae divisio, in THEORETICAM ET PRACTICAM. Atque hinc est, cur opusculum hoc in duas partes distribuerimus. In quarum prima de mentis operationibus. In altera de legitimo carum usu, quantum satis erit, tractabimus. Quoniam autem humana mens triabus modis res cognoscit; vel enim eas tan tummodo percipit, vel de iis iudicium profert, vel denique rationes conficit. De tribus his mentis operationibus priore parte agemus. Quumque veritates vel per se pateant, vel per rationem et meditationern inveniantur, vel denique ex aliorum scri Prolegomena. ptis hauriantur: inventae vero cum aliis communicentur. De omnibus his parte secunda non nulla haud proletaria monebimus. Experientia namque constat, nos omnis cognitionis expertes in mundum prodire (quidquid pro ideis innatis Platonici, et Cartesiani clamitent), atque primo res simpliciter perei pere, earumque ideas adquirere, deinde binas inter se conferre, tandem eas cum aliqua tertia idea comparare, indeque novas veritates deducere. Mentis actio, qua res aliquas sensibus obvias percipit, aut ab iis abstrahendo novas imagines sibi format, PERCEPTIO, sive idea dicitur: quum hinas ideas invicena confett, IVDICIVM: dum vero eas cum aliis comparat, atque inde novas veritates elicit RATIOCINIVM nominatur. Nec aliae attente consideranti mentis operationes occurrere pote runt. Scholion. De Logicae utilitate non est, quod plura dicamus. Quamvis enim quam plurimi eam scriptis suis ad astra tulerint; quisque tainen in se huiusmodi periculum facere poterit: nam quidquid ex recta ratione capiet emolumenti, id omne huic disciplinae se debere, aperto cognoscet. Prima mentis hnmanae operatio est SIMPLEX PERCEPTI, sive NOTIO sive NOTA sive SIGNUM, quam definimus per simplicem rei alicuius re-praesentationem in mente factam praesentationem autem intelligunt ad curatio res assimilationem eorum, quae sunt extra ens, in eodem. Dici quoque solet idea, conceptus, vel sim. Per rea plex apprehensio, ut scholis placuit. Sunt, qui perceptionem ab idea distinguendam putant, atque illam esse aiunt, mentis actionem in obiecto percipiendo. Hanc vero ipsam abiecti imaginem menti percipienti obviam, Sunt, qui eas terminis tantum differre docent. Quidquid id est, nobis placuit perceptionem cum idea confundere. Ad eoque nusquain hic de huiusmodi distinctione sermo cadet. Ideam alii definiunl per imaginem menti obversantem. Buddeus Phil. instrum. cum observ. alii per exemplar rei in cigitante. Hollmannus Log. Sed hae, aliaeqne definitiones eodem redeunt. Repraesentationis vox absque definitione ad sumi poierat, quum sit cuique nota. Sed ut methodici rigoris amatoribus non nihil daremus eam ita explicavimus, sequuti Baumeisterum Quoniam itaque notio est rei re-praesentatio. In omni autem re-praesentatione duo considerarida veniunt, nem, pe modus re-praesentandi, et obiectum, sive res ipsa quae re-praesentatur: liquet, in qualibet idea itidem duo animadverti posse, scilicet percipiendi modum, et obiecta nempe res perceptas; quorum ille FORMA, haec MATERIA idearum recte dicuntur. Si ergo ideae ad formam referantur consideratio illa dicetur FORMALIS. Si vero ad materiam, OBIECTIVA, vel Realis appellabitur, Et quia utroque respectu ideae inter se differunt: de formali ac materiali earum differentia diversis sectionibus agemus. MATE B nos De formali idearum differentia Experi Xperientia abunde constat quaedam ita percipere, ut ca ab aliis inter noscere possimus, quaedam vero non ita. Re-praesentatio illa quae sufficit ad rem perceptam ab aliis dignoscendam, idea di citur CLARA; OBSCURA contra, quae ad eam discernendam est insufficiens. Vnde idea recte dividitur in claram et obscuram E. Rosae ideam claram habes, ei eam a lilio, hiacynto, aliisque floribus distinguere scias, et quoties cumque tibi occurrit, eam dem agnoscas; contra si arborem peregrinam videas, eamque a reliquis plantis discernere nequeas, arboris illius ideam habes obscuram. Huiusmodi sunt ideae infantum recens natorum, hominum bene potorum, eorumqne, qui lethargo oppressi reperiuntur. CLARITAS enim Physicis est ille lucis effectus, cuius operes externas circa nos positas alias ab aliis distingnere possumus; contra vero OBCVRITAS est claritatis absentia, scilicet tenebrarum eftectus: nam quun tenebrae in lucis privatione consistant, haec vero obiecta externa distinguere faciat. Deficiente luce, deficit distinctionis facilitas: adeoque obscuritas in distinguendi impotentia sita est. Quum res existentes innumeris determinationibus et circumstantiis involutae observentur. Hae vero, nisi attente consideranti, sensuumqne aciem ad obiecta convertenti, innotescere non possint, ut experientia patet: recte infertur eo clariorem fieri ideam, quo plura possunt in obiecta distingui; adeoque ad claram idean adquirendam requiri sensus cum attentione coniunctos, qua deficiente, ideas fieri deteriores Esenplo sit hono in maxima distantia constitutus, qnem qui vilet, primo dubius hae ret, utrum corp is quidlibet sit, an vivens; deinde in obiectum illud oculorun aciem attente convertens, a motu animal esse comperit, sed cuiusnam speciei, nescit; propius vero accedenten, ho nisen distinguit; tandem ex corporis habiti, facie, aliis que circumstantiis Titium agnoscit. Vides quan attente spectator consideraverit, ut Titium cognosceret! Quem admodun ideae meliores funt, si ex obscuris clarae evadant, ex confusis distin ctae, ex inadaequatis adaequatae: ita deterio res redduntur, si ex claris fiant obscurae ex distinctis confusae ex adaequatis inadaequatae. Quia vero ab attentione penlet claritas idearum, eaque gralus habet, nec semper, aut in omnibus eadem est: liquet res alias aliis clarius a no 7 38 Logic. Pars 1. bis percipi posse, ideoque obscuritatem dari non modo ABSOLVTAM sed RELATIVAM. Hinc obscuritatis caussam plerumquc in hominibus, raro in re percepta quaeren dam esse; ac proinde praecipitanter iu dicare illos, qui absolute obscura esse di cunt, quae eorum superant captum: quo ut quae ignorant (ut Aesopica vul pes ) exsecrentur. * Obscuritas vel absoluta est, vel relativa. Illa habetur quum res percepta ab aliis prorsus internosci' non potest; haec autem, quando rem qampiam aliqui subobscure, quidam clar re, clarius alii percipiunt. Quod quum acci dit, illorum claritas respectu maioris horum claritatis est obscuritas relativa. fit Quoniam autem ad idearum clarita tem utramque facit paginam attentio, qua deficiente deteriores fiunt: con Sequens est ut obscurae eyadant perce ptiones, si alicui meditationi defisi alia percipiamus, vel si unico actu plura aut animo subiiciamus, denique si ab una perceptione ad aliam celerrime transeamnus. Et quia adfectus attentionem turbant, ut cxperientia docet: infertur menten adfectibus agitatam ad ideas cla ras vel numquam, vel raro admodum per, venire. Adfectus enim sunt motus quidam vehementiores appetitus sensitivi ex idearum obscuritate, et confusione orti, de quibus abunde in Psy chologia disseremus, adeoque iis praedominan tibus nullae, nisi obscurae confusaeve ideae haberi possunt. Si namque in ideis claritas et distinctio adesset, nullis adfectibus animus ve xaretur. Hinc ergo est, ut a Philosophis ad fectus inter errorum caussas enumerentur. Exemplo sit homo ira aestuans, qui donec ea agitatur, nec res clare percipere, nec perce ptionum suarum conscius esse potest. Vid. Seneca de Ira, et apud Virg. Aen. Furor, iraque mentem prae cipitant.Vides hinc, obscuritatis caussas easdem esse, quae attentionem turbant vel minuunt: nem pe distractionem, obiectorum multipli citatem, praeproperam festinationem, denique adfectuum praedominium. Quae omnia mentem frustra fatigant, et ad proficiendum în studiis ineptam reddunt. Sed quia Philosophus non solis stare sensibus; rerum autem latebras et recessus idest caussas et rationes inve stigare debet: per se patet 10. eum claris notionibus adquiescere non pos adeoque il. in distinctarum et adae quatarum perceptionum statu versari debe re ut infra dicemus. se; Clarae namque ideae attento sensuum usu ad Logic. Pars I. quiruntur; sensus autem, ut mox adparebit, res tantummodo exsistentes confuse repraesentant', in quarum cognitione nullum ra tio habet exercitium: nihil ergo Philosophus age Tet; nec hihim quidem in scientia proficeret si claris dumtaxat ideis contentus rationem ne gligeret, nec in caussarum inve stigatioue adlaboraret. Eadem experientia docet, nos re rum quas clare percipimus, vel notas sive characteres quibus ab aliis discer nuntur, distincte nobis sistere posse, eo rum scilicet ideam claram nabere; vel characteres illos invicem non posse digno sive ipsos obscure percipere. Re praesentatio clara' notarum obiecti, quod percipimus, idea dicitur DISTINCTA: repraesentatio contra notarum obscura, vo catur idea CONFUSA. Idea clara proin de merito dividitur in distinctam, et con fusan. seere 8 Si quis invidiam novit esse taedium ob alterius felicitatem, illius characteres sibi clare sistit, adeoque invidiae ideam habet distin ctam. Si vero coloris nigri notas distinguere nequeat, licet eum ab aliis coloribus discer nat, ejusdem ideam habet confusam: uti sunt omnes ideae colorum, saporum, sonorum, odo rum, etc., quorum characteres prorsus igno ramus. Distinctio haec a Cartesio, et Leibniz E. Cap. I. De Ideis. 41 tio inventa fuit: alii namque grammatica vo cum significatione decepti, ideas claras'ét di stinctas obscuras et confusas 'unum idemque esse docebant. Quum idea distincta sit notio clara notarum; ad claritatem autem notionum permultum conferat attentio: consequens est ut clarae ideae di stinctae fiant potissimum attentione, qua deficiente, etiamsi distinctae sint, confu sae evadant. Et quia singulae notae peculiaribus gaudent nominibus, qui bus exprimuntur: infertur CRITERIVM ideae distinctae id esse, si cogitala nostra aliis.cxponere, atque con is com municare queainus; oppositum autem ess: indicium ideae confusae. Hinc idcas confusas aliis referre volentes, objecta, quae confuse percepimus, ipsis ostendere, vel cum alia re, de qua ideam habent claram, comparare debemus. * Res clarior fiet exemplis supra allatis. Qui notionem invidiae habet distinctam, is eam verbis explicare poterit: quod recte ex sequetur, si notas, quib:is a:lfectuš iste ab aliis distinguitur, eau neret. Contra ei, quo modo coloris albi aut rubri nolas proferet, ut cum aliis eius notionenı corninunicet? Pro cul dubio, ut ab illo intelligatur, colorem illum, aut rem quampiar confuse perceptam, ipsius oculis admovere, vel cum alia re iarna nota conferre oportebit, sicque in altero con fusa quoque idea orietur. Hinc est, ut colo rum ideas coeco nato nullo modo explicarc possimus, isque visu carens nullam, nequi dem obscuram, umquam huiusmodi notionem adquirere queat. Porro rei, cuius distinctam habe mus ideam, vel omnes novimus characte res ad eam in statu quolibet agnoscendam sufficientes, et tunc idea distincta erit COMPLETA; vel quosdam tantum eosque insufficientes, eaqne INCOMPLETA dicetur. * Idea ergo distincta dispescitur in completam, et incompletam. Sic invidiae idea iam tradita completa est: adsunt enim notae sufficientes ad eam in statu quolibet internoscendam. Si ve ro hominem cum Platone definires per ani mal bipes implume, notionem haberes incom pletam: * hae namque notae non sufficiunt ad hominem semper ab aliis rebus discernendum, ut ostendit Diogenes Cynicus, dum hanc Pla tonis sententian irridendo improbavit. Nec eam postea coinpletam reddere potuerunt Platonis discipuli, addito latorum unguium charactere: nusquam enim homines a simiis discernere illa nota valebat. Laert. Licet duo clarissimiViri Leibnitius, et Wol. Cap. 1. de Ideis. 43 fius semper et ubique in eamdem sententiam ierint: in hoc tamen hic ab illo discessit. Quumque Leibnitius omnem ideam distinctam completam esse docuerit: Wolffins contra eam in completam, et incompletam dividi debere, docuit et demonstravit. a Denique eadem experientia edocti scimus, nos quaedam ita percipere, ut non solum eorumdem characteres singilla tim agnoscamus, sed et novas characte rum notas enumerare queamus;. quorum dam vero solis distinctis ideis adquiescere. Quum notarum characteristicarum notione gaudemus distincta; idea totalis erit ADAEQUATA; quum antem notas neb; confuse repraesentamus, idea oritur INA DAEQUATA. Quo fit, ut distinctam ideam rursus dividanius in adaequatam, et inadaequatam. E. g. Si quis invidiae notas rursus evolvat, sciatque taedium esse sensum imperfectionis, et felicitatem determinet per siatum durabilis gaudii: is invidiae idlea adaequata gandebit. Si vero in solis invidiae characteribus ail juie scat: nec ulterius in iis evolvendis progredia tur, tunc ideam habebit inadaequitam. Ob servandum tamen, quod quo novas notas, donec fieri possit, invenire liceat, eo adaequatior evadet notio. Hanc porro doctrinam Leibnitio debemus, qui eam in Actis Erud. Acad. Lips. semper 44 Logic. proposuit, eumque suo more sequutus est Wolffius Logic. ANALYSIS IDEARUM est formas tio idearum adaequatarum. Quumque idea fiat adequatioi, si novos semper cha racteres invenire liceat: patet eo adaequatiorem fieri notionem, quo longius eius analysis procedere. Quoniam vero ob sensuura limites non possumus plura distincte percipere: infertur 16. nos in notionum analysi" in infinitum progredi non posse: ideoque quum ad notas vel simplices, vel cuique claras perven. tum fuerit uiterius eam instituere prohi bemur. Notionum analysis Medicoruin anatomiae simi lis est. Quemadinodum enim Medici corpus humanum in partes dividunt, easque depuo in alias aliasque particulas resolvunt, donec ad exilissima tandem filamenta perveniant, om nes interim earum connexiones, structuram, et proprictates attente perscrutantes: ita et Phi Josophi idearum noías singillatim perquirunt, easque iterum atque tertio in novas notas mente resolventes, minima quacque adcurate contemplantur. Sicuti ergo Medicis, quum ad indivisihiles particulas pervenerint, eas in novas rursus se care non licet: Philosophis etiam ea facultas Cap. I. De Ideis. 45 ademta est in analysi notionum, si vel ad simplicia et indivisibilia, vel ad clara et evi dentia fuerit pervenlum, vel finis obtentus sit, ob quem fuerat analysis instituta. SECTIO II. De obiectiva, sive materiali idearum differentia. 28. Haecaec de divisione idearum formali. Ad, materialem, sive obiectivam quod at tinet, primo res, quas nobis repraesen {are possumus, vel sunt exsistentes, vel proprietates iis communes. Quidquid exsi stit dicitur INDIVIDVVM, sive RES SINGULARIS: individuum autem defiuiri po test id, quod est omnimode determina tum. Repraesentatio ergo individui vo catur idea SINGULARIS sive INDIVI DVALIS. E. g. “Socrates”, “Plato”, Aristoteles, Caius, Titius, haec dumus, haec mensa, hic liber quem legis, sunt individua, quia in unoqucque eorum adsunt tales circumstaniiae et detern ina tiores, ut Socrates sit Socrates, et non Plato, Caius sit praecise Caius, et non alius: ita ut si aliqua earum desit, desinant esse quae prius erant. Hinc individuum idem est cum uno mathemat.co, quod concipitur tanquam individuum in se, et ab aliis separatum. Iu re igitur individuum res singularis; ideoque eius perceptio singularis pariter adpellatur. Quamvis autem individua sint omni mode determinata hoc est innumeris circumstantiis involuta), quae efficiunt, ut ea longe inter se differant: bent tamen aliquas determinaliones, in quibus perpetuo conveniunt. Harum de terminationum complexus aliam ideam su periorem constituit, quae SPECIES dicitur. Non iniuria ergo species a recentio. ribus definitur per similitudinem indivi duorum. Determinationis vocabulum, licet barbariem redoleat, iure tamen hic a nobis adhibetur, et quia civitate donatum, et oh termini pu rioris deficientiam. Absque definitione por, ro sumitur utpote experientia seusuque com muni satis notum; eius vero completam no tionem dabimus in Ontologia, ubi methodici rigoris amatóribus abunde satisfiet. E. g. Socrates, Plato, Caius, Titius, licet aetate, ingenio, roribus, conditione, habitu, ceterisque inter se multum distent, habent tamen commuue corpus organicum, et animain ratione praeditam. Duae hae de terminationes speciem constituunt, qnae ho m, dicitur. Hinc vides, haec omnia individua in eo siunilia esse, quod sint homincs. Si plurium specierun pariter cir cumstantias consideremus videbimus eas in plurimis toto, ut aiunt, coelo differre; in aliquibus vero perpetuo similes esse. Atque hae determinaciones, in quibus spe. cies, licet diversissimae, perpetuo conve. niunt, novam ideam, eamque supremam, constituunt, quae GENVS vocatur. Genus ergo recte definitur per similitudinem specierum. E. g. “homo”, “equus”, leo, canis, quantumli bet in tot determinationibus invicem diffe rant, habent tamen in vita et sensione con venientiam. His circumstantiis conflatur genus, cui animalis nomen inditum. Observes ita que, omnes illas species in hoc esse per petuo similes, quod animalia nominentur, adcoque legitimam esse definitionem generis traditam, 31. Quum genus sit similitudo specie rum (S. 30. ), idque constituatur a com plexu circumstantiarum, in quibus species perpetuo conveniunt; in speciebns autem aliae determinationes exsistant, quibus il lae inter se differunt: sequitur 1, ut non abs se harum proprietatuin di versificantium summa a Philosophis voce tur DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA * E. g. Invidia et commiseratio id habent commune, quod sint taedium. En genus. In eo ve ro differuut, quod invidia sit taedium ob alte rius felicitatem; commiseratio vero ob infelici tatem. Id ipsum constituit differentiam specificam. 32. Repraesentatio, quae exhibet pro prietates rebus exsistentibus communes, di citur idea VNIVERSALIS. Et quia notio nes generum et specierum determinationes continent pluribus speciebus vel individuis communes: infertur ideas generum et specierum esse universa Jes. Rursus quoniam hae ideau couficiun tur, si determinationes aliquas ab aliis se paratas consideremus; unum vero sine altero considerare dicitur AB STRAHERE; liquido patet 3. ideas uni versales esse quoque ABSTRACTAS. Hinc est, ut vulgo dicatur, ideas esse vel concretas, in quibus omnes simul adsunt de terminationes; vel abstractas, quae aliquas tantum exhibent mentis abtractione ab aliis seiunctas: quod idem est, ac si dicas, omnes ideas vel singulares esse, vel universales. Ex dictis porro consequitur 4. ideas universales non exsistere, nisi in singula ribus, nempe speciem ac genus nusquam inveniri, nisi in individuis; adeoque 5. plus esse in individuis, quam in specie; plus quoque in speciebus, quam in genere. Ex quo patet 6. quam scite Logici pro puntiaverint: Notionis extensionem esse in retione inversa comprehensionis. * Regula haec aliter ab aliis enunciatur, sci licet: Ono maiorem habet idea comprehensio nein, eo minorem habet extensionem, ct con tra. Comprehensio dicitur complexus determi dationum, quae ideam aliquam constituunt. Ex tensio vero est consideratio subiectorum, qui bus delerminationes illae tribui possunt. Vid. la Logique, ou l'art de penser. Quum ergo individuum omnimodas determina tiones complectatur, ad unum tantum subiectum extenditur; genus vero paucissimas comprehendens circumstantias ad plu rima subiecta referri, nemo non videt. Posita igitur regulae illius veritate, nullo negotio intelligitur 7. nec ab individuo ad speciem, neque a spe cie ad genus umquam posse duci conclu sionem; ac proinde 8. non licere generi tribui, quod speciei convenit, aut ab illo removeri, quod huic repugnat; contra vero a genere ad speciem, atque ab hac ad individuum bene concludi, ideoque individuo dandum, quod speciei convenit, pariterque speciei tribuendum esse quidquid generi convenire observatur. Et recte ! nam nam in individuo comprehensio maior est, extensio minor, quam in specie, ut et in hac relate ad genus. Quidquid ergo de individuo enunciatur, eius proprietates differentiales; si ita loqui fas sit, respicit, quae in speciem non ingrediuntur: ac proin de de hac enunciari nequit. Eodem modo, quae de specie dicuntur, differentiam tantum specificam spectant: genus autem proprieta tes multis speciebus communes continet; adeo que speciei attributa nullo modo cum genere coniungi possunt. Res clarior fiet exemplo. Socrates est individuum, in quo omnimoda invenitur determinatio; id vero sub hominis specie comprehenditur. De So crate' recte enunciabis, quod fuerit philoso phus, quia attributum hoc ei convenit ob scientiam, qua praeditus erat, quaeque inter Socratis proprielátes individuales enumeratur. Possesne id de specie, idest de homine pronuntiare? Minime quidem: in determinationibus enim hominis specificis non scientia, sed scientiae capacitas, nempe ra tio ', invenitur. Contra hanc regulam peccare solent susurrones quidam, qui vitia vel de fectus in aliquo, vel aliquibus individuis for san occurrentia toti speciei, coelui, vel clas si imputare non erubescunt. Quum enim genus in specie, species pariter in individuo, contineatur): quidquid generi conyepit, cum specie coniungi; et quik uid speciei convenit, de individuo quo cap. de Ideis que enunciari debet aeque, ac ab his removeri quod ab illis discrepat.E. g. Animal sentit, ergo homo sentit: homo est intelligens, quia libet igitur homo intelligens est etc. Res exsistentes rursus vel inira nos sunt vel extra nos. Prioris classis sunt omnes animae actiones; posterioris vero obiecta quaecumque sensibus nostris obyer santia, vel mutationes in corpore humano ciusque organis supervenientes. SENSV INTERNO percipiuntur, sive REFLEXIONE, hae contra SENSIBVS EXTERNIS. Liquet ergo 10, ideas omnes singulares sola sensionc adquiri * Illae * Intra nos sunt affectus, et cogilationes vo strae, quae interno sensu, conscientia refle xione (haec opinia idem significant ) perci piuntur. E. g. si quis tristitiam, vel metum sentiat, ciusque idcam sibi formet, hanc sensu intern:), sive conscientia, nempe atlen tione ad proprias actiónes adplicatà, adqui sivisse dicitur. Extra nos porro sunt omnia alia obiecta etsistentia sensibus obvia. Sic in deas omnes singulares, quaecumque illae sint, sensibus percipi, nemo ignorat: superfluun enim ' esset id ' exemplis illustrare. Cuilibet autem de plebe noturn est, exter sensus quinque numerari, visum nein pe, auditum, olfactnm, gustum, et tactum, nos. iisque totidem organa esse destinata; visui scilicet cculum, auditui aurem, olfactui na res, gustui linguam, tactui denique specia tim manus, generaliter vero totam corporis humani superficiem. 36. Quum ergo res exsistentes sensibus percipiantur; ideoque ideae sin gulares sensione adquirantur; ex singula ribus vero universales sola mentis abstra ctione formentur: liquido infer tuir 11. omnes ideas vel SENSIÚNE, vel ABSTRACTIONE fieri dooque adeo esse ideas adquirendi mcdos. ** * nem * Et hoc est, quod a multis docelur, omnes ideas partim SENSIONE, partim ABSTRACTIONE, partim CONSCIENTIA, vel REFLEXIONE adquiri. Vid. Heinec. Logic.Nos enim sensio cum conscientia et reflexione confundi debere. Addunt alii tertium adhuc ideas formandi modum ARBITRARIAM scilicet COMBINATIONEM, veluti quum quis ideam hominis cum idea equi componit, novamque Centauri notionem conficit: cuius census sunt etiam notiones montis aurei, intellectus perfectissimi etc., quae nihil aliud revera sunt, nisi ice rum prius sensione adquisitarum combinatiores ab intellectu, vel phaniasia in unum redactae, pro quarum veritate generalem tradunt regulam: Si ideae arbitrio coniunctae sibi con tradixerint, impossibiles sunt, adeoque fal sae (quae alio nomine CHIMERICAE, a Scola sticis ENTIA RATIONIS vocantur ); si vero inter se non repugnent, pro possibilibus, adeoque pro veris sunt habendae. TITIAS esse. Ex quibus omnibus plane consequi tur 12. recte adfirmari a Philosophis, i deas omnes ex earum origine vel ADVEN. vel FACTITIAS. * INNA TAE namqne ab omnibus negantur, quid quid de iis praedicent Plato, Cartesius eorumque asseclae, quorum tamen au ctoritas tanta non est, ut eorum insomniis a sanioris Philosophiae cultoribus praebea tur adsensus, ut in Psychologia distinctius adparebit. Per adventitias enim intelligunt notiones sen sique adquisitas: per fictitias vero illas quae vel abstractione vel arbitraria combinatione fiunt. Plato namque animas humanas ab aeterno praeexsistentes posuit singulas singula astra inhabitantes, qnibus Deus monstruvii universi naturam, ac leges frtales edixit: sed quum a diis inferioribus Dei ministris mones 'vocat in corpora fatali necessitate inclusa fuissent eo rum omnium, aeternis ideis prius e rant intuitae, statim ob quos dae. quae in Jitas, non nisi longo sensuum usu, àc nedita tione pristipam cognitionem recuperare. Plat. in Timaeo. Hinc vulgatum eius effatum: Stu et discere idem esse, ac reminisci. CICERONE – TUSCUL. QUAEST. Illas ergo ideas, quas antea habebant, vocavit innatas. Sed quum id purum putumque sit Platonis som nium, nequaquam erimus de eo refutando solliciti. Cartesius hoc nomine donavit facul tatem homini competentem omnia intelligibilia videndi. Respons, ad art. 14: progranm. ann. Sed pèr hanc rectam rationem intelligi, quisque videt, quam proin de ideam adpellare est potentiam cum actu confundere. Cartesiani denique per ideas in natas intellexerunt axiomata quaedam eviden tia, quae ab ipsa cogitaudi facultate ortum ducunt, veluti: totum csse maius qualibet sui parte; non posse idem simul csse, et non esse ctc. At quis rerum omnium ignarus iguo rat, haec esse pura judicia, quae a termino runi illorum relatione, ac ab ideis totius et partis, exsisteniiue et non exsistentiae, sen su et abstractione prius adquisitis immediate pendent? Quae quum ita sini, ideas invatas nullo modo dari posse, merito concludimus. 38. Ideae praeterea sunt aliae SIMPLICES, a quibus nihil mente abstrahere pos sumus, aliae COMPOSITAE, bus per mentis abstractionem plura divi dere, atque invicem separare licet. in qui Ex quo necessaria consequutione conficitur 13. simplices ideas claras esse, at confu sas; compositas vero etiam distinctas. Tales sunt ideae omnes colorum, sonorum saporum, voluptatis, taedii, quas ideo aliis explicare non possumus, nec illarum chara cteres invicem discernere, ut ita üs'definien dis omnino incapaceś simus. ** Sic in idea mensae cuiusdam separatim con siderare possum matericm, formam, figuram, colorem, magnitudincm, et id genus alia. His addunt aliqui ideas ASSOCIATAS, si ve coniunctas, eas scilicet, quae ita simul a nobis adquisitae sunt, ut quum una nobis occurrit, altera quoque menti obversetur: veluti si rosain olim videns odoris simul no tionem accepi, quotiescumque odorem illum sentio, rosae etiam idea menti fit praesens.Denique quuin vel substantias, vel modos, vel relationes pobis repraesentare queamus, ideae sunt vel SVBSTANTIARVM, vel MODORVM, vel RELATIONVM. Per SVBSTANTIAM intelligimus ens, cui atiributa ei accidentia tan quam subiecto,: veluti inhaerere concipiuntur, MODI sunt adfectiones, et attributa substantiis inhaerentia, a quibus + D4 56 Log. Pars I. sola mentis abstractione separantur. RELATIONVM denique ideae sunt, quarum unius consideratio alterius considerationem includit ita, ut haec sine illa non possit intelligi. figura, Veluti diximus, ut nostram imbecillitatem adivemus: id enim in substantiis creatis lo cum habet, non autem in increata, in qua nulla inter essentiam et attributa, nec inter ipsa attributa realis distinctio dari potest, ut in Theologia naturali demonstratum ibimus. MODI vero sunt vel INTERNI, si in ipsa substantia. occurrant, ut dimensio, color etc. in corpore; vel EXTERNI, si in hominis mente sint, et tamen substantiae tribuantur, veluti quum dicimus- virtutem ma sni aeslimatam, quae tamen aestimalio est in hominum opinione. Relationes sunt ideae omnes quantitatum, item Patris, Domini, Regis, et cetera id ge pus. Videatur abunde ea in re Clericus in Logic, et in Arta Grit. Ex quibus plane colligitur 14. nas in substantiis nihil aliud cognoscere, nisi mo dos, ips4s vero substantias prorsus ignora re; idcoque substantiarum ideas esse in relatione ad mentem nostram omnino sed tantummodo abstractas et confuses, ram intelligibiles;. quinisomo ló. rerun natu eo magis agaosci, quo plures modi nobis innotescunt; maximam adhiben dam esse cautionem in perpendendis re lationibus, ne vel earum fundamentum non recte considerantes, vel absolute de relativis ideis enunciantes, praecipitantiae errorisque arguamur, * Quantum haec doctrina roboris habeat in se dandis hominum adfectibus, dici profecto, non potest. Exemplo sit is, qui se paupe rem esse dolet, quia divitum opes non ha bet, et id absolute profert. Si vero relationis pondus expendat, observetque alterum omnia bus necessariis rebus egentem: declamare de sinet, quia sibi tantum superflua desunt. Be ne ergo Seneca in Troad. Est mi ser nemo, nisi comparatus, Schol. Explicatis iam notionum diffe rentiis, ad huius doctrinae usuin acMilanius, quem paucis, iisque perutilibus, include mus regulis. Quisquis ergo Philosophiae operam navas si solidae cognitionis es cupidus, sequentes animo infigito. CANONES. i. Curato, ut rerum, quas pertra ctare cupis ', claram semper et distin ctam cognitionem adquiras: attentionem proinde, quae ad idearum perfectionem utramque facit paginam, in omni re adhibeto. Quoniam vero Matheseos studium mirifice at tentionem acuit: hinc est, ut hodie studio rum initium a Mathesi capiatur, exemplo Platonis., qui neminem erudiendum suscipie bat, nisi Geometria instructum. 2. In studendo praeproperam vitato festinationem; praecipue in primis scien tiarum principiis diu haereto, nec, nisi iisiprobe intelleétis, ad cetera pergito. Quantum enim festinatio idearum claritati osobsit, diximus in. 21. adeoque in adole. soentibus naturalis illa festinatio, et praeci pitantia caute est obtundenda, ne superficia rie discant et errores saepe labantur. Vnde VERVLAMIVS opportune docuit: Ius venum ingeniis, non plumas vel alas, sed plumbum el punderą auditinus. Caveio, ne nimia rerun varietate mentem obruas, neve plura semel simul que addiscenda putes. - Panca discito, eaque bune digesta contemplator. * Quum eaim attentio ad plura dividitur, minor fit atque inepia: proindeque ideae deteriores fiant: ita ut de iis perbelle dicat Seneca Ep. 2.: Nusquam est, qui ubique est. Qua de re Plinius VII. ep.9. praeclaram il lud monitum studiosae iuventuti perutile prae buit: Non multa 7, sed multum. to 3 * AC 4. Priusquam ulterius progrediaris ad idearum tuarum relationem attendi si qua sitt:: ne relativa pro absolu tis accipiens in errores incidas, 5. Mentis solitudinem, animique tran quillitaiem amato; ne affectibus attentionem iurbes, iran, tristitiam, an liaque pathemata; adeoque sodalitates, compotationes., spectacula fugito. ** * Bene monuit Ovidius Tristium l. v. 30. Carmina proveniunt animo dédlicta serenos Comessationibus enim corporis inertia aus getur, mens obstupescit et habetatur, ani mus ad voluptates inclinatur s spectaculis ve vero attentio distrahitur, i sensimqué a studüs animus avertitur, quo fit, ut aut nullae ad quirantur ideae, vel saltem obscurae, a qui bus errores ortum ducere infra docebimus. aut mie 6. Quae legisti, audivisti > ditatus es, ita familiaria tibi reddito, ut eorum notas aliis indicare queas. Ea proinde vel in chartam coniicito, te ipsum saepe examinaudo, idcarum tuarum distinctionem experitor. vel * Stilum CICERONE vocat oplimum, et praest an tissimum dicendi effectorem, et magistrum. De Orat. Notum est vulgatum illud; docendo disci mus. Rationem huius canonis invenies supra. nes, utpote rei immaterialis a stiones, nullo modo sensibus percipiuntur: ea non nisi signis, quae in sensus incur ruot;; abis potefieri possunt. SIGNUM enim est, res quaedam sensibilis quae praeter sui notionem excitat in mente ideam alterius rei, Sed quum ideae ng ** strae ordinario vel voce, vel scripto patefiant: binc prioris gencris signa VOCES, posterioris TÈRMINI, ntraqne vero VERBA dicuntur. Hinc verba per idearum nostrarum signa recte definiuntur, ut et voces signa quaedam sono articulato prolata, mentis nostrae conceptus indicantia. Signa quidem generatim appellantur, quia praeter soni vel scripturae; nationum nostrarum ideam in audientibus vel legentibus excitant. E. g. Lacrimae sunt signum tristitiae: quia quum hominem videmus lacrimantem, illico eum tristitia adfectum esse cogitamus. Fumus quoque est SIGNVM ignis, quia eo viso non solum fumi, sed ignis etiam notionein ad quirimus. Quae de signorum diversitate Scha Jastici docent utpote ad rem impertinentia, praetermittimus: astin Ontologia quaedam observatu digna obiter attingemus. Cave tamen credas, voces esse SIGNA conceptuum necessaria. Quum enim eaedem res non iisdem vocibus a diversis gentibus exprimatur: liquet, tas ab hominum ARBITRIO pena der, adeoque esse SIGNA conceptuum arbistraria. Cuique vero notum est, ad sona nar ticulatum sex requiri, nempe PVLMONES, qui follis vice funguntur, ORGANUM VOCIS scilicet trachea, eique apposita larynx cum suis apparatibus; LINGVA, cuius vis Braliones vocem prae ceteris articulatam red dunt; PALATVM, nempe fornicem, ubi lingua stras vid rationes exercet; quatuor DENTES incisores dicti, quibus sibilantes litterae efformantur, et in quos nedum lingua, sed et labia vibrant; ac denique LABIA, quae in se invicem et in dentes, inpingunt, ut fu sjus coram ostendemus. Ex qua definitione patet verba et voces inter se differre: quum verba et iam scripto, voces autem non nisi sono articulato proferri possint. Nos ideo voces adhibere, ut ab aliis intelligamur; proindeque. Iita loquendum, easque vo ces adhibendas esse, ut alii, quibuscum loquimur, mentem nostram intelligere pos sint; adeoque non licere terminis in anibus vet notionem deceptricem continentibus uti; sed tantum ii, qui ali quam notionem habent adlixam; quitinimo, singulis terminis eamdem semper ideam, eamque claram, respondere debere; ideo que cos, qui vel obscuram, vel non semper eamdem exprimunt notionem, om nino esse proscribendos. Alterius vero mentem intelligere dicimur quum, terminis easdem notiones adggimus, quas loquens cum iis coniunxit. mus TERMINUS INANIS dicitur, qui nulla, habet notionem sibi coniunctam: adeoque nis hil, praeter solam soni ideam, excitare potsest: quapropter vocari solet vor mente case' sâ, vel sonus sine menie, a Scholasticis terminius insignificativus. Talis est versus ille, quemia Nimiodo prolatum in infimo Tartari aditu fingit Dyinus Poeta Etruscus: Raphel mai umech zabi alini. ALIGHERI Inf. cant: Quoties autem vocem proferentes, aliquid cogitare videinur, quum tamen nihil cogita puldaunque sententiam cum ea donium ginius: tunc terninus ille NOTIONEM DECEPTRICIM continere dicitur. Huiusmodi sunt casus Epicuri, sensibilitas physica Hel yetii, historia e rationis penu depromta Boulangeri et Rousseau, quorum analysin cora, et in Metaphysica conficiemus. Si nam que vox aliqua vel non eamdem seniper, vel obscuram notionem habeat adfi xam. In primo casu auditor dubius haerebit, quamnam cum ea loquens, coniunxerit ideam, adeoque cui non intelligent. In secundo ves ro, quomodo mentem eius poterit intelligere, qui se non intelligit TERMINVS CLARVS est, qui claram coiitinet notionem, OBSCVRYS, qui eamdem habet obscuram. Terminusi qui eamdem semper exprimit ideam, FIXVS vel DETERMINATV; qui vero incon der stantem vagunite tabet significatum, VAGVS aut INDETERMINATVS dicitur, Plurės autem termini eandem rem significantes, SYNONYMA, sive termini synonymici. adpellantur, Scolasticis eum adpellare placuit univocum, sive unicam rem indicantem, ut ignis, aqua, A Scholis dicitur “aequivocus”, hoc est plura aeque significans. E. g. Cultus varios habet significatus: saepe enim pro adoratione Deo debita: quandoque pro honore: nonnumquam pro corporis, vel animi decore; non raro quo que pro telluris cultura accipitur, Tales sunt gladius, ensis, qui idem ar morum genus exprimunt. Eos e Scholis qui dam vocant “paronymos”, id quod ad intelligendas barbaras huiusmodi loquutiones breviter adnotavimus. Non heic inquirere licet: utrum in quolibet idiomate revera dentur synonyma? quaestio namque haec ad philologiam pertinent. Philosophia contra in exprimendis animae cogitationibus usum loquendi servat, et colit, quem penes arbitrium est, et ius, et norma loquendi (Horat. De Art. Poet.). Terminus CONCRETVS est qui qualitatem expriinit sabiecto inhaerentem, ABSTRACTUS vero qui qualitatem illam a subiecto separatam indicat, Terminus PROPRIVS dicitur, quando rem exprimit, cui significandae est destinatus; IMPROPRIVS vero, sive METAPHORICVS ad rem aliam indicandam transferatur ob quamdam similitudinem. si Sic “pius” est terminus concretus, “pietas” terminus abstractus, Concretus porro a Wolffio dicitur, qui notionem exprimit concretam (sive singularem); abstractus contra, qui ideam continet abstractam (sive universalem ). Haec autem omnia idem significant. E. g. Vox oculis proprie sumitur, si organum visui destinatuin indicet. Ubi vero Cicero Corinthum Graeciae oculum adpellat, eius uippe ornamentum ac pracsidium: improprie sive metaphorice vocem illam usurpat, Hinc vide, voces improprias esse vagas et indeterminatas. USVS LOQVENDI est significatio vocum in communi sei mone propria. At quoniam in familiari sermone voces aliquae occurrunt quas intelligimus quidem, li, cit ad notiones ipsis adiixas animum non hae voces dicuntur termini FAMILIARES, et ad usum loquendi non advertamus pertinent, Si quis ergo oculi vocem ad significandum organum sensorium visui destinatum usurpet, is loquendi usum servabit. Tales sunt voces omnes, quas frequentissime proferimus, ac memoriae mandavimus: ees enim intelligimus, sed usu et consuetudine adeo familiares evaserunt, ut eas proferentes ad sensum notionesque ipsis adfixas nusquam attendamus. Patet igitur Philosophum servare debere usum loquendi, adeoque terminis claris, fixis, atque in sensu proprio usurpatis ei utendum esse. Quod idem est, ac si dicas a terminis vagis, obscuris, impropriis, et familiaribos esse abstinendum: aliter enim non intelligeretur. Hic porro. Ex pluribus vocibus inter se apte connexis oritur SERMO, sive ORATIO sive PROPOSITIO. Definitur autem sermo per nexium plurium terminorum mentis nostrae conceptıbus exprimendis idoneum. а Logicis dispesci solet in CIVILEM, et TECHNICVII, sive eruditim, quorum ille in vita civili ab omnibus; hic in coinmunicandis ideis ad disciplinas pertinentibus, vocabulorum technicorum pe, ab eruditis adhibetur. Nisi enim ideis nostris explicandis sit idoneus, non sermo, sed confusus inanium vocum cumulus dici poterit. Dicuntur autem verba, vel voces technicae, quae ideas scientificas quibusdam disciplinis peculiares, usu annuente, exprimunt: cuiusmo di non pauca occurrunt in qualibet disciplina. Schol. Quae hactenus de vocibus dicta sunt, inania faere evaderent, nisi doctrinae usum auditoribus nostris ostenderenus. Quae igitur de iis observanda putamus paucis, isque tam familiari quain erudito sermoni inservientibus, complectemur re gylis. Philosophus ergo noster scquentes observet CANONES. Antequam oum aliis congrediaris, tecum attente perpendeto, quid cogites: Cogitationes porro tuas totidem vocibus exprimilo, quot ideas hubes. Quantum adiumenti adfcrat hic canon adolescentibus, ia promtu est. Quun enim fis familiarissima sit inanis illa et garrnia loquacitas, fua fit, at persaepe in te veritatis notam incurant des alimchanab inconsiifera to loquendi puriniz násvatur; facile parei, cur qui cogitationibus suis atteindlit', nulla, nisi benedigestum, emitiere posse verbum. Caveto, ne ideam soni habens, rei quoque notionem habere te credas; aut voces coniunctas intelligere quas disiunctas intelligis. Falluntur enim persaepe homines, quum ter minos inanes, et notionem deceptricem con. tinentes effutiunt, in quibus solam ideam $ 9. ni habent, et nihil cogitantes aliquid se cogitare creduat. E. g. Idea materiae et idea cogitationis possibiles sunt, pariterque voces, quibus illae exprimuntur singulae intelliguntur. Coaiunclae vero impossibiles evadunt, atque adeo intelligi nequeunt. Ecquis enim materiam cogitantem exsistere posse imquam probavit? Vid. Inst. nostr. Meiaph. eas 3. sum loquendi semper servato, nec novas temere cudito voces: quod si ad id quandoque necessitate cogaris, adcurate definito, ne obscurus fias. In hanc regulam peccatur, si quando vocabula technica, utut civitate donata, furene novitatis amore mutantur; iis novae voces substituuntur, quamvis rem, de qua a gitur, adcurate exprimant. Et si houe termini philosophici, reiecta barbarie, pristinae restituuntur puritati, ea non novatio dicen et proda est, sed renovatio, idest vocum ad pro prium avitumque decus restitutio Peregrina vocabula Latino, vel Italico sermoni ne iminisceto, nisi vel Tocendi, vel amici cuiusdam oblectandi caussa: alias eniin in paedantismum Empinges. Vid. Heineccium in Fundam. Stil. cultior. Id vero egisse Ciceronem ex eiusdem scriptis didacticis, et Epistolis ad Atticum abunde colligitur. Quum eniin paedantismus sit inanis glorio lae cupiditas in minotüs, ineptisque rebus sectandis quaesita; paedagogi vero, a quibus hoc nomen obvenit, id quoque habeant in vitio, qnod singulis verbis latinas interse runt phrases ac textos: ideo hanc notain incurruut quicumque, vel ad ostentandam e ruditionis niultiplicitatem, vel ob nimium tem poribus inserviendi studium, nullum, nisi pe regrino sale conditum, queunt formare ser monem. Si aliis displicere non vis, quoties cumque loqui oportuerit, modesto vultu atque amoeno fuam proferto sententiam: ne docere ex cathodrá potius, quam veruin dicere, videaris. 7Est et haec paedagogorum nota, qui pueris in docendo imponere adsueti, inagisiral e illud supercilium ubique servant, seque invisos au dientibus, maximo veritalis detrimento, red dunt. Vid. Buddei Oratio de bonarum littera rum decrcinento nostra aetate non tenere me tucndo. Dea rei distincia completa verbis expressa dicitur DEFINITIO. Res vero ipsá, sive definitionis obiectum, vocatur DEFINITVM. Ordo igitur po stálat, ut post'ideas earumque signa; bre vein de ddinitionibus tractationem hic sub iungamus, Quid sit idea distincta, et qua ratione ad quiratur, dixiinus supra. seq. De idea completa cousule, quae breviter do cuimus g. 25; diffusius enim hic, quae de illa dici merentur, enodabimus.Quemadmodum antem idea voce prolata di citur terminus, isque clarus si claram expri mat notionem; ad exprimendam, vero ideami distinctain, sive ' emuinerando; il dias characteres, non uno, sed pluribus claris opus est termiuis: ita complexus ille yocum, Cap. De definitionilus.hoc est idea distincta completa sermone expli cata, definitio dici consuevit; adeoque non abs re tractatus bic doctrinain sequitur ter minorum. eas ** ne . Ex qua definitione consequitur 1. in definitione notas et characteres enume rari oportere, qui sulliciant ad definiturn in statu quolibet agnoscendum, et ab aliis rebus distinguenduin; notas tales esse debere, ut nulli, nisi so li definito in tota eius extensione, conve niant; quare 3. merito a Logicis ad firmari, definitionem neque latiorem que angustiorem sno definito, sed ipsi aco, qualem esse debere, ut sibi invicem sub stilui possint. Id autem, per quod res ab aliis rebus distin guitur, eius essentia a Metaphysicis adpellari consuevit: inde ergojest, ut definitionem Lo gici esse dicant orationem, qua rci essentia explicatur. Quia vero per extensionem intelligimus quod cuinque subiectum, cui determinationes ideam aliquam constituentes tribui possunt; perinde est, ac si dicas, definitionis notas tales esse debere, ut omnibus subiectis, spe ciebus nempe, et individuis sub definito con tentis conveniant. Porro inter characteres il los insunt proprietates genericae, et specifi Si cae, quae integram definili essentiam expo. nunt, et repraesentant. Non iniuria igitur adfirmari solet, definitionem ex genere et differentia specifica constare debere. Si namque definitio talis non sit, ut possit definito substitui, vel (ut aliis placet ) cam eo reciprocari, vel illo latior, vel angustior erit, adeoque deficiens. Substitutio autem in co consistit, ut definitio pro subiecto, defini tum pro attributo, et contra, adsumi possit. E. g. Spiritus est substantia intellectu et vo luntate praedita: contra vero substantia intel lectu et voluntate praedita dicitur spiritus. Ex eodem quoque fluit 4 in defini tionem ingredi non posse, nisi ea, quae Jei perpetuo et constanter insunt, idest ATTRIBUTA, vel ESSENTIALIA; proin deque locum in ea non habere ACCIDENTIA, seu MODOS. Quaenam sint essentialia, et attributa, pate bit in Ontologia. Id unum hic notasse sull ciet, tam essentialia, quam attributa rei cou stanter ac immutabiliter inesse: nam attributa sunt eiusmodi characteres, quorum ratio suf ficiens cur rei insint, in eiusdem essentia et natüra continctur: ut sunt tria latera et tres anguli in triangulo. Quoniam vero definitio est idea rei distincta; haec autem est no nec tio clara notarum): sequitur ut ea vocibus claris sit exponenda, obscuri quidquam continentibus; ideoque 7. nec vagis, nec metaphoricis nec negativis terminis in illa sit locus. Imo vero 8. eam in vitio poni perspicuum est, si sit IDENTICA vel CIRCVLVS in definiendo committatur. Si tameu termini definitionem ingredientes ob scuri quid habere videantur, prius adcurate definiantur, ut claritatem adquirant. Sic in vidiae definitionein supra allatam nemini proferre licebit, nisi prius taedii si gnificatus alia definitione sit determinatus. Terminis negativis concipitur definitio > si explicet quid res non sit: ut si dicas, invi dia non est commiseratio. Hinc vides, eam esse vagam et indeterminatam, adeoque defi niti ideane inde oriri confusissim un, quod est contra definitionis indolem: Exceptio tantum datur in rebus contradicto riis nullun inedium adinittentibus, quarum una recte definita, altera negativis terminis explicari potest. Sic ens simplex non immeri to dicitur quod partibus caret, substantia, quae non exsistit in alio, tamquam in subie Definitio identica est, quae idlem per idem explicat, cuiusmodi suut nonnullae Scholarum cio etc. definitiones quas confusiones rectius dixeris. Exemplo sit quantitatis definitio ab iis allata per accidens, a quo res dicitur quanta. Quid, quaeso, haec verba significant, nisi quod quantitas sit quantitas? Cui vero usui definitiones istae esse possint, tironibus ipsis iudicandum relinquimus. Circulus enim Geometris est figura plana linea curva in se redeunte terminata: in defi niendo ergo circulus committitur, si in evol vendis definitionis characteribus, eorumque novis definitionibus formandis, in aliquam ipsarum definitum ingrediatur. Tunc enim per definitum explicaretur id, per quod defini lum ipsum explicari deberet; adeoque res re diret ad definitionem idemlicam, quae in vi to posita est. Illa notas et characteres e numerat sufficientes, quibus definitum ab aliis rebus in siatu quocumque discerni possit; haec autem rei definitae genesin et originem exponit, ** unde et GENETICA dicitur. * Per definitionem nominalem veteres intelligc bant grammaticam vocis explicationem, qua vel radix sive origo nominis investigabatur, et tunc Etymologia dicebatur: vel multiplex eiusdem significatio, eoque casu Homonymia; De definitionibus. 25 vel denique plures voces eumdem sensum ha bentes, et Synonymiae nomine veniebat. Quae enim nobis nominalis est, realis inter illos audiebat. ** Nominalis ergo est definitio spiritus, si eum definiveris per substantiam intellectu et volun tate praeditam: realis autem, si invidiam definias per taedium ob alterius felicitatem: in ea enim eiusdem caussa et origo explica tur. Vides hinc, nominales definitiones esse arbitrarias: reales contra necessarias. > 53. Si vero idea rei distincta quidem sit sed incompleta: tunc non definitio, sed DESCRIPTIO nominatur; adeoque in descriptione accidentia qnoque locum inve piunt, qnae quum in individuis tantum concreta observentur, hinc est, ut res sin gulares describantur, abstractae vero deti niantur; ** proinde illae Oratorun et Poe tarum hae Philosophorum propriae sint. Descriptio itaque, licet plures enumeret no tas; quam definitio, eas tamen ad rem in sta tu quolibet agnoscendam exhibet insufficien tes. Tales notae non exsistunt, nisi in rebus singularibus;, utpote omnimode determinatis: universales namque ab iis mentis abstractione erguntur, paucio resque adeo, ac sufficientes ipsis distinguendis continent characteres. Inde ergo fit, ut ha definiri possint, illae tantum describi. Intelligitnr hinc: cum generum et specierum definitiones apud Philosophos inveniamus, in dividuorum nihil nisi meras descriptiones Poetis ac Oratoribus familiares, et si ab his definitiones proferri videmus, eas vel incom pletas novimus, vel magno verborum ambitu expressas, ubi accidentia attributis, caussas effectibus permixta observamus, quas tamen Philosopho imitari nefas erit, quippe cui idearum analysis, essentiae rerum investiga. tio, verborum praeterea praecisio in deliciis esse debent. Schol. Superest, ut quae studiosae iu ventuti utilitatem adferre possunt, ea pau eis exponamus regulis huius doctrinae usum continentibus. Philosophiae igitur initiatus, si quid a studiis suis commodi percipere cupit, sequentes animo imbibat CANONES. Definitiones, utpote rei naturam et essentiam explicantés, ciim cura disci to, ' ạtque teneto. ' Iudicium porro cum m moria coniungito: ideoque aliorum definitionibus ne adquiescito; sed ope rum dato, ut eas intelligas, et ad tru tiram revoces. re Sunt enim, qui soli memoriae consulentes, quidquid in aliorum scriptis repererint, id omne discunt, ac turpe putant ab eo discedere. Hinc fit, ut si memoriae pondus inutile au feras, nihil, praeter arroquarov quoddam, maneat. Homunciones isti memoriae dumtaxat exercendae intenti, iudicii vero prorsus ex pertes, libros quosvis sine delectu memoriae mandare adsueti, innumeris snnt expcsiti er roribus; quotcnmque eorum oculis subiiciun tur. Ne igitur adolescentes, qui memoriam tantum in Scholis huc usque exercuerunt, eamdem premant viam, sibique pessime cou sulant: visum est, cautionem hanc eo neces sariam, quo prima scientiarum hic funda menta sternuntur, ipsis suggerere et inculca re, ut iudicium excolentes in aliorum senten tiis ad examen rcvocandis, et ad eruendas inde propria meditatione veritates apti red dantur. ver In legendis Auctorum libris, prum phrasiumque lenociniis ne conti eto: sed ut sententiam ipsis subiectam lare, ac distincte intelligas, pro vi ili curato. Ita vitabitur stupida illa aliorum sententiis adquiescendi consuetudo, quae in caussa fuit, ut liberculi aliquot ex transmontanis, transma rinisque regionibus huc appulsi stilo quodam auribus pruriente tot incautos captarint adolescentes, quos inter crassae incredulitatis te nebras errabundos non sine magno dolore vi demus. Hi namque culpabili ignorantia verbis tantummodo adquiescentes, nec sententias in tellexerunt, nec eas ad trutinam revocare sunt ausi, iudicandi quippe facultate destituti. 3. Rerum, quas nondum distincte in telligis, definitiones proprio marte con ficito, ut ex iteratis' actibus, continua que exercitatione habitum in eo adqui ras. Res quidem non parvi momenti erit, multun que laboris impendendum, pauco forsan aut irrito eventu. Animo tamen non deficiant a: dolescentes: ab exiguis enim initiis maxima procedunt, atque experientia tandem, qui sit huius canonis fructus, addiscent. Poterit autem quisque imitando incipere, experiundo prosequi, ac notionum analysi sednlam na vans operam felici demum exitu proficere. Vi de quae docebimus infra. Caveto, ne res omnes definiri pos. vel debere, credas; * aut definitio nes verbis diversas re quoque differre putes. Videantur interim a nobis ante dicta G. 27. Gap. III. De definitionibus. 79 ¥ Si namque dantur synonyma, verba nempe et phrases eumdem habentes significatum, quidni definitiones illae verbis diversae synonymicis erunt expressae terminis, adeo que re unum idemque significare poterunt? 5. Si e Philosopho Orator aliquan dofieri cupis, definitiones pro definitis adhibeto: tunc enim auditorum animos inani verborum ambitu non fatig abis solidaeque doctrinae clarissimum dabis indicium. Exemplo sit elegantissima M. Ant. Mureti pe riodus Part. I. Orat. 1. ubi de laudibus Theo logiae acturus, amplificat syllogismun quam brevissimum has continentem propositiones: Facultas hominem Deo con ugens est omnium praestantissima. Egpyas a eius talis est. Nam si eorum omnium, quae in hac inmensa re rum universitate cernuntur, unumquodque per ficiendi sui desiderio tenetur; et animus no ster ad similitudinem Divinitatis effictus tan to perfectior est, quanto propius ad illud, a quo ductus et propagatus est, exemplar ac cedit: dubitari profecto non potest, quia ea sit omnium praestantissima facultas, quae, quoad eius fieri potest, cum humanis divi na copulando, mortalitatem nostram, quantum illius imbecillitas patitur, Divinae natura e ar ctissima colligatione devincit. Vides hic Theologiae definitionem, oratorio licet more pro latam, multum orationi pulchritudinis ac di gnitatis adferre. 6. Definitionem tuam, si ab aliis di stingui exoptas, efformare curato; id que obtinebis, si intellectuales morales que virtutes tibi comparare studueris. * Hi namque definitionis characteres esse de bent. Quod ni facias in vulgi turba confu sus eris, nomenque tuum in tenebris, ob scurumque manebit ila, ut vel patrio, vel alio adpellativo nomine indigitari debeas. Notional Otionum analysin in adaequatarum idearum formatione consistere, snpra iam ostensum est. Porro in hac o peratione ideam aliquam in partes, sive notas dividi, hasque rursus in alias disper tiri, quisque novit qui earum naturam habet exploratam. Tunc igitur idea illa ut totum consideratur, characteres autem ut eius partes: adeoque non abs re analysis idearum verbis expressa DIVISIO nominatur, quae recte definitur, quod sit to tius in partes resolutio. Quum autem in divisione novae notarum de finitiones suppeditentur: iure doctrinam hanc definitionibus subiungimus. Quoniam vero quidlibet ut totum considerari potest: variae totius relationes sunt enatae. Et quidem 1. totum essan tiale quod constat ex partibus ad ajus essentiam pertinentibus, totum integra le, compositum nempe ex corporibus, quorum snmma eius integritatem constituit, genus, quod plures species suo ambitu comprehendit, 4. subiectum, quod plura accidentia sustinet, accidens quod pluribus subiectis inhaerere potest, 6. caus sa, quae plures producit 7 effectus, qui a pluribus potet procedere caussis. Quidquid tandem pro ratione obiectorum, circa ' quae versatur in tot partes distribui potest, quot sunt objecta. Inde ergo est, ut va riae a Logicis tradantur divisionis species veluti TOTIVS sive essentialis, sive in tegralis, in suas partes, GENERIS in suas species subordinatas, SVBIECTI in sua Accidentia in suos effectus, EFFECTVS CAVSSAE, ACCIDENTIS in sua snbiecta, rei in suas caussas, denique caiusvis per sua OBIECTA. Primae classis est haec: Homo dividitur in animam et corpus; vel as dividitur in duo decim uncias. Secundae: Animal dividitur in hominem, et brutum. Tertiae: Homo est, vel doctus vel indoctus. Quartae: Bonum est. vel animi, vel corporis. Quintae: Philoso phiae dogmata alia intellectuin instruunt, a. lia voluntatem dirigunt. Sextae: Veritatis impugnatio, vel ab ignorantia, vel a malitia procedit. Septimae denique: Philosophia theo retica alia circa res corporeas, alia circa incorporeas et intellectuales versatur. Totum illud, quod in divisionem cadit, DIVISUM; partes vero, in quas dispertitur, MEMBRĀ DIVIDENTIA no minantur. Sin membra haec in novas rur sus partes resolyamus., SVBDIVISIO di citar. * * E. g. Homo dividitur in partes suas essentia les animam nempe et corpus; hoc autem in caput, truncum o et artus reliquos. En subdivisionem, Ex membrorum itidem dividentiam numero nova quoque divisionis oritur dif ferentia. Si namque duo fuerint membra Cap. IV. De divisionibus. 83 dichotomia sive DIMEMBRIS; si tres? trichotomia seu TRIMEMBRIS; quatuor tetrachotomia hoc est QVA TRIMEMBRIS divisio, appellabitur. SI Sic bimembris erit divisio lineae in rectam, et curvam, trimembris trianguli in aequila terum, isosceles, et scalenum; quatrimembris denique parallelogrammi in quadratum, rc ctanguluin, rhombum, et rhomboidem., 58. Quoniam divisio est totius in par tes resolutio; totum autem ae quale partibus simul sumtis esse debet: consequens est 1. ut membra dividentia simul totum adaequare debeant divisum adeoqne nec plus illo, nec minus compre hendant; ut non sibi coincidant, sed repugnent, sintque per novas definitiones, easque oppositas, distincta; ut ex ipsa rei dividendae natura petantur, scili cet in tot membra totum dividatur, capax est; 4. denique ut ad confusio nem vitandam prius idea totalis ab am biguitate liberetur, posteaque divisio insti tuatur. i quot Contra hanc regulam peccant, qui angulum dividunt in rectilineum et curvilineum, vel qui lineam esse aiunt, vel rectam, vel curvam et derari potest: vel mixtam. In primo enim casu membra di videntia simul sunt diviso minora; in se cundo autem eodem maiora. Huic quoque regulae adversantur ii, qui bo. num dividunt in honestum, utile, et iucundum: haec enim membra simul in uno coexistere debent, ut genuinam boni denominationem tue ri possit: adeoque non sunt repugnantia. Peccant etiam ii, qui licet totum in membra opposita distribuant, ea tameu definitionibus non repugnantibus determinant, ut quum cns in simplex et compositum diviserunt, et hoc esse dicunt, quod partibus constat: illud contra definiunt per id, in quo nihil consi Repréhensionem ergo.eruditorum merito incurrunt Ramistae, qui tam superstitiose di.chotomiis adhaerent, ut in plura membra totum dividere irreligiosum putent. Nec ali ter iụdicandum est de iis, qui nimiae mem brorum multiplicitatis sunt amatores. Idem enim vitii, inquit Seneca, habet nimia, quod nulla divisió. Ep. Quum autem divisiones et subdi visiones potionum analysin contineant, haec autem in idearum adaequa tarum formatione consistat, ideo que ad maiorem distinctionem in nobis producendam sit comparata: sequitur 5. ut divisionibus aeque, ac subdivisionibus, quae iisdem ' reguntur regulis, omnia vi tentur, quae confusionem adferre possunt; proindeque 6. liquido patet, non licere p? as ter necessitatem subdivisiones multiplicare, ne memoria fatigetur, ac intellectui veių. ti tenebrae offundantur, Schol. Haec de divisione. Ad hujus porro doctrinae usum nunc transeamus quem paucissimis inde nascentibus include mus regulis. Logicae itaque Tiro utilissi mos aeque, ac necessarios hosce discat CANONES, In dividendo subdividendove non aliorum systemata, sed naturam tantum consulito. Confusionem aeque, ac tae dium vitare curato. Hoc namque modo nec Ramistarum supersti tiosa restrictio, nec Scholasticorum nimia di visionum membrorumque multiplicatio locum habebit. Natura enim omnium optima, et ad curatissima est magistra. Divisiones ne per saltum facito. * Ordinem ac seriem in unaquaque re ser vato. Dicitur autem civisio per sattum, quae ordi... nem non scrval, et in qua ea, quae in sub divisione cxprirai deberent, comprehendun tur: e.g. si ideam diviseris in claram et ina daequatam, divisionem conficies per saltum; inadaequatam enim quae in subdivisionem ingredi deberet in divisione locum habere observas. Series ergo atque ordo ne pertur betur, quisque in studia incumbens cavere stu deat. CAPVT QUINTVM De iudiciis, et propositionibus, 6o. Hactenus de ideis, earumque ana lysi, quantum instituti brevitas tulit, actum. Eas vero si comparemus, scilicet si duas ideas inter se coniungamus vel separemus, alia mentis oritur operatio, quae IVDI CIVM adpellatur. Est autem iudicium duarum idearum comparatio earumque relationis perceptio. Iudicium porro ver bis expressum dicitur PROPOSITIO vel ENUNCIATIO. E. g. Si ideam spiritus cum idea indestructibi litaiis conferas, videasque unam alteri conve nire, tunc spiritum esse indestructibilem ndi cas: contra, si indestructibilitatis ideam cor De iud. et prop. separas: haec poris notioni non convenire observes,corpus non esse indestructibile colligis. In primo ca su ideas coniungis; in altero mentis operatio, qua earum relationem ex pendis, iudicii nomine venit. ** Nonnulli discrimen inter haec duo nomina statuunt: ut prius locum inveniat, si in syllo gismo spectetur; posterius vero, si extra id inveniatur. Sed in re tam parvi momenti diu immorari, foret ineptum. Quoniam iydicium duas ideas compa rat, et si verbis exprimatur, propositio di citar; idearum vero signa sunt voces seu termini: liquet, quam libet enunciationem duobus constare termi nis, quorum ille, cui aliquid convenire vel discrepare ennuciatur, SVBIECTVM; is vero, qui subiecto tribuitur vel ab eo removetur, ATTRIBVTVM vel PRAEDICATVM nomiuatur, qui duo simul pro positionis EXTREMA dici consueverunt. Quumque eorum nexus verbo substanti vo exprimatur: merito vox illa ex hoc verbo desumta, quae propositionis extrema coniungit, COPVLA vocatur. E. g. In hac propositione, “Deus est aeternus,” Deus est subiectum, quia ipsi tribuitur aeternitas; aeternus dicitur attributum, quia Deo convenire enunciatur; vox deniqne “EST”, quae duo haec extrema coniungit, atque unum al teri convenire indicat, copula, hoc est coniunctio, adpellatur. Hinc ergo colligitur, quain cumque propositionem SUBIECTO, COPVLA, et ATTRIBVTO constare debere, ut enunciatio LOGICA PERFECTA dici pos sit. Si namque horum aliquis lateat, CRYPTICA, vel IMPERFECTA dicilur, quia naturalis compositio crypsi aliqua tegitur: id autem accidit, quum verbuin aliquod copulae et attributi vices sustinet e. g. Deus mundum creavit: idem enim esset ac dicere: Deus est Creator mundi. Est et alia propositionum crypticarum species, iu quibus sub uno verbo tota enunciationis latet compositio per ellyp sin eruenda: ut in illis: veni, vidi, vici: hic namque tres iusunt enunciationes ex iis dem verbis repetendae, nempe: “Ego fui-ve nens, ego fui videns, ego fui vinccns.” QvanVandoquidem in qualibet idearum comparatione sex potissimum con fiderari possunt, scilicet: materia, sive ideae quae comparantur; forma, seu comparatio ipsa; qualitas comparationis; eiusdem quantitas; objectum, 6. denique evidentia relationis: ideo sub totidem adspectibus propositiones intueri possumus; videlicet, ratione MATERIAE, FORMAE, QVALITATIS, QVANTITATIS, OBIECTI, et EVIDENTIAE. Quamvis autem hunc ordinem divisionis natura suppeditet: liceat nobis in hac tractatione qualitatem ante omnia perpendere, utpote quae in aliis distributionibus usui esse debet; quaque postposita, nonnulla obscuritate laborarent. Propositionis QVALITAS consistit in extremorum combinatione tione. Quum ea coniungimus, scilicet prae vel separa dicatum subiecto convenire enunciamus ADFIRMARE dicimur; NEGARE contra, si illa seiungamus, seu unum ab altero discrepare pronuntiemus. Recte igitur omnis propositio, si qualitatem spectes, dividitur in AIENTEM et NEGANTEM. E. g. Quum dico, “Mundus est contigens”, praedicatum cum subiecto coniungo, adeoque de mundo adfirmo esse contingentem. Quando vero enuncio, “Mundus NON est aeternus”, extrema seiung, idest aeternitatem a mundo removeo et hoc est quod dicitur negare. Ex quo vides, negationem (“NON”) copulae praepositam reddere propositionem negantem: quod si non copulam, sed terininorum ali quem, vel eius partem negatio afficia, non negans, sed INFINITA orietur enunciate. E. g. Marcus Aurelius Romano Imperio pote ral non nocere, quia Philosophus. Distinctio haec aliter ab aliis enunciatur, scilicet in adfirmativam et negativam. Vtrum que apte. 64. Si ad propositionum materiam attendamus, eae sunt vel SIMPLICES, vel COMPOSITAE. SIMPLEX enunciatio dicitur, cuius termini plures non sunt sed unuin habet subiectum, et unum prae dicatum; COMPOSITA vero, quae plura > Cap. V. De iud. et prop 91 continet vel subiecta, vel attributa; eaque est vel EXPLICITA, si compositio sit mania festa, vel IMPLICITA, Scholastico nomine EXPONIBILIS, si compositionem habeat latentem, et paullo obscuriorem. Addunt alii enunciationem COMPLEXAM eamque haberi aiunt, quoties terminus ali. quis propositionem contineat incidentem sibi adnexam, quae, licet ad essentiam proposi tionis non pertineat, ad eam tamen intelli gendam plurimum confert, exprimiturque per pronomen relativum QVI. E. g. Plato, qui divinus fuit dictus, ideas innatas admisit. Propositio illa, qui divinus fuit dictus, in, çidens est. Sed distinctio haec in Logica aut parvi, aut nullius fere est momenti. Simplex ergo erit propositio: Deus est ae. ternus, iten que: aer est gravis. *** In quo vero consistat palens, vel latens compositio, ex sequentibus abande patebit, ubi de explicitarum implicitarum que enuncia tionum speciebus sermo erit. Id porro sedulo observandum, in compositis non unam, sed plures contineri enunciationes, id quod ex earum analysi poterit elucescere. EXPLICITA enunciatio dividitor in CONDITIONALEM; CONIVNСТАМ; DISCRETAM; CAVSSALEM; DISIVNCTAM et RELATAM. Conditionalis, alio nomine hypothetic, est, quae praedicatum habet subiecto tributum sub aliqua conditione: e. g. “Si mundus est ens contingens, non exsistit a se” -- in qua prima pars conditionem, altera propositionem continet. De hac autem observandum. I. conditio existentiam non largitur: visi enim veritatem adquirat, enunciatio vera esse non potest. Sic si dicas, “Si navis ex Asia venerit, centum tibi me daturum promitio”: promissio vera non erit, nisi navis ex Asia redux fuerit; 2. conditio impossibilis habet vim negandi. Et -recte: nam conditio impossibilis numquam in exsistentem abire poterit; adeoque enunciatio nullibi veritatem adquiret. Vnde idem est di cere: si digito Coelun tetigeris, centum ti bi dabo, ac si diceres: numquam tibi dabo centum: conditio namque impossibilis est. Coniuncta, sive copulativa dicitur, in qua termini ita connectuntur, ut de pluribus su biectis idem attributum; vel plura altributa de eodem subiecto enuncientur. E. g. “Iustitia et prudentia sunt virtutes”; “Deus est aeternus et omnipotens”. Disiuncta, vel disiunctiva est, in qua uni subiecto plura tribuuntur praedicata, vel u Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 93 num attrubutum pluribus subiectis, ut plu ribus unum, vel uni plura conveniant, licet indeterminate. E. g. Aut doctus eris, aut in doctus. Quae de hac observari merentur, con fer in S. 58. cur Caussalis est, in qua ratio additur, praedicatum subiecto tribuatur. E. g. Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus: Politicas quia prudentiae regulas tradit, sedulo exco lenda, 1 Discreta dicitur, quae duo de eodem s biecto judicia continet qualitate diversa: ut illud Horatii. Coelum, nou animum mutant, qui trans mare currụnt. Item illud Terent. andr. 1. SC. 2. Davus sum, non Oedipus. Relata, seu relativa est, cuius una pars ab altera vim sunnit, ad eamque refertur ut il lud Virgilii Georg. et quantum vertice ad auras Aetherias, tantum radice in Tartara tendit. IMPLICITAE vero species sunt EXCLVSIVA; EXCEPTIV; COMPARATA RESTRICTIVA: licet alii quoque inceptivas, desitivas, et 'reduplicativus adiungant. Exclusiva est, in qua sensus duplicatur per particulas exclusivas solum, tantum, dumta xat etc., estque vel exclusi praedicati, e. g. oculus tantummodo videt. Exceptiva est, in qua particulae exceptivae praeter, nisi, et similes, sensum multiplicant. E. g.: “Omne ens, praeter Deum, est contingens.” Comparata cicitur propositio, vel particu la quaedam comparativa relationem adferat inter subiectum et praedicatum, ita ut ge mipus inde emergat sensus e. g., “ira est amore validior. Restrictiva denique est, quae multiplicem continet sensum per particulas restrictivas. quatenus, in quantum, quoad etc. geminatum. E. g.: Ilomo, quoad corpus ', est mortalis. INCEPTIVAS vocant, quae actionem aliquam in principio enunciante, ut: successio temporum a creatione incoepi; DESITIVAS, inquibus ejus cessatio et finis praedicatur, ut: tutela pubertate finitur: REDVPLICACIVAS denique, in quibus subiectum geminalum at liud iudicium continet tacitum. E. g. “Corpus, qua corpus est, a spiritu differt. Sed de his plura coram. Si enunciationis FORMAM spectemus, erit NECESSARIA, CONTINGENS (fortuitam Cicero adpellat), POSSIBILIS, IMPOSSIBILIS: in quibus si necessita, contingentia, possibilitas etc. reticeantur, ABSOLVTAE dicentur; si vero exprimantur, MENTALES. Necessariam dicimus, cuius extrema ita contiunguntur, ut aliter se habere non possint. E. g. “Circulus est rotundus”. Contingens est, cuius termini nullam neces sariam habent connexionem, sed ita cohaerent, ut aliter esse queant. E. g.: “Crastinus dies erit serenus”. Possibilem vocamus, in qua attributum sn biecto non repugnat, ut cera liquescit. Impossibilis dicitur proposition, cuius termini inter se repugnant, ut, “Circulus est quadratus”. Ratione OVANTITATIS enunciatio dividitur in VNIVERSALEM, si attri butum subiecto in tota huins 'extensione conveniat; PARTICVLAREM, si ad aliquas tantum species, ant individua in subiecti notione contenta extendatur; denique SINGVLAREM, si individuum subiecto exprimatur, Addunt alii inde finitam, sed eam non esse ab universali dstinctam, infra abunde patebit. in. Alia universalem vocant propositionem, qua ratio sufficiens, cur praedicatum subie cio tribuatur, latet in ipsa subiecti natura, scilicet, si praedicatum sit attributum essentiale subiecti. Ita haec enunciatio, “Homo est libertatis capax”, est universalis tum quia subiectum in tota eius extentione sumitur nullus enim homo invenietur, nullus enim homo invenietur, cui libertate careat; tum quia ratio sufficiens, cur libertas homini trihuitur, latet in ipsa hominis ESSENTIA et natura, hoc est, ut Scolastici aiunt, rationalitate. Signum universitatis in aiente propositione est “OMNIS” (italiano: “ogni”); in negante NVLLVS. Quae de universalitate metaplıysica et morali Philosophi docent, ea hic persequi brevitas non patitur, sed in ipsis praelectionibus aliqua no tabimus. Particularem propositionem alii esse dicunt, in qua ratio sufficiens; cur praedicatum subiecto naturam est repetenda; E. g. “quidam homines sunt crudili”. Vides hic subiectum non in tota sua extensione accipi, sed ad aliqua tantum individua extendi, ita ut ratio sufficiens, cur homini eruditio tribuatur hominis naturam inveniatur, scilicet in studio aique exercitatione. Particularitatis nota est QUIDAM, ALIQVIS; in negante vero additur particula NON. E. g., Livius Romanorun historiam ad sua usque tempora scripsit. En propositionem singularem: subiectum enim est terminus singularis. 6g. Ex quibus omnibus consequitur v. ad essentiam propositionis universalis non reqniri notam uuiversitatis, sed eam pro lubitu exprinii vel' omitti posse; INDEFINITAM dici propositionen in qua pota reticetur ac proinde recte a Philosoplus adfirmari, propositiones in definitas aequipollere universalibus; qui nimmo, signum universale numquam efficere posse, ut enunciatio talis evadat; falli ergo eos, qui universalem propositio hem defipiunt per eam, cuius subiectum signo aificitur universali; particula rem facile in universalem commutari pos se, si subiecto addatur ratio suficiens, cur ei convcniat allributum, Ecquis enim propositionem hanc: “Omnis homo est doctus”, ideo universalem esse aufirmabit, quia signo universali subiectum adficintur? Hinc si propositionem universalem particularibus, vel particularem universalibus terminis signisque exprimamus a veritate deficiet, ut suo loco dicemus. Sumas e. g. hanc propositionem: “Quidam homo est philosophus”, habes propositionem particularem. Adde snbiecto caussam, cur de homine esse philosophum enunciatur. scilicet scientiam; eamque sequenti modo exprimito: “Omnis homo scientia praeditus est philosophus”, ex particulari in universalem abibit. Mirum quantum transmulalio ist haec in scientiis prodest. Ab ea enim pendet propositiomm analysis; puta earumdem resolutio in hypothesin ct thesin. Nobis in secunda part, ubi de experientia sermo erit, huius modi commutationis usus erit obiter attingen dus. Iuvat hic compendii loco addere, veteres harum propositionum differentiam quatuor vocalibus indicasse: “A”, “E”, “I” et “O”, id quod se quentibus expressere versiculis: Asserit “A”, negat. “E”, verum universaliter ambae. Asserit I, negat O, sed particulariter ambo: De rat. et Syll. De propositionibus mathematicae methodo inservientibus. Ostrema enunciationum divisio quae earum obiectum, et evidentiam res spicit, ea est, quae in recentioribus Phi osophorum et Mathematicorun scriptis pas sim observatur peculiaribus desiguala nominibus, quaeque a nobis ideo distincte tradenda, quia me!l dun mathematicas in hisce justitutionibus sequi statuimus. Ratione ilaque OBIECTI pto positio est vel THEORETICA, in qua a liquid de subiecto enuncialur, vel PRACTICA, quae aliquid fieri posse aut debere adfirmat. Sic propositio theoretica est haec, “Omnes ro dii eiusdem circuli sunt aequales”. Practica vero: “Quovis centro et intervallo circulus describi potest. Vides hinc, theoreticam propossitionem veritatis alicuius enunciationem; pra cticam vero operationis faciendae expositiouera continere, Quo ad EVIDENTIAM enunciatio vel talis est, ut extremorum nexus per se clare pateat, vel quae demonstratione in digeat. Illa INDEMONSTRABILIS, haec DEMONSTRABILIS dici consuevit. Quibus enodatis, ad peculiaria propositionum nomina explicanda transcamus. Indemonstrabilis ergo est enunciation, “Totum sua parte maius est”. Demonstrabilis. contra haec: “Scientia Philosopho est necessaria”, ea enim ex collatione definitionum scientiae et philosophi debet demonstrari. Propositio indemonstrabilis theoretica dicitur AXIOMA. Si vero practica fuerit, POSTVLATVM vocalır. E.g. “Totum est aequale omnibus suis partibus simul sumti”. D. de Tschirnausen axioma vocat quamcumque propositionem ab unica definitione immediate deductam; Euclides au tem illam, quae primo intuitu ab unoquoque perspici potest. Res eo redit, ut axioma vo cemus enunciationem per se claram, adeoque demonstratione non indigentem, sive a defini tione, sive aliunde evideutiam suam repetat: ac proinde nostra definitio utramque amplectitur sententiam, ut diffusius coram ostendemus. ** E. g Quovis centro ac quovis intervallo cir culum describere. Coguita enim circuli defini tione, postulati huius veritasan. scitur, Cap. V. De iud. et prop. IOL Enunciatio theoretica demonstrabilis THEOREMA vocatur; practica contra dicitur PROBLEMA. In Theoremate ergo propositionis veritas ex plurium definitionum collatione demonstrari debet. E. g., “Deus est aeternus” Huius enim demonstratio ex definitionibus Dei, et aeter ni inter se collatis peti debet. Hinc est, ut duabus illud constet partibus, nempe enunciatione, qua veritas șive propositio theoretica enunciatur, et demonstratione, qua ea dein confirmatur: ideoque in fine demonstra tionis addi solet Q. E.'D., hoc est, “quod erat demonstrandum.” Quum Problema sit propositio practica, pa lam est, illud tribus absolvi, propositione sci licet, quae quid faciendum proponit, solutione, quae modum, quo fieri potest, ostendit, et demonstratione, quae rem bene processis se concludit, addends, “Q. E. F”. idest, “quod erat faciendum”. Sic problema est haec enunciatio: Commiserationem in altero excitare. COROLLARIVM, sive CONSEOTARIVM dicitnr quaevis enunciatio, quae ab alia immediate, et necessariae consequutione oritur. E. g. Cuum demonstraveris propositionem E T. hanc: Nihil est sire ratione sufficiente, per teris inde eruere corollarium; Ergo, id omne, quod ratione sufficiente destituitur, nec est, nec esse potest. SCHOLION, seu SCHOLIVM, est oratio, qua illustratur quidquid in propositione obscurum videbatur. In eo igitur doctrinae usus exponitur, historia narratur, auctorum sententiae referuntur aliorum obiectiones proponuntur et refelluntur, ce teraque observatu digna enucleantur: ut videre est in omnibus Mathematicorum, et Philosophorum recentium scriptis. LEMMA est proposititio ex aliena disciplina desumta, quae tamen ad demon strandum aliquid in doctrina, quam tra ctamus in subsidium adhibetur. Ita Aritmetici in costructione quadratornm et cuborum lemmata ab Algebra muluantur, ut est propositio illa: Cuiuscumque numeri bi partiti quadratum aequatur quadratis parti una cum facio dupli partis unius in al teram lucti. um Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 103 S E C T10 lll. De propositionum adfectionibus. HaecAec de enunciationum diversitate. Superest, ut de earum adfectionibus pau ca dicamus, de quibus quamplurima in Scholis praecipiuntur laboris quidem plena, vtilitatis autein expertia. Ad propositionum adfectiones referuntur: OPPOSITIO, SVBALTERNATIO, CONVERSIO, et AEQVIPOLLENTIA. OPPOSITIO est duarum proposi tionum inter se pugnantium collatio: estque vel CONTRARIA, si earura utra que sit universalis in qua propositio nes ambae possunt esse falsae, sed non ambae verae; vel CONTRA-DICTORIA, si etiam quantitate differant, *** in qua enunciationum illarum necessario una ve ra esse debet, altera falsa; vel deni que SVBCONTRARIA, si ambae sint par ticulares, **** in eaque propositiones am bae verae, at non ambae falsae esse possunt. * Sic oppositae sunt hae propositiones: Omnis E 4 spiritus cogitat; nullus spiritus cogitat: pu. gnant enim inter se, quum de eodem subie cto idem una adfirmet, altera neget. ** E. g. Omnis homo est ratione praeditus: nullus homo est ratione praeditus, quarum una vera est, altera falsa. Possunt tamen da ri casus, in quibus ambae falsae sint, veluti huum unirersaliter enunciatur, quod particu lariter proferri debebat. E. g. Omnis homa est eruditres: nullus homo est eruditus. Om nibus enim tribuere quod quibusdam tan tum convenit, est falsum dicere dicere, ut infra videbimus. *** Ita propositiones: Omnis spiritus cogitats quidain spiritus non cogitat, sunt contradi ctoriae, earum enim una universaliter ait, al. tera particulariter negat. Iure igitur exclusa altera includitur, et contra: nam falsum est a quibusdam removere quod omnibus con renit, vel aliquibus tribuere quod nulli com petit. ***** Talis est sequens oppositio Quidam ko mines sunt divites: quidam homines non sunt divites: Vides hic ambas propositiones veras esse. Quod si dicas: quidam homo est liber: quidam homo non est liber, quum haec falsa sit, altera vera esse debet. Rationem eius re gulae, ne longius provehamur, coram dabi una, mus. 7SVBALTERNATIO est duarum Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 105 propositionum sola quantitate differen tium, sed eosdem terminos habeniium mutua quaedam relatio. Vniversalis enun ciatio SVB-ALTERNANS; particularis vero SVB-ALTERNATA, a Logicis dici con suevit. * De qua adfectione duo notanda occurrunt: 1. Veritatem subalternantis veritas quoque subalternatae consequi tur, non contra **. 2: Falsitas propo sitionis ' subalternatae falsitatem etiam subalternantis arguit, non autem con tra. E. g. Duarum propositionum:, Omnis homo est eruditionis capax; quidam, homo est eruz ditionis capax, illa subalternans, haec subal ternata dicitur. ** Sic quum ia superaddito exemplo verum sit, omnes homines doctrinae esse capaces, verum quoque erit, quosdam homines doctrinae capa ces esse. Ratio huius regulae est. Contrariae ambae verae esse non possunt (S. 78. ). Si ergo 'subalternans vera sit; eius contrará falsa erit. Quum autem huic contradıcat subalterna ta, et in contradictoriis necessario una sit, altera falsa (C. eod. *** ), liquet subal ternatan necessario verum esse debere; alias, enim in contradictione falsitas ex utraque par te daretur, quod est absurdu:n. Contra ea si verum est, quosdam hom nºs esse eruditos vera E 5 106 Logica Pars. I. cui quum non certe infertur omnes homines eruditos esse. Si namque subalternata est falsa, eius con tradictoria vera erit; sit contraria subalternans, haec non poterit non esse falsa, adeoque subalternae falsitatem necessario sequi. E.g.Falsum est, aliquem spiri tum esse mortalem: falsum qnoque erit, omnem spiritum esse mortalem. At şubalternantis fal sitas non ita subalternatae falsitatem includit. Quum enim in subalternante, utpote univer sali, subiectum in tota sua extensione suma tur ($. 68. ), poterit attributum aliquod extra subiecti naturam rationem sui habere sufficientem, adeoque aliquibus tantum spe ciebus, aut individuis conveniens propositio piem efficere particularem (f. eod. *** ). Fal sa in hoc casu' erit subalternáns, non vero subalternata. Hinc si falsuin est, omnes homi nes ésse doctos, non ita falsum erit, quosdam homines esse doctas. CONVERSIO est mutua extremorum salva enunciationis veritate, substitutio Ea fit tribus modis, scilicet 1. SIMPLICITER, quum eadem qualitas et quantitas manet; 2. per ACCIDENS, quin quan titas sola mutatur; 3. denique per CONTRA-POSITIONEM, quum salva pro, positionis quantitate, terminis additur ne galio, qua fit, ut enunciatio lex determi pata in infinitam abeat. Cap. V. De iud. et prop: 107 * Scholerum est ha ec doctrina a nobis recensi ta in gratiam eor um, qui huiusmodi loquite tiones scire cupiu nt; sed non caret sua uti litate; imo haud raro est necessaria, Sim plex igitur est conversio: Omnis spiritus est substantia cogitans: omnis substantia cogi tans est spiritus. E. g. Omnis doctus est homo, copyertitur per accidens hoc modo: ergo quidam homo est doctus. *** Sic: Quidam homo non est. pius, per con trapositionem convertitur: ergo quoddam non pium est homo. Sed quorsum haec? ais. Con fer, Dan. Richterum diss. de convcrs. propo • sition. Halae 1740 AEQUIPOLLENTES denique dicun tur enunciationes, quae verbis licet di versae, cumdem tamen sensum habent. * Duae ergo propositiones synonymicis termia nis expressionibusque prolatae aequipollentes sunt, nempe eumdem valorem habentes. Ego Omne animal vivit et sentio: nihil tam ani manti proprium est, quam vita et sensie. Quae de his postremis propositionum adfectionibus laboriosius a Scholasticis traduntur, tempus terendum potius, quam ad rationein excolendam sunt adcommodata. Nobis haec tantum notasse sufficiet. Schol. Quae de iudiciis, ac propositio nibus cupidae iuventuti observanda arbitra. mur, ea paucis exponenda supersunt. Qua propter tironi Philosopho sequentes tenea di sunt CANON ES, 1, Q Voniam iudicia sunt sapientiae, vel stultitiae fidelia indicia, par cius iudicato ne aliis sis ludibrio teque in errorem temere coniicias. 4 * Sensus namque communis a iudicandi peritia scientiam hominis metiri solet. Ea de re quum de alterius sapientia vel stultitia iudicium proferre volumus eum criterio pollentem pel carentem adpellamus. 2. De nuila re, nisi cuius adaequa tam, aut saltem distinctam habes ideam, iudicium proferto, tuum. Idearum enim confusio praeiudiciorum mater est fera cissima. * Quum enim rerum, de quibus iudicare volu mus, distinctatu vel adaequatam habemus ide am: tunc eas undequaque cognoscimus, re lationesque perpendimus; adeoque termino rum nexibus optime coguitis, recte iudiça þimus, Cap. V. De ind. et prop. 109 4. In vel tuo i quocumque iudicio vel alieno caussam et rationem atten te perspicito, cur tales ideae tali modo coniungantur vel scparentur, nec alio. * * Etenim infra abunde patebit, verae prope, sitionis criterium esse, si ratio sufficiens ad. sit, cur praedicatum subiecto tribuatur, vel ab eo removeatur. Tali ergo ratione perspem cta, non poterit iudicium non esse verum; ac proinde errandi metus procul aberit. 4. Praecipitantiam fugito: ideoque in iudicando tardus, in enunciando tardior esto, ne levitalis errorisve arguaris. Me mento Augustini praeclarum illud: ver IA BIS AD LIMAM, SEMEL AD LINGUAM, Ne cit enim, monente Horatio, vox missa Leverti. Notum est responsum illud nescio cui num quam loquuto, ac pro sapiente seinper habi. to, datum, postquam semel toqui voluit: Si tacuisses, Philosophus mansisses. 51. De moribus, et viia hominum num uam iudicato. Nemo enim alterius in er est a Deo constituius: > Hinc sapientissimum illud Servatoris nostri 110 Logica Pars. I. monitom gauctiope muniiuin habemus Matth. VII. 1. Nolite iudicare, ut non iudicemini. Qua vero ratione praeceptum istud homini bus inculeatum sit, ostendemus in Iure Naturae. Quoniam duarum idearum convenien tia, aut discrepantia non semper unica intuitu aguosci potest, adeoque dan tur veritates demonstrabites(s 71. ); de monstratio autem ratiociniorum serie absol vitur: ordinis ratio postulat, ut de ratiocinatione verba faciamus. Est vero RATIOCINATIO, sive RATIOCINIVM, actio mentis, qua ex duobus iudiciis no tionein communem habentibus tertium eli citur; vel practice est duarum idearum cum teriia comparatio', earumque rela tionis. deductio. Ratiocinium porro verbis expressa dicitur SYLLOGISMVS. * Quando igitur mens de veritate iudicii alicu ius nouduin certa, eius extrema, sive ideas confert cum idea aliqua tertia, et ab earum convenientia vel discrepantia, tertium elicit Cap. IV. De rat. et Syll. III iudicinm: tunc ratiocinatur, hoc est rationes conficit, ut veritatem inveniat. E. g. Ut sciat, an aer sit gravis comparat ideam aeris, et ideam gravis; cum tertia idea corporis, ob servatque, num inter eas adsit convenientia: qua comperta, duas illas ideas inter se quo que convenire concludit hoc modo: Omne corpus est grave: Aer est corpus; Ergo aer est gravis. En ratiocivium. Quod si verbis exprimatur, erit syllogismus. 83. Experientia teste scimus, duas ide as cum tertia triplici modo comparari pos se: vel enim cum illa conveniunt, vel u na convenit, altera discrepat, vel ambae ab ea discrepant. In primo casu elicitur ter tium iudicium aiens, in secundo negans, in tertio vero nihil exsurgit. Totum ergo ratiocinii pondus duobus his axiomatis con tinetur: nempe 1. Quae conveniunt cum aliquo tertio ea conveniunt inter se: 2. Quorum unum tertio cuidam convenit, alterum autem ab eo discrepat, illa in ter se quoque discrepant * Primum axioma est ratio sufficiens syllogismi aientis ut videre, est in exemplo supra al lato; alterum negantis: e g. Qui Deo servit non servit Mammonae: sed Christianus Deo. 1. servit: ergo Christianus non servit Mamm onae. Vides hic duaru n idearum Christiani et Mam monae servientis., alteram convenire cnm ter tia Deo serviendi, alteram vero ab ea di screpare: unde infertur a se invicem discrepare. 84. Ex quibus rebus clare consequitur 1. in omni ratiocinatione tres tantummodo ideas esse debere, adeoque 2. in omni syllogismo tres tantuin terminus; * unde 3. si plures ad sint tirinini; guain tres, syllogisuum es se falsum. ** Quumque tres ideae totidem combinationes adinittant (per exper. ): sequitur 4: ratiocinium tria quoque iudicia continere; ac proinde 5. syllogismum tres, nec plures, enunciationes admittere) Advertendum hic, tam terminos, quani pro positiones syllogismums, componentes y pecu liaribus a Logicis ' donata fuisse nominibus. Et ut a teruninis incipiamus, praedicatum tertiae propositionis,, quae principalis dici potest, MATOR adpellatur, subiectum eiusdeni, MINOR; {erminus vero, qui tertiam ideanı ex. primit, quique rationem continet suffizientem couvenientiae, vel repugnantiae termini ma ioris cum minore, MEDIUS voćatur. E pro, Cap. V. De iud. et prop. 113 > positionibus etiam illa, in qua medius cum maiore confertur, MAIOR, vel PROPOSITIO simpliciter; illa, in qua medius cum minore comparatur, MINOR vel ASSUMPTIO; ambae vero PRAEMISSAE dicuntur, propositio denique, quam principalem supra, adpellavimus CONCLUSIO COMPLE xto, a Scholasticis CONSEQUENTIA nos minantur. Sic in primo exemplo gravis est terminus maior, aer minor, cor pus est terminus medius, adeoque prima pro positio est maior, altera minor, tertia con clusio. * Solet enim quandoque quartus irreperę ter. minus, et syllogismum corrumpere, idque raro patenter; nam saepius in termino aliquo, vel compositione latet. Fieri hoc potest 1. per aequivocationem, ut fi terminuin aliquiem yagnum adhibeas in sensu diverso: eg: Vilpes habet qualuorpedes, Herodes est vulpes; er go Herodes habet quatuor pedes. In quo ob servas vocem vulpes prino proprie; secundo vero metaphorice suintam; 3. per supposi tionis mutationem, ut si idem terminus ma terialiter in una, formaliter in premissarum altera sumatır. E. g. Iinne ens est generis neutrius: femina est ens, ergo fernina est ge neris ncutrius, in quo nocens in miori gran. matice; in minori philosophice anceptum est; 3. per confusionem termini abstracti cum con creto. E.g. Omnis prudentia est habitus bo nus: Titius est prudens: ergo Titius est ha bitus bonus. Tres ergo enuuciationes syllogismi materia dici possunt: forma namque legibus absolvi tur, quas infra 'exibebimus. 85. Quamvis vero ratiocinium tam fa cilis exequutionis primo intuitu videatur: difficilis tamen admodum est termini me dii, qui communis idearum mensura est inventio. Sed ut omois difficultas evanescat, experientiam philosophiae matrem consule re decet. Ea enim duce discimus, mentem postrani in ratiocinando duplieem ingredi viam: vel enim notionum alteram ad pro prium genus, vel speciem revocat, et quid quid his convenit, illi quoque tribuit, vel definitionis characteres evolvit, eosque al. teri convenire observans definic tum quoque coniungit. Duplex ergo est medium inveniendi methodus: altera sub iectum ad genus, vel speciem, sub qua continetur, reducendi, eique tribuendi, vel adimendi quidquid ideae genericae con vepit, vel ab ea discrepat; altera attributi definitionem cum subiecto comparandi, et ab eorum convenientia vel discrepantia, praedicati quoque cum subiecto coniunctio nem eruendi. cum ea Cap. IV. De rat. et Syll. Exemplo sit sillogismiis supra adductus. Scire cupis, aer sit gravis? Reduc subiectum sub genere corporis, et vide, utrum huic conveniat gravitas, eam de aere quoque enunciabis, ita ratiocinando. Quodlibet corpus est grave, aer est corpus: ergo aer est gravis. Haec erit prima medium inveniendi methodus. Rursum gravitatis defi nitionem evolve, eiusque characteres, nem pe corporum inferiorum pressionem confer cum aere. Quumque ei conveniant, attribu tum cum subiecto coniunges hoc modo: Quidquid corpora inferiora premit, est grave: Aer premit corpora inferiora: Ergo aer est gravis Habes hic alteram medium inveniendi me thodum. Eodemque modo in aliis ratiociniis investigando procedes: quod si adcurate ser ves, numquam tua te fallet ratiocinatio. 86. Ex hoc principio fluunt sequentes regulae ratiocinii fundamentales. I. Quid quid convenit generi vel speciei, conve nit etiam omnibus speciebus, et indivi duis eorum ambitu conteniis. 2. Quid quid repugnat vel generi specici, repugn it omnibus quoque speciebus, et individuis sub iisdem contentis. * 3. Cui convenit definitio, convenit pariter definitum: ac proinde 4. a quo discrepat definitto, di screpat etiam definitum. * Vides ergo ideam mediam semel universaliter sumi debere, quia ideam universalem, ge. mus nempe vel speciem, exhibet. Quod si bis particulariter sumeretur, ratiocininm vi tio laboraret, ut infra dicetur. Quumque praedicatum tam latc pateat, quam subiectum cui tribuitur, ut cuique manifestum est: li quet, propositionem, in qua medius vicem praedicati sustinet, particularem esse. Debet ergo medius terminis universaliter sumi in ea propositione, cuius subiectum constituit Et quoniam propositio, in qua subiectum in tota sua extensione sumitur, est universalis: liquido infertur, saltem unam praemissaram esse debere universalem. Variae syllogismorum figurae Scho lasticis fuere in deliciis, quas barbaris ali quot vocabulis, versibusque distinguere consueverunt. Nos, missis futilibus tracla tionibus, regulas quasdam Tironibus ma xime inservituras, quibus syllogismi leges breviter exponuntur, hic subiiciinus, quas. sequcntes exhibent. Cap. IV. De rat. et Syll. 119 CANONES. In syllogismo non plures termini sunto, quamtres. Si quartus irrepserit, vitiosusiesto. Est lex eo magis observanda, quo omnia sophismata, si bene perpendantur, contra illam peccare observamus. Ecquid enim sunt fallaciae tanto labore a Scholis evolutae, an liquitatis, amphboliae, dictionis composi tionis, divisionis, caussae, dicti simpliciter, con e juentis, accidentis, cetera, nisi syllogi smi e quatuor terminis conflati, in quibus quarins cryptice latet? Veritas hace altcate consideranti baud aegre patescet. Vide quae de quatuor terminis diximus g. Medius terminus numquam conclu sionem ingreditor. Monstruosuin enim es set, caussam in effectus constitutionem immisceri.: * → Intellectus enim in ratiocinando vice Mathe matici fungitur. Quia vero Mathematicus dua rum magnitudinuin aeqnalitatem ex cniusdam tertii adplicatione cognoscit, nec, nisi in comparatione, mensuram adhibet: ita et in tellectus in ratiocinando ex duobus indiciis 118 Logica Pars. I. * tertium ervit, in quod medium comparatio nis ingredi, valde foret absurdum. Vitiosum ergo esset ita raziocinati: Omnis bonus Phi losophus est homo: Titius est bonus Philo sophur: ergo Titius est bonus homo. Medius Damque terminus ex parte in conclusionem irrepsit. 4. Non esto plus minusve in conclu sione, ac fuit in praemissis, ne quatuor inde éxoriantur termini. Si nanque praemissae sunt veluti comparatio nes duarum magnitudinum cụm tertio eisdem adplicato, scilicet mersura: iudicium ex comparatione ipsa procedens, perfecte com parationibus ipsis convenire debet. Quando vero in conclusione plus minusve continetur, quam in praemissis, idem esset, ac si dice res productum maius vel minus esse altero, quod ex iisdem factoribus est ortum Plus cotineret conclusio, si ita diceres: Qui alium l'aesit, puniendus est: Cajus alterum laesit: Cajus ergo morte puniendus est. Minus con tra, si sic ratiocinaris: Qui furium commi sit, restitutioni et poenac subiacet: Titius fur tum commisit: tius restitutioni subiacet. 4. Ex puris particularibus, vel ne gantibus (praemissis ) nihil sequi, ius estc. Cap. V. De rat. et Syll. 119 * Diximus enim f. 86. *, praemissarum unam saltem esse debere universalem: unde si am hae essent particulares, impingeretur in regulam 1.1. S. cit.; si vero ambae negantes, tunc duarum idearum neutra cum tertia conveniret, adeoque nihil sequeretur per S. 83. Falsum ergo esset dicere: Quidam bo mines suni doeti: quidam homines sunt in docti: ergo quidam docti sunt indocti. Item Nullus impius salvatur: nullus impius est pius: ergo nullns pius salvatur. 5. Conclusio partem sequatur debilio rem, probe curato, ne in superiora pecces. * Pars debilior est propositio particularis, vel negativa. Si ergo una praemissarum fuerit particularis, conclusio quoque particnlaris, conclusio quoque particularis esse debet, alias plus esset in conclusione, quam in praemissis; quod est contra regulam 3.: si vero una praemissarum fuerit negans con clusio adfirmans contra regulam 2. In hoc eniin casu extremorum conclusionis unum cum medio convenit, alterum ab eo discre pat; adeoque ea inter se quoque discrepare concludendum est; quare conclusio negans esse dcbet. Quae de diversis syllogismorum figuris regulae vulgo traduntur, eae ad rem non faciunt; ac proinde a nobis tuto prae terinittuntur, 120 Logita Pars. I. CAPVT SEPTIMVM. De aliis ratiocinandi modis. 38. Sunt et aliae ratiocinandi formae, quae licet a syllogismo diversae adpareant syllogismum tamen continent vel 1. CRYPTICVM, vel 2., COMPOSITVM, vel 3. MVLTIPLICEM. De his obiter praesenti ca pite agemus. SYLLOGISMUS CRYPTICVS est, in quo forma ordinaria (*. 71 * ) quo modolibet périurbatur, aut occultatur. CRYPSIS ergo inducitur i. per ordinis perturbationem, *. 2. per propositionum aequipollentiam per propositionis alicuius omissionem, quo casu dicitur ENTHYMEMA, 4. denum per contractionem. * Ordo perturbatur, ai quando propositiones transponuntnr: ut si prino conclusionen vel minorem, de nde maiorein vel conclusio riem ponas. E. g. Quum ira sit adfectus minor ), debei omnino compesci (conclusio); omnis namque adfectus est compesccn dus (maior ). ܪ Cap. VII. De aliis rat. " modis. 121 ** E: 8. Adfectus est attentionem turbare. Quum ergo ira sit molus vehementior appe tus sensitivi ': infertur, in iracundo attcntio nem mirifice perturbari. *** ENTHYMEMA igitur est syllogismus dua bus constans propositionibus, quarum prima ANTECEDENS altera dicitur CONSEQUENS. In hac argumentandi forma praemise sarum aliqua reticetur, speciatim vero illa, quae cuique patet, ut: omnis adfectus tur bat attentionem: ergo ira turbat attentionem. Minor deest, utpote quae ab audiente sup pleri potest. Eodem modo et maior retice ri, minor contra exprimi solet: e. g. ir et est adfectus: ergo estcompescenda. SYLLOGISMUS CONTRACTUS dicitur in quo solus maior cum medio termino pro punijatur, relicto iniuore cum omni combi patione. Talis est Cartesii syllogismus. Cogi 10, ergo sum: ubi eogito est medius, est terminus maior; adeoque minor, scilicet ego, cum tota propositionum connexione reticetur: integrum enim ratiocinium lioc,mo do exponendum erat: Quid juid cogitat,exsistit ego cogiio: ego igitur exsisto. SYLLOGISMVS COMPOSITVS est, in quo adest aliqua' propositio composiía, estoque vel HYPOTHETICVS; * vel CO PULATIVUS, ** vel DISIVNCTIVVS, vel tandem ex hoc primoque coalescens, qui proprio nomine vocatur DILEMMA. Tom. I. F. Sun: Hypotheticus, sive conditionalis est, eut ius maior est propositio hypothetica: é g. Si homo est rationalis, sequi tnr, ut sit libertatis capax: atqui est ratio nalis; ergo est capax liberatis De hoc te nenda regula: Adfirmata conditione, adfir matur conditionatum; et negato conditionato, negatur conditio. Quum enim in hypothesi contineatur ratio sufficiens veritxtis proposi tionis, adfirmata caussá adfirmatur effectus contra vero negato effectu, eius quoque caus sa negari debet.. ** Copulativus, sive coniunctus est, qui malo. iorem habet duas simul propositiones coniun gentem, et negantein, quarum unam minor adfirmat, alteram conclusio negat. E. g. Non potest anima sinni aeternum vivere, et cum corpore perire, atqni aelernum vivit: ergo non perit cum corpore. Disiunctivas est cuius propositio maior est dis iunctiva. E. &. Aut anima cst ens ' simple: aut compositum: sed non est cns compositum, ergo est simplex. Notanda crgo regula: Ad firmato uno disi!ınctionis membro, reliqua negantur; ct negatis rcliyuis, unuin ad fir tur. Confer tamen quae de disiunctivis pro positionibus diximus. Si ergo in maiori propositio bypothetica cum disiunctiva copuletur, DILEMMA con surgit quod argumentatio bicornis vel crocodilina vocari solet. Id vero definitur: Syllogismus hypotheticus, cuius mai oris ' al 7 Cap. VII. De aliis rat. mo dis. Tera pars est disiunctiva, quae in minore negatur, et in conclusione totum destruitur. E. g. Si ens simplex naturaliter cx alio en te oritur tunc aut ex alio simplici, aut e composito oriri debet: sed neque ex alio ente simplici, neque c composito oriri potest: ergo naturaliter ex alio ente non potest orlum du cere. Mirificum est Dilemma AVGVSTINI Tract. 1. in Joann, quo Arianorum errorem circa Verbi aeternitatem egregie confutarit Huc referenda quae diximus de divisione MVLTIPLICEM SYLLOGISMVM, licet imperfecte exhibent 1. EPICHERE MA, in quo alterutri, vel utrique prae missarum probatio additur; * 2 PROSYLLOGISMVS, in quo ' prioris syllogismi conclusio posterioris eidem iuncti maiorem constituit POLYSYLLOGISMUS, qui plurium syllogismorum connexionem contínet, e SORITES, qui plures ita connectit propositiones, ut prioris aliribu tudi si ! posterioris subicctum. EPICHEREMA ergo rsl syllogisms. cuius praemissis compendii caussa ralio Quirlitur Exemplum habes iu Cic. pro Sex Rusc. MAI. Vt quis parricidii sit suspectus, is sce lestissimus ét audacissimus sit, oporlei. RATIO est enim crimen horrendum. NIIN. Sex Roscius non est talis PROB. Non est audax, non luxuriosus mon avarus. 124 Loigica Pars. I. CONCL. Non ergo est parricidii suspectus. ** In PROSELLOGISMO itaque duo adsunt syllogismi coniuncti, quorum posterior ma iorem habet in prioris conclusione contentam: quapropter eius minor SVBSVNTA vocatur MAI. Omnis spiritus est ens simplex, MIN. Anima humana est spiritus: CONCL. Ergo anima humana estens simplex. MIN. SVBSVMTA. Atqui ens simplex est indestructibile. CONCL. Ergo anima humana est indestructibilis. Si prosyllogismus uiterius procedat, aliae que minores subsumtae et conclusiones snb inugantnr, dicetur polysyllogismus, hoc est plurium syllogismorum connexio legitime fa cta. Exemplum habebis infra Part. II. Cap.3. Sect. 2. ubi demonstrationis specimen dabimus. SORITES a Cicerone de Divin. Lib II. cap. 4. acervalis dictus, est plurium propos sitionum cumulus ita connexarum, ut unius praedicatum sit alterius subiectum, adeoque tot syllogismos continet, quot sunt propo sitiones, demptis duabus, eodem fere modo, quo polygonum aa Geometris per diagonales in tot triangula resolvi potest, quot sunt la tera demtis duobus. Haec autem argumenta tio nisi cautiones quedam adhibeantur ad fallendum aptior est. Cautiones istae funt. 1. Nulla praemissarum diibia sit, aut falsa: > 1 Cap. VII. De aliis rał. modis. 123 coram. ex falso enim antecedente non potest verum consequens oriri.2. Non insint in Sorite duae propositiones negantcs. Hoc enim casu in eius resolutione aderit syllogismus ambas praemis sarum negantes habens, quem vitio laborare supra observavimus (F. 87. can. 4. ). En Soritis exemplum. Quodlibet corpus est ali quo loco: quod est in uno loco, potest etiam esse in alio: quod potest esse in alio loco, potest rnutare locum: quod potest mutare lo cum, est mobile: ergo quodlibet corpus est mobile. Eius vero analysis rationem reddemus 92. Syllogismo, eiusque speciebus. e diametro opponitur INDVCTIO, quse vere ac proprie dici potest argumentatio a posteriori, quippe quae a singularibus ad particularia, alquc ab bis ad universa lia procedit. Haec autem syllogismo prior est: nam quum ope experientiae praemis sas conficiat, indeque conclusiones eliciat universales, hac vero syllogismi praemissas constituant, utpote qui ab universalibus ad particularia, vel ab his ad singularia gra dum facit: hunc sine illa construi non posse, quisque videt, INDVCTIO itaque est argumentatio, in qua quiquid de singulis speciebus vel individuis speciation praedicatur, generatim quoque de toto genere vel speeie enunciatur; adeoque in ea tot minores adsunt, quot species vel in F 3 dividua exprimuntnr. E. g. aurum, argentuan orichalcum, cuprum, stannum, plumbun, ferrum, igni inieclun liquefiunt: ergo omne metallum igni ni ectum liquefit. Ad inductio nem ergo duo requiruntur, 1. plena partium enumeratio, 2. ut quod inferioribus tribuitur, ile superiori pariter enuncietur. Si ergo par tes omnes enuncientur, inductio dicelur com pleta, sin aliquae tantum, incompleta erit: si denique una dumtaxat fars proponatur, EXEMPLUM adpellabitur, quod tamen ad oratores non ad Philosophos pertinet, quum sit contra 34. S. n. 6. ** Ex iis enim, quae diximus Cap. 1., liquet, ideas universales abstractionis ope a singulari bus erui. Eodem modo Par. 11. Cap. 4. Sect. I. ostendemus, indicia universalia a sin gularibus abstrahendo confici. Id vero est, quod Inductionem constituit. Quum autein praemissarum syllogismi saltem una debeat es se universalis, patet, In ductionem syllogismo principia praestruere: adeoque illo priorem esse. Schol. De hụius doctrinae usu tandem pauca delibare juvabit. Quae de universa hac tractatione homini philosopho servanda sunt, qui sequuntur, exponunt. Cap. VII. De aliis rat, modis.127 CANONES, QVandaquidem ratiocinando veritas + vi. innotescit, principia prius con siderato num solida sint et indubia. Propositiones deinde ad trutinam revo cato, ac denique eurum connexionem adcurate perpendilo, ne in quolibet r'a riocinandi modo fallaris: “. Quum enim syllogismus materia et forma con siet: illan vero propositiones, hanc propo sitionum connexio, lioc est syllogismi "leges constituant; cuiuslibet autem rei bonitas materiae soliditate ac formae aptitudine absolvatur: patet; Philosophum de utraque sollicitum esse debere, ut ratioci. nia sua tulo proferre possit. 2. Quoniam omnis argumentatio ad unum redit syllogismum, id agito, ut huius leges nocturna diurnaque manu verses: alioquin loqui scies, non ratio cinari. Exploratum namque est, quamcumque ar gumentationem syllogismuni esse vel crypti cum ", vel compositum, vel multiplicem: nisi ergo syllogismi probe gnaa rus, nulliusmodi argumenta poterit quisque proferre. Qua de remiramur, viros alioquin F4 doctissimos, et de Philosophia optime atque abunde meritos, syllogismo fuisse adeo in fensos, ut eum inutilem, immo nullins bo ni effectorem esse clamitarint. Infra vero ab unde patebit, scientificam methodum sola syllogismorum concatenatione absolvi: unde evidenter proseguisque deducet, syllogismum homini philosopho esse omnino necessarium Videatur Wolffius in Log. Germ. S. III. seq., ubi mathematicas demonstrationes absque illo fieri non posse, experiundo ostendit 3. Si cum alio res tibi fuerit, omnia eius argumenta in syllogismos resolvito: tunc enim clare perspicies, cunctane re. cte procedant, an aliquis lateat error, an sub ambagibus fallacia occultetur. Varii namque sunt fallcndi inodi a Scholasti cis magno labore evoluti, qui tamen si ad sillogismum eiusque leges, tamquam ail ly, dium lapidem, exigantur, oppido evanescent, Ut hoc exempli loco addamus, si soriten duas propositiones negantes habentem in syl logismos resolvas: 'nonne statim patescet do lus, quum tres negantes propositiones in ra tiocinio, adeoqoe contra quartam eiusdem " legem peccatum esse, observabis. Praeclaro igitur hoc duce uti nolle idem esset, ac in. ventis frugibus, glandibus vesci. Hucusque usque satis satis.dede mentis mentis ope ope rationibus actum. Quum autem Logicae sit non contentiones nequicquam fovere, sed hominum vitae consulere, atque intel lectum in veritatis investigatione dirigere: doceamus, oportet, qua ratio ne tribus hisce mentis operationibus in cognoscendo diiudicandoque vero recte uti debeamus. Quod ut commodius effici pos sit, pauca quaedam de veritate generatim spectata, eiusque genuina tessera, hic prae mittemus, VERITAS est, vel METAPHYSICA, quum ens aliquod actu exsistens suam habet essentiam; vel ETHICA quando quilibet sermo interno sensųi, F 5 130 Logica Pars. II. scilicet conscientiae, respondet; ** vel denique LOGICA, si cogitationes nostrae obiectis suis sint conformes. Quia vero hic cum Metaphysica atque Ethicą nihil no bis est negotii, de veritate logica verba tantummodo faciemus. Metaphysice ergo verum dicitur quidquid om nibus gaudet proprietatibus, quae ad con stituendam eius essentiam sunt necessariae: adeoque huic falsum opponi nequit, qoia es: sentia entis est necessaria et immutabilis ut in Metaphysica fusius docebimus, ac proin de nequit ens exsistere, et sua simul essen. tia carere. Ita aurum est verum aurum, qu pin omnia auri adsunt requisita. At non_da tur, inquies, falsum aurum? Minime. Tunc enim non aurum, sed cuprum, orichalcum, aliudve, aut e pluribus metallis revera mi xtum erit. Illud autem verum aurum iudica. re, est nubem po lunone amplecti, atque a veritate Logica aberrare. ** Verę loqui dicimur, quum secundum cong scientiam loquimur, idest dicimus quae trinsechs sentimus. Atque ḥaec veritas dicitur moralis sive ethica, cui opponitur falsilo suium, quod est sermo contra concientiam prolatus, de in Moralibus agemus. quo 93. VERITATIS LOGICAE vocabulo itelligimus convenientiam cogitationum no strarum cum rebus ipsis, Quumquç no. De ver. eiusq. crit. 131 stra congitandi facultas tribus tantum mo dis sese exserat, vel in ideis forinandis vel in iudiciis eruendis vel denique in rationibus conficiendis (S. 15. ): liquet, logicam veritatem vel in ideis, vel in iu diciis, vel in ratiocinatione reperiri. * Hac definitione veritatem abstracto modo con sideramus: concreto namque definiri posset per cogitationem obiecto suo consentaneam. Porro veritasa Logicis dispescitur in FORMALEM, et OBIECTIVAM. Illa est, cuius obiea ctum extra nos vel non existit vel non tale ut a mente nostra concipitur: quales sunt veritates omnes purae geometricae; haec ve ro, cuius obiectum extra nos realiter exsistit. Ham alii INTERNAM hanc EXTERNAM adpellare consueverunt. Illa est clara, distin cta, et indeficiens, quippe qua mens de se suisque operationibus iudicat, haec vero ob scura, dubia, et fallibilis: non enim per eam, scire possumus, utrum cogitatioues nostrae obiectis suis extra nos positis conveniant necne? adeoque quum veritatem habemus in ternam, de reali extra nos obiecti exsistentia iudicare non possumus; quum contra veritatis externae compotes certi simus obiectum in cogitatione exsistens extra eamdem etiam rea liter existere. 96 IDEA VERA dicitur, si quando nca bis rem, uti in seu est, repraesentemus: *verum est lyDICIVM, siconiungenda co 2 F 6 132 pulemus, separanda seinngamus; 've rum itidem RATIOCINIVŇ, si ' neque in materia, neque in forma peccaverit, * Idea ergo singularis ($. 28. ) vera est, si quando eius obiectum extra nos realiter exsi stat, eoque modo, quo nobis illud reprae sentamus: vera pariter dici debet idea uni versalis, dum compositio vel abstractio a re rum natura non recedit, ita ut characteres illam comitantes simul in uno inveniri pos sint. Vides hinc, ideas deceptrices, chimae ricas, aliasque obiectis suis nullo modo re spondentes dici non posse veras. Advertas - tamen, absolutam obiecti deficientiam, vel ideae ab eo discrepantiam veritati nocere. Si namque obiectum non sit evidens, nec ideae characteres eum eo conferre queamus; con tra vero sufficientibus indiciis de eius verita te certi simus: notionem illam deceptricem vel terminum eam exprimentem inanem ad pellare, est contra Logicae regulas, ac pri ma cognitionis humanae principia tnrpissime peccare. In hunc errorem incidunt quicum que de mysteriis Sanctae Religionis sermonem instituentes, aliquam credentibus notam inu rere conantur, quod vocabula mente cassa proferant e id quod alibi diffuse enodabimus. ** Nimirum si de re quapiam aliquid adfirme mus vel negernus, quod adfirmari aut negari oporteret: veluti quum soli spendorem iri, buimus vel tenebras ab removemus? tunc judícia nostra veritate gaudebunt, f 2 2 eo 2 Cap. I. De ver. eiusq. crit. 133 *** Ratiocinationis, sive syllogismi materiam es se tres illas propositiones, e quibus confla tur; formam vero leges. (S. 87. ) expositas, supra docuimus (6- 84.** ). Si ergo pro positiones fuerint verae: leges autem adcuras te servatae, ratiocinium non poterit non es se verum: quia, quum qualis est caussa, ta lis esse debeat effectus, non potest ex veris praemissis falsa legitime fluere conclusic. Ex quo liquido colligi potest, eum, qui prae missas concessit, non posse negare conclusio nem ex iis legitimo nexu fluentem. Cave tas men, ne ex conclusione, licet evidenter ex praemissis deducta, de hárum veritate audeas áudicare: potest enim conclusio vera legitime ex falsis ambabus oriri praemissis. Talis es, set sequens syllogismus: Omnis virtus est fugienda: Avaritią est virtus; Ergo avaritia est fugienda, Vides hic veram conclusionem legitime ex fal sis praemissis deductam. Possesne conclusionis veritate praemissarum quoque veritatem ar 97. Quoniam iudicium verbis expres sumi propositio dicitur (§. 60. ): evi dens est. propositionem dici veram, quae adfirmanda adfirmat negandaque ne gat, servata ubique quantitate. * Sed quia non omnium cnunciationum veritas, nec ab omnibus distincte perspicitur: criterium aliquod inveniatur, oportet, ad quod guere? 134 Logica Pars. I1. tamquam ad lydium lapidem, propositio nem quamcuinque exigentes, eius verita tem dignoscere queamus. ** • Veluti quum particulariter enunciatur de su biecto quidquid extra illius naturam; vel uni versaliter quidquid in eius essentia rationem habet sufficientem. Vid. supra Part. I. Cap. 5. Sect. 1.. 68. ** Hoc autem criterium exsistere debet quo propositiones veras a falsis, a phanta smatis, realitates ab insomniis discernere pos simus: alias enim homo in perpetua illusia ne versaretur, id quod est Divinae sapientiae, homini, ipsiqne humanae menti iniurium. Quia de te Philosophi omnes in eo consenserunt, li cet in adsignanda illa tessera in contrarias partes opinando ierint, res 98. CRITERIVM VERITATIS est ra tio quaedam sufficiens, per quam intel. ligitur cur praedicatum subiecto tribua tur, vel ab eo removeatur. * Nimirum ut cogitationum nostrarum cum obiectis suis conformitatem perspicere possimus in 93. ), eiusmodi characteres in promtu haberi de bent, quibus attributi cuin subiecto con venientia vel discrepantia ita determinetur, nt mens adquiescat, nec ullus de earum veritate supersit dubitanli locus. Qua propter characteres illi REQVISITA ad peritatein recte dicuntur, De ver. eiusq. crit. 135 Variae de veritatis criteriis omni aetate fuere Philosophorum opiniones, exceptis Academi cis, üsqne, qui Scepticismum ad furorem usque provehere ausi, atque a Pyrrkone Pyr. rhonistarum nomine insigniti, nihil a nobis vere sciri posse, temerario ausu adfirmarunt, quorum insania comploranda potius esset, quam confutanda. PLATO yeri tesseram es se statuit, evidentiam intelligibilem aeterna rum idearum mentibus participatarum; EPI CURUS fidem sensuum. ARISTOTELES medium inter hos iter tenens, utramque evi dentiam veri criterium posuit: illam nempe in intelligibilibus; hanc in iis, quae sensi bus percipiuntur. STOICI, secundum Laer, tium, veri indicinm aibeant comprehensibilcm phantasiam hoc est, evidentiam &maginationum; CARTESIUS cum recentioribus, elaram, et distin ctam perceptionem: in Medit. 4.; MALEBRANCHIUS cam evidentiam, quam inter na animi coactio sequitur, ut ei adsensum denegare nequeamus. Lib.I.de inquir. verit. LEIDNIȚIUS in triplici evia dentia, intellectus, sensus et auctoritatis criterium illud posuit. Quae vero de his ob servari merentur, in ipsis praelectionibus ex ponemus. In hac ergo propositione: Aer est gravis, qualitas attributi, hoc est gravitas, per no tionem aeris determinatur: in hac enim inest ratio sufficiens cur ipsi illam tribuatur. Quum enim aer corpora inferiora premat; idque > 136 Logica Pars. U. ad costituendam gravitatis notionem requira tur: clare patescit, aerem esse gravem, adeo que propositionem esse veram. Et hoc est, quod Wolffius, criterium verae proposi, tionis ésse determinabilitatem attributi per notionem subiecti. 7 *** E. In hac propositione: Caius est invia dus, requisita ad veritatem sunt invidiae cha racterés alibi enumerati, qni in Caio deprehenduntur, quique rationem con tinent sufficientem, cur Caio to invidum es se tribuatur, Quum igitur veritatis criterium in ratione sulficiente consistat, et a requisitorum collectione constituatur sequitur 1. ut inter veritatis crite ria adnumerari debeant quaecumqne iis de terminationibus praedita sunt, ut a mente, quamvis invita, adsensum extorquere pos sint. At quia experientia quotidiana docet, mentem nostram non convinci, nisi ' sen suun testimonio in rebus sensibilibus, * in tellectus evidentia in intelligibilibus, auctoritatis deuique pondere in iis, quae neque sensu, nec ratione percipi possunt: liquet 2. criteria illa pro rerum di. versitate tria statuenda #Y *** esse, intellectus sensuum et auctoritatis EVIDENTIAM. nempe, Cap.II. De ver. eiusq. crit. 137 * Per res sensibiles intelligimus non modo cor poreas quae sensibus exsternis, sed et ipsas animae actiones, quae sensu interno perci piuntur. Quum igitur:Naturae sa pientissimus Auctor hominem conscientia, sen suque cum omnibns organis instruxerit, ut: omnium cogitationum suarum obiecta distin gueret, eorumque conscius esset: non ab re vera esse pronuntiamus, quae internus eter nique sensus ita se habere testantur. ** Et quidem omnium axiomatum evidentia a primo cognitionis humanae principio, nempe non posee idem simul esse et non esse, ori ginem suam repetit; hoc vero principium in timo sensu cunctis innotescit. Quaecumque porro propositiones a veritatibns evidentibus legitimo nexu deducuntur eamdem evidentiam adquirunt, quam illae habebant, id quod ra tione duce ac demonstratioris ope conficitur quibus intellectus convincitur,et mens adquie scit: evidens ergo est, veritates tam demon strabiles, quam indemonstrabiles ad Logicae reguias cxactas revera exsistere, ab homini bus certo cognosci posse, earumque criterium in intellectus adquiescentia reponi debere nempe ut Malebranchius ait, iu ea 'eviden ' tia, qnae internam producit coactionem, at que a mente adsensum extorquet. Huiusmodi sunt propositiones humanum ca ptum superantes, nobisque ideo imperviae, quae quum ab Ente intelligentissimo tantum agnosci possint, revelatae tandem addiscun tur, fidemque mereatur: quum entis illius perfectiones sint infinitae, nec de illarum 2 I veritate addubitari sinant. Eiusdem commatis sunt facta, sive propositiones singulares, quae in locis temporibusve remotis extiterunt, qnae que nec. sensibus, nec ratione a nobis una quam erui possunt, quidquid contra dicat D. Rousseau Disc. sur l ' inegalité parmi les ho mm.; sed sensibus olim ab adstantibus coaevis que percepta, ab his vero vel scriptis vel per manus tiadita ad. nos pervenerunt: ct quia narrantium auctoritas suspecta non est, certitudinem, aut saltem probabilitatem in mente producunt. Vides hinc, sententiam nostram in intelli gibilibus rationem, in sensibilibus experien liam, in factis rebusve humanum captum ex superantibus auctoritatem commend.ve; adec que eamdem asse cuin Cartesiana, Malebran chiana, et Leibnitiana. Sed quia tessera haec certitudinem potius, mentis scilicet nostrae statum, quam rei veritatem respicit, de ea, quam producit, evidentia plura infra, ubi de veritate certa sermo erit, haud spernen da dicemus. Interim confereudus Io.And. Osiander Diss. de Crit. Verit. Tubingae 1748. FALSITAS veritati opposita est di screpantia cogitationum nostrarum ab obiectis. Quumque oppositorum contrariae sint adfectiones, patet, falsitatem vel in ideis, vel in judiciis, vel in ratiociniis reperi ii; * adeoque FALSITATIS CRITERIVM esse manifestum rationis illius sufficientis defectum. Cap. I. De ver. eiusq. Falsa ergo est idea, quum aliter se habet a re repraesentata; falsum iudicium aiens., si quando subiecto non conveniat attributum, negans vero quoties boc illi conveniat; adeo que falsa propositio, quae neganda adfirmat, adfirmandaque negat, vel quae universaliter enunciat quod particulariter enunciari debe. bat; falsum denique ratiocinium, quod in materia vel forma peccat: i illa, quando propositiones sunt falsae; in bac vero, quum syllogismi leges, violatae sunt. ** Propositionis falsae rera tessera est, si non modo desit ratio sufficiens, cur praeuicatum subiecto tribuatur, vel non; verum adsit rl tio, cur contrariuin enuncietur: tunc enim subiecti notio determinal qualitatem attribu ti oppositi. Porro in ratiociniorum forma fal sitas esse potest vel patens, vel latens. Si vitinn sit manifestum, dicuntur PARALOGISMI; si vero crypsi aliqua tegatur, vo cantur SOPHISMATA A Scholasticis am bo vocantur FALLACIAE. Paralogismus est sequens: Omne homicidium est vitandum, nullum furtum est homicidium ergo nullum furtum est vitandum. In co enim aperto peccalum est colra Can. 4.6. 87.: me dius enim terminus his particulariter sumtus est. Sophisma contra crii, si sie ratiocinabea ris: Populus ex terra crescit: mulliluilo ko. 140 Logica Pars. II. minum est populus: ergo multitudo hominum ex terra crescit: quatuor namque termini ir repsere per aequivocationem termini populus, qui in maiori arborem, in minori hominum multitudinem siguificat. ** Plurima de fallaciis ad nauseam usque a Scho laflicis tradita invenientur, qui tamen tot tan tisque tractationibus nullum fecerunt operae pretium. Quia vero in huiusmodi failaciis, fi ve dictionis, five (ut ipsi aiunt) extra di ctionem, vitium plerumque latet in quarto termino cryptice tecto: Auditorum nostro rum mentes non ultra fatigabimus: attamen, si sapient, syllogismi leges memoriae inscul pent, et ad terminorum numerum semper animum adverlut. Quibens relligiose servatis, aut nihil scimus, aut numquam, neque de cipi ratiocinando, nec alios deçipere pote runt. Schol. De huius tandem docirinae usu opus cst, ut aliqua addamus. Ea paucis iisquo baud spernendis comprehendemus regulis. Qui ergo Philosophi nomen adse qui cupit, hos probe teneat. Cap. 1. De ver. eiusq. crit. CANONE S. I Dea, quae characteres continet si * bi invicem repugnantes, deceptrix est: imaginaria vero, qua ob similitudinem quampiam nobis fingimus quod non est, ut quasi per imagniem oculis obiectum praesens sistamus. ** * Hae igitur ideae proprie loquendo non falsae, sed potius impossibiles dici possunt, quia nihil sumt: ut ' idea circuli quadrati, ligni ferrei, creaturae infinitue', ec. ** Vocantur istae a Wolffio vicariae realium, quia earum vices gerunt, ut si memoriam ti bi rapraesentes per receptaculum idearumi: licet enim nulla adsit analogia inter spiritum el corpus, atque adeo inter eorum proprie lates: ob similitudinem tamen, quod, sicut in receptaculo plura servamus, quae inde, quum opus fuerit, depromiinus, ila memoria plures ideas, quae tamdiu latuere nobis sug gerit, memória ipsam veluti receptaculum nobis sistinus 2. De eo, cuius clare et distincte ra tionem perspicis sufficientem, tuto adfir mato: negalo vero, quod eidem pari ratione refragari cognoscis. Si eam non adhuc nosti: licet pro incerto haberi 142 Logica Pars. II. ſas sit, ne temere iudicato, donec veri tatis eius, falsitatisve criterio polleas. Hoc quidem modo vitari poterit audax illa in iudicando praecipitaptia, quae incautos maxime adolescentes quamplurimis subjicit erroribus. Hi ramque sola suarum virium praesumtione freti iudicia sua nec rationc ful ciunt, nec ad criterium aliquod exigunt; quo fit, ut ea praecipitanter nimis prouentiare adsueti, ratione tandem destituantur, et quid quid in buccam venerit effutiant. 5. Si diu in veritate invenienda fru. stra taboraveris, examen reintegrato. Si ne id qutdem profuerit, ne rem pro falsa, aut impossibili venditato, nitam ridiculus sis, qui mentem tuam veri ful sigue mensurani esse existimes. * * Perutilem harc cautionem inculcat Genu eusis noster, quae dici non potest, quanto sit omuibus adiumento. Quum enim obscurilas plerumque sit relativa, eiusque caussa in - bo mirum n.entibus, raro in re percepta, sit quaerenda (S. 20. ): nullum est huiusmo di iudicium, quod non ex praecipitantia fluat. Qui enim ita se gerunt, ni mia de in tellectus sui viribus praesamtione laborant, idque agunt, perinde ac si supremum persprie caciae cognitionisge gradum obtineant, cui an tefcratur remo, pauci pares putentnr. In hanc rigrilam offendunt quicumque mundi creatio Cap. II De ign. et er. cor. caus. 143 nem iu tempore, aliasve doctrinas, quas intellectu adsequi nequeunt, proimpossibi libus venditant, ut fusius in Metaphysica docebimns. Id vero quam ridiculum sit, nemo non videt. De ignorantia et errore, eorumque caussis. A Ctio mentis, qua verum (S. 94. ) agnoscit, resque sibi re praesentat ac percipit, COGNITIO adpellatur. Eius vero absentia dicitur IGNORANTIA, quae definiri pot est per statum mentis cognitione desti tulae. * Sic e g. qui disciplinae alicuius veritates ac praecepta novit, eaque mente tenet, illius cognitione gaudet: contra vero, si ea cogni lione sit 'destitutus, disciplinam illam igno rare diciiur. 103. Experientia quisque sna it aliena doceri potest, hominnm plerosque nihil aut minipium admodum in rebus cogno scere; plurima quoque nesciri ab iis, qui acriori se praeditos ingenio jactant: cos vero, qui doctissimorum virorum nomine gaudent, quo longius sua sese exserit co gnitio, eo plurima se ignorare comperient. 144 Logic. Pars II. * Ex innumerabili rerum, quae sciri possunt, puniero ingenii cuiuscumque vires superante, domesticaque experientia fluxit mos ille lau dabilis ad utilium rerum cognitionem ani mum adplicandi, neglectis iis, quae ad cu iusqne statum minime pertinentes, inter su ferflua et inuțilia referuntur. Recte namque observaverat Seneca necessaria a nobis igno rari, quia superflua discimus. Id ipsum er go argumento est, homines, postquam ad sublimiorem, ut aiunt, cognitionis apicem pervenerint, quamplurima adhuc habere, quorum nulla se gaudere cognitione animad vertant, illoruinqe esse admodum ignaros. 104. Ex quo patet 1. omnes homines in stalu verae ignorantiae versari, ac ne minem un quani reperiri posse, qui omui moda rerum cognitione praeditum se tuto adfirmet: quapropter oportere 2. ordine na in studiorum curriculo servari, ut primo necessaria * deinde ütilia, postremo iu cunda discantur; adeoque 3. eruditorum reprchensionem merito incurrere eos, qui neglecta hac methodo ad superfluarum re rum siudiuin animum adplicant, param curantes ea, quae ad interni extervique status suiperfectionem sunt necessaria. Necessaria dicuntur, quae Dei suique cogni tionem spectant, item quae facultatem quam quisque profitetur, postremo quae ad socie tatis commoda promovenda pertinent. Cap. II. De ign. et er. eor. cans. 1.45 ** Suo itaque officio deesset Medicus, si ne glecta medendi arte, eruditioni, hoc est quid quid extra Medicinae ambitum est, operam daret. Ignorantiam quoque suam magis pro moreret Legisperitus, si pro legum codici bus, medicos aliosve sibi inutiles libros evol veret. Alque utinam nostro hoc aevo Lit teratores isti extra aleam aberrantes defide, rarentur ! 105. Ad ignorantiae porro caussas de tegendas nobis lucem quam maximam ail fert experientia. Ea enim duce scimus igno rantain oriri a 1. DEFECTV IDEARVM, non solum in iis rebus, quae nostrum si perant captum, sed etiam in iis, quae iu jus limites von excedunt, 2. MENTIS IMBECILLITATE, sive impotentia co gnoscendi idearum nostrarum relationem, LABORIS IMPATIENTIA, qua fit, ut attentio minuatur, ideaeque fiant deterio res, STVDIORVM CONFVSIONE, MEMORIA vel nimia, vel labili, 6. denique SVBSIDIORVY INOPIA. (t ) Impotentia haec ab idearum mediarum defe ctu pendet: quo fit, ut communi illa defi ciente mensura, nec conferre inter se nolis nec propterea vertalem delegere quaemus. (ones T. 1. ** Confusio studiorum habetur, vel quia fine attentione aut ordine fiunt, vel quia plurima eodem tempore cursimque discuntur: ex quo pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sen sus. Hinc nimia illa sciolorum turba, solis frontispiciis praefationibusque furfuroscrum, nostram invasit aetatem, ** Nimia namque memoriae praestantia laboris impatientiam, adeoque ignorantiam parit; illius vero infidelitas cognitionis defectum au get. Ecqua enim cognitio ei, qui unam al teramve propositionein memoria retinere non valet? (+ ) Subsidiorum nomine veniunt Magistri, si ve viventes illi sint, sive mortni, scilicet li bri. Ex horum enim defecte lici non po test, quot sublimia vilescant ingenia, quae vel mechanicis adeo artibus, aut otio et libidi ni se addicunt. Elegantissimum est Alciati em blema, quo ingenia ista iuveni euidam com parat, cuius sinistra manus duabus alis in Coclum tollitur, dextera vero ingenti pon dere impedita deorsum fertur. Cujus em blematis dilucidationem reddemus Dolendum autem magnopere est, quod si quando iuvenes isti litterario furfure vix in crustati Rempublicam invadunt, societatis perturbatores, bilingues, susurrones, ad pessima demum et turpissima quaeque, (si paucos excipias ) parati evadunt. 106. Haec de ignorantia. Quando au tem propositicni verre dissensim, falsae contra adsensum praebemus, tunc ERRA coram Cap. II De ign. et ei. cor. caus. 147 RE dicimur, sive judicia confundere. Qua propter ERROR definiri potest, quod sit confusio iudiciorun. Error autem in iu dicando commissus PRAEIVDICIVM * adpellatur, quod esse dicimus iudicium erroneum praecipitanter et sine maturi tale latum. Dicitur vero praeiudicium, vel quia sanae mentis praevenit iudicium, vel quia praema ture et fine criterio profertur. Talia sunt pleraque vulgi praeiudicia, veluti: discum solis diametrum habere circiter bipalmarein: cometas esse bellorum caussas: et alia eius modi. 107. Quum praejudicium sit iudicium erroneum; error vero confusio iudiciorun: evidens est s. praeiudicia na sci ex idearum ob curitate et confusione, adeoque 2. eorum originem ab intellectus corruptione unice esse petendam. Equidem sunt plerique, qui praeiudiciorum originem a voluntaté repetunt, eamque pri us emendandam esse aiunt; ii tamen io to aberrant coelo: voluntariam namque praeiudiciis adhaesionem vel negligen liam animum ab iis liberandi, pro praeiudia ciis venditant. Si vero rem probe per penderint videbunt, ea, quae voluntatis vitia asserunt, ab intellectus vitiis vel imagin natione pendere: et si qui méntem obun brant ad feclus, appetitus quippe sensitiyi * * 7 G 2 148 Logica Pars. It. ** vehementiores molus, non aliunde, quam ah ideis obscuris et confusis ortum trahunt. Qua de re legatur Syrbius in Phil. rat p: 5. 108. Duo intérim sunt praeiudiciorum genera, AVCTORITATIS scilicet, et NIMIAE CONFIDENTIAE. * Illa sunt, quae nostris viribus parum confisi, nimi aque oscitantia laborantes ab aliorum, quorum apud nos plurimum valet ancio ritas, scriptis vel sententiis kausta adopta mus, eaque pro sanctis habenda puta mus; hec vero, quae nostris viribus niinium fidentes, quamquam praecipitan ter et sine meditatione prolata., tainquam vera lamen adsumunus illis firmiter achae remus, et proeiis, veluti pro aris et fo. cis, pugnamus. * Addunt alii praeiudicia AETATIS. At quum illa non sint, nisi opiniones praeconceptae a nutricibus parentibus, atque magistris a teneris, ut aiunt, unguiculis haustae: ea ad auctoritatis praeiudicia referri, nemo non ri det. Illustris VERULAMIUS de augm. scient V. 4. praeiudicia,, quae iilola vocat, in quatuor dividit classes, quarum prima am plectitur idola tribus, scilicet quae in ipsa hamana natura fundata sunt; altera idola specus, hoc est hypotheses a nobis ipsis provenientes; tertia i: lola fori, idest prae concept as opiniones, quae ab hominum com mercio mabant; quarta denique idola the *** Cap. II. de ign. et er. eor. caus. 149 atri, videlicet erronea iudicia, quae ex Phi losophorum sententiis bauriuntur. Quae 0 mnia ad duas, quas retulimus, classes com mode referri possunt, ut coram ostende mus. * Auctoritatis praeiudicia sunt ea, quae a nu tricibus, magistris (vivis illis mortuisve ), aut populo haurimus: eiusmodi sunt opinio pes omnes aliquibus civitatibus, familiis, vel.: sectis familiares, quarum cultores illis, tam quam glebae, adscripli, nulloque utentes iu dicio, eas, tamquam oracula, pronuntiant seque inde dimoveri non patiuntur. Curio sissima est Galilaei narratio in Systemate co smico, de viro quodam nobili Peripatheticae philosophiae addicto, qui qunm Venetiis in domo cuiusdam Medici sectionem anatomicam perfici vidisset, in qua maximam nervorum stirpem e cerebro exeuntem, per cervicem transire, per spiralem distendi, ac postea per totum corpus divaricari observasset, nec, nisi tenue filamentum, funiculi instar, ad cor pertingere, a Medico rogatus, adhuc in Aristotelis sententia manere vellet rumque originem a corde repelere? non sine magno adstantium risu respondit: Equide:n ita aperte rem oculis subiecisti, ut nisi tex tus. Aristotelicus aperto nervos corde deducens obstaret, in sententiam tuam per tracturus me fueris. Quis, quaeso, haec au diens a risu ' temperaret? *** Vocari quoque solent praeiudicia receptae hypotheseos, novitatis, similia: ut sunt sy nervo e G 3 750 Logica Pars 11. MAE, stemata omnia ab eruditis inventa, quibus tam acriter inhaerent, ut uullum sit rationis pondus, quo ab opinione sua dimoveri pa tiantur. 109. De errorum caussis, restat, ut paulo ca addamus, Eae vel REMOTAE sunt quae mentem ad errores ac praeiudicia praeparant et disponunt; vel " PROXI., quae mentem ipsam ad iudicio rum confusionem impellunt, erroresque producunt. Remotae rursus in generales dividuntur, et speciales. Caussae generales sunt ATTENTIONIS DEFÈCTVS, qui ideas reddit deteriores ADFECTVS, quos attentionem turbare, idearumque obscuritatem parere supra ob. Servavimus, SCIENDI LIBRO ciun ralurali corporis inertia, COMPENDIA et DICTIONARIA disciplinarum, in quibus nulla idearum analysis reperitur MALVS vocabulorum VSVS, quo fit, ut auctorum sensus non intelligatur denique LIBERTAS PHILOSOPHANDI. Praeiudiciorum cnim origo ab idearum ob scuritate repetenda est, idearum vero obscuritatem pariunt attentionis defe clus et adfectus er his ergo caussis praeiudicia nasci, quisque intelligit. Quainvis enim corporis inertia laboris impa Cap. 11. De ign. et er. Cor. caus. ¥ tientiam creet, adeoque ignorantiae tantum Caussa esse possit: cum sciendi tamen libidine conjuncta errorum genitrix est: etenim sciendi pruritus efflcit, ut intellectus tali cupiditate ductus intra ignorantiae fuae te niebras consistere nolit, opportunisque prae • diis vacuus ea investiget, quibus par non est, ac proinde in plurimos lahatur errores. ** Libertas enim philosophandi iuxto maior in receptas hypotheses illidit; nimis autem con etricia in auctoritatis praeiudicia nos urget, sel saltem crassam parit ignorantiam. 110. Speciatim autem AVCTORITA TIS praeiudicia oriuntur harum trium abaliqua EDVCATIONE, scilicet, CONVERSATIONE [conversazione], et CONSVETVDINE; ut et praeiudicia NIMIAE CONFIDENTIAE aa nimia INGENII FIDUCIA. Et ut de educatione quaedam singularia attingamus, id sedulo notandum: praeiu dicia, quae ab ca procedunt, tribus cha racteribus optime distingui, temporis BREVITATE, 2. loci RESTRICTIONE, cognitionis DEFECTV. Qui quidem characteres si desint, propositio non in ter praeiudicia, sed inter veritates com muni hominum consensione probat as est referenda. Quot mala hominibus adferat educatio, vix dici potet. Parentes enim tantum abest, ut puerorum intellectum perficere eorumquemor is mederi curent, ut potius eorum aninum maximis praeiudiciis, anilibus fabeliis, erro neisque opinionibus imbuant. De magistrorum educatione nihil dicemus, ab iis enim quam multa hauriuntur praeiudicia, quum iuvenes in magistrorum verba iurantes quaeuis eo run effata sancta esse putent, ac de illis veluti de Religione, dimicent ! Conversatio cuin libris et eruditis, consuetudo cum po pulo quot foveant errores, quum res sit me ridiana luce clarior, in ea explicanda nihil immorabimur Legatur interim Tullius Tuscul quaest. Lib. III. cap. 1. Qui nimium suo indulget ingenio, fieri non potest, quin in errores incidat, el pacdın tismum vel contradictionis spirituin induat, quae duo vitia aliorum aversionem odiuinque conciliant. Praeterquam quod novitatis studi um quanta hominibus mala produxerit, ii sciunt, qui Ecclesiae vel litterarum vices er annalibus didicerunt. Nimirum educationis praeiudicia tantisper in animo sedent, donec ad maturitatem ra tionisque perfectionem sit perventum; nou sunt ubique earlem, sed quamvis in cuius cumque Regionis gentibus praeiudicia sedeant, diversa tamen pro educationis morumque di versitate inveniuntur; rudium tandem von eti am sapientum mentes occupant ita, ut dum illi inter praeconceptas opiniones erroresque iacent, hi eorum insipientiam ac ignorantiam destruere nullo modo valentes vel rideant, vel de ea conquerantur. Cap. II, De ign. ei er. eor. caus. 253 mus Omnes illae, quas recensuimus caussae praeiudiciorum remotae sunt; pro Xima namque est PRAECIPITANTIA. Quae quum ita sint, optimum, idqne uni cum, ad praeiudicia vitanda remedium est iudicium suspendere, seu DUBITARE: est: enim DUBITATIO prudens iudicii su spensio. Tanc autem iudicium suspendi quum propositionein aliquam nec adfirmamus neque negamus. * Cave la nen credas, ad praeiudicia vitandą conferre Scepticismum, vel Pyrrhonismum insanam nempe illum de onnibus dubitandi miorem, quo hodiernos incredulitatis fauto. res uii, non sine dolore videmus. Stolidi tas enim, nedum temeritas infanda foret sine sufficienti ratione dubitare. Sobriam quip pe ac prudentem commendamus dubitationem eo fine institutam, ut suspendatur iu licium, donec mens ad ideas distinctas clarasve per veniat. ** Totum hoc de rebus intra rationis fines ex sistentibus, nullaque evidentia suffultis est intelligendum. Etenim quae Divina auctorita te nituntur, aut mathematica gaudent eviden tia de illis dubitare, impium; de his ve ro, foret adprime stullum. Schol. Espositis mentis humanae imbe. cillitate et vitiis, reliquum est jis praebeanius medelam. Quamvis Feromul, 7 ut aptam ti philosophicarum rerum Magistri, inter quos Nicolaus Malebranchius, et Antonius Genuensis, quamplurima ad id remedia. proposuerint, quibus vel minimum quidem addere, non opis est nostrae; licebit ta men, ad Auditorum nostrorum instructio nem, si plura n quimus, eadem saltem ab ipsis tradita paucis repetere. Quisquis ergo ignorantiam errorenive yitare cupis, hos menti infigito CANONES. MEREntem sedulo studio attentio ne, meditatione ab obscuritate et confusione liberato. * In hoc enim in. tellectus perfectio sita est, a qua exsu lant ignorantia et praeiudicia. * Ut id consequantur adolescentes, prae ocnlis habeant quae in prima harum Institutionum parte observavimus, ea praecipue, quae de ideis cap. 1. Schol. adnotavimus. 2. Ad studia praeiudiciis liber ac do cilis, uti modo in lucem editis infans, accedito. Magistrum eligito optimum ab eoque necessaria atque utilia disci io, nihil verens ab eius, qui te ad sa pientiam manuducit, prius ore pendere: Cap. II. De ign, et er. eor. caus. 155 ut praecepta demum, quum te ignoran tia deseruerit ad examen revocare possis. * In Magistrorum electione magna cautio adhi benda est: abea namque pendet cognitionum nostraram soliditas et rectitudo. Ad eorum dotes praecipue attendendum, de quibus ideo pauca inferius delibabimus. 3. Methodum ubique atque ordinem cordi habeto. In studiis eapraecedant per quae sequentia intelliguntur. Ex hujus canonis neglectu oritur studiorum confusio, quam ignorantiae caus sam haud postremam esse, experientia sensusque com munis evidenter ostendit Auctoritati nec nihil, nec multum deferto. Nimia namque aliis adhaesio servum pecus; sensus vero communi ne glectus audacem efficit, omniaque sibi permittentem. 5. De iis, quae vel Divina auctori tate, vel maxima evidentia destituta sunt, prudenter dubitato, donec certus fias. Rectam rationem prius, sensum dein de optimorum communem consulito. Quae captum vero tuum superant ne perqui rito, nisi prius opportunis mediis probę fueris instructus. * G6 156 Logica Pars. II. * Si vero captum humanum superent, ca non investigare omnino, recta ratio docet. 6. Laboris patiens, memoriae ac per spicaciae tuae ne nimis fidens esto. Me mento Poetae illud: ABSQUE LABO RE.NEMO MUSARUM SCANDIT AD ARCEM. Vides hinc, quam immerito a nostrae aetatis adolescentibus voluptati ac vanitati deditis laboremque horrentibus cognitio studiorum que felix exitus expectetur. Compendia et dictionaria, quippe quae nihil solidi profundique continent, ne multum amato. Paucos habeto libros, eosque lectissimos. * Cum lectione me ditationem semper coniungito Non nostrum est praeceptum, sed Senecae, qui ut facilem Lucilio suo viam ad virtutem aperiret, librorum paucitatem diserte com mendat his verbis: Cum legere non possis quantum habueris, sat est habere quantum legas. Ep. 2. Vide quae diximns Part. I. 8. Poetas caute legito, ne inanibus fabellis animunı imbuas. Populum, utpo te pessimi argumentum, ut anguem fu gito. Senecam audito dicentem: SANA TIMUR, SIMODO SEPAREMUR A ÇOETU, cap. 1. Schol. Cap. II. De ign. et er. cor. caus. 157 Ad poetas quod attinet, eorum lectionem adolescentibus vel omnino interdicendan, vel arctissimis includiendam cancellis cuperernus, quippe qui vivida phanthasia pollentes ima ginationi retinere potius, quam laxare debent habenas: id quod ia legendis Poetis contra evenit. Populi porro damna paucis expressit idem Seneca, quum ait: Inimica est mullorum convcrsatu. Ep. 7. De Veritate ceria, melliisque ad cam perveniendi. $ 12. sis ad veritatis investigationem gradum faciamus. VERITAS vel CERTA est, si in ea adsint omnia veritatis requisita, ut nulla nobis de illa re maneat suspicio aut dubium, vel PROBABILIS, si propius ad certitudinem acce dat, nempe quum non omnia insunt re quisita. De illa nunc, de hac subsequen ti Capite agemus. CERTITUDO est mentis status veritati adensum ita praebentis ut nulla de opposito adsit sollicitudo Ex consequitur i, ut si quam minima adsit suspicio non certitudo, sed INCERTITUDO vocetur. Et quia non idem est om. nibus mentis status, sequitur 2. eamdem evunciationem uni certam esse posse, al teri incertam. Tandem quoniam quisque mentis suae statum agnoscit, consequens est 3. ut nemo aliorum certitudinis sed suae tantum iudex esse possit. * Quia omne, quod verum est, vel absolute et in se tale est vel in relatione ad mentem, quae non semper terminorum nexum distincte percipit: ideo Philosophi certitudinem divide bant in OBIECTIVAM et FORMALEM, il lamque esse, aiebant, nexum propositionis in trinsecum, hanc mentis nostrae statum respi cere. Nos illam proprie VERITATEM, hanc CERTITUDINEM adpellamus. E. 8. Axioma; Totum est maius sua parte, si absolute et in se spectetur, VERUM dicitur, si vero ad men tem referatur, CERTUM est, quia talia ad sunt indicia, ut ipsi absque ulla oppositi formi dine adsensuin praestemus. Quoniam indicia ad certitudinem ducentia trium generum esse possunt, sci licet vel absolute infallibilia vel dalis tantum permanentibus caussis naturalibus, vel denique sccundum huinanae prudentiae leges: evidens est 4. triplicem etiam esse certitudinem, METAPHYSICAM nempe yel MATIEMATICAM, quae illis; PHY. Cap. 111. De veritate certa etc. 159 SICAM, quae istis; MORALEM tandem, quae his fulcitur indiciis, quaeque alio no mine FIDES HUMANA adpellatur. * Primi generis sunt axiomata, aliaeque pro positiones nullis obnoxiae vicibus;alterius haec propositio: corpus non suffultum cadt: pos fremi vero haec: Augustus fuit primus Ro manorum Imperator. 115. Experientia abunde constat, men tem nostram non statim, nec semper, quod verum est, certo cognoscere- Via ergo quaedam ipsi monstranda est, qua tuto ad certitudinem perveniat: eaque, pro certitudinis varietate, diversa est; spe ciatim vero triplex, EXPERIENTIA sci licet, RATIO seu DEMONSTRATIO, et AUCTORITAS, de quibus singillatim, et quantum res ipsa furet, breviter agemus. Uidquid a nobis sciri potest, vel singulare est vel universale (S. 26. seqq. ); itemque vel effectus, vel caussa. Singulares porro ideas sensibus ad quirimus; universales' vero in 160 Logica Pars II. tellectus abtractione conficimus. Rursus quaelibet caussa effecluin salte in natura, praecedit, ut in Metaphysica do. cebimus. Duae igitur cognoscendi viae no bis aperiuntur, altera, quae a singulari bus ad universalia; itemque ab effectibus ad caussas ascendit, nemp: a sensibus, si ve experientia incipit; ideoqne dicitur co gnitio a posteriori: altera, quae ab uni versalibus ad particularia, a caussis ad ef fectus rationis ope descendit descendit,, ac proinde vócatur cogniíio a priori. De illa nunc; de hac sequenti sectione agemus. Omue itaque, quod experientiae ope scimus, dicitur COGNITIO A POSTERIORI. Est autem EXPERIENTIA cognitio adqui sita ex attentione ad obiecta sensibus obvia, Sic per experieutiam novi'nus aquam made. facere, ignem col fucere, ceram igni admo tam liquefieri, ct id genus alia. 117. Quum experientia sit in rebus sen sibus obviis; sensibus auien percipianlur les exisientes sive indiviadua: patet 1. a uobis res tan tum singulars experimento addisci, * extra eas nsilium alind esse experientiae obiectum, adeoque 3. eam in abstractiş 2 2. Cap. Ill. de Veritate certa ctc. 161 sensus et universalibus locum non habere, licet haec ab ipsa deriventur. Igi tur 4. qui demonstrationem aliqu am posteriori conficere vult, is casum singu larein, allegare debet, dummodo experien tia non sit cuivis obvia; 5. denique, ex perientia non datur in iis, quorum n ullam habenius ideam. * Quoniam vero est vel internus, vel externus experientia quoque est vel INTERNA, vel EXTERNA. Illa habetur qnum nobis ipsis attendentes aliquid in anima nostra contingere percipimus: e. g quoties nobis malum aliquod repraesentamus; toties taedio nos adfici animadvertimus; haec ve ro, si res in organis nostris mutationem pro ducentes percipimus: ut si manu igui admota, calorem igui inesse observemus. "Experientia rursus dividitur in VVLGAREM, quae mnibus aeque patet, ut calor ignis, et ERVDITAM, quae speciali studio, atque adhi bitis necessariis mediis cooficitur, arleoque so lis innotescit eruditis, ut ' aeris gravitas, elasticitas ctc. 118. Habitus, sive promtitudo aliorum vel propria esperimenta colline andi, et ex iis conlusiones elicianendi, dicitur ARS EXPERIVNDI. Quae quidem ab experientia tam longe distat, quantum ba bitus dfert ab actu. * Non ergo sufficit unam alteramye experientiam peragere, aut aliquot instrumenta s ertractan. 162 Logica Pars II. di peritiam habere, ut experiundi arte prae ditus quis dici possit, sed opus est habitn longa exercitatione adquisito, non solum res experimento subiiciendi, sed propria aliorum que experimenta ad critices regulas exigendi, atque ex iis conclusiones scientificas, sive corolla ria legitimo rationis usu deducendi 119. Quoniam experientia sensibus ni titur; ad sensionem autem duo requiruntur, scilicet mutatio in or ganis sensoriis ab externis obiectis produ cta, et repraesentatio in anima huic obie cto conformis (ut in Psychologia ostende mus ): consequens est 6. ut sensus, po sitis ad sentiendam requisitis quam fallant; * proindeque 7. nos non et sensibus, sed a iudicio, quod ani ma praccipitanter fert super experientia, persaepe falli. Rinc. 8. cautiones quaedam ad errorem hunc vitandum adhibendae > num sunt. et Requisita ad sentiendum tria sunt, orga norum sensoriorum sanitas 2. attentio, 3. justa obiecti distantia. Quotiescumque ve ro de visu agitur, et quartum requisitum adesse debet, nempe èiusdem mcdii in ter obiectum et organum interpositio. Quum enim in visione radii lucis in corporum superficiem incidentes reflectantur, et in acre prius, deinde in oculi humoribus ac lente cristalli ua refracti ad retinam usque pertingaat, u Cap. 111. De Veritatė certa etc. 163 hi motum in nervo optico, quod sensationis caput est, producunt: si partim in aere partim in aqua aliove densiori medio obie clum ponatur, non eadem erit lucis refra ctio, adeoque non idem locus obiecti parti ' bus adsignabitur: unde fit, ut illud fractum vel recurvum adpareat. Si ergo neglecto hoc requisito adparentiam illam pro realitate sumamus, non sensuum, sed judicii defectú id provenire, fatendum est. Cautiones, quas inculcamus sunt 1. ut sior gana sensoria paullo debiliora fuerint, debi tis armentur instrumentis, 2. ut obiecta in iusta ab organis distantia posita attente ob serventur 3. ad tot sensus, ad quot redi gi possunt, redigantur. Si cautiones istae adhibeantur nullus in percipiendis rebus sensibilibus irrepere poterit error: si vero quae dicta sunt probe attendantur, non in surgent amplius difficultates, nec erunt qui vetustissimam cipionis in aqua fracti, turris que emimus rotundae adparentis cantilenam ad nauseam usque repetentes, sensuum fal laciam ulterius inculcare velint. 120. Quia vero per experientiam sin gularia tantum cognoscimus sequitur ut VITIVM SVBREPTIONIS incurrant ii, qui ea, quae minime ex perti sunt, vel quae imaginationi aut ra tiociniis experientia deductis debentur, pro experientia obtrudunt. * Tales sunt, qui pliaenomeni alicuius caussam raperientia constare adserdut. Veluti si quis 164 Logica Pars II. ferrum a magnete altrahi videns, experien. tia compertum esse diçat, ex magnete efflu - via exire ferrurn attrahendi vim habentia, vitium subreptionis incurret. Quum ergo res singulares tantum modo experiamur; earum ve ro repraesentatio dicatur idea singularis: recte infertur 10. notiones expe rientiae ope immediate formatas esse ideas singulares, ut et 11. singularia iudicia ipsis innixa. * Quumque his nova deducta iudicia non nisi ratiocinationis ope eruan tur: evidens est 12. haec nova iu dicia di ci non posse singularia, sed DIANOETICA sive ratiocinantia.Vocantur huiusmodi iudicia INTVITIVA, quia in his, quae in rei cuiusdain notione comprehensa intuemur, eidem tribuimus: ut ignis est rulidus: aqua madefacit. Scholastici ea vocabant discursiva: ratioci nium namque ab iis dicebatur discursus. E. g. ignis est cctivus: vapor est elasticus. Quandoquidem indicia intuitiva conficiuntur tribuendo rei quidquid in ipsi us potione comprehenditur: sequilur. 13. ut ea conficianlur accipiendo rem perceptam pro subiecto, eique tribuen I 22. Cap. III De Veritate certa ete. 165 do quidquid attente consideranti in ipsa occurrit, vel ab ca removendo quod in aliis, non etiam in illa observatur. * remove * In primo casu habebis iudicium aiens, in secundo negans. E. g. Ignem percipis eique calorein inesse observas. Sume ergo ignem. pro subiecto, calorem pro attributo, et ha bebis iudicium aiens: ignis est calidus. Contra quia alias observasti aquam madefa cere, id vero in igne non intueris: ab igne hoc attributum, eritque indiciun negans: ignis non adefacit. 123. Quemadmodun autem enunciatio. nes particulares in universales comunitari possunt: ita, quamvis notiones et iudicia ab experientia deducta sint singularia, commode tamen in u niversalia transmulari possunt, si regulae sequenies exacte servcolur. 12. Quoniain individua'sunt omnimo de determinata ($. 18., et variis circum stantiis involuta: 14. at tente separari a re percepta debent acci dentia sive modi ab attributis essentialibus, quibus tantumu modo est attendendun: 15. allributa haec essentialia onipibus speciebus vel individuis 166 Logica Pars II. convenientia abstractionis ope retinenda, atque inde notae characteristicae depro mendae sunt, quae ad rem illam ab a liis discernendam sulliciant. Hi quidem ermut characteres definitionis a posteriori ex in dividuis casibus eruendae. 125. Vt antem operatio recte procedat, oportet 16. tot facere iudicia intuitiua quot res ipsa percepta suppeditat, 17. ac cidentia omittere, 18. attributa, quae non seinper eadem sunt, determinationis bus particularibus liberare, ac tandem 19. plura ea in re adducere exempla magna pe sollertia attendere in quibus perpcluo conveniant, aut inter se discrc pent. * E. g. Vt scias quid sit commiseratio, ob serva casum aliquem, in quo videas te, aut alium alterius commiseratione percelli. Ad duc et aliam huius modi speciem, aut plu res etiam, si id res exigat, videtoque cir cumstantias, quae sunt perpetuo similes. Hoc modo in notescet tibi commiserationis idea universalis, cuius notae definitionem suppe ditabunt realem, commiserationem nempe es. se tacdinm ob alterius infelicitateir. Conf Wolfi. Log. Lat. §. 492. 126. Nunc quo modo iudicia universa lia a posteriori coulcianlur, observemus. Cap. III. De Veritate certa etc. 167 Quia ab experientia oriuntur iudicia intuitiva: videatur primum, num praedicatum sit attributum rei perceptae essentiale: quo casu enunciatio erit uni versalis ($. 68* ). Deinde experientiam multoties repetendo dispiciatur, utjum at tributum illud rei perceptae perpetuo et costanter insit. Quod si non semper illud inveniatur, investiganda est ratio, cur in ea aliquando deprehendatur, eamque biecto addendo, indiciuin enascetur uni versale (5. 69. ): * Ita e. g. esperientia novimus, igni semper calorem inesse, ceram autem non seinper es se liquidam. Iudicium ergo ignein esse cali dum erit universale: at non universaliter ius ferre poterimus ceram esse liquidam;sed opor tet invenire rationem cera aliquando liguescat, quae quun sit in igne, cui tunc admovetur, hac subiecto addita, universalis orietur ennnciatio: cera igni admota li quescit. cur > 1 127. Philosophus interim in rerum ca ussis et rationibus investigandis studiose versatus regulas quasdam sequa tur oportet, ut veriiates ex experientia de ducere queat. llae regulae sunt: 1. Si in obiecto aliquo mutatio observetur, qun ties obiecto alteri iungitur, idquc con 168 Logica Pars I. stanter: tunc hoc esse illius caussano 3 tuto concludi potest. * 2. Si duo vel plura, licet perpetuo, coexsistere wel se mutuo sequi observeniur, sta tim inferre licet, unum esse alterius ca ussam, nisi prius recta rario sic esse convicerit. non * Id clare patet exemplo cerae liquentis igni, aut solis radiis admotae. ** Si ergo bellum simul cum cometa existat, vel eumdem sequatur: praecipitantia erit iu dicare, hunc esse caussam illius. 21. 128 Ex quibus omn: bus clare deducitur 20 propositiones ex experientia legitime uistitala confectas esse certo veras; quouicumque sensioni omnibus requisitis in stuctae convenit, pro certo haberi, adeo. que 22. et definitiones experientiae adiu mento legitime efformatas, et 23. axio mata vel postulata ex his de ducta itidem certitudine pollere. Rationem definivimus per facile tum distincte perspiciendi. Il la ergo utimur si qnando enunciationem, de cuius veritate iudicium ferre volumus, ita cuin aliis connectimus, ut inde ter minorum nexus ctare perspiciatur: id ve. ro est, quod dicimus COGNITIONEM A PRIORI. Connexio isthaec vocatur DEMONSTRATIO, cuius est veritates ex certis principiis per legitimam ratioci nandi seriem eriiere (š. cod. ). SERI ES porro RATIOCINÀNDI habetur, si ex pluribus syllogismis invicem connexis conclusio prioris sit praemissa sequentis ut inox adparebit: qni quidem SYLLOGIS MI CONCATENATI dicuntur. 130. Ex quibus nullo negotio sequitue 1. in omni demonstratione duo requiri, nempe principia demonstrandi certa it in: dubia, eorumqne cum conclusione coone xionem. Et quia experientiae rite institu definitiones, axiomata et postulata T. 1. tae, 2 > H 170 Logic. Pars II. certitudine gaudent (s. 128. ): infertur 2. ea ad eiusmodi principia esse referen da, proindeque 3. illum adserta sua nou demonstrare, qui ea ex incertis dubiisque principiis deducit. 131. Quia vero duplex cognitio datur, a priori scilicet, sive per rationem; et a posteriori, seu per expe rientiam: sequitur hiec 4. duplicem quoque dari demonstrationem, earoque vel A PRIORI confici vel A PO. STERIORI: illam haberi, quando veri tatem aliquam a principiis legitime connexis deducimus, vel effectum per suas caussas probamus; si quando eam ex experientia reete institu ta, vel caussam per suos effectus demon stramus. ** Quum ergo a priori demonstrare volumus, principia statuamus necesse est, antequam ad syllogismorum concatenationem deveniamus. Id darius fiet exemplo. Ponamus hanc proposi tionem: Deus caret adfectibus. Eam a prio. ri sic demonstrabimus. DEFINITIONES. 1. Deus estens perfectissimun. 2. Intellectus perfectissimus est, qui omnia * hanc vero, sibi distinctissime repraesentat, 3. Appetitus sensitivus est. qui oritur ex idea boni confusa. 4. A'fectus sunt motus vehementiores appe 1. tu sensitivi. Cap. II!. De Veritate certa etc. 1. ): sed era mo AXIOMATA. 1. Ens perfectissimum gaudet in tellectu perfectissimo. 2. Distinctissima omnium repraesentatio ex cludit quamcumque idearum confusionem. THEOREMA. Deus caret adfectibus. DEMONSTRATIO. 1. Ens perfectissimum in tellectu gaudet perfectissimo (ax. Deus cst ens perfectissimum (def. 1. ); go Deus gaudet intellectu perfectissimo. 2. Quicumque intellectu gaudet perfectissi omnia sibi distinctissime repraesentat. Deus vero gaudet intellectu perfectissimo (num. 1. ): onania ergo sibi distinctissime repraesentat. 3. Qui omnia sihi distictissime rapraesentat, ideis caret confusis (ax. 2. ): at Deus om niasibi distinctissime repraesentat. (num. 2 ): ergo Deus caret ideis confusis. 4. Ab ideis boni confusis oritur appeti !us ser sitivus (def.?. ): quuin ergo Deuts careat idcis confusis (num.' 3. ); liquet, eum care re quoque appetitus sensitivi. 5. Qui appetău caret sensitivo, is caret adfe clibus (def. 4. ): atqui Deus carct appetitie sensitivo (num. 4. ): ergo Deus caret adfe ctibus. Vides hic syllogismorum connexione a principiis ceriis deducta confectam esse demonstratio nem. ** A posteriori demonstratur animae in nobis exsistentia hoc modo. EXPER. Si nobis ipsis attendamus, obserica biinus, aliquid in nobis esse, cuius ope nosa H 2 172 Logic. Pars. II. metipsos ab aliis rebus extra nos positis, inter eas vero alias ab aliis distinguiinus, boc est nostri rerumque extra nos positarum conscii sumus. DEFINITIO. Id. ipsum, quod nobis sui rerumque extra se positarum est conscium, dicitur anima. TIIEOREMA. Exsistit in nobis anima. DEMONSTRATIO. Experientia enim constat, aliquid in nobis esse nostri rerumque extra nos positarum conscium: id ipsiin autem est quod dicitur anima (per defin. ): e: c sistit ergo in nobis anima. Demonstratio iterum est, vel D. RECTA sive Ostensiva * vel INDIRE DIRECTA seu apogogica. **. Illa est qua ex notione subiecti colligitur eius nexus cum attributo; haec autem in qua oppositum tamquam verum assumen tes, conclusionem falsam inde deduci mus, ut propositionis nostrae veritas elucescat. Directa ergo erit demonstratio, si ordinem sequatur hactenus explicatum ($. 131., si ve a priori sil, sive a posteriori: ut videre est in superadductis exemplis ($: 131 " ); ** Indirecta demonstratio vocari quoque solet redactio ad impossibile vel ard absurdum, quia oppositam propositionem ut veram alla sumens, ex ea absurdum aliquod, sive cou clusionem impossibilem, eruit. Talis crit de monstralio scyueas. THEOREMA. Nibil est sine ratione sufficiente. DEMOSTRATIO. Ponamus aliquid esse sine ratione sufficiente. Ratio ergo, cur id sit aut fiat, erit in nihilo: adeoque nihilum ex sistet simul, et non exsistet. Essistet, quia aliter non posset esse caussa alterius: non exsistet, quia aliter non esset nihilum. Quod quum contradictionem involvat, sitque ideo impossibile: ergo nihil est sine ratione suffi ciente. 133. Ex hactenus dictis patet 1. quam cumque propositionem legitime demonstra tam esse certo veram idest certitudine gaudere metaphysica, proindeqne 2. de inonstrationem csse viam ad certitudinem perveniendi praestantissimam. Quumque ex perientiae et demonstraționis excellentiam ostenderimus: ' recie concludi mous 3. veritatem certain dici. dubia ' sensione, vel evidenti principio ni titur, dummodo in demonstrando CIRCU LUS non irrepscrit. In hoc vitiuni incurrunt ii, qui propositio nem probantem demonstrant per propositio nem probandam: quia in tali casu idem per idem demonstratur. Huic adfiuis est illa, quae a Scholasticis adpellari solet PETITIO PRINCIPII, nempe quum principium de monstrandi vel nullum est, vel nulla certi tudine aut ' evidentia gaudet. Huiusmodi sunt pleraeque enunciationes Epicuraeorum, Pla quae in H 3 174 Logic. Pars Ir. quis tonicorum, Stoicorum, aliorumque, de bus in Metaphysica erit disserendi locus. 134. Quoniam autem in detegendis per demonstrationem veritatibus ordo, sive methodus requiritur: ne longius hic pro grediamur, de ea sequenti capite, prout res exegerit, breviter enodateque tracta bimus. R Elite ut de AVCTORI TATE pauca dieamns. Ea non scientiam, ut experientia et rutio; sed FIDEM parit. Est autem FIDES: ad sensus propositioni datus, alterius te stimonio itinixus. Ex quo patet, rationem fidei sufficientem esse narrantis auctorita tem. Quumque auctoritas vel Divina sit, vel humana: fides quoque in DIVINAM et HVMANAM recte dispertitur. 136. Ex qnibus liquido infertur 1. fidei fundamentum in eo consistere, ut narrans taliasit, qui nec falli nec tallere possit; ac proinde 2. eo firmiorem esse fidem quo certiores sumus de scientia et veraci tate narrantis. Et quia Deus est omniscius Gap. VI. De Veritate certa 175 et infinite verax, quippe in quem nulla cadere potest ' imperfectio (per princip; Theo. nat. ): evidens est 3. fidem Dic vinam parere certitudinem omni exceptione maiorem; pariterque 4. Dei loquentis au ctoritatem esse fundamentum veritatis com pletum, omnibusque numeris absolutum; adeoqu 5. debere nos Deo loquenti ad quiescere, nec umqnam Dei testimonio demonstrationem ullam opponere, utpote vel falsam prorsus, vel indigestam. * Non potest enim certitudo certitudini adver: sari, quia si id esset, tunc contrariarum propositionum utraqua vera esset, adeoque idem simul esset et non esset: quod quum repugnet, non potest ergo fidei Divinae demonstratio ulla obiici. Quumque Dei verbum sit fundamentum veritatis com pletum (num. 4. f. huius. ): patet, quam cumque demonstrationem ei adversantem esse falsam. Quandoquidem autem auctoritas humana fidem parit bumanam, et certitudinem moralem: de ea pauca adhuc addenda supersunt. Et primo quidem, quum fundamentum fidei sit opi nio, quam de narrantis scientia bitate habemus; eoque fir mior sit fides, quo certiores sumus de hu et pro H 4 196 Logic. Pars II. jasmodi dotibus (S. eod. ): liquet 6. l dem humanam parere in nobis certitudi Nem moralem completam, si non adsit ra tio, cur in narrante aut imperitiain, aut malitiam supponere possimus: veluti si evidentia scientiae probitatisque indicia de derit si nihil emolamenti ex iis, quae narrat, perceperit, si ' parratio rectae ra tioni non repugnet; si denique pro nar rationis suae veritate dimicaverit, vel per secntionem passus sit. * Deinde quoniam non omnes homines eadem praediti sunt scientia et probitate, nec de his semper certo iudicare possumus, quum id io so la opinione versetur: exsurgit hinc probabi litas, de qua paullo post praecepta dabimus. * Postremâ haec conditio maius certitudini mo rali pondus adiungit: si vero deficiat, liu modo priores adfint circumstantiae, certilu do vim suam non amittit.. Schol. Nunc in eo sumus, ut explica tae doctrinae usum paucis tradamus. Qua propter Philosophus noster hos, qui se quuntur, observet. CANON E S. AMD quidlibet erudite experiundum, nisi necessariis praemunitusa in strumentis me accedito. Si haec desint, Cap. III. De Veritate certa etc. 177 aliorum experimenta consulito, dummo do eorum integritatis scientiaeque con stiterit, atque inde tuas deducito con clusiones. Si per insrumenta liceat, aliorum experimenta ad examen revo cato ut sacriorem eorum ideam ad quiras, caussasque facilius investigare possis. * Et quidem experientia erudita instrumentis opus habet, sine quibus experimenta fieri nequeunt. Si ergo desint, observationes nul lae erunt: ac proinde aliorum experimenta consulenda, praemissis cautionibus, quae de eorum veritate dubitare non sinant. Hinc Physicis admodum necessarius est machina rum instrumentorumque apparatus, ut phaea nomena observari possint, a quibus ad caus sas proximas rationis ope concludendum est. 2. Ne phantasiae partus, aut ratiocim nia ex experimentis deducta pro expe rientia venditato ne subreptionis ar guaris. *. Quidquid enim imaginationi debetur, reale non est, sed phantasticum. At in experientia realis rerum exsistentia observatur; adeoque qui phantas mata pro rebus obtrudunt, su bripiendo a dsensum extorquere conantur: et tunc evenit, ut cum ratione experientia pu gnare videatue, de quo infra sermo erit. Quod sem el expertus es, ne teme? depromito, sed experimenta saepius H 5 178 Logic. Pars II. repetens, an costantia sint, observato; nec, nisi certior omnino factus, de iis enunciato. Saepe enim accidit, ut effectus aliqui a cir cumstantiis oriatur accidentalibus, vel caus sae cuidam externae debeantur. Repetenda er go experimenta, ut diiudicari possit, utrum principali, an accessorüs caussis, effectus il le tribuendus sit, adeoque non mirum, si facta semel observatione, effectus productio propriae caussae non tribuatur, 4. Demonstrationes non nisi certis in dubiisque principiis superstruito. Ratio ciniorum catenam ne interrumpito; sed sequentium veritas ex antecedentibus patefiat. * Eo namque modo habebitur legitima syllo gismorum concatenatio in qua demonstras tionis essentia sita est, ut supra diximus. Ne ciedito, quamcumque enuncia tionis probationem pro demonstratione sumi posse: qaamvis omnis demonstra tio sit probatio. Ex debilibus enim prae inissarum probationibus exilis enervisque exsurgit demonstratio cui nihil potest roboris accedere. * Nimiruni demonstrationis robur a praemis stabilitate, legitimaque connexione procedit, adeoque pro; earum firmitate con clusionis pondus augetur, vel minuitur. sarumriat, 6. Demonstratio, ut certitudinem ра talis esto, quae neque per mate riam, neque per formam ulla possit ra tione convelli. Iunc enim adsensum etiam ab invito, extorquebis. 7. Si metaphysicae certitudini expe rientia adversetur, haecfallax esto. Absurdum namque foret id exsistere, quod rectae rationi repugnat. * Eo namque casu duas habemus 'propositiones inter se contradicentes, alteram singularem, quae quidpiam exsistere pronuntiat, univers salem alteram, quae idem existere posse ne gat; adeoque duo haec enunciata inter se pugnantia ita comparata sunt, ut quod pri mum sensibus perceptum fuisse ait, illud alte rum solidis rationibus intrinsecus impossibile esse demonstrat. Quum itaque ab impossibi litate ad non exsistentiam conclusio duci pose sit (per princ, Ontol, ): recte colligitúc, in hac collisione rationem vincere, ac proinde experientiam dici debere fallacem, quippe non experientia, sed subreptionis vitium rea pse adpellanda. Et hoc universali omnium phi losophorum consensione pro inconcusso axiom mate habendum est: ut ita Genuensis noster praecipuum inter suos de veritatis criterio cả nones illum posuerit: Si intellig:bili evidentiae physica adversetur, FALLAX HABETVR PHYSICA, est enim haecminor, cui proii # 6 180 Logica Pars 11. + de vals dicere, quam de intelligibili subdubitan re, quae summa est, acmathematicam parit certitudinem, par est. Cui deinde subiungit: Fingamus (quaquam id falsum keputo, ma thematica evidentia demonstrari terram mye veri: si qui sensuum evidentiam reponeret, non esset audiendus, nisi matorem minori evi dentiae praeferre velimus. Art. Lozicocrit Lib. IIT. cap. 3. 15. can 1, Sed quid, in quies, alienam auctoritatem in re tam evi, denti confulere conaris? Nimirum quia canon bic a quibusdam, apud quos Genuensis no stri plurimum valet auctoritas, nigro lapillo notatus est: ut sciant sententiam nostram non singularem aut phantasticam, sed ratio De aç unanimi hominum ratione utentium consensione fultam. cum eius quoque Viri ipsis non suspecti adsertione congruere. 8. Nihil Divinae auctoritatį opponere fas esto, Quum Deum loquutum esse con stal, cuncta silento. Huic metaphisicą, certitudo numquam refragator: sed si per rationem liceat, demonstrationes ad calculum revocato; * vel si Dei vera bum explicatione egeat, Ecclesiam in, fallibilem eius interpretem con sulit o. * Referentes nồs ad ea, quae diximns, quia demonstratio Dei verbo repugnans fal sa est, dummodo intra rationis fines quaer stip sit rationes,iterum conficiautur, e de Cap. IX. De. Methodo. 181 monstrationes ad calculum revocentur, ut adpareat, undenam oppositio illa ortum duxe rit, principiisne dubiis et incertis,, an a defectu legitimae connexionis? * Ratio huius canonis haec est, Onnis lex eiusdem Legislatoris spiritu est explican da Si enim leges humanae difficultate aut: ob scuritate aliqua laborent, earum explic atio et interpretatio tantum a Legislatore, eius que Administris est petenda, non a pri vatis Doctoribus proprio marte cudenda. Quan to magis ergo Divina lex quae verbo Dei con tinetur, ab eo qui eiusdem Dei spiritu gau det est explicanda. Ecclesiam autem Dei spi șitum habere, patet ex ipsis Servatoris no stri verbis Matth. ult, ubi Apostolis ait Ec ce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consumationem saeculi. Et loan. XVI. 18. Cum, venerit ille Spiritus veritatis (Pa. raclitus ), docebit vos omnem veritatem. Quid quid ergo Ecclesia pronuntiat, assistente su premo animarum Pastore Christo, et docente Spiritu Sancto pronuntiat; adeoque per eana Deus ipse suum interpetatur verbum 182 Logica Pars. Į1. G A PUT QVARTV M De Methodo. 138. Vum in demonstrationibus con clusiones ex certis principiis per legitimam ratiociniorum seriem dedu ci debeant; illa vero series arglimentorum METHODVS dicatur: non abs re brevem hanc de metho do tractationem doctrinae de demonstrationis bus subiungiinus. 139. Quilibet experiundo agnoscere po - test, enunciationis cuiusvis veritatem du plici modo detigi posse, scilicet vel eam dividendo, et ope analyseosed prima simpliciaque principia perveniendo, vel componendo idest, principiis ad conclu siones sensim ac legitimo nexu progre. diupdo. Vnde clare patet, methodum esse vel ANALYTICAM sive divisionis, vel SYNTHETICAM seu compositionis. * Methodus ergo anulytica a principiatis ad principia, synthetica a principiis ad princi piata (uti Scholae aiunt ) procedit. Dla composita resolvit. haec simplicia componit, Rem exemplis illustrabimus. Ad demqnstran dam enunciationem alibi (S. ) allatam? Deus earet adfectibus: analytice ita ratio cinabimur. 1. Quicumque caret appeti tusensitivo, caret @ap. IV. De Methodo, 183 etiam affectibus (per defin. aff. ): atqui Deus caret appetitu sensitivo; ergo Deus caret affectibus. a, Min. prob. Quicumque caret repraesentatio nibus confusis, caret quoque appetitu sensi tivo (per defin. app. ): Deus vero caret repraesentationibus confusis, ergo Deus ca. ret appetitu sensitivo. 3 Min prob. Quicumque omnia sibi distinctist sime repracsentat, repraesentationibus caret confusis (est axioma ): sed Deus omnia si bi distinctissime repraesentat: caret ergo repraesentationibus confasis. 4. Min. prob. intellectu gaudens perfcctissi mo omnia sibi distinctissime repraesentat (per defin. intell. Quum igitur Deus gau deat intellectu perfectissimo: omnia sibi distictissime repraesentat 5. Min. prob. Ens perfectissimum intellectu gaudet perfectissimo (est axioma ): Deus autem est ens perfectissimum (per defin. Dei ): ergo Deus gaudet intellectu perfe ctissimo Eamdem propositionem synthetice demonstravi mus ($. 131. * ). At in gratiam Tironum, quos ad Philosophiam manuducere instituimus, aliam adhuc dabimus demonstrationem, bre vem illam, at mathematico more confectam hoc modo: THEOREMA, Deus caret affectibus. DEMONSTRATIO. Est enim ens perfectism simum (defin. 1. ), cuius est intcllectu gaudere perfectissimo (ex 1. ), qmniaque 184 Logica Pars ir. sibi distinctissime repraesentare (defin.) id quod omnimodam ab eo idearum confu şionem excludit (ax. 2. ), Quum itaque ab idearun confusione pendeat appetitus sen sitivus (defin. 3. ) ', cuius vehementiores motus dicuntur affectus (defin. 3. ): iure colligitur, Deum omnino affectibus carere. Vides hic, quam bene monuerimus in fine primae partis, maximum atque insignem esse usum syllogismorum in conficiendis mathema ticis demonstrationibus: atque hinc patet, quam inepti ad demonstrandum sint ii, qui syllogisınıim eiusque leges negligunt, et igno rata vituperante 140. Quoniam methodus analytica a dif ficilibus ad facilia, a compositis ad sim. plicia progreditur (s. 139. ); synthetica vero a principiis ad conclusiones (S. eod. ) conséquens est 1. ut illa in veritate inve nienda, haec in alios docendo adhibeatur; * adeoque 2. eruditorum reprehensionem in currant qui ip docendo illam potius, quain hanc sequi amant. Et quia feracior illa est, haec sterilior **: novit quisque 3. docendi ordinem id exigere, ut post quan auditoribus synthetice veritas fuerit explanata, iisdem "analytice modus. indi cetur, quo fuit ab auctore inventa. Analyticam enim methodum in docendo ad bibere idem esset, aç opposita et difficili ti 9 Cap. IV. De Methodo. 185 rones ducere via, eosque ad veritatem vel numquam, vel raro admodum pervenire ** Feracior quidem est analytien methodus quia singula ad examen revocat, minuta quae que considerat, atque possibiles omnes fin git casus, inde ab hac quasi sylva conserta, enodatis extricatisque ambagibus, ad rem ipsam perveniat; synthetica vero sterilior, et generalibus namque principiis brevi atque ex pedita via pergit conclusiones. Eadem autem ratione illa difficilior, haec facilior est: adeoqne illa viatori tramitis inscio, qui di vinando et om nia tentando difficiliter quo tedebat pervenit: haec eidem perito similis, qui brevi apertaque via iter conficit, et finem ideo suum cito consequitur, 541. Iam ad melhodi leges, tum utri que communes cum alterotri peculiares, tradendas acMilanius. Eas aliquot complc clemur regulis; quarni quinque genera les, ceterae vero speciales sunt, analyticae praesertim methodo inserviturae. Quicum que igitur veram: methodum in veritatis investigatione cailere cupit, hos rigides servet. 186 Logica Pars. II. CANON E S. I. Q Votiescumque ad demonstrandum accedis, cur ato, ut a facilibus notisque incipias, indeque ad ignota et difficilia gradatim progrediaris. Prin cipia itaque solida, ideasque selig ito medias, atque ea semper cordi habelo * Est haec lex, quam inculcavimus ($. 130. ) et alibi retulimus. In -singulis ratiocinationis gradibus eamdem semper servato evidentiam, ut altei um ab altero derivari clare sentias. * * Ita vitabitur paedantismus, hoc est inutile illud memoriae pondus iudicio destitutum, et in minimis quibusque sectandis vanam quae ritans gloriolam, de quo vide supra Part. I. Cap. 3. Schol. Can. 4 3. Stilo utitor facili, ac naturali, non oratorio vel ampulloso. Verborum tantum, quantum ideis clare exprimen dis satis est adhibeto: nec, nisi in ideis claris, quidquam tentato. * Verborum enim copia ignorantiae confusioni sve indicium est: quae namque ignoramus vel confuse scimus, ea nimia verborum cir cuitione explicare cogimur. Cap. IV. De Methodo. Argumentum pertractanduſ ab am biguitate, si quafuerit, liberato prius; deinde in tot membra dividito, quot ca pax est: singula attente examinato ac definito: * omnia clarissimis explica to verbis, ac quaestione quam simplicis sime exprimito. * Prae oeulis tamen habeantur, quae de de finitionibus diximus Verba: quce obscuritatis aliquid habent, adcurata definitione dctermina to, in eoque semper sensu adhibeto. * Confer quae diximus SS. 5. 46. De methodo analitica livec habeto: 6. Ad veritatem inveniendam, quae stionemve solvendam, ne nudus princi. piorumque inscius accedito: num sorida cognitione ad id paratus advenias, se dulo perpendito. * Sinamque incapax principiisque destitutus rem aliquam adgrederis, fieri non poterit, quin inepta et ridicula effutias. Quaecumque cum proposita quae stione aliquam habent connexionem di 古 88 Logica Pars II. ligenter exquirito: omnes possibiles ti bifingito hypotheses: quaecumque ei lu men adferre possunt, ne rciicito sed Omnia simul colligito et comparato. 8. Principia quaeque atque ideas mutuo conferto: omnium relationes perpendito efinesque sectator, eaque, superflua de mendo in parvum referto numerum. Omnia deinde corrigito diuque considera to, ut tibi familiaria fiant. * Speciatim vero principiis diu haereto. Repetitione namque attentio renovatur ius ope ideas meliores fieri docuimus F. 19. Schol. Quas de syudetica methodo tradenda forent, ea partim a nobis incul. cata sunt, partim infra, ubi de modo alios docendi sormo erit, enodabuntur. Si quis autem metho dum hanc callere cupiat, is Christiani Wolf fii tractatum de methodo mathematica, universae Matheseos elementis * praemis-. sibi curet reddere familiare CU sum * Exstant haec 5. voluminibus in 4. excusa Ha lae Magdeburgicae. Cap. V. De Veritete Probabili. GA P VT QUIN T V M De Veritate probabili -542. o 142 Eritatein dici certam mnia adsunt requisita quamcum que oppositi formidinem excludentia, su pra docuimus. At intellectus nostri infirmitas persarpe impedimento est, quo minus nobis illa veritatis indicia pa. teant ita, ut veram absque ulla oppositi suspicione perspiciamus. Hinc ergo est, cur in praesenti capite de probabilitate, quantum satis erit, dicere instituerimus. Est autem PROBABILITAS status mentis ex indiciis insufficientibus verita ti adhaerentis, cum aliqua tamen op positi formidine, PROBABILIS ergo di cilur enunciatio in quc adest ratio in sufficiens, cur praedicatum subiecto tri bu atur. * Ita Cicero pro Milon. cap. 10 probabilibus argumentis probat, Clodium Miloni insidias struxisse. Ait enim: Clodium dixisse, Milo nem esse occidendum; 2. eum Miloni neces sarium iter Lanuvium facienti obviam ivisse, 3. idque itinere effecisse maxime expedito, et praeter consueludiuem; 4. servos cu: n les lis ante fundum suum collocasse. Probat id 190 Logica Pars I. esse > in quidem, sed probabiliter, insufficientibus quippe indiciis, adeo ut aliqua adhuc adsit oppositi formido. Ex quibus definitionibus clare de ducitur 1. eo probabiliorem esse proposi tionem, quo plura adsunt veritatis indicia 2. dici vero DVBIAM, si ex alterutra parte aequalia fuerint rationum momenta, adeoque 3. IMPROBABILEM qua paucissima inveniuntur; quibusque e contrario fortiora indicia opponuntnr; 4. omne probabile, esse quoque possibile, quamvis 5. non omne possibile dici pro babile possit. * Probabilitas enim supponit possibilitatem: quum enim probabilitas veritatis alicuius exsi sicntiam indicet, exsistere vero nequeat, cui deest possibilitas, liquet, tunc de pro. babilitate qnaestionem institui posse quum rei possibilitas firmata sit: ut ita qui eam esse im possibilem demonstravit, uihil aliud oneris habeat, omnemquede probabilitate contro versiai tollat. Possibilitas autem non infert probabilitatem: nam quum possibile sit, quod non involvit contradictionein (per princ. Onol. ), non ideo probabile dici potest, nisi quaedam adsint circumstantiae, quae id revera exsislere evincant. 145. Quia dantur enunciationes probabi les, sillogismus autem propositionibusconstat: liquet 6. Cap. V. De Veritate Probabili. 191 dari quoque syllogismum probabilem. Et quia couclusio sequidebet partem debiliorem; debilior vero est pro positio probabilis, prae certa: consequens est 7. ut conclusio sit probabilis, si alte rutra praemissarum talis sit. Sed quoniam conclusionis vis est aggregatum virium praemissarum (s. 82. seqq. ), infertur 8. ut si utraque praemissarum sit probabilis, conclusionis probabilitas minuatur pro sum ma graduum, quibus illae a certitudine recedunt. * Denique quum demonstra tiones coficiantur ex syllogismis concatena tis, quorum unus ab altero vim sumit: evidens est 9. integram de monstrationem, in qua vel una probabi lis propositio irrepsit, non esse, nisi 7 pro babilen. * Certitudo namque in philosophicis se habet, ut aeqealitas in mathematicis. Sicuti ergo ae qualitatis nulli sunt gradus, ita et certitudi nis. Probabilitas autem maior est vel minor provt minus magisve a certitudine recedit,ut et inaequalitas servata proportione. Ponamus ergo certitudinem constare gradibus 12. Si una prae missarum tantum certa sit, altera duobus gradibus ab ea recedat, habebimus conclu sionem probabilem duobus dumtaxat gradi 192 Logica Pars II. Io bus a certitndine distantem: tunc enim ma ior erit Ei, minor -, quibus addie tis, babetur in conclusione summa = 2. quae duobus tantum gradibus ab unitate, sive certitudine diftat. Ponamus porro prae missarum unam ita probabilem esse, ut duo bus gradibus a cerit udine deficiat, altera ve ro tribus; habebimus conclusionem sive summam fractorum et E quae quinque gradibus ab uuitate pe a certitudine recedit, quot deerant in am babus praemissis. Dem. 146. His generatim expositis, ad pro babilitatis species transeamus. Probabilitas recie dividitur ib HISTORICAM, PHYSICAM, POLITICAM, PRACTICAM, et HERMENEVTICAM. De singulis pau ca delibabimus. A probabilitate differt OPINIO, quae est propositio insnfficienter probata, scilicet a principiis nondum certis, et precariis dedu cta, quae ideo est mutabilis, ac proinde po test ut plurimum esse falsa: unde opinio di viditer in PROBABILEM, et IMPROBA, BILEM, prout principia sunt prout princi pia sunt probabilia, vel precaria, omni nem pe rationis auxilio destituta. Sap. 7. De Veritate probabili. He completanarratio eae De probabilitate historica. SISTORIA, est factorum fidelis et. Eius au ctores sunt homines: fidem ergo parit hu mapam. Homo vero factum aliquod fideliter et complete narrans, HISTORICUS vel TESTIS dicitur. Sed quia aliorum narrationes neque experientia, nec demonstratione ad examen revocari possunt ob vitae intellectusque nostri brevitatem mentisque imbecillitatem, nec de omnium probitate certo constare potest: quando ` id in sola opinione versetur, non certitudinem, sed probabilitatem in nobis gignunt. Quumque hominum aucto ritate freti adsensun historiae praebeamus: evidens est, historicae probabilitatis funda mentum esse fidem humanam. * Ut autem narratio historia dicatur, dcbet non modo esse fidelis, hoc est res clare, eoque, quo contigerunt, ordine narrare, sed completa etian ', omnia scilicet factorum adiuncta, circumstantias, relationes, caussas; et fines amplecti.Hinc Cicero Historici perinde, ac Oratoris dotes paucis expressit, nempe talem esse debere ne quid falsi dicere audeat ne quid veri non audeat.Quia fides aliorum testimonio in nititur, estque fundamentum pro babilitatis historicae; homines autem ob ignorantiam malitiamve, aut fal li aut fallere possunt, ut experientia testa tur: consequens est, ut ad adsequendam probabilitatem historicam cautiones quae dam adhibendae sint, quibus testium an ctoritas, factorum genuinitas, natrationuin qucque veritas dignoscatur. eam * Hinc ergo enata est ARS CRITĪCA, sive habitus aliorum auctoritatem ad trutinam re. vocandi, recte adhibendi, factaque scienter ac sine erroris nota dijudicandi:Tapinps 1 namque indicium notat. Et quamvis artis cri ticae officium, vulgarem sequuti opinionem, infra ad solum librorum examen atque in terpretationem restringamus; non ideo no bilissimam hanc artem cancellis adeo angu stis coarctare volumus; sed quidquid de usi auctoritatis, rernm gestarum examine ac in dicio dicenda sunt, ea ad artem criticam: pertinere, qnisque sciat: id quod semel pro sem per observandum. 119. Quia ergo in omni narratione tria considerari possunt; narrans nempe, bar ratiun, et ipsa narratio: hinc est, ut in fide humana ad tria potissimum attendi so leat, scilicet i. ad homines narrantes, ad res narratas, 3. ad modima parran di. * Ab hominibus nunc ordiamur. * Atque in his, quae sequuntur, regulis tam historicam, quam hermeneuticam probabilita tem respicientibus, nedum librorum genui nitatem integritatsmve expendentibus, gene rales totius críticae leges ad singulares spe cies et circumstantias adplicandae consistunt, in quibus addiscendis eo maiorem operam collocare debet, qui philosophi nomen tue ri cupit, quo frequentius in evolvendis li bris, factisque diiudicandis erit ei, re exi gente, versandum, Quoniam hominibus, licet eadem natura, non cadem tamen est perspicacia, mcrumque probitas, nec omnes iisden sensibus eamdein rem percipere possunt (per cxper. ); hoinnes autem factum aliquod narrantes testes vocantur 147. ): patet in quolibet teste tria concia derari posse, scilicet INTELLECTVM, VOLUNTATEM et SENSUS, Si intellectus spectetur, testesa sunt vel PRVDENTES ac PERSPICACES, yet RVDES et IGNARI; si VOLVNTAS,idem sunt vel NEVTRI PARTI, vel VNITANTVM faventes, itemque vel PROB!, vel IMPROBI; si denique SENSVS, sunt vel I 2 ATI 196 Logica Pars II. OCVLATI, qui factum quod narrant ocu lis perceperunt, vel AVRITI, qui illud ab aliis audiverunt; et hi denno vel Co AEVI sunt, qui eodem facti tempore vi xerunt, vel RECENTIORES qui id postea ab aliis acceperunt. Sic Livius inter testes prudentes est referen dus: multo namque po!lebat iudicio. Idem tamen Romariorum parti favebat, quippe Romanus et ipse. Tandem factorum, quae sua aetate evenerunt, testis coaevus, eorum autem, quae ante conditam condendanıve urbem, ac per tot saecula ad sua usqne tem posa accidisse tradebantur, recentior dicen dus est. 152. Ex quibus omnibus patet 1. in fa cti alicuius narratione, quod attentionem iudiciumque requirit, homines prudentes et perspicaces rudioribus ignavisque esse antehabendos; promiscue vero se habe re in rebus solis sensibus, non etiam iu dicio, indigentibus, dummodo in illis af fectus partiumve studium non metuatur: tunc enim rudiorum testimonium proba bilius erit; 3. testes neutrales alterutri parti faventibus recie pracferri, nec non 4. oculatos auritis, 5. coaevos recentiori. bus, inter auritos autem prudentes ru dioribus, eos tamen, ad quos ex oculato Cap. IV. De Veritate Probalili. 197 nullam esse, fide digno magnaque auctoritate pollente facti fama pervenit, ceteris incerto alio. quin rumore ductis esse anteferendos, ac denique 8. coaevi testimonium plurium contestium narratione augeri, cui nescio quidnam ad probabilitatem ultra deesse possit, 153. Quod altinet ad res ipsas narratas síve facta; observandumu 9. probabilitatem si circumstantiae adsint sibi invicem repugnantes;nihil enim impossibi le potest esse probabile (S. 144. ); 10. nullam quoque esse probabilitatem, si testis unicus factum aliqnod insolitum et mira bile narret: licet 11. probabilius id ha bendum sit, si a pluribus probatae fidei viris unico contesta narretur; 12. nulla itidem probabilitate gaudere, narrationem, quae claris rationibus -aperto repugnat; 13. non idem tamen dicendum de ea, quae moribus opinionibusque nostris ad versatur, *** nec 14. si caussa modusque ignoretur, aut vim artemque nostram su peret. Sic pleraque prodigià ab uno Livio narrata nullam merentur fidem, utpote omni proba bilitate destituta: veluti quod scribit Lib. 1. ca. 12. post pugnam Romanorum cum Albanis, Tullo ' Hostrilio Rege 1 factam, I 3 198 Logica Pars. II. in Monte Albano lapidibus pluisse; vel quando, Tarquinio Prisco regnante, Au guris Attii Nevii cotem novacula discissam refert Lib. I. cap. 25.: id enim mirabile quidem et insolitum, sed a Livio tantum relatum. Qua de re iure idem Historicus de his, fimilibusque factis improbabilibus vocabulo ferunt fidem suam sartam tectam servat, non modo singulorum narratione, sed et in historiae suae proaemio, ubi cas ideo nea adfirmare, nec refellere velle fatetur, ut potc poeticis magis decora fabulis, quam incor. ruptis rerum gestarum monumentis confirm mata. nempe Lu nam ** Huiusmodi sunt fabulae illae, quibus Mu hamedanum scatet Alkorauum, a Muhamede bifarian digito divisam partemque in vestis manicam delapsam iterum in coelum repositam; palmae eiulatus in eius absentia, et id genus alia. > *** Sunt enim, mores pro regionum ac tem porum varietate, varii. Quidquid ergo mori bus nostris turpe est, fortasse apud alias Gentes honestum erit, et quod nostro sae culo nefas habetur id licitum esse alio: tempore potuit. Quis enim ut cum Cornelio Nepote loquamur, non vitio verteret The bano Epaminondae, saltasse eumcommode scienterque tibiis cantasse? Et tamen haec aliaque nostris moribus indecora inter eius virtutes commemorantur. Nepos. in Proem. Cap. V. De Veritate probabili. 199 154 Quoad modum narraudi tandem, id sedulo advertendum, facta stilo simplici non oratorio aut poetico, narrari debere. Si itaque simpliciter atque historice nar ratio scripta legatur, maiorem meretur lidem, quam quae poeticis pigmentis aut oratorio fuco lasciviens aures demulcere conatur. De Probabilitate physica, politica, et practica. 153.TJAEc de fide humana, quam qui ritatis praeiudicio occupatus conseri debet. Ad alteram nunc probabilitatis speciem ac Milanius, nempe PHYSICAM; quae ha betur, quum ex pluribus phaenomenis ad caussam aliquam physicani concludimus, cui illos tribuimus effectus. Gravesandius eas vocat hypotheses. 8 Probabile est, fluxum maris à lunae solisque attractione pendere: nam ex plurie. bus phaenomenis hanc illius caussam ess posse, compertum est. Ad physicam probabilitatem eruen dam quatuor adhibendae sunt cautiories: 1. ut phaenomenon adstumtum sit certum, eiusque distincta idea, aut clara saltem, habeatur, ne chimaeram pro re, aut nu bem pro Iunone amplectamur; 2. si phae nomenon illud sit ab alio relatum ad historicae probabilitatis regulas, tamquam ad lydium lapidem, exigatur: 3. eius porro caussae omnes pose sibiles investigentur, et.cum phaenomeno conferantur; ac denique 4. ex iis una plu resvc adsumantur, quae cum omnibus cir cumstantiis apte conveniant. * Quum autem doctrina haec ad Physicam fa cultatem pertineat: sufficiat de ea quaedam tantum hic notasse: commodius enim in Phi. sica tractabitur. POLITICA probabilitas ea est, qua ex alicujus personae phaenomenis in dolem animi arguimus. ' Quumque in ex propensiopuni signis ad ipsas propen siones concludamus: evidens est tracta tionem hanc ad Ethicam potius, quam ad Logicam pertinere: adeoque non mirum, si eam inoffenso pede oniittamus. ea Ut clarius politica probabilitas intelligi pos sit, sumamus e. g. aliquem, in quo vultus hilaritas, iocandi studium, corporis mobi litas, laboris impatientia, prodigalitas', in constantia, garrulitas etc. observentur: non ne eum statim voluptati deditum esse con Cap. V. De Veritate probabili. cludes: Haec erit probabilitas politica. Lega tur interim Cl. Heineccii dissertatio: Dein cessu animi indice. Quae de probabilitate PRACTICA dici inerentur, ea fusius persequuti sunt Andreas Rutigerus in Lib. de sensu peri et falsi. III. 8., et Ludovic. Mart. Kallius in Elementis Logicae probabilium Nos paucis rem expediemus. Eam Rudige rus vocat, qua ex physicis vel moralibus principiis futurum aliquem praedicimus even tum. Quod quum in practica casuum si milium expectatione consistat, eaque ex pectatio vocetur analogia evidens est practicam probabilitatem recte adpellari ARGUMENTUM AB ANALOGIA; id quod maximo apud Politicos usui esse solet. * * Politici namque in gubernandis rebus publi cis probe versati probabiliter unius aut alterius Regni praedicunt eversionem, propte rea quod aliae res publicae post easdem cir cumstantias subversae sint: adeoque a simi Jium casuum exspectatione practicam eruunt probabilitatem. CA habetur, quum a quibus dam in Auctoris scripto obviis eius sen. surn eruimus. Saepe enim accidit, ut in auctoris alicuius interpretatione quaedam occurrant, quae multiplicem sensum ad mittunt: tunc ex auctoris fine, verborum significatione, locorumque collatione pro babiliter colligitur, quidnam auctor ille voluerit intelligere, idque fit ope ARTIS HERMENEUTICAE, quae definiri potest per habitum Auctorum loca interpretan, di, sive eorum sensum eruendi. SENSUS AUCTORIS est ceptus, quem scriptor vel loquens vult in legentium auditorumve animis per ver ba produci. Auctorem ergo interpretari dicimur, qumun ex legitimis principiis eius sensus investigamus. Et quia ars hermes neutica est facultas auctorum loca inter pretandi; consequens est 1., ut eius sit genuinum auctoris sensum erue Te; adeoque 2. regnlae tradantur, opor tet, quarum ope sensus ille quam proba, bilius investigari possit, соп Cap. v. De Veritate,probabili. 203 Quumque in his regulis totius Hermeneuticae adeoque et Criticae artis leges Auctorum in terpretationem respicientes pofitae fint: non mirum, si a canonibus huic sectioni subii.. ciendis abstineamus, quippe qui superflui omnino forent, et loquacitatem potius, quam logicam praecisionem arguerent. Quoniam Scriptoris sensus perver ba significatur: colligitur in de 3. ut interpres linguam, qua scriptor conceptus suos expressit, eiusque idiotis, mos probe calleat: adeoque patet 4. falli eos, qui linguam illam ignorantes aliorum versionibus translationibusque fidunt; 5. ut ad scriptoris sectam, finem, affectus,mu nus, aetatem, gentis suae mores ' attendat: unde 6. integrum Auctoris systema prae oculis babeat, ac de eo secu dnm dome sticas notiones, non ex propriis opinioni bus, iudicium ferat., quid > * Praeclare id monet Clericus Arte Critica Part. Il Sect. 2. cap. 2. $. 7. et 8. Opor tct, inquit Vir eruditissimus, nostrarum opi nionum veluti oblivisci, el quaerere, veteres illi Magistri senserint non quod sentire dcbuisse nobis videniur, ut sape rent. 162. Ex eodem principio fluit 7 inter pretein affectibus, praeconceptisque opinionibns omnino vacuum esse debere; nee 8. Auctoris verba extra contextum legere aut considerare, sed antecedentia et con sequentia attente conferre: multoque ma gis y. loca parallela auctoris eiusdem sol licite comparare, ut quod obscuritatis ir, repserat, statim evanescat. Quumque ad cognitionis claritatem ac distinctionem om ne momentum ferat attentio (m. 19. ): sequitur 10. ut qui librum aliquem probe interpretari vult, eum attente atque ordi ne legat, et codicem habere ' curet quam emendatissimum. ' * Quantum ad librorum interpretationem con ferat editio, ratio in promptu est. Videmus enim, quam multis scateant erroribus edi tiones quaedam ab indoctis ignarisque con fectae typographis, ut Delio saepe notatore opus habeant. "Nitidissimae prae ceteris sunt editiones a Viris claris, qui id oneris susce perunt, effectae, quibus multum iure merita debet Respublica litteraria, Cop. V. De Veritate probabili. Uoniam magno Hermeneuticae adiumento est Ars Critica: non abs re fuerit, pauca de hac illustri arte haud contemnenda degustare. Quam bene de ea meritus sit Vir multiplici eruditione praeditus Ioannes Clericus, communi sa pientum consensu probatur. Nos eius du ctu regulas saltem generales nostris audi toribus trademus ut quantum fieri pote rit, libros genuinos a nothis, integros a corruptis discernere valeant. Res quidem foret laboris plenissima et satis prolixa, si Critices distincte praecepta trade re conaremus. Id adcurate cxsequutus est Clericus, quo'nemo elaboratius eam pertra ctare, operaeque pretium facere posset. Nos autem tironibus scribentes, notiones maxime genericas jis suppeditare adlaboramus; quia, quum perfectum fuerit ipsorum iudicium, et matura aetas, omnia, quae hoc super argu mento scienda forent, in eodem Clerico legent. ARS CRITICA est habitus libro Fum genuinitatem et integritatem diiudi, 20 Logica Pars I. Candi. * Quae definitio ut intelligatur, oportet claras notiones genuinitatis, et in tegritatis librorum in legentium animis excitare. * Notandum tamen hic Crilices vocabulum strictissimo iure usurpari', regulasque ea in re generales tironibus suppeditari: latiori Damque significatione tam historicam proba bilitatem, quam hermeneuticam amplectitur, de quibus per summa capita praecedentibus sectionibus sermonem instituentes praecepta, yeluti per lancem saluram, ex hibuimus. Earum. LIBER GENUINUS dicitur, qui ab eo, cuius nomen prae se fert,-. fuit exaratus; SUPPOSITUS autem, qui ab alio, quam cuius nomine insignitúr, scripius est. * Liber dicitur INTEGER, si tantum contineat, quantum Auctor in eo descripsit, CORRUPTUS vero al quid ab alio additub sit, vel demtum: speciatin Viro si additum INTERPOLATVS; sin den tuni, MVTILVS appel. latur. si 2 * Dici quoque solet spurius fictus vel fictitius: liniec vocabula ab aliis distinguantur. Sed non est idoneus huic quaestioni locus, Cap. V. De Veritate probabili. 2014 * Huius corruptionis quatuor caussas tradit Clericus: nempe Librarios (dictantes perin de, ac scribentes ), Criticos, impostores, tempus. Satis erit haec generatim scire guia singillatim percurrerenon vacat. 166. Criticae leges ab eodein Clerico de cem adisignantur. Eas nos sequentibus ex ponemius regulis, quas philosophus nos ter observabit. Sequantur ergo. CANONES t. " S " ppositum habeto librum, qui in vetuslis codicibus alii tribuitur Auctori; interpolatum, si in aliis de sideretur, quod in eo reperitur; muti lum denique, si quae in ipso desunt in antiquis codicibus inveniantur. 2. Si a veteribus quaedam a libro ali quo exarata sint, ea vero nunc in li eadem inscriptione. insignito deside rentur: aut alius esto, aili muiilus. Si aliter legantur, suspeciels. Si vero omnia aptu cohaereant, genuinus esto et inte ger, nisi alia adsit ratio dubitandi. 3. Liber, cuius nulla fit inentio in veteribus catalogis, aut a scriptoribus proxime sequentibus, plerumque fictus esto, cut saltem suspectus,. 209 Logica Pars I. > 4. Scriptá a veteribus diserte reiecta, aut in dubium vocata, nequit recentio, rum auctoritas, nisi gravissimis rationi. bus,, pro genuinis admittere. 5. Liber dogmata continens iis con trária, quae scriptor cuius nomen praefert, alibi constanter defendit, ut plurimum aut spurius esto, aut interpo latus. 6. Idem iudicium ferto de eo, in quo personae, facta, uut nomina com memorantur Auctore, cui tribuitur, recentiora. 7. Spurium quoque aut interpolatum iudicato librum in quo controversiae tractantur post Scriptoris tempora na tae, vel adest scriporis imitatio. 8. Talis quoque ut plurimum esto si fabulis scatens, aut ineptus, viro docto minimeque imperito tribuatur. 9. Liber stilo scriptus diverso a stilo Auctoris aut saeculi, in quo ille vixit, spurius esto, eiusque censendus, ius stilo est conformis. In. Vocabula recentiora Auctorem arguunto recentiorem, aut libri interpo Talioncm: in translatione vero, si ni hil est quod sapiet linguam, in qua scripsisse constat Auctorem, cui tribyi: utr, translatio non esto, cu * Cap. V. De Veritatc probabili. 209 * Pluribus hanc doctrinam persequi deberemus, idoneisque illustrare exemplis: sed res est maximi momenti, et nimis implicata, nec in stituti brevitas eam disquisitionem patitur. Quivero plura cupit, adeat Clericum in Ar te Critica, ubi plurima inveniet suo gustui. adcommodata. Id interim notasse sufficiet, in hisce omnibus ad praxin adplicandis ma gna cautione opus, esse ne in praecipitan tiam, adeoque in errores prono cursu la bamurSendus pecialior Logicae usus nunc evol vendus, nempe PRAXIS, qua mentis nostrae operationes sint in verita tis investigatione dirigendae.Veritas inveni tur vel proprio marte, sive per meditatio nem rite institutam; vel ab aliis inventa quaeritur et ud trutinam revocatur. Quia vero nec meditationi, nec bonae lectioni par est, qui hasce lautitias nondum degus tavit: Logicae est regulas suppeditare quibus mapuducti adolescentes et recte mea ditari, et libros cum fructu legere dis cant. Quumque nostrum sit auditorum nos trorum utilitati studere: de duobus his veri tatem inveniendi modis hoc capite agemns. MEDEDITATIO est conformis co gitationum nostrarum bonae methodi legibus adplicatio. Meditamur itaque, quum cogitationes nostra's bonae methodi legibus g. 138. seqq. ) ita dirigimus, ut veritates ex veritatibus, co gnitiones ex cognitionibus eruamus. Ex qua definitione sequitur 1. ait quantum diſfert regula ab eius adplica tione, tantum optima methodus a medi tatione distet,. meditaturus leges quibus bona methodus absolvitur (S. 141. ), callere debeat; adeome 3. eo felicius meditetur, quo exactius leges illas esequitur; nec non 3. aliquarum saltem veritatum debeat es se gnarus, ut ex ijs veritates aljas erue re legitime possit (S. 167. ). 5. Tirones ergo, aliique bonae methodi, veritaium que ignari ad meditandum sunt inepti. * Cui enim serei principium deest, nullo mo do seriem ipsam, hoc est veritatum catenam conficere potest. Pari modo qui concatenationis leges ignorat, quantumvis veritatum mente te *} Cap, VI. De Veritat. inquisitione. 211 neat, nec illas recte disponere, nec ordina tam seriem formare valet. 170. Quia ad bonam methodum requi ritur idearum claritas (5 141. cap. 3. ); ad claritatem autem confert attentio (S. 19. );consequens est 6. ut qui feliciter meditari vult, attenitonem praecipue colat; quin 7. et praeiudiciis liber et 8. certis indubiisqoe principiis (S. 131 ) praemunitus ad meditandum accedat. Quum que ad principia referantur praecipue de finitiones (f. eod. ): recte consequi tur 9. ut res de qua institui vult mcdi. tatio, edcurate definiatur, f. 141. cap. 5. ), ac inde novis definitionibus omnia dividantur. El * Serventur tamen, quae de definitionibus (Par. I. Cap. 3. ), et divisionihu:s (Cap. 4. ) docuimus, et quomodo definitiones ex ex perientia eruantur. quoniam inter principia etiam axiomata et postulata enumerantur (S. 130 ), eaque es definitionibus legitimue eruuntur: liquido infertur 10. medita turo innotescere quoque debere modum ex definitionibus axiomata eruendi, * ut om nes principiorum species probe tencat. Quonam autem modo ex unica definitione ar. iomata et postulata formentur, hic adden dum. Tribus quidem modis id effici posse certum est: scilicet PARTIS OMISSIONE, nempe quum genus vel differentiam specificam omittimus. E. g. ab hac definitio ne: Invidia est taedium ob alterius felicita tem, omitte genus, et habebitur axioma: Invidia respicit felicitatem alterius: omitte differentiam, eritque aliud axioma: Invidia est taedium 2. INVERSIONE, si definitio in definiti locum substituatur. E. g. Qui er alterius felicitate taedium percipit est invi. dus 3. CONVERSIONE, si aientes pro positiones in negantes convertamus E. g. Qui ex alterius felicitate non percipit taedium, -non esi invidus; vel eum, qui non est in vidus, alterius feliciiaiis non taedet. Postu lata eadein ratione conficiuntur, si nempe modus exprimatur, quo quid fieri potest: sed ea melius ex realibus, quam ex nomi nalibus definitionibus deducuntur. Sic ex ea dem definitione habebis postulatum: Invidia excitatur, si invido alterius felicitas reprae sentetur. 172. Praestructis ita principiis, opor tet il. ut ex eorum collatione THEO REMATA, vel PROBLEMATA compo nantur, j 12. et unde consequentiae im mediatae sese offerunt, COROLLARIA deducantur, vel 13. ubi maiori explicatio ni locus erit SCHOLIA subiungantur. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 213 Est enim Theorema propositio theoretica de monstabililis, demonstratio autem ex principiorum collatione conficitur, ut videre est in superioribus Cap 3. Sect. 2. et Cap. 4. Hoc modo ex principiis (§. 171. * confectis erui poterit theorema: Invidia oritur ab odio, et similia. Pari mo do quia Problema est propositio practica, eius solutio et demonstratio ex eorumdem principiorum collatione petitur. Ita ex eisdem principiis orietur problema: Juvidiam in altero excitare; cuius solutio haec erit Invidia ex odio nascitur. Fac er go ut is, in quo invidiam excitare vis, ala terum odio prosequatur, cuius inde felicita tem ei ostende: ex ea namque taedium per cipiet, adeoque in eo invidia excitabitur. Corrollaria vero tam ex indemonstrabilibus, quam ex demonstrabilibus enunciationibus des duci possunt. Sic ex superioribus axiomatis varia oriuntur corollaria, veluti ergo qui tae dii non est capax, invidus esse non potest: item ex postulato: ergo ubi non adest feli citatis repraesentatio, locum non habet invi dia ex secundo item theoremate ergo qui alterum amat, ei non invidet; atque ita porro. 173. Haec omnia vero praecepta, ut aemoriae infingantur, brevissimis ample temur regulis, quas, qui sequuntur, shibent 214 Logica Pars II. CANONES. ANicquam meditationem instituas, ipsam quantum natura ipsa fert, exa cte dividito. 2. Ex definitionibus axiomata, item postulata deducito, atque ab his per im mediatas consequutiones corollaria con ficito. 3. Plura principia vel antecedentes propositiones mutuo conferto, et sic theoremata vel problemata efformabis, ex quibus, quae haberi poterunt, erues consectaria. 4. Propositiones - inventas bona me thodo legitimoque nexu comparato, et id agito, ut omnia per demonstratio nes apte cohaereant. 1 * Ita novae orientur veritates, novaque semper ratiocinia fluent. Perinde ' vero est, qua met hodo ratiociniorum series in ordinem rediga tur, modo regulae alias ($. 141. ) propositae rite observeutur. Scol. Sint haee satis de meditatione, ei usque legibus, quae numerosias protra here non fert instituti compendium. Qui Cap. YI. Da Veritatis Inquisitione. 115. vero longius et distinctius meditandi re gulas vellet addiscere, ei Baumeisteri dis sertatio de arte meditandi attente legen da foret, eaque in syccuin et sanguinem vertenda. Interim ad auditorum nostrorum instructionem hic brevem subiicere praxin censuimus, quo facilius artem hanc per discere possint. Qua de re eruditissimiVic ri exemplopi addncemus pulcherrimum. Si quis AMICI characteres sit exploratu. rus, absque librornm auxilio, sequentem instituens meditationen, haec habibit. §. I. Ex casuum sin vularium observa tione g. 124. seq. ) critor Amici DEFI TIO: Amicus est persona, quae nos amat, f. II. Ad definitionis porro notas atten dens quisque videt, notionem amoris de. finitione indigere. Eodem igitur modo. hacc noya definitio eraalur. Sic. amare alierum nihil aliud significat, quam ex alterius felicitatc volup'atem percipere. 6. JIÍ. Ex his definitionibus eo, quo diximus, artificio axiomata de dacantur. Et quidem ex prima definitione (1. ) fiunt AXIOMATA. 1. Amicus al terum amat. 2. Qui alterum non amat non est amicus.3.Quicumque obligatur ad ali un amandum, ad amicitiam ei praestan 116 Logica Pars 11. dam obligantur.4. Vbi nullus amor, ibi nulla omicitia. 5. Quamdiu durat amor, tamdiu durat amicitia. 6. Qui efficit, ut ab alio ametur, eum sibi red dit amicum. Quidquid amorem in altero excitat amicitiam foret. 8. Quid quid amorem impedit, amicitiam tollit. Ex amoris defimtione ori untur sequentia. 1. Qui alinm amat, ex illius felicitate deleciatur. 2. Quicumque obligatur ad volupiatem ex aiterius fe licitate capiendan, obligatur ad alte rum amandum. 3. Qui iubet, ut volup tatem ex a terius felicitate capiamus, alterum, iubet, ! ť umemus. 4. Quid quid promovet voluptatem, ex alterius felicitate capiendain, promovet amo rem. 5. Qui illum impedit, hunc sis tit. V. Collatis inter se duabus illis de. finitionibus, nascitur. THEOREMA. Amicus alterius feli. citate delectatur. DEMONSTRATIO. Qui alterum a. mat, alterius felicitate delectatur (s. 1. ): amicus alteruu amat; ergo amicus alte rius felicitaie delectatur. 5. VI. Ex quo inmediata consequutico ne cequentia fluunt, IV. AX Cop. IV. De Veritatis Inquisitione. COROLLARIA. 1. Anicus ergo ex amatae personaefelicitate nullo taedio afficitur. 2. Sed potius ex eius infeli citate taedium sentit. S. VII. In quibus, quum taedii facta sit mentio, perapte addi potest. SCHOLION. Est autem invidus, qui, ex alterius felicitate taedium percipit misericors vero, quem alterius infelici. tatis taedet. $. VIII. Hinc ergo habentur THEOREMA I. Amicus non est in vidus. DEMONSTR. Invidus enim est, qili ob'alterius felicitatem taedio adficitur (S. VII. ): Quod quum in amico non reperiatur: amicus " go non est invidus. THEOREMA. Amicus est mise ' icors. DEMONSTR. Taedium enim percipit x personae amatae infelicitate ) $. II. or. 2: ): quod quum dicatur coinmise atio (5. VII. ): amicus ergo commi eratione tangitur erga personum ama zm. §. IX. Nova rursus inde sequenlur COROLLARIA. 1. Invidus ergo non si bonus amicus. 2. Qui ergo nescit Tom. 1. 218 Logica Pars. Ij. > novae r'e commiserari alterius vices, eumque ab infelicitate, dum potest, non vult eri pere, non se dicat amicum. 6. X. Si meditatio continuetur inde sequentur veritates. Et quidem defi niendo rursus notas voluptatis et felicita tis, maxima enunciationum seges adpare bit. Sint ergo. DEFINITIONES. Voluptas sive delectatio est sensus perfectionis. 2. For licitas est status durabilis gaudii.. XI. Ex quarum prima oriuntur AXIOMAT'A. 1. Delectutio ex aliqua supponit eius bonitatem ac per feciionem, earumque repraesentationem. 2. Quicumque obligatur ad sensum per fectionis in altero promovendum, obli gatur. ad voluptatem in eo excitandum. 3. Oui - iubet primum, praecipit secun dum. §. XII. Ex altera vero fluunt sequentia AXI. 1. Qui alterius felicitate dele ctatur, ex eius statu durabilis gaudii voluptatem capit. 2. Qui alterius statum durabilis gaudii promovet, eius felici tatem promovet. 3. Qui illud iubet, hoc quoque iubet. 4 Quicumque obligatur ad primum, obligatur ad secundum. 1. XIII. Conferantur definitiones cum antecedentibus, indeque nasceutur. Cap. VI. De Veritatis Inquisitione. THEOREMA I. Amicus alterius feli citatem sibi, tamquam bonum, reprae sentat. DEMONSTR. Alterius enim felicita te delectatur ($. V. ): quod quum fie ri nequeat, nisi illam sibi, iamquam bonum, repravsentet. Ergo amicus alterius felicitatem sibi tamquam bonum, repraesentat. THEOREMA II. Amicus delectatur alterius statu durabilis gaudii. DEMONSTR. Quum enim ex alterius felicitate delectetur; felicitas vero sit status durabilis gaudii (S. X. def. 2. ): ex hoc patet, amicum, quo que va luptatem percipere, THEOREMA. Amicus alterius gauuium durabile sibi, tamquam bonum repraesentat. DEMONSTR. Eius namque statu de lectatur (per theor. 2. ), quod fieri non potest, nisi id, tamquam bonum, sibi repraesentet. Ergo amicus alterius gaudiun durabile si bi, tamquambonum, repraesentat. §. XIV. SCHOLION. His praemissio succurrit lex appetitus, qua anima id, quod sibi, tamquam bonum repraesen tal, adpetit, et promovere studet. Plurimae hinc propositiones de duci poterunt. Et quidem THEOREMA. Amicus alterius felici tatem, idest gaudium durabile, adpe tit, et promovere studet. DEMONSTR. Omne, quod nobis, tamqnam bonum, repraesentamus, ad petimus et promovere studemus (XIV. ) amicus sibi alterius felicitatem statum que durabilis gaudii, tamquam bonum, repraeseníat: er go ea omnia adpeiit; et promovere stil det. *. XVI. Ex quo, sponte manant, COROLLARIA. Ergo amicus om nia cavet, quae alterum taedio affi ciunt 2. nec ullam omittit occasionem quai personae amatae iucunditatem et voluptatem promovere possit. S. XVII. Durabilis gaudii porro notio nem evolvendo occurret. DEFINITIO. Durabile gaudium est voluptas eminentior ex possessione ve iarum perfectionum grta. 9. XVI. Ex qua ultro sese off -rt. AXIOMA. Qui alterius gaudium du rabile promovet, eius quoque proinovet perfectiones. Atque inde exurget novum THEOREMA. Amicus alterius per fectiones promovet. DEMONSTR. Eius enim gaudium durabile promovet ($. XV. ), quod idem est ac promovere eius perfections. F. XX. SCHOL. Est autem legis Natu rae iussum: Tuas aliorumque promove to perfectiones. S. XXI. Jude ergo oriuntur. COROLLARIA. 1. Amicus ergo legem Naturae observat 2. Nos ergo obligati sumus ad amicitiam colendam, 3. Adeoque,qui homines sibi reddit ini. micos Naturae legem violat. 4. Vo. luntati ergo Divinae: conveniens est, ut aliis simils amici. etc. Haec brevi meditatione compertae sunt veritates, Quod si modilatio aliquamdiu proferretur, dici non potest, quot novae propositiones exurgerent. Huic autem exer citationi si adolescentes adsueverint, aut nostra nos fallit opivio, aut sine multa lectione, brevi tempore, minimoque la bore Philosophi acutissimi evadent. K 3 2? 222 Logica Pars IT S E C T I O. II. De librorum lectione. Q" non 174 Vum intellectus noster arctis simis sit limitibus circumscrip tus, atque adeo veritatibus omnibus pro pria meditatione eruendis incapax:facile est and intelligendnm, cur aliorum scripta le genda sint, ut quae proprio marte possumus, ab alis detecta inueniamus. Sed quia non omnia ab omnibus adcurate scri pta, plerique etiam intellectus voluntatis vitio laborant, ideoque errare possunt: cautio quaedam adhibenda est in legendis eorum libris, ac proinde Lo gicae interest praecepta tradere, quibns in jis ad examen revocandis, dijudicandisqne veritatibus ab aliis inventis aut exaratis mens dirigatur: id quod in praesenti se ctione docendum. 175. LIBER est aut HISTORICVS, aut ŚCIENTIFICVS.Ille, in quo facta, seu enunciationes singulares; hic, in quo pro positiones universales et dogmata traduntor.* * Hac librorum divisione nulla alia exactior. Quorum eum librorum habemus notitiam, Cap. VI. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 223 nihil, nisi duorum, quae enunciavimus, ar gumentorum alterutrum esse potest obiectum Patet ergo ratio, cur libros omnes in histo ricos, et didacticos sive scientificos distri buerimus. 176. HISTORIA, quum sit rerum quae acciderunt fidelis narratio (S. 147. ), facta vero vel Naturae opera, vel Societatem vel fidelium communionem nempe Eccle siam, vel deniqne litterariam Rempublicain spectent, esse potest NATVRALIS, ClVILIS, ECCLESIASTICA, vel LITTERARIA. * Rursus quoniam omnium, aut quo rumdam, vel alicuius ex quatuor illis, fa cta refert, dividitnr in UNIVERSALEM, PARTICULAREM, et SINGULAREM. Jarum prima Naturae opera enumerat, altera hominum vices et facta commemorat, iertia Ecclesiae vicissitudines et annalia narrat, po strema vel disciplinarum et librorum, vel eru ditorum vitas et fata omnia refert. ** Historia Naturalis ergo erit VNIVERSA LIS, si omnia in ea Naturae opera eno dentur; PARTICVLARIS si alicuius tantum classis, veluti ex Regno vegetabili, fossili, ani mali etc. SINGVLARIS si alicuius tantummo do plantae, lapidis, metalli, aut viventis inventio, usus, incrementum etc, narrentur. K 4 224 Logica Pars II. civili, ecclesiastica, et litteraria, de quibus plura coram 177. Quia libri vel scripta ideo. legun tur ut veritates ab aliis inventae et dete ctae discántur (5. 274. ); ea vero verbis referta sunt, ut auctoris sensus intelliga. tur (§. 160. ), idest eaedem ideae ver bis adsignentur, quas Auctor cum iis con iunxit (S. eod. ): per se patet genera lis in legendo servandus. CΑΝΟΝ. IMN legendis, aliorum scriptis curato, uit easdem notiones cum verbis con iungas, quas Auctor voluit iisdem adfigi. 178. Ex quo legitima consequutione na scitur i. in cuiuscumque libri lectione at tendendum esse ad definitiones, quibus sin gularum significatio determinatur, vel and conceptum ab usu loquendi tributum 11s, quae sine definitione adsumuntur. Et quia claras ideas ac distinctas adquirere si ne attentione non possumus (9. 19. ): se quitur 2. ut ad id potissimum requiratur attentio, crebriorque repetitio, in libris praecipue historicis ut facta facilius me inoriae mandentur. * 9 Cap. VI. De Veritatis Inquisitione. 225 * Vide quae de attentione ac repetitione dixi mus in Part. I. cap. 1. Seol. can. ult. 179. Et quoniam in historia tria potis simum spectantur, nempe veritas, ordo ac finis, facile patet 3. in libris histori cis legendis attendi debere ' ad rerum sive factorum veritatem, ad eorum ordinem et legitimam seriem et ad finem an sci licet liber Auctoris scopo respondeat. > * Pro diiudicanda rerum VERITATE, bislo ricae probabilitatis regulae traditae sunt($.152. seqq. ). ORDO vero tuin in locorum, tuna in temporis circumstantiis consistit. Eius ergo legiiimitatem quoad loca suppeditat GEO GRAPHIA, circa teinporis autem seriem CHRONOLOGIA. FINIS demum ex üsdem scriptis abunde patebit, adeoque, an ei res pondeant, ex eorum lectione diiudicari pote rit Historiae nituralis finis est obiecta rario ra adcurate describere, phaenomeni alicuius cuncta notatıı digna, partiunqne nexum di stincte exponere; Civilis est politices civilis que prudentiae regulas exemplis et factis con firmare; Ecclesiasticae scopus est, statum Ecciesiae, incrementin, in file costantiain, in profligandis erroribus - prudentiam Su premi item Numinis, in ea conservanda au gondaque Providentiam, 2 gelis, ostendere; Litteraria? tandeſ, inveniendi arlena, quam EVRISTICAM vocant, aptis aliaque id K 5 226 Logica Pars II: subsidiis, et veritatum a veteribus invenla rum cognitione perficere. Cognito itaque libri scopo, restat ut attente legatur (S. 178. ) statimque innotescet, utrum suo fini respon deat. 1 180. De librorum scientificorum lectio ne sat erit, si pauca degustemus. Quo niam in scriptis didacticis methodus reqni rit, ut nullus adsumatur terminus, nisi notionem habeat sibi adiunctam, atque ut ea praemittantur, per quae sequentia in telliguntur: consequens est 4. ut in iis legendis singulae veritates prius in classes dispescantur, ibique videatur utrum ad principia an ad propositiones iu de deductis pertincant; deinde 5. ad sin gulas voces et notiones jis ab Auctore ad fixas attendatur; (ac deni que 6. ut legens veritates antecedentes si bi reddat familiares, nedum demonstratio nes in syllogismos resolvat, in quibus vi. deat, si quid doli contineatur. 181. In scriptorum porro didacticorum examine ad eorum dotes potissimum respi ciendum, de quibus sequenti capite age. mus. Id unum porro meminisse juvabit; ad illorum examen conficiendum requiri absolụtam et continuatam libri lectionem, Cap. VII. De l'erit. comm. 227 attenta mque veritatum earumque nexus con templationem: * quae omnia si desint, le ctio dicetur SUPERFICIARIA. * Ad id ergo ineptissimi videntur scioli quidam in sola romanensiiim fabellarum lectione ver sati, qui in dijudicandis per tabernas comoe diis scurrilibus, aut ephemeridibus omnia studia sua contulerunt; vel adolescentuli vo culis tantum, phrasibusque meinoriae infi gendis adsueti, qui vix e paedagogorum fe rula manum subduxerunt: " Requiritur autem laboris patientia, attentio, mens methodo ac meditationi adsuefacta, non vero in expen ex. dendis rerum corticibus solo sensuum et phan tasiae ductu exercita. OVampdoquidem a Platone * monitum non praeclare, non est no bis solum nati sumus, adeoque nec nobis sed aliorum commoda pro movere debemus: veritates a nobis dete ctas, vel quae ab aliis inven tae nobis ope lectionis innotuerunt, aliis proponere Natura obligamur. Qui vero verbis alium ad ignotarum veri talum cognitionem perducit, is eum Do 5 K 6 228 Logica Pars. Ir. CERE dicitur adeoque DOCTOR CO gnominatur. 7 * Ip Ep. ad Archytam Tarentium. Vid. Cic. de Fin. Lib. II. cap. 14. ** Latius hic patet docendi vocabulum, qu am a Cicerone de Offic. Prooem. usurpatur. Id ve ro ex definitione admodum completa prono, ut aiunt, alveo fluit. Ceterum in hoc usum loquendi sequuti sumus: vulgari namque ser mone tritum est, Magistrorum alios esse vi VOS, alios mortuos, qui Scriptorum vel Auctorum nomine distinguuntur, ita ut libros melonymicę magistros mortuos vulgo appel lent. 183. Et quoniam verba vel voce profe runtur, vel scripto exaranțur (S. 42. ): patet, duplicem esse docendi modum, vo ce scilicet, atque scriptis; adeoque MA GISTRUM dici debere, tam eum qui li þros in lucem edit, quam cum qui in A cademiis iuventutem instruit. Speciatim autem in sequentibus eum, qui scripta didactica (de quibus hic tantum ser mo est ) conficit, SCRIPTOREM vel AU. CTOREM; eum vero, qui adolescentes ro ce docet DOCENTEM, DOCTOREM, MAGISTRVM dicemus: idque ad evitan dam confusionem, atque inutilem verborum repetitionem. Sed quia doctrinam hanc in dus as dividere instituimus sectiones, nt de utri Cap. VII. De Verit. commun. se esse usque virtutibus ac vitiis aliqua dicere posse mus: nunc, quae utrique communia sunt, dispiciemus. Ad calcem denique capitis quae dam de discentium dotibus ae naevis com pendii loco addemus. 184. Quia vero docents est, alios ad ignotaruin veritatum cognitiovem prducere; cognitio avlein debet certa et distincta eaque vel a posteriori vel a priori: consegucas esi 1. ut lectores vel auditores de veritatibus certi reddendi sint, adeoque 2, indiciis sufficientibus at que inf.l.bilibus ad veritatis cognitionem adducendi. quod ut fiat, 0 portet 5. ut docens ab iis intelligatur, ideoque 4. sit perspicuus, ad quod requiritur 5. ut artein, in qua versatur, distincte intelligat bonam methodum rigide servet (. 138. seqq. ), 7. et si quid implicatum confu suinque occurrat, distincte explicet. > * Criterium enim notionis distinctae est, si cum aliis eam possimus per verba communi Care: nisi ergo distincta artis suae docens cognitione gaudeat, fieri non potest, ut eius praecepta perspicue aliis proponere queat. CONVICTIO est actio, qua al terum de veritate certum reddimus. Quod quum fiat demoustrationis ope (. 133. ) quisque videt, convictionem sola demon stratione absolvi. * Ex quo liquet 8. do centem alios de veritate, quam docet, debere convincere, ** ac proinde 9. pro babilibus argumentis uti ei non licere: *** nisi res talis sit, ut sola probabilita te cognosci possit. * Quoniam ergo convictio demonstratione ab solvitur demonstratio vero est vel directa vel indirecta, vel a priori vel a poste riori: non abs re convictioni ea dem nomina, prout veritates demonstrantur, a Philosophis tributa sunt. ** Vt vero rationis pondus in convincendo ani mum sese insinuet, oportet, ut iHe sit atten tus, in demonstrationibus versatus, et talis; qui rationum momenta perpendere possit. Quapropter solidis demonstrationibus, non conviciis, irrisionibus, dictisque iniuriam in ferentibus ad veritatem est trahendus. Convi cia nanque odium iramque pariunt, et atten tionem turbant. *** Dici haec solet PERSUASIO, quae quum sit rationibus insufficientibus innixa, convi ctio dici nequit, quippe quae a convictione longe multumque distat. " Hinc vides, convictio sit Philosophcrum propria, perсиг Cap. VII. De Verit. commun. 231 suasio vero Oratorum, qui in investigatione verosimilium argumentorum versantur, quan tum sufficiat ad caussam probabilem redden dam, de quo conferendus est Cicero de In vent. cap. * 186. SOLIDITAS est completa artis, quam profitemur, methodique cognitio, Hinc ergo patet 10 maximam et praeci puam doceotium dotem esse soliditatem, adeoque 11. litteratos superficiarios es se ad scribendum aeque, ac docendum ineptos. * Vitium vero soliditati oppositum in speciali bus tractationibus infra explicabimus. Ad eas itaque progrediamur, SECTIO I. De Librorum dotibus. IBER, in quo veritates continen tur, SCIENTIFICVS dicitur, alio nomine SCRIPTUM DIDACTICVM. Eius dotes sunt SOLIDITAS, PERSPICVITAS, METHODVS, et SVFFICIENTIA. SOLIDITAS consistit in principio rum firmitate, ac deinonstrationum stabi 232 Logica Pars II. bilate. Solidus ergo dicitur liber 1. si eius dim principia certa fuerint atque indubia ($. 150. ), 3. si propositiones singulae rig de sini demonstratae, si bona me thodus in demonstrando adbibita pec in demonstrando cir culus irrepserit. Si vero bonae methodi leges fuerint negle ctae, tunc liber SVPERFICIARVS dice tur. Huiusmodi vero libris Rempublicam ca rere litterariam, foret maguopere optandum. 189. PERSPICVITAS in verborum pro prietate, iustaque eorum cum ideis pro portione sita est. Verborum PROPRIETAS es'git, ut voces omnis secundum usum loquendi fixo sign ficatu adbibeantur, adcuratisque definitionibus deter spineniar. Iusta verborum cum ideis PROFORTIÓ requirit, ut liber non sit prolixior, nec brevior, quam scopo SIO conveniat. * Quemadmodum enim prolixitas verborum mul titudine mentem obruit: ita et nimia brevi tas Auctoris sensum occultat, adeoque am bae oliscuritatem pariunt, scilicet vitium per spicuitati oppositum Vid. Heinec. Fundam. Stili culiior. Part. S. cap. 2 §. 50. Cap. VII.De Verit. comm un. nexu 190. METHODVS in eo est ut veri tates ex veritatibus et principiata, ut aiunt, ex principiis legitimo et continuo sint deducta, nihilque confusionis vel perturbationis inveniatur; denique si ea praecesserint, per quae sequentia intel. ligi possunt. SVFFICIENTIA tandem id exigit, ut liber sit COMPLETVS, idest veritates et propositiones exhibeat Auctoris fin i suf ficientes: qui namque finem non ahso lvit, INCOMPLETVS adpellatur. * Longum valde foret, si sufficientiae particu lares characteres, hoc est fines lot tantorum que librorum percurrere vellemus. Sufficiat tamen generales eiusdem notas evolvisse: id enim ex attenta cuinsque libri lectione quisque poterit diiudicare. 192. SYSTEVIA est congeries verita tum inter se connexurum, et a prin cipiis suis legitime deductarum. Et quia id quatuor, quas recensuimus, dotibus absolvitur: hinc est, ut Logici dicant, librum quemcumque scien titicum systematice scribi oportere. * Non omnes tamen qui libros scribunt systema conficere possunt; sed ii tantum qui veritates a se detectas, et ad eumdem 234 Logica Pars IT. > scopum tendentes in libros referunt. Eorum autem, qui alienis laboribus insudant, alii sunt COMPILATORES, qui aliorum opera hinc inde dispersa colligunt, atque in lucem edunt, mulla ordinis habita ratione; E PITOMATORES qui brevius aliorum scripta prolixiora componunt. Et hi qui dem reprehensionem numquam, quandoque vero laudem (illi praecipue ) ab eruditorum universitate reportant. Sunt vero quidam, qui aliorum scripta suffurantes ea typis man dant, impudentique fronte suo nomine inscrie bunt, iique PLAGIARII nuncupantur. De his autem quidnam dicendum, sit, omnes no runt. SECTIO II. De Doctorum virtutibus et vitis. DOCTO OCTOR appellatur, qui alios voce ad rerum ignotarum co gnitionem perducit, vcos de veritatibus, qnas tradit, certos reddit, atque convincit. Eius virtutes partim ab inte !lectu, par tim a natura, partim a voluntate penden tes, sunt quatuor: ab intellectu SOLIDITAS, et in doendo PRUDENTIA; a na tura DOCENDI DONUM; a volnntate ve ro AMOR. De singulis pauca disquiremus. Cap. VII. De Verit. Commun. Ex doctoris definitione sequitur 1. ut generales docentis characte res possidere debeat is, qui doctoris munere fungi vult; adeoque 2. prima et praecipua eius virtus sit SOLIDITAS qua fit 3. ut res abstractas et intellectu difficiles exemplis illustret, at que propositionum omnium sive a se, si ve ab aliis enunciataruin analysin instituat. Nisi enim exemplis ac similitudinibus res dif ficiles illustrentur, aegre ab auditoribus au dietur, quibus abstrahendi ars vel ignota prorsus est, vel laboriosa: adeoque taedium concipientes attentione carebunt nihilque intelligentes doctorem fine suo frustrabunt. 195. Quia vero doctor auditores suos de veritate cerlos reddere debet (S. 184. ); ad certitudinem autem ducit demonstratio: consequens est 5. nt scientia praeditus, verborum facilitate in fructus ct ad rationem de omnibus red dendain promlus esse debeat. Et quia au ditores convincendi sunt, et ad hoc in eis attentio requiritur: patet 6. Doctorem DOCENDI DONO in. signitum esse debere, idest dicendi promti tudine et suavitate, quo deficiente, ad proprium munus obeundum ineptus erit. 236 Logica Pars II. parvum in eo 9 a do * Vt enim auditor sit attentus, cavere debet qui eum docet, ne taedio, eum adficiat. Tae dium autem haud excita bit, si verborum inopia, dicendi infelici tate, animique imbecillitate laboret. Eo nam que casu non modo attentionem minuet sed et illius ludibrio se exponet. Qui ergo se huiusmodi suavitate ac promtitudine senserit destitutum, ei auctores fuerimus, ut cendi munere se abstineat, si operae preti um perdere nolit. 196. Quoniam autem non eadein omni bus est adolescentibus perspicacia, que non tam voce, quam exemplo erudiuntur: liquido infertur 7. ut doctor facoltate gau deat doctrinas ad discentium captum ge niumgne adcommodandi. ac media ad fi nem rite disponendi, nec non 8. in ex sequendis praeceptis auditores manuducat, seque iis pracheat antecessorem: praecipue veio 9. si in moralibus vitaque civili ver setur institutic, animum ipse prius ad vir tutem instruat, ut ad hoc vivum exemplar omnes conformari studeant. * Et hoc est, quod dici soiet PRVDENTIA INDOCENDO. * Si namque docentis actiones a praeceptis dis crepent, nequicquam laborum suorum fru ctum exspectabit, et adolescentes exemplum potius malum, quam bonam vocem sequuti Cap. VII. De verit. commun. 237 nihil, praeter praeceptoris imitationem, prae se ferent: quum bene monuerit Iuvenalis: Omnes duciles sumus pravis ac turpibus imi tandis suos.Postrema doctoris virtus eaque magni momenti, est AMOR erga Quum enim in erudiendis pueris aut ado lescentibus permulta opus sit fidelitate inserviendi promtitudine, patientia patientia, et labore haec auien omma nisi ab iis, qui nos amant, sperare non possumus: recte infertur 10. doctorem sincero audi tores suos amore prosequi; adeoque 11. et studio; 7 commoda promoveadi adfcctum esse debere. eorum * Quam necessaria sit haec in doctore virtus, ex sequentibus alimde patebii. Si namque amor deficiat, et studium deerit disceniium utilitati inserviendi: ac proinde pro doctore exsurget mercenarius vel utilitati, vel existi mationi propriae consulens; et tanc nec morun ratio umquam habebitur, et omnes lucri fa cendi artes promovebuntur. Si haec omnia ponantor, habebimns magistrum, vel leo poribus inservientem, in muneris exercitio ne gligentem, timidum, sui dumtaxat studio abreptum, et ad vilissima quaeqne facilem; vel inaccessibilem, clatum, ' omnia sibi per mitientem, quandoque etiam garrulum, ét e cathedra, tamquam e suggestu, aliorum no mina lacerantem, quo tutius possit de suis virtutibus declamare. 198. Si virtutum quas recensuimus opposita evolvautur, illico doctorum vi tia ad parebunt, quae breviter enumera bimus. Eorum primum et praecipuum est IMPERITIA, idest artis methodique-igno. ratio. Huius effectus sunt 1. obscuritas, qua fit, ut talis doctor terminis inanibus, vagis obscuris, nec recte definitis sit con tentus, resque difficiles exemplis illustrare nequeat: 2. confusio quae methodi negli gentiam, analyseos ignorantiam, ac con vincendi impoientiam parit: 3. docendi ineptitudo; quum enim ars ignoratur et methodus, deficit prompitudo et suavitas, quibus ducendi donum absolvitur * (S. 95.): 4. molesta prolixilas, aut obscurabre vitas; ignorata namque arte vocabula quoque technica ignorantur, quo fit, ut vel inanibus circumloquutionibus, vel paucis et insufficientibus rei explicandae verbis uta tur: 5. superfluorum tractatio et necessa riorum omissio, quam veram ignorantiae causam esse ait Sencea (S. 103. * ): 6. ser monis barbarics, cui proxima est obscuri. tas et taediuin, adeoque ad minuendam ten dit attentionem. Non desunt equidem, qui naturali quodam suavitatis defectu laborantes nec genio, nec captui auditorum se accommodare sciunt, li cet doctissimi sint et omnimoda, eruditione praediti. Naturalis autem haec imbecillitas non inter vitia sed inter defectus est referen da, adeoque imperitia dici neqnit. Quamvis enim huiusmodi doctoribus lepor desit: me diorum tamen excogitatio aliaqne pruden tiae subsidia praesto sunt. Ineptitudinis ergo caussa non alia adsignari debet, quam impe ritia, scilicet soliditatis absentia. > 199. Alterum doctoris vitium a primo oilum ducens est IMPRVDENTIA in docendo, quae in caussa est, ut auditorum Caplui genioque se adcommodare, atque media ad finem ducentia excogitare, ac proinde animis morbo aliquo laborantibus mederi nesciat. Quae enim prudentia in imperito? Imprudentiae quoque debetur illa paedagogo rum imbecillitas, qua inter se invicem de futilibus inoptisque rebus decertantes, vel aliis invidentes discentium animos adversus aemulos stimulanti. et ad pueriles irrisiones dicacitatesque concitant: quo fit, ut ipsi in spretum et abietionem incidant, adolescentes contra pessimos, audaces, ridiculosque mo res induant. Logica Ad voluntatis vitia, quae amorem excludunt, referuntur: AMBITIO, si ve nimia gloriae laudisque cupiditas, qua fit, ut vana eruditionis, autº eloquentiae ostentatione, nimioque sermonis fuco di sciplinarum praecepta non explicentur, sed implicentur, propriaeque existimationi potius, quam discentium utilitati doctores consulant. - 3. AVARITIA, quae omnia trabit commodum efficitque, ut sola sit utilitas iusti prope mater et aequi: VOLVPTATIS CONSECTATIO, quae ignaviam, laboris im pa tientiam oilierique neglectum parit, atque soliditatis defecium arguit, quum bene monterit Genuensis.noster: difficile esse reperire hominem vere doctum simul autem et mollem, ad suum Inde quoque fluxit Cynicus iile mos, et ef fraenis alios lacerandi consuetndo, quae in caussa fuit, ut de quorumdam adolescentum petnlantia ad satyras proclivium emunctae nae ris homines conquesti · gint: videbant enim pravam consuetudinen a pessimo doctorum exemplo vatan in naturam paullatim ac cor ruptionem abituran Ex codem tandem fons te manat ctiam illa docentium praesumtio, qui, ne discipulus supra magistrum esse vie deatur, vel aliquot sublimiores doctrinas sla Cap. VII. De verit: commun. 241 bi solis reservant, vel sublimia auditornm in genia deprimunt ac despiciunt. Praeterquam quod ambitio in doctoribus novitatis amorem gignit, eosque opinionum singularium et ab surdarum, saepe etiam impietatis studiosos efficit: id quod maximo adolescentihus detri mento est, praecipue quum auctoritatis prae indicium altius in iis radices agat. Vid Hei nec. Ethic. l. 77. ** Quando quis avaritiae studet, non aliorum, sed sua tantum commoda promovet, idque per fas an nefas, nihil sua referre videtur. Hinc auditorum quosdam opibus pellantes, vel praeceptorum gratiam muneribus ementes reliquis praeferunt, eos seorsum instruunt, ac speciali cura in aliquibns reconditis rebus erudiunt, eaque praedilectione prosequuntur, ut se aliorum odio, invidiae vero illos expo nant, adeoque nihil neque hi pro. ficiant. *** Art. Logicocritic. Lib. I. cap. Voluptati nanque dediti plerumque sunt ignavi, desides, et laboris impatientes; atque inde fit, ut non satis praeparati ad doces dum accedcntes in lycaeo quidquid in buccain vererit effutiant, et quia ex abundantia cor dis, ut Servator ait, os loquitur, bonos persaepe mores verbis factisme corrumpant. Delicatuli isti suat etiam meticulosi, adeoque veritatem, quam alias intrepido vultu, si ri te munere suo fungi vellent, dicere debe ne aliorum indignationen incurruni Tom. I. L neque illi reni, ) 242 Logica Pars II. aut dissimulant, aut tegunt, aut (quod val de dolendum ) foede corrumpunt. Praeterea in huiusmodi hominibus ridicula quaedam et thrasonica reperitur ambitio, scilicet paedan tismus', quo furentes nusquam, nisi de suis rebus gestis plurima exaggeranti, auditorum, que risui se exponunt. 201 • Superest, ut doctrinae usum do etorumque officia exponamus, ut si qui munus hoc inire cupiunt, bene incipere, feliciusque prosequi possini. Quicunque cr go ad istruendam iuventutem animum ad. pellis, hos diligenter observato: CANON ES. Avditores eligito perspicaces, mui toque supientiae umore Nagrantes. Eo rum porro attentionem excitato sae pius, ac vitia, quibus eos laborare per cipis, prudenter sensimque corrigito. 2. Doctoris munus, nisi solida artis methodique cognitione imbutus, ne te mere suscipito: idque summa fidelitate, prucuttia, ac sincero erga discentes amore absolvito. 3. Adolescentes in moralibus civili Cap. VII. De Verit. comm. 243 busque disciplinis non tam voce, quam exemplis erudito. Evidentissimum numiz que, teste Augustino, docendi genus est subiectio exemplorum. 4. Religionis amorem, morumque in tegritatem in discentibus foveto, neque te illis familiarem nimis reddito, ne, excusso subiectionis fraeno, doctores parvipendentes nihil proficiant, et ad pessima quaeque praecipites ruant. "De Discentium dotibus ac naevisn's 202, Am de dotibus IAm vitiisque discça tium pauca apperidicis loco ad damus. Eorum est de veritatibus certos reddi; solidache imbui co gnitione, quae non nisi es claris distinctisque oritur notionibus. Ad claras vero ac distinctas ideas adquirendas requiritur attentio et libertas a praeiudiciis: Quidquid ergo attentionem tur bat, vel praeiudicia fovet, ab iis abesse debet. 203. Priina ergo et maxima discentium dos est BONA NENS, DOCILITAS, ATTENTIO sincerus erga stu. dia et docentes AMOR, LABORIS PATIENTIA et otii fuga, + 6. de. nique ANIMI SOLITUDO. It * Bonae mentis vocabulo intelligimus non mo do naturalem ingenii perspicaciam, cuius de fectus hominem reddit cognitionis incapacem, verum etiam animum bene educatum vcrae que Relligionis amantem: quum Divino oracu lo monituin sit initiuin om nis sapientiae esse timorem Domini. Hoc est libertas a praeiudiciis,ut supra di clum est, animique inclinatio ad quaecunque praecepta ediscenda, et ad pra xin adplicanda. ID adeo Si namque Doctores et studia amemus, his sedulam navamus operam, illosque atter te auscultamus: si vero amor hinc absit, taedium supervenit., attentio minuitur, que aut parum aut nihil in studiis profie mus. | Laboris enim impatientia ignorantiae cause est, ut dixiinus; quoniam veri tates vel propria meditatioue vel Aucts rum lectione inveniuntur, medtatio vero perinde ac lectio laborem cai gunt, ut ex superioribus abunde constat. De verit. eomm. 245 # Multitudo namque non modo praeiudicio rum fons est sed at tentionem quoque distrahit aut saltem mi nuit: adeoque solum oportet esse, qui sa pientiae sentit amorem. Ex iisdem principiis sponte manant discentium vitia, qualia sunt 1. Religionis spretus, quem conse quitur voluntaria praeiudiciis adhaesio, 2. mentis hebetudo, 3. attentionis distra ctio, 4. otium et laboris impatientia a dolescenlibus familiarissima, 4. aversio a studiis vel doctoribus, 6. denique spe ctaculorum, multitudinis, et sodalita tum amor, quo fit, ut attentio distraha tur ($. 40. Schol. Can. 5. ), et ad voluptatem inde ac perditionem praccipiti Cursu ruant. Schol. Quae de discentium officiis tra lendae forent regulae, eae ab eadem do trina huc usque exposita facile deduci po erunt. Quapropter hic a canonum addi tione con mode abstinemus. De litterario certamine. zv ERTAMINIS LITTERARII no Emine intelligimus quascumque disputationes, quae pro veritatis disquisitione vel diiudicatione instituuntur. Hae disceptationes similiter vel scriptis, vel vo. ce liont: et quidem SCRIPTO, vel alio rum errores confutamus, vel nosmet ab eorum imputationibus defendimus: VOCE autem rationes utrinque conficiuntur, et ad examen revocantur. Si ergo alterius errores scripto detegantur, actio haec dicilnr CONFITATIO; si pro positiones ab alterius impugnatione vindicentur, DEFENSIO, si denique coram disce platio instituatur, propio nomine DISPVTATIO adpellatur. De harum qualibet diversis sectionibus agemus qua alium erroris convincimus. Ex qua definitione patet 1. confutantem de Cdium erroris convincimus. Ex bere falsitatem propositionis, quam alter pro vera asseruit demonstrare, idque a priori vel a posteriori, directe aut apogogice indiciis sufficientibus, hoc est principiis demonstrandi certis ei utendum esse. Etquia eadem propositio non potest esse simul vera et falsa (alias in contradictionem inpingeretur ): evidens est. propositio nem legitime denionstratam confutari non posse, adeoque. eius demonstration, nem esse contrariae confutationem. Antequam vero confutatio instituatur opore tet STATVM QVAESTIONIS conficere, idest verum suctoris sensum intelligere, ut propositionem falsam ex ipsius auctoris men le demonstret. Eo enim ipso vitabitur LOGOMACHIA, qua propositio vera impetitur, cuius veritas, licet ab adversario sit cognita, aliis tamen verbis expriiuiiur et impugnatur, adeoquc insurgit quaestio de verbis. Vid. Weienfelsium de logomachiis eruditorum. Si vero indicia fuerint insufficientia, scilicet principia probabilia et precaria, tunc non con L'utilis, sed IMPVGNATIO dicetur. Impugnari tamen potest, nempe dubiis au dificultatibus quisbusdam subiici, ut eius veritas clarius elucescat, nec ulla remaneat op positi suspicio, id quod infra in Seet. 3. docebimus. Quoniam confutatio ost convictio; haec autein requirit, ut con vincendus sit attentus, nec adfectus in eo attentionem turbantes exciteptur: liquido infertur 5. confutantem ea omnia quae attentionem in altero per turbant, atque adfectus excitant, vitare debere; consequenter 6. a conviciis, ir risionibus, vel consequeniiis periculosis, quae confutandi famam laetlunt, abstinen dum esse. Sunt autem PERICVLOSAE huiusmodi CONSEQVENTIAE, quae non quidem ex genui no Auctoris sensi, sed ex confutantis opi nione eruuntur, quaeque non veritatis de fendendae gratia deducuntur, sed ut adver sarii fama in discrimen vocetur, isque alio rum ludibrio exponatur. Harum porro con sequentiaruin confectores proprio nomine CONSEQVENTIARII vocantur. 208. Qaum ergo consequentiae pericu losae aliorum odium Auctori concilient eique invidiam creent: non abs re a Philosophis argumenta ab invi L4 1 + Cap. ult. de titt. cerlamine. 249 * dia fuerunt appellatae. Ex quo patet ARGUMENTUM AB INVIDIA ductum in confutando sollicite esse vitandum; a deoque 8.non abs re consequentiarios a Wolfio PERSECUTORES cognominari. * Logic. Lat. Idque iure merito. Nam confutator vere dicitur, qui veritatem ab al terius paralogismis vindicare studet. At qui non veritatem, sed adversarii famam perse quitur, nullo inodo confutator dicendus est, sed alterius persecutor, quia id non rationis auxilio, sed invidiae stimulo perficit. Schol. Quoniam itaque in confutante solius veritatis amor exigitur: ut in con futatione nihil vel minimum peccetur, hos qui sequuntur, servare curato. CAN ONE S. I. A, D confutandum solo veritatis a more, non odio adversus alte rum ductus accedito. Adversarium soli dis rationibus non conviciis, dictisve famae nocentibus de errore et falsitate convincito. 2. Si obscuro impropriove stilo ad edəssarius scripsit, ut dictionem corriagat, seque intelligendum praestet, ad wertito. Si quid ab altero in demonstran do peccatum, sive principia falsa sint, sive connexio illegitima, cuncta distincte modesteque patefacito. Demonstrationis rigidus custos principiorum diligens investigator esto, ne tibi ab adversario nota inuratur. E tenim TURPE EST DOCTORI, QUUM CULPA RE DARGUIT IPSUM. DEFENSIO est propositionis ab alterius impugnatione vindi catio. Ex eadem ergo definitione sequitur 1. ut propositio legitime confutata defen din non possit, ut et 2. ad defensionem propositionis sufficiat eius veritatem solide demonstrare, aut 3. si de terminis tan tum quaestio sit, eos adcuratis definitio nibus determinare. Duobus vero modis defensio insti taitur. Vel enim propositionis veritatem ab alterius impugnatione vindicamus, vel Cap. ult. De litt. ccrtumine. 251 impugnantis errores itidem detegimus. Pri mae classis seripla dicuntur APOLOGE TICA; alterius vero POLEMICA vel E RISTICA. * jin, * Horum quidem scriptorum minorem num rum Respublica optaret litteraria. His nam que nec veritas invenitur, nec ratio perfici tur, sed contentiones animique perturbatio nes aluntur, nulla prorsus utilitate, magno autem Societatis, ac iuventutis studiosae malo.? 211. Defendenti ergo, ne a recto. aber ret, Sequentes proponimus., C ANONES. 1. PhoRopositionem a te légitime demon Stratam, aut notionem cum ver bis rite ' conjunctam ab alterius cuiusvis impugnatione ne defendito. Pro të nam que evidentia pugnabito?? 2. Eius, qui te maledictis conviciis que laesit, scriptis modesto respondeto silentio. * la cedendo victor abibis. * Si namque simili stilo, respondeas, nullum operae pretium facies, adversarii petulantiam temeritate lua iustificabis, inque idem vitium incides, quod in alio reprehendis. Quidquid ab altero tibi impugnari sentis, in eo tua versetur defensio. * Si vero argumentis ab invidia periculosis que consequentiis ab aliquo persecutore adfectus fueris, sat est eius malitiam et nocendi studium ostendere teque commiseratione potius, quam ira per citum perhibere. Si ergo deverborum sensu quaestio sit, eum te explicasse sufficiet: si principia impugna tor urgeat eorum certitudinem ostendas oportet: si in demonstrationibus te ar guere velit, earuin legitimam connexiouem prae oculis ponere; si vero aliqua consequen tia absurda tibi impPombaur, aut ipsius conse quentiae veritatem, aut eam ab adversario non recte deductam, demonstrare debebis. Quod si persecutor obscurae famae sit, te tacente veritas ipsa loqietur, tuaque mo destia impudeutem adversarium confusione " obruet. Ad veritatis tandem disquisitionem acMilanius, quae non scripto, sed voce fit, quaeque disputationis no. De litt. certaminemine venit. Est igitur DISPUTATIO -aru ritatis alicuius discussio voce facta. Ea tribus ' personis absolvitur, quarum una propositionem'impugnat, altera eamdem defendit, tertia vero huic suppetias fert. * Adeoque qui veritatem difficultatibus du bisque implicat, OPPONENS; qui vero eaka ab eiusmodi impugnatione vindicat, DEFENDENS, vel RESPONDENS; qui deni que huic aliquid adiumenti adfert, PRAESES aupellatur. Ex qua definitione liquet 1. di-, sputationem esse impugnationem proposi tionis veraen eiusque. defensionem; ideo que 2., utramque demonstratione absol vi, ut disputantium alteruter de veri tate convincatur; quare 3. quidquid ge neratim de convictione dictum, de disputatione etiam intelligatur, prae cipue vero 4. status quaestionis formandus et 5. oportet, ut lingua loquantur clara et intelligbili, hoc est amboruin captui adcommodata 6. ut u trique nec animus nec lingua deficiat. Su per omnia autem 7 affectibus carcant, odio, praesertim et invidia, Non enim ad rixandum, sed ad disputandum. descendunt. At affectus convicia iniuriasque pariunt, quibus attentio turbatur (S. 207. ): ac proinde a disputantibus louge debent ab esse, ne ira odiove perciti tantum absit ut veritatem inveniant, ut potius.a convicis ad manus transeánt. Ex eadem definitione fluit 8. di sputantes debere in terminis contradicto. riis versari, hoc est ut idein ab uno a d. firmetur, ab altero negetur'. Et quia idem subiectum in contradictione requiritur; eruitur 9. disputantes debere in terminorum notionibus convenire: quapro pter 10 si verborum sensus- lateat, eorum explicationem a respondente peti posse, ut in claris distinctisque rebus incidat contro versia, ct ' sic logomachiae vitentur. Disputatio vel' ACADEMICA est, vel DIALECTICA. Illa continuato ac paene oratorio dicendi genere, haeć syllo gistico more conficitur. In illa opponens disscrtatione quadam propositionis veritatem impugnat, respondens contra eodemstilo obiectiones diluit, ihesiique defendit; in hoc vero syllogisniis aliisque ratiocinandi modis chunciationem opponens inpugnat, ' et ex Cap. ult. De litt. certamine. adverso respondens ratio cinia ad trutinam revocans propositiones veras concedit, falsas negat, dubiasque distinguit, eoque progre diuntur, donec ad principia perveniant.Addi potest methodus disputandi SOCRATI CA, quae Opponentis interrogationibus, et Defendentis responsionibus dialogico stilo ab solvitur. Sed quum ea iam pridem ab usu recesserit: ab eius explicatione merito ab stinemus: in ipsis tamen praelectionibus, quae de ill a dicenda forent, paucis expe diemus. Vides ergo methodum Academicam ad eru ditionis et eloquentiae ostentationem in Aca demiis prae se ferendam unice inventam esse. In disputando autem, quum homini pede stanti in uno ñec eruditio, nec verborum copia praesto esse possit, Dialectica metho dus merito praeterenda, Vtcumque vero disputatio instituatur invabit disputantiirin munera paucis expo nére: id quol sequentibus exequemur re gulis. Et primo quidem amborum, dein de opponentis; postremo respondentis mu nia recensebimus. Quisquis ergo ad dis putandum accedis, hos religiose castodito: Phim Rimum omnium controversiae sta tum conjici !). Nihil porro, nisi terminis claris fixisque expressum, in e am incidito. Obscura quaeque explica to. 2. Dispu'ans adfectibus vacuus, veria tatis tantum amans, eiusque invenienda cupidus esto. Cuncta modeste, suaviter, amice proferto. Convicia et dicta mor dacia, velut angiem, fugito. OPPONENTIS hae fere partes sunto. 3. Quacunque meihodo thesin aliquam adoriris, syllogisticam artem cuidi ha beto. Argumentu solida non sophismata ineptasve fallacias, proponito. Conclu sio thesi impugnatae semper e diametro contraria esto 4. Si quid a respondente tibi propo nitur explicandum, explicato: si vero probandum, tamdiu syllogismorum, au xilio probato, donec ad principia per veneris. Ad singula respondentis verba et distinctiones attendito. Si illa obscura sint, illi explicanda dato; si vero clara, Cap. ult. De litt. certamine. 257 novas exceptiones, prout res tulerit, contra formato. Praecipue videto, si ad versarium ex assertis suis convincere et refutare, proprioque, ut aiunt, gladio iu gulare possis Et hoc est, quod vocari solet ARGVMENTVM AD HOMINEM, de quo tamen videa tur lo. Lockius de intell. bum. IV. 17., qui eius insufficientiam in vero inveniendo et de bilitatem ostendit. Nos autem tantum in ex ercitationibus litterariis, quae coram fiunt id commendamus: de veri namque investiga tione fusius supra tractavimuis. RESPONDENS demum id sibi negotii sciat praecipue datum. Argumentum opponentis prius repe tito, deinde sedulo perpendito, num de bila gaudeat soliditate. Praenissarum quae tibi dubiae videbuntur, probatio nem postulato. Syllogismum in forma peccantem totum reiicito. Si haec bene processerit materiam ad examen reyocaio. Propo sitiones falsas negato, veras concedito, dubias vero distinguito: sed de omnibus rationem reddere memento., ne ridiculas, evadas. 258 Logic. Pars. ii. 本 Perridicula ergo est illa Scholasticorum regula: Semper nega, numquam concede raro distingue. Si namque casu neges, duo rum alterum exspectare debebis, vel ut ne gationis caussam adferas, vel ut lucem quo que neges meridianam: utrumque homini sen sibili acerbissimum.. 8. Si oppositae propositionis impossi bilitatem demostrare possis; nihil ultra oneris habebis. Si vero in auctoritate probatio ' versetur: sat erit adversarii te.ctus obscuros claris auctoritatibus re fellere. 9. Caveto, ne propositionem concedas, in qua adversarius struxit insidias: ne cx eius admissione incidas in laqucos. Schol. Ceterum disputandi regulac usu magis ct exercitio, quam praeceptis, ad discuntur '. Si tamen dicendum quod res est, in huiusmodi litterariis contentionibus von soliditas, sed promtitudo, immo ve ro impudentia valet et veritas amittitur potius, quam invenitur: Qua de re vide inus eruditos doctosque viros raro admodum ad disputandum descendere. Legatur Bud seus Obseru. in Plit. instrum. Pur: III. Cup. 3. g. 11. SMART (In The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy – he lived in London where he was a mmber of the Athenaeum, the address of which he gives in several of his essays. He defends Locke from the criicisms of Scot HAMILTON, and especially Irishman Whately, in ‘Thought and language: an essay having in view the revival, correction, and exclusive establishment of Locke’s Philosophy, Longman), AN OUTLINE OF SEMATOLOGY; OR, AN ESSAY TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A NEW THEORY OF GRAMMAR, LOGIC, AND RHETORIC. Perhaps if words were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afibrd us another sort of Logic and Cretic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with. Locke. LONDON: JOHN RICHARDSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE. G WOODPALL, AHQEh COUBT, •KllfWl* tTRWT, LOWDON. I PUT not my name to these pages, nor shall I, beyond this notice, speak in the first person singular, but assume the pomp and cir- cumstance of the editorial "we". Why I choose for the present to remain unknown, I leave the reader to settle as his fancy pleases. He is at liberty to think that, being of no note or reputation, and fearing for my book the fate of George Primrose's Paradoxes, I do not place my name in the title page, because it would inevitably make that fate more certain. Or, if he chooses, he may imagine a better motive. He may suppose me to be the celebrated author of ***** *, with half the alphabet in capitals at the end of my name ; and that I prefer an incogfiito, lest he, my "cotirteous reader", should relax the rigour of examination, and receive as true, on the authority of a name, a theory that may be false. In the last chapter of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, there is a threefold division of knowledge into ^uo-t*^, TrpaxriK^, and trtjfieiaTiK'^. If we might call the whole body of instruction wliich acquaints ua with TO. <f>v<TtKa by the name Physicology, and that which teaches to -irpaKTixa by the name Practkology, all instruction for the use of TO <7?j^aTo, or the signs of our knowledge, might be called Sematology. Physicology, far more comprehensive than the sense to wliich Physiology is fixed, would in this case signify the doctrine of the nature of all things what- ever which exist independently of the mind's concep- tion of them, and of the human will ; which things in- clude all whose nature we grow acquainted with by ex- perience, and can know in no other way, and therefi>re include the mind, and God ; since of the mind as well as of sensible things we know the nature only by ex- perience, and since, abstracted from Revelation, we know the existence of a God only by experiencing His providence, Practicology, the next division, is the doctrine of human actions determined by the will to s preconceived end, namely, something beneficial to in- dividuals, or to communities, or the welfare of the kJ The signs which the mind makes use of in order to obtain and to communicate knowledge, are chiefly words; and the proper and skilful use of words is, in different ways, the object of, 1. Grammar, of 2. Logic, and of 3. Rhetoric. Our outline of Sematology will therefore be comprised in three chapters, corresponding with these three divisions. species at large. As to Sematology, the third division, it is the doctrine of signs, showing how the mind operates by their means in obtaining the knowledge comprehended in the other divisions. It includes Metaphysics, when Metaphysics are properly limited to things TB /*ETa Tct pi/fiKa, i. e. things beyond natural things things which exist not independently of the mind's conception of them ; e. g. a line in the abstract, or the notion of man generally: for these are merely signs which the mind invents and uses to carry on a train of reasoning independently of actual existences; e. g. independently of lines in concrete, or of men individually and particularly. But as to the class of signs which the former of these instances has in view, and which are peculiar to Mathematics, there will be no necessity, in this treatise, to make much allusion to them: it is to the signs indicated by the other example that reference will chiefly be made: for these are the great instruments of human reason, and we believe they have never yet had their suitable doctrine. To ascertain the true principles of Grammar, the method often pursued will be adopt- ed here j namely, to imagine the progress of speech upward as from its first invention. As to the question, whether speech was or was not, in the first instance, revealed to man, we shall not meddle with it : we do not propose to inquire how the first man came to speak Beattie and Cowper, poets if not philosophers, ate among those who insist that speech must have been revealed. The former thus turns to ridicule the well L known passage in the Satires of Horace, Cvm prorepseruntf &c. lib. I. Sat 3* v. 99 : When men out of the earth of old A dumb and beastly vermin crawled. For acorns, first, and holes of shelter, • They, tooth and nail, and bdter dceker, B 2 4 ON CiSAUMAH. [CHAP. I. but whether language is not a necessary effect of reason, as well as its necessary instrument, Fought fist to fist ; then with a club Each learned hia brother brute to drub ; Till more experienced grown, these cattle Forged fit accoutrements for battle. At last, (Lucretius Bays, and Creech,) They set their wits to work on speech : And that their thoughts might all have marks To make them known, these learned clerks Left ofi' the trade of cracking crowns, And manufactured verba and nouns." Theory of Language, Part I. Chap 6. (in a note.) The other poet does not, on this occasion, appear in metre, but is equally merry. " I ta';e it for granted that these good men are phi- Bophically correct in their account of the origin of language ; and if the Scripture had left us in the dark upon that article, I should very readily adopt their hypothesis for want of better information. I should suppose, for instance, that man made his first effort in speech in the way of an interjection, and that ah ! or oh ! being uttered with wonderful gesticulation and variety of attitude, must have left hia powers of ex- presdon quite exhausted ; that, in a course of time, he would invent many names for many things, but first for the objects of his daily wants. An apple would consequently be called an apple ; and perhaps not SECT. 1.] ON GRAMMAR. 5 growing out of those powers originally bestow- ed on man, and essential to their further deve- lopment. many years would elapse before the appellation would receive the sanction of general use. In this case, atid upon this supposition, seeing one in the hand of another man, he would exclaim, with a most moving pathos, * Oh apple !' Well and good, ' Oh apple,** is a very affecting speech, but in the mean time it profits him nothing. The man that holds it, eats it, and he goes away with ' Oh apple!** in his mouth, and nothing better. Reflecting on his disappointment, and that perhaps it arose from his not being more explicit, he contrives a term to denote his idea of transfer,, or gratuitous communication, and the next occasion that offers of a similar kind, performs his part accordingly. His speech now stands thus * Oh give apple ! ** The apple-holder perceives himself called upon to part with his fruit, and having satisfied his own hunger, is perhaps not unwilling to do so. But unfortunately there is still room for a mistake, and a third person being present, he gives the apple to him. Again dis- appointed, and again perceiving that his language has not all the precision that is requisite, the orator retires to his study, and there, after much deep thinking, conceives that the insertion of a pronoun, whose office shall be to signify, that he not only wants the apple to be given, but given to himself, will remedy all defects; Now instead of taking it for granted, as others have done who have pursued the method proposed, that men sat down to invent the parts of speech, because they found they had ideas which respectively required them, we as- sert that men have originally no such ideas as correspond to the parts of speech. The im- pulse of nature is, to express by some single sound, or mixture of sounds (not divisible in- to significant parts) whatever the mind is conscious of; nor is there any thing in the na- ture of our thoughts that leads to a different procedure, till artificial language begins to be he uses it the next opportunity, succeeds to a wonder, obtains the apple, and, by his success, such credit to his invention, that pronouns continue to be in great repute ever afl^er. Now as my two syllable-mongers, Beattie and Bl^r, both agree that language was originally inspired, and that the great variety of languages we find on earth at present, took its rise from the confusion of tongues at Babel, I am not perfectly convinced, that there is any just occasion to invent this very ingenious solution of a diiEculty, which Scripture has solved already." Letter to the Rev. Wm. Unwin, April 5, \'J8i. invented or imitated. Let us take, for our first fact, the cry for food of a new-born infant: that is an instinctive ciy, wholly unconnected, we presume, with reason and knowledge. In proportion as the knowledge grows, that the want, when it occurs, can be supplied, the cry be- comes rational, and may at last be said to signify, " Give me food," or more at full," I want you to give me food." In what does the rational cry, (rational when compared with the instinctive cry,) differ from the still more rational sentence? Not in its meaning,but simply thus, that the one is a sign suggested directly by nature, and the other is a sign aijsing out of such art, as, in its first acquirement, (we are about to presume,) nature or necessity gradually teaches our species. Now, that the artificial sign is made up of parts, (namely the words that compose the sentence,) and that the natural sign is not made up of significant parts, we affirm to be simply a consequence of the constitution of artificial speech, and not to follow from any thing in the nature of the communication which the mind has to make. The natural cry, if understood, is, for the purpose in view, quite as good as the sentence, nor does the sentence, as a whole, signify any thing more.Taking the words separately, there is indeed much more contained in the sentence than in the cry; namely, the knowledge of what it is to give under other circumstances as well as that of giving food ; oi'Jbod un- der other circumstances as well as that of being given to me; of me under other circumsttances as well as that of wanting food: but all this knowledge, in this and similar cases for which a cry might suffice, is unnecessary, and the indivisible sign, if equally understood for the actual purpose, is, for this purpose, quite adequate to the artificially compounded sign. The truth is this, that every perception by the senses, and every conception which [By Conception I mean that power of the mind, which enables it to fonn a notion of an absent object of perception ; or of a sensation which it has formerly follows from such perception, as well as every desire, emotion, and passion arising out of them, is individual and particular; and if language had continued to be nothing more than an outward indication of these its passive affec- tions, it would have consisted of single indivi- dual signs for single individual occasions, like those which are originally prompted by nature. But it was impossible to find a new sign for every new occasion, and therefore an ex- pedient was of necessity adopted; which expedient, from its rudest to its most refined ration, will be found one and the same, an expedient of reason, and that through which all the improvements of reason are derived. The expedient is nothing more than this : when a new expression is wanted, two or more signs, each of which has served a particular purpose, are put together in such a manner as to modify each other, and thus, in their united fclt." Stewart : I'hilos. of the Human Mind, Vol. I. Chap. 3. [capacity, to answer the new particular purpose in view. In this manner, words, individually, cease to be signs of our perceptions or con- ceptions, and stand (individually) for what are properly called notions', that is, for what the mind knows ; collectivelif, that is, in sen- tences, they can signify any perception by the senses, or conception arising from such per- ception, any desire, emotion, or passion in short, any impression which nature would have prompted us to signify by an indivisible sign, if such a sign could have been found : but individually, (we repeat,) each word be- longing to such sentence, or to any sentence, is not the sign of any idea whatever which the mind passively receives, but of an abstractiont • Notio or notitia from oco, I knov. (It is a pity we cannot trace the word to ado instead of noac.->.) Note, Locke will be mucli more intelligible, if, in the majority of places, we substitute " tlie knowledge of" for what he calls " the idea of" His wide use of the word idea has been a cause of the widest con&slon in other writers. t Home Tooke's doctrine is very different from wliich reason obtains by acts of comparison and judgment upon its passively-received ideas. tbis. He says (Diversions of Purley [2d edit. 1798] Vol. I. page 51,) " That the business of the mind, as far as regards language, extends no further than to re- ceive impressions, that is, to have sensations or feel- ings"; he affirms (pa££^im) that what iscalled abstrac- tion has no existence in the mind, but belongs to lan- guage only, and that " the very term metapht/sic is nonsense "' {page 399). It is hoped that what follows in the test will prove these opinions to be erroneous. Could the proper name John, or any word being an artificial part of speech, have been invented, if the mind had not exerte d its active powers upon its passively r&- ceived ideas ? For whatever ideas of this last kind we have of John must be ideas arising out of particular perceptions ; and ve must irame him to our minds standing, or sitting, or walking; talking, or silent; dressed or undressed, with other circumstances which imagination can vary, but cannot set aside. It is only by comparison that we know John to be independent of all these, and the name is the effect of this know- ledge, not the cause of it. The abstraction is not in the word only ; for till we know that Jolm is separate (abstract) from whatever circumstance the perception of him includes, how can his name exclude it ? Neither is the terra iiietaphysic nonsense when applied to this The sentence " John walks " may express what is actually perceived by the senses ; or any other abstraction. For John separate from circumBtancea that must enter into an actual perception, ifithe nameof anotion /iCTa^ua-ixii, i.e.outof nature, or of which we have no example in external nature, though it may esist in our minds, like a line in mathematics, which is deifined as that which has length without breadth, and which is therefore, for the same reason, properly called a metaphysical notion, and pure mathematics are justly considered a part of metaphysics. It was because H. Tooke set out with these principles thus fiindamentally erroneous, that he could not complete his system when he had brought it to ail but a close. With admirable acuteness of inquiry, he had tracedup every part of speech till he found it, originally, either a noun or a verb, and he then left his book im- perfect, because he could not, on the principles he had started with, explain the difference bet ween these : he promised indeed to return to the inquiry, but he never fiiliilled his promise for the best of reasons, that there was no pushing it further in the way he had gone ; he must have contradicted all his early premises to have reached a true conclusion. The whole cause of his error seems to havebeen a too unqualified understanding of Locke's doctrine, that the mind has no innate ideas. but neither word, separately, can be said to express a part of that perception, since the perception is of John walkmg, and if we per- ceive John separate from walking, then he is not walking, and consequently it is another perception ; and so if we perceive walking se- parately from John, it must be that we perceive somebody else walking, and not him. The separate words, then, do not stand for passively received ideas, but for abstract notions ; so far as they express what is pec- ij ceived by the senses, they have no separate meaning ; it is only with reference to the un- derstanding that each has a separate meaning. The separate meaning of the word John is a knowledge (and therefore properly called a I notion not an idea*) that John has existed and ] Hence, TOOKE acknowledges nothing originally but ] the senseB, and the experience of those senses, calling reason " the effect and result of those senses and that experience." See Vol, II. page 16. " If indeed the word idea were uniformly employed to signify what is here meant by notion, and nothing else, little objection could be made: such use would will exist, independently of the present perception, and the separate meaning of the word •walks, is a linowledge that another may waik as well as John. This is not an idea of John or an idea of walking such as the senses give, or such as memory revives : for the senses present no such object as John in the abstract, that is, neither walking, nor not walking; nor do they furnish any such idea as that of •walking inde- pendently of one who walks. There is then a double force in these words, their separate force, which is derived from the understanding, and their united force, by which, in this instance, they signify a perception by the senses. nearly correspond in effect though not in theory, with the old Platonic Bcnse, and in the Platonic sense Lord Mooboddo constantly employs it in his work on the "Origin and Progress of Language." But as Dr. Reid observes, ** in popular language idea signifies the same thing as conception, apprehension. To have KD idea of a thing is to conceive it." This sense of the word Dugald Stewart adopts. (Philos. of the Human Mind, Vol. L Chap. 4. Sect. 2.) Locke, as already intimated, uses the word in all the senses it will bear. In otlier instances, the united significa- tion of words may not be a perception of the senses j but whatever may be their united meaning, they will separately include know- ledge not expressed by the whole sentence, though, if the meaning of the sentence be ab- stract, the knowledge included in the separate words will be necessary to the knowledge ex- pressed by the sentence. " Pride offends," is a sentence whose whole meaning is abstract; but pride separately, and offends separately, are still more abstract, and in using them to form the sentence, we refer to knowledge be- yond the meaning of the sentence as a whole, namely, to pride under other circumstances than that of offending, and to offending under other circumstances than that of pride offending; and here, tlie knowledge referred to seems necessary, in order to come at the knowledge expressed by the sentence. " John walks," (or, according to our English idiom, " John is walking,") is a perception by the senses, and does not therefore depend on a knowledge of John, and of walking in the abstract ; (though to express the perception in this way requires it;) but " Pride offends," does not express an individual perception, nor would many individual perceptions of pride offending give the knowledge which the sen- tence expresses : we must have obser\'ed what pride is, separately from its offending, and we must have observed what offending is, separately from pride offending, before we can rationally understand, or try to make known to others, that Pride offends. In this DOUBLE force of words, by which they signify at the same time the actual thought, and re- fer to knowledge necessary perhaps to come at it, we shall find, as we proceed, the ele- ments, the true principles of Logic and of Rhetoric; while in tracingthe necessity which obliged men to signiiy in this manner even tliose individual perceptions which nature would have prompted them to make known by a single sign, (if such sign could have been found,) we shall ascertain the true principles of Gkammau. The last mentioned subject must occupy our first attention. 5. To get at the parts of speech on our hypothesis, we must consider them to be evolved from a cry or natural word. Not that this is the present principle on which words are invented ; for art having furnished the pattern, we now invent upon that pattern j but our purpose is to consider how the pattern itself is produced by the workings of the human mind on its first ideas. Those ideas can be none other than the mind passively receives through the senses ; and perhaps the first active operation of the mind is to abstract (sepa- rate) the subjects or exterior causes of sensa- tion from the sensations themselves. When we see, we find we can touch, or taste, or smell, or hear ; and when the perception through one of these senses is different, we find a difference in one or more of the others. We also recollect (conceive) our former per- ceptions, and finding the actual sensations not recoverable by an effort of the mind alone, we recognize the separate existence of the ma- terial world. All this is Knowledge, acquired indeed so early in life, that its com- mencing and progressing steps are forgotten ; but we are nevertheless warranted in affirm- ing that not the least part of it, is an original gift of nature. Along with this knowledge we acquire emotions and passions ; for to knoia material objects, is to know them as causes of pleasurable or painful sensation, and hence to feel for them, in various degrees, and with various modifications, desire and aversion, joy and grief, hope and fear. And here, as the same object does not always produce the same emotion, or the same emotion arise from the same object, we begin a new class of abstractions: we separate, mentally, the object from the emotion or the emotion from the object: we are enabled in consequence to abstract and consider those differences in the objects, from which the different effects arise, and to ascer- tain, by trial, how far they yield to volition ope- rating by the exterior bodily members, which SECT. we have previously discovered to be subservient to the will. In this new class of abstractions, and the consequences which arise from them, we shall find the beginning of that knowledge which human reason is privileged to obtain, compared with that which the higher orders of the brute creation in common with man, are able to reach j and from this point we shall be able to trace how man becomes /ie'poyjr, or divider of a natural word into parts of speech *, while other animals retain unaltered the cries by which their desires and passions are first expressed. 6. As we are able to separate, mentally, the object from the emotion, and to remem- ber the natural cry after the occasion that produced it ceases, the natural cry might re- main as a sign either of the object or of the emotiont. But this does not carry us beyond Thia is the sense in which we choose to under- stand the word, and not merely voice-dividing or ar- ticulating. f For instance, as, in the present state of language, the exclamation of surprise ha-ha '. is either an inter- to the mind which forms the abstraction, and has the power to establish a sign (wliether audible or not) to fix and remember it: our inquiry is, how a communication can be made from mind to mind, when the signs which na- ture furnishes are inadequate to the occasion. And first be it observed, that only such occa- sions must, at the outset, be imagined as do but just rise above those for which the cries of nature are sufficient: we must not suppose a necessity for communicating those abstract truths which grow out of an improved use of language, and which could not there- fore yet have existence in the mind. And we have further to observe that no communication can be made from one mind to another, but by means of knowledge which the other mind possesses; the cries of na- ture can find their way only into a conscious breast, that is to say, a breast that has known, jection eignifyiDg that emotiou, or the n so placed ae to give occasion to it. or at least can know, the feelings which are to be communicated, and is capable, therefore, of sympathy or antipathy ; and knowledge of whatever kind can be conveyed to another mind only by appealing to knowledge which is already there. To suppose otherwise, would be to attribute to human minds what has been imagined of pure spirits, the power of so mingling essences that the two have at once a common intelligence. To human minds It is certain that this way of communicating is not given, but each mind can gain knowledge only by comparing and judging for itself, and to communicate it, is only to suggest the sub- jects for comparison. Let us suppose that a communication is to be made for which a na- tural cry is not sufficient, the difficulty, then, can be met only by appealing to the knowledge which the mind to be informed already possesses. The occasion will create some cry or tone of emotion ; but this we presuppose to be insufficient. It will however be under- stood as far as the hearer's knowledge may enable him to interpret it that is, he will know it to be the sign of an emotion which himself has felt, and he will think perhaps of some occasion on which himself used it. But the cry is to be taken from any former par- ticular occasion, and applied to another; and he who has the communication to make, will try to give it this new application by joining another sign, such as he thinks the hearer is hkewise acquainted with. The natural cry thus taking to its assistance the other sign, and each limiting the other to the purpose in hand, they will, in their united capacity, be an ex- pression for the exigence, and will, to all in- tents and purposes, be a sentence. In some cases, nature seems to furnish an instinctive pattern for the process here described : —a man cries out or groans with pain ; he puts his hand to the part affected, and we at once interpret his cry more particularly than we could have done without the latter sign. In other cases, we are driven to the same process not by an instinct, but by the ingenuity of reason seeking to provide that which nature has not furnished. If a man unskilled in language, or not using that which his hearers understand, should try to make known what art expresses by a sentence such as " I am in fear from a serpent hidden there," his first effort would be the instinctive cry of fear ; but aware that this could be particularly interpreted only of a known, and not of an unknown occasion, he would, by an easy effiirt of ingenuity, fix it for the present purpose by add- ing a sign or name of the reptile, (for mimick- ing the hiss of the reptile would obviously be a name,) and by joining to both these a ges- ticulative indication of place. The instinctive cry thus newly determined and appUed, is a sentence ; and however clumsy it may seem when compared with the more complicated one previously given, yet the art employed is of the same kind in both. We leave the read- er to smile at the example as he pleases, and will join in his smile while he compares it with that in the epistle of the poet in the note at Sect. 1.; and, if he is disposed to smile again, we will suppose another example : Two men going in the same direction, are stopped by an unexpected ditch, and ejaculate the na- tural cry of surprise ha-ha/ This is remem- bered as the expression suited for that par- ticular occasion; and the mind, the human mind, seems to have the power of generalizing it for every similar object. Suppose one of these men finding another ditch very offensive to his nose, signifies this sensation by screwing up the part offended, an d uttering the nasal interjection proper for the case ; the interjection may not be sufficient j for the other man may remain to be informed of what his companion knows, namely that the offence proceeds from the ditch. To fix the meaning, therefore, of the interjection to the case in hand, the communicator adds the former natural cry in order to signify the ditch, and the two signs qualifying each other, are a sentence. 8. An artificial instrument as language is, growing (as we suppoaej out of necessity, and adapted at first to the rudest occasions ; per- fected by degrees, and becoming more com- plicated in proportion as the occasions grow numerous and refined ; such an instrument, when we compare its earliest conceivable state with that in which it has received its iiighest improvement, must appear clumsy and awk- ward in the extreme. But in the very rude state in which we here suppose it, the art em- ployed is essentially the same as afterwards : two or more signs are joined together, each " sign referring separately to presupposed know- ledge, but in their united capacity communi- i eating what is supposed to be unknown. Of the signs used, that must be considered the, principal by which the speaker intimates the, actual emotion j the other signs, which do but j fix its meaning, are secondary. Thereforej ; though the appellation word (that is p^/io, i dictum, or communication,) strictly belongs to the whole expression or sentence, we may reasonably give that appellation to the principal sign. According to this supposition, the original verb was an expression equiva- lent to what we now signify by I hunger, I thirst, I am warm, I am cold, I see, I hear, IJeel, &c., / am in pain, I am delighted, I am angry, 1 love, I hate, I fear, I assent, I dis- sent, I command, I obey, &c. Whether this a priori conjecture has any facts in its favour, is an inquiry suitable to the etymologist, but fo reign to our purpose, because, whether true or not, the general argument by which we in- tend to prove the nature of the parts of speech, will remain the same*. " Vet it may be worth while to quote the coinci- dent opinion of another writer. " It may be asked " says Lord Monboddo, " what words were (irst invented. My answer is, that if by words are meant what are commonly called parts of speech, no words at all were first invented ; but the first articulate sounds that were formed denoted whole sentences ; and those sentences expressed some appetite, desire, or inclination, relating either to the individual, or to the common business which I suppose must have been carrying on by a herd of savages before language was invented. And in this We have next to imagine the use of any of the foregoing verbs in the third per- son ; for that, it should seem, would be the next step. In communicating that anothet- hungers or thirsts, or sees or hears, or is angry or pleased, &c., the difficulty would be to give the word this new application, and a limiting sign would, as usual, be necessary. A proper name would be the sign required ; and if not too great a tax upon fancy, we may conceive the invention of these from the mimicking of a man's characteristic tone, or his most frequent cry ; not to mention the assistance of gesticu- lative indication. But when verbs had thus lost the reference which, at first we presume, they always bore to the speaker, a sign, whether a change of form, or a separate word, would be wanted to bring them back to their early meaning as often as occas ion required. A gesticulative indication of the speaker and way I believe language continued, perhaps for many ages, before names were invented." Origin and Pro- grese of Language. Vol. I. Book 3. Chap. 1 1- of the person spoken to, can easily be con- ceived : how soon tliese would give place to equivalent audible signs, the reader is left to calculate j and as to the pronoun of the third person, he may allow a longer time for its in- vention, especially as even in the finest of lan- guages, tliere is no word exactly answering to ille in Latin and he in English. 10. We have suggested a clew to the in- -yention of proper names, and (for the reader jnust allow us much) we will suppose these, L ^ far as need requires, to be invented. But r piost of these, from the difficulty of inventing a new name for every individual, would gra- dually become common. If a man has called I the animal he rides on by a proper appellation I corresponding to horse, what shall he call t Other animals that he knows are not the same; and yet resemble? Because he is unprovided .. r jwith a name for each individual, he will call' I each of them horse*, and the name will then " Compare Adam Smith, " Considerations con- cerning the First Formation of Languages," appended no longer be proper but common. But the same powers of observation which acquaint us with the points of resemblance, likewise show the points of difference, and when we wish to distinguish the animals from each other, how is this to be done ? The question is easily answered when we have a perfect lan- guage to refer to, but it was a real difficulty when the expedient was first to he sought. Yet the difficulty not unfrequently occurs even in a mature state of language, and the manner in which it is overcome, will enable us to conceive how, in the rude state of Ian- guage we are supposing, itwas universally met, till the noun-adjective became a part of speech*. Of two horses, we observe that one to his work on the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As a proof how prone we are to extend the appellation of an individual to others, he remarks that " A child just learning to speak, calls every person who comes to the house its papa or its mamma ; and thus bestows upon the whole species those names which it had been taught to apply to two individuals." The Mohegans " (an American tribe) " have so has the colour of a chestnut, and the other is variegated hke a pie ; and we call the former a cfieslnut horse, and the other a pied or piebald horse. Here we perceive are two nouns-sub- stantive joined together to signify an indivi- dual object, and employed, Ui their united ca- pacity, to signify what would otherwise have been denoted by an individual or proper name. This, then, is their meaning, respectively, as a single expression. In their abstract or separate capacity, the one word denotes either one or the other of the two animals without reference to the difference between them : the other word denotes, not a chestnut or a pi^ but that colour in a chestnut, and those varie- gated colours in a pie, by which one of the animals is distinguished from the other, and these words are no longer nouns-substantive DO adjectives in all their language. Although it may at first seem not only singular and ciuious, but im- possible that a language should exist without adjectives, yet it is an indubitable fact," Edwards quoted by Tooke, Diversions of Purley. but nouns-adjective *. And here the ques- tion will naturally occur, how would a hearer know when a noun was used substantively, and when adjectively ? As this would often be attended with doubt and ambiguity, the necessity of the case would soon suggest some slight alteration in the word as ofi;en as it was used adjectively ; and the same all- powerful cause would likewise, in time, dia- tinguish adverbs from adjectives : for at first an adjective would be used without scruple to limit the verb, as to limit the substantive j since The invention of the simplest nouns-adjective, says Smith, " must have required more meta- physics than we are apt to be aware of." But the dif- ficulty he imagines is done away by the hypothesis suggested above ; and how near it is to the truth, will fae conceived by calling to mind the ready use of al- most any substantive as an adjective, as often as need requires : e. g. a chestnut horse, a horse chestnut ; a grammar school, a school grammar ; a man child, a cock sparrow, an earth worm, an air hole, a (ireking, a water lily ; not to mention the innumerable com- pounds that are considered single words ; as, seaman^ Iiorsenian, footman, inkstand, coalhole, bookcase, Sic.t this is often done even in the present state of language j but the doubt whether it was to be taken with the substantive or the verb* would soon produce some general difference of form ; and thus the adverb would be brought into being as a distinct part of speech. 11. Still it would often happen, that in endeavouring to limit a verb to the particular communication in view, no substantive or pro- noun joined to it, not even with the further aid of an adjective or adverb joined to the substantive or verb, would suffice ; and failing, therefore, to convey the communication by one sentence, it would become necessary to add another to limit or determine the significa- tion of the first. Now a qualifying sentence thus joined, when completely understood in connexion with that it was meant to qualify, would be esteemed as a part of the same sen- tence, and the verb, in the added sentence, E. g. whether " I love much society " is to be understood / much-li/ve suciety, or, / Iwe 7iutch- society. would possibly then lose its force as the sign of a distinct communication. This again, will easily be understood by a reference to what occurs in the present state of language. Look- ing at the sentence, " In making up your par-- ty, except me," no one hesitates to call concept a verb ; but in this sentence, *^ All were there, except me," although the word except has pre^^ cisely the same meaning, yet, as we do not con^ sider the clause except TTie to be a distinct com- munication, but only a qualification to suit the whole sentence to the purpose in view, we call except a preposition *, that is, a word put be^ This solution of the difficulty in the invention of prepositions, which seems so considerable to Adam Smith, is suggested, as the reader will perceive, by the etymological discoveries of Home Tooke, and will receive complete confirmation by the study of his ad- mirable work. Let it not be supposed, however, that we have nothing to object to in the Diversions of Purley : some ftmdamental principles we have already marked for inquiry ; and on the point before us, we have to observe on that curious way of thinking, which leads him, because a word was once a verb or a noun. fore another to join it to the sentence that goes before. 12. But in thus qualifying sentence by sen- tence, it may sometimes be necessary to use three verbs, one of them being merely the sin- gle verb that joins the two sentences together ; as, " I was at the party, and (i. e. add, or join this further communication) I was much de- lighted." Sometimes a noun will be used in this way ; as, " I esteemed him, because (i. e. this the cause) I knew his worth." Any par- ticular form of verb or noun used frequently in this manner to join sentence to sentence, will cease at last to be considered any thing more than a conjunction *. IS. As to the article, we have only to sup- to esteem it always so ; on the same principle, no doubt, that, because the word truth comes from he trou-eth or thinkelh, a.aA a man's thoughts are always changing, he denies that there is any such thing as eternal, im- mutable truth. * Again the reader is referred to the Diversions of Purley, for a confirniation of this account of the birth of conjuncticms. pose some adjective used in a particular limit- ing sense so frequently, that we at last regard it as nothing more than a common prefix to substantives : as to a participle^ it is confess- edly, when in actual use, either a part of the verb, or a substantive, or an adjective : and as to an interjection^ this we have supposed to be the parent word of the whole progeny ; and if it is sometimes used among the parts of an artificial sentence, it is only as a vibration of the general tone of feeling that belongs to the whole. 14. In this manner, or in a manner like this in principle and procedure, would lan- guage grow out of those powers bestowed on man by his Creator, even though it had not been directly communicated from heaven :-— in this manner is the progress from natural cries to artificial signs contemplated and pro- vided for by the constitution of the human mind; in this manner would the parts of speech be developed j and men placed in so- ciety, and endowed with powers for observation, reflexion, comparison, judgment, would, in time, become fiepoire^f or dividers of a na- tural word into significant parts, with the same kind of certainty that they become bipeds or walkers on two legs* ; being bom neither one nor the other. * And according to Monboddo, with the same certainty that they lose their tails; for when they were mutu/m, et turpe pecus^ he appears to think they might have been so appendaged ; nay, he knew a Scotchman that had a tail, though he always took care to hide it : (his lordship was surely in luck^s way to find it out.) After all, it would be difficult to prove, notwithstanding the authorities Monboddo quotes, that herds of men were ever found destitute of language. Leaving, therefore, the origin of the first language, and the subsequent confiision or division of it precisely as those two &ct8 stand in Genesis, all we mean to assert in the text is this, that if a number of children having their natural faculties perfect, were suffered to grow up together without hearing a language spoken, they would invent a language for themselves : though, for a long time, it might remain nothing better than that of the Hurons described by Monboddo, (Origin and Progress of Lang. VoL I. Book 3. Chap. 9.) in which the parts of speech are scarcely evolved, from the original elements, but what in a formed language But the object of the foregoing at- tempt, was not so much to trace the origin is expressed by several words, is expressed by a sign not divisible into significant parts. Thus, he says, there is no word which signifies simply to cut, but many that denote cuttingjish^ cutting wood^ cutting chaths, cutting the heady the arm^ &c. And so of the language throughout. More than one generation would be re- quired, and very favourable stimulating circumstances, to bring such a chaos of a language into form ; but that the human mind has within itself the powers for accomplishing it sooner or later, we see no cause to doubt These words, and the whole of the hypothesis in the text above, were written before the third Volume of Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind had been seen. From that part which treats on Lan- guage we quote the following passages : That the human faculties are competent to the formation of language, I hold to be certain.* Language in its rudest state would consist partly of natural, partly of artificial signs ; substantives being denoted by the latter, verbs by the former.*" These are among the many passages which coincide with the views opened in the previous hypothesis. It is to be added, that D. Stewart considers the imperative mood to be the first form in which the artificial verb would be displayed. and first progress of language, as to get at the real ground of diflference among the se- veral parts of speech. On this subject, there prevails a universal misconception. Prom the definitions and general reasoning in Grammar ; from the theories laid down in Logic ; and the basis on which the rules and prac- tice of Rhetoric are presumed to stand, this principle seems to be taken for granted, that the parts of speech have their origin in the mind independently of the outward signs, when, in truth, they are uothing more than parts in the structure of language ; contrivances adopted at first on the spur of theoccasion, the shifts and expedients to which a person is driven, when not being able to lay bare his mind at once according to his consciousness, he tries, by putting such signs together as were used for former occasions and therefore known as regards them, to form an expression, which, as a whole, will he a new one, and meet the pur- pose in hand. True indeed it is, that these very contrivances become, in their more refined use, the great instruments of hmnan rea- son by which all improvement, all extensive knowledge, is obtained; but we are not to confound the instrument with the intelli- gence that uses it/ nor to suppose that the parts of which it is composed, have, of ne- cessity, any parts corresponding with them in the thought itself. It is not what a word signi- fies that determines it to be this or that part of speech, but how it assists other words in ma- king up the sentence. If it is commissioned to unite the whole by the reference immediate or mediate which all the other words are to bear to it, and to signify that they are a sen- tence, that is, the sign of a purposed commu- nication, then it is the verb : if it has not this power, (namely, of uniting the other words into a sentence,) and yet is capable, in all other respects, of standing as an independent sign, (this sign not being the sign of a purposed communication) then it is a substantive .-—if it is the implied adjunct of a substantive, it is an adjective or an article^ if of a verb^ an adverb : if we know it to be a word, which, in a sentence, is fitted to precede a substantive, (or words taken substantively) in order to con- nect such substantive with -what goes before, then it is a preposition : and if it goes before, or mingles in a sentence, in order to connect it with another sentence, then it is a conjunc- tion. These are the only real differences of the parts of speech : as to the meaning, that does not of necessity differ because a word is a different part of speech ; the following words, for instance, all express the same notion : Add Addition Additional Additionally With* Andt * The imperative of the Saxon verb Jpi^an to join. -|- The imperative of the Saxon verb ananab to add. The place and ofHce of these six words in a sentence would of course differ, and the sentences in which they were respectively used would require a various arrange- Our definitions reach the real differences among these words, and they will be found adequate to all differences, when, by the ob^ servation hereafter to be made, we are quali- fied to make due allowance for the licences assumed by the practical grammarian *• In ment to meet the same purpose, but as to the meaning of the words, it would be the same in whatever sentence : e. g. Add something to our bounty. Make an addition to our bounty. Give an additional something to our bounty. Give additionally to our bounty. Increase o ur bounty with the gift of something. Consider our bounty and give likewise. * To suit our definitions to an elementary grammar, they must be quaUfied and circumstanced: a verb, for instance, must be shewn to be a word that is by itself a sentence, as esurio ; or which signifies a sentence, as I am hungry ; or which is fitted to sig- nify a sentence, as am, lovest. A verb in the infinitive mood, is a verb named but not used ; a8 to be, to love ; or if used in a sentence, it is not the verb. A noun- substantive is a name capable of standing independently, but it cannot enter into a sentence except by being connected directly or indirectly with a verb. The in- flexion of a noun-substantive, as Mard, Mark'' 8^ is the mean time, in order to throw as much light as possible on the nature of the con- nexion between thought and language, let us look back a little on foregoing statements, and partially anticipate those which are to be opened more at full under the heads of Logic and Rhetoric. called a substantive, bnt in so calling it, we must say a Bubstantive in the genitive, or other case. A noun- adjective is a name not fitted to stand independently, but to be joined to a noun-substantive, and so to form with it one compound name. An adverb is a word not fitted to stand independently, but to be joined to a verb, and to form with it one compound verb, A preposition ig a word governing as its object a substantive or pro- noun in the manner of a verb, but not an obvious part of a verb, nor capable, like a verb, of signifying a sentence. The article, pronoun, participle, conjunc- tion, and interjection, may be defined as usual. We would suggest moreoverthat in an elementary grammar, no definition, and no part of a definition, should be brought forward, till absolutely required by the examples that are immediately to follow it. In teaching a child, it is the greatest absurdity in the world to set out with general principles, when the business is, to reach those principles by the eiiamina- tion of particulars. It may be that the organs of sensation are not all fully developed in a new-born in- fant ; but if, for the sake of our argument, we allow that they are so, this is as much as to say, that our earliest sensations from the ob- jects of the material world, are the same that they are afterwards. But there must be this most important difference, that the early sensations are -wilkoui knowledge, and the lat- ter, with it. I know that the object which now affects my sense of vision, is a being like my- self, I know him to be one of a great many similar beings ; I know him to be older or younger than many of them, to be taller or shorter; I know pretty nearly the distance he is from me ; 1 know that the particular circumstances under which he is now seen, are not essential to him, but that he may be seen under other circumstances : I know that what now affects my sense of hearing, is the cry or bark of a dog j I know, although my eyes are shut, that there are roses near me, or something obtained from roses j I knoie u that sometliing hard has been put into my mouth ; and now I know it to be part of an apple. All the sensations by which the various knowledge here spoken of is brought before the mind, the new-born infant may possibly be capable of; but as to the know- ledge, there is no reason to believe he lias the least portion of it. For the knowledge is gained by experience, requiring and com- prising many individual acts of observation, comparison, and judgment j all which we suppose yet to take place in the new-born infant. Now, in looking back to what has been said on the acquirement of language, we find the effect of our progressing knowledge to be this, that every sign arising out of a par- ticular occasion, will lose that particular re- ference in proportion as we find it can be used on other occasions j and so all words will, at last, in their individual capacity, become ab- stract or general. This is as true of such words as yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, . bitter, sweet, and the like signs of what Locke calls simple ideas as of any other * : for we can evidently use these words on an infinity of different occasions j and the power of so using them is an effect and a proof of our knowing that the different occasions on which we use the same word, have a something in common, or in some way resemble. But while all words thus acquire an abstract or general meanipg, every communication which we purpose to make by their means, must, in comparison with their separate signification, be particular ; and our putting them together in order to form a sign for the more particular thought, will be to deprive them of the abstract or general meaning which they had indi- vidually. If this is the real nature of the process, we are completely mistaken if we suppose that every word in a sentence sig- nifies a part of the whole thought, and that the progression of the words is in corre- spondence with a progression of ideas which the mind first puts togetlier within, and then * Vide Locke, Book II. Chap. 1. Sect. 3. signifies without What deceives us into this impression, is, that on considering each word separately, each is found to have .1 meaning. Let us try, however, whether the joining of words into a sentence, does not take from them the meaning they have separately. Put to- gether the three words " My head aches," and we have an expression, namely the whole sentence, which signifies what, from a want of clearness in our remarks, may possibly be the reader's present particular sensation: hut my, separately, signifies the general knowledge I have attained of what belongs to ine as dis- tinguished from what belongs to another j a knowledge which is not at all necessary (that is, the ^'•CTJcra/ knowledge) to the sensation it- self, nor even to the expression ofit, if we could find any single sign in lieu of the three which we have put together. Accordingly, the word my, as soon as it is joined to the other words, drops that meaning which it had separately, and receives a particular limitation from the word head, which word head is likewise limited by the word rrof ; and the more particular meaning which both these receive by each other, is limited to the particular oc- casion by the word aches. Yet, it may perhaps be thought, that in this, and in every other sentence, each word, as the mind suggests it to the lips, is accompanied by the knowledge of its separate meaning, and that, in this manner, if we use the word idea in the un- restricted sense familiar to the readers of Locke, each word may be said to represent an idea. Without entirely denying the justice of this view of the matter, we offer in its place the following statement : 17. In forming a sentence for its proper occasion, the knowledge of which each sepa- rate word is fitted to be the sign, may, or may not be in the mind of the speaker: it may be entirely there, or only in part, or not at all there ; that is to say, the speaker may not know the separate meaning of a word, but only the meaning it is to have in union with the other words. And even if the speaker does know the full separate meaning of each word, yet he is not under the neces- sity of thinking of that separate meaning every time he uses it : nor does he, in fact, think of the separate meaning of words while, in putting them together, his purpose is to ex. press what has been often expressed before, but only (and even then but partially and occa* tonally) when he uses words to work out some conclusion not yet established in his own mind, or when a train of argument is required to convince or persuade other minds. This statement will of course require some con- siderations in proof. 18. And first, as to the knowledge of which each separate word is fitted to the sign, it is to be observed that our knowledge grows with the use of words, and therefore our firet use of them is unaccompanied by that know- ledge which we gain by subsequent use. This is true, whether we invent words, or adopt those already invented. In the rude beginning of language, the first use of a word for head, would be a use of it for a particular occasion, and the word would be particular or proper. If the speaker used it with reference to himself, it would signify what we now sig- nify fay the two words my head ". By observ- ation and comparison, he would find he could extend the meaning of the word, and apply it with reference to his neighbours as well as himself, and it would then no longer be proper but common ; that is to say, it would signify a human head, and not mj/ head. Extending his observations still more widely, he would ap- ply it with reference to every other living crea- ture, and it would accordingly then signify a /(u- ing creature's head. Looking and comparing still further, he would apply it with referenceto every object, in which he discovered a part having the same relation to the whole as the head of a living creature has to its remaining parts ; and the word would then, and not till then, have its present meaning ; that is to " Compare the characteristics of the Huron lan- guage referred to in the note appended to Sect. 14. say, in a separate unlimited state it would signify neither my head, nor a human head, nor a living creature's head, but the top, chief part, beginning, supremacy of any thing whatever. Nor is the process essentially different in acquiring the use of words already invented. A child does not at first put words together, but, if his head aches, he will say perhaps "head! head!" using the single word in place of a sentence. At length he will say mi/ head, and brother's liead, and horse's head, and cradle's head. Still there are other applications of the word to be learned by use ; and it surely will not be contended that any one knows the meaning of a word beyond the cases to which he can apply it. The knowledge which a separate word is fitted to signify, may then be wholly or may be partly in the mind of him who uses it in a sentence ; and it is very possible not to be there at all. A foreigner, for in- stance, who had beard the phrase the head of the army applied to the general-in-chief, would know the meaning of the phrase, but might be quite ignorant of the meaning of the separate words, or even that it was com- posed of separable words : and probably most people can look back to a time in early life, when they were in the habit of using many a phrase with a just application as a whole, without being aware that it was reducible into parts in any other way than as a poly- syllabic word is reducible. ig. But even when the speaker, in form- ing a sentence, has previous possession of all the knowledge of which each word is sepa- rately fitted to be the sign, yet he does not in general think of their separate meaning while he is putting them together, but only of the meaning he intends to express by the whole sentence. For through the frequent use of phrases and sentences whose forms are hence become familiar, there is scarcely any senti- ment, feehng, or thought, that suddenly arises in the mind, that does not as suddenly sug- gest an appropriate form of expression. This [chap. is manifestly the case with such sentences as arc in constant use for common occasions : these the speaker cannot be said to make, they occur ready-made, and he pronounces the words that compose them with as little thought of their separate meaning as if he had never known them separate. Even when sentences ready-made do not occur, yet the forms of sentences will occur, and the speaker will, in general, do nothing more than insert new words here and there till the sentence suits his purpose. Thus he who had said " My head aches," will recollect the form of sentence when his shoulder aches, and in using the sentence, will only displace head for shoulder: or if his head " is giddy," he will only displace aches for the two words quoted, in order to say what he feels. 20. When indeed we use language for higher occasions than the most ordinary in- tercourse of life ; when by its means we pro- secute our inquiries after truth, or use it dis- cursively as an instrument of persuasion, then the operation itself is carried on by dwell- ing on and enforcing the abstract mean- ing of some of the words and some of the phrases whUe in their progress towards form- ing sentences, as of the sentences while in their progress toward forming the whole ora- tion or book. But in such cases, language may more properly be said to help others to come at our thoughts, than to represent our thoughts : although it is likewise true, that we could not ourselves have come at them but by similar means. Independently of the words, therefore, the thoughts would have had no existence j neither should we have proposed the inquiry after the truths we seek, nor have imagined any thing in other minds, by addressing which they could be influenced. Still, however, in these higher uses of lan- guage, (uses which are to be dwelt on more at full in the chapters on Logic and Rhe- toric,) there is the same difference between words separately, and the meaning they re- ceive by mutual qualification and restriction ; that is to say, in these higher uses of lan- guage, 83 well as in those already remarked upon, the parts that make up the whole ex- pression, are parts of the expression in the same manner as syllables are parts of a word, but are 7tol parts of the one whole meaning in any other way than as the instrumental means for reaching and for communicating that meaning. And suppose the communication cannot be made but by more signs than use will allow to a sentence, suppose many sen- tences are required many sections, chapters, books, we affirm that, as the communica- tion is not made till all the words, sentences, sections, &c. are enounced, no part is to be considered as having its meaning separately, but each word is to its sentence what each syllable is to its word ; each sentence to its section, what each word is to its sentence ; each section to its chapter what each sen- tence is to its section, &c. Thus does our theory apply to all the larger portions of dis- course, and to the discourse itself, Aristotle's definition of a word, namely, ** a sound sig. niiicant. of which no part is by itself signi^ ficant ;" * for if our theory- is true, the words of a sentence, understood in their separate ^rapacity, do not constitute the meaning of the whole sentence, (i. e. are not parts of its whole meaning,) and therefore, as parts of that sentence, they are not by themselves significant ; neither do the sentences of the discourse, understood abstractedly, constitute the meaning of the whole discourse, and therefore, as parts of that discourse, they are not by themselves significant : they are sig- nificant only as the instrumental means for getting at the meaning of the whole sentepce or the whole discourse. Till that sentence m oration is completed, the Word t is unsaid which represents the speaker's thought- If ♦ 4^6jvii (ni/xAVrixiii vi'; A*sf oj oOih B<rri xalP abrh arif/iotv-i rikiv. De Poetic c. 20. f In this wide sense of the expression is the Bible called the Word of God. We shall distinguish the term by capitals, as often as we have occasion to use it with simitat comprehensiveness erf meaning. it be asserted that the parallel does not hold good with regard to such words as Aristotle has in view, because, of words ordinarily so called, the parts, namely the syllables, are not significant at all, while words and sentences which are parts of larger portions of dis- course, are admitted to be abstractedly sig- nificant, however it may be that their abstract meaning is distinct from the meaning they re- ceive by mutual limitation, we deny the fact which is thus advanced to disprove the parallel : we affirm that syllables are signifi- cant which are common to many words ; for instance, common prefixes, as wn, mis, corif dis, bi, tri, &c.; and common terminations, as nesSjJul, hood, tion, fy, &c. j and so would every syllable be separately significant, if it occurred frequently in different combinations, and we could abstract out of such combina- tions the least shade of something common in their application : nor is it peculiar to syllables to be without signification individually; the same thing happens to words when they are always combined in one and the same way in sentences *. Conceiving, then, that we are fully warranted in the foregoing statement, we affirm it to be the true basis of Grammar, Lo- gic, and Rhetoric. Leaving the latter two subjects for their respective chapters, we pro- ceed, in this chapter, with such further proofs as may be necessary to confirm our position as far as Grammar is concerned. 21. We have imagined the gradual de- velopment of all the parts of speech recog- nized by grammarians ; but no reference has yet been made to the inflexions which some of them undergo; nor to the diflference of meaning they receive in consequence of such inflexion ; nor to interchanges of duty among the several parts of speech ; nor to pecu- liarities of use, which so oflen take from them their characteristic differences; nor to va- " What separate meaning, for instance, is there, now, in the words which compose such phrases as, by- and'bij, goodJi'ye, ftatc-du-you-do, 8cc. I ON GEAMMAB. riety of phrase in expressing the same mean- ing j nor to the power which we frequently exercise of making the same communication by one or by several sentences ; nor, in short, to the multitude of refinements which grow out of an improving use of language, many of which seem to confound and destroy the definitions we obtain from the first and simplest forms of speech. All these seeming irregularities will, however, find a ready key in the general principles we have ascertained. For our general principles are these : i. That two or more words joined together in order to receive, by means of each other, a more particular meaning, are, with respect to that meaning, inseparable j since, if separated, they severally express a general meaning not included in the more particular one. Hence it follows, that words may as easdy receive a more particular meaning by some change of form, as by having other words added to them : nay, it seems more natural, when the principle is considered, to give them a more particular meaninjj by a change of form than fay any other way. ii. That a word is tliis or that part of speech only from the. office it fulfils in making up a sentence. From this principle it follows, that a word is liable to lose its characteristic difference as often as it changes the nature of its relation to other words in a sentence ; and it also follows, that every now and then a word may be used ia L8ome capacity wliich makes it difficult to be assigned to any of the received classes of words. iii. That since the parts of which a sentence is composed denote general know- ledge, distinct from the more particular mean- ing of the whole sentence, it may be possible i to work our way to a particular conclusion, either in reasoning for ourselves or in per- j auading others, by putting such words to- gether as form a sentence, that, as a whole, expresses the particular conclusion; but that when, from the length of the process, this cannot be accomplished in a single sentence, we shall be obliged to work our way by many sentences, whicli will bear the same relation to the conclusion implied by them as a whole, as the parts of each sentence bear to what the sentence expresses. From this principle it follows, that using many or fewer sentences to arrive at the same result, will frequently be optional. The examination of these se- veral consequences a Httle more in detail with reference to the principles from which, i they flow, will complete the chapter. It is well known, that the inflexions which nouns, verba, and kindred words are liable to in many languages, are comparatively unknown in English, the end being for the most part attained by additions in the shape of distinct words. Thusthe particular re- lation of the word Marcus to the other words in the sentence, which in Latin is made known by altering the word into Marco, is signified in English by the word io ; and to MarcuSy esteeming the two words as one ex- pression, is the same as Marco. So likewise the word amo, which in English signifies / Gl l&ve, is adapted to a different meaning by being changed into amabit, which in English is to be signified by he mil love, the three words, taken as a whole, being the same as the single Latin word. Shall we call to Mar- cus the dative case of Afarcus, and he will, love, the third person singular of the future tense of / love, as Marco and amabit are re- spectively called with reference to Marcus and amo? or shall we parse (resolve into grammatical parts) those English sentences, and so deny, in our language, a dative case and ' a future tense ? It is evident that this is a question which only the elementary grammar- writer is concerned with : he may suit his own convenience, and contend the point as he -I pleases. Thus much is certain, and is quite sufficient for our purpose, that to Marcus, cannot be considered a dative case, nor he wiU ] love a future tense, on any other principle than the one it is stated to flow from, namely; that marked i. in Sect. 21. 23. To the practical grammarian we may likewise frequently allow, for the sake of convenience, the continuing a word under its usual denomination, when its office, and con- sequently its character, are essentially changed. He will love, taking the three words as one expression, are a verb both on the principles we have ascertained, and in the practice of the elementary grammarian : but in parsing tliis verb this p^iio, dictum, communication, 01 sentence, only one of the three words can properly retain the denomination of verb, viz. that word to which the others have a re- ference, by which they hang together, and are signified to be a sentence, namely, will. As to the word love, which the practical grammarian will tell us is a verb in the infi- nitive mood, it does not in fact fulfil the office of a verb, but of a substantive. But if, by calling it a verb in the infinitive mood, its character for practical purposes is con- veniently marked, we may fairly leave the matter as it stands. All we insist upon is, that the doubtful character of the word is a consequence of the principle marked ii. in Sect 21." I • Strictly, there is no verb but when a c cation ib actually made ; and that word is then the verb, which expreaseB the communicatioti, or which, when several words are necessary, ie the sign of union among the whole of them. A verb not actually in use is acaptain out of commission, and if we still call it a verb, it is by courtesy. Home Tooke never an- swered his own question, " What is that peculiar dif- ferential circumstance, which added to the definition of a noun, constitutes a verb ?" (Diversions of Purley, Vol. II. p. 514),) because he bad previously blinded himself to the perception of what it is, by laying down the principle already animadverted upon in a note ap^ ponded to Sect. 3., namely, that the business of the mind, as far as regards language, extends no fiirther than to receive impressions: the consequence of which priuciple would be, (if it could have any consequence at all,) that the first invented elements of speech were nouns, or names for those impressions ; which accord- ingly seems to be his notion, and that verba afterwards arose from nouns, by assuming the difierential some^ thing that was found to be wanting. Our doctrine is, that the original element of speech contained both the artificial noun and the artiiicial verb ; that the mind exerted its active powers in order to evolve the artir ficial parts ; that the act of joining them together It might also perhaps admit of dis- pute, whether substantives in what are called their oblique cases, do not, by being the ad- juncts to other words, and taking a change of form to signify their servitude, cease in fact to be substantives, and merit no higher name than adjectives or adverbs. But here again we consult convenience by using the descriptive title, a substantive in the geni- tive, dative, accusative, or ablative case. We only need insist, as philosophical inquirers, that the definition of a substantive in Sect. 15., is not less correct, because it does not in- clude a substantive in these oblique cases*. i^ain, made them a verb ; but if the title was given to one more than to the other, it was given to that which arose most immediately from the occasion, and took the other to fis or determine it ; and that subsequently that word in a sentence came to be coneidcred the verb, which joined the parts K^ether, and signified them to be a sentence. * The only oblique case in English substantives, is the genitive terminating in 'fi or having only the apostrophe, the s being elided. Grammarians, in- deed, have found it necessary to allow an accusative. The very doubt itself which so often arises, whether a word is this or that part of speech, the varying classification of the parts of speech by different grammarians, are cir- cumstances entirely favourable to the theory advanced, and adverse to any theory which attempts to explain the parts of speech by a reference to the nature of our thoughts in- dependently of language. For if the parts of speech had taken their origin from this cause* because pronouns have it : for if in the sentence Cas- s-iua loved him, we put the noun where the pronoun stands, and say, Casmus loved Brutus, it seems con- venient to consider the noun to be in the same case that the pronoun was in. On the same principle, the substantives which, in the classical languages, have no accusative distinct from the nominative, are neverthe- less considered to have an accusative, because, lite other substantives, they can be used objectively with regard to verbs active and certain prepositions. On the score of convenienee this must be allowed. But when words are taken separately, (and this, by the very delinttion of the word, is the business of parsing,) it is evident that only those substantives are, strictly speaking, in the accusative case, which, when uaed as just staled, have a form to signify it. surely we could never have been in doubt either as to vskat, or koio many, they were. But our theory accounts at once for the in- certitude on these, and many other points. We admit no original element of speech but the VERB, or that one sign which denotes what the speaker wishes to communicate. If no one sign can be found adequate to the occa- sion, then we must make up a sign out of two or more. Now the division of a verb into these parts of speech, is necessarily attended by the consequence, that each part is insigni- ficant of a communication by itself, and that they signify it only by being joined together. Supposing a sentence never consisted but of two parts, the mere act of joining them to- gether, would be sufficient to signify that they were a sentence or verb. But the ne- cessity or usage of speech being such, that the hearer knows a sentence may consist of two or of many words, how is he to be warned that a sentence is formed, unless to certain words is given the power of signifying a sentence, while to other words this power is de- nied until associated with a word of the for- mer class? Hence the distinction between noun and verb ; a distinction arising out of the necessities of speech, and not out of the nature of our thoughts. The noun and the verb, then, are the original parts of speech, the verb beingthepreviouselementof both. But as each derives its office and character solely from an understanding between the speaker and the hearer, a change of understanding may make them change their offices, and so the verb shall sometimes be a noun, and the noun a verb. These changes occur in fact so frequently, as to require no example. Then, as we have seen, a noun will frequently be used as the adjunct of another noun, and so become an adjective j an adjective or other word may be joined to a verb, and so become an adverb j and any of these, by frequent use in particular combinations, may acquire, or seem to acquire, a new and peculiar office, and so become articles, prepositions, and conjunctions. But who can ascertain that de- gree of use, which, to the satisfaction of every grammarian, shall fix them in their acquired character • ? Nay, must not every such word, of necessity, while in transitu, be at one period quite uncertain in its character ? In this man- ner do the effects arising out of such a theory of the parts of speech as we have supposed, agree with actual effects, and fully explain them. 26. Again, on any other hypothesis than the one before us, what are we to think of compounded nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, &c., of which all languages are full ? With- out adverting to established compounds, such as (to take the first that occur) husbandman. * What, for instance, shnll we call the word fi/ce in such phrases as like him, like me? Originally theword unto intervening between it and the pronoun, govern- ed the latter ; but unio cannot now be aid to govern the pronoun, since it has been so long disused, as to be no longer mtderstood. We miglit therefore say, that like is a preposition governing the pronoun : the point perhaps is disputed ; be it so : for this fact jugt serves our argument. : m worJcmanlike, waylay, browbeat, nevertheless ; without bringing words from the ilUmitably compounded Greek language, we may refer to such as are not established, but compounded ibr the particular purpose ; as when Locke speaksof '* Mr. 'Nev/ton'sjiever-enough-io be ad- mired book," where the words in italic are an adjective; and when some old lady pettishly says to her grandchild " Don't dear Grand' mother me i" v/here the whole sentence, ex- cept the pronoun governed in the accusative, is a verb. So in the phrases to fiAxov <rvvoia-eiv 7^ iroXei the being-about-to-be'prqfitable-to-t/ie- Ci'/y,— and, TO Tct Tou iroXefiov raj^ii xal Kara Kaipov Trpa.TTea$at, the completing-spcedili/'and- seasonablif-the'lhings-for-the-war, we are war- ranted in considering the whole of the words following the article, to be, in each instance, a noun-substantive. For these, and for every other species of compound, the theory before US at once accounts. For it shows that the use of many words to form one sentence, arises out of the necessities of language only, the na- tiira] impulse of the mind being tomake its com- munication by a single expression. Having complied, then, with the necessities of lan- guage, and rendered it capable of serving as the interpreter of much more knowledge than we could have attained without its help ; we then return on our steps, and give a unity to our expressions in every possible way. 27. The corruption of early phrases, by which, in so many instances, they come under the denomination of adverb, will be found another obvious consequence of the present theory, while they abundantly perplex the grammarian who attempts to reconcile them to any other system. "Omnis pars orationis" says Servius, "quando desinit esse quod est, migrat in adverbium." " I think" says Home Tooke, " I can translate this intelligibly Every word, quando desinit esse quod est, when a grammarian knows not what to make of it, migrat in adverbium, he calls an ad- verb."* What indeed can be made of such ' Divctsioiia vi Puiky, Vol. I. expressions as at all, by and by, to be sure, for ever, long ago, no, yes. They are adverbs, say the grammarians. But (to take the phrases first) what are the words, individually, of which the adverbs are composed? The answer will be, they are prepositions, adjec- tives, &c., which remain from the corruption of regular phrases once in use. This is a true, account of the matter : yet it leaves us still to ask, what ai'e these single words, now that the phrases which produced them exist no longer in their original state. Let any gram- marian, if he can, prove their right to the name of any of the received parts of speech. Our system, if it does not make a provision tor them by a name for a new class of words, at least shows the cause and the nature of their difference. For according to our principles, words have both a separate and a, joint signifi- cation. But if words should be constantly another place, he says " that this class of words, (ad- verb,) is the common sink and repository of all hetero- geneous, unknown corruptions." occurring in particular combination, this ef- fect will enaue, that their separate significa- tion in such hackneyed phrase, will at last be quite unattended to, and their joint significa- tion alone regarded ; and such phrases will then be as liable to be clipped in the currency of speech, as any long word which is trouble- some to be uttered at full : thus will the re- maining parts of the phrase be fixed for ever in their joint, and lose for ever their separate signification*. So much for the words com- posing adverbial phrases. But what are we to say for no, yes, which probably had the same origin as the phrases ? These have not, Hke the phrases, a compound form, nor do they, like the phrases, always assist in making up a sentence, but are frequently and proper- ly pointed oft' by the full stop. Are we, un- der such circumstances, to call them adverbs P •• Yes." This is the answer our grammarians make. But is there, in these words, any • Thcwordtoas asignofthcinfiiiitivL'moodcumcs onilcr this doicnption. thing which gives them a just claim to be ranked with any of the received classes of words? " No." This is an assertion it would be difficult to gainsay. For consider them well, and we shall find, that, in their present use, they are not j3ar/s of speech at all, except with reference to the larger portions of dis- course of which all the sentences are parts : they are sentences ; and they afford a striking example of what was intimated in the prece- ding section, namely the tendency oflanguage, in a mature state, to return on its early steps as far as can be done without losing the ad- vantages gained : for not only do we, when- ever we can, bring the smaller parts of speech into such union as to form larger parts, but in some instances, (as in these last,) we come round again to the simpHcity of natural signs. 28. This union of the smaller into larger parts of speech, and the power we have to dis- pose the same materials into more or fewer sentences, will furnish further proofs, that the present theory of language can alone be the true one. A proper examination of compound sentences will show, that the grammatical parts into which they are first resolvable, are not the single words, but the clauses which are formed by those words ; which clauses are substantives, and verbs, and adjectives, and adverbs, with respect to the whole sentence, however they may, in their turn, be resolva- ble into subordinate parts of speech bearing the same or other names. To take the fol- lowing as an example : " The sun which set this evening in the west, will rise tomorrow morning in the east." The two parts into which this sentence is resolvable, are, to all intents and purposes, a noun-substantive and a verb, if considered with respect to the whole sentence*. This is the first, or broadest ana- * And HO may the two parts (technically called the protasis and apodosis) of every periodic sentence be considered : for every period, (TEfi'ofos, a circle,) is re- solvable into two chief parts, the one assimilated to the semicircle tending out, the other to the rendering- in, or completing semicircle. These answering parts ate commonly indicated in Greek by iJth ft; in En- ]lysis. Then taking the former of these two chief constructive parts, we shall find it re- solvable into these two subordinate parts, viz. the sun, a noun substantive, and w?iick set this evening in the west, its adjunct or adjective : the latter chief constructive part being in the same way resolvable into will rise, a verb, and, tomorrow morning in the east, its ad- junct or adverb. Returning to the adjective of the former chief constructive part, we shall gUsh very frequently by as so; though yet, &c. There may exist a doubt in most sentences so construct- ed, whether the one part has a claim to be considered tlie verb more than the other : each part is meant to be insignificant by itself, and, {as was lately supposed of the parts of speech in their early institution, before a sentence was composed of more than two words,) they Bifrnify a communication by the very act of being join- ed together. Yet as the protasis is a clause in sus- pense, and so resembles a substantive in the nomina- tive case before the verb is enounced ; as the apodo- 618 removes the suspense, and so resembles the verb in its effect on tlie substantive ; it seems that in con- Hidering the protasis as a nominative case and the apo- dosis aa its verb, we shall not be far from taking a, right view of the principle and procedure. 7find it, if separately viewed, to be a sentence having its nominative which, its verb set, and the latter having its adverb tins evening in the ivest ; which adverb is resolvable into two clauses of which the former consists of the de- monstrative adjective this, and evening, a sub- stantive used objectively with relation to the preposition on understood •• The latter clause in the west is nearly similar in its grammatical parts ; but the preposition it depends upon, is not understood. This subordinate or adjec- tived sentence which we have thus taken to pieces, (viz. which set this evening in the west,') is however no sentence when considered with " Or more properly this eeening is an adverb ; for a word cannot justly be called understood, when its ab- sence is not suspected till the grammarian informg us of it : on before euch phrases when the custom to omit it had just begun, was indeed understood; it is now understood no longer, and what remains of any such phrase is an adverb. As the next clauses, in the tceat, retains its preposition, we are at liberty to parse the clause, instead of considering it, in the whole, as an adverb attcndijig the verb set, though we are also ab liberty to consider it in the latter way. reference to the larger sentence of which it is a grammatical part : but it might, if the speaker had pleased, have been kept distinct, and the same meaning have been conveyed by two simple sentences, as by the one com- pound one : e. g. " The sun set this evening in the west : It will rise tomorrow morning in the east." Here, we have two sentences or commuuications. But this is nothing more than a difference in the manner of conveying the thought, precisely analogous to the using of two words that restrict each other, in place of a single appropriate sign. In the instance before us, the thought, whether expressed by the one sentence or the two, is the same ; and it is one and entire, whatever the expression may be. For we must not confound the two facts referred to in the sentences, with what the mind thinks of the facts : it is the con- nexion of the facts that the speaker seeks to make known. Yet he may imagine he can best make it known by using the two sen- tences ; for though, it is true, that while they are in progress, they will be understood se- parately, yet no sooner will they be com. pleted, than the hearer will understand them limited and determined the one by the other, and no longer abstractedly as while they were in progress. In this manner, in correspond- ence with the principle stated Sect. 21 . iii., will the same result be obtained by the two, as by tlie one sentence. This power, which exists in all lan- guages, of expressing the same thought in a variety of different ways, is, one would think, a suiEcient proof, by itself; that thoughts and words have not the kind of correspondence whicli is commonly imagined : for if such cor- respondence had existed, the same thoughts would always have been expressed, if not by the same words, yet by words of similar mean- ing in the same order. Let us suppose that tlie expressing a thought by several words,' I had been, (which it is not,) a process analo- gous to that of expressing the combined sounds of a single word by several letters. There is the more propriety in instituting tlie compa- rison, because men were driven to the latter expedient by a necessity similar to that which drove them to the former. For, no doubt, the first idea of the inventors of writing was, to appropriate a character for every word ; and we are told that, to this day, a practice near to this prevails in China, But it was soon found that the immense number of characters this would require, must make the completion of the design next to impracticable ; and the expedient was at length adopted of spelling words. By this expedient, twenty four cha- racters, by their endless varieties of position with each other, are capable of signifying the multitude of words, and the innumerable sen- tences, which constitute speech. The parts of speech were set on foot by a similar urgency, and in tlie same way. At first, every sound was a sentence. But the communications which the business of life required, far, far outnumbered every possible variety of sound. It was fortunate, therefore, when a necessity eo ON C arose to give to some of the sounds a less par- ticular application ; for then the requisite sign was formed out of two or more sounds already in use, and no new sound was required. So far the parallel holds ; but it will go no further. In the spelling of words by letters, the same letters must always be used, if not the same characters, yet characters of the same power. And it would have been the same in spelling a thought by words, if the process had been what it is commonly supposed to be :— that is to say, the same thought would always have been expressed by the same words, or if the words had been changed, the change must have been word for word, as in a completely literal translation from one lan- guage to another. How different this is from fact, hardly needs further examples in proof. Mr. Harris attempts to shew *, that • Hermes, Book I. Chap. 8. We cordially agree in Home Tooke's opinion of thia well-known work, that it is " an improved compilation of almost all the enors which grammarians liave been accumulating S tlic different forms or modes of sentences, depend on the nature of our thoughts. That the character of a thought has an influence in determming our preference of this or that mode of speech, needs not be questioned; but all the modes of speech, are interchangeable at pleasure, and therefore they cannot aub- stantiallydepend on thenature of our thoughts. An affirmative sentence, " 1 am going out of town," ma be made imperative, " know, that I am going out of town ;" or interrogative, *' Is it necessary to say, that I am going out of town ?" A negative sentence, " No man is immortal," maybe made affirmative, "Every man is mortal." It would waste time and patience to multiply examples. The con- clusion, then, is, that the parts of speech and from the time of Aristotle, to our present days." Di- versions of Furley, Vol. I. page 120. Vet occasionally, when our etymologist runs a little bard on this Com- piler of errors, the theory we advance, opposite as it ib in its general tenor to all that the Hermes conttuns, will be found to lend its author a lift. See the section ensuing in the text. the forms of sentences, are alike attributable to the necessities and conveniences of lan- guage, and not to the nature of our thoughts independently of language. Perhaps by this time it may almost seem that an opinion con- trary to this has no defined existence, and that the combat has been against a shadow. But this is not true. If the opinion opposed to the principles contended for, is seldom ^rwio% expressed, it is nevertheless universally under- stood it is at the bottom of all the systems of grammar, of logic, and of rhetoric, which we study in our youth, and which we after- wards make our children study ; and as it is an opinion radically, essentially wrong, the pains employed to overthrow it, cannot, if successful, have been supeiHuous. In no other way was a preparation to be made for an outline of the higher departments of Sema- tology. 30. New, however, as we believe our theory to be, yet it is not without authorities in its favour ; and with these we shall conclude the chapter. Harris, the author of" Hermes," in treating of connectives, stumbles unawares on the fact, that a word which is significant when alone, may he no significant part of what is meant hy the expression it helps to form. He makes nothing indeed of the fact, further than to lay himself open to the ridicule of Home Tooke for tKe inconsistent assertions in which it involves him. " Having" says Tooke *, "defined a word to he a sound significant, he (viz. Harris) now defines a pre- position to be a word devoid of signification ; and a few pages after, he says, ' prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own meaning into the words with which they are compounded.' Now if I agree with him," continues Tooke, " that words ai'e sounds significant, how can I agree that there are sorts of words devoid of signification ? And if I could suppose that prepositions are devoid of signification, how could I afterwards allow, ' Diversions of Purley, Vol. I. Cliap. 9. 9 that they transfuse something of their own meaning?" Yet with all this, Harris is right, only that he is not aware of the principle, which lies at the bottom of his own doctriue. A preposition, as well as every other word, is a sound significant j it has an independent abstract signification : but being joined into a sentence, it is devoid of that signification it had when alone : it has then transfused its own meaning into the word with which It is compounded, as that word has transfused its meaning into the preposition that is to say, they have but one meaning between them. 31. But Dugaid Stewart, in his Philoso- phical Essays, furnishes a direct, and a more satisfactory authority in favour of the theory we have advanced. " In reading " says he •, " the enunciation of a preposition, we are apt to fancy, that for every word contained in it, there is an idea presented to the understand- ing ; from the combination and comparison of which ideas, results that act of the mind • Philosophical Essays, Essay 5. Chap. I. called judgment. So different is all this from fact, that our words, when examined sepa- rately, are often as completely insignificant aa the letters of which they are composed, de- riving their meaning solely from the connexion or relation in which they stand to others." Again : " When we listen to a language which admits of such transpositions in the arrange- ment of words as are familiar to us in Latin, the artificial structure of the discourse suspends, in a great measure, our conjectures about the sense, till, at the close of the period, the verb, in the very instant of its utterance, unriddles the jenigma. Previous to this, the former words and phrases resemble those detached and unmeaning patches of different colours, which compose what op- ticians call an anamorphosis ; while the effect of the verb, at the end, may be compared to that of the mirror, by which the anamorphosis is reformed, and which combines these appa- rently fortuitous materials, into a beautiful portrait or landscape. In instances of this sort, it will generally be found, upon an accurate examination, that the intellectual act, as far as we are able to trace it, is altogether simple, and incapable of analysis ; and that the elements into which we flatter ourselves we have resolved it, are nothing more than the grammatical elements of speech j the logical doctrine about the com- parison of ideas, bearing a much closer affinity to the task of a school-boy in parsing his lesson, than to the researches of philoso- phers able to form a just conception of the mystery to be explained." Had this acute philosopher brought these views of language to the elucidation of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, and so have cleared them from the incrusted errors of immemorial antiquity, the reader's patience would not have been tried by the chapter now finished and those which are to follow. Say, first, of God above, or man below. What can we reason, but from what we know. POPE. 1. In commencing this branch of Semato- logy, it may be as well to define not only this but the other branches, that their presumed relation and difference may at once appear : i. Grammar, then, is the right use of words with a view to their several functions and inflexions in forming them into sentences ; ii. Logic is the right use of words with a view to the investigation of truth ; and iii. Rhetoric is the right use of words with a view to inform, convince, or persuade *. * This definition includes the poet^s use of words as well as that of every other person, who, having one or more of the purposes mentioned in view, speaks or fts The object of the present chapter will be, to show that there is no art of Logic (except sucli as is an imposition on the un- derstanding but that which arises out of the principles ascertained in the previous chap- ter ; that tliis, which is the Logic every man uses, agrees with the definition in the previ- ous section; —and that we cannot carry the definition further, without transgressing a clearly marked line which will usefidly distin- guish between Logic and Rhetoric. 3. In affirming that there is no art of Lo- gic but that which arises out of the use of signs, we do not mean that reason itself is de- writes skilfully. Should it be said, that the poet's end is to delight, we answer that he gains this end by in- forming, convincing, or persuading. The true dis- tinction between the poet and any other speaker or wri- ter, lies iu the different nature of their thoughts, In communicating his thoughts, the poet, like others who are skilful in the use of words to inform, convince, or persuade, is a rhetorician ; although, with reference to the creative genius displayed, {iroix^n a jrcn'm,) and al- so with reference to the added ornament of metre or rhyme, we chU the result, a poem. pendent on language. Reason must exist pri- or to language, or language could not be in- Vented or adopted. What we affirm is, that prior to the use of words or equivalent signs, o art exists : the mind then perceives, as far fts its powers extend, intuitively; and thus working without media, it can no morye ope- rate otherwise than as at first, than the eye can see otherwise than nature enables it. The mind can, however, invent the means to assist its operations, as it has invented the telescope to assist the eye ; the difference being, that the telescope is not such an instrument as all minds would invent, but the use of signs to assist its operations, grows out of the human mind by its very constitution, and the influ- ence of society upon that constitution. 4. That writers on Logic do not in gene- ' ral view the matter in this light, is evident from this, that they devote, or at least they persuade themselves and their readers that they devote, a great pait of their considera- tion to the operations of the mind indepeud- 9entlyof language, which, for any practical end, must evidently be nugatory on the supposi- tion stated above ; since, if the mind, without the aid of signs, can but operate as nature en- ables it, all instruction concerning what the mind does by itself*, will but be an attempt * WattB Bays t&at " the design of Logic, b to teaeli us the right use of our reason." Recurring to our comparisDU in the previous section, this is as if any one had proposed to teach the right use of the eye. It is true indeed, a man may be taught a right use of the eye, that is, he may be taught to observe proper ob- jects by its means ; and so may he be taught a right use of reason by applying it to those things which are conducive to his improvement and happiness. But all this belongs to Morals not to Logic ; nor was this Watts's meaning. He imagined a man could be tattght how to use his reason independently of any considera- tion of an instrument to work with ; as if any one had offered to teach mankind how to sec with their eyes. Now, there is nothing preposterous in offering to show how a telescope is to be used in order to assist the eye ; nor any thing preposterous in trying to show how words may be used in a better manner than com- mon custom instructs us, in order to assist the mind. Be it observed that the objection here made, is to what was proposed to be done by Watts, and not to teach us that which every one does with- out teaching, and which no teaching can make us do better : but if, by the use of signs, the mind can carry its natural operations to things which it could not reach without signs, the instruction of the logician should at once begin by pointing out the use and the abuse of signs. Now this is in fact the point at which every teacher of logic does begin, how- ever he may disguise the real proceeding from himself, and whatever confusion he may throw over his subject, by not knowing in what way he is concerned with it. In pretending to teach us the nature of ideas j logicians do no- thing but teach us what knowledge we attain to what he actually does, except so far as he has done it amiss from setting out badly. What follows in the text will explain this last observation. Our illustration must not lead the reader to think we are ignorant of the fact that men do learn to see, that is, to correct, by experience and judgment, the im- pression of objects on the retina. We take the matter as commonly understood, namely, that men see correct- ly by nature, which is near enough to the truth for our present purpose. by means of words-, and when Home Tooke says of Locke's great work, that it is " merely a grammatical Essay or Treatise on words," * be comes so near the truth, that it is wonder- ful he should have so wrongly interpreted other parts of that philosopher's doctrine. Putting a wrong construction on Locke's just fundamental principle, that the mind has no innate ideas, Tooke affirms that '* the busi- ness of the mind, as far as it regards language, extends no further than to receive impres- sions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. What are called its operations are merely the operations of language." t This is palpably absurd ; ftx how can language operate of it- Diversions of I'utley -j- Diversions of Purley, Vol. I. page 51. We have already quoted this passage ; and perhaps more than ontc : but it is hoped we need not apologise for the re- petitions whicli may be found in this and the next chapter. Our purpose is to trace Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric, to a common source, and in doing so, if they really have an origin in common, we must necesEarily traverse the same ground repeatedly to come at it aelf? The mind must observe, compare, and judge *, before it can invent or adopt the lan- guage of art ; and having adopted it, every use of it is an exercise of the reasoning facul- ty, excepting only that kind of instinctive use, in which some short sentence takes the place of a natural ejaculation. Feelings or sensa- tions we cannot help having ; but these do not help us to language. This requires the ac- tive powers of the mind ; and every word, in- dividually, will accordingly be found the sign of something we kno-w, obtained, as every thing we know must be obtained, by previous acts of comparison and judgment, involving, These powers of the mind are innate, that is to e&y, they belong to tlie mind by its constitution, al- though sensation is the appointed means for first call- ing them forth. It should seem as if Tooke thought nothing was bom with man except the power to receive senEStionB or feelings, and that reason comes from Un- guage ; an opinion so preposterous that we can hardly think him capable of it ; and yet, from what he says, no other can be understood : " Jleason,"" he says, " ia the result of the senses, and of experience." Diver- sions of Purley, Vol. 11, p^e 16.in every instance beyond that which sets the sign on foot, an inference gained by the use of a medium. And such, as we have seen, are the necessities of speech, that tliey lead us constantly to extend the application of words ; which extension requires new acts of comparison and judgment; and thus, by means of words, (or signs equivalent to words,) we are constantly adding to our knowledge, still carrying the signs with us, to mark and contain it, and to serve afterwards as the media for reaching new conclusions. It is only ne- cessary to read Locke's Essay with this ac- count of the matter in view, to prove that it is the true account j so readily will all that he has said on ideas, yield to this simple inter- pretation *, He who first made use of words Read," saya Tookc, " the Essay on the Underslnnding over with attention, and see whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded, will not hold equally true and clear, if we substitute the composition, &c. of lerraa, wherever he has supposed a composition, Sec. of ideas. And if that, upon strict examination, appear to you to be the case, you will equivalent to yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, used them, respectivelyy to signify the individual sensation he was con- scious of, and in that first use, the expression must have been a sentence, or tantamount to a sentence. By experience, he came to know the exterior cause of that sensation, and after- wards, by the same means, to know that other need no other argument against the composition of ideas : it being exactly similar to that unanswerable one which Mr. Locke himself declares to be sufficient against their being innate. For the supposition is un- necessary : every purpose for which the composition of ideas was imagined being more easily and naturally answered by the composition of terms, whilst at the same time it does likewise clear up many difficulties in which the supposed composition of ideas necessarily in- volves us." Diversions of Purley. In this, and other passages, H. Tooke is very near the trutli ; but he nevertheless misses it. " The com- position, Sic. of terms "' in lieu of " the composition, &c. of ideas," does not describe the actual process. But Tooke, who discovers that Locke has started at a wrong place, begins his own theory from a false found-4 ation. • yide Locke, B. 2. ad initium : we have used the examples before. Chap. I, Sect. 16. ol^ects produced the same sensation. To these several objects he would naturally apply the expression (originally tantamount to a sen- tence) by which he first signified the sensa- tion ; and suppose those objects already pro- vided with namesj the expression would, in such pew application, be tantamount to a name or noun-adjective. Thus in the several instances, he would use two names for one thing, in correspondence with our present practice when we say, yclhw flower, yellow sky, yellow earth, yellow skin. Such a proce- dure is an effect and a proof of what the speak- er has observed in common, and of what he observes to be different, in the several ob- jects; and this is a knowledge evidently ob- tained from comparison and judgment exer- cised on many particulars. The same know- ledge enables us, when we please, to drop the words which name the objects accojding to their differences, and to retain only that which signifies their similarity, and the name-adjec- tiv e then becomes a name-substantive standing for the sensation itself whenever or how4 ever produced, and not standing for it in amy particular case, until limited to do so by the assistance of other words. Individually and separately, then, these words^ viz. yellow; white, heat, cold, soft, &c. are, to him who has properly used them in particulars, tiie eigns of the knowledge he ha^ gained by com^ paring those particulars :«^hey denote con- clusions arising out of a rational process which has been carried on by their means ; which conclusion, as to the word^elloWf for instaop^ is this, ^that there are great mwy Qbjepte which produce the same sensation, or a sensar tion very nearly the same j*— ^(very nearly the same, since yeU&w^ by all who have acquired a full use of the word, is applied to different shades of yellow j ) and to understand the word, is to have arrived at, or kno^ this cof^- elusion. 5. The words so far referred to, are those which denote what Locke calls simple ide^js. Now, we may reasonably doubt wheth^ the mind could have obtained the knowledge, which, as we have seen, is included even in a word of this kind, if it had not been gifted with the power of inventing a sign to assist itself in the operation. That sign needs not be a word, though words are the signs com- monly used. He who remembers the sensa- tion of colour produced by a crocus, is re- minded of the crocus the next time he has the same sensation from a different thing ; and the crocus may become the sign of that sensation arising from the new object, and from every future one. And this is the way in which the mind probably assists itself an- tecedently to the use of language, or where, (as in the case of the totally deaf *,) the use of Though long for a quotation, yet we cannot re- sist transcribing, from a work by Dr. Watson, master of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum, Kent Road, near London, the following able remarks : they will help to shew how for superior are audible signs to every other kind, and place in its proper light the misfor- tune of being naturally incapable of them. He is speaking of the comparative importance of the two it, by the ordinary means of attainment, is precluded. But for this power of the mind, senBES, hearing and seeing. " Were the point," he says, " to be determined by the value of the direct sensations transmitted to the sensorium through each of them, merely as direct sensations, there could not be any ground for a moment's hesitation in pro., nouncing the almost infinite superiority of the ej/e to ] the ear. For what is the sum of that which we derive I from the car as direct sensation P It is sound ; and sound indeed admits of infinite variety ; but strip it of j the value it derives Irom arbitrary associations, and it is but a titillation of the organ of sense, painful or pleasurable according as it is shrilly soft, rough, dis- cordant, or harmonious, Sec. Should one, on tlic con- trary, attempt to set forth the sum of the information we derive from the eye " independently of the aid derived from arbitrary means " it is so immense, that volumes could not contain a full description of it ; so precious, ' that no words short of those we apply to the mind itself, can adequately express its value. Indeed, all lan- guages bear witness to this, by figuratively adopting visible imagery to signify the highest operations of in- tellect. Expunge such imagery from any language, and what will be left ! What, in this case, must be- come of the most admired productions of human ge- nius P Whence then (and the question is often asked) 1 does it arise, that those bom blind have such su- h2 which seems pecuHai* to man, and is the cause of language, (not the effect of it, as perlority of imelligence over those bom deaf? Take, it miglit be said, ii boy nine or ten years of age who has never seen the light, and you will find him con- versable, and ready to give long narratives of past oc- currenceH, &c. Place by his side a boy of the same age who baa had the misfortune to be bom deaf, and observe the contrast. The latter is insensible to all you say : he smiles, perhaps, and his countenance ie brightened by tlie beams of ' holy light;' he enjoys the face of nature; nay, reads with attention your features ; and, by sympathy, reflects your smile or your frown. But he remains mute : he gives no ac- count of past experience or of future hopes. You at- tempt to draw something of this sort from him : he tries to understand, and to make himself understood ; but he cannot. He becomes embarrassed : you feci for him, and turn away from a scene so trying, under an impression that, of these two children of mi^ fortune, the com])ari8on is greatly in favour of the blind, who appears, by his language, to enter into all your feelings and conceptions, while the unfortunate deaf mute can hardly be regarded as a rational being ; yet he possesses all the advantages of vi- sual information. All this is true. But the cause of this apparent superiority of intelligence in the blind, is seldom properly understood. It is not that those H. Tooke seems to tliiak,) we never should have been able to arrange olyects in classes, who are blind possess a greater, or anything like an equai stock of materiak for mental op^adons, but bs- cause they possess an invaluable etigine for forward- ing those operotioiis, however scanty the materials to operate upon artificial language. Language is de- fined to be the expression of thought ; so it is : but it is, moreover, the medium of thinking. Its value U> man is nearly equivalent to that of his reasoning fa- culties: without it, he would hardly be rational. It is the want of language, and not the want of hearing, (unless as being the cause of the wont of language,) that occasions that deficiency of intelligence or ine&. pansion of the reasoning faculty, so observable in the naturally deaf and dumb. Give them but language, by which they may designate, compare, classiiy, an4 consequently remember, excite, and express their sen^ sations and ideas, then they must surpass the origin< ally and permanently blind in intellectual perspicuity and correctness of comprehension, (as far as having kctual ideas afiixed to words and phrases is concerned,) by as much as the sense of seeing, furnishes matter for mental operations beyond the sense of hearing, con- Eidered as direct sensation. It is one thing to have a^ fluency of words, and quite another to have correct no- tions or precise ideas annexed to them. But though the car furnishes us only with the sensation of sound, and reason on them when so arranged ; nor to consider some common quality in many ob- jects, separately from the objects themselves. Every object might have produced the same individual effect by the senses, which it now produces, and have been recognized as the same object when it produced the effect again ; for all this happens to other animals, as to man ; but to know a something in each which is common to many, implies a remem- brance of that something in the rest at the time of perceiving each individually j and how can this remembrance, (a remembrance and sound, merely as such, can stand no comparlEOD with the multiform, delightful, and important informa- tion derived from visual imprestiioDS ; yet as sound admits of such astonishing variety, (above all when articulated,) and is associablc, at pleasure, in the mind with our other sensations, and with our ideas," (notions,) " it becomes the ready exponent or nomenclature of thought ; and in this view is important indeed. It is on thie account, chiefly, that the want of hearing is to be deplored as a melancholy chasm in the human frame.'" Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb, not of the objects, but of a common some- thing in all of them,) how can it be kept up, but by a sign fitted to this duty ; which sign, as just observed, may be either a word, or one of the objects set up to denote the com- mon characteristic, and retained in mind Bolely for this purpose, in this representative capacity ? 6. In proceeding from what are called by Locke simple ideas to those he denominates [ complex, we shall find the account just given equally applicable. The words he refers to . under the threefold division of Modes, Sub- stances, Relations, are, as our last examples, signs of certain conclusions obtained from s comparison of particulars. This is true even \ of a proper name ; for a proper name, as was ' shewn Chap. I. Sect. 3., does not denote an individual as we actually perceive him, or as. J we remember him at any one time ; but it J denotes a notion, that is, a knowledge of him I drawn out of, or separated from all our par- ' I04f oNr Lo&ic. [cHap. ii. ticular perceptions *• For such an effect of reason^ we have however nb certainty that the superior powers of the huknan mind ar« indispensable; nor is it eiisy to ascertaiq any peculiar privilege it enjoys till we find it rising from individuals to classes. As soon as it sets up a sign to represent some property, whether pure or mixed, which has been observed iA many individuals,— or to re- * It id aft efifect of reaisoiiing to know that a pa]>> ticular act or situation, which enters into our percep- tion or conception of an object, is not essential to know, for instance, tliat the act of walkiAg is ftot es- iBentiAl to John. The reasoning by which «uch k^w- ledge is acquired, occurs indeed so early, that the operation is forgotten ; but there was a time when our perceptions were without the knowledge, because they had not been repeated i^ isu^ti^t hUtiibet to leHkbl^ the mind to make the BCcessary ootaipluidcms^ Th^ natives of the South Sea Islands^ when Cttptaia Cook <8nd his companions first made their appearance among them, took every sailor and his garments to be one creature, and did not arrive at a different condhision, but by o{>portuiiitte6 fdr comparicon. present the whole class of individuals, so classed because of the common property, ^it displays a power of assisting itself which we have no cause to think any of the inferior animals enjoy. To ahew how this takes place in producing what Locke calls complex ideas, and which he subdivides into Modes, Sub- stances, Relations, would only carry us onc^ more over the ground we have so often cur- Lsorily traversed. We should have to shew, for instance, how some word, at first equiva- lent to a sentence, by which a man expressed his delight at a particular visible object, came to be a name for the object ; how this name beauly, came to be applied as a noun-adjec- tive to the nouns-subatantive of other objects producing the same or a similar emotion j how, by the continued application of this noun-adjective, we kept on comparing innu? merable particulars, till our knowledge (no- tion) included a very wide class of things very different indeed in other respects, nay^ including objects of other senses than sight— but still, agreeing with each other in a certain effect produced on the mind : and that then, dropping the nouns-substantive of the nu- merous individuals, we retained solely in con- templation the noun beautiful or beauty, the sign of the knowledge we had gained from this extensive comparison— of the induction derived from these numerous particulars *. • Very few persons reach so wide a knowledge of the subject as we here refer to, and books may be, and have been written, to teach us how to apply the word beautiful with taste, and critical nay, moral pro- priety. Having attained so far, we are not to suppose that beautiful or beauty is a real existence independently of the classification of objects we have thus established. All we have learned is, to know the objects which pro- duce a certain elfect ; to know why they produce it ; to enjoy, it is probable, the pleasure of that effect with higher relish ; and to be prepared, by means of the classiUcation we have formed, to lise, in our reasonings on the objects it contains, to higher truths, and still more important conclusions. Now, if the reader would see how a business so plain and simple, may appear very complex and mysterious, let him consult Plato on the beautiful or t'o xayjtv, as he will find it treated, for instance, in the dialogue called STMHOSION : Let him admire as he will, (for who can help it. We should again have to shew, (to take another instance,) how a word once expres- sive of some sentiment or recognition of which a horse was the subject, came to be used as a name for that particular horse i that the name came afterwards to be given to another resembling creature, thence to another, and to others, till the points of re- semblance which led to this extension of the word, could be found no longer *. We should especially in company with Cicero, witness his Errare tnekercule malo cum Plaione, quam cum istia vere sentire?) let him admire the sublimity which the amiable and highly-gifted Athenian throws over his doctrine ; but let him not be betrayed into an opinion, that a speculation which is in the most exalted etriun liipoeh'y, belongs to the sober, the undazzled, and tin- dazzling views of philosophy. • Compare Chap. I.Sect, 10. We may be per- mitted once more to observe, that, with regard to sab- stances at least, the sign of the class needs not be a word : one individual set up for all, will equally serve the purpose. Not that the boundaries of a class are plain, till an accurate logic determines them ; but the general differences (as of the horse, for instance) are sufficiently obvious to prevent a person from being likewise have toshew, (totake a third instance,) how some word,-^originally equivalent, like the others, to a sentence, by which a man expressed his gratitude for kind offices, might come to be a name for every one to whom gratitude for similar offices was due; and how this ua.me,Jriend, applied at first only to misled, who carries one individual in his mind ae the eign of all he has seen, and all he calculates on seeing, and reasonB on this one, with a conviction that the reasoning includes all the others. The idea of an in- dividual thing which is thus set up as the represent- ative of a class, may perhaps, without impropriety, be called a general idea ; and if Locke had never used the expression but in subservience to such an cxplana- uon, little or no exception could have been taken to it. There is a passage (Essay on the Understanding, Book III., Chap. 3. Sect. Jl.) which perfectly ac- cords with the doctrine in the text, and proves that though Locke had misled himself by setting out with an opinion that the operations of the human under- standing could be treated of independently of words, he had more correct thoughts on the subject as he proceeded. Another passage, giving a correct account of abstraction with reference to language as the instru- ment, will be found Book IL Chap. II- Sect. 9- one who stood in this ration to the speaker, came at last, by observing and comparing other cases, to be applied to all who stood in the same relation to any other person. We should, in short, have to shew the same pro- cess with regard to all the examples of modes, substances, and relations, which Locke's Es- say supplies; but with these brief hints to guide him, the reader may be left, in other instances, to trace the process for himsdf. It will now be time, still witii reference to the principles ascertained in the last chapter, —to examine some other points of doctrine in- sisted upon by writers on Logic. 7. The operations of the mind necessary in Logic are said to be three, viz. Percep- tion or Simple Apprehension ; Judgment ; and Reasoning. Under the first of these di- visions, writers on Logic treat of ideas, or the notions denoted by separate words, that is, words not joined into sentences ; under the second, they give us separate sentences, technically called propositions j ^and under the third, they shew how two propositions may of necessity produce another, so that the three shall express one act of reasoning. Now, that perception, judgment, and reasoning, are all essential to Logic, needs not be called in question ; but if the theory we have before us in this treatise be true, the common doc- trine will appear, by the manner in which it ex- emplifies these acts of the mind, to have com- pletely confounded what really takes place, in the preparation for, and in the exercise of this art. What, in the first place, is perception but a sensation or sensations from exterior objects accompanied by a judgment ? Our earliest sensations are unaccompanied by any judg- ment upon them ; for we must have ma- terials to compare in order to judge ; and these materials, in the earliest period of our existence, are yet to be collected. At length, we can compare j and because we can com- pare, we judge, and hence we come to know : " I know that the object which now affects my sense of vision is a being like myself; I know him to be one of a great many similar beings j I know him to be older or younger, &c. ; I know that what now affects my sense of = hearing, is the cry or bark of a dog" •, &c.j I could not know all this, if I had had no means of judging ; and I can have no means of judging which the senses do not originally furnish or give rise to. Perceptiouj then, (which in every case is more than mere sen- sation,) always includes an act of judgment ; and to treat of Perception and Judgment under different divisions of Logic, must pre- vent the proper understanding of both. In- stead, however, of the term Perception, some writers t use that of Simple Apprehension. *' Simple apprehension," says Dr. "Wliately, *' is the notion (or conception) of any object in the mind, analogous to the perception of the senses." t The examples appended to • See Chap. I. Sect. 16. of- Viz. Professor Duncan and Dr. Whately. J Elements of Logic by Dr. Whately, Chap. II. Part I. Sect. 1. this definition, are, *'inan;" "horse;" •'cards ;" " a man on horseback ;" " a pack of cards." Now, if the notion or conception of tliese, 13 analogous to the perception of them by the senses, then, as the perception includes an act of judgment, so Ukewise does the conception. But, in truth, the no- tion corresponding to any of these expressions, is very different from the perception of a man, a horse, a man on horseback, &c. ; and the word or phrase in a detached state does not stand for a perception or concep- tion inclusive only of an act of judgment, but signifies an inference obtained by the use of a medium, in other words, a rational conclusion. For in all cases, what gives the name and character of rational to a proceed- ing, is the use of means to gain the end in view. When we perceive intuitively of two men, that one is taller than the other, al- though the judgment we form may be an e0ect of reason, yet we do not describe it as a rational process ; but if the investigator, not being able to make a direct comparison between them, introduces a medium, and by its means infers that one is taller than the other, then we say the conclusion has been obtained by a process of reason *. So, in applying a common name to two individuals that are intuitively perceived to resemble, we may be said to exert the judgment, and nothing more ; but if we apply it to a third, and a fourth, and a fifth, it is a proof that we measure each by the common qualities ob- served in the first two, and that we carry in the mind a sign of those common qualities (whether the name, or one of the former in- dividuals) for the purpose of carrying on the process. In this way, an abstract word or phrase, let it signify what it will, provided it be but abstract, is both the sign of some ra- Reasnn is the capacity for using mpdia of any kind, and it consequent capacity for language : the term reasoning has reference to tlie act of thinking, with the aid of media in order to reach a couclu- tional conclusion the mind has already come to, and the means of reaching other conclu- sions : which statement is true even of a proper name. For the name John, for in- stance, underetood abstractedly, does not sig- nify John as we now perceive him, or as we have perceived him at any one time ; but it signifies our knowledge of him separately from any of those perceptions. But we could not know of him separately from our percep- tions, unless we had the power of setting up some sign (whether the name or aught else) of what was common to all those perceptions, and comparing them all with that sign *. • It is not meant that we could not know him every time we perceived him, but that we could not know of him separately from our perceptiong, if we bad not the power spoken of in the text. It might be curious to trace this distinction in the case of a dog. A dog knowE his master every time he perceives him : when he does not perceive him, he is reminded of his absence by some change in his sensations, (smcU, for instance, as well as sight, and perhaps some others ;) he therefore seeks him, and irets if he cannot find him. But abstracted from all perception, and It appears, then, from what precedes, that words and phrases which writers on Logic give as examples of Perception or Simple Apprehension distinct from Judg- ment and from Reasoning, are no examples at all of the first distinct i'rom the latter two ; and equally groundless will appear that dis- tinction which refers a proposition to an act of judgment separate from reasoning. Not that an act of reasoning takes place whenever a proposition or sentence is uttered. For, as we have seen in the previous chapter, (Sect. 19.) a speaker does not always think of the separate meaning of the words when he utters a sentence ; and if a sentence denotes, as a whole, some sensation or emotion not de- pendent on reason, (for instance, " My head aches;" •' My eyes are delighted,") the ut- tering of it as a whole, without attending to the sqiarate words, will no moj'e express aa from all notice by change of sensation, it will scarcely be contended that a dog knows of his master, as a ra- tionsl being knows of his absent friend. act of reasoning, or even of judgment, than would a natural ejaculation arising out of the occasion, and used in place of the sentence. But the following propositions, " Plato was a philosopher;" "No man is innocent ;" which are given in Watts's Logic as examples of the act of the mind called Judgment, stand on a different footing ; and we affirm that, being used Logically, they involve not an act of judgment merely, but express a conclusion drawn from acts of reasoning. 9- Previously to shewing what has just been asserted, let us distinguish a grammati- cal, and an historical understanding of these sentences ; for a mere grammatical under- standing of them must be, and an historical may be, essentially different from the logical understanding of them. A grammatical un- derstanding, for example, of the sentence, Plato was a philosopher, is merely a recog- nition of its correctness as a form of speech without considering whether it conveys any meaning or not ; and it would be grammatically understood if any words whatever were substituted for those that compose the sen- tence, provided they had a proper syntactical agreement. An historical understanding im- plies some concern with the meaning of the sentence ; but this may be very different in kind and degree, as depending on the know- ledge whicli the mind is previously possessed of. If the hearer did not know what Plato waa previously to the communication, but knew the meaning of the word philosopher, he would, by the sentence, be informed what he was, If he previously knew, from history, how Plato lived, thought, and acted, but did not know the meaning of the term philosopher, the ad- ditional information conveyed to him by the sentence, would be but little : he would be in- formed. Indeed, that he was called a philoso- pher, but why or wherefore, he could, for the present, only guess. Let us suppose, however, that before he comes to calculate why Plato is called a philosopher, he had heard the word plied to others : if he bad heard Socrates m [chap. II. called a philosopher, and Confucius a philosopher, he would, on hearing Plato so called, compafe the individuals in order to ascertain some common qualities in all, of which the word might be the sign, and getting these, he would know or have a notion of the word philosopher ; though the notion would pro- bably undergo many modifications as otlier individuals, Solomon, Seneca, Locke, Rous- seau, Newton, were successively subjected to the common sign : for if the hearer fixes his notion at once, many individuals will perhaps be excluded from his class of philosophers, which other people include under that term ; and perhaps he will include many, which the usage of the term excludes. In this way, then, while our knowledge of what is included in separate words or phrases is imperfect, we may nevertheless have some understanding of the sentences we hear or read ; and this his- torical understanding suggests the reasoning process just described, by which we get a logical understanding of the separate words. But now to make a logical use of tfaem in framing a proposition. We suppose the preliminary steps, namely the knowledge included in the separate words ; we suppose it to be known, from history, how Plato lived, thought, and acted ; we suppose it to be known what is meant by philosopfier, by having heard the word applied to many indi- viduals i but we have not yet applied it to ' Plato ; in other words, we have yet to ascer- tain whether Plato belongs to the class of in- dividuals denominated philosophers. Writers on Logic talk of a comparison of ideas for this purpose, and of an intuition or judgment ; but this, to say the best of it, is an imperfect and bungled account of the matter. If, in- deed, to know how Plato lived and acted can be called an idea, it is necessary to have this idea ; it is further necessary to have a clear notion of the term philosopher, if this again can be called an idea: and it is true enough that in comparing Plato with this sign, we judge or know their agreement intuitively. But out of this intuitive judgment an infer- ence arises, and the sentence expresses that inference : a comparison has been instituted through the intervention of a medium, in order to ascertain whether Plato is to be as- signed to a certain class of individuals ; we intuitively perceive his agreement with the medium, and draw or pronounce our infer- ence accordingly, " Plato was a philoso- pher." Nor is this the splitting of a hair, but a real distinction, marked and determined by that difference in the words so often pointed out, when understood detachedly, and when understood as a sentence. The proposition, Plalu was a pJiilosopher, may be understood as a whole, without making the comparison in the mind between what Plato, and what philosopher, abstractedly signify j but this, with a full understanding of the whole sentence, can be done only after the comparison has once at least been effectually made : then indeed, when the comparison has been made, and the inference drawn, the sentence which expresses that inference, be- comes, like any single word, the sign of knowledge deposited in the mind, and, like such single term, it is fitted to be an instru- ment of new comparisons, and further con- clusions. Let us now take another proposition : A philosopher, or every philosopher," (for the meaning is the same,) " is deserving of respect." This, hke the other, is an infer- ence from a comparison which took place in the mind ; previously to which comparison, the notion or knowledge included in the word I philosopher was obtained in the manner lately described (Sect. 9.) : and the notion included in the phrase to be deserving of respect was similarly obtained, but independently of the knowledge denoted by the other expression ; that is to say, the phrase deserving of re- spect, was originally, we suppose, a sentence applied to some one thing deserving of re- spect J whence it was successively applied to other things till a class was formed in other words, till a notion (knowledge) was esta- blished in the mind of what things are de- serving of respect. Now, the present ques- tion is, whether a philosopher is deserving of respect ? To determine this, we consider what a philosopher is, (it is presupposed tliat we have this knowledge,) and we then niea- Bure our notion of a philosopher with our no- tion of what is deserving of respect, and thus £nd that a philosopher is to be admitted among the things to which we had been ac- customed to apply the designation deserving qf respect : that is to say, we come to the conclusion, that a philosopher is deserving of respect. Here, therefore, as before, there has been a reasoning process previously to the proposition, and the proposition expresses the inference from it. And the comparison having once been made in this instance as in the other, the sentence becomes, like any single term, the sign of knowledge deposited in the mind, and like such single term, is fitted to be an instrument of new compsrisons, and further conclusions. Well then, we know from reasoning these two things, that " Plato IB a philosopher," and that " a philosopher is deserving of respect." These are detached WORDS* or sentences : but the mind, in com- paring them, at once comes to the inference that Plato is deserving of respect: and the whole may be expressed in one sentence ; thus ; " Plato, who is a philosopher, is deserv- ing of respect j" where Plato-who-is-a-pJiiio- sopher, is equivalent to a noun-substantive in the construction of the whole sentence ; and, deserving-qf-respect is equivalent to another ; and thus the two, with the assistance of the verb which signifies them to be a sentence, are but one proposition. Here, as in the former cases, a comparison has been made \ij. means of the signs of deposited knowledge ^ for we knew that Plato was a phUosopher; we knew a class of things or persons deserv- ing of respect: comparing our knowledge by • See the second note (Aristotle's definition of a' vord bcuig the first) appmded to Sect. 20. Chap. I. ir. means of the sign deserving-of-respect, the in- ference follows, that " Plato, who is a philo- sopher, is deserving of respect." And the comparison having once been made in this instance as in the others, the sentence be- comes, like any single terra, the sign of know- ledge deposited in the mind, and either in this or any other equivalent form, is fitted to be an instrument of new comparisons and further conclusions. And in this manner are we able, ad infinitum, to investigate new truths by means of those already ascertained, always making use of former words or their equivalents, as the means of operation. 12. Now, so far as Logic is the art of in- vestigating truth, (and we intend to show that its office ought not to be considered of further extent,) this is the whole of its theory. We have defined it as the right use of words with a view to the investigation of truth ; and the way in which words are used for the purpose, is that which has been described : in brief, they are used by the mind in making such comparisons as it cannot make intuitively. Of two objects, or of a sensation or emotion twcie experienced, we can intuitively judge what there is in common between them;, l< suppose a third object, or a sensation, &c« thrice experienced, an intuitive judgment can still be applied only to two at a time, and wei can but know in this way what there is common to every two. But if we set up tf sign of what is common to two, we can compare with the sign a third, and a fourth, and a fifth, and judging intuitively how far it agrees with the sign, we infer its agreement in thq same proportion with the things signified, In Logic, the sign used is always presumed to be a word. Now, in our theory of Ian- guage, every word was once a sentence ; and every sentence which does not express the full communication intended, but is qualified by another sentence, or becomes a clause of a larger sentence, is precisely of the nature of any single word making part of a sentence *. • See Chap. I. Sect. 28. IM I^CMAP. 11, From the first moment, then, of converting the expression used for a particular communi. cation, into an abstract sign of the sentiment or truth which that communication conveyed, the mind came into possession of the instru- mental means for furthering its knowledge : and this means always remains the same in kind, and is always used in the same way. The word which once signified a present par- ticular perception, ceased, through the ne- cessities of language, to signify that percep- tion in particular, and came to signify, in the abstract, any perception of the same kind, or the object of any such perception. In this state, it no longer communicated what the mind felt, thought, or discovered at the moment, but was a sign of knowledge gather- ed by comparisons on the past. By u«ng this Bign, the mind was able to pursue its inves> tigations, and every new discovery was de- noted by a sentence which the sign helped to form, its general application being limited to the particular purpose by other signs. But if one WORD" ' may lose its particular pnrpose, and become an abstract sign, so may another, and be the means, in its turn, of prosecuting further truths, and entering into the com- position of new WORDS. Thus will the procesa which constitutes Logic, be aiways found one and the same in kind, having for its basis the constitution of artificial language, such as it was ascertained to be in the previous chapter. H 13. Now of this Lc^ic, the Logic, uni- H versally, of ntpotres, or woKD-dividing men, H let the characteristics be well observed, in order H to keep it clear from any other mode of using H signs for the purpose of reasoning, to which H the name of Logic is attributed. The Logic H here described, is a use of words to regista- H our knowledge as fast as we can add to it, by H new examinations, and new comparisons of I things } each new esamination, each new H sen! • The reader will bear in mind the comprehenBive sense of the term which we have in view, when it is printed in capitate. comparison, being made with the help and the advantage of our previous knowledge. The reasoning takes place in the mind in such a manner that it is not a comparison of terms, but a comparison of what we newly observe, with what we previously knew. Words indeed are used, because without signs of one kind or of another to keep before the mind the knowledge already gained, we could compare only individuals j but however words may in- tervene, it is always understood that the mind, at bottom, compares the things, A man may be informed, that, " Plato who is a phi- losopher, is deserving of respect;" that, " William who is recommended to his service, is an honest man ;" that, *• A particular tree in his garden, is a mulberry tree ;" that, " Stealing is a vice, and temperance is a virtue ;" that, " Throughout the Universe, all greater bodies attract the smaller ;" that, " A triangle described within two circles in such a manner that one of its sides is a radius of both, and the others, radii of each circle respectively, is an equilateral triangle;" a man may be informed of these and similar ^'things, and may entirely believe the inform- ation; nay, hemayjustifiably believe it J for he may know of those who give it, that their ho- nesty is such, that they would not wilfully de- ceive him ; that their intelligence and inform- ation are such, that they are not likely to say what they do not know to be true : but a man can be said to know these things of his own knowledge, and in this way to be convinced of their truth, only by a process of reasoning that musl take place within his own mind ; a process which can take place only in a mind by nature competent to it, and which requires, in every case, its proper data or facts, aided, it is true, by language, or by signs such as Ian- guage consists of, to register each inference *, • The necessity of language, as a means of in- vestigation, applies not to our last example. The mincl may investigate (though no one can demonstrate) mathematical truths, with no other aid than visible diagrams ; or even diagrams that are seen only by " the mind's eye." and so to get from one inference to another, and thus, ad infinitum^ toward truth. Be- cause the several steps, leach of which is a conclusion so far attained, cannot take place, without the instrumentality of signs to assist the mind, we consider the process an art ; and if the signs used are words, the art is pro- perly called Logic. But whatever aid the reasoner may borrow from words, the only true grounds of his knowledge are the facts about which the reasoning is employed. Without them, no comparison of the terms can force any conviction further than that the terms agree or disagree. He may be told that " Every philosopher is deserving of respect,*' and that, " Plato is a philosopher :** but if he knows not what a philosopher is, or what it is to be deserving of respect, the comparison of the terms in order to draw a conclusion from them, will be a mockery of reason : it will be reasoning indeed, but reasoning without a rational end. And suppose the knowledge to have been acquired of what a philosopher is by the application of the word to many particulars, and by a consequent classification of them in the mind, supposing the knowledge of what is deserving of respect to have been acquired in the same way, supposing the inquirer has learned from history what Plato was in his opinions and manner of life, the conclusion takes place by a com- parison of the thingSj by means indeed of words, but not by any comparison of the terms independently of the things ; nor is the con- viction in the least fortified, or the process ex- plained, bya demonstration that in reasoning with the terms alone, independently of their meaning, we get at the conclusion ; by shewing, for instance, that the terms which include the facts, may be forced into cor- respondence with the following ^nwwfa; Every B is A : C is B : Therefore C is A. Every philosopher is— deserving of respect : Plato is— a philosopher : Therefore Plato ^is deserving of respect. This way of drawing a conclusion from a comparison of terms, is. properly speaking, to reason or argue with words ; but in the Lo- gic we have ascertained, every conclusion is required to be drawn from a comparison of the facts which the case furnishes ; and words being used only for the purpose of registering our conclusions, such Logic is properly de- fined the art of reasoning by means of words. The inquirer who seeks to know, of his own knowledge—" Whether William who is re- commended to his service, is an honest man", will gather facts of William's conduct by his own observation ; and these he will com- pare by the light of his previous notion (i. e. knowledge) of what an honest man is : but then he must have that previous notion, or he cannot make the comparison ; and the notion will have been gained by a process just like that he is pursuing : and so downwards to the original comparison of individiial tJujigs, from which all knowledge begins. So again, if an inquirer seeks to know that " a particular tree is a mulberry tree", he must first know what a mulberry tree is; and how can he know this but by a comparison of different trees? There must be some art employed to classify the individual trees, otherwisehe could never know more than the difference between every two trees. By setting up one tree, or some equivalent sign, as a word, to denote the common qualities observed in many, he comes to know what a mulberry tree is ; and looking at the particular tree in question, he sees that it has the common qualities indica- ted by the sign, and infers that it is a mul- berry tree. So likewise, if an inquirer seeks to be convinced that " SteaUng is a vice", or that "Temperance is a virtue", he must have such facts before him as will enable him to come to a clear conclusion as to what is vice, and what is virtue : and this conclusion will either include or ex- clude stealing with respect to his notion of vice, and temperance with respect to his notion of virtue, and he will consequently be convinceti or not convinced of tlie proposition in question. So, once more, if an inquirer desires to know, of his own knowledge, *' Whether, throughout the universe, all greater bodies attract the smaller", he must first observe certain facts from which the ge- neral law may be assumed hypothetical ly : he must then ascertain what, according to other notions gained from experience, would be the effect throughout the universe of the general law which he has so assumed ; and if the effects arising out of the hypothesis cor- respond with actual effects, and no other by- pothesis to account for them can be framed, he will have all the proof the subject permits, and know of his own knowledge, as far as can be known, the conclusion asserted. So, lastly, if an inquirer seeks to be convinced that "a triangle described within two circles in such a manner that one of its sides is a radius of both, and the others radii of each circle re- spectively, is an equilateral triangle", he must first form within his mind the notions of a triangle, and of a circle, the latter of which he will find can be conceived perfect in no other way than in correspondence with this definition : "a plane figure bounded by one line called- the circumference ; and is such that all straight lines, (called radii,) drawn from a certain point within it to the circumference, are equal to one another. " Having formed this notionr^ he will find, by certain acts of comparison^ (which must take place within the mind, al- though they may be attsisted by a* visible sign-J^ that the previous proposition is an inevitable consequence of the notfon so formed, and his' conviction: wiU be comffiete. If the convic- tion, in the previous ifrstances, has not the same force as iiti the last^ ^if, in those instances, the force may be diffident m. degree, while in the last there can be no coD^victioa short of lliat which iS' absolute an4- entire, the cause^ in not that the reasoning process^ is different in kind, but that the facts or data about which" it is' employed are dii&re»t. In the last in^ stance^ the reasoning is employed about notions, which admit uf being so defined, that every mind capable of the reasoning at once assumes them before the reasoning pro- cess begins ; but in the other instances, the facts or the notions may be attended by cause for doubt. A man, if he have any notion of a philosopher at all, cannot indeed but be quite sure (consciously sure) of his own no- tion of a philosopher j but how can he be sure that others have the same notion, or even quite sure that Plato had the qualities that conform to his own notion ? In the same way, he will be quite sure (consciously sure) of his own notion of an honest man ; but he may be deceived as to the facts which bring William within that notion. He will be quite sure (consciously sure) of the notion he has in naming a tree a mulberry tree ; but that notion may be totally unlike the notion which other people entertain ; or if the general no- tion agrees, he may mistake the characteristics in the particular instance. He will be quite sure (consciously sure) of his own notion of vice or of virtue, and whether it includes or excludes this or that conduct, action, habit, or quahtjr ; and in this case the conviction is absolute and entire while the reasoner confines himself to his own notion ; but the moment he steps out of this, and begins to inquire whether it agrees with that of others, he finds cause to doubt. He must be quite sure (sen- sibly sure) that bodies near above the earth's surface have a tendency towards it ; and by proper experiments he may convince himself that all bodies without exception which are so situated, have the same tendency. In sup-, posing the fact universal of the tendency of smaller bodies to the greater, his conviction of the consequences involved in that hypo- thesis, must, as soon as he has mentally traced them, be absolute and entire ; but he has yet to find whether reality corresponds with the hy- pothesis. The strongest proof of this will be, the correspondence of the consequences of the hypothesis with the phenomena of na- ture, joined to the impossibility of forming ON LOGIC. [chap. II. another hypothesis which shall account for these phenomena; and the doubt, if any, will attach to that impossibility, and to the accuracy of bis observatioda of the pheno* rneoa* I^ then, there is roonr for doubt, and cocise^aently for various degrees of assent, in all the instances except m that whose facts or data are notions which the mind is bound to tstke up according to the definitions before it enters on the argument, we are not to con- clude that the reasoning process is different in kind iti any of them ; since the difl^ence in the facts or data about which the reasoning process i& employed, fully accounts for the ab- solute and entire conviction which takes place in one instance, and the degrees of convictioti which are liable to happen in such cases as^ the others. 14. But what IB a process or act of rea^ soning? Is it, abstractedly from the means' u£^d to register its conclusions, and so pro- ceed to new acts of the same kind, ^is it aa act which rules can teach, or any generalbsau- tion make clearer, or more satisfactory than it is originally ? We shall find, upon examina- tioH, that any such pretence resolves itself in- i to a mere verbal generalization, or the appli- cation of the same act to itself; and that this does in no way assist the act of reasoning, or explain, or account for, or confirm it. A man requires not to be told *' It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," in order to know that himself exists ; he requires not the previous axiom, " The whole is greater than its part, or contains its part, " in order to know that, reckoning his nose a part of his head, his head is greater than his nose, or his nose belongs to his head ; neither is the previous axiom, " Things equal to the same, are equal to one another", necessary to be enounced, before he can understand, that if he is as tall as his father, and his father as his friend, he is as tall as his friend *. Whatever neatness of arrangement a system may derive from being • Compare Lofku's Essay, Book IV. ChajHeis 7 and 12. 1headed with such verbal generalizations, it is manifest that they neither assist the reasoning nor explain it : nor must a generalization of, this kind be confounded with the enunciation of what is called a law of nature*, (the law of attraction and gravitation for instance, ) since this last is a discovery by a process of experiment and reasoning, but a verbal gene- ralization is no discovery at all ; it is merely a mode of expressing what is known by every " rational mind at the very first opportunity for exercising its powers. Or more properly speaking, the laws of reasoning, which are gratuitously expressed by what are called axioms, are nothing else than a mode of de- * See Whately's Logic, Chap. I. Sect. 4, where he attempts to evade Dugald Stewart's oh^ection to the Ariatotelian syllogism, that it is a demonstration of b demoiigtration, by comparing the Dictum de omni et de nullo to the enimciation of a law of nature. It is rather pleasant, in the first note of the Chapter referred to, to hear the doctor running riot upon Locke's con- fuinon of thought and common place declamation, be- cause the latter had the sense to sec the futility and puerility of the syllogism. SECT. 14.] ON LOGIC. 141 scribing the constitution of a rational mind.;—* they are identical with the capacity itself for reasoning: to view them in any other light is to mistake a circumlocution for the discovery of a principle. And this kind of mistake every one labours under who supposes that, by any means whatever, an act of reasoning is assisted or explained, accounted for, or con- firmed. Nothing is more certain, than that if two terijns agree with a third, they agree with each other, if one agrees and the other dis- agrees, they disagree with each other: but every other act of reasoning has a conclusion equally certain (the facts or data about which an act of reasoning is conversant being the sole cause of any doubt in the conclusion*,) and this or any other attempt at explaining or accounting for the act, will therefore only . * And note, that when people are said to draw a wrong conclusion from facts, the correct account would be, that they do not reason from them, but from some- thing which they mistake for them, through their ina- ability to understand, or their carelessness to the na- ture of, the facts given. I4!l [chap. ir. amount to the placing of one such act by the side of another; as if any one should set a pair of legs in motion by the side of another pair, and call it an explanation of the act of walking. Such would at once appear to be the character of the Aristotelian Syllogism, were it not for the complicated apparatus ac- companying it ; an apparatus of distinctions and rules rendered necessary by the nature of the terms compared. For these terms being obtained by the division of a sentence, are such that they agree or disagree with each other only in the sense they bore before the division took place. Our theory makes this plain; for it shows that words which form a sentence limit and determine each other, and thus have a different meaning from tliat which belongs to them when understood abstracted- ly. Therefore, though it may be true that " Plato is a man deserving of respect, ' does not follow that " Plato " and " A maai deserving of respect " shall agree togetiier as abstract terms : accordingly the latter term understood abstractedly, signifies any or every man desei-ving of respect, and does not agree with Plato. It must be obvious, then, that terms obtained iirthis way, can be compared with other terms similarly obtained, only un- der the safeguard of certain rules. Such rules are accordingly provided ; and tliat they may not want the appearance of scientific general- ization and simplicity, they are all referred to one common principle, the celebrated dic- tum de omni et de nullo ; whose purport is, that what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus, may be affirmed or denied of every species or individual under it ; which indeed is nothing more than a verbal generalization of such a fact as this, that what is true of every philosopher, is true of any one philosopher. All tliese pretences to the discovery of a uni- versal principle, do but leave us just where we were, a few high-sounding empty words ex- cepted; and this must ever be the case when we seek to account for that which is, by the constitution of things as far aa we can ascertain them, an ultimalefact. An act of reason- ing is the natural working of a rational mind upon the objects, whatever they may be, which are placed before it, when, having formed one judgment intuitively, it makes use of the re- sult as the medium for reaching another: and the pretence to assist or explain this operation by the introduction of such an instrument as the syllogism, is an imposition on the under- standing. 15. This will more plainly appear when we examine the real use, (if use it can be called,) of the Aristotelian art of reasoning. It may be described as the art of arguing unreason- ably, or of gaining a victory in argument without convincing the understanding. As it reasons "with words, and not merely by means of words, it fixes on expressions not on things, and is satisfied with proving a conse- quence, or exposing a non-sequitur in those, without inquiring into the actual notions of the speaker. " Do you admit " says a syllogi- zer, " that every philosopher is deserving of respect? " " I do;" says the non-syllogi- zing respondent. " And you admit, (for I have heard you call him by the name,) that Voltaire is a philosopher : you admit, there- fore, that Voltaire is deserving of respect. " Now, if the notion of the respondent is, that Voltaire is not deserving of respect, here is a victory gained over him in spite of his con- viction. Arguing from the words, and allow- ing no appeal from them when once conceded, the conclusion is decisive*. But in looking beyond the words to the things intended, we shall find that the respondent either did not mean every philosoplier, as a metaphysical, but only as a moral universal, or else (and the supposition is the more likely of the two) that in calling Voltaire a philosopher, he called • " If," says a. doughty Aristotelian doctor, " a imiyeraity is charged with cultivating only the mere elements of mathematics, and in reply a list of the hooks studied there is produced, ^should even any one of those books be not elementary," [" / day here on my biynd,''] " the charge is in fiiirncss refuted." Whately's Logic, Chap III. Sect. 18. . II. him so according to the custom of others, and not according to his own notion. In a Logic whose object is truth and not victory, the business would not therefore end here. An attempt would be made to change the notion of the respondent (supposing it to be wrong) by an appeal to things. His mind might in- deed be so choked with prejudice as to be in- capable of the truth ; but at least would the only way have been taken to remove the one and procure admission for the other. To the foregoing, let another kind of example be add- ed : " Every rational agent is accountable ; brutes are not rational agents ; therefore, they are not accountable." * " Non sequitur*^ cries the Aristotelian respondent. The other man, who reasons by means of words and not merely mth words, is certain that the internal process by which he reached the conclusion is correct ; nor is he persuaded to the contrary, or at all enlightened as to his fault, when he is told that he has been guilty of an illicit pro- ♦ From Whately's Logic, Chap. I. Sect. 3. cess of the major. He is informed, however, that his mode of reasoning finds a parallel in the following example : " Every horse is an animal ; sheep are not horses ; therefore they are not animals.'* * But this he denies ; be- <:ause he is sure that his mode of reasoning would never bring him to such a conclusion as the last. All this time, while the Aristo- telian has the triumph of having at least puzzled his uninitiated opponent, the real cause of diflference is kept out of sight, name- ly, that the one refers to that reasoning which is conducted merely with words, and not by means of words only, while the other refers to that reasoning which looks to things, inatten- tive perhaps, as in this instance, to the expres- sions. If the latter had used no other ex- pression than " Brutes are not rational agents ; therefore they are not accountable ;•" the as- sertion and the reason for it, must have been suffered to pass; but because another sen- tence is prefixed to these two, and the whole * Whately'*s Logic, Chap. I. Sect. 3. l2 F 1 of them happen to make a violated syllogism, the speaker is charged with having been guilty of that violation, when in fact he has not at- tempted to reason syllogistically at all ; i. e. to draw his conclusion from a comparison of the extremes with the middle, but from a judg- ment on the facts of the case. In a Logic which gets at its conclusions by jneans of words, and not by the artifice we have just referred to, an expression which does not reach the full facts reasoned from, (every rational agent, for instance, where it should have been said none but a rational agent,J would not be deemed an error of the rea- soning, but a defect in the expression of the reasoning. ] 6. These examples will, it is hoped, be sufficient to show the real worth of the Aris- totelian syllogism, ft is indeed, as its advo- cates assert, an admirable instrument of ar- gumentation ; but of argumentation distinct from the fair exercise of reason. It is a pro- per appendage to the doctrine of ReaUsm, SECT. 16.]] 149 and with that exploded doctrine it should long ago have been suffered to sink. While ge- nera and species were deemed real independ- ent essences, to argue from words was con- sistently supposed to be arguing from things : but now that words are allowed to be only counters in the hands of wise men, the Logic of Aristotle, which takes them for money, should surely be esteemed the Logic of fools". The claim for its conclusions of demonstrative certainty, rests solely on the condition that words are so taken. Every conclusion from an act of reasoning, would have that charac- ter, if the notions about which it was employ- ed were notions universally fixed and agreed upon. In mathematics, this circumstance is the sole ground of the peculiar certainty at- tained. All men agree in the metaphysical notion of a point, of a line, a superficies, a circle, and so forth t : if all men necessarily Words are the counters of wise men, but the money of fools, Hobbes. f According tu Stewart, mathematical agreed in the notion of who is a philosopher and who is not, of what is vice and what is virtuBj and so forth ; our conclusions on these and similar subjects, would, as in mathematics, be demonstrative : but till definitions can be framed for Ethics in which men must agree, there is little chance of erecting this branch of learning, with any praciical benefit, into a science, according to the notion insisted on with some earnestness in Locke's Essay*, lu Physics we can do more ; for men agree pretty well as to what is a mulberry tree, and what is a pear tree ; what is a beast, and what is a bird ;— by experiment they can be shewn what are the component parts of this sub- stance, what the qualities of the other j and so forth : so that here, our conclusions need definitions are mci-e hypotheses. Do they not rather describe notions of and relating to quantity, which, by the congtitution of the mind, it must reach, if, setting aside the sensible instances of a point, a line, a circle, &c., it tries to conceive them perfect ? * Book IV. Chap. III. Sect. 18,: and the same book Chap. XII. Sect. 8. not be wanting in all necessary certainty; although, as that certainty depends on the conformity between our notions, and the out* ward or sensible objects of them, it will be of a different kind from the certainty obtained in meta-Phi/sicSj and therefore not called de- monstrative. In the latter department, (Me- taphysics,) the chain of evidence has its first hold, as well as every subsequent link, in the mind, and the mind cannot therefore but be sure of the whole. 17. As we propose to limit the province of Logic to the investigation of truth, the re- marks and examples in the section preceding the last (15.), might have been spared till we come to consider Rhetoric, to which we in- tend to assign, among its other ofiices, that of proving truth. How far the form of ex- pression which corresponds to the syllogism, is calculated to be useful to a speaker or wri- ter, may at that time draw forth another ob- servation on the subject. Meanwhile we pro- pose to exclude it entirely from Logic; and in truth the common practice of manlcind out of the schools, has never admitted it as an in- strument either for the one purpose or the other. Common sense has always been op- posed to it ; and Logic is a word of bad reputa- tion, because it is supposed to mean the art of arguing for the sake of victory, and not for the sake of truth. In vain have Locke, Campbell, Reid, Stewart, and other sound thinkers, endeavoured to clear the art from its reproach by detaching the cause : the Aristo- telian Syllogism has been repeatedly over- thrown ; yet some one is ever at hand to set it on its three legs again, and argue in defence of the instrument of arguing : some per- tinacious schoolmaster may always be found Who e'en though vanquished yet will ahgue still; While words oflearncd length and thundering sound*. Amaze the gazing rustics ranged around. Videlicet, Terms middle and extreme ; premiss major and minor,- quantity and quality of propositions ; Universal affirmative ; Universal negative ; Particular affirmative ; Particular negative ; Distribution and non- distribution of terms; Undistributed middle; Illicit pro- So much (till, in the next chapter we come to a parting word ) so much for the Aris- totelian Syllogism. 18. As to the Logic which we have en- deavoured to ascertain, it is, we repeat it, the Logic which all men learn, and all men ope- rate with in gathering knowledge ; and the only inquiries which remain are, i. Whether, so far as we have gone, there is ground or ne- cessity for principles and rules in the exercise of Logic, as there is for grammar in speaking a language; and ii. Whether we ought to consider its limits as extending beyond the cBss of the major ; Illicit piocese of the Tninor ; Mood itnd figure— Barbsrs, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Cesare, CameBtres, Festino, Baroko, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton, Bokardo, Feriso, Bramantip, Camenes, BU maris, Fesapo, FrcBison ; Categoricals, Modals, Hypo- theticals. Conditionals, Constructive form. Destructive form, Oatcnsive reduction, Illatire conversion, &c. kc &c. Well may we join with Mons. Jourdain " Voila dee mots qui sont trop rebarbatifs. Cette logique ]& ne me rcvient point. Apprcnons autre chose qui soit plus joli.'* . [chap. II. bounds proposed at tlie commencement ot* this Chapter. 19. Though few persons would be dis- posed to answer the former question in the negative, yet an analogous case may induce a moment's pause in our reply. At the conclu- sion of the first note appended to Sect. 4., allusion was made to the fact, that men do not see truly by nature, but acquire, through judgment and experience, the power of know- ing by sight the tangible qualities of objects and their relative distances. Now, the in- terference of rules, supposing them possible, to assist this early discipline of the eye, would be useless perhaps raiscliievous : why are we to think differently of the discipline of the mind, as regards the use of those signs which, if our theory is true, are forced upon us at first by an inevitable necessity ? Because the art of seeing truly is necessary to the preserva- tion of the individual ; and nature takes care, therefore, that we do not teach ourselves im- pertectly or erroneously ; but the conducting of a train of reasoning with accuracy and pre- cision into remote consequences, is unne- cessary in a rude state of society j and man, who is left to improve his physical and moral condition, has the instrument of that improve- ment confided to his own care, that he may add to its powers, and form for himself rules for using it with much more precision and much more effect, than any random use of it can be attended with. Accordingly, if we look to that department of knowledge which Locke calls ipvaiK^ *, we shall find that it owes its existence to the accurate Logic by which inquirers registered all their observations and all their experiments, and by which they as- cended from individuals to classes, till each had comprehended in his scheme all he de- sired to consider. Here then begins the pro- per business of Logic as a system of instruc- tion : it ought to lay open all the various me- thods of arrangement and classification by ' Vide the lutrixluction to this Treatise. which science is acquired and enlarged ; and if something may yet be done toward im- proving these methods, it should open the way to such improvement. The Aristotelian rules for definition, which are a sound part of Logic, should be explained and illustrated ; and the nomenclatures invented by various philosophers, particularly that which is used in modern chemistry, should be detailed and investigated. SO. But if, by the application of a more accurate Logic than belongs to a random use of language, men have been able to accom- plish so much in ^uo-ik^, it does not appear that they have great cause to boast of their success in the other department, namely n-paKTiK-^. Do they act, whether as com- munities or individuals, muck better with a view to their real interests, than they did two thousand years ago ? If improvement here, as in the other department, is possible, how is it to be accomplished ? We live in an at- mosphere of passions, prejudices, opinions, which mould our thoughts, and give a cer- tain character and hue to all the objects of them ; these we do not examine, but take them as they appear to us, and our reasonings too often start from them as from first facts. As to the process itself, a process which every individual conducts within his avra mind according to the power which nature gives him, we affirm that it cannot be other than it is, and that, provided it starts from true data, it can never lead us wrong : but if that is false which at the outset we take for true, then indeed our conclusions may be perniciously, ruinously erroneous. It is ac- cordingly the business of the moralist to re- move the false hue which habit, opinion, and passion, cast over the surface of things ; and it should be the business of the politician to examine the principles on which the general affairs of the world are conducted, and open the eyes of mankind to their pernicious ten- dency, if in the whole or in part they are per- nicious. But neither the moralist nor the politician can come at the necessary truthis intvitiveljf : they must use the mediaj and the media consist in that use of words which con- stitutes Logic, as we have described it. We do not intend to say that language affords the means of reaching equal results to every person who makes the right logical use of it ; for men's minds are very different in natural capacity; and some are able to perceive truths intuitively, which others attain only by a slow process; as tall men can reach at once, what short men must mount a ladder to : but we do intend to say, that, let the natural powers of any human mind be what they will, there is no chance for it of any ex- tensive knowledge, but through the employ- ment of media to assist its natural operations ; <and, we repeat it, the media which nature suggests, and leaves for our industry to im- prove, is language *. Well then, if our im- * The reader does not understand us, if he deems it an objection to our reasoning, that many highly gifted men in point of understanding, do not provement in ntpaKrucrfj is, at this time of ^ay, less than we might expect, is it not reason- able to think that, with regard to this depart- ment, we do not quite understand the instru- mental means, and consequently do not ap- ply them with complete effect ? Surely there is some ground for such a suspicion, when we find a doctor (of some repute we presume) in one of our two great places of learning, de- claring that '^ the rules of Logic have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the premises, but merely teach us to decide (not whether the premises are fairly laid down, but) appear to have a skilful use of language. A man may be rhetorically unskilful in language without being logically so ; he may be imable to convey to others how and what he thinks ; but he may make use of media in the most skilful manner to assist his own thoughts. And if his capacity is such that he seei many truths intuitively for which others require media^ it is evident that he cannot convey those truths to them till he has searched out the means. The nature and the principle of such an operation be- longs to our next chapter on Rhetoric. fim whether the conclusion fairly follows from the premises." * We acknowledge that the Logic to which this description applies, has never been the Logic of mankind at large, however it may have been the baby-game of men in colleges ; but that the office of Logic should be described so completely opposite to what it really is, at a time when its proper office and character ought to have been long ago thoroughly understood, is not a little surprising, and may reasonably warrant the suspicion stated above. We have no doubt our reader is by this time convinced, that men who reason at all, do not want rules for drawing their conclusions fairly, if we could but get them to draw those conclusions from right premises ; and that to get at right pre- mises is every thing in Logic. For this end, it is our business to set all notions aside that have not been cautiously acquired ; and to begin the formation of new ones at the point * Whateiy'a Logic. Provinceof Reasoning, Cliap- I. Sect. 1. sf;ct. 20.] IGI where all genuine knowledge commences, the intuitive comparison of particulars or single facts ; to make use of the knowledge (notions) hence obtained as media for new comparisons or judgments; and so on ad in- Jinitum. Alas! it is but too certain, that though we draw our conclusions faiily enough, our premises, in a vast proportion of cases, are laid down most foully, because they are laid down by our ignorance, our passions, and our prejudices ; and because language itself, when its use is not guarded, is a means of deception*. • We arc somewhat backward in offering examples of general remarks, such as is this last ; because it is scarcely possible to be particular without touching on questions in religion or politics that carry with them, either way, a taint of parti zanshi p ; and we hold it to be very impertinent in a writer on Logic, to turn those general precepts for the discovery of truth which he is bound to ascertain, into a particular chan- nel in order to serve his own sect or party. What business had Watts to exempliiy so many of hU cautionary rules by the errors of Papistical doctrine, at a time when its doctrine was a subordinate and But can the assistance which lan- guage is intended to furnish, be rendered such party queBtioit, and be himself was a sectarian opposed to it ? We trust that no exception of the same kind can be taken {particularly as we give them only in a. note) to two examples we are about to submit of the remark in the text, that language itself may lie the means of deceiving us into wrong premiseB : they are by no means singular, hut Guch as may he met with every hour on almost every question. The ph rase natural state is, as we all know, a very com- mon expression, which we are much in the habit of applying to things that have not been abused or per- verted from the form or condition in which nature first placed them. Now, because the same phrase happens to be frequently applied to man in a rude state of society, we start, in many of our reasonings, with the notion, that in proportion as we have depart- ed from such a state, we have perverted and abused the purposes of nature ; when, in truth, it seems wiser to inquire, whether we have yet reached the state which nature means for creatures such as we are, and whether she is not constantly urging us on to such an unattained state. Our other example is of narrower in- terest, and belongs to politics, or rather to what is called political economy. The word price, in general loose speaking, means that which is given (be it what it may) to obtain some other thing ; but in a strict as to lead us to truth in spite of ignorance, passion, and prejudice, and in spite of the delusions of which it is itself the cause? Why not, if the guarded and careful use of it, is fitted to diminish these obstacles, and if we do not look for the ultimate effects -faster than, by the use of the means, the obstruc- tions ^ive way ? Nor are mankind inattentive to improve the means, nor are the means and mercantile Bense, it has a uniform reference, direct or indirect, to the quantity of precious metal given for commodity ; inasmuch as gold and silver are the sole universal medium of barter throughout the world, and every promise to pay has reference to a certain quan- tity of one or the other of these metals. These things premised, it must be obvious that the phrase price of gold, using price in a strict sense, is an abeurdity, and could arise only from confounding the meaning which prevails in ordinary speech with the meaning in which the merchant uses it. What, then, are we to think of an English House of Commons, which, some twenty years ago, deputed to a committee the task of in- quiring into the causes of the high price of bullion ? Might not the committee, with as much reason, have been deputed to inquire, why the foot rule was more or less than a foot ? without effect : for when we ask, whether their moral and political condition is much ad- vanced beyond what it was in the most pro- mising state of the world in past days *, we do not mean to deny what every one of common knowledge and observation is aware of, that it has advanced : all we urge is, that a sys- tematic attention to the means of investigating truth, might, peradventure, in politics and morals, as it has in physics, have been at- tended with effects more widely beneficial. Neither do we afSrm that existing works on Logic are destitute of many admirable pre- cepts for investigating truth, although we assert that the precepts are referred either * Note, that it is unfair to fix on a particular part of the world in proof of what it was in the whole. States and cities may advance themselves for a time by a partial policy which keeps others backward : but the policy will fail in the end. By a natural course of things the advanced state will merge in the mass and improve it : and thus the world will keep on advancing, although the spectator, who contemplates only the particular state, will think it is retrograding. to a false principle, or to no principle at all fitted to unite them into one body of sys- tematic instruction. The work lately referred to *, fnrnishes, for instance, many excellent precepts for avoiding errors in the use of words, and for guarding against the snares of sophistry; and if such precepts and such ex- amples as it offers, distinct from the doctrine of the syllogism, were industriously collected, and brought forward in aid of the Logic which all men learn and all men use, they would be of inestimable value. A useful system of Logic will guard our notions from error not only while we think, but while we are reasoned witht: for one chief way by which truth enters the mind, is through the * Viz, Whately's Logic. Our meaning will be understood ; but wc express it by ii distinction which is grounded on no real dif- ference. He who is reasoned with, if he understands the ai^ument, is set a thinking ; and his agreeing or disagreeing with the argument is the effect of his own thoughts, however these may be set in motion, and perhaps unreasonably influenced, by what he hears. medium of language as employed by others : and Logic should therefore arm us with all possible means for coming at truth so offered, through the various entanglements by which the medium may be accompanied. Hence, the various sophisms of speech accompanied by their appropriate names, would still occupy a place in such a Logic ; nay, for this purpose, and for this alone, would the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism deserve explanation ; namely to understand how a conclusion drawn from mere terms, may, as a conclusion from them, be perfectly true and perfectly useless, and thus to induce us to bottom all our reasoning on things. Having thus offered, on the first of the questions proposed in Sect. 18, such observations in the affirmative as we thought it required, we now proceed to the second question. That question was. Whether we ought to consider the limits of Logic as extending beyond the bounds proposed at the com- mencement of this chapter : towards answering which, we may first inquire how far other views of it extend. By the Scotch metaphy- sicians, and generally in the schools of North Britain, the word Logic seems to be so used as to imply the cultivation of the powers of the mind generally, correspondently with M'atts's definition of tlie purpose of Logic, namely, " the right use of reason." " I have always been convinced," says DugaJd Stewart*, " that it was a fundamental error of Aristotle, to confine his views to reasoning or the discursive faculty, instead of aiming at the improvement of our nature in all its parts." And he then goes on to mention the following as among the subjects that ought to be con- sidered in a just and comprehensive system of Logic. " Association of ideas ; Imagina- tion ; Imitation j the use of language as the GREAT INSTRUMENT OP THOUGHT ; and the artificial habits of judging imposed by the principles and manners in whicli we have * Fhilotiuphical Essays. Chap. 16s been educated." * Now if the threeibld di- vision of human knowledge is a just one, which, in the Introduction of this work, was his * io the same purpose, Philosophy of the Humat n the second volume of Mind, (Chap. III. Sect. S.) he speaks thu^ The following, (which mention by way of specimen,) seem to be among the most powerful of the causes of our felse judgments. The imperfections of language both as an instru- ment of thought, and as a medium of philosophical communication. 2. The difficulty in many of our most important inquiries of ascertaining the facts on which our reasonings are to proceed. 3. The partial and narrow views, which, from want of information, or some defect in our intellectual comprehension, we are apt to take of subjects which are peculiarly complicated in their details, or which are connected by numerous relations with other questions equally problematical. And lastly, (which is of all perhaps the most copious source of speculative error) the pre- judices which authority and fashion fortified by early impressions and associations, create to warp our opinions. To illustrate these and other circumstances by which the judgment is apt to be misled in the search of truth, and to point out the most effectual means of guarding against them, would form a very important article in a philosophical system of Logic," borrowed from Locke,— namely into, it., the knowledge of things tiiat are, ii., of things fitting to be rfonc, and, Hi., of the means of acquiring and improving both these branches of knowledge;— it wUl at once appear that all the subjects referred to in this enumeration of Stewart's, except the fourth, which we print in capitals, come under the denomination of physica: they are energies or tendencies of the mind derived from nature, or habits arising out of natural causes ; and they come accordingly under the division of things ex- isting in nature, which things, as they all concern the mind, it is the business of the Pliilosophy of the human mind to explortf: but the fourth of the subjects mentioned in the quotation from Stewart, viz •* the use of LANGUAGE AS THE GREAT INSTRUMENT OF THOUGHT," comes under the third of the divisions laid down by Locke, and ought cer- tainly to be distinguished from the other subjects, because it is the means of becoming acquainted with them : it is the instrument. m and they are among its objects. True, we discover, as we proceed in the use of it, and we are properly warned by those who have used it before, that its efficacy is assisted or impeded by extraneous causes, as well as by defects in the instrument itself: similar dis- coveries will be made, and similar warnings must be given, in the practice of almost every art: but these ought not to enter into the de- finition of the art, although it will be proper to bring them forward, incidentally, as we open its rules. " A method of invigorating and properly directing all the powers of the mind is indeed," says Dr, Whately, " a most magnificent object, but one which not only does not fall under the province of Logic, but cannot be accomplished by anyone science or system that can even be conceived to exist. The attempt to comprehend so wide a field is no extension of science, but a mere verbal ge- neralization, which leads only to vague and barren declamation. In every pursuit, the more precise aud definite our object, the more likely we ai'e to obtain some valuable result j if, like the Platonists, who sought after the avTodyaSov, the abstract idea of good, we pursue some specious but ill-defined scheme of universal knowledge, we shall lose the substance while grasping at a shadow, and bewilder ourselves in empty generalities." *To these just remarks, we may add our ex- pression of regret that Dugald Stewart never had opportunity to do more than speak pro- ^'^ectively of *' a just and comprehensive system of Logic ;" " to prepare the way for which, was," he says, " one of the main objects he had in view when he first entered upon his inquiries into the human mind."t Had he himself completed such a design in- stead of leaving it for others, we doubt not he would have found the necessity of circura- scribing Logic within the bounds we have proposed, in order to give it existence as an • Whately's Logic ; Introduction, t Pliilos. Essays. Prelim. Diss. Chap. II.: in the paragraph immediately following the last quotation. fjtt ON LOGIC. [chap. U. art distinct from the wide ocean of intellectual philosophy. 23. But Dr. Whateiy, who deems, with us, that every consideration of the mind con- ducted without reference to its making use of language as its instrument, lies out of the de- partment of the teacher of Logic*, com- pletely differs from us, as to the province of the art. Of the question, " whether it is by a process of reasoning that new truths are brought to light," he maintains the negative t, and consequently denies that investigation be- longs to Logic. Afler what has been ad- vanced in the former sections of this chapter, we think it quite unnecessary to combat this opinion here ; and as Dr. Whateiy concedes, that " if a system could be devised to direct • Dr. Whateiy defines Logic (Chap. II. Part I. Sect. 2.) " the art of employing language properly for the purpose of reasoning." But with him, reasoning B argumentation. t Whateiy "s Logic, Province of llcasoning, the. mind in the progress of inveBtigation ", it might be " allowed to bear the name of Lo- gic, since it would not be worth while to con- tend about a name " *; as, moreover, we propose to comprehend under Rhetoric all that belongs to the proving of truth that is, convincing others of it after we have found it ourselves ; we might be satisfied with stating that this is the distribution we choose to adopt, and there let the matter end. Be- lieving, however, that our reasons will shew this distribution to be not only useful, but al- most indispensable, we proceed to offer them. 24, And first, that, so far as we have gone, the art we have described ought to be called Logic, we think will hardly now be de- nied: for we have proved that from be-' ginning to end, it is a process of reason, that is to say, a process to reach an end by mediae and we have shown that the media are • Whalely't* Logic, Province of Jteasoiiing, Chap. II. Sect. 4. Wi words, (Xo'yoi.) If the term Logic is not pro- perly applied to such an art as this, we know not where an instance can be found of pro- priety in a name. But shall we include the of- fice of proving truth under this name, as well as that of investigating it ? We answer, no, for these two reasons : first that the things them- selves are difierent, and ought therefore to be assigned to different departments ; since it is one thing to find out a truth, and another to put a different mind in a posture for finding it out likewise : And, second, that persuasion by means of language, which is the recognized office of Rhetoric, is not so distinct from con- viction by means of language, as to admit of our saying, precisely, where one ends, and the other begins. That common situation in life. Video meUora proboque, deteriora sequor, proves indeed there are degrees of conviction which yield to persuasion, as thei'e are other degrees which no persuasion can subdue : yet perhaps we shall hereafter be able to show, that such junctures do but exhibit one set of motives outweighing anol^ier, and that the ap- plication of the term persuasion to the one set, and of conviction to the other, is in many cases arbitrary, rather than dictated by a corre- spondent difference in the things. If, then, the finding a truth, and the proving it to others, ought to be assigned to different departments of Sematology, why not, leaving the former to Logic, consider the latter as appertaining to Rhetoric, seeing that convincing is not always, and on every subject, clearly distinguishable from persuading, which latter is the acknow- ledged province of Rhetoric ? Thus will ana- ^5ii' uniformly belong to Logic, and synthesis to Rhetoric. While we use language as the medium for reaching further knowledge than the notions (knowledge) we have already gained, we shall be using it logically : when, knowing all we intend to make known, we employ it to put others in possession of the same knowledge, we shall be using it rhetorically. As learners we are, according to this distribution, to be deemed logicians }— .as teachers, rhetoricians. The two purposes are quite distinct, though they are often con- founded under the same name, reasoning ; which sometimes means investigation, and sometimes argumentation*, or a process with • 111 spite of all we have said against taking up no- tions from mere terms, (for " what's in a name ?") we confeES a strong antipathy to the word argumentatmi. It no sooner meets our eyes, than, fearing the approach of some Docteur Pancrace, we instinctively put our hands to our ears. " Voub voulez peut-etre savoir, si la substance et Vaceident sont termes synonymes on equivoques k I'egard de Tetre? Sganarelle. Point du tout. Je... Pancrace. Si la lo^ que est un art, ou une science.^ Sgan. Ce n'est pas cela. Je... Pancr. Si elle a pour objet les trois operations de I'esprit, ou la troieieme seulement ? Sgan. Non. Je... Poner. S'il y a dix categories, ou s'il n'y en a qu'une ? Sgan. Point. Je... Pancr. Si la conclusion est Vessence du sylle^sme ? Sgan. Nenni. Je... Pancr. Si fessence du bien est mise dans I'appetibilite, ou dans la convenancc? Sgan. Non. Je... Pancr. Si le bien se rcciproque avec la fin ? Sgan. He, non! Je... Pancr. Si la fin nous pent emouvoir par son etre reel, ou par son Stre intentionel ? Sgnn. Non, non, non, non, non, dc par tons lea diables, non. (Moli&re's Mariage Force.) We join in our friend Sganarelle'g a view to proof: and the confusion is promoted by the circumstance, that the two pro- cesses are often used in subservience to each other. Thus, when a writer sits down to a work of philosophical investigation, it is to be expected that the general truths he designs to prove, are already in his possession ; but he has to seek the means of proving them. Now in searching for these, it is not unlikely, that, with regard to the detail, he will frequently come to conclusions different from those he was inclined to entertain, though the final re- sult he had entertained may remain un- changed. At one moment, therefore, he is a logician, at another, a rhetorician. His reader, on the other hand, is a logician throughout : in following and weighing the arguments offer- ed, he is an investigator of the truths which deprecation, wishing to shun all argumentation, except of that quiet kind which takes place when the talkers on both sides are disposed to truth, ilot victory. If the word conveyed to us the notion of so peaceable a meeting, we should have no objection to it ; but we have confessed our prejudice. the other undertakes to prove. In this man- ner may the same composition, accordingly as it exercises the inquiring or the demon- strating mind, be considered at one time with reference to Logic, at another with reference to Rhetoric. Still must it be admitted, that to investigate and to prove are different things ; and conceiving there is sufficient ground for confining Logic to the former office, we shall conclude our chapter as we began it, by defining Logic to be the right use of WORDS with a view to the investiga- tion of truth. Non posse Oratorem esse nisi viriim bonum. AKG, CAP. I. LIB. XII. QtriN. 1N3. In the chapter just finished, it was shown that the use of language as a Logical instru- ment, entirely agrees with the theory of Gram- mar we ascertained in the first chapter, and that, on no other principles than those which arise from that theory, can Logic be pro- fitably studied. We have now to show that the use of language as a Rhetorical instrument agrees with the same theory, and that the view of the art hence obtained, lays open its true nature, and the proper basis for its rules. 2. The language of cries or ejaculations, which in the first chapter we started with, may be called the Rhetoric of nature. To this succeeds the learning of artificial lan- guage ; and the process, whether of invention or of imitation, brings into being the Logic described in the preceding chapter. For whether we invent a language, or learn a lan- guage already invented, (presuming it to be the first language we learn,) we must learn, (if we do not learn like parrots,) the things of which language is significant. All words whatever, not excepting even proper names *, express notions (knowledge) obtained from the observation and comparison of many par- ticulars ; and singly and separately, each word has reference to the particulars from which the knowledge has been gained. But it is by degrees we reach the knowledge of which each single word is fitted to be the sign. We begin by understanding those sentences, or single words understood as sentences>, that signify our most obvious affections and wants, and which, taking the place of our natural cries, retain the tone of those cries as far as the articulate sounds they are united with permit. In all cases, as a sentence expresses * Vide Chap. II. Sect. 7- ad fincm. a particular meaning in comparison with the general terms of which it is composed^ the hearer may be competent to the meaning of the sentence, who is not competent to the full meaning of the separate words. A cry, a gesture, may deprecate evil, or supplicate good ; and a sentence which takes the place of, or accompanies that cry or gesture, will, as a whole, be quickly interpreted. But the speaker and the hearer must have made con- siderable progress in the acquirement of know- ledge by means of language, before the one can put together, and the other can separate^ understand, such words as, ^^ A fellow creature implores"; "A friend entreats *\ It is by frequently hearing the same word in context with others, that a full knowledge of its meaning is at length obtained * ; but this implies that the several occasions on which it * Consult, on this subject, Chapter 4th of Du- gald Stewart's Essay " on the Tendency of some late Philological Speculations,^ being the fifkh of bis " Phi- losophical Essays^. [chap. hi. is used, are observed and comjiared; it im- plies, in short, a constant enlargement of our knowledge by the use of language as an in- strument to attain it. 3. But he who uses language as a logical, will also use it, when need requires, as a rhe- torical instrument. The Rhetoric of nature, the inarticulate cries of the mere animal, he will lay aside ; or at least he will employ them (and he will then do so instinctively) only on tliose occasions for which they are still best suited, for the expression of feelings re- quiring immediate sympathy. On all other occasions, he will use the Rhetoric by which a mind endowed with knowledge, may expect to influence minds that are similarly endowed ; and our inquiry now is, how the effect is pro- duced;— how, by means of words, (taking words to be nothing else than our theory of language has ascertained them to be,) how, by such means, we inform, convince, and persuade. 4. According to our theory, wobds are to be considered as having a double capacity ; in the first, as expressing the speaker's actual thought ; ^in the second, as being the signs of knowledge obtained by antecedent acts of judgment, and deposited in the mind ; which signs are fitted to be the means of reaching further knowledge. Now, when we use lan- guage as a rhetorical instrument, we use it, or at least pretend to use it, in order to make known our actual thought, in order that other minds should have that information, or be enlightened by that conviction, which we have reached. Could this be done by a single indivisible word could we realize the wish of the poet Could I embody and unbosom now That which is most within me ; could I wreak My thoughts upon expression, and thus throw Soul, heart, mind, passions, feelings, strong or weak. All that I would have sought, and all I seek, Bear, know, feel, and yet breathe, into One Word* Were this instantaneous communication with- Byron's Childe Harold, Canto III. Stanza 97- in our power. Rhetoric would be a natural faculty, not an art, and our inquiry into its means of operation would be idle. But getting beyond the occasions for which the Rhetoric of nature is sufficient, and for which those sentences are sufficient that serve the most ordinary purposes of life, an instan- taneous communication from mind to mind, is impossible. The information, the conviction, or the sensitive associations, which we have wrought out by the exercise of our observing and reasoning powers, can be given to another mind only by giving it the means to work out the same results for itself ; and, as a rhetorical instrument, language is, in truth, much more used to explore the minds of those who are addressed, than to represent, by an expression of correspondent unity, the thought of the speaker ; rather to put other minds into a certain posture or train of thinking, than pre- tending to convey at once what the speaker thinks. Contrary as this doctrine will ap- pe$ir to common opinion on the subject, a very little reflection will show that it must be true. For a word can communicate to another mind what is in the speaker's, only by having the same meaning in the hearer^s : but if it have the same meaning, then it signifies no more than what the hearer knows already, or what he has previously experienced. And this is plainly the case with sentences (words) in familiar use, which signify what all have at times occasion to express, which are used over and over again for their respective pur- poses, and of which, while uttering or hearing them, we do not attend to the meaning of the separate words, but only to the meaning of the whole expression *. Here, it is confessed, the communication is made at once ; but then it is a communication which the hearer is pre- pared to receive, because he has himself used the same expression for the same purpose. What is to be done when the information or the conviction is altogether strange to the mind which is to receive it ? In this case the ♦ Refer to Chap. I. Sect 19. ON RHETOKIC. QCHAP. HI. speaker will seek in vain, as in the first case, for an expression previously familiar to the hearer; and he will have to form an expres- sion. But how shall he form it? As words have the power of representing only what is known on both sides, he must form it not with signs of what is to be made known, but of what is already known. In this way, he may produce an expression whether that expression take the name of sentence, oration, treatise, poem, &c. * which, as a whole, de- notes that which his mind has been labouring to communicate the information, the con- viction, or the sensitive associations he is de- sirous that others should entertain in common with himself. The necessity of so protracted, so artful a process, must be set down to the hearer's account, not to the speaker's. The latter is (or ought to be) in previous possession of what he seeks to communicate he has been through the process, and reached the result : but that result he cannot give at once ' Compiirc Chap. I. Sect. 20. and gratuitously to others : he can but lead them to it, as he himself was led, by address- ing what they already know or feel ; and his skill in rhetoric will be the skill with which, for this purpose, he explores their minds. It will be a process of synthesis on his part, and of analysis on theirs. He will form an ex- pression out of WORDS which signify what they already know, or what they have already felt : and the separate understanding of these on their part, will enable them to understand his expression as a whole. This being the theory of Rhetoric which grows out of our theory of language, we now proceed to show that the actual practice of every speaker, and of every writer, is in accordance with it. 5. To begin with Description and Narra- tion : Is it not obvious, that, to procure in another mind the idea of things unknown, we proceed by raising the conception of those that are known ? An object of sight which the party addressed has never seen, we give an idea of by allusions made iu various ways to objects he has seen :— or if, being new as a whole, it is made up of parts not new, we give the idea of the whole by naming the parts, and their manner of union. An unknown sound, or combination of sounds, an unknown taste, smell, or feel, is suggested to another mind by a comparison, direct or indirect, with a known sound, taste, smell, &c. As to conceptions purely intellectual, it is a proof how little one mind can directly represent or open, itself to another, that, in the first in- stance, such conceptions can be made known not by words that directly stand for them, not by comparisons with things of their own nature, but only by comparisons with affec- tions and effects outwardly perceptible; as would at once be obvious in tracing to their origin all words that relate to the faculties and operations of the mind *'y although it is true * Thus afdrnvs^ amma^ +*'%»», originally signify wind or breath : ^vfiog /Mevog^ mens^ impetuosity ; in- tellect is from inter and lego, I collect from among ; perception and oonceptUm are from capio I take, a that these words at last become well under- stood names, that at once suggest their re« spective objects, without bringing up the ideas of the objects of comparison that once in- tervened. In narration we proceed by similar means. We presume the hearer to be ac- quainted with facts or events of the same kind as that which is to be made known, though not with the particular event ; for we \x%Q generalievmSy i. e. terms expressing kinds or sorts, in order to form every more par- ticular expression. If the hearer should be unacquainted with facts or events of die same kind, the communicator then has recourse to use of the verb still common in such phrases as ^^ I take in with my eye,'' and, " I take your meaning ;'' judgment is from jus dicere ; understanding suggests its own etymology ; refleadon implies a casting or throwing back again; imagination is from imago^ an image or representation; to thinks according to Home Tooke, is from thing ; " Res-^k thing (he says) gives us refyr I am thinged,'' i. e. operated upon by things. These are etymologies suggested by authori- ties universally accessible ; the curious in this depart- ment of learning would be able to add much more. circuitous comparisons. If nothing is pre- viously known to wliich the action or event can, however remotely, be compared, the attempt to make it known must be as fruitless as that of giving an idea of colours to one bom blind, or of sounds to one born deaf*. Not without reason does the angel thus speak to Adam in the Paradise Lost : High matter thou enjoin'st me, O prime of men, and hard : for how shall I relate To human sense the invisible exploits Of warring spirits ? And he proposes to overcome the difficulty in the only way in which it can be concaved possible to be over- what surmounts the reach Of human sense, I shall delineate so By likening spiritual to corporal forms, As may express them best. Far. Lost. Book 5. 1. 5G3. Still must the discourse of the Angel have been unin- telli^ble to Adam : for the latter must be supposed ignorant not only of the things to be illustrated, but of far the greater part of the illustrations. There was no keeping clear of this defect in the philosophy of die jwem, if, in a poem, we arc to look for philoso- phy. The discourse even of Adam and Eve, though Thus, then, when we make use of words in order to inform, we produce the effect by adapting them to what the hearer already knows. In using words in order to convince and persuade, we produce the effect in the same way. But to convince, it is ne- cessary to inform to acquaint the hearer either with something he did not know before, or with something he did not attend to ; and the information is called the argument * or proof. Thus the information that "Plato was a philosopher," is an argument or proof that he is deserving of respect: and the clear testimony that " a man has killed another maliciously," proves that the perpetrator is guilty of murder. But why do we account the information in the respective instances an argument or proof of the conclusion ? For Iieautifully fiimple, is tilled with alluaions to things which the least philosophy will teach us they could not be acquainted with. * The word argument is commonly used iii the sense we here assign to it ; though it is likewise often used with » more coniprelicnBivc meaning. no Other reason than this, that it is addressed to a notion (knowledge) previously acquired of what persons are deserving of respect, (in the first instance,) and of what constitutes the crime of murder, (in the second instance.) Take away this previous knowledge, and the information remains indeed, and may perhaps be clearly understood, but in neither instance can it lead the hearer to the conclusion, that is to say, it will not then be an argument for the end in view : it will communicate, perhaps, what it professes to make known, but there the matter will end. In every process, then, by which we propose to convince others of a truth, there are three things implied or expressed : i. that which we intend to prove true, and which, if stated first, is called the proposition, if last, the conclusion : ii. the in- formation by which we try to prove it, and which is accordingly called the argument or pro of; iii. the previous notion (knowledge) to which the information is addressed, and which is frequently called the datum ; being that which is presumed to be already known, and therefore conceded or given by the person reasoned with ; on account of which, and solely on this account, the information is offered in the capacity of an argument or proof. Now, here we have the parts of a syllogism, (though in reversed order, viz. the conclusion, the minor, the major,) and this may serve to show, without having recourse to the Aristotelian doctrine of the comparison of a middle with extremes, why the form of a syllogism, where necessary, must always be a forcible way of stating an argument. For first we state that which our hearer cannot but. concede j (major ;) then we state that which he did not know or attend to, in such a way that he must receive it on our testi- mony, or admit as evident as soon as it is attended toj (minor;) and these two being admitted, they are found to contain what we proposed to prove: which we then draw from them without the possibility of a rational contradiction; (conclusion.) For example; o our hearer knows by experience what persons are deserving of respect: he knows, then, that ** Every philosopher is deserving of respect.^ We then remind him of the fact which he has learned from history, that " Plato is a philosopher :'' Hence on his own knowledge we advance the undeniable conclusion, " Plato is deserving of respect'' Is this conclusion at all fortified is the process which led to it explained by shew- ing that a comparison of the terms independ- ently of the things, produces the proposition which expresses it ? Both the hearer and the speaker must have the kno'wledgevfYiicYi the first two propositions refer to, or the conclusion can- not be drawn for any rational end : and if they have the knowledge, they have the conclusion in that knowledge. In convincing the hearer, the speaker does nothing but remind him that he (the hearer) has the necessary knowledge ; and the syllogism, we admit, puts the matter home in a very forcible way : but that is all : another form of speaking will oflen do equally well : for instance, " Plato who is a philosopher is deserving of respect." Whether the truth is stated in this way, or in the for- mer way, or in any other way, the extract- ing of a middle and extremes out of the ex* pression, and demonstrating that these agree or disagree, is, we repeat it, a puerile addition to the process that has previously taken place. Again, with regard to the other example at the beginning of the section: Our hearer knows, (suppose him to be a juryman,) either of his own knowledge, or by the definition laid down by the judge, that ^^ Maliciously killing a man is murder.''^ This is the datum, or major. He receives in charge, i. e. he is informed that A. B. killed a man maliciously, which is tantamount to saying that " What A. B. did, is killing a man maliciously.*"ON RHETORIC. This information is to be the argument or minor by which the conclusion is to be esta- blished; but the juryman must be made sure of its truth, he must know it, before he can receive it in this capacity : well, he is made sure of its truth : must he then go to Aristotle, and be taught to compare the middle with the extremes, in order to pro- nounce his verdict that " What A. B. did, is murder:'' that is, he is guilty of murder? Will he be MORE satisfied with his own verdict, if he is able to do so ? Common sense pronounces, no. Let us, then, for ever have done with the Aristotelian Syllogism ; admitting, how- ever, in favour of the form of expression, that to express (i.) the datum, (ii.) the inform- ation which, because it is addressed to the da- tum, is an argument,— and (iii.) the conclusion from them in three distinct propositions, is a very forcible way of stating a truth which we have reason to believe our hearer is prepared to admit the moment it is so stated. But the syllogism thus detached from the artifice of comparing a middle with extremes, is only one among the innumerable ways of express- ing a truth, which the custom of language permits, and is no more the invention of Aristotle in particular, than any of those other forms that might be used instead of it *. 7. This brief notice of the syllogism in addition to what was advanced in the last chapter, occurs by the way : ^the point we had in hand, was, to show that in convincing others by means of words, we adapt our words to what they already know. And this must be evident from what has preceded. For we previously proved, that, in order to inform, * Our observations on the syllogism are not meant to call in question the intellectual capacity of the in- ventor. For what we conceive to be a just estimate of his merits, we refer to Dugald Stewart'^s Second Vol. of the Philos. of the Human Mind, Chap. III. Sect. 3., near the middle of the section. we adapt our words to what our hearers al- ready know ; and we have just shown that the process of convincing them, is a process in which we address some information to a pre- existing notion. Let us now see how this doctrine tallies with the terras of art which are already in recognised use ; and, as occa- sion may offer, let us inquire if there be any difference, and what, between conviction and persuasion. 8. That every argument used to influence others, is considered to derive its efficacy from some pre-existing notion, opinion, or rul- ing motive, whether permanent or transitory, in the hearer, is evident from the following and similar expressions : argumentum ad Judi- cium, by which we signify that our inform- ation is addressed to such general principles of judgment as mankind at large are guided by : argumentum ad hominem, by which we imply that we address those peculiar principles by which the individual man is actuated. Again ; argumentum ad vtrvcundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam, argumentum ad Jidem, argumcn- tum ad passiones, all imply arguments (infoim- ation) addressed to some partial motives of judgment and action ; and in all these, the conclusion arising out of the reasoning has the same validity, as far as regards the mere act of reasoning : it is the difference of the data that makes it of very different value. A conclusion from an argument addressed to principles which all men recognise, is obvious- ly a conclusion of universal force; but one which arises from an argument addressed to peculiar principles, can of course be convinc- ing only to such as admit those principles. So likewise a conclusion which arises from the reverence entertained for the author of the principles professed ; or which follows in the hearer's mind from his limited notions, and would not follow if he were better inlorra- ed ;— or which follows because of his faith, and would not follow, if he had not that iaith J— or because his passions are previously disposed, and would not follow, if they were otherwise disposed: in these and in similar cases, the argument is valid, and therefore ef- fective with respect to the minds for which it is adapted, but addressed to other and more general motives or knowledge, it may be no argument at all *. Here, then, we may perhaps see how the difference arises between conviction and persuasion ; mere persuasion is conviction as far as it goes ; but it is con- viction arising out of partial data : the person persuaded is conscious that the reasoning process itself is right, but he suspects perhaps more than suspects tliat the data which he has permitted his inclinations to lay • Hence, what is Rhetoric at one tune and to one set of auditors, may be none whatever at another time. Who has not admired tlie Rhetoric of Marc Antony, (the Hpeecb over Ciesar's body,) in Shakspeare's play of Jnhua Caesar ? But why do we admire it F Is it such Rhetoric as would persuade all people under the circumstances supposed ? No. But it is just such Rhetoiic as was fitted for the multitude under those circumstances; and we admire the dramatist who so completely suits the oration to the art of the speaker, und the minds of those whom be has to operate upon. down, are wrong: he perceives another con- clusion from other and less suspicious data, though he has not resolution enough to em- brace it : so that the case we referred to in the last chapter* as being so common in life, Video meliora proboque^ deteriora sequor, amounts to this, that we are divided between two conclusions, the one drawn from data which we know to have the sanction of uni- versal consent, the other from data supplied by private motives. Thus, when Macbeth is bunging in doubt between the suggestions of duty and ambition t, the conclusion from each source is reasonably drawn : but he is not ignorant of the different value of the respec- tive sources. He has nearly determined in favour of the conclusion drawn from duty, when his wife enters, who, by addressing con- siderations (information, arguments,) to his known sentiments of greatness and courageous f Shakspcare's Macbetb, Act I. Scene 7- daring, persuades him to murder Duncan and seize the crown. 9. So much for the terms of art by which we signify the quaUty of the arguments we use, as depending on the known motives, or information, or disposition, of the persons addressed : which terms suit our theory so well, that they seem to be invented for it. Nest, for the terms by which the arguments themselves are technically distinguished. First, we have a distinction of them into Ex- ternal and Internal. Now, according to our theory, every argument consists of some in- formation which we communicate to the per- son reasoned with : but this information may be something that he could not possibly have discovered by any consideration of the subject itself J or it may be something that he might have so discovered ; in which latter case, our information will amount to nothing more than making him aware of what he had overlooked. The former, then, will be an ex- temal argument or proof; the latter, an in- temal argument. Of the former, the evidence in a court of justice is an example ; as are al- so proofs from history and other writings, and irom the testimony of the senses. Of the lat- ter kind, are all arguments from what are call- ed the topica or loci communes : for instance, from the definition or conditions of a thing j as when certain lines are inferred to be equal to each other from their nature or conditions as being radii of the same circle : from enumeration ; as when we prove that a whole nation hates a man, by enumerating the several ranks in it, who all do so : from nota~ tion or etymology ; as when we infer that Lo- gic has reference to the use of words in reasoning, from its connexion with the Greek Xt'yw I speak, and \6yoi a word :— from genus f as when we prove that Plato is deserving of respect, by showing that he is one of a getius or kind that is deserving of respect : from species ; as when we infer the excellence of ^ virtue in general from that which we observe eo* [chap. lit. in some particular act of virtue : anil so like- wise of the same kind, namely internal, are aiguments from the other well known topics ; (not to prolong the instances, which are easily imagined ;) from cause, whether efficient, JiJial, Jbrmal, or material; from adjuncts, antecedents, consequences, contraries, opposiles, similitudeSy dissimilitudes, things greater, less, or equal: &c. The deriving of arguments from these internal topics*, is nothing more, on the part of the speaker, than turning a subject into every point of view that may suggest a some- thing relating to it, overlooked perhaps by the hearer, and which, by being brought to his notice, and addressed to his pre-existing notions, may prove, or render probable, the proposition in hand ; and according to the de- gree of force which the argument carries, it is • The reader needs not be reminded how largely this subject of topics, (or places for finding the internal or artiiicial proofs in contradiGtinction to the external or artificial,) ia treated by the ancients : for instance, by Aristotle, by Cicero, (vide the book called Topu-a,) and by Quinctilian. deemed an instrument of conviction or of persuasion. An argument from defimlion ; - (for instance from the conditions of a problem or theorem j as where lines are required to he drawn which are to be radii of the same cir- cle J ) which argument is addressed to a notion assumed among the general conditions of the I reasoning ; (for instance, that " a circle is suct]^ ] a figure that all lines, (called radii,) drawn, j from a certain point within it to the circum- ference are equal " ;) an argument so derived and so addressed, is demonstrative of the pro- position which it is brought to prove : (e. g^ that the lines are equal.) An argument froni[1 enumeration, (for instance, from a statement 1 of the several ranks that are found in a n&- ] tion,) addressed to a notion that the parta J enumerated are all the parts, (for instance^ j that the several ranks of people that hate A. j B. comprise the whole nation,) is also de- monstrative with respect to that notion ; but if the enumeration should not comprehend all the parts in the hearer's notion of the whole, or if the hearer should doubt whether his own notion is sufficiently comprehensive, no ab- solute conviction takes place. Still, the enu- meration may induce belief, and will in such case be said to persuade, though not to con- vince. The same might be shown of the ar- guments derived from all the other topics. Entire conviction would follow from any of them, if the hearer were fully satisfied both of the truth of what is offered in the way of ar- gument, and of the correctness of his own no- tion to which the argument is addressed : but greater or less degrees of doubt may accom- pany each of these, and greater or less de- grees of doubt will therefore attach to the conclusions which flow from them. We may moreover observe, that the truths a speaker has in view, do not always stand in need of demonstration : they are perhaps admitted al- ready, but it may be that they do not suffici- ently influence the hearer's sensibilities. The object of an argument will then be, to awaken those sensibilities, and with this effect its purpose wiU stop : as, for instance, when in or- der to awaken sensibility to the frail nature of man's existence, (not to demonstrate it,) the speaker draws his argument from simili- tude : Ah ! few and full of sorrows are the days Of mieerable man ! his life decays Like that fair flower that with the sun's uprise Its bud unfolds, and with the evening dies. Here, the argument is obviously meant for persuasion. There may, at the same time, be an ultimate truth in view, which the speaker designs to enforce when he has prepared the mind for receiving it; and he will then employ arguments of a different kind, and address them to notions of universal dominion. But with regard to any of the arguments which, in this brief review we have glanced at whether external or internal, whether demon- strative, or only inducing belief, whether de- signed to convince, or fitted but to per- suade, the process accords with the theory assumed: the speaker adapts words to knowledge the hearers have already attained, or to feeliugs they have already experienced, in order to conduct them to some discovery he wishes them to make, or to some unexperienc- ed train of thought conducive to such dis- covery. 10. The assumption of this as the great principle of the art, will, in the next place, enable us to clear it from certain misdirected charges to which it has always been liable. The expedients which the orator employs, the various tropes and figures of which his discourse is made up, are apt to be looked upon as means to dissemble and put a gloss upon, rather than to discover his real sentiments*. That, like all other useful * We refer more especially to the following pas- sage with which Locke concludes his Chapter ^^ on the Abuse of Words ;^ being the 10th of his 3d book. ^^ Since wit and &ncy find easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and allusion in language will hardly be ad- mitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and de-things, they ^re sometimes abused*, nobody • E/ 3f, ort /jieyaKa jSxa\J/£(£v av b xi^f^^^°^ d^Uag Tn roKzuTn ^uvifAEi tcHv Aoywv, touto re Jtoivov eo'ti Kara ^ivruv Tuv ayaOav* Arist. Rhet. I. 1. light than information and improvement, such orna- ments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative ap- plication of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats : and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may rehder them in ha- rangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided ; and where truth and knowledge are con- cerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or the person that makes use of them. What, and how various they are, will be superfluous here to notice ; the books of rhetoric which abound in the world, will instruct those who want to be informed : only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind ; since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men will deny : but to consider them by their very nature as instruments of deception, only proves that the objector utterly misconceives the relation between thought and language. These expedients are, in fact, essential parts of the original structure of language ; and however they may sometimes serve the pur- poses of falsehood, they are, on most occa- sions, indispensable to the effective communi- cation of truth. It is only by expedients that mind can unfold itself to mind;— lan- guage is made up of them ; there is no such thing as an express and direct image of thought. Let a man's mind be penetrated love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerftil instrument of error and deceit, has its esta- blished professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation : and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it, to suf- fer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.'*' with the clearest truth let him burn to com- luunicate the blessing to others ; ^yet can he, in no way, at once lay bare, nor can their minds at once receive, the truth as he is con- scious of it. He therefore makes use of ex- pedients : he conceals, perhaps, his final pur- pose ; for the mind which is to be informed, may not yet be ripe for it :— ^he has recourse to every form of comparison, (allegory, simile, metaphor*,) by which he may awaken pre- disposing associations : he changes one name for another, (metonymy,) connected with more agreeable, or more favourable associa- tions : he pretends to conceal what in fact he declares ; (apophasis ; ) to pass by what * In referring to these and other figures of speech, it is impossible not to be reminded of Butler'^s distich, that All a rhetorician'^s rules Teach nothing but to name his tools. The fact is as the satirist states it. But then it is something to a workman to have a name for his tools ; for this implies that he can find them handily. May we add to our remark, that the world is scarcely yet in truth he reveals ; (paraleipsis) he interrogates when he wants no answer ;— (ero- tesis ; ) exclaims, when to himself there can be no sudden surprise;— (ecphonesis) he corrects an expression he designedly uttered ; (epanorthosis) he exaggerates ;— (hyperbole) he gathers a number of particu- lars into one heap; (synathroesmus) he ascends step by step to his strongest position ; (climax ) he uses terms of praise in a sense quite opposite to their meaning ; (ironia) he personifies that which has no life, perhaps no sensible existence ; (prosopopoeia) he imagines he sees what is not actually present ;— (hypotyposis) he calls upon aware how much it owes to such men as Butler, Moliere, Shakspeare, Pppe ;r-^men who joined to other rich gifts of intellect, that of plain sound sense, which enabled them at once to see, in their true light, the vanities and absurdities of (misqalled) learningp But for the histo- rian of Martinus Scriblerus, his predecessors and suc- cessors, the world might still be under the dominion of a set of solemn coxcombs, whose whole merit consisted in making small matters seem big ones, and themselves to appear wiser than their neighbours. the living and the dead ; (apostrophe) all these, and many more than these, are the ar- tifices which the orator* employs ; but they are artifices which belong essentially to lan- guage ; nor are there other means, taking them in their kind and not individually, by which men can be effectually informedy or perstuidedj or convinced. Could the prophet at once have made the royal seducer of Uriah's wife fully conscious of the sin he had committed, he would not have approached him with a parable t : that parable was the means of opening his heart and understanding to the true nature of his crime ; and it is a proper instance of the principle on which all eloquence proceeds. It is true, we do not * We trust the reader scarcely needs to be remind- ed, that the word Orator isused throughout this treatise, in the comprehensive sense which includes all who wield the implements of Eloquence. In modem times, the influential orator is read not heard ; or if heard, his hearers are few in number compared with his readers. t 2 Sam. 12. now make use of parables fully drawn out ; but all metaphorical expressions, all compa- risons direct or indirect, are to the same pur- pose ; namely, that of bringing the mind of the hearer into a state or temper fitted for the apprehension of truth. Nor, (we repeat,) must it be thought that the means referred to, (excepting some instances in bad taste,) are ornaments superinduced on the plain mat- ter of language, and capable of being detached from it : they are the original texture of Ian- guage, and that from which whatever is now plain at first arose. All words are originally tropes ; that is, expressions turned (for such is the meaning of trope) from their first pur- pose, and extended to others. Thus, when a particular name is enlarged to a general one, as our theory shows to have happened with all words now general, the change in the first instance was a trope. A trope ceases how- ever to be one, when a word is fixed and re- membered only in its acquired meaning ; and in this way it is that all plain expressions have originated. In a mature language, a speaker or writer may, therefore, if he pleases, avoid figurative expressions. But the same neces- sity, the same strong feelings, which originally gave birth to language, will still produce new figures, or lead the speaker to prefer those already in use to plain expressions, if, by the former, he can touch the chords, or awaken the associations, that are linked with the truths iie seeks to establish. Our theory of language, and consequent theory of Rhetoric, will, in the next place, no longer leave us to wonder at an ef- fect, which Dr. Campbell has laboured to account for with much ingenuity; namely, that nonsense so often escapes being detect- ed both by the writer and the reader*. For according to our theory, words have a sepa- rate and a connected meaning, each of which is distinct from the other. Now, suppose a succession of words to have no connected See Philosophy of Rhetoric, Vol. II. Book II. meaning, which is as much as to say, suppose them to be nonsense ; yet, in their separate capacity, they will nevertheless stand for things that have been known and felt ; and if both the speaker and the hearer shbuld be satisfied with the vague revival of this know- ledge and of these feelings, they will neither of them seek for, and consequently will not detect the absence of an ulterior purpose. The effect which is produced by words thus used, (or rather misused,) extends no further than that produced by instrumental music, and is of the same kind. For no one will pretend that a piece of niusic expresses, or can express, independently of words, a series of ra- tional propositions ; yet it awakens some sen- timents or feelings of a suflSciently definite cha- racter to occupy the mind agreeably. Now perhaps it is not an unwarrantable libel on one half of the reading world, if we affirm, that they read poetry and other amusing composition for no further end, and with no further effect, than the pleasure of such vague Sentiments or feelings as spring from music : and to such readers it is of little moment whether the words make sense or not. Ac- cordingly, when composition like the follow- ing is put before them^ which presents striking though incongruous notions, in words gram- matically united, agreeably jingled, and having a connexion, probably, with certain sensitive associations, they are liable to read on, not only without feeling their taste shocked, but perhaps with some pleasure. Hark ! I hear the strain erratic Dimly glance from pole to pole ; Raptures sweet and dreams ecstatic, Fire my everlasting soul. Where is Cupid's crimson motion, Billowy ecstasy of wo ? Bear me straight, meandering ocean, Where the stagnant torrents flow. Blood in every vein is gushing, Vixen vengeance lulls my heart ; See, the Gorgon gang is rushing ! Never, never let us part *. * " Rejected Addresses ;^ the particular example Nor is it in (pretended) poetry alone, that the eflFect here alluded to tahes place. Bring to- gether the rabble of a political party, and place before them a favourite haranguer: it 13 not by any means necessary that he should make a speech which they understand, or even himself: he has only to string, in plausible order, the accustomed slang words of the party, and to utter them with the usual fer- vour ; the wonted huzzas will follow as a matter of course, and fill each pause that the speaker's art or necessity prescribes. And BO likewise in an assembly of a different de- scription, the piously disposed congregation above being in ridicule of Rosa Matilda's style. See also Pope's " Song by a Person of Quality." The reader whose taste is gratified by such composition as is here caricatured, stands at the other extreme from that mathematical reader, who returned Thomson's Seasons to the lender with an expression of disgust, that he had not been able to find a single thing proved from the beginning to the end of the book. The reader for whom the genuine poet writes, is equally removed from each extreme. of a conventicle : the good man whom they are accustomed to hear has but to put to- gether the words of familiar sound and evan- gelical association grace, and spirit, and new light, regeneration and sanctification, edification and glorification ; an inward call, a wrestling with Satan, experience, new birth, and the glory of the elect ; interweaving the whole with unceasing repetitions of the sa- cred name, accompanied by varied epithets of, blessed, holy, and divine : and with no further assistance than the appropriated tone and frequent upturned eye, he will throw them into a holy transport, and dismiss them, as they will declare, comforted and edified. This effect, which is apt to be attributed to hypocrisy because the ordinary notions of language suggest no cause for it, our theory explains with no heavy scandal to the parties. 12. Concerning the elements of Rhetoric ranged under the divisions of Invention and Elocution, we have now made what remarks our object required. There yet remains one division, namely, Pronunciation *; which will, however, scarcely furnish occasion for extend- ing our observations ; since our theory is not in any peculiar manner concerned with it. As we started with the Rhetoric of nature, namely, tone, looks, and gesture, so we are at * Disposition and Memory are in general adde4 to these three. " Omnis oratoris vis ac facnltas,'*^ says Cicero, ^^ in quinque partes est distributa ; ut deberet reperire primum, quid diceret; deinde in- venta non solum ordire, sed etiam momento quodam atque judicio dispensare atque componere ; tiun ea de- nique vestire, atque omare oratione ; post, memoria sepire; ad extremum, agere cum dignitate et venustate.^ De Orat. 1. 31. As to two of these divisions, we have no occasion to notice them, because there is nothing in our theory of language which requires them to be viewed in a new or peculiar light : We may take oc- casion to observe, before' concluding the note, that the modem use of the term Elocution, assigns it to sig- nify what the ancients denoted by Pronunciation or Action : and Dr. Whately sanctions this modem sense by adopting it in his Rhetoric. We have used it in the foregoing page in the ancient sense : ^^ quam Graeci f^aa-iv vocant,^ says Quinctilian, ^^ Latine dicimus Elocutionem.'*'* Ins. viii. 1. once ready to admit that these may, and ought to accompany the language of art ; that they ought not to be absent even from the recollection of him who writes, lest his style be deficient in vivacity. In union with these parts of Pronunciation, is that ele- ment of artificial oral speech called Empha- sis ; and it will be to our purpose to observe, how very inadequate are the common notions of language to account for the actual practice of emphasis, as it may be observed in English speech. The common view of words that make up a sentence, is, that they respectively correspond to ideas that make up the thought : and therefore, in a written sentence, if we would know the emphatic word, we are de- sired to consider which word expresses the most important idea*. Thus, when Dr. * To this end some teacher of elocution (elocution in the modem sense) somewhere says : ^^ If, in every assemblage of objects, some appear more worthy of no- tice than others ; if, in every assemblage of ideas, which arc pictures of those objects, the same difference Johnson was asked how we ought to pro- nounce the commandment, ** Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour/* he gave as his opinion that not should have the emphasis, because it seemed the most im- portant word to the whole sense. But Garrick influenced by no assumed theory, pronounced according to the practice of English speech, ** Thou shalt-not bear," * &c. There is in fact no other rule than custom in English speech for the accenting of words in a sentence, any more than there is for accenting syllables in a word. A peculiar or referential meaning may indeed disturb the usual accent of a prevail, it consequently must follow, that in every assemblage of words, which are pictures of these ideas, there must be some that claim the distinction called emphasis.^ All this ingenious parallel, with Aristotle^s authority to back it, we affirm to be purely visionary, and we hope the reader by this time thinks as^ we do. Yet is the passage in entire accordance with the no- tions of language that commonly nay, it should seem, universally prevail. * The story is somewhere related by BoswelL word : for instance, the common accent of the word for^ve, will be displaced if the word is pronounced referentially to a word that has a syllable in common ; as in saying to give and loj'drgive. And just so will it be in a sentence which is pronounced refer- entially to an antecedent or a subsequent sentence, either expressed or understood : which would be the case, if we pronounced tie ninth commandment in contradiction to one who had said "Thou shaltbear false witness," &C., for then we should accent it in Johnson's way, and say " Thou shalt n6t bear," &c. Now this is what is properly called emphasis, namely, some peculiar way of accenting a sentence in order to give it a referential mean- ing. A sentence pronounced to have a plain meaning has its customary accents, but no emphasis. The commonest example will be the best ; and therefore we will quote one that may be found in every book in which emphasis is treated of: "Do you ride to town to-day?" If this is pronounced without allusive meaning, ride, town, and day, are equally accented by the custom of the language, and there Is no emphasis properly so called : which, by the way, is a pronunciation of the sentence that teachers of read- ing, in their search after its possible oblique meanings, forget to tell us of. Suppose we give an emphasis to ride, then lide-to-toivn-to day will be allusive to wdlk-to-town-to-day, as we might accent the word intrinsical in the mauner marked with a reference to the word Extrinsical, although the plain accentuation is intrinsical. So again to-loTvn-lo-day is allusive to the-country-to-day, and to-town-to-ddy is al- lusive to to-town-to-m6rrow ; as the word powerless might be accented on the last syl- lable with a view to poweiiful. That the ac- tual practice of emphasis corresponds with this account, the reader may satisfy himself by observing the conversation of the well- bred, not their reading, for that is oflen conducted on mistaken principles : and we scarcely need point out how completely this practice accords with our theory of language. For with us, a sentence is a word, not more resolvabie into parts that constitute its whole meaning, than a word made up of syllables ; and as with regard to a word of the latter de- scription, the accent is determined to one syl- lable by custom, but is disturbed and placed on another syllable in making allusion to another word having syllables in common ; so with regard to a sentence (word) made up of words, the accents are likewise determined to certain words that usually bear Ihem, but these accents are disturbed and placed on other words in making allusion to a meaning which has, orwhich, if expressed, would have, words in common. And here, with this new kind of proof in favour of our theory, and with the last subject usually treated of in Rhetoric, we might stop the hand that has traced this OutHne. But there remain a few remarks that could not be introduced earlier, for which the patience of the reader is en- treated a little longer. We may take the liberty in the first place to observe, that, with regard to the materials of Sematology which have been con- sidered, our theory leaves them what they were : it pretends only to show the true basis on which they stand, and that the learned distribution of them, is not that which accords with the actual practice of mankind. Suppose then, (if we may suppose so much,) that our Grammars, our Books of Logic, and our In- stitutes of Rhetoric, are to be altered in con- formity with the views which have been opened, the changes will not affect the detail, but the general preliminary doctrine, and the subsequent arrangement. As to doctrine, the changes will mostly consist of omissions. In Grammar, if we omit the common de- finitions of the parts of speech *, and allow * God help the poor children that are set to learn these, and other of the definitions in elementary grammars, particularly English grammars; for the Latin ones are a little more sensible. That jumble of a grammar that has the name of a Lindley Mturay in the title page, after defining a verb to be ^^ a wend the tyro to learn what they are by the parsing of sentences that is, to ascend from par- ihat Bignifiea to be, to do, or to suffer," {as if no other part of speech signified to be, to do, or to suffer,) after saying what is true enough, but cannot be under- stood by a child till he has practically discovered it, that " common names stand for kinds containing many sorts, or for sorts containing many individuals under them;" with many like things, picked up from Lowth and others, equally fitted for the instruction of young minds; condescends to give a few plain di- rections for knowing the parts of speech, such as the tyro is likely to understand: but the author, as if ashamed of having been intelligible, remarks that " the observations wliich have been made to aid learners in distinguishing the parts of speech from one another, may afford them some small assistance ; but it will certainly be mucli more instructive to distinguish them by the definitions, and an accurate knowledge of their nature" Now the observations referred to, are, in fact, the only passages calculated to give a just un- derstanding of the parts of speech ; the definitions wliich the writer enhances, being founded in an es- sentially wrong notion of the nature of grammar. It is speaking to the purpose to tell the tyro that " a substantive may be distinguished by its taking an article before it, or by its making sense of itself;"^ that, " an adjective may be known by its making sense with ticulars to generals instead of descending from generals to particulars, there la nothing the wortl thing, or any particular Gubstantive ;" that, " a verb may be diBtinguishcd by its making sense with any of the personal pronoiuiB ;" that, " a preposi- tion may be known by its admitting after it a personal pronoun in the objective case ;" and so forth. These are not only plain directions for the purpose professed, but they suggest the real differences among the parts of speech; and if the compiler had condescended throughout his book (or books, for there are appen- dages) to adapt his explanations, in the same manner, to the minds of those who were to be taught, he would have avoided the errors of doctrine which he always runs into when be attempts to give, what as the author of an elementary grammar he has never any buaiiiesa to give, namely a philosophical or general principle. Moreover, in the arrangement of his materials, he seems incapable of, ot at least is inattentive to, the clearest and most necessary distinctions. Thus, (to take at random two examples from liis book of ex- ercises,) he gives the following as instances of bad grammar : " Ambition is so insatiable, that it will make any sacrifices to attain its objects. When so good a man as Socrates fell a victim to the madness of the people, truth, virtue, re- ligion, fell with him." (Ibid 116.) The former of these sentences exemplifies the Logical fault, non- in what remains that can be objected to : the declining of nouns, the conjugatiiig of verbs, scquitur, and the latter will advantageouBly receive the Rheimcal ornament polysyndeton : but to give them as instanccB of defective Grammar, b to blind the learner to the nature of the art he is studying. The grammatical works wc are referring to, seem, from the number of editions they have gone through, to be in very general iise, or we should not have deemed them worth so long a note. \Ve pass to a remark on another grammatical work of very different character and value, the Greek grammar of Matthise. This work has justly won the approbation of the learned throughout the world; but we conceive the praise belongs to its elaborate detail, and not to such principles as the following. " Every proposition, even the simplest, must contain two principal ideas, namely that of the Subject a thing or person, of which any thing is asserted in the proposition, and that of the I'redicate, that which is asserted of that person or thing." (Matth. Gr. § 293.) To state our objections to tliis passage is difficult, because we do not know how the author or translator may define a propositic»i, or what they may mean by the principal ideas in it. Perhaps they may consider no expression a proposition which does not consist of a subject and predicate. Wc deny that, from the nature of the thought, any commu* nication requires these grammatical parts, {they are A and the other business of the grammar-scliool, we deem, as it has always been deemed, in- dispensable. In Logic, if we omit ail that is taught concerning ideas independently of words ; if we omit what ia taught concerning the two operations of the mind, Perception and Judgment distinct from Reasoning, not because those operations do not take place, but because every single abstract word fully understood, (and Logic begins with words,) expresses a conclusion from a rational process as efTectually as a syllogism ; and if we further omit (and the omission is important) whatever is peculiar to Aristotelian Logic ; all that remains will, on the principles we have had before us, be essentially useful to the learner ; namely, the precepts for accurate definition ; the precepts against the assumption of un- warranted premises j the precepts for guarding against the false conclusions to which we are merely g^rammalical,) though the necessities of lan- guage in general prescribe them. See Chap. I. SecL 25. ; about the middle of the Section. liable when we reason tvith words, and not merely by means of words; the precepts for guarding against being led away by true con- clusions, when there may be conclusions like- wise true and more important from other data ; which data, with their conclusions, are, kept out of sight by the art of the speaker, or . the blindness of the inquirer*. In Rhetoric, there is less to be omitted than in the other branches ; but in this department, the general views we have opened are important, because they exhibit the art in connexion with a great and worthy end; an end which, it should seem> has not always been thought essential to it. * We mean to say, that the7na(e)'taZsof acomplete budy of ioEtructioD ia Logic already exist in Literature ; but tliey esisE not in any one system. They are more- over BO mingled with what is erroneous hi doctrine, that the good is difficult to reach, without imbibing a great many wrong notions that frustrate the practical benefit How can it be otherwise, if what we have endeavoured to prove, is true, that the principle of the Logic which all men use and all men operate witli, has never yet been cxpIaiRvd ? For as Rhetoric is an instrumental art, we are told that it ought to be considered ab- stractedly from the ends which the speaker or writer may propose in using it j and Quinctilian who insists that the Orator, (that is, of course, the consummate orator,) must be a virtuous man, lias been classed with those whom atraihevffla, and aXai^ovela have betrayed ioto a wrong estimate of the art*. As we think the good old Roman schoolmaster is not quite beside the mark in his notion on this point, we propose to inquire wliether the placing of Rhetoric on the basis we have ascertained, does not lead to the position he so stoutly maintains. Now, the immediate basis of Rhetoric is Logic ; and our remarks will therefore begin with the latter. 14. Logic as well as Rhetoric is an in- strumental art ; but if our definition is correct, it is an instrument for the discovery of truth, and it is then only perfect as an instrument when it is completely adapted to that end. • See Whately's Rhetoric. A great and worthy end is therefore essential to Logic ; and a correspondent effect will appear in those who have made a skilful use of it. But the Logic we speak of, is that which is applied to things, namely to Physicot and Practica *; that is to say, which is em- ployed to ascertain the constitution of the world in which we Uve, and of ourselves who live in it, and thence to deduce what we ought to do: but the examination of the world, and of ourselves, and of our duties, is the examination of particulars ; and our Logic has recourse to universals for no other purpose than to understand particulars the better. If there is a Logic, which, resting in universals, confers the power of talking learnedly and wisely, yet leaves a man to act the part of an Ignoramus and a fool in the commonest concerns of life, this is not the Logic we have had in view. There is indeed a learned ig- norance, aa there is an ignorance from want of learning ; there is also an ignorance from natural incapacity, and an ignorance from superinduced insanity ; by any one of wliich tbe mind may be prevented from reaching truth. Not that in any case whatever the reasoning process is wrong ; but if the reasoning proceeds on wrong or insufficient premises, which it will in any of these cases, the conclusion will of course be wrong. Some one has said that " the difference between a madman and a fool is, that the former reasons justly from false data, and the latter erro- neously from just data." This is incorrectly said : the idiot who walks into the water because he knows no better, is incapable of the just datum, and therefore cannot be said to reason from it : if he knew the datum, namely that the water would drown him, he would not walk into it ; but he does not know this, and therefore he walks into it : in doing which, he reasons, so far as his know- ledge goes, as justly as the madman, who walks into it because his disturbed fancy makes him take it for a garden. Wlien the road to truth is blocked up by either of these two causes, namely irabeciUty or insanity. Logic can do nothing ; but ignorance whether from wrong learning or from want of learning, is to be removed by the appUcation of ge- nuine Logic to P/it/ska and Praclica. Still, independently of tlie toil to be encountered, there are obstructions and delusions which are liable to turn the most ardent inquirer out of the path. There may not be natural im- becility, nor permanent insanity ; yet there may be an habitual incapacity of judgment from the influence of prejudice, and aa occasional insanity of judgment from the in- fluence of passion. But among other things we learn in Pki/sica, these facts are to be reckoned ; and the precepts which warn us of them, are among the most important of those which belong to Praclica. In the mean time, that we may be induced to persevere in the search after truth, till our real interests become so plain that we cannot but embrace them, we are not permitted to feel at ease under the mists which passion and prejudice create. The fool and the madman to whom mists are reaUties, are satisfied in their judg- ments; but it is not so with those who see dimly through the fog, and suspect there may be better paths than those they are pursuing. This suspicion, as light breaks in, may at last become conviction, strong enough to subdue even the habit or inclination by which a wrong path is made easy, and a departure from it difficult. True, indeed, such over- powering conviction may not reacii the ma- jority of mankind at present: they may be compelled, as heretofore, to wear out life in struggles between right and wrong, between inclination and duty, between future good and present solicitation : but are we forbidden to hope, for future generations, a gradual alleviation of so painful a conflict, in propor- tion as what is good and what is evil shall be made plainer to the eye of reason • P At least > * All vice is ignorance or habit. Who would not take the best way of being happy, if he knew it that may we affirm, that all learniag has, or ought to have, this consummation in view. is, knev it to conviction and his habits did not prevent him ? But he may discover the best way when hia bahitE are fixed; as a miEerable dnmkard, who drinks on to escape from utter dcepair, sees with bitter regrel the happiness of a sober life. With a common notion of learning and ignorance, an objector will demur to our statement ; but such an objectot should be told, that a man may have run the circle of the sciences aa they are commonly taught, and yet remain in ignorance of what is most important to be known. This is s truth which not only Christian teachers, but the wise among the heathen inculcate. In that admirable relic of Socratic philosophy, £;EBHT02 niNAH, there are, among the personifications, two that bear the names of naiitia and "Htuimaihla, (Learning and Counterfeit-learning,) by the latter of which is ligured all that, independently of the knowledge which makes I men permanently happy, passes under the name of I learning. Now, in that knowledge which alone ia | valuable, a man cannot be called learned, whose coik viction is not strong enough to determine his practice. The thirsty wight Tiho, in a state of profuse perspira* tion, calls for a glass of iced-water, may know there is danger in the draught : but if his knowledge is not strong enough to prevent the act, what is its value ?— at the moment, it is even worse than useless ; since Such then is the aim and scope of Lo- gic in relation to Physica and Pracika : it is may be sufficient to disquiet the luxury of the draught, though not sufficient to subdue the desire for it. When Macbeth, (for the case is not dissimilar,) resolves to gratify his ambition, he is not ignorant of the danger he runs, and the secure happiness he leaves behind him ; but he is so far ignorant as to prefer the phantom of happiness to the reality. Yet he is not so ignorant as his wife, and he reaps, in consequence, less immediate gratification. Having once held the balance, with some impartiality, between right and wrong, he is incapable, even for a moment, of being a triumphant villain. The crooked-baek Richard, (for having begun our examples with Shakspeare, we will continue with him,) is not so distracted by divided data. " Securely privileged," says Foster, " from all interference of doubt that can linger, or hiunanity that can soften, or timidity that can shrink, he advances with a grim con- centrated constancy through scene after scene of atrocity, still fiilfilling his vow to ' cut his way through with a bloody ase.' He does not waver while he pursues his object, nor relent when he seizes it." (Essays on Decision of Character, &c.) Yet both he and Macbeth's wife at length get nervous in their sleep : for so it is, that if one scruple of conscience lurk in the soul, it will produce its effect sooner or later; and tliat effect will begin when the bodily powers are the means of discovering truth in botli these departments. Now we assume, that the pro- weakest; and as body and mind have a mutual in- fluence, the former -will sicken and perpetuate the horrors of the latter, unless, as with Richard, a violent death intervene. The three wretches vc have thus far referred to, have this in common, that they do not embrace vice for its own sake, but as a means of reaching the phantom of happiness that dances before them. But there is a state of vice brought on by habit, in which a man finds a pleasure in doing evil, and is in- capable of any other pleasure. lago is our example a character which, it is to be feared, is by no means out of life. Imagine a shrewd and selfish child per- mitted from infancy to create for himself a satis- faction in the disquietude of others a little worrier of defenceless creatures— a petty tyrant indulged in his worst caprices ; imagine such a one, as he grows up, placed where his habits cannot be indulged but in secret, and where those around him are such, that he must, in his own mind, either hate them, or hate himself: imagine all this, and lago will appear too possible a character. Some critics have objected, that there is no sufficient motive for the mischief he brings on Othello, Desdemona, and Cassio. Can there be, to Aim, a stronger motive, than that they arc noble- minded, benevolent, and happy, and tacitly remind him, at every instant, that he is in all respects a per business of Rhetoric is to make truth known when found j which assumption, if ad- mitted, would at once establish our position ; for to suppose a consummate orator would, in such case, be to suppose one who is too fully possessed of truth not to be led by it himself, while acting as a guide to others. After ad- mitting the assumption, it would signify little wretch? He knows and bitterly feels, tliat each " hath a daily beauty in his life that makes him ugly-" The only pleasure which habit has given him, in lieu of those of which it has made him incapable, is, to torture the beings that wound his self-love to the quick, and to destroy the happiness he cannot partake in. Such is the power of habit. Though the means, when properly applied, of putting a human being in train to become an angel, yet added to, and encouraging the tendencies of his uninstructed nature, it will render him, prematurely, a fiend. lago is utterly depraved a being incapable of Paradise if placed in it more odious tlian Milton has been able to depict even Satan him- self; for that majestic bdng, (the hero of the poem as Drydeu truly says he is,) never appears " less than arcliangel ruined. " The " demi-devil " of the dra- matist, excels, in mental deformity, what the epic muse has been able to conceive of " the author of all evil. "to object the actual characters of those who speak and write ; for they may be pretenders in Rhetoric j or their advance in it, though real, may be very inconsiderable toward the perfection we are supposing. But it may be said that the assumption begs the question, and leaves us still to show that the office of leading men to truth is essential to Rhetoric, in contradiction to those who view it as a mere instrument equally fitted for the purposes of truth and falsehood. Now, it must be con- fessed, with regard to the means employed in Rhetoric, that they frequently seem adapted to the prejudices of men, to meet rather than to oppose their ignorance and their passions. And if there were any way of conveying truth at once into minds unfitted to receive it *, the It is a comiuoii thing to say of a person, that he vtiU not be convinced. The fact generally stands thus : we use arguments that convince ourselves, and presume they are fitted to convince him, not knowing or not observing, that all argument derives its force &om the previous knowledge in the mind to which it is addressed ; and that our hearer may have been so use of such means would be conclusive against an honest purpose in the speaker. But the instantaneous communication of truth, is, un- der most circumstances, impossible ; and there- fore we may next ask, what interest a writer or speaker can have in an ultimate purpose to deceive. The answer will be, to serve one or other of those partial purposes, of which the common business of life, whether we look into its private circles, or into the forum or senate house, furnishes hourly examples. But may we not describe all this as a conflict, in educated as to render convicUon impoBsible by iuch arguments as we offer him. Suppose, however, it be true, that our hearer mill not be convinced, thai is to say, does not wish to be convinced, because his par- ty perhaps, or his profession, or the career (be it what it may) into which he has entered, does not agree witli what is sought to be established : let us in candour consider in such a case what a vantage ground we oc- cupy, inasmuch as we see our own interest, temporal or eterual, coupled with the proposition in view ; and let us condescend, by the argumeittum ad homhiem, to give him a similar advant^e, before we expect his conviction from the argumentum ad judicium. which each is eager to show just so much truth as suits the present purpose, and to veil the rest? And will not the whole of truth be shown in this manner, as far at least as men have discovered it, although not shown at once ? Of these skirmishers that use the arms ufiensive and defensive of the art, each takes credit for a certain degree of skill j but among them all, which is thg Orator? Is it not he who soars above partial views and partial pur- poses, who unites into one comprehensive whole what others advocate in parts, who teaches men to postpone petty for greater ad- vantages, and to seek the welfare of the indi- vidual in the happiness of the kind ? If, then, the palm of eloquence is permanently his alone, who contends for it in this manner, our chain of argument will not want many links before we reach the conclusion, that to undertake the art on a valid principle, we must con- sider its purpose to be that of leading men to truth. 16. A Rhetoric growing out of the Logic of Aristotle *, which, as we have seen, is the art of reasoning mlh words, and not merely by means of words, may indeed well be sus- pected as a specious and delusive art. Aim- ing at plausibility alone, it gives the power of talking largely without requiring the know- ledge which grows up Irom experience in particulars ; and thus we have statesmen, who, if we listen to them, are capable of setting the world in order, but know not how to re- gulate their households ; we have financiers ready to accept the control of a nation's • Aristotle's own treatise on Rhetoric is a work completely to its purpose ; that is to say, fitted to make men prevailing speakers at the time in wliich he wrote, by exhibiting comprehensively the bearings of the ques- tions they would have to discuss, and the various kinds of persons they would have to influence. It is indeed remarkable how little Aristotle's other works are of a piece with his Logic ; nor is it without some show of reason that Stewart supposes he was aware of its empty pretensions, and was too wise to be deceived by it himself, though lie chose to impose it on others. Sec Vol. II. of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Chap, III. Sect. 3. wealth, that have never learaed to manage their own estates; we have lawyers, whom the simplest questions of right and wrong would be sufficient to pei-ples * ; and priests who, once a week, discourse " in good set terms " to well dressed congregations, of vir- tue and of vice, of this world and the next j but who would be incapable of oifering, from their own stores, a single argument fitted to deter a plain thinking, ignorant man from vice, or to stop the commission of a specific offence by remonstrance adapted to the case. This specious eloquence, however, like the Logic from which it springs, has almost lost its re- putation and influence: we now require from speakers and writers more substantial recom- mendations than the power of dwelling on vague generalities ; and in proportion as But perhaps, with regard to lawyers, we are requiring knowledge, which, as matters stand, would be an incumbrance to them. A special pleader may Bay, " what have I to do with simple right and wrong ? My business is to see how the letter of the law can be applied or evaded." Mfi genuine Logic enlarges the empire of truth, will the necessity appear of seeking in an en- lightened mind, and a heart kindled by active philanthropy, for the true springs of eloquence. Thus will ambition be brought to side with virtue} because there will be no way of winning distinction, but by cultivating the powers of language in subservience to that knowledge, which gives a man the de- sire and the faculty of beiug useful to others, and governing himself. To conclude ; the theory which, in this treatise, we have endeavoured to establiah is this, that we come at all our knowledge by the use of media, which media are, chiefly, words; and that, as the words procure the notions, the notions exist not antecedently to language : —that when, by these means, we have gained knowledge, and try, by similar means, to communicate it to others, we do not, while the process is going on, represent our own thoughts, but we set their minds a thinking iu a particular train ; that our own thought 13 represented by nothing short of the completely formed word, whose parts, if any or all of them are separately dwelt upon, are not parts of our thought, but signs of knowledge which we and our hearers possess in common, and which, by bringing their minds into a particular attitude, enables them to conceive our thought, when the whde WORD that expresses it, is formed: that i§ before this word is formed, there are parts by which something is Communicated not known before, yet, being communicated, it is still but a part of the means toward knowing something not yet communicated, and stiU, therefore, the principle holds good, that we are adding part to part of the whole word which is to express something not yet communicated ; which word, even though it ex- tend to an oration, a treatise, a poem, &c., is as completely indivisible with respect to the meaning conveyed by it as a whole, as is a word which consists only of a single syllable, or a single sound. If this doctrine truly de- scribes the nature of the connexion between thought and language, we claim for it the merit of a discovery, because the common theory, that is, the theory which men are presumed to act upon, and to which all pre- ceptive works are adapted, not the theory which, unawares, they really act upon, ex- hibits that connexion in a very different light. And, as a discovery, we are the more dis- posed to urge attention to it, because our soundest metaphysicians have expressed them- selves as if there 'ooas something to be dis- covered as regards the connexion we speak of, before a system of Logic could be establisiied on a just foundation. Locke says that when he first began his discourse on the Under- standing, and a good while after, he thought that no consideration of language was at all necessary to it. At the end of his second book, he discovers, however, so close a con- nexion between words and knowledge, that he is obliged to alter his first plan ; and having reached his concluding chapter, he speaks as if he still felt that he had not yet ascertained the full extent to which language is an instrument of reason. Dugald Stewart, too, from whom, in the conclusion of our first chapter, we quoted a passage which entirely agrees, so far as it goes, with the views we have opened, ' has the following remark in his last work, the third volume of the Philosophy of the Human ' Mind : " If a system of rational Logic should ever be executed by a competent hand, this ** (viz. language as an instrument of thought) '* will form the most important chapter." Our doctrine is, that this will not merely form the most important chapter, but that it wtU be the only chapter strictly belonging to Jjo^ I ^c ; and yet the theory we offer keeps deaf of the extreme which betrayed Tooke, who appears to consider reason as the result of language. We pretend, then, to have inade the discovery which Locke felt to be necessary, and the nature of which Stewart more than i conjectured j but oura is only " «?i Outline ; '* and the system of rational Logic which the Scotch metaphysician speaks of, yet remains to be "executed by a competent hand:" — we pretend but to have ascertained for it the true foundation. — Something might be add- ed on the importance which the subject de- rives from the aspect of the times : for the most careless observer cannot but remark, how the rapid communication of knowledge from mind to mind moulds and forms public opinion ; and how the opinion of the many, ac- quiring, day by day, a character and a weight that never distinguished it before, threatens to become the law to which not only individuals, but governments, and eventually the common- wealth of nations, must conform ; and hence we might be led to urge that Philosophy cannot be employed more opportunely, than in a new examination of the instrument by which so much has been, and so much more is likely to he effected. The consideration is, how- ever, too obvious not to have occurred to the reader, and we therefore close our remarks. At page 55, the assertione, that the words of a sentence, " as parts of that sentence'''', and the sentences of a discourse, " na parts of that discourse"", are not by themselves significant, would perhaps sound a little less paradoxical, if, instead of each of the phrases quo- ted, the reader were to substitute " as parts of that completed expression ". At page 88, supply the other parenthetical mark after " imderstanding" in line 4. At page 196, line 6, the question is asked, whether the juryman must go to Aristotle, and be taught to compare the middle with the extremes ? The reader will observe that the example is already farced into a form, namely that of a syllogism in barbara, which a juryman untaught by Aristotle would probably never think of giving it, the other way of speaking being by far the more obvious, viz. To kill a man maliciously is murder ; A. B. killed a man maliciously ; therefore A. B. is guilty of murder. Here, instead of the Aria- totclian names major and minor, we prefer calling the first proposition the datum, and the second, with re- ference to the datum it is addressed to, the argument ; and the truth of the argument having been proved by testimony, we atfirm that the conclusion is as evident as a conclusion can be, and that the Aristotelian formula is a needless and puerile addition to a process already complete — a proof of what is proved : — it is a use of language for the purpose of reasoning which does not identify with, but goes beyond, and childishly refines upon that use of language in which the logic of mankind at large consiets. The doctrine of the whole work may receive some light from the following way of stating it : — Man, in common with other animals, derives immediately from nature the power to express hie immediate, or, as they are commonly called, his natural wants and feelings. But he also possesses the power of inventing or learn- ing a language which nature does not teach ; and it is solely by the exertion of this power, which we call reason, that he raises himself above the level of other animals. By media such as artificial language consists of, and only by such media, he acquires the knowledge which distinguishes him from other creatures ; and each advance being but the step to another, he is a being indefinitely improveable. But if words are the means of knowledge, it is an error to describe or con- sider them in any other light ; and we accordingly deem them not as, strictly speaking, the signs of thought, but as the means by which we think, and set others a thinking. This principle being admitted, renders unnecessary Locke's doctrine of ideas ; and Sematology stands opposed to, and takes the place of, what the French call Idealogy, With respect to these addenda, should the reader ask, whether they are to be esteemed a part of our WORD, we answer in the affirmative. We imagined our woED complete. If, on further consideration, we had supposed so, we should not have added another SYLLABLE. {^uT^Qh a ffvMMiiSavuv.) G. WoedbUi Frlnlei, Angd Courl, SkJnnsi Street, Londoo. Giuseppe Capocasale. Keywords: sematologia, la sematologia di Vico, dialettica, assoc: ‘a tear’ may be a sign of sadness – or love – (‘una furtiva lagrima – ‘m’ama’) but the kind of sign that an idea or conception of the soul, or ‘rivelazione’ of the animus -- are related with are arbitrario – ad placitum -- arbitrary, not necessarily a natural causal sign or nature. The correlation between the segnans and the segnato may be ‘imitativa’ or iconic, arbitrary, arbitraria, associative, associative, etc. A sign is not essentially connected with the purpose of communication (smoke means fire, spots mean measles, a tear means love). Grice is into ‘communication,’ not sign as such – a theory of communication, not a semeiotic. Capocasale does not expand on the intricacies of the cocodrile’s tears (fake tears – or Grice’s frown), because he is not interested, but it woud just take a footnote to his comment on ‘lacrima’ being a ‘signum’ traestitiae. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Grice e Capocasale” – The Swimming-Pool Library

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GRICE E CAPOCASALE

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Wednesday, January 8, 2025

GRICE E CAPOCASALE

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